Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game

Ganguly, Chirantan and Ray, Indrajit 2012. Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game. [Discussion Paper]. Department of Economics Discussion Paper, vol. 12-03. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

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Abstract

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the  possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the  actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated -partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Unpublished
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	University of Birmingham
Last Modified:	04 Jun 2017 09:44
URI:	http://orca-mwe.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/98935

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