Communities, abandonment and ‘recognition’: the case of post-state funding community bodies

Dr Crispian Fuller
School of Geography and Planning
Cardiff University
King Edward VII Avenue
Cardiff
CF10 3WA

FullerC2@cardiff.ac.uk
ABSTRACT

Communities have increasingly been internalised as subjects with responsibilities in the delivery of urban policy and involvement in broader urban governance. A prominent example is the English New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme that ran between 2001 and 2012. Towards the end of government funding, NDCs were required to develop succession strategies that would leave a ‘legacy’ for their communities. This involved the development of social enterprise bodies that would continue to support community involvement and regeneration efforts through ownership of capital assets, acquisition of public service contracts, and partnership working with mainstream service providers. This paper examines the influence of communities on post-NDC bodies, and the relationship between these organisations and local government, which was a critical agent in the management of the previous NDC bodies. The ‘recognition’ perspective of Honneth (1995), which is concerned with the self-actualisation of actors through inter-subjective relations based on forms of recognition (e.g. respect), is deployed in the analysis of post-NDC bodies. The paper concludes that long term community representatives’ have incorporated market values as a means in which to acquire ‘respect’ from social enterprise professionals, and that there is a lack of recognition by state agents of the role of post-NDC bodies in contemporary urban governance.
INTRODUCTION

Governmentality and political economy accounts of neoliberalism emphasise the responsibilisation of community and voluntary sector bodies in urban policies (Cochrane, 2007; DeVerteuil, 2015). Such accounts have not tended to examine the transition from state-led bodies to post-state funded community-led social enterprises in any great detail, including their potential to circumvent or disrupt neoliberal tendencies (see Williams et al, 2014). New Labour’s New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme is one such programme that sought to incorporate communities into state-led urban regeneration programmes, and has involved transition to independent social enterprises.

The NDC programme ran between 2001 and 2012, involved thirty nine NDC partnerships operating in the poorest neighbourhoods in England, with a ten year life and an average budget of £50m in which to reduce deprivation. They were designed to bring communities and service providers together within a territorially defined space but forming a ‘scale’ of governmental intervention and ‘place’ of communities. NDCs involved devolved responsibility to communities by ensuring they contributed to decision-making, and levering-in additional funding from the public and private sectors (SEU, 2001). With the end of Round one NDCs in 2011 and Round two in 2012, the parent government department - Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) - asked all partnerships to develop succession strategies to ensure a ‘legacy’ from the programme, but following strict guidance in which market-based ‘social enterprise’ entities were to be created to deliver these strategies (DCLG, 2008).
Resulting post-NDC organisations are charitable trust bodies, possessing one or more subsidiary registered companies for trading purposes, producing profits that go into the charity, and can broadly be defined as ‘social enterprises’, with revenues funding community activities. Government guidance outlined the activities that could be undertaken by these bodies, primarily relating to managing community assets and delivering competitively tendered public sector service contracts (DCLG, 2008). Building upon Clarke (2005), this represents neoliberal state ‘abandonment’ to the market, and thus broader networked spatial relations, as residents are considered ‘active’ in being able to compete in the market to generate profits for community regeneration, with the state believing they have been ‘empowered’ through the possession of assets and community resources (see DCLG, 2008).

Following Newman (2014), one cannot simply encapsulate this abandonment under a universal set of neoliberal and post-crisis austerity processes which are explained through macro neoliberal tendencies that produce ‘hybrid’ local arrangement, or the responsibilisation of communities through uncontested and homogenous forms of governmentality. Rather, it is a case of critically examining the uneven, incomplete and politicised processes constituting community participation in such post-state bodies and their relations with other actors in urban governance (see Spears et al, 2009). This leads to two major issues that are the focus of this paper. First, to what extent are the community representatives of post-NDCs able to influence these bodies? Second, are post-NDC bodies able to influence broader scalar local government actors that were the accountable body for NDCs and who impact on their territorial areas through public service provision?

‘recognition’ approach in understanding community influence. The approaches of both Fraser (2000) and Honneth (1995) examine identity politics and social (in)justice in an age of capitalism. However, while Fraser (2000) advocates the interdependence of (cultural intersubjective) recognition and redistribution (unequal capitalist economic relations), Honneth (1995) concentrates on recognition, arguing that conflicts over redistribution occur through struggles over (mis)recognition based on morality and intersubjective relations.

For Honneth (1995), ‘recognition’ in society is a basis for the ontological self-realisation of actors and social justice, with agents making moral claims for recognition as they need to be ‘recognized in his dignity if he is to maintain a positive relation to himself’ (Deranty and Renault, 2007: 97). Honneth (1995; 2007) identifies three normative elements that are the basis of moral identity claims and justice, and through which social injustices are addressed by way of struggle. Firstly, recognition through love and affection which underpins self-confidence and successful social autonomisation; secondly, through respect in which rights are bestowed through legal and moral means; and, finally, recognition of the achievements of actors which brings about self-esteem. When denied, actors struggle for recognition, with society viewed as sites of social struggle as groups compete, through different forms of recognition, around the value and moral configurations underpinning social institutions, and their actual social and cultural ‘worth’ (Kompridis, 2007).

Such an approach brings a more in-depth morality-based analysis of the (spatially orientated) intersubjective construction of actors (e.g. identities) and social relations (e.g. how they are viewed by others). One can see in such thinking the role of intersubjective social relations in producing space, which is embedded within ‘relational’ concepts of multi-dimensional and interrelated spatial relations (Allen and Cochrane, 2014). Therefore, through this recognition
perspective we can problematize the role and influence of community representatives on post-NDCs and local government. More broadly, the paper argues that there needs to be greater onus on the performative deliberative practices producing (dis)agreement in urban governance, rather than simply treating the latter as a hegemonic neoliberal landscape. This requires greater sensitivity towards processes of intersubjective ‘recognition’, as well as the (spatially orientated) moral and ethical motives and argumentative critiques/justifications deployed in everyday deliberative practices by actors (see Barnett, 2013).

The focus of this study is on an analysis of 20 post-NDC bodies that agreed to be interviewed, representing 66.6% of all such organisations as of 2015 and spread across all English regions and various urban sites, and a breadth of deprivation levels (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

[FIGURE 1]

In total, 42 interviews were conducted with directors and community representative chairpersons, representing two interviews at each post-NDC, which was followed by a further round of interviews with local government Board members. Community chairpersons were interviewed because they are the ‘lead’ community representative and typically possess a long historical association with their NDCs, as well as being embedded within the micro-politics of their local communities. The paper is therefore focused on the perceptions of these individuals, but where such perceptions are triangulated with the opinions of the directors and external local government stakeholders.

(TABLE ONE)
COMMUNITY ACTORS, THE LOCAL STATE AND RECOGNITION

Community influence, social enterprises and recognition

Post-NDCs and their predecessor were conceived in an age of neoliberal tendencies, manifest in reduced national welfare programmes and greater devolved responsibility to citizens to help themselves and their communities (Fuller and Geddes, 2008; Wallace, 2010). ‘Active citizenship’ and entrepreneurship, volunteerism and mutualism with other members of the community have all come to prominence, largely as a mechanism in which to justify state retrenchment, and embedded within an understanding that citizens fulfil civic ‘duties’ in order to be entitled to ‘rights’ (Dargan, 2009; Newman, 2014). There is a presumption of homogeneity, apolitical relations, self-regulation and consensus between community members in neoliberal thinking, framing them a cohesive actor in urban governance (Herbert, 2005). They are typically viewed as place-specific within the ‘local’, which is regarded as bounded and homogenous, and is thus a spatial site where cohesive and efficient social coordination can occur, in contrast to a nation state apparatus often defined as bureaucratic and inefficient (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).

Of importance in such processes is the creation of citizen subjectivities based on participation, responsibilisation and ‘professionalization’, whereby residents are constituted as bureaucratic representatives of their communities (Bondi, 2005). This community ‘professionalization’ is at the heart of these social enterprise bodies, with their development taking place within the context of the UK Coalition government’s ‘localism’ rhetoric, in which community bodies substitute retrenching state services (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). However, they ignore, in the same way as the NDC programme did before them, the heterogeneity of communities, and
the politics characterising community bodies and their differing geographical relations (see DeFilippis, 2008).

With government providing no support to these bodies, there arises the critical issue of whether communities are able to influence the running of post-NDCs that are managed by social enterprise professionals (more broadly, see Spears et al, 2009). Relations between community representatives and social enterprise officers employed to manage post-NDCs are key to such processes. How their knowledge is valued and the extent to which there is institutional continuity in existing participatory arrangements, have been highlighted as critical factors for community influence in social enterprises (Eversole, 2011). In the case of the former, expert knowledge, stemming from broader geographical relations, still tends to be valued more than communities, which is often viewed as being place-specific (Purcell, 2006).

A critical issue found in many social enterprises is the relationship between market and social values, and such issues have the potential to significantly influence and distort the role of community representatives (Dart, 2004; Alter, 2006). For Spears et al (2009), social enterprises have to mediate and balance the tension between maintaining revenues through competition in the (spatially networked) market, and remaining committed to social objectives within the ‘place’ of communities. Pharoah et al (2004) and Pearce (2006) found that with a greater focus on income generation comes less concern with social goals, since generating revenues means engaging broader market values. For Pearce (2006), social enterprise professionals are pragmatically supportive of market values, not least because they place critical importance on revenues as an ends, rather than as a means. Such values are often in tension with conceptions of community that are based on values and recognition embedded within behaviours of civic duty, interdependence and reciprocity (Cornwall, 2008).
It is within such a context that community-led social enterprises are the deliberative arenas in which community representatives and professionals work through the ‘politics of recognition’ (Deranty and Renault, 2007). Whilst many accounts in this literature have elaborated on the complex relations between different constituents (e.g. Wallace, 2010), they tend to focus on practices of collaborative governance, rather than seeking to understand the relationship between such practices and the causal nature of human actors and their intersubjective constitution. In contrast, a critical form of recognition for Honneth (1995) is the realisation of (cultural, political and material) rights and respect through moral means, which fosters the self-respect and dignity that is personhood. Achieving self-respect takes place through the self-realisation of a competent moral subject, whereby actors inter-subjectively recognise each other through ‘their status as morally responsible’ (Honneth, 1995: 110).

Yet determination of this inter-subjective judgement is indeterminate, and has underpinned the greater ‘inclusivity [of more people] and precision [in extending subjects rights]’ (ibid) of contemporary law in defining such moral responsibility. Self-respect and dignity of actors has come to be related to their ability to claim rights. Where other actors accord rights and respect, which recognises the moral worth of these subjects, self-respect is produced. Where these are denied, it leads to feelings of disrespect and, ultimately, struggle and resistance through claims of moral worth (Honneth, 1995). Through such a perspective it is possible to examine the relationship between community representatives and social enterprise professionals in post-NDC bodies, based on forms of ‘recognition’.

**Urban governance, communities and recognition**
Since New Labour efforts have been made to give communities and social enterprises a ‘voice’ and role in urban governance arenas and service provision, both of which are ‘legacy’ tasks of post-NDCs (Haugh and Kitson, 2007; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008; DCLG, 2008). Yet urban governance remains a site of considerable inequalities between community groups and state bodies, power relations between different organisations, and with the nation state unable to fully control diverse organisations (DeVerteuil, 2015; DeFillippis et al, 2009). This is particularly evident in DeVerteuil’s (2014) argument that many accounts of urban injustice, with their focus on ‘punitive’ logics, fail to fully comprehend and elucidate the disparate aims, practices, values and identities characterising the voluntary sector (see also DeVerteuil and Wilton, 2009).

State restructuring under a regime of neoliberalism, abandonment and recent ‘austerity localism’ produces complexities in welfare provision around differing degrees, types and speeds of change (see DeVerteuil, 2003), as well as providing routes for communities to influence and resist state agendas (Williams et al, 2012). This has been notable in the accounts of subversive actors within and beyond the state through ‘interstitial politics of resistance and experimentation’ (Williams et al 2014), social enterprises as a form of resilience (Steiner and Atterton 2015), and ‘progressive localism’ (Featherstone et al 2012; Morse and Munro, 2015) under a regime of ‘spatial liberalism’ (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). Given that the basis of these accounts is the need to recognise the fractured, assembled and performed nature of communities and neoliberal governing arrangements (see Springer, 2015), then one must seek to understand how such heterogeneity is constructed through intersubjective relations, which for Honneth (1995) requires emphasis on a ‘politics of recognition’ involving the ethical and moral dimensions of action (see Williams et al, 2014).
Conceptualisation of how communities and social enterprises seek to influence state bodies through particular geographical relations is critical. For Staeheli (2013), activists have to reconfigure moral obligations and responsibility in seeking to ensure the state fulfils its obligations towards civil society. One significant element is the role of legitimacy in providing a moral and ethical basis for an organisation, agreement or action, and subsequently underpinning argumentative stances and justifications (Boltanski, 2011). Legitimacy, as part of efforts to convey ‘justice’, is important in understanding the ethical receptiveness of state actors to the aims and wishes of communities (Curtis, 2008). In the social enterprise literature the ‘legitimacy’ of an organisation, and ability to influence, is defined as conforming to sectoral institutionalised norms of behaviour (Mason et al, 2007; Walker and McCarthy, 2010). An alternative is to view legitimacy as performative and intricately related to the moral and ethical inter-subjective construction of relations between actors, and the desire for recognition (see Fraser, 2000).

For this we turn to Honneth’s (1995; 2007) emphasis on conflict in social life and the role of moral identity claims (Barnett, 2013). Honneth (1995, 2007) argues that recognition of a person’s attributes and achievements by a given community builds self-esteem, which is ‘socially defined worth of their concrete characteristics’ that is not validated in the legal system given its abstract and universal nature (121). Recognition is produced by actors achieving tasks better than others. Actors convey through semantic and discursive means the worth of their values and achievements, with the aim of bringing about greater solidarity through broader recognition of their worth (Kompridis, 2007).

But the role of politics is paramount, with Deranty and Renault (2007) arguing that Honneth (1995) provides a ‘politics of recognition’. Those actors seeking to dominate can
misrecognise as they frame actors in accordance with certain conceptions of worth (Boltanski, 2011). Where perceptions of social injustice arises they are based on the perceived misrecognition of the affected groups’ sense of self-value and worth, which is embedded within particular geographies (e.g. relational global networks encompassing community groups contesting global capitalism; see Featherstone, 2008), and thus geographical relations are intrinsic to the politics of recognition. This has been notable in studies of local state-citizen relations which demonstrate the embeddedness of geographical relations in the politics of recognition. The state constructs the identities, and geographical relations, of communities and community representatives that frames their eligibility and role in these broader participatory forums (Barnes et al, 2007; Newman et al, 2006). Citizens have often been viewed as lacking the bureaucratic skills and knowledge in which to lead and manage, often as they are framed as having knowledge that is confined to the territorialised smaller geographical spaces of neighbourhoods (Wallace, 2010). Civic values of participation in governance is thus subordinated to bureaucratic values of efficient service provision through the scalar nation state apparatus, resulting in the exclusion of communities (Sullivan et al, 2006).

The effects of misrecognition are considerable as ‘disesteem’ is produced, manifest in the reduced ability of actors and groups to act autonomously and self-realise their causal abilities (Honneth, 2007). This sense of injustice leads to struggle and contestation for recognition based on their ‘worth’, something that has been alluded to in various studies of state-citizen relations, and involving deliberative argumentation (see, for example, Barnes, 2009). Taking this forward, the deployment of a ‘recognition’-based conceptual framework will examine the ability of community-led post-NDCs (which are partly territorialised by way of community
participation and assets but work through various relational networks) to influence a broader scalar local government.

POST-NEW DEAL FOR COMMUNITIES

Post-NDCs and communities

New Deal for Communities partnerships were firmly rooted within neoliberal tendencies of utilising citizen capabilities and expertise in addressing what was considered territorialised poverty, viewed under the guise of ‘neighbourhood effects’ (MacLeavy, 2009). This was to take place through activation, empowerment and responsibilisation in programme and service design at a defined neighbourhood scale, which typically brought disparate neighbourhoods together under the rubric of a ‘community’ (Dinham, 2004). NDCs were thus sites discursively framing communities as subjects of ‘participation’ and community ‘professionalization’ (Bondi, 2005), with citizens actively enrolled as professional representatives for their communities, and taking on bureaucratic responsibilities (Dargan, 2009). These are a set of priorities and actual practices that remains important to post-NDCs, although the definition of ‘local’ is no longer centrally defined (DCLG, 2008). As registered charities, regulated by the Charities Act (2011), or Community Interest Companies (Companies Act 2004), corporate governance arrangements have to adhere to nation state legal rules and regulations. However, actual appointment to post-NDC boards is very much a devolved process and, following NDC trends, is highly problematic. Post-NDCs are governed by a board of representatives made up of a majority of community representatives elected to these positions, along with one or two local councillors, and non-resident
stakeholders that bring particular expertise such as business management but the number of representatives are small across all post-NDCs.

Overall changes to the breadth and depth of community involvement in post-NDCs has not occurred, with a continuing decline in involvement across all organisations, irrespective of geographical location (Lawless and Pearson, 2012). Only nine post-NDCs have community representatives that have been elected to resident associations (although only one post-NDC uses the Electoral Commission), who are then nominated to serve on the post-NDC board by the association’s governing committee, of which they are a member. In the other cases they are simply appointed to the board with agreement of all members, and in both routes there are no discernible spatial trends across England between north and south, or urban size, suggesting a critical role for the individual institutional contingencies of NDCs.

Post-NDC officers and board members justify these approaches by way of business efficiency and a lack resources in which to maintain previous levels of participation and accountability, and with legitimacy bestowed on these place-based residents association, although interviews suggest that post-NDCs have little knowledge or care for the democratic robustness and accountability of such bodies. In this sense the market directly intrudes on community accountability as participation is defined in terms of commercial costs and revenues, with ‘rights’ coming about through the emphasis placed on commercial profits as the dominant form of worth. One particular example is that of Bridge Renewal Trust in Haringey, North London, where posts are advertised through a community newsletter and then the board selects candidates based on an interview process, with the approach justified on the basis of business efficiency, namely around the costs of such activities.
The danger with such arrangements is that the board has the ability to select what they perceive as suitable representatives, but often strongly guided by the directors, perpetuating already biased forms of representation and rights towards particular groups. This represents a degree of continuity with NDCs as community ‘professionalization’ was severely mediated by the level of influence communities had on NDC bodies, as well as the variation of access and influence between different groups, all of which lived through differing geographical relations (Beebeejaun and Grimshaw, 2011). In the case of Newham New Deal Partnership, in East London, the Director notes that the broader representativeness of community representatives is uncertain, because they are there for possible reasons other than representing the broader community (Post-NDC Director interview). By relying upon the perceived democratic legitimacy of resident’s association or direct appointments to boards from residents living in the original NDC area, post-NDC bodies follow previous New Labour thinking in terms of defining communities as homogenous and without conflict and power relations between social groups (see Mathers et al, 2008). Yet there is a heavy reliance on community activists that have long been involved in NDCs and other local community activities in all post-NDCs, irrespective of their geographical location, some considered to be working for altruistic principles, many others in relation to their own community group interests (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview). As one local government representative notes of the ‘North Earlham, Larkman and Marlpit Development Trust’ in Norwich:

“I think you do kind of see a churn of individuals and they tend to be the same individuals from the same groups with the same interest. Even of the same demographic, you know, you can see that there are quite a few elderly females on the Board, who will be those individuals who’ve been in the community for a long, long time; but when one moves on it may be that a friend of hers may be invited on the Board from the area.” (Local government representative interview)
Certain local government representatives, spread throughout all regions, are sceptical of community participation, viewing dependence on long term community representatives as biased recognition of their importance as representatives of the community, which hinders broadening-out of community participation (anonymised Local government representative interviews). In this sense the politics of recognition is embedded within geographical relations between scalar but relationally networked local government actors, defining legitimacy in terms of local democracy; and community representatives who deem their legitimacy in terms of long term place-specific relations with residents.

The recognition by community representatives of their worth produces a ‘self-respect’ which in itself further increases self-perception of their importance to communities, and ability to perceive the wishes of the community. As one community representative at Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Company in Hull, in the north of England, notes:

“We are the ones that have been around for years, we knew how to run the NDC, how the Council thinks, and what our community wants. That makes us the ideal people to take forward the Trust…. This has been appreciated by the new manager and the community in our resident association, with no one coming forward to contest my appointment.” (Community representative interview).

Post-NDC directors and local government representatives, across all regions, typically frame community representatives as remaining influenced by the types of parochial actions witnessed in NDC bodies. One local government representative describes a situation where “residents have a very narrow viewpoint. They are just looking at ‘what do I get’? Even when we were looking at priorities for areas, it was why should they get that before we do” (anonymised local government representative). An (anonymised) post-NDC Director, in control of a large neighbourhood centre, recites incidents where:
“There are times when a decision made by the residents association is a conflict of interest with the powers of the organisation…..it was done as I say in the best interests of the community they would argue, but only their community group. I think that kind of unprofessionalism runs through communities at times. Because they’re not professional and because this issue of conflict of interest is something they just don’t often grasp.” (Post-NDC director interview)

Community representatives believe such views of unprofessionalism represent misrecognition by a local government actor situated beyond their neighbourhoods, designating them with moral ambiguity for favouring particular sections of the community. They argue that this is deployed by directors and local government board members to “restrict the say of communities in how the organisation is run”, and that it is the social enterprise professionals that lack knowledge of the circumstances and desires, and thus spatial relational networks of the diverse communities that community representatives have to represent (anonymised community representative interview). This represents enduring biased social relations as NDCs which were often dominated by officers, particularly where there was a lack of breadth and depth to community participation, and typically involved officers framing the (spatial) subjectivities of these communities and their role in the organisations (MacLeavy, 2009). In such processes there was misrecognition of the worth of these citizens, on the basis of what they are able to contribute in achieving the NDCs’ aims (Perrons and Sykes, 2003).

Many post-NDCs, across all regions and various urban sites, seek to produce a certain form of legitimacy amongst the community which involves the construction of particular networked spatial relations. As one representative from the Coventry post-NDC body (Moathouse Trust) notes:
“We’re very conscious as a Trust that we need to be seen to do things for this community, and I’m not sure the NDC ever fully grasped that, but if we don’t do things for the community people will wonder what we do, and the tendency is to think it just does stuff for itself.” (Post-NDC Director interview)

Such forms of legitimacy are based on the perception of an action- and outcome-orientated body, which officers believe the community would judge worthwhile, thus acquiring respect. This does have implications for the relationship with communities, as most post-NDCs seek to focus on outcomes, rather than a breadth of participation through in-depth consultation and involvement mechanisms. For many post-NDCs, across various urban sites, this has justified a stance towards maintaining strong representation through long term community representatives, thus demonstrating a continuity with NDC spatial relations, which accords respect towards these residents as a means in which to be action-orientated and achieve wider community legitimacy. Possibilities for broader community involvement are curtailed, and the development of recognition and self-respect is itself limited to particular individuals. As one councillor at the Greets Green Community Enterprise (GGCE), situated in Sandwell (West Midlands), notes:

“Greets Green Trust relies heavily on a few residents, meaning that many others don’t realise that they can get involved...this isn’t very empowering for them, you’re talking about people that are severely lacking in confidence.... but they won’t get any help from the new bodies.” (Local government representative interview).

Post-NDC social enterprise professionals generally find they are managing resident expectations and addressing “unrealistic aims and financial expectations” in their succession strategies, which further hinders their respect towards community representatives, and the allocation of rights in managing the organisation (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview). This typically involves territorialised commercial capital assets such as neighbourhood centres and commercial premises, common to the majority of post-NDCs, which have
struggled to attract and retain tenants in the marketplace, with only five post-NDCs making a net profit in 2014-15 (see Table 2).

TABLE 2

Many directors note that a lot of effort went into the bureaucratic “detail” of succession strategies in order to get these approved by the lead Government department (DCLG) and local government as the accountable body, but “nobody seemed to stand back from it far enough, and say, hang about, does this make sense?” in terms of the market (anonymised Post-NDC director interview). The Director of Greets Green Community Enterprises (Sandwell, West Midlands) highlights the example of a succession project involving the recycling of computers which was viable, but residents desired a project that would bring in greater funding, with external consultants suggesting the recycling of monitors and TV. For the Director this added a great deal of complexity to the project, involving costly machinery, which is “an enormous stretch for what is basically a charity”, but which was “overlooked” by relevant NDC professionals and residents that did not have the commercial skills to comprehend these challenges (Post-NDC Director interview).

The production of particular forms of self-realisation and inter-subjective (mis)recognition must be understood as constantly produced (Kompridis, 2007). In the case of post-NDC Board members, all directors take the view that citizens have to go through what is termed a ‘transition period’ (Post-NDC Director interview). Directors judge the role of community representatives in NDCs as having been to agree allocations of large amounts of money and ensure that all the budget was spent, otherwise it would be returned to central government, thereby representing the importance of bureaucratic scalar relations. This is a subjectivity that
is now incongruent with what is judged worthy by all social enterprise professionals and local government councillors when running a commercial entity, which they argue requires a “business acumen” to deliver business plans that identify and exploit market gaps (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview). As the post-NDC director of Centre West (Newcastle) argues:

“What we lack is people with business acumen, and we could probably do with some kind of professional input, like we could benefit from maybe legal acumen, marketing acumen….areas like that where we are a little bit weak.” (Post-NDC Director interview)

Yet the nation state provided no support or training for community representatives as NDCs transferred to market-based post-NDCs. For many community representatives it was a case of central government mistakenly believing this would be a natural transition, without the need for state support. In the absence of any support through this state ‘abandonment’, community representatives believe they have subsequently struggled to acquire the ‘respect’ they would desire from officers and local government stakeholders.

It is important to recognise the intricacies of this politics of recognition, whereby disrespect of social enterprise professionals by community representatives leads to counter forms of disrespect by the former. Post-NDCs typically lack financial resources in which to employ a large team of professionals, with community representatives possessing a “lack faith in the team that they’re left with in terms of skills and experience” because of their small size. This is then typically cited by many as a reason why the organisation is not generating sufficient revenues in which to reinvest in the community (anonymised community representative interviews). The response to such forms of recognition by professionals has been to frame the situation in terms of struggling to address “unrealistic” commercial aims that were approved
by communities in the succession strategies; as the director of Greets Green Community Enterprise (Sandwell, West Midlands) argues:

“The breadth of the New Deal activities created some unrealistic expectations in the population, because talking to our Chair, he admits that people just came expecting everything to be free. You keep telling them, well, the partnership’s over, those days are gone, there’s still people saying ‘why can’t you do some of what they did?’ Well, very, very limited given that we have to try and generate funds, and the [NDC] partnership had roughly £5 million a year to spend. We’re into sort of handfuls of thousands and they were into millions. So, getting a realistic expectation of what could happen is difficult.” (Post-NDC Director interview).

It is therefore the case that misrecognition by professionals is constructed through their belief that residents have insufficient understanding of a marketplace that is imbricated in relational spatial networks working within, through and beyond post-NDC localities. As with the NDC programme, this represents the continuing effort of professional officers and the nation state to construct the subjectivities of communities, ensuring they are congruent with NDC legacy priorities rather than the desires of local communities (see Mathers et al, 2008). Here we see the darker side of professionalization occurring as residents are internalised within state priorities, with misrecognition of their role distorting the original NDC programme intentions of community leadership (Wallace, 2010), and is particularly notable in the relationship between market and community values in post-NDCs.

**Market versus community values**

A critical element of the influence of communities on post-NDC bodies is the mediation of social priorities, relationally produced and constituting the ‘place’ of post-NDCs, and market values that operate through much broader spatial relational networks, and which relate to post-NDCs being run as organisations competing in the market to generate revenues. An overarching factor for many post-NDCs has been the introduction of professional social
enterprise officers, replacing regeneration-based officers that left at the end of the NDC programme, and who are generally framed as “bureaucratically orientated career civil servants” (anonymised local government representative interview). All post-NDC directors have backgrounds in working for social enterprises and frame their role in terms of, first and foremost, maintaining commercial viability and, secondly, being accountable to residents. As the director of Bridge Renewal Trust, in North London, argues:

“We are focused on running it as a business, as a social business. And making sure that it's sustainable. And I think the accountability element of it, yes we still need to make sure that we… maintain the channel of communication with residents and so forth, but we take the view that if we don't run as a business then we will not be here long.” (Post-NDC Director interview)

In general, the approach to sustainability relies upon having an income stream from various territorialised capital assets, principally relating to purchased industrial, office and shop accommodation (see Table 2). This also includes multi-function neighbourhood centres, incorporating different services (e.g. doctors’ surgeries) that were built by seven NDCs across all regions and different urban sites (see Table 2). Such capital assets have not provided large turnovers because of their considerable overheads, including building maintenance, with non-community representatives often stating that buildings such as neighbourhood centres are as much a liability as an asset (anonymised community representative interview) (see Table 2). As one community representative notes with regards a large neighbourhood/sports centre in Coventry, built by the Moathouse Trust post-NDC body:

“This building was built because the community wanted it built, and it was always considered to be something that the community should own and control, but if you look at it there’s a lot of offices in it, and there’s a sports centre, and the sports centre will never make any money, it’s a cost. So, there’s always a question whether this building was an asset or a liability.” (Community representative interview).
Yet while community representatives had a degree of influence during the NDC programme, through the construction of ‘place’ by government, there is evidence that market values, as conveyed by social enterprise professionals, now influence their attitudes and beliefs. With high operating costs, maintaining income levels have become paramount, and as noted by the chair of Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Company in Hull, this need to “cover the costs of this large building” has grown in importance. This has become particularly important as many post-NDC reserves started to diminish to cover costs during the recent recession. Across all post-NDCs we see a change in the perceptions of community representative towards the purpose of the organisation, representing the incorporation of spatially networked market values given the need to ensure a revenue stream, and the desire for forms of recognition that are expected of them by managers, and is thus congruent with community professionalisation and institutionalisation (Bondi, 2005). This is particularly evident at Greets Green Community Enterprise (Sandwell, West Midlands) where the community representatives epitomises the onus on financial stability first and foremost, and thus reconfiguration of the politics of recognition towards the broader relational spaces of markets:

“So, I’m all in favour of having some ambitious goals there, but they do have to be tempered by the realism that we can afford to do very little until we have stabilised the finances. Once that’s happened you can start putting things back and then the real question is, okay, the core cost here is as low as it’s possible to get them therefore we can say to any other partners that extra income will now go on delivery of projects and objectives people want to pick out.” (Community representative interview)

Residents generally place a higher premium on reserves, and thus the long term survival of post-NDCs, rather than spending on place-based community projects without a clear financial and commercial rationale. For example, just after succession at Moathouse Trust, the post-NDC in Coventry (West Midlands), a non-resident representative produced guidance for the establishment of a ‘committee chest’ for dispersing funds to community/voluntary groups
situated within the previous NDC boundaries. However, community board members did not endorse the fund because they believe some of the requests “would not be valid… not justified” (local government representative interview). The Board started to judge proposals in terms of the financial rewards of supporting such activities, which can be measured in quantitative terms of financial benefits, rather than more intangible benefits from community activities (Community representative interview).

The transfer from large scale NDCs to much smaller post-NDC bodies has also involved substantial organisational downsizing, most important of which has been the significant reduction in the number of full time equivalent and part time employees to 9.85, although there are significant divergences, and with some of the largest located in the northeast and Yorkshire (Table 2). Qualitative data indicates however the heavy reliance on part time employees and those funded by specific short term projects (NDC director interviews). Yet such downsizing has been uncontested and has even become a virtue to be celebrated, as one community representative notes: “it was the best thing for the Trust, because the Trust had to downsize its ambition really” (anonymised community representative interview). What we see is a reconfiguration of the attitudes of community representatives, with post-NDC directors having a critical role in such processes, and involving a “great deal of time talking openly with residents about the need to be small because the income isn’t great and the reserves are small” (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview). Frugality has thus become a moral worth for community representatives across all post-NDCs as they seek to be portrayed as morally responsible, coming about through their dialogue with directors as they seek “to do what’s best for the Trust” (anonymised community representative interview).
Post-NDCs and community influence on mainstream service providers

A key element of the intended legacy of NDCs was for post-NDCs to be able to influence service providers, operating through broader relational networks and governing scales, which impact strongly on their communities and areas (DCLG, 2008). In contrast to ‘progressive localism’, communities involved in the NDC programme lacked influence on state actors working to disparate central government aims and spatial scales (MacLeavy, 2009). Local Government, as the accountable body for NDCs and providers of administrative support, was accused of possessing knowledge of the bureaucratic scalar governing procedures in which partnerships operated, with communities lacking such knowledge and the resources to influence these arrangements (Fuller and Geddes, 2008; Mathers et al, 2008; Beatty, 2010). This conforms to broader trends in which communities have often been unequal partners in area-based initiatives and pre-established scalar participatory governance (Hastings et al, 1996; Purcell, 2006).

Such trends have continued with post-NDC bodies as the level of interest by local government has diminished considerably across all post-NDCs, leaving them to struggle with influencing the agendas of these agents. Misrecognition of the achievements and worth of NDCs has contributed to disesteem for post-NDCs and communities, including the contribution of the NDC to regenerating their areas. In contrast to the evidence presented by the National Evaluation of NDCs (DCLG, 2010), many local government representatives (across all English regions and urban sites) believe that the NDC had limited impact on their areas, with respondents highlighting the inconsistent improvements demonstrated in the Government’s ‘Indices of multiple deprivation’ index (see also Fuller and Geddes, 2008; MacLeavy, 2009; Wallace, 2015). A key practice of such misrecognition is comparison with non-NDC places.
in the same city or town, as demonstrated in the statement of the local government representative for the ‘North Earlham, Larkman and Marlpit Development Trust’ in Norwich:

“Let’s have a look…I’d put down little impact, probably, that’s what I would say, on the basis of what…? Let’s look at the hard facts…if you compare this area with any other area in Norwich, there’s no difference, but they’ve had 40 million quid spent on it, that’s the only change, so, therefore, you have to say to yourself, well, where as 40 million quid gone? And I can’t tell you, because I don’t know where it’s gone! I can’t tell!” (Local government representative interview)

The national austerity programme of budget cuts since 2010 has meant that many state agencies are preoccupied with service cuts, involving the reconfiguration and retrenchment of their relational spatial networks, rather than engaging community bodies as part of outsourcing programmes (Jones et al, 2015). As the Director of ‘Back on the Map’ (in Sunderland northeast England) states: “because all of our service-provider partners have been subjected to either cuts in resources or radical restructurings, they’ve got a lot to distract them from continuing their relationship with us”. Even in London where the four participant post-NDCs have acquired service contracts, many directors note that the outsourcing of services is being met with resistance from local government: “It's not in an officer’s interests to be giving services away and contracting out, and I’d say there is a culture of protectionism” (anonymised post-NDC Director interview).

The opportunities for acquiring contracts in this environment has not been significant, as one director notes: “We’ve tried to say to them, ‘Look, there may be different ways of working – we can work with you.’ It hasn’t quite worked yet” (anonymised post-NDC Director interview). In such situations we can see local government’s conceptions of worth embedded within a ‘civic’ value system (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006), where it considers itself the democratically accountable community leader in their areas, providing services at the same
time as guiding the strategic priorities of other state and non-state bodies through various relational networks (Fyfe, 2005). Post-NDC bodies have struggled in this landscape to be recognised as community leaders and service providers, despite the broader rhetoric towards ‘localism’, producing forms of disesteem where they have not sought to significantly challenge local government’s recognition of their role.

This is not to suggest there are no opportunities in the future. Post-NDC organisations, such as ‘West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust’ in northeast England, note that the Council is more willing to work with the third sector as they seek to outsource services. One local government representative suggests that discussions are occurring as the Council downsizes and wants to outsource “problematic services such as neighbourhood wardens” (anonymised local government representative interview). Many post-NDC bodies have experienced such discussions across various English regions and urban sites, which are considered to be characteristic of the nature of the ‘permanent austerity’ debate, with a greater role for social enterprises in public service provision as they have lower overhead costs, but where the actual contracts are not necessarily conducive to their organisational strategies, skills and resources (Coote, 2011). As one (anonymised) post-NDC director argues:

“If they think we’re going to fall over ourselves, and go, whoopee, it’s something for us to do, and we may well turn around, and say, actually, you’re not giving us a viable service. You’re trying to unload a problem, and there might well be a difference between members and officers on that, because officers know damn well what they’re doing, members may not.” (Post-NDC Director interview)

In such processes there is misrecognition taking place as social enterprises are framed, and thus ‘recognised’, in terms of monetary cost reduction, involving spatial relational networks configured around the local government political scale. This is in contrast to post-NDCs wishing to be viewed as empowering communities by seeking to influence, by way of
relational networks, public service actors operating at broader administrative scales, with the aim of addressing issues deemed relevant in these previous NDC spaces. As the director of Greets Green Community Enterprises (Sandwell, West Midlands) notes: “there is the danger that we are seen as a way of offloading their responsibilities but don’t get acknowledged as important to the community… we are just the cheap contractor” (Post-NDC director interview).

Processes of misrecognition, in which post-NDCs are judged unworthy in relation to local government conceptions of service quality and community well-being, have further compounded the perceptions of misrecognition and disesteem of professionals and community representatives at post-NDCs. We can also see this in the service contracts acquired by a few post-NDCs, spread throughout the English regions (see Table 2), which have been subject to austerity measures. These contracts have been renegotiated and reduced in size, but with local authorities keeping output targets at “very demanding levels” (Post-NDC Director interview). Local authorities seeking to benefit from these contract changes do so because they view post-NDCs as a contract delivery body, which can be subject to commercial aims (embedded within market values) around cost reduction, rather than being recognised as a community body working to benefit communities through the reinvestment of revenue surplus. As one (anonymised) London post-NDC director notes:

“If the local authority gives you a contract, they talk about negotiations but there is no such thing. What they are trying to do on this contract is, having said to me, ‘Obviously this is your money. You need to spend it as you wish’, I was then told I had to take out a lease in another building for £5,000. I said, ‘That’s more than I pay for my whole office space in my own building.’ I said, ‘I won’t do it.’ They said, ‘You will do it.’” (Post-NDC director interview)
We also see such dynamics taking place in post-NDCs that possess neighbourhood centres where there is a return, as stating by a community representative at Moathouse Trust (Coventry, West Midlands), to the “paternalistic attitudes of local government” (community representative interview). In the case of this post-NDC neighbourhood centre, the local authority, which has responsibility for the liabilities of the centre, has “reverted back to being property managers” in negotiations concerning the future of the building (community representative interview). Council officers view the neighbourhood centre in terms of monetary value, rather than as a community asset that is to be owned and run for the benefit of the community. As the community representative notes:

“We found ourselves rehearsing some of those discussions, which really you shouldn’t have to do, in the context with succession strategy, which was really all about the Council justifying what it was going to do post NDC to sustain the investment that had been made over a ten year period.” (Moathouse Trust Community representative).

Beyond these issues, the vast majority of post-NDC bodies across all regions and urban sites indicate they are no longer the main ‘nexus’ agents of community engagement between state agents and local communities constituting the previous NDC area, displacing the recognition of NDC achievements in this area (see DCLG, 2010). For instance, Centre West in Newcastle (northeast England) established an extensive set of mechanisms for engaging communities, which was formally recognised by the (national) Audit Commission as representing good practice for the City Council. The succession strategy “offered” these arrangements to the Council as part of their “holistic” regeneration efforts, but “the city ignored that advice from the Audit Commission and decided to set up its own officer-dominated duplicate governance structures”, involving far less accountability and input from residents in steering groups (Post-NDC Director interview). The reasons for this approach centred on not wanting “a model like ours where residents were actually in a majority and making decisions about resources, that
was obviously too radical for them at the time” (Post-NDC Director interview). The response by the post-NDC has been to keep lobbying these state bodies on their achievements in engaging and representing communities, as well as citing how there is a “legitimate” role for the post-NDC in being a mechanism in which: “our residents are really keen to hold service providers to account…. that they are continuing to focus in the area to continue the work that we started” (Post-NDC Director interview).

Finally, it is important to note that recognition of their achievements and worth by local government is possible for post-NDC bodies. In areas such as Bristol the succession strategy of Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management organisation is based on a deliberative neighbourhood management approach, focused on “influencing decisions, having an overview, bringing partners together, deliberately not being a service provider, so not being a competitor with the community and voluntary sector” (Post-NDC Director interview). This involved engaging and developing the capacity of communities, deriving from and reinforcing the previous-NDC construction of ‘the community’, to convey their wishes to local government. This constructs relational networks and ‘centres’ all efforts towards moral ‘recognition’ of the post-NDC body and the community as “entitled to have a voice” (Post-NDC Director interview). Efforts have included working in what the post-NDC director notes is a “negatively branded” area called Stapleton Road. This particular space has been subject to stigmatisation by the local media for its high crime rate and negative perception of the local community, including dependence on the welfare state, which has a detrimental impact on the esteem of residents (Community representative interview). The post-NDC has worked with residents to “give them voice, to get things done”, help them understand Council decision-making, and bring them together with the local authority which many residents distrust (Post-NDC Director interview).
Importantly, this example demonstrates the critical bi-lateral nature of ‘recognition’ with the success of the efforts of Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management organisation contingent on the attitude and responsiveness of Bristol City Council. The Council views the worth of the post-NDC in terms of its democratic legitimacy as a place-specific community body, and in such processes we see the generation of esteem as “more locals have the confidence to get involved, feel like they are being listened to once again” (Post-NDC Director interview). However, such processes are yet to occur at the vast majority of post-NDCs, spread across all regions and urban sites, with many suggesting that the disesteem arising from the tendencies outlined above has resulted in these bodies becoming more inward-looking, concerned with managing territorialised assets, rather than seeking to work through broader governance involving relational networks that stretch beyond their areas.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the role of community social enterprise bodies in a post-nation state funding landscape of ‘abandonment’. Through the utilisation of Honneth’s (1995) ‘recognition’ approach we can conceptualise community representatives in terms of efforts to acquire ‘respect’ from the social enterprise professionals employed to manage post-NDCs. They are being driven by market principles with self-actualisation based on respect and esteem relating to conceptions of worth embedded within market values, rather than foregrounding social priorities. Post-NDCs also seek to influence local government within their localities, but have not acquired the forms of recognition they would desire from these agencies, who have not designated considerable worth to their past NDC achievements.
Given such misrecognition, post-NDCs have retreated back to the political and socially constructed relational networks of the ‘place’ of NDCs. This occurs through a focus on individual capital assets, and to the topological relations of the market via the management of these assets, rather than extensive participation in the disparate spatial relations of wider urban governance. This has broader implications for the geographical understanding of post-state funded community organisations. It is clear that such community bodies are nexus sites mediating spatially networked market values and processes, and a set of place-specific relational networks encompassing local residents. This follows Newman’s (2014) argument that it is important to move towards more nuanced accounts of the complexities, limitations and fragilities of neoliberal tendencies, including the role of alternatives and their performativity. Indeed, this suggests the need for far greater analysis of residual and partly marginalised meso-institutional actors, such as the voluntary sector, in the dynamic relations between state, society and market in urban governance.

More broadly, the politics and practices of ‘abandonment’ in an age of ‘spatial liberalism’ reflects state retrenchment, with an onus on (spatially uneven) ‘local’ rational and responsible actors in addressing place-specific priorities around deprivation and economic growth (see Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). Without nation state control and no specific national standards, such abandonment presents the possibility for community social enterprises to contest, distort and circumvent neoliberal ideologies, institutions and policies. Nonetheless, evidence from this study suggests that such processes are yet to occur, with abandoned community representatives engaging market values so as to survive and influence the running of these bodies. Fewer national interventions and standards also offers the potential for greater spatial differentiation in terms of the ability of post-NDCs to achieve their priorities, further
contributing to uneven institutional arrangements and disparate progress towards reducing deprivation. Whilst local government and those non-state actors embedded in Government policy (e.g. national charities delivering local services) have the ability to influence and be supported, post-NDCs are beyond the ‘gaze’ of the nation state, meaning that this is truly abandonment to the market.

Finally, from the experience of post-NDCs it is clear that the politics and power relations of state ‘abandonment’ means that analysis of the deliberative practices underpinning ‘(dis)agreement’ is critical in urban governance. While Honneth’s (1995) approach goes some way to explaining how actors work towards social justice, the scope for explaining how shared public concerns are mobilised and agreement develops, is less evident (see Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006). For Barnett (2013) one way of taking this forward is a ‘plural geographies of worth’ approach that builds upon Boltanski and Thevenot’s (2006) sociology of critique perspective, and which can transcend insular Anglo-Saxon centric approaches that we often find in the analysis of neoliberal relations between state, market and society.

The concept of ‘plural geographies of worth’ is understood as the ‘coordination of actions in time and space was understood to operate through the negotiation between multiple practices of evaluation, justification and accountability’ (Barnett, 2013: 156). The approach requires far greater sensitivity towards, first, the actual (spatially orientated) argumentative logics deployed by actors as they critique and justify their values and worth, which are based on particular societal conceptions of common good (e.g. civic values around fostering social equalities); and, second, how they interact with the critiques, justifications and thus conceptions of worth projected by other actors in subsequent deliberations (see Fuller, 2014). Through such an approach it is possible to critically examine the (spatially orientated) ethical
and moral motives underpinning the practices of actors and, thus, the constitution and performativity of everyday political deliberations, and how these connect with broader ethical and moral conceptions through particular geographical relations. Ultimately, this facilitates greater in-depth examination of the mechanics, complexities, incompleteness and contradictions of contemporary urban governance, rather than treating these as simply hegemonic neoliberal landscapes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank the research participants for their valuable insights, and the helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers on an earlier drafts of this paper.

FUNDING
This research was funded by the British Academy Small Grant Award.
REFERENCES


Figure 1: Participating post-NDCs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Urban site</th>
<th>Indices of Deprivation Ranking (2015)</th>
<th>Ranking as a % most deprived of all SOAS areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust</td>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre West</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Back on the Map</td>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>Outer city</td>
<td>1175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>Bradford Trident</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doncaster Community Development Trust</td>
<td>Doncaster</td>
<td>Inner town</td>
<td>1313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Company</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>Outer city</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>North Huyton Communities Future</td>
<td>Knowlsey</td>
<td>Outer town</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>Greets Green Community Enterprises</td>
<td>Sandwell</td>
<td>Inner town</td>
<td>3356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moat House Community Trust</td>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>Outer city</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Horizons</td>
<td>Walsall</td>
<td>Outer town</td>
<td>3234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>NELM Development Trust</td>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>Outer city</td>
<td>3871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>East Brighton Trust</td>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>1496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marsh Farm Futures</td>
<td>Luton</td>
<td>Outer town</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plus You Ltd</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Outer city</td>
<td>3492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>9296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Devonport Regeneration Community Partnership</td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>Outer city</td>
<td>7981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Newham NDP</td>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>10589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation Trust</td>
<td>Aylesbury</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>4496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridge Renewal Trust</td>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>6210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The New Cross Gate Trust</td>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>6232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The IMD ranking is based on the calculation of multiple deprivation indicators for Super Output Areas (SOAs) which correspond to populations of approximately 1,500 residents or 650 households (32,844 in total for England). Income, unemployment, crime, health barriers to housing and services, and living environment. The ranking included is based on the postcode of the post-NDC body.

Source: DCLG (2015)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of FTE/ PT employees</th>
<th>Annual gross income (2014-15)</th>
<th>Annual expenses (2014-15)</th>
<th>Strategic focus</th>
<th>Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>897,613</td>
<td>1,278,220</td>
<td>Capital assets; Service provision</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre West</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>732,295</td>
<td>733,966</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Back on the Map</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>489,725</td>
<td>311,283</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Community centre, housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>Bradford Trident</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,431,666</td>
<td>1,544,022</td>
<td>Capital assets; Service provision</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doncaster Community Development Trust</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No income 7,096,241 (assets)</td>
<td>1,849,780 (depreciation)</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre, Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Co.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>810,050</td>
<td>1,280,252</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre, Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>North Huyton Communities Future</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>174,529</td>
<td>469,294</td>
<td>Capital assets; Neighbourhood governance;</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greets Green Community Enterprises</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>273,656</td>
<td>131,015</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moat House Community Trust</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>145,098</td>
<td>88,995</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre, Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Horizons</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>851,085</td>
<td>861,530</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre, Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>NELM Development Trust</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>602,038</td>
<td>569,860</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>East Brighton Trust</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>284,456</td>
<td>253,496</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marsh Farm Futures</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>594,640</td>
<td>690,310</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plus You Ltd</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>235,782</td>
<td>362,752</td>
<td>Capital assets; Service provision</td>
<td>Neighbourhood centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>145,501</td>
<td>205,782</td>
<td>Capital assets; Neighbourhood governance;</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Devonport Regeneration Community Partnership</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Capital assets</td>
<td>Business park, sports centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Newham NDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>84,348</td>
<td>162,075</td>
<td>Neighbourhood governance; Service provision</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation Trust</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>623,336</td>
<td>654,347</td>
<td>Neighbourhood governance; Service provision</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridge Renewal Trust</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>491,458</td>
<td>486,530</td>
<td>Capital assets; Service provision</td>
<td>Community pharmacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The New Cross Gate Trust</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>309,358</td>
<td>300,951</td>
<td>Capital assets; Service provision</td>
<td>Commercial property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Average         |                                      |                          | 458,832                      | 519,234                   |                                              |                                             |

Note: 1. ‘Commercial property’ includes assets such as shops, offices and industrial units. ‘Service provision’ relates to delivering contracted services from various sources, such as local government and the NHS.
2. Devonport Regeneration Community Partnership is a registered private mutual society with financial accounts unavailable to the general public.

Source: Author’s survey; Annual accounts registered at Companies House and Charity Commission.