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Unmediated and mediated communication equilibria of Battle of the Sexes with incomplete information

Ray, Indrajit and Ganguly, Chirantan 2010. Unmediated and mediated communication equilibria of Battle of the Sexes with incomplete information. In: Basu, Banasri, Chakrabarti, Bikas K., Chakravarty, Satya R. and Gangopadhyay, Kausik eds. Econophysics & Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques, New Economic Windows, Springer, pp. 347-361.

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Abstract

We consider the Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow two-sided cheap talk before the game is played. We characterize the set of fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria. The best fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, when it exists, has a desirable characteristic. When the players' types are different, it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the mediated communication equilibria of the game. We find the range of the prior for which this desirable equilibrium exists under unmediated and mediated communication processes.

Item Type: Book Section
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9788847015005
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 08:50
URI: http://orca-mwe.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/86080

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