PALAMITE SOTERIOLOGY IN AUGUSTINIAN DRESS?
OBSERVATIONS ON PROCHOROS KY DONES’ WRITINGS AND
TRANSLATIONS OF WORKS OF AUGUSTINE

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Abstract: Augustine’s influence on medieval Latin theology is thoroughly known. What is less well recognised is the fact that through the translation and reception of some of his works Augustine also influenced certain developments in Byzantine Greek theology, especially in the fourteenth century. This article deals with one such case, Prochoros Kydones’ translations of works of Augustine, in particular his translation of De vera religione 1-15. The focus of the article is on the theological background of Prochoros’ work, on the development of Prochoros’ own theological position, and on the possible influence of Prochoros’ translation activity on this development. The article closes with a detailed look at a few examples of how Prochoros translated and thereby also transformed certain Augustinian phrases and theological motifs into Greek theology.

In 1984 and 1990 the late Herbert Hunger published two slim volumes containing translations of works of Augustine by the Byzantine monk Prochoros Kydones.1 Prochoros Kydones (ca. 1333/34 - ca. 1370) was the younger brother of the more famous Demetrios Kydones (ca. 1324 - ca. 1397/98). Both were theologians and translators of Latin theological texts and as such opposed to the theology which had become predominant in Byzantium under the influence of Gregory Palamas.2 Gregory Palamas’ brand of Hesychasm had been declared orthodox by a synod in


1351 and a strong supporter of Palamas’ views, Philotheos Kokkinos, had become Patriarch in 1364. But unlike his brother Demetrios, Prochoros Kydones had for a long time seemed reconciled to, or at least tolerant of, Palamism and Hesychasm. He had been a monk in the Megistē Lavra on Mount Athos since his youth, even while Palamas was for a short time hēgoumenos there, and he had not fallen foul of the new orthodoxy until ca. 1366, when, apparently instigated by the Patriarch, his abbot, Jakobos Trikanas, accused him of heresy, and a synod was convened in spring 1368, at which he was condemned. He died not long after.

The views of which Prochoros Kydones was accused and condemned were his subscription to syllogistics as a theological method and his conclusion, reached by this method, that the divine light, or ‘Thabor light’ (cf. Mt 17:2), a central concept of Hesychast soteriology, was not uncreated, but created. They were set out in his works ‘On Essence and Energy’, Book VI of which is on the ‘Thabor light’ (VI.2 is headed ‘that the light on Mount Thabor is created’), and his ‘Refutation of the abuse of quotations [sc. of Church Fathers] in the tomos against the Metropolitan of Ephesus and Gregoras’, which contains a section on syllogisms. Parts of the latter were read out at the synod of 1368.

It has long been recognised that Prochoros Kydones was not motivated by a rationalist, a- or even anti-spiritual attitude towards theology, but by a genuine commitment to orthodox, patristic, tradition, which compelled him to study the sources and analyse them critically, ‘discern’ them, before following a particular spiritual path, or subscribing to particular soteriological views and expectations. His ‘criticism’ was not born of ‘an unfettered search for an indefinite truth’, but ‘grounded deeply in the heritage’ of his home culture. And it included not only dialectics and syllogistics, but also Latin philology. Like his brother Demetrios, Prochoros Kydones translated patristic Latin, in particular Augustinian, texts in order to use them to inform the current debate. Demetrios, who as an imperial civil servant, had learned Latin from a Spanish mendicant, famously translated Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles, completing it in 1354, and later the Summa theologica, though only in part. S.th. III was translated by Prochoros.

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1 Compare F. Tinnefeld, Demetrios Kydones, Briefe I/1 (Stuttgart 1981) 238.
2 For the tomos of the synod see Tomus Synodicus II (PG 151:693-716); also J. Darrouzès, Regestes des actes du patriarchat de Constantinople I/5. Les regestes de 1310-1376 (Paris 1977) 454-458 (nn. 2509, 2518, 2533, 2541).
3 For this text see M. Candal, ‘El libro VI de Prócoro Cidonio (Sobre la luz tabórica),’ in: Orientalia Christiana Periodica 20 (1954) 247-297, 258-297 (text and translation).
4 ‘Tomos’ here refers to the tomos of the synod of 1351, which, among others, had condemned Matthaios the Metropolitan of Ephesus and Nikephoros Gregoras; for the text of the tomos compare Darrouzès, Regestes n. 2234.
7 Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz, 203; see also ibid. 234-35 on photismos as a common motif of Byzantine soteriology. Clearly it was also a major concern for Prochoros Kydones.
8 For what follows see in detail Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz, 178-79.
But despite the role of syllogistics in Prochoros’ thought Thomas Aquinas and Latin scholastic texts were less predominant in his translation programme than one might think. Many translations were in fact from works of Augustine. This too has been known for some time. Already Angelo Mai in his *Nova Patrum Bibliotheca* cites an excerpt from Prochoros’ translation of *De vera religione* 1-15. A century later Michael Rackl and Giovanni Mercati include Prochoros’ translations in their surveys. In addition to *De vera religione* 1-15, extant in *Vat. Gr. 1096* (fos. 149°-156°), they include a fragment of *De beata vita* (*Vat. Gr. 609* fo. 173°-r), *De libero arbitrio* (*Vat. Gr. 609* fos. 180°-184°), and, in this order, *Epp. 132, 137, 138, 92, 143, 28, 147 and 82*. Hunger’s editions build on these earlier studies, though they also represent a great leap forward in that they make use of the autograph in *Vat. Gr. 609* in ways that overcome misunderstandings created by earlier descriptions.

Prochoros Kydones’ translations are situated in a long history of translations of works of Augustine into Greek. Its beginnings lie in Augustine’s lifetime, during the Pelagian controversy. Later, Augustine was cited in proceedings of councils and similar church documents. A climax was reached during the 13th century, when diplomatic efforts at reunion resulted in such a magnificent achievement as Maximos Planudes’ translation of *De trinitate*. Less than a hundred years later, in the controversy between Palamites and anti-Palamites, translations not only of more recent works (e.g. by Thomas Aquinas or Anselm of Canterbury), but also of works of Augustine informed the methodological debate.

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15 Again, some of the letters (especially the longer ones, like *ep. 147*) are only translated in part; the following list is based on Hunger, *Prochoros Kydones. Übersetzungen von acht Briefen*, 11: *ep. 132, fo. 185°* (CSEL 44:79-80); *ep. 137, fo. 185°-188°* (CSEL 44, 96-125); *ep. 138, fo. 188°-190°* (CSEL 44:126-148); *ep. 92, fo. 190°-v* (CSEL 34:436-444; des. mut. 443.18 explicare); *ep. 143, fo. 190°-191°* (CSEL 44:250-262); *ep. 28, fo. 191°* (CSEL 34:103-113); *ep. 147, fo. 202v* (fg.: CSEL 44:321.19 et quod - 329.24 sicut); *ep. 82, fo. 209°* (CSEL 34:351-387; des. mut. 357.13 possuisse); for an overview of the content of these letters (they are all in some way related to the themes of salvation, judgment and beatific vision) cf. J. Lössl, ‘Augustine in Byzantium,’ in: *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 51 (2000) 267-95, 288-291.
20 See Altaner, ‘Augustinus,’ his role as an ecclesiastical figure provides Augustine also with a place in modern orthodox theology; compare Fürst, ‘Augustinus im Orient,’ 312-14 (literature).
21 Αὐγουστίνου Πατρί Τριάδος Βιβλία Παντωμάδικα, ἀπαίρ ἐκ τῆς Λατινῆς διάλεκτος ἐς τῆς Ἑλλάδας μετάφρασε Μάξιμος ὁ Πλανοῦς. Εἰςαγωγή, ἐλληνικό καὶ λατινικό κείμενο, γλωσσάριον, editio princeps, ed. Μανοίλου Παπαθωμπούλου, Τσαβαρά Τραβάρη, Gianpaolo Rigotti (Athens 1995).
22 For an extensive survey of translations from Latin during this period see Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz*, 173-180; and now also Id., *Von Photios zu Bessarion. Der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren bleibende Bedeutung* (Wiesbaden 2003) 69.
The publication of the editio princeps of Maximos Planudes’ translation of De trinitate in 1995\textsuperscript{23} initiated to some extent a re-writing of this long history during the past decade. Since then not only the more overt influence of Augustine on his translators and adherents, but also an at least potential, more covert, influence on those using those translations, who would not necessarily have wanted to appear as adherents of Augustinian thought, like Gregory Palamas, could be explored, as was done by Reinhard Flogaus and, perhaps more critically, Jean Lison.\textsuperscript{24} It is in the wake of recent studies such as these that one may today ask to what extent, if Palamas was himself influenced by Augustine, someone like Prochoros Kydones, who had clearly grown up in a Palamite and Hesychast environment, represented less a radical departure from Palamite Hesychasm than a form of it that was more explicitly influenced by Augustinian or classical patristic thought than the more orthodox party would allow for. Since it is the latter which is normally identified with Palanism, it may be thought inappropriate to call Prochoros’ anti-Palamism a kind of ‘Palamism’. But the fact remains that Prochoros has a Hesychast history or background and his concerns remained those of his Hesychast colleagues, even though after the publication of his critical works they accused him of heresy and condemned and disowned him. It is his closeness to them that appears fascinating, not so much his apparent departure from them. This article aims to illustrate this. How did Prochoros remain true to his tradition while making use of the influences which he appropriated through the study of western theology and in particular the translation of texts of Augustine.

We already indicated that for Prochoros Kydones and his brother Demetrios Augustine was not prima facie the most interesting theologian. Thomas Aquinas was. He would have appeared far more modern, contemporary, and applicable to them. Prochoros’ main opus, ‘On substance and energy’, was in large parts a compilation of arguments drawn from the Summa contra gentiles, the Summa theologica and De potentia.\textsuperscript{25} Nevertheless, Demetrios had also translated the Liber Sententiarum Sancti Augustini compiled by Prosper Tiro and parts from Contra Iulianum and In Iohannis evangelium tractatus. And Prochoros, in his treatise ‘On the kataphatic and apophatic method in theology and the theophany of the Lord on the mountain’, did not cite any Thomas Aquinas, but only Greek Patristic sources and Augustine, Ambrose and Pope Leo the Great.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus Prochoros applied the scholastic method (i. e. dialectics and syllogistics) as well as the patristic argument (i. e.from authority and tradition). He perceived no conflict between medieval scholasticism and scholarship based on sources (as promoted by Renaissance humanists). For him both went hand in hand: Scholasticism improved method and style in rational argument, study of the fathers histori-...

\textsuperscript{23} See above n. 20.
\textsuperscript{25} See Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz, 207 n. 836.
\textsuperscript{26} Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz, 208.
cal and philological knowledge. In Prochoros Kydones we can witness both. He advocates syllogisms and proves to be an excellent philologist. He loves to argue, but he also wants his argument to be based on proper textual study.

At the synod of 1368 both were at stake. Prochoros was accused of denying some of the most basic tenets of Hesychasm, the most basic one perhaps that the mystic light which one can attain in contemplation and which is the light of which the Gospels speak in the story of the Transfiguration, is uncreated, i.e. God himself, in form of his energy, as distinct from his substance, or essence (ousia). Hesychasts thought to be able to sustain this position of having a real distinction in God rather than pure, actual, simplicity, by distinguishing an ever transcendent, unapproachable side of God, and an approachable one, analogous to the sun and his rays; and they could underpin this position from tradition. Those however who were increasingly influenced by the kind of Platonist-Aristotelian thought that came in via the scholastic method and the study of conventional and especially western Patristics, like Augustine, began to reject this teaching, and Prochoros certainly was one of them. It took him sixteen years after the canonisation of Hesychasm at the synod of 1351 to make his criticism public. His main work, ‘On Substance and Energy’, dates from 1367, and his works on syllogisms and on the kataphatic and the apophatic method in connection with the Transfiguration must have appeared not long after. They are both cited at the synod of 1368.27 But not only his dialectics and syllogistics were cited at the synod. His use of the patristic argument and in particular Augustine also played a role. The synod, apparently aware of Augustine’s authority and perhaps also of the importance of Planudes’ translation of De trinitate, does not attack Augustine, but Prochoros’ use (or, in the synod’s view, abuse) of him:

‘And ostensibly,’ it says, δὲ δὲν, ‘he [Prochoros] calls Augustine as a witness purporting to show that in one of his writings that Father of the Church says that when the good and the evil will see (ὁροῦνται) the judge of the living and the dead, then undoubtedly the evil too will not be able to see him in any other way. They will not see him in the form (κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν) according to which he is the son of man but in the glory (ἐν τῇ δόξῃ) that reveals him as judge, not in the humility (ἐν τῇ ταπεινώσει) of someone who is judged.’28

Clearly, if the glory revealed in the last judgment is the same as that revealed in the transfiguration, and uncreated, and only accessible to those who attain it in a beatific vision, it cannot be that the wicked ‘see’ it in the same way, since that would mean that the wicked, too, are saved. That this is the background of this charge seems clear from a statement immediately following the one just cited:

‘Asked how he understands (νοεῖ) that [expression] “the glory of his glory” (sc. in the expression “Glory lies in his glory”, ἐν τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ ἡ δόξα) Prochoros answered: “As that of the only-begotten Son of the Father, which he has together with the Father and the Spirit in regard to creation, that which has become, and that which also shows itself’

27 See above nn. 5, 7, 8.
28 Accusation brought against Prochoros Kydones as recorded in the tomos of the Synod of 1368 (PG 151:707AB).
in the countenance (ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ) of Christ on the Holy Mountain, according to which the wicked, too, will see him.\(^{29}\)

The Augustine reference to which the Synod refers in the passage cited earlier could be from De Trinitate (1.3.30), which Prochoros cites in Book IV of his ‘On Substance and Energy’. Interestingly, he uses Planudes’ translation, omitting only a few phrases. He writes:

‘For the same reason Augustine teaches that “it is characteristic of the true believers (τῶν εὐσεβῶν Ἰδιώ) to hear the message of Christ’s incarnation in such a way that they believe in it on the ground that he is equal to the Father in the form of God (ἐν μορφῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ). Equally true is that which follows from this, as the one who holds it firmly proclaims: »As the father has life in himself, he gives life to the Son to have it in himself« (Jn 5:26).” Then he continues to deal with the vision of Christ’s glory in which he will come as judge, which will be common to the wicked as well as the just.’\(^{30}\)

The passage in De Trinitate is a commentary on Jn 5:24-27. It goes as follows (the lemma is cited in square brackets; it does not appear in the source):

[Jn 5:24: ‘He who listens to my word and believes in him who sent me has eternal life’] Augustine: ‘This eternal life is that sight in which the wicked have no part … And this applies only to loyal believers who believe him to be equal to the Father in the form of God … Then [following Jn 5:27: ‘And he also gave him authority to do judgment.’] he comes to the sight of his splendour in which he will come to judge, a sight that will be shared by the wicked and the just alike … Yes, even the wicked will be given a sight of the Son of Man: a sight of the form of God will be granted only to “the pure of heart, because they shall see God” (Matth. 5:8).’\(^{31}\)

This is quite subtle and can be spun in more than one way. On the one hand, Augustine himself has to qualify his understanding of ‘seeing God’, because it is traditionally identified with ‘being saved’. The biblical proof text is Matth 5:8. If we talk of the wicked seeing God in the context of the last judgment, we have to qualify this, or, as the Hesychasts suggest, stop talking of the wicked seeing God. On the other hand, the Thabor light, or the concept of God’s visible glory, as the Hesychast view would have it, is here, according to Augustine, not the ideal place in which to locate that eternal light the sight of which means salvation. This kind of light, of which after all the Gospel itself speaks, belongs to the category which also the wicked can see. That (other) light, of which we speak in connection with the salvation, is transcendent, i.e. it lies beyond our physical vision and beyond immanent, historical, occurrences like the transfiguration or the last judgment.

Prochoros, too, makes this distinction, when he adds to the passage cited n. 28: ‘What has to be added, of course, is that, obviously, the wicked will not see the form (ἡ μορφή) of the son according to which he is equal to the Father.’ (Vat. Gr. 609 fo. 211’7-10).

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\(^{29}\) Prochoros Kydones’ explanation of his position as recorded in the tomos of the Synod of 1368 (PG 151:707B).


\(^{31}\) Augustine, On the Trinity 1.3.30 (ed. Papathomopoulos et al. 107.93-109).
De Trinitate was not the only Augustinian text that Prochoros may have had in mind when dealing with this question. Letters 92 and 147, of the latter of which he translated a part, also deal with the question of ‘seeing God’. Letter 147.47 picks up an exegesis of Matth 5:8, in which it is reiterated ‘that God is not seen in a place, but with a pure heart, and he is not sought with bodily eyes and not countenanced by physical sight nor touched with the sense of touch, or heard with ears, or sensed as in a physical approach.’ On the other hand: ‘It is due to our manner of speaking that we call bodies, physical objects, visible, and this is why we call God invisible: that we do not succumb to the belief that God has a body, not because we want to cheat pure hearts out of their contemplation of his substance.’ Thus it makes sense for Augustine to speak of ‘seeing God’, but not in a physical sense, since God has no physical substance.

‘Of course, there are those,’ Augustine continues, ‘who hold that God himself is body [i.e. the principle of every body, body as such, omnino], because they believe that whatever is no body, cannot be a substance. But they must be refuted,’ Augustine says. And there are others who do not believe that God is substantially body, but believe that when they are going to rise from the dead, they are going to see God in a spiritual body which they imagine to be a kind of image of the physical body. And what about that spiritual body which according to Phil 3:21 transfigures our humble body to conform with the body of his glory, the μορφή of his δόξα, of which we heard earlier? In view of this, Augustine says, Scripture speaks of the Father seeing the son and the son seeing the father. As a consequence ‘seeing’ cannot only refer to a physical process. Gen 1:31 speaks of God ‘seeing everything’ (‘and it was very good’).

In short, Augustine distinguishes between a physical and a spiritual, or non-physical, vision, and does not accept the former as a form of beatific vision. Prochoros follows him in that and also develops the epistemological basis for arguing the case in his work on ‘On the kataphatic and apophatic method in theology and on the theophany of the Lord on the Holy Mountain’. In it Prochoros criticises the Hesychast claim to offer a new form of kataphatic theology, which on the ground of uncreated energies no longer relies on metaphorical, or analogous, names for God, but has access to univocally appropriate names, as if revealed directly to the initiate in a private revelation. For Prochoros this went against the traditional differentiation between subject and object, that which signifies and that which is signified, νοητή, or συμβολική, and νοητά. Prochoros refutes the ontological as well as the epistemological assumptions behind the idea of uncreated energies and argues that the kataphatic like the anaphatic way relies solely on created things, for it proceeds, in analogy, from an image or likeness to the original. The apophatic way in contrast is simple and without further presupposition (ἀπλή, ἀναιτίος). In and by itself it expresses a deeper knowledge and experience of God and it is only because of the way we are created, as beings with bodies in time and space, that it relies on a composite, or synthetic, and also causal (σύνδεσμος, αἰτιατή) equivalent, which formulates statements about God based on our physical experiences. There is no way that these two methods can be detached from each other, because, ultimately, we do not have a direct knowledge of the reality of God as such (τί εἶναι).
Finally, a few observations on Prochoros’ translation of Augustine’s *De vera religione*. This translation of a text which combines a neo-Platonic outlook with first traces of what was to become typical ‘Augustinian’ thinking (e. g. teachings on original sin and grace, and free will and predestination) illustrates particularly well how Prochoros, despite his opposition against the doctrinal side of Palamism, can only be properly understood within its context, as a monk from Athos and a near contemporary of Palamas, and, certainly as a young monk, under Palamas’ influence. The Greek text is taken from Vat. Gr. 1096 fós. 149r-156r. The §§ are numbered according to the critical edition of the Latin text (CCL 32:187-260).34

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<tr>
<th>title</th>
<th>de vera religione</th>
<th>περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θρησκείας</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>eorum sapientes quos philosophos vocant</td>
<td>οἱ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς σοφοὶ, οὗς φιλοσόφους καλοῦσι</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>non quod ... lapis et canis essent colenda sapientibus ... itaque et ipse Socrates cum populo simulacra venerabatur</td>
<td>οὐ γὰρ ὁτι δεῖ ... τιμῶν τοὺς φιλοσόφους ... αὐτοῦ τε οὖν Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων έσταρο τά εἰδολα ...</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>quamobrem sanandum esse animum ad intuendum incommutabilem rerum formam et eodem modo semper se habentem ...</td>
<td>διὸ καὶ Θεραπεύτου εἶναι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα πρὸς τὸ Θεωρεῖν τοῦ τῶν οὕτων ἀμετάβλητον ἀρχήτυπον καὶ ταυτῶς ἔχων δεῖ ...</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>si tam innumerabiles aggreduuntur hanc viam, ut desertis divitiis et honoribus huius mundi ...</td>
<td>εἰ οὕτως ἀγαριζόμεθα ταῦτην μετίασι τὴν ὁδὸν, ὡς πάντων καταλειφθέντων τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ τῶν συμματικῶν παζῶν καὶ τῶν έν τίμῃ τῷ κόσμῳ τιμῶν ...</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>... et eorum potius consuetudini cessimus quam illos in postram fidem voluntatemque traduximus</td>
<td>μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν ἡμείς τοῖς τούτων ἔστειν εἰκόμεν, ἢ τούτους εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πιστίν μετηγάγομεν.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>sed quaquomodo se habeat philosophorum iactantia, illud cuivis intellegere facile est religionem ab eis non esse quae exeratam ...</td>
<td>ἀλλ', ὅπως τοῦς τῶν φιλοσόφων ἔχει τὸ οὐκαίμα, ἐκείνου παντὶ τῷ χάδιος εἶδόμαι, μὴ λόγου παρ' ἐκείνους ἀξίαν εἶναι τὴν πιστίν ...</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>sic enim creditur et docetur ... non aliam esse philosophiam ... et aliam religionem</td>
<td>οὕτως γὰρ πιστεύεται καὶ διδάσκεται ... μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσοφιῶν σπουδήν, καὶ ἄλλην τὴν θρησκείαν</td>
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In § 2 Prochoros translates sapientes as φιλόσοφοι. In § 1 he had translated sapientes as οἱ σοφοὶ. But there he had also noticed Augustine’s explanation that among the ancients ‘the wise’ (sapientes, σοφοὶ) liked to be called ‘would-be-wise’ (philosophi, φιλόσοφοι), people who would like to be wise, which can be taken seriously, as a compliment, or as an ironic remark, as it might have been intended by Augustine. In any case, a sentence later Prochoros can use the two expressions synonymously. In § 8 a further aspect is added on to this. There Augustine argues that philosophy and religion, quest for wisdom and worship of God, are one and the same thing. Now here Prochoros adds ‘among us’ (παρ’ ἡμῖν), by which he probably means ‘us Christians’. Augustine implies this, but he does not express it. Prochoros however gives the impression that for him, in his situation, philosophy is something quite specific, namely the monastic life in the Laura.35 Thus his addition παρ’ ἡμῖν in § 8 and his identification of ‘the wise’ and ‘philosophers’ in § 1 and 2 assume a very special meaning. And there are further details which could hint at the ascetic-monastic context of Prochoros’ translation.

In § 5 Prochoros translates divitiis as τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν. In § 10 ascetic passages are expanded and almost paraphrased. Ad admonitionem nostrae patientiae becomes νομιμότατα πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι προσεκτικοτέρους ἡμᾶς καταστάμενοι, ad exercitationem nostrae patientiae πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὴν ἡμῶν καρτερείαν. Patientia is a general human virtue, καρτερεία (or καρτερία) however the kind of patience which is exercised, in the context of a life long commitment, by ascetics or monks.36

In § 2 Augustine wrote that even Socrates worshipped idols alongside the common people. Prochoros adds to this καὶ Πλάτων. This does not change the general thrust of the basic argument that the ancient philosophers despite the advanced nature of their teachings failed to distance themselves from popular ancient polytheism. But there is a slight shift as far as history of philosophy is concerned. It is possible that Augustine would have found it easier to place Socrates in a context of pagan folk tradition than the venerable figure of Plato, while for Prochoros the difference had become far less significant. In § 3 Prochoros translates animum ad intuendum as τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμωμα πρὸς τὸ ἰδεώρειν. It seems that Prochoros saw animus as the faculty of the soul (anima, ψυχή) to attain the beatific (intellectual) vision. It was one of Prochoros’ main motifs to introduce Augustine to Greek orthodoxy as a platonising church father, similar to Gregory of Nazianzus or Basil the Great. It was this

36 Of course, Prochoros could here have followed a later MS and read in it paenitentia instead of patientia. In that case he would have understood καρτερεία as the penance of remorseful sinners.
what lay behind his translation programme. One of the central theological-spiritual concepts of his project was that of a beatific intellectual vision. Vera rel. contains a programme of fides quærens intellectum, faith seeking understanding. This is what fascinated Prochoros, far more than the first traces of a doctrine of grace becoming visible for the first time in vera rel., with its problematic rendering of the relationship between grace and free will. Against this background it becomes clear why Prochoros in § 6 should translate the Latin expression fideמ voluntatemque as πίστις, and nothing else. The Augustinian concept of voluntas, vital in this context for Augustine, was not of interest to him. One could even ask which Greek expression should have rendered voluntas in this context. Prochoros uses πίστις also for religio, e. g. at the beginning of § 8, where the text speaks of the absence of religio among the pagan philosophers who participated in the cults despite their misgivings about them. Further on in § 8 Prochoros renders religio as Ἰερουσαλήμ. The same expression can be found in Vat. Gr. 1096 in the title of the work: De vera religione, παρὰ τῆς ἁλίθους Ἰερουσαλήμ. In § 9 religio is translated as εἰσέξεια. This means that Prochoros seems to have had a less clear cut concept of religio than Augustine, who in vera rel. had tried precisely to specify religio as something more than simply worship, or piety. However, this is not to say that Prochoros did not have an idea of the difference. Note the use of expressions for religion in the following statement recorded in the tomos of the Synod of 1368, which is coined against the Palamites (PG 151:701): εἴ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀποκαλύψεως τῆς πίστεως ἐκχωμεν, ὡσπερ οἱ τῆς εἰσέξειας παρὰ τῆς ἠγκατάκτης ... ἐπεῖ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἡ Ἰουδαϊκὴ ἀρχή, καὶ ἐπικοινώνησαν οἱ ἀφανεῖς ἡμῶν τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν, καὶ σκοτεῖ καὶ τυφλοί... (‘if, of course, we had our faith from personal revelation, as the leaders of that religion ..., then we too would be smitten by the Jewish curse, and our eyes would be darkened, we could not see, and (over-)seers ((ἐπι-) σκοτού) would be blind...).

To conclude, therefore, all of these writings, his dialectic works and works on syllogisms, and his translations from works of Augustine, appeal to the kind of intellectual and scholastic Hesychasm for which Prochoros stands. Having lived as a monk in the Great Lavra on Mount Athos since his youth he had believed in salvation as an ultimate form of illumination, a revelation of truth in every sense of the word. Revelation, so he continued to believe, reveals to man a Logos who leads him on to search the truth with some scope of success: ἡμῖν πρὸς ἦθεν τῆς ἠλίθους λόγος τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως διεκκινήμασα. In fact, Prochoros’ kind of, or attitude to, Hesychasm was in a certain sense a radicalised one, for it comprised not only the physical and moral, but also the intellectual sphere. Rather than labelling him an anti-Palamite in the sense that one would label, say, a Scotist an anti-Augustinian, one might call him an intellectualist, as opposed to the somewhat anti-intellectual voluntarism of orthodox Palamism. His main work carries the title ‘On substance (οὐσία) and energy (ἐνέργεια), Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ἐνέργειας, and in further treatises he argues for syllogistics as necessary tools for any theology as a reflection on one’s spiritual experience and for the distinction between one’s own, limited, physical, experience as created and the uncreated truth of God himself. One very basic and (to the Palamites) infuriating argument was that no matter what we do, whenever

38 However, it is interesting in this context that among the Augustinian texts which he translated was De libero arbitrio, which he rendered παρὰ τῆς αὐτεξουσίας.
we express ourselves we do so assuming that our partners in dialogue understand what we say on the basis of the principles of logic (or that part of logic that pertains to the use of ordinary language, called syllogistics, which is largely based on the principle of non-contradiction) and human understanding.

All Prochoros wanted to do was to use syllogistics and textual study to deepen the understanding of his spiritual path. Tellingly, he was not accused of refuting Hesychasm comprehensively. Only certain key ideas were picked out and held against him, like the denial of the uncreatedness of the light of Thabor. Finally, his use of translations for theological argument explains why he translated only certain texts, or only parts of them, and if we look in detail, we discover some of his theological ideas in these translations. Herbert Hunger’s contribution to the understanding of Prochoros’ theological thinking by publishing his translations of works of Augustine can thus hardly be overestimated. Needless to say, there is a lot more work to be done. By far not all of Prochoros’ works and translations have been published and the whole oeuvre still awaits serious study. The present article can only scratch the surface in that respect, but perhaps a few glimpses have been allowed into the fascinating mind of this 14th century figure.