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Inflation, Investment and Growth: a Money and Banking Approach

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Abstract

Output growth, investment and the real interest rate are all found empirically to be negatively affected by inflation. But a seeming puzzle arises of opposite Tobin-like inflation effects because theory indicates a negative Tobin effect when investment falls and a positive Tobin effect when the real interest rate rises. We define inflation’s Tobin effect more specifically in terms of the effect on the capital to effective labor ratio and resolve the puzzle by showing the simultaneous occurrence of all three negative inflation effects, on growth, investment and real interest rates, in a model calibrated to postwar US data. Here, investment along with consumption are exchanged for within a monetary endogenous growth economy with human capital and a decentralized credit-producing sector.

JEL: C23, E44, O16, O42

Keywords: Inflation, investment, growth, Tobin

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1. Introduction

A host of recent evidence indicates that inflation causes a negative long run effect on economic growth, both using international panel data (Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004) and international G7 time series (Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim 2006). Yet, starting as far back as Feldstein (1982) and including Barro (1995), inflation is also found empirically to cause a decrease in investment; recent long run evidence supports this (Madsen 2003, Byrne and Davis 2004). A theoretically negative long run investment effect is found as well (Stockman 1981, Smith and Egteren 2005, Mansoorian and Mohsin 2006) and this result is viewed by Stockman (1981) as an "inverse", or negative, Tobin (1965) effect. The conundrum comes about in that there is also significant long run evidence that inflation causes a lower real interest rate (Rapach 2003, Rapach and Wohar 2005, Ahmed and Rogers 2000), which is viewed as a positive Tobin effect. This appears to be a puzzling contradiction: evidence indicating both long run negative and long run positive Tobin effects. Resolving this puzzle theoretically, in a way consistent with the empirical long run inflation effects on growth, real interest rates and investment, has not been done within standard general equilibrium analysis.

In Tobin (1965), the Solow (1956) model is extended by adding on a money demand function in which money and physical capital are substitutes. Then in the long run, an increase in inflation induces substitution away from real money towards capital. The consequent long run equilibrium increase in the capital to labor ratio, or "capital intensity" is the focus in Tobin, and so can be thought of as a positive Tobin effect. It results in a lower marginal product of capital and lower

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1Fountas et al. (2006) find "strong evidence" that inflation negatively Granger-causes output growth in the G7 countries for monthly postwar data using a bivariate VAR-GARCH model. They also discuss more ambiguous results on how inflation uncertainty affects growth, which is theoretically explored for example in Lioui and Poncet (2008).

2Some of this evidence is related to inflation uncertainty, as in Byrne and Davis (2004), although uncertainty is not introduced in our paper. Also, Ahmed and Rogers (2000) is an exception that shows evidence that the investment to output ratio rises in the US when inflation goes up.
real interest rate. There is a temporary increase in output along the transition path until the new steady state is reached, within the exogenous growth Solow world (see also Ireland (1994) and the Walsh (1998) treatment). Thus the long run real interest rate falls, the long run investment rate rises and output growth only temporarily rises.\textsuperscript{3}

Fairly robust evidence supports only the first element of the original Tobin (1965) theory: that the long real interest rate falls. And in contrast to Tobin, evidence supports that the investment rate falls and that the long run growth rate of output falls. Thus the answer to this dilemma of seemingly opposite Tobin effects, along with a negative long run growth effect, cannot be found in Tobin’s extension of Solow. Instead for the puzzle’s resolution we show that it is sufficient to view the inflation mechanism more broadly. And it is necessary to carefully define what is meant by the Tobin effect in this broader framework: it is defined as in Tobin as "capital intensity", but in particular in terms of the effect of inflation in causing higher capital to effective labour ratios across sectors (as in Gillman and Nakov (2003)). Our definition is almost identical to what underlies the Tobin effect in his original model, except that our capital intensity is the stationary capital to effective labour ratio, which includes the Lucas (1988) indexing of labour by endogenous human capital instead of the Solow indexing of labour by exogenous technological change.

Our approach is therefore the inflation tax effect along the balanced-growth path equilibrium with Lucas (1988) endogenous growth (Section 2). Previously it has been shown in this setting how inflation acts as a tax on goods and productive time, causing the real interest rate and the output growth rate to fall (Gillman and Kejak 2005b), qualitatively as appears to be consistent with evidence. But the problem is that the investment to output ratio rises in such models (Gomme 1993),

\textsuperscript{3}In the Solow-Tobin model, using standard notation, output $y_t$ depends on capital $k$ and labor $n$: $y_t = A_t k_t^{1-\beta} n_t^\beta$; investment $i$ with depreciation $\delta_k$ is $i_t = k_{t+1} - k_t (1 - \delta_k)$, and the balanced path output growth rate $g = (k_{t+1} - k_t) / k_t$ is exogenous. It can be seen that $i_t / y_t = (g + \delta_k) \cdot \left( \frac{k_t}{A_t^{1/\beta} n_t^\beta} \right)^{\beta}$; if $\frac{k_t}{n_t}$ rises because of inflation, then so does $i_t / y_t$. 

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rather than falling as in recent empirical evidence and as in the theory of Stockman (1981). Stockman’s approach is to require money for the exchange of not just goods consumption, but also for all output including investment. This reasonable assumption, in that all output does in fact have to be exchanged for, means extending the cash-in-advance constraint beyond its typical specification for only consumption to additionally include investment. But a simple approach of just using the actual Stockman model is not sufficient: there inflation causes the real interest to rise as the capital stock is decreased, which is contrary to the evidence showing that the real interest rate decreases.

The key to resolving this puzzle is to consider that the real interest rate effect need not be positive as in Stockman (1981), when the Stockman exchange constraint is included in a more general model. An increase in the inflation rate can still decrease the real interest rate (unlike Stockman), while at the same time the investment rate decreases (as in Stockman). Consider that there can be two opposing effects on the real interest rate, when it is determined exclusively by the capital to effective labour in the goods sector in an economy such as Gomme (1993). If the Stockman constraint covers all of the consumer’s expenditures, then an increase in the inflation tax discourages the consumer’s supply of physical capital (or savings), causes the savings schedule to "shift backwards" and pressures the real interest rate upwards as the equilibrium investment decreases. But with the increase in the inflation tax also falling on consumption, the consumer substitutes away from (exchanged for) goods, towards (non-exchange) leisure and away from labour, which pressures the real wage to rise relative to the real interest rate; meanwhile this substitution also is from current to future consumption, towards more savings and pressuring the real interest rate downwards. As long as the labour decrease is large enough relative to the decrease of the physical capital available, then the real wage to real interest rate ratio will rise, the capital to

\footnote{Note that the original Lucas (1980) cash-in-advance constraint on only consumption was applied to an economy in which there was no physical capital; investment is zero and not explicitly excluded from the exchange constraint.}
effective labour ratios in the all sectors will rise and the real interest rate will fall (Section 3). This means that the investment to output ratio can continue to fall even while the capital to effective labour ratios rise across sectors and the real interest rate falls. This scenario, if it occurs, solves the puzzle.

This paper shows that applying the cash-in-advance constraint to both consumption and investment within the endogenous growth framework indeed does fit the described inflation evidence, within a realistically calibrated model of the US economy, for inflation rates rising up towards moderately high levels (Section 4). Besides the Stockman (1981) constraint, the growth part of the model is also a key ingredient. Inflation reduces the return to human capital and the economic growth rate. It does this because the inflation-induced goods to leisure substitution causes a lower "capacity utilization rate" of human capital when leisure increases; this directly lowers the return on human capital and the growth rate. But since the after-inflation-tax return on physical capital must equal the now-lowered return on human capital along the balanced growth equilibrium path, the savings-investment rate falls throughout the whole inflation range under consideration. This means that the inflation-induced fall in the investment rate is robust within a full range of the inflation rate, while the fall in the real interest rate becomes less and reverses to become an increase in the real interest rate once inflation continues to rise past a moderately high level. At this point the positive pressure on the real interest rate from the savings decline dominates the negative pressure from the labour decrease, which in turn has become increasingly smaller in magnitude because of the critical role played by exchange credit: it is used increasing more to avoid the inflation tax, allowing leisure to be used increasingly less as an avoidance device.

The results rest upon the human capital endogenous growth feature, which is a widely used paradigm,\(^5\) and upon leisure use, which is ubiquitous in dynamic

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\(^5\)In contrast, a positive Tobin (1965) effect will not result in an Ak endogenous growth model, even with the Stockman (1981) exchange constraint, in that the real interest rate is exogenously equal to \(A\). This result and an overview of growth models is provided in Gillman and Kejak (2005a).
macroeconomic models and strongly emphasized for example by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008) as a key channel. The paper’s economy is the same as the nesting model of Gillman and Kejak (2005a), except that here it is extended by decentralizing the banking sector that produces exchange credit. This explicit banking production approach, which is known as the financial intermediation approach in the banking literature (Matthews and Thompson 2008), is based on a well-established industry-production function for financial intermediation services.

The credit production function still yields the same empirically plausible generalized Cagan (1956) money demand (Mark and Sul 2003, Gillman and Otto 2007), as is found in Gillman and Kejak (2005b), which is essential for a realistic simulation of the negative inflation effect on growth. And the money to credit substitution implicit in the money demand determines how much leisure increases when inflation goes up, determining in part the effect of inflation on the real interest rate and therefore the plausibility of the model’s Tobin (1965) effect on interest rates. Decentralizing the banking sector is important in that it makes more exacting the calibration of the money demand, in that this now depends explicitly on parameters of a micro-founded credit production technology. Comparative statics of these technology parameters show how they affect money velocity and the balanced-growth rate, which in turn affects the investment rate and real interest rate. These results are also shown through full model simulations (Section 4).

Therefore the paper contributes a theoretical explanation of seemingly conflicting Tobin (1965) evidence on investment and real interest rates, within an economy that is calibrated realistically to US postwar data. At the same time, this model is theoretically consistent with other long run inflation-related evidence: on money demand, the output growth rate and on the employment rate; as well as with the effect of financial sector productivity increases on output growth and with the assumed structure of financial intermediation services production (Section 5). The consistency of the economy with these other empirical effects helps create greater confidence in the model’s robustness for its resolution of the Tobin evidence.
2. Representative Agent Model

2.1. Consumer Problem

The representative agent’s discounted utility stream depends on the consumption of goods $c_t$ and leisure $x_t$ in a constant elasticity fashion:

$$
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \right)^t (\log c_t + \alpha \log x_t).
$$

Exchange is required for both consumption and investment goods, denoted by $i_t$, whereby the consumer uses either nominal money, $M_t$, or credit from a credit card. Let $q_t$ denote the real quantity of credit and $P_t$ denote the nominal goods price. This makes the exchange constraint:

$$
M_t + P_t q_t \geq P_t c_t + P_t i_t.
$$

It is assumed that all expenditures are sourced from deposits, denoted in real units by $d_t$, held at the financial intermediary. The consumer buy shares in the intermediary by making a deposit, whereby the price per share is given by the intermediary at a fixed price of one, so there is no possibility of a capital gain. However the share, or unit deposit, yields a dividend that is paid by the intermediary to the consumer, so that the intermediary has no remaining profits after the dividend distribution; the intermediary is a "mutual bank" owned by the consumer, as is consistent with a representative agent model. The per unit dividend is in essence the payment of a nominal interest rate on deposited funds. Denote the per unit nominal dividend as $R_q t$; total nominal dividends are then $P_t R_q t d_t$ (see Section 2.2 for the intermediary problem).

Since all expenditures come out of the deposits, this means that

$$
P_t d_t = P_t (c_t + i_t).
$$

The fractions of capital allocated across the three sectors, of goods ($G$), human capital ($H$) and credit ($Q$), add up to 1:

$$
1 = s_{Gt} + s_{Ht} + s_{Qt};
$$

(2.4)
the fractions of labour add up to the total productively utilized time, or \(1 - x_t\):
\[
1 - x_t = l_{Gt} + l_{Ht} + l_{Qt}. \tag{2.5}
\]

Physical capital, \(k_t\), changes according to
\[
k_{t+1} = i_t + (1 - \delta_K) k_t. \tag{2.6}
\]

Human capital, \(h_t\), is accumulated through a constant returns to scale (CRS) production function using effective labour and capital; with \(A_H > 0\), \(\epsilon \in [0, 1]\),
\[
h_{t+1} = A_H (l_{Ht} h_t)^{\epsilon} (s_{Ht} k_t)^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - \delta_H) h_t. \tag{2.7}
\]

The change in the nominal money stock, \(M_{t+1} - M_t\), is equal to income minus expenditure. The nominal income received from capital and labour, with \(P_t\) denoting the price of goods and with \(r_t\) and \(w_t\) denoting the real rental and wage rates, is
\[
P_t r_t (s_{Gt} + s_{Qt}) k_t + P_t w_t (l_{Gt} + l_{Qt}) h_t.
\]
Also there is a lump sum government transfer \(V_t\) and the dividend distribution from the intermediary of \(R_{qt} d_t\). Expenditures are on consumption and investment, \(P_t (c_t + i_t)\), and for the payment of the fee for credit services; with \(P_{qt}\) denoting the nominal price per unit of credit, this fee is \(P_{qt} q_t\). Together these items make the income constraint:
\[
M_{t+1} = M_t + P_t r_t (s_{Gt} + s_{Qt}) k_t + P_t w_t (l_{Gt} + l_{Qt}) h_t + V_t + P_t R_{qt} d_t \tag{2.8}
- P_t c_t - P_t i_t - P_{qt} q_t.
\]

2.2. Financial Intermediary Problem

There are two approaches to positing the production function for financial intermediary services: the "production" approach and the "financial intermediation" approach. In the first, only labour and capital is used to produce the financial service, typically in CRS fashion. In the second, a third input is added, the deposits into the bank and again a constant returns to scale function is used, but now of the three inputs instead of just labour and capital. The distinction between the two approaches, when nested as part of a general equilibrium, is crucial. As
King and Plosser (1984) insightfully point out, if the CRS assumption is made using just labour and capital as inputs, then there is a flat marginal cost curve of credit supply, where the intratemporal credit is used for exchange. And with an alternative of money for making exchanges, with a marginal shadow cost that is also "flat" at the nominal interest rate of \( R \), then there is no unique equilibrium between money and credit use.

In this section it is demonstrated that the financial intermediation approach, of including deposits as an input, solves this problem of the definition of equilibrium, by giving an upward sloping marginal cost, per unit of deposits. Then a unique equilibrium between money and credit results. This is impossible following the production approach without deposits as is proved below in the following section on the full equilibrium analysis (Section 3.1).\(^6\) And the financial intermediation approach is supported empirically (see Section 5).

The intermediary is assumed to operate competitively. It sets the price of deposits and then the consumer determines the quantity of deposits it wants to hold, \( d_t \), as with a mutual bank. The production function for credit services is CRS in effective labour, since the human capital indexes the raw labor in all production sectors of the endogenous growth model, capital and the deposited funds \( d_t \). With \( AQ \in (0, \infty) \), \( \gamma_1 \in [0, 1) \), \( \gamma_2 \in [0, 1) \) and assuming that \( \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 < 1 \), the production function is given by\(^7\)

\[
q_t = AQ (lQt h_t)^\gamma_1 (sQt k_t)^\gamma_2 d_t^{1-\gamma_1-\gamma_2}.
\]

\(^6\)Assuming only labor and capital (the "production" approach) King and Plosser (1984) note that "The constant returns to scale structure implies that at given factor prices the finance industry supply curve is horizontal." Baltensperger (1980), in focusing on costly intermediation services, finds that the production function must be of decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor, or conversely that there needs to be a convex cost function, so that the constant marginal revenue per unit of funds equals the rising marginal cost per unit funds. Berk and Green (2004), in their study of mutual funds intermediation, specify a convex cost function, as does Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004) for a variety of value-added bank services. Using the "production" approach, Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) also assumes a money demand function, while Li (2000) sets capital equal to one, both being ways to still get a unique equilibrium but requiring additional assumptions.

\(^7\)From Sealey and Lindley (1977) and Clark (1984), where this form of the function is first specified.
Dividing equation (2.9) by \( d_t \) and defining normalized variables as 
\[ l_{qt} = \frac{l_{qt}h_t}{d_t}, \quad \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \quad \gamma_t^* = \frac{q^* \gamma_t}{d_t}, \] 
the production function can be written as
\[ q_t^* = A_Q l_{qt}^{\gamma_1} s_{qt}^{\gamma_2}. \] (2.10)

The solvency restriction that assets equal liabilities is given by
\[ P_tq_t + M_t = P_t d_t. \] (2.11)

The liquidity constraint is that money withdrawn by the consumer is covered by deposits:
\[ P_t d_t \geq M_t. \] (2.12)
When no credit is used, the liquidity constraint holds with equality and is equal to the solvency constraint.

Defining the residual return per unit of deposit as \( R_{qt} \), which results after profit maximization, the total nominal profit is then \( R_{qt} d_t P_t \) and it is returned to the consumer as owner of the bank, and its deposits. The competitive profit maximization problem then can be written as maximizing profit, denoted by \( \Pi_{Qt} \), with respect to the three inputs of capital, labour and deposits, subject to the production function in equation (2.9); profit here is the revenue \( P_t q_t \) minus the costs \( w_t l_{Qt} h_t P_t + r_t s_{Qt} k_t P_t \), and the dividend payout \( R_{qt} d_t P_t \): 
\[ \max_{q_t, s_{qt}, d_t} \Pi_{Qt} = P_t q_t - w_t l_{Qt} h_t P_t - r_t s_{Qt} k_t P_t - R_{qt} d_t P_t, \] (2.13)
subject to equation (2.9). More simply with normalized variables of \( \frac{P_t}{P_t} = p_{qt} \) and \( \Pi_{Qt}^* = \frac{\Pi_{Qt}}{P_t} \) and using equation (2.10), the firm’s problem is
\[ \max_{q_t, s_{qt}} \Pi_{Qt}^* = p_{qt} A_Q l_{qt}^{\gamma_1} s_{qt}^{\gamma_2} - w_t l_{qt} - r_t s_{qt} - R_{qt}. \] (2.14)

The solvency and liquidity constraints in equations (2.11) and (2.12) are always satisfied in this simple problem. Zero profit, or \( \Pi_{Qt}^* = 0 \), results through the distribution of the dividends according to the number of shares of bank ownership.
as given by the real quantity of deposits \( d_t \), at the dividend rate of \( R_{qt} \). Therefore 
\[ R_{qt} = p_{qt} q_t^* (1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2), \]
as follows directly from the CRS properties of credit production. This residual dividend rate in equilibrium is equal to the per unit-of-credit revenue of \( R_t \) minus the per unit cost \((\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) R_t\), as shown below (in Proposition 4, Section 3.1), by using in addition the equilibrium price of credit (equation 2.22 below in Section 2.5).

The first order conditions of the simplified problem in equation (2.14) can be written as in terms of average and marginal products: with \( AP_{lqt} = \frac{q_t}{l_{qt}} \), \( AP_{sqt} = \frac{\omega_t}{s_{qt}} \), \( MP_{lqt} = \gamma_1 AP_{lqt} \), \( MP_{sqt} = \gamma_2 AP_{sqt} \) and the marginal cost per unit of credit, denoted by \( MC_t \):

\[
p_{qt} = \frac{w_t}{\gamma_1 \left( \frac{q_t}{l_{qt}} \right)} = \frac{w_t}{\gamma_1 AP_{lqt}} = \frac{w_t}{MP_{lqt}} = MC_t; \tag{2.15}
\]

\[
p_{qt} = \frac{r_t}{\gamma_2 \left( \frac{q_t}{s_{qt}} \right)} = \frac{r_t}{\gamma_2 AP_{sqt}} = \frac{r_t}{MP_{sqt}} = MC_t. \tag{2.16}
\]

These Baumol (1952) conditions equate the marginal cost of credit funds to the value of the marginal products of effective labour and capital in producing the credit, the standard price theoretic conditions for factor markets; the marginal products are fractions, \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \), of the average products. And from these conditions, the marginal cost schedule can be derived traditionally in terms of input prices, parameters and the output level \( q_t^* \).

From equation (2.15), \( MC_t = \frac{w}{\gamma_1} \). Substituting in for \( l_{qt} = A_Q^{\frac{1}{\gamma_1}} s_{qt}^{\frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_1}} (q_t^*)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_1}} \) from the production function in equation (2.10), gives that \( MC_t = \frac{w}{\gamma_1} A_Q^{\frac{1}{\gamma_1}} s_{qt}^{\frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_1}} (q_t^*)^{\frac{1-\gamma_1}{\gamma_1}} \).

Finally, substituting in for \( s_{qt} \) from the bank’s first-order condition in equation (2.16), in which \( s_{qt} = \frac{r_t MC_t}{w} q_t^* \), and simplifying gives that

\[
MC_t = \left( \frac{w}{\gamma_1} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2}} \left( \frac{r_t}{\gamma_2} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2}} A_Q^{\frac{1-\gamma_1}{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2}} (q_t^*)^{\frac{1-\gamma_1}{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2}}. \tag{2.17}
\]

For simplification, define \( \gamma = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \) and rewrite the marginal cost as \( MC_t = B_t (q_t^*)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}} \), where \( B_t = \left( \frac{w}{\gamma_1} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma_1}} \left( \frac{r_t}{\gamma_2} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma_2}} A_Q^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}} \).
Consider the following proposition; the proof for this and all other propositions (2-7) are given in the Appendix.

**Proposition 1:** The marginal cost curve is upward sloping for $\gamma \in (0, 1)$, convex for $\gamma \in (0, 0.5)$ and concave for $\gamma \in (0.5, 1)$ when plotted against output $q_t^*$. 

Figure 1 illustrates the convex case of the marginal cost curve (curved line), with $\gamma = 0.3$, $B = 1.3541$ and with the nominal interest rate of $R = 0.15$ also drawn in as a horizontal line.

![Figure 1. Marginal Cost of Credit per unit of $q_t^*$](image)

### 2.3. Goods Producer Problem

The goods producer competitively hires labour and capital for use in its Cobb-Douglas production function. Given $A_G \in (0, \infty)$, $\beta \in [0, 1]$,

$$y_t = A_G(l_G l_t h_t)\beta(s_G k_t)^{1-\beta}, \quad (2.18)$$

with the first-order conditions of

$$w_t = \beta A_G(l_G l_t h_t)\beta-1(s_G k_t)^{1-\beta}, \quad (2.19)$$

$$r_t = (1 - \beta)A_G(l_G l_t h_t)\beta(s_G k_t)^{-\beta}. \quad (2.20)$$

### 2.4. Government Financing Problem

The government money supply changes according to a lump sum transfer of cash, $V_t$, given to the consumer each period:

$$M_{t+1} = M_t + V_t. \quad (2.21)$$
Assuming that this supply is such that there is a constant rate of money supply growth, defined by $\sigma \equiv \frac{V_t}{M_t}$, this money supply is

$$M_{t+1} = M_t (1 + \sigma).$$

2.5. Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium

Given prices $r_t$, $w_t$, $P_t$, $P_{qt}$ and $R_{qt}$, the consumer maximizes utility in equation (2.1) subject to the constraints in equations (2.2) to (2.8), with respect to $c_t$, $x_t$, $l_Gt$, $l_Ht$, $l_Qt$, $s_Gt$, $s_Ht$, $s_Qt$, $q_t$, $d_t$, $i_t$, $k_{t+1}$, $h_{t+1}$ and $M_{t+1}$. Given prices $r_t$, $w_t$, $P_t$, $P_{qt}$ and the technology of equation (2.10), the financial intermediary maximizes profit (equation 2.14) with respect to normalized inputs, yielding equilibrium equations (2.15) and (2.16). The goods producer maximizes profit subject to the CRS production function constraint (2.18), giving conditions (2.19) and (2.20). And the government’s budget constraint (2.21) provides the market clearing condition for the money market; the deposit condition (2.3) provides market clearing for the intermediary’s deposit market; and goods market clearing of income equal to expenditure is given by equation (2.8).

Along the balanced growth path (BGP) all growing real variables ($c_t$, $y_t$, $q_t$, $d_t$, $m_t \equiv M_t/P_t$, $i_t$, $k_{t+1}$, $h_{t+1}$) grow at the same rate, with this balanced growth rate denoted by $g$. Other stationary variables on the BGP also are denoted without the time index in the following BGP equilibrium conditions (with $\gamma \equiv \gamma_1 + \gamma_2$); these are then used to describe the effect of inflation in the next section.

$$p_q = R, \quad (2.22)$$

$$R = \sigma + \rho + \sigma \rho, \quad (2.23)$$

$$\frac{m}{y} = 1 - \left[ R^{\frac{\gamma_1}{\omega \gamma}} A_Q^{-\frac{1}{\gamma_2}} \left( \frac{\gamma_1}{\omega} \right) \left( \frac{\gamma_2}{\omega} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_1}} \right], \quad (2.24)$$

$$\frac{x}{\omega c_t} = \frac{1 + \bar{R}}{wh_t}, \quad (2.25)$$

$$\bar{R} = (1 - q^*) R + \gamma R q^*, \quad (2.26)$$
\[
\frac{w}{r} = \frac{\beta \ s_G k_t}{1 - \beta \ l_G h_t} = \frac{\varepsilon \ s_H k_t}{1 - \varepsilon \ l_H h_t} = \frac{\gamma_1 \ s_Q k_t}{\gamma_2 \ l_Q h_t},
\]

(2.27)

\[
r_H = \varepsilon A_H \left( \frac{s_H k_t}{l_H h_t} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} (1 - x),
\]

(2.28)

\[
1 + g = \frac{1 + r_H - \delta_H}{1 + \rho} = \frac{1 + \frac{r}{1+R} - \delta_K}{1 + \rho},
\]

(2.29)

\[
\frac{i_t}{k_t} = \frac{k_{t+1} - k_t (1 - \delta_K)}{k_t} = g + \delta_K,
\]

(2.30)

\[
\frac{i_t}{k_t} = \frac{g + \delta_K}{A_G(\frac{k_G k_t}{s_G})} \cdot s_G = \frac{g + \delta_K}{r \cdot s_G} = \frac{r}{r} \cdot \frac{1+R}{r} \cdot \frac{1 - \delta_K}{1 + \rho}.
\]

(2.31)

3. Analysis of the Effect of Inflation

The price of credit per unit is simply the nominal interest rate, by equation (2.22), giving the perfectly elastic demand for credit at the price \( R \); thus the marginal cost of money (\( R \)) equals the marginal cost of credit, in a generalization of the margin found in Baumol (1952). At the Friedman optimum, the nominal interest \( R \) equals zero (equation 2.23), no credit is used (equation 2.17) and normalized money demand (inverse money velocity) is equal to 1 (equation 2.24), which gives the special case of a cash-only economy.

Consider what happens when inflation increases. As inflation rises, \( R \) rises and the shadow cost of exchange \( \tilde{R} \) (equation 2.26) rises; the agent then substitutes from money to credit as in equation (2.24) and from goods towards leisure according to the marginal rate of substitution given in equation (2.25). This \( \tilde{R} \) is the average exchange cost per unit of output and is equal to a weighted average of the cost \( R \) when using cash, with the weight of \( m/y \), and the average cost when using credit, \( (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)R \), as weighted by \( 1 - m/y \).\(^8\) Substitution towards leisure \( x \) reduces the employed time \( (1 - x) \); the capital to effective labour ratio also

\(^8\)That \( (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)R \) is an average cost can be verified by dividing the total cost of credit production, net of deposit dividends, by the total output of credit production.
rises across all sectors as the real wage $w$ rises and the real interest rate $r$ falls (equations (2.22)); but in equation (2.28) the rise in $\frac{\mu_H}{\mu_H}$ is dominated by the increase in leisure so as to reduce $r_H$. The growth rate, in equation (2.29), therefore falls as $R$ rises because $r_H$ falls and because the after inflation-tax return on physical capital, which can be defined as $r_K \equiv r/\left(1 + \hat{R}\right)$ (see equation (2.29)), also falls. And so the returns to capital remain the same but lower, in that $r_H = r_K$, but now at a lower level and the growth rate falls accordingly.

The negative inflation effect on the investment to capital ratio of equation (2.30) follows directly from the growth rate effect. The effect of inflation on the investment to output ratio, $i/y$, as given in equation (2.31), similarly depends on the growth rate effect, but also on the changes in the interest rate and in the capital share of the goods sector, $s_G$. In the simulations below (Section 4), it is clear that the changes in $r$ and $s_G$ go in opposite directions and are therefore offsetting to some extent, leaving the growth effect to dominate and to cause $i/y$ to fall when inflation increases.

The role of the Tobin effect here is actually rather secondary, as it affects the growth rate and the investment rate. The reallocation away from expensive labour and towards cheaper capital acts to better realign factor inputs given the inflation tax. This ameliorates the negative growth and investment effects, but does not reverse them. However this positive Tobin effect, in terms of the increase in the capital to effective labour ratio, uniquely determines that there is a decrease in the real interest rate as $R$ rises up from zero.

### 3.1. Credit Supply and Money Demand

As the money demand is residually determined by the credit supply, the fundamentals of the credit supply also underlie those of the money demand and ultimately impact upon the sensitivity of the Tobin effect. The comparative statics of the money demand with respect to the credit production parameters are qualitatively the same as for the comparative statics for the marginal cost curve. And a focus on marginal cost allows for simple graphical illustration, with respect
to changes in the three structural parameters of the credit technology: $A_Q$, $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$. While an increase in inflation causes more use of exchange credit, with a movement along the marginal cost curve up to a new higher $MC$, a change in the structural parameters causes the $MC$ to shift graphically.

**Proposition 2.** Given $q^*$, an increase in $A_Q$ decreases the $MC$.

Figure 2 graphs how an increase in the credit productivity parameter $A_Q$ pivots down the marginal cost (dotted line) from its baseline (solid line). This also causes more credit supply and a lower money demand at a given nominal interest rate. And it increases the balanced path growth rate (see Section 3.2 and Section 4).

The scale parameters $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ have different effects on marginal cost and on growth. These scale parameters are important for the calibration of the growth, investment and interest rate effects. First consider that their sum must be less than one in order for the economy’s equilibrium to be well-defined.

**Proposition 3.** Assume that $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 = 1$ and that both credit and goods sectors are equally labour intensive ($\gamma_1 = \beta$). Then there exists no equilibrium.

If $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 = 1$, then there is no third factor, deposited funds, entering into the credit production function and there is no equilibrium, so that the proposition shows the importance of deposited funds as a non-trivial factor. With $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 < 1$, the marginal cost per unit of funds is upwards sloping as in Figure 1 (Section 2.2) and there is a unique equilibrium of credit supplied and of money demanded, at a given nominal interest rate.

A second important characterizing feature is that the sum of the scale parameters are in fact equal to a measure of the per-unit interest cost of the credit. Here define $R^{*}_{qt} = R_{qt}d_{t}/q_{t}$ as the per unit of credit dividends.

**Proposition 4.** The proportional per unit cost of credit is equal to the degree of the economies of scale, in that: $(R_t - R^{*}_{qt}) / R_t = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2$.

Consider that the total financial intermediary dividends returned to the consumer are $R_{qt}d_{t}$, or $R_{qt}d_{t}/q_{t}$ per unit of credit. The differential between the price of credit per unit of credit output, $R_t$, and the dividend rate of return per unit of credit, $R^{*}_{qt}$, gives the average cost of the resource use per unit of credit,
This makes the degree of the "returns to scale", $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2$, equal to the fraction of the nominal interest rate that are used up by the production costs per unit of credit, which is the basis for calibration in Section 3.

Given the per unit cost interpretation of $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2$, consider how changes in these parameters affect the marginal cost of credit function:

**Proposition 5.** Defining curvature as $\eta \equiv \left( \frac{\partial \log MC}{\partial \log q} \right) / \left( \frac{MC}{q} \right)$, then for a given $w$ and $r$, an increase in $\gamma_1$ causes a decrease in the curvature of the $MC$ curve and an increase in the level of $MC$ for a given level of credit output, given a sufficiently low quantity of credit output.

![Figure 2. Marginal Cost with Changes in $A_Q$ and $\gamma$](image)

Figure 2 also illustrates Proposition 5. For $MC = B \left( q^* \right)^{(1-\gamma)/\gamma}$, where $B$ is given by equation (2.17), it graphs an increase in $\gamma$ from $\gamma = 0.25$ (solid line) to $\gamma = 0.40$ (dashed line), while $B$ actually depends on $\gamma$ and falls in turn in this example from 1.73 to 0.94. The increase causes less curvature and a higher marginal cost for a given, sufficiently low, $q^*$. Therefore, increasing $\gamma$ causes greater "scale" which leads to lower marginal costs at high output levels but higher marginal costs at low output levels.

The effects on money demand of changes in $A_Q$ and $\gamma$ can be understood in terms of shifting the marginal cost curve. If the $MC$ shifts down, credit is cheaper, less money is used and velocity is higher; the reverse holds if the $MC$ shifts up. A higher money velocity means that the inflation tax falls on less real money and
so the tax reduces the growth rate by less. Section 3.2 shows these growth effects analytically for a human capital only economy.

3.2. Growth

Analytically for the case of no physical capital, the comparative statics of the balanced path growth rate are qualitatively the same as in the full model simulations. Consider for the next two propositions that $\beta = \varepsilon = 1$ and $\gamma_2 = 0$; then the technology is $y_t = c_t = A_G l_G h_t$, $h_{t+1} = (1 + A_H l_H - \delta_H) h_t$ and $q_t^* = A_Q^2 q_t^2$.

Proposition 6. An increase in the credit sector productivity level, $A_Q$, causes an unambiguous decrease in the BGP leisure use and growth rate.

This reflects the intuition that greater productivity in producing credit results in a lower marginal cost of credit production (Proposition 2), a higher money velocity, a lower effective inflation tax ($\tilde{R}$) in equation (2.26), less leisure use and a higher growth rate. Increasing the scale $\gamma$ gives the opposite results for sufficiently low nominal interest rates, since it causes marginal cost $MC$ to rise (Proposition 5):

Proposition 7. Given that $R < R' \equiv \frac{2}{A_Q} e^{-\frac{3}{4}}$, an increase in $\gamma_1$ causes on the BGP an increase in leisure use and a decrease in the growth rate.

3.3. The Real Interest Rate

Whether the capital intensities are rising across the sectors depends on whether $w/r$ is rising. And when sectoral capital intensities are rising, the real interest rate is falling. A way to think intuitively of the overall forces determining $r$ is to think in terms of what is happening to capital intensities when inflation increases.

To illustrate these effects, consider the Becker (1965) concept of "full income", $y^F$, that includes the shadow income from non-market output (human capital investment) as well as the explicit income from market output, from all sectors of the economy. Looking at his full income in terms of the total cost ($TC_t$) of all output, where $TC_t \equiv y^F$, then $(s_G l + s_H l + s_Q l) r_t k_t + (l_G l + l_H l + l_Q l) w_t h_t = TC_t$.

Note here that the banking sector cost does not include the interest cost of the
deposits (an input to production), since this is just the residual profit that is redistributed back to the consumer; then only the labour and capital costs remain. Substituting into the $TC_t$ using the goods and time constraints of equations (2.4) and (2.5), the $TC_t$ can be written as the "isocost line":

$$\frac{k_t}{h_t} = A_t - \frac{w_t}{r_t} (1 - x_t), \hspace{1cm} (3.1)$$

where $A_t \equiv \frac{TC_t}{r_t h_t}$, with a vertical axis of normalized capital $k_t$, a horizontal axis of raw labor $1 - x_t$ and a slope of $-\frac{w_t}{r_t}$. The capital to effective labour ratios in all sectors have a slope that is proportional to $\frac{w_t}{r_t}$ (see equation 2.27); therefore when $\frac{w_t}{r_t}$ increases, the ratios $\frac{sgt k_s}{l_{gt} h_t}$, $\frac{sht k_s}{l_{ht} h_t}$ and $\frac{sqt k_s}{l_{qt} h_t}$ increase.

Figure 3 indicates the capital intensity ratios of the two sectors, goods and human capital investment, by the slopes of the positively-sloped rays from the origin (the goods sector is more capital intensive), and isocost lines of the form in equation (3.1) by the negatively sloped lines. When the inflation rate rises, the labour time $1 - x$ falls and so does $k/h$, so that the initial, outermost (from the origin), isocost line shifts inward until the middle isocost line is reached, with new higher sectoral capital intensities (dashed rays from origin). The input price ratio $w/r$ is higher since the slope of the isocost is steeper, capital intensities are higher (equation 2.27) and so the real interest rate has fallen. When the inflation rate continues to rise, the $k/h$ falls again but by less and the labour time falls by much less, resulting in the innermost isocost line. Here $w/r$ (the slope of the isocost line) now has fallen back to what is was in the outermost isocost line and the capital to effective labour ratios have fallen back to the original ray from the origin. When $w/r$ falls, then the real interest rate rises. The falling $k/h$ and $1 - x$ that underlie Figure 3, along with the $i/y$ and $r$ effects, are shown in simulations of the calibrated model in Section 4.
4. Calibration and Simulation

The baseline calibration sets parameters and BGP target values of variables as based on postwar US annual data for 1954-2000; these are given in Table 4.1. Based on the postwar US quarterly calibrations of Gomme, Ravikumar, and Rupert (2006) and Gomme and Rupert (2007), the shares of effective labour in the goods sector and human capital investment sectors are 0.64 and 0.70 respectively; the annual investment-capital ratio, \( i/k = (i/y)/(k/y) \), is 0.088; the implied annual rate of physical capital depreciation, \( \delta_K = i/k - g \), is 0.071; the depreciation rate of human capital is the same as for physical capital, \( \delta_H = 0.071; \) and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( \theta \) is 1. The average annual rate of growth of real GDP, \( g \), and the average inflation rate, \( \pi \), are 1.68% and 5%, respectively, as in the data. This implies a BGP money supply growth rate of \( \sigma = 6.68\% \).

Given a time preference rate at the standard value of \( \rho = 4\% \), the nominal interest rate is equal to \( R = \sigma + \rho + \rho \sigma = 10.68\% \) and the gross real return on capital is \( r_K = r_H = g + \delta_K + \rho + \rho g = 12.8\% \). To also achieve the Gomme et al. (2006) target values for working time \( l_G = 0.255 \) and leisure \( x = 0.5 \), the utility parameter for leisure is set at \( \alpha = 1.935 \).

The basis for the calibration for \( \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 = \gamma \) is the interest differential formula
### PARAMETERS

**Preferences**

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Table 4.1: Baseline Calibration
of Proposition 5, whereby $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 = (R - R_q)/R$. It is calibrated using financial industry data at $\gamma = 0.268$, assuming the use of data from just one year, on the basis that this parameter does not change over time. To see how this was calibrated, first note that the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that $R_qd = Rq(1 - \gamma)$ is the total dividend returned to the consumer (interest dividend on deposits); this makes $\gamma Rq$ the resource cost of the credit. Per unit of credit this is $\gamma R$, so $\gamma$ is the per unit cost of credit divided by $R$. To compute this, consider that $\gamma = (\gamma Rq) / (Rq)$ is the total credit cost divided by $Rq$. For the total credit cost estimate, we use as the basis the average annual fee for an American Express credit card as a measure of how much interest is paid on average; it is assumed to reflect the total interest costs of using the annual exchange credit through a "charge card", rather than a roll-over intertemporal credit card. For an average person this is calculated as $\$170$, comprised of the basic $\$125$ Gold Card annual fee plus ad-on charges of $\$45$ for late payment penalties. For $R$, the average 3-month Treasury Bill interest rate, on an annual basis and as an average for the postwar data sample period, gives that $\gamma = 0.0606$. Finally for $q$, it is true that $q = (q/d)d = [1 - (m/y)]d$ and that in the economy $y = d$; therefore $q = [1 - (m/y)]y$. Using real GDP per-capita at 2006 prices, $y = \$25127$, while the US M2 average annual income velocity for 1954-2000 is equal to $1/0.584$. Putting this together, $Rq = (0.0606)(1 - 0.584)25127 = 633.44$, and $\gamma = 170/633.44 \approx 0.268$. Dividing $\gamma$ between capital and labor shares is done by assuming the same ratio of the labor and capital shares in the goods sector: $\gamma_1/\gamma_2 = \beta/(1 - \beta) = (0.64)/(0.36)$. This implies that $\gamma_1 = 0.172$ and $\gamma_2 = 0.096$, respectively. To then achieve the target value of $m/y = 0.584$, it requires that $A\Omega = 1.44$.

4.1. Credit Production

Figure 4 simulates the baseline equilibrium credit $q^* \in [0, 1)$ (equation 2.10) as graphed with respect to the $l_q$ labour axis (curved line), including the tangency (circle) of the profit line (straight line) of equation (2.14) to the production function; its slope equals the marginal product of credit labour, or $w/R = 10.39$. 21
Figure 4. Baseline Equilibrium Credit Production.

4.2. Growth, Investment Rate and Tobin Effects

Figure 5 simulates for the baseline calibration how the growth rate falls as the inflation rate goes up (solid lines) and the comparative statics (dashed lines) of a 5% rise in $A_Q$ and a 20% rise in $\gamma$. As in Propositions 6 and 7, greater credit productivity increases the growth rate and an increase in $\gamma$ decreases the growth rate for a given inflation rate.

Figure 5. Inflation, Growth, and Changes in $A_Q$ and $\gamma$
Figure 6. Inflation vs Returns on Capital, Investment Rate, Capital/Effective Labor

Figure 7. Effect of Inflation on Productive Time \((1 - x), k/h, i/y\) and \(s_G\).
Figure 6 (left-hand side panels) shows the human capital return $r_H$ (equation 2.29) and $i/y$ (equation 2.31) falling as the inflation rate increases. And it shows (right-hand side panels) that $r$ falls and $s_G k/l_G h$ rises as inflation rises, up to a moderately high level of inflation, but then the graphs reverse at higher levels of inflation. This shows that the real interest rate $r$ falls while $i/y$ falls, but eventually $r$ starts to rise, in concordance with the change in capital intensities. Note that here $r$ does not begin rising until at a level of the inflation rate higher than those experienced in the postwar US, thereby confirming a "positive" Tobin effect, while having a negative $i/y$ and growth effects, for the baseline calibration.

Figure 7 shows related effects of inflation: on the rate of productively employed labour in all three sectors, $1 - x$, exhibiting a similar nonlinearity as seen for other variables; on the physical capital to human capital ratio $k/h$ with it also falling in a similar nonlinear fashion; on $i_H/y$ which is the ratio of outputs in the human capital investment and goods sectors; and on $s_G$ the share of capital in goods production. The falling levels of both $1 - x$ and $k/h$ are consistent with the isocost line of Figure 3 shifting inwards towards the origin as inflation increases, while the decrease in $i_H/y$ is consistent with the initial penalization of the labour intensive sector, as $w/r$ increases. These changes in $i_H/y$ are reflected in the initial rise in $s_G$.

5. Discussion: Consistency with Facts

The paper shows potential consistency with the negative effect of inflation on the balanced path growth rate of output, the investment rate and the real interest rate. It shows that the real interest rate goes down as inflation rises, for levels of inflation up to a rate that is above that found in the US postwar era. But the other long run features of the model are also consistent with empirical experience.

The money demand interest elasticity is a generalized version of Cagan (1956)'s elasticity of $-bR$, where $b$ is a positive parameter. Here the elasticity can be shown to be a function $\varepsilon$ of $bR^z$, where $\varepsilon (bR^z) = -z\frac{bR^z}{1-bR^z}$ with $z = \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}$ and with $b$ a
function of input prices and credit technology parameters. The result is that both elasticities rise in magnitude as the nominal interest rate rises. A Cagan function has been supported for international data (Mark and Sul 2003) and this particular generalized Cagan elasticity has been supported for US and Australian data (Gillman and Otto 2007). In stochastic form, this type of money demand is able to explain velocity at business cycle frequencies (Benk et al., 2008).

The money demand is residually determined by the credit supply, since these are perfect substitutes in exchange. So it is noteworthy that the credit production used here has found empirical support for its CRS specification in the financial intermediation/banking literature ever since this technology for financial intermediation services first emerged (Hancock 1985, Wheelock and Wilson 2006). This means that both parts of the money-credit solutions have empirical support.

The money demand determines the velocity effect and the subsequent goods to leisure substitution. The resulting decrease in employed time \( (1 - x) \) as a result of inflation (Figure 7), in the long run, is consistent with evidence finding cointegration of inflation and unemployment (Ireland 1999, Shadman-Mehta 2001), given that unemployment and the employment rate are found to move closely together. The fact that there is the nonlinear effect of inflation on the employment rate may not have been identified empirically but certainly is an area that might be further investigated.

The credit supply behind the money demand also has the feature that financial development from higher credit sector productivity leads to a higher balanced path growth rate. This result is consistent with the large literature on finance and growth, in which finance is found to positively affect growth.

And the central feature for the Tobin effect of a comovement between inflation and the capital to effective labour ratio is supported empirically in Gillman and Nakov (2003), for both US and UK data. Here cointegration is found between the two series and Granger causality is found from inflation to the input ratio. This compliments the evidence on the negative effect of inflation on growth, investment and the real interest rate. So it appears that many related facets of the stationary
equilibrium analysis are consistent with long run evidence.

However in qualification the model’s simulated decrease in the real interest rate (Figure 6) is small in magnitude, compared for example to Rapach (2003) who finds larger decreases in the real interest rate from inflation increases. However there are no taxes in our model as in Feldstein (1982) and there may be other features not modeled that make the simulated effect relatively small. The model captures many features simultaneously, in terms of the signs of the changes of many variables, the profile of the changes across the range of inflation (for the inflation-growth effect) and the functional forms (for money demand and credit supply) that are also found in the empirical results. The restriction of calibrating the model carefully to US postwar data makes it challenging to get magnitudes of all such changes to correspond to empirical findings, especially given differently estimated models without precisely comparable results.

However the model does capture for example the estimated magnitudes for the decrease in the output growth rate, which has been well-investigated in empirical studies. For example, Barro (1995) using international panel data finds a 0.24 percentage point decrease in the growth rate from a 10 point increase in the inflation rate. Our Figure 5 shows that the growth rate falls by 0.4 percentage points, when inflation rises from 10% to 20%, and this falls to a 0.2 decrease when inflation rises from 20 to 30%; others show that this magnitude does indeed decrease as the inflation rate goes up (Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004).

Thus the paper has mostly restricted its theoretical description of the empirical findings to one of getting the direction of the changes correct, within a well-calibrated model, for ranges of the inflation rate as seen in the postwar US data. The profile of the inflation-growth effect and the money demand functional form are exceptions, in that these are rather well-studied over different inflation rates, and we can capture these accurately within the model. The non-linearity in the inflation-growth effect has not been well studied in other dimensions. Our results in particular find this same profile for the investment-output ratio; further study of whether this profile exists empirically would be interesting.
6. Conclusion

The paper offers a solution to the puzzle of explaining conflicting Tobin type evidence that is found in the literature. It focuses on a natural way to define the Tobin effect in terms of the effect of inflation on capital intensity as in Tobin. But the model’s capital intensity is the capital to effective labor ratio, with effective labor indexed by Lucas (1988) human capital instead of by Solow (1956) technological change, as in Tobin. For inflation rates within the US postwar experience, the results within the calibrated economy are that inflation causes a rise in the ratio of the wage rate to the real interest, a rise in the capital to effective labour ratio across sectors and a decrease in the real interest rate. This is consistent with Tobin’s decrease in the real interest rate even though it includes a Stockman (1981) exchange constraint that causes an inflation tax on investment.

The ability to explain this evidence qualitatively, in a quantitatively precise calibration, along with related inflation effects indicates some success with this approach. This suggests that it may be arbitrary to restrict the specification of cash-in-advance exchange constraints to cover only consumption goods, while leaving investment to be frictionlessly acquired. One way to test the appropriateness of the model’s exchange constraint specification is to investigation stochastic extensions of this model, with shocks for example as in Benk et al. (2008). It might be possible to determine if the paper’s Stockman (1981) approach, within endogenous growth and with money and banking, leads to a stronger explanation of the movements of real and nominal variables over time.

A. Appendix: Proofs of Propositions

Proposition 1 Proof: Given $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ and $MC_t = B_t (q_t^*)^{(1-\gamma)}$, it is clear that $B_t > 0$, which implies that the "slope" coefficient $B_t$ is positive. For $B_t$ held constant at $\bar{B}$, $\frac{\partial MC_t}{\partial q_t} = \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \bar{B} (q_t^*)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}-1} > 0$ if $\gamma < 1$, establishing the $MC$ upward slope. Then the exact value of $\gamma$ determines the curvature:

$\frac{\partial^2 MC_t}{\partial (q_t)^2} = \left(\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} - 1\right) \left(\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}\right) B_t (q_t^*)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}-2} > 0$ if $\gamma < 0.5$ and $\frac{\partial^2 MC_t}{\partial (q_t)^2} > 0$ if $\gamma > 0.5$,
establishing convexity and concavity respectively.

**Proposition 2** Proof: From equation (2.17), for a given \( q^* \) and \( (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \in (0, 1) \), it follows that \( \partial (MC) / \partial A_Q < 0 \).

**Proposition 3** Proof: From equation (2.10), \( q_t/d_t = A_Q \left( \frac{l_Q h_t}{q_t} \right)^{\gamma_1} \left( \frac{s_Q k_t}{q_t} \right)^{\gamma_2} \) and with \( \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 = 1 \), then \( 1 = A_Q \left( l_Q h_t/q_t \right)^{\gamma_1} \left( s_Q k_t/q_t \right)^{\gamma_2} \). Using equations (2.10) and (2.24), it can be shown that \( l_Q h_t/q_t = \gamma_1 R/w \) and \( s_Q k_t/q_t = \gamma_2 R/r \); substituting these relations back into the previous equation, it results that \( 1 = A_Q (\gamma_1 R/w)^{\gamma_1} (\gamma_2 R/r)^{\gamma_2} \), or \( R = A_Q^{-1} (\gamma_1/w)^{-\gamma_1} (\gamma_2/r)^{-\gamma_2} \). Substituting in for \( w \) and \( r \) from the equations (2.19) and (2.20), \( R = \left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma_1} \right)^{\gamma_1} \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\gamma_2} \right)^{\gamma_2} \left( \frac{A_G}{A_Q} \right) \left( \frac{l_Q h_t}{s_Q k_t} \right)^{(\beta-\gamma_1)} \).

With \( \gamma_1 = \beta \), the last expression becomes \( R = \frac{A_G}{A_Q} \). The nominal interest rate is a constant independent of the growth rate: \( R = \sigma + \rho + \sigma \rho \) (given the log-utility assumption) which in general is not equal to \( \frac{A_G}{A_Q} \), giving a contradiction. In the case when \( \frac{A_G}{A_Q} = \sigma + \rho + \sigma \rho \), then there is no equilibrium since \( A_Q > 0 \) implies that \( R > 0 \); then equation (2.24) implies that \( q_t = \infty \), which violates that \( q_t/d_t \in [0, 1) \), derived by combining equations (2.2) and (2.3).

**Proposition 4** Proof: Since \( R_t = p_{qt} \) by equation (2.22), then, by use of the CRS property of the production function of equation (2.9), \( \frac{w_d l_Q h_t}{R_q q_t} = \gamma_1 \) and \( \frac{s q_t k_t}{R_q q_t} = \gamma_2 \). From equation (2.14) and using the definitions above of \( l_Q \) and \( s_Q \), it follows that \( R_q = R_q q_t^* - \gamma_1 R_t q_t^* - \gamma_2 R_t q_t^* = R_t q_t^* (1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2) \). With the definition above that \( R_q^* = R_q / q_t^* \), then \( R_q^* = R_t (1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2) \), or \( R_t = R_q^* \left( \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \right) R_t \) and so \( \left( R_t - R_q^* \right) / R_t = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \).

**Proposition 5** Proof: With \( \gamma \equiv \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \) and \( \eta \equiv \left( \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \gamma_1} \right) / \left( \frac{MC}{\gamma_1} \right) \), then \( \eta = (1 - \gamma) / \gamma \) and \( \partial \eta / \partial \gamma_1 < 0 \). Second, by equation (2.17), \( \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \gamma_1} = \frac{a}{\beta \gamma_1} \left\{ 1 - \left( \frac{\lambda}{\beta} \log \frac{w}{\gamma_1} + \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_2} - \log A_Q + (1 - \gamma) \log q^* \right) \right\} \) and this writes as \( \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \gamma_1} = MC \left( \frac{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_1} - \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_2} - \log A_Q + (1 - \gamma) \log q^*}{\gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_2} - \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_1} - \log A_Q + (1 - \gamma) \log q^*} \right) \). For ease of exposition, let \( \gamma_1 = \gamma_2 \). Then \( \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \gamma_1} = MC \left( \frac{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_1} - \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_1} - \log A_Q + (1 - \gamma) \log q^*}{\gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_2} - \gamma_2 \log \frac{w}{\gamma_1} - \log A_Q + (1 - \gamma) \log q^*} \right) > 0 \), for \( q^* < e^{-2\gamma_1} \left( \frac{w}{\gamma_1} \right)^{\gamma_1} A_Q^{-1} \).

**Propositions 6 and 7** both use the following BGP equilibrium solution for the case with no physical capital: \( q^* = (\gamma_1 R/A_G)^{\gamma_1/(1-\gamma_1)} A_Q^{1/(1-\gamma_1)} ; \frac{a}{h_t} = 28 \)
\[
\frac{A_G(1+A_H(1-\pi)-\delta_H)}{A_H(1+\gamma_1 A_G q^* R)/(1+\rho)} \cdot x = \frac{\phi_R \omega(R)(1+\frac{\delta_H}{A_H})}{1+\frac{\delta_H}{A_H} \omega(R)} \cdot \text{where } \omega(R) = \frac{1+(1-q^* R + (\gamma_1 q^*) R}{1+\gamma_1 A_G q^* R} (\text{ratio of "shadow price" of goods to "social cost" of goods}) \text{ and } 1+g = \frac{1+A_H(1-\pi)-\delta_H}{1+\rho}.
\]

**Proposition 6 Proof:** From the solution given above, it is clear that \( \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial A_Q} > 0 \) and since \( \gamma_1 < 1 \) that \( \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial q^*} < 0 \). With \( \delta_H < 1 \), it follows that \( \frac{\partial x}{\partial \Omega} > 0 \). Consequently \( \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial A_Q} < 0 \); with \( \partial g/\partial x < 0 \), then \( \frac{\partial g^*}{\partial A_Q} > 0 \).

**Proposition 7 Proof:** From the solution given above, \( 1+g = \frac{1+A_H(1-\pi)-\delta_H}{1+\rho} \) and so \( \frac{\partial g}{\partial q} = -\frac{A_H}{1+\rho} \frac{\partial x}{\partial q} \). Using \( \text{sign}(x) \) for the sign of \( x \), it follows that \( \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial q}{\partial q^*} \right) \) is a negative function of \( \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial x}{\partial q^*} \right) = \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial q}{\partial q^*} \right) \). Given that \( A_G = 1 \) as in the baseline calibration, from the solution above \( \Omega = 1 + \frac{(1-q^*) R}{1+\gamma_1 q^* R} \) and \( \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial q^*} = \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial q^*} + \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial q^*} q^* R \) where \( \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial q^*} = \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial q^*} \left( e^{1-\gamma_1} \log[A_Q(\gamma_1 R)^{\gamma_1}] \right) \).

Thus \( \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial q^*} = -\frac{a^* R(1+\gamma_1 R)}{(1+\gamma_1 q^* R)^2} \left[ 1-\gamma_1 \log(1+\gamma_1 q^* R) \right] \right] + (1-q^*) R \right) \right) \right) \) and since \( (1-q^*) R < 1+\gamma_1 R \) for \( R < 1, \frac{1-\gamma_1 \log(1+\gamma_1 q^* R)}{(1-\gamma_1)^2} + \frac{(1-q^*) R}{(1+\gamma_1 R)^2} + 1 < 0 \) if \( R < R' \equiv \frac{1}{1+\gamma_1 A_Q} \). In the baseline calibration, \( A_Q = 1.44, \gamma_1 = 0.268 \) and so \( R' = 0.73 \), establishing that \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial q^*} < 0 \) for \( R < 0.73 \).

**References**


