‘Honour’
and the political economy of marriage

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD, 2015
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This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

Signed __________________________ (candidate) Date: 13 April 2015

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD.

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STATEMENT 2

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.

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Summary

‘Honour’-based violence (HBV) is defined as a form of crime, predominantly against women, committed by the agnates of the victim, often in collaboration, which are justified by the victims’ perceived violation of social norms, particularly those around sexuality and gender roles. While HBV is often considered as a cultural phenomenon, I argue that the cross-cultural distribution of crimes fitting this definition prohibits a purely cultural explanation. I advance an alternate explanation for HBV through a deployment of the cultural materialist strategy and the anthropological theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Claude Lévi-Strauss (as interpreted by Gayle Rubin) and Eric Wolf. I argue that HBV is an epiphenomenon of the ‘exchange of women’ model of marriage transactions occurring within the patrilineal kinship structures typical of Central Eurasia, and that this is particularly marked amongst peoples with a history of agrarian and pastoral modes of production, in which kinship underwrites relations of resource and labour sharing. Within these scenarios, marriage is an aspect of the political economy of the group, since it extends or consolidates kinship networks. In post-agrarian neopatrimonial states, kinship relations remain salient to social status through nepotism and the intensification of subgroup identification. I argue that women’s embodiment of the standards of marriageability — their ‘honour’ — within their communities is a form of symbolic capital which inflects the status of their families, and their ability to participate in strategic marital exchanges.
This theory is investigated through an extensive and historicised survey of kinship and marriage in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and through original survey data on marriage forms and attitudes and experiences of HBV in the region, suggesting that HBV and understandings of gender, marriage and kinship are intrinsically linked. Thus, this thesis argues that while HBV may appear to be enculturated, its aetiology may be material in nature. Efforts to reduce HBV in the Middle East should encompass reform of personal status laws which posit the patrilinear, patricentric family as the ideal model, and that campaigns to reduce forced and child marriage should be considered as part of the process to reduce HBV.
‘Honour’

and the political economy of marriage

Joan Clayton
To wash disgrace

“Oh mother,” a rattle, tears and darkness
Blood gushed out, and the stabbed body trembled.
“Oh mother!” Heard only by the executioner
Tomorrow the dawn will come and roses will wake up
Youth and enchanted hopes will ask for her
The meadows and the flowers will answer:
She left to wash the disgrace.
The brutal executioner returns
And meets people
“Disgrace!” He wipes his knife
“We’ve torn it apart.”
And returned virtuous with a white reputation.

Nazik al-Malaika (1923-2007)
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Credits

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Terminology

AFFINE

Person related through marriage.

AGNATE

Relative with common patrilinear descent.

ACHIEVED STATUS

A social position that a person can acquire on the basis of merit, which is a position that is earned or chosen.

ASCRIBED STATUS

The attributes of an individual’s position in society that are involuntary and often inevitable, such as those based on sex or descent.

BILATERAL DESCENT

A reckoning of kinship by which ego traces descent equally through both parents and both sexes in all generations and collateral lines (see Appendix B).

BRIDEWEALTH

Payments transferred from the family of the groom to the family of the bride to realise a marriage.

CORPORATISM

Owning and allocating resources within collective kinship relationships.
Ego

The person at reference in kinship terminological systems.

Endogamy

The custom of marrying only within the limits of family.

Exogamy

The custom of marrying outside the tribe, family, clan, or other social unit.

Isogamy

Marriage between people of equal social status or caste.

Kinship

The network of culturally recognised interpersonal relations though which individuals are related to one another.

Lineage

A kin group whose members trace their relationship through genealogical links on the chain of descent.

Patrilateral

Related through a father, father’s side.

Patrilinear descent

Kinship relations derived by tracing common descent exclusively through males, from a founding male ancestor. (See Appendix B).
PATRILocal

Residence form determined by a rule that, upon marriage, a man remains in his father's household while his wife leaves her family to move in with him.

POLYGyny

Marriage of a man to more than one woman.

NEOLOCAL

Residence form determined by a rule that each spouse leaves his or her family of origin and jointly forms a new household.

SEGMENTATION

The division of a descent group or household into two or more independent units.

TRANSHumANCE

Pattern of nomadism amongst pastoralists featuring two sites — typically a summer and winter pasture.

 Abbreviations

FGM

Female Genital Mutilation/Modification.

HBV

‘Honour’-based violence.
KRG

Kurdish Regional Government.

KRI

Kurdistan region of Iraq.

MENA

Middle East and North Africa.

*Note on orthography*

The Sorani dialect of Kurdish spoken in Iraq is normally rendered in Arabic-style script but is here rendered in Roman type. As script-based languages have a phonetic rather than conventional orthography, transliterations into English take varying forms – for example, *jin be jine*, a form of marriage discussed on page 154 can also be found spelled as *zhymbyzhn* (in Dzięgel 1982, p. 251). Thus the orthography within this work strives to be internally consistent, but should not be considered definitive.

American spellings in quotations have been silently corrected to British English for the sake of consistency, although titles in the Bibliography retain their original spelling.
Dedication

To those who face death.
1. Introduction

Honour is everything for me…. If I were married, in that case, the girl whom I married would be my honour. My sister is my honour too, so are my relatives, the daughter of my aunt and the daughter of my uncle are also my honour. That is, all of them are my honour. Everything happening around me and all my family line are my honour.

24 year old Imam from Batman, Turkey (Kardam 2005, p. 17)

It's easier to sacrifice a son or a daughter than it is to sacrifice a society or your extended family, who you are trying to please all the time.

‘Neina’, survivor of ‘honour’ based violence (Corbin 2012)

Honour killing is a tragedy in which fathers and brothers kill their most beloved, their daughters and sisters . . . Here, affection and brutality coexist in conflict and unity.

Shahrzad Mojab, Kurdish writer and feminist (2002a p. 61)
Defining ‘honour’-based violence

Coomaraswary (2005, p.xi), writing as the UN’s Special Rapporteur on violence against women, describes honour-based violence (HBV) as follows:

*Honour is generally seen as residing in the bodies of women. Frameworks of ‘honour’ and its corollary, shame, operate to control, direct and regulate women’s sexuality and freedom of movement by male members of a family. Women who fall in love, engage in non-marital relationships, seek a divorce or choose their own husbands are seen to transgress the boundaries of ‘appropriate’ (that is, socially sanctioned) behaviour. Regulation of such behaviour may in some cases involve horrific direct violence — including ‘honour killing’, perhaps the most brutal control of female sexuality — as well as indirect subtle control exercised through threats of force or the withdrawal of family benefits and security.*

Crimes often predicated upon a supposed ‘shaming’ act committed by the victim, which casts the patriline as a whole into disrepute within the community.

Welchman and Hossain’s cardinal anthology on HBV (2005) cites Abu Odeh’s (1996) statement that the ‘paradigmatic example of a crime of honour is the killing of a woman by her father or brother for engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual practises before or after marriage.’ In this analysis, perpetration within HBV is *agnatic*, in that the perpetrator is a member of the same patriline as the victim, and the crimes are narrowly defined as murder justified by the breaking of sexual norms. For other writers (Baker et al. 1999; Salter 2014), HBV has continuities with intimate-
partner violence (IPV) and domestic violence occurring in gangs where the point of distinction is the collective nature of the aggressors, where ‘it falls to all male members [of the family] to enforce ... compliance’ (Baker et al. 1999, p. 172).

Yakin Ertürk, Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women, associates the language of ‘honour’ with both collectivity and agnation:

\[
[T]he \text{ family’s honour is presumed to be achieved through the conduct of its female members, founded upon their body and sexuality – which is directly related to shame and modesty. In this context, the building block of social relations is commonly the collective entity – i.e. family, tribe, kinship groups etc. – as opposed to the individual. Consequently, shame and modesty codes embody the entire group, not just the individual who is perceived to have violated the honour code. In this respect, preserving the honour of the collective group requires women to exercise modesty and obedience and men to exercise control over women to ensure their compliance with group norms. (2009, p. 64)
\]

In related research I conducted in connection with this thesis (Payton 2014), definitional attributes which distinguish HBV from other forms of violence against women and domestic violence, are agnation (the perpetrators are members of the same patriline as the victim), collectivity (the active or tacit collaboration of members of a patriline and the wider community in perpetration) and the deployment of a discourse of ‘honour’ to justify violence. This research was used due to its use of empirical methods to explore the definitional attributes of HBV for Middle Eastern women who had experienced violence, rather than extracting a definition from theoretical or
INTRODUCTION

policy-related work, so that I could be sure of using a definition which was close to native understandings.

Women’s ‘honour’, then, seems to be a property pertaining to an *agnatic collective* — who share a common responsibility both for safeguarding their collective reputation, which is dependent upon the socialisation of female members to normative standards for female behaviour, and for applying metanormative sanctions when kinswomen are perceived to have violated such norms.

‘Honour’ killings have attracted the most attention of all forms of ‘honour’-based violence\(^1\), yet these are just the most extreme forms of a continuum of violence which can be enacted, including:

- Forced marriage;
- Beatings;
- Imprisonment;
- Forced hymenoplasty and abortion;
- Public humiliation, including facial mutilation, shaving the head, parading in public on the back of a donkey amongst others (Hassanpour 2001).

According to Pew (2013, p. 190), only 22% of Iraqi citizens believed that ‘honour’ crimes were *never* justified against women; only 33% believed they were never justified against men. Iraq showed the highest support for HBV

\(^{1}\) Due to the high visibility of murder in terms of the media and criminal justice system, many of the examples in this thesis will relate to this crime. Many of the lesser crimes enumerated above are invisible due to the ability of families to coerce their victims into silence. Also, victims who seek protection and support due to fears of HBV have an extreme need for confidentiality due to the escalation patterns of HBV, the potential for collusion and the longitudinal nature of HBV risk. The responsibility for victim protection means that sub-lethal cases are rarely available for analysis.
across the whole survey, which was limited through solely addressing predominantly Muslim nations, reflecting the general but contentious popular association of ‘honour’ crimes with Islamic identities. In Iraq, Pew found that 44% of respondents believed that the ‘honour’ killings of women were ‘often acceptable’, whereas 5% or fewer participants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Indonesia agreed with this proposition. From the entire MENA region, only in two countries — Morocco and Tunisia — did a majority agree that women should never be killed on the basis of ‘honour’ (2013, p. 90).

While the UN’s Country Team for Iraq identify that family violence against women and girls in the KRI is extremely high, it appears to be higher still in South/Central Iraq (Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey 2011), implying that the prominence of the issue in the Kurdish region is not necessarily an indication of greater incidence, but of greater attention, partly due to the efforts of the indigenous feminist movement.

Since the 1990s, through such events as Das’s (1995) study of the murders of Bangladeshi women who had been raped during the war with Pakistan, Jordanian women’s activism against discriminatory laws in the late 1990s (Husseini 2009), the publicity surrounding the murder of Samia Sarwar in 1999, Asma Jahangir’s (1999) decision to include ‘honour’ crimes within her brief as Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings to the UN, various...

Within Kurdish regions, activist women were forerunners in recognising the nature of ‘honour’ in terms of violence against women, making it a key part of their campaigning from 1993 (Fischer-Tahir 2009, p. 66), since when it has become a predominant focus of a well-developed and active local women's movement (Mohammed 2009; al-Ali and Pratt 2011). It is also an issue of prime concern within diasporic Kurdish women's organisations in the West, where several similar murders of Kurdish women by their fathers and families have been recorded after Fadime Şahindal. Fadime herself was an activist against HBV, to the extent of delivering testimony to the Swedish Government about the family pressures upon her, a year before she was murdered by her Turkish-Kurdish father (Wikan 2008). She is amongst many Kurdish feminists who have been at the forefront of drawing attention to crimes such as these and defining them in relationship to ‘honour’ in the diaspora and the Kurdish homelands.
History and extent of HBV in the KRI

Figure 1.1: A journalist takes a call beside a graveyard receiving unclaimed women’s bodies, Rania, KRI.

Figure 1.2: She views a photograph of an unclaimed body of a 17-year old girl dredged from the Darband River in Rania.
Captain Rupert Hay, a contemporary of TE Lawrence, recorded several murders of women while serving under the British Mandate for Iraq (1914-1932) in Arbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region, within his personal journal:

*With regard to a woman’s honour the law is most strict. A woman of any social standing who misconducts herself, or who is suspected on reasonable grounds of misconducting herself, must surely die; and the husband, brother, or whoever is responsible for her, who fails to put her out of the way, is considered to have lost his honour; and a Kurd’s nāmūs or honour is one of his most precious possessions. Many women must have been murdered in this way while I was at Arbil, but very few cases came to my ears, and then usually a long time after the event. I know of one fair lady who was tied up in a sack and thrown into the river. Even when I did get wind of such affairs it was out of the question to take any action, seeing that the entire tribal opinion supported the murderer, and it was impossible to obtain evidence. With regard to the man who is the cause of a woman’s downfall the law is not so severe. In some cases he, too, is murdered, but more usually he escapes by paying the price of the woman’s blood.* (Hay 1920/2008, p. 56)

Historically, there are references to similar violence in Kurdish regions as early as the 1850s.

*They even kill their own wives, daughters, mothers and sisters. And to [punish] such bad deeds women also kill; for instance mothers also strangle their daughters in the night or poison and kill them and mothers-in-law do it to their daughters-in-law and sisters to sisters. No chief [agha²] and no village elder [rî şpi³] will ask why*

---

² This can mean a tribal leader or landowning quasi-feudal ‘nobleman’ (Natali 2005 p.143)
³ Rî şpi literally means ‘white beard,’ demonstrating that age and masculinity are considered signs of authority within Kurdish society.
you have killed [this woman].
(Mela Mehmud Bayezidi (1858-9) cited in Mojab 2004a, p. 112)

The Kurds are a people who claim ancestry from the Medes, and inhabit the Taurus and Zagros mountains. Conquest and domination have been an overarching theme of Kurdish history, from the 7th Century Arab conquest to attacks by the Seljuks, Safavids and Mongols. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) promised Kurdish independence, a promise which was shattered in the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne (1922) wherein Kurdish regions were divided between the new nation states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. This exercise in imperial boundary creation effectively meant that in Iraq, a state which was not a nation partitioned a nation which was not a state. In each of these states, Kurds faced discrimination as minorities. This took its crudest form in Iraq, through an attempted genocide, enacted to further the violent suppression of emergent nationalist activism under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party. For around 22 years after the establishment of the no-fly zones in 1991, the Kurdish region was controlled by the two most significant political parties — the Partîya Demokrata Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)) and the Yekêti

---

4 Bird (2005 p. 12) notes that by the 1800s, Kurdish 'high culture' had all but collapsed, due to the decline of the Silk Routes, internal warfare, plague and imperial suppression. Thus Bayezidi’s statement should be historically located in a period of ‘a chaotic tribal order, with an economy based on raiding’ which may have led to increases in the prominence of interpersonal violence underpinning Bayezidi’s observations.
5 A map is included in the Appendix (p. A)
Niştîmanî Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)). Their relationship has been both peaceful and bloody by turns, from to a violent civil war known as the birakuţi (fratricide) in the 1990s, followed by a power-sharing pact in 1998, although the influence of the PUK seems to be waning. Subsequent to the second Gulf War, the Kurdistan region has achieved a degree of federal independence within Iraq, and boasts a comparatively peaceful state with a booming oil economy, although this is currently threatened by the proximity to the territory controlled by Sunni Arab militants known as the Islamic State, which has led to a refugee crisis within the region. Violence against women remains a severe social problem in the KRI.

Within the present-day Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), ‘honour’-based violence such as that described by Hay and Bayezidi across history remains endemic and well-attested (Begikhani 1998; Mojab 2002a, b; Begikhani 2005; Taysi 2009; UNAMI 2009; Begikhani et al. 2010; Danish Immigration Service 2010; Alinia 2013), where there is a general consensus that these crimes have been increasing since the 1990s (Mojab 2004b).

There were a reported 25 ‘honour’ killings in the KRI in the month of September 2011 (Kurdish Globe 2011); the UN estimates that at least 255

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Dirik (2014) identifies the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as the only Kurdish region to have achieved quasi-statehood, as ‘the worst for women’ of all the Kurdish regions. She particularly contrasts the progressive gender politics instantiated by Syrian Kurdish nationalists in cantonships carved out during the civil war which started in 2011, with the masculinist, feudal politics governing Kurds in Iraq.
women died in ‘honour’ killings in the first six months of 2007 (Cockburn 2008). The Kurdistan region has a population slightly less than that of Scotland, where just 18 adult women were murdered between 2010-2011 in total (The Scottish Government 2011). Although a significant proportion of victims of ‘honour’ killings are female adolescents under 18 (Begikhani 1998), patterns of fatal child abuse in the UK are also radically different — of between 45-55 non-accidental killings collected over decades, almost all were infants, and there was no distinction by gender (Reder and Duncan 2000).

An epidemic of murders of young women in Guatemala was reported as a ‘femicide’ on the basis of figures such as 362 deaths in 2006 (Center for Gender and Refugee Studies 2006, p. 9), which term Guatemalan feminist group MuJER (2012) defined as ‘the systematic murder of women’. The level of ‘honour’ killings in the KRI undoubtedly could also be considered in terms of a femicide; assuming that the second six months of 2007 saw similar figures to those cited above, the comparative ratio of deaths per million head of population in 2007 is that for every four victims of the Guatemalan femicide, 15 Kurdish women and girls died in ‘honour’ killings.

**Legal status**
Crimes described as being motivated by ‘honour’ enjoy a mitigating legal status in many Arab countries (Zuhur 2005), including Iraq. While legally, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) removed the statute of Iraqi law that
allowed for reduced sentencing for crimes of ‘honour’ in 2003 (Begikhani 2005), it was not until American forces were present in the region that this began to be extended into practice (Mohammed 2009), and a culture of impunity remains (Greiff 2010). Al-Ali and Pratt (2008, p. 144) note that Kurdish women’s rights activists remain frustrated by the failure of this federal legal code to be brought into practice, where there is a preference for using family and tribal mediation, particularly when political and economic interests are at stake. As, technically, Iraqi law is sovereign over the semi-autonomous Kurdish region, the KRG’s reforms have no sound legal basis for enforcement (al-Ali and Pratt 2011). Furthermore, research by the Kurdish Human Rights Project in 2008 (Yıldız et al., pp. 39-40) found that the older Iraqi law unquestionably remained in use, despite the 2003 reform, implying that where this applies, the maximum jail sentence in a case of honour killing is just a few years — which may be commutable if the defendant has no criminal history.

Kurdish media also report convicted killers being freed in general amnesties, along with failures to pursue and prosecute offenders (Bahaddin 2010a; Iraqi Civil Solidarity Initiative 2013) within an environment where politicians deny the extent of honour-based violence (Salih 2007). It may also be difficult to prosecute even if there is willingness to do so: in Urfa (in the Kurdish region of Turkey), over a third of cases of ‘honour’ killings resulted in acquittal due to an inability to penetrate family solidarities in order to gain
sufficient evidence for a conviction (Belge 2011, p. 103). Due to family complicity, murders can be readily presented as suicides or accidental deaths.

There is a tendency for victim-blaming within this culture of impunity: Tavqa Rasheed, in a 2007 interview, gave three reasons for the high levels of honour killings and female suicide in the KRI — mobile phone technology, modern television programmes, and women’s ‘lack of social awareness.’ Rasheed was speaking as the KRG’s Director of the Ministry for Human Rights (in Mason 2010, p. 14). Nevertheless, according to a Kurdish informant, the police forces do have lines of referral to deal with women in need of protection, and Kurdish women in Iraq certainly have greater faith in the police’s ability to address domestic violence than women in the South/Central region (Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey 2012, pp. 49-50). The Kurdish polity have made commitments to reducing violence against women which often exceed those of their neighbours (Natali 2010, pp. 91-92), and certainly some perpetrators (often those of low social status) are sentenced commensurately with the offence of murder, regardless of their claims of an ‘honourable’ motivation — much to their chagrin (Alinia 2013, p. Chapter 4). This shows an increasing, if uneven, determination to tackle issues of violence against women within the KRI.
Gendered crimes
Victims of HBV are normally, but not exclusively, women (Danish Immigration Service 2010), with one very significant, gendered distinction: women are almost always killed by their own families, whereas men tend to be killed by the families of women they are accused of ‘dishonouring’. The killing of a man by non-kin may tend to institute family feuding, leading to reprisal killings from his own relatives; whereas the contained nature of the family means that a woman can be killed without any such ramifications.

There may be little sympathy for a girl or woman who has endangered the lives of her male agnates through providing a provocation for inter-familial feuding, and subverting the interests of the group (Schneider and Schneider 1976). It could be considered then, that a decision to kill a woman rather than a man operates like the duelling culture of Early Modern Europe: it provides a way of maintaining ‘honour’ without leading to prolonged and damaging blood feuds (see King 2008b, p. 328). On the other hand, pressure from Kurdish tribal leaders attempting to reach an agreement may require a family to kill their own son in preference to instituting a feud (Begikhani 2005; Danish Immigration Service 2010, p. 7), particularly where a family is lacking in political influence to withstand communal pressure.

In more practical terms, a family may kill a co-resident female first due to proximity, giving her ‘accomplice’ advance warning to flee, initiate negotiations, raise supporters to mount a counter-attack, or raise blood-
money to ransom his life. Males suspected of homosexuality, however, may be targeted for ‘honour’ killings and violence by their own families and vigilantes (Copestake 2006), since ‘male homosexuality threatens male solidarity and superordination’ (Caplan 1987, p. 2) through transgressing foundational gendered dualities. That the discussion of HBV against males is limited within this work is not meant to dismiss or ignore male victims: it is a recognition that within most cases of HBV — those which do not involve male homosexuality — whether the victim is male or female, the crimes tend to pivot on the presumed ‘dishonouring’ of a girl or woman as a primary motivation for violence.

‘Honour’ crimes are by no means perpetrated solely by men, as women may both participate in violence, and play an active role in policing women’s behaviour (Glazer and Abu Ras 1994; Awwad 2001; Nelson 2003; Sen 2005) although according to Sir’s research, male relatives are predominantly considered to bear executive responsibility for safeguarding family honour:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers and brothers</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the men in the family</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the women in the family</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The agha (local headman)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The grandfather</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The men and women of the family</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Whose duty is it to defend ‘honour’ (Sir 2005)
Similar to Charrad’s findings in the Maghreb (2001, p. 63), a husband appears to hold less responsibility for the behaviour of his wife than her agnatic kinsmen.

**Popular attitudes and community pressure**

Taysi (2009) and Sir’s (2005) examinations of attitudes to honour amongst predominantly Kurdish populations in Iraq and Turkey respectively show varying levels of support for HBV. Sir investigated the attitudes of 423 respondents in predominantly Kurdish villages in Turkey (2005). In a vignette describing an unhappily married woman’s adultery, over 37% of Sir’s respondents agreed that the woman should be killed, and many other suggestions also proposed violent ‘correction’. Only 16% did not believe she should be punished (p. 232). Taysi’s interview-based research in the Sulaymaniyah region of the KRI found that 30% of respondents felt violence against ‘dishonourable’ behaviour was justified on at least some occasions (p. 34) and that 90% understood the word ‘honour’ to relate to the control of women’s sexuality.

A study of 180 perpetrators of ‘honour’ killings in Turkey (within a region with a high Kurdish population), observed that the perpetrators may be lauded by their families and community (Gezer 2008). The favourable treatment of ‘honour’ killers by the forces of social control ranges from reduced sentences and sympathetic treatment in custody, to lacklustre investigation of ‘honour’ crimes. This legitimation of honour crimes at several
levels seems to position the honour killer as an altruist — one who is prepared to make their children burnt offerings upon the altar of normative morality.

However, to assume that this implies that families have a Spartan disregard for their female kin, or that they are entirely motivated by misogyny would be an act of callous condescension. Onal’s sensitive journalistic investigation into sentenced ‘honour’ killers in Turkey (2008) found deep wells of regret expressed by some perpetrators, along with evidence of extreme social pressure. She touchingly describes the case of Ilyas, a Thracian man living in the squatter settlements of Turkey, who endured months of public abuse from his Kurdish neighbours, including broken windows, spitting, and children pelting him with stones in the street until he ‘reclaimed his “honour”’ through killing his sister who was suspected of ‘misbehaviour’ (pp. 134-139).

Such communal pressure has also been indicated in British murder cases, where the fathers of Banaz Mahmod and Heshu Yones (Bedell 2004), indicated harassment within the Kurdish communities in which they lived, engineered to compel them to ‘correct’ the ‘deviant’ behaviours of their daughters. In the Yones case, as Mojab (2004b, p. 16) notes, the harassment of Abdallah Yones, Heshu’s father, was reconfigured into shows of support after he killed her. As Abu-Rabia (2011, p. 38) observes, the perpetration of
an ‘honour’ killing may be considered ‘an organized social act by the family, not a matter of personal preference.’

A ‘dishonoured’ family thus could be described as being in a condition of stigma, in Goffman’s (1963) term, in having a spoiled and discredited identity, separating them from the community as a whole, which persists until they restore their status through reasserting control over ‘deviant’ women, regardless of the cost to the family. ‘Neighbours won’t say hello, they won’t trade with members of the group and they won’t marry their other daughters until the deed has been done,’ according to Turkish author Mehmet Faraç (interviewed by Pope 2012, p. 201). An imprisoned perpetrator of a crime he described as an ‘honour’ killing identified community exclusion as a major motivation behind his murder:

[S]he took my honour...Now I prefer to die here than live outside and be ridiculed. Now I can hold my head up. I did not dare to go to a funeral or to go out in public because people were ridiculing me. (in Alinia 2013, p. 66)

Withdrawal of such reciprocal relations can be ‘the most salient sanction’ available within a Gemeinschaft type of social ordering (Collier 1988, p. 224). Those who do not redeem their ‘honour’, therefore, may become excluded from the social and economic life of the community, including the all-important ability to transact marriages for their children.
The sense of erasing humiliation that characterises Katz’s (1988, Chapter 1) description of the ‘righteous slaughter’ is meshed with the collective basis of Tilly’s (2003, Chapter 4) ‘violent rituals’, which ‘ordinarily reflect and reinforce existing systems of inequality,’ (p. 87). Honour killings may thus be performative acts, carried out for the benefit of a wider collective, an act of purification through sacrifice, which leads to reintegration into the community. Syrian ‘honour’ killers, for instance, mark the performative nature of ‘honour’ killings through slitting the victim’s throat. They take pains to describe the act in specific terms in front of the judge — making an analogy to the sacrifice of an Eid lamb — to situate the crime as ‘honour’-based without explicitly using the language of ‘honour’, and thus make a tacit claim for juridical sympathy (Ghazzal 2011).

Honour violence can thus be seen as a metanorm (Horne 2004), in being a normative response to norm violation. In the case of ‘honour’ crimes, then, it appears that the socialisation of the family to kill an ‘errant’ member is non-deviant; it is the victim who is seen as deviant, within a contentious politics based on the custodianship of women’s bodies. Violence as a means of re-establishing social control is a phenomenon well described by Black (1983) who identifies that many violent aggressors perceive and justify their actions in this light. This motivation may be particularly significant in discussing collective violence such as stonings or lynchings (de la Roche 1996), in which collectives enforce and enact community norms.
In the neighbourhood, the social boundary shrinks to houses, courtyards, or blocks at most for women. People passing through the neighbourhood and downtown can be neighbours, co-villagers or neighbouring villagers of her husband’s family. Any one of them can observe her wherever she goes and warn or humiliate her husband and his family for her ‘misconduct’ which risks their honour. She can go out without fearing disciplinary gossip and rebuke only when she has a legitimate companion and her husband’s permission. Yet the husband’s permission is not always easy to obtain because most husbands are sensitive to gossip which can endanger their honour. (Him and Hoşgör 2011, p. 338)

Gossip, as a means of generating, enforcing and policing social norms, has been identified as a foundational aspect of human distinctiveness (Dunbar 1998). ‘Kurds constantly worry about falling victim to gossip,’ Brenneman (2007, p. 117) tells us, ‘whether or not the subject of gossip is true.’ As ‘honour’ is defined in practice by the collective, reputation can become a point of vulnerability. To allege sexual misconduct on the part of a wife, daughter or niece is a method of indirectly attacking a rival; in fact, discussion of a person’s female relatives may be normatively circumlocutory in order to avoid implications which might be considered to disparage the reputation of a family’s womenfolk (Sweetman 1994, p. 96).

This vulnerability to gossip is imbricated in a regime of constant surveillance by family and community, where interfamilial conflicts can be expressed through identifying failures to comply with the community-generated ideation of ‘honour.’

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7 The authors are describing Doluca, a rural–urban migrant neighbourhood in the predominantly Kurdish city of Van in Turkey.
The interdependencies of communal life equip it to function as a veritable panopticon. Sir’s examination found that over 12% of respondents stated that the primary duty of the community was ‘to keep a watch on women living on one’s street and in one’s neighbourhood’. Wolf’s (2010) short documentary on ‘honour’ crimes in south-eastern Turkey shows elderly men apparently occupied playing card games outside their homes; closer viewing shows that these men are simultaneously monitoring women’s excursions outside the domestic realm with close attention. Fischer-Tahir (2009) observes that women of the urban middle classes in Sulaymaniyah in the KRI, are aware of being under surveillance by their families and neighbours, meaning that they felt they could not, for instance, use a taxi service to leave or return to their own neighbourhood, lest they be criticised for sharing a car with an unrelated man. Thus the community assumes the role of defining female deviance, and of policing it through a regime of constant surveillance (Glazer and Abu Ras 1994; Awwad 2001). The eyes and ears of the community may create just as effective a surveillance culture as any CCTV network.

To be ‘dishonoured’, then, is to be perceived as being ‘dishonoured’ within the mutable interpretations of ‘honour’ operating within the wider community. Therefore it is quite mistaken to conceptualise the complex nature of

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8 Bozarslan (2004, p. 88) notes that junior males may also be subjected to this kind of street discipline by their elders.
‘honour’ in the sense of a quasi-religious law, under which punishments are meted out for non-conformity to a pre-determined code of conduct.

VanEck (2003) characterises ‘honour’ as being normative and contingent rather than prescriptive, describing ‘honour’ as existing in a state of constant definition and redefinition within those collectives which claim a stake in the control of women, wherein the most significant stakeholders are their agnates and potential affines. A woman’s violation of ‘honour’ may pass without any repercussions, so long as knowledge of the ‘shaming act’ can be confined within the household or lineage (see Payton 2014). According to VanEck, families frequently do make efforts to contain any knowledge of a transgression from the community at large, in order to avoid any escalation to violence (p. 43).9

The ‘Eleventh Commandment’ may hold primacy over all the other directives of ‘honour’ culture. An advocate working with survivors of HBV in the KRI told Alinia (2013, p. 97) that ‘[f]amilies do not like their problems to become public knowledge and, therefore, a precondition for the possibility of reconciliation [i.e. of a ‘dishourable’ girl or woman with her family] is that the community does not know about the case.’

Reconciliation is considered impossible, then, where knowledge of ‘shame’ cannot be contained. ‘Honour’, then, operates above the level of the

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9 For an example of containment attempts see also Glazer and Abu Ras’s (1994) meticulous single case-study.
household, despite being imbricated within its identity and status. ‘Honour’ and ‘shame’ are defined at the level of the community — even to the extent of allowing ‘vigilante’ honour crimes, as the following apologue exemplifies:

_A shepherd, while grazing his sheep one day, came across a boy and girl doing something sherim (shameful)… [T]he shepherd immediately took his long dagger and killed them both with one stab. The villagers considered him as a man concerned with the honour of the village, and even the parents of the boy and girl were more ashamed of their children than angry at the shepherd._

(Brenneman 2007, pp. 59-60)

**Thesis outline and research questions**

The thesis will attempt to develop an aetiological exploration of HBV using a two phased approach, in which a theoretical, model-building phase based in a programme of synthetic reading, will be expanded upon and tested by an empirical phase, based in survey analysis. The intent is to develop an explanatory model of HBV which is not over-determined by conceptions of culture, but located instead within particular structurings of kinship. The research questions for each phase are as follows:

**Theoretical research questions**

1. Can family ‘honour’ be described as relating to particular geographies and organisations of the family rather than specific cultures or religions?
2. How is ‘honour’ understood and expressed within domestic gender relations?
3. How do various traditional forms of marriage express relationships within and between families; and how does this impact upon the ‘honour’ of women and families?
4. How have traditional forms and understandings of marriage altered over the KRI’s recent history of political and economic changes?

**Empirical research questions**

1. What are the structures of marriage and kinship within the sample?
   a. How many marriages within the sample were arranged, and who was involved in their arrangement?
   b. How common are the 'traditional' forms of marriage — i.e., those between cousins, direct exchange and elopements — and what are their characteristics?
   c. What can be determined from the differing levels of consent to marriage arrangement?

2. Do these familial structures correlate with an individual’s likelihood to approve of HBV?

3. Are there common factors within families in which HBV has been experienced?

The methodology and epistemology behind these phases will be outlined in chapter two. Chapter three establishes an ecosociological basis for the model, where kinship is identified as being a primary method for organising relations of labour and resource sharing, which places particular importance upon marriage arrangement as the method by which kinship identifications are extended or consolidated. It also discusses the relevance of patrilinearity within Middle Eastern understandings of kinship which construct the political economy of marriage. The Kurdish understanding of ‘honour’ *(namûs)* is explored, and related to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital, where it is described as a precondition for participation in marital strategies.

Chapter four develops this understanding into a politics of the domestic realm, identifying how the logics of patrilinear kinship structure and the expectation of patrilocal residence lead to inequalities of power on the bases of gender and seniority within the household. This conditions a particular
vulnerability for young women, who are predominantly the victims of HBV. It also discusses the anxieties around the physical manifestation of virginity which is central to the understanding of namûs as a precondition for participation within marriage exchanges.

Chapter five comprises a microsociology of marriage forms found the KRI (cousin marriage, direct exchange marriage, which have been analysed in detail to provide an understanding of how each form can be understood as a particular strategy operating within an overall political economy, and how each form reinforces the understandings of women’s honour within the wider system of marriage.

Chapter six tracks developments in marriage arising through modernity, including the proletarianisation of the region and the growth of companionate marriage as ‘modern’. This also describes the development of neopatrimonial politics in which sub-national identities, including those of kinship, remain salient in the distribution of oil revenue. While marriage is identified as undergoing transformation towards a neolocal, nuclear form, there remains an impetus for the instrumentalisation of marriage to maintain identity groups within a Balkanised democracy. This chapter completes the theoretical phase of the thesis.

Chapter seven provides the results of the quantitative analysis of survey data and comprises the empirical phase. Descriptive data outlines the structures
of respondent’s families, including their marriages and those of their siblings. Findings suggest that attitudes supportive of HBV are correlated with other values which support male dominance in marriage; however, experiences of HBV have a different profile, having a higher correlation to acceptance of parental marriage arrangement and higher levels of cousin marriage which can be related to patrilineal identities.

These findings are discussed in the conclusion, along with the research and political implications of the thesis as a whole.

The next chapter will outline the theoretical, methodological and epistemological aspects of the research. It outlines and discusses explanations of HBV based in ‘culture’ and patriarchy, and introduces the conceptualisation of ‘particularity and difference’ taken from Ertürk (2009) which is key to the epistemology of the thesis as a whole. It includes a methodology of both the theoretical and analytic phases.
2. Theoretical and methodological approach

This thesis addresses the issue of 'honour'-based violence against women within the KRI from a materialist perspective, taking a mixed methods approach which combines a theorised account of local structures of marriage and the family discerned from various ethnographic and cross-disciplinary sources, and the quantitative analysis of original survey data. This chapter outlines the theoretical and methodological considerations which have underpinned the development of research questions.

My own interest in 'honour' developed in 2000 when I moved into a predominantly Kurdish neighbourhood in the UK, where some of my Kurdish friends and neighbours candidly, and in some cases eagerly, shared both their experiences and their feelings around 'honour' and the violence committed in its name. Their candour, I felt, was in some part due to my status as a cultural outsider, lacking the ability to share damaging information within their networks; and as a person from a culture which they considered to be liberal, particularly upon sexual matters, and therefore unlikely to pass judgement upon any supposed 'transgressions'. Due to personal experiences, I had direct
knowledge of violence against women, often extremely severe, within my own family and community which formed a basis for shared experiences. However, the less familiar concept of ‘honour’ deeply permeated their accounts of their lives and experiences — which appeared to be very different from the South-Welsh, working class attitudes with which I was raised, where it is quite normal for most people have a succession of several long- and short-term sexual relationships over their lives, particularly in late adolescence and early adulthood. From this point on, the idea of sexual ‘honour’ was, for me, no longer an abstract phenomenon associated with horrific (but rare) murders in sensationalised media accounts, but as a real and quotidian aspect determining the lives of people I counted as my friends.

This led to an obsession to understand the phenomenon which initially propelled me towards volunteering for IKWRO (an NGO providing services to Kurdish and other Middle Eastern women) in 2005, and ultimately to a belated entrance into academia in order to develop and test the understandings developed through these experiences.

The key problematic to address in theorising HBV is its distinctive perpetration patterns and the varying understandings attached to violence across regions outlined in the introduction.
Exploring theories

As Ertürk (2009) identifies, the most significant challenge in working in the field of violence against women is in accounting both for its universality, and for its particularity: in this instance, of negotiating the universality of murder with the particularity of ‘honour’ as a justification (cf. Mojab 2004b) and its characteristic patterns of perpetration. Violence against women, and against children, is a universal phenomenon, and therefore it can appear invidious to provide a distinct terminology to any particular form of violence within this category. This is particularly the case where this form of violence is overwhelmingly — and inaccurately — associated with Muslims. This misapprehension occurs within a toxic contemporary discourse drenched with xenophobia, exceptionalism and prejudice (Spruyt and Elchardus 2012).

The existence of HBV is casually used as evidence for the presumed superiority of ‘Western’ social norms (Reed 2014) — which tendency extends beyond the West, since the supposed Kurdish tendency to commit ‘honour’ crimes is an aspect of ethnicised Turkish discourse (Pervizat 2006; Koğacioğlu 2011).

However, any temptation to Western cultural chauvinism on this point may be misplaced: justifying violence in the name of ‘honour’ abuts and intersects a similarly longstanding practice of justifying violence in the name of ‘passion’ — a rubric which, in fact, often provides the basis for mitigatory
sentencing for 'honour' crimes in those Arab states with a heritage of Napoleonic law (Zuhur 2005), wherein killers motivated by 'honour' will often represent their crimes as being committed as an unpremeditated crime passionnel\textsuperscript{10}.

The legal defence of 'provocation' as it relates to murder in Europe and the Anglophone world is also frequently used in gendered terms to position male violence as a disciplinary response to 'deviant' female behaviour — often conceptualised as 'nagging and shagging' — which challenges hegemonic constructions of masculinity (Veleanu 2012). These justifications may be used to exonerate violence against, and the murder of, female intimate partners even where 'provocation' is removed as a legitimate defence (Fitz-Gibbon 2009). Whether crimes are related to 'honour' or to 'passion', the reversal of focus from the perpetrator's violence to the 'provocation' of the victim is identical, whether the murder in question is uxoricide, filiacide, sororicide, nepticide, or any other kind of murder within a kinship grouping.

Nevertheless, the existence of specific laws which stipulate lenient sentencing for 'honour'-related crimes (Zuhur 2005) indicates that 'honour' has an emic presence within Middle Eastern understandings of violence. Moreover, perpetration patterns vary, indicating structural differences

\textsuperscript{10} Crimes passionnels are a category under Napoleonic law which is understood in the sense of a crime being committed a brief period of quasi-insanity due to heightened emotions. This allows for reduced sentencing without a full insanity plea. The paradigmatic example is a husband who catches his wife in adultery and slays both parties in a fit of rage.
between these forms of gendered violence. To take Israel as a case in point, as a country where different attitudes to sexuality and gender coexist, historic homicide data reveal that 18.2% of murders within the non-Jewish (i.e. predominantly Arab) category were committed by an agnatic relative, predominantly a sibling\textsuperscript{11}. For Jews who had immigrated from Western countries, there were no agnatic murders at all (Landau et al. 1974) — although the levels of homicide committed by Jews were overall slightly higher.

As ‘honour’ based violence is a current, severe, and on-going phenomenon, a great deal of current literature prioritises exposure and description rather than explanation, with the pressing aim of critiquing and improving policy and practice (Gill 2009; Bano 2010; Begikhani et al. 2010); and of critiquing the discriminatory nature of legal codes which may permit ‘honour’ killers reduced sentences (Faqir 2001; Abu Hassan and Welchman 2005; Hoyek et al. 2005; Warraich 2005; Warrick 2005). Another trend in current scholarship into HBV within diasporic communities is to examine the effects of the growing awareness of honour crimes in Europe and the Anglophone world, often through inaccurate and stigmatising media reportage, in terms of the effects this has upon attitudes to minority communities within a

\textsuperscript{11}Touma-Sliman (2005) states that amongst Israeli Arabs the most common perpetrator of ‘honour’ killings is the younger brother of the victim.
climate of anti-Muslimism (Bredström 2003; Pratt Ewing 2008; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009; Gill and Brah 2014).

Thus, a majority of feminist writings critique responses to ‘honour’ crime, whether these are legal, organisational, or cultural, rather than the aetiology, structure or processes of ‘honour’ crimes themselves. A detailed and systematic literature review (Kulczycki and Windle 2011) finds that most studies of ‘honour’ killings in the MENA region are flawed by poor generalizability, few have original data and those which do suffer from inevitable methodological difficulties, such as poorly verified data, due to the secrecy surrounding the topic, and the uncertainties of informants’ accounts (p. 1445). Kulczycki and Windle also raise the areas which have been scrutinised: characteristics of perpetrators and victims; the legal status of honour crimes and public opinion and socio-structural determinants. In the main, explanations of the phenomenon itself are either absent or tacit and unexplored, where the writers’ aims are to provide better services and to identify mechanisms for crime reduction.

Ultimately, most attempts to provide explanations of the ‘honour’ complex itself, and its relationship to violence, terminate in one or another of a pair of grand abstractions: ‘culture’ (Hirsi Ali 2007; Chesler 2010), or ‘patriarchy’ (Sev’er and Yurdakul 2001; Gill 2006; Reddy 2008). This polarised identification partially addresses Ertürk’s problematic by suggesting that such crimes either cannot be generalised beyond the specific ethno-religio-
cultural identities of their perpetrators and victims, or, alternately, that they can be generalised more broadly to all male-dominant societies.

Certainly the latter explanation is more persuasive: the collective ‘punishment’ of women’s sexual ‘deviance’ in order to police collective norms, is, or has been, a widespread feature of many human societies, from the ‘Skimmington Ride’ episode in Hardy’s (1886/2007) *Mayor of Casterbridge* to the public head-shaving of French women considered to have collaborated with the Nazis at the end of WWII. However, HBV with a collective and familial basis, where violence is not merely considered expressive or instrumental, but is seen as a *duty* which the victim’s agnates owe to the wider community has a distinct distribution (Kressel et al. 1981).

Arguments based in ‘culture’ however, have clear flaws: Hirsi Ali’s account over-associates HBV with Islam, ignoring the prevalence of such crimes outside the Muslim world, such as in contemporary India which, in raw figures, is no less a producer of corpses for ‘honour’ than neighbouring Pakistan. She also overlooks the large Muslim communities within South-East Asia where ‘honour’ crimes have not been identified, and there is little evidence of agnatic supervision of women’s sexual behaviour (Dube 1997, Chapters 4-5).

Chesler’s (2010) study is flawed, firstly through acquiring all her data from English-language media sources, thus delimiting the nature of cases she
Theoretical and Methodological Approach

addresses through making allocations on a basis of media-led definitions. Neither the publications used nor the timeframe over which they were collected are provided. Her widely-repeated statement that 91% of killings defined in this way are committed by Muslims (with the implication that this is sufficient to relate them to Islam) is thus rendered questionable: it is likely that the Anglophone press over-attributes crimes as being based in ‘honour’ to Muslim communities due to common stereotypes, and fails to recognise ‘honour’ crimes in populations which are not currently associated with ‘honour culture’. It is particularly unclear to what extent, for example, Indian publications were used to develop the data, because honour crimes are reported regularly in Sikh and Hindu communities in India, particularly in Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. To pick a period at random, there were four separate murders described as ‘honour’ killings
12 in the Times of India, the Hindustan Times and the Daily Bhaskar between 10-17 September 2012, far more than were reported in any other national presses over the same period.

Furthermore, it appears her definitions of what kind of crimes are, and are not, HBV lack precision. To take up a specific case: Chesler takes Kim Gandy, President of the National Organisation of Women, to task for describing the murder of Aasiya Zubair by her husband in New York, in 2011, as domestic

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12 The Indian NGO Prajnya (2009) states that the majority of Indian ‘honour’ killings are violent, agnatic responses to contact between caste Hindu girls/women with Dalit (i.e. untouchable) boys/men.
violence. Chesler insists that the murder was an 'honour' killing, and that by categorising it as domestic violence, Gandy is misrepresenting violence against women in minoritised communities. Yet while the murder of Zubair was unusually violent — she was decapitated — there were no indications of any distinctive patterns of 'honour' motivation, nor of the collective agnatic perpetration and community pressures associated with HBV. Zubair planned to divorce her husband Muzzammil Hassan: if she had lived to do so, she would have been the third wife to divorce him on the basis of his violent behaviour; the first that he went on to murder. Hassan then, appears as a serial domestic abuser, following a recognisable and well-established pattern of killing his victim at the point of separation (Stolzenberg and D'Alessio 2007). It appears as if the Hassan case has been bundled into Chesler's 'honour' category merely because the perpetrator and victim had Pakistani origins, and because the method was associated with the murder of Daniel Pearl in 2002. In this sense, it is only Chesler's racialisation of Zubair's identity, and of the method by which she was murdered, which places her in the 'honour' category — which otherwise would include Eastenders star Gemma McCluskie, beheaded by her brother in 2012.

Most significantly, cultural arguments tend to lack historicity: situating HBV as a Muslim or Middle Eastern/South Asian phenomenon ignores the broader patterns of distribution across Eurasia, both current and historical. Recent history suggests that similar honour-based acts of violence have occurred in
European regions within living memory (Peristiany 1966; Tillion 1966/2007), including Italy (Bettiga-Boukerbout 2005), Greece (Campbell 1964; Safilios-Rothschild 1969), Spain (Pérez-Molina 2001; Shiba 2003), and the Balkans (Denich 1974) including the former Yugoslavia (Puhar 1997). Honour crimes are currently recorded in Albania, where they are predominantly associated with Catholic communities (Mangalakova 2003; Mustafa and Young 2008). Other Central Asian countries, particularly those with Turkic and Indo-Iranian linguistic heritages also show strong continuities with honour culture: in Chechnya, President Kadyrov expressed support for the principle of killing for honour (Markosian 2012), and literature from Uzbekistan (Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights 2000), Azerbaijan (International Rescue Committee 2004) and Tajikistan (Haarr 2010), although primarily discussing other forms of violence against women, indicate some instances of agnatic HBV.

Historically, China could also arguably be related to ‘honour’ culture, since there was an expectation that ‘dishonoured’ females commit suicide (Hsieh and Spence 1981; Elvin 1984; Tien 1997; Theiss 2004). Outside Eurasia, the complex of agnatic ‘honour’ appears as a Spanish colonial importation to Latin America (Gutiérrez 1985; Lipsett-Rivera and Johnson 1998), although it has vastly declined in significance (Caulfield 2000; González-López 2004; Mayblin 2011), particularly given its incompatibility the pre-colonial practice of informal male/female cohabitation, which has become greatly more
prominent from the early twentieth century (Esteve et al. 2012). One might also consider that many ‘fallen women’ within the Catholic world may have been dispatched to lives of penitence within convents and ‘Magdalen’ asylums, which provided a non-violent means of disposing of unmarriageable women. Also, within majority Muslim communities, there is no indication that religious minorities are not equally compliant to the directives of the ‘honour’ system.

It is difficult to discern how large a potential ‘honour’ zone may be: since the crimes are by nature clandestine, and since areas outside the Middle East and South Asia have not been subjected to the same level of intense scrutiny and may not have a sufficiently developed civil society in order to be flagged by local activists, prevalence could be far wider than currently assumed.

This wide dispersal prohibits a purely ethnocultural explanation through the sheer overwhelming fact of the enormous religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of peoples practising HBV. Subsuming various faith groups — Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, Yezidi, Hindus and so forth — and various language groups — Indo-Iranian, Turkic, Romance and Arabic — into the same cultural category is to extend the Geertzian (1965) definition of ‘culture’ as a semiotic collective well beyond breaking point.

And yet — even taking into account the historic prevalence of HBV, this does not translate to a pan-Eurasian phenomenon: in the north-west, while the
sexual control of women remains a salient aspect of male reputation — as could be shown, for example, in Fontane’s *Effi Breist* (1894) — this does not appear to imply a license for familial collectives to apply violent correctives to their daughters, sisters, nieces and cousins. Such a licence appears to remain with the husband, and to be manifested through individual male/male duelling (Appiah 2010) or intimate partner violence (Beard 2002), rather than being a required duty of a woman’s agnates\textsuperscript{13}. Nor is there much evidence of ‘honour’ culture in the south-east, in Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines\textsuperscript{14}(Dube 1997).

The problem posed by Ertürk — that of accounting for the universality of violence against women while acknowledging particularities within its forms and structures — remains unanswered by cultural explanations.

This is only one aspect of their problematic nature.

\textsuperscript{13} One interesting exception to this is found in Margaret Cavendish’s *Orations*, where she argues both for and against clemency in the case of two brothers condemned for the murder of a ‘dishonoured’ sister; however this might best be understood as a thought experiment, typical of her style of philosophy (Hursh, 2001).

\textsuperscript{14} While Dube suggests that Filipina women were not subject to agnatic supervision, Article 247 of the law of the Philippines specified that if a woman were caught in *flagrante delicto* and either or both parties were killed by her husband, or a co-resident parent (if she were under 18), the sentence was temporary banishment (*destierro*) rather a punishment appropriate to homicide. The use of a Spanish term here suggests colonial influences, and for Brewer (1999), there was no particular fixation with virginity or women’s adultery in pre-colonial Philippino culture. This exemption was repealed in 2006 following a motion by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago who strengthened her case by making a direct comparison to HBV (Defensor-Santiago, 2006).
Culturalist arguments

Culturalist readings of violence against women chime with the rise of identity politics since the 1980s (MoghiSSI 1999), leading to a trend to identify delimited social phenomena closely with the identities of the groups wherein they occur: a form of cultural constructionism which evades addressing the materiality of hierarchical power (Jackson 2001, p. 289). This tends to build upon a conceptualisation of ‘cultures’ as discrete and static units, which fails to capture either the heterogeneity within any group or the porosity between collectives (Sewell Jr 1997) — an increasingly prominent failing in an age of mass media in which symbols are generated and proliferate transculturally.

The concept of ‘culture’, as Moghadam argues,

> is ambiguous in the assumption that ‘cultures’ are shared rather than multiple, often associated with ‘traditional’ societies which are considered inert; masking more than it reveals and making claims on people (especially women) rather than for them. (1994, p. 7)

Trouillot (2003), in a chapter entitled ‘Adieu Culture’, even argues for the rejection of the concept of ‘culture’ which he says has become ‘irredeemably tainted’ by the politics of identity and blame. ‘Culture’, then, may have become a licence for outsiders to wring their hands at the presumed ‘barbarity’ of othered persons (while congratulating themselves on their own refinement) within a framing which combines cultural essentialism with cultural relativism. The attribution of violence to ‘culture’ not only
concretises a particular practice within a particular vision of alterity; it also raises the potential for a ‘cultural’ defence, where perpetrators of crimes may claim that the crime was ‘normal’ for their culture and thereby appeal for reduced punishments (Torry 2001; Song 2007; Ballard 2011). This may be depicted as ‘tolerance’ of alternate value systems on the part of a state which indulges minorities. In fact, the ‘cultural’ defence can be seen as a cultural intervention in itself.

For instance, when Abdallah Yones pled guilty to killing his daughter Heshu, his tariff was reduced upon the basis of his Kurdish ‘culture’ and the provocations of his ‘dishonourable’ daughter. This positions Abdallah Yones as *echt* Kurdish, at the core of Kurdish tradition. Correspondingly Heshu Yones becomes deracinated; rendered peripheral to her own ethnicity. Such interventions tend to reify diasporic masculinities as the representation of diasporic communities as a whole — in which the vibrancy of Kurdish feminism and the differing and hybrid worldviews of younger generations are amongst the many identities located as external to an elemental, male-defined ‘Kurdishness’ (Alinia 2013), in which ‘respect’ for the presumed values of ‘othered’ cultures quickly devolves into a disrespect for the rights of women subordinated within those groupings (Mojab 2004b, p. 27). The efforts of Kurdish feminists and other dissidents against the patriarchal order are thus disparaged through being framed as being exterior to their own culture, ‘contaminated’ by Westernised or colonial influence — despite the
fact that Kurdish women have been independently organising for their rights for almost a century.\(^\text{15}\)

As Koğacıoğlu (2004) points out, framing the problem of HBV as one of ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ is a mechanism which exculpates the state and other institutions from potential complicity in its continuance, as we can see, perhaps, as far back as Hay’s *laissez faire* attitude to the murders of Kurdish women under the Mandate (p. 1). Such ‘cultural’ defences have a strong intersection with Third-Worldism: anthropological expertise only intrudes into Euro-American judicial science when it relates to ‘cultures that in our ignorance we can imagine as stable, timeless, ancient, lacking in internal conflict, premodern’ (Pollit 1999, p. 29). A member of an urban street gang is unlikely to be able to make an appeal to the culture of his group as a mitigatory circumstance, although this is no doubt a significant part of his or her identity.

While it is increasingly identified that aspects of many venerable belief systems buttress social inequalities, the social sciences retain a tendency to ‘confuse structural violence with cultural difference’ (Farmer 2006, p. 287). In an essay on HBV, Mojab states:

\[\text{[M]any academics are concerned that if they even discuss, let alone critique oppressive traditions in other (for example Middle Eastern)}\]

\(^{15}\) According to Mojab (2004b, p. 31) the first Kurdish women’s organisation was founded in 1919.
Culturalist arguments interplay with the narrative of the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ (Huntingdon 1993) the toxic combination of Orientalism and Occidentalistm which attempts to draw a crude binary between the ‘modern West’ and the ‘Muslim East’, creating a chasm which effectively swallows up the recent history of European HBV, which does not fit into the binaristic narrative. In tune with this, ‘honour’ crimes are frequently located within a discourse of scriptural determinism16, where Islam is identified as the *differencia specifica* between the (supposedly) HBV-free ‘West’ and the (supposedly) honour-obsessed ‘Muslim World’. This position is both over-deterministic, and not consonant with current and historical data as outlined above.

Narayan, (1997 Chapter 3) in a discussion of dowry murders in India, describes similar readings as insinuating the idea of ‘death by culture’, for their susceptibility to position othered peoples as arational and non-agentic subjects of ‘culture’ — as ‘traditional creature[s] of habit and violence’, as Abu-Lughod describes it (1997, p. 110). Disputing such readings, Narayan constructs an explanation of bride-burning which focusses upon the

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16 ‘Is there a fatwa on your head?’ demanded bus adverts in Edmonton, Alberta, paid for by the American Freedom Defence Initiative, with the stated intention of raising awareness of ‘honour’-based violence, accompanied by photographs of young murder victims. This represents a careless conflation of the mechanisms of Islamic legal authority with manifestations of familial violence (Sohi and Afsar 2013).
economic exploitation of the powerlessness and isolation of young brides within normative marriage expectations of exogamous patrilocality and the dowry tradition. None of these can be considered distinctively Indian practices. Thus Narayan locates violence within domestic economies and kinship structure, exposing motivations which are banally instrumental, rooted in political and economic exploitation and the affordances by which loose dress and domestic gas stoves allow a perpetrator to disguise a deliberate murder as a kitchen accident, rather than in a mystifying Orientalised conception of Hindu culture. The easy availability of firearms and gendered inequalities inflect violence against women in the United States, she notes, yet discussions of American expressions of violence against women are qualitatively different in addressing these aspects of American ‘culture’.

Narayan’s approach exposes the nebulosity of ‘cultural’ explanations in comparison with the concrete affordances and motivations for violence which any particular social configuration may present. Describing HBV as ‘cultural’ without examining how it fits into the material interests and goals of an individual or a collective becomes a tautological method for attributing difference to alterity.

A frequent flaw in the cultural argument is ontological: it appears to commence from a position that HBV is arational, and thus must be examined
in terms of other phenomena which are similarly considered arational — ‘culture’ and religion. To those influenced by evolutionary theories, there are few practices more self-defeating than killing one’s own offspring. Sam Harris thus attributes ‘honour’ crimes directly to religion in a *Washington Post* article (2007) entitled ‘God’s Hostages’. While cultures may certainly adopt practices which are maladaptive for their survival (Edgerton 1992), such practices are rarely so widely cross-culturally diffused and longitudinally maintained as HBV.

So I argue, within this thesis, that HBV is neither arational nor maladaptive in any immediate sense: that perpetrators are not blindly following the dictates of their ‘culture’, nor of their religion, but acting in their own embedded interests as social beings within particular social formations.

This leads to the second great abstraction: *patriarchy*. While patriarchy has been identified by a majority of writers as being intrinsic to ‘honour’, there have been surprisingly few attempts to answer the core question of universality and particularity; of how differing configurations of male dominance may explain the curious distribution of crimes of this nature. A specific analysis of HBV may need to be entwined with a re-analysis of patriarchy which considers differences in the construction and rationales behind male power between regions (Joseph 1996). However, explorations in this area have had a limited success in providing an aetiology for HBV.
Khan (2006, pp. ix-xxiii) provides a compelling rationale for advancing understandings of HBV using a materialist methodology; however her historical materialist framing is insufficiently sensitive to intergroup variations and fails to explain why the areas she studies (Pakistan and Turkey) have high levels of HBV in contradistinction to other regions. While she identifies the continued undervaluation of women’s labour in these regions, this phenomenon is found very widely in human societies with differing patterns of violence. As Sev’er and Yurdakul (2001, pp. 978-979) identify, increased entrance into the workforce has not relieved women of any of the burdens of representing family ‘honour’, and may indeed have made ‘honour’ all the more fragile. They themselves claim that an approach based in radical feminist ideas around male power may be more explanatory: however this again confronts the near-universality of male power and the delimited appearance of HBV, which they do not attempt to unravel.

King (2008b), drawing from a detailed and sympathetic ethnographic study of the KRI, very usefully describes women’s honour as operating as a barrier around ‘patrilinear sovereignty’, suggesting that norms and metanorms around female sexual behaviour may have a linkage to particular orientations of kinship. Alinia’s (2013) intersectional position, combining the gendered aspects of these crimes with a wider political focus on broader power-structures and group identities, provides a valuable synthesis of the problem at hand.
While these generative and illuminating attempts do not provide an acultural explanation why HBV is predominantly identified within Eurasia, but not universally across Eurasia, these will form the starting assumptions of this work which uses a combination of these insights: taking a materialist, anthropological approach, focusing upon the hierarchical relations of gender and kinship at the level of the household, and in interactions between households, and then positioning this within the external power structures of the state and other power-holders.

**An anthropological approach**

Encounters between anthropology and criminology have been minimal since César Lombroso hung up his callipers, at a point in history when criminology was in its nonage, and mainstream anthropology appeared more concerned with the mensuration of the human form than the exploration of the human experience. Early anthropological attempts to create a Linnaean taxonomy of humanity were closely linked to the racist construction of ‘moral’ hierarchies based on race, and in overall effect were often little more than prejudice and negative stereotyping of non-Whites dressed in an ugly pseudo-scientific discourse of ‘degeneracy’ and ‘atavism’. The subsequent diversion into cultural anthropology has tended to compensate for these offences by exhibiting a Rousseauian romanticism of the supposedly simple life of pre-modern societies (Edgerton 1992) drawing a discreet veil over criminality, exploitation and violence which tends to elide the most problematic,
exploitative and conflictual features of societies (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2006, p. 6), which, naturally, tend to be those of most interest to scholars with an interest in violence.

The complex of honour-and-shame was first associated with the Mediterranean region in the late 1950s (e.g. Peristiany 1966) and although these studies are insightful, they are also distinctly pre-feminist in their focus upon male experiences. Attempts to revisit the heritage of mid-twentieth century anthropological learnings on ‘honour’ from a feminist perspective have been limited (e.g. Coombe 1990; Lindisfarne 1994), both of which date prior to the reinvigoration of interest in ‘honour’ from either feminist, criminological or international human rights perspectives. Studies which have a determined focus upon kinship number even fewer (e.g. King 2008b).

Although ‘honour’ has been a preoccupation of anthropology since the 1960s, the discipline as a whole has historically tended to overlook expressions of ambivalence and conflict within the family (Peletz 2001), mirroring the general exemption from critical scrutiny which the family has long been accorded across a great deal of scholarship (Okin 1991).

Since HBV is emically defined by agnatic perpetration, then a determined focus on the family, using the anthropology of kinship, presents the greatest promise for explication, given that gender roles are largely inculcated, performed and policed within the family (Collier and Yanagisako 1987).
In the Middle East, according to Joseph (2000b, p. 16), patriarchy cannot be disarticulated from kinship structures. Charrad (2000, p. 71) asserts that if a \textit{differencia specifica} is to be sought, it should be investigated through an analysis based in \textit{kinship} rather than religion or ‘culture’. Joseph further argues that western feminism has long concentrated on the conjugal bond as a producer of gendered inequalities, to the neglect of the extended family (2000a, p. 117) which produces these just as readily, often complicating gendered inequalities with other intersections of privilege, such as seniority. For Sacks (1982, p. 111) this lacuna results from the pervasive influence of the capitalist ideation of the nuclearized domestic realm, within a scholarship which neglects the nature of extended kinship relations in favour of analysing the functionality (or otherwise) of the conjugal bread-winner/home-maker dyad, which is falsely presumed to be normative and universal.

Etymologically, ‘patriarchy’ is itself a kinship relationship, situating dominance in the figure of the father/\textit{pater}, after the Roman \textit{paterfamilias} who possesses \textit{patria potestas}, to the extent of the power of life or death over all his dependents, including his wife, children and slaves. Second-wave feminism extended the term ‘patriarchy’ to apply far more widely to systems of male dominance, regardless of the nature of male power within those systems. Male dominance has a wide variety of forms, not all of which are located within the family, but which may relate to attitudes within states, religious institutions, male dominated work environments and so forth.
Theoretical and methodological approach

Research methodologies

In this thesis I develop and then test a model of ‘honour’ based violence which is based in a materialist explanation using a phased approach, where the model built in phase one is subsequently scrutinised through an analysis of original data which forms phase two of the research.

Theoretical phase: Model building

I take the dynamics of universality/particularity not just as foundational to defining the problem at hand, but also for the development of the epistemology — through the development of a scrutinising gaze which oscillates between micro- and macro-sociology, which pans and scans across and between cultures and historical periods. Like a pupil which dilates and contracts to gain a depth of visual field, the theorisation occurs within a shifting focus: interactions within a specific ethnie are repeatedly contextualised within a panoramic, comparative, transdisciplinary and historicised framing. My intention here is to avoid the underexamined assumptions of the cultural premise with to ensure that the description of how ‘honour’ operates in the KRI which I present is neither exceptionalised, over-reliant upon ideas of cultural difference, nor incongruous with understandings applicable across wider territories and periods. The purpose is to deploy the central problematic identified by Ertürk (2009) — that of
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

universality and particularity mentioned above (p. 24) in development of a method of analysis.

The cultural materialist perception forms the starting point for the development of a raft of research questions, which were addressed through an intensive programme of synthetic reading, intended to clarify the phenomenon and to develop a theoretical model. This involved an intense and focussed programme of reading, evaluating and synthesising various sources which I conceptualise as ‘a creative activity that produces a new model, conceptual framework, or other unique conception’ (Torraco 2005, p. 362). My reading encompassed a wide variety of sources and benefitted from a willingness to traverse various disciplines and genres — my records indicate I have read almost 300 books during the research period, ranging in substance from folklore and literature to colonial travelogues; from the anthropology of kinship to the politics of state formation; from Mediterranean ethnographies to histories of marriage; from NGO reports to local news-sources, and naturally, innumerable articles drawn from searches across every database of academic journals to which I had access. It involved several visits to the British Library to secure rare texts — and browse the shelves for inspiration — and extensive use of the online library provided by the Fondation-Institut Kurde de Paris17, which provides documents in several languages, of which I was able to read those which were in English and

17 http://bnkinstitukurde.org
French. It also built upon personal explorations of the subject, professional contact with women who had experienced HBV, and in interactions with Kurdish friends and co-workers at IKWRO with whom I discussed my thoughts and theories long before I gained the confidence to articulate them in the academic genre.

This has been supplemented with a mapping exercise which is used heuristically in order to provide a starting point for conceptualisation of the relationships between ecology and kinship. The map used kinship data from Jones’ (2003a) geographical distributions of kinship organisation (developed using Burton et al’s (1996) work with the Ethnographic Database) and superimposes current patterns of HBV onto Jones's kinship structures using the graphic design programme Adobe Illustrator, and shading various areas. The methodology behind identifying areas in relation to ‘honour’-based violence (reckoned from 2000) used in Figure 3.3 (p. 57) originates from several sources which are identified in a table which can be found in Appendix C (page E) along with the dates of publication of the sources used.

The map data should not be considered in any way authoritative, but more in terms of an impressionistic, heuristic starting point for considering the geographical/ecological patterns underlying acceptance of HBV, for several reasons enumerated here:

1. The recognition of HBV may be inconsistent – documentary evidence may focus disproportionately upon areas which have a pre-existing
notoriety for ‘honour’ killings and thus leave other areas unscrutinised, particularly those which lack a free press and an independent civil society;

2. The Pew data used was not collected across non-Muslim populations and significant areas were not researched;

3. The mapping project assumes a stasis which is not justified – for instance, while the UK’s Country of Origin report identifies HBV as ‘not common’ in Libya (Home Office 2012, p. 147), however, media reports suggest an eruption of various forms of violence against women in the aftermath of the uprisings and civil war of 2011, including HBV (BBC 2011). Last, mapping country wide regions misrepresents more granular patterns. Landinfo’s report on Iran (2009a), for instance, suggests far higher occurrence in the Kurdish, Lori, Arab, Baluchi and Turkic peoples living in Iran than in the majority Persian population (p. 7);

4. Combining approval of HBV (from Pew) with occurrences of HBV (from NGO and state data sources) creates an unwarranted equation between attitudes and experiences.

The mapping exercise is thus intended to provide a broader canvas for the ascription of custodial attitudes towards women to patrilinear understandings of kinship found in King (2008b) and Dube (1997) to commence addressing the phase one questions.

Any attempt at holistic reading and model building will inevitably have its own holes. Even the most voracious reader cannot hope to read more than a small proportion of the literature relevant to her interests. Furthermore, a solely theoretical model without analytic testing lacks substantiation.

My model is built through a synthesis of anthropological, political, historical and sociological texts which seek to locate ‘honour’ in a way which is dependent upon social structure — relations of resource-sharing and labour within and between families are organised by marriage. Within these structures, it is in a family’s interest to keep control over marriage. Given the
patriarchal nature of Kurdish society, this is particularly expressed through the custodianship of young women which becomes a point of masculine/familial reputation. This situates ‘honour’ in the interactions between individuals and families, rather than within any particular culture.

The second, empirical, phase was designed to test some of the model’s principles, to analyse the approval of HBV against the experience of HBV and to gain an impression of contemporary Kurdish family structures, and what relationships these had to the experiences of HBV.

**Empirical phase: Analytic testing**

In order to provide the most robust test of the model, I decided to use a quantitative methodology that could provide insights into family structure and marriage, in order to see if there were correlations between differing family structures and forms of marriage in terms of the acceptance and experiences of HBV within the family.

I developed an online survey into marriage, family forms and attitudes to marriage, ‘honour’ and gender roles, initially drafted in English.

With the assistance of the Kurdish IT Group and volunteers from the Kurdish community, the open source LimeSurvey programme, an alternative to survey programmes like Surveymonkey or Qualtrics which has the advantages of being free, and allowing for the alteration of core code. This
facility was used to adapt the programme to display Kurdish script (which, like other Middle Eastern languages, is read from right to left, whereas most software assumes that text runs from left to right). I compiled a list of phrases necessary for the front-end translation: these were mostly short phrases necessary for navigation of the survey, such as ‘click for next page,’ and supplied this to the Kurd IT Group volunteers who created the necessary translation package for installation into LimeSurvey. The benefits of arranging this through the Kurdish open source community was that this allowed the translation package to became available to everyone downloading LimeSurvey subsequently, providing a free tool to all researchers wishing to use the Kurdish language in surveys in the future.

I installed this software, configured it with the Kurdish language pack, and hosted this upon my own personal web domain to make it accessible through a browser. The English language questionnaire was beta-tested by five bilingual Kurdish volunteers and the questions adjusted according to their comments, which involved the removal of a one question which had a possibility of causing negative reactions in respondents.

All the questions and available multiple choice responses translated into the Sorani dialect of Kurdish by a Kurdish academic with a PhD in Kurdish linguistics. He is fully bilingual in English and Sorani Kurdish, having studied for his PhD in the UK. He used the more commonly used scripted orthography of the language, which resembles Farsi and Arabic, which was
input into a translation matrix that formed part of the software package. This presented him with each phrase to be translated individually in English, along with a box into which he could type directly in Kurdish, which was then saved into the database directly so that the text elements were linked.

While the highest standards of questionnaire interpretation require a complex and demanding back-and-forth translation in order to gain equivalence between questionnaire tools (Forsyth et al. 2006), these are frequently related to contrastive cross-cultural studies between different language groups to provide a level of assurance that the responses can be compared across groups. This research did not feature comparisons between languages: the English version was not disseminated, and only served as a draft for the Kurdish version (cf. Harkness and Shoua-Glusberg 1998) which was produced simultaneously. I collaborated closely with the translator, providing him with a full explanation of the ideas behind the thesis and what the questions were intended to achieve, treating him effectively as a co-researcher. We discussed the translation of several significant terms in detail during the process. This was read through by another Kurdish speaking volunteer (again, a person to whom the theory of the thesis had been explained at length) to check for errors before dissemination.

This was then publicised through Kurdish universities and the Awene newspaper, on a Kurdish-language job site, and with the generous help from
my personal networks, and also through the social networking sites Facebook and Twitter (using the popular hashtag #Twitterkurds) with short invitations to participate written in Sorani Kurdish (in both script and ‘Latin’ forms). The translator also tracked social media responses to the survey as it was disseminated and fed them back to me, so that I could be aware of the public response (which was overall positive and welcoming of the research).

The intent of the survey was to capture family relations and patterns of marriage as well as attitudes. Respondents were asked to indicate not only practices in relation to their own marriage, where appropriate, but also those of their siblings, in order to extend the reach of the data — both numerically, and in the hope of gaining greater variation within the sample, rather than relying on solely upon the experiences of those with access to the internet.

The results of this survey are outlined in Chapter 7.

The next chapter commences this exegesis through addressing the ecological aspects of the KRI with reference to the environment, the development of the mode of subsistence and its characteristic kinship patterns.
3. Ecosociology

When Allah was creating these mountains, the mountains cried ...
They said, ‘Who’s going to take care of us? You are making us so snowy and so void.’ ... Then Allah showed the Kurds to them.

*Dialogue from the Kurdish movie ‘A Season in Hakkari’ (Dirik, 2011)*

Figure 3.1: Kurdish pastoralist (2013)

Sexuality is lived primarily as a relation of antagonism between groups, within groups, and at the level of the subject. Relations between communities are basically antagonistic involving power struggles over land, pasture and labour power. These antagonisms mean that other communities are cast as immoral and weak and that relations between them (including marriage alliances) are fraught with danger and deep-seated hostility.

(*Sirman 2004, p. 41*)
This chapter addresses the question of whether family ‘honour’ can be described as relating to particular geographies and organisations of the family rather than specific cultures or religions.

The cultural materialist strategy developed by Harris (2001) seemed particularly relevant to the exploration of aspects of human life which inhabit culture at a deep level, but where it appears untenable to posit a cultural point of origin. Harris places humanity’s endeavours to achieve basic biological survival as core to the development of social structures and models of thought. The materialist strategy prioritises the etic — observed behaviours and practises over emic native understandings — a vast contrast to the cultural approaches of such significant figures in cultural anthropology as Geertz, Boas and Malinowski. I do not seek to place semiotic and materialist understandings into conflict through this choice of approach (cf. Sewell Jr 1992), nor to disavow the fact that ‘honour’ operates discursively through enculturated processes. Rather, I am seeking to focus upon the materialist aspects in order to locate the reasons why a society would choose to adopt such a costly and restrictive system — in terms of the labour demands of constant surveillance of female kinfolk, and the human costs of murder and violence — to such an extent that it has been reproduced over centuries.

This involves a full consideration of how such a code may play a role in political and economic interactions between individuals and collectives.
The key insight of the cultural materialist strategy is derived from Marx’s (1859) proposition that ‘[t]he mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.’

The cultural materialist position argues that aspects of human behaviour which have been related to ‘culture’ may have deep aetiologies based in the strategies developed by individuals and collectives in order to achieve subsistence. These, in turn, are inflected by the affordances and delimitations of the environment:

Traditional tundra societies are more likely to share cultural patterns with each other than with tropical rain forest societies, regardless of whether some descended from a common ancestral culture. High-altitude plateau cultures differ in systematic ways from fishing cultures in island archipelagos. (Sapolsky 2005)

Infrastructure (such as ecology, technology and the mode of production) may supervise societal structures (such as kinship and power hierarchies) given that similar infrastructures appear to generate societal structures within similar constraints, in order to address similar challenges.

If HBV is considered as a combination of the normative control of women by their agnates, along with the metanorm of violent enforcement of control, then a cross-cultural analysis must consider that many societies are sexually liberal, or may be repressive without licensing violent mechanisms of control. In the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, fewer cultures are sexually restrictive
than the converse (Schlegel 1995). This is probably due to the high representation of hunter-gatherer societies within the dataset, since these tend to be sexually permissive (Konner 2010, p. 523).

As Meillassoux (1981) suggests, there is less impetus for the control of filiation within hunter-gatherer societies due to a lack of proprietary interest in the land. A Kiowa wife, for instance, who was facing a beating for infidelity would be protected by her brothers rather than censured by them; if she were killed, her brothers would enact bloody vengeance upon the husband (Collier 1988, p. 188). Even where cultures are violently punitive of women’s sexual autonomy, this is not necessarily expressed through a communal requirement to agnatic murder (Sanday 1981, p. 151).

**Introducing ecosociology**

Given the countries enumerated in my first chapter, HBV appears to be loosely associated with a belt formation across the Eurasian continent (Figure 3.3 below). The crispness of the ‘honour’ zone is striking, and reminiscent of the ‘patriarchal belt’ terminology used by Kandiyoti (1988) and Caldwell (1982). While the Eurasian areas where honour crimes are culturally heterogeneous, they share geographical similarities.

Most of the countries in which HBV has been identified as a current practice fall between the Tropic of Cancer and $\phi 45^\circ$N. Other countries with
suspected, historic connections with this type of violence —Southern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia — are contiguous with this region, extending in a northerly direction, possibly terminating in southern France (Goody 1983, p. 17). This addition makes interpretation even more curious since such a distribution does not accord with any historic empire, state or other collective.

The specific patterns of male dominance which exist in central Eurasia can be related to the geographical zone which Kandiyoti (1988) identifies as ‘classical patriarchy’, in tune with Rubin’s (1975) narrow, anthropological sense of the term, related to the lifestyles of pastoral nomads, structured by patrilinearity—a formation which has deep continuities with the foundational structures and ideologies of the earliest Eurasian civilisations: the Urkultur of agrarian life within the continent. The ‘patriarchal belt’ formation encompasses part of the Alpides (Figure 3.2), a particularly mountainous region, formed due to the collision of the Indian, Eurasian, Arabian and African tectonic plates in the late Mesozoic period, including the Zagros and Taurus Mountain ranges —

18 For an explanation of patrilinearity, see the diagrams in Appendix B.
the Kurdish homeland. Diamond (2007) suggests that the pre-modern
transmission of technology, animals and knowledge occur more readily along
lines of latitude because similar climatic and ecological conditions are more
suitable for the spread of livestock and agriculture.

Thus the ‘belt’ formation may suggest an ecosociological explanation, where
similar modes of adaptation to the environment were shared across lines of
latitude, an odyssey in which patterns of power and authority within the
family were transmitted along with plough technology, livestock, seed-crops
and the myriad other innovations and adaptations of the Neolithic revolution,
which tended to be demically and culturally transferred along mountain
ranges.

The transmission of agrarian technologies, as evidenced by genetic, linguistic
and archaeological evidence (Zilhão 1993; Cavalli-Sforza 1996; Renfrew
1996), suggests a primary wave reaching Southern Europe around 4800-
4400 BCE, which then spread to the rest of the continent in 4000-3500 BCE.
While accounts of the foundational period of human civilisation develop over
time with new archaeological findings, there is little doubt that the Neolithic
revolution occurred in the Near and Middle East, and that this formed the
epicentre for the diffusion of wheat, barley, sheep, goats and probably cattle
and pigs to Europe, Egypt and South Asia (Cavalli-Sforza 1996, p. 51). Cereal
production commenced in the Middle Euphrates valley, reaching the foothills
of the Zagros mountains in the 7th millennium; around the same period goat
and sheep-herding was developed in the lower regions of the Zagros-Taurus mountains (Harris 1996, p. 554); craggy terrain which only the most nimble beasts can navigate.

Pastoralism has the longest established history in a region extending from the Mediterranean to the Indus; and can be found also in the Caucasus and Northern Eurasia (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1968) — a region which coincides with the ‘patriarchal belt’ formation.

Excavations of such ‘deep history’ have, until very recently, confronted the limitations of human knowledge and the difficulties of describing societies at such temporal distance from our own. Yet recent developments within archaeology, genetics, linguistics and anthropology tend to suggest large pre-historic macro-cultural blocs, often transmitted along mountain ranges, with broad but non-identical patterns of intersection between linguistic groupings, genetic similarities and — most importantly for my purposes — kinship patterns (Burton et al. 1996; Jones 2003a).

Kinship patterns are cross-mapped against the occurrence of HBV and support for it in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Cross mapping of HBV with kinship macrocultures
Within these groupings, the largest geographical area — the ‘Middle Old World’ — occupying the majority of central Eurasia, but excluding the peripheries of the continent, comprises the patriarchal belt.

For Jones (2003a), North Eurasia and the Circumpolar regions originated in distinct political economies based in foraging and horticulture with bilateral kinship structures, developed during a period of post-glacial settlement; the Middle Old World, on the other hand, was historically dominated by pastoralism coexisting with intensive agriculture, patrilinearity as the basis of political power, and rule by pastoral nomadic tribes (Jones 2003a, p. 507 Table 2). With very few exceptions, pastoralist societies are patrilinear, clannish, and male-dominated, with sharp gendered divisions of labour (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2001, p. 36). There may be, then, linkages between ecology and kinship orientations.

Kinship structures can be paradigmatic of social and political organisation (Todd 1985). Jones’ delineation of the cross-cultural dimensions of kinship assumes two vectors: matricentricity/patricentricity; and unilinearity/bilaterality which have profound ramifications for the organisation of the family.

*Traits characterising patricentric societies include brideprice, sororal polygyny, patrilocal residence, exogamous or clan*

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19 I.e., the Maasai of Tanzania and the Tuareg of North Africa, both of which are plains-dwelling societies.
communities and transhumance or nomadism, while matricentric traits include matrilocal residence, segmented communities, nonextended families and the absence of marriage exchange... Traits characterising unilineal societies include clan communities, unilineal kin groups, nonsororal polygyny and cousin marriage while bilateral (non-unilineal) traits include bilateral descent groups, ego-centred kindreds, bi-local or neolocal residence. (Jones 2003a, p. 503)

This provides a vital clue to unravelling the riddle of HBV distribution across Eurasian regions, through placing the societies of the Middle Old World as particularly likely to have patricentric structurations of the family, frequently accompanied by unilinearity — meaning that kinship is overwhelmingly patrilinear in form. This has impacts upon the organisation of the family and domestic life. For instance, Dyson and Moore (1983) attribute the greater autonomy, more balanced gender ratios and lower fertility found in the southern states of India to their matrilineal kinship structures, in comparison to the firmly patrilineal north (which encompasses the regions which are most notorious for HBV).

Dube (1997) poses a key question based on her comparative studies within South Asia, where she finds the agnatic control of women’s sexuality is pronounced in southwest Asia, but comparatively weak in the southeast:

*Can it be a coincidence that women in bilateral and matrilineal Muslim communities do not observe seclusion*\(^\text{20}\) whereas for women

\(^{20}\) By 'seclusion' Dube is referring to an expectation of the physical segregation of the sexes in order to protect female 'honour', which is assumed to be compromised through contact with non-agnatic males.
in patrilineal and patri-virilocal kinship organisation it has become a mark of identity? (1997, p. 67)

King (2008b) answers Dube’s question by arguing for a very direct relationship between HBV and patrilinearity in the KRI, asserting that patrilinear structures place a heightened symbolic value upon chastity and virginity, seen as a barrier against agnatic outsiders, which places female reproductive capacities under the control of agnatic groups.

HBV then, might be associated with unilineal, patricentric (patrilocal/patrifocal) structures of kinship occurring within the central landmass of Eurasia, which also applies, at least at an ideological level, to the clannish Roman and Greek empires (Hodge 2007, p. 22). Its absence or earlier demise from other Eurasian regions and the ‘New World’ may be attributed to the bilateral and matrilineal kinship structures found there.

Attempts to schematise kinship relations have stumbled between Lévi-Strauss’s so-called ‘universal’ structures to looser, social constructivist readings in which relationships are defined in emic terms. Jallinoja (2011) makes a graceful synthesis of these contestations, locating a common ground between Lévi-Strauss, Bourdieu, Schneider and Carsten, in distinguishing between ‘official’ kin (using Carsten’s term) and ‘practical’ kin (using Bourdieu’s), recognising the discrepancies with which persons represent their relationships. To provide a simple example, an uncle and nephew of
similar age may present themselves as cousins, feeling that a fictive attribution is a better expression of their lived relationship than the formal degrees of relatedness to be found on a kinship chart.

Bilateral relations thus always exist at a practical level, even if kinship is officially reckoned in a unilinear sense. However, ‘official’ kinship has a great deal of cross-cultural variance due to these differentiations: in English, a father’s brother, and a mother’s brother are both designated by the term uncle, due to the bilateral system of kinship, where each individual claims their heritage from both their paternal and maternal lineages on an equal basis. In Kurdish however, a paternal/agnatic uncle is called *mam*, whereas a maternal/affinal uncle is called *khal*. In traditional agricultural corporatism with diffusive inheritance patterns, a man is expected to co-labour and share the resources of the patrimony with his brothers, making the agnatic/affinal differentiation a proxy for specific economic and labour relationships.

The attribution of a specific kinship term, then, may denote ‘how that person stands in relation to the means of production and therefore to other people in the same and different relationships to these means,’ (Sacks 1982, p. 110) — and these vary widely across cultures. Kinship based collectives have historically performed most of the social, economic and political functions of rural communities across the world, including providing mutual support and conducting the various tasks of pastoral life, including digging wells,

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21 Tellingly Kurds may use *mam* and *kak* (elder brother) as honorific terms to show respect.
regulating access to grazing lands, burning off surface vegetation, the selective grazing of herds and so forth (Bonte 1981, pp. 23-24), and in the absence of a developed state and welfare system they continue to maintain this function.

Thus, the patriline is the primary lineage in terms of patrimonial inheritance and labour, whereas matrilateral relations are comparatively peripheral, and may, for this reason be less afflicted by conflict. Official relationships may also be somewhat flexible however, where, for instance, a tribe \(^{22}\) with an exclusive identification that wishes to arrange a valuable marriage alliance outside the collective may find a method of mythologizing the relations between them to smooth over the ambiguities between the systems of official kinship with the realpolitik of practical kinship.

### The organisation of labour and resources

*The family is an association if you like, a corporation or a clan. It is something more than the sum of the individuals, with their human and fallible complexities, that compose it; to ensure its safety, it has a supreme and primordial right to the devotion of all its members.*

Barret Wendell, *La france d’aujourd’hui*, 1910 (in Nye 1993, p. 98)

\(^{22}\) I am using Charrad’s definition of tribes (2001, p.9) ‘a political entity bound by shared conceptions of patrilineal kinship serving as a basis for solidarity, and oriented to the collective defence of itself as a group.’
'Human beings,' says Haidt (2012), ‘are the world champions of cooperation beyond kinship, and we do it in a large part by creating systems of formal and informal accountability,’ which are used to negotiate interactions, particularly those operating across social boundaries. Cooperation beyond kinship is a particular point of interest in marriage, which can either extend or consolidate a kinship group.

This chapter argues that a fixation upon women’s ‘honour’ is just such a system of accountability, and further, that it has been generated due to the ways in which marriage is used to organise social relations within patricentric agrarian-pastoralist societies.

Wolf’s (1982) magisterial ecosociological history describes how kinship can be viewed as a distinct mode of production, particularly predominant amongst those people upon the peripheries of ‘tributary’ empires — which would include the mountainous and inaccessible terrain of the Kurdish regions, which has historically been the location where successive Middle Eastern civilisations and empires peter out (Houston 2008, p. 10). The historic defensibility of the Zagros mountains, and the suitability of the terrain for guerrilla warfare, has often led to the Kurds being considered uncontrollable by imperial powers, from the Achaemenid Empire of 550–330 BCE (Wiesehöfer 2009), to the time of the British Mandate and beyond (Fieldhouse 2006, p. 108). These regions, perduring just beyond the grasp of
Leviathan, were described as ‘Lands of Lions’ by the Arabs who attempted to subdue them (Bird 2005, p. 14).

According to Goldstone and Haldon (2009), early Middle Eastern empires initially based their administration and executive powers upon kin-based modes, which were then gradually replaced by other bureaucratic systems involving a separate social class of functionaries, such as the eunuchs of the Byzantine Empire (Ringrose 2007), although lineage tended to remain salient. It can be deduced then, that within peripheral areas which were not fully integrated into an overarching state or empire, access to power is likely to remain mediated by kinship to a significant degree. As Batutu says (1993, p. 511), ‘the existence of powerful tribes [in Iraq] was, as a rule, a concomitance of weak cities.’

Following Engels (1884/2010), Wolf addresses kinship, property claims, and the status of women as linked phenomena. He describes the kinship-ordered mode of production as ‘a way of committing social labour to the transformation of nature through appeals to filiation and marriage, and to consanguinity and affinity’ (1982, p. 91) — in short, a politics built around heredity and reproduction. Where resources are finite in nature — i.e. based in the control of particular tracts of land — there is a crucial need to negotiate access to resources such as farmland, pastures and water,
particularly in the absence of exclusive or juridically-defined rights (Bonte 1981, pp. 28-29).

Kinship performs this function where access to resources is restricted or allocated via a *kinship licence* (Wolf 1982, p. 91). According to Meillassoux (1981), the frangible but intense bonds of sexual partnership formed by individual choice were sufficient for adhesion within foraging societies where there is less proprietary interest in the land, being viewed as common property; but the development of forms of subsistence such as intensive agriculture place a higher stake on kinship claims to resources, which become allocated by lineage. Where resources fall under control mediated by kinship rather than common ownership, more permanent marital relationships were sought through organising relationships on the basis of filiation rather than individual preference. Marriage thus becomes a collective transfer event, allocating rights and responsibilities to both parties, and to their kin. It may therefore become a subject of collective strategizing by kin groups, as has been observed by Bourdieu (1962, 1972) in France and Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) in India.

Where pressure on the land is particularly intense, approaching ‘ecological closure’, such as in the desiccated landscape of the former Fertile Crescent (Wolf 1996), ecologically depleted during Islam’s ‘Golden Age’, and the ‘tragedy of the commons’ which is particularly pertinent to pastoral life (Hardin 1968), relations around resources become increasingly
circumscribed and exclusive, and ‘the idiom of filiation and marriage is used to construct transgenerational pedigrees, real or fictitious’ (Wolf 1982, p. 91) in order to provide more compelling symbolic narratives of ownership to mythologize and justify control over land and water. King and Stone (2010) found just such an intense preoccupation with lineage in their studies of Kurdish families, with a strong patrilinear bias, which tended to erase or subsume female histories into phallocentric narratives of descent.

Prior to WWI — which led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent division of Kurdish territories into the new nation-states of the Middle East created by the Allied powers under the Treaty of Lausanne — transhumant pastoralism was the predominant economic mode; since when sedentary agriculturalism increased (Head 1974), followed by the development of industry, and the exploitation of native oil wealth in the KRI since the fall of Saddam Hussein, leading to a rapidly modernising economy.

Kurdish regions are predominantly mountainous, creating moral microclimates with a tendency towards conservatism with intense, if agonistic and unstable, local loyalties, and an ethos of individualism and self-reliance (Izady 1992, p. 187). Such attitudes are indeed typical of pastoral life, where pastoralists face the difficulties of maintaining control and possession over pasture-land in the absence of standardising bureaucratic and legal ownership (Campbell 1964; Schneider 1971) which did not exist
until the colonial period in Iraq. 'In the mountains,' says McDowall (1996, p. 8), 'land was traditionally controlled by the tribe, and the agha was responsible for the equitable allocation of pastoral rights,' while Kurdish farmers were subject to a quasi-feudal control by their landlords.

In transhumant arrangements, pastoralists are sporadically absent from the pastures they wish to possess; furthermore their livelihood is ambulant and can be driven away by a rival. Pastoralism is thus an insecure means of subsistence, vulnerable to conflict; it is also one which obliges pastoralists who do not wish to subsist entirely on milk, meat and butter (see Masson Smith Jr. 2000) into contact with other groupings to obtain cereals, vegetables, legumes and manufactured goods, which must be acquired through trade with, or exploitation of, settled communities; or through the raiding which is common to pastoral life (Lindner 1983, p. 11).

Successful individuals in pastoral societies need to express the personal characteristics which address these vulnerabilities, which includes self-reliance and aggression (Goldschmidt 1971; Moritz 2008). There is a tendency towards the formulation of tribal links as a metastasis and mystification of kinship, in order to increase numeric power in the face of potential conflict. For McDowall, despite being in a period of disintegration, tribalism remained strong, if heterogeneous and difficult to classify in the late 1990s in the KRI. It was also was deeply factional:
Loyalties of one group to another are not immutable, and can be severed and different ones negotiated, in response to tribal or economic situations. When an ambitious chief tries to extend his territory or the number of loyal groups under his control, there will almost certainly be a counter-move and shift of alliances as others endeavour to contain his ambition. This counter-move may be inspired by central government, or by neighbouring tribal groups who do not wish the ‘equilibrium’ to be disturbed. (1996, p. 9)

Van Bruinessen (1978) states that nomadic and transhumant tribes historically used their military power to negotiate with farming communities, which could range from the provision of protection from other tribes in exchange for tribute, to the extraction of protection money to escape attacks, in a complex web of asymmetric interdependency and might. It is, indeed, typical of pastoralists in general to subordinate farming communities (Cavalli-Sforza 1996, p. 56). Much of Middle Eastern history features waves of conquest by successive nomadic pastoralist groups, using their greater mobility to plunder and subordinate other civilisations (Ibn Khaldūn 1377/2005; Richerson et al. 2001, p. 76). Hence, pastoral norms and values may be considered high status, since they have frequently been associated with the prestige of powerful social groups.

If relations between tribal nomads and settled farmers were characterised by exploitation, then intertribal relations could be characterised by intense hostilities: Van Bruinessen’s classic ethnology of the Kurds (1978) found that every respondent who was questioned regarding the functions of kinship
structures — tribe, clan, village, lineage — gave the same response: that such structurations were necessary for participating in intertribal wars, disputes and blood-feuds, provoked by claims over territory, or over women.

Sedentary and nomadic lifestyles differ markedly:

\[\text{Kurdish society on the plains and in the foothills differs so markedly from that of mountain Kurds that in many respects they can be treated as a separate culture. The plain economy was and is sedentary, combining pastoralism with the more important business of growing barley, rice, tobacco and wheat. Blood ties frequently exist but they are not as all-embracing as among tribes with a nomadic tradition, and even those who might call themselves a tribe are usually subject to a wholly unrelated landlord family that has title to the land by the government. (McDowall 1996, p. 10)}\]

Schneider finds a pattern of coexisting/competing pastoralism and agriculture in the Mediterranean region led to the development of an internal social code, where groups were:

...competing for the same resources\(^{23}\) in a way which fragmented the social organisation of each community and blurred the boundary between them. In the absence of a state, pastoral communities and agricultural communities in their midst, developed their own means of social control — the codes of honour and shame — which were adapted to the intense conflict that external pressures had created within them and between them (1971, p. 3).

\(^{23}\) It should be noted that Schneider considers access to women as one of these contested resources, since child-bearing is essential for labour, economic security of the elderly and for the continued defence of corporate holdings against aggressors.
The pastoral mode has a tendency to lead to resource shortage, through encouraging population and herd expansion as strategies which benefit the individual (Szkult 1981) whilst depleting natural resources. This is particularly the case for societies reliant upon sheep, which have a particularly heavy impact upon the environment. This is a recipe for ecological closure rather than an Arcadian harmony with nature.

Agriculture is no less expansionist, tending to encourage high fertility and therefore running the risk of falling into the Malthusian trap. According to Wolf (1982), the impact of socioecological pressures upon the family is for each patriline to treat marriage in the manner of the European aristocracy: that is, as a method for forming political alliances, and for negotiating territorial claims:

> [T]hey organise the exchange of persons between pedigrees through their definition of ties of affinity; marriage, instead of being a relationship between a bride and a groom and their immediate relatives only, becomes a tie of political alliance between groups...On the level of filiation and marriage, kinship sets up individuated linkages among shareholders in social labour. (Wolf 1982, p. 92)

Thus the kin-ordered mode sources the maintenance of power in control over parentage and the reproductive powers of women. According to Wolf, this grants ‘rights over the social labour embodied in females, offspring, and affines: the second defines not only descent, but also collaterality — the genealogical range of movable allies’ (p. 93), such as the ‘vengeance group’,
who can be called on to support the family in feuds and small-scale wars, or, less dramatically, able bodies who can help bring in a harvest, supply dishes for a funeral feast, and so forth. The licence for sharing in a patrilineal resource entails a reciprocal requirement to participate in patrilineal labour.

There are therefore constant tensions between patrilinear exclusivity — the need to retain control of resources within the kinship group — and inclusivity, through the need to gain allies, supporters and labourers. Such an ordering of society has two direct results: first, instability and antagonism between patrilines; and second, the delimitation of women’s sexual autonomy.

**Instability and antagonism**

‘Within the Kurdish nation,’ states Prince Sharaf al-Dîn Bitlîsî, the first historian of the Kurdish peoples, (1597/2005, p. 18, verse 42), ‘none follows nor concurs with the other, nor is there solidarity among them.’

A patrilinear kinship-ordered society is vulnerable to fission and internal and external conflicts, between original settlers and interlopers, between junior and senior lines, and between prospering and declining patrilines: a pattern which can be associated with *segmentary agnation*[^24]. This fissile nature may be exacerbated by resource shortage, and ‘contradictions between individual-household-corporate subgroup centrality in production and

[^24]: See Appendix B for a diagrammatic representation of segmentary agnation.
corporate ownership of productive means’ (Sacks 1982, p. 117). Versions of
the Bedouin proverb ‘Me against my brother, my brothers and me against my
cousins, then my cousins and me against strangers,’ which occur widely
across the Arab world, clearly express both the strengths — and the internal
contestations — of the segmentary mode of organisation within patrilinear
societies.

Ibn Khaldūn (1377/2005), drawing on the experiences of the Arab conquests,
suggests that there is a natural lifecycle of a society, which is hardy in
adversity during its progress towards power, but becomes decadent once
success is attained; patrilines are in constant contestation with rivals to
maintain their position in order to escape subordination or absorption by a
stronger patriline, and to maintain continuities through producing sons. For
Ibn Khaldūn, successful patrilines need to express asabiyaa — deep kinship
solidarities to provide cohesion and display collective strength.

In the Pashtun context any explicit vulnerability may imperil the future of the
family:

*Households which demonstrate weakness, by failing to control either women’s behaviour or their independence in the arrangement and completion of a marriage, lose honour and credibility and find themselves on a downward spiral and extremely vulnerable. They are likely to become economically and politically dependent on a stronger (and more honourable) household, and may suffer outright exploitation and oppression.*

(Tapper 1981, p. 393)
The power of any individual or collective relates to the number of followers one can attract, and the political support one can muster — and therefore, power accrues to those who can foster strategic marriages and thereby place other persons and families in positions of obligation. Yet any one man’s attempt to gain supremacy within this system is ultimately constrained by the limitations of his own fertility and that of his wife (or wives), based in how many sons he can claim to his own lineage, and how many daughters he can deploy to gain or reinforce allegiance from others. Even where polygyny is practised, there are natural limitations to this method of advancement. It is also delimited by challenges from within the kinship group, where relationships between brothers are egalitarian, and hence often competitive — more brothers may mean more potential allies, but they also mean more potential antagonists, leading men to locate social preferment in their ‘honour’. Reputation and reciprocity are the bases of normative ethics, and can well become an aspect of individual and group-based competition (Van Vugt et al. 2007).

The combination of potential antagonism with practical interdependence within an agonistic society liable to blood-feuds (Belge 2011) means that the necessary evil of extra-familial interactions is conducted with an extreme sensitivity to any exterior encroachments upon male/familial status. Schneider outlines the operations of such an agonistic environment within the hybrid pastoralist/agrarian zones of the Mediterranean region:
As a political phenomenon, honour can attach to any human group from the nuclear family to the nation state. The problem of honour becomes salient when the group is threatened with competition from equivalent groups. It is especially salient when small, particularistic groups, such as families, clans or gangs are the principal units of power, sovereign, or nearly so over the territories they control. Concern for honour also grows when contested resources are subject to redivision along changing lines, when there is no stable relationship between units of power and precisely defined patrimonies, i.e., when the determination of boundary lines is subject to continual human intervention. Finally, concern for honour arises when the definition of the group is problematic; when social boundaries are difficult to maintain, and internal loyalties are questionable. (1971, p. 2)

The most significant aspect of this form of honour is that it requires assertive, even choleric, response to status challenges. ‘Honour’ can be a carapace of machismo intended to mask any vulnerability through displaying a readiness to use violence against any slights to their status. It is in this sense that Cohen and Nisbett (1996) relate the higher levels of violence recorded in the southern United States to an American version of ‘honour’ culture. They point out that the emergence of southern ‘honour’-based codes, based in self-reliance and self-assertion, arose within frontier communities of sharecroppers, prospectors and ranchers which were both territorially vulnerable and lacking in social order. Thus men and groups sought to portray a reputation of being formidable foes to discourage challenges to their position and property, through cultivating a sensitivity to perceived slights; to ‘greatly to find quarrel in a straw / When honour’s at the stake,’ (Hamlet, Act 4, Scene 4). Certainly, Cohen and Nisbett’s description of
'honour' has been shown to correlate with heightened levels of interpersonal violence (Altheimer 2012).

Tensions between the individual and the group, suggests Cottino, lead to ‘the centrality of trust’ as an aspect of ‘honour’ — a reputation for fair-dealing and reciprocity — which relates to the apparently paradoxical coexistence of rugged individualism with collective interdependence. Within this paradox, cultures can simultaneously appear as agonistic and highly integrated, due to the development of a social order poised between the horns of a dilemma:

...an endemic situation of uncertainty, an existential condition where two conflicting basic demands coexist: an urge to compete for limited goods on the one hand; a need for reciprocal dependence and mutual aid on the other. (Cottino 1999, p. 106)

It is precisely because there is so much reason for families to be suspicious and mistrustful that a reputation for trustworthiness and honesty becomes a preeminent aspect of ‘honour.’ From Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the Nuer in the 1940s onwards, ‘honour’ has been understood within anthropology as a means of developing an interactional social order in communities which lack external regulation. However, as Bates (2010, p. 30) and Collins (2008, Chapter 6) identify, the order which develops in this way is likely to be fragile, unforgiving and violent. Collins (2008, p. 230) notes ‘societies with an honour culture are notorious for...their pervasive atmosphere of threat and insecurity.’ Peace, within an order poised upon such competing tensions, is founded upon a tense and volatile state of stalemate. This is evident in many
situations where external agencies of social control are lacking or unreliable, or where the actors are marginalised and unlikely to have their concerns treated seriously (Black 1983, p. 41). For Collins (2008, p. 231), ‘honour’ codes tend towards a stratification by violence: ‘the community is palpably divided into an elite of tough guys and tough groups (whether they are called gangs, families, clans, aristocrats etc.) and those who are subject to them.’ The deterrent effect of threatened violent reprisal is not equally available to smaller groups, particularly those lacking in the capacity for violence.

The discourse of ‘honour’ may be used as a justification for displays of dominance by a violent elite as part of the cultivation of an asymmetric power-dynamic in which slights are given freely, but not suffered, by those with the greatest capacity to make violent reprisals. ‘Interactions thus take place in a volatile ambience of honour and impudence,’ observes Bates (2010, p. 30), in which ‘young hotheads move to the fore; and a culture of machismo permeates the society.’ This can include the humiliation and exploitation of female members as proxy attacks upon less powerful groupings.

As Collier (1988) suggests, within classless societies, a major source of inequalities is the ability to claim ‘rights’ over women’s bodies through kinship statuses, such as parenthood or marriage. Three basic aspects of ‘honour’ can be seen to interlock here: violence as a normative response to
status challenges, interactional group norms around reciprocity and reputation, and a collective stake in the control over women's bodies.

I now consider the nature of agnatic ‘rights’ over women's bodies in greater detail.

**Marriage within kinship networks**

*By restricting the interaction of men and women and by assigning men the dominant role ... it becomes possible for both men and women to view the female as an object, a part of the capital goods of the patrilineage to be kept for itself or exchanged.*

(Rassam 1980, p. 173)

That marriage alliances have the function of gaining social connections is the foundational insight of Lévi-Strauss’s notion of the ‘exchange of women’, (1949/1969), influenced by Maussian mechanics of gift exchange, in which he describes women as the ‘supreme gift’, transitioned from one family to another through marital arrangements in order to forge alliances. The ‘exchange of women’, for Lévi-Strauss, was the basis of human civilisation — and universally discernible. The claimed universality of Lévi-Strauss's application of the ‘exchange of women’ has been redoubtably challenged (Harris 2001, Chapter 7), along with his androcentricism in effecting one of the most thorough erasures of female agency in anthropological history (Weiner 1992) in his unquestioned presumption of male ownership of female bodies.
However, the kernel of his theory has been productively re-examined by Rubin (1975). She recognises that the ‘exchange of women’ (or perhaps, more accurately, interfamilial transferences of rights over women and girls) is by no means universal. In fact, that there may be situations, such as amongst the Nuer, Minangkabau and Hopi societies, where a more appropriate description might be the *exchange of men* (Singer 1973, p. 43; Peletz 1987; Krier 2000). There are many societies with a completely different orientation to marriage entirely, including some where it may be entirely absent (Hua 2008). However, Rubin identifies the exchange of women as a significant organisational principle within many societies. Males select their partners in only 31% of the world’s societies, whereas females do so in only 8% (Broude and Greene 1983). Rubin says:

*If women are the gifts, then it is men who are the exchange partners. And it is the partners, not the presents, upon whom reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mythical power of social linkage. The relations of such a system are such that women are in no position to realise the benefits of their own circulation* (1975, p. 174)

She redefines the ‘exchange of women’ as:

*...a shorthand for expressing that the social relations of a kinship system specify that men have certain rights over their female kin, and that women do not have the same rights either to themselves or to their male kin. In this sense, the exchange of women is a profound perception of a system in which women do not have full rights to themselves.* (p. 177)
If, by exchanging women, men and families are brought into alliance, then women are the *conduits* by which that alliance is effected. As conduits, women’s roles as wives are simultaneously an extension or reaffirmation of kinship relations, a constant enactment of the alliance between families. Rubin does not take this to mean that women are objectified in any literal sense of the word, but does point up the intrinsically asymmetric nature of the arrangement.

Rubin’s statement may, for my purposes, be creating an overdualistic model of the gendered nature of the asymmetries of the system of exchange, which may itself be rooted in Lévi-Strauss’s original androcentric framing. Women are, in fact, far more active participants in the negotiation of marital exchanges than her formulation allows. Within patrilinear societies, it is not merely men as men who have these rights over their female kin but a wider kin network, including both parents and other members of the kingroup who hold these ‘rights’ as members of the patriline, rather than deriving them from their gender. Nor are junior males immune from parental pressure and some may themselves be forced into marriage unwillingly.

Nevertheless, as a way for expressing the inequities of those forms of marriage arrangement in relation to Wolf’s kinship-oriented mode of production, Rubin’s feminist reclamation of Lévi-Straussian theory appears to be very apt for the discussion of patricentric, patrilinear societies where
marriage represents a woman’s transition from parental to marital household.

Naziha al-Dulaymi, of the League for the Defence of Women’s Rights in Iraq, and who also served a brief tenure as a cabinet minister (1959-60), wrote a scathing attack on Iraqi marriage practices in the 1950s.

*She claimed that women of ‘the peasant class’ were treated as a means of production by their fathers and later their husbands. At an early age, they start working for their fathers, who hope to profit further from their daughter’s mahrg as soon as they reach puberty...They are traded for livestock or other women, their prices influenced by market conditions. Child marriages, more prevalent in years of drought and grave economic need, have seen fathers offering their daughters at very young ages for paltry sums, or even without a mahr so as to be absolved of the burden of supporting them...Moreover they could be offered as compensation for murder, theft, humiliation and as debt payment.* (Efrati 2005, pp. 581-582)

Ertem and Kocturk (2008), conducting focus groups with Kurdish-speaking women in Turkey found similar patterns of marriage transactions, along with a pattern of endogamous cousin marriage, which is so far considered normal in the Middle East that it is likely that al-Dulaymi did not identify it as worthy of particular comment.

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25 Mahrg is an Islamic requirement for marriage, which could most accurately be described as an indirect dowry. However, the context of al-Dulaymi’s statement suggests that she is referring to a prestation which I will refer to as *brideprice* (see p. 187).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most frequent (&gt;75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriage</td>
<td>• In this region marriage decisions are made by the family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cradle betrothal</td>
<td>• This is rare nowadays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin marriage</td>
<td>• A girl is the right of the (paternal) uncle’s son. If he doesn’t want her, the girl’s family can accept proposals from other family men or outsiders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct exchange</td>
<td>• This is an option for poor people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice marriage, elopement</td>
<td>• If a girl falls in love and elopes with a boy against the wishes of her parents, this will damage her family honour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Summarised content analysis of group discussions conducted by Ertem and Kocturk (2008)

Ertem and Kocturk’s respondents appeared very aware of the political and economic factors of marriage while remaining respectful of the presumed
legitimacy of parental power. According to Hassanpour (2001), the patterns referred to by al-Dulaymi and Ertem and Kocturk occur within both rural and urban regions of the KRI.

Rubin's notion of the role of women in marriage as conduits, expressing relationships between men and families takes a central position in the conceptualisation of ‘honour’ within a local political economy. Women quite literally embody marriage alliances within patrilinear societies: their transmission from one household to another, their provision of domestic labour, and their ability to reproduce their recipient patriline is the embodiment and enactment of the kinship alliance which the respective families have forged through marriage. Women’s compliance to the demands of their affines — their ability to embody normative wifehood — is the very substance of the inter/intra-familial link, jeopardised by the wife’s failure to live up to the overt and tacit standards of the interfamilial marriage contract.

As ‘partible aspects of patrilinear identity’ (Strathern 1990, p. 229), women serve as representatives of their own family’s commitment to collective norms in front of their affines and the community at large. Should a woman or girl fail to satisfy the interactively-generated terms of the transaction involved in her transference from her natal household to that of her affines/husband, and their/his ability to command her labour, sexual
functions and reproductive capacity, she fails to maintain the alliance between the families by the same token.

Bonds forged through marriage are expected to be permanent, because the breaking of a marriage alliance means the jettisoning of social capital and the potential for alliances to dissolve into resentment and potential conflict, which would lead to the renegotiation of unstable ‘kinship licences’ providing access to resources and kinship based labour. In one case identified by Alinia (2013, p. 71), for instance, the men involved considered the relationship formed by marriage to have long-term obligations beyond the life of the wife. A wife-killer described the attitude of his father-in-law: ‘Her father is a very good man. He said that it is your right to do as you did. He even said that he would bring me a new wife.’

Therefore women bear the responsibility of maintaining this relationship through conforming to the normative ideals of wifehood in such a way as to place themselves beyond reproach. The families’ ‘rights’ over the women they ‘exchange’, in Rubin’s sense, map on to their ‘responsibilities’ to control them, to ensure that they meet the societal standards of marriageability generated within the collective as a whole, in order to underwrite the delicate political and economic connectivities that marriage creates.

Through placing women as ‘tokens of alliance’ the kinship licence delimits their autonomy, as young women cannot be trusted to understand or subscribe to the delicate politics and vested interests of the family, patriline
and tribe, and to take them into consideration when they engage in relationships, nor to allow these to occlude their personal preferences.

According to Horne (2004, p. 1038): ‘[t]he desires of self-interested individuals for collective benefits produced at the group level create social dilemmas; their interests in interpersonal exchange create a distinct but related set of dynamics.’ In keeping with this characterisation, the locus of the creation of these dynamics is neither the individual nor the group, but in an interim, structurated position. Thus the norms of ‘honour’ are socially constructed through the interactions between the individual and the group (Awad 2001), all of whom are current or potential stake-holders, participants and competitors in the political economy of marriage alliances.

**Namûs as symbolic capital**

For Bourdieu (2001, p. 45), women’s reputations are an aspect of *symbolic capital* — which he identified within systems based in the exchange of women in Kabylia. This symbolic capital is a prerequisite of their circulation, and the benefits, in terms of social capital, which accrue to their patrilines through their marriages:

> [W]omen are assets which must be protected from offence and suspicion and which, when invested in exchanges can produce alliances, in other words social capital, and prestigious allies, in other words symbolic capital… [T]he value of these alliances, and

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26 Bourdieu (1977) defines symbolic capital as the ‘prestige and renown attached to a family or a name’, and as the ‘most valuable form of accumulation’ in societies based in collective labour (p 179).
therefore the symbolic profit they can yield, partly depends on the symbolic value of the women available for exchange, that is their reputation and especially their chastity — constituted as a fetishised measure of masculine reputation, and therefore of the symbolic capital of the whole lineage — the honour of the brothers and fathers, which induces a vigilance as attentive, and even paranoid, as that of the husbands, is a form of enlightened self-interest.

Women’s ‘honour’, then, is the symbolic capital of a woman’s reputation, expressed in terms of conformity to normative modes of female sexual behaviour, which conditions her acceptance into the category of ‘marriageable’, occurring where marriages are intended to bring her family social capital and connectivity — both in Wolf’s sense of the ability to mobilise social labour, and in the Bourdieusien sense of interpersonal connections. Bourdieu’s description of the collective guardianship of honour as a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’, (i.e. as a form of custodianship in order to reap higher rewards through marriage connectivities, and in terms of gaining esteem in the community), does not imply that such guardians of ‘honour’ are ‘rational fools’, the *Homo economicus* of classical economics (Sen 1977). Neither rational fool nor cultural dupe, the Bourdieusien individual is a canny strategist, whose methods of self-advancement are developed and shaped within the inherited structures and conceptions of his society, although they may certainly challenge and reform them.

The English word ‘honour’ (which is the usual gloss for symbolic capital) is an imprecise placeholder for a complex lexicon in Kurdish of which
normative femininity of which the control of women is merely one aspect; ‘honour’ also regulates masculinity and interpersonal relations in general. ‘Honour’ requires that both males and females be generous, courageous, honest, loyal to their ingroups, respectful of norms of hospitality and actively concerned for the reputation of their collective, but thereafter the qualities associated with ‘honour’ and ‘dishonour’ begin to break down into gendered modes (Pitt-Rivers 1965). For Tapper (1991, p. 15), the first, non-gendered sense is seen as a transcendental morality; whereas the second is competitive and secular (cf. Wolf 2001, p. 173).

In the Kurdish language, there is a complex lexicon relating to matters of reputation, honour, shame, pride (Hassanpour 2001) including bext, meaning a reputation for fair dealing, and qedir, meaning reputation or prestige (Sweetman 1994, p. 94). Of most significance to ‘honour’ as a system of male/familial control of women, and a justification for violence are the interlocking concepts of şerêf, which is also used in Arabic, and namûs, which has a Persian derivation. The two terms are mutually constitutive (Bourdieu 1965, 2001; Baron 2006) as shown in Table 3.2 (which synthesises these articles with the foregoing discussion in this section):
While şeref and namûs are coded on a gender axis, this should not be taken to mean that only men have şeref and only women have namûs, as aspects of the reputation of either gender can be described with either term. Yet a male’s violations of namûs are not catastrophic to his status within the family in the way that a woman’s would be. As Kandiyoti (1988) observes, masculinity is an achieved status, which is dynamic; whereas femininity is an ascribed status, which is commensurately passive. Men have a greater ability to restore lost status through active means, which are less available for women, whose value is often conceptualised in terms of restraint. Pre-marital virginity is essential of women’s requirement to conform to the requirements of namûs.

The categories are interdependent: the şeref of the patriline is founded upon the namûs of the women associated to the patriline. A woman who has become bênamûs, i.e. dishonoured in the eyes of the community, cannot restore her status herself. If her agnates do not respond assertively to her behaviour, it undermines their self-presentation and self-conceptualisation as an honourable ‘şerefi’ family within the community.
Men’s honour is thus dependent upon the behaviour of women. A language of contamination may be used: dishonour is described as rûreş – a black face, whereas rûyê xwe sipî kirin – making one’s face white – is a phrase used to denote the restoration of ‘honour’ (Sweetman 1994, p. 94).

King (2008b) identifies namûs as a symbolic boundary, which is used to exclude agnatic outsiders within a patrilinear society. While this is a strong component, Fischer-Tahir’s summarisation of 150 respondents’ opinions in Sulaymaniyah found the following emic associations of namûs, with telling gendered distinctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Related to</th>
<th>Male respondents</th>
<th>Female respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>jin, ofret, mê (woman)</td>
<td>perde (hymen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>perde (hymen)</td>
<td>pak-u xawêni (chastity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mal, xêzan (house, family)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>niştîman (homeland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts</td>
<td>parastin (protection)</td>
<td>şerim (shame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tole (revenge)</td>
<td>xoperestin (self-protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>arami (calmness, patience)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cil-u berg (clothing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>pêwist (necessary)</td>
<td>pêwist (necessary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rez (respect)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>pirozî (sacredness)</td>
<td>pirozî (sacredness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paki (purity)</td>
<td>ciwani (beauty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism</td>
<td>bê mane (unreasonable)</td>
<td>deselatdar (authoritative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zordar (tyrant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>keltûr (culture)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dab u-nerî (tradition)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rewûst/exlaq (moral, ethics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be agayî (unconsciousness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Meanings of namûs (Fischer-Tahir 2009)

In contrast to the complex, measured and ambivalent associations around namûs within Fischer-Tahir’s educated middle class population reproduced in Table 3.3 above, Alinia (2013, p. 64) notes that convicted murderers in the
KRI who claim an ‘honourable’ motivation are very invested in şeref and namûs as terms, but are unable to describe their meanings, which they take to be self-evident.

Alinia describes this as ‘internalised discourse’ — as deep-founded, unconscious beliefs, and values, taken as apparent universals, they appear as doxa\(^{27}\) for these perpetrators: ineffable but foundational. ‘For us sharaf is the greatest thing. For us, I mean, the most important and greatest thing is sharaf. It is like that. It is above everything else,’ stated one perpetrator (2013, p. 63).

As heterodoxy within the concepts of şeref and namûs becomes more evident, particularly differing across rural/urban and class lines, the decreasing acceptance of such crimes within the KRI means that these perpetrators are finding themselves increasingly out of tune with the changing values of their society. Alinia observed that three of the four perpetrators she interviewed expressed a keen sense of injustice over being punished for the murders they had committed. One said:

\[
\text{I think it is unfair. If I had killed innocent people, I mean if I had killed two persons without any reason or if I had attacked people and robbed them, it would be justified to punish me and even kill me. But unfortunately now I have been sitting here for two years for my sharaf and my namus. (p. 63)}
\]

\(^{27}\)Doxa is a Bourdieusien term, meaning the experience by which “the natural and social world appears as self-evident” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164).
But while there has been a shift in the acceptability of violence as a form of reputation management, the expectations of women's conduct remain slower to change. 79% of respondents in the KRI identified the following behaviours as ‘dishonourable’ when engaged in by women:

1. Marital infidelity
2. Pre-marital (‘illegal’) sexual relationships
3. Romantic relationships (i.e. non-sexual, but affective, relationships with a male, whether the woman is married or unmarried)
4. Disobeying parents
5. Sexual misbehaviour\(^{28}\)
6. Other behaviour deemed inappropriate, including violations of normative dress codes. (Taysi 2009, p. 21)

These factors relate to marriage as a locus for the constraint of female sexuality, particularly when one bears in mind that the majority of ‘honour’ crimes related to Taysi’s fourth point, ‘disobeying parents’ are directly related to the refusal of an arranged marriage. These findings echo those of Sır (2005) in Turkey.

In Sen’s theorisation, ‘honourable’ behaviour for a woman connotes:

*Modest sexual behaviour, fidelity in marriage, no pre- or extramarital relationships with men, no unchaperoned rendezvous with men outside the family, meeting motherly obligations to children, meeting wifely obligations to husband, meeting daughter’s obligations to parents, meeting daughter-in-law obligations to parents-in-law and so on.*

\(^{28}\) Taysi’s actual term is ‘prostitution’: however, amongst Kurds this term often does not have the Western definition of commercial sex, but a more general sense of promiscuity or sexual misconduct. As this appears a more likely interpretation of her respondents’ statements, I have rephrased it for clarity. (cf. Kreiger, 1984).
Women who request divorce, and divorcées who claim child custody, are also frequently considered to have offended ‘honour,’ even though these are transgressions against the gender/kinship order rather than against normative sexual behaviour. Through synthesising Sen, Sir and Taysi’s accounts, women’s ‘honour’ seems to rest on three conditions:

1. Acceptance of parental marriage arrangement;
2. Protection and maintenance of marriageability by conforming to communal social norms related to gender relations and sexuality before marriage;
3. Meeting the standards of normative wifehood after marriage, through subordinacy to her affines; fidelity and persistence in the relationship even if this is to her detriment.

A woman’s honour then, appears to be a valuation of her utility within the political economic systems of marriage, built upon her compliance with instrumental marriage and her conformity to the normative role of wifehood, both before and after marriage.

I suggest that individual households and patrilines within the kinship mode of production, have mutually, catallactically\(^{29}\), developed a requirement for women to display namûs as a precondition for participation in the marriage

\(^{29}\)Hayek describes exchange relations as *catallactic*. The Greek-derived term means ‘to exchange’ but also ‘to admit in the community’ and ‘to make friends’ — a term which thus encompasses transactions related to social capital alongside those related to exchanges of goods and services. As for Polanyi (1957, p. 243), ‘the substantive meaning of economic derives from man’s dependence for his livelihood upon nature and his fellows.’. Catallaxy, for Hayek, describes the spontaneous order brought about by the mutual adjustment and interactions of many individual economies in a market (Espers 2011, p. 150).
market, which is deeply integrated into the socioeconomic life of the community.

Namûs also represents a point of vulnerability. Ginat (1981, p. 153), states that his field research into ‘honour’ killings in Israel and Palestine indicates that ‘political and economic reasons underlie any accusation [of immorality] made at the value level.’ Women, as weak points in an agonistic network of interrelations, can provide a means for a proxy attack on the family: alleging sexual impropriety upon the part of a female can bring a family into disrepute and internal dissent — which may result in violence30.

It is important then, that a woman’s ‘honour’ be such as to pre-emptively rebut any disparagement of her character. Allegations do not have to be evidenced, because the central ‘crime’ against honour is less a violation of a moral code, than of provoking gossip. Many, if not most, of the corpses for ‘honour’ on the coroner’s examining tables of the KRI have intact hymens (Begikhani 1998). It becomes incumbent upon a woman or girl to behave in such a manner where her ‘honour’ is not just maintained, but is completely beyond challenge, because it reflects not only upon herself, but upon her entire lineage.

30 It is in this sense that husbands have been observed to deploy threats of ‘dishonouring’ as part of a campaign of domestic abuse. Dr Hawkar Ibrahim at Koya University, KRI found that of 47 women who experienced domestic violence, around 40% reported that their husbands had threatened to raise allegations against their ‘honour’ (personal communication). See also Payton, 2014.
Having outlined the role of kinship in terms of the organisation of kinship and labour in broader social organisation, I will now take the discussion of these relations into the domestic setting.
4. Power and the family

The patriarchal privileging of males and seniors combined with patrilineality enhances the power of male elders within the kingroup, particularly their power over women of the lineage. A father’s brothers can have authority over their nieces and nephews, and male cousins can have authority over their female counterparts. The intersection of patriarchy and patrilineality increases the range of men with authority over women — an authority nested in kinship terms.

(Joseph and Slyomovic 2001, p. 3)

The restrictions on sexual freedom came... as a dictate to the young that they not obey their hearts’ desires lest confidences be broken, assets divided, and boundaries of the group weakened.

(Kressel 1992, pp. 167-168)
This chapter will consider how ‘honour’ is understood and expressed within domestic gender relations. In Triandis's (1995) delineation of individualism and collectivism as opposing ends of a continuum, he identifies ‘honour’ crimes as a feature of collectivist societies, where an individual's detachment from the family is minimal, and where people identify themselves as parts of their collectives and are expected to subordinate their personal goals to those of the group. This is particularly apparent in the approach to the socialisation of children in collectivist communities, which tends to support interdependence, continuity and familial obligations (Kağitçibaşi 1989). More individualistic cultures tend towards childrearing methods designed to develop a child’s independence and self-esteem, in preparation for an eventual separation from their natal homes.

Within unilineal descent patterns, according to Triandis, the ‘moral’ conformity of a collectivist society reaches exaggerated proportions, since even the potential synthesis of norms through marriage connections is stratified to favour the norms of the recipient family. The implication this raises is that, within collectives, certain groups have a greater power to direct and define the goals of the family — in short, that following a patrilinear descent pattern will prioritise value systems which are favourable to patricentricity. Indeed, patrilocal families in Turkey have been found to be more ‘traditional’ in their values than neolocal units (Aykan and Wolf 2000).
Where people are encouraged to sacrifice their personal goals for the good of the collective, or are not allowed the psychic space to explore their own desires, then they become vulnerable to instrumentalisation, to being used by their parents and other kin to serve their own interests. It is of course not the case that all marriage arrangements are self-serving on the part of the parents, who may well have the very best of intentions for their children, particularly where the interests of the collective may align very closely with those of the individual (see Shaw and Charsley 2006). However, blithely treating parental marriage arrangement as a purely altruistic act, which, for instance Batabyal (2005) manages to achieve for the length of an entire book, is deceptive. Even the conservative Edmund Burke (1729-1797), a stalwart supporter of the patriarchal family and parental marriage arrangement, admitted that fathers were often motivated by ‘avarice’ in their dealings on behalf of their children (Hunt Botting 2007, pp. 78-79). More subtle expressions of self-interest, such as those for social preferment, may be less easily recognised, particularly where the interest of the collective is considered to encapsulate those of the individual.

However, the desires of parents and children in relation to marriage are certainly non-identical. Buunk et al. find that diasporic Kurdish parents and children have very different priorities in marital choice: young Kurds express a preference for partners who are intelligent, not overweight and who have good personal hygiene, whereas their parents are far more concerned with
maintaining group identities, finding non-Kurdishness the most unattractive characteristic in a potential son or daughter-in-law (2008, p. 57, Table 3).

Wherever persons identify themselves as being permitted to make choices on behalf of another person it is inevitable that self-interest will creep in, whether this is identified as such, or as being for the 'greater good' of the collective. This is how abuses such as those adumbrated by al-Dulaymi above become possible. In fact, pressures upon young people to accept marriages which have been arranged may be intense, and the younger generation may be driven to express resistance in extreme forms (Abu-Lughod 1990; Batsleer et al. 2003). There is no bright boundary between forced and arranged marriages (Gangoli et al. 2006); notions of consent and duress which form the basis of attempted distinctions are slippery in practice, both in current times (Deveaux 2006) and throughout history (Laiou 1993), hard to define or prove in any community, let alone one which prioritises the collective will over the desires of the individual.

**Domestic politics of the family**

The vectors of a gender-hierarchy intersect with vectors of a gerontocratic age-hierarchy, where youth is expected to defer to age, and females are expected to defer to males (Joseph 1996). The asymmetries of a system with dual axes of privilege: of age, and of gender, creates a situation wherein the subjects of marital translocations — girls and young women — who have the
greatest stake in their own future also have the least ability to influence any transactions made upon their behalves, or share in the benefits of their circulation. Rather these benefits accrue to the patrilinear group from which they are distanced through marital relocation. Elder males gain social and political capital, and access to collateral relatives through the extension of family ties; in patrilocal/patrifocal societies, mothers-in-law gain a domestic under-labourer; husbands gain an admittance to adulthood and the pleasures of licit sex and parentage; brothers see their own prospects for marriage improve, either through the payment of brideprice or the prospect of receiving a bride in exchange — whereas brides leave their natal home to face a potentially hostile environment, in which they are at the bottom of the domestic pecking order, and where any burgeoning affection between the couple may be perceived as a threat to the husband’s existing family relations with his own mother, brothers and unmarried sisters. The Kurdish proverb _bûme bûk; bûme pepûk_ expresses the trauma of marital translocation bluntly: ‘I became a bride; I became miserable.’

It is in the interest of the extended family to inhibit pair-bonding in order to lock the labour value of the couple into the household, rather than allowing for the formation of deep emotional bonds, which could lead to them nuclearizing, and becoming separated from the rest of the family (Charrad 2001, Chapter 3). This is achieved, says Lesthaeghe (1980), through making the expression of marital affection shameful. This is certainly the case
amongst Kurds where uxorious husbands are described as *alî*, which suggests emasculation (Hassanpour 2001), and who may be teased on this account (Yalçın-Heckman 1991, p. 142). Couples are expected to hide any affection they have in public (Stephens 1963, p. 421), since such displays are considered shameful (Neurink 2013). To cite an extreme example, within the nomadic Azeri-Turkish speaking Shahseven tribes of Iran, it was considered taboo for a husband and wife to hold any private conversations at all for the entirety of their first year of marriage (Tapper 1980).

Morsy (1990) provides a revealing history of women’s progression through the lifecycle. While a young bride is subjected to great stresses, including frequent threats of divorce during early marriage, subordinacy to her affines, possible violence, and the trauma of estrangement from her natal family, elder women accrue domestic power with increasing age and numbers of children. Being usually significantly younger than their husbands due to the requirements for a compliant and virginal bride, they are able to command the household once their husband reaches senescence, through their close relationships with their sons, and through having a position of dominance over their daughters-in-law. Women’s subordination has a temporal quality and the lowly position of a young bride may be very distinct from that of a mother, especially a mother of sons.

**Women’s involvement in violence**

*Men and seniors have also been the subject of kinship discipline. It has been, paradoxically, the relative success of the kin contract to*
discipline males and seniors into their responsibilities and obligations, to manage their labour, to commit them to their families, that has led to the asymmetrical vulnerability of women and juniors. (Joseph 2000a, p. 135)

Since the motivation for males, as political actors in the public sphere, to conform to the norms of ‘honour’ has been explicated in terms of building profitable alliances, this raises the question of why women may support this system, since it limits women’s autonomy in multiple ways such as prohibiting political participation, education, employment and extra-mural leisure. First, marital arrangements which are beneficial to the collective benefit female members of that collective as well; mothers, sisters and aunts may all stand to benefit indirectly from a prestigious or instrumental alliance, and as such, are, no less than males, stakeholders within the system. Secondly, it is common amongst subordinated peoples for a normative system which favours their oppressors to have become internalised through their socialisation. Even where it is not fully internalised, lip-service may be paid to this system, rather than facing sanctions from more powerful members of the collective. Thirdly, since the symbolic capital of namûs is based on delineating ‘good’ from ‘bad’, women can gain status and self-esteem from including themselves in the former category, and demonstrating this through outcasting women who have not proved to be careful custodians of their reputation, in the sense that Hawthorne (1850) depicts self-righteous Puritan women revelling in the humiliation of the adulterous Hester Prynne.
Yet there may be features of kinship structure which further diminish women’s solidarity: beyond the symbolic division of namûs and bênamûs, there are distinctions of generational differences in power between women. These particularly affect a new bride in a patrilocal extended family, and, to a reduced degree, in a patrifocal but separate residence.

Women in patrilinear family structures
Where patrilocality or, to a lesser degree, patrifocality, occurs within a separate spheres model of gender relations, elder females may become dominant in the realm of the private wielding power over her own children and any of their wives. Her power may be delimited outside her domain, but within the domestic realm, she has an unchallenged line of authority over all residents, except the nominal patriarch. For men, their interactions in the public sphere are inflected by their consciousness of their own insecure status vis-à-vis their fellow men, which is a ground for anxiety and potential contestation. A summary of these power relations is shown in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Executive dominance over household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive role in marital arrangement for children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reliant on family connections for survival (brothers/cousins etc.) within a competitive agora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>Subordinate to parents; dominant over sisters/wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Little ability to influence marital arrangement</td>
<td>• Least ability to influence marriage arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reliant on parents/agnates; not yet considered adult</td>
<td>• Liminal status between agnatic and affinal families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Axes of power by age and gender within the patrilinear extended family

One of the first lessons a Chinese bride has to learn upon entering the patrilinear extended family, according to Wolf (1974), is that her husband cannot be counted upon to support her in disputes with her mother-in-law — that she has no effective allies within the household. If the bride cannot make herself pleasing to her husband and thus gain a supporter in a household full of strangers — a difficult task, given the extended family’s attempts to undermine marital intimacy and the lack of privacy involved in collective habitation — she has only one hope: to bear a son, which will cement her into the affinal patriline. This not only leads to an improvement of her position in the family, but also provides her with a male supporter, able, in due course, to participate in public life upon her behalf, and whose affection she can be surer of commanding over the long term.

Thus, younger women’s transition to power comes through the development of a ‘uterine family’ (Lamphere 1974) nested within the patriline. In order to protect her interests, she binds her son closely to her as her representative in the public sphere, and her source of financial security in old age using any means necessary; his wife, once trained, replaces her domestic labour, allowing her to retire to a supervisory role.
Thus, a woman’s most productive embedded strategy for self-advancement is one which supports the overarching system of patrilinearity. A Turkish mother-in-law, finds White (1999, p. 45), seeks to monopolise her daughters’-in-law’s labour for the benefit of the affinal network, and may restrict her abilities to tend to her own mother and father, using strategies from restricting her movements to encouraging spousal violence against her (pp. 53-54). Sonuga-Barke and Mistry (2000) find that the mental well-being of elder females far surpasses that of younger women in South Asian extended households; younger women disproportionately report depression and other mental illnesses and comparatively high levels of suicide, which suggest that these intergenerational conflicts between women within the household have serious negative effects upon the wellbeing of junior women.

Vertical patrilines are primarily affected by lateral conflicts — competition between brothers, and rivalries between neighbouring families and tribes; whereas the uterine family is beset with vertical conflicts of generation and status, confrontations between mothers and daughters-in-law where mothers assert their dominance over an incoming bride, assuring their primacy in their relationship with their son, which is crucial to their continued well-being, and in order to maintain their command over the domestic realm. Fischer-Tahir, for instance, observes that Kurdish mothers-in-law have full licence to criticise their son’s wives, but that wives cannot counter-attack (2009, p. 61).
Kurdish mothers have historically played a predominant role in the selection of wives for their sons (Hansen 1961). As, in societies which practise sexual segregation, males rarely have contact with unrelated females, so it may fall to the mother find her son a mate, which his father then approves. If the mother-in-law and daughter are to be co-workers in the same kitchen, then the mother is likely to spend significantly more time in her presence than the husband will, so the success of their relationship may be more significant to the family functioning than that of the marital dyad. Through this close contact, it is also the mother-in-law who is in a position to judge the bride’s behaviour, and to raise allegations against her ‘honour’.

For these reasons, it is not necessarily in the interests of elder women to subvert the gender order: it would put them in the position of having made great investments in building their personal power bases only to lose them just before they began to see a return on their labour and sacrifices, through the overturning of the established patriarchal bargain which brings them status in return for longitudinal conformity to social norms (Kandiyoti 1988). Through dissenting to the doctrine of ‘honour’, they risk relinquishing the ability to bring an interloper into check by disallowing the strategy of threatening to accuse her of ‘immoral’ behaviour.
Adolescence/early adulthood as a period of vulnerability

Cross-culturally, girls in their middle to late teens are disproportionately subjected to checks upon their sexual behaviour which can upset family marriage plans (Schlegel 1995) and lead to early pregnancy. Kurdish victims of honour killings may be of any age, but are predominantly between the ages of 13 and 20 (Begikhani 1998), a similar profile to other countries where statistics upon honour killings have been available for analysis, with young married women being the most likely victims (Kressel et al. 1981; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004; Hoyek et al. 2005; KA-MER 2005; Nasrullah et al. 2009) — although it should be noted that the impetus for a family to kill for ‘honour’ may not dissipate over time. ‘We have heard,’ say Düzkan and Kocali, (2000, p. 385) ‘of women with grandchildren who have been murdered because they eloped to get married in their youth.’ This liminal period of adolescence to early adulthood is also notable for a high occurrence of female suicidality in the KRI (Rasool and Payton 2014) and the Middle East in general (Rezaeian 2010).

Alinia’s research interviews with survivors of HBV (2013), conducted across twelve women’s shelters in the KRI revealed a startling fact: of unmarried survivors, all had refused arranged marriage (p. 111); of married survivors, all had been married without much in the way of explicit consent (p. 116). In the KRI in 2004, 6.8% of girls were married before the legal age of 15, and
26% before the age of 18 (UNICEF 2004); almost all are married by 25 (WHO/Iraq 2006/7). Marriage can thus be described as compulsory for Iraqi Kurdish women. For over 65% of married women and girls aged 15-19, their husband is over five years older than they are; for around 28%, this age difference exceeds ten years (UNICEF 2004). From menarche, occurring at around 13, girls may be considered eligible for marriage, which implies physically leaving their natal patriline. Menarche thus marks the point at which a girl’s peripheral status becomes manifest, from which point surveillance of her behaviour increases, and some families take steps to locate a suitable husband if one has not already been found.

This is an age where it becomes likely that girls may be removed from school to protect their ‘honour’ (although another motivation may have been to benefit from their domestic labour (White 1999, p. 71)). This is a marked phenomenon in rural areas, even though the KRI has achieved a high level of attendance in education for girls in comparison to other parts of Iraq (Geopolicity 2009), due to the comparative security of the region. However, in Sulaymaniyyah only around half of those enrolled in Grade 1 make their way to Grade 6, with slightly fewer than half completing their studies in Dohuk and Erbil (UN Children’s Fund 2010). Brenneman (2007, p. 81) remarks upon the loneliness of his own daughter due to the disappearance of her playmates from the streets and schools from the rural Kurdish village where they lived. From age 10-12, he says, these girls were restricted to the
domestic realm to be protected from potential ‘dishonour’ in anticipation of marriage.

A young bride remains at the margins of her husband’s patriline until she reproduces it through bearing a male child, which improves her status within his family and cements her into the affinal patriline. For women in patrilinear societies, the period between menarche (at around 13 years) and the birth of a first son could be described as a state of liminality (Triandis 1995, p. 179); peripheral to the male-defined core of her own family, and not yet fully integrated into that of her affines (cf. Turner 1964; Wolf 1972, p. 149) — a period which correlates with the greatest risk for violence. This is also a period where the intense preoccupation with young women’s bodies is most keenly expressed, focussing specifically upon the physical manifestation of virginity.

The importance of virginity

Houzan Mahmoud, activist with the Organisation for Women’s Freedom in Iraq, recalls an incident where, as a young girl, she caused a scandal amongst her peers by climbing a tree. ‘Come down from that tree,’ they called up to her, ‘or you’ll lose your virginity.’

The ‘hymenisation’ of virginity, as the demarcation between the classes of women, a prerequisite for marriage, and the responsibility of the agnatic
collective, appears to originate from the Hebraic rather than the Mesopotamian worldviews. Deuteronomy 22:13-20 insists upon bloodied sheets as proofs of virginity and the Babylonian Talmud notes several cases of men raising complaints about a lack of blood when engaged in first marital coitus (Kelly 2000, pp. 19-20).

As Fischer-Tahir finds, this distinction is found in everyday usage of the Kurdish language:

*To find out whether a certain man is married or not, a person might ask “Has he taken a wife (jin-i hênawe)?” A man who ‘takes’ something is active...To discover if a woman is already married, a person might ask “Has she married (şû-i kirduwe)?” But both men and women tend to ask “Is [she]31 a virgin or a woman? (kiç-e yan jin-e)?”* (2009, p. 50)

If women's 'honour', in the sense of namûs, is considered a form of symbolic capital which is essential to the marital arrangements I have previously described, then this raises the question of why there should be such wide cross-cultural consistency across Eurasia in the connection of women’s symbolic capital with sexual restraint: why ‘honour’ in women represents chastity, virginity and restraint rather than sexual prowess, wit, athleticism or any other personal characteristic a woman might exhibit. There appears to be little practical reason why this should be the case: sexually active women

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31 The original question as phrased in the source text was 'Is it a virgin or a woman.' However, the Kurdish language does not have gendered pronouns, so the use of ‘it’ in this sentence may indicate inconsistent translation rather than dehumanisation.
are not less industrious, less healthy or less fertile, than women who refrain from sex. There can hardly be a better indicator of fertility than a healthy child.

Yet the linking of a woman’s symbolic capital with chastity is deeply rooted in Eurasian culture, from Pamela Andrews’ assiduous protection of her ‘virtue’ (Richardson 1897/2003) to the profit margins of a variety of clinics performing hymenoplasties in the present day.

The hymen, unforgettably described by El Saadawi as ‘that very thin membrane called honour’ (1977/1980, p. 38), holds a crucial relevance to women’s eligibility for marriage, and is a point of anxiety for young women across the Middle East. Kressel states that the role of virginity in the Middle East is distinct from tribal Africa, Asia and Australasia, and ‘primitive’ [sic] Europe, including even the most repressive of Victorian values, in that the loss of virginity is considered a justification for violence (1992, p. 168).

Virginity is also presumed to be in the state’s domain in the Middle East, where virginity tests are conducted by officials (Parla 2001), even used as a means of political repression (Taher 2012). The state of the hymen then, is a public rather than a private matter. In conducting psychosocial research into Kurdish women living in Norway, Ahlberg found virginity was an extreme concern to all her clients. Her respondent ‘Aisha’ remarks that women who do not bleed upon marriage have their heads shaved, and are returned to
their families on the back of a donkey\textsuperscript{32} (2007, p. 87). ‘Fatima’ records the shame of failing to bleed sufficiently upon her own wedding day. She was discarded by her proposed husband who cried ‘You are no virgin! I have been deceived; I believed I was getting a proper wife.’ She was forced to leave the village with her family, hanging their heads in shame (Ahlberg 2007, p. 122). ‘Fatima’s’ description of the ritual of defloration is similar to that recorded by Hansen (1961).

Hansen (1961, p. 134) says that the young husband is expected to consummate the marriage abruptly and then ‘leave the field to the waiting woman, who roughly dries the bride’s genital opening in order to obtain as clear a trace on the sheet as possible.’ ‘Fatima’ (Ahlberg 2007, p. 122) adds that this ritual, as she observed it, was by no means private, as at all the weddings she had attended, guests crammed the wedding meal down, in order to crowd around every available window and door crack and observe the first act of coition between husband and wife. Linen strips safety-pinned to the bed as trophies. As soon as the act was completed, observers burst into the room and ran through the village playing a version of capture-the-flag with the blood-stained strips, with prizes awarded to the final possessors.

\textsuperscript{32} An identical punishment is prescribed for unmarried women or girls who break their hymeneal membrane in the Hindu \textit{Manusmriti}, a Brahminical legal treatise [8/369], written in Sanskrit, which is, like Kurdish, an Indo-Iranian language.
Broude and Greene (1983) observe that, cross-culturally, the more likely it is that marriage is non-consensual, the less likely it is that newlyweds are granted privacy for their first sexual act; and the more sexually repressive a society is, the more likely that consummation is ceremonialised. Occuring within culture in which physical displays of affection between married couples and any display of flesh, male or female, are normally vehemently proscribed, this ritual appears to be a rather nerve-wracking experience for both newlyweds. The bride, may be sensible of the risk, now completely beyond her control, of being shamed, and even killed, if she does not produce sufficient blood; the groom, must attempt congress, possibly for the first time in his life, with a tense and potentially terrified woman who may be a virtual stranger to him, and maintain an erection of sufficient rigidity to pierce her hymen before an audience of his peers.

It appears that there is more in play here than the ‘purity’ of the bride; that the male is also being subjected to a test of potency in his ability to perform sexually under adverse conditions (cf. Abu-Zahra 1970, p. 1086; Lindisfarne 1994) Hassanpour (2001, p. 239) notes that the Kurdish noun piyawetî (manliness) connotes ‘the ability to fuck...with the given example [in a Kurdish-language dictionary]... “he that has become a man over the bride...he has removed her hymen.”’

‘Within a patriarchal system,’ says Moruzzi (2013),
...men are as firmly tied into a binary identity as women are: The equivalent to women’s entrapment in the duality of the mother/whore opposition is men’s confinement to the roles of protector and patriarch or victimizer and criminal...Within the family, a woman is a mother or a possible mother-to-be; outside the family, a woman is a possible whore. Within the family, a man is a protector or a possible patriarch; outside the family, a man is a possible libertine or a thug.

The ritual on the male side, binding them into new roles as family men, has more in common with the hazing of a US college fraternity or military unit than an erotic encounter; phallic masculinity is displayed to gain admittance to the homosocial community of adult married men. Virginity does not just demarcate the boundaries between girl and woman; taking it makes a boy into a man, through a public display of sexual potency (Donnan and Magowan 2010, p. 140).

Hansen (1961, p. 133) observes that the families of Kurdish brides keep blood-stained cloths (çarşeb) as proof of virginity until a successful birth binds the woman into her husband’s patriline, in case of dispute about the bride’s ‘honour’, or indeed the groom’s potency, calling the marriage contract into question during the most hazardous period of liminality.

The ritual described above, though it is telling that it has continued for so long, should not be considered contemporary practice — most urban Kurds will commence married life in the privacy of a hotel suite, beginning their

33 Cf. Deuteronomy 22: 13-21
lives in decorous privacy. The state of the hymen, however, may well remain a point of interest to their families, who may still demand the customary sanguine proofs. The status of the hymen has been a point of legal interest, when used as a justification for ‘honour’ killing.

A judgement pronounced in Duhok on 9 October 1999 stated:

_The father killed his daughter after she told him that she could not marry in Dihok because she was no longer a virgin...It is confirmed to the Court by the post-mortem that the girl’s hymen was broken while she was not married and this indicates that the girl was badly behaved and honourable motivation is reached in this case._

‘Honourable’ motivation meant that despite witnesses to the murder, the father and uncle received a one year suspended sentence (Begikhani 2005, p. 215). In the case of Du’a Khalil, a Kurdish teenager from the minority Yezidi religion, who was publically stoned to death in Bashiqa, Northern Iraq, the political ramifications of the state of her hymen were such that six doctors (two of whom were Yezidi, two Christian, and two Muslim, in order to evade accusations of bias) were called in to provide post-mortem gynaecological examinations. Her (intact) hymen raised far more medical interest than the pulverised skull and fractured spine which were the actual causes of death.

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34 This may allow a couple who have pre-empted marriage, or a non-virgin bride with an understanding groom, to keep their secret between themselves, and evade any repercussions through fakery, using animal blood, or a small cut to an unobtrusive part of the body to pass the familial muster, if such proofs are indeed required.
There are, as Stone (2006, p. 241) identifies, few solid reasons to account for the value of virginity, as there is neither intrinsic nor functional value to this particular membrane. Many accounts of the high status of virginity seem to proceed from the curious notion that men have an innate sexual desire for virgins, which desire is most fully expressed where males have greater power over marital choice. Yet virgin preference on the part of males is by no means universal — in fact fewer societies require virginity before marriage than demand it (Schlegel 1995, p. 141). The !Kung, for instance, have no word for virgin in their language whatsoever (Fisher 1992, p. 263).

As such the value placed upon virginity in Eurasian cultures remains in need of explanation. While there is a common notion within arguments based in evolutionary psychology that virgins are desirable as brides because they cannot be already pregnant, thereby hoodwinking a man into supporting a child that does not bear his genetic code, virginity is by no means the only method of ascertaining the status of any woman’s uterus. It is not even reliable, given the wide range of methods of faking an intact hymen available since antiquity, such as the 9th century Persian recommendation of an astringent coupled with a pessary fashioned from dove’s intestines and animal blood (Blank 2007, p. 91). The prophet Muhammad, writing within a pagan milieu where marriage, divorce and remarriage were very frequent (Bianquis 1996), instituted the iddat waiting period into Muslim practice, in which a woman is obliged to wait for three menstrual courses between
marriages in order to ensure that there is no uncertainty about paternity. There is no reason why such a method could not be applied to never-married women to ensure a husband's reproductive dominion over his wife's uterus, with far more reliability than a show of hymeneal blood.

Schlegel (1991) is perhaps the only writer to have addressed the obsession with virginity in functional terms. She notes that virginity has high status where women either command dowries or expect inheritance. Her argument is that in agrarian societies, illegitimate children are unwelcome because they drain resources from the natal family without benefitting from the additional resources brought in by the father, and that virginity is prized in order to prevent opportunistic or otherwise unsuitable men from seducing women in order to benefit from their dowries and property rights, such as the spendthrift Willoughby in Austen’s *Sense and Sensibility* (1811). In support of this theory, we could note that in European history, women's virginity has often been a predominant concern of the propertied classes while being rather less significant amongst the working poor, who lack estates or much in the way of property which would be subject to redistribution via marriage. However, Schlegel's argument loses momentum outside the northern European milieu. The argument that illegitimate children are undesirable due to increasing the burden of family resources without providing an additional source of male income seems rather less convincing in a society as vigorously pro-natal as traditional agricultural corporatism, where children are put to
work from very young ages (Dziegel 1982, p. 248). There is no reason why the illegitimate child of a daughter would make a less effective farmhand or shepherd than the legitimate offspring of a son, as long as there were sufficient resources to raise him or her from infancy, which could be diluted by contributions from the extended family. The need for support would not be prolonged in subsistence farming economies, where children begin to produce surpluses as young as six years of age (Harris 1997, p. 205).

Schlegel’s assumption that a premium on virginity prevents an opportunist from seducing his way into his wife’s riches appears to depend upon a principle of ‘shotgun’ marriage, which assumes that an unmarried impregnated woman inevitably marries her seducer, thereby passing on control of her pre- and post-mortem inheritances. Within Schlegel’s schema, abortion, infanticide or lone parenthood are ruled out as viable options, as is marriage to a more eligible man willing to accept the role of pater to the offspring of a premarital association, despite the fact that any of these options would effectively confound the strategies of a scheming male fortune-hunter hoping to impregnate his way into a fortune. That these options were not available to the non-virgin woman suggests that the causal chain Schlegel makes must be reversed: it is only because there is a high premium on a virgin bride that the seducer’s strategy can be effective, because it is based on a belief that an unmarried but sexually experienced woman is an unmarriageable social outcast.
Moreover, in Islamic marriages, there is no assumed commonalty of property through marriage, as there is in the European assumption of *coverture*, nor are there substantial dowries or ‘portions’ payable to the groom from the bride’s family. While a Muslim husband may attempt to persuade his wife to contribute to the household, he has no legal ability to force her to do so; and while he does potentially inherit from her estate, the amounts of inheritance in cash terms from women are comparatively smaller, and since women often outlive men, particularly in societies riven by conflict, and since wives are typically younger than their husbands, they are more likely to be beneficiaries of their husband’s estate than testators of their own. While the potential of women’s inheritance rights can be problematic to patrilinear corporatism, within the Middle East these are often contained through preferential patrilateral cousin marriage, which is a parsimonious strategy for retaining property within a kinship group, and through persuading women to waive their inheritance rights in exchange for guarantees of fraternal protection in the event of marital breakdown. It seems more likely, as King and Stone (2010) and Altunek (2006) observe, that it is the overwhelming weight of patrilinear ideology that renders illegitimacy unthinkable — not to mention the difficulties of marrying off an illegitimate girl where ‘honour’ is conceived not only as collective, but as a heritable quality (Altunek 2006, p. 62).
Ortner (1978) identifies a large region where virginity is considered men’s concern, which includes the familiar roster of the Mediterranean, Middle East, India and China. Ortner relates this to the rise of state ideologies of purity. While the dialectic of purity and contamination is have symbolic resonances within many societies, this explanation tends to beg the question in eliding the hymen with ‘purity’.

This is a peculiar notion, given that the supposed ‘proof’ of physical virginity is a messy business and that societies that fetishize hymeneal blood are often notably squeamish about menstrual blood. There is certainly no necessity behind this association, as can be seen in societies where the defloration of a new bride is performed by an intermediary to avoid ‘contamination’ of the groom (Rubin 1975, p. 165 fn 1), which also rather undercuts the notion that there is a ‘natural’ basis to ensuring paternity.

The discourse of purity and filth is commonly, and cross-culturally, deployed to make moral judgements (Nussbaum 1999). The linkage of hymeneal blood with ‘purity’ may speak more deeply to the emotionalisation of conventional morality, which tends to carry cognitive connections with disgust (David and Olatunji 2011) rather than with any actual concerns about dirt. Douglas’s core position is that the language of contamination is deployed in symbolic terms, so it is worth considering whose interests the symbolic linkage of a hymen with ‘purity’ serves.
Looking in more depth into the context of Islamic family law, a local, cultural, explanation presents itself. In the context of the Shafi’i articulation of Islamic jurisprudence, associated with Sorani-speaking Muslim Kurds, the father and paternal grandfather, and other patrilinear relatives, are amongst those persons who have an exclusive licence to arrange the marriage of a virgin
*without her consent,* whereas they do not have similar rights over a non-virgin woman. According to a manual of classical Shafi’i jurisprudence:

*Whenever the bride is a virgin, the father or father’s father may marry her to someone without her permission... As for the nonvirgin of sound mind, no one may marry her to another after she has reached puberty without her express permission, no matter whether the guardian is the father, father’s father, or someone else.*

(al-Misri c. 1368, p. m3.13)

Al-Shafi’i explicitly equates the paternal power to force marriage upon a virgin daughter with the authority of a master over a slave (Ali 2010, p. 38).

Thus, within the Shafi’ite system, a public demonstration of a woman’s virginity serves as a communication of her subjugation to patrilinear will. The presence of blood forms a physical proof of the absence of the requirement for the consent of the woman, hymeneal ink signing a contract between agnatic and affinal families, in which the effluvia from a woman’s body serves as witness to her exclusion from the decision making process (cf. Mernissi 1982, p. 183).

There is perhaps, another, simpler, but perhaps more compelling and universal rationale for an insistence on the presence of the hymen, which is
that, in the absence of trickery, a woman can appear as a virgin only once in her lifetime, and in a community where she is known, falsifying virginity within a second marriage is an impossibility. If virgins are identified as the only acceptable category of marriageable women, then unhappy married women with no means of support but marriage may consider themselves unlikely to remarry well, and thus remain within their first marriage. Their options are to remain in an undesirable marriage, the ignominy and uncertain future of a return to the natal family, or destitution: thus making virginity a requirement for marriage serves a function of increasing women’s dependence upon an individual man, and reducing the chances that she will seek divorce, and break the connections of alliance which her marriage both symbolises and embodies.

Of the Abrahamic faiths, Islam has a comparatively liberal attitude to divorce, to the point where marital bonds are perceived as inherently fragile and unstable (Charrad 2001, p. 34), whereas Christianity has been particularly resistant to divorce (Goody 1983, p. 41). Catholic women can testify to the lifelong claim a husband is presumed to have over the body of his wife, while patriarchal Protestant movements in the States call for ‘Covenant’ marriages which eschew ‘no-fault’ divorces as ungodly and damaging to children (Spaht 2002). Female-initiated divorce is particularly disruptive within patrilinear family structures, which seek to ensconce a woman and her children under
the control of a man (and his family) for as long it suits his (and their) purposes.

Islamic directives on divorce are asymmetric, and do not favour women — men may divorce according to their whim through pronouncing a triple *talaq*\(^{35}\), with few long term obligations to support their former partner, whereas women must supplicate to religious authorities to be released from marriage, and ransom their freedom by repaying any monies or property they received as dower (*mehr*\(^{36}\)); some lose custody of their children in this process. Female-initiated divorce (*khul’*) remains possible for Muslim women, however, and may indeed have been very common in Middle Eastern history. Stowasser and Abul-Magd (2004), for instance, place the current idealisation of marital permanence in the Arab world as a colonial importation, derived from Christian practice. Within pre-modern Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Jordan, *khul’* divorces were liberally dispensed (Stowasser and Abul-Magd 2004; Rapoport 2007); for instance in 18-19\(^{th}\) Century Nablus, half of all divorces passing through the court were *khul’* (Tucker 1991, p. 241), and more than half of those within the medieval Ottoman court of ‘Aintab (Pierce 1999, p. 282).

\(^{35}\) Islamic divorce has a very similar structure to that in Orthodox Judaism, where men are merely required to make a triple statement of divorce before witnesses, whereas a woman must seek consent of her husband, or of the Rabbinical court if this is withheld.

\(^{36}\) See p. 172 below for a more detailed discussion of *mehr*. 
Bargaining theory addresses three points in relation to marriage: the first decision is when/whether to marry, the second, whom one marries, and, and the third is how the surplus value of marriage is distributed (Zelder 2002, p. 157). Within a system of marriage arrangement, the expectation is that the collective holds executive control over the first two points of bargaining. The couple does, however, have to live together and arrange their lives as a couple, and generate patterns of the division of labour and resources. Economists see divorce as a ‘threat point’ (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981) where either spouse will refuse an output share that makes him or her worse off than if they were to divorce. This mechanism works to maintain a limited degree of equilibrium within the marital division of resources and labour. The asymmetric ability of men and women to divorce, however, leads power within the relationship to accrue towards the male. Some men may threaten their female relatives with an easily-accomplished divorce (for example, threatening daughters with the dispossession of their mothers in the event of non-compliance in marital arrangements) making divorce threat a means of power and control over women. Yet, in order to maintain patrilinear control over the family, and to solidify the bonds of obligation and alliance between families created by marriage, women’s ability to deploy divorce threats must be contained, delimited and penalised.
So the premium upon virginity, and the exclusion from licit sexuality of unmarried non-virgins combines to constrain female divorce threat; the high status of women's virginity — men's virginity being largely their own private affair (Mernissi 1982, p. 185) — may be linked to a strategic desire to limit women to one marriage over their lifetimes rather than any intrinsic value associated with the hymen.

If this is the case, it is certainly effective: Bois, writing in the late 1960s, suggests that divorce was infrequent among Kurds, and was mostly initiated by males where a wife had failed to produce male children to reproduce the patriline, that women's remarriage after divorce was even more rare, and that the patriline always retained custody of any children, so that for a woman, divorce inevitably led to the loss of her custodial rights (1966, p. 44). Indeed, it continues to be rare: of ever-married single women in Iraq, a mere 5.7% were divorcées: the rest were widows (United Nations 2009).

By comparison, within horticulturalist societies in New Guinea, Africa and Amazonia, while first marriages are often arranged by parents, these are often short-lived and divorce is treated unproblematically (Fisher 1992, pp. 161-162). This suggests that where the kinship licence is less central to domestic economies, marital permanence is also less significant. A premium upon virginity then, may be an attempt to restrict women's ability to divorce in societies where this is an option legally available to women, but in which it is disruptive to the social orderings of labour, resources and reproduction.
The position of non-virgin women

*Do not run. Do not jump. Do not ride a bicycle. Do not go in for sports at all. Otherwise you might injure the hymen and then ‘we’ll lose our reputation.’ Do not speak in a loud voice, ‘eyb-e’! Do not sit with your legs apart, keep your eyes down, do not talk without permission, ‘eyb-e! Do not play with the neighbour’s sons on the street...and so on.* (Fischer-Tahir 2009, p. 65)

The hymen is of crucial significance to unmarried women, and yet is hardly a reliable indicator of a lack of sexual experience: hymens may be broken through non-sexual acts, or may be so tough or so flexible that penile penetration fails to rupture them, or they may, indeed, be non-existent from birth (El Saadawi 1977/1980, p. 80). With these factors in mind, it is unsurprising that Kurdish girls may be restricted from climbing trees, riding bicycles and the other physical pleasures of childhood — superstition endows the hymen with a dangerous fragility precisely because of its importance. The protection of the hymen becomes metonymous for the restriction of the entire body, limiting the range of motion and expression available to a girl or woman in the process of learning to embody expected behaviours. The obsession with the physical hymen telescopes into an ethic of total control of virgins — ‘women must refrain from sexual activity...and from any act that might lead to sexual activity, and from any act that may lead to an act that might lead to sexual activity’ and so on (Abu-Odeh 1996a) to

\(^{37}\) *Eyb-e here is Kurdish for ‘shameful’, and is expressed in terms of a reprimand.*
the extent that a woman or girl becomes an embodied extension of her own ‘thin membrane called honour’ and subject to numerous restrictions upon her behaviour. In common idiom, a woman’s loss of virginity and ‘honour’ are described as like the breaking of glass, the staining of cloth, the striking of a match, the smashing of an egg, or the trampling of a flower into the mud — an irreversible act of destruction.

Underlying the conceptualisation of namūs are stereotypes of female sexuality: non-virgin women are assumed to be lascivious and sexually indiscriminate, a belief which is only exacerbated by the fact that women who are not married, cannot access the labour market, and do not have supportive families may be forced into forms of transactional sex for their own survival. The situation of divorced women in societies where virginity is considered an essential prerequisite to marriage is poor (Cohen and Savaya 1997). Beiruti divorcées, for instance, are considered unmarriageable due to their lack of virginity, and considered legitimate targets for sexual harassment, and even rape (Wehbi 2002, p. 296).

While Mernissi (1985) optimistically suggests that this fixation upon women’s sexuality is a form of a recognition of women’s power, it could equally be compared with the ‘Jezebel’ stereotype of enslaved women in the United States (Pilgrim 2002). It is unsurprising, perhaps, that a society that allows women a very limited capacity for discrimination in sexual affairs envisions them as being sexually indiscriminate. Such a conception could
provide an explanation for the strong preoccupation with female infidelity found in cultures related to ‘honour’ (Vandello and Cohen 2008). According to Buunk and Solano (2012), there is a high correlation between parental marriage arrangement and ‘mate-guarding’ behaviour — their term for sexual jealousy — which may be expressed by both men and women.

Goddard (1987, p. 190) describes this view of the omniverously sexual woman as an expression of a deep ambivalence around sexuality based in the contradictions generated by the attempt to reconcile women’s real existence as sexual agents within a system which is dependent upon them behaving as sexual subjects. This contradiction lies at the heart of the fragility of namûs and the valorisation of virginity, which is, if anything, a requirement to submit oneself to the status of sexual subjecthood, necessary for the orderly use of the ‘kinship licence’ as a political and economic tool, through eschewing autonomy over one’s own sexual and reproductive life.

The next chapter takes a microsociological approach to the interactions involved in traditional forms of marriage, with particular attention to the operations of social capital, commencing the consideration of the role marriage plays in social organisation.
5. A microsociology of marriage forms

I don’t want to marry a shepherd,
who always has mud on his trousers.
I don’t want to marry a drover,
who has cracks in the soles of his feet.
I don’t want to marry a scholar,
who is so proud of himself,
just for smearing ink with a pen.
I don’t want to marry a rich man,
whose wealth shows a wound in his heart.
I don’t want to marry a poor man,
that dare not look at my face.
Dear mother, kind mother,
I want to take the road\textsuperscript{38} as I promised:
I want to marry the one that I love.

\textit{Kurdish folksong (Zaza 1962), my translation}

\textsuperscript{38} ‘Taking the road’ is the literal Kurdish term for elopement. See p. 214
This chapter will consider how various traditional forms of marriage express relationships within and between families and how this impacts upon the ‘honour’ of women and families.

Societal functioning depends on a multitude of promises, contracts, and arrangements, of which marriage may be the most significant within societies primarily structured according to kinship and filiation. For Timur (1981, p. 68), traditional forms of marriage and the extended family represent ‘functionally related phenomena.’ I now consider the various traditional forms of marriage strategisation in more detail, progressing from those with the closest proximity to the family (endogamy, in the form of cousin marriage), to the balanced reciprocity of direct exchange marriage, often occurring within small communities, to the monetised interactions of exogamy with brideprice, with a final discussion of the wild-cards of abductions and elopements.

These four forms of marriage are by no means distinctly Kurdish but can also be found co-occurring within rural Italy in the 1950s (Pirro 2008), amongst the Roma in Bulgaria (Pamporov 2007), in Afghanistan (Kargar 2011), and in Pakistan (Afzal et al. 1994; Jacoby and Mansuri 2007), and according to Segalen (1986, p. 16), in Southern France. This suggests that these forms may be logical formations within the political economy of marriage: that they are not distinctive ‘traditions’ delimited to any one culture, but may be
considered more in terms of catallactically generated manoeuvres, in the Bourdieusien sense of ‘regulated improvisations’ which have developed within similar contexts, in similar ecological niches, and within similar familial structures.

I do not intend for the reader to take the forms of marriage described in this chapter as describing a predominant contemporary reality, since although these modes are still practised, as survey results show (page 285), they are declining in the face of modernity; rather, I wish to identify these forms as ideal-typic models, similar to Collier’s (1988) treatment of three Amerindian marriage forms\(^{39}\), in order to consider how different forms of marriage relate to the structure of patrilineal societies featuring the ‘exchange of women’, and how these may motivate and inflect the societal preoccupation with namûs. I also be consider how these interact with the hegemonic presence of Islam within Iraqi personal status laws (Efrati 2005) which impact upon the individual regardless of confession or level of religiosity.

The hazard of using an ideal-typic approach is the danger of homogenizing diverse experiences and giving the impression of stasis. As Hansen (1961) notes, prior Western writers drew few distinctions between women’s various differing situations in generalising about ‘Kurdish women’. Accordingly she

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\(^{39}\) Collier’s discriminations between the three forms of marriage she identifies — brideservice, equal bridewealth and unequal bridewealth — are based on the forms of prestation accompanying each transaction. However, my discriminations focus instead of the identities of the spouses and their bearing on relations within the family and community.
takes care to attend to differences in educational level, and urban/village backgrounds. There are, of course, many more differences than these between women which inflect their experiences of gender and kinship. Natali (2005, p. 31) points to a variety of socioeconomic and political statuses based on tribal/non-tribal and Muslim/non-Muslim distinctions, as well as ‘warriors and tillers of the land, landowners, peasants and urban groups.’

Hansen’s own study (1961) is underpinned by a blithe functionalism which elides any asymmetries of power within the communities she surveys; however, the fact that she finds a community which is both orderly and non-violent is indicative that active violence is not necessarily integral to the system, as long as its norms and values remain unchallenged. Thus, casting the history of gender relations across Kurdish history as irredeemably violent and exploitative is to ignore the influences of a recent history of internal strife, devastating geopolitics and a precipitous confrontation with modernity; however, historicising it as harmonious and egalitarian (even within the restrictions of a gender-complementarian model) overlooks intrinsic, structural inequalities and conflict, which may become most apparent during periods of societal stress.

While Kurds may belong to many religions, the majority are Sunni Muslims, and Islam has a hegemonic status as source of family law in both Iraqi and
Kurdish law, meaning that Islamic ideations of the family may be particularly influential.

I commence with a discussion of a form of marriage which is considered unique to the Middle Eastern region: preferential patrilateral cousin marriage.

**Cousin marriage**

Anne Elliot, protagonist of Jane Austen’s last novel, *Persuasion* (1817/2006), faces a marital dilemma: approaching spinsterhood at the ripe old age of 27, she is courted by her suave but self-interested cousin, William Elliot, who proposes a match between them that would allow her to return to her beloved family home, entailed to him through primogeniture. She also reencounters a former suitor, the stalwart Frederick Wentworth, whom she had rejected eight years earlier under the pressures of friends and family who felt his social status was inadequate. The themes which underlie her dilemma — familial pressure, status, social capital, self-interest and property — are just as salient even where marital arrangements are handled by relatives rather than the intended spouses themselves.

In the West, cousin marriage is low and declining within the indigenous population, falling to less than 1% over the 20th century in the United Kingdom (Shaw 2001, p. 316). Cousin marriage is now generally considered
rather uncouth. Across the entire MENA zone and within diasporic Middle Eastern and North African communities, however, there is a strong expression of preference for cousin marriage, with patrilateral parallel cousin marriage (hereinafter PPC\textsuperscript{40}) being a particularly favoured form.

**Preferential nature of cousin marriage**

Yalçın-Heckman's meticulous ethnography (1991) of members of the Kurdish Hamawand tribe, living in the Turkish village of Hakkari, indicates that of 66 marriages where the relationship between the couple was known, 34 were endogamous, and 19 were real or classificatory PPC marriages. She notes that for Hakkari, PPC was considered 'ordinary marriage' (1991, p. 236). In the city of Van, in the Kurdish region of Turkey, researchers commented that the high level of cousin endogamy — 34.4% — was due to family pressure rather than choice (Akbayram et al. 2009). In Iran, consanguineous marriages were found to be at 38.6% overall, with less economically developed areas demonstrating higher levels (Saadat et al. 2004). In Iraq, research into genetic illnesses found that 43.3% of the control group had consanguineous marriages, of which 35.6% were between first cousins (Al-Ani 2010).

\textsuperscript{40} The existing literature preponderantly refers to this form of marriage as FBD marriage - in reference to the bride as the father's brother's daughter; however I have elected to use alternate terminology to evade the implications of focussing on the identity of the bride rather than the extended family structure.
Within ethnographic literature, the Middle Eastern version of PPC is considered unique because the lineage historically not only has rights of disposal over a woman’s body, but also has been considered to hold rights of access (Barth 1954; Fernea and Malarkey 1975, p. 188). This means that if a father wishes to marry his daughter to someone other than his brother’s son, he must first seek permission from his brother(s) and nephew(s).

However, far from being an absolute rule, PPC marriage represents a strong preference. A father might well give lip-service to the importance of marrying his daughter to his brother’s son, particularly when questioned by an anthropologist where he will tend to give conventional responses, but this may not reflect practical reality for several reasons. First, and most simply, PPC marriage may not be mathematically possible where there are disparities between the numbers of unmarried males and females within a patriline (Ottenheimer 1986, p. 936). Secondly, a growing awareness of the genetic risks involved has led to a small decline in cousin marriages amongst Kurds (Brenneman 2007, p. 73). Last, a father’s choice may be weighted by individual preference rather than communal norms: if his brother’s son is a loafer, while his sister’s son or an unrelated man is responsible and industrious, he may well pick the latter in the interests of his daughter and her future children’s prosperity, although he may face opposition in this preference from his own brothers and nephews through their assumed right of ‘access’:
When Haifa Khalil, from a village near Aleppo, refused to marry a cousin whom she found “disrespectful and childish”, her parents tried to arrange a marriage to another, unrelated man. But they faced opposition from her uncle, who threatened them. He said she could marry any of his sons, but insisted they had priority over anyone else. Under pressure from tribal elders, Haifa finally agreed to the match. Now, she says, “I have no dreams or hopes in life. I feel that I am under sentence.” (IWPR - Syria 2009)

Such ‘cousin-right’ may be broadly supported by forces outside the family: in a similar case in Diyana, in the KRI, a girl who refused to marry her cousin applied for the annulment of a marriage contract made while she was a baby. Despite the judge’s agreement, the village Mullah informed the judge that the match had his approval and should be upheld, and the girl was threatened with violence until she complied with family wishes (Minwalla and Portman 2007, p. 17).

**Inheritance patterns**

Patterns of reciprocal cousin marriage has been strongly linked to female inheritance rights (Leach 1955/1971, p. 152). Sanmartin (1982, p. 664) finds, for instance, that in the Mediterranean region, while cousin marriage is very common where female inheritance is recognised, it is rare, and even considered deviant, where women do not inherit. Tillion's (1966/2007) expeditious but insightful ethnography of the Maghreb identifies the Islamic directive for female inheritance as a strong motivation for endogamy of this kind. Islamic laws on inheritance, known as ʿulm al-farāʿ ʾidd, (the ‘Science of
the Shares’), are diffusive, tending to spread wealth across many inheritors rather than concentrate it in the hands of a single individual, as is the case in primogeniture, which has historically been the organisation of European inheritance patterns. Islamic directives involve a great number of potential inheritors to any estate; moreover testators can only dispose of a limited proportion of their estate at their own discretion, and that proportion should not be bequeathed to an inheritor who already has a set share under Islamic principles (Esposito and DeLong-Bass 2007, p. 65).

PPC marriages are strongly and significantly more likely to be found if the area was part of the 8th Century Umayyad Caliphate, and are far more likely to have been retained where the Islamic faith remains predominant (Korotayev 2000) — often significant as being part of national laws, regardless of individual preference.
While a great deal of contemporary feminist attention to Muslim family law on inheritance confronts the injustice of a daughter's share being half of that of a son, which has predominantly been the case in Iraqi personal status law (Efrati 2005), the very fact that females inherit at all can be disruptive to patriline, through the potential to impede the smooth transmission of corporate holdings, most significantly land and flocks, down the patriline.

The following diagrams provide a demonstration of capital transference through Islamic directives on inheritance⁴¹, in which the size of each arrow represents the proportions of the estate.

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⁴¹ Calculations were carried out using the online service ‘The Islamic Inheritance Program’ at http://www.islamicsoftware.org/irth/irth.html, according to Shafi‘ite principles.
Notably, the share accruing to the wife in the event of the husband’s death is the smallest and this is the only transmission of money into the affinal patriline.
Rather less of a female’s estate is maintained within her own patriline, although this is not likely to be a large amount, as she may well have passed on her personal wealth, often in the form of gold jewellery, to her daughter as a wedding gift in advance of her death.

The complex mathematics of Muslim inheritance may have been practicable to the Arabian communities who were the first recipients of Islam, whose economy was based in mercantilism and cattle herding. Mecca is, and was,
extremely arid, and an inhospitable environment for plant-life; its prominence and livelihood was as a trading city rather than an agricultural centre, where each citizen — man, woman and child — often had some trading interest in every camel train passing through the city (Wolf 1951). The disposal of the estate of a trader and herdsman is more readily arithmetically resolved through the division of units of camels and tradable goods, which can in turn be bred or traded for profit.

However, for the agricultural communities of the Fertile Crescent, the division of an estate rested far more firmly upon the division of land or flocks, with the potential to threaten the basis of subsistence for the family as a whole. The estate of a farmer must be divided geometrically, in acres and feet, which would ultimately, through a few generations, render some partitions so small as to be unusable. Moreover, land is not, like tradable goods or livestock, a renewable resource. Plough technology, first utilised in Mesopotamia, has been preserved without change since the 3rd millennium BCE in some Kurdish regions (Kren 1996, p. 169), and requires land of sufficient dimensions to plough effectively. Agriculturalists are resistant to the division of their estates which they hold as a corporate patriline; pastoralists have an interest in maintaining and defending their patrilinear claim to pastureland, and to prevent any divisions of their flock, particularly
since sheep herding requires a flock of optimal size. This may be particularly salient where patterns of co-heredity are not simplified by high mortality rates (Goody 1983, p. 121).

Inheritance directives, as Tillion observes, place Muslims who derive their subsistence from a corporate patrimony, whether agrarian, pastoral or some combination of the two, into a theological quandary: do they follow the tenets of their religion, or do they safeguard the interests of the corporate family, within very different economic models for survival? Given that the inheritance directive is in the Qur’an itself, it is difficult for any professing Muslim to evade its implications. As married women remain dependent upon their brothers and fathers for shelter and support in the event of marital breakdown, it is an easy, and indeed a common, strategy for men to dissuade female relatives from asserting their right to inheritance through providing a guarantee of support on such an occasion. However, Muslim women retain, in potentia, a jural right to claim their portion, vouchsafed by the most authoritative text within the Islamic faith. This potential disruption to the material basis of the family can be circumvented through ordaining endogamous marriage, suggests Tillion, which has the effect of binding a woman into the corporate family through marriage, and thereby assimilating her interests into those of the collective. It is as if, she tartly observes, women

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42 Flocks below this optimum level will not herd together and become impossible to control (Lindner 1983, p. 57).
gain control over property at the expense of losing control over their bodies (1966/2007, p. 42).

While anxieties around inheritance rights and the wish to maintain control over patrimony may account for cousin marriage becoming a widespread strategy, it does not account for the explicit preference for patrilaterality. Zoroastrians also practised cousin marriage, and women also inherit (and inheritance is technically equal between brothers and sisters, rather than the half-share that Muslim women receive), but there is no lateral preference (Fischer 1973). So Tillion’s explanation may provide a starting point, but does not account for laterality, nor take account of the common cultural techniques for evading women’s Islamic right to inheritance.

Marriage and fraternal relationships

‘The preferential right of a man to his [father’s brother’s daughter] actually entails a relationship between two men, the groom and the bride’s fathers,’ as Charrad identifies (2001, p. 59). Prescribing cousin marriage on the father’s side is a productive strategy where it serves the purpose of solidifying relationships between brothers (Holý 1989), relationships which are particularly significant in plough-based farming economies (Goody 1976), which rely upon collective male labour to function. This ability of endogamy to consolidate power and property has long been a facet of dynastic power,
from the brother-sister marriages of Ancient Egypt, to the patterns of PPC marriage found in the family of Constantine the Great (Goody 1983, p. 53).

Tensions between brothers who share juridical property rights may threaten the transmission of patrimony even more than women’s inheritance through threatening the cooperative basis of agricultural labour. Fraternal relations lack the clear age hierarchies established in primogeniture, which is the European solution for maintaining an undivided patrimony. Men may be discouraged from demanding exclusive use of their own portion of land, or from requiring the division of a flock, where such actions would cause uneasy relationships between themselves and their brothers and nephews/son-in-laws, which would thereby disadvantage their own daughters and grandchildren. Cousin marriage effectively ties a father’s interest in his own descendants to those of his fraternal relations. This may be particularly valuable if the death of a father in a classically patriarchal household leads to a frérèche – an acephalous household shared by brothers, which can be particularly vulnerable to fission.

Holý (1989) argues that PPC’s tendency to increase male solidarity is a particularly valuable strategy within an environment of tribal contestations. He notes that in Kurdish regions, tribal ashireh Kurds, who are more likely to have greater needs for solidarity in the face of tribal rivalries have a higher level of PPC marriage than their non-tribal, less belligerent, sedentary peers.
This is a salient challenge against a position that places the containment of female inheritance as a sole motivation – *ashireh* Kurds, as members of a tribal grouping which may be nomadic or transhumant, locate solidarity within a notional patriline, and have a commitment to lineage which supersedes that of their commitment to land, whereas Kurds engaged in sedentary farming, have a more permanent relationship with their land, as the source of their livelihoods, rather than with their comparatively low-status patrilines. They may also find it valuable to renew matrilateral connectivities through successive matrilateral cousin marriages, a strategy known as the *renchaînement d’alliance* (Richard 1993).

As Yalçin-Heckman (1991) finds, tribal identifications must be constantly reinscribed through the making and remaking of kinship and other linkages. Patrilateral cousin marriage maintains and reproduces both patrimony and patriline by the same token. In times of conflict it is clearly a poor strategy to increase the reproductive potential of a rival clan. Conjecturally, if a society were to regulate its marriage practices entirely through PPC, all relationships would become agnatic and vertical, with no external horizontal relationships outside the patriclan which could mediate or discourage inter-clan hostilities. Thus, PPC will tend towards a continual regeneration and reinscription of the brittle, vertical structures of segmentary agnation which would tend to increase inter-tribal hostilities. In combination, these various motivations suggest a potential cyclical structure with a general tendency to increase
cousin marriage over the long term, particularly in situations where access to land and water becomes contested. Endogamous marriage preserves corporate property, but also tends to increase segmentation which in turn leads to hostility between families, tribes and clans. These contestations increase the requirement for male solidarity — which is formed through endogamous alliances.

Thus, cousin marriage may appear as the consolidatory phase of a patriline — not least because any man who founds a new patriline is, perforce, a man who is distanced from his own agnates. Kressel (1992) finds that amongst the Bedouin of Ramla and Lod, cousin marriage does not occur until a patriline reaches the third or fourth generation, suggesting that in its early stages, a patriline is reliant on exogamous linkages to build social capital but that subsequently a successful patriline turns inwards as it becomes self-reliant in social and reproductive capacities. Kressel also finds that the networks of interfamilial reciprocity are delicately balanced, recounting an example where one individual within a family refused to accept a PPC marriage which ultimately led to chaos, bloodshed and long-lasting enmities across an entire extended family which he describes at length (1992, pp. 106-113). Thus, normative cousin marriage, through knitting the interests of several individuals together through kinship, risks a tumultuous disruption in the event of unravelling. The impetus for families to enforce and reciprocate cousin marriages is therefore strong.
Khuri (1970), within a Freudian framing, suggests that the strategic merit of PPC marriage is that it tends to reproduce the family without changing its structure, leaving existing patterns of power and eroticism intact; through a transformation of kinship status for the marrying couple, rather than the insertion of an interloper into the family, established kinship and domestic structures are maintained without significant alterations. PPC marriage builds stasis into the family, through introducing no new affines, who could threaten the established familial order. PPC marriages are not just the ‘normal’ form of marriage that Yalçın-Heckmann observed in Hakkari, they are also, in the words of a Kurdish informant, the ‘safest’ marriage formation (cf. Fricke et al. 1986, p. 493). Women are necessary for the reproduction of the patriline, but as interlopers within the virilocal household, they may hold a dangerous potential to threaten its continuity and cohesion. Related women, already inculcated with the family’s values, sharing, to some degree, their goals and interests, pose a lesser existential threat to the collective. From the other direction, containing female relatives within the family lessens their ability to share family secrets or ‘dishonour’ their family in front of unrelated persons. As potential loose threads, women are knitted back into the body of the family so they cannot snag or pull, and unravel the family reputation.

Containment is also the aim in marriages designed, and even coerced, to ‘save’ ‘honour’; where a woman has become suspected of ‘dishonourable’
behaviour, it may be considered the duty of a cousin to step forward and provide a ‘respectable’ face-saving marriage. Zahra al-Azzo was 15 years old when she was kidnapped and raped. Her cousin married her in order to ‘save her reputation’, but this was not considered adequate by the collective. Her family dispatched her brother to kill her, to the dismay of the widower, who had developed a genuine affection for the young woman. Indicating the collective and public nature of such killings, news of Zahra’s death was celebrated with festivities in which her entire natal village participated (Zoepf 2007).

Cousin marriages are not only the ‘safest’ form for the family’s property, the family’s cohesion and the family’s ‘honour’, they may also be relatively safer for the woman involved, as the degree of relatedness reduces the hazards of patrilocality for incoming brides. Cousin marriages have a lesser tendency toward intimate partner violence than exogamous marriages, as the daughter-in-law/niece is not in the extremely isolated and vulnerable position of a stranger-bride within patrilocal societies, who enters a household having little affective ties to the household (Ottenheimer 1986, p. 936), but on the contrary, has a network of relatives ready to intercede in the case of abuse. Lower rates of psychiatric morbidity are recorded in cousin marriage than any other forms in Jordan, for instance (Daradkeh et al. 2006). Fricke et al. (1986) find that women married to cousins tend to be older at the age of marriage than those married for bridewealth. This, Fricke et al.
hypothesise, is due to the regime of agnatic surveillance: cousins, being part of that regime, do not need a child-bride to guarantee themselves of her virginity and pliability, as they can remain confident in their collective contribution to policing her behaviour, and have an intimate knowledge of the parental order under which she has been socialised.

Despite such advantages, such marriages may be difficult to exit in the case of violence or incompatibility. In all cases where marriages are arranged by a collective, divorce has wider effects on more persons than the marital dyad and their children, including the loss of social ties — with possible economic ramifications. Where the couple are related this can lead to dangerous schisms between close relatives, which are deeply hazardous to group cohesion. That divorce rates are low in some forms of cousin marriage (Afzal et al. 1994) thus cannot be taken to indicate that such marriages are particularly satisfactory for the couples involved, but that the social costs of divorce are very much higher when a couple are already closely related.

Indeed, the low levels of fertility and higher rates of divorce associated with cousin marriages in other environments are often adduced as examples of the Westermarck effect, a developmental explanation of incest avoidance which posits that people raised together from childhood are disinclined to become sexually attracted to each other in adulthood (McCabe 1983; Chapais 2008, pp. 66-67).
A Moroccan proverb states that “He who marries the daughter of his father’s brother is like him who celebrates his feasts with a sheep from his own flock” (Webster 1982, p. 180). Women married to cousins are like sheep bred to be sacrificed for weddings in one sense: they are beings raised from birth for the explicit purpose of consolidating and reproducing the patriline. There are strong expectations within every society for a person to identify potential sexual partners within a particular category, whether this be class, caste or within kingroups, with social penalties upon those who do not comply. To explicitly prefer another person outside the permitted categories for sexual expression is not merely a defiance of patriarchal power, but can be conceptualised as an act of sexual deviance.

Barth finds that murders of Kurdish women and girls who refused their cousins were ‘not infrequent’ (1953, p. 28). In A Voice from Kurdistan43 Rauf and Mohammedi record that:

- On 23rd August 1994, Shadieh Hassan Rasool Tayraheh was shot dead by her cousin in the city of Erbil, because she refused to marry him.
- Chinar Abdulhaliq was immolated by her cousin in Makhmoor district because she refused to marry him.
- In early June 1997, Chiman Ali Mineh Soor was stoned to death by the men of her tribe, in Ismaeel Abad, a village near the Shelair district.

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43 A Voice from Kurdistan is a Kurdish language pamphlet prepared by local activists Rega Rauf and Muzaffar Mohammedi, listing ‘honour’ killings and suicides across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq between the years 1991 and 1999. A translation can be viewed at http://joannepayton.me.uk/wp/?page_id=1156
She refused to marry her cousin, and was accused of having had a sexual relationship with a man. While the first two crimes appear, at least on the surface, to be individual acts, ‘crimes of passion’ arising in an environment where male cousins enforce their presumptive rights over the bodies of their kin, the last is clearly collective, the act of a family acting in concert as a corporate unit.

Such collective violence can also be seen in the most notorious case of a collective murder within recent Kurdish history, the death by lapidation of Du’a Khalil Aswad, mentioned earlier in this thesis. Du’a was a member of the minority Yezidi religion, under which women do not have inheritance rights; nevertheless, PPC marriage is practised within this group (Allison 2001b, p. 137). She eloped with a young Muslim man and requested protection from his family. They were reluctant to shelter her due to the dangers of exacerbating tensions between the Yezidi and Muslim communities. Islamist propaganda portrayed the Yezidi as infidels and devil-worshippers\textsuperscript{44}, leading in turn, to reactive and defensive organisation amongst Yezidi males, and a proliferation of inter-community hostility. Without the support of her inamorato and his family, Du’a appealed to state and religious authorities for protection, but these handed her back to her killers.

Her murder was carried out against the wishes of her own parents who remain ‘shamed’ within the community, as it was believed they did not

\textsuperscript{44} This prejudice against the ancient sect forms a catastrophic part of the actions of the self-styled Islamic State against the Yezidi minority in 2014, which includes the enslavement of Yezidi women and girls.
discourage her elopement. They did not participate in the stoning, which was instigated by the paternal uncle, carried out by cousins, and observed by the male population of the village, who recorded and distributed the event on their mobile phones, leading to enormous media attention and local and international abhorrence. In this situation the assumed ‘rights’ of cousins as prospective suitors overweighed the potency of the nominal paterfamilias to determine his daughter’s fate, and were accepted as such by the observers, and by the security forces who observed the murder without intervention.

Thus ‘honour’ is similar to PPC in distributing presumed rights over the body of a woman to a family collective. Meeker (1976) notes that there is a distinction between those societies where a husband is permitted to kill for ‘honour’, and those where the responsibility remains with the victim’s agnates (see also Tapper 1991, p. 16). The latter appears to be the case in Middle Eastern understandings of HBV (Payton 2014). The responsibility remains with the collective, insists Meeker, within societies in which endogamy prevails. Cousins, singly and collectively, as presumed potential future spouses, retain a residual responsibility and ‘right’ over a woman’s body even before marriage – the ‘right’ of access feeds into a motivation to control, monitor and discipline; to assume the attitude of a jealous and custodial husband in advance of marriage. Thus if a woman is suspected of a premarital relationship it may not be perceived as an indiscretion, but as an adulterous act against a group of men whose expectations are that she will
ultimately be married to one of their number, and a failure to meet family obligations on the part her father and brothers.

Through the institution of cousin marriage, a presumptive allocation of ‘rights’ of access to a woman’s body, and responsibility for her behaviour, derives from the moment of her birth onto a collective of related males, which is able to form both a surveillance network, and if need be, to take part in a murder. Thus, the normative expectation of cousin marriage creates a basis for the collective and familial control of women by their cousins, aunts and uncles and other patrilineal relations, whose interest in safeguarding her ‘virtue’ is not merely deployed in the service of collective family reputation, but also in an individuated and possessive interest in her as a potential bride or affine.

**Direct exchange marriage**

*Aveen Ali, 14, was only four years old when she entered into an exchange marriage. “Out of ten girls in my extended family, six other girls and I were married as kids,” she said. One of her uncles had fallen in love with a woman and had asked for her hand, but the woman’s family had requested a girl in return. Aveen ... along with three of her cousins was exchanged for her uncle’s bride.*

“My father and my uncles didn’t regard us as human beings. We were sacrificed for their love,” she said. (Mohammad 2007)

*Jin be jine*, literally meaning ‘a woman for a woman’, is a form of marriage in which one girl is directly exchanged for another, which has been long
recorded amongst Kurds in Iraq (Leach 1940; Barth 1953; Hansen 1961; Dzięgel 1982; Taysi 2009). Marriage by exchange is also recorded in the first written history of the Kurdish peoples, the *Sharafnâmä* (Bitlîsî 1597/2005, p. 21, verse 43). Direct exchange marriage is described by Kurds in Turkey as *berdel*, by Afghans as *badal* (Kargar 2011), *makhtiar* (Tapper 1981) or *alish* (Tapper 1991, p. 149), and by Pakistanis as *watta-satta* (Jacoby and Mansuri 2007).

Marriage by direct exchange is rare on a global scale (Schlegel and Eloui 1988, p. 294), and is primarily associated with societies characterised by a horticultural means of production, lower levels of economic complexity and little accumulation of property (p. 296), and as such is somewhat unexpected within a country with an economy based in petroleum exports. It is probably due to the impoverishment of the practitioners that such marriages are considered the lowest status form of legitimate marriage (Dzięgel 1982, p. 258; Fricke et al. 1986, p. 494; Jacoby and Mansuri 2007; Ertem and Kocturk 2008). *Jin be jine* allows cash-poor communities and families to build technically exogamous but local alliances that accrue local solidarity without the necessity of raising brideprice. They create a quadrangular relationship which links the destinies of four persons, and which duplicates the connection between the respective patrilines. The categories of exogamy and endogamy effectively become unified through simultaneity.
A project to register the prevalence of *jin be jine* marriage within the KRI in support of a campaign by Kurdish MP Sara Faqe, which resulted in 5% of the female population of the Pshdar region coming forward to declare their marriages as being conducted by exchange (Mohammad 2007). Such enthusiasm for Faqe’s project suggests far wider prevalence in practice, where many of those married in this fashion were very likely to be unaware of the initiative, unable or unwilling to come forward, or may not have supported her abolitionist stance. In Turkey, Ilkkaracan (2001) also found that one in 20 of her sample population in the Kurdish dominated region was married via *berdel*. Kudat et al. (2000) found 17% of marriages of this type in villages on the Şanlıurfa-Hurran plains of North-Eastern Turkey. Within some of the village-based micro-environments created by the rugged and mountainous landscape of Kurdish regions it may be almost universal, such as the town of Karacadağ, where over 95% of marriages are reported to take the form of direct exchange (Esmer 2010).

Direct exchange forms of marriage benefit families with several daughters through accruing wealth and/or female labour to the patriline, particularly where polygyny is practised. Abdullah Ahmed, a Kurdish Pshdari man with one brother and seven sisters, divorced three wives upon reaching maturity and deciding upon a love marriage. Each had been contracted to him in exchange for one of his sisters by his father during his childhood (Mohammad 2007). The elder generation may also use exchange forms of
marriage to accrue additional wives for themselves rather than their sons, trading their daughters and nieces (Esmer 2010). For Sorani-speaking Kurds, the term gewre be biçûk\(^45\) may also be used to denote jin be jine where there is a generational gap (Hassanpour 2001) — where one or more young girls are exchanged for an adult woman. A rough local rate of exchange holds two prepubescent girls as the equivalent of one fertile woman: ‘A visitor would give us one of his daughters for two children,’ stated Mula Ahmed, an elderly villager from Rania, KRI (Johnstone 2009).

**Status matching in direct exchange marriage**

*Berdel* marriages require an absolute symmetry: from an equal number of attendees from each family to identical gifts of jewellery to the bride or furniture to the marital home (Esmer 2010), with some ceremonies even taking place across a bridge over which brides cross simultaneously from opposite ends (Ersen 2002), like spies passing over Glienicke Bridge in a Le Carré novel.

Marriages, like many collective ceremonies, function as displays of social status: in direct exchange ceremonies, displays of social and cultural capital are carefully calibrated in order to give an appearance of parity. Ersen witnessed a marriage ceremony which almost ended in violent acrimony due

\(^{45}\) Literally, ‘a big [woman] for a small [girl]’
to one family's perception that the other had exceeded their allowance of guests. ‘Balanced [marital] exchanges,’ says Collier (1988, p. 103), ‘establish a dyadic relationship in which the exchangers are equal,’ – or, at the very least, must appear to be so.

Sahlins (1974) outlines a schema of the political economies of non-state societies based in spheres of reciprocity: the household stands as a central unit in which members are expected to participate for the benefit of the collective as a whole, where the goods and services are considered to be communal (‘generalised reciprocity’); but each degree of removal from the household increases the tension around any form of transaction.

Mapping the forms of traditional marriage discussed in this chapter onto Sahlins’ schema reveals that the differing nature of the transactions connected with each different form of marriage is related to their relative distance from the household.
Cousin marriage, operating at the smallest possible degree of removal from the household is the ‘safest’ form, in being the closest to ‘generalised reciprocity’, occasioning little in the way of financial recompense; outside the village or tribe ingroups, in the zone of ‘negative reciprocity’, transactions and negotiations are likely to be characterised by asymmetry, and hence
insecurity and concern. *Jin be jine*, which tends to take place at the level of the
village and tribe, falls in an intermediate position between these two forms,
striving for the delicate equilibrium of ‘balanced reciprocity’. Transactions
which occur within the village/tribe but outside the direct lineage, for
Sahlins, are marked by anxiety, where parity in all dealings must be made
explicit, at the risk of producing resentment which could trigger feuds and
schisms, endangering the collective life of the community.

Fiske (1992) describes ‘equality matched’ interactions as ‘a relational
structure where people can compare differences and use the operations of
addition and subtraction to assess imbalance’, where favours and goods
given and received are recorded on a mental ledger to ensure that such
transactions do not incur any cause for grievance between persons and
families over time, and that the relationship is not unfair on either
transacting party.

The requirement of absolute reciprocity in direct exchange marriage
demands that both couples divorce in the event of one marital breakdown.
Ahmet Börek, a young Kurdish man happily married through *berdel* in
Turkey, explains that ‘the brother is his sister’s shadow,’ and that he would
not hesitate to break up his own marriage if his sister’s failed. The only
alternative for Ahmet and his wife in this instance would be a payment of
brideprice, changing the form of the transaction from direct exchange to a
cash basis. This may be resisted by the groom’s family through a lost pride
over the failure of reciprocity (Ersen 2002) — which can, according to
journalist Sebnem Eras, lead to violent tribal and interfamilial clashes (Das
2010). Alinia (2013, p. 121) recounts the effects of one direct exchange
marriage deal that went sour, which disproportionately fall upon the bride
due to the patricentric ordering of Kurdish society. HK was married through
direct exchange at 13 years of age, however, ‘HK’s husband’s family refused
to give their daughter to HK’s brother...HK’s marriage was dissolved and she
was sent back to her family. Her husband’s family kept her baby, who was
five months old.’

Jacoby and Mansuri (2007) propose that similar exchange marriages in
Pakistan operate to reduce the mistreatment of brides, pointing to lower
levels of estrangement, violence and depression in watta-satta marriage. In
what they acknowledge as a sub-optimal solution for the widespread nature
of domestic violence against women in Pakistan, they suggest that a man may
feel restrained from beating his wife, if he knows that by so doing his sister
may be beaten in reprisal.

It is usual for a woman’s first port of call in the case of abuse to be to her
natal family, who remain invested in her well-being (Haj-Yahia 2000; Haj-
Yahia and Sadan 2008), where she may be repelled or supported, or where
particularly enraged brothers may pay the abuser back in his own coin
(Morsy 1990). Such arrangements increase women’s dependency on males:
'a woman whose brothers refuse to take her in is at the mercy of her husband, just as a woman whose husband renounces her is at the mercy of her brothers,' (Collier 1988, p. 117).

This 'argument from deterrence' neglects the distasteful corollary that implies that a man, upon learning his sister has been beaten, appears to be obliged to reciprocate this violence upon the body of his wife, rather than through a direct intervention to the abuser. So while such relational mirroring may encourage restraint, it also has a clear capacity to lead to escalation, where women may become hostages to proliferating male rivalry expressed through their own bodies. That such a stratagem is, at least according to Jacoby and Mansuri, more effective than otherwise, suggests that men may have closer affective ties to their sisters than to their wives, as could be inferred from Ahmet's declaration of support for his sister. Joseph's (1999) examination of the dynamics of love and power within Middle Eastern brother-sister relationships indicates a high level of connectivity between cross-gendered siblings — in which brothers groom their sisters to conform to masculine requirements for their future marriages, within a relationship which forms the closest approximation to adolescent love-play permissible in societies where male/female contact is delimited.

The berdel commitment between families extends beyond the life of the woman, where a widower may take his widow's sister through sororate, or request that his widow's natal family pays half the brideprice required to
replace her (Das 2010), indicating that maintaining the alliance formed by a
direct exchange marriage is the most crucial aspect for the life of the
community. In this sense, if direct exchange forms do form a disincentive for
spousal violence, this appears more likely to be an epiphenomenon than a
motivation for the adoption of the form. The mirroring of the relationship is
more likely to express a requirement for marital permanence than marital
accord, a counter to the availability of divorce under Islamic law.

Compensation marriage

_It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in_
_payment of blood money. Thus if £90 is owing, the price of the blood
_of one man, the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three
cows and a donkey._ (Leach 1940, p. 56)

_Badal khueen_, literally meaning blood substitute\(^6\) or _jin be xwên_ (woman-for-
blood), is the distinct form of exchange marriage mentioned in the
_Sharafnâma_, where it serves as a means of averting blood-feuds and vendetta
killings, often brokered by arbitrators attempting to mediate tribal disputes.
Women married under _badal khueen_ may not divorce and are required to
sever any contact with their natal family; as Leach indicates two girls in
marriage were considered the equivalent of the blood-money for the death of
one man. Such ‘compensation’ marriages are practised in current times in
Pakistan and Afghanistan under the names of _swara_ or _vani_. The young bride

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\(^6\) Etymology provided by Dr Azad Osman, University of Arbil, Northern Iraq. Such marriages
are known as _fasliyah_ in Arabic, and _swari_ and _vani_ in Urdu.
— who may well be a child for whom no other arrangement has yet been made — may be mistreated by the family in reprisal for the initial killing of their kinsman (Minallah 2004; Kargar 2011 ch. 4). Bird interviewed a Kurdish agha who was involved in dispute mediation still deploying badal khueen as a means of building family reconciliation in the aftermath of murders, and disputes over ‘honour’ and land, in order to avoid blood feuds. He told her:

_Sometimes I resolve two or three killings a month, sometimes only one a year. The people come to me, and I try to reconcile their two families, with offers of money, or women, or land._

(Bird 2005, p. 234)

Bird observes that it is the poor, unable to raise blood money, who are most likely to marry off their daughters in such forms of reconciliation.

**Reciprocity and ‘honour’**

Taysi assumes a causal relationship between direct exchange forms of marriage and ‘honour’-based violence (2009, p. 40); indeed areas like Sindh in Pakistan, Pshdar in the KRI, North-East Turkey, and rural Afghanistan combine a notoriety ‘honour’ killings with a wider prevalence of direct exchange marriage. While co-occurrence is an inadequate grounding for such presumption, particularly when there are many other commonalities amongst societies where it is practised (Schlegel and Eloui 1988), it is possible to speculate about potentially hazardous aspects of this form of marriage within the Middle Eastern context. Sev’er (2005), for instance,
commenting on the premeditated honour killing of ‘Semse’ identifies her as having been married in a direct exchange format, observing that if one of the brides in the pairing ‘is unacceptable — not a virgin, the other family may retroactively insist on bride-price. In such cases, either family may consider killing the woman who spoiled the deal.’

Concerns about ‘spoiling the deal’ are very pertinent. In Guizh, a mountain village in Rania, KRI, a young women immolated herself\(^{47}\) rather than enter an exchange marriage which had been arranged for her. Her mother, Peroz Ali, told a reporter from Al Jazeera:

> I said to my daughter you will bring us shame if you don’t marry. Now I wish I had accepted her decision. We have to stop the mullahs and the villagers from doing this. (Johnstone 2009)

Here the daughter’s ‘shame’ is not related to any sense of sexual misbehaviour, but through rendering the family unable to fulfil an obligation. The potential for ‘dishonour’, in this sense, lies not ‘between a woman’s legs’, in Mernissi’s pungently crude phrase (1985), but rather between the pages of an unbalanced ledger, in a failure to conform to the political and economic norms of communal reciprocity. ‘Honour’ in this context has a greater relationship to \textit{bext}, the principle of fair-dealing, than \textit{namūs}. Guizh villagers, galvanised by the tragedy, told Al Jazeera’s reporter they sought to reject the

\(^{47}\) This is a very common method of suicide in the KRI, and one which is particularly used by women and girls (Rasool and Payton, 2014).
custom of *jin be jine*. This could not be effected by a mere pronouncement, however, but required the ‘renegotiation of contracts’ (Johnstone 2009). Not all Guizh males and families could be expected to show the liberality with which Abdullah Ahmed released his three brides in Pshdar; they might instead demand alternative forms of compensation in terms of cash or goods which the families of their promised brides might be unable to muster.

The concern for a status parity and reciprocity which is intrinsic to direct exchange forms of marriage suggests deep-seated structural tensions. Neither purely collective nor individualistic, the segmentary nature of Middle Eastern kinship patterns leads to ‘complementary oppositions between lineage segments of equal depth, and a structuring of violence on genealogical grounds,’ (Lindholm 1986, p. 343). Agrarian/pastoralist societies, largely lacking horizontal divisions of class or occupational differentiation, are vertically divided into patrilines, with little means of establishing hierarchy between most men, besides appeals to the depth, in terms of patrilinear history, and breadth, in terms of the number of supporters a family can count upon, either to back them in blood feuds or make political intercessions upon their behalf.

As McDowall (1996, p. 9) observes,

*...in Kurdish society, like others dependent upon strong blood ties, a quarrel between two people is almost a contradiction in terms. No relatives of someone in a dispute can easily stand apart since they are required to take their relative’s side. Thus all disputes take on a dangerous factional quality.*
In such an antagonistic scenario, marked by transient loyalties, cross-familial alliances are necessary for self-defence and internal harmony — but are ultimately fragile in nature. ‘Our families did not marry them, but we did not fight each other,’ remarked Yezidi agronomist Akim Saringovitch Farizian in 1996, speaking of neighbouring Muslim villages (Meiselas 1997, p. 35), suggesting that these two distinct categories — the people with whom one intermarries, and the people with whom one fights, have a diametrical relationship. Indeed, the insular Pashtun Durrani describe themselves as ‘one people among whom women are exchanged’ (Tapper 1981, p. 392). The Yezidi eschew intermarriage with Muslims in order to shore up their internal solidarity and consolidate and protect their minority religious identity, yet this, as earlier pages have demonstrated, leaves them vulnerable to attacks from the more populous Muslim Kurds with no marital alliances to bridge the communities.

This picture of ‘honour’ we see in the Guizh case, then, is markedly different from the obsession with female comportment which has been described by Kurdish and Turkish respondents (Kardam 2005; Sir 2005; Taysi 2009), but relates to a family’s ability to build suitable political alliances, and to follow through on any marital contracts which have been arranged. This aspect of ‘honour’, in terms of meeting obligations, seems consonant with the agonistic nature of interfamilial relations described above. It could be considered that all exogamous marriage alliances take place between potential antagonists,
and represent an attempt to recruit the other family as allies, or to neutralise any potential threat they represent, through recruiting them into kinship relations: a manoeuvre which is made particularly explicit in the practice of *badal khueen*. The delicate concern with status matching during marriage ceremonies bespeaks caution, forming an explicit display that both sides are entering into a mutual alliance in good faith.

However, the intense fixation on status-matching during marriage negotiations and ceremonies can only allay the volatile nature of interfamilial relations to a certain degree. One gold bracelet may have an equal weight to another, but the primary axis of exchange — one woman for another, exchanging one family for another — can never be made upon a basis of equilibrium, as no two women, men or families are identical. Even where there is little occupational variation within genders, there remain physical, mental, intellectual and dispositional differences between any two persons which will inflect their roles as spouses. Sacks (1982, pp. 224-225) also finds there are integral contradictions between the roles of sister and wife in lineage-oriented societies — ‘[a] wife’s subordinate relationship to her husband and his lineage was ideologically in sharp contrast to the sisterly equality in her own.’ It is in the families’ interests to groom the departing bride in the image of her shadow, as Joseph’s observations (1999) suggest; as the reflection of the docile reproducer of the patriline that they wish to recruit to their number, a method of smoothing the transition from sisterly
equality to the deference appropriate to a wife and daughter-in-law within a patricentric household.

As a form of symbolic capital as well as a social norm, namûs represents an available personal attribute which, unlike attractiveness, personality or character, can be rendered into some level of uniformity and some sense of equivalence in instrumental terms. Conformity to a normative code of female behaviour would tend to maintain the delicate balance of status matching, avoiding giving grounds for grievance to the family sought as allies.

This inculcates a strong motivation for a family to police their kinswomen so that they are less likely to occasion challenges to the parallel relationship through any questions over her ‘honour,’ which would void the alliance and create antagonistic relations. Unlike lineage endogamous marriage, where the incomer bride largely shares the background of her spouse, direct exchange marriage locates a newlywed within an alien family, and with an unknown spouse, whose norms of behaviour and expectations may be different from those of her own household. Namûs functions as a normative, catallactically defined standard for wifehood, an assurance of a woman’s suitability to the role she must play to maintain her own relationship, the relationship between her kinsman and his wife, the wider relationship between the families involved — and ultimately, in maintaining the gender relations of the society as whole.
Young women are hostages not merely to the relationship of their ‘shadow’ but also to political disputes between patrilines due to their liminal role in both families; either divorcing, or ‘occasioning’ divorce through a perceived failure to conform to the expectations of marriage in terms of namûs, will jettison the social capital gained through the alliances.

The shadow relationship of jin be jine links individuals and families to the wider political economy of marriage in a very direct sense; through deploying instrumental marriages to create alliances within a geographically delimited community, delicately poised between hostility and interdependence, women become embodied conduits, in Rubin’s (1975) sense, of strategic relations between families, a position which is crucial for the political survival of the family, but which places them in a position of extreme vulnerability through requiring them to embody communally defined norms of marriageability in order to maintain the alliance.

**Exogamy and brideprice**

*My mother...was fourteen years old when someone came from my village and told my father about her...My father went to get her and brought some jewels. Her family accepted him, he, of course, paid something, and so she left with him. Still today families make the negotiations and still must pay.*

Kurdish *agha*, interviewed in 1996 (in Meiselas 1997, p. 36)
Bridewealth, referred to (twice) in the quote above, tends to occur in societies where corporate unilineal descent groups predominate. It is frequently associated with exogamous marriage, rather than the cousin endogamy in which payments are small or fictive, or the precise matching of direct exchange marriages, which tend to occur within a framework of village-level endogamy. Both of these forms are, indeed, frequently rationalised as a method of evading marital prestations. Thus substantial bridewealth payments frequently co-occur with exogamy, implying the displacement of a girl or woman from her agnates and her reinstatement within the affinal family. This may also be a chance to display status, particularly since exogamous marriage is considered a prestigious form for wife-takers (Yalçın-Heckman 1991, p. 236).

While the most common marital prestations occurring within the organisation of marriage — bridewealth and dowry — operate in opposite directions, these cannot be considered as mirror images of each other, because the recipient of the prestation is different in each case. Dowries function as pre-mortem inheritance, as start-up capital for a new household in a manner similar to a wedding list at a department store, and can be an act of parental investment by the bride’s parents into the household, supporting the wellbeing of future grandchildren. They may also be a method of ‘buying’ status through hypergamous marriages, where the bride comes from a lower
socioeconomic stratum or caste than the groom, enabling cross-generational social mobility (Nasrin 2011).

Under Islam, marriages require the payment of *mehr*, considerations which accrue directly to the bride, and which can be considered as a form of bridewealth (Bell 1998). The amount of *mehr* is even specified on state-issued Iraqi marriage certificates. *Mehr* can be described as a form of indirect dowry or ‘morning gift’, with precedents in Judaic and Zoroastrian practice.

In common with the rabbinic *mohar* (Satlow 2001, p. 214) established by Shimon ben Shathach (c. 120-40 BCE), *mehr* is often at least partially promissory, serving as a divorce settlement where wives have no claim to their husband’s property in the event of male-initiated marital dissolution. This aspect of *mehr* supposedly discourages men from recklessly divorcing their wives by repudiation and also provides some financial support for widowed and divorced women between marriages48. Busby describes gifts to brides amongst the Kurds as follows:

> *The cost to the groom’s family is substantial. The amount varies depending on the social and financial status of the families involved. Between poor families the groom’s family will be expected to buy a complete set of clothes, including shoes, and perhaps a dresser. They must also provide at least one each of the following items of gold: a bracelet or watch, a ring, a necklace, a pair of earrings, and a gold coin to be hung from the chain...If the families are wealthy, more gold is required. The number of rings, earrings and bracelets,*

48 Women who initiate divorce on their own behalves waive their rights to *mehr* and are obliged to repay any monies received prior to marriage. This can lead to dissatisfied husbands reluctant to pay *mehr* mistreating their wives in the hope that they will become desperate enough to waive their financial rights in order to escape abuse (Kamal 1998).
lengths of chain and number of coins are all stipulated and may cost several thousand dollars. (1994, pp. 10-11)

For one recent Kurdish groom, these demands amounted to some $12,700 (Rûdaw 2013). This can be an opportunity for families to make conspicuous displays of wealth. Such gold and jewellery becomes the possession of the wife, forming a pragmatic method of preserving capital and achieving financial security in an environment where there is no modern banking system and the currency has historically been vulnerable to hyperinflation and collapse.

However, the main focus of this section will relate to marital payments which enrich the patriline, rather than those which provide financial security to the daughter/bride. These payments to the bride's patriline are referred to as naqd in Arabic, or şîrbayî (milkprice) or xönbayî (bloodprice) in Kurdish (Hassanpour 2001). This type of payment to the family of a bride will be referred to as brideprice in order to position it as a subcategory of bridewealth which in contradistinction to mehr, although as these are frequently simultaneously negotiated, they may in practice be somewhat muddied categories.
Figure 5.5: Directions of payment in marital prestations
Either form of dowry is an intergenerational transmission, whereas brideprice is retained within the elder generation. Where dowry or brideprice is negotiated by elders, this cements gerontocratic control. Couples who seek to marry can be prevented from so doing by a father insistent upon receiving a brideprice beyond the capacities of a suitor.

Brideprice is common in Africa, yet rare in Eurasia, which has tended towards dowry across its history, particularly in European regions. I now examine the conditions under which a system of brideprice may develop.

**Origins of brideprice**

Fortunato’s (2011) linguistic phylogenesis of Indo-European languages developing from Ancient Hittite suggests that dowry predates brideprice across Eurasia, finding that the language of brideprice was a later adoption by collectives speaking languages derived from the Indo-Iranian family (which includes Kurdish) and Albanian49, and that indeed, some of these societies have oscillated between dowry and brideprice across history up to a maximum of four times.

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49 Albania also has a current history of ‘honour’ killings of women and blood feuds, especially in the predominantly Catholic Northern region, where they are justified by reference to the *Kanun* of traditional law (Mustafa and Young 2008).
This can be supported through historical accounts: Rose (1998), for instance, describes marriage within the pre-Islamic Sassanid Empire as based in indirect dowry with no occurrence of brideprice\(^{50}\).

For Fortunato, the key variable associated with brideprice across this deep history is *polygyny* — a proposition which is well supported by other scholars (Grossbard 1978; Atkinson and Lee 1984; Ember et al. 2007; Patterson 2012). Within the KRI, Barth found a level of 4% polygyny across 94 men in four villages in the 1950s (1953, p. 29); Bois (1966) suggests that polygyny was common before the time of his own investigations of Kurdish regions, especially amongst tribal leaders making political alliances, but estimated a contemporary level of around 2%, suggesting a low and declining level of polygyny\(^{51}\). Middle Eastern patterns of polygyny tend to show a fairly low incidence in contradistinction to the high levels found in Africa, suggesting a scenario where limited polygyny is the privilege of a small elite. McDowall (1996, p. 10) identifies that the larger social networks, and hence greater power, of an *agha* related to a history of polygynous marriage within his lineage, which was unavailable to male villagers and tenants, who were often subject to feudal control upon their marital choices.

\(^{50}\) Interestingly, several commentators agree that women’s consent was crucial to Sassanian marriage and that women commonly married in opposition to parental interests (Fischer 1973; Rose 1998; Choksy 2003).

\(^{51}\) However, Bird has the impression that polygyny was actually *increasing* in the KRI in the 2000s, due to increasing wealth inequalities in a modernising nation and gender imbalances caused by the *Anfal* and male emigration (2005 p. 111).
Patterson’s (2012) analysis of the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample also shows a significant relationship between brideprice and slavery, finding that half of all societies with brideprice hold slaves and the presence of brideprice triples the odds of finding institutional slavery. If slavery, brideprice and polygyny appear to cluster within societies, this may suggest that all three phenomena result from an exterior determinant. For several writers, this determinant is warfare, in its pre-modern forms (Divale and Harris 1976; White and Burton 1988; Ember et al. 2007).

That war correlates with polygyny and polygyny with brideprice has a certain logic: a polygynous society is one which establishes male/male competition for women, who become the rewards for male assertiveness and financial or military success, either through the high status of the most aggressive males, able to demand brides within their own community, or through the rape and enslavement of captive women, taken from other groups. Competition for in-group women may become intense in this scenario, where the most successful males monopolise the reproductive capacity of the collective (Betzig 2012), with particular crises likely when there are fewer captives available, either in times of peace or of defeat. This competition would tend to wreck communal solidarity if expressed through violent contestations between men of the ingroup. Monetization of this

52 The first slaves in ancient civilisations were women; *geme*, the Sumerian term for slave literally means ‘mountain woman’ (Fisher 1979 p. 314).
competition, therefore, can express competition within forms which are less likely to lead to physical injuries and the depletion of the military/defensive strength of the community.

Polygyny thus both stratifies men into those wealthy enough to be able to afford more than one wife and those who have no licit means to achieve reproductive relations. Polygyny may benefit some women: particularly senior wives, who are able to pass on the most arduous aspects of household labour to their subordinate juniors, and the mothers of sons; but for junior wives, mothers of daughters, and the children of polygynous marriages, polygyny has numerous and severe hazards beyond the scope of this thesis (for a summary, see iMAPP 2011).

Societies where males make war to plunder and to enslave female captives, are able to replace all of the physical functions of wives with slaves. The ‘natural’ balance of the genders, in the sense of the tendency of humans towards the conception of male and female children in roughly equal numbers, is in a constant state of disequilibrium through warfare, since defeat may lead to a high level of male death, and victory to an influx of female captives. Either position leads to a surplus of females providing a logical basis for polygyny, especially within a context of the combined

53 The enslavement of female captives is a frequent aspect of warfare. See, for instance, Euripides’ The Trojan Women, the Old Testament [Judges 21:10-24, Numbers 31:7-18, Deuteronomy 20:10-14] and the ahadith [Bukhari 3: 432, Abu Dawud 2: 2150], and in modern times, the enslavement and sexual exploitation of Yazidi women by militants of the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq.
rational for pro-natalism to be found in the agrarian lifestyle and a warlike orientation, where male children are valued both as warriors and as labourers. Successful individuals, in this scenario, are male warriors who are able to amass booty and captives, leading to a social orientation to place a high value upon ‘masculine’ values, which thereby leads to son preference — already strongly featured in patrilinear societies. Such societal orientations frequently feature high levels of female infanticide where male physical strength is a desirable quality, whereas female reproductive capacities run the risk of being alienated by the enemy in defeat, and may be replaced by captives in victory (Divale and Harris 1976).

While son preference is recorded within Middle Eastern regions, this is not expressed in female infanticide which is robustly, and emotively, condemned in the Qur’an54 nor in the sex-selective abortions so common in India and China (Sen 2003). While a small gender disparity in the deaths of infants within the Middle East is discernible, this relates to differential parental attention within societies with a preference for sons, who may then tend to receive better medical care and nutrition, rather than as a result of a determined attempt to eradicate daughters (Ahmed et al. 1981).

As Miller (1984) finds, in a comparative study of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the existence of brideprice can make an economic case for raising daughters

54 Qur’an 17:31; 81:8-9
within patrilineal societies: brideprice may effectively form a subsidy encouraging families to raise daughters even though sons are identified as more likely to increase a family’s status and wellbeing. Thus a societal adaptation to brideprice would appear to be adaptive in increasing the reproductive potential of any warlike, polygynous group. Polygyny can intersect with son preference, where one of the most common justifications for taking a second wife is the failure of the first to provide a male heir to continue the patriline.

However, the continuance of brideprice in periods where polygyny and the kind of warfare which results in bride-capture are more marginal remains to be explained.

**Brideprice in relation to female labour**

*Cultural understandings of how men acquire wives, by structuring the contexts in which some people work for others, also structure the conversations in which people develop culturally acceptable justifications for appropriating the labours of others.*

(Collier 1988, pp. 232-233)

In Goody and Tambiah (1973) and Schlegel and Eloui’s (1988) explication of modes of marital transaction, direct exchange and brideprice marriages are described as occurring where women’s labour value is significant. The geographical distribution of brideprice and dowry for the above writers rests upon the technology of production. According to this theory, in sub-Saharan
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Africa marriage is arranged by brideprice where women are hoe cultivators; in Eurasia marriages are predominantly arranged by dowry where the gendered division of labour is more stark, and plough-based male labour is the main form of subsistence. African women occasion brideprice because they participate in subsistence farming, in this analysis; European women are dowried because they do not.

At first glance, the evidence in the Kurdish case would appear to bear the asset-value argument out: Bois (1966) well illustrates the industriousness of rural Kurdish agricultural women, whose domestic labours occupy their entire day, from bread-making in the early morning to cooking the final meal of the day late at night. Female pastoralists are similarly tireless. Laizer (1991, pp. 10-11) recounts staying in a pastoral encampment during winter, where the men, unable to graze their animals due to snowfall, sipped sweet tea and chatted all day, while the women of the household cooked, cleaned, milled grain, baked bread, churned butter, milked, and cared for hens, geese, goats, sheep and other larger animals. Johnson (1940), states that Kurdish women were, in fact, responsible for all productive labour amongst transhumant tribes: men slept all day and spent their nights guarding their valuables from raiders of other tribes — and presumably indulging in some banditry themselves. For Johnson, the labour value of women was a primary consideration within marriage:
The beauty of a young girl taken in marriage is a secondary consideration in determining her price...Her value will depend upon her utility — her physical strength for manual labour, and her ability to make carpets, rugs, clothes and other things. (p. 54)

However, it is not clear that such women can be considered any more industrious than other peasant women in similar environments, with similar modes of subsistence: there is little reason to assume that the Sarakastani pastoralist women described by Campbell in Greece (1964) or the Sicilian agricultural women described by Schneider and Schneider (1976, p. 90) were any less hard-working than the Kurdish women described above, although their labours were augmented through the expectation that they provide a dowry including such items as several sets of hand-embroidered bed-linens and several sheep upon entrance to marriage. Such an ‘either-or’ model also fails to fit the evidence for the simultaneous coexistence of brideprice transactions within 75% of the societies practising dowry/indirect dowry (Nunn 2005). Therefore, to see such a distinction in terms of woman as an asset-value — as if African women were productive and therefore worth the outlay, whereas European women were indolent financial burdens to the extent that their husbands require compensation for their upkeep — has numerous problems.

First, it ignores the possibility that such differences may merely be regional, an argument which Burton and Reitz (1981) support through log-linear analysis. Secondly, it conflates various experiences, and various women, as if
they were part of the same ‘market’ with the same internal values, whereas women, and women’s labour, may have different kinds of values attributed to them within different societies. For instance, in highly pro-natalist societies, women may be expected to produce numerous offspring rather than take a major role in primary production, and therefore their ability to contribute labour is less valuable to their affines than their fertility. In societies where women are less valued for fertility — those with high levels of infanticide, post-partum taboos on sex, etc. — other characteristics such as practical skills, appearance or status may become more salient indicators of a woman’s potential value to her husband and affines.

Bell astutely comments that:

\begin{quote}
In order for dowry to imply a low valuation of women, it must be the case that their parents have attempted to find the highest positive prices for them — actively seeking brideprice — only to find that the highest prices are negative. However, we know that the payment of dowry does not imply the inability to sell the bride for a prestige price. On the contrary, the giving of dowry becomes a prestige practice, not the unfortunate consequence of having a worthless daughter. Dowry and brideprice are not different points on the same scale; they correspond to entirely different institutions. (1998, p. 206)
\end{quote}

The weakest point in the labour-value position on brideprice, I would argue, is the assumption that remuneration for labour, whether direct or indirect, has any straightforward connection to the value of that labour. As Hartsock (1985, chapters 1-2) identifies, there is a tendency for scholars to use the
exchange theories developed by Blau and Homans in overly functionalist ways, assuming that interactions express voluntary exchanges between equals. This neglects the imbalances of power and authority, and overstates the voluntarism of any individual’s engagement in political and economic relations within their milieu. Importantly, within gender-complementarian societies, neither marriage, nor the various forms of labour required within a marriage, could be considered voluntary (Jaggar 1983, p. 117). Due to the gendered division of labour and the taboos on premarital sex and illegitimacy, marriage is an essential rite of passage into adulthood, sexual maturity and parentage for both men and women. Where the gendered division of labour is intense and fiercely policed, each individual man or woman needs a heterosexual counterpart, whatever his or her contribution to production may be, due to the interdependencies introduced by a gendered division of labour. An adult man who refuses to perform tasks such as laundry or cleaning because they are perceived as emasculating (see White 1999, p. 38), must marry, live in filth, or remain a source of labour to his mother and sisters; an adult woman who is unable to own or rent her own home must marry, take to the streets, or remain in her childhood home at the sufferance of her father and brothers. Such an entwinement of social, familial and economic interdependences means there is little choice in the matter for the individual. Just as, in capitalist societies, participation in the labour market is effectively involuntary for the vast majority of people who do not have private wealth, regardless of the terms of employment, participation in
the marriage market is almost inevitable for the vast majority of individuals in strongly gender-divided societies, whatever the price for this participation may be.

Furthermore, either in the capitalist mode or within the combined unit of production and consumption which is the traditional household, it is problematic to assume that the market delivers an accurate reflection of the value of labour, particularly, one might argue, for the labour value of women. Delphy and Leonard’s (1992) identification of the persistent cultural devaluation of domestic and secondary processing labour performed by women and girls suggests that there may be widespread misrecognition of the female contribution to subsistence through emphasising the manly outdoor labour that ploughs, sows, reaps and threshes at the expense of the womanly indoor labour that winnows, grinds, kneads and bakes. Divale and Harris (1976) suggest that where male supremacy is entrenched, women may provide more labour-value to the family than they do in other societies quite simply because they lack the power to withhold their labour.

**Brideprice as recompense to affines**

Several commentators have presented brideprice as a form of refund for expended resources: as recompense to the bride-giving family for the resources expended in raising her to marital age (as is suggested in the use of the term şîrbayî meaning milkprice). This would not explain cases where
brideprice is absent, minimal or fictive, as in the forms found earlier in this chapter. A daughter does not consume less of a household's resources if she is married endogamously. Moreover, a resource-refund argument would suggest that the brideprice of a spinster in mid-life should be higher than that of a nubile teenager, a position for which there is little supporting evidence and a great deal to the contrary (Rassam 1980, p. 174; Borgerhoff Mulder 1988). Conversely, in Bangladesh, where dowry is expected, the marriages of older women reflect their reduced market value through payments of higher dowry as compensation (Chowdhury 2004).

Barth suggests that for Kurds (1954, p. 167) brideprice is a form of compensation for eschewing cousin marriage and the patrilineal solidarity that this produces. Yet cousin marriage, as I have argued, is far from an iron rule, particularly amongst non-tribal populations, and it is difficult to establish whether patterns of brideprice and cousin marriage intersect in ways which could indicate a specific connection between the two forms of marriage: certainly, brideprice is globally a far wider phenomenon than cousin marriage. Barth's explanation thus appears rather unilinear in positing a direct relationship between two opposing poles of marriage, when marriage practices have been shown to have several varying and flexible configurations.

Sourcing explanations for the purpose of brideprice in emic accounts, as Barth does, can be problematic, due to the delicacy and vested self-interests
involved around discussions of marital transactions. Valeri’s (1994) study of the Huaulu, for instance, found that Huaulu men simultaneously insist that they ‘buy’ their wives, but ‘give’ their daughters in marriage, despite the identical and reciprocal nature of the transactions involved.

Alternatively, brideprice payments could be considered in terms of remunerations for the transfer of certain specified ‘rights’ over a relative. This assumes that parents have the right to command and transfer these ‘rights’, irrespective of their children’s volition. As Moghadam (2004, p. 171) says, ‘rights’ over a woman’s products, be they rugs or offspring, are considered to belong to their male kin, and are theirs to exploit or transfer. Such an assumption may be problematic from an individualistic human rights perspective, through allocating substantial powers over a child’s labour and body to her or his parents; nevertheless, such allocations of alienable and heritable ‘rights’ over individuals are common throughout history, whether over slaves or kinship members.

Marital ‘rights’ over women which are accrued through marriage may be arranged in separate ‘packages’ concisely summarised by Caplan (1984, p. 31), which may, or may not, include:

*Jus in rem*: Rights over her as an object;
*Jus in personam*: Rights over her labour;
*Jus in uxorem*: Right to identify her as his wife;
*Jus in genetricem*: Right to assume paternity of her children.
Brideprice was one of the practices compared to slavery in the *UN 1956 Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery* (Åstrom 2009, p. 111). From Wollstonecraft (2002/1759) and Mill (1869) to Pateman (1988) and Ali (2010), feminists have scrutinised the peculiar nature of the marriage contract through making comparisons between wifehood and indentured servitude and slavery. The practice of brideprice, if seen as payment for a woman’s body and the right to exploit her labour and reproductive capacity, seems to concretise these arguments through removing the final distinction between the categories.

However, brideprice need not position women as outright chattels since ‘rights’ over her labour, body and children which are transmitted by marriage are not necessarily held in perpetuity by the affinal collective, nor are they transferable beyond it. A heated anthropological debate in the late 1920s and early 1930s concluded that brideprice cannot be considered the outright purchase of a woman, as even wives in the most unfavourable of conditions differed from slaves in at least one respect: that married women cannot be further alienated from their natal families than they already are, whereas slaves can be resold freely. Only the natal family have the authority to marry off a woman, and this right is rarely transferred by marriage (Valeri 1994, p. 3), with the possible exception of levirate, where a widow is obliged to remarry within the patriline of her late spouse — again, a method of maintaining interfamily relations within a patrilinear order.
It may also be noted that these transferred ‘rights’, as identified by Caplan, remain similar whether or not brideprice is paid. Nevertheless, within highly patriarchal societies, the distinction between wife and slave can be very fine (Seaver 2007, p. 155) and the difference rests rather less in the rights extended to any individual woman than in the ‘rights’ which are retained by her natal family.

Within Islamic law a clear and important distinction is that women maintain ownership of their own property after marriage and their own legal identities, a right which British women did not achieve until the passing of the Married Women’s Property Act 1870. Muslim women could themselves own slaves, although they could not, Ali (2010) notes, make sexual use of their slaves, a liberty which was reserved for Muslim men due to Islamic concerns about patrilineal paternity. Women’s gold and other personal possessions may be passed down to their daughters through matrilineal inheritance, in contradistinction to the patrilinear trends of Islamic societies, and mature widows may be freer from familial pressures over subsequent marriages than they were over their first (Rassam 1980).

While there has been a great deal of resistance from anthropologists against describing marriage by brideprice in terms of commerce, this does not mean such exchanges can be considered merely symbolic or ceremonial, in the sense of traditional Japanese yuino gifts of dried cuttlefish. Brideprice can be
the subject of negotiation, even delicate haggling, within Middle Eastern settings. This would suggest that its social function goes far beyond the symbolic representation of an act of transference, but itself forms an integral part of the transference relationship. According to Van Bruinessen (2000), Kurdish brideprice payments tend to be high rather than tokenistic or symbolic. Their negotiation involves ‘considerable, subtle diplomacy’ (Barth 1953, p. 26) in calculating the ‘actual economic value of a woman’ (p. 28).

Tapper (1981) found that the Durrani Pashtun men sought to arrange their own marriages in areas where the brideprice was low, but hawked their daughters in areas where they were high, showing a canny awareness of market forces and an eagerness to maximise the returns upon their expenditure. She also quotes a will left by a Durrani tribesman in which he numbers his daughters amongst his personal effects, allocating the ability to arrange marriages and receive brideprice to various inheritors and creditors, treating daughters as assets to be distributed (Tapper 1991, p. 104).

Brideprice may, then, be a crucial source of income: catastrophically, in times of financial crisis, young brides may be effectively sold to elderly men for money or to repay familial debts (Brenneman 2007, p. 98), or trafficked into prostitution under the guise of marriage (Minwalla and Portman 2007).

Tapper thus argues that wedding prestations:

…cannot be treated as a closed system, nor understood apart from other prestations (including intangibles such as prestige and political support) which are also part of marriage arrangements;
nor can all these prestations themselves be understood apart from a detailed economic and political structure of the total society. (1981, p. 390)

Borgerhoff Mulder’s (1988) longitudinal examination of brideprice payments amongst the Kipsigis certainly shows that these are inflected by the demands of the local market and subject to change, along with societal changes and variations in the broader economy. As such, the levels of brideprice which are negotiated may be of particular interest in understanding how these payments fit into interfamilial relations. Kressel’s examination of brideprice amongst the Israeli Bedouin shows that the level of brideprice negotiated relates to the respective social positions of the arranging parties:

A suitor in a clearly superior position to the bride’s group, economically and in political strength (e.g. having a large number of agnates) may pay a low brideprice plus his implicit patronage for her kinsmen. In addition, a solitary immigrant to the community who may be impecunious may get a bride as an ‘act of mercy’ almost for free; he thereupon becomes affiliated with her group or lineage. On the other hand, an agnatic outsider seeking a bride in the group may have to pay a top price. (1992, p. 125)

Kressel’s first example shows that low bridewealth may correspond with a greater transmission of social capital to the wife-givers; the second example suggests the absorption of an individual into the wife-giving patriline as a client, benefitting from his subsequent loyalty and labour; and the third redresses the lower availability of the social capital within a connection with
a son-in-law with roots outside the community who may well take his wife and leave the area. The greater the distance from the natal family, generally the higher the price: close agnates pay less than distant agnates; unrelated neighbours pay more than distant non-relatives, and non-countrymen pay the highest of all (Kressel 1977, p. 444). Brideprice can clearly be seen to be operating alongside, and compensating for, exchanges in social capital and labour rights between families wherein both the capacities of the bride and groom, and the respective statuses and affordances of their families and connections, are all subject to valuation.

**Brideprice and ‘honour’**

For Bell (1998), dowry represents a gift for alliance. Yet persons in societies using brideprice also have the need to develop alliances and patronage relationships through marriage. Lin (2001, p. 136) argues that a movement towards societal organisation by social capital is part of a movement away from slavery and conquest, which may be the conditions under which brideprice developed:

> [A]s the size of the primordial group increases, it also creates problems for the maintenance of centralised authority over resources and competition for the succession to resource entitlement...Competition for scarce materials can be and is ended at a primitive level by one group taking physical possession of other primordial groups and turning the members of these groups into resource generating instruments — enslaved labourers. However, unless the ability to take possession of another group is overwhelming in terms of relative size or superiority of instruments (technology), there is always a risk that the confrontation will result in the enslavement of ego’s group instead.
A less risky strategy than conquest, then, is the building of relationships as social capital. The enslavement of captives, alienated from their own kinship networks, may be replaced by the translocation of brides into patricentric structures; somewhat distanced from their agnates, but where the maintenance of interfamilial relations provides important social linkages for resource and information sharing, and conflict resolution.

Exogamous ties formed through marriage would be considered ‘weaker’ than those between persons with pre-existing relationships, yet it is these supposedly ‘weak’ ties which may be the most valuable (Granovetter 1973), since they extend links of social influence beyond existing parameters, creating diffuse and varied channels of interfamilial connectivity — forming bridging capital, in Putnam’s sense (Leonard 2004). The strong ties of cousin endogamy and the village endogamy of direct exchange marriages consolidate pre-existing relationships and build ingroup loyalties — they do not establish new patterns of knowledge/resource sharing or patronage from which the contracting families can profit.

According to a Kurdish informant, tribal transhumant nomads often choose to marry off some of their womenfolk into sedentary farming populations or towns, which would tend to provide kinship-mediated routes of access to those resources unobtainable through pastoral life, and supply political linkages into the life of the village. This creates a softer route to influence
than the exploitative power relations historically observed between pastoralists and farmers, thus following Lin’s trajectory of relationships formerly expressed through violence and subordination becoming expressed through social networking, in this case, expressed through marriage/kinship relationships.

In terms of social capital then, exogamous marriages may be the most advantageous to both sides of the transaction; but since the distance between the parties is the greatest, there are more likely to be inequalities between the transacting parties. In this instance, the negotiation of brideprice and marriage itself takes place under circumstances which Sahlins (1974) would characterise as ‘negative reciprocity’ — transactions take place within an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, and where negotiations must be conducted with the utmost delicacy, and which take into consideration the value of the alliance to each family — as well as the personal characteristics of the bride herself.

Pamporov (2007, p. 473) commenting on marriage amongst the Bulgarian Roma55 outlines the following determinants of brideprice:

1. The appearance of the bride;
2. Her practical skills;
3. The reputation of her family;
4. The wealth and property status of both families;

55 Roma marriage follows similar patterns to those described in this chapter, including patrilocality, cousin endogamy, direct exchange, brideprice exogamy and abduction/elopement; virginity is demanded and female sexual autonomy is repressed.
5. The level of connectivity between the two families.

So, the elements of brideprice which relate to the bride as an individual are erotic/reproductive potential and capacity for labour. In terms of social capital, status — wealth and property — will increase the value of the bargain. The other determinant related to her family is somewhat obscurely described by Pamporov as ‘reputation’. A Kalaydje Rom clarifies this: brideprice, he says, is ‘a payment about the honour of the bride’ (Pamporov 2007, p. 472).

Chastity then, and the family’s reputation in enforcing this, may be considered one of the determinants of brideprice. Exogamy means that the prospective affines will tend to have less knowledge of the household order under which the young bride has been socialised and may fear buying a pig in a poke: ‘bad girls go out’ according to Ertem and Kocturk’s (2008) Kurdish respondents, suggesting that a girl who has garnered an unfavourable reputation within her natal area may be married exogamously to a family unaware of this.

Negotiations around exogamous marriage may therefore be particularly tense, combining mutual suspicion with a desire to maximise the value of the alliance. In such circumstances, the appearance of conformity to the standards of ‘honour’ becomes a particularly salient quality, which must be protected from the least doubt, and where the status of both families taking
part on the transaction are subject to valuation; and where disagreements may be taken as status challenges.

**Women’s opinions of brideprice**

Early ethnographers of Kurdish regions tended to state that women found brideprice flattering, as a mark of status and regard (Hansen 1961). Leach (1940, p. 120) reports that Kurdish men claim to have paid high fictive brideprices for their cousin-wives in order to flatter their feminine vanity. It might be noted, however, that brideprice as a mark of status is likely to be relational to the status of other women: a woman is unlikely to consider her brideprice flattering if it is markedly lower than that of her peers.

Later research has found that most women express hostility to the practice. Of Ilkkaracan’s (2001) Turkish and Kurdish respondents, 61% reported an exchange of money from their husband’s patriline to their own in order to realise marriage. 78.9% of women were opposed to the practice of brideprice, and in open-ended questions, 56.3% described their opposition as being due to the commodifying nature of being married in return for payment. Kreiger (1986, p. 125) reports that Cairene women expressed resentment over marriage for brideprice in similar terms:

*I knew of several women’s anguish at having been married by their fathers to men they didn’t care for, while they were not allowed to marry men they loved. The phrase ‘my father sold me for money’*
was uttered by several women as an explanation of why they had married their husbands.\textsuperscript{56}

In research specifically examining brideprice, less than 0.5% of Ugandan women supported the institution, giving reasons similar to those advanced by Ilkkaracan’s respondents:

- It posits women as property
- It leads to child marriage within impoverished families
- A refusal to refund brideprice by the natal family leaves women trapped within their husband’s kin-group in the event of marital disharmony or widowhood (Kaye et al. 2000; Hague et al. 2011).

Women in societies who have experienced a transition from other forms of marriage towards brideprice feel their status to be degraded (Lovett 1997). Ilkkaracan’s respondents added that men who pay for brides believe they have gained ‘all rights over their wives’ sexuality and fertility,’ suggesting that the monetization of the transference of rights implied in marriage is perceived as instantiating a higher level of control over them.

Brideprice then may be a method of creating relationships of peonage, where the initial payment is used both to justify the subordination of wives, and as a

\textsuperscript{56} Hoodfar’s (1997) attentive and sympathetic study of marriage and work in Cairo indicates that fathers were often more interested in arranging profitable and high-status marriages for their daughters suggesting a greater emotional distance and a higher investment in social status, whereas mothers tended to prefer isogamous and endogamous marriages to reduce social inequalities in marriage between the partners, which they thought would reduce the husband’s ability to subordinate his wife and the likelihood of violence.
form of restriction which prevents her egress. Collier (1988, p. 165) suggests that this is the main purpose of brideprice — to oblige families to pay a financial penalty if the bride returns home, which would be her first response in the event of marital dissatisfaction.

Just as mehr could be, in part, considered to form a kind of financial deposit discouraging a man from pronouncing a summary divorce, brideprice could be seen as a corollary: a deposit ensuring against a family’s acceptance of a married woman’s return to the natal home in the event of marital disharmony. Thus the societal co-occurrence and simultaneous negotiation of brideprice and indirect dowry identified by Nunn (2005) can be related to a single motivation: preserving marital relationships (and the social capital accrued through those relationships) through financially underwriting interfamilial connections within the most risky negotiations, i.e. those with members of outgroups, which are those which are the most marked by concerns about unequal bargains. Negotiations which take place in this insecure terrain place tensions across both families. A female Rom told Pamporov:

> If the woman\(^{57}\) who wants my daughter pays me, if she pays more expensive, it is clear that she is going to love my daughter much more and to give much more care. And if one day my daughter makes a mistake, she is not going to turn her out of the house, because she will be sorry for the money paid.

\(^{57}\)This presumably refers to the prospective mother-in-law.
Here she casts brideprice as an expression of genuine interest, which will reduce the chances of her daughter facing the potential for abuse in the patricentric household. However, if the family’s ‘reputation’ is linked to concepts of ‘honour’, in terms of being a reliable producer of women well-socialised to their future roles as brides, then the performance of ‘honour’ is financially incentivised, whether this is self-interested, or perceived as being in the interests of achieving the best possible marriage for the bride. A payment ‘about honour’ invests the recipient family in verifying ‘honour’: if ‘honour’ is a precondition of a financial transaction then ‘honour’ can become the crux upon which such a transaction succeeds or fails.

While the requirement for brideprice suggests that it may inhibit the repudiation of women, due to the expense of requiring a replacement, this may not be the case if the affinal collective claims the woman is being divorced due to an offence against ‘honour.’ They may be considered to have legitimate grounds for complaint, which must then be addressed either by interfamily negotiations, potentially requiring the repayment of brideprice.

This facility is open to abuse, as a case from my professional experience suggests. A young Kurdish woman had been married off by her impoverished father in return for brideprice which was agreed to be paid by instalments. However, her husband soon ceased payments and the father pressurised him to meet his obligations. However, according to her account, the husband had
determined to kill her under the guise of ‘honour’ — through alleging she had 
been unfaithful — in order to avoid future payments and to argue for a return 
of monies already expended. Therefore a desire to contest or demand the 
return of brideprice can incentivise the identification of women as bénamûs. 
This is not to argue that the payments of brideprice inevitably lead to crimes 
justified by ‘honour’, nor the converse, since many of the European 
Mediterranean countries with recent histories of HBV practised dowry and 
forms of brideprice are common across sub-Saharan Africa, where evidence 
for HBV, as described in this thesis, is not marked. It does, however, indicate 
that there is a real marriage market, since ‘prices’ cannot be generated by 
providing another indicator of the ‘exchange of women’ as an organising 
principle, and an incentivisation for the stringent control of sexuality within a 
marriage market in which this is considered a necessary precondition for 
participation.

Brideprice, within this context can perhaps be most aptly described in Ben-
Yorath’s term (1980, p. 3) as an ‘approximation of the ex-ante differences in 
the expected values of the packages being exchanged,’ which includes the 
agreed ‘rights’ over women’s bodies and labour, the value of the association 
to the contracting families in terms of status, social capital and resource 
sharing, and the cultural expectations of conformity to the moral standards of 
the collective, which is deeply entangled with the conceptualisation of namûs.
Elopements and abductions

The tale of *Siyamand* and *Khadje*, as interpreted by Kurdish folklorist Nourredine Zaza, describes an elopement in gripping detail:

> And so, on Khadje’s wedding day, when she was due to be taken on horseback from her father’s home to that of her husband, Siyamand attacked the convoy, which was guarded by seven of his beloved’s brothers. At the point of his sword, he took her from her guardians, threw her onto the back of his horse, and, with the speed of a hawk, ascended the inaccessible peaks of Mount Sipan. (Zaza 1962, p. 36)

The brawny Siyamand, an orphan working as a shepherd (a prototypical Kurdish folkloric hero), became besotted with Khadje, the mauve-eyed daughter of his employer. Khadje, equally smitten, encouraged Siyamand to formally request her hand in marriage. Her father refused due to Siyamand’s low status, so the lovers stage an abduction in a swashbuckling defiance of parental power. Camping out in the mountain caves, they awaited Khadje’s father’s acceptance of their union. The author dubs the couple ‘husband and wife’ after their absconsion, coyly indicating that they have made love. Sex is, according to Masters (1953, p. 158), the first act in any Kurdish elopement, ‘so they can only be separated by death, for a woman who has lost her virginity out of wedlock must be killed by her kinsmen’. Khadje’s father,

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58 My translation
sensible to the slight upon his dignity, remains set upon vengeance, and the pair is left to survive in the caves indefinitely, despite the onset of winter snows. In a cautionary dénouement, Khadje becomes saddened by her life in exile, despite the plentiful booty Siyamand amasses through banditry. Siyamand dies in an accident due to his characteristic impetuosity, and Khadje hurls herself off a cliff in despair.

Such folk traditions identify a very different kind of relationship than the instrumental uses of marriage implied in the preceding sections of this chapter, bringing not only a rare expression of overt challenge to gerontocratic power, but also of discriminating female desire: through such displays of masculine vigour as galloping on horseback through the village with a sheep slung across his broad shoulders, Siyamand becomes the recipient of love-songs, gifts and love-letters from women and girls across the village. This folkloric passion is common in Kurdish oral or literary history: the national epic Mem û Zîn (1692) is only one amongst many tales common to Kurds of all faiths (Allison 2001a, b) depicting romantic love which is ultimately doomed by unsympathetic elders — the theme of chagrin d’amour familiar from Renaissance, early Arabian and Egyptian literature.

Abu-Lughod’s (1985) luminous ethnography of the Bedouin Awlåd ‘Ali tribe found that Bedouin songs and lyric poetry were rich with sentiment and regret, expressing the obverse side of a social order that otherwise demands stoicism in the face of misfortune. Normative arranged marriage in India, for
instance, feeds into the stylised romanticism of Bollywood heroes, who bear more than a passing resemblance to the intrepid Siyamand (see Afshar 1994, p. 139). Yet these tales of elopement and abduction by no means serve as wish-fulfilment fantasies for young Kurds: they reproduce, in heroic idiom, a real, if minority, practice in Kurdish regions.

Romantic love…is a prominent feature of adolescence…A youth and maiden may arrange rare meeting in secret, and exchange gifts, embroidered handkerchiefs, flowers, apples or even rings…Most of these affairs…are ended by one or other of the parties being engaged to some other person. Several young men told of their love for girls in adolescence, and how their parents had ultimately betrothed them to youths they hardly knew or did not particularly desire…[C]ouples on the rarest occasions may elope, taking sanctuary with a chieftain who will arrange their marriage. Almost all, however, defer to the wishes of their parents.
(Masters 1953, p. 265)

Redûkewtin (which literally means ‘taking the road’) is a long recorded tradition in Kurdish regions by which young lovers can evade the strictures of gerontocratic control. Five per cent of Ilkkaracan’s (2001) Turkish respondents had eloped or requested their lovers to ‘abduct’ them; Yalçın-Heckman (1991) reports on several cases of elopement/abduction in her study of the Hamawand.

Romantic love in Western thought has typically been associated with modernity and nuclearisation (Bertilsson 1986), despite the emergence of the conjugal nuclear family clearly predating industrialisation (Laslett 1977; Macfarland 1978). From Weber to Habermas, and from Parsons to Simmel,
romantic love has been portrayed either as ‘an instrumental aid to the maintenance of an ever more rationalised society, or as a functional resource for increasing communication in a social universe that is fragmented and atomistic,’ (Lindholm 1998).

Within this formulation, pre-modern peoples are not considered to be capable of romantic love as understood in the modern West. Hunt, (1959, p. 10), for instance, states that:

...by and large the clanship structure and social life of most primitive societies provide a wholesale intimacy and broad distribution of affection; Western love with its especially close and valued ties between two isolated individuals is neither possible nor needed.

As Hunt describes it, the significance of love to Euro-Americans is a redirection of sentiments which, before modernity, were contained within the family. Certainly, within a nuclear family, the intense emotional and practical interdependence of the central dyad is pivotal, whereas participation in a wider social network can reduce the intensity of this bond (Broude 1987). This cannot be taken to mean that intimacy cannot develop between sexual partners and co-parents, nor that it is considered an undesirable outcome of marriage (Abu-Lughod 1998a, p. 11), especially where it reinforces, rather than threatens, the existing domestic order. To assume that a wider distribution of interdependence and sentiment means that Hunt’s ‘primitive’ peoples have no use for romance appears perilously
close to suggesting that the expression of love, like a fine cognac, requires a sophisticated palate to appreciate it. Yet subjective descriptions of the experiences of love in fact show remarkable cross-cultural consistency (Jankowiak and Fischer 1991; Riela et al. 2010) as shown in poetry from Sappho to Hafez and beyond.

Goode (1959), writing in the same year as Hunt, notes that if anything, the breadth of the cross-cultural appearance of romantic sentiments can be discerned in the extreme measures many societies take to contain or redirect the disruptive, centrifugal force of eros, using institutions as culturally varied as purdah, chaperonage, and compulsory heterosexuality. Lindholm (1998) suggests that it is not that love is unknown to pre-modern and modernising peoples, but that the assumptions of Western scholarship are underpinned by a heteronormative sociobiological ontology which takes love to be an elaboration of the reproductive instinct, designed to produce stable pair-bonds for the nurturance of offspring. Thus, the majority Euro-American ‘affective’ orientation to sexuality assumes that the development of an intense dyadic relationship is a necessary precursor to sex and reproduction within long-term relationships, in contradistinction to purely reproductive or hedonistic forms of sexual expression (DeLamater 1981). However, where marriages are strategies to gain prestige and social capital, from Ancient Rome to the court of Louis XIV, Lindholm (1998) suggests, the sentiment of love, whether chaste or sexual, is relocated outside reproductive
relationships, and hence rendered invisible under the sociobiological schema. The Pukhtun of the Khyber Pass take an instrumental and dispassionate view of marriage, he claims, yet nevertheless idealise prostitutes and prepubescent boys — persons who are outside the realm of domestic politics, so that erotic and other interpersonal passions cannot disrupt the power structures of the household (cf. Rassam 1980, p. 175).

Elopement, then, may provide a means for a society which has a high regard for romance between couples, yet an instrumental orientation towards marriage, to unify these aspects, providing a space for individuals with strong individual preferences to buck the normative system of marriage arrangement. Redûkewtin inverts the generational power basis of the system of marriage arrangement, through presenting parents with a fait accompli, placing the parents in the child’s position of having no options except assent or refusal. While some families will take steps to regularise an elopement, often involving post-marital exchanges of brideprice, others may respond with an ‘honour’ killing in response to the challenge to parental power. In 2007, Jihan eloped with Jaleel Mustafa, a former peshmerga who had applied for her hand without success, and became his second wife in a polygynous household. Mustafa attempted to resolve the issue with Jihan’s family through a payment of $5000 and through giving his sister to her family under badal khueen. The families appeared to be reconciled; however in

59 Literally a term meaning ‘one who faces death’, a guerrilla fighter or militia member.
2010, when Jihan was pregnant with her second child, four of Jihan’s relatives invaded her home and shot her 20 times (Bahaddin 2010b).

Nevertheless, for redûkewtin to have continued as a tradition, even as a minority practice or one confined to certain communities or tribes, many families must be more receptive to runaway daughters, and kidnapping son-in-laws, than Jihan’s family. There may be reasons for a father to prefer a dynamic abductor to a meeker ‘by-the-book’ suitor, not least because he can use the fact of the elopement to press for a higher brideprice (Sweetman 1994, p. 139). A man’s ability to conduct a successful abduction can demonstrate several character traits which are valued in agonistic communities that place a high status on masculine self-assertion — physical courage, ingenuity, and an assertive and dynamic response to any challenges to his status — which would include the refusal of his initial marital advances. Even a man who eschews the derring-do of a horseback rescue, and, like the Hamawand (Yalçın-Heckman 1991), prefers to organise a low-key kidnapping in collaboration with his relatives and friends, displays a valuable capacity for generating and mobilising an alliance network, demonstrating leadership skills and social capital. Abductors also demonstrate their skills as providers, through their ability to provision the couple during their period of estrangement from the community, and demonstrate their dedication to the girl or woman of their choice. Since cousins have preferential access to related women, an abductor is likely to
originate from outside the primary family grouping, so if his family are reputable, this presents all the benefits of exogamy in increasing their influence network, without putting the families through the lengthy and delicate political work of alliance negotiation. In recognition of this, Hamawand fathers of pre-eminent patrilines have been known to hire bodyguards for their unmarried daughters, in order to prevent them from elopement with, or abduction by, lower status males seeking to accrue status through hypergamous marriage (Yalçın-Heckman 1991).

Within the tribal past, redûkewtin may have implied seeking the protection and prospective membership of another tribe, where that tribe’s leaders would weigh up the benefits of adding a reproductive couple to their number against the potential for violent reprisals from the couple’s tribe of origin. If rejected by their families, a couple sheltered by a hospitable tribe or community could forfeit any claims upon their respective patrimonies through geographical separation, and likewise dissolve all their existing social connections, in order to found a new patriline. A modern alternative to seeking assistance from another tribe is to seek it from the state. Yet as the case of Kurdistan Aziz demonstrates, the state may not respond effectively: Kurdistan Aziz eloped at 16, and sought protection from the local police force in the capital city of Erbil. They carried out a virginity examination and finding her hymen to be intact and ‘no signs of sodomy’, rather than
organising protective measures, they restored her to her tribe, where she was killed (Begikhani et al. 2010, p. 71).

Elopement in Kurdish culture

As Kurds have historically been unable to define their own penal and family law codes, where even today, jurisprudence in the semi-autonomous KRI is subordinate to that of the Iraqi state, it is difficult to demonstrate official or popular opinions upon elopement. However, within the short-lived (1946-1947), Soviet sponsored, Kurdish ‘Republic of Mahabad’ in Northern Iran, the following notice was promulgated repeatedly by the National Council:

*The Elopement (redûkewtin) of Girls and Women is Prohibited*

The Kurdistan National Council rules that any man who forcibly elopes a married woman or [a woman who] has not moved into [the husband’s home] will be sentenced to death; if a girl is eloped the man must be killed; but if a man asks for a girl’s hand in marriage and he is refused and there is no erî barrier° [to their marriage] and [the girl] is unmarried and consenting, there is no punishment, otherwise there will be three months to three years of jail. (Mojab 2001, p. 83)

As Mojab observes, this ruling, issued with the authority of religious approval, conforms to a patriarchal reading of marriage: depriving a man of his wife, or his potential wife, (who may, of course, be a child bride promised

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° I have not been able to locate an English translation of the word *erî* as used in this directive, despite seeking expert opinion. It is most likely to refer to the Islamic degrees of prohibition in marriage, as stated in the *Qur’an* [4:22-24].
to him from the cradle), carries a death penalty, whereas abduction carries a jail penalty, which could potentially be rather short, as long as a subsequent marriage is arranged. Mojab notes that this was presented as an Islamification of rural practices which had not previously felt the influences of shari’a, sardonically remarking that this respect for Islamic principle did not extend to land reforms which would allow women to claim inheritance of land or property in accordance with the Qur’an. Following Mojab’s cynical tone, we might also note that there is no attempt to regulate jin be jine which is specifically condemned in ahadith but which does not, like redûkewtin, disrupt male/familial control over marriage.

In response to this ruling, Muhammad-Amin Manguri, a member of the Republic’s military administration, stated that this was in conflict with the tribal practices of the Bilbas confederacy. The Bilbas found this ruling oppressive, he said, because it did not allow for ‘freedom of loving, flirtation, falling in love, mixed dancing and abduction.’ Manguri felt that the ruling made young people ‘hermits’ and forbade the pleasures of love, and denied them the social status of redûkewtin – which proved both the desirability of Kurdish women, and the courage of Kurdish men. The principle of freedom of romantic love was, for Manguri, a defining aspect of the Kurdish national

61 Direct exchange marriage is forbidden within ‘strong’ ahadith - Sahih Muslim [3295] and Sahih Al-Bukhari [9.908], using the Arabic term shighar.
character, a level of liberty unmatched by Europeans or their Arab and Persian neighbours.

Manguri’s objections thus mark a potential starting point for a trend in Kurdish discourse to locate redûkewtin as a vivid counter-tradition against the otherwise rigid control over marriage and sexuality by families (Morgan 2000; Talabany 2000). Manguri, and the Bilbas collective, appear to be willing to abdicate paternal power for the sake of their children’s freedom. But a key paradox remains: there were no effective barriers to the Bilbas allowing free association and marriages or other forms of partnering without requiring them to enact the performative act of abduction — they could merely have permitted youngsters to marry according to their inclinations. Redûkewtin, then, appears to have a symbolic status: through creating a visible challenge to elder control it simultaneously acknowledges it, paying a tribute to the ideal of parental control through the formulation of the act of defiance.

Yet there may be other motivations in play in the practice than allowing free choice in marriage. The gendered asymmetry of the actors’ roles in any elopement or abduction is more likely to support young men’s access to women’s bodies than female sexual autonomy.
Relation between abduction and rape

Despite the ability of elopement to express women’s agency in convincing a chosen suitor to ‘abduct’ her, one may, however, question how much agency a woman can ultimately demonstrate when thrown across the back of a horse, or, in a more modern scenario, trapped in the back of a moving car by her abductor and his confederates. Neither the Mahabad ruling, nor Manguri’s objections, pay much attention to the principle of consent to the act of abduction, but only consent to a subsequent regularising marriage: so while redûkewtin may be linguistically different from the Kurdish term for bride capture (jin helgirtin), in practice there may be as much slippage between the categories as there is between marriages which have been forced, and those which have been arranged.

In keeping with the private/public polarisation of gender roles, women’s encouragement of their chosen ‘abductor’ is covert, and hence enigmatic, whereas the male’s abduction is a public performance, a blatant expression of dominion over a woman’s body in defiance of parental wishes. Not all women may be complicit in their abductions; parents may indeed have refused the initial request upon their daughter’s urgings. The difficulty in establishing whether a case is one of a predatory abduction of an unwilling woman or a consensual elopement arranged between lovers rests upon the ever-present ambiguities around women’s consent, and the prevalent double standard that holds women responsible for sexual ‘shame’: women abducted without their
consent were considered to have connived in an elopement and punished (Yalçın-Heckman 1993); whereas women who have voluntarily eloped may be described as having been abducted to avoid admitting the shame of having an insubordinate daughter (Yalçın-Heckman 1991).

Marriage by abduction, with its attendant ambiguities around consent, is recorded in many contemporary states sharing the KRI’s Indo-Iranian linguistic identity. It is primarily associated with Kyrgyzstan (Wilensky-Lanford 2003) where only 34% of women from 504 households stated that their abduction was by mutual consent (Kleinbach et al. 2004). This practice appears to be spreading to Kazakhstan (Werner 2009) and Tajikistan (Ahmadova 2011) in a post-Soviet era of re-traditionalisation; bride capture has also been recorded in Azerbaijan (Kiryashova 2005) and Georgia (Amnesty International 2006; Duarte 2006), which border Kurdish regions; significant Kurdish enclaves currently exist in Georgia. Wilensky-Lanford (2003) describes this as a way for poor and otherwise unattractive males to achieve brides.

Schneider suggests that bride-capture is a historical aspect of pastoral life in the Mediterranean:

*Pastoral families place a premium on large families and this focusses attention on women. They bear the sons that make the family economically and politically viable. In a sense, they are contested resources much like pastures and water, so much so that kidnappings, elopements and the capture of concubines appear to*
Werner (2009) notes that marriage by abduction is represented as ‘authentically’ Kyrgyz, despite being unable to locate any scholarly support for widespread prevalence before Sovietisation. She notes that through abduction, men profit from the honour/shame complex around virginity (p. 323): once abducted, a woman is considered not to be a virgin and is thereby unmarriageable to any other man but her abductor. The family of the abductor may even make a display of a clean sheet in their window if an abducted woman does not bleed upon penetration, as if women should keep themselves ‘pure’ with their own lovers and fiancés against the eventuality that a stranger should choose to abduct and then rape them. A woman who vehemently refuses marriage with her captor is considered unmarriageable thereafter, because it is presumed that she has been raped. She may thus be under pressure to marry from her own family, who otherwise face the prospect of maintaining her in the paternal household indefinitely. ‘Now you are mine forever...you will not be able to refuse me,’ gloated a Kurdish rapist to his deflowered victim (Ali 2009, p. 37).

Indeed, Article 433 of the 1926 Turkish penal code specifically abrogated any charges against a rapist if he agreed to marry the victim, as does Paragraph 398 of the Iraqi Penal Code (Ahmed 2010, p. 14). In Turkey, this was not reformed until after 2000 (IlkKaracan 2007); and even in 2011, Turkish
feminists have had to defend their position against suggestions that the principle be reinstated to Turkish law (Hürriyet 2011). In defence of rapist/victim marriages in Turkey, Doğan Soyaslan, consultant to the Justice Minister, stated:

No man would like to marry a woman who is not a virgin. Marrying a rapist after rape is a reality of Turkey. The brother and father of the girl who was raped would like her to marry the rapist.

(in Ilkkaracan 2004, p. 258)

Several reports point to women being forced to marry their rapists in Kurdish families with similar justifications relating to ‘honour’ and virginity (The Scotsman 2005; Zaman 2005); otherwise rape victims may become victims of ‘honour’ killings (Kara 2004; Agence France Presse 2009; Hardi 2011, p. 60), making marriage to a rapist a preferable option to many women, where this is possible. Whether this is an available option depends upon the relationship between rapist and victim. For Nigar Rahim, raped and impregnated by her brother, there was no possibility of a ‘regularising’ marriage, and she was killed shortly after being ‘returned’ to her family, despite their signatures upon a commitment not to harm her (OWFI 2012). Neither was it an available option for women raped or forced into transactional sex by camp guards during the Anfal pogroms, leading to women remaining silent about such abuses in order to protect their own, and their families’ reputations (Hardi 2011, p. 65). Hence, these abuses have been
hidden from fuller accounts of the genocide: also missing from the *Anfal* body-count are those who died subsequently, at the hands of their own families, or at their own hands. ‘How many have been forced to marry,’ asks Hardi, (2011, p. 74) ‘and then killed because they were not virgins?’

In the wider setting, the ‘dishonour’ occasioned through rape is, or has been, considered to be dissipated through a rapist/victim marriage in Arab countries (Warrick 2005; Ouis 2009), China (Luo 2000), Italy (Pirro 2008) and South American countries (Lipsett-Rivera 1997; Sims 1997) amongst several other countries.

*Redûkewtin* may be seen as a traditional form of resistance to parental control; however, the broader Central Asian experience suggests that such resistance, in which the male is the primary actor, hinges upon the ephemerality of women’s consent and the centrality of virginity within traditional culture. So, while the existence of *redûkewtin* indicates that the younger generation are not universally compliant to the expectation of marital arrangement, and that the elder generation do not universally demand that compliance, the practice remains an artefact of the system it appears to subvert, allowing certain women limited agency, which comes with the cost of increasing their vulnerability to opportunistic male peers. If the power relations of patrimonialism are seen in terms of a matrix of age and gender, with most power accruing to senior males and the least to junior females, and senior females and junior males occupy intermediate positions,
then abduction functions more in terms of intergenerational conflicts between younger and elder males for the control of female bodies, rather than an assumption of autonomy by women themselves. Elopements, then, may represent individual challenges to patrimonial control, but they are embedded within the values of this system.

**Synthesis**

If we consider a patrilinear community as a fabric of discrete but interlinked families and lineages, the lateral patterns of the ‘exchange of women’ forms the horizontal weft connecting the vertical, patrilinear, warp. Young women are peripheral, partible aspects of the family's identity, whereas men embody its continuity and solidarity. Therefore, the weft threads are frail and insubstantial, being composed of individual women, whereas the warp strands are thick woolly plaits of the intertwined interests and identities of fathers and uncles, sons and brothers, including those female members who are integrated to the patriline through their sons. Thus the points of connection between patrilines are also the major points of vulnerability in their interrelations. Political enmities, territorial disputes, resentments, grievances or any other of the vexatious aspects of village or tribal life test the tensile strength of the fabric, with the potential to sunder patrilines from each other, ripping apart the frail lateral linkages formed by the exchange of women. Persons suspended between groups tend to be vulnerable to
tensions between these groups: perhaps, then it is the marginal, liminal status of women within patrilinear orderings, with their divided identities, loyalties, and interests, that lead to the Islamic characterisation of marriage as rather unstable and fragile (Charrad 2001, p. 31).

Of the forms of marriage recounted above, marriages by brideprice, *jin be jine* and *badal khueen* are transactional, enacted through explicit negotiation, whereas *amoza* and *redûkewtin* are transformative — the former enacted through a change in status from cousin to spouse, and the latter theoretically enacted through the severance of existing kinship alliances to found a new patriline, although in practice this often disperses into a transactional form through a process of regularisation. Interestingly, each collectively-ordered configuration can be based in a different mode of Fiske's (1992) elementary forms of sociality: cousin marriage in communal sharing; direct exchange marriage in balanced reciprocity; and exogamous brideprice marriages in some form of market pricing. Yet the values which women must embody are generated across all potential forms of marriage so that women are circulable within the system in order that the family can be flexible in applying whichever mode of marriage they find appropriate to their needs by the time she reaches marriageable age.

Cousin marriage involves a transformation of an existing familial relationship rather than a transference, yet the simultaneous operation of transactional forms within the same political economy institute similar values for
marriageability upon all women; for instance, a man cannot allocate a wife of ‘lesser’ value to his nephew than he would to a stranger without showing disrespect to his kinfolk and thus endangering the most significant relations upon which his status, identity and livelihood rests.

Most forms of traditional marriage thus have an inbuilt impetus to encourage the collective control of women.

To summarise these:

- **Endogamous cousin marriage**: Each cousin sees himself, or one of his brothers, as a potential spouse of his cousin and as such takes a quasi-husbandly role in delimiting her sexuality; disputes arising between fathers and their brothers have the potential to dissipate the patrimony and must be avoided at all costs;
- **Direct exchange marriage**: Families, and brothers within the marital quadrangle in particular, are motivated to guarantee marriageability in order to ensure that the parallel marriages endure;
- **Exogamous marriage with brideprice**: Chastity is surveyed in order to ensure a high brideprice, and to avoid becoming liable to repay brideprice;
- **Abduction/elopement**: The threat of elopement/abduction which would alienate the symbolic capital of a woman to her family is reduced through limiting her interactions and monitoring her movements.

To thoroughly comprehend the nature of marriage as a political economy however, it is necessary to go beyond the exchanges involved in any individual partnering and remember that each household, family and lineage is engaged in repeated marriage negotiations on behalf of each junior family member and does so within a context of the marriage negotiations of the other members of their lineage. ‘I am not the owner of myself. Everything I
do, I must think of my sisters,’ stated a young Kurdish woman (Bird 2005, p. 175), because a girl who ‘goes astray’ may jeopardise the marriage chances of her siblings and cousins through bringing the family name into disrepute, effectively tarnishing the brand image of the family as producers of well-socialised brides for the marriage market.

Taysi’s delineation of risk factors mentions that women forced into marriage, women whose ‘shame’ was public knowledge, women from tribal backgrounds and married women had an increased risk of ‘honour’ crimes (2009, p. 40). These factors all dovetail with the foregoing explanation: families who force unwilling women into marriage already display more interest in attaining the various forms of capital dependent on the marriage alliance rather than the well-being of the woman concerned; women whose ‘shame’ is public knowledge risk the corporate reputation of the family, disallowing more discreet solutions; tribes, having an identity based in kinship alliances and facing conflictual relationships with their rivals have the greatest investment in maintaining solidarity.

It is of course questionable how far such forms of marriage persist: being clearly rooted in agrarian/pastoralist value-systems within a region which is rapidly industrialising, and reinventing itself as an oil-producing nation, the values surrounding marriage have been subjected to seismic changes — which I address in the next chapter.
6. Marriage into the modern era

In the case of north-western Europe, we are looking at the singular example of a region that ... had the accidental luxury of setting its own pace in arriving at what are now recognised as the trappings of modernity. The process ... was very different from the ways modernity has since arrived in most other settings around the globe, where it has more typically been imported into a variety of sites beyond households.

(Hartman 2004, p. 255)

The individual man or woman was expected to view the family group’s survival or improvement as being of more importance than individual fulfilment ... Today that old system is under severe strain through changed political and economic conditions, the transformation from a rural to an industrial society, war and conflict, and the influence and interference of the West.

(Fernea 1985, p. 26)

Despite economic changes in the broader social structure, kin groupings remain agents of social control, enforcing behavioural norms and ordering political life in their local areas.

(Charrad 2001, p. 4)
This chapter addresses how traditional forms and understandings of marriage have altered over the KRI's recent history of political and economic changes.

**Histories of trauma and conflict**

While sociologists have often viewed persons in terms of class, gender, ethnicity or culture, the impact of generational differences can also be seen to be deeply significant for the understanding of a society containing high levels of structural conflict. Each generation grows up in a milieu which is different from that of its parents, and for Kurds, this implies a very different encounter with the process of modernity, particularly where such changes have had a startling velocity.

The Kurdish peoples have experienced an enormous amount of trauma over their history. A middle-aged Kurd living in Northern Iraq at the time of writing would have lived through the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) including mustard gas attacks upon Kurdish regions, the genocidal Anfal campaign (1986-1989), a campaign of annihilation including chemical warfare, most notably the devastation of the town of Halabja (1988), the invasion of Kuwait (1990), immiserating UN sanctions (1990-1998), Desert Storm (1991), a populist nationalist uprising, which was swiftly crushed through superior Iraqi military power (1991), exacerbated by an embargo which left the Kurdish population near starvation (Laizer 1996, p. 125), a civil war between
the two major Kurdish political parties (1994-1998), and the second Gulf War (2003-2011). Although Kurdish regions are far better irrigated than other Middle Eastern countries through high levels of snowfall, aridity and agricultural underdevelopment reduce self-sufficiency. In 2007, some 80% of food was imported to the region due to 'several decades of conflict, poor government policies, international sanctions, and more than 20 years of isolation,' (RTI-International 2008, p. 1) making subsistence extremely parlous over this period.

Decades of militarism and repression by external states overlie internal tribal contestations, which have been a perennial aspect of Kurdish life up until the present. British archaeologists in the 1920s excavating the ruins of Mesopotamian antiquity comment upon being interrupted by gunfire and inter-tribal warfare and brigandage by Kurdish tribesmen (Meiselas 1997) where sheikhs and aghas were in constant conflict (Fieldhouse 2006, p. 73), and where, even today, inter-tribal relations may be bellicose (Belge 2011).

Such history has inevitable effects on a society, both through increasing militarisation, which increases both societal violence, and the association of masculinity with aggression (Enloe 1983; Saigol 2008). The Ba’athist imagery of men and women as coequals within the socialist workforce became supplanted by the more visceral symbolism of a male defending the honour of his country (and his women), violentization through the apprenticeship
into military or quasi-military units (Sanborn 2003)\textsuperscript{62}, the ascension of patriotism as a masculine value occluding affective relationships (Rohde 2006), and through the psychological traumata caused to individuals (Smelser 2004; Lindencrona et al. 2008). Luft (2008) describes such reorientations as ‘disaster masculinities’. It is worth considering that such historical trauma may well include the precipitous modernisation of the area after the Gulf Wars which is in itself disruptive of the Kurdish way of life — in particular, in that it presents radically different experiences and understandings of social life between those generations with direct experience of the region’s tragic history, and a generation born in a period of comparative peace, at least within their enclave.

As Bird (2005, p. 74) remarks, Kurds have ‘lived with the suffocating weight of often indeterminate dangers their whole lives.’ The same middle-aged Kurdish man may be the veteran of several wars, conflicts and several other insults to his dignity and survival, in which close alliances with kin will have been vital for his well-being. Under an effective police state, there were obvious reasons for restricting relations to those persons one could trust and maintaining boundaries of kinship, clan and ethnicity. On the other hand his fifteen year old daughter will have lived in relative security and increasing prosperity, and an increased contact with the globalised media, from Korean

\textsuperscript{62} Hardi (in Neurink, 2014) notes how under Saddam Hussein, violence became a spectacle of power and control, including the exposure of children to brutalising images during the Iran-Iraq war, where propaganda broadcasts showed mutilated Iranian corpses on primetime Iraqi television.
soap operas to American blockbusters, within an increasingly heterogeneous cultural landscape in an increasingly urbanised, industrial and consumerist society.

The moral codes of a collective may be ‘tight’ or ‘loose’, (Gelfand et al. 2011) based upon the strength of social norms and tolerance of deviant behaviour. ‘Tightness’ is related to ‘a dense and homogenous population: often situated in ‘an agricultural base...communal control of property, corporate control of stored food and production power ...and high levels of tradition’ (Triandis 1995, p. 53). Gelfand et al. (2011) find that societal trauma increases the perceived need for strong norms and a severe punishment of deviance.

Thus in the KRI we find a fairly recent history of the homogeneity, pastoral/agrarian bases of society and corporate kinship organisation of resources which leads to ‘tightness’ overlaid with a high level of societal trauma which would tend to amplify the effect, overlaid yet again with intergenerational conflicts between an elder generation with vested interests in the status quo and a younger who are less embedded in traditional structures including the mechanisms around the exchange of women.

The Kurdish feminist movement is increasingly visible internationally, particularly where female peshmerga in uniforms or masculine versions of the Kurdish ethnic dress are imagined as Amazons in a counter to the image of the niqabi-wearing women of the Islamic State. The contributions of
Kurdish feminism emerges out of a complex political consciousness which confronts histories of subordination as a stateless minority along with critiquing phallocentric tribal structures (Diner and Toktaş 2010) tending towards the secular, leftist orientation that characterises Kurdish nationalist movement. Kurdish feminism has, thus, developed from multileveled experiences of subordination: as women in a society structured to some degree by patricentric family forms, as minoritised citizens in repressive states, as post-colonial subjects in an era of globalisation, and as foci for geopolitical attention. Unusually, the inclusion of women in Kurdish paramilitary movements challenge the expectation that women’s roles are primarily domestic and builds links between feminist positions and national identity.

There are over a dozen campaigning organisations currently operating in the KRI (al-Ali and Pratt 2011, p. 340), and many more in the extensive Kurdish diaspora. After 1991, the apparent rise in ‘honour’ kilings in the KRI led to both the PUK and KDP claiming a cultural basis for these murders, coalascing religious, tribal and national conservatism into a cultural discourse which led to the concept of ‘honour’ becoming a site of vigorous contention in Kurdish discourse. Kurdish feminists working against violence against women have been subsequently engaged in either confronting or rearticulating national ‘culture’ within the nationalist struggle, the state, and as a part of international feminist discourse.
**Intergenerational changes**

The Middle East has an overwhelmingly youthful population, particularly in Iraq, with a birth-rate of 4.8 children per adult women, as shown in the population pyramid at Figure 6.1. Over 40% of the population are currently under 15 years of age (Roudi 2001; Assad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007). Alinia states that in the KRI, 36% of the population is under 14; only 4% are over 63, and the median age is just over 20 (2013, p. 13).

![Population pyramid, Iraq 2006 (data from CIA World Factbook)](image)

Across the Middle East, high fertility combined with increasing levels of infant survival have led to a notably youthful population, often under-employed and radicalised, disempowered, and kept within subordinated
positions in the family through the inability to find work or marry (Singerman 2007). General Middle Eastern demographic trends also show a substantial increase in the age of first childbirth, where over half of women aged 24 are not yet mothers (Panel on Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries 2005, p. 532), significantly increasing the period between first marriage and first childbirth. Increasing age at marriage will mean that conflicts about marital arrangement are more likely to arise.

The older the parties are at a point of a marriage the less convincing the traditional justification that young people are too immature to decide upon their own marriages becomes. The more young people have the opportunity to associate with each other in the workplace or within educational establishments, the less willing they are to accept parental marriage arrangement (Ghimire et al. 2006). The demographic trends towards later age at marriage, and later entry into motherhood, increase the duration of women’s liminal status, which although providing a space for women’s self-actualisation outside the domestic sphere, increases the duration of a period where the family ‘honour’ is particularly vulnerable, and involves the most rigorous levels of familial and community surveillance. According to Hartman (2004), this liminal period also creates discontinuities and disjunctions between familial/collective and individual/conjugal norms. A prolonged period of unmarried adulthood increases the opportunity of norm transgression — and thus of metanormative sanctions.
Following a wider Middle Eastern trend (Singerman 2007), Iraq has seen a decline in age at first marriage and a higher proportion of women remaining unmarried until 1997, at which point the percentage of married women in the youngest group stabilises, and increases within older cohorts (United Nations 2009) shown in Figure 5.2.

The uptick of early marriage recorded in 2007 may be related to the rise in violence and disorder during to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, including a massively increased incidence of gender violence, and the subsequent conservative religious orientation of the Iraqi leadership (Amowitz et al. 2004; al-Ali and Pratt 2008; Susskind 2008), leading women and their families to identify early marriage as providing security within a chaotic and hazardous environment. The Kurdish experience of the Allied occupation of Iraq has been very different from that of South and Central Iraq, in solidifying...
Kurdish statehood, and ridding them of a national enemy. There was little armed conflict in the region, and no power vacuum after the fall of Saddam Hussein, leading many embattled Iraqi minorities, such as Christians, to seek refuge from the tumultuous South and Central regions of Iraq both during and after combat.

There was also little consolidation of right-wing religious power after the region acquired semi-autonomous status. Political attitudes in the KRI are markedly secular within the Middle Eastern context, since Kurdish nationalism (kurdayetî), has tended towards a predominantly pro-secular, leftist and ethnicized, even essentialist, character (Natali 2005, p. 182) where Islam is ‘worn lightly’. It could be assumed then, that while Kurdish regions, while being slower to industrialise, have historically recorded younger ages at marriage than South and Central Iraq (Kohli 1977), the broader trend for an increase in age of first marriage would be less likely to be have been attenuated by the war — and be more in tune with the pattern of rising age at first marriage across the Middle Eastern region.

This represents a long-term change in one of the foundational forms of human organisation: the family. Changes in the domestic realm and the sex/gender system are rarely welcome to conservatives, who tend take recourse in the language of tradition and religion to justify the patricentric family.
The decline of marriage arrangement

But how marriages were made now, the princess could not learn from any one. The French fashion—of the parents arranging their children’s future—was not accepted; it was condemned. The English fashion of the complete independence of girls was also not accepted, and not possible in Russian society. (Tolstoy 1875-7/2003, p. 44)

Tolstoy’s ‘English fashion’ — marital autonomy for young women — ultimately derives from distinctive Anglo-Saxon and Nordic family structures (Laslett 1977). These appeared at first as a global oddity, emerging before the Early Modern Era, but have subsequently become entangled with the dissemination and discourses of modernity and capitalism.

Kinship patterns have distinct and specific geographical appearances and a far wider variance than is accounted for by Laslett and fellow kinship scholars who tend to allocate populations into categories based on broad geographical zones, based on rather scanty data (Wall 1998; Viazzo 2003). So, although I use the terminology of the north-western European family structure, I proceed, again, on the basis that these represent ideal types and tendencies rather than homogenous and static realities.

Interestingly, the changes in family form within this region originate not amongst the élite, landed classes where the requirement to retain property
within the lineage tended to maintain a more traditional model of marriage, but within an incremental evolution of the lifecycle of the lower classes (Segalen 1986, p. 136).

Seccombe delineates these types as follows:

While in the West [of Europe], neo-locality (in the narrow sense) and the weak-stem family form prevailed; in the East, patrilocality was customary in many regions and strong-stem and joint family forms were prevalent, giving rise to larger compound households with extended co-residence and cooperative production. (1992, p. 153)

The distinctive features of the north-western European family were:

1. nuclear family residence, with weak-stem families as a transitional form;
2. late age at first motherhood, in the late 20s or early 30s, with a high proportion of unmarried persons;
3. a low age difference between spouses, and;
4. many persons spending part of their life-cycle attached to other households in service, from adolescence onwards.

By contrast, the stereotypical 'Oriental' family structure (which again, shows remarkable diversity in practice) features (Tucker 1993):

1. extended family residence;
2. early marriage for women and hence early motherhood, with marriage effectively compulsory;
3. a high age difference between spouses, along with normative marriage arrangement, and;

63 The 'stem' formation is associated with primogeniture, whereby a single child co-resides with their parents in perpetuity, benefitting from an uncontested inheritance and supporting parents in their old age. Those children who are expected to leave a 'stem' family may do so by marriage (in the 'strong' formation) or for other reasons, typically for employment (in the 'weak' formation.) The 'stem' formation is often seen as a transitional form occurring between the extended and discontinuous nuclear family formations.
4. a fixation upon family 'honour' and lineage.

The reasons for the development of the specific north-western European pattern remain contested, but the erosion of the traditional peasant class is a particularly salient factor. Seccombe, in particular, stresses the formation of a new landless proto-proletarianised class in the Early Modern Era, obtaining their subsistence through providing waged domestic, agricultural or artisanal labour to property owners where it was available — and falling foul of newly minted vagrancy laws where it was not (Fumerton 2006). For less proletarianised regions, the process was slower. Of France, Segalen (1986, p. 126) observes:

*A number of studies who that even when no land was involved it is still possible to detect family marriage policies, because in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries peasants did own some property – agricultural implements, livestock, the lease to their farm, for example. The capital they owned in the form of family prestige, an ancient name and fame, was just as important, and perhaps even more so, in a poor society. In an economic system where it was impossible to amass wealth, the ultimate aim of marriage strategies was to maintain the position of the family, and sons and daughters adapted themselves to it all the more willingly as there was no social status outside the family."

Within the proto-proletarianised classes in north-west Europe, the younger generation, including girls, left their own households to take up labour

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64 Hardy's (1891/2001) character Tess Durbeyfield presents a good example of this phenomenon: she finds migrant agricultural labour as a henwife, dairymaid and swede-hacker before succumbing to the temptations of the more lavish existence of a 'kept woman'.
wherever they could find it, often in service, sometimes setting up their own households as boarders or lodgers several years in advance of marriage (Pooley and Turnbull 1997) while they saved up for the expenses of family life. With no financial motivation to obtain their parents’ blessing and with no pressure to ensure the continuation of the tenancy of family land (which no longer existed), parental economic interests in the mate choice of their children gradually became severed.

It was this liminal period of women’s ‘semi-dependency and semi-freedom’ as domestic servants, lodgers and boarders, located between the familial and the conjugal household, that, for Hartman (2004, p. 57), led to the development of a distinctively modern gender order. To illustrate her argument, Hartmann compares two towns — Montaillou, in the French Pyrénées, with a Mediterranean pattern of marriage and kinship, and the infamous Salem, Massachusetts, where gender relations were inflected by the Anglo-Saxon values of its colonists.

In Montaillou, marriages were arranged for girls as young as six, and certainly were expected by menarche. Despite Christian rulings on incest, cousin marriages were practised in order to shore up lineage solidarity. Gender roles were rigid, and there is a likelihood that female infanticide was a common practice. Attitudes to women were brazenly misogynistic, and spousal abuse was widespread and considered acceptable: women bearing the marks of spousal assaults were plainly visible on the streets of
Montaillou. Men’s primary concerns were with the reputation of their _ostal_ (household); women were concerned with their reputation for virginity and chastity, which was guarded by males of their _ostal_. Non-marital rape was uncommon for all but indigent women and rape was treated as an offence against the _ostal_, rather than the woman herself.

In Salem, on the contrary, marriages were late and self-determined, and hence the subject of anxiety, since there was a greater risk of ending up a spinster. Public attitudes to women were respectful, although women working outside the household encountered non-marital rape — which was prosecuted as an act of violence against the victim rather than her relatives. While women still identified their role primarily as wives and mothers, they made significant incursions into the male realm as co-workers. Gender roles were more fluid: ‘It is much harder,’ finds Hartman (2004, p. 143), ‘to detect a consensus in Salem [than in Montaillou] on what men and women considered most basic to manhood and womanhood.’

Collective violence emerges less from pre-existing hatreds than from sudden uncertainties and shifting social conditions, suggests Tilly. For Hartman, the moral panic around witchcraft in Salem was disproportionately femicidal,

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65 However this did not tend to lead to agnatic violence; rather, women took responsibility for managing their own reputations. Women of Montaillou made frequent recourse to litigation to charge gossips with slander, a pattern of female reputation management which can be found across Mediterranean regions and Spanish colonies after the Renaissance (Cavallo and Carutti 1990; Gotkowitz 2003), as well as public brawling in which women attacked their accusers (Taylor 2000).
precisely because of these mounting anxieties and ambiguities around gender roles; just as the femicides of Guatemala have been described as a backlash against women moving into wage labour and away from traditional domestic roles (Prieto-Carrón et al. 2007).

Early marriages, which tend to embed couples into existing households (at least initially), entail an ‘apprenticeship into household management’ (Hartman 2004, p. 105) which is freighted with the weight of tradition. Later, neolocal, marriages, where the couple are founders of their own household, face the difficulties that each couple must effectively reinvent the wheel in deciding how to order the household: however, this constant reinvention undermines ‘decades of deference to the wishes of the elder generation,’ and effectively generates innovation. One of these innovations is, Hartman argues, the greater fluidity of gender roles found in Salem in comparison to Montaillou.

This geographical oddity — marriage by choice, deferred into adulthood — has developed into a global phenomenon. The older model, attuned to the needs of an agrarian society, has become supplanted by one which fits those of an industrial economy: severing family continuities, proletarianising the peasant class into a mobile workforce, increasing the requirement for

66 This intersects with Aykan and Wolf’s (2000) findings that neolocal households in Turkey tended to be less constrained by tradition.
literacy, and ultimately instituting the late-marrying, conjugal, nuclear family as the new normal (Coontz 2004, 2006).

Rindfuss et al. (1983) describe such changes in the conceptualisation of marriage in South-East and East Asia since the 1950s as the ‘quiet sexual revolution,’ where parental authority over marriage has waned or been abdicated entirely across the whole region (Mitchell 1971; Malhotra 1991; Retherford et al. 2001; Jones 2003b, 2010). Virginity has become less important as a prerequisite for marriage, and a matter of reduced concern to parents in areas where this was previously a point of anxiety (González-López 2004; Chang et al. 2011).

For East Asia, the transformation from arrangement to choice took the form of a ‘voluntary abdication’ of parental power. Here, Jones (2010, p. 5) argues, lacking the strong patriarchal ideology of Confucianism, and already having bilateral patterns of descent, there was little reason to retain a system of marriage arrangement in the face of rising ages at marriage, and increases in women’s education and employment. Furthermore, due to the success of the ‘tiger economies’ of East Asia, rapid development cushioned the transition from one family form to another through associating it with economic success.

This transformation is by no means consistent, even within Europe: the family structures of Spain and Italy remain less individualistic than those of
the UK and Scandinavia, with far lower levels of single parenthood, for instance, and greater familial co-residence (Giddens 1998, p. 89). The trend, however, is undeniable, and it is those family structures within less individualistic societies in Europe which are exhibiting the most rapid movements towards convergence. Although there is never likely to be a single form of the family (Reher 1998), the ideal family form of classical patriarchy is increasingly under threat.

Detraditionalisation

*We lodged in a Kurdish house, typical of the style of architecture common among the settled tribes ... The big house is the patriarchal roof, where the patriarch, his sons, their wives and children, and their animals, dwell together.* (Bishop 1891, p. 89)

Mir Hosseini (1987) notes the effects of proletarianisation upon an Iranian rural community, which led to fission among the landless and which ‘compromised the economic viability of herders; and caused partial separation of landed households, which become residentially separate while retaining the joint ownership of family land.’ Mohammadpur’s (2012; 2013) investigation of family life amongst Kurdish tribal groups in Iran shows this economic transformation in terms of its effects upon family structure, which he conceptualises as a process of ‘disembedding’. He found the intensely patriarchal structures described by Bishop in the 19th Century were not so
distant a memory. One elderly female participant, who defined her family as ‘feudal’ stated:

_I come from a family with 30-40 members. Our household affairs were managed and controlled by my uncle, and we had to respect and obey his orders. Even if he asked us to die, we had to die!_  
(Mohammadpur et al. 2012, p. 87)

This memory was in stark contrast to the tribe’s experiences of modernisation, where, while deploring the loss of traditional values, interest and pride in lineage, and community solidarities, there were greater indications of autonomous mate-choice, neolocality and female agency, as well as a reordering of the domestic realm. One elderly man commented:

_[W]omen['s] power has been increased, and it is still increasing, because the culture has been changed; in the past, if a woman got sick, she felt ashamed to go [to the] city to visit [the] doctor; nowadays, my boy takes his wife to doctor if she is sick, he loves his wife very much, no shame. He think[s] that his wife has priority on any things!_ (Mohammadpur 2013, p. 127)

Mohammadpur lists these apparently fairly recent alterations — in which the most significant factors were urbanisation, mass media and modern health and education — and describes their effects as:

_[I]oosening traditional patterns of family management, privatization of family life, personalisation of marriage, declining kinship roles in arranging marriage, decreasing kinship ties, limiting family size, changing attitudes towards family, and redistribution of power among sexes._ (2013, p. 128)
Here, proletarianisation, and the other aspects of modernity identified by Mohammadpur, has made this society less like Montaillou, and more like Salem.

From 1927-1977, Iraq underwent a period of transformation from a quasi-feudal, quasi-tribal society to a modernised, urban society — although these changes did not significantly alter the lifestyles of rural women (Ismael and Ismael 2000, p. 189). From the 1920s, after the British conquest of Mesopotamia, land registry marked the step in a transition to a market economy. However, this tended to increase the power of aghas and tribal leaders, who registered tribal and collective land under their own names, rendering the peasant class landless and proletarianised. Through the typically British colonialist strategy of ‘indirect rule’ during the Mandate existing kinship-based power structures were co-opted into the imperialist project.

Charrad (2001, p. 24) remarks that:

> Often, the objective of the colonizer was to make tribal kin groupings serve as conservative, stabilising elements of the social order, as political power was monopolized by colonial authority. Among the colonized, the extended kinship unit acquired further value as a refuge from those dimensions of society being transformed by the colonizer.

This was supplemented by the mechanisation of agricultural labour increasing the movement of seasonal labourers into the growing cities,
leading to the proletarianisation of former sharecroppers (McDowall 1996, p. 11). To end the resulting flow of migration to the cities, laws were passed favouring aghas and tribal communities, tying individuals more closely into their networks (Natali 2005, p. 30). By 1958, 55% of arable land had been consolidated into the hands of 1% of landowners (p. 41). As the Iraqi state became dependent upon petroleum exports, there was an increasing will to ‘Arabise’ Kurdish regions and, thereby, their oil resources (p. 58). Ba’athist petrolisation led to a consumer society, where agriculture declined, and an ‘oil rentier’ economy developed. Resources were channelled through the state, increasing the centralisation of power.

Industrialisation not only proletarianises former farmers and pastoralists, but also replaces artisanal labour by mass production. The industrial and state sectors become predominant employers, particularly within oil-producing nations, where the government are responsible for managing a national resource and distributing the forthcoming revenue. Waged labour replaces corporate kinship structures as capitalism becomes the predominant mode; and human capital — qualifications, skills and so forth—become an important mode of advancement. This leads young people to pursue education and labour opportunities outside their communities in order to take their place in the new economy, sometimes even outside their country: the geographic continuities between generations become lost.
Industrialisation and urbanisation have been both rapid and recent within the KRI:

*Following the implementation of Law No. 90, a special agrarian reform law issued in 1975 for the Kurdish areas, many villages lost their gardens and migrated to the major cities. In 1977, according to Iraqi statistics, 53 percent of the inhabitants of the Governate of Sulaymaniyah lived in rural areas, whereas 47 percent lived in urban areas. In 1987, only ten years later, 28.5 percent lived in rural areas and 71.5 percent in the urban centres. In 1977, 92,000 men and women were counted as working in agriculture but by 1987 this figure had dropped to 29,000.* (Fischer-Tahir 2009, p. 27)

Industrialisation has been shown to decrease the levels of sexual segregation and parental control of marriage within Muslim societies and presents a vivid challenge to the rationales underlying marriage as described above (Davis 1993). Hansen paints the following picture of marital relations at the beginning of the 1960s:

*The young woman is thus selected by the women with whom she will have to live and work...From her own home she is well trained in the domestic work that can be expected of her. She has been brought up with the quite natural idea that her most important destiny and greatest happiness is to be allowed to bear children...She is not expected to be her husband's comrade on a spiritual or intellectual level.* (1961, p. 181)

Hansen describes a homosociality so intense that men meet no other females than their relatives; and their bride only on the day of marriage, after which their relationship is expected to be formal and deferential. However, also according to Hansen (p. 180), a desire was expressed by young men
returning from universities outside the region for an educated wife with whom they could share a conjugal relationship. These represent the first cracks in the edifice of the reproductive, complementarian orientation to marriage she outlines. Camilleri’s (1967) longitudinal studies of a Tunisian village far more deeply entangled in the throes of modernisation in the same period indicated a more profound ‘shattering’ of the logical basis of the patriarchal model of the family, including young people’s demands for autonomous mate choice, which became a source of friction within their families.

Abu-Rabia-Queder (2007, p. 299) suggests that, for Bedouin women, ‘narratives of intimacy and love express modern ideas of individualism, freedom of choice and self-fulfillment,’ where women are torn between the ‘dialect between the global and the local…personal autonomy, freedom and individuality, on the one hand, and the cultural expected feminine self, which is communal, embodied in the collective and the tribal, on the other,’ and where ‘narratives of intimacy and love express modern ideas of individualism, freedom of choice and self-fulfilment.’

In the KRI, Fischer-Tahir describes an increasingly educated young urban populace taking control over their own marital and sexual lives fifty years after Hansen:
In today’s Sulaymaniyah the [traditional forms of] marriage⁶⁷...are more common among the older generation and in quarters of the city predominated by families that migrated from the rural areas in the 1970s and 1980s. In the educated middle-class milieux, the paths to marriage are very different. First of all, men and women meet as students in the university. Secondly, they are or were colleagues. Thirdly, men and women meet in the fields of politics, culture and sports. Fourthly, their families are close neighbours or live in the same neighbourhood. Fifthly, a man likes his best friend’s sister or a woman is attracted to her best friend’s brother, relationships that result in marriage. Finally, a woman and her family look systematically for a male migrant in Western Europe or the United States...Although kinship may play a role in these methods of finding a marriage partner, it remains in the background. (2009, p. 46)

These young people of the educated urban middle classes then, are predominantly arranging their marriages by choice — for one subsection of the population at least, the progression towards what we might call post-agrarian marriage is well underway, with a focus upon isogamous marriages rather than the prioritisation of lineage and patrimony. This can also be shown in a rapid increase in divorce: Alinia (2013, p. 122) notes that the divorce rate in the KRI increased by 66% in 2010.

However, outside these middle-class milieux, such a societal restructuration poses a formidable challenge. Concerns around the ‘kinship license’ remain salient, and reactionary gender essentialists see the performance of traditional gender roles and deference to parental wishes as foundational to society.

⁶⁷ I.e. those described in my previous chapter from page 140.
While modernity may decrease parental controls over sex and marriage, this should not be considered as unproblematic (Bossen 1975). As explained above, traditional Kurdish marriages were based in a gendered division of labour in which women are major contributors to the subsistence of the family. Ehrenreich and English (2005) delineate in detail negative effects co-occurring with the ‘crisis of patriarchy’ occasioned by the transformation of a society from an agrarian base of subsistence, where women were at least valued for their labour, to an industrialised, consumer society where they became increasingly dependent upon a male breadwinner. Intimate relations were no longer built upon a structure of bilateral economic co-dependency, in which distinctive masculine and feminine skillsets were considered complementary, if not of equal value. Therefore, while loosening sexual mores, modernity can also lead to the disempowerment of women who had rather less to bring to the table of marriage (at least in material terms) than their grandmothers, whose carpet looms, cheese-presses and tandoors gather dust, as a specifically feminine skillset becomes subsumed into consumer culture (cf. Abu-Rabia-Queder 2007, p. 301). The nuclear household becomes almost entirely a unit of consumption, romanticised as a retreat from the working world rather than a busy gynocentric locus of production with multiple participants, mostly women and children. The domestic realm comes to rotate around the activities of the absent member — the breadwinner, bearing his pay-cheque and demanding his dinner.
As consumers rather than producers, women’s dependency upon the breadwinner is increased (Ehrenreich 1983; Lewando-Hundt 1984). This has been identified as frustrating for the increasing amount of educated women within the populace, for whom the end of education may mark a withdrawal to a comparatively enclosed and isolated domestic sphere (Abu-Rabia-Queder 2007).

Where male power becomes removed from kinship status it may become attached to masculinity itself: a transition from the kinship contract identified by Joseph (2000a) to the sexual contract outlined by Pateman (1988) is not necessarily a great victory for women’s autonomy. So-called sexual revolutions, then, may recreate pre-existing gendered roles into newer, but no less restrictive, phallocentric and heteronormative forms (Jeffreys 1985; Abu-Lughod 1998b).

The cult of domesticity may represent a shattering of female homosocial spaces and women’s isolation within individuated households. ‘Nazdar’, (in Laizer 1996) a Kurdish woman with a domineering husband, comments on the frustrations of conjugal domesticity in terms that might have been familiar to Freidan (1963) over 30 years earlier:

*A man has absolute freedom to do whatever he chooses, but a woman is expected to stay home awaiting her husband and his friends at any time of the day or night, cooking whenever visitors arrive, bringing tea and refreshments at all hours. She is a servant on duty every hour of the day, every day of the year for the rest of her life...Very few of us seem to break out of such a way of existence. A woman’s meaning in life had been predicted as someone who*
serves her father, her brothers, and later on her husband.
(pp. 181-182)

For Baffoun (1982, p. 241), while modernity represents an opportunity to shake off sexual and gender-based repression based in the ‘ancient superstructure of honour, purity and virginity’, which pivots around women’s role-performance of wifehood, daughterhood and sisterhood, this becomes replaced by ‘a cult of money’, where status is increasingly viewed in capitalist terms rather than through kinship hierarchies — within a milieu of immiseration and atomisation of migrants from rural areas, and the depletion of those kinship networks, which although restrictive of individual liberties, were also a primary means of protection and support.

While HBV has been a recorded feature of Kurdish life since at least the mid-1800s, it is difficult to say whether the current eruption of honour-based violence into the public consciousness represents an increase in crimes in real terms. Certainly most NGOs are reporting year on year rises (Kurdish Globe 2011), although this could be related to greater awareness of a phenomenon previously veiled in ignorance. However, an actual numeric rise makes sense if seen from the perspective of a growing backlash, of a sexual revolution which is not quiet, but clamorous and bloody upon certain fronts: of an emerging femicide, which bases itself in anxieties around changes in the
gendered organisation of society, such as those which have been identified behind the murders of women in Guatemala and Salem.

An increase in the violent implementation of male dominance then, suggests that the system of socialisation is no longer an adequate means of control and that the general assent to long-established values is waning in the face of a ‘crisis of patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti 1988). Zakaria describes the challenge of individualism to the status quo as follows:

*When an individual makes a decision based on the criterion of individual desires everything that is communal is immediately threatened. Failure to punish transgressions means that the community is weak, its edicts and pronouncements are not pressing on those wishing to belong and are, in fact, arbitrary and subject to being flouted.* (2012)

Zakaria suggests that increasing levels of honour violence are a result of a younger generation attempting to change the basis of decision making in their societies, to relocate executive power from the collective to the individual, in order to increase their own ability to make autonomous decisions. As Alinia notes, in the KRI

*Women and men who reject forced marriage and the various kinds of control reject and question not only gender roles in their own families, but also a whole system of knowledge, power and domination that has emerged in the intersecting violence of class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and generation in a historical context permeated by colonialism, brutal ethnic and national oppression, poverty and mass violence.* (2013, p. 162)
If ‘honour’ is seen as the discourse of a system of structural violence which is losing purchase with a younger generation, this could lead for an increased likelihood that those who wish to maintain control will make increasing recourse to physical violence — and also to make appeals to tradition, culture, and religion in order to shore up normative systems which are collapsing in the face of modernisation processes.

‘Honour’ in religio-legal discourse

While the term ‘honour’ is used several times in the Qur’an, none of these usages apparently relate to the control of women’s sexuality but tend to be associated with military success. However, the ‘Affair of the Necklace’ indicates that the control of women’s sexuality was a communal affair for the first Muslims. The events are recounted as follows: Aisha, wife of Muhammad, was left behind by the caravan she was travelling with because she was searching for a lost necklace. She returned to the community at Medina with the assistance of a young man, which led to animadversions on her behaviour and calls for Muhammad to take action against her. It was after this event that Muhammad instituted the requirement for four witnesses to adultery, and instituted punishments for false accusations of sexual crimes which were just as severe as the penalties for adultery and fornication themselves.

However, ‘honour’ in the sense of the control of women can be found in the enormously influential 10th century writings of Al-Ghazzali (2002), where a
woman’s sexual behaviour is felt to directly impact upon the social status of her husband (although he does not emphasise its impact upon her patriline). While Al-Ghazzali’s recommendations for women’s proper comportment to evade dishonour are extremely restrictive (women must not, for instance, look out of their windows or be seen on their roof-gardens, let alone leave their houses) there is a sense in which these are performative, intended to communicate male control rather than exert it. Al-Ghazzali recounts:

Once when the Messenger [i.e. Muhammad] returned from a journey it was nearly night. He admonished the men saying: “Let no one go to his house suddenly this night. Wait until tomorrow.” Two men disobeyed; each one saw disallowed things in his house.

It seems paradoxical that a wife cannot look out of the window, yet a husband must not return unannounced to allow her the opportunity to hide any evidence of a lover, but this perhaps this scenario speaks strongly to the sense of ‘honour’ as a collectively generated normative system where the eleventh commandment emphasises the public appearance of compliance over any actual transgressions.

In contemporary times, Muslim discourse around ‘honour’ has become associated with the virulent misogyny of some Islamist preachers (Jafri 2008), arising within an Occidentalist world view which identifies the

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68 As an example, on 26th June 2013, the organisation Zhiyan raised a court case against Mela Mazhar, Imam of the Qadir Bla mosque in Arbil for describing women’s rights activists as prostitutes and ‘cattle unfit for sacrifice’ in an interview with the Kurdish newspaper Awene.
‘West’ as a threat to traditional family life and a source of cultural contamination, in the most spectacular manifestation of the modern efflorescence of identity politics since the 1980s (Moghadam 1994, p. 3), which has also featured a reclamation of idealised family roles by conservatives of all stripes, and in all nations (Moghadam 2004, p. 140).

Shehadeh’s (2003, p. 234) survey of key Islamist thinkers finds a recurring theme that women’s ‘conduct, domesticity and veil are vital for the survival of the Islamic way of life, without which culture, religion and morality will crumble.’ This viewpoint intersects sufficiently with the doctrine of ‘honour’ to become utilised as an idiom for the continued control of women within circumstances where justifications based in tradition alone have diminishing traction. Central to the Islamist perspective, holding a significant symbolic value to many Muslims, is the body of Islamic legal traditions, consisting of Qur’anic scholarship (*fiqh*), a codification of Muhammad’s rulings over the first Muslim community, supplemented with interpolations generalised from his recorded sayings, the *ahadith*, which is often referred to as *shari’a*69.

Hélie-Lucas (1994) identifies the preservation of *fiqh*-based personal status laws as the preferential symbol of Muslim identity within Islamist thought, noting the passing of several *fiqh*-inspired delimitations of women’s

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69 This discussion follows Mir Hosseini’s (2010, p. 5) rough distinction between the opinions of the medieval jurisprudents — *fiqh* — which form the basis of many Islamic personal status laws and *shari’a* in the sense of a moral/religious/devotional ideal, which she argues have been erroneously treated as isomorphic.
autonomy justified in the name of shari‘a, in Algeria and Egypt in 1984, India in 1985, Sri Lanka in 1986 and Mauritius in 1987 and 1989 — and of course, in post-Revolutionary Iran. As part of this trend we could add the intrusion of so-called shari‘a courts into diasporic communities.

The Islamic legal tradition treats any form of sexual contact outside legal marriage (or the sexual use of a female slave by her male owner) as a crime (known as zina) irrespective of gender, with 100 lashes specified as a penalty for the unmarried, and stoning to death for the married. While such laws were obsolescent throughout most of the Muslim world throughout the early twentieth century, with most Muslim majority countries combining fiqh-based personal status law with modern, carceral criminal laws, the Islamic Revival reinvigorated the reclamation of fiqh-based criminal law, in Libya (1972), Pakistan (1979), Iran (1979), Sudan (1983 & 1991), Yemen (1994) and in regions of Indonesia — and in 2014, in Brunei. Nearly all of those sentenced to stoning, lashes or prison for sexual offences so far have been women (Mir Hosseini 2010, pp. 10-11).

There is a broad consensus in fiqh that the evidentiary standards for zina punishments are high, demanding four eye-witnesses to actual penetration; a rather unlikely occurrence for women outside the sex industry. While making consensual sexual behaviour the business of the state is clearly intrusive on

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70 The sexual crimes of slaves were reckoned separately and were less severe, suggesting, perhaps, that slaves had a diminished ability to avoid sexual contact.
personal liberties, at least this tends to diminish the principles of *patria potestas* which underpin a family’s supposed right to kill a family member they perceive as errant, and instantiates some form of evidentiary requirement. However, the vast majority of violent acts against those accused of sexual transgressions are not delivered by the state, however, but within the power structures of the household, by relatives and without evidence.

The question as to whether vigilantism is permissible in Islam is a matter of lengthy debate (Cook 2001); certainly there appears to be no question in the minds of members of zealot gangs and militias in Iraq persecuting homosexuals and women that the directive to ‘command right and forbid wrong’ is a duty of faith rather than the business of the state (Fang 2007); nor that some of those who see HBV as a family’s duty do so within discourse inflected by their own interpretations of Islam, and with the knowledge of these bloody punishments for infractions of Muslim law. This should be contextualised, however, with awareness that people tend to justify their acts within common idiom, and where religious language carries prestige, it is likely to be adopted to as a means of justification. Pew data finds very little support for any correlation between religious observance and approval of HBV within Muslim populations. Nor did they detect any consistent pattern between support for *shari’a* law and approval of ‘honour’ crimes (Pew Research Center 2013, Chapter 3).
However, this may not be the most significant aspect of interaction between *fiqh* and ‘honour’ crimes: the aspect which tends towards the continuation of the gendering of marital roles and expectations is not found within criminal law, but civil law, which has the power to shape and express hegemonic ideals around kinship and gender, and represents an area in which the heritage of Islamic jurisprudence is far more influential. ‘Agnatism,’ as Charrad states (2001, p. 42), ‘pervades Islamic law.’ Within Arabia, the Islamic form of marriage (*nikah*) replaced several diverse forms of marriage, some of which were matricentric, including polyandrous unions and matrilineal residence (Ahmed 1992, p. 42). The traditional Islamic model, by contrast, is firmly patricentric and patrilinear, modelled upon a contract of sale (Bukhari 70:4834) — ‘in which a man asked another man for his ward or daughter, paid her her dower and then married her’ (Mir Hosseini 2012, p. 158).

*Fiqh* diminished the role of consent, particularly women’s consent. According to Ali, for the 10th Century jurists:

> Marriage was necessarily consensual. It required an agreement, expressed in terms of offer and acceptance, by the two contracting parties. But these were not necessarily the bride and groom. Guardians and legal proxies abound in the legal sources, especially for brides. (2010, p. 30)

Questions of consent differ between schools (*madahib*) of Islamic jurisprudence: however all allow for the compulsion of a minor into marriage
(Ali 2010, p. 32). Nor is there complete licence for the woman who has reached adulthood, whether through her defloration, or reaching the age of majority in the Hanafite school — the general concurrence of fiqh is that such a woman may not be compelled into marriage, but neither can she marry without the consent of her guardian (wali) (Ali 2010, p. 43). The guardian is identified as her father or paternal grandfather — a formulation which would be recognisable to Basil of Caesarea, centuries earlier, as patria potestas — in order that the voice of the patriline is represented in marital arrangements.

‘In elevating religious law to civil status,’ claims Joseph (2000b, p. 19), ‘Middle Eastern states have given senior men and not women and juniors the right to own property in their persons.’ The comparatively liberal Iraqi Personal Status Law of 1959, while claiming conformity with Islamic tradition, is nowhere near so restrictive, and was influenced by feminist activism (al-Ali and Pratt 2008): forced marriage is forbidden, with a maximum sentence of three years for those who coerce marriage, and relatives are not permitted to prevent a couple from entering marriage under Article 1.

Islamists have criticised Iraqi law as failing to fulfil ‘shari’a’ requirements, and have attempted to desecularise family law and place it in the hands of clerics, with the justification of permitting differing Sunni and Shi’ite stances relating to marriage. This is a recipe for a Lebanese solution of laws differing
between individuals on the basis of their inherited confession. On March 8, 2014, Iraqi women activists took to the street to protest a proposed law inspired by the Ja’afari school of Islamic jurisprudence which would lower girls’ marriage age to nine, along with various other legal changes similar to Iranian family law (Al-Salhy 2014). This proposition had been greatly feared by Iraqi feminists (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2010) who are well aware of the anti-feminist effects of clerical influence over family law in neighbouring Shi’a Iran. Indeed, increased levels of coerced and child marriages have been recorded in South/Central Iraq since the invasion, signed off by clerics rather than judges (al-Mansour 2012), signalling a de facto shift in the basis of power from the state to the clerisy. While Iraqi law is technically sovereign across the region, local Kurdish legislation has taken a markedly different direction.

**Love, sympathy and mutual responsibility**

Iraqi law was amended by the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2008, where men’s ability to contract polygynous marriage was greatly delimited (at least in terms recognised by the state, since it remains possible to conduct religious marriage without formal registration), and the rhetoric around marriage shows a turn towards valuing conjugality over reproduction, suggesting an adaptation towards post-agrarian understandings of marriage. The Iraqi law of 1959 baldly states that the purpose of marriage is ‘mutual life and children’, whereas the Kurdish amendments (Mufti 2008) redefine
this as ‘love, sympathy and mutual responsibility’, in a turn away from a reproductive model to one which is amatonormative71. However, while the same amendments pronounced forced marriages legally void, Article 2 removed the necessity for marrying couples to be present at their weddings, allowing Kurdish women to be married off by proxy. While this may be convenient for members of the Kurdish diaspora who can marry without the trouble and expense of attending a wedding, this cannot be considered adequate for a full expression of consent.

Furthermore the conditions for women’s ability to divorce hinge upon the gendered model of sexual relations. Women must prove that their husbands have failed to honour the ‘patriarchal bargain’ model of marriage to achieve divorce through providing proof of a failure to provide financial support or suitable accommodation (Article 5; 10.3); any alimony is suspended if the wife is deemed to have been ‘disobedient’, which includes leaving the family home without husbandly permission; mothers are only considered legal guardians by default if the father is absent or dead in Article 5.3, and patterns of Islamic inheritance are preserved in Article 25.

A woman’s rights activist related her organisation’s attempted involvement in the process of development of the reformed code:

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71 Amatonormativity is a term used in Brake’s (2012) philosophy to describe the privileging of romantic/erotic relationships over other forms.
We held several meetings with parliament about these things and we managed to convince 40 members of parliament...We made them sign our proposals, but unfortunately the ministry of religious affairs did not accept them....[I]t was stopped because according to them it opposed the Shari’a. Then they organised a committee to discuss our suggestions, and the committee consisted mostly of religious clerics and some legal experts and all of them were men and they were all quite old...The outcome was that our opinion was totally disregarded... (Alinia 2013, p. 103)

So while family law in Kurdistan may be more progressive than the superordinate law of Iraq, there are still powerful interest groups involved in maintaining gendered inequalities within the family, despite the region’s comparatively secular orientation, there is a confluence of conservative forces which use religious language to legitimise discriminatory law.

**Neopatrimonialism and nationalism**

*Family is... a key political resource in most Middle Eastern and North African countries. This is in part because of the frequent inadequacy of government social service programmes, and partly because governments privilege family relations in offering access to government resources. Family provides a person with his or her basic political network: family contacts are usually the place to go if one needs access to a government agency. Political leaders, in turn, want to know of a person’s family connections and the support of family members. Politicians and administrators often allocate resources to persons through the head of the family, and favour their own families in the process. This constant emphasis on family in the state arena turns family relationships into powerful political tools. And since family is patriarchal, politics also privileges patriarchy. (Joseph and Slyomovic 2001, pp. 4-5)*
Weber, Durkheim, Tönnies, and Parsons have been amongst the many thinkers who have envisaged the modern state as eroding the ties of village, lineage and tribe. As King-Irani (2004, p. 306) observes, however, given the harsh climates and economic and political insecurity of the Middle East, and the tendency of Middle Eastern states to serve the interests of narrow elites rather than those of the populace, the flexibility and durability of kinship relations remain valuable for individuals. Even with the advent of modernisation and the attendant challenges to the structure of the traditional family, she affirms that kinship relations retain ‘considerable power to galvanise ideologies, shape perceptions and guide actions in the realm of politics, commerce and administration’. Wider kinship ties, then, are not ‘meaningless vestiges of the past, but… social forms that serve a real function,’ (Charrad 2001, p. 19). This combines with the predominant Middle Eastern identification of the family as the basic unit of society, wherein citizens are imagined in terms of sub-national collectives — such as kingroups, and tribal, ethnic and religious groupings — rather than the imagined rights-bearing bounded individual within liberal thought (Joseph 2000b, p. 11).

As Charrad (2000, p. 72) identifies, particularistic ties, including those of kinship, may retain considerable political relevance within the nation state. Sharabi (1992) dubs the persistence of the family forms of classical patriarchy within Middle Eastern modernity as neopatriarchy. The use of this
term does not imply a historical discontinuity with patriarchal family forms, but reflects the survival of the patricentric family in the face of the potentially centrifugal influences of modernity.

Bureaucratisation institutionalises asymmetric patron-client bonds and veils their transactional nature (Beekers and Van Gool 2012, p. 9): where, for instance, the state becomes a major provider of secure employment, and appointments are mediated through interpersonal linkages, the connectivity provided by kinship remains a valuable resource for obtaining jobs, government contracts and access to power-brokers. For Sharabi, such an ordering leaves Middle Eastern society in an ambiguous position, stalled between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, which he implicates as the reason for the region’s failure to achieve economic modernity, development and a culture of individualistic human rights, through the requirement to accept personalised hierarchies and the inducement to identify closely with one’s own interest group.

A more precise iteration of Sharabi’s concept may found in the term neopatrimonialism, coined by Eisenstadt (1973), which, like its Weberian parent term, was developed in order to explain societal change. If the institutionalisation of the hierarchies and interconnections of the patriarchal family is core to the patrimonialist mode of organisation, then neopatrimonialism represents a synthesis: the centralisation and bureaucratisation of patrimonialist relationships within a modern state. The
concept has been found particularly useful in the analysis of modernising African states, wherein patrimonial politics, built on relations of kinship and patronage, inhabit the institutional realm, operating alongside and within modern bureaucracies. These are also apparent within the Middle Eastern region, but underexplored, where there is a tendency to overemphasise the ‘Arab strongman’ model (Bank and Richter 2010). O’Neil (2007, pp. 3-4) sums up three characteristics of the neopatrimonial state:

1. Weak separation between the public and private spheres: including clientélism, nepotism and corruption;
2. A prioritisation of vertical over horizontal ties: prioritising kinship, religious identity and ethnicity over class identities;
3. Personalism: a high concentration of power in a few individuals.

He finds these are likely in artificial post-colonial states, with fragmented social organisation, and a pre-capitalist economy. The localism of patrimonial relations, structured around the interactions of various groups becomes centralised within the state, developing a core/periphery dynamic. The asymmetric but reciprocal rights and responsibilities of the small-scale patron-and-client dyad may not be an intrinsic aspect of ‘core’ neopatrimonial relations (Beekers and Van Gool 2012, p. 17), which can tend to exclude certain groups with fewer connections to the core state bourgeoisie. This can lead to insecurity for those on the periphery.
Brownlee (2002) notes that in Iraq, Saddam Hussein combined family-centred rule, the recruitment of fellow Tikritis to the Republican Guards, and an apparatus of state oppression, including several secret services and a network of informants, which bolstered the regime from internal challenges. Charrad (2011, p. 64) finds that while the mechanisms of state control were kinship oriented, Hussein's interactions with local patrimonialist power-groups depended upon his personal needs for authority and control, swinging from attempting to destroy alternate power structures, to attempting to recruit them to his own networks.

Hashim (2006) describes the mainstream Kurdish politics as ‘intolerant of political pluralism and heavily patrimonial’ where ‘intertribal differences...resulted in the creation of a political theme of clientelization and neopatrimonialism, which mirrored...the similar system that Saddam operated in the rest of the country,’ wherein leaders buy loyalty with rank, position, power and money. Such organisation by kinship is found from the bottom of the social ladder to the very top: the Kurdish political scene in Iraq has, until 2013 been divided between a duopoly between the PUK and KDP, with accompanying militias, and associated tribal and regional affiliations. Every male member of the leaders’ families held senior positions within the party, the party’s security forces or with the party’s massive economic conglomerates (Nore and Ghani 2009, p. 109).
There is, in fact, a disturbingly authoritarian drift to the Kurdish state, from the suppression of the free press (Reporters Without Borders 2010), violent suppression of dissent (Ahmad 2013), the harassment of dissidents (Qadir 2007) and the prolongation of presidential rule without elections (Middle East Online 2013). Reporters Without Borders (2010) particularly note that common topics of self-censorship amongst Kurdish journalists include discussions of sexuality, criticism of religious and tribal leaders, and exposés of state corruption.

Such kinship and patronage networks can be sustained not merely because of their ability to shore up autocratic power, however, but also due to their efficiency, particularly in states lacking formal infrastructure. Any social scientist who has used snowball sampling methods can attest to the ability of personal networks to reach large groups of people, yet would also admit that such a method is inevitably partial. Distributing power through social networks then, leads to the possibility for the development of an insecure underclass, disconnected from elite and informal networks, with a limited ability to access power.

Fukuyama (2001) identifies social capital networks as a social good — as long as these networks do not lead to entrenched and exclusive interest groups, with double standards for ingroup and outgroup members. The impersonal infrastructures of bureaucracy can be underdeveloped where
personal connectivities are a deeply embedded means of obtaining state services. American-Kurdish blogger, Helene Sairany (2010), recounts attempting to deal with an inefficient and frustrating bureaucracy in the KRI, commenting ‘God help the poor soul who intends to approach a public office for help without having any sort of wasta.’ Wasta is an Arabic term used widely across the Kurdish region which could be associated with terms like ‘connections’ or ‘pull’. Wasta is used to evade the tedium and uncertainty of dealing with state bureaucracies, wherein ‘kinship, locale, ethnicity, religion, and wealth render some people more privileged than others in obtaining employment, university admission, or treatment under the law,’ (Hutchings and Weir 2006, p. 151).

Privilege for some implies disenfranchisement for others, and hence an inclination to latch on to powerful networks. ‘Coping with insecurity means investing in the social relationships with friendship groups, family and community, but also in relationships with those in power who might offer a share of the privileges of neopatrimonial rule,’ according to Beekers and Van Gool (p. 19).

Nepotism, cronyism and corruption make family ties important for social advancement; the lack of a welfare state and established banking system makes them essential for survival, where children provide security in old age and families provide support in crises and supply loans for new ventures amongst many other functions. Such connectivity is deployed in countless
actions, from gaining preference in making applications for scholarships for one’s children, to obtaining travel visas. Wolf (2001, p. 172) predicts that the existence of such élites will recreate the restrictions upon marriage found in the agrarian kinship licence ‘so as to minimise the outward and downward flow of resources.’

Qadir (2007) exposes a wide range of institutionalised corruption\(^{72}\), which includes the operation of several parallel legal systems: the formal courts, state security courts dealing with political offences, military courts with jurisdiction over peshmerga militias, two separate KDP and PUK komalayati reconciliation tribunals, with similar organisations existing within tribal units\(^ {73}\). The conception of justice in these arenas can be arbitrary — one particular case in point is the commutation of a life sentence passed upon a PUK peshmerga, Salih ‘Machine Gun’ Muzali, who had been found guilty of the murder of two sisters. This was achieved through the direct influence of the PUK’s leader Jalal Talabani, who had arranged for the case to be transferred to a komalayati.

In such a situation, the Kurdish legal position upon ‘honour’ crimes may be unenforceable. One activist stated:

\(^{72}\) Qadir’s exposures of political corruption in Kurdistan led to a 30 year sentence for defamation (Rubin 2006). This was reduced to 18 months under pressure from the Austrian government due to Qadir’s citizenship status.

\(^{73}\) Such informal tribunals have not been found to be favourable to women’s interests within the wider region (Manganaro and Poland 2012), and may not treat domestic abuse or child marriage as offenses worthy of any official response (Tas 2013, pp. 1128-1129)
It is supposed that the courts should work according to the new law, but you see women are killed every day and nothing is done to stop it. In those cases where the perpetrator is punished, it is because he is not rich and/or does not have a powerful contact...I tell you very clearly that those in power create obstacles to these issues. The political power here in Kurdistan is the same as the political parties. They commit crimes against women by protecting murderers and perpetrators. When the issue goes to court we have problems with the legal system’s lack of independence...They can close a very serious case with a phone call...[A] person who is not a member of one of the ruling parties cannot be appointed a judge. (Alinia 2013, p. 100)

Joseph (1996, p. 15) notes that ‘kin-based shops, businesses and farms account for a significant proportion of small and big businesses in the Arab world.’ Within the industrial sector in Turkey, factories tend to employ workers on the basis of kinship or other shared identities (Dubetsky 1976). Such family businesses reproduce the corporate family into an industrial and commercial era, where individuals remain dependent upon the goodwill of relatives for their survival and preferment — and the diffusive nature of Islamic inheritance laws may delimit businesses from expansion beyond family levels (Kuran 2010). Individuals are thus motivated to conform to the wider ideology of familism, which includes, according to Dubetsky, a reputation for 'honourable' behaviour.

As this thesis has argued at length, marriage arrangement can be a means of building advantageous social capital relationships. Kurdish journalist Sardasht Osman wrote a satirical poem for the Kurdistan Post in 2010
entitled ‘If only I were Massoud Barzani’s son-in-law’, just prior to his abduction and assassination, which is believed to have been a reprisal for the poem. Osman (2010) enumerates the benefits his family would accrue through making such a connection: ‘For my uncles, I would open [a] few offices and departments and they, along with all my nieces and nephews would become high generals, officers, and commanders.’ As Osman’s satire identifies, families which have little influence can use marriage to procure connections. ‘If a man does not have relatives, he picks a wife who will give him good connections,’ as a respondent told Morsy (1990, p. 112).

So, the need for marriages to create social linkages may not be delimited to rural populations with concerns about land-use, water rights, seasonal labour and support during raids and blood-feuds, but may also apply to an urban bourgeoisie, which needs to build strategic kinship relations to mediate interactions with the state and other sources of political power. As an example taken from my professional experience, some Kurdish women, who had been married to Ba’athist operatives by their families, were ordered to divorce them in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. Due to the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party, these men had lost their utility value to

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74 Massoud Barzani was, at the time of writing, the President of the KRI and the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

75 Discussions of Osman’s poem (such as in an edition of ‘Inside Iraq’ broadcast on Al Jazeera on 25 June 2010) have fascinating overtones, where some readings present the poem as an affront upon the ‘honour’ of Barzani’s daughter and the Barzani collective rather than a critique of the excesses of neopatrimonial rule.
the families concerned, and the women’s fathers sought to build more advantageous connections through arranging remarriages which would hide evidence of former collaboration with the regime. A formerly instrumental relationship became an embarrassing mésalliance through a reversal of fortune, and women were told that their continuing relationships with their husbands were now perceived as shameful.

Neopatrimonial logics thus underscore the operation of the entire political system. ‘Incorporations of patriarchal kinship modes of operation, moralities or idioms are not perceived as disruptions to the state or family boundaries, but continuous with them,’ states Joseph (2000b, p. 27). In keeping with this, she reformulates Pateman’s (1988) ‘sexual contract’ as a ‘kinship contract’ (Joseph 2000a, p. 110), which could be read as Wolf’s ‘kinship license’, adapted to the structurations of a modern state. Whereas Sharabi suggests that a stasis in family forms impedes the state from thorough-going modernisation, this analysis identifies that the modernising nation state, and other political actors, are themselves imbricated in directing kinship and marriage according to their own political ends — from the contestations around national personal status law across the Middle East, to the mass induction of Iraqi women into the workforce in the 1970s.

These include the ‘desires of Kurdish leaders not to upset their more socially conservative constituency and undermine their political influence in the region,’ (al-Ali and Pratt 2008, p. 104). The Kurdish women’s movement, and
other dissenters to the systemic subordination of women are therefore frequently pitted against religious and tribal leaders, who have often received the indulgence of the state, tribes and the Kurdish nationalist leadership, and been co-opted by British and American representatives (Alinia 2013, p. 22) and, prior to that, by the Ottoman authorities (Alinia 2013, p. 25). Even the donor agencies who provided support during the Anfal crisis tended to deal with established routes of power (Natali 2010, p. 46), tending to further consolidate patriarchal structures.

**Women as carriers of group identity**

*The very basic rhetorical and organisational principles of the nation are tropes for and expressions of gendered power. They familiarly include rhetorical notions of, and socio-political organisation based on, a homosocial community of heterosexual men (who protect women, children and land from foreign threat); the primary identification and allegiance of individual (male) citizens who congregate in the public sphere to rally, lobby, and legislate for the continued (often near-fictive) sequestering of a private sphere where women, children, sexuality and family reside; the genesis of the nation state as the (masculine) principle that brings regulatory order to the undisciplined and excessive (feminised) masses.* (Layoun 2001, pp. 14-15)

*Namûs* has been described above as a form of symbolic capital which is attached to women’s bodies, but King (2008b) also valuably conceptualises namûs as a boundary which expresses patrilinear sovereignty. Women’s bodies, dress and activities are particularly prone to becoming hostage to
ideals of nationhood and identity (Yuval-Davis 1993), especially in time of war, charged with the impossible task of simultaneously representing cultural authenticity and modernity, and demarcating cultural boundaries between groups claiming exclusive identities, carrying the reputation of the patriline alongside their ethnic, class and religious identities within an increasingly diverse and mobile society.

This may be particularly the case where identities are threatened, through the dynamics of assimilation, repression and resistance. As an example, the Arabisation policies of the 1980s encouraged Arab men to marry Kurdish women through providing hefty financial inducements (Cobbett 1989, p. 132), effectively attempting to undermine Kurdish cultural identity through taking advantage of the partible nature of women's identities within patrilineal systems. King (2008b, p. 335) cites an interview with a legal professional in 1998, who noted that after the Kurdish Uprising of 1991, the peshmerga carried out killings of women on a daily basis, justified by accusations of fraternisation with Arab men:

*There was a “black list” of the women who had had sexual relations with Ba’ath party men. Some were prostitutes, some operated out of fear of the government of Iraq, some were poor, their husbands were off fighting in the war — there were many reasons. The peshmerga decided to kill one per day. This was their own decision. The law does not support it because they were not killing their own relatives.*
This vigilantism — which was apparently directed solely at Kurdish women, wherein the sexual behaviour of Arab or Turcomen women was apparently considered a matter for their own communities — was eventually quashed by central powers, and the power of life and death restored to the patriline. However, it can be seen that women are being treated as emblems of national and sub-national identity, wherein sexual contact across ethnic (and other) lines is perceived as challenging not just male/familial sovereignty, but the nation itself. Within the nationalist struggle, namūs became nationalised.

As a final example of this intersectional quality to reputation management in relation to the definition of ethnocultural and ingroup boundaries, Thornhill (1997, pp. 82-92) describes a visit to Qushtapa. In 1983, between five and eight thousand men of the Barzani tribe, forced into collective townships in that area, were rounded up and ‘disappeared’ by Ba’athist troops, leaving thousands of widows and children without male support, bearing extreme poverty along with the pride of their tribal identity. Thornhill interviewed a mother, who, in the absence of male kin, took upon herself the role of clearing family shame, through killing her 23 year old daughter (a mother of two) who had been raped by an unknown man while working in the fields. Murder was another task which had devolved to women through the absence of males. The interview exposes complicated rationalisations for the act: the

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76 There are, according to estimates, some 50,000 Anfal widows in the KRI (Alinia 2013, p. 38)
'honour' of the nation, of her disappeared kinsmen, of Islam, and of the Barzani tribe. In 1993, a doctor working in Qushtapa noted that there had been over 20 such 'honour' killings in recent years. (Laizer 1996 p. 167) Women’s bodies and sexualities have become sites of identity and political contestation beyond the patriline, towards the nation, and other subgroup identities. ‘If established states invoke the family when building their identities,’ asks King (2008b, p. 335), ‘how much more must a vulnerable, “illegitimate” state do so?’ As King (2008a, pp. 215-216) observes, returnees to the KRI from Western diaspora nations make a point of denigrating 'Western' family structures and attitudes to sexuality in order to display their ‘Kurdish’ identities as uncorrupted by contact with different attitudes. Collective and ritualized violence, according to Tilly, are results of boundary activation, wherein: [v]iolence generally increases and becomes more salient in situations of rising uncertainty across the boundary. It increases because people respond to threats against weighty social arrangements they have built on such boundaries — arrangements such as exploitation by others, property rights, in-group marriage and power over local government.’ (2003, p. 76) As Snyder notes (2000), such factional boundaries become sharpened during transitions towards democracy, which encourage the identification of individual interests with political collectives, often socioeconomic, ethnic or
religious in nature. Women’s bodies are not just resources, but *boundaries* between identity groups: controlling their use is a means of claiming cultural exclusivity and asserting the group’s identity. Pluralism, particularly where sub-national groups are identified as mediators of political power, adds complexity to patrilinear orderings: cross-cutting these with many alternate identities, each of which draws boundaries around its exclusivity, both for their internal integrity, and as modes of mediating state power. These are tensions which are particularly pointed within urbanising settings, where members of particularistic identity groups find themselves thrown together with others, by economic necessity rather than choice, where there is an increased potential for relationships to form across the established boundaries of identity. These can challenge exclusive identities and the principles of patrilinear sovereignty over women’s sexual and reproductive capacities.

*Abu-Lughod* (1990, pp. 48-49) found that for Bedouin women, sedentarisation led to a far more onerous regime of surveillance upon women, where older women lamented the lack of freedom for their daughters who complained of boredom due to seclusion, and men more frequently levelled accusations of immorality against young wives and adolescent girls. This, says *Abu-Lughod*, relates to a heightened male anxiety around the custodianship of women within diverse communities, with a greater potential for boundary traversal.
Kurdish women’s activism is extremely vibrant. Historically Kurdish societies have been less resistant to women assuming political power than their Persian and Arab neighbours (Van Bruinessen 2001). As Alinia (2013, p. 49) states, women’s rights activism is well-established in the KRI, after being occluded for decades by the Kurdish struggle for identity and self-government. 41% of civil servants in the KRI are women (Mahmoud 2012) along with 37% of Kurdish MPs in 2011 (The Kurdish Globe 2011) — in marked comparison with the UK with just 22% in 2012. However, as Hardi notes (in Neurink, 2014) women parliamentarians selected under the quota system may have been chosen for their political and tribal loyalties to the existing system rather than their political skills or support for progressive policies. Kurdish women participate in feminist debates at a global level; they produce academic journals, run shelters and participate across all levels of society.

While Kurdish women are making strides towards equality, gender-based violence and female suicide are increasingly identified as the most significant issues confronting Kurdish women. Such a pattern has been observed by Mitra and Singh (2007) within the Indian state of Kerala, which has the highest levels of educational and political attainment by women, yet also features year on year increases in gender violence and female suicide. Mitra and Singh dub this the ‘Kerala Paradox’: where male power is no longer firmly vested in the political and economic realm, they argue, physical
dominance becomes a method of last resort for maintaining normative male supremacy.

They are not alone in finding that within conservative cultures, increases in women’s autonomy can lead to increases in violence against them (Koenig et al. 2003). Where male dominance in the private and public spheres become discrepant, women’s accomplishments in the public realm may be parallelised by a rise in private violence committed by men and families fearful of the affordances of their empowerment, and anxious to retain the privileges of control.

If the movement of the instrumentalisation of women’s bodies is moving away from a ‘kinship licence’ based in agrarian practice, in which control of marriage and reputation is deployed to legitimise the distribution of resources and labour, then it is developing towards identifying women’s bodies as emblems of identity, and marriage as one means of accessing networks of political power. The next chapter discusses original data upon marriage in the Kurdistan region to paint a picture of marriage — and ‘honour’ — in transition.
7. Survey analysis

In order to establish how far the picture of violence within family dynamics painted in the foregoing pages could be applied to a society undergoing modernisation, I determined to explore contemporary attitudes and kinship structures using quantitative methods. This would provide data which could address the lack of knowledge around contemporary Kurdish family structure and attitudes, but also to see how far the model developed in phase one of this thesis would be supported, through correlating experiences of HBV within a family to marriage practices and family structure.

**Sample**

Internet surveys are a cost-effective means of reaching a large population, and may be particularly useful in countries like the KRI which have no postal system, although their tendency to reflect the opinions of those wealthy enough to own personal computers, or those who have access to computers through an institution, is a clear limitation for representative sampling. Since a good deal of this distribution was through academic networks this means that the working class is hugely underrepresented (making up under 8% of students in the KRI, according to Aziz (2011).) There was a high rate of failure to complete, which I believe could relate to the unfamiliarity of respondents to the online survey format, since I fielded emails and other personal communications from respondents who needed clarifications.
around the nature of online surveys. Also, given the delicate nature of research into family life, no questions within the survey were coded as essential, meaning that respondents could, and frequently did, skip questions which they did not wish to answer. In combination this led to almost half of the data being incomplete across all fields. Due to a fair sample size (426 responses), and the design of the survey which gathered a great deal of data very efficiently\(^\text{77}\), the data gathered were sufficient to address the research questions discussed on pages 23-24.

These were addressed through successive univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses of the sample.

### Sample description and variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female: 109 (33.7%)</td>
<td>15-29: 60 (59%)</td>
<td>City: 83 (80%)</td>
<td>Single: 55 (50.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-39: 21 (20.1%)</td>
<td>Town: 10 (9.6%)</td>
<td>Married: 30 (27.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-54: 20 (19.6%)</td>
<td>Collective settlement: 7 (6.7%)</td>
<td>In relationship: 7 (6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55+: 1 (1%)</td>
<td>Village: 2 (1.9%)</td>
<td>Divorced: 10 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other: 2 (1.9%)</td>
<td>Engaged: 5 (4.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: 214 (66.3%)</td>
<td>15-29: 102 (50.5%)</td>
<td>City: 117 (55.2%)</td>
<td>Widowed: 2 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-39: 81 (40%)</td>
<td>Town: 57 (27%)</td>
<td>Single: 96 (45.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-54: 16 (7.9%)</td>
<td>Collective settlement: 17 (8%)</td>
<td>Married: 94 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55+: 3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>Village: 18 (8.5%)</td>
<td>In relationship: 15 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other: 3 (1.4%)</td>
<td>Divorced: 4 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engaged: 5 (2.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{77}\) The survey design involved a format structured by logical operators which presented different questions depending on whether the respondent was married, for instance, and which looped a set of questions relating to the marriages of siblings appropriate to how many siblings were identified in an earlier question.

In questions relating to age and background, there were around 5% missing data across both genders. The sample’s skew towards young, urban males,
may be considered typical of the demographics of internet users in the Middle East (Malin 2010). Women within the sample were predominantly from urban backgrounds ($\chi^2 = 16.8, 1 \text{ df}, p = <0.001$), using a recoded variable in which towns, collective settlements and villages were combined into a single *non-urban* category.

*Endpoints*

The respondents had an average of around eight siblings ($n = 323, \mu = 8.06, \text{s.d.} = 2.81$) suggesting that large families remain common even amongst elite families. While the survey only had the capacity to record 10 siblings of either gender, only two responses strated at that threshold, since two respondents had ten (or possibly more than ten) sisters. The sample of siblings had a fairly even gender split, shown in the graph below, with 323 sisters to 325 brothers, and a fairly even distribution across the family.

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78 From 1974, Saddam Hussein bulldozed an unknown number of Kurdish villages in a region spreading from Khanaqin to Sinjar (areas surrounding the border of Iran and Turkey), as part of his Arabisation project, intended both to establish a tighter grip on Iraq’s natural resources, and to eliminate loci of nationalist resistance. This involved the forcible relocation of over a quarter of a million former villagers and tribesmen. Collective settlements were built to accommodate some of these displaced persons (Human Rights Watch 2004a, p. 8-9).
Question structure
Questions related to family structure took the format shown in Figure 7.3.

Each respondent was asked to indicate the number of married siblings he or she had and the questions were looped so that data was recorded separately for each sibling, from eldest to youngest. To simplify the survey and to make the burden of questions less complicated for respondents, whether the marriage was underage was only requested of individuals in arranged or forced marriages; only respondents who indicated that they (or a sibling) had chosen their spouse freely was asked about parental approval of spousal choice (to establish whether or not parents generally accepted their children’s choices) and only those respondents or siblings who had had an arranged marriage were asked the identity of the arrangers,
These were followed with a bank of attitudinal questions which can be found in the Appendix on page G. Of these attitudinal questions, two were particularly pertinent to the aims of the study: one which asked for the respondent’s attitude to HBV, and one which asked if there had been any experience of HBV within the family. These were the main dependent variables which I have analysed and will be explored in greater depth at the bivariate and multivariate stages of analysis.

The following sections will each focus initially upon data around family structure and marriage forms, and then follow with analysis of the key dependent variables, using increasingly complex analytical strategies.

**Univariate analyses**

Univariate analyses look at single variables in isolation. They are used to gain information about the data and the sample. This section will provide the first level of analysis into the data, provide basic information about the responses to the questions which were asked, and to give a broad view of the raw data.
Marriage and family

Respondent only questions: Brideprice and remarriage

Questions solely asked of respondents revealed that there were no instances of brideprice within the sample. This question was not asked of respondents regarding the marriages of their siblings, since it was likely to be unknown to the respondent, given the delicacy of marriage prestations. Of 83 responses to the question regarding marital prestations, 41 (49%) reported no gifts or money taking place to realise their marriage, and 34 (41%) stated that the only gifts or contributions were for the couple themselves, six (7%) reported reciprocal exchanges between families, and the remainder (1%) were unaware if there had been any exchange of marital prestations. This means that there was no evidence of brideprice as it has been described in this thesis (on pages 170 to 201) so this category was not available for further analysis.

This may suggest that the tradition is becoming outmoded for this group of respondents, who are likely to be middle class and express their status through their education and employment status rather than their ability to muster cash or jewellery, or that respondents were reluctant to identify brideprice occurring within their marital arrangements because it has negative associations within this population.
Of all respondents, only five (1%) had married more than once, and in all cases their first marriage ended with divorce, suggesting a very low rate of divorce and remarriage as suggested in the literature.

**Arrangement and consent**

Since marriage practises are key to the foregoing argument it was important to gather information on levels of consent to marriage, a subject upon which there is little data. Respondents were asked to indicate the levels of consent involved in each marriage — that is, their own, and those of their siblings — with four given options:

1. **Forced**: I/my brother/my sister was forced to marry against my/his/her will;
2. **Fully arranged**: The marriage was entirely arranged by the family;
3. **Mediated**: The marriage was arranged jointly by me/my brother/my sister and the family working together;
4. **Free choice**: I/my brother/my sister married entirely by my/his/her own choice.

Combined data from both respondents and siblings — totalling 781 marriages — is shown in Figure 7.4.

The largest set of marriages within this sample (i.e. respondents and their siblings) were described as freely chosen; only a very small minority were described as forced. However, a slight majority of marriages were not free choice, but involved some degree of intervention.
Figure 7.4: Autonomy in marriage choices

Age at marriage arrangement
Forty-three (11%) of the 405 forced, semi-arranged and fully-arranged marriages within the sample were arranged when the spouses were minors, of whom 22 were male and 21 female. This does not necessarily mean that these parties were actually married as minors; the marriage may well have been arranged at some point before adulthood, but conducted later on in the life of the individual. These were reported by 18 respondents, representing just over 4% of the sample as a whole, suggesting that a very small minority of families repeatedly arrange marriage for under-18s rather than it being distributed across the sample.

Format of marriage
Over 80% (n=599) of marriages within the sample were exogamous while 16% (n=108) of marriages were between cousins, and 5% (n=34) took the
direct exchange format. No incidents of elopement or abduction were recorded, so this category is again unavailable for analysis. Given that direct exchange marriages were primarily associated with non-urban respondents ($\chi^2 = 4, 1\text{df}, p = 0.042$), and that the sample is predominantly urban in origin, this hints at a higher prevalence for Kurds living in rural areas, as suggested in the foregoing section on direct exchange marriage. Cousin marriage was also reported, but at a lower level than has been recorded in South/Central Iraq (Al-Ani 2010); again, this is likely to be higher across the general population of the KRI than within this sample, who being predominantly middle-class, are more likely to identify class-based isogamy than endogamy as a productive strategy to maintain status.

Approval of choice marriages
Questions were asked to establish whether individuals’ choice marriages (whether those of the respondents themselves or of their siblings) were accepted by their families and the families of their spouses, to gain an impression of the acceptability of marital choices in which relatives did not intervene.

As Table 7.1 shows families appear to have neutral or positive reactions to the marriage choices of their own children:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Very negative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Very positive</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From own family</td>
<td>16 (4.6%)</td>
<td>46 (13.2%)</td>
<td>141 (40.4%)</td>
<td>59 (16.9%)</td>
<td>87 (24.9%)</td>
<td>349 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From spouses’ family</td>
<td>6 (2.3%)</td>
<td>17 (6.6%)</td>
<td>107 (41.3%)</td>
<td>53 (20.5%)</td>
<td>76 (29.3%)</td>
<td>259 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Families’ responses to marital choices
From the opposite direction, these opinions were mirrored by questions asking for the respondent’s opinion upon the spouses’ families’ acceptance of their new member, although it should be noted that this line of questioning asks the respondent to speculate about something which is outside his or her direct experience.

**Post-marital residence**
While Kurdish families are clearly patrilineal and patricentric (King 2008b; King and Stone 2010), at least in official terms, it is unclear whether the predominant household pattern is nuclear as Donovan suggests (1990), or patrilocal, given that a survey of 148 Kurdish women in Istanbul revealed that over 68% had lived with their mothers-in-law, particularly in the early years of marriage (Karahan 1995). It should be noted that even the existence of a predominance of nuclear families does not preclude the extended family as the ‘ideal’ form, since nuclear families may become extended later in the household lifecycle and may be influenced by demographic factors. Aziz’s (2011, p. 111) survey of university students in the KRI found that nearly 60% were living in households of 5-7 members, and around 24% were larger, suggesting that the extended family remains a common ordering of the household. Certainly, the family remains overwhelmingly male-dominated, with fathers making all important decisions in 80% of households (Aziz 2011, p. 115).
It may be too simplistic, however, to view marital residence simply on the basis of the location of the household without extending attention to other indicators of proximity. If a couple split away from a patrilocal extended family household only to relocate next door, or on the same street, or — after the fashion of Egyptian peasants, to occupy a separate apartment within the husband’s father’s house — the influence of the extended family may prevail (Lee and Stone 1980, p. 321), even if the wife is now able to take command of her own private domestic realm without interference from any in-laws. In such a circumstance, the new household may no longer be technically considered virilocal or patrilocal, but should be considered patrifocal, in the sense that Tanner (1979) and Young and Wilmott (1962) describe daughters who live neolocally, but in proximity to their mother’s houses, as matrifocal.

I asked respondents to indicate where they, and their siblings, lived after marriage: whether with their spouse’s family, near to their spouse’s family, near their own family, with their own family, or in a new household which was not close to either family. Patrilocality means that post-marital residence was in the house of the father (for the husband), or the father-in-law (for the wife). Patrifocality indicates that although post-marital residence was not with the father/father-in-law, the marital residence was close to the agnatic household; matrifocality and matrilocality describe the converse situation — residence with or proximate to the bride’s mother.
Of 769 marriages of respondents and their siblings, matricentric family forms are the least popular, with patrilocality remarkably strong within the sample. It should be noted that the question asked where the couple lived ‘after the wedding’, and for many of these, either patrilocality or matrilocality may have been a temporary arrangement while locating neolocal accommodation.

The attitudinal questions (see also Appendix D page G) provide an insight into respondents’ views about these different locations for starting their married life. A majority (76% of respondents) strongly agreed that it was preferable for a couple to start their married life in their own home. From cross-tabulation, it can be seen that some 55% of married respondents are, or were, living in family arrangements which they personally considered sub-optimal ($\chi^2 = 4$, 5 df, $p = 0.535$). There may be a strong trend towards
traditional patricentric families across the sample, but this does not necessarily seem to be the arrangement which respondents individually identify as the best—and this may be a source of intergenerational conflict.

**Persons involved in marriage arrangement**

I asked respondents to identify the actors who were involved for each forced, arranged and mediated form of marriage.

The survey allowed respondents to select as many options as appropriate, in recognition of the fact that marriage arrangement is often a collaborative affair, and as Figure 7.6 shows, a wide variety of marriage arrangers were identified. This tends to dispel the idea that marriage arrangement is the role of the family patriarch, especially given that female relatives are frequently involved in marriage arrangement. Rather than the pattern advanced by Rubin where men are considered ‘exchange partners’ and women the subjects of exchange (1975, p. 174), it seems here that marriage arrangement is an activity in which the whole family can participate.

There were 134 responses to this question. While the largest group of 60 respondents (45%) identified a single marriage arranger operating in the family, 12 (9%) identified more than five.

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79 The diagram omits the category ‘not known’ which tends to represent women’s marriages in particular. This will be discussed below.
**Survey Analysis**

**Figure 7.6**: Pie chart of marriage arrangers

**Attitudes**

The sample showed strongly negative attitudes to marriage arrangement and to traditional forms of marriage in particular. There was a general, if somewhat inconsistent, support for power-sharing in relationships and an approval for women's work outside the home within the sample. However, virginity remained a salient aspect of women's role for almost all respondents.

Around a quarter of the sample expressed some level of approval of HBV. A similar amount reported experiences of HBV within their own families, which

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80 Full responses to these questions are given in the Appendix (p. G).
rose to a third if non-committal responses were disregarded. Interestingly, questions around the topic of ‘honour’ raised the most uncertainty. Questions relating to whether HBV had occurred in the respondent’s own family, and whether a failure to restore ‘honour’ would lead to social exclusion had disproportionate non-responses, either as no answer at all (representing 14% of the responses to the question as to whether HBV had occurred in the respondent’s own family, compared to 5% for most others), or a non-committal neutral response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prompt</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disputes about namûs have led to violence in my own family</td>
<td>10.9% (n=21)</td>
<td>17.3%  (n=33)</td>
<td>13.6% (n=26)</td>
<td>25% (n=44)</td>
<td>35% (n=67)</td>
<td>100% (n=191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence may sometimes be justified if a person has brought shame to their family</td>
<td>5.6% (n=12)</td>
<td>20.7% (n=44)</td>
<td>12.7% (n=27)</td>
<td>24.9% (n=53)</td>
<td>36.2% (n=77)</td>
<td>100% (n=213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Responses to key dependent variables

The ratio of HBV approvers at around 25% of the sample is in tune with Taysi’s (2009) findings in the Sulaymaniyah region that 30% of respondents felt violence against ‘dishonourable’ behaviour was justified on at least some occasions suggesting that there is a persistent level of approval for this form of violence.

**Bivariate analyses**

Bivariate analyses are used to establish whether, and to what extent, two variables are related. The aim of this section is to identify and explain
significant differences according to gender, to levels of consent to marriage, and attitudes and experiences of HBV.

Marriage and family

Marriage Consent Variable
Given that familial influence over marriage is an important aspect of individual freedoms and at the core of the ‘exchange of women’ model identified as foundational to the concept of ‘honour’, I created a variable designed to give an indication of the levels of consent to marriage which were most typical for each family. For the creation of this variable, forced and fully-arranged marriages were recoded as 1, demarcating low consent, given Alinia’s (2013, p. 109) observation that some Kurdish women in fully-arranged marriages appeared to assume that parents had an absolute right to arrange marriage which they could not challenge, making discrimination between these two forms difficult. Marriages which were arranged in collaboration were recoded as 2, representing mediated consent, and free choice marriages as 3. These were totalled for all respondents and their siblings, and then divided by the total number of all marriages reported by each respondent, creating a variable with values between 1 and 3, to give a sense of the general level of family involvement in the marriages of the respondent and her or his siblings. Due to the diffuse nature of the data on marriage, occurring across the categories of siblings and respondents,
combined scores were developed for marriages involving men (i.e.,
respondents’ brothers and male respondents), and marriages involving
women (i.e., respondents’ sisters and female respondents.)

**Gender and autonomy**
A dependent t-test\(^{81}\) using versions of the marriage consent variable which
were separated by gender, used a matched pair analysis to compare levels of
autonomy in marriage for male respondents and respondents’ brothers
against female respondents and respondents’ sisters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Consent</th>
<th>(\bar{X})</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
<th>Error</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>cor=0.232 &lt;br&gt; p=0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Dependent t-test of marital autonomy by gender

This indicated that women were significantly more likely to have had a
greater level of family intervention in their marriage than men, where the
mean value locates most female marriages more closely to the model of
mediated consent than males.

For males, the higher mean indicates a significantly greater likelihood of
being permitted to make a free choice. The higher the consent level within
arranged forms of marriage, the more likely it was that it coexisted with free
choice marriage within the family: for example, just 7.8% of families in which
a marriage had been coerced upon one sibling, allowed another a free hand in

\(^{81}\) The dependent t-test was selected given the nature of the dummy variable – the Marriage Consent Variable - described on page 290.
their choices ($\chi^2 = 4.8$, 1 df, $p = 0.029$). This can be compared with 26.3% of families, in which marriage arranged without consultation co-occurred with free marriage ($\chi^2 = 17.5$, 1 df, $p = <0.000$), and 49.7% in which marriages were arranged through collaboration ($\chi^2 = 26.2$, 1 df, $p = <0.000$).

It appears then, that levels of consent to marriage may not be identical across siblings within the same family, but they are grouped, with each individual family having greater or lesser tendencies towards allowing autonomy or maintaining control over the marriages of young people. Just as marriages under the age of 18 were clustered within certain families, so are low consent forms of marriage.

**Autonomy and attitudes**

Comparison of attitudinal data with the family-wide marital autonomy variables proved to show interesting correlations using ANOVA (Appendix E, page M). Findings indicated that individuals from families which tended towards greater intervention in the marriages of female relatives were more likely to believe that virginity was essential for women, that women’s roles were as housewives and mothers, and to support the institution of brideprice, amongst other patriarchal attitudes. Low marital autonomy, then, appears to correlate with traditional gender roles, and this does indeed suggest that there is some linkage between adherence to the expectations of traditional femininity and marriage arrangement.
Survey Analysis

There was a near-significant correlation (p = 0.057) with the belief that violence could be acceptable against a person who had caused shame to the family and lower levels of marital autonomy, suggesting there is also a connection between families which exert control over women’s marital choices and the approval of HBV.

One significant finding was that respondents from families in which the marriages of men and boys had higher levels of intervention were more likely to agree that young people were under pressure to marry from their families, whereas there was no such finding in relation to the female marital autonomy scale. This suggests that lower levels of male autonomy in marriage are more likely to be resented as a parental infringement upon individual liberties, whereas lower levels of female autonomy are more likely to be accepted as an aspect of the status quo.

Of forced marriages, over 85% of these took place in families in which the parents were responsible for marriage arrangement ($\chi^2 = 66, 1$df, p = <0.001) whereas for fully-arranged marriages, this was less than 50%, suggesting that parental involvement in marriage is associated with lower levels of expressed consent and, by corollary, that marriages arranged by more distant relatives feature more consultation.

This was tested using ANOVAs upon a filtered dataset, from which free choice marriages were temporarily removed from the analysis to provide a fair comparison of arrangers. Whereas parental involvement in marriage
arrangement significantly impacted upon the Marriage Consent Variable for male respondents and respondents’ brothers – reducing it from 2.25 to 2.2 (F = 2.04, df = 16, p = 0.014), there was little impact upon the Marriage Consent Variable for female respondents and respondents’ sisters which remained largely unchanged (F = 1.1, df = 14, p = 0.378). It appears then, that for males, closer kinship relationships between the arrangee and arranger correlate with decreased personal autonomy for the arrangee. This is less visible for females, since they tend to be found in lower consent forms of marriage across the sample.

The data was then tested to see if the number of marriage arrangers operating within a family influenced marital autonomy.

| Mean of marriage arrangers within the family against levels of consent |
|---------------------------|--------|
| Free choice               | 0.6    |
| Mediated                  | 1.9    |
| Arranged                  | 2.1    |
| Forced                    | 3.9    |

*Figure 7.7: Mean of marriage arrangers in the family by marriage consent level*
A comparison of the means of the numbers of marriage arrangers across the family as a whole gives the impression that the greater the number of individuals who were involved in marriage arrangement within that family, the higher the likelihood of marriages within that family being forced, as shown in Figure 7.7.

ANOVA indicated that all relationships between marriage type and the number of arrangers were highly significant, for forced marriage ($f=14.4$, df = 11, $p=<0.001$), fully arranged marriage ($f=11.1$, df = 11, $p=<0.001$), mediated marriage ($f=29.7$, df = 11, $p=<0.001$) and free choice marriage ($f=3.2$, df = 11, $p=<0.001$).

The fully arranged and mediated forms are very close in value. However, it should be noted that each mediated marriage could be considered to involve an additional marriage arranger — this being the arrangee/spouse him/herself.

The count of marriage arrangers across a family also has a highly significant correlation, correlating with a lower value within the marriage autonomy variable ($f=5.3$, df = 23, $p=<0.001$).

So, both parental involvement in marriage arrangement and a higher number of arrangers may be correlated with lower levels of individual autonomy in marriage. The more collaborative marriage arrangement is within the family, the more it appears to exclude the arrangee, suggesting these are families in
which the interests of the collective are very much considered to outweigh those of the individual, since the more persons who are invested within marriage arrangements in a family, the more likely it is that a family member will be coerced into marriage. Also it shows that although parents may not be the predominant marriage arrangers, as shown in Figure 7.6, where they do intervene, they are more likely to override the wishes of the younger generation.

**Marriage arrangers and gender**

Figure 7.8 shows the identity of marriage arrangers by the gender of the arrangee. For each gender category, percentages have been derived to compensate for the unequal numbers of female and male respondents for which marriage arrangers were identified within the survey⁶².

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⁶² Arrangers were identified as being involved in the marriages of 161 female respondents/respondents’ sisters and 299 male respondents/respondents’ brothers.
Most strikingly, respondents were significantly likely to say that they did not know who had arranged their sisters’ marriages ($\chi^2 = 25, 1\text{df}, p < 0.001$).

Since there was no significant difference between male and female respondents responding that they did not know who arranged their sisters’ marriages ($\chi^2 = 2, 5\text{df}, p = 0.571$), it seems likely that generally, marriage arrangements for women are more discreet, and thus they are less likely to be discussed within the family meaning that respondents were not able to respond to this question. This, along with the smaller sample size for women’s marriages means that it is harder to generalise from these results than it is for the marriages of men.

Mothers were significantly more likely to arrange marriages for sons rather than daughters ($\chi^2 = 10, 1\text{df}, p = 0.001$); sisters were near-significantly more
likely to arrange marriage for their brothers than for their sisters ($\chi^2 = 3$, 1df, $p = 0.06$).

It was found that where mothers arranged marriages for their sons, 80% of these marriages occurred within families with patricentric orderings ($\chi^2 = 12$, 1df, $p < 0.001$), meaning that the bride the mother had selected would reside with, or close to, her own residence, suggesting that the dynamics of household politics described above, where a mother-in-law wishes to influence the choice of her daughter-in-law as a domestic co-labourer, may still apply within some households. To some degree, there may be similar dynamics with sisters who expect to remain in the paternal household, but it may also be the case that sisters are likely to socialise with women of the appropriate age to make suitable matches for their brothers.

Women were more likely to have involved an ‘other relative’ ($\chi^2 = 4$, 1df, $p = 0.04$). This may reflect a greater tendency for women to use the extended family for marital networking, possibly because they may be less likely to be involved in workplace and other friendship networks. It could also related to the fact that women appear to be under a higher expectation to have arranged marriages than men were, and that therefore they may be more motivated to find persons within the family to validate their choices; or also of a recognition that due to androcentric orderings of the family, and the
difficulties of divorce for women, marriage may be perceived as more of a risk by women, and therefore they prefer to consult more widely.

It is interesting to observe that ‘other relatives’, such as cousins, nieces, nephews and so forth, and friends are more likely to be from the same generation as the arrangee than the family roles provided in the survey, which would suggest a greater attunement to contemporary values around marriage within a modernising economy than the parental generation, who may have opinions on what makes a suitable spouse which the younger generation find outdated. This would allow women to fulfil the social expectation of having an arranged marriage but with a greater level of confidence in the choices made by an age-matched peer.

**Birth order**
Birth order has some effects upon marriage autonomy for brothers, but not for sisters as shown in Figure 6.9. For respondents’ sisters, the proportion of marriage by free choice remained under 40% regardless of their position in their birth order for the first four siblings. However, respondents’ brothers were increasingly likely to have been able to make their own choices the later they came in the birth order, with 16 (80%) of brothers who came fourth in the birth order taking a free choice marriage.

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83 Only the first four siblings were analysed due to the natural decay in sample size, which meant that although there were 197 marriages for first siblings, there were only 19 for the fourth.
While the eldest brother of the family seemed to be under the same constraints as the eldest sister, younger brothers were accorded increasing autonomy than their elders, whilst younger sisters were not.

Figure 7.9: Gender, birth order and percentage of free choice marriage

For males, this appears to correlate with a declining requirement for traditional forms of marriage, with both cousin marriage and direct exchange marriages (‘traditional’ forms) being much more common for males earlier in the birth order, as shown in Figure 7.10.
It appears as if there is a clear strategy to marriage arrangement for males: lower levels of free choice for elder brothers indicate responsibilities to build social capital through marriages which build obligations within groups, which pressures weigh less upon younger brothers, who are able to assume greater latitude in their choices. On the other hand, women's marriage arrangement has little relationship to birth order. This suggests that while eldest sons have a heightened responsibility to enter into marriages with strategic value, for daughters, this responsibility remains constant throughout the life of the family.

**Marriage formats**

Direct exchange forms of marriage were significantly associated with a non-urban background ($\chi^2 = 4.0, 1\text{df}, p = 0.042$) whereas exogamous marriage
was near-significantly associated with an urban environment \((\chi^2 = 3.5, 1 \text{ df}, p = 0.052)\), with no clear pattern behind the occurrence of cousin marriage.

As Figure 7.11 below shows, cousin and direct exchange forms of marriage revealed themselves to be largely separate phenomena, with only four families having conducted both forms, whereas the crossover between cousin or direct exchange marriages with exogamy was much larger.

This suggests that different micro-cultures have developed largely separate strategies around marriage; as suggested earlier, direct exchange marriage may be more likely to be associated with an agricultural, non-tribal lifestyle in villages, whereas cousin marriage is more likely for people influenced by pastoral/tribal modes of life.
Marriages by direct exchange or cousin marriage were strongly and significantly found in families in which arranged marriage were practised ($\chi^2 = 82.5$, df = 1, p = <0.001). Few people then, choose marriage with their cousins or by direct exchange upon their own initiative. There was also a strikingly high prevalence of marriages arranged while the arrangee was a minor within ‘traditional’ forms of marriage. Of the marriages arranged before the arrangee reached the age of 18, 66.7% of these marriages was with a cousin, or in a direct exchange form, against just 15.9% of those married as adults, marking a strongly significant difference ($\chi^2 = 30$, df = 1, p = <0.001). Early marriage arrangement appears to have a strong correlation
with endogamous forms of marriage: the types of marriages which serve to solidify reciprocal relationships within patrilines and between local families may be the outcome of long-term, multigenerational relationships in which reciprocal marriages may be considered an aspect of maintaining long-term alliances, even before the potential spouses are born.

**Attitudes and experiences**

*Variables*
The responses to the key prompts shown in Table 7.2 were used to create binary variables which will be referred to as *HBV Experience* and *HBV Approval*, where over a quarter in each category were positive results (made from combining strongly agree and agree), which rose to closer to a third when neutral and missing responses were removed.

There were no significant findings in relation to the correlation of approval of HBV, nor of whether or not HBV had been experienced within their families. However, it is important not to treat these variables as paired: whether or not a person approves of HBV is a directly accessible personal opinion. Whether or not HBV has been experienced within a family is a fact which may or may not be known, and a positive response may describe varying situations. Given that Kurdish families are large, and that modernisation has been rapid, it is very likely that respondents have branches of the family in very different conditions, and with very different attitudes, from their own:
for instance, an urban professional reporting an experience of HBV could be recalling the fate of a great-aunt passed down through family legend, which may have little to do with his current circumstances and family structure.

These variables should not, therefore, be treated as equivalent; it should be understood that there is likely to be far lesser potential for representativeness and reliability intrinsic to the variable which relates to the experience of HBV within a family in comparison with the individual’s own approval of HBV.

**Gendered attitudes**

![Figure 7.12: Key gendered differences in attitudes](image)

Each bar in Figure 7.12 shows the percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with each proposition, with neutral and missing responses discarded.

Women were less likely to agree that couples should not have relationships...
before marriage ($\chi^2 = 4.2, \text{df}=1, p = 0.029$); they were less likely to agree that women's primary roles were as housewives and mothers ($\chi^2 = 6.8, \text{df}=1, p = 0.006$), that women should be virgins before marriage ($\chi^2 = 7.4, \text{df}=1, p = 0.006$), that men should be breadwinners ($\chi^2 = 5.6, \text{df}=1, p = 0.013$), that husbands should take charge of their family ($\chi^2 = 13.6, \text{df}=1, p < 0.0001$), and that young people had too much freedom ($\chi^2 = 3.4, \text{df}=1, p = 0.046$), that namûs is the basis of a moral society ($\chi^2 = 4.1, \text{df}=1, p = 0.032$), and that brideprice is a mark of respect ($\chi^2 = 3.3, \text{df}=1, p = 0.048$). It should be noted here, that as women in the sample are more likely to have urban origins, this may also reflect this as well as their gender.

**Approval of HBV**

There were several marked differences between those who approved of HBV and the rest of the sample, where HBV approval appeared as part of a constellation of conservative and gender-complementarian attitudes. These can be seen in Appendix E (p. G). Some of the most significant findings are illustrated below, where the percentage of agree strongly/agree responses has been shown for those who expressed approval of HBV, against non-approvers.
The understanding of ‘honour’ as relating to the control of women in Kurdish society was cross-tabulated against its sibling variable, in which the respondent was given the option to express personal dissent. A majority (75.3%) of those who agreed that ‘honour’ connotated the control of women in Kurdish society also agreed with the statement that ‘honour’ should not have that meaning. For this group, the subject of ‘honour’ is very distinct from the unquestioned acceptance identified amongst HBV perpetrators by Alinia (2013, p. 63) but shows a movement towards the more nuanced understandings suggested by Taysi (2009) and Fischer-Tahir (2009).

This suggests a normative system in transition, undergoing generational change.
Experience of HBV

The most significant findings were that respondents from families where HBV had been recorded were more likely to agree that parents arranged marriage in their own self-interest ($\chi^2 = 8.6$, df = 1, $p = 0.006$); that families who failed to restore ‘honour’ faced exclusion within their own communities ($\chi^2 = 5.5$, df = 1, $p = 0.006$); that marriage is a business arrangement between two families ($\chi^2 = 8$, df = 1, $p = 0.009$) and that young people faced pressure around marriage ($\chi^2 = 5$, df=1, $p = 0.021$). They were also significantly more likely to report a non-urban background ($\chi^2 = 5$, df = 1, $p=0.02$).

In combination, these differences present a view of marriage which is related to the exegesis in this thesis: marriage is a business arrangement where the
benefits accrue to the family rather than the arrangee, in which arrangees are under pressure from their parents, within a wider atmosphere of community pressure to conform to the dictates of 'honour'.

They were also more likely to disagree that direct exchange marriage forms were a source of social problems ($\chi^2 = 7.8$, df =1, p = 0.012). This might be related to the fact that they as non-urban dwellers, they were less likely to have negative preconceptions around a form of marriage which has been stigmatised as a rural practise. A full table of results is provided in the Appendix (page J). However, differences in the attitudes and demographics of those who had experienced HBV in their families and those who had not were not as numerous as those between HBV approvers and non-approvers.

It is also notable that there was little intersection between those who approved of HBV, and those who reported experiencing it within their families ($\chi^2 = 0.2$, df = 1, p = 0.522)$^{84}$. It is possible that the relationship between individual approval and the experience of HBV within the family may be comparatively weak. There may be a need to look beyond the phallocentric attitudes displayed by HBV Approvers, and to situate the actual occurrence of such crimes within a wider context which I will return to at the multivariate stage of analysis.

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$^{84}$ Given that these two questions were ones which received a disproportionate rate of non-responses, it should also be noted that may be a significant relationship concealed by the reticence of those who did not respond to these questions: of the 36 respondents who did not provide a response on the topic of whether HBV had caused problems within their own family, 24 also did not choose to indicate their attitude to HBV.
Structurally, there were interesting findings particular to the experiences of HBV shown in Figure 7.15.

It was within families which did not feature the consultative ‘mediated consent’ method of marriage arrangement that HBV was most likely to be experienced ($\chi^2=3.3$, df=1, $p = 0.049$). This finding suggests that this form, which requires the highest levels of concord between parents and children, is the least likely to instigate conflicts between generations which erupt into violence.

This gives weight to the position that HBV is related to intergenerational struggles around marriage choice and autonomy.
Multivariate analyses

Multivariate analyses help to uncover relationships between several variables and thus help to provide a more nuanced account of the factors related to attitudes and experiences of HBV. These two dependent variables were examined using the technique of binary logistic regression, where each dependent variable was coded as a binary.

Each dependent variable was analysed using an iterative process to develop the most robust model through a process of elimination, including full cross-checks for multicollinearity. In each case, the model which was developed for one dependent variable was tested against the other to contrast the predictive strength of each model across both conditions.

Measures

Dependent variables: The same variables were used in this phase of analysis as in the bivariate phase as described on page 306, i.e., responses to the questions around approval and experience of HBV were collapsed (1=Agree and Strongly Agree, 0=Disagree and Strongly Disagree) to create a dichotomous variable, suitable for use in a logistic regression equation. Missing data and non-committal responses were recoded leaving the HBV Approval variable with 186 responses, and HBV Experience with 165.

Independent variables: Attitudes were measured using 5-point Likert scales: however, it was necessary to recode these in order to ameliorate the effects
of missing data and to make the findings more easily interpretable. First, all non-responses and neutral responses were recoded to 0. Then the remaining responses were re-coded on a scale of 1-4 (where 1 means the respondent agrees strongly, 2 that the respondent agrees, and so forth) to allow them to be used as scale variables. Thus, a positive coefficient in the model may be interpreted as increasing the likelihood of either approving of HBV, or belonging to a family in which HBV has been experienced.

**Approval of HBV**

*Binary logistic regression*

There were 186 cases included in this regression, in which 56 individuals had expressed a personal acceptance for violence, justified using the language of ‘honour’. Variables were added into the regression in an iterative method in order to build the strongest possible model within the limitations of the sample.
Findings located HBV as an aspect of a patriarchal model of gender relations, with a particular emphasis upon virginity: beliefs that women should be virgins before marriage more than doubled the likelihood of approving of HBV. An interesting and unexpected finding was that approval of brideprice was, after attitudes to female virginity, one of the most important aspects in the model. This, then, tends to support the feminist positions against brideprice noted above and suggests an area in need of greater attention.

According to the Nagelkerke $R^2$ value, over 50% of the approval for HBV can be linked with a constellation of attitudes towards women, gender and family roles which could be considered phallocentric. This is a very robust finding for the social sciences, showing strong interrelations between attitudes towards virginity, male dominance, male custodianship of women and the acceptability of brideprice.

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**Table 7.4: Binary logistic regression for dependent variables, focussing on HBV Approval**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Approval of HBV</th>
<th>Experience of HBV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>Impact$^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be virgins before marriage</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>140%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brideprice is a mark of respect for a bride and her family</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our society, honour comes from controlling all the women in a family</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A husband should take charge of his family</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands and wives should share their responsibilities without either of them taking overall control</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^*$ Negative effects: e.g., persons approving of HBV tended to disagree with the principle of power sharing in marriage.

Nagelkerke $R^2$ value: 0.52

This was calculated using the formula $\text{percent}=(1-(\text{SUM(ExpB)/1}))^{*-1}$. See Long (1997), p. 228. It indicates the impact of each independent variable within the model in percentage terms.
The model proved very weak for predicting HBV Experience however, with only one of the attitudinal variables retaining significance in the model, several reversals, and a very poor $R^2$ value, which explained less than 8% of the variance in the model. Moreover, two of the five variables have negative effects, whereas they are positive in the model for HBV Approval. While those who approve of HBV tend support the institution of brideprice and male dominance within the family, those who have reported HBV tend to take the opposite position.

The fact that it is possible to create an extremely robust model for predicting the HBV Approval which is next-to-useless in predicting HBV Experience shows a marked discrepancy, strongly suggesting that the attitudes which support HBV and the circumstances which give it rise may be rather distinct which underlines the lack of correlation between the HBV Approval and HBV Experience variables mentioned above.

**Experience of HBV**

I carried out a similar process for attitudinal and other factors which could be predictive of the *experience* of HBV. This model had a sample size of 165, where 54 had given positive reports of HBV in the family.
The attitudes found amongst those who had knowledge of HBV within their families had a very different quality from those which predicted approval shown above: rather than the patriarchal attitudes towards gender roles, which were predominant in the model which predicted approval of HBV, these tended instead to refer to the issues of marriage and family structure, where an acceptance of parental authority to arrange marriages is the strongest indicator of experiencing HBV within the family. The constellation of values here is less related to a gendered view of the conjugal than in the model above, but to power relations within the family.

It is noteworthy that this model, although the strongest for predicting HBV Experience within the available data, was actually better at predicting HBV Approval than its actual purpose, despite the fact that most variables were not significant within the model when applied to HBV Approval. Those variables which were significant against both dependent variables, i.e., respect for parental marriage arrangement, and the belief that ‘honour’ is located in the control of women, tend to support the position that there may

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Experience of HBV</th>
<th>Approval of HBV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents know best and don’t need to consult before arranging marriages</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin marriages cause problems</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our society, honour comes from controlling all the women in a family</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples should not have any relationship before marriage</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-urban background</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nagelkerke R^2)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5: Binary logistic regression for dependent variables, focussing upon HBV Experience
be interactions between the principle of marriage arrangement and the location of namûs, as a form of symbolic capital in the control of women.

Partly, the failure of the same models to provide similar responses across both dependent variables may be related to the distancing effect which increases the potential for unexplained measurement errors in the HBV Experience variable. Another aspect might be that attitudes are actually rather poor predictors of HBV experience: that rather than attitudes, there may be structural aspects in play. The attitudes which provided the best fit to HBV Experience — negative experiences of cousin marriage, the acceptance of low consent forms of marriage, and the restrictions upon male/female socialisation — might be more indicative of dynamics around marriage as it relates to the interests of the wider family. If so, this would tend to support the theories outlined in this thesis which locate the situations under which HBV may arise in kinship structure.

Patterns of marriage amongst the urban middle class who formed this sample, in which free choice was predominant, may be very different from their suburban and rural contemporaries. In order to assess the relationship between HBV experience between families in which marriages were arranged and those in which it was not, I performed a binary logistic regression on a filtered dataset, which only included respondent data where
they had reported one of the three forms of arranged marriage occurring within their family, thus reducing the sample size to 184 respondents.

This allowed for the comparison of the different forms of marriage, such as a comparison between cousin marriage and direct exchange marriage. If the dataset had not been filtered, the presence of freely chosen marriages would tend to confound the comparison of one form of marriage with another, given that the data shows that overwhelming majority of marriages which take either one of these forms are arranged. In correlations it was found that within families where marriages were arranged, those which featured cousin marriage were the most likely to have reported incidences of HBV ($\chi^2= 4.2$, df = 1, $p = 0.035$), whereas there was no such correlation in cases of direct exchange ($\chi^2= 0.5$, df = 1, $p = 0.364$) or exogamous marriage ($\chi^2= 1.1$, df = 1, $p = 0.227$).

Due to the requirement for casewise deletion for logistic regression, many cases were excluded, resulting in n=88, this model was not able to accept many factors due to the statistical rule of thumb that requires 30 cases per independent variable; and indeed, few factors proved to be significant within the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Experience of HBV</th>
<th>Approval of HBV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin marriage within the family</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>150%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-urban background</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6: Binary logistic regression for HBV dependent variables, within families which arrange marriage
Cousin marriage appears to be a clear risk factor for HBV Experience, where the existence of cousin marriage within a family in which marriage is arranged increases the likelihood of HBV being experienced within that family by 2.5 times, more than doubling the chances of violence being reported in the family. Direct exchange marriage (analysis not presented) showed no significant relationship with experiences of HBV, although it should be recalled that families which had used direct exchange marriage strategies were a very small subset of the population as a whole.

To gain more insight into the relationship between HBV experience, cousin marriage and consent, I prepared a multi-layered crosstabulation which demonstrated an intersection between low consent to marriage, cousin marriage and the experience of HBV. Although this lacks power in its positive interpretation, it can read to indicate that in families in which a high level of consent to marriage is expected, this does not correlate to the experience of HBV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience of HBV</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High consent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other marriage</td>
<td>63 (81%)</td>
<td>31 (89%)</td>
<td>94 (83%)</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin marriage</td>
<td>15 (19%)</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
<td>19 (17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78 (100%)</td>
<td>35 (100%)</td>
<td>113 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low consent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other marriage</td>
<td>24 (73%)</td>
<td>8 (42%)</td>
<td>32 (62%)</td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin marriage</td>
<td>9 (27%)</td>
<td>11 (58%)</td>
<td>20 (38%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33 (100%)</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
<td>52 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7: Multilayered crosstabulation - HBV Experience, marriage consent level and cousin marriage

Probability calculated using Fisher’s Exact Test due to small cell sizes
Summary and discussion

- By a small margin, more marriages within the sample were arranged than freely chosen. A wide range of individuals participate in marriage arrangement;
- Cousin marriage and direct exchange marriages are rare within this sample and have characteristic profiles;
- There are wide differences between families in attitudes to marital consent and arrangement, with tendencies for certain families to adopt low consent forms, whereas others tend towards higher consent forms;
- Families remain patricentric, despite the wishes of a younger generation;
- Approval of HBV is correlated with patriarchal gender roles, particularly around virginity;
- Experience of HBV is correlated with acceptance of parental authority, and is less firmly rooted in other attitudes than approval; it may tend to have more structural than attitudinal elements — such as with cousin marriage — which require further exploration.

While there are some findings of low consent marriage and child marriage within a minority of the sample, these appear to be clustered within particular families rather than spread across the sample as a whole. This suggests that for this sample, these practices are those of specific families which are atypical. This indicates the diversity of Kurdish society and the extent to which the sample have adopted urban habits and attitudes.

Both experience and approval are important aspects of the phenomenon of 'honour': while explorations of the experience of HBV has the greatest potential to model risk or posit causal explanations of how HBV arises, the understanding of HBV approval is important for understanding the social
acceptibility of violence. Whether or not a person approves of HBV may influence her or his approval of perpetrators, support for violence reduction programmes and legislation on violence and so forth. Moreover, given that I earlier identified community pressures as a distinctive feature of HBV in which a crime may be a response to public pressure rather than the wishes of the perpetrators, and that 43.3% of respondents generally, and 66.7% of those in families in which HBV had been reported, agreed that families who did not clear ‘honour’ were excluded from society, the attitudes of the general public are an important element to be considered in the continuation of this form of violence. Findings here are in line with other research in the region which indicate that a large minority support HBV in principle, and that those that do share conservative attitudes to gender roles, such as the requirement for virginity, and the maintenance of traditional gendered divisions of labour.

However, it is clear that there are marked differences between attitudes towards HBV and the structural situations in which it occurs: with cousin marriage emerging as a particularly strong predictor, which insinuates that the experience of HBV is more closely related to aspects of how marriage organises family relations than simply to enculturated attitudes. So while 

*attitudes* towards HBV can be considered to have a basis in culture, the experiences of HBV may be more closely related to family structure and marriage arrangement, which tends to support the model advanced in the theoretical phase of this thesis which argued for a material, rather than
culturally-based understanding of HBV. There appears, then, to be an association between HBV, which was defined as agnatically-perpetrated violence in the supplementary work that underpins this thesis (Payton, 2014), and the agnatic structure of the family as shown through cousin marriage.

It should be stressed that it is less the fact of cousin marriage that is associated with violence, so much as it is the expectation of control over marital choice within those families invested in this form. Where families are large, cousin marriage is considered acceptable, and socialisation is often kinship-oriented, an individual is likely to interact with many cousins, increasing the possibility that she or he might voluntarily select a partner from amongst their number. Where coercion is absent, there is no observed increase in the risk of HBV.

The mere fact of cousin marriage is not to be understood as causal on a simple level, given its broad and cross-cultural appearance. Instead I take the presence of cousin marriage as an indication of the prioritisation of agnation within families which serves a number of aims, including a wish to maintain property within the family and to consolidate ties of loyalty and filiation within a family, patriline or tribe.

PPC marriage is the most agnatic of forms of marriage: by its very nature, it insists upon the retention of women within the patriline. All forms of cousin marriage create complex and delicate webs between individuals and
patrilines, and can cause massive disruptions if any of the interactions within a kingroup are perceived as a source for insult.

It is not the choice of an individual to marry within a specific group that leads to the directive to subject women to discipline from their families, both in terms of surveillance and, and emotional and physical violence: it is the coercion implicit in the general requirement to marry in the interests of the collective, however this interest is identified and where it clashes with the wishes of the individual. This may involve other subnational groups besides those of kinship which instrumentalise various endogamies as a method of maintaining exclusive identities, which are used to mediate and contain access to power and resources, such as ethnic, linguistic and religious identity groups. It may be that similar relations between coercion, violence and endogamy can be found within other systems of organisation as well as patrilinearity.

This provides one indication for the peculiar contrast found between the approval for HBV and reported experiences: approval of HBV may be an aspect of values related to gender-roles, whereas the experience of HBV is linked more closely with particular organisations of the family.

The way in which attitudes to 'honour' appear to be distinct from the experience suggests a point of transition; of changing and clashing understandings where the understandings of 'honour' are becoming
distanced from past experiences of violence which was attributed to
‘honourable’ motivations. This was suggested earlier in this thesis through
the contrasting understandings of namûs discussed in Chapter 3 (pp 92-3)
within the context of the increasing nuclearisation of marriage which is
becoming amatonormative, which meant that for middle class respondents,
the understandings of namûs were complex and nuanced, the subject for
discussion and re-interpretation within an environment where ideas of
companionate marriage had become more prevalent, in contrast to
imprisoned perpetrators of HBV for whom namûs and şeref remained
inflexible, self-evident categories.
8. Conclusion

Strategies for eradicating VAW\(^{87}\) must be based on the recognition that it is rooted in a universal patriarchal gender regime, comprised of alternative patriarchies that may complement or contradict one another at any point in history. Therefore, in the final analysis, eliminating ... honour crimes... requires ending patriarchy. This is not going to happen tomorrow but what... is happening is the lessening of the patriarchal nature of societies as patriarchal privileges are challenged, weakened and ruptured.

\(^{87}\) i.e. violence against women

\[(\text{Ertürk 2009, p. 67})\]

[It is quite illusory to believe that symbolic violence can be overcome with the weapons of consciousness and will alone... This is seen, in particular, in the case of relations built on kinship and all relations built on that model, in which these durable inclinations of the socialized body are expressed and experienced in the logic of feeling... and duty, which are often merged in the experience of respect or devotion and may live on long after the disappearance of their social conditions of production.]

\[(\text{Bourdieu 2006, p. 341})\]
CONCLUSION

The delineation of ‘honour’ in the foregoing pages is complex, locating the development of a normative/metanormative system within particular ecological niches, particular structurations of kinship and particular understandings of gender. I have argued that the norms and metanorms around female sexual expression which make up the symbolic capital of ‘honour’ have been generated within these frameworks. There is, then, no single ‘culture of honour’, but distinctive beliefs and practices which have been interactively generated according to similar logics, to address similar challenges.

To consider HBV merely in cultural terms discounts the heterogeneity within each society where it occurs. No subgroup can be considered bearers of culture, even if some subgroups cling to cultural discourses to counter potentially disruptive changes to domestic hierarchies. The survey data collected for this thesis indicates that phenomena like early marriage, low consent forms of marriage, traditional forms such as direct exchange and cousin marriage are more likely to relate to particular, and in some cases distinct, microcultures than to be a facet of some abstract and homogeneous ‘Kurdish culture.’ While this study was limited in its sample, it is telling that those surveyed — the urban, educated middle class, who would be considered the most likely to have embraced modernity — provided such strong, if complex, indications of the understanding of namūs as being closely interrelated with ideas about marriage and gender. It is notable that PPC, the
CONCLUSION

marriage form most indicative of strongly agnatic principles of kinship structure had the strongest association with experiences of HBV, which survivors emically defined by agnatic perpetration (Payton 2014).

Moreover, taking a purely cultural approach is to ignore the potential for a deeper aetiology, based in the materiality of a system of social organisation which operates through filiation and marriage. ‘Honour’, then, in the sense of the agnatic custodianship of female reputation, is not the result of a masculine will to power, nor of any distinctive culture, nor the operations of a misogynist cabal; it is a terminology used for those qualities which are considered valuable, even essential, to the interactions of patricentric communities which are politically and economically organised by kinship, and in which women’s marriages become inter/intrafamilial transactions in social capital — the structures of classical patriarchy, understood as a kinship relationship built upon inequalities of age and gender. The identification of female sexuality as a point of collective vulnerability, to be subjected to surveillance and, in some cases, violent correction, is a consistent epiphenomenon of family structures whose most salient aim is to maintain and improve the status and security of the patriline within a patricentric ordering. These are all aspects of a form of the family which developed according to the needs of agrarian and pastoral societies in antiquity, which are particularly visible in those beset by conflicts and difficulties in achieving subsistence, such as in the intrinsic ecological,
CONCLUSION

economic, social and political vulnerabilities of the lives of pastoralists and agriculturalists, and in times of social strife and upheaval. While aspects of culture and religion may have originated under the same conditions, and to a degree underwrite, and sometimes challenge, the values of these systems of power, this should be taken as a reflection of a common and co-constitutive point of origin. In current times, while the anxieties around patrilinear identity and property may be thought to be decreasing in an era of detribalisation and proletarianisation, kinship remains a significant means of access to power through state systems, and therefore informs national and sub-national identity groups’ self-conceptions. The control of women’s behaviour remains salient due to vested interests in the control of filiation.

The responses to the research questions posed in this thesis are indicated in Table 8.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Theoretical phase</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Can family ‘honour’ be described as relating to particular geographies and organisations of the family rather than specific cultures or religions?</td>
<td>In Chapter 3, I argue that ‘honour’ is a method of social organisation within populations which lack security and suffer from shortages of resources, which I particularly associate with pastoral and agrarian lifestyles. I suggest that these lifestyles tend towards organisation by kinship, which is used to express relations of labour and property, which makes the control and deployment of marriage a strategic consideration for the family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is ‘honour’ understood and expressed within domestic gender relations?</td>
<td>In Chapter 4, I suggest that the patrilinear household reinforces inequalities of age and gender which subordinates young women in particular. I discuss the role of virginity as an expression of women’s sexual subjectification and as a method of restricting women from divorce and remarriage where this has the potential to disrupt the orderings of kinship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

How do various traditional forms of marriage express relationships within and between families; and how does this impact upon the ‘honour’ of women and families?

In Chapter 6, I examine several pre-modern marriage forms and tease out the complex relationships within and between families established in these forms of marriage. This tended to show the operations of marital exchanges within.

How have traditional forms and understandings of marriage altered over the KRI’s recent history of political and economic changes?

In Chapter 7, I discuss how proletarianisation tends to decrease the role of kinship in organising labour and access to resources, which means that marriage becomes less significant to the collective, as class-based hierarchies replace those based on lineage. However, where societies remain a neopatrimonial orientation kinship relations remain valuable for channelling state resources. Furthermore, democratisation process can lead to a balkanisation of identities, which are then maintained through controlling out-marriage.

Empirical phase

What are the structures of marriage and kinship within the sample?

- How many marriages within the sample were arranged, and who was involved in their arrangement?
- How common are the ‘traditional’ forms of marriage — i.e., those between cousins, direct exchange and elopements — and what are their characteristics?
- What can be determined from the differing levels of consent to marriage arrangement?

In this particular sample, marriage and kinship was in a transitional state:

- Slightly more marriages were arranged than were free choice, although high-consent forms of marriage were predominant overall; a wide variety of persons were involved in marriage arrangement: marriage arrangement is not necessarily the preserve of the family patriarch;
- Traditional forms of marriage are rare and tend to be associated with marriage arrangement and a higher likelihood of early marriage;
- Lower consent to marriage correlates with traditional gender roles.

Do these familial structures correlate with an individual’s likelihood to approve of HBV?

The approval of HBV correlates with various patriarchal attitudes to gender rather than a distinct family structure.

Are there common factors within families in which HBV has been experienced?

Families in which HBV has been experienced tend towards respect for parental marriage arrangement, non-urban origins and higher levels of cousin marriage than others.

Table 8-1: Responses to research questions

Suggestions for further quantitative research

The contrasting findings regarding the experience of HBV and the attitudes that support it suggests that it would be worth conducting further research.
into the experience of HBV, which could involve taking a sample with more direct experiences of HBV, such as survivors of violence. With this kind of sample, the analysis would be less hampered by the intrinsic distance of an experience of HBV within the wider family, and the respondents’ own attitudes and situation which could be contrasted with the data discussed above to establish if these structural differences would appear more stark with a variable that was able to capture experiences of HBV more directly, such as a sample based on HBV survivors, possibly through an NGO in the KRI.

Other suggestions might also explore brideprice in more detail: given that respect for the principle of brideprice almost doubled the likelihood of approval for HBV in the binary logistic regression shown in Figure 7.4. The absence of reported brideprice payments in the sample means that any relationships between these phenomena cannot be explored.

More broadly, this approach could be used to research factors underlying collective and agnatic crimes across Eurasia, and gather contrast data from other groupings. It would particularly be interesting to research kinship forms and HBV in India, to contrast the effects of tribalism with caste, to establish what are the mechanisms and interests involved in marriage arrangement, and how dowry payments fit into this. Another avenue would be research into patterns of kinship change and violence within the family across Eurasia, where it may be interesting to discern patterns of change
which lead to the cessation or decline of agnatically perpetrated violence using longitudinal data.

**Theoretical implications**

It is a core contention of this thesis that the differing kinship and marriage structures of Central Eurasia have led to this particular form of violence; but these kinship and marriage structures are currently subjected to enormous restructurations, particularly amongst the young, urban, middle-class individuals that made up this sample. If the ‘culture of honour’ can be considered to originate in the attitudes and gender ideologies generated within the kinship license, which is becoming a less significant means of organising society than it was in previous eras, then it could be argued that namûs, as a form of symbolic capital, may also be undergoing a contemporaneous change in connotation (see also pp. 93-4). While the definition of HBV used in this thesis was developed through empirical research involving a case-file study of those who had experienced such crimes (Payton 2014), it is not to be expected that this definition is one which will remain stable through a period of social, political and economic changes.

As the opinions of supporters of HBV show, the concept of namûs still serves as a mark of female compliance to patriarchal norms, but increasingly reflects a compliance which to a more individuated understanding of marital and kinship relations occurring in a post-agrarian economy. Namûs appears to be
developing into a representation of subordinacy to the will of the husband, within an individualised gender order, rather than to the will of the patriline in a collectivised gender order, of which the expectation of cousin marriage is but one aspect. The conceptulisation of *namūs* may thus be in a process of losing its mooring in conformity to the power structures of the classically patriarchal agnatic family, to become reattributed to conformity to male dominance within conjugal families: in which process it would lose much of the behavioural differences between HBV and the far more globally common patterns of intimate partner violence. This may mark the distinction identified by Tapper (1991) and Meeker (1976), between societies in which the discourse of ‘honour’ permits/demands agnatic violence, and those in which it permits spousal violence (referred to as Model A and B by Tapper (1991, pp. 16-17)) noting that Meeker identifies that Model A is to be associated with societies with high levels of cousin marriage. The tendency of modernisation may not, then, work towards the erosion of the restrictions of *namūs*, but the redirection of their custodianship to a husband rather than an agnatic collective as observed by Weiss in Pakistan (1994).

Sirman (2004) tracks a similar change in household organisation in Turkey, a society which, with some exceptions, (which would include the Kurdish population), has not been primarily ordered by kinship since the Ottoman Empire. Under both the Ottoman and Turkish nation states, she suggests, kinship relations of dependency and interdependency, control and
dominance, withered, and become supplant by andocentric households, based on women's supposedly voluntary submission to an individual man. Gendered inequalities which are individuated and conjugal eclipsed those which based in collectivity and patrilinear kinship.

What we may be seeing then, within this sample of young, educated and urban people, who could be considered to have the greatest stake in modernity and its values is a process of transition from one form of understanding 'honour' to another — moving the cultural directive for the male dominance/female submission from being an aspect of the reputation of the patriline to that of the partner.

The entire schema of honour and shame, namûs and şeref, is a site of contestation between feminists and nationalists, between progressives and conservatives and between differing strands within all these categories. Even at the level of understanding, it seems impossible to situate HBV as part of Kurdish culture in the broadest sense, but as the micro-culture of certain families with certain distinct forms and expectations of marriage.

The conceptualisation of HBV I have presented also provides indications of productive routes for further exploration, such as: the interrelation of exclusive identities such as tribal, ethnic and religious affiliations and the control of female sexuality as representing the 'borders' of these subgroups, as described by King (2008b); changing patterns and understandings of
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...marriage and gender in societies undergoing industrialisation; differences in modes of survival in relation to attitudes to female autonomy; and perhaps most interestingly, whether the theorisation developed in this thesis in relationship to the KRI holds out in considerations of other regions and groupings within Eurasia, and across history.

Implications for reducing violence

My first personal encounters with individuals who had experiences of the constructs of ‘honour’ over a decade ago challenged my preconceptions, and this thesis represents a grappling with understanding. The dynamics of ‘particularity and universalism’ which came from encountering a value system which felt simultaneously familiar and ‘foreign’, which I now understand as an aspect of commonalities across Eurasian civilisations. The greatest obstacle to my understanding of ‘honour’ was no epochal cultural clash, but turned out to be a tendency to disremember the differences between my own experience of the small, individualistic, diffusive and discontinuous kinship structures of Northern Europe with the more integrated collectivist family groupings of Southern Eurasia.

The problem which I identified as the most challenging when I first confronted the system of ‘honour’ as described to me by Kurdish friends was that of its cost to individuals. It appeared to me that the various pressures of the ‘honour’ system caused insecurity and anxiety to young women, who
lived with an awkward consciousness of the need to maintain appearances and imposed various restrictions upon their activities. On the other hand I have also encountered some of their male counterparts who were by no means cold-blooded enforcers of patriarchy but often felt ambivalent about the power they held over female relatives, and anxious about their responsibility to uphold the public reputation of the family. Since crimes which come under the heading of HBV are often horrendous in nature, it is no easy thing to feel sympathy for the perpetrator; yet it is highly unlikely that people could brutalise and kill their relatives without being traumatised by the experience, nor that they could do so simply under a perceived requirement for cultural conformity.

As a system it seems too onerous in its demands, both on men and on women, to be accounted for through shared norms alone. This insight has been the incentive for over a decade spent in trying to find an explanation for ‘honour’ that I found personally satisfactory. Rather than seeing individuals as being caught in a false dichotomy between ‘Eastern’ cultural restrictions, versus the supposed potentialities of ‘Western’ freedom, I sought to situate these tensions within deeper webs of interaction, to see how ‘honour’ worked within its own context. I have, over the years, encountered women who have been victimised in such traumatic ways, in harrowing betrayals of all the principles of loyalty, trust and care that we normally associate with family life. I remain staggered by the heroic endurance of HBV survivors and awed
by the commitment of anti-HBV activists. If this research can be used to help reduce the harms of this system to all involved, then that would be the most productive result of the work involved.

At the outset of this thesis, I deployed Harris’ (2001) terminology of infrastructure, structure and superstructure in order to conceptualise my approach to describing the aetiology of HBV. I now return to this terminology in order to gesture towards avenues for reducing violence against women and increasing female autonomy and wellbeing.

At an infrastructural level, the agrarian ways of life which initially supported patrilinear orderings of society and rigid control over resources and labour through filiation are in decline, due to the economic transformation of the region into an industrialised society in which the state is a major employer, and where a younger generation predominantly has very different attitudes to marriage and sexuality than that of their parents. However, this does not mean that economic modernity is a panacea, and all that is needed is for inevitable historical processes to reach their fruition: Boserup (1970), most notably, has noted the enormous problems with assumptions that modernity’s effects on women are necessarily benign. As Haghighat (2013) points out, the capital-intensive petrochemical-based industrialisation of the Gulf States have had minimal effects upon women’s employment or status, but instead has increased the employment (and in many cases, exploitation).
of migrant labourers while women’s roles remain domestic, and restricted by the dictates of ‘honour’.

Positive change for women and girls cannot be achieved through an inert reliance upon historical processes.

**Stimulating cultural changes**

This research follows Taysi (2009) in showing a middle ground of respondents who identify ‘honour’ in terms of the control of women, and as a widely-shared societal principle — but as one which they differentiate from their own views. A 34 year-old Civil Servant from Sulaymaniyah City, for instance, provides a delicate criticism of the local conception of ‘honour’:

> There is no unanimous definition to honour; it changes from one culture to another. For example, in a closed society like mine it is directly and merely related to women and sexuality, but maybe in another culture honesty is considered honour. (in Taysi 2009, p. 20)

Individuals may, then, be rather less committed to ‘honour’ as individuals than they believe themselves to be as a collective. However, given that ‘honour’ — in all its forms — is a method of creating systems of accountability, this can lead to an overconformity to misperceived norms bred from pluralistic ignorance (Miller and Prentice 1994). This could create a phenomenon of conservative lag, a societal ‘Abilene paradox’. This is a particularly significant factor in the management of public identities. This is a particularly relevant consideration given that HBV has been identified as a
response to community pressures. Just as feminists have identified that rapists benefit from a ‘rape culture’ which normalises male sexual aggression, perpetrators of HBV may benefit from an ‘honour culture’ which normalises male/agnatic ‘disciplinary’ violence. Confronting ‘honour culture’ and ‘rape culture’ through exposing the structural violence and false assumptions that underpin them, may reduce the popular acceptability of these forms of violence against women.

In this sense, awareness raising around women’s human rights and the public condemnation of violence against women, such as is demonstrated by women’s organisations like Zhiyan\textsuperscript{88} (Bahaddin 2012) can lead to questioning of how deeply rooted such attitudes are, and to vital shifts in mentalities. Encouraging secular and progressive clerical voices to unite in the condemnation of violence against women, both real and symbolic, should work towards a paradigm shift as to what, exactly, ‘honourable’ behaviour connotes. Such an approach is in tune with Appiah’s (2010) suggestion for a discursive shift around ‘honour’ which would attempt to render ‘honour’ crimes themselves a source of shame rather than redemption, flipping the current discourse to one which locates high social status in enabling, rather than restricting, the autonomy of female relatives. Appiah is correct to identify that it is neither practicable nor desirable to challenge the broader concept of ‘honour’ or reputation as an aspect of human interactions since

\textsuperscript{88}Zhiyan [Life] is a confederacy of women’s NGOs calling for an end to HBV in the KRI.
this is one of the ethical foundations of human interaction. According to evolutionary scientists, normative ethics has three main bases: kinship relationships, reciprocity and reputation (Van Vugt et al. 2007; Gintis et al. 2008; Sperber and Baumard 2012). Recorded crime rates for the Middle East are apparently stable and low (Serajzadeh 2001-2), and while these may well have significant lacunae, particularly in terms of violence against women, these normative mechanisms may also be responsible for promoting a high level of social order outside the home. The issue underpinning HBV is not so much the mechanisms by which this particular system of ethics operates, but its basis in inequitable gender/age relations within the family, the ‘exchange of women’ dynamic and in beliefs around femininity, which can be criticised — and potentially dismantled.

To create effective new connotations around ‘honour’ which are not based in exploitative relations, there would be a need for several institutions with diverse interests and views around ‘honour’ to consolidate around a single sentiment. This includes a need to avoid mixed messages ranging from laws which posit ‘honour’ as mitigatory in many states, inconsistent sentencing of perpetrators, and victim-blaming — an almost universal facet of violence against women in all its forms, from domestic violence (Gracia and Herrero 2006) to rape (Suarez and Gadalla 2010). There is a disturbing tendency across Middle Eastern states, for instance, to use women’s prisons as reserve accommodation when shelter spaces are not available, and to imprison
women for consensual sex in both commercial and non-commercial forms. Clearly, it may be more practicable to provide such dubious ‘protection’ measures to the victim rather than neutralising the threat of collective violence, but it does so at the cost of the victim’s liberty, and sends a message that the victim is considered a guilty party; that female sexual expression is liable to retaliation by the state.

However, the idea that it is possible to change the consensus around what ‘honour’ connotes assumes that there is a singular ‘honour’ culture, rather than a plurality of sub-national groupings — tribes, ethnic groups, confessions, communities — which each have interests embedded in particular kinds of reputation management. While education has shown to have positive impacts on young people’s opinions on ‘honour’ in Western settings (Cihangar 2013), this may not be the case where its values are more deeply embedded into the social structure. The Jordanian women’s movement was one of the first to address ‘honour’ killings, and has tirelessly campaigned for legal and social reform, with strong support from the royal family (Husseini 2009): however, recent research shows that 46.1% of Jordanian boys, and 22.1% of Jordanian girls, continue to consider this form of violence justifiable (Eisner and Ghuneim 2013).

This approach clearly has a basis in the tendency for discussions of HBV to take on ‘cultural’ or scriptural determinist ideations which I outlined in my introduction, which is based in the assumption that perpetrators are merely
enacting their ‘culture’ or religion and that this, therefore, can be changed discursively, through reinterpreting religion and ‘culture’ in ways which are more positive to women. Certainly, the questioning of public attitudes towards violence against women is a positive development, but as a sole basis for action it fails to address any potential strategic and self-interested aspects in maintaining the patterns of kinship and gender which give it rise. As Mojab observes (2004b, p. 3), attempts to change mentalities are the reduction of a sociological phenomenon into a problem of psychology, representing attempts to correct ‘a “wrong”, uninformed, uneducated or deviationist male attitude’, which fatally depoliticises patriarchy as a system of gender/generational power: the common manoeuvre of blaming the individual for societal ills.

The KRI has seen a remarkable attenuation in FGM (predominantly clitidorectomy) since the release of the documentary ‘A Handful of Ash’ and the criminalisation of FGM in the KRI in 2011 (Khalil 2013), showing that attitudes to violence against women can indeed change rapidly due to debates within the public sphere. However, only a comparatively small number of people materially profited from this practise: the elderly rural women and traditional midwives who conducted mutilations on young girls can hardly be considered an influential power-bloc. The preservation of FGM as a tradition was also ranged against discourses that claimed female sexual
pleasure as a necessary aspect of marriage — for men\textsuperscript{89}. The ideology of 'honour', on the other hand, distributes privilege and power to a wide variety of actors within each family and underpins the gender order of the society as a whole, which may tend to make it far more resilient to discursive shifts than FGM.

A semiotic, superstructural shift, which attempts to change the symbolism of namûs to reconfigure the nature of symbolic capital it denotes, appears to be an incomplete means of transformation, as long this as symbolism is generated within, and is valuable to, perduring patrilinear orderings of the family.

\textit{Enabling structural changes}

\begin{quote}
\emph{When violence against women is framed as a matter of “tradition,” a distinction is established between, on the one hand, traditions— which are seen to be native, timeless, and unchanging—and on the other, institutions—which appear as contemporary and timely.}
\end{quote}

(Ko\c{g}acıoğlu 2004, p. 120)

Cultural and psychological arguments around violence against women, suggests Ko\c{g}acıoğlu, may be deployed to divert attention from failures of the

\textsuperscript{89} In a critical reading of Fazil Hemet’s (2006) ‘Family Guidance’, a government-approved Kurdish-language marriage manual which has reached its 3\textsuperscript{rd} Edition, Fischer-Tahir’s (2009) exposes the sexism underlying the self-consciously ‘modern’ model of conjugality it presents. She quotes a revealing passage on page 331 in which Hemet dispenses advice to women (p. 145): ‘It is important to know that modern progressive men want to bring their wives to orgasm and bring them pleasure...Therefore, try to free yourself of frigidity, of fear and shame, and of the shackles and barriers caused by social, psychological, ideological and physical problems.’ This places an asymmetric onus upon women to condition their sexual responses in order to provide more gratification to men. Hemet’s vociferous opposition to FGM could also be considered in this light.
Conclusion

state and other actors to address gendered inequalities: to place the offenders once more as mere followers of 'culture' and 'tradition', beyond its remit — and its responsibility. This then, obscures the ways in which the state has a degree of complicity: through failing to provide adequate support and protection measures and through continuing in the ideation of a particular family form as superior to others. Restrictive gender roles are underwritten within law and policy, through assumptions around male headship in families or the channelling of resources and benefits through males, or through labour markets which have limited female participation: these are amongst several means in which the patriarchal family is considered normative.

States which remain imbricated within neopatrimonial modes of organisation may be particularly poorly placed to challenge the nature of oppressive gender relations within the family, given the various embedded interests in maintaining the status quo, from appeasing conservative constituencies, to retaining well-established processes of social advancement and privilege. In order to erode the instrumentalisation of marriage, and the commodification of women's bodies for collective benefits and ingroup identity maintenance, there is a need to reduce inequalities of privilege and power, and to begin a process of 'boundary deactivation', towards ending internal segregations of gender, ethnicity, confession and identity. Rydgren and Sofi (2011) suggest the fostering of intercommunity links in order to
bridge troubled relationships between various ethnic groups in Kurdish regions, and this policy could also reduce the risk of violence erupting where young people seek partners from outside their group.

These moves — challenging neopatrimonial rule and building intercommunity linkages — are often accomplished by a healthy civil society, able to take counter-hegemonic positions, provide checks on state power and build alliances across groups. Indeed, a strong women’s movement has been cross-culturally found to be the best method of reducing violence against women (Weldon 2002).

A distinctively Kurdish civil society emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf War (Natali 2005, p. 64), which has included the ascension of several women’s organisations (Mohammed 2009; al-Ali and Pratt 2011). Ideally, civil society organisations scrutinise the operations of the state, stimulate political participation, develop leadership and articulate minority interests. Hyden (1997) notes, however, that such organisations need to be internally democratic, non-hierarchical, accountable, non-exclusive and autonomous in order to maximise their impact. Civil society needs to model democracy internally as well as enabling the democratic process externally. The creation of even more cliques, coteries and cabals proliferates rather than challenges neopatrimonial orders. Neopatrimonial states are particularly likely to retard the development of civil society associations. In neopatrimonial states, Tripp finds (2001) that women’s activism may be channelled into ‘patronage
machines’ — ancillary women’s wings, leagues and associations tied to the pre-existing loci of power, inhibited from providing deep structural criticisms of the state through a need to maintain funding and political support. In the KRI, 43% of the civil society organisations surveyed by the National Democratic Institute (2011) were state-funded (p. 8); 57% were partnered by political parties (p. 5) which may be beneficial for their financial security, and for a certain level of access to power-brokers, but which may compromise neutrality, and tend towards proposing solutions which do not disrupt the status quo. Qadir (2007) identifies Iraqi Kurdish civil society as being ‘under the yoke’ of the ruling powers.

Hyden states that in order to maintain the counter-hegemonic quality of civil society within neopatrimonial states, organisations may need to be funded externally to the existing structures of power rather than being locked into existing patterns of patronage. This can be a particularly fraught issue when related to funding from Euro-American organisations, given anxieties around ‘Westernisation’, and the potential for funding to be tied to neo-colonial and Orientalist agendas and goals. Organisations in receipt of ‘Western’ funding may be accused of bearing a ‘Westernising’ agenda even when this is far from reality. For women’s organisations, the absence of neutral funding sources leads to the fraught choice between a neopatrimonial Scylla and a neo-colonial Charybdis, and yet, these organisations represent the best hope for reducing violence against women.
While, as Alinia (2013) indicates, the policing of HBV in the KRG has developed enormously over the past decades, there is an apparent tendency to gloss over the collective nature of perpetration which I identified elsewhere (2014). Neither Alinia’s nor Onal’s (2008) studies of perpetrators indicate the punishment of all members of a conspiracy, but rather of individuals. Where prosecution of the perpetrators occurs, it appears to end with the individual who pulled the trigger, while the remainder of perpetrators escape justice. Glazer and Abu Ras (1994) note that of three brothers seemingly responsible for a murder in Israel, only one was imprisoned, with strong indications that he had been selected to ‘take the fall’ from amongst their number and that he had been financially compensated for his sacrifice. A thorough-going attack upon a collective crime should not be limited to the actions of a single member; it may be, in fact, the more liminal members of the group who are more likely to be deterred from collaboration by the opportunity cost of negative repercussions.

Bourdieu suggests relations built around kinship may survive long beyond the expiry of their utility value, particularly when this hysteresis maintains pre-existing hierarchies of power: familial relationships are ambiguous, and loaded with emotion — where ‘affection and brutality coexist in conflict and unity,’ (Mojab 2002a, p. 61). If, as argued, the nature of power hierarchies within a family is related to the form that the family takes, then it is policies towards the family that must be scrutinised.
Policies towards the family are paradoxical in all states: on one hand, the family is considered ‘natural’, or at least pre-political, and hence exempt from scrutiny, but on the other, the kinds of families which can be formed are often tightly regulated and subject to numerous interventions which tend to favour an ‘ideal’ family form over others — tending towards patrilinear, patricentric, amatonormative, gender-complementarian and heterosexist models, which are considered ‘authentic’. Other formations are considered heterodox at best; and at worst, deviant, antisocial and counter to public morality.

While kinship relations are a perennial human institution, there is no single natural form of the family. The family has proven itself to be a ‘masterpiece of nature’ (to use a term from Santayana), precisely because, not despite, of its incredible diversity — from the ‘walking marriages’ of the Na, in which fatherhood is not a recognised status (Hua 2008), to the multiple paters of the Canela (Greene and Crocker 1994). The family is resilient, then, because it is flexible and adaptable, capable of taking on various forms: concerns about the 'breakdown of the family' frequently have more relationship to the disruption of pre-existing domestic hierarchies than to any realistic apprehensions about the collapse of the primordial mode of social organisation. They reflect the vested interests of the existing structure, and the extent to which its predominance renders other forms of the family unthinkable (Joseph 1996).
There is then, far more to the system of ‘honour’ to be challenged than its tendency to result in violence: one aspect of this is its enmeshment with the lack of respect for the human right of individual consent to marriage under Article 16(b) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The assumption that parents hold hereditary, alienable rights over the bodies of their children by default must be challenged robustly. This should not, of course, prohibit parents from becoming involved in the intimate lives of their offspring, nor should youngsters be prevented from accessing parental intervention and advice if they so choose. It does, however, call for an adequate and overt expression of consensuality and an environment in which the bodily sovereignty of women and young people can be asserted. Action against ‘honour’ crimes and actions to curb forced and early marriages must be considered part of the same project, forming a broader movement towards the recognition of the free expression of consensual adult sexuality as an aspect of bodily sovereignty, fundamental to human rights — and towards an of a concept of human rights which are borne by the individual rather than embedded within kinship or other sub-national groupings.

‘Family law,’ says Charrad (2001, p. 5), ‘raises questions that are at the intersection of kinship and state.’ Personal status laws have typically been used to prioritise certain family groupings over others, and the personal status laws of the Middle East have been particularly criticised for shoring up male power within families (Anwar 2009). Can it be any accident that Tunisia
and Morocco show the least support for HBV in the MENA region (Pew Research Center 2013, p. 190), and also boast the most ‘woman-friendly’ personal status laws (Charrad 2012)? The Moroccan family code, for instance, has been identified as enabling the development of matrifocal, rather than patriarchal family orderings (Hosseini 2000, p. 160). Tunisian women hold more power in the family than Egyptian women do, which Yount and Agree (2004) associate with their status in family law. The lower support for HBV in the former Soviet bloc in central Eurasia (Pew Research Center 2013, p. 190) may also reflect the historic Russification of personal status laws (Kane and Gorbenko 2011).

A family law system which allows for the proliferation of family forms rather than prioritising a patricentric ‘ideal’ may thus allow for greater flexibility in family formation and structure, so that the patricentric family is merely one option, rather than a default against which others are negatively compared.

As Ertürk (2009) has suggested, there are emerging faultlines within the edifice of ‘classical’ patriarchy which can be ruptured; but these are faultlines which are deeply embedded into the ordering of society itself, from the most intimate level of the household to the seats of government, emanating across history, from ancient folktales to the expressions of modern law. To change this will take the passion, determination and courage to transform society itself, and to harness and direct those social transformations which are
already in progress. This needs to be tempered with resistance to the tendencies of the globalisation of the capitalist family to replace the subordination of women and girls by their agnates with the subordination of wives by their husbands. Conjugality has its own hazards: earlier I noted that although Israeli Arab women were far more likely to be murdered by an agnate than Jewish women, there was little difference in the actual rate of women murdered. The conjugal household ultimately proved to be just as deadly to women as the agnatic regime (Landau et al. 1974). Phallocentric conjugality may present a very different structure of the family than one which is predicated upon agnation, but is ultimately an 'alternative patriarchy', as Ertürk describes it, rather than a solution to male dominance.

Ending HBV and violence against women requires challenges not merely to the typical inequalities of gender and generation within the household forms of classical patriarchy, but to all interlocking systems of dominance from the state to the household and beyond — towards a radical reimagining of the family and marriage, and towards the autonomy of children within families. ‘Ending patriarchal domination of children, by men or women,’ says hooks (2000, p. 77), ‘is the only way to make the family a place where children can be safe, where they can be free, where they can know love.’
Of woman torn (excerpt)

nora
decapitated
by her father on her forbidden
honeymoon he paraded
her head through
cairo to prove his
manhood this is 1997

and i can only hope
you had a special song a
poem memorized a secret
that made you smile

this is a love
poem cause i love
you now woman
who lived tried to
love in this world of
machetes and sin
i smell your ashes
of zaatar and almonds
under my skin
i carry your bones

Suheir Hammad (1973-)

CONCLUSION
9. References


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10. Appendices

A: Map of Kurdish regions in Iraq

Hewlêr is the Kurdish name for the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, but this work uses the Arabic name Arbil. Also I have spelled Silémani as Sulaymaniyah, and Ranye as Rania, Helebe as Halabja, Rewanduz as Rowanduz and Dihok as Duhok.
**B: Kinship diagrammes**

**BILATERAL DESCENT**

**PATRILINEAR DESCENT**

---

**NOTE:**

This diagram represents official kinship relations: it should not be assumed that this means that there are no relationships between unshaded individuals: in fact, within patrilineal societies, a person might have warmer relationships with blood relations who are not reckoned as...
official kin, because these relationships may be less tense due to a lack of co-inheritance and other shared responsibilities.

Paradigmatic segmentary agnatic kinship structure

Figure 10.3: Segmentary agnation

This diagram shows a rather unnaturally tidy pattern in which the two sons of the founding ancestor split into segments, focusing upon the first segment where each man in turn produced two male heirs and then died. In the first family, unity was preserved, whereas in the second scenario, there was a split in each generation where the family divided, with potential for fission in the youngest generation. It can be seen that the first is the most effective way of
maintaining a male labour/military force, but also we can readily understand how disputes between brothers can fragment this unity.
C: Map sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Documentary evidencea</th>
<th>Pew &gt;30%b</th>
<th>Caseworkc</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Yes (Danish Immigration Service 2012)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Yes (Khafagy 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Yes (Human Rights Watch 2004)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Yes (Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland) 2012)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Yes (Landinfo 2009a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Yes (Landinfo 2009b)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Yes (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Yes (Faqir 2001; Human Rights Watch 2004; Abu Hassan and Welchman 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Yes (Baydoun 2011)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Yes (Amnesty International 1999)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Yes (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004; Touma-Sliman 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Yes (Danish Immigration Service 2007)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Yes (Kardam 2005)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Yes (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2010b)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Yes (Sisters Arab Forum for Human Rights 2005)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.1: Sources of data used to develop kinship/HBV map

a) In this category I was looking for report in which HBV was a title issue authored or commissioned by the UN, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or in Country of Origin reports or enquiries to assess asylum claims through the Refworld resource. Local NGO materials and academic articles have also been included where the report was substantial and included statistics.

b) This refers to the approval rating for ‘honour’ killings in the Pew Forum report (Pew Research Center 2013, p. 190) as expressed by combining those who agreed that ‘honour’ killings of women were ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ necessary. Countries with a combined approval rating of over 30% have been included, as a reasonable midpoint where the maximum approval rating by this calculation was 60% (for Iraq).

c) This category refers to the country of origin named by a client seeking help for HBV from the NGO, IKWRO as described in Payton (2014b), or the country of origin of a client requiring expert witness statements from the author on the basis of a fear of HBV. This was done to ‘round out’ information, particularly where there is an absence of evidence.
due to societies with restrictions upon civil society and NGO activities, and omission from the Pew study. However, this represents a very low sample threshold.
D: Statistical analysis of questionnaire data

1. Univariate responses to attitudinal questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prompt</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In our society, honour comes from controlling all the women in a family</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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<td>(n=39)</td>
<td>(n=55)</td>
<td>(n=16)</td>
<td>(n=52)</td>
<td>(n=64)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Honour should not be related to the control of women</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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<td>(n=84)</td>
<td>(n=69)</td>
<td>(n=21)</td>
<td>(n=11)</td>
<td>(n=11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where honour has been compromised, a family which does not respond will be excluded from the community until some action has been taken*</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=36)</td>
<td>(n=46)</td>
<td>(n=41)</td>
<td>(n=41)</td>
<td>(n=25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namûs is the basis of a moral society</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=36)</td>
<td>(n=64)</td>
<td>(n=38)</td>
<td>(n=35)</td>
<td>(n=41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes about namûs have led to violence in my own family**</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=21)</td>
<td>(n=33)</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td>(n=44)</td>
<td>(n=67)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violence may sometimes be justified if a person has brought shame to their family</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=12)</td>
<td>(n=44)</td>
<td>(n=27)</td>
<td>(n=53)</td>
<td>(n=77)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence within the family is never justified</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n=131)</td>
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<td>(n=11)</td>
<td>(n=10)</td>
<td>(n=6)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether and who to marry should be the choice of the individual, not the family</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=105)</td>
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<td>(n=8)</td>
<td>(n=9)</td>
<td>(n=5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriages are a valuable tradition</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=21)</td>
<td>(n=16)</td>
<td>(n=15)</td>
<td>(n=53)</td>
<td>(n=117)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents arrange marriage in their own interests rather than that of their children</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=15)</td>
<td>(n=33)</td>
<td>(n=14)</td>
<td>(n=100)</td>
<td>(n=60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families make better choices when they arrange marriages than individuals would do on their own behalf</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=4)</td>
<td>(n=19)</td>
<td>(n=28)</td>
<td>(n=127)</td>
<td>(n=40)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriages have no place in a modern society</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=76)</td>
<td>(n=56)</td>
<td>(n=22)</td>
<td>(n=40)</td>
<td>(n=20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples should have the chance to get to know each other before</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=162)</td>
<td>(n=55)</td>
<td>(n=4)</td>
<td>(n=1)</td>
<td>(n=3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples should not have any kind of relationship before marriage</td>
<td>8.8% (n=20)</td>
<td>10.6% (n=24)</td>
<td>6.2% (n=14)</td>
<td>33.2% (n=75)</td>
<td>41.2% (n=93)</td>
<td>100% (n=226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether and who to marry should be the choice of the individual, not the family</td>
<td>49% (n=105)</td>
<td>41% (n=88)</td>
<td>3.7% (n=8)</td>
<td>4.2% (n=9)</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>100% (n=215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriages are a valuable tradition</td>
<td>9.5% (n=21)</td>
<td>7.2% (n=16)</td>
<td>6.8% (n=15)</td>
<td>23.9% (n=53)</td>
<td>52.7% (n=117)</td>
<td>100% (n=222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents arrange marriage in their own interests rather than that of their children</td>
<td>6.8% (n=15)</td>
<td>14.9% (n=33)</td>
<td>6.3% (n=14)</td>
<td>45% (n=100)</td>
<td>27% (n=60)</td>
<td>100% (n=222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families make better choices when they arrange marriages than individuals would do on their own behalf</td>
<td>1.8% (n=4)</td>
<td>8.7% (n=19)</td>
<td>12.8% (n=28)</td>
<td>58.3% (n=127)</td>
<td>18.3% (n=40)</td>
<td>100% (n=218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriages have no place in a modern society</td>
<td>35.5% (n=76)</td>
<td>26.2% (n=56)</td>
<td>10.3% (n=22)</td>
<td>18.7% (n=40)</td>
<td>9.3% (n=20)</td>
<td>100% (n=214)</td>
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<td>Couples should have the chance to get to know each other before marriage</td>
<td>72% (n=162)</td>
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<td>1.8% (n=4)</td>
<td>0.4% (n=1)</td>
<td>1.3% (n=3)</td>
<td>100% (n=225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples should not have any kind of relationship before marriage</td>
<td>8.8% (n=20)</td>
<td>10.6% (n=24)</td>
<td>6.2% (n=14)</td>
<td>33.2% (n=75)</td>
<td>41.2% (n=93)</td>
<td>100% (n=226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages between cousins are the best and safest kind</td>
<td>1.4% (n=3)</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>7.9% (n=17)</td>
<td>36.7% (n=79)</td>
<td>51.6% (n=111)</td>
<td>100% (n=215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages between cousins can cause problems between the couple</td>
<td>25.1% (n=52)</td>
<td>42% (n=87)</td>
<td>14% (n=29)</td>
<td>15% (n=31)</td>
<td>3.9% (n=8)</td>
<td>100% (n=207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin be jine is a practical way of managing marriage in a community</td>
<td>66% (n=2)</td>
<td>0.5% (n=1)</td>
<td>5.5% (n=12)</td>
<td>12.3% (n=27)</td>
<td>80.1% (n=177)</td>
<td>100% (n=219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin be jine marriages cause social problems</td>
<td>66% (n=142)</td>
<td>26% (n=53)</td>
<td>5.1% (n=11)</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>100% (n=216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brideprice demeans women by treating them like property</td>
<td>45% (n=98)</td>
<td>11.5% (n=25)</td>
<td>8.3% (n=18)</td>
<td>10.1% (n=22)</td>
<td>25% (n=54)</td>
<td>100% (n=217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brideprice is a mark of respect for a bride and her family</td>
<td>8.9% (n=19)</td>
<td>16.4% (n=35)</td>
<td>8.9% (n=19)</td>
<td>26.8% (n=57)</td>
<td>39% (n=83)</td>
<td>100% (n=213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage is a business arrangement between two families rather than a relationship between two people</td>
<td>3.3% (n=7)</td>
<td>1.9% (n=4)</td>
<td>5.2% (n=11)</td>
<td>19.8% (n=42)</td>
<td>69.8% (n=148)</td>
<td>100% (n=212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is better for a couple to start their life together in their own home, if this is possible</td>
<td>76% (n=162)</td>
<td>19.7% (n=42)</td>
<td>0.9% (n=2)</td>
<td>1.9% (n=4)</td>
<td>1.4% (n=3)</td>
<td>100% (n=213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people are under a lot of pressure from their parents</td>
<td>10.5% (n=24)</td>
<td>23.7% (n=54)</td>
<td>6.14% (n=14)</td>
<td>32.5% (n=74)</td>
<td>27.2% (n=62)</td>
<td>100% (n=228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prompt</td>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when it comes to marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people have too much freedom these days</td>
<td>11% (n=24)</td>
<td>43.3% (n=94)</td>
<td>8.3% (n=18)</td>
<td>30.9% (n=67)</td>
<td>6.5% (n=14)</td>
<td>100% (n=217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people elope because their families are too controlling</td>
<td>11.7% (n=25)</td>
<td>25.4% (n=54)</td>
<td>15% (n=32)</td>
<td>31.5% (n=67)</td>
<td>16.4% (n=35)</td>
<td>100% (n=213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples who elope are thoughtless and selfish</td>
<td>15% (n=32)</td>
<td>27.7% (n=59)</td>
<td>25.8% (n=55)</td>
<td>23.9% (n=51)</td>
<td>7.5% (n=16)</td>
<td>100% (n=213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents know what is best for their children and do not need to get their permission when arranging marriage</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>0.9% (n=2)</td>
<td>36% (n=77)</td>
<td>58.4% (n=125)</td>
<td>100% (n=214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should consult with young people before they arrange a marriage</td>
<td>67.3% (n=148)</td>
<td>28.2% (n=62)</td>
<td>2.3% (n=5)</td>
<td>0.5% (n=1)</td>
<td>1.8% (n=4)</td>
<td>100% (n=220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A husband should take charge of his family</td>
<td>9.6% (n=21)</td>
<td>32% (n=70)</td>
<td>6.8% (n=15)</td>
<td>39% (n=85)</td>
<td>12.4% (n=27)</td>
<td>100% (n=218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s most important role is providing financial support to their families</td>
<td>6.3% (n=14)</td>
<td>21.6% (n=48)</td>
<td>6.8% (n=15)</td>
<td>44.6% (n=99)</td>
<td>20.7% (n=46)</td>
<td>100% (n=222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s most important roles is as mothers and housewives</td>
<td>7% (n=16)</td>
<td>11.4% (n=26)</td>
<td>5.2% (n=12)</td>
<td>38% (n=87)</td>
<td>38.4% (n=88)</td>
<td>100% (n=229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be able to work outside the home if they wish to do so</td>
<td>54.7% (n=116)</td>
<td>34.9% (n=74)</td>
<td>4.7% (n=10)</td>
<td>3.3% (n=7)</td>
<td>2.4% (n=5)</td>
<td>100% (n=212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands and wives should share their responsibilities without either of them taking overall control</td>
<td>57.8% (n=126)</td>
<td>34% (n=74)</td>
<td>2.8% (n=6)</td>
<td>3.7% (n=8)</td>
<td>1.8% (n=4)</td>
<td>100% (n=218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be virgins before marriage</td>
<td>53% (n=121)</td>
<td>17.1% (n=39)</td>
<td>10% (n=23)</td>
<td>10% (n=23)</td>
<td>9.6% (n=22)</td>
<td>100% (n=228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should not be necessary for women to be virgins before they are married</td>
<td>10.3% (n=22)</td>
<td>8.9% (n=19)</td>
<td>9.4% (n=20)</td>
<td>22.5% (n=48)</td>
<td>48.4% (n=104)</td>
<td>100% (n=213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.2: Univariate responses to attitudinal questions
3. Bivariate analysis of approval for HBV

For the purposes of this analysis, the category 'HBV approvers' was made by combining respondents who agreed or agreed strongly with the statement 'Violence may sometimes be justified if a person has brought shame to their family'. Correlations with a p-value < 0.05 are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-approval</th>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A husband should take charge of his family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>46.2% (n=78)</td>
<td>92% (n=46)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 60.056$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>53.8% (n=91)</td>
<td>8% (n=4)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namûs is the basis of a moral society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>53.6% (n=81)</td>
<td>85.1% (n=40)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 27.167$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>46.4% (n=70)</td>
<td>14.9% (n=7)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s most important roles are as mothers and housewives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>17.3% (n=30)</td>
<td>40% (n=20)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 25.19$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>82.7% (n=173)</td>
<td>60% (n=30)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples should not have any kind of relationship before marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>20.5% (n=35)</td>
<td>43.4% (n=23)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 24.804$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>79.5% (n=136)</td>
<td>56.6% (n=30)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our society, honour comes from controlling all the women in a family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>45.6% (n=77)</td>
<td>71.7% (n=38)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 21.266$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>54.4% (n=92)</td>
<td>28.3% (n=15)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be virgins before marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>76% (n=127)</td>
<td>96.3% (n=52)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 17.963$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>24% (n=40)</td>
<td>3.7% (n=2)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people have too much freedom these days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>55.1% (n=92)</td>
<td>77.4% (n=41)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 15.562$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>44.9% (n=75)</td>
<td>22.6% (n=12)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brideprice is a mark of respect for a bride and her family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>26.1% (n=43)</td>
<td>45.3% (n=24)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 14.973$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>73.9% (n=122)</td>
<td>54.7% (n=29)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should not be necessary for women to be virgins before they are married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly</td>
<td>23% (n=37)</td>
<td>5.6% (n=3)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 13.940$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly</td>
<td>77% (n=124)</td>
<td>94.4% (n=51)</td>
<td>$p = &lt;0.001$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10.3: Bivariate analysis of approval for HBV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Arrangement Comparison</th>
<th>Non-approval</th>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Families make better choices when they arrange marriages than individuals would do on their own behalf</strong></td>
<td>12.3% (n=20) 87.7% (n=142)</td>
<td>27.7% (n=13) 72.3% (n=34)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 14.348 )  ( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Where honour has been compromised, a family which does not respond will be excluded from the community until some action has been taken</strong></td>
<td>53% (n=70) 47% (n=62)</td>
<td>71.4% (n=30) 28.6% (n=12)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 8.371 )  ( p = 0.004 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>55.2% (n=95) 44.8% (n=77)</td>
<td>70.9% (n=39) 29.1% (n=16)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 8.036 )  ( p = 0.005 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men’s most important role is providing financial support to their families</strong></td>
<td>27.9% (n=48) 72.1% (n=124)</td>
<td>42.3% (n=22) 57.7% (n=30)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 7.683 )  ( p = 0.006 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Couples who elope are thoughtless and selfish</strong></td>
<td>56.5% (n=74) 43.5% (n=57)</td>
<td>72.5% (n=29) 27.5% (n=11)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 6.006 )  ( p = 0.014 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arranged marriages have no place in a modern society</strong></td>
<td>69.3% (n=113) 30.7% (n=50)</td>
<td>57.7% (n=30) 42.3% (n=22)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 4.859 )  ( p = 0.027 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
<td>65% (n=119) 35% (n=64)</td>
<td>53.6% (n=30) 46.4% (n=26)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 4.657 )  ( p = 0.031 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arranged marriage is a valuable tradition</strong></td>
<td>17.5% (n=29) 82.5% (n=137)</td>
<td>27.7% (n=13) 72.3% (n=34)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 4.721 )  ( p = 0.03 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Young people are under a lot of pressure from their parents when it comes to marriage</strong></td>
<td>33.5% (n=57) 66.5% (n=113)</td>
<td>44.2% (n=23) 55.8% (n=29)</td>
<td>( \chi^2 = 3.849 )  ( p = 0.05 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Bivariate analysis of the experience of HBV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>No HBV experience</th>
<th>HBV experience</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Families make better choices when they arrange marriages than individuals would do on their own behalf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>1.8% (n=1)</td>
<td>13% (n=7)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 8.572$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>98.2% (n=107)</td>
<td>87% (n=47)</td>
<td>$p = 0.006$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where honour has been compromised, a family which does not respond will be excluded from the community until some action has been taken</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>44.4% (n=36)</td>
<td>66.7% (n=28)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 5.472$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>55.6% (n=45)</td>
<td>33.3% (n=14)</td>
<td>$p = 0.006$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage is a business arrangement between two families rather than a relationship between two people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.8% (n=3)</td>
<td>15.2% (n=7)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 8.009$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>97.2% (n=103)</td>
<td>84.8% (n=39)</td>
<td>$p = 0.009$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin be jine marriages cause social problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>99.1% (n=106)</td>
<td>89.8% (n=44)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 7.809$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>0.9% (n=1)</td>
<td>10.2% (n=5)</td>
<td>$p = 0.012$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>72.5% (n=79)</td>
<td>54.7% (n=29)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 5.062$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-urban</td>
<td>27.5% (n=30)</td>
<td>45.3% (n=24)</td>
<td>$p = 0.02$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people are under a lot of pressure from their parents when it comes to marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>28.5% (n=30)</td>
<td>46.9% (n=23)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 4.993$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>71.4% (n=75)</td>
<td>53.1% (n=36)</td>
<td>$p = 0.021$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our society, 'honour' comes from controlling all the women in a family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>38.8% (38)</td>
<td>53.8% (28)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 3.132$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>61.2% (60)</td>
<td>46.2 (24)</td>
<td>$p = 0.055$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents arrange marriage in their own interests rather than that of their children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>18.1% (19)</td>
<td>31.2% (15)</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 3.298$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree strongly</td>
<td>81.9% (86)</td>
<td>68.8% (33)</td>
<td>$p = 0.056$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.4: Bivariate analysis of HBV experience

Results in the bottom two rows of the table do not meet the 0.05 standard of significance, yet have been reported due to their near-significance and interest value.
## 5. ANOVA analysis of attitudinal data against marriage consent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>MCV (Male)</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>MCV (Female)</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women should be virgins before marriage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.3035</td>
<td>0.61527</td>
<td>2.0605</td>
<td>0.65287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3949</td>
<td>0.58518</td>
<td>2.4488</td>
<td>0.53838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Couples should not have any kind of relationship before marriage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.2750</td>
<td>0.62788</td>
<td>1.8910</td>
<td>0.66586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3673</td>
<td>0.60469</td>
<td>2.2549</td>
<td>0.63399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>It should not be necessary for women to be virgins before they are married</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.4596</td>
<td>0.62833</td>
<td>2.4524</td>
<td>0.64467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3171</td>
<td>0.59784</td>
<td>2.0794</td>
<td>0.62476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s role is as housewives and mothers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.3253</td>
<td>0.68865</td>
<td>1.8700</td>
<td>0.70278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3348</td>
<td>0.59330</td>
<td>2.2352</td>
<td>0.63925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brideprice is a mark of respect for a bride and her family</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.3207</td>
<td>0.52462</td>
<td>1.9222</td>
<td>0.64886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3878</td>
<td>0.60721</td>
<td>2.2391</td>
<td>0.63688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honour should not be related to the control of women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.3848</td>
<td>0.61857</td>
<td>2.2111</td>
<td>0.66035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.2805</td>
<td>0.45570</td>
<td>1.8597</td>
<td>0.67391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Young people are under a lot of pressure from their parents when it comes to marriage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.1953</td>
<td>0.65697</td>
<td>2.0890</td>
<td>0.65668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.4190</td>
<td>0.56647</td>
<td>2.2371</td>
<td>0.64487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>2.3055</td>
<td>0.64882</td>
<td>2.2262</td>
<td>0.63190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-urban</td>
<td>2.3167</td>
<td>0.58915</td>
<td>2.0176</td>
<td>0.67875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Families make better choices when they arrange marriages than individuals would do on their own behalf</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.1979</td>
<td>0.63016</td>
<td>1.8854</td>
<td>0.79517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3916</td>
<td>0.61635</td>
<td>2.2404</td>
<td>0.63498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90 MCV stands for the Marriage Consent Variable as described on page 306
### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MCV^a (Male)</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>MCV (Female)</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Namú is the basis of a moral society</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.2617</td>
<td>0.61790</td>
<td>2.1188</td>
<td>0.64006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.4678</td>
<td>0.55394</td>
<td>2.2706</td>
<td>0.67074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f=3.854</td>
<td>p=0.052</td>
<td>f=1.725</td>
<td>p=0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence may sometimes be justified if a</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>person has brought shame to their family</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree strongly</td>
<td>2.2521</td>
<td>0.62229</td>
<td>2.0319</td>
<td>0.69642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/disagree strongly</td>
<td>2.3848</td>
<td>0.60183</td>
<td>2.2565</td>
<td>0.62564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f=1.335</td>
<td>p=0.250</td>
<td>f=3.687</td>
<td>p=0.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.5: ANOVA analysis of attitudinal data against marriage consent

Results in the bottom two rows of the table do not meet the 0.05 standard of significance, yet have been reported due to their near-significance and interest value.