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**Abstract:** This study explores the formative origins of youth justice policy and the discursive process of mandate-seeking in party manifestos in Westminster elections. Analysis of issue-salience and policy framing reveals: party politicization, a significant increase in issue-salience from the 1990s onwards, and a shifting structural policy narrative with inherent contestation and contradictions. The past decade has seen some attempts to revisit pre-1970s welfarist approaches following an extended emphasis on criminalization, incarceration and punishment. This discursive shift has presaged an impressive reduction in levels of incarceration and numbers sentenced, yet international and historical comparative data suggest party programmes need to place continuing emphasis on diversion if full compatibility with the UNCRC is to be secured.
Author Response to Referees’ Comments

I am very grateful to the two referees for their helpful and constructive comments. I’ve listed below the ways in which I’ve addressed each point. Apologies if it looks a little long-winded – I wanted to explain how I’ve carefully and systematically addressed every point. The paper is much improved as a result and I have added an acknowledgement at the end of the paper. Once again – thank-you.

Referee: 1

Comments to the Author

The article deals with an important topic – and there is no doubt much more that might usefully be written about the politics of youth justice. The scope of the research reported upon is also promising dealing with elections from 1960 to 2010, and with a further election imminent, a rigorous analysis of historical tendencies would provide a context in which those interested in youth justice could understand the likely consequences of that contest.

The article is however undermined by a number of serious weaknesses that, in my assessment, render it unpublishable in its current form.

1. The author makes a plausible case for analysing election manifestos as an indicator of electoral discourse and political agenda setting. However, the findings derived from that exercise appears to undermine that case in that, abstracted from any context, the analysis lacks a relationship to the complexity of the broader political, policy and practice dynamics that have framed youth justice over the relevant period.

Author Response

This is really helpful – thanks. As noted below – I’ve extensively refocused the paper – replacing the former analysis of aggregate framing patterns (i.e. breakdown of use of frames over the whole period 1964-2011) with careful attention to distinct narrative phases in the development of youth justice. This then situates the framing/ discourse into the political/ policy context as referred to by the reviewer(s).

a) The account presented – relying on the manifesto data – is one of a growing political salience attached to youth justice underpinned by the use of an increasingly punitive language. While that is undoubtedly a reasonable characterisation of part of the period under discussion, it simply does not do justice to the substantial political and policy sways that have occurred over the relevant time frame.

Author Response

Apologies – the first submission was heavy handed in concentrating on the punitive aspect. As the following points (below) explain, I’ve taken on board the reviewer’s helpful comments and the revised paper now outlines the twists and turns in the narrative – and
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importantly, moves away from criminalization and punitive policy during key periods – giving a more balanced view.

b) The reader would not pick up from the article, for instance, that far from the 50 years spanned by the article following a single increasingly trajectory of intolerance towards young people in trouble, that the 1970s were characterised by rapid increases in custody, albeit that intervention was often justified with a welfare gloss and that the 1980s saw massive reductions in the use of child incarceration which continued to the early 1990s. The remainder of that decade and the early 2000s witnessed an escalation in the use of custody which then remained relatively stable until to 2008. In the last two years covered by the article, there was a substantial decline which has continued in the period since.

Author Response

This is really helpful – thank-you. As noted, I’ve made a major change to the structure of the paper to address this point. I have fully taken on board the criticism re. the complexity of the broader political, policy and practice dynamics.

In response I’ve restructured the paper using structural narrative analysis (Peterson and McCabe, 1983) as it’s an ideally-suited framework to pick out the twists and turns in YJ policy - linking them to the political context. I’ve used the periodization set out by the reviewer. Instead of, as before, aggregate discussions of framing over the whole 5 decades, the paper summarises the framing in each period.

For accessibility I’ve captured this in the (new) Table 1 – which provides illustrations of the discourse from each of the periods - and I’ve linked this through commentary, to the wider literature.

I’ve substantially updated the literature cited (20+ new references) – in order to address the foregoing point – and offer a more balanced view.

Additional Citations:


Ministry of Justice (2014) Youth Justice Statistics - 2012/13
England and Wales, Youth Justice Board/ Ministry of Justice
Statistics Bulletin, London, MoJ/ YJB.

and the Rediscovery of “Authoritarian Popularism”’, Chapter 5 in J.
Pilcher and S. Wagg (eds) Thatcher’s Children?: Politics, Childhood

NY: Plenum.

Smith, D. and Utting, D. (2011) Reforming the response to youth
crime: from evidence to implementation, Journal of Children’s
Services, 6, 2, 67 – 76.

c) The author also discerns in the data an increasingly interventionist stance towards children who
break the law. If that is so, it would appear to demonstrate the tenuous nature of the links between
manifestos and policy and practice since the 1980s and the present conjuncture are notable for the
high level commitment to diversion, manifested in both periods, by very sharp falls in the number of
children entering the formal and in particular being subject to prosecution. Again the reader would
struggle to find any acknowledgement of that reality.

Author Response
This is really helpful – thanks. I have carefully amended the text
of the revised paper in the ‘Structural Policy Narrative’ section to
note the high level commitment to diversion, manifested in both
periods referred to.

d) Rather than simply representing the data as objective facts that describe the political reality, the
article accordingly needs to mediate the statistical and discourse analysis through what we know
actually happened if it is to help explain (or even accurately reflect) developments.

Author Response
In the restructured paper I’ve now made connections between the
discourse and policy developments.

2. Part of the difficulty resides in the selective nature of the literature review which the author uses
to develop a narrative of increasing punitivism. Almost all the materials cited were published
between the mid 1990s and 2002 during which time many critical authors were – with some
justification – describing the impact of the punitive turn and the politicisation of youth crime. That
account fitted with that period, but cannot necessarily be extended in either direction. John Pitts’
the New Politics of Youth Crime, which deals with the New Labour experience is for instance cited,
but his earlier work published in 1998 – which argues that youth crime under Thatcher was
depoliticised is not mentioned. Similarly, although Haines and Drakeford’s 1998 book is referenced,
one would not know that much of the content was describing what they consider to be the many
successes of youth justice in the period up to the early 1990s in terms of establishing a philosophy of

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/yjj
minimum intervention. Strangely, perhaps, the author does not refer to perhaps the best known series of writings on politics and crime by David Downes and Rod Morgan in successive volumes of the Oxford Handbook on Criminology which trace in some detail the contours of changing political responses to law and order and recognises that in many ways that the 2010 election was significantly less focused around a punitive agenda that previous electoral contests. In the most recent of that book, Rod Morgan and Tim Newburn detail the rediscovery of ‘devolution, discretion and diversion’ so far as youth justice is concerned in the final years of the Labour government and the run up to the last election.

Author Response

Again, this is really helpful – thank-you. I’ve substantially updated the literature cited – in order to address the foregoing point – and offer a more balanced view/ reflect the subtleties and twists and turns – not least the most recent move away from earlier punitive approaches – and I’ve updated the references.

Added References:


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3. Given this literature, the data in figures 1 and 2 which show that the salience of youth justice was considerably greater than at any previous election since 1964 comes as something of a surprise – and is rather counterintuitive. It would be appropriate for the author to acknowledge that fact.

**Author Response**

I’ve amended the text to address this point:

Additional text:

They are also striking because the 2010 election was significantly less focused around a punitive agenda that previous electoral contests, yet youth justice continues to be a prominent issue. An underlying explanation here being public attitudes – and parties’ attempts to be seen to be addressing continuing fear and anxiety over youth crime from key sections of the electorate, groups parties need to engage if they are to secure electoral success (Jacobson and Kirby, 2012).

Additional reference:


It would perhaps also help if the article was a little bit clearer about the mechanism by which incidents of ‘salience’ are counted. A quick search of the Labour and Tory 2010 manifestos for instance show there is (between them) just one reference to youth crime and none to youth offending (although Labour notes that youth reoffending has fallen). Each manifesto has one reference to young offenders but in the Conservative document this is in the context of providing help. There are several references to anti-social behaviour but few of these are specific to young people and where they are Labour indicate that they intend to provide support and the Conservatives that they will provide mechanisms to allow the police to deal with it without criminalising the child. (The author quotes the relevant passage but chooses to omit this conclusion to the sentence.) None of this is obviously consistent with the data shown in figures 1 and 2.

The methodology describes a range of ‘frames’ but it is not totally clear whether occurrences are only counted if they relate to youth crime or youth offending (although the author implies this). For instance, simply logging instances of ‘partnership or multi-agency working’ generates a much higher count, but many the references in the latest manifestos are not in the context of addressing crime and certainly not youth crime. Even where the frames are more obviously to do with crime – such as ‘revising the law / increasing penalties’ – they are not necessarily indicative of an approach to youth justice – and the former half of the frame could of course be referring to introducing more lenient approaches. Similarly, to suppose that references to ‘family support, rehabilitation and addressing social causes’ is indicative of a more punitive climate is questionable.
In this context, the paper should be clearer about what the data actually show.

**Author Response**

Apologies. I didn’t do a good enough job in the earlier version. I’ve clarified this in the Methods section. So for example with the 2010 manifestos references to content like ‘Cadet forces will move increasingly into state schools and we will expand spare time activities for young people, doubling those available – including sport – on Friday and Saturday nights, with neighbourhood police teams closely involved in areas where youth crime is highest’ – contains quasi-sentences under ‘proaction/ early intervention’ to prevent youth crime. Likewise, ‘Youth reoffending is now falling, and the numbers in youth custody have fallen by 30 per cent. We will expand US-style street teams which use youth pastors and vetted ex-offenders to reach out to disaffected young people’ etc.

**Added/ clarifying text:**

The references analysed refer to quasi-sentences on youth crime or youth offending. They were identified using signifiers and context. Thus exhaustive searches of the manifesto text using key signifiers associated with youth justice – ‘youth’, ‘child’ ‘young’ (person/people), juvenile etc. – allowed the quasi-sentences to be identified. In addition, the context of references was also important – for example where, seemingly generic references were proximate to youth justice-related manifesto sections and sub-headings (e.g. ‘Tackling Youth Crime’). Dividing the manifestos using quasi-sentences controlled for long sentences that contain several policy proposals.

4. The use of data as evidence is also a little idiosyncratic. For instance on page 17, the author describes what is, at first sight, a debate between the three political parties on the effectiveness of their opponents’ crime policies. But the quotations used each come from different elections and accordingly in very different political contexts. To present them as a dialogue would seem to be inappropriate. The use of quotations similarly has no sense of history or chronology; so on page 18, for instance, Goldson’s 1997 assessment that youth justice policy making has been shaped by conditions of moral panic is evidenced the Conservative manifesto from 1979. Similarly, on page 14, two quotations are presented alongside each other from manifestos published in 1964 and 2005 without any recognition of the different context in which the passages originated.

**Author Response**

I didn’t do a good enough job explaining this – I wasn’t really presenting these examples of politicking as a contemporaneous dialogue as such – but evidencing the way that the discourse featured such attacks and dismissal of opponents’ policies in order to secure ‘issue ownership’. I’ve taken these examples out of the revised version.

Re. chronology – I’ve removed the adjective ‘prescient’ in relation to Goldson – and added a note that the quotes used are illustrative of tropes yet underlining that each example is specific – contingent – and the result of the prevailing historical and political context.
5. There also some conceptual difficulties with the paper:

a) To characterise traditional Conservative policies as based on neo-liberalism is a little ahistorical
given that most commentators point to 1973 oil crisis as being the at which neo-liberalism as a
serious political / economic force emerged – some 13 years after the start of the period with which
the article deals.

**Author Response:**

I have amended the sentence – removing the reference to neo-
liberalism.

b) Eliding ideas of the social investment state with punitive early formal criminal sanctioning of
children is not an obvious connection

**Author Response**

This aspect of the text is removed from the revised paper.

c) Partnership and multi-agency working is singled out as one ‘frame’ that has become increasingly
salient and it is contended that it is an indication of successive government’s commitment to welfare
pluralism. A number of issues arise here. First, it is undoubtedly true that there has been a shift
towards reduced state intervention in welfare – and that this has impacted more significantly on
criminal justice since 2010 with the Coalitions’ transforming rehabilitation agenda. But neither of the
quotations adduced to support the salience of the frame make any reference to anything that could
be regarded as pluralism in this sense. Second, partnership working in youth justice has, arguably,
been more a reflection of what John Pratt calls the corporatist model of youth justice, in which
managerialism plays a key role. Youth offending teams are for example statutory partnerships and
even the Coalition has no current (published) plans to change that arrangement. Third, while
managerialism may be a concomitant of increased punitivism, it is not a necessary correlate. In this
context, the author appears to misunderstand what Pitts has in mind when he talks of Korrectional
Karaoke. Although the phenomenon he describes takes place against the background of ‘increasing
penalties’, Pitts’ point is a rather different one that relates to deprofessionalisation associated with
top down performance measures and targets.

**Author Response**

Apologies ‘non-state provision’ is a better/ more accurate label
I’ve amended the text accordingly. I’ve replaced the quotes referred
to. I’ve also outlined the economic driver behind the Coalition’s
use of non-state delivery. I’ve removed the Pitts reference to
Korrectional Karaoke in the revised/ restructured paper.

**Added Text:**
The prominence of the ‘non-state provision’ frame (e.g. ‘voluntary organisations and the private sector will be offered greater opportunities to deliver offender services’, Labour Party, 2005, 27) - is explained by Yates (2012, 436). He observes that ‘in youth justice, in a similar manner to the 1980s, the neo-liberal driver of reducing public sector spending, which had played such a significant role in the elevation of diversionary, decarcerative and decriminalizing philosophies’ – is, once again to the fore. Etc.

Added References:


In sum, while the article deals with an intrinsically interesting topic, provides material over an impressive time span, is quite well written and, in parts, persuasively argued, in my assessment some work is required before it could be accepted for publication.

Author Response

Once again, I’m really grateful to the reviewer for the helpful and constructive comments – the paper is much improved as a result.

Referee: 2

Comments to the Author
An interesting, thoughtful article on an important topic. However, I was very much left with the impression that the author(s) was rather unfamiliar with youth justice in England and Wales. It had the feel of an outsider's assessment of trends and changes. This is not a fatal flaw, but it does limit the extent of the insight.

**Author Response**

Many thanks – I’m v. grateful for the reviewer’s constructive comments and suggestions. In the revised version I have taken great care to deepen the analysis, and engage with a broader range of references in order to strengthen the insights.

The time frame is used somewhat oddly. There is an analysis of manifestos across the whole period and then the language is compared across parties. However, no account is taken - or appears to be taken - of when the particular phrases/language appear(s). This, surely, is important? That is to say, what the Conservatives or the Labour Party say is important, but when they say it is equally so. A key example would be ‘punitiveness’. The timing of the use of punitive language is surely key, but is barely reflected upon. Surely the analysis should be structured by time period, electoral cycle and so on. No sense is given, for example, of what parties say when in government versus what they might claim in opposition.

**Author Response**

Yes, this is really helpful. Thank-you. I’ve extensively restructured the paper. Gone are the aggregate discussions of different frames. Instead, as the reviewer suggests, I’ve restructured the analysis in relation to distinctive narrative phases – thereby allowing for engagement with the political/prevailing context in the way referred to.

I thought some of the citations were odd to say the least (by which I mean they were frequently not the ones that I’d have thought of had I been looking for work to support particular claims being made). That said, it is of course entirely up to the author to select what they feel is the appropriate literature in such cases. There are few things that are missing that I think it is difficult to justify having left out. Among these I would include the series of pieces written by David Downes and Rod Morgan in the Oxford Handbook which have become something close to the definitive overview of the politics of British criminal justice policy over the past quarter century. Second, Paul Rock’s BJC article on the early stages of criminal justice policy-making seems an odd omission given certain of the arguments in this piece.

**Author Response**

This is very helpful. I’ve drawn on Downes and Morgan’s excellent work in the revised version of the paper – and deepened the analysis by engaging with around twenty new references, many of which are more recent that in the first submission.

More particular comments:

p.5: "...youth justice is a valence issue". This is an unsubstantiated claim. I’d like to know what evidence there is for such a claim.
Author Response

In the revised version I’ve not engaged with the literature on valence politics – instead deepening the analysis on the discourse in relation to the narrative periods.

In the methodological section I’d have expected to find some discussion of how the coding was undertaken. What, for example, counts as a ‘reference’ to youth justice?

pp.6-9:

Author Response

Apologies. The methodology in the first submission as overly brief. I’ve now expanded/ clarified the methodology in the revised version.

I was surprised not to find much discussion of extant research using party manifestos (pros and cons). Is it a well-worn path?

Author Response

Apologies. The revised Methodology section now refers to the extant research using party manifestos. Yes, it’s a burgeoning area –with broad coverage in journals like Electoral Studies, Discourse and Society etc.

Amended text:

Comparative analysis of framing practices in different polities and tiers of government is a long-established methodological practice (Gould, 2000; De Vreese et al, 2001; Papacharissi, 2008; Aman, 2009; Edwards, 2012). However, it is acknowledged that manifestos have limitations as a data-source; not least because party policy proposals are also set out in speeches, debates, new media updates and other documents; yet they constitute the principal political texts that reflect a party’s priorities and issue positions thereby allowing systematic analysis over time.

Additional References:


Once again, my thanks to the two reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments.
Popularism and Punishment or Rights and Rehabilitation?

Electoral Discourse and Structural Policy Narratives on Youth Justice:

Westminster Elections 1964-2010

Abstract

This study explores the formative origins of youth justice policy and the discursive process of mandate-seeking in party manifestos in Westminster elections. Analysis of issue-salience and policy framing reveals: party politicization, a significant increase in issue-salience from the 1990s onwards, and a shifting structural policy narrative with inherent contestation and contradictions. The past decade has seen some attempts to revisit pre-1970s welfarist approaches following an extended emphasis on criminalization, incarceration and punishment. This discursive shift has presaged an impressive reduction in levels of incarceration and numbers sentenced, yet international and historical comparative data suggest party programmes need to place continuing emphasis on diversion if full compatibility with the UNCRC is to be secured.

Key Words Youth Justice, Policy, Issue-Salience, Manifesto, Elections, UK

Introduction

Effective youth justice policy\(^1\) is an internationally-held policy goal that spans a number of key issues and debates including community safety, the exercise of state power,
modes of citizenship, social cohesion, law, policing and social welfare (Jones, 2001; Junger-Tas and Decker, 2008). Whilst leading studies have charted the changing political context shaping youth justice policy in the UK (Piper, 2001; Smith, 2005; Goldson and Muncie, 2006; Smith, 2013), limited attention has been afforded to electoral politics. This is a key lacuna for as Armstrong (2004, 100) notes, ‘media hyperbole about children and crime, along with electoral politics, may well reflect a configuration of personal anxieties, competing social values and public policy options... that represents a crisis of governance far more than a crisis of ‘youth’’. Accordingly, the present study makes an original contribution by analysing electoral discourse and the level of attention (‘issue-salience’) and use of language (‘policy framing’) in relation to youth justice in party manifestos for Westminster elections (covering England and Wales).

The discourse-based process of mandate-seeking in election programmes matters to the development of youth justice because it constitutes the link between the representative process and policy development in liberal democracies. In this, manifestos serve multitude of functions. Inter alia, they: 1. provide substantive details of future government (and opposition parties’) policies; 2. show how parties compare in the priority they attach to youth justice; 3. reveal areas of inter-party conflict and consensus; and 4. provide insight into how policy is shaped by party ideology and contingent on local socio-economic and political factors. Overall, such a focus reveals the political use of language and discourse-based processes that underpin the development of public policy, thereby providing a ‘discursive benchmark’ to complement ex post analyses of policy delivery (Meyers et al, 1998). In short, it is a an
approach that engages with the rejoinder that the ‘wider social, cultural and political context [of youth justice policy...] needs to be considered’ (Case, 2007, 93, emphasis added); as well as the invocation that ‘academic analysts of youth justice need to remain ever-cognizant of both the extrinsic and intrinsic complexities of criminological research and the simultaneous play of politics’ (Goldson and Hughes, 2010, 211).

Accordingly, the current focus acknowledges the role of electoral discourse as an important indicator of political agenda-setting (Cobb and Ross, 1997). Moreover, attention to discourse and policy design recognizes the way that both institutionalize and legitimize particular types of governmental intervention in order to uphold law and order. And, furthermore that these empower some interests and exercise control over others, thereby creating a new context for future policy debates. This also provides insight into parties’ attempts to appeal to particular audiences at the time of elections. In turn, this two-way process shapes wider voting patterns and determines which policies are endorsed at the ballot box. The latter is explained by mandate and accountability theories (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Royed, 1994; Fearon, 2003). The former states that when in government parties should implement the policies that they pledged when running for office. In contrast, accountability theory asserts that elections are effectively ‘opinion polls’ on the performance of the party (or parties) forming the previous administration – and whether they delivered their manifesto policy programme (Przeworski et al, 1999).

In summary, the following discussion explores the contemporary development of youth justice policy by: 1. exploring changes in the issue-salience of youth justice since its emergence in the party programmes of the 1960s; and 2. examining policy framing in
manifesto discourse. Accordingly, the remainder of the paper is structured thus: a
discussion of the literature on the youth justice policy and electoral competition is
followed by an outline of the research methodology. The findings in relation to the study
aims are then presented. Their implications are discussed in the conclusion.

**Electoral Politics and the Formative Phase of Youth justice Policy-Making**

Over previous decades a series of moral panics (Cf. Cohen, 1972) about hooliganism and
anti-social behaviour led to growing political attention to youth justice (Ungar, 2001;
Pitts, 1988). As Goldson (1997, 79) noted, the policy agenda was shaped by ‘conditions
of ‘moral panic’ within which policy and practice has been refocused upon punishment,
retribution and the wholesale incarceration of children’. Thus as Allen (2002, 5)
concludes:

> the combined effect of increasing concerns raised by the most senior police
officers and elements from the judiciary; almost obsessive media interest in
crime with particular stress on violent crime, the sensational and the extreme;
and a developing sense of fear within the public, exercised a very substantial
influence over politicians and policy-makers.

This is a pattern replicated in other liberal democracies (e.g. Welch, et al, 2002; Krinsky,
2008). More recently, there has been a shift in approach. As Smith (2013, ix) explains:

> Much of the language has changed... practice has moved on. Perhaps now with a
greater emphasis on restorative approaches and less on monitoring and
surveillance (box ticking); disposal patterns have revealed a significant change of direction with the fallow years of the early 2000s succeeded by a very substantial decline in the numbers of young people formally processed and locked up.

Whilst these and other extant accounts chart developments in government policy on youth justice (Cf. Newburn, 1998; Tonry, 2004; Yates, 2012; Smith, 2013), limited attention has been given to the formative phase of policy-making and its electoral underpinnings using longitudinal analysis of salience and framing in relation to the programmes of the main parties’ competing for office in a given polity. When study has focused on youth justice policy and elections valuable reference has been made to: parties’ reconsideration of their policy positions in the wake of electoral defeat (Rutherford, 2000, 104); populism and the use of focus groups in setting party programmes (Pitts, 2001), media coverage of youth crime during elections (Franklin, 2002); and substantive policy developments (Downes and Morgan, 2012).

Accordingly, in order to address the absence of longitudinal work on manifesto discourse the following draws upon the electoral theory of ‘issue-salience’ (RePass, 1971; Robertson, 1976). This is a conceptualisation whereby pivotal importance lies not on party issue-positions but on the prominence and attention afforded to different issues in their campaigns; ergo the more an issue is emphasised by a party (making it ‘salient’), the greater the probability it will attract voters who share similar concerns. Traditionally, quantitative analysis has been used to explore this (Libbrecht et al, 2009; Volkens, 2001). The present examination takes a more holistic approach by combining this with an exploration of policy framing. Frames here are ‘a necessary property of a
text—where text is broadly conceived to include discourses, patterned behaviour, and systems of meaning, policy logics, constitutional principles, and deep cultural narratives’ (Creed et al, 2002, 37).

In electoral theory youth justice is a ‘position issue’ – meaning that parties differ in their views on what public policy should - and should not - aim to achieve; not least in relation to the severity of penalties imposed, and degree of emphasis on rights and restorative justice. *Inter alia*, parties’ contrasting issue positions reflect their ideological standpoint on the appropriate balance between the state and the market, their conceptions of the nature of contemporary citizenship, and the relative merits of statism versus *laissez faire* governance (Peck, 2008).

As the following discussion shows, the increase in salience in Westminster elections is a function of the party politicization of youth justice. This term refers to how issues rise and fall on the political agenda as parties compete for votes on a given issue (Carter, 2006). It is allied to the concept of ‘issue ownership’ (Petrocik, 1996), whereby parties prioritize certain policy issues, emphasize earlier policy successes and attempt to highlight party competence on a given topic - whilst at the same time dismissing rivals’ records. The underlying motive is to be seen as the ‘owners’ of an issue – thereby securing electoral and reputational advantage.

**Methodology**

By applying mixed research methods the current study responds to earlier calls for policy work to combine content and critical discourse analysis (Tonkiss, 2004).
Accordingly, issue-salience is determined by content analysis of manifestos. This is applied by recording the number of incidences of key words, ideas or meanings in party programmes (Krippendorff and Bock, 2008) and is complemented by frame analysis (Schön and Rein, 1994). The latter is concerned with how, as principal political texts, manifestos enable parties to construct (or ‘frame’) policy proposals on youth justice and other matters. In electoral terms, as Nelson and Oxleya (1997, 75) observe: ‘frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame’. In this way framing leads to political agenda-setting (Cohen, 1963; Cobb and Ross, 1997) and, ultimately, the substantive policies that are mandated.

Comparative analysis of framing practices in different polities and tiers of government is a long-established methodological practice (Gould, 2000; De Vreese et al, 2001; Papacharissi, 2008; Aman, 2009; Edwards, 2012). However, it is acknowledged that manifestos have limitations as a data-source; not least because party policy proposals are also set out in speeches, debates, new media updates and other communications; yet they constitute the principal political texts that reflect a party’s priorities and issue positions thereby allowing systematic analysis over time. Accordingly, as noted, electronic versions of the manifestos of the leading2 parties in UK general elections 1964-2010 were analysed using appropriate software.3

Thus, in the preliminary stage of the research, the manifesto texts were divided into ‘quasi-sentences’ (or, ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue,’ Volkens 2001, 96).4 The references analysed refer to quasi-sentences on
youth crime or youth offending. They were identified using signifiers and context. Thus exhaustive searches of the manifesto text using key signifiers associated with youth justice – ‘youth’, ‘child’ ‘young’ (person/ people), juvenile etc. – allowed the quasi-sentences to be identified. In addition, the context of references was also important – for example where, seemingly generic references were proximate to youth justice-related manifesto sections and sub-headings (e.g. ‘Tackling Youth Crime’). Dividing the manifests using quasi-sentences controlled for long sentences that contain several policy proposals.

Individual quasi-sentences were subsequently coded using a deductive coding frame (Joffe and Yardley, 2003) based on key topics and themes derived from the academic literature on the youth justice policy (See Figure 2). Thus, this schema incorporates a range of frames including: ‘increasing penalties/ revising the law’, ‘victims’ needs/ restorative justice’, ‘family support/ addressing social causes’, ‘rehabilitation’ and, ‘non-state provision/ multi-agency working’. Divergent views on the coding emerged in <2 per cent of quasi-sentences (N=472) (resolved by discussion between coders). Issue-salience was then determined by logging the frequency of quasi-sentences in a database of party manifestos.

As existing electoral studies reveal, over recent years party programmes have tended to become more detailed and have a greater word-length. This has potential methodological implications for any claims of shifting salience over time; not least because any change might be regarded as a possible function of increased manifesto length rather than greater attention to youth justice policy by the respective parties. To control for this the present analysis calculates references to youth justice as a
percentage of all quasi-sentences in each manifesto (i.e. quasi-sentences on all topics and issues; see Figure 1 – below).

**Youth Justice Policy in Westminster Elections 1964-2010**

*Issue-salience*

A survey of election manifestos from the first decades following the Second World War reveals that early party programmes failed to make specific reference to young people. The wider context to this is the prevailing ‘Buskellite’ consensus that saw parties fixed on issues of reconstruction, the economy and employment – such that limited attention was given to criminal justice in general (Downes and Morgan, 2012, 184). Youth justice finally emerges as a manifesto issue in Westminster elections in 1964. Thus, the Right-of-centre Conservative Party noted: ‘A Royal Commission has been set up to report on sentencing policies and the most effective methods for the treatment of offenders. We have asked it to give urgent priority to the growing problem of crime among the young’ (Conservative Party, 1964, 17). Subsequent pledges included, we will ‘preserve the Juvenile Courts and expand the methods available for dealing with the problems of young people’ (Conservative Party, 1966, 15). During the 1960s parties’ overall approach to youth justice was one of welfare-oriented social intervention (Cf. Doob and Tonry, 2004) – as, for example, embodied in the Children and Young Persons Act (1969) (for a discussion, see Harris, 1982).
Youth justice continued to receive limited attention in parties’ manifestos until the 1990s (just 14.7 per cent of all manifesto references were made prior to that decade). Subsequently there is a ‘step-change’ in salience in Westminster electoral politics. Just over a fifth (22.2 per cent) of references were made in the 1990s alone, 29.2 per cent in 2000s, and 33.9 in 2010. Over the period 1964-2010 the two main parties are broadly equal in the attention they pay to the issue. The Conservatives account for 45.5 per cent of references, followed by Labour with 44.8 per cent. The Liberals/ Liberal Democrats are responsible for just 9.6 per cent. However, these aggregate totals mask a key difference between the two principal parties. Prior to the 1992 election the Conservatives were responsible for almost three-quarters of quasi-sentences (72.8 per cent). Whereas Labour gave limited attention to the issue; they were responsible for just 16.3 per cent of quasi-sentences and referred to youth justice in just three of their eight election manifestos 1964-92.

The present data provide a clear indication of how, over the past quarter century, youth justice has become an increasingly important policy issue in UK politics. When the 1992 and 2010 elections are compared there is a six-fold increase in the number of references to youth justice. It is a political (re-)prioritization confirmed when parties’ youth justice references are plotted as a percentage of total quasi-sentences (i.e. on all topics and issues) in each election (Figure 1). These data are significant for they show that, from the 1990s onwards, it is Labour’s competition with the Conservatives
that drives the increase in youth justice issue-salience in Westminster electoral politics. They are also striking because the 2010 election was significantly less focused around a punitive agenda that previous electoral contests, yet youth justice continues to be a prominent issue. An underlying explanation here being public attitudes – and parties’ attempts to be seen to be addressing continuing fear and anxiety over youth crime from key sections of the electorate, groups parties need to engage if they are to secure electoral success (Jacobson and Kirby, 2012).

Structural Policy Narratives

The 1990s political (re-)prioritization of youth justice is accompanied by statistically significant differences in way that the three major parties frame policy proposals ($P=>0.05$): This is evident in the parties’ ‘framing profiles’ – a graphical illustration that depicts the percentage of party references to youth justice falling under each frame (Figure 2). Accordingly:

1. For the Conservatives the three leading frames in the Party’s discourse were ‘increasing penalties/ revising law’ (16 per cent), ‘pro-action/ early intervention’ (14.7 per cent), and ‘strengthening the police’ (13.4 per cent).

2. In contrast, for Labour they were ‘pro-action/ early intervention’ (20 per cent), ‘non-state provision'/ multi-agency working’ (18.4 per cent), and ‘family support/ addressing social causes’ (12.1 per cent).
3. In the case of the Liberals/ Liberal Democrats the three lead frames were ‘non-state provision/ multi-agency working’ (20 per cent), ‘custodial arrangements/ institutional reforms’ (18.4 per cent), and ‘pro action/ early intervention’ (12.1 per cent).

Greater insight into the role of parties’ contrasting language use in the formative development of policy is provided by structural narrative analysis. This is a technique borrowed from linguistics (Peterson and McCabe, 1983). It offers a temporal perspective of how frames as narrative devices, develop and become more or less prominent and persuasive over time (Kohler Riessman, 2008, 275). It shows how policy development - as well as political acts, are effected through, and need to be understood in relation to narratives (Maines, 1993, 20). Applied to the manifesto data it shows how the discourse shifts over time; in turn revealing the substantial political and policy sways that have occurred over the past half-century (Table 1.). Four periods emerge from the data. Each is discussed in turn.
The data underline how the 1970s were characterised by rapid increases in custody, albeit that intervention was often justified with a welfare gloss. The lead frame over the period was ‘increasing penalties/ revising the law’ (26.5 per cent), followed by ‘family support/ addressing social causes’ (20.6 per cent), the working of the ‘juvenile court system’ (17.6 per cent) and ‘custodial arrangements’ (14.7 per cent). As Muncie (2004, p. 259) cogently notes:

the recommitment to custody was based on three main factors. First there was the popular belief that the 1970s had witnessed a rapid growth in juvenile crime, characterised by a hard-core of “vicious young criminals”. Second, the tendency on the part of magistrates to give custodial sentences for almost all types of offence... The third was the role of welfarism in drawing juveniles into the system at an increasingly early age.

The discourse is typified by references such as, ‘a strengthened police force will be in the forefront of the continuing battle against crime. But additional measures are needed to tackle the growth in crime committed by young persons, especially in our towns and cities’ (Conservative Party, 1974b, p. 11). However, party accord did not endure. For, as Smith (2011, 11) observes, ‘as crime became more of a problem, cross-party consensus broke down and criminal justice policies began to appear in party manifestos and became the stuff of party political contest’.
1979-92

In contrast, 1980s saw massive reductions in the use of child incarceration; a pattern that continued into the early 1990s. Indeed the period to the 1992 election is regarded by analysts as one characterised by many successes in youth justice policy and practice; not least in terms of establishing a philosophy of minimum intervention (Haines and Drakeford, 1998). During this period almost a half (46.4 per cent) of all manifesto references fall under three frames; ‘family support/ addressing social causes’ (22.2 per cent), ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘parental responsibility’ (both 12.2 per cent). Whilst ‘custodial arrangements’ (27.4 per cent) is the lead frame, there is also a significant decline in the number of references to increasing sanctions (-11.1 percentage points).

Newburn (1996, 62) explains the varied discourse of the period: ‘during the 1980s, the Thatcher administrations – for whom punitive “law and order” policies were a central electoral strategy – adopted a series of policies which had the effect of reducing both recorded juvenile crime rates and the juvenile prison population’. Thus, for example, the discourse placed greater emphasis on the responsibility of parents as well as alternatives to custodial sentences. For example: ‘this Act makes parents more responsible for crimes committed by their children’, and ‘we shall set up more compulsory attendance centres to which the courts can send young hooligans’ (Conservative Party, 1983, 22). In part, this shift was driven by budgetary concerns and is part of what Pitts (1998, 9) describes as ‘a more or less “depoliticised” strategy of delinquency management” which aimed to handle offenders more efficiently and so more cheaply. As a result, they were also handled more humanely’.
The second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed an escalation in the use of custody – a pattern which then remained relatively stable until to 2008. The majority of references from this period (58.2 per cent) are couched in terms of a custodial criminalizing approach (and fall under the associated frames: ‘increasing penalties/ revising law’, ‘juvenile court system’, ‘custodial arrangements’ etc.). As Gelsthorpe and Morris (2002, 238) observe, ‘in the late 1990s into the new millennium other principles began to emerge, many of these reflect restorative justice principles’. Examples of this trajectory include, ‘young people who find themselves on probation for shop-lifting, vandalism or petty thuggery should be shown where the path of crime may lead. They should be given a brief personal experience of the nature of prison life... 'Joy-riders' will now face prison sentences of up to 5 years’ (Conservative Party, 1992, 29). There was also a hardening of Labour’s discourse. For example, ‘young men, commit about half of all serious crimes. We need a new approach to catch, convict, punish and rehabilitate more of them’ (Labour Party, 2001, 34).

From the mid-2000s onwards there has been a substantial decline in the number of youth offenders in custody. In part, this has been driven by a shift in the political debate in the wake of the Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Antisocial Behaviour (2010). As McIntosh and Phillips (2011, 30) note, this has seen ‘a new rhetoric around
crime, justice and anti-social behaviour which focuses more on rehabilitation than previous approaches... A move away from the more punitive vestiges of New Labour’s law and order agenda’ (McIntosh and Phillips 2011, 28). Thus, the last years of New Labour and run up to the 2010 election can be characterised as one where there has been a rediscovery of ‘devolution, discretion and diversion’ so far as youth justice is concerned (Morgan and Newburn, 2012, 490). It is a shift evident in the manifesto discourse where ‘non-state service provision’ is the lead frame (33.3 per cent), followed by ‘pro-action/ early intervention’ (26.8 per cent) and ‘family support/ addressing social causes’ (15.9 per cent). The prominence of the ‘non-state provision’ frame (e.g. ‘voluntary organisations and the private sector will be offered greater opportunities to deliver offender services’, Labour Party, 2005, 27) - is explained by Yates (2012, 436). He observes that ‘in youth justice, in a similar manner to the 1980s, the neo-liberal driver of reducing public sector spending, which had played such a significant role in the elevation of diversionary, decarcerative and decriminalizing philosophies’ – is, once again to the fore.

Against this backdrop it should be noted that, in many ways, the 2010 election was significantly less focused around a punitive agenda that previous electoral contests. As Downes and Morgan (2012, 190) suggest, this was also partly due to the pressing need to address the economic crisis, furthermore it was driven by Labour’s challenge to the Tories claim to be the traditional ‘party of law and order’. The shift towards reduced state intervention in welfare – and commensurate increase third and private sector provision has thus impacted more significantly on criminal justice since 2010. Notably with the UK Coalition government’s transforming rehabilitation agenda. Thus, for
example, the Ministry of Justice, National Offender Management Service, the Youth Justice Board and Probation Trusts awarded £53.7m of contracts to third sector organisations between May 2010 and October 2012 alone (Garside et al, 2013, 9). Such non-state provision has, arguably, been a reflection of what Pratt (2002) calls the corporatist model of youth justice, in which managerialism plays a key role.

[Table 2 – about here]

Tropes

Tropes form part of political discourse and cross-cut policy frames. As Fischer and Forrester (1993, 117) explain, they are ‘figures of speech and argument that give persuasive power to larger narratives [including policy frames] of which they are part’.

The present analysis shows a number crosscut the discourse. The data related to earlier electoral cycles support Goldson’s (1997, 79) assessment that policy-making on youth justice was been shaped by ‘conditions of ‘moral panic’ […] and] has been refocused upon punishment, retribution and the wholesale incarceration of children’. Accordingly, as Table 2 underlines, retribution and punishment are key tropes in the manifesto discourse. At their most extreme examples appear to disregard ‘due process’ and the possibility that defendants may be found not-guilty. For example, ‘at the moment about a third of all juveniles appearing before the youth courts are discharged without any punishment at all. This sends all the wrong signals to youngsters - particularly first time offenders - who then feel they can get away with crime’ (Conservative Party, 1979, 15).
Also particularly evident in the 1990s, is the prevalence in the discourse of pejorative descriptors under the ‘demonization’ trope supports Haines and Drakeford’s (1998, 34) assessment of political and media debate ‘habitually demonising young people and baying for ever more excessive punishment’. This trope was frequently employed by parties at the time. In a party political sense it is a valuable device for it allows social problems to be blamed upon ‘others’. The negative consequences of which are that this often encompasses marginalized groups - or those with limited access to power and redress. As Young (1999, 111) observes, it is a mode of politicking that may entail a ‘customary inversion of causal reality... instead of acknowledging that we have a problem in society because of basic core contradictions in the social order, it is claimed that all the problems of society are because of the problems themselves’. Allied to this is parties’ use of ‘fear’ (Bailey and Williams, 2000). Playing on popular fears about youth offenders is a further troubling aspect of the discourse owing to its de-sensitising effects. As Armstrong (2004, 113) notes, ‘the fear of crime is what strips us of our moral sensitivity. While crime is understood in terms of ‘risks’, our concern is with limiting risk rather than understanding and changing the world in which we live’.

The discourse of fear is heightened by the manner in which the party manifestos emphasise what they regard as contemporary policy failings and their associated social costs; both of which may contribute to moral panic. In the 1990s in particular, this trope was employed by both main parties in order to present their proposals as the solution to a prevailing malaise (Goldson, 1997; Moore, 2000). Use of the frame resonates strongly with what Young (2009, 4) refers to as ‘moral disturbance because of conflicts
in values’. These are most evident in the Right’s promulgation of ‘traditional values under attack’ (e.g. Conservative Party, 1987, 31).

Each of the foregoing are used as a rationale for the dominant pre-2000 trope of ‘punitive ness’ (cf. Hamilton, 2014). This is an approach described by Pratt et al (2005, xv-xvi) as one that:

in a number of ways, reverses long-standing traditions that had become hallmarks of modern democratic penal culture, while overseeing the introduction of sanctions that were, until recently, seen as incommensurate with its values [... or at least,] obeying a different set of values and cultural expectations from those that had previously provided the frame of reference under welfare state/penal modernity.

Examples of the latter include: ‘Young Offenders - A strengthened police force will be in the forefront of the continuing battle against crime... to deal more effectively with persistent juvenile offenders-for example, football hooligans-and the range of available institutions must be improved’ (Conservative Party, 1974b); and ‘cracking down on local disorder and anti-social behaviour... to deal with the “yob culture”’ (Labour 2001, 32).

A further trope, particularly evident in Labour’s manifestos after 1997, is that of ‘transformation’ (e.g. ‘transforming our approach to the young offender’, Labour Party, 1970, 18). This artfully removes the party concerned from the pre-existing political context. It resonates with the policy literature on responsibility-displacement and (non-)defence of earlier rounds of policy making (Gray and Jenkins, 1982; Boardley and
Kavussanu, 2010). It is revisionist in nature and gives the impression 1. that the party in question bears no responsibility for past rounds of policy-making, and 2. is offering a corrective and championing the cause of those suffering from the problems of youth crime by promising the wholesale reform of a dysfunctional policy and governance framework created by others (Cf. Walgrave, 2004).

‘Efficiency’ is the remaining trope. It is particularly prominent in the Conservatives’ manifestos of the 1980s, subsequently it also features in the policy programmes of New Labour following the party’s embrace of neo-liberalism. Its adoption reflects the pervasive language of managerialism resonant in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as parties’ keenness to extoll the benefits of ‘new public management’ (Cf. Hood, 1991; McLaughlin, 2001) as well as ‘best-value’ regimes (Stewart, 2002). For example, ‘Faster Justice - Justice delayed is justice denied... We are determined to speed up justice... the time taken to bring juveniles to court would be cut from 10 weeks to a matter of days’ (Conservative Party, 1997, 37). It is a trope that has gained renewed life in the context if the post 2007/8 economic recession.

Discussion

The present findings highlight the discursive underpinnings of the late-twentieth century rise in the issue-salience of youth justice policy in the main state-wide parties’ manifests in Westminster elections. Prior to the 1990s the data show how it received little attention in party programmes. During this era the political Right was the ‘owner’ of youth justice in electoral discourse, for throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s Left-of-
centre Labour Party paid scant attention to the issue; instead concentrating on other areas of welfare development (Pugh, 2011). From the 1990s onwards the analysis reveals the political (re-)prioritization of youth justice as an election issue as the two main parties competed in framing policy pledges in order to secure issue-ownership and colonise the political centre-ground.

The current study also reveals how the Conservative manifestos of the 1990s, together with aspects of the New Labour discourse, perpetuated and intensified pervasive popular politics of criminalization, incarceration and retribution (McVie, 2011). This endured through to the early 2000s, thus undermining earlier welfarist approaches to youth justice (Pitts, 2001). Subsequently, the use of custody remained relatively stable until to 2008. In the two years leading to the 2010 election there was a substantial decline in prosecutions and incarceration. This has continued to the present, for since 2009/10, there have been 55 per cent fewer young people entering the Youth Justice System and 36 per cent fewer young people (under 18) in custody (MoJ, 2014, 4). Over the past election cycle the manifesto discourse has instead emphasised a high level of commitment to diversion. On one level this might augur well. Yet, as Smith and Utting (2011, 71) note, problems remain – and these are fully not addressed in the party programmes. Not least the fact that, in their view, ‘the present system in England and Wales fails to resolve the tension between punishment and welfare in a coherent way... and it is incomprehensible to most young offenders’. Part of the blame here might be attributed to the framing practices of parties and the prevalence of ‘mixed messages’. In turn, this underlines the relevance of the present focus on the formative phase of politics, and in particular manifesto discourse and the electoral grounding of future
government policy. In this this parties find themselves facing the challenge of bridging
two conflicting priorities. Electoral necessity dictates the need for robust quasi-punitive
language that ‘plays well’ with the key sections of the electorate that the parties hope to
engage. Whereas, the policy shift away from the earlier punitive ‘turn’ of the 1990s has
resulted in a rapid drop in sentencing and convictions.

There is a further key point that emerges from this. Whilst the ‘direction of
travel’ of the past half-decade is wholly encouraging (compared to 2011/12 levels, there
has been a 20 per cent reduction in the level of youth incarceration). It is also the case
that the average custody population in 2012/13 (including 18 year olds held in the
youth secure estate) was 1,708 (MoJ, 2014, 10). From an historical viewpoint this is
approximately 50 per cent higher than in 1993 (Pickford and Dugmore, 2012, 93) and,
from an international perspective it is comparatively high (Hazel, 2008). The most
recent data relating to September 2011 (Council of Europe, 2013, 76, Table 2.2) reveal
that England and Wales still has the third highest number of inmates aged under 18
years of age in Europe (after Greece and Turkey).\(^\text{10}\) This would suggest the need for
parties’ to place greater emphasis on compliance with the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (Cf. Scraton and Haydon, 2002; Goldson and Muncie, 2006;
Muncie, 2008) and, heed the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s (2007: para. 10)
call (in relation to practice in England and Wales) that, ‘the traditional objectives of
criminal justice, such as repression/retribution, must give way to rehabilitation and
restorative justice objectives in dealing with child offenders’.

It is against this backdrop that the foregoing discussion points to a future
research agenda that builds on the current study and explores and number of associated
aspects of policy-making on youth justice and electoral politics. Topics for future study include examination of: 1. the effect of lobbying and public attitudes data on the shaping of youth justice policy pledges in party election programmes; 2. the internal party processes of agenda-setting on youth justice as parties draft their manifestos, including the role of individual political actors and lobbyists; and 3. the influence of youth justice policy pledges on voting behaviour.

In summary, the present analysis underlines that, from a criminological research perspective, future study of youth justice policy in liberal democracies needs to be cognizant of the formative origins of state intervention and the discursive process of mandate-seeking, issue-salience and policy framing in party election manifestos. Not only does this reveal patterns and processes of party politicization it also shows the parties’ shifting emphasis from popularism and punishment to rights and rehabilitation.

Acknowledgement

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References


1This paper follows Pickford and Dugmore’s (2012, 2) definition ‘The youth justice system in England and Wales caters for young people who get in trouble with the police who are aged 10-17 (inclusive)’. (Northern Ireland also has 10 years as the minimum age of criminal responsibility. In contrast, Scotland since 2011 will not prosecute below 12 years under the terms of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, provision 52.
2Defined in terms of share of the popular vote.
3Where necessary, hardcopy only versions of early manifestos were transcribed. The software used was Nvivo 9.
4A worked example of coding with quasi-sentences: ‘We will extend extra powers to the police for dealing with anti-social behaviour by young people and streamline the system of youth courts to make it far more effective’ is coded as one quasi-sentence under the ‘police powers’ frame, and one under the ‘juvenile court system’ frame.
59 incidences.
6Derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project, https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/
7ANOVA P=0.001769463, Df =2 , F. crit = 3.327654499
8These are non-discrete – they are based on general election cycles.
9Of the handful of references to youth justice in the manifestos of the 1960s the majority were in relation to ‘custodial arrangements/ institutional reforms’ (42.6 per cent), followed by ‘family support/ addressing social causes’ (28.6 per cent).
10Source: Table 2.2: Age Structure of Prison Populations on 1st September 2011: Minors and Persons Between 18 and 21 of Age (CoE, 2013, 76).
Figure 1. The issue salience of youth justice policy in the three main parties' general election manifests 1974 (Feb)-2010: Youth justice as a percentage of all quasi-sentences in each election (N= 3,060).\(^1\)

\(^1\) 1974 rather than 1964 is the start year in the Figure owing to availability of base data from the Comparative Manifesto Project from which the ‘all quasi-sentences’ data are derived.
Figure 2. Policy framing profiles: UK General elections 1964-2010 (All-party post-1964 total of youth justice policy quasi-sentences disaggregated by frame. Each party = 100%) (N= 472).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Narrative Phase</th>
<th>Examples of Discourse</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Rapid increases in custody, albeit that intervention was often justified with a welfare gloss</td>
<td>‘The courts must be enabled to deal more effectively with persistent juvenile offenders-for example, football hooligans-and the range of available institutions must be improved’ (Conservative Party, 1974b, 11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s - early 1990s</td>
<td>Massive reductions in the use of child incarceration</td>
<td>‘The Prison Scandal - The 'short, sharp, shock' has failed. As the Magistrate’s Association has recommended there should be a single youth custody sentence. Detention centres, already under-used by the Courts, should be abolished, and the accommodation released to be used for remand centres’ (SDP, 1987, 17).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early 2000s</td>
<td>Early 2000s witnessed an escalation in the use of custody which then remained relatively stable until to 2008.</td>
<td>‘It’s time to stop turning a blind eye to crimes committed by young offenders and ensure instead that they are put back on the right track. We will increase tenfold the number of places in Secure Training Centres - taking persistent young menaces off our streets’ (Conservative Party, 2001, 23); ‘Cracking down on local disorder and anti-social behaviour through local partnerships and measures to deal with the ‘yob culture’ (Labour Party, 2001, 21).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>Substantial decline in custody</td>
<td>‘We recognise the need for criminal sanctions like ASBOs and fixed penalty notices, but they are blunt instruments that often fail their purpose of deterring people from committing more crime. We will introduce a series of early intervention measures, including grounding orders, to allow the police to use instant sanctions to deal with anti-social behaviour without criminalising young people unnecessarily’ (Conservative Party, 2010, 56).</td>
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Table 1. Manifesto Discourse and the Structural Narrative of Youth Justice in England and Wales 1970-2010.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TROPE</th>
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<td>Retribution</td>
<td>’Tackle youth crime. We will widen the use of schemes that require offenders to repay their debt to society and to confront the consequences of their actions’ (Liberal Democrats, 1997); ‘As part of a community sentence, young offenders will be taken to see what life is really like inside one of our prisons - a sobering experience for them’ (Conservative Party, 1992); ‘Persistent juvenile offenders need to be properly punished’ (Conservative Party, 1997).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>[Parents] worry that... the dangers of being drawn into crime and drug use are growing. And they fear that passing our values on from one generation to the next is harder than ever’ (Conservative Party, 2001); ‘drink- and drug-fuelled violence... young people getting onto the conveyor belt to crime’ (Conservative Party, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonization</td>
<td>A hard core of persistent young offenders commit a disproportionate number of crimes. ... [we will] combat loutish behaviour’ (Conservative Party, 1997). ’We will increase tenfold the number of places in Secure Training Centres - taking persistent young menaces off our streets for at least 6 months’ (Conservative Party, 2001); ’We shall set up more compulsory attendance centres to which the courts can send young hooligans’ (Conservative Party, 1983); ’...deal with the yob culture’ (Labour Party, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral panic</td>
<td>‘The origins of crime lie deep in society: in families where parents do not support or control their children... where... traditional values are under attack’ (Conservative Party, 1987); ‘They offend again and again, laughing at the law and making their neighbours' lives a misery’ (Conservative Party, 1997).</td>
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<td>Punitiveness</td>
<td>‘Family Intervention Projects – proven to tackle anti-social behaviour – a no-nonsense regime of one-to-one support with tough sanctions for noncompliance’ (Labour Party, 2010); ‘Anti-social behaviour can be confronted. [...] with] genuine neighbourhood policing clearly focused on zero tolerance’ (Conservative Party, 2005); ‘we will experiment with a tougher regime as a short, sharp shock for young criminals’ (Conservative Party, 1979); ’We will be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime, and halve the time it takes persistent juvenile offenders to come to court’ (Labour Party, 1997); ’by cracking down on local disorder’ (Labour Party, 2001); ’We are piloting a tough new regime, with a heavy emphasis on discipline’ (Conservative Party, 1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>‘Transforming our approach to the young offender’ (Labour Party, 1966); ‘mostly young men, commit about half of all serious crimes. We need a new approach to catch, convict, punish and rehabilitate more of them’ (Labour Party, 2001); ’overhaul our youth justice system and improve Young Offender Institutions’ (Labour Party, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>‘... streamline the system of youth courts to make it far more effective... The job of the Crown Prosecution Service is to prosecute criminals effectively. There is strong evidence that the CPS is over-centralised, bureaucratic and inefficient’ (Labour Party, 1997).</td>
</tr>
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^The quotes used are illustrative of tropes yet each example is specific and the result of the prevailing historical and political context.