Liberation Propaganda:
Lebanese Media Campaigns against the Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon (1996-2000)

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This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration & Statements

This work has not been previously accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidate for any degree.

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Dedication

To the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, his support made my dream to pursue a PhD become a reality.

To my late tutor Geoff Mungham, who was the first to guide me towards looking into a new interpretation of propaganda in the work I did as a journalist.
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Abstract

On May 25th 2000 Israeli occupation forces withdrew from South Lebanon after 22 years of occupation. The role the Lebanese media played in achieving liberation has been regarded as significant. Media campaigns were conducted to unite the Lebanese people against their foreign occupier (the Israeli military forces) and in support of the Lebanese resistance in South Lebanon.

This study is a qualitative investigation into the culture and performance of Lebanese journalism in the context of the Israeli forces' escalating incursions against Lebanon and their encounters with the Lebanese resistance. It is a story about journalism told by a journalist, yet one who is using academic tools to narrate her story and the story of her fellow journalists. Necessarily, the ethnographic tale of Lebanese journalists' coverage of these events, and of their performance, has been narrated retrospectively and reflexively. Thus, it is a reflexive ethnographically informed study.

The culture and performance of Lebanese journalism has been examined within the framework of war propaganda. The objective has been to restore propaganda as a distinct generic entity and to claim a new understanding for it in the context of two conditions: foreign occupation and the struggle against that occupation. This study examines the media coverage of the two Lebanese TV stations, Tele Liban and Al Manar in just such a context of occupation and resistance to it. The first of the two television stations was considered to have started the campaigns I will call instances of liberation propaganda and the latter to have successfully continued them. To identify the characteristics of an alternative interpretation of propaganda this study will explore the historical, cultural, organizational and religious contexts in which the Lebanese TV outlets and journalists studied here operated and how these contexts shaped their professional practice and their news values. My argument will be that particular kinds and genres of journalism realise a positive form of propaganda in this particular context. This positive form of propaganda is what I call liberation propaganda.
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Chapter One: Introduction

On April 18 1996 I was there.
Children, women and old people lay in dozens, beheaded and eviscerated. They thought that sheltering inside the United Nations headquarters in the village of Qana might save their lives from indiscriminate Israeli shelling over their villages, but it did not. One hundred and six innocent souls were crushed. I remember how drastic and horrendous the scene was. I remember the villagers of Qana shouting at the camera, waving their hands in every direction asking us to film and tell the world what the Israeli army had done to the innocents, to their loved ones. I remember standing among the scattered bodies of guiltless people paralyzed by the horrors of what I was witnessing and the civil defence rescuers screaming at us to continue filming. I remember the UN soldier sitting in one corner and crying over a child he was playing football with before the Israeli bombs fell.

These strong memories have remained ever present, even years after the massacre took place. It became part of my collective memory as a Lebanese citizen and as a journalist.

Israel occupied South Lebanon for more 22 years between 1978 and 2000\(^\d\). In April 1996 the Israeli army launched a massive assault on Lebanon aiming at uprooting the Lebanese resistance (mainly Hezbollah- the Party of God), causing massive destruction across south Lebanon and committing massacres, killing and injuring hundreds of Lebanese civilians. For sixteen days I was positioned in South Lebanon reporting the Israeli assaults on the villages and cities of the south for Lebanese state-run TV. Tele Liban. It was not until the war was over that I was able to recognise the importance of the role we played as journalists in bringing people together, uniting them in support of their fellow citizens in the south and in support of the resistance fighters against the Israeli occupation forces. Broadcasting live images of shattered, innocent bodies of the Qana victims brought solidarity among Lebanese people to its climax. It was not until the war ended that I realised how the role we played as journalists was perceived as ‘heroic’ in the Lebanese press and among the Lebanese people.
I felt that I had fulfilled my duty as a journalist to report and inform the public of what was really happening in South Lebanon. The nationalistic and patriotic reporting was seen as part of my role as a professional journalist, but later I realized that it was those patriotic and nationalistic approaches that made my coverage of the events in the South and that of my colleagues ‘heroic’.

Being ‘heroic’ was not inimical to the idea that our coverage was proclaimed as professional and is still remembered as such years after. Roula Abdallah, of the daily Al Mustaqbal, wrote on March 29th 2007: ‘Zahera and her colleagues raised the audiences’ confidence in the Lebanese media to inform, [and] without the need to quote international agencies like Reuters or AFP’ (Abdallah, Al Mustaqbal, 29.3.07: 8).

What seemed to be the first national media campaign to have brought people together in solidarity against a foreign occupation force was followed later by a more structured media campaign conducted by Al Manar TV, the TV station affiliated to Hezbollah (the Party of God), the main armed resistance force in South Lebanon. Al Manar’s media campaign came to dominate the broadcasting environment of the country. They labelled themselves as the Resistance Channel, and had one aim in mind: making liberation of South Lebanon from Israeli forces achievable.

Between April 1996 and May 2000, when the Israeli army withdrew from South Lebanon, emphasis was put on the positive role the Lebanese TV stations played to achieve Liberation. Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, told Al Manar journalists after the liberation that, if it had not been for Al Manar, the resistance would not have achieved the liberation. The late Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, praised the role the Lebanese media played in leading the country towards liberation – and it was then that I felt the need to address questions on the role we, the Lebanese journalists, played in achieving that liberation.

The most poignant question to me was whether or not what was seen later as media campaigns could be labelled as propagandistic. If so, what kind of propaganda was it? Did it match with aspects of twentieth century propaganda models discussed in the
West? Did it meet all its criteria, techniques and principles? If it was propaganda, then what defined ‘our propaganda’? The aim of our media campaigns of both Tele Liban and Al Manar was to help in achieving liberation of our land from a foreign occupation force. Thus the propaganda we conducted, if shown, was propaganda with the aim of liberation and could be given the name *liberation propaganda*.

Additionally, there emerged a clear sense that we, the journalists, were deeply proud of the ‘objective coverage’ delivered, starting on the 11th of April 1996 till May 25th 2000, the Liberation Day. Nonetheless, what kind of objectivity were we adhering to? How do journalism’s norms and values fit with certain kinds of propaganda? Does objectivity apply in a propaganda campaign and what kind of objectivity would it be?

This thesis seeks to address these questions through exploring the following Lebanese media coverage as case studies:

1) How Tele Liban covered the April 1996 events by closely examining prime time news coverage.
2) Al Manar’s coverage of major military incursions and encounters between the resistance and the Israeli occupation forces in South Lebanon between October 1997 and May 2000.
3) Press commentaries on the above coverage.

Lastly, there are interviews with journalists, heads of news, editors and chairmen involved in the coverage during those five years were undertaken.

These tasks are performed within the framework of a reflexive ethnography. This study is a qualitative investigation into Lebanese journalism culture and performance in relation to the Israeli forces’ aggression against Lebanon and their encounters with the Lebanese resistance. It is a story about journalism told by a journalist, yet one who is using academic tools to narrate her story and the story of her fellow journalists. Necessarily, the ethnographic tale of Lebanese journalists’ coverage and performance will be narrated retrospectively. Thus, it is a retrospective ethnographic study.
The Lebanese journalism culture and performance will also be examined within the framework of war propaganda. As stated later, the objective here is to restore propaganda as a distinct generic entity (O’Shaughnessy, 2004) and to claim a new understanding for it in the context of two conditions: foreign occupation and the struggle against that occupation.

To identify the characteristics of a more positive interpretation of propaganda, this study will explore the historical, cultural, organizational and religious contexts in which Lebanese TV outlets and journalists (studied here) operated and how these contexts shaped their news values. This involves looking at particular genres of journalism, but as positive forms of propaganda.

In Chapter Two I will look into the work of some prominent scholars on propaganda to illustrate how propaganda takes different definitions and forms within different political, social and cultural circumstances. The chapter will present a history, definitions, principles and analyses of different notions of propaganda, as seen by different scholars at different times through the twentieth century and the beginnings of the twenty-first. It seeks, through demonstrating different researchers’ approaches to propaganda, to develop an understanding of the kinds of propaganda used in liberation contexts in particular. Therefore, understanding different approaches to propaganda will later allow an exploration and discussion of whether the media campaigns applied in Lebanon (against the Israeli occupation of part of its southern territories) match any of the propaganda notions illustrated here, and in what respects.

Chapter Three will look at how ethnography and the methodologies related to it are able to explore the contexts Lebanese journalists operate within and help achieve the suggested positive understanding of propaganda. To identify the characteristics of a new interpretation of propaganda this study will explore the historical, cultural, organizational and religious contexts in which the Lebanese TV outlets and journalists studied here operated and how these contexts shaped their professional practice and their news values. The chapter will try to establish how different cultural contexts might generate different understandings and implementations of the same set of journalism norms and news values.
Chapter Four offers a necessarily truncated account of the historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a story of the origins of the conflict and how it developed, and, within that wider frame, the Lebanese-Israeli conflict will be examined. The reader will gather that the historical account is narrated from an Arab perspective, though sources from all sides of the conflict are used. Thus, this particular perspective of the historical narration is intentional, since it is the account that most Arab people, including journalists, especially those living in countries proximate to Israel-Palestine, have carried in their collective memory, generation after generation.

Chapter Five sets the scene of the Lebanese television milieu and tries to establish the position of Tele Liban (TL) and Al Manar TV within the medium’s development. The chapter will provide a chronological account of this development, highlighting the reasons behind the two stations’ distinctive roles in the media war with Israel.

Chapter Six will present the ethnographic story of TL’s coverage during the April 1996 ‘Grapes of Wrath’ operation. It will consist of a reflexive chronological narration of 17 days of TV coverage of the Israeli’s military incursions, based on 40 hours of TL’s prime-time news between 11.04.96 (the day the Israeli assault started) and 27.04.96 (the day the assault ended). Thus, during this period, the performance of TL journalists, including my own, will be presented and examined in relation to theories and norms discussed in Chapters Two and Three. As a self-reflexive fieldwork account, this chapter also holds a personal diary of the April 1996 events, but one produced by transcribing and translating prime time TV news archive and head-notes – as discussed in Chapter Three, as well as coverage of events from press archives. Such a narration is also aided by interviews conducted with most of the TL journalists and administrators who were directly involved in the April 1996 coverage.

Drawing on the theoretical framework discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the chapter will aim at outlining the news values and norms that characterised the work of the Lebanese journalists in their coverage of the April events and the impact of the historical, social and religious context on the way they operated. Following this analysis, it pinpoints features and performances related to the propaganda notions and principles presented in Chapter Two.
Chapter Seven consists of a chronological narration and analysis of Al Manar’s coverage of ten major military incidents, mainly in South Lebanon, between 1997 and 2000, the Liberation year. Having close connections with Al Manar journalists, and being given access to their archives, helped in building the ethnographic story of their coverage. Narration is also aided by interviews conducted with these journalists and the administrators, who were directly involved in the 20 hours coverage studied here. Press archives from Israeli, Lebanese and pan-Arab papers are also used to highlight or support the stories told. These clips were collected from Lebanese newspaper archives and from two documentation centres in Beirut: the Arabic Centre for Information and the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation. This chapter also covers, in a separate section, Hezbollah media policies, strategies that are implemented through special units that have indirect connections with Al Manar TV. This section is aided by interviews with Hezbollah’s media personnel and press archive. Thus, the chapter studied what is essentially far greater than 20 hours of coverage.

Importantly, the performance of Al Manar journalists during the 1997 to 2000 period will be presented and examined in relation to propaganda principles and techniques and journalism’s norms of objectivity, neutrality, accuracy and impartiality that will be introduced in Chapters Two and Three. The narration will be produced by transcribing and translating the TV news archive.

Thus, this chapter will draw on the theoretical framework centred around the norms and values of journalism and their implementation during times of war. It will aim at outlining the news values and norms that characterised the work of Al Manar journalists in their coverage of major encounters between the resistance and the Israelis troops between 1997 and 2000 and the impact of the historical social, cultural and religious context on the way they operated. It will therefore seek to pinpoint features and performances related to the propaganda notions and principles presented in Chapter Two.

The chapter identifies similarities and parallels between Al Manar journalists’ performance and those of Tele Liban journalists during their coverage of the April
1996 events. Necessarily, the work relates concepts, actions and what is revealed by witnesses to the literature on propaganda.

In the Conclusion, this study aims at presenting the suggested definition, characteristics and understanding of liberation propaganda. What makes this study original in the field of propaganda is that no academic literature has been found on media campaigns operating with the same contexts as this study: foreign military occupation and the struggle against that occupation. Previous use of the term ‘liberation’ propaganda has been related to different contexts than this study. It was Gerhard von Glahn (1966) who first introduced the term in an article submitted to the journal Law and Contemporary Problems. His article talked of the use of propaganda for use in foreign countries, and as a device to abet and arouse ‘revolutionary tendencies’ and violence to overthrow the rulers. It is very important to distinguish this use of the term ‘liberation’ from the one I am developing. The propaganda this thesis is investigating is one that is conducted by domestic governments, alongside domestic liberation resistance movements, with the aim of achieving liberation from a foreign occupying army. Indeed, it could be said that the liberation propaganda I will describe is something like a domestic variant to von Glahn’s externally driven version. What I want to describe is a propaganda that seeks loyalty, and that binds citizens to their governments and their resistance groups in a common fight against a foreign enemy. The Lebanese media performance during Israel wars with Lebanon between 1996 and 2000 is presented here as a case study and an example of this. It is what Karl von Clausewitz would call ‘pursuit of an armed struggle by other means’ (cited in Thomas 1996: xi). This study sets out then to explore and identify the notion of liberation propaganda – which is argued as essential to understanding media behaviour in certain contexts.

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1 On the 25th of May 2000, Israeli troops completed their withdrawal from the majority of the occupied territories in South Lebanon, keeping a small piece of disputed land called Shebaa farms. The area is located at the junction of Syria, Lebanon and Israel. It is 14 km (9 miles) in length and 2.5 km (2 miles) in width. Israel claims it is Syrian land and Lebanon says it is Lebanese land. Syria says it is Lebanese, but has not supplied the United Nations with any written documents on the issue yet (see BBC News, 25.05.2000 and Chassay, The Guardian, 10.10.2006).
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt are the countries that have common borders with Israel-Palestine. The Israeli government code-named its operation after John Steinbeck’s famous novel ‘Grapes of Wrath’, rhetorically relating its operation with the theme of ‘fighting for existence’.
Chapter Two: Propaganda Review

Propaganda must be defined by reference to its aims (Bartlett, 1942: 6).

Barlett’s approach to propaganda hardly matches other scholars’ definitions of what propaganda is or how we identify it (see Ellul 1965; Taithe & Thornton 1999; White, 1939, Jowett and O’Donnell 1999). As this chapter will demonstrate, propaganda was seen throughout its existence in quite different terms, with some positive, but mostly negative connotations attached to it. However, none could claim a definitive description. By looking into the work of some prominent scholars on the issue, this chapter will try to illustrate how propaganda takes different definitions and forms within different political, social and cultural circumstances. The chapter will present the history, definitions, principles and analysis of different notions of propaganda as seen by different scholars at different times throughout the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. While this does not claim to cover all that has been written on the issue, it nevertheless aims to develop some understanding of different kinds of propaganda and particularly to think about the way the meaning of the word has been connoted both negatively and positively, historically, and in the literature. It seeks through demonstrating different researchers’ approaches to propaganda to develop an understanding of the kinds of propaganda used in liberation contexts in particular. There are clearly different kinds of liberation movements around the world, like insurgencies self-consciously aimed to resist or throw-off a dominant power, or liberation movements aimed at imperialism and colonialism (Algeria, Hungary, South Africa…) or indigenous liberation movements against nation-state formations (Indians in U.S. and Mexico, ethnic conflicts in Balkans…). However, despite the variety of contexts liberation could suggest, it is the Lebanese situation I am interested in and working towards. Therefore, understanding different approaches to propaganda will later allow an exploration and discussion of whether the media campaigns applied in Lebanon (against the Israeli occupation of part of its southern territories) match any of the propaganda notions illustrated here, and in what respects.
Histories and Definitions:

There is a tendency to think of propaganda as a relatively recent development and to associate it with the appearance of modern media, yet it has an extremely long history. Thousands of years before the invention of mass media in the modern sense, ancient civilizations and their successors could use the communications channels of their own particular era with skill and effect (Thomson, 1999: 1). Hatem (1974) went further to say that propaganda has been with us in one form or another throughout recorded time:

According to Driencourt, Aristotle’s book on Rhetoric provided “... the first surviving handbook of its kind of propaganda: the propaganda of persuasion by speech and oratory. The book remains a classic of spoken propaganda as technique” (cited in Hatem, 1974: 54).

Ancient and mediaeval understandings of the term were very different from today (Taithe et al. 1999), leaning towards proselytisation. In its strictest terms, propaganda referred to the activities of the papal body, the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Taithe et al. 1999: 1). The term did not exist until 1622. In this context, the term propaganda simply meant ‘extension, increase or enlargement’ (Currey cited in Taithe et al. 1999: 63).

Originally titled Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propagando, it grew out of a commission of three cardinals set up by Pope Gregory XIII (1572-85) to answer the needs of communicating with recently discovered lands and to promote the union of Rome and Oriental Christians (Kontler cited in Taithe et al., 1999: 97).

The word propaganda was not commonly used until the eighteenth century, when modes of persuasion employed by the supporters of the French Revolution were described as resembling Christian techniques of conversion (Currey, cited in Taithe et al. 1999: 64). Portalis, Napoleon’s minister of ‘ecclesiastical affairs’, revealed in his memorandum of February 1806 that civil ceremonies were ‘nothing’ if they were not ‘attached’ to religious ceremonies. For him, ‘only this would connect earthly events with heaven, and provide a mysterious and subliminal character to state occasions’ (Rowe, in Taithe et al., 1999: 123). Flora Taristan’s tour of France (between 1843 and 1844), calling for economic rights and the right to work and associate, has been described and analysed as propaganda.
In the study of her propaganda there is a hopelessness of both her aim and method. The aim was working for the salvation of the whole of humanity, the method was one woman touring France. The strenuous effort put into convincing her targeted audience was impossible to sustain. We could easily dismiss this case of Flora Tristan, apparently struggling against all the odds, as a fanatic who made no impact, until we realise that she did not disappear without trace. The force of her propaganda has gone beyond her short-lived campaign. It has been taken up by historians of feminism and given a new significance. Her evangelical spirit has endured (Cross in Taithe et al, 1999: 163).

However, Flora Tristan’s ‘propaganda’ was very different to the negative connotations attached to propaganda later in the twentieth century. According to Maire Cross (ibid), her message was not intended to deceive (and this understanding is important for this thesis because I want later to argue that propaganda can inform campaigns which work for positive ends and in honest ways). Propaganda in the Tristan sense was close to the original meaning; ‘active transmission or propagation of the faith was an inherent part of it’ (ibid: 154).

Also useful is Edward L. Bernays in his book Propaganda (1928), who fiercely defended ‘the fine old word, Propaganda’. He argues that the word in itself has certain technical meanings which, ‘like most things in this world, are neither good nor bad but custom makes them so’ (Bernays, 1928: 20). To illustrate his point, Bernays explored the different meanings of the word propaganda in Funk and Wagnall’s Dictionary and located four which happen to be related to the College of Propaganda at Rome mentioned earlier. However, one of the definitions stated that propaganda is the ‘effort directed systematically toward the gaining of public support for an opinion or a course of action’ (ibid: 21). Bernays (1928) believes that there has been no word in the English language whose meaning is as distorted as ‘propaganda’ and that the change or distortion took place during World War I.

... [I]n its true sense propaganda is a perfectly legitimate form of human activity. Any society, whether is be social, religious or political, which is possessed of certain beliefs, and sets out to make them known, either by the spoken or written words, is practicing propaganda ... Propaganda in its proper meaning is a perfectly wholesome word, of honest parentage, and with an honorable history. The fact that it should today be carrying a sinister meaning merely shows how much of a child remains in the average adult (ibid: 22).
True propaganda for Bernays is disseminating truth, and it only ‘becomes vicious when its authors consciously and deliberately disseminate what they know to be lies’ (ibid). Bernays identified this ‘vicious’ form of propaganda as ‘new propaganda’. Connelly and Welch (2005) agreed with Bernays’ argument in favor of sincere propaganda.

Between 1914 and 1918 the wholesale use of propaganda as an organized weapon of modern warfare transformed it into something more sinister – something to be ashamed of. Propaganda was now widely viewed as a pejorative term associated with lies and falsehood (ibid: xi).

On the other hand, what was known later as ‘modern political propaganda’ is, as White (1939:11) stated, an art which dates from the beginning of the twentieth century. In twentieth-century Western Europe the popular perception of propaganda focuses on the activities of governments and the state; here the meaning of the word propaganda changes and its sense is perverted by the developments of German and Russian totalitarianism or by its close links to advertising (Taithe, 1999: 1). Writing in 1926, Lord Ponsonby echoed the sentiments of many after World War I. when he wrote that propaganda involved ‘the defilement of the human soul [which] is worse than the destruction of the human body’ (in Taylor, 1995: 1). Propaganda has become something done by other, less scrupulous people; it is an enemy conducted by an enemy (ibid: 2). Thus, the term propaganda gained a negative reputation.

As one British Foreign Office official put it in the late 1920s, it is a ‘good word gone wrong’. We are all in fact propagandists to varying degrees, just as we are all victims of propaganda (ibid).

Political propaganda within contemporary life was generally first developed by the state, within the state, for its own inhabitants. Nevertheless external propaganda gained similar importance, and its neglect, as Bartlett (1942: 7) argued, may run any such group into serious danger. Bartlett was writing in the wake of the Nazi propaganda that reached its climax during World War II. This was the time when Goebbels (the mastermind of the Nazi’s propaganda) made it clear that ‘objectivity has nothing in common with propaganda, nothing in common with truth’ (cited in Thomson, 1999: 4). Goebbels statement dismisses any form of propaganda that is not related to deception. Such a negative model of propaganda is not appropriate to this thesis, which seeks to focus on the more positive definitions of propaganda.
As stated, the term propaganda did not see widespread use until the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was used to describe the persuasion tactics employed during World War I and those later used by the so called ‘totalitarian regimes’, and in this context, Laszlo Kontler charted the early uses of the negative understanding of propaganda, defining it as the attempted supremacy of an overpowering ideology (in Taithe et al, 1999: 14). This is also important to my argument here. I will want below to differentiate good and bad, defensive as opposed to offensive, and integrative rather than subversive, forms of propaganda.

Propaganda came to be defined as the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception. However, as scholars began to study the topic in more detail, many came to realise that propaganda was not the sole property of “evil” and totalitarian regimes, and that it often consists of more than just clever deceptions. Leonard W. Doob was one scholar who revisited his own definition of propaganda and rejected any clear-cut definitions:

Leonard W. Doob, who defined propaganda in 1948 as “the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behaviour of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time” (p.390), said in a 1989 essay “a clear-cut definition of propaganda is neither possible nor desirable” (p.375). Doob rejected a contemporary definition of propaganda because of the complexity of the issues related to behaviour in society and differences in times and cultures (Jowett et al. 1999: 4).

The word propaganda has changed to mean mass “suggestion” or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. As Pratkanis et al put it, propaganda has become:

… The communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of having the recipient of the appeal come to “voluntarily” accept this position as if it were his or her own (Pratkanis et al, 1991: 9).

In 1939 A.B. White explained that political propaganda had (during the nineteen-twenties and thirties) become the chief internal weapon of governments, employed not only to persuade a sufficient number of people that a particular course of action was expedient or right, ‘but to keep whole populations in a complete, and, it is apparently hoped, a perpetual emotional subjection’ (White, 1939: 11). Thus, as White described, the object of the propaganda carried on by many governments in that period was to
induce great masses of people to think alike and in the way desired by those governments (White, 1939: 23). By 1942, F. C. Bartlett adopted almost the same definition of political propaganda - as a process that aims, either wittingly or unwittingly, at producing whole nation groups in which all individuals think, act and feel alike ‘which has profound consequences’. However, Bartlett related achieving propaganda purposes to censorship:

For this aim can be realised only in so far as the population concerned can be guarded from other influences. A successful propaganda of this type carries with it a dominant and stringent censorship (Bartlett, 1942: 14).

The propaganda that Bartlett identifies appeals to a particular pride in a group or race, to the emotions and sentiments attached to strong symbols, to fear and anxiety, to the urge for dominance or submission, to greed and envy, or to what passes as legitimate social and political ambitions (Bartlett, 1942: 24).

Jacques Ellul in his famous book. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (1965/1973) speaks of several kinds of propaganda. He first divides propaganda into two kinds: political propaganda and sociological propaganda. For Ellul, the first involves techniques of influence employed by a government, a party, an administration, or a pressure group, with a view to changing the behaviour of the public.

The choice of methods used is deliberate and calculated; the desired goals are clearly distinguished and quite precise, though generally limited. Political propaganda can be either strategic or tactical. The former establishes the general line, the array of arguments, the staggering of the campaigns; the latter seeks to obtain immediate results within that framework (such as war time pamphlets and loud speakers to obtain the immediate surrender of the enemy) (Ellul, 1965/1973: 62)

He defines sociological propaganda as the penetration of an ideology by means of its sociological context:

Through the medium of economic and political structures a certain ideology is established, which leads to the active participation of the masses and the adaptation of individuals. The important thing is to make the individual participate actively and to adapt him as much as possible to a specific sociological context (Ellul, 1965/1973: 64).
In addition, Ellul identifies eight other kinds of propaganda. He starts with the propaganda of agitation, an often subversive propaganda that has the stamp of opposition.

[Propaganda of agitation is a] propaganda led by a party seeking to destroy the government or the established order. It seeks rebellion or war. At that moment the subversion is aimed at the enemy, whose strength must be destroyed by psychological as well as physical means, and whose force must be overcome by the vigour of one’s nation (Ellul, 1965/1973: 71).

He then moves to talk about the propaganda of integration where each member should be an organic and functional fragment of the society of which they are, ‘perfectly adapted and integrated’. It involves members that must share the stereotypes, beliefs, and reactions of the group; they ‘must be an active participant in its economic, ethical, aesthetic, and political doing’

Propaganda of integration thus aims at making the individual participate in his society in every way. It is a long-term propaganda, self-reproducing propaganda that seeks to obtain stable behaviour, to adapt the individual to his everyday life, reshape his thoughts and behaviour in terms of the social setting (ibid: 75).

The kind of liberation propaganda I will define below actually involves aspects of both kinds defined by Ellul: subversive and integrative propaganda. This is because in a liberation context those who are committed to the process of liberation are also almost always totally socialised and integrated into the ‘political doing’ that is their particular form of liberation while also subversively acting for the nation against the perceived enemy.

Ellul suggested the conditions that are required for propaganda to exist and develop. He believes that modern propaganda could not exist without mass communication. By that he means the inventions that produced press, radio, television, and motion pictures, or those that ‘produced the means of modern transportation and which permit crowds of diverse individuals from all over to assemble easily and frequently’ (ibid: 89). We could now update his arguments in relation to the internet, mobile phones and the multiplicity of more recent forms of information technology that have become available since 1989. For Ellul, political circumstances were also effective and immediate causes of the development of mass propaganda (ibid). All of these
issues are directly relevant to the kind of propaganda I want to focus on below which is crucially connected to the operations of the media and to the behaviours of practising journalists in war time. Nevertheless, he insists that for modern propaganda to develop, society must also be a mass society. A mass society for him is a society with considerable population density in which local structures and organisations are weak, while flows of opinion are strongly felt, people are grouped into united and influential collectives, the individuals are part of these groupings, and a certain psychological unity exists (ibid: 93). For Ellul, mass society is characterised by the uniformity of material life. Members of a society share the same preoccupation, the same mythical beliefs and the same prejudices (ibid). He states that the individuals making up the mass in the grip of propaganda may seem diversified, but they have enough in common for propaganda to work on them directly (ibid). 'Without the mass to receive propaganda and carry it along, propaganda is impossible' (ibid: 95). He argues this further by considering that 'from mass society emerge the psychological elements most favourable to propaganda: symbols and stereotypes' (ibid: 94). Additionally, Ellul puts primary importance on the feeling of 'togetherness' for propaganda to be effective psychologically and sociologically (ibid: 95). As I have argued above, a unified mass society or group and the feeling of togetherness are essential elements to the propaganda I will describe below.

In 2002 Nancy Snow, the author of Information War (2003) interviewed Konrad Kellen, the translator (from French into English) of Ellul’s book Propaganda and the author of the introduction to the American edition. Kellen said of Ellul that 'the greatest contribution to the literature on propaganda was his proposition that propaganda is most effective when it is least noticeable' (Snow, 2003: 22). Snow related Ellul’s proposition to present-time American war propaganda, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Barton Whaley (in Lasswell 1980) saw deception and psychological manipulation as exclusive features of propaganda. He identified different terms used of propaganda when applied to the international arena: psychological warfare, political warfare, international political communication, and public diplomacy. Nevertheless, by whatever name, by whichever groups, propaganda for Whaley seeks to influence the behaviour of one or more foreign groups, ranging from the general public to particular
elites. He considers deception as an important and sometimes dominant element of such efforts to control or influence (Whaley in Lasswell 1980: 341).

I treat deception as information designed to manipulate the behaviour of others by inducing them to accept a false or distorted presentation of their environment—physical, social, or political. So defined, deception is a special psychological mode of both communication and power. In terms of communication it is disinformation, that is, information intended to mislead (Whaley in Lasswell, 1980: 340).

Harold Lasswell, the American pioneer of propaganda studies in the 1930s, defined propaganda as ‘the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols’ (in Thomson, 1999: 1).

As Thomson points out. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis, founded in 1937, defined propaganda in very similar mode as ‘the expression of opinion or actions by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to determined ends’ (Thomson, 1999: 1). This introduces a deliberate aspect to propaganda which Thomson goes on to contest.

First of all, there is the question of whether propaganda always has to be deliberate or planned, excluding, as Lasswell did, what he called the ‘unpremeditated contagion of ideas’ (Thomson, 1999: 1).

He believes it is unwise to insist on the words ‘deliberate’ or ‘systematic’ in any definition of propaganda, recognising as Ellul did (see above) the importance of ‘sociological’ or ‘integrative’ propaganda and refusing to tie the definition of propaganda down to merely ‘deliberate’ or ‘planned’ forms. He states that too many great movements of mass persuasion have begun and continued without any master plan, that much of what is legitimated by the media, and becomes the staple ‘common sense’ or dominant myths of a society, is in fact ‘propaganda’.

The definition of propaganda formulated by H.J. Gans is broader and overcomes this difficulty: ‘each group in society tries to get its own particular values legitimated by the media and they affect the distribution of wealth, power and prestige by controlling the symbols, myths and information’ (Thomson, 1999: 3).

According to Thomson, as in definitions discussed above, a second problem with the definition of propaganda lies in the common assumption that mass persuasion is only
propaganda when it uses mistruth and deception or emotional manipulation (Thomson, 1999: 3). He believes that any definition of propaganda that emphasizes a reliance on untruth would be naïve and would exclude too many important campaigns of mass persuasion which did not have to resort to any deception. Thomson recognises the existence of non-negative forms of propaganda and sees news, information and facts as potentially constituting a major component of such propaganda (Thomson, 1999: 4). This fits with the understanding of propaganda I want to develop below and is helpful here to my arguments. Based on these arguments, Thomson (1999) established his own definition of propaganda. For him, it is a very broadly defined phenomenon: ‘the use as communication skills of all kinds to achieve attitudinal or behavioural changes among one group of people by another’ (ibid: 5).

This broad definition has in fact achieved some influential currency. Both Wright (1991: 73) and Tugwell (1987: 409) use the definition established by NATO: ‘Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly’. According to Miller (1994), this is not in principle a partisan definition, but in the work of the ‘counter-insurgency theorist’ it is only applied to the enemies of the West. Such writers are apparently unable to conceive that Western governments might also engage in ‘special appeals’ to their own benefits and so. discussions of the media strategies of Western governments as forms of propaganda are few indeed.

As we have seen, the entire apparatus of government secrecy and the intimidation and regulation of media institutions are the ever-present companions of the media strategies of the powerful (Miller 1994: 72).

The activities of Western governments are referred to as ‘counter-propaganda’ or ‘spin’ or ‘media management’ (Wright 1991: 207; and Alexander et al 1990: 24 cited in Miller, 1994: 70), never as ‘propaganda’. Accordingly, Miller agrees with Robins et al (1987: 8 cited in Miller 1994: 72) that propaganda is a ‘matter of the politics of information’. This position ultimately leads Miller to argue that propaganda is just a small part of the media information strategies of all governments. What is important for my argument here is that these theorists, taken together, bring together the
operations of the media, the question of power, the issue of information warfare, and
the ‘common sense’ of everyday life, within the framework of a broad definition of
‘propaganda’ which is about influencing public opinion in ways which the influencer
believes to be positive or good.

On the other hand, Hatem (1974) begins with the negative view of propaganda, and
argues for a narrower concept of propaganda: that is to view it as the dissemination of
information from concealed sources or with concealed objectives.

Motives are difficult to designate and record, and can be reported only
indirectly since they are subjective states, and the discussion of motives
usually involves evaluation. Yet a motive of devious manipulation, and its
evaluation, must enter into what most social scientists (as well as the common
man) have defined as propaganda (Hatem, 1974: 56).

Hatem pointed to Josef Goebbels’ definition of political propaganda (quoted above) in
his famous speech in Nuremberg on 6 September 1934:

Political propaganda is designed to establish the state’s beliefs in the minds of
the masses and make them committed to these beliefs. Propaganda could no
longer be simply a means to seize power; it had to become a means for
consolidating this power. Political propaganda is the most effective weapon
for seizing power and for serving the state if we intend to stay in power

Nevertheless, Hatem refused to connect propaganda completely to dishonesty or
harm, even though ‘the present century provides examples enough of its calamitous
results in the hands of a group prepared to distort truth’ (Hatem, 1974: 59). In his
defence of ‘honest propaganda’, Hatem points out that selectivity in terms of material
need not operate against the public interest, provided the selection employed does not
suppress essential facts, however injurious to its case, but rather reveals truths which
might be hidden. One of the examples he gives is when a party in opposition
justifiably concentrates its propaganda effort on publicising information, which the
dominant group has been at pains to conceal (Hatem, 1974: 59). Again, we find the
theorist returning to the idea that for those in opposition, that is, without power,
propaganda may actually be a positive way of challenging the status quo. This too
will be useful to my arguments about liberation propaganda.
According to Hatem, the compulsions towards ‘honest propaganda’ are especially strong in the realm of international affairs, where timing is often critical, where many key facts are available as classified information known only at the highest level, where the consequences of a wrong decision are incalculable, and where in any case the pre-existence of propaganda-conditioned reflexes properly calls for counter-propaganda to supply world opinion with the means of effecting a balanced judgement, in other words to bring to light an adequate selection of facts and essential considerations which would otherwise remain hidden (ibid: 63). Hatem believes that counter-propaganda of this kind is a significant issue. He identifies one key example within the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Arab-Israeli confrontation. […] admirably illustrates this function, in a situation in which the Zionist party to the conflict has for decades exploited its greater access to the mass media to mould much of world opinion in a manner favourable to its cause. The interests of truth and objectivity demand the presentation of the facts in their totality, and consequently demand the most effective and widest publication of the Arab case. It is in circumstances like these that public relations, in alliance with honest propaganda, exercise their most valuable function by bringing before world public opinion the truth in its most complete yet assimilable form. This is the essence of information for justice and peace (Hatem, 1974: 63).

Discussing counter-propaganda during confrontations and conflicts, Hatem adds that since any political act may influence mass opinion, regardless of the means employed, an important part of total policy is the calculating and managing of psychological effects. Thus, when aimed at an enemy during wartime, propaganda is identified as ‘psychological warfare’ (Hatem, 1974: 58). It is significant here that propaganda has began to merge in terms of definition with public and media relations so that it begins to become possible in certain circumstances to define a media campaign as propaganda.

Philip Taylor’s work demonstrates how actual propaganda needs to attain a higher level of sophistication to win over an audience (in Taithe et al, 1999: 12). Taylor considers that in the struggle for power, propaganda is an instrument to be used by those who want to secure or retain power just as much as it is by those wanting to displace them. He says ‘for the smoke to rise there must first be a spark which lights the flame. Propaganda is that spark’ (Taylor, 1995: 5). Taylor, like Hatem (1974), believes that propaganda can be used for ‘good purposes’, just as it can be abused. He
assumes that it is those good reasons and causes behind propaganda that should be the legitimate objects of moral and critical analysis and judgement, not the propaganda itself. Thus, according to Taylor, if the history of propaganda in the twentieth century appears to be largely a history of abuse, it does not follow that this has always been, and always will be, the case (ibid: 6). Taylor has provided his own definition of propaganda as the communication of ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a particular way (ibid).

By propaganda, then, I mean the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way. Although I recognise that such propaganda [might be] accidental or unconscious, here I am discussing the conscious, methodical and planned decisions to employ techniques of persuasion designed to achieve specific goals that are intended to benefit those organising the process (Taylor, 1995: 6).

Taylor’s recognition of accidental or unconscious propaganda is similar to the understandings of ‘sociological’ or ‘integrative’ propaganda discussed above. This understanding acknowledges the fact that symbols and deeds can have unintended meanings that are not able to be controlled by those who author them, and that the ‘common sense’ understandings of a society or social group may not have been planned or deliberately constructed by anyone. On the other hand, this does not stop people making very conscious and deliberate decisions to attempt to control and manage meanings. It is the latter process, which Taylor is most interested in here.

Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) dismiss the notion of accidental and unplanned propaganda. They identify propaganda as the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that ‘furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’ (Jowett et al. 1999: 6). They assume that the purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to an audience with a related objective:

Whether it is a government agency attempting to instil a massive wave of patriotism in a national audience to support a war effort … [or a leader showing his strength, or a company marketing a product] a careful and predetermined plan of prefabricated symbol manipulation is used to communicate an objective to an audience (ibid: 3).

They adopted Combs and Nimmo’s (1993) view of propaganda as “an indispensable form of communication” and “a major form of public discourse” (cited in Jowett et al,
1999: 5). Based on this, their definition of propaganda focuses on the communication process, and, most specifically, on the purpose of the process (ibid: 6). They seek to understand and analyse propaganda by identifying its characteristics and they place it within communication studies ‘to examine the qualities of context, sender, intent, message, channel, audience, and response’ (Jowett et al, 1999: 5). If propaganda devices were spotted through analysing media messages, then for Jowett and O’Donnell they fall into three categories:

Propaganda is also described as white, grey, or black, in relationship to an acknowledgement of its source and its accuracy of information White propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate... Black propaganda is credited to a false source and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Black propaganda is the “big lie”, including all types of creative deceit... Grey propaganda is somewhere between white and black [propaganda]. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain (ibid: 12-15).

According to Jowett (1999), national celebrations, with their ‘overt patriotism and regional chauvinism, can usually be classified as white propaganda’ (Jowett et al, 1999: 21). As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, Jowett’s definition of white propaganda is useful to the understanding of propaganda I will develop below.

Additionally, Jowett and his colleagues make reference to another dimension of propaganda. It is Doob’s (1948) ‘sub-propaganda’. They believe the propagandist’s task within sub-propaganda is to spread an unfamiliar doctrine, for which a considerable period is needed to build a frame of mind in the audience toward acceptance of the doctrine.

To gain the target audience’s favour, various stimuli are used to arouse the attention of the related encoders and agents who mediate communication. L. John Martin (1971) ...called sub-propaganda “facilitative communication” (p. 62) – that is an activity designed to keep lines open and maintain contacts against the day when they will be needed for propaganda purposes (Jowett et al. 1999: 22).

Other divisions of propaganda for Jowett et al are political propaganda and sociological propaganda. Sociological propaganda involves techniques of influence employed by a government, a party, an administration, or a pressure group, with a view to changing the behaviour of the public. The choice of methods used is
deliberate and calculated; the desired goals are clearly distinguished and quite precise, though generally limited (ibid: 62). On the other hand, Jowett et al (1999: 62) refer to political propaganda as either strategic or tactical. They draw a comparison between the two divisions of propaganda. The first establishes the general line, the array of arguments, the staggering of the campaigns; the second seeks to obtain immediate results within that framework ‘such as war time pamphlets and loud speakers to obtain the immediate surrender of the enemy’ (ibid).

Beyond this, Taithe and Thornton (1999) present an extreme classification of propaganda. For them, ‘Propaganda is about life and death and this choice is never better exemplified than in time of war, when the choice is indeed between staying at home and going to the front’ (Taithe et al, 1999: 15). However, they believe propaganda is often most fully discussed in counter-propaganda. ‘Denouncing the other’s devious techniques and lack of credibility, while displaying similar methods, makes this a paradoxical and in some ways self-undermining process’ (Taithe et al, 1999: 1). However, demonising ‘the enemy’s’ credibility and keeping one’s own credibility intact might be achievable in a propaganda campaign, as the cases this thesis is investigating indicate.

In contrast to Taithe (1999), Herman and Chomsky (1994) do not relate propaganda to war specifically. They speak of a systematic propaganda ‘in a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest’ (Herman et al. 1994: 1). They believe mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general public. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. This requires the systemic propaganda mentioned above (ibid).

A propaganda model focuses on this inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public. The essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news “filters”, fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government,
business, and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism. These elements interact and reinforce one another (Herman et al. 1994: 2).

The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourses and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to propaganda campaigns (ibid). In one way or another this is the relationship between propaganda and censorship identified by Bartlett (1942: 14), but here it is in the hands of big corporations and media moguls. The question of power is central here.

However, soon after September 11, the War on Afghanistan in 2001 and the War on Iraq in 2003. Western governments were again in control of the flow of information and media messages to the public. Poignantly, Bernay’s (1928) ‘vicious propaganda’ was given the name ‘Public Diplomacy’ by the American administration (Snow in Miller. 2004: 54). In this we see again how easily the negative and positive forms of propaganda transmute into one another. It is all a question of perspective and context. It depends whether you (or the group you represent) are the one who benefits from the propaganda and it is a question of semantics.

Many scholars related the American and British administrations’ media campaigns to legitimise the war on Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’. to lies, deception and psychological manipulation (see Connelly and Welch. 2005; Rutherford. 2004; Miller, 2003; Rampton and Stauber 2003; Snow 2003). Thus, the term propaganda has been introduced again in the twenty-first century, with the same negative connotations.

The propaganda war is the most integrated part of the new war on terror; it’s the part that is most hidden from view but also the most pervasive … it is controlled information, not designed for community empowerment or popular education that aims to further the ability of people to think for themselves. American propaganda is the sugar pill that makes the bitter truth goes down (Snow. 2003: 23).
Rutherford (2004) speaks of war being managed through media. This is what Connelly and Welch (2005) identify as the war for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public.

Modern military campaigns are likely to become struggles of information in the battle for the high ground of public opinion. In such a struggle the management of perception - the battle for ‘hearts and minds’ - will continue to be about words and pictures and not just about bombs and aeroplanes (Connelly and Welch, 2005: Xvii).

Nicholas O’Shaughnessy tried, in his book Politics and Propaganda, Weapons of Mass Seduction (2004), to analyse the meaning, content and significance of the word propaganda today. He believes that:

"Propaganda is ubiquitous. While such saturation is an obvious and definitive characteristic of totalitarian regimes, in democracies it is more concealed, because it is more sophisticated and naturalised as supposedly objective mass media communication. [However.] if we do not have labels for phenomena we tend not to recognise them (ibid: 224)."

He argues that the recognition that new forms of propaganda have arrived, and old ones continue, ‘means that the work of propaganda analysis is never complete’ (ibid: 244). Yet, in this regard, O’Shaughnessy (ibid: 62) believes that ‘there is no universal ‘key’ to propaganda via either sociology or psychology’ and that ‘those who look for a universal theory, a code to unlock, search in vain’. He argues that ‘the many manifestations of propaganda, styles, appeals, tricks, must be accessed in a … heterodox way’ (ibid).

However, several scholars and institutions throughout the twentieth century, including O’Shaughnessy himself, have identified certain characteristics that relate to propaganda. He speaks of myth, symbolism and rhetoric as foundation concepts, and hyperbole, fantasy, emotion, enemies, manipulation, deceit and utopia as key elements (ibid: 3). His concepts and key elements relate to what other scholars have identified as the tools and principles of propaganda. Nevertheless, before presenting the propaganda principles and tools, it is essential to look at the one academic study that dealt with propaganda in liberation contexts and was arguing for legal control of what was given the name liberation propaganda.
Propaganda in Liberation Contexts

The only use of the term liberation propaganda that I have been able to find actually refers to a very different kind of propaganda to the kind I want in this thesis to call liberation propaganda. Gerhard von Glahn (1966) introduced the term Liberation Propaganda in an academic article submitted to the journal Law and Contemporary Problems. Von Glahn refers to ‘the so-called “liberation” propaganda’ (von Glahn, 1966: 553) as a form of Ellul’s agitation and subversive propaganda mentioned above (ibid: 562). The propaganda von Glahn investigated was one conducted by foreign governments in support of local revolutionary groups to achieve domestic change in a foreign country. Domestic change by force is an essential element of the phenomenon von Glahn describes. According to von Glahn, this type of propaganda has in its object ‘the arousal and abetment of tendencies toward an outbreak of revolutionary violence in another country’ (ibid: 553). He adds:

The purpose of such violence may be assumed to be the creation of radical domestic changes, such as a termination of colonial status, the elimination of legal racism, the ending of “neo colonialism,” or simply the replacement of one governing elite by another (ibid).

Von Glahn studied the case for what he called ‘legal control of “Liberation” propaganda’. He explained that the propaganda he is looking at is that emanating from foreign governments, excluding propaganda conducted by other groups:

In order to keep this analysis within reasonable bounds, the inquiry has been restricted to propaganda emanating from governments, thus leaving aside similar efforts by private individuals and by groups below the level of national political grouping in single party states such as the Soviet Union (ibid: 553).

Von Glahn considers that the phenomenon he is describing represents ‘a mortal danger to any government. For it seeks to dissolve the basic cement of loyalty that binds a citizen to his or her government and his community’ (ibid: 554). Nonetheless he identifies liberation propaganda as a ‘common tool in foreign policy’ (ibid: 553).

It is very important here to distinguish this use of the term ‘liberation’ from the one I want to develop. The propaganda this thesis is investigating is one that is conducted by domestic governments, alongside domestic liberation resistance movements, with
the aim of achieving liberation from a foreign occupying army. Indeed, it could be said that the liberation propaganda I will describe is something like a domestic response to von Glahn’s externally driven version. What I want to describe is a propaganda that seeks loyalty, and that binds citizens to their governments and their resistance groups in their fight against a foreign enemy. It is what Karl von Clausewitz would call ‘pursuit of an armed struggle by other means’ (cited in Thomas 1996: xi). It is propaganda of integration and where it is a propaganda of subversion, it is subversive of the activities of a foreign enemy. It is, like most forms of propaganda, context specific. It borrows some, and rejects other, aspects of the principles and tools of propaganda which are identified in different academic studies in the twentieth and twenty first centuries.

The sections which follow will list and explore some of these tools and principles in order to be able to refer to them in later chapters in relation to detailed case studies of forms of propaganda utilised in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict.

**Principles and Tools**

Shaping perception is usually attempted through language and images, which is why slogans, posters, symbols, and even architectural structures are developed during wartime. How we perceive is based on “complex psychological, philosophical, and practical habitual thought patterns that are carried over from past experiences (Hayward. 1997: 73 cited in Jowett et al, 1999: 7).

One of the main propaganda characteristics or principles Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) speak of is shaping perception. Perception for them is the process of digging up information from the world around us, as well as from within ourselves. ‘Each individual has a perceptual field that is unique to that person and which formed the influences of values, roles, group norms and self-image’ (O’Donnell & Kable, 1982, cited in Jowett et al. 1999: 7).

But what has this to do with propaganda? According to Jowett (1999), propagandists understand ‘that our constructed meanings are related to both our past understanding of language and images and the context in which they appear’ (ibid: 7). Shaping perception is needed when propaganda is aiming or attempting to rouse an audience to
certain ends or attempting to render an audience passive, accepting and non-challenging (Szanto cited in Jowett et al. 1999: 12).

Pratkanis et al (1991) add to this idea, explaining that for a propagandist to change old beliefs or to create new ones, he or she has to build on beliefs that already exist in the minds of the audience. A propagandist has to use anchors of belief to create a new belief. They aver that, ‘the stronger the belief of a receiver, the more likely it to influence the formation of a new belief’ (Pratkanis et al. 1991: 31).

How, then, do words gain their power, their ability to influence and persuade? Briefly put, the way an object is described and the manner in which a course of action is presented directs our thoughts and channels our cognitive responses concerning the communication (Pratkanis et al. 1991: 44)

Pratkanis et al pointed out the importance of having an authoritative figure whom people are willing to believe in order to let the message pass through to them. They go back to Aristotle who wrote on the matter more than 300 years before Christ:

We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises or rhetoric that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses (Aristotle cited in Pratkanis et al, 1991: 86).

They also draw attention to another aspect propagandists should consider while planning for their campaign. They believe that the clear trustworthiness of a person can be increased and the clear bias of the message decreased if the audience is absolutely certain the person is not trying to influence them (Pratkanis et al, 1991: 98). In their presentation they stick to this formula: ‘When communicators do not appear to be trying to influence us, their potential to do so is increased’ (ibid: 99). Besides, they believe the propagandist should consider encouraging the fear aspect, which means making the audience fearful of [the perceived] enemy (ibid: 99). This contradicts what the Lebanese journalists tried to achieve in their media messages to the home front between 1996 and 2000. They did not want their audiences to fear ‘the enemy’ - they wanted the public to feel fearless and resist the ‘enemy’, as presented in chapters Six and Seven.
Hatem (1974), on the other hand, draws attention to the importance of myths and legends in operating propaganda campaigns. He identifies legends as ‘modified accounts of past events and historic figures, whereas myths are imaginative accounts of the meaning of life’. Coming down to us from the past as a part of our cultural heritage, myths and legends are adult extensions of the childhood world of fantasy and make-believe. ‘Whether the birth of a legend is deliberate or not, the fact remains that masses of mankind live in these images’ (Hatem, 1974: 77). According to Hatem, the most effective leader-symbols are the national, cultural and group heroes. These are personifications of values, causes and critical events. Their names, pictures and status are a focus of the emotional loyalties of their publics.

The leader symbol of greatest potency is the charismatic leader, that is one who is believed to be in some unusually intimate relation with supernatural power, or to have some extraordinary qualities beyond the normally human (Hatem. 1974: 81).

As will be demonstrated in chapters Six and Seven, the late former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, and Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, were viewed as leader-symbols in the Lebanese context this thesis is exploring.

For Merton (in Jackall 1995), the over-all strategy of persuasion makes use of a special social situation in which mass interest and emotions are centred on a national co-operative venture. He assumed varied techniques and devices were employed to move the audience from a state of mind to definite action. ‘But these devices of mass persuasion, primarily, technical in character though they are, have a moral dimension as well’ (Merton in Jackall, 1995: 261).

The public sacrifice presumably entailed by a daylong stint at the microphone set Smith apart from others who “only talked but didn’t act”. Propaganda of the deed proved persuasive among some who rejected propaganda of the word. Listeners who revealed their profound distrust of the “power of speech” were moved by the symbolic act (Merton in Jackall, 1995: 263).

Merton made it clear that people are moved ‘by emotion, by fear and hope and anxiety, and not by information or knowledge’. However, he assumes it may be pointed out that complex situations must be simplified for mass publics and, in the course of simplification ‘much that is relevant must be omitted’ (Merton in Jackall, 1995: 270).
Leonard W. Doob dedicated a whole chapter in Jackal’s book *Propaganda* (1995) to the Nazi’s Propaganda Minister Goebbels’ principles of propaganda. He reveals that among the Nazi documents restored by the American authorities in Berlin in 1945 are close to 6,800 pages of manuscript, presumably dictated by Goebbels as a diary that covers the period from January 21, 1942 to December 9, 1943 (Doob in Jackall, 1995: 190).

All that is being assumed, in short, is that the manuscript more or less faithfully reflects Goebbels’ propaganda strategy and tactics: it is a convenient guide to his bulky propaganda materials (Ibid: 191).

Goebbels speaks of 19 principles. All aim to dictate, manipulate and deceive people. Some of these techniques were fully or partially applied in forms of propaganda used in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict which is the subject of this thesis. Some were used by Tele Liban and Al Manar journalists, but the case studies this thesis is investigating show very clearly that these features do not characterise all forms of propaganda.

If we are later to contest this list, it is important to state these principles in detail, as offered by Doob (in Jackall, 1995: 193-214), remembering that these are principles of negative propaganda designed to deceive:

**Principle 1:** Propagandists must have access to intelligence concerning events and public opinion;

**Principle 2:** Propaganda must be planned and executed by only one authority;

**Principle 3:** The propaganda consequences of an action must be considered in planning that action;

**Principle 4:** Propaganda must affect the enemy’s policy and action;

**Principle 5:** Declassified, operational information must be available to implement a propaganda campaign;
Principle 6: To be perceived, propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be transmitted through an attention-getting communications medium;

Principle 7: Credibility alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false;

Principle 8: The purpose, content, and effectiveness of enemy propaganda; the strength and effects of an expose’; and the nature of current propaganda campaigns determine whether enemy propaganda should be ignored or refund (Doob in Jackall. 1995: 200).

Principle 9: Credibility, intelligence, and the possible effects of communicating determine whether propaganda materials should be censored;

Principle 10: Material from enemy propaganda may be utilised in operations when it helps diminish that enemy’s prestige or lends support to the propagandist’s own objective;

Principle 11: Black rather than white propaganda must be employed when the latter is less credible or produces undesirable effects;

Principle 12: Propaganda may be facilitated by leaders with prestige;

Principle 13: Propaganda must be carefully timed;

Principle 14: Propaganda must label events and people with distinctive phrases or slogans;

Principle 15: Propaganda to the home front must prevent the raising of false hopes, which can be blasted by the future events;

Principle 16: Propaganda to the home front must create an optimum anxiety level. The strategy can be reduced to two principles;
Principle 17: Propaganda to the home front must diminish the impact of frustration. Goebbels sought to diminish the impact by following two principles: First, inevitable frustrations must be anticipated. Goebbels’ reasoning seems to have been that a frustration would be less frustrating if the element of surprise or shock were eliminated. Second, inevitable frustrations must be placed in perspective;

Principle 18: propaganda must facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets of the hatred

Principle 19: Propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter- tendencies: instead it must offer some form or action or diversion, or both

Full reference to these principles and tools will appear in Chapters Six and Seven, when they will be compared to TL and Al Manar journalists’ performances. However, they will be used *illustratively* in the discussion of later data and do not constitute a method for the systematic examination of the output.

**Analysis: What the Literature Says about How to Detect Propaganda**

Bartlett (1942: 131) wrote six and a half decades ago that no accurate measurement of the effects of propaganda was yet possible. Nonetheless, Jackall (1995: 218-22) presents the devices that the Institute for Propaganda Analysis look at to detect the existence of propaganda. These constitute a rough mode of analysis of the rhetorical devices which characterise an instance of propaganda. They call them ‘the seven common propaganda devices’:

1- *The name-calling device*
2- *The glittering-generalities device*
3- *The transfer device*
4- *The testimonial device*
5- *The plain-folks device*
6- *The card-stacking device*
7- *The band-wagon device*
Name calling:
Here the propagandist appeals to our hates and fears. He does this by giving “bad names” to those individuals, groups, nations, races, policies, practices, beliefs, and ideals that he would have us condemn and reject.

Glittering Generalities:
Here he appeals to our emotions of love, generosity, and brotherhood, honour, liberty, social justice, public service, the right to work, loyalty, progress, democracy, the American way, constitution defender.

Transfer:
Transfer is a device by which the propaganda carries over the authority, sanction, and prestige of something we respect and revere to something he would have us accept (such as religious leaders).

Testimonial:
In this device the propagandist makes use of testimonials. “When I feel tired, I smoke Camel and get the grandest ‘lift’”.

Plain folks:
‘Plain folks’ is a device used by politicians, labour leaders, businessmen, and even by ministers and educators to win our confidence by appearing to be people just like ourselves – “just plain folks among the neighbours”.

Card-stacking:
This is a device in which the propagandist employs all the arts of deception to win our support for himself, his group, nation, race, policy, practice, belief or ideal. He stacks the cards against the truth.

The Band Wagon:
This is a device to make us follow the crowd, to accept the propagandist’s program en masse. Here his theme is: “Everybody’s doing it”.
`Propaganda and Emotion:

Observe that in all these devices our emotion is the stuff with which propagandists work.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis states that the public are fooled by these devices because they appeal to our emotions rather than to our reason. They make us believe and do something we would not believe or do if we thought about it calmly, dispassionately. The institute’s advice in examining these devices is to note that they work most effectively at those times when we are too lazy to think for ourselves.

They tie into emotions that sway us to be “for” or “against” nations, races, religions, ideals, economic and political policies and practices, and so on through automobiles, cigarettes, radios, toothpaste, presidents, and wars (Ibid: 217).

**Thomson: What is it all for?**

Thomson (1999) changes the question of how to detect propaganda to: What was it all for? And he provides a rather more detailed account of what to look for in analysing propaganda.

First he divides propaganda into eight main categories, so analysis can be undertaken according to the objectives for which it is used: ‘Political. Religious. Economic. Moral. Social. Diplomatic. Military. and Diversionary’ (Thomson, 1999: 7-12). Then he moves to consider the range of media used in the propaganda campaign; Visual Arts, Photography, Music, Opera, Dance and Body Language, Literature, Poetry, Theatre, the Novel, History, the Press and Print, Leaflet Distribution, Cinema, Radio, Television, Telephone and Internet. Event Management (Thomson, 1999: 13-45). Each alone or combined is related to a particular device of propaganda in order to achieve its effect. These propaganda devices, according to Thomson, range from structural tools to linguistic, musical, and visual, which make the task of persuasion easier.

Rhyme has been recognised for thousands of years as having the capacity to make simple phrases more memorable, more exciting and apparently more significant. There have been numerous rhyming moral or legal codes such as the Norse Havamal and rhyme has been almost universally used to help with behavioural training of the young (Thomson, 1999: 49).
Thomson draws attention to what he calls ‘The Dangers of Not Going Far Enough’. He believes in analysing the likely reasons for failure in propaganda campaigns, as ‘there are three main areas to consider: message structure, media and audience factors’ (Thomson, 1999: 72). The failure might be related to public resistance to too much propaganda that is obvious, or people are having difficulty accessing media messages. or there may be some other general irregularities such as the fact that some groups who are very good at internal propaganda (to the home front) are bad at external (propaganda to non home audiences) (Thomson, 1999: 73). Thomson also refers to certain factors that have helped improve propaganda performance over time:

A number of factors, both of message presentation and media usage, have tended to improve propaganda performance down the ages. The value of repetition has been recognised subconsciously from the earliest times, particularly in terms of visual messages on coins or buildings, event management and music. More recently its efficacy for verbal propaganda has been more appreciated (Thomson, 1999: 74).

**Jowett and O’Donnell: How to Analyse a Campaign**

Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) give a straightforward chart of how to analyse a propaganda campaign. They offer ten elements of analysis. as follows:

1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign:
2. The context in which the propaganda occurs:
3. Identification of the propagandist:
4. The structure of the propaganda organisation:
5. The target audience:
6. Media utilization techniques;
7. Special techniques to maximise effect;
8. Audience reaction to various techniques;
9. Counterpropaganda, if present;

These ten divisions are intended, alongside the other lists and suggestions explored briefly above, to provide checklists of common understandings of what propaganda is against which to measure and compare the activities in the case studies which are the focus of this thesis. They will be referred to again in Chapters 6 and 7, but they are not intended to provide any kind of exhaustive analytical methodology.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to present a brief history of some of the definitions, principles and analyses of different notions of propaganda, as seen by different scholars at different times throughout the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. It sought to explore different definitions and characteristics of propaganda in order to see what basis there was in the literature for developing a model of Liberation Propaganda which would be adequate to describe the activities of the Tele Liban and Al Manar journalists in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict and which would perhaps be generalisable to other such situations.

As this chapter demonstrated, propaganda was seen and identified throughout its existence by different terms. Some positive, but mostly negative connotations were attached to it. However, none could claim a definitive description. This thesis is trying to restore Edward L. Bernays (1928) old argument that ‘the fine old word, Propaganda’ in itself has certain technical meanings which, ‘like most things in this world, are neither good nor bad but custom makes them so’ (Bernays, 1928: 20) – and then to use the word again in a positive sense to describe what might also be called a media campaign or indeed something else.

To reinforce Bernays’ point, this thesis adopts Barlett’s approach to propaganda which states that ‘Propaganda must be defined by reference to its aims’ (Bartlett, 1942: 6). Both Bartlett and Bernays have similar elements within their definitions of propaganda. However, Bernays’ (1928) emphasis is on the word ‘systematically’ in the process of gaining public support, while Bartlett (1942) uses the terms ‘wittingly or unwittingly’, which identifies more with the understanding of propaganda this thesis is arguing. It fits within the framework of Ellul’s (1973) propaganda of integration. ‘Propaganda aims at making the individual participate in his society in every way’ (Ellul: 1973), but this can be accomplished even when the campaign is part accidental, part improvised, part an almost unconscious (because professionally trained) response to desperate situations. ‘Deliberate’ here acquires context-specific meanings which are not entirely contradictory with its quasi opposites ‘automatic’, ‘unwitting’.
Nevertheless, by propaganda, I mean a campaign that which accomplishes, and intends to achieve, a collective national public support for a cause or a mission with mass media being a core tool in disseminating political, social and patriotic messages to the public. In accordance with that, the notion of Liberation Propaganda this thesis is investigating is certainly of a media campaign that seeks to bring national unity and support for the resistance groups in fighting the occupation forces within a sovereign independent state.

- Further, it is a propaganda of integration not (internal) subversion.
- It is an ‘honest’ (Hatem: 1974) ‘white’ (Jowett and O’Donnell: 1999) propaganda. Its sources and aims are acknowledged
- It is a propaganda that claims dependency on objective and factual information.
- It is a propaganda that aims at dismissing fear of the enemy and denouncing the enemy’s credibility and abilities, and highlights the ability and credibility of the resistance groups and its leaders.

It therefore dismisses Goebbels’ assertion that ‘objectivity has nothing in common with propaganda, nothing in common with truth’ (cited in Thomson, 1994: 4). This propaganda uses national symbols and relates it to the history of the conflict between the occupied and the occupier, to achieve its fundamental goals.

This chapter’s objective was to assist in establishing similarities and differences between what has been written and studied on propaganda and the case-studies this thesis explores. These similarities and differences will be drawn upon in chapters 6 and 7 to illustrate the elements and contexts within which Liberation propaganda operates.

The coming chapter will try to answer how ethnography and the methodologies related to it are able to explore these contexts and help achieve the suggested new understanding of propaganda. It will also try to establish how different cultural contexts might generate different understandings and implementations of the same set of journalistic norms and values. Contextualizing norms such as objectivity and
neutrality are arguably essential to identifying the suggested propagandistic performances.

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1 This was remarked upon by the late Geoff Mungham (supervision tutorial 2001), who said that there are no previous studies that examined in detail propaganda in a liberation context similar to that that existed in Lebanon, which offers the novelty of the study.
Chapter Three: Theory and Methodology

A new ethnography is a story based on the represented, or evoked, experiences of a self, with others, within a context ... Its theme is the persuasive expression of interpreted cultural performances (Goodall, 2000: 83).

This study is an ethnographically-informed study. Ethnography is the process that I use to conduct a qualitative investigation into the culture of Lebanese journalism and its performance in relation to the Israeli forces’ escalations against Lebanon and their encounters with the Lebanese resistance.

This investigation adopts Goodall’s (2000: 126) assessment of ethnography as ‘a way of writing the personal experience of the researcher into meaning in ways that serve as analyses of cultures.’ Cultures are what Goodenough (cited in Wolcott in Van Maanen, 1995: 86) refers to as the combination of concepts, beliefs, and principles of action and organization of a society. Culture is what ‘an ethnographer has found and [what] could be attributed successfully to the members of that society in the context of his [her] dealings with them (ibid).’ Additionally, this study recognizes the contribution of ethnography to the phase of theory development and to the testing of theory (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 24). It will do what Goodall (2000: 127) describes as an ethnographer’s main task: ‘try to find out why by figuring out how.’

The culture of Lebanese journalism and its performance will be examined within the framework of war propaganda. The objective here is to re-connect what is often simply referred to as media campaigning with the positive meanings of propaganda discussed above and thus to restore to propaganda its potential meaning as a positive and distinct generic entity (O’Shaughnessy, 2004). I intend to claim a new understanding for propaganda as it was enacted and performed in the specific context of this study. To try and identify the characteristics of a new interpretation of propaganda this study will explore the historical, cultural, organizational and religious contexts in which the Lebanese TV outlets and journalists studied here operate and how these contexts shape their professional practice and their news values. My argument will be that particular kinds and genres of journalism realise a positive form of propaganda in this particular context. This positive form of propaganda is what I will call liberation propaganda.
This chapter will explain how new forms of ethnography and the methodologies related to these are able to explore these contexts to achieve the suggested understanding of liberation propaganda. It will also establish how different cultural contexts are capable of generating different understandings and implementations of the same kinds of professional practices and sets of news values.

Given that different interpretations of news values may produce different journalistic performances, contextualizing these (El Nawawy and Iskandar 2003) is arguably essential to identifying the suggested propagandistic performances.

Ethnography

In his book *Writing Culture* (1986: 3) James Clifford reviewed ethnography as an emergent interdisciplinary phenomenon. He realized that ‘its authority and rhetoric have spread to many fields where “culture” is a newly problematic object of description and critique.’ He saw ethnography as a ‘hybrid textual activity… [that] traverses genres and disciplines (Clifford and Marcus (1986: 26)’. Clifford’s work was a major intervention in ethnography. It was the first twentieth century collection that drew scholars’ attention to the need to critically review the nature and doing of ethnography. Aull Davies (1999) attributes the development of an extensive postmodern critique of the production of ethnographic texts to Clifford and Marcus (1986) and earlier to Marcus and Cushman (1982). It was in particular the critique of the idea that the ethnographer could ever be (or had ever been) a detached observer of the cultures in which s/he always became embedded in doing his/her work, and the understanding of the ethnographic product (the written up data or findings) as writing and thus text/interpretation rather than objective truth which left its impact on the later theory and practice of ethnography. After Clifford and Marcus (1986), ethnography was always subjective, always an interpretation, always positioned and inevitably ‘involved’/implicated as well as constructed and able to be deconstructed (see Sanjek ed., 1990: Smith 2005). It was always, like all texts, multiply contextualized and the study of context thus became a key part of it.

Schlecker and Hirsch (2001: 75), following Clifford’s understandings, believe that the turn to ethnography in media studies indicates the ambition of researchers to explore multiple contexts, seeking to acquire ever more knowledge about the processes of
production of media texts. They consider that ‘more contextualization yields more knowledge’, and argued that ‘ethnography made possible the study of the subject-matter’s belonging to multiple contexts (ibid: 78).

However, for Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 2) ethnography is simply one social research method drawing on a wide range of sources of information. They consider ‘participant observation’ a similar term to ethnography. Thus ‘the ethnographer participates overtly or covertly in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions’ (ibid). Researchers collect in these contexts whatever data are available to shed light on the issues with which they are concerned, which matches the ethnographic process conducted in this research. Some scholars have simplified the description of ethnography and related it to ‘any written report that is based on fieldwork’ (Werner and Schoepfle 1987b, 42, and attributed to Robert Launay cited in Wolcott in Van Maanen. 1995: 93).

Nevertheless, by adopting this description alone, despite the importance of ethnographic accounts as writing, we would be neglecting the different methodological approaches related to ethnographic practice - such as dedicating a certain period of time to spend in the field conducting participant observation, taking field notes, writing diaries, collecting records and documents, conducting focus groups and in-depth interviews and becoming an active participant in the daily life which is being observed and studied. These are the processes which produce the ethnographer’s involvement and position the ethnographer as an ‘insider’: these then are also the processes which must be accounted for in articulating later the position from which the ethnographer writes or speaks. It is this complex and broad definition of ethnography which I am referring to when I speak of this study as an ethnographically informed study. In the coming section I will explore different methodological approaches to ethnography.
**Participant observation - Field work**

Participant observation is usually taken as a typical form of research *strategy* rather than a ‘unitary research method’ in that it is always made up of a variety of methods (Aull Davies, 1999: 67).

The hallmark of participant observation is long-term personal involvement with those being studied, including participation in their lives to the extent that the researcher comes to understand the culture as an insider (ibid: 71).

There have been several attempts to differentiate between various roles that the ethnographer may take on in field settings. Junker (1960) and Gold (1958) (cited in Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 93, in Aull Davies 1999: 72 and in Seale, 1999:222) distinguish between the ‘complete participant’, participant-as-observers’, ‘observer-as-participant’, and ‘complete observer’. The table below states what Junker (1960) believed to be the ‘theoretical social roles’ for fieldwork.

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<th>Fieldwork</th>
<th>Comparative involvement</th>
<th>Comparative detachment:</th>
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<td>Subjectivity and Sympathy</td>
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<th>Participant As Observer II</th>
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Complete Participant I IV Complete Observer.


Nevertheless, the ‘complete participant’ might take two forms - covert and overt roles. The first is when ‘the ethnographer’s activities are wholly concealed’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 94). The researcher here may join an organisation or group...as though ‘they were ordinary members but with the purpose of carrying out research’ (ibid). The second is when complete participation occurs ‘where the putative researcher is already a member of the group or organisation that he or she decides to study’ (ibid).

Being a member of the ‘Lebanese journalists’ grouping’, the researcher here is involved in this study in an overt form as a ‘complete participant’. I am examining the
performance of two groups of journalists in two different TV institutions at different periods of time. I worked as a journalist for Tele Liban during the period under investigation and had close connections with journalists of Al Manar who considered me to be ‘one of them’, reflected in phrases like ‘you know what I am talking about’. In particular, both groups were aware of my research aims, which helped to facilitate my conversations, interviews and discussions.

I was granted access to many hours of TV archives that covered the two periods under study. When I asked Tele Liban Chairman Ibrahim Khoury for permission to access the TL April 96 news archive he responded without hesitation: “The least we can do is give you access to the coverage you played an essential role in”. The Al Manar Chairman at the time, Muhamad Haidar, received me with words of praise for the role I played in covering the April 1996 events in South Lebanon, when Israel launched its military operation, code named ‘Grapes of wrath’, against Lebanon.

However, I had to ask my ‘colleagues’ from both institutions not to treat my questions as coming from someone ‘who was there and knows it’ but as a researcher who does not know already and who is looking for their answers and opinions on certain issues, attitudes and behaviors. I tried to treat my subject as ‘anthropologically strange’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 8), that is, to now distance myself from my earlier ‘insider’ status and to attempt to look at the material they provided from somewhere else. This is of course always a difficult task. The ‘insider’ position is never actually forgotten by either the researcher or the researched but it is possible at least to make that insider position less familiar and to take up an additional position, now informed by academic theory, through which to see and hear what is being researched.

This double positioning had two quite different kinds of consequences. First, none of the journalists that I approached for an interview refused my requests, and access to all the visual and print archives needed for the research was granted to me. Additionally, I had discussions and conversations with the journalists interviewed for this research before and after conducting the tape recorded interviews. Hezbollah media coordinator at the time Haidar Dakmak answered all my requests for interviewing personnel within the Islamic resistance media unit. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 98) argue, being an ‘insider’ or a ‘complete participant’ helped me
get access to inside information about the world in ways that brought out other participants’ experiences. ‘In this way greater access to [other] participant[s] perspectives may be achieved’ (ibid). Nevertheless, being a complete participant, studying a group I was a member of made it impossible to achieve complete detachment, and this raises the question of the disadvantages of being a ‘complete participant’, and of being a retrospective ‘complete participant’, in particular, in conducting fieldwork. Learning to see what I had experienced at first hand through the lens of academic theory, and then learning to question my informants and my data from that same academic perspective and in ways which refused to allow them any longer to regard me as a complete insider, was one of the major challenges of doing the research. It involved developing a double or hybrid professionalism, as journalist and academic researcher, and learning to challenge the one with the other and vice versa. In doing the research, I therefore remained always both inside and outside, both involved and at something of a distance. That distance was achieved by academic training and through the time that had elapsed between the events analysed and the doing of the research.

**Problems-Issues**

Hammersley and Atkinson speak of the danger of ‘going native’. ‘Not only may the task of analysis be abandoned in favour of the joys of participation, but even where it is retained bias may arise from over-rapport’ (1983: 98). The ‘complete participant’ might be overwhelmed with the experience of participation itself so he or she gives more prominence to this experience rather than to the analysis of the data generated from the experience. This would not apply to the case where the researcher is claimed to be a ‘complete participant’ before the start of the research, as is the case here. I am in this research, in part, researching my own professional practice in retrospect. I am doubly positioned here too - as ‘complete participant’ in the processes and events researched and then retrospectively as a ‘complete participant’ looked at from a distance through ‘the eyes of the researcher’. This raises again the issue of detachment but also issues to do with memory and hindsight.

There might be a tendency among political actors to attribute retrospectively to past actions greater coherence than existed in an actor’s mind in the situation at the time of
actual performance. The questions of propaganda and objectivity were not asked by the Lebanese journalists at the time. It was the researcher, who presented the journalists with these questions many years after the events took place. The professionalism of the coverage at the time had as one of its aims to provide objective reports. Hence, the question of propaganda was not a dominant issue, but the question of objectivity was present. These two issues emerged from my academic attempts to understand what had gone on: they were constructs of the research process, used then to question and explore the professional processes of an earlier period.

Discussing issues of propaganda in addition to objectivity, balance, neutrality, detachment and truth years after the events, was not contested by the journalists, but was rather embraced as an opportunity to reflect on their work in covering the Lebanon-Israeli conflict between 1996 and 2000. Propaganda in its negative connotation was dismissed, as the data in chapters 6 and 7 makes clear, in particular, due to the fact that it is related (in their understanding) to matters of lying and deceiving. As presented in chapter Six, the only person who embraced the word propaganda in his reflection was the Chairman of Tele Liban at the time Fouad Naim who said: ‘if it was propaganda, then it was propaganda of the truth’. Nevertheless, the national aspiration for liberation was maintained by all journalists involved in this study at the time of the events. It was from the collocation of those two understandings: ‘propaganda of the truth’ and ‘aspiration for liberation’ that my initial understandings of what I was analyzing as a form of ‘liberation propaganda’ actually came. I observed this collocation as an active member of the group during the conflict, and later in my analysis of interview and television data. As presented below, memories of what happened at the time of the events including what was done and what the journalists said their intentions were, were an essential part of the researcher’s own encounters with the journalists (as subjects of this study) and of the researcher’s viewing of the recorded tapes of the coverage. An archive of press commentary on the events and its coverage also continually revived those memories and reinforced them or challenged them. In fact, being a retrospective complete participant, and an academic researcher trying to maintain some distance, helped in verifying when the journalists’ responses were genuine (that is, matched my memories of events), and when they were fabricated, exaggerated or even driven by public and official appreciation of the outcome of their coverage. The important
methodology here was something akin to triangulation in social science terms, or multiple positioning in more humanities terms. It involved constantly checking my own memories and hindsight against the interviews and the press and television archives.

This helps to counter the other kind of disadvantage that might arise from participating in the field. Ethnography has sometimes been rejected on the grounds that the data and findings it produces are subjective, mere personal impressions that cannot provide a solid foundation of rigorous analysis. On the other hand, others argue that ‘only through ethnography can the meanings that give form and content to social processes be understood (Hammersley and Atkinson. 1983: 2). ’Moreover, Hertz. (1997: 97) refers to the possibility that ‘while a foreign researcher runs the risk of being culture blind. an indigenous researcher runs the risk of being blinded by the familiar’. In spite of this, the question of bias and ‘going native’ and ‘being blinded by the familiar’ can be countered with the approach of triangulation and self-reflexivity that this study adopts.

Self-reflexivity

Writings on self-reflexivity, in contrast, are more often about finding ways to compel a subject to locate itself and/or to engage in a certain degree of conscious and critical self-reflection. Self-reflexivity is therefore commonly portrayed as an introspective act that solidifies as it identifies a subject (Nast, Nast & Pile. 1998: 97).

Nast argues that ‘besides involving a re-analysis of the body-as-place’. reflexivity ‘requires recognising the emotional and material qualities of inter-subjectivity’ (ibid: 111). She refers to Keith’s (1992) analysis of racism in Britain and how it was important for him to bring his anger about racism into his research agenda and into his writing (ibid). Nast (1998: 107) points out that reflexivity is an embodied process wherein the body is itself a field for registering and negotiating difference. Differences are negotiated and registered in relation to performances in different cultural contexts, associated here with journalism cultures and performances.

On the other hand, Clifford and Marcus (1986:14) describe self-reflexivity as ‘a subgenre of ethnographic writing’. They consider a ‘self-reflexive “fieldwork account”’ and decide that even if it is seen as ‘variously sophisticated and naïve,
confessional and analytic’, this account ‘provides an important forum for the
discussion of a wide range of issues, epistemological, existential, and political’ (ibid).
A good example of this is Sasha Roseneil’s (in Hobbs and May, 1993) research
project: Greenham: Revisited: Researching Myself and My Sisters. She discusses the
process of carrying out research on a socio-political movement and community of
which she has been a part. She locates her research in the newly established tradition
of ‘post-positivist feminist methodology’, and focuses particularly on how she has
used her own experience and how being an ‘insider’ has impacted on the research
process (ibid: 177). In her work Roseneil gives prominence to the commitment to
reflexivity in feminist methodology. She argues that

[F]eminist methodology aims to highlight and examine the role of the
researcher, and demands that the researcher’s work be un-alienated labor
(Reinharz 1984; Stanley 1990). Based on an epistemology that considers all
knowledge to be socially constructed, it begins with the acknowledgement that
the identity of the researcher matters. She is unavoidably present in the
research process, and her work is shaped by her social location and personal
experiences (ibid: 181).

Aull Davies (1999) in her book Reflexive ethnography takes reflexivity from its
feminist methodology to a broader definition.

Reflexivity, broadly defined, means a turning back on oneself, a process of
self-reference. In the context of social research, reflexivity at its most
immediately obvious level refers to the ways in which the products of research
are affected by the personnel and process of doing research. These effects are
to be found in all phases of the research process from initial selection of topic
to final reporting of results. While relevant for social research in general,
issues of reflexivity are particularly salient for ethnographic research in which
the involvement of the researcher in the society and culture of those being
studied is particularly close (ibid: 4).

Referring to the close relationship between reflexivity and objectivity, she also says
‘The two are not identical’ (1999: 4). Nevertheless, she argues

[R]esponses to the difficulties apparently raised by reflexivity frequently
involved attempts to ensure objectivity through reducing or controlling the
effects of the researcher on the research situation (ibid: 4).

Nonetheless, as alluded to earlier, Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 8) have
suggested that, even when the ethnographer is researching a familiar group or setting,
‘the participant observer’ is required to treat it as ‘anthropologically strange’ in an
effort to make clear the assumptions the researcher takes for granted as ‘a culture member’.

In this way the culture is turned into an object available for study. Through marginality, in perspective and also in social position, naturalism proposes that it is possible to construct an account of the culture under investigation that captures it as external to, and independently of the researcher; in other words, as a natural phenomenon. In fact the description of cultures becomes the primary goal. The search for universal laws is rejected in favour of detailed descriptions of the concrete experience of life within a particular culture and of the social rules or patterns that constitute it (ibid).

Nevertheless, this does not overcome Bolak’s (in Hertz, 1997: 96) evaluation of problems of one’s own representations of the field. He sees these as ‘only partial truths and descriptions’. Moreover, he makes it clear, drawing on his self-reflexive account of the study he did of urban working class households in Turkey, that ‘how we represent and account for others’ experiences is intimately related to who we are, and the connections needed to be spelled out (ibid).’ Thus, the personal element could not be cast out.

The story you write will be part of the larger story of who you are, where you’ve been, what you’ve read and talked about and argued over, what you believe in and value, what you are compelled to name as significant (Goodall, 2000: 87).

Aull Davies (1999) points out that the use of the ethnographer’s self to study and understand others occurs most commonly in what she calls ‘native anthropology’. She explains that the word ‘native’ is “usually interpreted as the representatives of Third World countries or disadvantaged groups in Western societies. [who] carry out ethnographic research on their own people” (ibid: 181).

This gives the ethnographer an ‘insider perspective’ and claims him or her to be the key informant of the research - see Lal (1996) on her research in India, which led to her ‘identity examination’ as an American from a South Asian background; Panourgia (1995) on death and the social organisation of dying in the context of modern Athens; Rosaldo (1993) on how his interpretation of Ilongot head-hunting was transformed in response to his own experience of grief following a tragic personal loss.

Working as a TV journalist in Lebanon for almost nine years equipped me with the ‘insider perspective’. As Seale (1999) put it, I (the researcher) became the primary
research instrument and informant. As mentioned earlier, this research is self-reflexive. However, I have to emphasise that the self and the others (Tele Liban and Al Manar journalists) here shared the same cultural, social and political heritage. Thus, studying the performance of other journalists will be achieved through studying the self and vice versa, as well as by triangulation with other press and television data and the data of memory and hindsight: for these have in fact to become part of the data for analysis in a project of this kind.

**Ethnographic methodological approaches**

This research uses many ethnographic tools and methods, but because it deals with past events that the researcher participated in (Tele Liban coverage) or observed (Al Manar coverage) as they were happening some of the methods related to ethnography were not applied as defined: the first such absence is ‘field-notes’.

**Field-notes**

Goodall (2000: 126) claimed that ‘field-notes are the grammar of ethnography, which is to say the grammar of the ethnographer’s story.’ He also wrote ‘field-notes, once written, mediate between lived experience and ethnography’ (ibid: 87).

But what are field-notes and how do we translate them into an academic tale? This is a question asked by Goodall who stated simply that ‘there is no one answer to this’:

> The easy answer is that you do it the best way you know how. Between these two pieces of relatively useless advice lies the whole human territory of writing experience (ibid: 119).

Goodall (2000: 122) refers to the research process as ‘the journey of discovery’. He points out that, for the writer, it becomes part of the story itself. Thus, ‘interpretive tales’ of the field work ‘tend more often to read like good short stories or novels than like standard research reports.’

While Goodall frees the writing process from any strict frame, Clifford (1986) describes six elements that determine Ethnographic writing:
(1) contextually (it draws from and creates a meaningful social milieu); (2) rhetorically (it uses and is used by expressive conventions); (3) institutionally (one writes within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines, audiences); (4) generically (an ethnography is usually distinguishable from a novel or a travel account); (5) politically (the authority to represent cultural realities is unequally shared and at times contested); (6) historically (all the above conventions and constraints are changing). These determinations govern the inscription of coherent ethnographic fictions (Clifford, 1986: 6).

Clifford’s six ways of framing ethnographic writings are considered while writing the ‘tale’ or story of this study’s fieldwork. The story I am telling draws from the cultural, social and religious setting the Lebanese journalists operate within. It takes into consideration specific Lebanese journalists’ traditions, disciplines and rhetoric. It is not a novel or an autobiography; it is a documented account of events that took place over a specific period in Lebanon and how journalists dealt with them – and details are an essential part of this story. They will help me identify certain characteristics for the proposed new understanding of propaganda. Nevertheless, the question that comes up here is where do these details come from and are they part of something that can be called field-notes?

Roger Sanjek in his book Fieldnotes (1990) speaks of several components of field-notes: Head-notes, scratch notes, personal accounts including diaries and journals, records including texts and transcriptions, videotapes, recorded interviews and photos. Since there was no intention of doing an ethnographically-informed study while the events were taking place scratch notes or notes on the performance were not written down at that time, but in the course of the research the reproduction of a chronological journal-diary was produced depending on Head-notes and the Tele-visual records of the events. Additionally, press archives and recorded interviews were used to help achieve the aims of this research.

**Head-notes**

According to Sanjek (1990: 93) head-notes is a term coined by Simon Ottenberg. He explains it simply by saying that ethnographers come back from the field with field notes and head-notes. For him the field-notes stay the same, written down on paper, while the head-notes ‘continue to evolve and change as they did during the time in the field’. Sanjek refers to Ottenberg’s explanation of ethnography as a product of the two
sets of notes. ‘The head-notes are more important. Only when the anthropologist is
dead are the field-notes primary (ibid.).’ Head-notes are experiences and memories
that the ethnographer carries from the field. They are stories, encounters,
conversations, sayings and attitudes that escaped the written field notes or journal and
are preserved only in the head of the ethnographer.

Sanjek speaks of three ethnographers that based their ethnographic tale on Head-
notes: Margaret Mead was struck by the importance of her Head-notes, on her third
visit to Manus in 1965:

[B]ecause of my long acquaintance with the village I can perceive and record aspects of this people’s life that no one else can... It is my individual consciousness which provides the ground on which the lives of these people are figures (Mead. 1977: 283, cited in Sanjek. 1990: 93).

The second is Niara Sudarkasa (Gloria Marshall) who wrote a rich account of her
1961-62 field work in the Yoruba community of Awe relying on her Head-notes. She
forgot her field notes, diaries and letters at home; all that she had was her dissertation
and a few photographs.

[W]hat follows, therefore, might best be described as remembrances of, and reflections upon, my efforts as an anthropologist in the making. These are the encounters, the evaluations, the episodes that are chiselled in memory (Marshall 1970: 167, cited in Sanjek, ibid).

The third was Martin M.C. Yang’s 1945 classic, *A Chinese Village*, which was
written from head-notes (memories of the field) alone (Sanjek. 1990: 93).

As far as this research is concerned, the practice of war reporting as a TV journalist
had to be considered as fieldwork after the event. Sitting in my supervisor’s office, it
was the process of going through more than 60 hours of TV coverage that recovered
memories (head-notes) of what was taking place behind those televisuual scenes. And a series of questions arose: Who constructed the running order of the news bulletin?
What was the background for certain stories? What was the importance of certain
statements? Why were they given prominence and by whom? How were editorial
decisions made? What was the role of reporters in editorial decisions?
Thus, recovered memories or head-notes helped to structure the framework of the in-
depth interviews conducted with journalists, heads of news and TV chairmen. Head-
notes and interviews were supported by televisual and press materials on and around the events which constitute what Sanjek (1990) calls field Records.

Records

Sanjek speaks of the balance needed between field-notes and records, but he explains that it is unique in each research project and that most anthropologists produce both kinds of documents (1990: 102):

Many ethnographers would probably feel uncomfortable speaking of research as fieldwork if it produced records but no field-notes. Yet the demands of particular sub disciplines and theoretical approaches increasingly drive fieldworkers toward more directed record collection. Attention to wide-ranging field-notes correspondingly recedes.

Among field-notes records, Sanjek identifies ‘texts’ as a particular kind. They are produced by transcription.

Transcription, unlike inscribing scratch notes, usually involves an encounter between informant and ethnographer away from ongoing social action and conversation. Ideally, the ethnographer and informant sit alone together; the ethnographer carefully records answers to posed questions, or writes down in the informant’s own words and language a dictated myth, spell, recipe, or life history remembrance. While hand written transcriptions may be retyped and translated later, the point is to secure the informant’s precise words during the field work encounter, as they are spoken. The results of such fieldwork procedures are texts (ibid: 104).

Texts in relation to this research are transcriptions of 31 interviews conducted with journalists, heads of news, editors, news directors and chairmen. Journalists here were playing the role of informants besides the researcher. These texts (interviews) also helped to refresh my memories around the events that are being studied. They assisted in restoring, and enabling me to reconstruct after the events, a chronological journal of what was happening at the time and what role we played as journalists and media institutions to encounter the huge scale of attack Israel launched on Lebanon. I will elaborate more on ethnographic interviewing later in this chapter.

Collecting press archival clippings could also be identified as collecting ‘texts’ within the ‘Records’ framework. Press clippings on the events under question and its coverage were collected from different sources, but mainly from Assafir and Annahar
dailies’ documentation centres and from the Islamic Studies Centre which deals with collecting every press writing that covers the work of the resistance and its media outlets (Al Manar is considered one of them). Other press materials used here are personal archival press clippings collected near to the time of the events under consideration. Most of these are commentaries by others on my part in the events of April 1996.

**Journals and Diaries**

Carstens et al (1987 cited in Sanjek, 1990: 108) point to the fact that chronologically constructed journals provide a key to the information in field-notes, while diaries record the ethnographer’s personal reactions, frustrations, and assessments of life and work in the field. As Sanjek explains, sometimes the same account might contain elements of both forms.

[This] is evident of two extracts from S.F. Nadel’s “diary” of his Nuba fieldwork .... Latterly, the increasingly intertextual nature of post-field ethnographic writing has intruded on both journals and diaries. Journals may now record reactions to ethnographies read or reconsidered in the field; and diaries, one suspect may be written with the aim of publishing “personal account” of field work (Sanjek, 1990: 108).

Sanjek indicates that the chronological structure of ethnographic writing must also be based on the ethnographer’s diary. He stated that ‘the factual and the personal are commingled’ (1990: 10).

Because this study is looking at incidents and activities that took place before designing it, the practice of war reporting as a TV journalist had to be constructed as field work after the event. Basically, head-notes substituted for field-notes, and memory was recovered by the detailed accounts of videotaped coverage of the periods under investigation and through newspaper archives on both the events and the TV coverage of the events, as mentioned earlier. The recorded coverage and press commentaries were studied thoroughly before conducting the interviews with the journalists. This allowed the researcher to use the visual and press material as an aiding tool to prepare her lists of questions for the subjects being studied.
A chronological journal was constructed based on the recorded videotape coverage of the events under investigation. Diaries were not written, but some memories were revived and I was able to record some reflections that certain images brought back to my memory. Those memories were also helpful in reviving other journalists’ memories of the events, their performance and their feelings at the time. Records were collected by conducting, transcribing and translating 31 interviews with people in the field. More than 60 hours of recorded TV coverage, and a vast number of press clippings will be used to construct the story of Lebanese journalists’ performance in dealing with an army that had occupied their land for over two decades.

This is therefore not a traditional ethnographic study, but it uses many ethnographic strategies and it can thus be described as an *ethnographically informed* study. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising how Sanjek (1990) views field-notes. This allows the claim that this study has its own sets of field-notes that were collected during fieldwork constructed in non-conventional ways.

Field-notes are “of” the field, if not always written “in” the field. But what, physically, are they? Anthropologists bring back a variety of objects from field work, including much paper. Jackson found no defining consensus on what to include: notes on reading, photocopied archival material, a ceramic dish, even the ethnographer her-or himself (“I’m a field-note,” stated one storer of head-notes)—all were considered field-notes by some. Anthropologists also bring back photographs, films, videotapes, audio recordings, and recovered documents of many sorts, including informant’s letters or diaries (1990:95).

As mentioned earlier, as part of the records collected for this study, in-depth interviews with journalists, editors and TV chairmen involved in the coverage under question were conducted. But I also had the archive of press materials mentioned above and the television coverage. In a very real sense these were the materials I had brought back from the field.

**Interviews**

According to Seale (1999: 227), ‘interviewing has a particular characteristic in ethnography.’ He explains that interviewing is an essential aspect of the fieldwork. It helps in collecting certain data that could not be collected in any other way (ibid).
Some ethnographers, following the dictates of naturalism, argue that people’s accounts should always be unsolicited, so as to avoid the reactivity of formal interviews. But interviewing may be the only way of collecting certain data, in which case the researcher needs to decide who to interview (Seale, 1999: 227).

Different forms of interviewing were conducted for this research. Semi-structured interviews, where questions were prepared to stir up journalists’ memories of the events, and narrative interviews that applied Seale’s (1999) naturalism where journalists were asked to talk about what they remember of those days and how they operated and what was their role. The journalists of Tele Liban and Al Manar chosen for interview were essential elements in the coverage under investigation. It required active listening on my part, with some interference when shared experiences came up during the interviews.

Seale (1999: 227) refers to the importance of focusing on the context in which the interviews occur. However, I will not be focusing on the context here because the interviews took place years after the events took place and were conducted in places other than news rooms – such as in interviewees’ houses or their new offices (one of the interviews were conducted at the Foreign Ministry with one of Tele Liban’s reporters who became the Foreign Minister’s media advisor). All interviews were done face-to-face except for three. Of these, the first was conducted over the phone with former chairman of Tele Liban, Fouad Namin, who heads a pan-Arab radio station operating from Paris (Radio Orient). Questions were sent by fax to Tele Liban’s former head of news, Aref Al Abed, in Bahrain, where he was editor of one of the Bahraini national papers. Al Abed recorded his story on two 60 minute tapes and mailed it to back to me. The third non-face-to-face interview was conducted online with Nadine Majzoub, one of Tele Liban’s reporters, who had moved to the United Arab Emirates to work for Abu Dhabi TV as a news producer.

Investing my own experience in interacting with the interviewees helped the interviewees feel more comfortable to speak their own mind on issues (like objectivity and propaganda) that might have been sensitive for them to talk about if they were talking to someone they did not know. Aull Davies (2002) believes that such interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee can only make the interview
more effective. She talks about some of the approaches to self-involvement in interviewing:

Another approach to the question of self-disclosure is Oakley’s (1981) argument that, both for ethical reasons and for the efficacy of the interview, an interviewer must be prepared to share their own knowledge; she suggests that the interviewing process can only develop effectively ‘when the interviewer is prepared to invest his personal identity in the relationship’ (ibid: 41). Others suggest that personal experience should be called upon, not just to develop empathy or fulfil ethical expectations, but also to challenge and contrast as another means of developing understanding. De Vault (1990) notes that difficulties in developing empathetic understanding, when examined as to why such empathy is not forthcoming, may be equally helpful in interpreting interviewees’ perspectives (Aull Davies, 2002: 101-102).

All interviews were conducted in Arabic and tape recorded. I transcribed and translated them into English and used several quotations to support the narration and analysis of the story of this research. Sanjek speaks of the importance of the transcripts in writing the ethnography. He gives Agar’s (1986) work as an example:

Agar used participant-observation, documents, and taped “career history interviews” in his study of independent truckers. The lengthy interviews, “a format designed to let the interviewee have control,” were the core of his research: “to work with this material, transcripts are necessary; their preparation is tedious work, since a clean hour of talk might take six to eight hours to transcribe … Transcription was done on a word-processor to facilitate ‘proof-listening’ - going over the transcript, listening to the tape, and checking for errors” (1986: 178). Agar had an assistant transcribe most of the interviews, and his ethnography includes extensive quotations from these texts (Sanjek, 1990: 115).

Atkinson. (1992: 4) recognizes that the ethnographer and the journalist have things in common and that good work in both trades is recognized by similar criteria: 

[Both work is] based on thorough research, ethically and conscientiously conducted, with a systematic review of sources and evidence, and conveyed to the reader through coherent written texts. (The worst kinds of ethnography and the worst kinds of journalism share similar negative traits) (ibid).

Ethnography and Journalism culture

Ethnography is one of the tools to explore cultures. Or, as Woolcott (1995: 86) put it, ‘culture [is] an explicit conceptual orientation that provides the purpose and rationale for doing ethnography’.
Culture is an abstraction based on the ethnographer’s observations of actual behavior, coupled with insights and explanations of the other “that is our way.” “We’ve always done it like that.” or “if that happened. I guess my reaction would be…” (ibid)

Here, journalism culture is the object of this ethnographically informed study.

Pronouncedly interdisciplinary and self reflexive, the cultural inquiry of journalism employs diverse research perspectives and scholarly tools that are used to variously consider journalism broadly as a culture. “Culture” itself has many invocations, not all of them mutually exclusive (Zelizer. 2004: 175-6).

Zelizer presents culture as ‘a phenomenon of concerted action that uses conventional understandings to guide members of collectives in doing things in consensual ways (ibid)’. Zelizer draws attention to the fact that ‘culture is one of the resources journalists draw upon to coordinate their activities as reporters and editors (ibid)’. Alternatively, as Zelizer put it, ‘news itself is seen as cultural’. a culture that is relative to the actions of the groups and individuals taking part in its production. Cultural inquiry will be applied in this study by taking an analytical track where ‘journalist are seen both through journalists’ own eyes, tracking how being part of the community comes to have meaning for them, and queries the self-presentations that journalists provide’ as Zelizer explains (Zelizer. 2004: 175-6).

Cultural analysis of journalistic performance will be considered here because it emphasises ‘the constraining force of broad cultural symbol systems regardless of the details of organisational and occupational routines’ (Schudson, 1991: 143). It moves simultaneously with and at the same time oppositional to the ‘conventional understandings of how journalism works’ (Zelizer, 2004: 176): · ·

Cultural analysis of journalism views journalists not only as conveyors of information but also as producers of culture, who impart preference statements about what is good and bad, moral and amoral, and appropriate and inappropriate in the world (ibid: 177).

In addition, cultural analysis considers the ‘meanings, symbols and symbolic systems, rituals, and conventions by which journalists maintain their cultural authority as spokespeople for events in the public domain’ (ibid: 176).
Mark Pedelty, in his book *War Stories* (1995), spoke about war correspondents in El Salvador as a community in and of themselves. He referred to the fact that ‘they work together, play together, and often, live together’, but most importantly, ‘they share an integrated set of myths, rituals, and behavioral norms’. According to Pedelty, ‘they are a culture as coherent as any in the postmodern world’. He conducted an ethnography on this culture, which he described as ‘oddly alien and exotic’ (Pedelty 1995: 4).

While Pedelty looked into ‘war correspondents culture’ in El Salvador, this study looks into the culture of reporters and editors during certain military escalations related to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. However, it is worth mentioning that those reporters carry almost the same features as the El Salvadorian correspondents’ community. They, too, share an integrated set of myths, rituals, and behavioral norms. They too represent a distinctive culture, which might be true of any occupational culture.

Nonetheless, Pedelty believes that his war correspondents have a unique relationship to terror in the sense that they need terror ‘to realize themselves in both a professional and spiritual sense, to achieve and maintain their culture identity as “war correspondents”’ (Pedelty 1995: 2). This understanding does not apply to Lebanese journalists covering the escalations with Israel. Those interviewed for this research revealed that the sense of terror they experienced was one Israel imposed on them. It was a sense of injustice that kept them going, a sense they all shared. The difference is that Lebanese journalists were part of the nation under attack. Pedelty’s journalists were not.

Another way to look into cultural patterns of journalistic performance is through sociological inquiry, which, according to Zelizer (2004), began with Warren Breed’s classic study “Social Control in the Newsroom” (1955). She points to the fact that journalistic inquiry became ‘significantly more sociological’ with Breed, who applied the sociological research concept of ‘social control’ to journalism. Acknowledging that ‘no society could exist without such social control, ‘a term ...by which a society tries to bring its recalcitrant members in line with consensual behaviour’ (ibid: 53), Breed tackled how modes of social control were implemented in a newspaper.
environment. He found that while, ideally, the newspaper should have been a “democracy”, it was clear to him that the publisher set policy and reporters followed it (see Breed’s study on social control in the newsroom, and functional analysis in Berkowitz, 1997).

Breed’s research, which was based on participant observation as a method, studied the production process involved in news work. His research helped establish that journalism’s standards tended to be largely unwritten, but were willingly followed by journalists in forming a wide range of behaviours. It also ‘offset any remaining assumptions that news making was generated on the basis of an editor’s personal whim’ (Zelizer, 2004: 54).

Breed’s study was followed by several media production studies on the sociology of the news room. Many of the approaches he discussed were picked up by other scholars over the years. One of these approaches that speaks of the tendency of journalists towards following ‘unwritten standards’ identifies the way Tele Liban and Al Manar journalists operated in the field of war reporting during the events this research is investigating.

Germane to this, Simon Cottle, in his book Media organization and production (2003), highlights the fact that most of the studies conducted on news rooms, starting with White’s (1950) gate keeping study, and continuing with Breed (1955) and Warner (1971), discussed the reasons for journalists conformity to a news policy. Lang and Lang (1953) and Halloran et al. (1970), on the other hand, looked at the effects of collective journalistic expectations about reporting behaviour (Cottle, 2003: 14). Cottle also refers to Gay Tuchman’s (1972) study on the strategic use of objectivity by journalists as a means of avoiding criticism (more on Tuchman’s study of objectivity will be presented later in the objectivity section). Cottle also points to Tuchman’s 1973 study, which ‘tackled the journalistic reliance upon typifications in routinising the unexpected nature of news’ (Cottle, 2003:14).

Early studies, all worth reading to this day, pointed to the explanatory potential of attending to aspects of the news production process and becoming familiar with the journalist’s working environment. Other studies did likewise,
though these relied mainly on professional interview testimonies and retrospective accounts of media production and organisational factor (ibid).

Cottle states that throughout the 1970s and 1980s a number of what he calls “substantive” ethnographies” developed the ‘interest in the organisational, bureaucratic and professional nature of news production and news manufacture processes.’ His list of studies included Epstein (1973); Altheide (1976); Murphy (1976); Schlesinger (1978); Tuchman (1978); Gans (1979); Golding and Elliot (1979); Bantz et al. (1980); Fishman (1980); Gitlin (1980); Ericson et al. (1987) and Soloski (1989).

Based on extensive and intensive periods of newsroom observations and interviews, sometimes conducted across many years and different news outlets, researchers became fully conversant with news-making processes. How news was subject to temporal routines, how newsroom layouts were organised spatially, and how news processing was organised in relation to a newsroom division of labour, corporate hierarchy and professional cultural milieu all became basic building blocks to understanding. The ideological consequences of the organisational character of news production were often stressed (ibid: 14).

Michael Schudson speaks in his study on the Sociology of News production (in Berkowitz, 1997) and later in his book Sociology of News (2003) of early studies of gate-keeping as the base for studies on the sociology of the generation of news. However, he gives prominence to two studies, one conducted by David Manning White (1950) and one by Gieber (1964). Manning studied a middle-aged wire editor at a small newspaper in the American Mid-West.

[The wire editor] decided which wire service stories would run in the paper and which would not. For one week, “Mr. Gates” (as White called him) made available to the researcher every piece of wire copy, both those he rejected and those he selected to print in the paper. He then wrote down a reason for rejection on every story he rejected. Some of these reasons were not very illuminating – “not enough space” (Schudson in Berkowitz, 1997: 8).

However, as Schudson points out, Walter Gieber’s (1964) study of 16 wire editors in Wisconsin found out that the wire editors were occupied with ‘mechanical pressures’ of the work rather than the social meanings and impact of news. The Daily Telegraph editor, for example, rarely allowed his personal evaluations to enter into his news selection process. Instead, ‘the values of his employer were an accepted part of the newsroom environment’ (Schudson in Berkowitz, 1997: 9). He was concerned with
bureaucratic routines, goals of production and interpersonal relations within the newsroom (Gieber, 1964: 175 in ibid). In 1991 Glen L. Bleske replicated White’s study on a female editor she called ‘Ms Gates’. Bleske found few changes in the attitude towards the selection of what is considered newsworthy and what is not. Major differences were related to the technological aspects of the job and not the approaches (Bleske. in Berkowitz, 1997: (72). As far as this study is concerned, it is not a ‘conventional study’ on the sociology of the news room. However, certain cultural and social approaches within the news room will be considered when looking into the attitudes and conduct of the Lebanese journalists under investigation.

This study considers Schudson’s (2003) assertion that news is a manufactured good.

[News is] the product of a set of social, economic, and political institutions and practices. The typical sociological impulse is to trust empirically observable things to recognize in every cultural product its immediate origin in human action and human purposes (Schudson, 2003: 13).

Zelizer (2004: 187) believes that the ‘complications surrounding journalism’s reverence for facts, truth, and reality extended to additional aspects of its internal mind-set’, which explains this tendency towards following ‘unwritten standards’ in the news room. Additionally. Zelizer points to the fact that it is common in cultural analysis that journalists’ professional ideology is offset by an insistence ‘that the production of knowledge is always accomplished in the interests either of those who hold power or those who contest that hold’ (ibid).

**News values and objectivity**

News values and objectivity are key aspects of the culture that this research is exploring. Journalists’ admiration for truth and facts are discussed in earlier works in tandem with journalistic norms of objectivity, neutrality and balance. Lebanese journalists’ interpretations of these values will be presented in the coming chapters, giving prominence to the ongoing discussions on the validity of the single understanding of objectivity that some scholars in the West advocate (Campbell, 2004). In the coming section I will try to present some of these arguments and discussions, trying to put more focus on alternative views of the traditional understanding of objectivity. This section aims to establish how different cultural
contexts might generate different understandings and implementations of the same set of news values.

To start with, the concept of objectivity for its advocates in journalism ‘assumes the possibility of genuine neutrality of some news medium being a clear un-distorting window’. but, as Fowler (1991: 12) emphasises, it ‘can never be this’. As Campbell (2004: 160) points out, there is a distinct body of criticism of the Western news media’s attachment to objectivity (see also Pavlik 2001, Bell 1998 and Hall 2001). Campbell divides this body of literature into three kinds.

First are those who decry objectivity on grounds of it being an impossible goal… Second, are those who regard objectivity as undesirable regardless of whether it can be achieved or not… Third and perhaps the most recent school of thought, are those who decry objectivity on the basis that technology has made the concept unnecessary and redundant (Campbell, 2004: 160-1).

The most poignant among these three categories in relation to this research lies within the second category Campbell identified. Martin Bell, the former BBC war correspondent, explains it thus:

I am no longer sure what ‘objectivity’ means: I see nothing object-like in the relationship between the reporter and the event, but rather a human and dynamic interaction between them (Bell in Kieran. 1998: 18).

Kate Adie, former BBC chief news correspondent (1998: 44 cited in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 3) questions the understanding of objectivity when covering wars, but without labeling it. She says ‘the very nature of war confuses the role of the journalist’. She points to the fact that in having to face the horrendous realities of conflict, ‘any belief that the journalist can remain distant, remote, or unaffected by what is happening tends to go out the window in a hurry’ (ibid). Adie admits that ‘when faced with the consequences of battle and the muddle of war… I don’t have the answers, but I keep on asking questions’ (Adie 1998:54 cited in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 3).

I was there to witness …to repeat what I hear, to observe the circumstances, note the detail, and confirm what is going on with accuracy, honesty and precision… (Witnessing was) the only way you can stand by your words afterwards, the only guarantee that you can give your listeners, or viewers, or readers. You saw it, you heard it, you are telling the truth as far as you know (Adie, 1998:46-47 cited in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 5).
According to the Lebanese journalists of Tele Liban and Al Manar interviewed for this research, being an eye witness, and one with a commitment to telling the ‘truth’ and reporting facts, was what characterised their performance during the coverage of the Israeli escalation against Lebanon. It also reflected my own interpretation of what I was doing during my years of war reporting. Our sense of citizenship and patriotism characterised most of the coverage under investigation. And, as Allan and Zelizer (2004: 5) point out, this sense called into question my perception of how best to conduct myself as a reporter. I was made to judge my performance by trying to match what I had learned in the west about being an objective reporter and what I did on the ground. As Campbell (2004: 153) put it clearly, ‘in Western nations the principle of objectivity traditionally stands as a fundamental cornerstone of journalistic professionalism and integrity’. I was taught that objectivity means that as a journalist I should adopt a position of detachment, rather than neutrality, toward the subject of reporting. This suggests the ‘absence of subjectivity, personalized involvement, and judgment’ (El Nawawi and Iskander in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 320).

This confusion kept haunting me while I was trying to find a way of theorising and framing my own wartime experience. Biographies of war correspondents, such as Jeremy Bowen (2006), Robert Fisk (2006), Fergal Keane (2005), Kate Adie (2002), Martin Bell (2003) and John Simpson’s (1999) book on the war in Kosovo, eased my confusion, but I was still looking for a theoretical frame to relate to. Allan and Zelizer (2004) addressed some theoretical aspects of this confusion. They believe that a distinction should be drawn between ‘patriotism and militarism’ in the work of a war reporter. They believe it is central to the problems of this profession. They point out that a reporter’s sense of national identity needs to be considered ‘in a way that sheds light both on how it can underpin journalism’s strength, while simultaneously recognizing the constraints it can impose of the integrity of practice’ (Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 4). However, Allan and Zelizer point out that ‘war reporting reveals its investment in sustaining a certain discursive authority — namely that of being an eyewitness’ (ibid).

Meanwhile, as I struggled with these issues, the atrocities of September 11 took place. The Arab satellite channels entered the international news market, mainly Al Jazeera, through the coverage of the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the war on Iraq in 2003.
and were criticized by both the American administration and the British government for not being ‘objective’ in their reporting (Harb and Bessaiso, 2006). At that point, the concept of contextual objectivity floated to the surface (El Nawawi and Iskandar, 2002 and El Nawawi and Iskandar in Allan and Zelizer, 2004). The notion of contextualization was seen as a corrective to some of the limitations related to the notion of objectivity.

Contextualization demonstrates a situational position, a way by which collectivism among participants within the same “context”—whether cultural, religious, political, or economic—is realized and engaged. It is precisely this contextualization that aggravates and complicates the pursuit of “objective” coverage within the news media setting. Contextualization further confuses attempts at even-handedness and efforts to cover all sides of a story. Particularly in times of war, it is the context within which a reporter operates that makes communication with the “enemy” unacceptable (Iskandar and Nawawi in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 320).

El Nawawi and Iskandar relate contextual objectivity to the audiences the media is reporting on. They see the theory as “the necessity of television and media to present stories in a fashion that is…impartial yet sensitive to local sensibilities” (El Nawawi and Iskandar, 2002: 54).

However, they make it clear that neither objectivity nor context should be the sole priorities. The exclusivity of either is dismissed and one is placed in “the gray area in-between the two where fairness and balance are situated” (ibid: 321). Additionally, Bernard Rosheco in his piece Newsmaking (in Tumber, 1999) speaks of three aspects of timeliness to be conceived when a certain news story is considered for publication or broadcasting.

For an item of information to be timely, in the sense employed here, requires the conjunction of: (1) recency (recent disclosure); (2) immediacy (publication with minimal delay); (3) currency (relevance to present concerns). To speak of news as timely information, therefore, is to imply the existence and interaction of a news source, a news medium, and an audience (ibid: 18).

The importance of immediacy and recency were well acknowledged by journalists and editors interviewed for this research as a necessity for gaining public attention, but the main concern of the research at this point is the concept of currency, which supports the argument of contextual objectivity.
When an editor speaks of exercising ‘news judgment’ in assessing the ‘news value’ of a report, he is applying his criteria of currency to the available items of recent information from which a news presentation can be assembled. Currency is the ‘local angle’ in the broadest sense, which is why emergencies that acutely affect local audiences are a news staple for local media (ibid: 19).

Looking at the bigger picture, in his study of *The Power of News* (1995), Schudson argues that news is produced by people who operate within a cultural system within what he described as ‘a reservoir of stored cultural meanings and patterns of discourse’ (ibid: 14). He sees news as a form of culture that ‘incorporates assumptions about what matters, what makes sense, what time and place we live in, what range of considerations we should take seriously’ (ibid). Similarly, in his book *Television Culture* (1987), Fiske made a clear statement that news can never give a full, accurate, objective picture of reality. He asserted that news should not attempt to do so for this ‘can only serve to increase its authority and decrease people’s opportunity to “argue” with it, to negotiate with it’ (Fiske, 1987: 307). In the same vein, in his book *Media Organisation and Production* (2003), Cottle states that the studies on the sociology of news production have ‘produced an invaluable sociological record and analysis of news production and the forces constraining news output.’ According to Cottle, these studies demonstrate how ‘in-depth study of news producers, their cultural milieu and professional domains could help to explain the dynamics and determinants of news output’ (Cottle, 2003: 16).

Schudson (in Berkowitz, 1997) speaks of how journalists he met in different conferences were pushed into fiercely defending their conduct.

- [They defend their conduct] on the familiar ground that they just report the world as they see it. the facts, and nothing but the facts, and yes, there’s occasional bias. occasional sensationalism, occasional inaccuracy, but a responsible journalist never, never, never, fakes the news (Schudson in Berkowitz, 1997: 7).

Schudson’s story identifies with the notion of ‘truth’ that most of the Lebanese journalists interviewed for this study were embracing when asked whether they were ‘objective’ or ‘biased’ in their reporting.

The discussions around objectivity go back in time to the nineteenth century when objectivity was first identified as the professional norm of American journalists and as
a ‘cornerstone of the professional ideology of journalists in liberal democracies’ (Lichtenberg in Curran and Gurevitch, 2000c: 239). Lichtenberg took her defense of objectivity further to announce that ‘American journalists still embrace it as one of the fundamental norms of their profession’ (ibid). Lichtenberg speaks of what he calls critics of objectivity – who assert “that reality is not ‘out there’; it is a ‘vast production, a staged creation – something humanly produced and humanly maintained’ (Carey, 1989 cited by Lichtenberg in Curran and Gurevitch, 2000c: 239):

Reality, on this view, is ‘socially constructed’, and so there are as many realities as there are social perspectives on the world. There is no ‘true reality’ to which objective knowledge can be faithful (ibid).

Gaye Tuchman in her study on objectivity as a strategic ritual (1972) (in Tumber, 1999) states that journalists, like social scientists, deal with objectivity as a safeguard between themselves and their (potential) critics (Tuchman in Tumber, 1999: 298):

Attacked for a controversial presentation of ‘facts’, newspapermen invoke their objectivity almost the way a Mediterranean peasant might wear a clove of garlic around his neck to ward off evil spirits (ibid).

According to Tuchman (ibid) newpersons, unlike social scientists ‘have a limited repertoire with which to define and defend their objectivity.’ Tuchman argues that the newperson must make immediate decisions ‘concerning the validity, reliability, and ‘truth’ in order to meet the problems imposed by the nature of his [or her] task’ in processing news.

The newsmen cope with these pressures by emphasising ‘objectivity’, arguing that dangers can be minimised if newsmen follow strategies of newswork which they identify with ‘objective stories’. They assume that, if every reporter gathers and structures ‘facts’ in a detached, unbiased, impersonal manner, deadlines will be met and libel suits avoided (ibid: 298).

Tuchman speaks of four strategic procedures that help a newperson claim the notion of ‘objectivity’:

- Presentation of conflicting possibilities.
- Presentation of supporting evidence.
- The judicious use of Quotation Marks [which in TV news comply with sound -bites].
- Structuring information in an Appropriate Sequence (ibid: 302).
Soloski (1989) (in Berkowitz, 1997) assumes that objectivity is the most important professional norm for journalists in the United States. He asserts that objectivity does not exist in news stories as such, but in the behavior of journalists:

> Journalists must act in ways that allow them to report the news objectively. For journalists, objectivity does not mean that they are impartial observers of events—as it does for the social scientists—but they seek out facts and report them as fairly and in as balanced a way as possible (Soloski in Berkowitz, 1997: 143).

The emphasis on the importance of objectivity as a professional norm for American journalists in particular has been dismissed later by other scholars who spoke of certain circumstances where ‘the media were deemed to be partial’, such as during the time of war, where not supporting their own country’s war efforts might seem ‘inappropriate’ (Williams, 2003: 126). Schudson (2003) refers to journalists’ self-consciousness about the risks to national security of reporting and publishing at the height of the cold war. This, according to Schudson, was transferred into a wave of patriotic fervor in the wake of September 11:

> After September 11, 2001, however, American journalists individually and collectively shared in a wave of patriotic fervor and a deep sense of vulnerability. This led to some serious self-criticism about news stories that detailed the flaws in airport security, the vulnerability of subways to terrorist attack, and the technology of crop dusting. When reporters and editors begin to reasonably imagine that their audiences include mass murderers who seek to inflict as much damage on the country as they can, these journalists, too carry out their work on a wartime footing (Schudson, 2003: 164-5).

Schudson (2003: 187) points to the idea that objectivity is vulnerable to external circumstances. He defines three circumstances that might jeopardize American journalists’ objectivity: tragedy, public anger and threats to national security.

Williams (2003) speaks of more general patterns as to where objectivity could not be guaranteed.

> Not all news is intended to be objective. There are forms of news reportage that traditionally have deviated from the ‘objective model’. McQuail (1992: 189-91) identifies ‘some older versions of news’ such as the ‘human interest, partisanship and the investigative’ functions of news that are seen as legitimate parts of the practice of journalism, but each of which contradicts in some way what is expected of objective journalism (Williams, 2003: 126-7).
Further, for Fiske (1989a), 'objective facts' always support one point of view (in Williams, 2003: 127), and this point of view is affected by the social, political and cultural context the journalist is operating in. Noha Mellor in her study on The Making of Arab News (2005) sees that objectivity as presenting two opposing opinions is beside the point, 'assuming that one of the two opinions is misleading or false, because then the media would be helping to promote this opinion' (Mellor, 2005: 89). Mellor refers to Bekhalt's (1998) study on Egyptian press news values. His study showed that objectivity ranked third on the list of principles journalists claimed to adhere to when reporting the news. Accuracy, on the other hand, 'was by far the most important factor for the majority of journalists, followed by honesty' (ibid).

Some Arab scholars, like Hassan Tawalba (1981, in Al Jammal, 2001: 66f, in Mellor, 2005: 89) took it to the extreme by stating that honesty should not be applied when 'dealing with the flow of information supplied by international (western) news agencies, which are supposed to be loyal to their western governments'. Tawalba believed that 'here journalists have a priority of serving their own national interests, and should not discriminate information that is verified' (ibid). Thus, the claim of ultimate 'objectivity' is arguable and is bound by the cultural and social context journalists are operating in to produce news. These cultural and social aspects that influence or shape news reporting are mostly recognized in what Knightley (2000) calls 'the distinctive genre of war reporting' within which the work of the Lebanese journalists under investigation here falls.

However, the question that arises (as far as this research is concerned) is what relationship exists between war reporting and propaganda. Oliver Boyd Barrett (in Allan and Zelizer, 2004) recognized this relationship, and claims that the genre of war reporting serves a propaganda purpose. However, he speaks of a 'genre' being exploited by the state and other propagandists 'in ways that cripple the capacity of media consumers to make useful sense of the world' (ibid: 25). Barrett's explanation lies within the negative connotation that was given to the term propaganda following the First World War.

Classic warfare is the epitome of a "good story", high in tension and drama, with complex main plots and sub-plots played out within traditional binary oppositions of aggressor and victim, winner and loser... War provides ritualistic challenge, testing, and evaluation, that call upon extraordinary
resources and resourcefulness from media institutions, journalists, technicians, and other support workers. Their collective experiences feed the stuff of professional legend, confirming and renewing the narrative of what it means to be a “journalist” (ibid: 26).

Barrett makes a clear connection between propaganda and the news values of war reporting by stating that ‘war reporting is generally one sided’ (ibid: 29). Wars are covered through a reporter’s lens. He sees the contextual aspect of war reporting as a good tool in the hands of propagandists.

The media typically cover war from the point of view of the country in which they and their major owners and readers are based, reflecting the point of view of that country’s government and its foreign policy elite (ibid: 29).

The propaganda this research is aiming at identifying looks at objectivity from a contextual perspective and tries to re-think propaganda as a positive media tool used by journalists in a crisis situation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter sought to answer how ethnography and the methodologies related to it are able to explore the social, cultural, religious and political contexts journalists operate within in order to achieve the latterly mooted understanding of propaganda.

This chapter also tried to establish how different cultural contexts might generate different understandings and implementations of the same set of news values. Journalistic norms of objectivity, neutrality and balance were explored in different contexts.

The chapter suggested that different interpretations of news values and norms might produce different journalistic performances and that contextualizing news values and norms is essential to identifying the suggested propagandistic performances.

This chapter along with chapter two looked to examine the theoretical basis for analyzing the Lebanese journalists’ performance during major escalations with the Israeli occupied forces in South Lebanon.
The coming chapter will further explore the issue of contextualization, presenting the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, a narrative that dominates the collective memory of most Arab populations including the journalists under investigation in this study.
Chapter Four: The Arab-Israeli conflict: An overview

All your friends are false. All your enemies are real (Mexican proverb)

The Arab-Israeli problem evokes heated discussion of its exact nature, whether it is a clash of religions or races, or a territorial dispute involving historical claims to the land. Recent analysis tends to focus on the clash of nationalisms, which arose during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Devore. 1976: xxii).

J.C. Hurewitz wrote, in January 1949, that no area of the Middle East has so much been written about by so many with so little concern for objective appraisal and analysis as Palestine. Any attempt, said Hurewitz, to exhaustively analyse the books, pamphlets, official documents, and articles of even the last dozen years would demand a volume in itself and the collective effort of many scholars, for no one can pretend to have read - let alone digested - all of this material (Hurewitz cited in Devore 1976: xxxiii).

This statement was only a warning; the stream of literature on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict has become an ever-increasing flood. Scholars in the field are ‘tempted to consider building an ark to keep their heads above the deluge of paper’ (Devore 1976: xxxiii).

In his book Arab-Israeli Conflict Devore counted around 500,000 documents about this subject. It might be assumed that this number has at least doubled since then.

This chapter will try to draw a relatively short account of the historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a story of the origins of the conflict, where it started and how it developed. Within the wider frame of the Arab-Israeli conflict the Lebanese-Israeli conflict is offered separately later in this chapter. The reader will gather that this historical account is narrated from an Arab perspective, though I have used sources from all sides of the conflict. Thus, this perspective of the historical narration is intended, since it is the account that most Arab people, especially those living in countries around Israel-Palestine, have carried in their collective memory, generation after generation.
The coming historical account will cover the period up to the early 1990s, which is the period that is alluded to through the historical connotations expressed in the Lebanese journalists media messages in the events under investigation in this thesis.

**Historical Background**

The conflict may be said to have lasted for a century, and to have begun some years after an influx of Jews into Palestine in the 1880s. Between then and the 1890s the Jews were a tiny minority, numbering between 8000 and 25,000 according to different counts, and relations with Arabs were reasonably cordial. Later, Jews arrived in larger numbers, and fears arose in Arab minds that something similar to a new crusade was beginning.

Arab-Jewish tensions grew steadily between the two world wars, but the presence of a third party, the British mandate government, had a dampening effect. It was not until Britain’s withdrawal and Israel’s declaration of independence in May 1948 that all hope of a peaceful solution collapsed. The expulsion of most of the Palestinian population in 1948-49, and the loss of their land and homes, created more bitterness than any of the five periods of struggle which followed (the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Six Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, and the 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon).

Human misery cannot adequately be conveyed in figures, and yet the statistics give some sense of the scale. The Palestinian death toll from 1948 to 1993 was 261,000, with 186,000 wounded and 161,140 disabled. The civil wars in Lebanon, which resulted from complications within the Arab-Israeli conflict claimed a further 90,000 lives, 115,000 wounded, 9627 disabled, and 875,000 refugees (Heikal, 1996: 7).

In 1994 there were 800,000 Palestinians in Gaza, 1 million on the West Bank, 2 million in Jordan and 400,000 in refugee camps in Lebanon, making a total of 4.2 million Palestinians living in lands close to their former homes. The Jewish part of Israel’s population was about the same, including settlers in east Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. In numerical terms there was an even balance between Israelis and Palestinians, but all the power was held by one side.
Where it all started

The Arab Israeli conflict is a modern Gordian knot that continues to complicate recent history and current international politics. Regrettably, no modern Alexander … has appeared capable of solving the problem with a single decisive stroke. The vast complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict are rooted in the history of Palestine, for centuries a critical area of cultural transition. Some commentators extend the issue almost back to Creation, although they rarely agree as to when even that event took place (Devore, 1976: xxii).

Part of the more recent ‘vast complexities’ can, perhaps predictably, be traced to Europe. At the end of 1894 a French Jewish army captain. Alfred Dreyfus, was convicted behind closed doors of espionage for Germany, and sentenced to deportation for life to Devil’s Island. The officer was publicly humiliated at the Military School: his sword was broken; he was stripped of his uniform; and taken away in chains. The mob present shouted. ‘Death for the Jews.’ The trial of Dreyfus on treason charges was the most controversial case of the day. It was eventually proved that Dreyfus had been a scapegoat, selected because he was Jewish (Heikal, 1996: 19 and Ovendale. 1984: 1).

Nonetheless. known for boasting about his family fortune. Dreyfus was not even liked by the young Austro-Hungarian journalist. Theodore Herzl. who reported the trial. But Herzl became convinced Dreyfus was innocent, and was shaken by the hostility to the Jews the case unleashed in France. Six months later Herzl suggested ‘a Jewish exodus’ to Barons Maurice de Hirsch of France and Albert Rothschild of Britain. He told them that for nearly 2,000 years the Jews had been dispersed all over the world without a state of their own, and that if only the Jews had a political centre they could begin to solve the problem of anti-Semitism. They were convinced (Ovendale, 1984). The Dreyfus affair became the symbol of Jewish inequality in European society. It focused attention on anti-Semitism, and helped to give birth to the Zionist movement. Herzl is regarded as the founder of political Zionism. However, several writers before him had argued in terms of a separate Jewish state:

In 1833. Benjamin Disraeli. in his first novel. Alroy, outlined his scheme for a Jewish empire with the Jews ruling as a separate class. This scheme was moderated to the domination of empires and diplomacy by Jewish money in Coningsby. published in 1844. In Tancred. Disraeli explained history in terms of race. and saw the Jews as being a superior race. But in George Eliot’s
novel, *Daniel Deronda* (1876), one of the characters is there to show that the Jews still have a mission to fulfil: the repossession of Palestine (Ovendale, 1984: 3-4).

Political writers like Moses Hess with *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862) and Leon Pinsker expressed similar ideas. Pinsker, a Jewish doctor from Odessa, argued in his book *Auto Emancipation* that anti-Semitism would persist where the Jews were a minority; thus, they needed a homeland of their own. When writing *Der Judenstaat* (The State of the Jews), Herzl was seemingly unaware of these earlier writings.

Herzl’s diaries show that in formulating his ideas he was influenced by the activities of Cecil John Rhodes, the great imperialist who bestowed his name on a country: in May 1895 Mashonaland and Matabeleland became Rhodesia which was administered by a chartered company, the British South Africa Company (ibid: 4).

Herzl asked that the Jews be granted sovereignty over territory adequate for their national requirements and they would see to the rest. He was convinced the only solution to European anti-Semitism was the establishment of a Jewish national state. He persuaded himself, against compelling evidence to the contrary, that Palestine was a land without people, ideally suited to a people without land (Heikal, 1996).

Herzl had two possible regions in mind: Palestine or Argentina. Argentina was one of the most fertile countries - temperate, vast and sparsely populated, while Palestine was the unforgettable historic homeland, and the very name would be a good rallying point. In 1895 Argentina’s population was almost 4 million, that of Palestine around 500,000. Significantly, in *Der Judenstaat* Herzl did not mention how the local population was to be disposed of.

With the publication of *Der Judenstaat* Herzl became the ambassador of the emerging Zionist movement, and on 23 August 1897 he convened the first World Zionist Conference, bringing together Jewish representatives from many countries. Held in Basel, Switzerland, it is regarded by Jews as a landmark in the creation of the state of Israel. The World Zionist Organisation was created with the aim of establishing ‘a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law’ (Heikal, 1996:23). After the Basel conference the rabbis of Vienna decided to see for themselves what Herzl was talking about, and sent two representatives to Palestine:
The Bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man.’ It was a message
Zionists did not wish to hear, and the inconvenient husband was never
acknowledged (ibid).

In 1895, Herzl noted in his dairies that something would have to be done about the
Palestinian natives:

We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring
employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in
any country. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor
must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly (Herzl cited in Said, 1992:
13).

In his book The Question of Palestine, Edward Said wrote that, for much of its
modern history. Palestine and its native people have been subject to denials of a very
rigorous sort - in order to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on a
desired land. the Zionists convinced themselves that these natives did not exist, then
made it possible for them to exist only in the most rarefied forms:

... First denial, then blocking, shrinking, silencing, hemming in. This is an
enormously complex policy, for it includes not only the policy of the Zionists
toward the native Arabs, but also the policy of Israel toward its Arab colonies,
and the character of the Israeli occupying forces on the West Bank and Gaza

Yet a few, at least of the Zionist immigrants, were well aware that they were not
coming into a land empty of civilised people. Asher Ginzberg, a Jewish writer who
used the name of Ahad ha-Am. wrote after his first trip to Palestine in 1891:

We are in the habit of thinking that all the Arabs are wild men of the desert
and do not see or understand what goes around them, but that is a great
mistake. The Arabs, especially the town dwellers, see and understand what we
are doing and what we want in Palestine. but they do not react and pretend not
to notice, because at the present they do not see in what we are doing any
threat to their own future ... But if ever we develop in Palestine to such a
degree as to encroach on the living space of the native population to any
appreciable extent, they will not easily give up their place (Ginzberg cited in

Nonetheless, this was an exception, and the denial of the existence of the Palestinian
people as a nation was transmitted to the future generations of Zionism.
Writing in the New York Times Magazine on 5 October 1986, the then Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres, could still find it in himself to repeat the denial - despite the
presence of nearly five million Palestinians - as if they and their land were discovered by the incoming Zionists:

The Land to which they came, while indeed the Holy Land, was desolate and uninviting; a land that had been laid waste, thirsty for water, filled with swamps and malaria, lacking in natural resources. And in the land itself there lived another people; a people who neglected the land, but who lived on it (cited in Said & Hitchens. 2001: 5).

Said (2001) argued that the Prime Minister of Israel has entirely transformed the people of Palestine into the mere tool of ‘the Arab states’ who incited them, as if to say that on their own Palestinians would either have left or would not have resisted the incoming Zionist settlers:

As ideological weapons, such notions had the effect early on of reducing reality in Palestine for Western audiences and policy-makers to a simple binary system (Said & Hitchens, 2001: 5).

However, some Zionist leaders were not able to hide the pride they felt in wiping out the existence of the Palestinian Arabs. Moshe Dayan told the Ha-Aretz on April 4 1969:

We came to this country, which was already populated by Arabs, and we are establishing a Hebrew. that is a Jewish state here. In considerable areas of the country [the total area was 6%] we bought the lands from the Arabs. Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I don’t blame you. because these geography books no longer exist; not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either ... There is no place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population (Dayan cited in Said, 1992: 14).

According to the most precise calculation yet made, approximately 780,000 Arab Palestinians were dispossessed and displaced in 1948 in order to facilitate what the Zionists call the ‘reconstruction and rebuilding of Palestine’ (Said, 1992). These are the Palestinian refugees, who now number well over two million. We should also add to them the number of Arabs held, since 1967, inside the Occupied Territories - numbering 1.7 million - of whom half a million are part of pre-1967 Israel. The ‘transformation’ of Palestine, which resulted in Israel, has been an extraordinarily expensive project - especially for the Arab Palestinians (Said, 1992: 15).
**Arab Awakening**

At the end of the eighteenth century Palestine had been in the hands of the Ottoman Empire for nearly 200 years, but the empire was weak and Russia and Austria were nibbling at its extremities. It suited Britain to keep the Ottoman Empire intact as a means of restraining Russia, and as a way of protecting the best trade route to India (Heikal, 1996).

The first threat to the Egyptian route came in 1798, when Napoleon occupied Egypt with the intention of bringing the Red Sea under French control. Hoping to close the secondary routes through Palestine too, he sought to populate the Holy Land with people who would be permanently in his debt. It was for this reason that Napoleon called upon the Jews in the Diaspora to return to the holy land and rebuild the civilization they had abandoned. ‘Oh Israelites, come to your holy places,’ his proclamation beckoned (ibid: 16). Nothing came of this because the Ottoman sultan, with the help of the British navy, sent a formidable army to oust the French, who withdrew in 1801. However, Napoleon’s proposal sowed an idea, which was taken up by the British later in the nineteenth century.

The aim was to solve two problems at once: to persuade the Jews to leave Europe, where they were unpopular, and established them in Palestine where they could guard the contingency routes (Heikal, 1996: 16).

In June 1913, the first Arab National Congress was held in Paris. It was concerned with the likely chaos in the Arab Provinces brought about through the Turkish thwarting of Arab aspirations. The main item on the Congress agenda was to establish decentralized governments in the Arab provinces. The Arabs in Palestine were conscious of this awakening. By 1891 some Arabs in Palestine were aware of another threat to their aspirations: the increasing influx of Jewish settlers. They started to demand an end to Jewish immigration and land purchase (Ovendale, 1984: 10).

Because of the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, knowledge of the Zionist program spread to the Arabs outside Palestine. It is evident that the Arabs distinguished between the ‘Ottoman’ Jew and the ‘foreign’ Jew, only the former
deserving equal rights in a decentralised administration. They also knew the
difference between ‘Jew’ and ‘Zionist’ (ibid: 10).

In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, urban Jewish immigration increased
rapidly into Palestine. Jerusalem’s Jewish population nearly doubled between 1881
(13,920) and 1891 (25,322). In Jaffa (Haifa in Arabic), and other cities, it grew at an
even faster pace, alarming urban Palestinians and creating ill-will among them,
according to Jewish sources of the period (Farsoun & Zacharia 1997: 58).

The first formally recorded act of Palestinian opposition and protest occurred in 1891.
A telegram signed by a number of Palestinian notables, sent from Jerusalem to
Istanbul, urged the Ottoman authorities to prohibit Russian Jews from entering
Palestine and acquiring land. Opposition by native Palestinian Arabs to foreign
immigration thus preceded the foundation of the Zionist movement.

Jewish sources at the time observed that the declared aim of the Zionist
Congress to establish a home in Palestine quickly affected relations between
Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish immigrants (Farsoun & Zacharia, 1997: 58).

Between 1908 and 1914 nationalist opposition in Palestine to Zionism grew.
There were fears that if the Jews conquered Palestine the territorial unity of the Arab
world would be shattered and the Arab cause weakened.

Unofficial opposition to Zionism began to express itself more spontaneously, directly,
and forcefully. In 1908 clashes between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist immigrant Jews
occurred in Haifa (Jaffa), and peasants attacked Zionist Jewish settlers in the district
of Tabariyya. From every city, including Haifa, signed statements were sent to the
Ottoman authorities protesting at the sale of land to these settlers (Farsoun &
Zacharia, 1997).

By 1910, Palestinian newspapers and the public raised a clamour over the sales of
land totalling 2,400 dunums1 between Nazareth and Jenin by the rich merchant Emile
Sursock of Beirut to the Jewish Colonisation Association (JCA). In 1913 the Sursocks
sold another 2,000 dunums in the Marj Ibn Amer to the JCA. displacing hundreds if
not thousands of peasant families:
Many of the absentee Arab landowners belonging to large and wealthy Syrian and Lebanese families, such as the Daouks and Sursocks, sold their land to Jews, but surprisingly few Palestinian Arab families did, considering how heavily Arab farmers and tenants were in debt during the 1930s and 1940s (Cooley, 1973: 28).

By 1914 there was an awareness that Zionism had to be considered in relation to the wider Arab cause, as well as to local conditions in Palestine. Zionism was not responsible for the Arab awakening, but from an early stage it appeared as a threat (Ovendale, 1984: 10-11).

One of the earliest written documents in opposition to Zionism was a booklet by Najib Azoury:

Two important phenomena, of identical character but nevertheless opposed, which till now have not attracted attention, are now making their appearance in Asian Turkey: these are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent efforts of the Jews to re-establish, on an extremely large scale, the ancient kingdom of Israel. These two movements are destined to struggle continuously with one another, until one prevails over the other. The fate of the entire world depends on the result of this struggle between two people, which represent two contradictory principles (cited in Farsoun & Zacharia, 1997: 59).

The growing Arab consciousness and its politicisation into Pan-Arabism reinforced Palestinian identity. On the eve of World War I, the Palestinian Arabs were on the verge of uniting as a nation. But Palestinian consciousness did not yet transform itself into an all-Palestinian, nationalist movement or develop an independent, centralised political organisation. The Palestinian Arabs were thus unable to act decisively on their own behalf, either against the Ottoman Turks before World War I (WWI) or against the British authorities during the mandate between the two world wars.

**World War I: British War Promises**

Israel was the result of many factors, of course, principally of the imperialist desire to divide and rule, allied with a Zionist program also determined to end anti-Semitic oppression. The various partitions that brought about the numerous independent states of the Middle East left behind, if they did not altogether destroy, the notion of Arab unity that was a guiding idea in the area for the first half of the twentieth century (Said, 2000: 226).
The goal of the Zionist movement, as mentioned earlier, was to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, which consisted of the present-day Israel, as well as the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jordan.

Palestine was one of several Arab territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire until its defeat in World War I. At the end of WWI, Britain gained control of Palestine and in 1922 the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate in Palestine. Throughout WWI, Britain gave conflicting signals to Zionist Jews who sought to establish, in Palestine, a nation-state for the Jewish people and to Palestine Arabs who likewise sought independence and self-government (Swedenburg in Hourani et al. 1993: 447).

To the Arabs, Britain promised ‘to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca’. This promise was given in exchange for Arab help in defeating the Ottoman Empire (Heikal. 1996: 34-35, ‘Hussien-MacMahon Correspondence’, 1915).

To the Zionists, it promised ‘the establishment in Palestine of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’<see Avalon Project. Yale University website. Balfour Declaration, 2 November, 1917>i..

Yet secretly, Britain had already agreed with its French ally that the two would divide up much of the Middle East and control it themselves, an agreement known later as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (Cooley, 1973:31). Britain thus exacerbated the growing conflict between Zionists and Palestinian Arabs due to its hypocrisy and inconsistency, combined with deception to both groups as it sought to retain control of the region for its own colonialist reasons.

**The Balfour Declaration**

British Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister Arthur Balfour was a key figure in the founding of the state of Israel. Arabs never tire of repeating, with some historical justification that many of the problems of the modern Middle East can be laid at the door of the British and their imperialist double-dealing. The most criminal act, according to the Arabs, was the so-called Balfour Declaration (Heikal 1996).
The declaration, giving Britain's backing for the establishment of a national homeland in Palestine, had a curious origin. A leading émigré Zionist who found himself teaching chemistry at Manchester University during the First World War was Chaim Weizmann. By 1916, Britain was running out of natural acetone needed to make ammunition for the Western Front.

Weizmann was put in touch with the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and was hired to find an artificial substitute, which he rapidly did, ending the nightmare prospect of Britain losing the war for a lack of bullets.

The declaration of the Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour that was to follow on November 2, 1917 was, at least in part, a reward for Weizmann's enterprise. The trouble was that the British made overlapping commitments to the Arabs as a way of getting them to support the war against the Turks. When the Turks were defeated, Britain went back on its word to the Arabs and divided the region up between itself and France (Philo and Berry, 2004).

They finally pulled out in 1948, leaving the Arabs and the Jewish immigrants to fight it out amongst themselves. Between the World Wars it should be noted that as far as the Jewish minority in Palestine was concerned, Zionism had very little to do with them. Despite the worldwide interest among Jews in the Balfour Declaration, no publicity was undertaken for it in Palestine, among the Jewish community there:

This fact was in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter, of Balfour’s view that 'the present inhabitants’ need not to be consulted—even though those present inhabitants also include Jews (Said, 1992:19).

The Inter-War and Pre-World War II Periods

As WWI ended, Britain and France moved to consolidate their control over Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. In 1921, Winston Churchill suggested that ‘Transjordan’ (Jordan now) be separated from the Palestine Mandate and ruled by Abdullah, the son of Britain's ally, Sharif Hussein. One year earlier, Feisal, Sharif Hussein's other son, was made King of Iraq in compensation for Britain's forcing him to relinquish the throne of Damascus, Syria. Feisal had assumed the Syrian throne and wrongly
assumed that it was his due, given his and his family’s support for the British against the Ottomans in WWI. But, as Britain had already given up control of Syria to its French ally, Britain had to remove Feisal from Syria.

By 1922. Britain had direct or indirect control over Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq (as well as Kuwait and other Arab ‘kingdoms’ in the Persian Gulf). Additionally, France had created a new ‘Lebanon’ nation (with a slight Christian majority), carved out of greater Syria: it controlled both countries.

But Palestine would not be governed easily. The conflicting goals of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism would not be reconciled. Britain flip-flopped for 25 years, first siding with Zionists then with Palestinians. The conflict only worsened as neither was satisfied in their national aspirations. World War II and the Holocaust only added more political and moral pressure to the situation. Still, the conflict was not to be resolved (Ovendale, 1984: 119).

Arab opposition to an Israeli state began after the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which supported the idea of a Jewish national homeland. In the 1920s there were anti-Zionist riots in Palestine, which was then governed by Britain under a League of Nations mandate.

By 1947, unable to reconcile the mutually exclusive claims by two different groups to the same land, Britain—its empire crumbling worldwide—put the issue into the hands of the newly established United Nations. The UN recommended a partition of Palestine into two separate states: one Jewish and one Arab. The Palestinian Leaders and other Arabs were, however, not willing to give up any more of their historic land to anyone:

The Recommendation of the British government’s 1937 Peel Commission—that Palestine be partitioned into separate Jewish and Arab states—was accepted by the Jewish community but rejected by the Arabs. The idea of partition remained latent until the scope of the Holocaust, and Britain’s decision to withdraw from Palestine, prompted a vote in November 1947 by the UN General Assembly, successor to the League of Nations, to divide Palestine into two awkwardly demarcated states and internationalise Jerusalem (Makovsky, 1996: 2).

Palestinians saw the European leaders as being responsible for this problem. It was Europe that had created the Jewish refugee crisis—both through the Holocaust and
especially afterwards. Palestinians and other Arabs were determined not to be Europe’s new victims. They refused to give up their own land for Jewish-European immigrants who would simply control Arab land even as Arabs struggled for independence from European colonial rule (British and French).

The Zionists, then led by David Ben-Gurion, accepted this partition plan, even though they had always dreamed of controlling all of western Palestine and Jerusalem.

The Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab states rejected the partition proposal. They felt Palestine was all theirs, that the Jews were a foreign implant foisted upon them, and that they had the strength to drive them out.

Just before the British completed their withdrawal on May 14, 1948, the Zionists declared their own state, and the next day the Palestinians, aided by the armies of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, launched a war to prevent Jewish independence and to secure control of all of western Palestine (Friedman: 1998: 14).

Israel was established as a nation-state on May 14, 1948. For Zionist Jews, it was a day of deliverance, of independence, of freedom, and hope. For Palestinians, it was a day of nakbeh, or ‘catastrophe’. the day their own struggle for independence, freedom, and hope was dashed. The battles that had been going on for years between the Zionist and the Palestinian Arabs erupted into a full-scale war between the new state of Israel and its Arab neighbours - Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.

Poignantly, the Jewish Israeli forces stood at around 35,000 men and women, many of whom had received training in World War II. The Combined Arab forces were around 40,000, most of whom were ‘irregulars’, but with no formal military training:

In the course of that war, the Zionists not only managed to hold all the areas assigned to them by the United Nations but to seize part of the land designated for the Palestinian state as well (Friedman: 1998: 15).

As a result of this war an estimated 600,000 –700,000 Palestinian refugees fled the massacres Haganah and Stren Zionist groups were committing against the Palestinian Arabs (Dier Yasin, Kibia, Kfar Qassem) to the Gaza Strip. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Makovsky. 1996).
Even after the defeat, Palestinian intellectuals expressed their convictions that Israel is a ‘false nation and that they would keep fighting to get their land and rights back’ (Durr cited in Cooley, 1973: 78-79). Dr Ibrahim Durr, a Palestinian biochemist and writer told writer J. Cooley in the late 1960s that Israel is ‘an artificial structure, a colony totally alien to the Middle East, especially as a manifestation of western interests and culture’. He finds it ‘lacking in the elements necessary for the survival as a state’; after stating that Israel ‘is a closed, racist, paramilitary society with an unchecked policy of expansion’ (ibid). Durr speaks of the loss of Palestine as a consequence of the Arab weakness at the time:

The Arabs repeatedly lost to Israel not only because of Israel’s powerful allies, technological advancement, and military efficiency and organisation, but also because of the Arabs themselves. This phase in the history of the Arabs is that of decadence, weakness and dissolution. They have no real friends, especially among the big powers; and thus have to fight a battle on two fronts: the outside one and in their own societies (ibid).

However, in 2001 Edward Said offers another perspective on this continuous ‘defeat’:

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948 occurred partly because the Zionists acquired control of most territory of Palestine, and partly because they had already won the political battle for Palestine in the international world in which ideas, representations, rhetoric, and images were at issue (Said, 2001: 1).

The Arab-Israeli Wars:

[Noam Chomski] sees the Palestine problem as ‘a clash between total justice and total justice, since each side feels rightly that its national survival is the issue’. He calls for a revival of aspirations toward liberation socialist binationalism as the only realistic hope for peace (Khalidi, 1976: 4).

There have been a series of wars and territorial conflicts between Israel and various Arab states in the Middle East since the founding of the state of Israel in May 1948. These include the war of 1948–49 (discussed above); the 1956 Suez War between Israel and Egypt; the Six-Day War of 1967, in which Israel captured territory from Syria and Jordan; the October War of 1973; and the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of Lebanon. In the times between the wars tension has remained high in the area, resulting in clashes and military operations taking place on both sides. However,
following the 1973 war the main front where these clashes and military operations were mostly concentrated was within the Lebanese territories. Another front was reopened in 1987, when the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose against the occupied army in a mass uprising that was later know as the first Palestinian Intifada (Arabic, literally ‘shaking off’). In the coming section I will briefly discuss these wars and try to present how the military and political situation in Lebanon became directly affected by the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Suez crisis of 1956

During the 1950s, nationalism spread among the Arab countries of the Middle East. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his followers sought to rid Arab lands of the influence of Western nations. On July 26, 1956, Nasser took control of the Suez Canal from its British and French owners. The canal connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas and is a key shipping route between Europe and Asia.

Many western countries protested at Nasser's action, and Britain, France, and Israel secretly plotted to end Egypt's control of the canal. On October 29, Israel attacked Egyptian forces in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, which lies between Israel and the canal. Israel, with British and French help, occupied most of the peninsula. The UN called a cease-fire on November 6, and by early 1957, Israel, under international pressure, returned the Sinai to Egypt. The canal reopened under Egyptian management in April of that year. After the Suez crisis, Arab guerrillas launched small-scale attacks inside Israel, and Israel responded with raids into Arab territory.

In 1964, the Arab League, inspired by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, organised the Palestinian resistance groups under one umbrella, which became known as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) (see Shlaim, 2000: 230).

The Six Day War or June War

Since...[the Suez crisis], Israel has expanded in size and in power. In 1967 it militarily acquired, and still holds, vast amounts of Arab land and people, including the entire mass of historical Palestine (Said et al. 2001: 2).
In May 1967, Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, which was Israel’s only access to the Red Sea. Avi Shlaim in his book The Iron Wall wrote that Nasser understood the psychological significance of this step. Shlaim added:

[Nasser] knew that Israel’s entire defence philosophy was based on imposing its will on its enemies, not on submitting to unilateral dictates by them. In closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, he took a terrible gamble and lost (Shlaim, 2000: 237).

Shlaim believed that Nasser neither wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel. It was just one step to impress Arab public opinion in the face of Israeli threats to overthrow the regime in Damascus (ibid: 236).

By June 5, Egypt had signed defence agreements with Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. These steps alarmed the Israelis. On June 5, they launched a surprise attack on Egypt. Syria, Jordan, and Iraq joined Egypt in fighting Israel. Within hours, Israeli warplanes had destroyed almost all the Arab air forces. Israeli tanks then retook the Sinai Peninsula. Israel also gained control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. It had taken West Jerusalem in the 1948 war. In the north, Israel took Syria’s Golan Heights, an area bordering Israel. The fighting ended on June 10. Israelis call this conflict the Six-Day War. Arabs call it the June War (Bergman, 2000).

The 1967 war was followed by the United Nation Security Council Resolution 242, which called for the ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’ (Philo and Berry, 2004: 34). The resolution called for just settlement for the Palestinian refugee problem. Syria and the Palestinians rejected the resolution on the grounds that it spoke of the Palestinians as a refugee problem without any mention of their right to self-determination and a national sovereign state (ibid; see also Seale, 1989).

The 1967 War was a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although it provided Israel with greater strategic depth and more defensible borders, it also made Israel responsible for the security and well being of more than one million Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories and created another 200,000 refugees (Makovsky, 1996: 3). However, by the end of 1969, 7,554 Arab houses had been
razed, and by August 1971, another, 16,212 houses had been demolished, according to the London *Sunday Times* of June 19, 1977 (Said, 1992: 15).

After the 1967 war, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) sought to become the representative of the Palestinians in world politics. It developed educational and social service organizations for Palestinians, mainly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan.

The PLO also began to take independent military action. In the late 1960s, PLO groups began to attack Israelis, both inside and outside Israel. In response, Israel attacked Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon, where many guerrillas were based. The Israelis also assassinated a number of PLO leaders.

In the wake of this massive 1967 Arab defeat, a revolutionary mood swept through the Arab world. One immediate impact of that mood was that radical independent underground Palestinian guerrilla organisations, known as *Fedayeen*, which had sprung up in the late 1950s and 1960s outside Arab government control, were able to take over the PLO apparatus from the Arab League (Friedman, 1998: 16).

In 1969 Yassir Arafat, the head of *Fatah* guerrilla group and movement (‘conquest’ in English) was elected chairman of the PLO’s executive committee. Then, as now, the PLO was composed of a broad range of Palestinian guerrilla organisations representing many different political tendencies.

The PLO was granted significant economic aid by the Arab states in order to carry on the battle with Israel. The PLO soon took control of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan, using them as bases of operation against targets in Israel and against Israeli targets abroad:

In both Jordan and Lebanon the PLO assumed quasi-sovereign authority over certain regions bordering on Israel. Their raids on Israel brought massive Israeli retaliation, which created tensions between the Palestinians and part of the Lebanese community and Palestinians and the Jordanian regime (ibid).
The October War or Yom Kippur War (1973)

After the 1967 war, Egyptian and Israeli troops continued to attack each other across the western border of the Sinai Peninsula. Nasser died in 1970 as a result of a stroke suffered in attempting to put down a "civil war" in Jordan between PLO fighters and the Jordanian army of King Hussein, a war known as ‘Black September’ (explored later in this chapter). In the early 1970s Egypt made numerous attempts to regain the occupied Sinai through diplomacy, but its peace overtures were rejected by Israel (Shlaim, 2000). Anwar el-Sadat, who had succeeded Nasser, began plans to retake the Sinai Peninsula from Israel. He was joined by the new President of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, who sought to reclaim the Golan Heights. King Hussein declined to participate, fearing the loss of even more of his land should the Arab states not succeed against the powerful Israeli army (Bregman, 2000).

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a massive assault on Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. The attack took Israel by surprise, in part because it came on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism (Rodinson, 1985). At first, Egypt drove Israel's forces out of the western Sinai, and Syria pushed Israeli troops from the eastern Golan Heights. However, the United States gave Israel large amounts of military equipment and the Israeli Army was able to regain most of what it originally occupied in 1967 (Philo and Berry, 2004: 47). Israelis call this war the Yom Kippur War. Arabs call it the October War or the Ramadan War. The state of war between Egypt and Israel ended in 1979 with a peace treaty signed at Camp David.

The Camp David Accords

In 1978, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat joined Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and U.S. President Jimmy Carter in signing the Camp David Accords. Under these agreements, Egypt recognized Israel's right to exist. In return, Israel agreed to give back to Egypt the part of the Sinai it still occupied, having returned the far western part in 1975. Sadat and Begin also agreed on the need for national independence for the Palestinians. In talks leading up to the Accords, Egypt and Israel received promises of large amounts of U.S. economic and military aid. In 1979, Egypt
and Israel signed a treaty confirming their new ‘peaceful relationship’ (Rodinson, 1985).

Most Arab leaders strongly opposed the Camp David Accords and the 1979 treaty. They believed that the unilateral separatist agreement of Camp David denied the legitimate rights of the Palestinian (Seale, 1989). As a result, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, an organization of cooperation between Arab nations, in 1979. In 1981, an Egyptian religious group opposed to his policies assassinated Sadat.

The First Intifada (Uprising)

In 1987, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip began an uprising against Israel’s military rule of those territories. The uprising became known as the Intifada, an Arabic term meaning uprising or shaking off. Demonstrations occurred throughout the occupied territories. Entire towns refused to pay taxes to Israel, and most Palestinians quit their jobs with Israeli employers (Friedman, 1998). Most of the demonstrations were peaceful, but a few became violent. The Intifada grabbed international attention and triggered criticism of Israel for its continuing control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and for its extensive use of force in trying to control the Palestinians. Many commentators said that somehow the Palestinian Intifada was influenced by the growing Lebanese resistance in South Lebanon against the Israeli occupation (Atwi, 2002: 195-203).

The origins of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict (and the 1978-1982 wars)

[The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was an] unprovoked aggression against unarmed and innocent civilians. More specifically, the deaths of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps after the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 are seen by Netanyahu as the responsibility of Lebanese Phalangists and nothing to do with the Israeli government or armed forces. [Yet the] action of the Phalangists were clearly sanctioned and authorised by the Israeli government (Said cited in Kennedy, 2000: 53).

In 1968 the Fedayeen (the military arm of the PLO) moved increasingly and openly into Lebanese bases following an Israeli helicopter raid, which burned thirteen Lebanese civil airliners at Beirut International Airport on December 28, 1968. This
brought into the open the entire issue of the Fedayeen presence in Lebanon (Cooley, 1973: 104).

In the fall of 1969, Lebanon had signed an agreement with the PLO in Cairo under President Nasser’s support. This agreement (given the name Cairo Agreement) legitimised the Palestinian rights to operate from southern Lebanon (Fisk, 2001: 74). Saeb Salam, the Prime Minister at the time, being an experienced politician heading ‘a young technocrats’ cabinet, promised to respect Palestinians ‘freedom of action’ from Southern Lebanon provided by the Cairo Agreement (ibid).

In May 1970, General Mordecai Gur, commander of Israel’s northern military sector, sent an Israeli armoured brigade with air cover into the Arqoub. This is the Lebanese territory below the Lebanese slopes of Mount Haramon, the partly wooded region of caves, defiles and hidden valleys where Israel claimed the Fedayeen had their main bases in Lebanon. During this operation the Israeli tank crews demolished Hebbariyeh, one of the Lebanese villages heavily targeted by the Israelis. A few days later they withdrew after failing to kill any significant numbers of assumed guerrillas (Cooley, 1973: 87).

In September 1970, radical Palestinian guerrillas brought three hijacked airliners to Jordan and prevented the Jordanian army from getting near the planes or rescuing the passengers. Recognising he was on the verge of losing control over his whole kingdom, King Hussein decided to wipe out Arafat and the PLO by launching a full scale offensive against the Palestinian refugee camps and neighbourhoods in the Jordanian capital, Amman. The PLO responded by calling for Hussein’s overthrow and vowing to wrest Jordan from his hands. The PLO lost, forcing Arafat to flee Amman disguised as an Arab woman (Friedman, 1998: 16).

Arafat and the PLO immediately moved to Lebanon and had their new base in the Palestinian refugee districts of Beirut and South Lebanon. It was at this point the Lebanese conflict became fully intertwined with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Lebanon’s delegation to the Thirty-Second General Assembly was headed by Mr. Fouad Boutros, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, who met with
President Jimmy Carter in New York on 5 October 1977, to emphasise, among other things, what he was to state in his speech before the Assembly: “The war in Lebanon is, in most respects, the result of a prior injustice committed against a people driven out from its land and deprived of its country. Thus, injustice has itself provoked injustice and violence has engendered further violence in the host country of what befell Palestine” (Tuieni, 1979: 4).

In February 1972 the Israelis repeated their incursion of May 1970: for four days, they occupied Lebanon’s Arkoub region while their soldiers blew up houses used by the guerrillas, killing about fifty of them with the aid of Skyhawk and Phantom fighter bombers. When the Israeli forces withdrew, under the pressure of US disapproval and a unanimous UN Security Council resolution calling on them to withdraw and not repeat the attack, the Lebanese army was deployed in the Arkoub region for the first time since 1969 (Cooley, 1973: 131).

After Arafat and his men fled Jordan they were welcomed by Lebanese national socialist parties, mostly Muslims and Druze, who identified with their cause and thought they could have the PLO on their side in bringing pressure on the ruling Maronite Christians to share more political power (Fisk, 2001).

Recognising this, the Maronite Christians wanted the PLO out, believing it was disrupting Lebanese life and, most importantly, the Lebanese Muslims would be unable to press their demands for more power. The Muslims and left wing political movements and parties (gathered in one body, the ‘Lebanese National Movement’ the LNM), in turn, opposed any crackdown on the PLO, which, in effect, had become their main support in bring political changes to the way Lebanon was run by the Maronites (Friedman, 1998: 17).

As a result of this political deadlock, the Lebanese government and army became paralysed. The Christian Maronite groups turned to their own armies - the Phalangists and Tiger militias - to deal with the Palestinians. On April 13, 1975, twenty-seven Palestinian civilians riding in a bus through East Beirut were ambushed and killed by some Phalangists. The next morning, Palestinian guerrillas backed by LNM fought pitched battles in the streets of Beirut with the Phalangists and Tiger militias. Eventually, Christian elements of the Lebanese army sided with their tribe, Muslims
did the same, and Lebanon soon found itself in a civil war that erupted on April 13th 1975 (see Friedman, 1998; Fisk, 2001; and Picard, 2002).

March 14th 1978 invasion

Encounters with the Israelis between civilian villagers, the Lebanese left-wing factions and the Fedayeen continued. In March 1978, and in the absence of a powerful government in Lebanon. Israel invaded South Lebanon, occupying almost 7% of Lebanese territories in an operation the Israelis called ‘Operation Litani’. The Lebanese suspected Israel might permanently occupy parts of South Lebanon and so secure control of new water resources (ibid). The projects Israel conducted on the Litani River later confirmed the Lebanese suspicions.

There was … a great symbolism in Israel’s selection of the code-name for its military operation. The Litani River, Southern Lebanon’s principle lifeline, had always been coveted by Israel. Even before the inception of the Jewish State, when the borders between Lebanon and Palestine were being re-drawn by the British Mandate as an essential economic component of the projected “National Home”. When Israel was created by the 1947 UN resolution, which partitioned Palestine, a number of economic schemes were proposed for joint Israeli-Lebanese exploitation of the Litani waters (Tuinen, 1979: 5).

Even the most modest Lebanese attempts to divert minor rivers and springs in the same area had been blocked by ‘Israeli incursions, shelling and the constant use of force. to keep open Israel’s option on the Litani’ (ibid). While the invasion was still underway, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 425, depriving Israel of the political dividends expected from Operation Litani’s success. The Resolution called upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and established a United Nations International Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Lebanon announced that 1,168 people had been killed in the invasion.

Israel made no response to the UN Resolution, and its Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman, called for the establishment of a local militia in South Lebanon to collaborate with the Israeli Army and maintain order in the area (the militia was given the name ‘the Southern Lebanon Army’, SLA). Israel occupied South Lebanon up to the Litani River, with the exception of a “pocket” round Tyre (ibid: 467).
Since March 1978, peace-keeping in Lebanon has been undergoing a dramatic process, which made its ultimate success doubtful and the credibility of the international intervention highly questionable (ibid: 477).

**The June 6th 1982 invasion**

Incongruously enough, the incident that eventually brought war took place neither in Lebanon nor in Israel, but in London. On 3 June 1982, Palestinian gunmen of the Abu Nidal group shot the Israeli Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, and seriously injured him. There was no reason intrinsically why such an incident should turn into a *casus belli* and necessitate a massive Israeli invasion to wipe out the PLO in Lebanon, especially given that Abu Nidal was a sworn enemy of the PLO and its leader Arafat, whom he often dubbed ‘the Jewess son’ and had even sent his people to assassinate him (Bregman. 2000: 158).

On June 6 1982, the Israeli army launched a massive military operation against Lebanon, the ‘Peace for Galilee’ operation (code-named by the Israelis), supported by the Phalangists and commanded by Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Defence Minister at the time.

Sharon, like others in Likud, strongly believed that the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon would shatter Arafat’s influence among the inhabitants of the West Bank. He said: ‘Quiet on the West Bank requires the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon’. and one of his colleagues, the then Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said: ‘the defence of the West Bank starts in West Beirut’ (Bregman. 2000: 155).

The Israeli army arrived at the gates of Beirut on the 14th of June. The western part of the Lebanese capital was under siege for three months.

Israeli aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets in a psychological warfare campaign to frighten the residents of West Beirut into leaving... [The Israeli army] bombarded PLO positions and residential areas of West Beirut by land, sea, and air for fourteen hours on August 1 in the most intense shelling of the besieged capital since the invasion commenced on June 6 (Tanter, 1990: 149, 160).

On August 21st Arafat and the PLO fighters evacuated West Beirut to Tunisia on board ships provided by the Americans, French and Italians. An American mediator, Philip Habib, succeeded in achieving an agreement between Arafat and the Israelis.
The agreement stated that if the PLO evacuated Beirut the Israeli army would give assurances it would not enter West Beirut.

The 1982 conflict was the first where Israel was not fighting the armed forces of another sovereign state. Lebanon has been described as an “involuntarily open society”, since it had no effective government for seven years before the 1982 invasion (Munham cited in Mercer et al, 1987: 263).

On September 14 the head of the Phalangists, Israel’s prime ally, Bashir Jumayyil, was assassinated. Many Lebanese considered Jumayyil a collaborator with the enemy:

Israel had carefully cultivated Bashir Jumayyil for years, providing arms and training for his men and invaluable help abroad in his uphill struggle for international respectability. Israel had invaded Lebanon on June 6 [1982] for its own reasons, and without the Lebanese Forces’ political support and rear-base facilities it is doubtful whether Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defence Minister Ariel Sharon would have dared launch the operation (Randall, 1993: 3).

At 3:30 am on Wednesday, September 15, Jumayyil’s military lieutenants met with Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, Israeli Chief of Staff, and Major General Amir Drori, in charge of Israel’s Northern Command and in effective charge of the entire Lebanese operation. The Israelis were going to invade West Beirut – in defiance of promises to the United States, Lebanon, and the PLO made during the peaceful evacuation of more than 11,000 Palestinian guerrillas completed just two weeks earlier.

Bashir’s death simply left too many possibilities for error that could nullify Israel’s sacrifices and benefits in the war to date. The Israelis had counted on Jumayyil to clean up West Beirut with its armed leftist militias and the two thousand PLO fighters, who the Israelis had convinced themselves, on the basis of erroneous electronic eavesdropping, had been left behind (Randall, 1993: 13).

Hours later the Israeli army invaded West Beirut. On September 16 the Phalangists, under the supervision of the Israelis, committed a massacre in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps of almost 3000 civilians, among them children and old people.

On the same day, the first Lebanese resistance operation was conducted against the Israelis in Hamra Street in the middle of West Beirut. The Lebanese Communist
Party, the Communist Labour organisation and the Lebanese National Social Party led the resistance operations at the time.

A month later, the aircraft that had been throwing leaflets threatening West Beirut to leave their city were now throwing leaflets asking the Beirutis not to shoot at Israeli soldiers because they were leaving.

Israel’s previous military engagements were brief (four, six and eighteen days respectively in 1956, 1967 and 1973) and conclusive, but the 1982 conflict “just kept rolling on” and has still in a sense to reach a conclusion (Munghan cited in Mercer, 1987: 263).

In 1984 Israel withdrew to what it named later as the ‘security zone’ in South Lebanon, giving it total control over the Litani River, and imposing a military administration run by the head of the SLA, a Lebanese officer (paid by the Israelis), Saad Haddad.

In the wake of 1982 Israeli invasion, Hezbollah, the Shiite Islamist Party of God, emerged. Resisting the occupation was one of the main reasons that brought several members and religious leaders of different Shiite political movements and groups together to form one party under the auspices of the Iranian revolution that had taken place in 1979. Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, told the Party’s paper Al Ahd on November 21st, 1997, that ‘had the enemy [Israel] not taken this step [the invasion]. I do not know whether something called Hezbollah would have been born. I doubt it’ (cited in Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 11).

A few months after the invasion, the Shiites of South Lebanon, which constitutes the majority of the population there, became aware that the Israelis had come to stay and that they would not leave until after they had achieved what they claimed to be their objective at the time, uprooting the PLO from South Lebanon (Jaber, 1997: 15; Ranstorp, 1997: 30). Poignantly, the Israelis initiated a plan, similar to that used in the West Bank, to administer the area through committees that were run by their proxy militia, the SLA (Jaber, 1997: 15). The Israeli army and its allies started pressuring figures within the local population to join the scheme through taking their relatives as hostages into a camp they established in Ansar village near Sidon (ibid). The camp, known as the Ansar concentration camp, due to its tents and barbed wires, was used to
detain without trial and abduct those suspected of aiding and abetting members of the underground resistance movement that was sweeping the villages of south Lebanon (Jones 2002). What had started as a small group of resistance fighters became at a later stage a mass resistance movement that led to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from major cities and towns in South Lebanon.

In 1985, Hezbollah issued its mission statement, officially announcing the emergence of this new party. Resisting the Israeli occupation till it withdrew from the Lebanese territories was one of its main objectives. However, it was not until late eighties that the Hezbollah Islamic resistance gained the upper hand in fighting the Israelis. By the early nineties the Islamic resistance became the sole force that had the logistic and military capabilities to fight the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon (for more information on the emergence, structure and objectives of Hezbollah see Jaber, 1997; Ranstorp. 1997; Saad Ghorayeb, 2002; Hamza, 2004; Palmer Hayek, 2004; Qassem, 2005).

Meanwhile, Israel was finding it difficult day after day to stop the resistance fighters from targeting its troops in the occupied zone of South Lebanon. The Islamic resistance, which was growing support and popularity among the local population, became Israel number one target. Their war against the resistance fighters took various shapes and forms: commando operations, incursions and mini-invasions.

The ‘Seven Days’ Operation of July 1993, code-named by the Israelis as ‘Operation Accountability’, and the ‘Grapes of Wrath’ Operation of April 1996 (studied in detail in chapter Six) were two major attacks Israel launched on the Lebanese territories, targeting Southern villages and cities outside the occupied zone and the main power stations in the capital, Beirut. These two events took place after Lebanon had survived its civil war and all the Lebanese factions had agreed after 15 years of fighting and killing to put an end to it. They agreed on Lebanon’s right and legitimacy to resist the Israeli occupation forces in South Lebanon until Israel implemented UN resolution 425.iii They also agreed that Lebanon was to be a united Arab state where Muslims and Christians share similar powers. They equally rejected all tendencies and attempts towards dividing Lebanon into mini religious states (Al Abed, 2001) and declared Israel as a state enemy and those who establish contact with the Israelis as traitors.
However, with this agreement, Israel lost the support of the right-wing Christian Phalangists who, besides the SLA proxy militia, were the main political supporters of Israel in Lebanon. The relationship between the Phalangists and Israel goes back to the early leaders of the Zionist movement (Eisenberg, 1999).

Although chronologically awkward, it is argued to be appropriate to look now at the origins and developments of the place Lebanon played in the minds of early Zionists. This brings the timeline up to the point left here.

**Lebanon in the early Zionist imagination:**

Interest in the natural resources of the Galilee and a growing sense of possible political and economic opportunities among the Lebanese characterised the early period of Zionist attention to Lebanon (Eisenberg, 1999: 38).

Encouraged by the vague border in the Galilee region, early Zionist strategists considered Lebanon, especially the southern portion, as an arena for potential Zionist settlement. Chaim Weizmann toured Lebanon in 1907. Two weeks later, he was back in Haifa, anxiously seeking support for several small industries he wanted to establish in Sidon.

Saida [Sidon] is a good place in every respect. The raw material is available, there is a harbour, it is favourably situated, capable of development, and has a Jewish population (Weizmann cited in Eisenberg, 1999: 39).

Thus, Weizmann had in mind the possibility of building Jewish settlements in Southern Lebanon.

The call for a Zionist policy of cooperation with the Lebanese Maronites came from a pro-Zionist journalist in Beirut. Writing directly to Weizmann, J.J.Caleb offered his unsolicited assessment of the situation’s relevance to the Zionist case. Caleb claimed they would be two minorities against the Muslims in the region. He maintained that, with Christian Lebanese assistance, the Zionists could splinter the Muslim-Christian bloc in Palestine. Besides, some Zionists leaders such as Menachem Ussishkin claimed that part of biblical Palestine fell within Lebanon and Syria (ibid: 45).
Zionist activities in the first decades of the twentieth century found cause for encouragement in their encounters with the Maronites.

On the surface, the Maronites and the Jews thought they had much in common: some Maronites saw themselves as modern-day Phoenicians bringing all the Phoenician Diaspora back to Lebanon, just as the Zionists were doing with the Jews; together they would restore the ancient Mediterranean (Freidman, 1998: 135).

The past history of a Zionist-Maronite ‘friendship’ had emerged in 1860, during the Maronite–Druze civil war. The Druze had decidedly seized the upper lands and exchanges of killing took place between the Maronites and the Druze. The Ottoman authorities refused to reply to the Maronite’s call for ‘rescue’.

In desperation, the Maronites cried out for help to the European nations. Two of the first European personalities to respond to their appeal were Sir Moses Montefiore, a wealthy Jewish communal leader in London, and Adolph Cremieux, a distinguished French Jewish statesman. Montefiore arranged for the Maronites’ plight to receive prominent coverage in the London Times and set up a fund to assist the survivors, to which he gave generously of his own money. Cremieux proved instrumental in persuading the French to send troops to Lebanon to save the Christians. French intervention rescued the Christians and brought about the Maronite dominated Mutasarifyya (ibid: 51).

At the end of World War I, when Britain and France carved up the Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern possessions. France at one point had divided its League of Nations mandate into five separate states, including a Greater Lebanon run by the Christians. It added to the Christian Mount Lebanon region such predominantly Moslem areas as Tyre in the South, Tripoli in the North, and the fertile Beqaa in the East ‘to make an economically viable state’ (Randal, 1993).

In 1936, the Maronite Patriarch testified in favour of a Jewish state in Palestine before the Peel Commission, established to end the violence there. The following year, David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency, told the Zionist World Workers Party meeting in Zurich that “Lebanon is the natural ally of the Jews of the land of Israel …the proximity of Lebanon will furnish a loyal ally for the Jewish state as soon as it is created (Randal, 1993: 188).

It is documented that, after the Ottoman Empire’s collapse in 1918. Zionists had tried ‘unsuccessfully’ to persuade Britain to claim all of South Lebanon up to the precious waters of the Litani River for Palestine, but France, as a mandate power over Lebanon and Syria, declined the request and announced the founding of ‘the State of Great
Lebanon’ (Menargues, 2006) in 1920 within its current borders. In what Israelis call the War of Independence, ‘Israeli troops in 1948 occupied Lebanon up to the Litani River, withdrawing to the present border only in the following year’ (Randal, 1993: 189).

A few years later, the then Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, recognized ‘unfriendly’ designs on Lebanon in a series of records in his personal diary (published in Hebrew in 1979 and only after Sharett’s son let down establishment efforts to prevent its publication - as documented in Randal, 1993).

Long before the Palestinian guerrillas became a physical threat to Israel, Sharett recorded Israeli plans to destabilize, indeed dismember, Lebanon and install a puppet regime pliable to Israel’s diktat. Various entries from the 1930s show Sharett discouraging Maronite extremist dreams of enlisting Zionist help to undo the Greater Lebanon created in 1920. Sharett’s February 27, 1954, entry deals with the then recently retired Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon, and chief of Staff Moshe Dayan all of whom wanted to take advantage of a coup d’etat in Syria to invade that country. Ben Gurion insisted that if Iraq invaded Syria, as seemed possible, “this is the time to arouse Lebanon – that is to say the Maronite –to proclaim a Christian state. Sharett demurred: ‘I said this is an empty dream’ (Randal, 1993: 189).

Sharett argued that ‘not only were all Christians no longer a majority in Lebanon, but the Greek Orthodox minority wanted no part of a Maronite-dominated Christian state’ (ibid: 191). On May 16, 1955 Sharett recorded:

[For Moshe Dayan] all that is needed [is] to find an officer, even a captain. We should win his heart or buy him, to get him to agree to declare himself the saviour of the Maronite population. Then Israel would enter Lebanon, occupy the necessary territory and set up a Christian regime allied to Israel and everything would run just fine (ibid: 193).

What Sharett disclosed proved right in the light of what has happened in Lebanon after 1975. Civil war enveloped the country. Israel did latch onto a renegade Christian army officer, Saad Haddad, who did its bidding in the southern border area.

Sharett revealed Ben Gurion’s beliefs:

The state “must invent dangers and, to do so, it must adopt the method of provocation-and-revenge… and above all—let us hope for a new war with the Arab countries—so that we may finally get rid of our troubles and acquire space,” Sharett’s entry read, before noting, “(such a slip of the tongue—Ben
Gurion himself said it would be worthwhile to pay an Arab a million pounds to start a war)” (ibid: 194).

Meanwhile, Ben-Gurion’s 1948-49 diaries shed light on the extent of Israel’s relationship with various Lebanese politicians in the late 1940s, as well as on Israeli contacts with a Phalangist’s envoy in the war’s immediate aftermath.

In 1946, the relationship with the Maronite community in Lebanon was formalised by an agreement between the Jewish Agency and the Maronite Church, but the agreement’s limited value was reflected in the latter’s insistence that the treaty be kept secret, and the ensuing controversy between Patriarch Arida and his emissary, Tawfiq Awwad, who both sought to disassociate themselves from it (Rabinovich, 1985: 104).

The Maronite Church did not want to put itself in a confrontation with the massive Arab sympathy and support for the Palestinians, even among Maronites themselves.

Now the Palestinian refugees are pouring into Lebanon ... One must also include the British consul general’s observation that even Christians had begun to feel that the Palestinians were being wronged (Eisenberg, 1994: 97).

The Maronites mostly treated their contacts with Israel with secrecy until the early seventies when the PLO left Jordan for Beirut.

Israel’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war can be traced back – grotesque as it may seem – to a crucial meeting on the steps of the Magdalene Church in Paris. There, back in the early 1970s, an Israeli agent of the Mossad promised, albeit unofficially, to a Christian leader by the strange name of Mugabgab, that, if asked, Israel would assist the Christians in Lebanon. This led to a meeting in 1975 between Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin and the Maronite Christian Leader Camille Chamoun, on board an Israeli destroyer in the Mediterranean, to discuss Israeli aid to the Maronites in Lebanon (Bergman, 2000: 149).

A year later, with the civil war in Lebanon raging and the Maronite forces under growing pressure and in serious military straits, a Maronite leader of the Al Kataeb Phalangist party, Joseph Abu Khalil, approached Mugabgab. Bergman (2000) recorded they set sail from Kaslik in Lebanon to the port of Haifa in Israel on 12 March 1976.

Their ship was stopped at sea by an Israeli patrol boat, and after identifying themselves and explaining the purpose of their trip they were taken to Tel Aviv, where they met Israel’s Defence Minister Shimon Peres. Peres asked
Abu Khalil: ‘why have you have come to ask for weapons. We need ammunition’. Peres discussed the matter with Prime Minister Rabin, and they decided on a dramatic increase in material help to the Maronites in Lebanon. (Bregman, 2000: 149).

It is often alleged that Israel’s principal motive in offering support to the Maronites in Lebanon was ‘sympathy and compassion’. This, however, is not true; in providing supplies and some other assistance to the Maronites, Israel was serving its own ‘national interests’. The Maronites were fighting the PLO and other traditional enemies of Israel (left-wing and Muslim parties) and, by assisting the Maronites, Israel was using a proxy to do its ‘dirty work’. Supporting the Maronites provided the Israelis. Mossad in particular, with a ‘window’ to the Arab world, crucial for the purposes of gathering intelligence (ibid: 149).

With political endorsement given, Israeli boats began sailing back and forth delivering arms to the Maronites. A boat would sail into Lebanese waters towing craft heaped with weapons and ammunition, and off the coast the craft would be released for the Maronites to tow away. Arming the Maronites was a major logistical operation and, although contacts with the Maronites in Lebanon were usually maintained by the Mossad, in this case the huge supply operation was supervised by the Israeli defence ministry. It is estimated that between 1975 and 1977 the Rabin government spent $150 million on arming the Maronites (ibid: 150).

In September 1976 the Phalangists officially announced the formation of their armed militia headed by Bashir Jumayyil, the young son of Peir Jumayyil, the head of the main Phalangist party at the time, ‘Al Kataeb’. The militia was given the name of the ‘Lebanese Forces’. Bashir established a good relationship with the Israelis.

But perhaps most important were the development of Bashir Jumayyil’s personality and leadership, the build-up of his party’s and militia’s power, and the dynamics of the relationship between him and his Israeli allies. By 1980, Bashir Jumayyil had developed, at least in some Israeli eyes, from the charming and volatile younger son of a veteran political leader into the mature head of the single most powerful political and military force in Lebanon, a real ally to Israel, and a man with the capacity to change the paradigms of both the Lebanese crisis and the Lebanese polity (Rabinovich, 1985: 108).

Bashir Jumayyil was the first to promise the Israelis that, with their help, he could ‘reshape Lebanon and forge a peace treaty’ (Friedman, 1998: 138). Under the protection of Israeli tanks, Jumayyil was elected President of Lebanon in August 1982. The Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Menachem Begin, and Defence Minister,
Ariel Sharon, met Bashir in Nahariyya and wanted Lebanon to sign a peace treaty with Israel quickly, no later than a month after Jumayyil’s inauguration on September 23. Jumayyil proposed instead a ‘non-aggression pact’. He came to realize the dangers of a peace treaty with Israel—at least before an overall Middle East settlement was achieved (Randal, 1993: 9).

Begin cited [Saad] Haddad’s case. Haddad knew how to take orders, ‘knew what was best for both Israel and Lebanon; he was an example to be followed’. he said. But even on that score there was confrontation. Bashir had wanted to put Haddad on trial for dereliction of duty and treasonable trafficking with Israel. Yet here was Begin insisting that Haddad serve as Defence Minister or army commander in Bashir’s new government. Jumayyil and Begin ended up shouting at each other. Sharon said that when he held someone or something in his grasp, he did not give them up. Israel was in the driver’s seat, he made clear, and Bashir had better do what was expected of him. Gemayel at one point held out both arms and said, “put the handcuffs on!” Then he shouted. “I am not your vassal!” (ibid: 10).

But for the Israelis he was. That was what irritated the Lebanese Forces; especially after the Israelis leaked news of what they had agreed would remain a secret conversation (ibid: 10).

After Bashir was assassinated the relationship between the Maronites and the Israelis worsened.

The Christians felt used by the Israelis ...an outraged population, and a revivified opposition that were determined to get at the truth. Nor were they convinced that Israel was innocent of Jumayyil assassination. Even in the Jumayyil family seat, the mountain village of Birkaya, and even among key members of his clan, the episode at Nahariyya was cited as sufficient proof that the ‘Israelis preferred a partitioned Lebanon to the prospect of a strong government under Bashir’ (Randal. 1993: 21).

However. Bashir’s brother Amin took power and was elected to the presidency - and what Bashir did not accept was accepted by Amin. Lebanon signed a peace treaty with Israel on the 17th May 1983. The treaty was not accepted by the left-wing and Muslim parties and a severe wave of fighting took place. The 17th of May treaty was cancelled by the Lebanese government on the 5th of March 1984. Cancellation was the condition left-wing and Muslim parties, supported by Syria, had put on Amin Jumayyil to start negotiating about how to end the civil war in Lebanon (Al Abed. 2001: 146-147).
The civil war did not stop then. In the following years it was heavily fuelled. The Maronites ended up fighting each other - reflecting a time in Lebanon where almost every religious sector was fighting itself. Some 144,000 people died from 1975 and more than 184,000 were wounded, including 13,000 who were permanently handicapped, in a country of only about 3.5 million in 1990 (Blanford, 2006: 41). Around 90,000 families were displaced from their homes and at least 17,000 people simply vanished (ibid). It was not till 1990 that most of the Christian and Muslim leaders of Lebanon met in a reconciliation conference in Al Taef in Saudi Arabia and agreed to put an end to the civil war. This agreement was known later as the Al Taef Accord and former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was assassinated in February 2005 by a car bomb, was the architect of this Accord (for more on the role Hariri played in bringing all Lebanese parties together to end the civil war see Blanford, 2006).

Lebanon’s official institutions thus regained their unity and power. The Lebanese government declared its support for the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. It also announced its support for the Palestinians’ right to establish their sovereign state in Palestine and for the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland (Al Abed. 2001; Picard, 2002). All the governments that took office after 1990 recognised the Islamic resistance armed struggle against the Israeli occupation as ‘national resistance’ (Palmer Harik, 2004).

After 22 years of occupation Israel made a unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000. On the 24th of July 2000, the United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, finally certified Israeli compliance with UN Security Council 425. However, there were small number of issues still unresolved when the verification process came to a halt. Among those problems was the Chebaa Farms, a small piece of land that Israel claimed to be Syrian land (related to UN resolution 242), yet which Lebanon believes is Lebanese and that therefore needed to be liberated from Israeli occupation according to Resolution 425. The resistance declared the continuation of its military struggle till Israel withdrew from Chebaa Farms, that they release all Lebanese detainees from Israeli prisons and stop violating the Lebanese air space (O’Shea, 2004). Exchanging prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah was the main aim behind capturing two Israeli soldiers from the border line between Israel and Lebanon on the
12th of July 2006 (Nasrallah’s speech, Assafir, 13.07.06). On the same day Israel launched a disproportionate war against Lebanon claiming that it wanted to destroy the resistance. However, Israel’s war objectives were not met, and instead Lebanon’s civil infrastructure was destroyed and Hezbollah and the Islamic resistance gained more popularity among the Lebanese and Arab population\(^v\) (Blanford, The Christian Science Monitor, 28.07.06).

**Conclusion:**

This chapter has sought to establish an historical account of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict. It is a historical narration of how the history of these conflicts is seen in the eyes of many Arabs and Lebanese. It is this historical account that would affect the way messages are constructed and put forward by journalists from both TL (Tele Liban) and Al Manar. This chapter was divided into two: the first introduced the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, which explains and indicates the background for using ‘enemy state’ rhetoric by the Lebanese journalists. The second section is on Lebanon, its conflict with Israel, and how that has affected its stability and security, causing divisions among its different religious communities. This section indicates and explains the emphasis that has been put by both TL and Al Manar journalists, on the need to achieve national unity. Uniting the nation, as Chapters Six and Seven reveal, is what propaganda to the home front was aiming at, whether planned or not planned.

Before attending to the performance of TL and Al Manar journalists in covering the conflict with Israel, the coming chapter will try to set the media scene in Lebanon. It will explore the development and the structure of the Lebanese broadcast media in general and the TL and Al Manar TV stations in particular.

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\(^{v}\) A Duna is equivalent to 1000 square meters.

\(^{u}\) < > symbols are used to identify online sources.

\(^{\text{iii}}\) On March 19th 1978 United Nation Security Council adopted Resolution 425, which calls upon Israel to withdraw immediately from all Lebanese territory. It also calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. The UN Security Council also decided to establish a peace-keeping interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Lebanese government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area (Tweni, 1979).
iv Established under the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine in July 1922 "... recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine" (Gilbert, 1998: 50).

iv According to a poll released by the Beirut Centre for Research and Information, 87 percent of Lebanese support Hezbollah’s fight with Israel, a rise of 29 percent on a similar poll conducted in February. However, the level of support for Hezbollah’s resistance from non-Shiite communities has increased. Eighty percent of Christians polled supported Hezbollah along with 80 percent of Druze and 89 percent of Sunnis (Blanford, The Christian Science Monitor, 28.07.06).
Chapter Five: Setting the Media Scene

Little has been written on the history and structure of television in Lebanon. According to Dr Nabil Dajani of the American University of Beirut most of the available literature on the topic is either outdated, too general or lacks precision 
<Dajani. TBS Archives, Fall/Winter 2001>1. However, Jean Claude Boulus dedicated a book to the history of television in Lebanon, focusing mainly on Tele Liban, depending on his long experience as a broadcaster and later as chairman and general director of the company. His book was written in French and translated into Arabic. Thus, following extensive searches, it seems that Boulus’s book is the only one devoted to the television industry in Lebanon. Other contributions are scattered in books on the Arab media or the Arab TV industry in general.

This chapter intends to set the scene of the Lebanese television milieu and tries to establish the position of Tele Liban and Al Manar TV within the medium’s development. The chapter will provide a chronological account of this development, highlighting the reasons behind the two stations’ distinctive roles in the media war with Israel.

William Rugh (2004) states that Lebanon is a special case among Arab broadcasting systems, as it is among Arab print media systems. He asserts that

Lebanese media institutions do not fit the model of the third world (public sector ownership, usually by a government agency) or of the West. Lebanese broadcasting has been at least partially owned and operated by the government. (Rugh, 2004: 195)

La Compagnie Libanaise de Television (CLT)

The initiative to establish television in Lebanon belongs to two businessmen, Wissam Izzedidine and Alex Arida, who had little experience in television broadcasting. They envisioned their project in essentially business terms, ‘giving little or no attention to its social implications and responsibilities’ <Dajani, op.cit>.
In October 1954, Izzeddine and Arida approached the government and proposed that they build a television station financed by the sale of advertising (Boulos, 1995; Boyd, 1993; Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2001, Dajani, TBS, 2001). After two years of negotiations they signed an agreement with the government on the 9th of April 1956 for the establishment of a station that would operate two channels, 7 and 9 VHF, one for the Arabic-language and the other for foreign programs <Dajani, TBS, 2001>.

At 6.30 on 28th of May 1959 the first TV image was broadcast in Lebanon (, 1995: 39). CLT thus became the first commercial TV station in the Arab world. In Boyd’s (1993: 73) words it became ‘the first non-government operated, advertising-supported television station in the Arab World’. CLT was operating from a building built especially on a hill in Talet Al Khayat in the Western sector of Beirut (Boulos. 1995: 31).

The agreement consisted of 21 articles, addressing the terms under which CLT would operate, the most salient being that:

- The government does not give the company monopoly rights.
- Broadcasters should be under government scrutiny, and should not include programs which threaten public security, morals, or religious groups, or enhance the image of any political personality or party.
- Programs should be restricted to education or entertainment, and advertising should not exceed 25 percent of broadcast time.
- Television is to respect all laws and regulations relating to the rights of the press and of authors, and shall be subject to all laws and internal or international regulations dealing with wireless communications and broadcast institutions. It shall also exchange sound programmes with the Lebanese radio in the sphere of overall cooperation.
- The agreement, once approved officially, shall be in force for 15 years, at the end of which the government has the full right to buy all facilities connected to the project, at prices specified by two experts, one representing the government and the other the company whose agreement has been ended (Boyd, 1993: 72-73).

Additionally, Article 7 states that ‘government censorship on the TV network is guaranteed by Information Ministry employees’ (Boulos, 1995: 30). They supervise all programs and films prepared for broadcast. They have the authority to ‘amend or delete any segment that contradicts the responsibilities that come from the existing conditions’ (ibid).
Further, the government had the authority to set editorial policy guidelines for news and special events coverage. According to William Rugh (2004), the government tended to exercise this right only ‘as a veto power over sensitive issues in times of political crisis’ (2004: 196). The news was written and edited by TV editors, using local reporters and international news services quite freely, and, in the spirit of the agreement, the news team were careful to ‘avoid favouring one group or another, or criticizing a foreign power, so their political material tended to be much more bland than the press’ (ibid).

The bulk of their programming was non-political, and nearly three quarters of it is usually imported film or videotape. Foreign interests did not diminish over the years, either. The French supplied considerable material to CLT, and Channel 9 was dedicated to broadcast mainly French programs and news. Thus, the channel’s target audiences were the ‘elite francophone people’, as Jean-Claude defined them. In other words it targeted ‘those who speak English and French and [therefore] appealed more to the advertisers’ (Boulos, 1995: 37). Channel 7, in turn, was completely dedicated to Arabic news and programs and was defined as ‘the popular channel’ (ibid: 36).

After transmissions started, CLT established a separate company to handle the station’s administration and advertising sales. This was known as Advision and ‘had the American Time-Life organisation as a partner for a short period’ (Boyd, 1993: 73). Nevertheless, the French interests in the station never diminished and were growing day after day.

The French supplied considerable material to CLT and their role in that station became so important that license agreements were negotiated directly between the French and Lebanese governments (Rugh, 2004: 196).

Compagnie de Television du Liban et du Proche (Tele Orient)

In April 1959, another group of Lebanese businessmen approached the government with a request to set up a second television station, “Compagnie de Television du Liban et du Proche” (Tele-Orient). An agreement identical to the one granted to CLT was concluded in July 1959 <Dajani, op.cit>. The organisation, which agreed to the same conditions as CTL, was partially financed by the American Broadcasting

Despite efforts to increase revenue by producing programs for export to the Arab world, financial problems plagued both CTL and Tele-Orient from the very beginning. Unable to compete successfully for both limited viewers and financial resources, the two organisations started to cooperate with advertising sales and even broadcasting the same program simultaneously. In 1968, Adivision had become the sales agent for Tele Orient as well. and. in October 1972, Tele-Management was created to undertake complete marketing and advertising sales for both television stations (Boyd: 1993: 74).

Earlier on October 21st 1967 CLT modified its transmitters to transmit French SECAM colour broadcasting, becoming the third TV station in the world after the Soviet Union and France to introduce it. Meanwhile, Tele-Orient was preparing its transmitters to use the German PAL colour system (Rugh, 2004: 196 and Boulos, 1995: 88).

Between 1972 and the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the television business seemed to stabilize. Both stations were returning a profit, and local production had increased because of the export market for Lebanese taped television programs. Both stations maintained a limited broadcasting schedule of only 6 hours (Boyd, 1993 and Boulos, 1995).

In March 1976, the broadcast media became heavily involved in the civil war dispute.44 In the middle of the CLT evening Arabic newscast on March 11, 1976, Lebanese Army officer, Brigadier Aziz Al Ahdab, forced his way into the studios of Channel 7 and demanded airtime for “Communiqué No. 1.”

Owing to his status and his armed entourage, he was granted his wish. After televising the statement that proclaimed that he was the new ruler of Lebanon and stating that the president [Sulieman Franjieh] should resign, Al Ahdab
moved to the Ministry of Information radio studios and broadcast what had been said on CTL. Thereupon he returned to CTL to supervise the French-language version of the communiqué on Channel 9. Employees of Tele-Orient, which had been transmitting the CTL Arabic program, immediately stopped transmissions after the statement was read. [Nonetheless,] Al Ahdab did not become an important force in the civil war, but he sparked a media war that had been avoided until that March evening (Boyd, 1993: 76).

Hearing that these broadcasting facilities had been “occupied” by Nationalist forces (mainly Muslims), supporters of the Maronite Christian President took control of Tele-Orient and the radio transmitters at Amsheet. Thus, each major warring group had a radio and a television outlet that could enthusiastically broadcast programming in support of its own side.

Jacque Wakim occupied the screen in Al Hazmieh and was complimenting Franjieh’s presidency while the presenters in Talet Al Khayat were praising the national movement’s supporters (Boulos, 1995: 126).

They were thus conflicting with each other’s with news flashes, and there were endless rounds of threats, insults, “we shall overcome” speeches, patriotic songs and military marches broadcast. Caught in the middle were the listeners and the viewers (Khoury in Bouls, 1995: 76). It was not until a newly-elected president took power and the Arab peacekeeping force entered Lebanon in 1976 that the respective transmitters and studios were returned to their owners (ibid).

It was on the 23rd of September 1976, that President Elias Sarkis took over the presidency. He was in deep need of a media outlet that would help promote his presidency and bring back peace and unity to the Lebanon after two years of civil war (Boulos, 1995: 132). Radio-Lebanon lost its audiences after the establishment of the Phalangist Radio “Voice of Lebanon” in 1976. However, the government did not have the technical and financial capabilities to build its own TV station (ibid).

However, it happened that the two private TV stations were facing very serious financial problems. They informed the government they were threatened by bankruptcy and might stop operating. Both stations asked the government to consider an arrangement whereby the television system could be rebuilt (ibid). A devastated economy, damaged transmitters, and sections of the country without electricity for receivers had left both stations at a point where it was amazing that the stations were
operating at all. In late 1977, the two television organisations and the subsidiaries, Advison and Tele-Management, agreed to form a partnership with the Lebanese government for the creation of a single new national television system known as Tele Liban. The new organisation became half government owned, with the remaining half equally divided between the two private companies (Boyd, 1993: 80).

**Tele Liban**

On 7/7/77 legislative Decree number 100 was published in the government’s *Press Gazette* with the headline: ‘A licence was granted to establish a mixed company named Tele Liban, owned partially by the government and the private sector’ (op.cit: 133).

The company was formed ‘to manage, organize and utilize the various television transmitting installations, and to undertake all commercial and television production tasks’ <Dajani. op. cit>. The new company was given monopoly over television broadcasting in Lebanon until the year 2012. Tele Liban (TL) was to be managed by a board of directors of twelve members: six representing the Lebanese government and the remaining six representing the two companies. The chairman of the board was to be appointed by the Lebanese Council of Ministers.

On 16/5/77 a united news program was broadcast from the studios in Hazmieh.

John Khoury of Channel 5 [Hazmieh] began the prime time news bulletin on 16/5/77 by saying: “I have good news for you”. The camera at that point zoomed out and two of Talet Al Khayat news presenters appeared at his side. Arafat Higazi of Channel 7 greeted the audience and said: “A united news bulletin for a united country” (Boulos, 1995: 135).

Wissam Iz Addine of CLT and Klaude Sawaya of Tele-Orient saw in Tele Liban’s founding agreement two disastrous articles that could straiten the company from developing in the long run. Further, the appointment of TL’s chairman by the government gave it the power to fire him or her merely for political reasons. Additionally, the appointment of a government commissioner on the TL board of directors aimed practically at reducing the board’s freedom in decision making (Boulos, 1995: 139).
While the formation of TL was obviously a sound step toward the creation of a national television system, several years of operation did not dramatically change the two formerly privately owned stations (Boyd, 1993: 80). Meanwhile, the creation of TL did not improve public service. According to Dajani (op.cit) the private sector involved in television felt secure and free of the fear of losing its license, since the government was now its partner. Lebanese officials were, on the other hand, content with their control of the overall management of this medium. They tended to focus on improving the substantial aspect of broadcasting that was wrecked by the war.

According to Boyd (1993), William E. Osterhaus of Varitel Communications of San Francisco, California, spent several weeks in Beirut studying the Tele Liban operation, under a grant from the International Communication Agency. His October 1979 final report included 15 recommendations that could have provided a more solid basis for TL. These included the suggestion that services such as Tele Liban 1, 2, and 3 be emphasised rather than channels that were heavily identified with the previous ownership (7, 9, 5, and 11). Another recommendation suggested making one station site a transmission headquarters, the other production. Still another involved the elimination of the ‘politically expedient but inefficient and disruptive practice’ of switching weekly the origination of the main Arabic news program between the former CTL and Tele-Orient studios (Osterhaus, 1979 in Boyd, 1993: 81). These recommendations were put aside and were not taken into consideration, mainly because of the political and security instability Lebanon was witnessing. Israel invaded parts of South Lebanon in March 1978 and declared it a ‘security zone’. Israel invasion deepened the division between Lebanese factions (see chapter Four) and these divisions were reflected within TL operations.

TL’s situation became further complicated in July 1980. As a result of armed conflicts in east Beirut between two rival Christian factions—the Christian Phalangist Party and the National Liberal Party—Charles Rizk, Tele Liban President, was kidnapped and held for several hours until he agreed to resign. He had refused to stop transmitting on one of the channels used by the Hazmeh (previously Tele Orient) facility. The Phalange Party (Lebanese Forces) wanted to confiscate that channel to broadcast their own television programs (Boyd, 1993: 81).
On the 6th of June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, reaching Beirut. The second invasion widened the gap between the Lebanese: those who believed they were defending the country’s independence and resisting the invaders and those that believed that Israeli forces could help them maintain their political supremacy over Lebanese soil (see Chapter Four). West Beirut was under siege for three months and TL’s news bulletin was broadcast from Hazmih (Boulos, 1995: 139).

On the 6th of February 1984 fierce fighting broke out again and the two channels produced two different news programs. They were divided again ‘in reality’, if not on paper (ibid: 141). Each channel sided with the parties that dominated the area they broadcast from.

TL’s previously unified news staff was split and moved, primarily according to religious affiliation, so that mainly Muslims wrote the newscast from Channel 7 in West Beirut, while Christians wrote the simultaneous newscast from Channel 5 in Hazmih. and audiences could easily tell the difference. Since both programs were in Arabic, audiences could choose the news according to their political preferences. With some irony, it could be said that the continuing bitter factional feuds in Lebanon helped maintain diversity in its media, but, as William Rugh (2004: 198) suggested, this was ‘at the price of even greater bias by individual broadcasting units’.

As a result of the war, and following the realisation by warlords of the importance of broadcasting, other television channels began to emerge, representing the interests of the different warring factions (Fontan in Sakr, 2004: 167). The warring factions were encouraged by the deterioration of the state of affairs in Lebanon and the further weakening of the central government during the Amin Jumayyil presidency, in the mid-1980s.

The Lebanese forces launched their own TV station known as Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, LBC. They started broadcasting on 23/8/85. The Information Minister at the time, Micheal Samaha, took the company to court, because it was TL who had a monopoly over the airwaves till 2012, but the civil war had weakened the judicial system in the country and the case never produced a judgement. LBC attracted many
of the TL employees and it was their expertise that started the new commercial company owned by the Lebanese forces (Boulos, 1995: 141).

In the last 15 minutes of Amin Jumayyil presidency in September 1988, Jumayyil signed a decree handing power to the leader of Lebanese army, General Micheal Aoun. Acting Prime Minister Salim Al Hoss considered this step unconstitutional and announced himself the sole legal prime Minister of Lebanon. The country’s split was becoming deeper and so was the divide between the two Tele’ Liban channels. Hazmieh became the voice of Aoun and the Talet Al Kahyat channel the voice of the Al Hoss government (ibid: 144).

Subsequently, the Taif Agreement, signed in 1989, supposedly indicated the end of the civil war and presented a blueprint for national reconciliation (see Chapter Four). It recognized that the large number of unlicensed radio and television stations were a mixed blessing, as some of them did not comply with international rules and regulations governing the use of broadcast and reception equipment, channels and frequencies, and many lacked the techniques, methods, and professional competencies of modern media institutions. The Taif Accord stated that the information media should be reorganized within the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war. To specifically address this, as will be revealed later in this chapter, Audio-visual Media Law, number 382, came into existence five years later.

Meanwhile, General Michael Aoun refused to accept the Taif Accord and equally refused to hand over the presidential Palace to the newly-elected President Rene Mouad. By controlling the Palace he also controlled Tele Liban’s Channel 5 and 11. On 22/11/89 the first president to be elected after the reconciliation conference in Taif in Saudi Arabia (see Chapter Four), Rene Mouad, was assassinated and President Elias Hrawi was elected in his place. The Lebanese army was divided into those supporting Auon and the others supporting Hrawi.

On 31/1/1990 fighting erupted between the previous allies, Aoun and the Lebanese forces. Aoun used channels 5 and 11 and the Lebanese forces used LBC to accompany their battles (Boulos, 1995: 146). This lasted till 13/10/1990 when Aoun
fled the presidential Palace to the French Embassy in Beirut and then to France after being attacked by Hrawi’s Army backed by the Syrian army.

The Information Minister at the time, Edmond Rizk, met the directors of the Hazmih channels and called upon them to follow the leadership of George Skaf, the appointed TL chairman by Hrawi and AL Hoss Government (ibid: 147). At that stage Tele Liban was reunified again and the need to reorganise the media scene in Lebanon had become the ‘talk of the town’ (ibid: 149).

As Jean-Claude Boulus (1995) pointed out, no audience in the early 1990s was as lucky as the audience in Lebanon. In Greater Beirut alone the audiences were able to watch 17 channels, with their mix of different local and international programs. Altogether, there were 54 TV channels operating all over Lebanon (1995: 151), and many of these were serving small geographic areas, operating from small flats with one transmitter.

Most important among these stations were LBC, which was the official organ of the Lebanese Forces, one of the major warring militias, and Al-Mashrek Television, which was established by Nationalist politicians opposed to the Maronite-Phalangist Party and the Lebanese Forces. Among the pirate stations at the time was the New Television (NTV), which was established by the Lebanese Communist Party, and later bought by an independent businessman.

Albert Mansour took over the Information Ministry from Rizk and started working on the new Audio-Visual Law. Meanwhile, he worked on bringing TL into one company. Most of Osterhaus’ (1979) recommendations, mentioned earlier, were put into implementation here. The Talet Al Khayat building was taken as TL’s headquarters and the centre for news and current affairs programs, while Hazmih was allocated for other programming, such as entertainment and drama productions (Al Abed, interview with author, 2004).

Months before he became Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri bought TL’s private sector shares. In January 1993 Fouad Naim was appointed as TL chairman, and was given the green light by the prime minister to improve TL transmission and production quality. He was immediately engaged in transferring TL from a shattered company
into a first rate TV station in Lebanon. To achieve this, he unified the TV logo and paid Satchi & Satchi (Lebanon division) to draw up a new look for the station. In the meantime, he introduced a new plan for the departments’ structures. All news staff at Hazmieh were moved to Talet Al Khayat, while people working in drama production and entertainment programming at Talet Al Khayat were moved to Hazmieh (ibid).

In 1994 the government took a decision to ban news and political programs on all operating TV stations in Lebanon except for TL. This decision came after TV channels participated in what the government sensed as provoking sectarian hatred in the wake of a church explosion at Al Najat that killed 10 people at Sunday Mass. In the same session, the government took the decision to buy all of TL shares so it would be completely owned by the government, and renewed Fouad Naim’s chairmanship for another three years (Boulus. 1995: 151). Naim was determined to transfer TL into a public service TV station that put the public interest ahead of that of the advertisers.

When I was appointed as chairman I was totally convinced that TL had all the chances to succeed. We had a rich shareholder, Rafic Hariri, who owned 50% of the company’s shareholding. When Hariri became prime Minister, I believed that TL had a better than ever chance to survive. Due to the hard efforts of both TL’s new and old employees, in only three years TL became second in terms of viewer ratings in Lebanon and we were quickly heading towards the first position. Because it belonged to none of the political parties or political figures in Lebanon, we were able to operate more freely, and without political constraints, though this led to the station closing down at a later stage. In fact none of the other political leaders cared because their own privately-funded TV stations were operating and legally licensed (Naim, interview with author, 2004).

During 15 years of civil war, TL’s journalists were dragged into the state of being merely government employees that come to work to sign in and then leave. More than 200 employees at the news department used to produce the half hour news program each day. According to Aref Al Abed, head of news during Naim’s period, a new structure was introduced to produce four news programs a day. The first one of the day was at 7.30am. To make this program run, journalists and technicians had to start their shifts by 4.00am. and so a decision was made to employ ‘young enthusiastic journalists’ to produce and present the morning news (Al Abed, interview with author, 2004). The news department was transformed in a short time into a ‘veritable
bee hive’, and TL’s prime time news soon gained second position by viewer ratings and was rapidly heading towards being number one (ibid).

It is argued that they achieved this status through covering the Israeli aggression in April 1996.

TL achieved this prime position in TV ratings during the April coverage. It happened that we had asked a statistics company to conduct a study on TL viewership to identify our weaknesses and strengths. The head of the company came back to us saying: ‘you’ve gained the viewers’ trust - even my wife and children wait for the breaking news music of TL to learn what was happening. Most of the people we interviewed said they switched to TL (Al Abed, interview with author. 2004).

Naim pointed out the fact that they had received ‘very positive feedback from audiences all over Lebanon’. He stated that ratings went up to above 68% of the audience viewing (interview with author. 2004). TL’s superiority in covering the April events was also clearly documented in the Lebanese press (Dalil Annahar, 26.04.96; Al Sharek, 27.04.96; L’Orient-Express, issue May 1996).

First we took the initiative before the other channels. We moved our transmission units to South Lebanon while others stayed in Beirut. What also characterised our coverage were the people who were working with us. They were more concerned with what was happening; they were active and more devoted. The quality of their production was much better than other journalists. TL’s staff had less technical abilities than the others, but the quality of our production was higher than our technical abilities. Competition was in the back of my mind all the time, though in events like this I did not think directly of the competition: all we thought about was: what was the best way to cover such a massive event. It appeared later that all the other channels were trying to follow what we did. One of the funniest attempts conducted by a competitor channel was when they established a studio in a destroyed building near their main studios north of Beirut and started transmitting their news from there as if they were standing in the battlefield (Naim, interview with author. 2004).

Naim expressed his anticipation of the fact that TL would receive positive feedback from the Lebanese audiences. He praised TL’s journalists and employees’ performance and the feedback their work received from the Lebanese public was not a surprise to him. Naim regarded television news as ‘public service’. Casey and his colleagues (2002: 142) say that television news provides audiences with information about what apparently matters of worldly consequence and issues beyond audiences’ immediate realm, and TL’s news department was directed to do just that.
It is my perception of the role of any media institution, to follow such a quick and effective response to events. We worked hard to transfer TL into a public service TV model like that in some of the European countries. We achieved this goal to a large extent during our period. TL has proved, more than at any other time, that it was a station that closely followed every aspect of Lebanese life. It had the ability to operate fast, take journalistic initiatives, and be flexible. Later I felt sorry for what happened to TL. They did not allow it to grow bigger, to be more influential. Maybe we were scaring the competitive commercial channels (Naim, interview with author, 2004).

Naim had asked the government for an increase in TL capital so the company would be able to keep moving forward, but the government took a decision in September 1996 to grant licenses to five privately-owned TV stations in accordance with Audio-Visual Law 382, ratified in 1994, and thus deprived TL of its monopoly over the airwaves without any compensation. The government accepted Naim’s almost immediate resignation.

They failed TL because there was no real understanding of what public service TV meant within the Lebanese political milieu. The excuse given at the time was ‘What can a public service broadcast station do that a commercial TV station cannot?’. They were convinced that the state-run TV was there to cover their activities. One minister said bluntly: Why have a state-run TV if I can ask a commercial channel to cover my official and non-official activities? We don’t need a public service broadcaster in Lebanon’. We used to tell them that television was not there just to make money. Its budget should come from the government and not from advertising - in order for the station to keep producing programs that benefit the public and not the advertisers. But these arguments were not understood in Lebanon (Naim, interview with author, 2004).

Naim argued for freedom both from commercial interests and pressures and from state intervention. He was in favour of maintaining an independence of expression. His understanding of public service broadcasting thus matches that of the BBC. It is what Casey (2002: 185) and his colleagues see as ‘a system that operates or is meant to operate in the public interest’. The public here is conceived as a ‘national body of people’ (ibid).

However, in Lebanon the commercial TV station was not seen an extension of the public service broadcasting, as in the UK (see ibid: 186), but as an alternative or replacement. Poignantly, with the lack of government financial support, TL was not able to compete with the commercial TV stations. A few years later the government
took the decision to close down TL for ‘restructuring’ and ‘streamlining’ it. It was facing huge financial losses.

Law 382/94 made Lebanon the first Arab state to authorise private radio and television stations to operate within its borders. This decision deprived the country’s only non-confessional\textsuperscript{viii} station of a monopoly it had been promised would last until 2012. By licensing a total of six terrestrial stations, the law obliged Tele Liban to face five competitors in a country of just 4 million people [and] with a television advertising market that most people thought could support two or three stations at most (Sakr, 2001: 50).

The government decided initially to close for three months, but the closure lasted for several months after that. It was re-launched with 25% of its old capacity—in terms of personnel, output and number of channels.

**Media law 382**

On November 4 1994, the Lebanese Parliament adopted the Audio-Visual Law after four years of discussion. The law legalized channels being broadcast illegally and introduced new ones, handing out licenses on a confessional, political and geographic basis (ibid).

As mentioned above, TL was deprived of its monopoly over the airwaves. However, no compensation was granted in return; nevertheless, TL was exempted from the fees generally required from all other media outlets <IIM, issue 5, November 2002>.

The law specified four categories for granting licenses to privately-owned TV and radio stations:

- Category One: Stations entitled to broadcast news and political programs, among other programs.
- Category Two: Stations permitted to transmit all programs, except news and political.
- Category Three: Stations that broadcast coded signals, limited to subscribers.
- Category Four: Stations that broadcast via satellite and whose coverage extends beyond Lebanese territory (ibid).

The law required that stations apply for licenses, valid for 16 years, with categories One and Two paying higher licensing fees of LL 250 million\textsuperscript{viii} and an annual rent of LL 100 million (ibid).
The licensing decision is made by the Council of Ministers, but a 10-member advisory body called the National Council of Audio-Visual Media was formed to review the licensing applications and offer its opinion before submitting it to the Council. In terms of ownership, the law compels institutions to have nominal shares and prohibits any natural or legal person from owning more than 10% of the company’s equity (Boulos, 1995: 308). Article seven of Law 382 stated seven elements the government take into consideration while granting licences. Among these elements was the ‘prohibition of transmitting any material that might encourage normalising the relationship with the Zionist enemy’ (ibid: 308).

In February 1996 the government issued a complementary decree number 7997 based on the Audio Visual Law (No. 382). The decree had been discussed previously and enacted 15 months after it was passed.

> It was considered by many to be a restrictive law that banned stations from broadcasting news deemed to rouse sectarian or religious tensions, as seen in the eyes of the authorities, while others deemed it necessary considering the confessional and sectarian feuds in the country <IJM, issue 5, November 2002>.

Two years later and, in accordance with Law 382, the Cabinet decided on September 17 1996 to legalise the most prominent of these television companies and grant them the special licence needed to broadcast news (Fontan in Sakr, 2004: 167). Four stations were legalised beside TL: "The National Broadcasting Network" (NBN) that has not yet started operating, "Future Television", "Murr Television (MTV)’’ and the "Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International” (L BC). The others were given a time limit of two months to liquidate their business. According to Naomi Sakr, confessional thinking (based on sectarian loyalties and divisions) and the minimum number of constituencies that the government felt it needed to satisfy determined it all. ‘Confessionalism’ in broadcasting became institutionalised.

Thus, besides Tele Liban, Maronite Christians were supposed to content themselves with LBC, Sunni Muslims with Future TV, Christian Orthodox with Murr TV and Shia Muslims with NBN (Sakr, 2001: 51).

The sixth license was eventually awarded to Al Manar TV, run by Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite political group dedicated to resisting Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon (ibid: 51). Al Manar was granted a license as a ‘resistance channel’. Thus, its
license would expire when the occupation ended. However, Al Manar was granted a full licence to operate as a national TV station in 1997 after they were able to match the requirements mentioned in Law 382.

According to Naomi Sakr, this was only conceded after a political struggle in which Tele Lumiere, an unlicensed Christian religious station, was allowed to continue broadcasting, ‘supposedly to restore the delicate sectarian balance by providing a counterweight to Al Manar’ (ibid).

In 1999 the new government reconsidered the applications rejected by the previous government and consequently three more licenses were granted. The stations receiving the new licenses were ones that opposed the former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. These were: the New Television (NTV), in June; the Independent Communication Channel International (ICNI) and United Television (UTV), in September. Both channels had not resumed operations after they stopped transmissions in 1996. <Dajani, TBS, Fall/winter 2001>.

Al Manar TV

Al Manar started its transmission on June 4, 1991, from a small apartment in the southern suburbs of Beirut. According to Al Manar head of news Hassan Fadlallah, they started transmitting six hours a day at most through a small transmitter that covered the southern suburbs of Beirut (Shames. Assafir, 24.12.2004). The channel was brought to life by a group of enthusiastic young men (Krayem. Assafir, 28.12.04) to open out the resistance message and accomplishments to the Lebanese public. As stated by both Krayem and Muhamad Haidar, chairman of Al Manar and member of Hezbollah’s Political Bureau, they started thinking of such a project as early as 1986.

In the late eighties the Islamic resistance accomplished operations that proved painful to Israeli positions in South Lebanon. The media coverage of these operations was weak, and the Israelis kept the killing of their soldiers in south Lebanon away from the Israeli and international media. They used to announce these killings after a day or two, saying that the soldiers had, for instance, died in a car accident. It was then that we decided that we needed our own publicity tool to uncover the Israeli lies. Thus, we started thinking of establishing our own TV and radio stations (Haidar, interview with author, 2003).
Hassan Fadlallah revealed that the first resistance videotape was broadcast on Tele Liban, channel 7, in 1986. However, as soon as Al Manar was launched, the tapes were sent to the new established channel. Since then, Al Manar had gained its reputation of being the resistance channel (Shames, Assafir, 24.12.2004). Nevertheless, this reputation was confined to the small area it used to cover. Between 1991 and 1996 Al Manar was developing its technical abilities and transmission powers. In September 1996 the government granted Al Manar a temporary license as ‘the resistance station’. The Al Manar licence was bound to last till the end of the Israeli occupation. According to Krayem that was an official admission by the government of the role Al Manar playing and of the need for such a channel that portrays resistance heroism and accomplishments till the liberation of the occupied territories in south Lebanon (Krayem, Assafir, 28.12.2004).

There had to be a TV station that committed itself to bringing out images of the suffering of our people in the occupied territories, the victims of Israeli arrogance, and that of those living in areas bordering the occupation who suffer its semi-daily aggressions, besides focusing on the resistance activity and establishing its role, hoping to formulate a resistant nation governed by justice and equality. Thus. Al Manar saw the light of day <Al Manar website, accessed: 02.05.2000>.

Al Manar mission statement indicates the ‘propagandistic nature’ of the channel. It was founded on the basis of propagating for the resistance activities and displaying the images of Israel atrocities in South Lebanon. Thus Al Manar TV station was established to be the resistance media tool in its fight with the Israeli army. Television is a popular media form that is constructed as an ordinary medium that fits with everyday life (Casey, et al, 2002: 88). Al Manar, as its mission statement indicates, wanted the resistance struggle to be part of people’s everyday lives.

Meanwhile, Al Manar worked on fulfilling the legal, structural, financial and technical demands needed to obtain a licence to operate as a privately owned commercial general TV station. The ‘Lebanese Media Group’ (LMG) was established with shareholders from different Lebanese religious sects (both Muslim and Christian). In July 1997, Al Manar and radio Al Nour were granted full licences under the name of LMG, but it was not legally registered till November 1998 (ibid).
Afterwards they were granted official full licences. Al Manar’s offices were transferred to several qualifying workshops to equip the staff with the most developed techniques in media production. Many of the Al Manar journalists and technicians were sent for training courses in Lebanon, France, Syria, Iran and Egypt. Later they signed an agreement with French Thomson Company to equip Al Manar with the latest technologies (ibid).

By 1997 Al Manar’s terrestrial channel was able to reach Lebanon in its entirety, as well as parts of occupied Palestine and Syria, and broadcast 18 hours a day. Preparations had started to launch a satellite channel, which came to light on May 25 2000: the day South Lebanon was liberated (Haidar, interview with author, 2003).

By fielding an increasingly effective media team to videotape the general situation in the South and the daily attacks launched against the enemy, Hezbollah’s television station, al-Manar, became the favoured source of information for those who wanted to closely follow events in the South. While other Lebanese broadcasters and foreign television journalists could only record Israeli/Hezbollah skirmishes from safe positions well behind the lines, Hezbollah cameramen, as noted above often filmed right at the confrontation point (Harik, 2004, 133).

Since obtaining its licence from the government in 1997, the channel has increased its audience share to 15 per cent of the Lebanese people from all groups of society. Krayem and other Lebanese officials stated that the channel has been declared the third most watched TV channel in Lebanon (Fontan in Sakr, 2004: 177-178)

By welcoming speakers from all sectors of the Lebanese population onto its programs, Al Manar has tried to identify itself as a television channel fostering inter-sectarian collaboration. Of importance when taking into account the television ratings for the whole of Lebanon is the predominance of Al Manar as a substitution channel, not constantly watched by non-Hezbollah viewers, but frequently consulted for specific programs, especially the news (ibid: 178).

Al Manar succeeded in achieving this position by portraying a TV message of inter-sectarian collaboration against a common Israeli enemy, and at times ‘against the government’s economic policies’ (ibid: 179).
Conclusion

By the time TL’s ‘superiority’ in responding to wide-scale events in South Lebanon was declining, Al Manar’s star was rising. Al Manar continued the role TL played, mainly during the April 1996 events, and on a daily basis. Meanwhile, the government in both cases used their media coverage as support for its political stance inside Lebanon and in the international arena. The government refused to abide by American and Israeli pressures to deprive the Islamic resistance of its weapons and insisted that the resistance has the right to fight as long as the occupation exists. The April understanding that the government achieved with Israel under the auspices of the United States, France and Syria stated clearly that the resistance had the right to conduct operations against the Israeli army in the occupied territories of South Lebanon.

This stance legitimised the resistance and its media on the national and international levels. Accordingly, the government granted Al Manar a licence as a ‘national resistance channel’. The Islamic resistance gained, in the wake of the April 1996 aggressions and the Qana massacre, the nation’s support. All sects and religious groups in Lebanon and not just Shiite Muslims showed solidarity with the resistance.

The coming chapter will explore the events of April 1996 and how TL journalists covered those events using an ethnographic approach. The aim is to identify the relationship between TL journalists’ war reporting and propaganda principles and techniques. To achieve this, TL’s news production processes and ‘product’ will be investigated.

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1<> symbols are used to identify online sources.
2 The first state-owned TV station in the Arab world was Iraqi TV.
3 Radio in Lebanon was established in 1938 by the French Mandate authorities, which controlled it completely until they withdrew in 1946. The newly independent Lebanese government took it over as a monopoly. As William Rugh explains, ‘the French established the precedent of governmental radio, so the Lebanese officials were able to retain it’ (Rugh, 2004: 195).
4 This comes under the terms of the license granted to the TV station by the government.
5 In addition to this, they used to produce local programs in French and Boulos was one of their early presenters.
6 The civil war erupted on April 13 1975 (for more details see chapter Four).
7 A political system based on religious sectarian grounds and preferences.
viii Equivalent to US $170,000.
ix A political system based on religious sectarian grounds and preferences.
ix Al Manar, according to its licence application, is run by an independent board of directors. This board has members (mainly businessmen and bank managers) that have no organisational ties to Hezbollah. However, they support the resistance's operations in south Lebanon.
ix Al Nour a radio station established by Hezbollah and was later run by a separate board of directors.
Chapter six: Tele Liban’s coverage: “Grapes of Unity facing Grapes of Wrath”

On April 11 1996, Israel launched a massive military operation against Lebanon, code-named ‘Grapes of Wrath’, claiming it ‘an open war’ against Hezbollah’s guerrilla fighters. However, its missiles targeted power stations, water supplies, bridges and civilian compounds inside Beirut and throughout the Southern villages of Lebanon. The operation lasted 16 days. Yet Hezbollah remained intact and Israeli bombs and missiles killed and injured hundreds of civilians, among them children, women and elderly people. The war displaced more than 400,000 villagers and inhabitants from their homes, and damaged newly-reconstructed Lebanese infrastructure, mainly roads and power stations. In addition, the Israeli army destroyed houses in several villages, bringing them to the ground and burning fields of wheat and tobacco, depriving villagers of their main source of living (see Assafir 11.0.96 to 26.04.96 and Tele Liban news coverage 11.04.96 to 27.04.96). During this operation Israel perpetrated five massacres: in Suhum, Al Jmiajmeh, Mansouri, Nabatiyeh and Qana.

The Israeli army described its operations as ‘surgical’, while the Lebanese government considered them an unacceptable aggression against its own sovereignty, and called on the international community to put pressure on Israel to stop its hostile attacks against Lebanon. Resistance leaders (mainly Hezbollah) declared the resistance would retaliate and would not stop its operations against Israel until Israeli forces withdraw from the occupied territories in South Lebanon (see Assafir 11.0.96 to 26.04.96 and Tele Liban news coverage 11.04.96 to 27.04.96). Lebanon at the time was still recovering from fifteen years of civil war that had destroyed its economy and separated the land and its people (see Chapter Four). One of the public institutions that was then reunited and was trying to establish itself as a public service media organisation was Tele Liban (TL) (see Chapter Five).

Part of South Lebanon and some nearby villages of the western Bekaa district were still occupied (known as the occupied zone - see Chapter Four), and news on Israeli aggression against its people and resistance operations against Israeli troops were
given priority on most TV channels operating at the time. This was prominent on TL which, as mentioned before, was trying to establish itself as a public service TV station rather than being just a state-run government mouth-piece that put the authorities’ voice ahead of the public’s (Naim, interview with author, 2004).

This chapter will present part of this researcher’s own story - an ethnographic account of TL’s coverage during the “Grapes of Wrath” operation. To aid the structure and flow of the narrative, it will consist of a self-reflexive narration and analysis of the chronological events of 16 days of TV coverage of major military incursions. The narration is based on 40 hours of TL prime-time news between 11.04.96 and 26.04.96, and, as suggested in the Methodology, this chapter will necessarily be of a reflexive nature. The performance of TL journalists, including my own, during this period will be presented and examined in relation to theories and norms introduced earlier in Chapters Two and Three. As a self-reflexive fieldwork account, this chapter necessarily also contains first person narration. It is a personal diary of the April 1996 events, produced by transcribing and translating prime time TV news archive and head-notes (memories brought up by watching the news coverage - see Chapter Three). Such narration is also aided by interviews conducted with most of the TL journalists and administrators who were directly involved in the April 1996 coverage. It is also aided by press clip archives. Drawing on the theoretical framework discussed in chapters Two and Three, the chapter will aim at outlining the news values and norms that characterised the work of the Lebanese journalists in their coverage of the April events and the impact of the historical, social and religious context on the way they operated. It will also try to indicate or pinpoint features and performances related to the propaganda notions and principles presented in Chapter Two.

This chapter’s story starts on April 11th 1996 when the first Israeli bomb hit a yard near Beirut international airport.

11.04.96

On the first day of the aggression Israel bombarded the southern suburbs of Beirut for the first time since 1982 and at the same time launched an aerial bombardment on several positions in South Lebanon. According to Fouad Naim, chairman of TL
(1992-1996), and Aref Al Abed, TL’s head of news (1993-1997), the scale of bombardment and the ‘intimidating statements’ of Israeli officials to target the newly reconstructed infrastructure in Beirut and adjacent cities meant that these attacks were not like previous ones. Al Abed believed that it could be the beginning of an unlimited, wider operation:

I started thinking, as the head of news, what should I do? How should we prepare ourselves to cover such a wider scale operation? We were working and preparing our TV channel to be the best in the country. Taking that into consideration, I was asking myself whether we should just count on our correspondents in the south to shoot stories and send them with a driver to the headquarters in Beirut and risk the road trip delay or should we move a live transmission unit south and have live coverage. I consulted with the chairman, Fouad Naim, and we decided to transmit live from south Lebanon (Al Abed, interview with author, 2004).

The decision was made and the preparation to establish an outside broadcast unit in South Lebanon was under way.

12.04.96

On 12-04-96 the situation escalated. The headlines of the prime time evening news on TL read:

- Israeli war against Lebanon escalates killing and wounding dozens of Lebanese civilians.
- Israeli aggression targets Syrian troops in southern suburbs of Beirut, killing one Syrian soldier and injuring 10.
- Israel threatens to destroy fifty southern villages and terrorise the residents to leave their houses.
- The resistance bombards Israeli northern settlements with Katyoshia rockets four times and Peres escalates his threats against Lebanon.

Prime Minister Hariri tells CNN Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is the only solution for this vicious circle of violence (TL news, 19.30, 12.04.96)

On that day Israeli aggression reached its peak in Shumur, where 9 civilians were killed when Israeli jets bombed their house. Among the dead were women and children.

In addition, the Israeli army forced inhabitants of 50 South Lebanon villages adjacent to the occupied zone, which Israel called the security zone, to leave their homes under threat of heavy bombardment. Villagers were therefore fleeing their villages and
heading towards the cities of Tyre and Sidon. Israeli bombardment and air raids continued intensively and there was no sign the aggression would stop in the near future (Assafir, 13.04.96).

It seems Israel has taken the green light from the White House to proceed with its hostile attacks against Lebanon. The White House spokesman Michael McCary said Hezbollah is to be blamed for committing what he called ‘some acts’ that made it difficult to maintain peace and stability in south Lebanon and northern Israel. He added that the best solution is for Hezbollah to stop what he called ‘provocative activities’ against Israel.

Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has repeated his statement that the solution for this vicious circle is for Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon (TL news, 19.30. 12.04.96).

The Lebanese army used TL prime time news as a platform to circulate a coded message calling upon particular personnel to join their positions. The message was first on the running order after the headlines and was repeated word by word by the news presenter two times. It read:

In the wake of the attacks on the Lebanese army positions, the army’s leadership is asking all military personnel that belong to ‘K’ units to join their military position immediately. I repeat … (TL news, 19.30, 12.04.96).

This is practically what Merton in Jackall (1995) refers to as a ‘symbolic act’. Merton explains that ‘propaganda of the deed proved persuasive among some who rejected propaganda of the word’. He states that ‘listeners who revealed their profound distrust of the “power of speech” were moved by the symbolic act’ (Merton in Jackall, 1995: 263).

What the Lebanese army did was a symbolic act. The Lebanese army lacked communication resources (see Iskandar, 2006: 59), and thus it used the media to call upon its troops to be on high alert and join their positions. This is also an act meant to tell the public that the Lebanese army is on the same side as the resistance movement. It is a statement which indicates that the army takes Israel’s intimidations and attacks as an act of aggression against Lebanon’s sovereignty and national dignity and that they are in line with Hezbollah as a resistance movement in fighting the aggression.
Based on the escalation of events the decision was taken and on the third day of the Israeli operation an OB (Outside Broadcast) van with an anchor-producer (myself), a reporter (Nadine Majzoub), a cameraman (Mahmoud Jalloul), a director (Safi Al Aris) and two members of the technical team were heading south to Sidon (Saida in Arabic, 48 kilometres south of Beirut. It is the largest city in South Lebanon and known as the ‘gate city’ to the South). Aref Al Abed described the first team who agreed to go to South Lebanon as suicidal. He said they all agreed to take the mission without question, even though they were aware of the dangers of heading south (interview with author, 2004).

According to Chairman Fouad Naim, the motives for such a decision were merely professional and the people who were chosen to carry out the coverage were also chosen for merely professional reasons.

With an event like this, even if it had no patriotic aspects or national connotations to us as a company, I would still have taken the same decision to offer our audiences a full and detailed coverage. If we were operating in a different country and an event like this takes place I would have given it the same priority. If I was still the head of Agence France Press in the region, as I used to be, and this happened in Lebanon or even in Israel, if the Lebanese invaded Israel and I was in Tel Aviv I would have made the same decision. The bonus for us here was that we were part of this nation. The attacks were affecting us and our own people’s lives (Naim, interview with author, 2004).

Naim was making reference here to the newsworthiness of such events, which meets with the aspects of recency, immediacy and currency that Roscho (in Tumber 1999) said should be conceived as a news story for broadcasting or publication (see Chapter Three).

Based upon this, our team were supposed to set up the technical equipment and broadcast from the Sidon governmental compound. TL chief editor at the time Wasef Awada explains that this was chosen because of previous experience.

In July 1993 Israel launched a military operation against Lebanon for seven days [and] on a smaller scale. We situated our live transmission in [this] compound in Sidon for safety reasons and we thought that those reasons were still valid. We could not have found a better location. In addition, the technical team was familiar with every aspect of the place, so setting up the live
transmitters and connecting them to the outside broadcast van’s control room would not take much time (Awada, interview with author, 2004).

Thus, around four o’clock that afternoon developments of what we called the ‘Israeli aggressive operation’ against South Lebanon were covered live, minute-by-minute from Sidon.

Among the stories that we broke from Sidon that afternoon was the Mansouri massacre. A missile hit an ambulance carrying families escaping the fire towards a safer place, a few meters away from a UN check point near Mansouri village. The massacre was accompanied by an Israeli announcement of their operation code name.

The third day of aggression, code-named by the “Israel computer” the “Grapes of Wrath” operation, exploded with hate and hit children and newborn babies inside ambulances. The occupation forces committed a massacre today when its air fighters attacked an ambulance. Six of the passengers were killed, among them are two children and a newborn baby. Eight of the ambulance passengers were injured. For more details we go live to Zahera Harb in South Lebanon (Ashi, TL news, 19.30, 13.04.96)

Details of when, how and where were given, accompanied with images of the ambulance victims in Najem hospital’s morgue in the nearby city of Tyre, beside images of critically injured children lying in hospital moaning and crying. Names of the victims were announced too. However, one victim remained unknown:

The body of a newborn baby was brought to hospital in Sidon. It is said to be one of the ambulance victims, but no one has been able to identify her full name yet, so she was registered as baby X (Harb, TL news, 19.30, 13.04.96).

I remember that evening, I was full of fury, anger and sadness, but tried to be as calm as I could while presenting the story to the Lebanese audiences. Being professional, at that point, meant that I should reveal all aspects of the Israeli aggression against civilians and powerless villagers. Journalistic professional norms of objectivity and neutrality did not necessarily collide with my sympathetic reporting with the victims. Bringing the factual images to my audiences and pin-pointing the scale of the Israeli aggressions were clear objectives to me. I was clearly on the side of the victims and it was not just that day’s events that guided my position, but also a history of Israeli oppression and aggressiveness against Lebanese and Palestinian people (see Chapter Four) some of which I lived through before I became a journalist. On that day, I
realised I had two tasks to fulfil, as a journalist with access to information, sources and audiences: to report and inform and to help. However, looking back at the coverage in retrospect, a critic would say that our coverage was not impartial and the truth we were seeking was ‘positioned’, as no attempts were made (or even considered) to interview Israeli officials or spokespersons. However, Lebanese journalists were operating within a certain political and legal context - Lebanese laws prohibit contacts between Lebanese citizens and Israelis, including journalists. Thus, we were using sound bites and statements they had given to international news agencies. Besides, talking to the ‘enemy’ was not seen as a necessity; instead, it was seen as an act of treason.

Thus, starting April 13th 1996 and for 16 days, TL became the voice of the southerners, those who stayed and those who escaped and took refuge in other parts of the country. Our airtime was open for refugees appealing for those whom they left behind or who had moved on and whose whereabouts were unknown. Hospitals, civil defence centres, aid organisations, government officials. Lebanese army leadership and resistance leaders were treating TL as a nationwide communications channel. One example is a communiqué issued by Hezbollah (the main resistance group) on the eve of 13.04.96 after an earlier statement threatening the Israeli government that the resistance was going to ‘retaliate against its aggression, inside and outside Lebanon’.

Secretary General of Hezbollah Assayed Hassan Nasrallah has just declared a state of alert among Hezbollah militants and calls for the martyrdom regiment to join its positions immediately (Ashi. TL news. 19.30. 13.04.96).

This communiqué carried two messages: one for the Lebanese people, the “audiences”, and one for the Israeli Government. It indicated that the Lebanese resistance would not stand still and watch the Israelis commit their atrocities and that, if the Israelis decided to expand their occupation to other parts of South Lebanon, the resistance militants were ready to use their bodies as weapons to fight them. It aimed at assuring the southerners that the resistance would not stand still in response to their suffering – but also to spread fear among the Israelis. What distinguished this communiqué is that it was issued by what Hatem (1974: 81) calls the ‘leader symbol’. Assayed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah was that ‘symbolic leader’ whose high credibility ran not only among Lebanese, but also among some
Israelis. Efrat Abraham, a sister of an Israeli soldier captured by the resistance from inside the occupied territories told *Maariv*, the Israeli daily that for herself and her family Nasrallah is more credible than any of the Israeli leaders (translated from Hebrew in *Assafir* 26.3.2001).

Notably, during the April events two leaders came to be symbolic: one was Nasrallah and the second was the prime minister at the time, Rafik Hariri, who led the political negotiations with world leaders to stop the Israeli aggression. as this chapter will demonstrate below.

Throughout that day we were guiding refugees where to head, to public schools and public institutions that were prepared to receive them, mainly in Sidon and Beirut. At the same time our correspondents in Tyre and Nabatiyeh were interviewing civilians who had decided to stay despite the Israeli threats. Two reports from Nabatiyeh and two from Tyre, each around three minutes, explained the ‘strong will of those inhabitants who are committed to their land and would never submit it to the enemy’ (TL news, 19.30, 13.04.96). We ran sound bites from the villagers saying: ‘Where shall we go? We are not going to leave our houses for the Israelis. We were born here and we will die here’. Such sound bites were repeated by villagers interviewed elsewhere for prime time news.

We set up a small radio-monitoring unit in Sidon to keep an ear on news from the Israeli’s Arabic radio station and that of the Israeli collaborators’ radio station - Lahed (see Chapter Four for information on who the collaborators were). Israel’s Arabic radio and the Lahed station were running, warning communiqués to the inhabitants of South Lebanon to evacuate their villages within a certain time, threatening that the Israeli army would raze their villages to the ground (Communiqué No. 4, Lahed Radio, 13.04.96). We wanted to be aware of each of these intimidations in order to draw people’s attention to them in our coverage and to be able to help them if they decided to leave or to stay.

Looking back at what happened, I realise that Israel was using these communiqués to cause panic among the southern population and to make them flee their villages, thus putting pressure on the resistance and the government to answer Israeli demands to
stop the resistance operations in the occupied territories in South Lebanon. Accordingly, we were presenting the communiqués and then we were showing how people were not responding to Israeli pressures. We had news packages about how people were steadfast in their towns and villages, refusing to obey the Israeli army orders.

We established an open line between the newsroom in Beirut and our colleagues in Sidon, coordinating and exchanging information. The only thing we asked our colleague Zahera Harb to do in the first 24 hours of the coverage was to focus more on the people who decided to stay steadfast in their villages and towns rather than those who were leaving. We did not want to be accused by the Lebanese authorities of encouraging people to flee their villages. We did not want people to leave their land, but, at the same time, we felt responsible to inform residents about the Israeli warning statements (Al Abed, interview with author, 2004).

Apart from this request, there was no editorial guidance on how and what to report from the field. It was up to the producer-anchor in Sidon to decide where to send camera crews. During the 16 days of militarily operations the producer-anchors were guided by what is happening on the ground. The producer-anchor and the head of news used to conduct daily discussions over the phone about the running order of the prime time news program and how to distribute air time between the studio in Beirut and that in Sidon. All producer-anchors who operated from Sidon interviewed for this study emphasised that there did not need to be any editorial guidance on what and how to report. They were aware of what rhetoric to use. As mentioned earlier, they were operating with all the historical, political and legal aspects of the conflict with Israel in mind. For all of them Israel was ‘the enemy’ that was aiming to destroy their country.

Similarly. Fouad Naim TL chairman and Aref Al Abed head of news asserted that none of the Lebanese officials interfered in TL’s decision to conduct live coverage from South Lebanon.

Even though I had a good relationship with the Prime minister, neither he nor any of his entourage has interfered politically in what we broadcast and what we did not. As I said before, we were dealing with an enemy of the nation and the scale of events was enormous. The Lebanese politicians were busy looking into what Israel was doing and the scale of its operation (Naim, interview with author, 2004).
One example of how certain events dictated air time priorities was the Mansouri village massacre near Tyre. Our first day of live coverage was marked with the horrifying images of the ambulance massacre mentioned earlier. Reuters reporter and camerawoman in South Lebanon Najla Abou Jahjah was filming the ambulance going by when an Israeli helicopter hit it with two missiles. A few seconds later, she filmed a father carrying two heavily bleeding children in his hands calling for help. Abou Jahjah managed to get to the hit vehicle where victims were still inside. The scene was dreadful: bodies of children, young girls and women were lying inside the smashed ambulance - some were still alive and moaning. Abou Jahjah focused her camera on a little girl full of dust and blood calling her aunt in a low weak voice. The voice of the little girl was mixed with the sound of the ambulance windscreen wipers, still moving right and left on the dusty, broken windscreen.

Abou Jahjah’s footage was broadcast unedited on TL from Sidon by 8.30 that evening when Reuters decided to release them. She told TL six days later she did not expect that the missiles would hit the ambulance.

There was a huge cloud of dust and I saw a man coming out carrying two children in his hands and saying: “My children are torn apart”. I rushed to where he was pointing and there was the ambulance thrown into the entrance of nearby houses. The camera was rolling and I could see one of the girls opening her eyes. She looked at us and then lost consciousness. Another two girls were crying and moaning. I decided at that point to stop filming and went to call for help. I rushed to the nearby UN checkpoint and asked for help, but they were afraid to leave their position. It took them 15 minutes to join the father in trying to rescue his children. At that time I started filming again (Abou Jahjah, interview with author, 5/7, TL, 19.04.1996).

Abu Jahjah said that this filled her full of the anger of frustration in not being able to do anything. She tried to stay calm but couldn’t; she was terrified and anger was growing inside her towards the Israelis and towards the UN soldiers who did not rush to help with the rescue. Thus, her images came out to be graphic close ups of children bodies. Those images were a good tool for uniting the Lebanese people in hating the Israeli military machine that had caused this calamity. Goebbels states that propaganda to the home front needs to specify the targets of the hatred (Doob in Jackall, 1995: 214). Abu Jahjah’s images were a good tool in fulfilling this principal.
The scenes of the massacre were too shocking. The anchor in TL studios in Beirut (Zaven Kouymjian) could not hold back his tears after showing the images and broke down in tears on air.

Israeli ‘aggression’, as named by all Lebanese media outlets, including TL, was escalating. The coverage from Sidon had to be extended to cover most of the 24 hours and since Sidon did not have any hotels at the time, we had to sleep in Hammoud hospital near our transmission point. A bond was growing with the local people. When we announced on air two days later that the TL team in Sidon was sleeping at Hammoud hospital we had people from the neighbourhood coming to our transmission position and inviting us to sleep over in their houses instead of the hospital.

Our coverage contributed towards achieving solidarity among the general public. Mervi Pantti and Jan Wieten (2005) describe how the media play an important role in managing emotions and repairing social life during tragedies. They state that ‘media can, for instance, actively contribute to turning a climate of anxiety and fear into one of restored morale and unification’ (Pantti and Wieten, 2005: 304). Our coverage helped to restore morale and unification. Something similar happened later with American news-magazines coverage of the events of September 11. Kitch (2003) has described in a study of American news magazines’ reporting of September 11 how the lasting story of September 11 was not of terror, death, and destruction, but one of courage, redemption, and patriotic pride (Kitch, 2003: 222). Thus, coverage transformed the negative feeling of fear into the positive feeling of courage and patriotism.

14.04.96

On the next day 14.04.96 TL transformed from a channel that broadcast both entertainment and news programs into a channel that broadcast only news and social and political programmes that dealt with these serious events. The format of coverage was set: the air is open for the anchor in Sidon’ to feed the nation with any development taking place in the South even if it was a small detail. At the same time an anchor in Beirut would be ready 24 hours a day for any breaking news on the
political, diplomatic and military fronts in other parts of the country. In addition, the airwaves were open for refugees who wanted to send messages to their families or to ask for aid supplies. TL airtime was also available, either through TL journalists or directly for NGOs and government officials who want to guide the refugees to where to go and what to do.

On the second day of coverage we felt that our responsibility towards our people was growing and the reasons were not just professional, but also national, as Nadine Majzoub explains:

The situation, as I remember, was so dangerous and difficult. Most of the villages were under fire, the enemy [Israel], most of the time, was issuing warnings to the villages they might be bombarding, ordering people to leave their homes. At that particular time we had to run to that exact village, watching the aircraft over our heads and watching people running away from their houses. But what I always had in mind was the silence of the places; for me, that was harder than the bombs sound, because in silence you feel the fear. Danger for me was working under fire and the difficulty was in choosing the right story with the right shots at the right time. I tried to cover villages’ bombardment as it was happening. I was always looking for the strong and expressive shots. Personally, I did not use emotional words, shots most of the time were more expressive. And I always thought that telling what was really happening with a good shot (image) is better than using emotional and subjective words. I did my best to give a real image to the viewer and let him or her judge. I focused on one thing: a war was going on and the viewer had the right to see what was happening. Our main concern was to be accurate and communicate the true nature of the Israeli aggression (Nadine Majzoub, interview with author, 2004).

Nadine feels that what guided her performance was mere journalistic professionalism. However, in her quote she admitted focusing on certain images that would reveal ‘the real aggressiveness’ of the Israeli army. She was not subjective with the language she used, but with the images she picked. Nevertheless, Nadine believes that what she had done did not collide with objectivity as a journalistic norm. She tends to relate objectivity to being factual, as other reporters and producers of the April events did. One other thing that Nadine’s quote revealed was the difficulty in detaching yourself as a war reporter from the context (if geographic or cultural, social or humanitarian) in which you are reporting. This relates to the concept of contextual objectivity, discussed in Chapter Three, and which will be illustrated later in this chapter. Similarly, the difficulty of detachment, especially when civilian victims are involved,
was expressed by other war reporters like Kate Adie (1998) and Martin Bell (1998), who questions the notion of objectivity during war time. Adie (1998: 44) says that having to face the horrific realities of a conflict, ‘any belief that the journalist can remain distant, remote, or unaffected by what is happening tends to go out the window in a hurry’.

The importance of images as an effective tool to gain other parts of the nation’s solidarity with the people of South Lebanon was recognised by all other reporters and producers without any direct guidance. All the material gathered by our correspondents and reporters from their daily tours and visits to villages, towns and cities would end up in the Sidon governmental compound, where we established our centre of operation. We would run all footage live without editing, as soon as it arrives at the transmission centre in Sidon and then edit and package it in 3 minutes reports for prime time news. In the case of severe human causalities or brutal destruction the images were run without editing, even on prime time news that might be extended from half an hour to two and sometimes three hours for this purpose. Lebanon’s broadcast media at that time was still operating without any regulation, charters or codes (see Chapter Five on the media scene in Lebanon). Showing graphic images of bodies was seen as natural and necessary to reveal the ‘true nature’ of the Israeli aggression – and thus shattered bodies on the screen was a norm that Lebanese broadcast journalists adopted during 15 years of civil war. All journalists interviewed for this research believed that by broadcasting such graphic images they were communicating the ‘real’ situation on the ground to the Lebanese and wider Arab public. The ‘reality’ they were referring to was similar to what Durham and Singer (ICA conference, 2006: 6) referred to in their analysis of journalists’ coverage of Hurricane Katrina. They stated that the reality that journalists report in the time of crisis is a ‘shared interpretation of reality within the larger social context of the news environment’.

Soon after we started our live coverage we began receiving phone calls from besieged villagers, informing us of what was happening in their villages we took their numbers and started calling them back to clarify news from radio Israel or Lahed radio on the situation in their villages. They became our ‘citizen journalists’. Some of those ‘voluntary reporters’, who were not able to stay for longer in their villages and towns,
passed our numbers on to other villagers and town residents who stayed behind. They would connect them with us before they leave. This way we were kept informed of what was happening to them and to the people who stayed in the village. We were able to identify the kind of aid they needed and the appeals they wanted to bring up on national TV. One example of the appeals broadcast ran as follows:

We want to repeat the appeal brought up by the people of Nabatiyeh to the administration of the Power Company in the area. They want to cut off the power supply to high voltage cables that feed the city. Israeli missiles cut the wires down and they are lying on the streets. The streets are highly dangerous and the residents are not able to leave their houses (Harb, TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

Some of those people had to leave their city later to head for a safer place. They stopped and introduced themselves to us in Sidon before they continued their journey to their refuge destination.

Meanwhile, the Israeli attacks on the fourth day of the “Grapes of Wrath” operation were escalated, as was the resistance retaliation - as the headlines of that day’s prime-time news read:

The Israeli aggression against Lebanon exceeded the limits and recorded the largest amounts of air raids on Lebanese soil since 1982. Israel evacuates south of Litany River from its inhabitants and more than 100,000 citizens fled Tyre. Israeli aerial bombardment targets power stations in Beirut, the southern suburb of city, and Bekaa valley in East Lebanon. The resistance records the largest missile attack on Northern Israeli settlements in the history of the Arab Israeli conflict. Prime Minister Hariri meets Mubarak, Chirac and Abed Al Majeed in Paris and Cairo (Headlines, TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

The Lebanese authorities were on high alert. The Lebanese High Relief Committee held open meetings headed by Deputy Prime Minister Michele Al Murr. President of the Republic Elias Hrawi had open meetings with cabinet ministers. House speaker Nabih Beri chaired a meeting of the parliamentary committees of defence and foreign affairs. Prime Minister Hariri started a diplomatic tour to Damascus, Cairo, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Paris and London calling for the intervention of these governments to put pressure on Israel to stop its aggression. Hariri summarised to international media representatives Lebanon’s position as to what was happening:
What Israel is doing will not lead to a solution, and, despite our own opinion of Hezbollah, Israel is occupying our land. Yet Hezbollah is leading the resistance, and what Israel wants from us is to fight the resistance on its behalf and that will not happen. The solution lies in political negotiations that are based on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied zone in South Lebanon (Hariri, interview with CNN, TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

The Lebanese foreign minister, Fares Boueziz, communicated this position to ambassadors of the UN Security Council countries, then the ambassadors of European Union countries in Lebanon (TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

The Minister of Information, Farid Makari, called upon all local, Arabic and international media organisations to keep on reporting and revealing what he called ‘the barbaric nature of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon’. He emphasised that reporting accurately and objectively what is happening could achieve this.

The ambulance massacre emphasised once again the aggressive nature of the state of Israel and reveals the Hebrew state’s true intentions towards Lebanon. This massacre exposes and contradicts the excuses and lies Israel is communicating to the world through its media and its politicians’ declarations (Makari, TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

This position was portrayed in our coverage without receiving any political guidance from any of the government officials. All the journalists who were part of the coverage and interviewed for this research made such assertions, as did the key figures on the TL administration board in similar interviews. Their assertions coincide with my own memory of how we were running the coverage at the time. Israel was the enemy and Hezbollah fighters were resistance fighters. News priority was given to the causalities of Israeli aggression and the resistance rockets shelling the Israeli Northern settlements were presented as retaliation and revenge for the victims of the Israeli aggression.

Lebanon, that was torn apart during 15 years of civil war (see Chapter Four), was coming together for the first time and started to function as a unified civil society (Iskandar, 2006: 73). Lebanon’s Christian Maronite Cardinal, Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, called upon all Lebanese to stick together in this crisis and ‘help their brothers and sisters who are suffering in South Lebanon in every possible way’ (Sfeir, TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96). He asked the international community to help Lebanon
survive the aggression. Churches were open throughout the country to receive the displaced. Similarly, Lebanese Muslim leaders made such appeals, and mosques were open to receive the refugees beside the public schools and public universities. All of this was portrayed and reported on TL, thus making its screen ‘the link to the nation’, which became one of the mottos of the coverage.

The besieged families in the central sector are calling through Tele Liban, the government and all humanitarian organisations to support them with food and water through the International Red Cross and UN troops. Many of the families are taking refuge inside the UNIFIL positions near to their villages. Among these are 200 families taking refuge in the UN headquarters in Qana (Harb. TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

Similarly to what was mentioned earlier, we started broadcasting interviews with refugees who regretted leaving their houses. For example:

Anchor: Israeli bombs are chasing refugees from south Lebanon to Beirut and its Southern Suburbs.
Refugee surrounded with her children crying: I regret fleeing my village; I prefer dying there and not being homeless like this (TL news, 17.30, 14.04.96).

Meanwhile, we broadcast news reports on villages and cities threatened by the Israeli army to ‘be bombed if not evacuated’, highlighting the fact that people were not surrendering and refusing to leave their homes. One example of this was a report revealing life in Tyre an hour after an Israeli warning for the citizens to leave the city was applicable. In the report Nadine Majzoub interviewed inhabitants who refused to leave their houses and insisted on staying in their homes. One of the sound bites that marked the report was ‘We will not give the Israelis what they want. We will not evacuate our cities and towns’ (TL news, 19.30, 14.04.96).

15.04.96

On the fifth day of the attacks Israeli threats and actions grew. They bombed the second largest power station in Lebanon in a Christian neighbourhood, which was dominated by militias who supported Israel during the Lebanese civil war (see chapter Four). Bsaleem station was the second power station Israel bombed in less than 24 hours. This caused a power shortage all over Lebanon and up to 8 hours of power cuts in Beirut and the Mount Lebanon area. On that day we started broadcasting appeals
and guidance for households on how to deal with the power shortage and asking them on behalf of the Ministry of Power ‘to reduce their usage of electricity, because the damage is huge and it will take time and money to fix it’ (TL news, 19.30, 15.04.96).

Images of the Bsaleem Power Station minutes after the attacks with the fire still raging and the dust filling the place were broadcast unedited for around five minutes, during which time Israeli jets bombed again and killed and injured firemen working on the scene.

This was accompanied by communiqués of Israeli threats that we also broadcast, but with the intention of challenging them or of focusing on people or activities who did.

The ‘collaborators radio station’ transmitted, a few moments ago, communiqué number nine issued by an Israeli military spokesman. The communiqué states the following: “Bombing the southern suburbs of Beirut and Bsleem power station is part of the new game rules Hezbollah has introduced. If Kiryat Shmona [a northern Israeli settlement on the southern borders of Lebanon] is not living in peace then Bier Al Abed, Haret Hreik and Bourg Al Barajneh [towns in the southern suburbs of Beirut] will not live in peace and if Kiryat Shmona is living in the dark then Beirut will live in the dark too”. Here ends the Israeli communiqué transmitted, a few moments ago on Militia Lahed Radio station and carried as [communiqué] number 9 (ibid).

Thus the Israeli side of the story was not absent from our coverage. Their military and political statements were given airtime, but were dealt with as claims or as ‘hidden barbaric intentions’. We, as journalists, viewed Israel as an ‘enemy state’ and that position was clear in the rhetoric we used to present and analyse Israeli statements and communiqués. TL’s introduction to the primetime news on April 15 1996 was a clear example:

It seems that international political and diplomatic attempts and efforts to ease the acuteness of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon were faced with Israeli determination and stubbornness to destroy more. Hours before the United Nations security council meets and before the arrival of French Foreign Minister Herve de Sharet to the region, Uri Lubrani disclosed in a press briefing the barbaric aspects of the Israeli intentions against Lebanon: … ‘We say that Hariri’s tours are a waste of time because the solution is not in Cairo or Paris but in Beirut’.

Prime Minister Hariri announced from Paris that many forget to mention the occupation. They mention the Katyusha rockets and Hezbollah and they don’t mention the occupation, which is the main reason behind what is happening now (Introduction, TL news, 19.30. 15.04.96).
We were showing the impact of the Katyusha rockets vii on the Israeli northern settlements, but after going through all the news of the ‘Israeli aggression’ and in not more than two minutes and sometimes in not more than 30 seconds. The resistance acts were always portrayed as retaliation actions, an act of resistance and Hezbollah (by name) was rarely mentioned as the perpetrator. Hezbollah was issuing its communiqués regarding the rocket shelling and the guerrilla operations against the Israeli army in South Lebanon under the auspices of the ‘Islamic resistance’. However, in our coverage we were using the word resistance on its own more than the word ‘Islamic resistance’, giving it the national patriotic sense rather than confining it to a certain sectarian group. We were applying a form of self-censorship in order to achieve a unified society in support of the resistance actions, which relates to Bartlett’s (1942: 14) definition of propaganda. He believed that propaganda is a ‘process that aims … either wittingly or unwittingly, at producing whole nation groups in which all individuals think, act and feel alike’. Lebanon as a whole, in all its sectors and parties, was a target for Israel; this was expressed extensively in Lebanese officials’ statements and activities and was reported in our daily coverage. Christian neighbourhoods were bombed by Israel, just as with Muslim areas. Newly built power stations and highways were destroyed and the Lebanese had to live in the dark because of the Israeli aggressions.

Press conferences and statements of Lebanese leaders were broadcast in full. Lebanon had faced sectarian and political divisions during its 15 years of civil war, including differences on the position towards Israel as being a friend or an enemy state (see Chapter Four). We therefore gave air time to leaders of all different sects to express their position and opinions on the aggression, which mainly came in support of the resistance and in condemnation of Israel aggression. The top figures that were given prominence were the president of the republic Elias Hrawi (Maronite), the House Speaker Nabih Beri (Shiite), the Prime Minister Rafic Harray (Suni), MP Walid Joumbalt (Druze), Maronite Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir and Secretary General of Hezbollah, Assayed Hassan Nasrallah. They were calling upon all Lebanese to unite against the aggression and to show support for the people of South Lebanon who were suffering the most. A unified civil society in Lebanon was in the make and Israeli attacks came to help reinforce and shape that process. The leaders
emphasised joining all efforts to fight Lebanon’s enemy—and they succeeded, as this chapter will reveal below.

Statements and appeals were disseminated to influence people’s opinions, emotions and attitudes, which meet with NATO’s definition of propaganda, mentioned by Wright (1991) and Tugwell (1987):

Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly (Wright, 1991: 73 and Tugwell, 1987: 409).

On the fifth day, the House Speaker Nabih Beri visited the southern city of Tyre\textsuperscript{viii}, challenging the Israeli threats to bomb the city if not evacuated. As one of the Shiite leaders, who constitute the majority in population of Southern Lebanon, he called upon all the citizens who left their houses and fled to Beirut to return to the South. Beri told CNN (the only other channel transmitting live from Tyre):

Shimon Peres said that if he was asked to choose between war and peace he would have chosen peace. From here we say to him, thank you for the peace you have shown us, which only reflects your criminal intentions and attitudes (Beri, CNN, TL news, 15.04.96).

Beri’s visit to Tyre was broadcast in a detailed report on TL prime time news.

Beri visited the UN Headquarters in Tyre and made a phone call to Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Major-General Stanislaw Wozniak.

[Footage of Beri talking on the phone with Major-General Stanislaw Wozniak]:

“Tell the Israelis we got their message, they won’t be able to destroy us and we will remain here with our people supporting their steadfastness. They are not targeting Hezbollah, as they claim, they are bombing the civilians and destroying their homes and villages.”

[Voice over]:

Beri met with both Christian and Muslim leaders in Tyre. Then he held meetings with government officials in the city and was guiding them to bring residents of nearby villages who want to escape the aggression and the siege of their home towns to the city of Tyre.

[Footage of Beri addressing Tyre officials]: Tyre should not be evacuated. Alexander the Great drowned Tyre after it resisted his invasion [in 332 BC]. Tyre that faced Alexander the Great will not fear the Israelis. I’m calling upon all the displaced villagers who left for Beirut to return to South Lebanon (Beri in Awada. TL news, 19.30, 15.04.96).
A report on how people were surviving life in Tyre, and how much were they attached to their land, followed the report on Beri’s visit. The message was for the people to stand fast in their city. It was a counter message to that distributed by the Israelis. Goebbels propaganda principle 19 estimates that ‘propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies: instead it must offer some form of action or diversion, or both’ (Doob in Jackall, 1995: 214). The Lebanese authorities’ message was aiming at making steady fastness the form of action or the diversion from feelings of despair and defeat the Israelis were trying to enforce through their communiqués.

However, that did not cancel the fact that those who decided to stay in nearby villages were under Israeli scrutiny, suffering from food and water shortages and lacking the simplest needs for survival. Thus, the report on the opposition of Tyre was followed by images of a UN convoy carrying food supplies to besieged villagers near Tyre. This convoy was hit by Israeli shelling in an attempt to prevent the convoy from reaching its target. ‘UNIFEL sources have told TL that the convoy will try getting to those villages tomorrow after making a new round of negotiations with the Israeli’ (Harb, TL. news. 19.30, 15.04.96). The images carried the voices of the UN soldiers swearing at the Israelis (but without actually naming them) for bombing near the convoy vehicles and causing such panic among the team involved. The images were shot by one of the TL cameramen who was accompanying the convoy.

Soon after, this story was followed by appeals from hospitals in the area to supply them with medical and humanitarian aid for families who had taken refuge inside the hospitals and appeals to help set up additional morgue places.

Najem hospital in Tyre is calling through Tele Liban (TL) upon the Ministry of Health to supply the hospital with extra fridges for the morgue. It cannot take more martyrs. ix Otherwise, they need ambulances to come and take the bodies of the ambulance massacre martyrs to hospitals in Beirut. Also, the hospital has shortages of medicine and blood supply (ibid).

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hariri met French President Jacques Chirac in Paris and held a press conference with the French and foreign media there. Hariri was talking in English, French and Arabic and his press conference, that lasted around one hour and half, was broadcast fully with subtitles at the end of the 15.04.96 news bulletin. The press conference re-emphasised what he called “the ground rules of the Lebanese
position”, gave full support to the resistance and raised question marks about the Israeli intentions behind the operation.

We are a small country that has just come out of a civil war. It is a country that paid a huge price because of that war. Small countries always believe in international law and legitimacy. What shall we do when a war is launched against us? Do we declare war on them? We cannot. We don’t have the resources. I have said it clearly. The Israeli army is stronger than ours and the Israeli war machinery is capable of destroying the whole of Lebanon. However, we are practically in the 21st century and there is the United Nations and we will go for it. Israel occupies our land and there is a resistance to this occupation. If we agree or we don’t agree with the resistance political line or history or relationships, that has nothing to do with the fact that our land is occupied. It is the occupation that created the resistance. What should we do, deprive the resistance of its weapons to make the occupation easier for the Israelis! This is impossible. It is not just us that say that, everyone in Lebanon rejects that. No prime Minister of Lebanon agrees to deprive the resistance of its weapons as long as Israel is occupying our land. Israel is reinforcing Hezbollah by maintaining the occupation (Hariri, in TL news, 19.30, 15.04.96)).

“We are the victims, and we have the right to resist the occupation” - that was Lebanon’s message to the world and to the international community. The footage of destruction and shattered bodies of innocent people broadcast on TV added value and credibility to the message. Nationally, victimising the nation and emphasising the right to fight oppression was a unifying feature. Chairman of TL Fouad Naim denied having followed government guidance on highlighting the victim feature in TL’s coverage. He said they were stories of newsworthiness and that the government might have actually benefited from TL’s coverage to put its argument forward (Naim, interview with author, 2004). Naim, like other colleagues who asserted an absence of direct guidance on what to report and what not to, dismissed the concept of any ‘managed’, ‘planned’ or ‘systematic’ attempts to manipulate ideas and attitudes a feature which most propaganda scholars assert should exist to define propaganda (see Chapter Two).

However, performances like this can still be related to propaganda. Thomson (1999: 1) points out that it is unwise to insist on the words ‘deliberate’ or ‘systematic’ in any definition of propaganda. He states that too many great movements of mass persuasion have begun and continued without any master plan (ibid: 3).
On the sixth day the crisis was still not resolved, but international political initiatives to try to put an end to the military escalation in South Lebanon started to float to the surface. France sent its Foreign Minister to the region to try negotiating a ceasefire and the United States presented an end to violence initiative, but that Lebanon found hard to accept. The American initiative consisted of seven points, one of which stated that Hezbollah should abstain from any activity at the border of the occupied zone or inside it, which meant putting an end to resistance operations against the Israeli forces in the occupied territories of South Lebanon.

Additionally, humanitarian aid started arriving in Lebanon from both Arabic and Western countries. TL’s headlines ran thus:

The Israeli aggression continues for the sixth day and its primary outcome for today is five martyrs and 12 injuries (pictures of destroyed houses). American ambassador Jones presented an American initiative to the Foreign Ministry, and a presidential meeting in Baabda is scheduled this evening to study it. Prime Minister Hariri ends his tour in Saudi Arabia and sees difficulties for Lebanon in accepting the American initiative. De Sharet meets [Syrian President] Al Assad and [Syrian Foreign Minister] Al Sharaa in Damascus and returns to Lebanon this evening (Headlines, TL news. 16.04.96).

On the fourth day of the live coverage Zaven Kouyoumdjian took over the anchor-producer position in Sidon from me and I joined the UNIFIL (United Nation Interim Forces in Lebanon) team who was trying to take in food and supplies to the besieged villages with a cameraman and an assistant.

The story of the day was that of two newly-wed couples in Ain Al Helweh. Israeli jets bombed the building they lived in and they were both critically injured. The camera shot their destroyed flat with their wedding pictures among the rubble and then followed them to hospital where they lay in a critical condition.

Phone lines were cut off in the Tyre and Nabatiyeh areas and Zaven Kouyoumdjian lost contact with the besieged families and with TL correspondents. He was able to establish connection half an hour into the news bulletin and appeals started flowing on
air from the villagers and hospitals. Tele Liban announced on that day that its airwaves would be available to any citizen who wanted to send messages to their families in Beirut or in the south at any time.

By doing this we were bringing people together and were communicating the suffering of those who had fled and those who remained steadfast in their villages and towns to the whole nation. Sympathy brings unity. We were being sensational in the professional sense of that term. However, by examining it retrospectively in relation to propaganda principles and tools, we were simply using emotions, one of propaganda’s key elements (see Chapter Two) to achieve sympathy and unity, but without any structured or prepared plan.

By that day, refugees were getting aid supplies from all parts of Lebanon and abroad and international aid agencies. The High Relief Committee and the Lebanese army were establishing aid centres where volunteers could go to help package aid units for the refugees and then distribute them. Reports on the refugees conditions in Sidon, Beirut and Mount Lebanon areas were included in the news bulletin. In addition, there was a report on the condition of the power stations that were hit by the Israelis and another report on the consequences of the electricity shortage on the everyday life of the Lebanese people. The Minister for Power at the time, Elie Hobeika, confirmed that the damage was huge and needed large amounts of money and a long time to fix them. He announced that Lebanon would go to the United Nations asking for compensation from Israel. France announced that day that it would help in fixing the stations.

Prime time news ended with an interview with Prime Minister Hariri at the end of his visit to Saudi Arabia commenting on the American initiative for a ceasefire. He announced that he was introduced to it by the American ambassador in Saudi Arabia and would discuss it with the President of the Republic and the House Speaker on his arrival in Beirut. However, Hariri doubted, in the interview, the possibility of accepting some of American initiative points mainly that of asking Hezbollah, regarded by all Lebanese as a resistance force, to stop all its military operations inside and on the borders of the occupied zone in south Lebanon.
On the seventh day of the aggression more innocents were killed and injured and there was more destruction. The American initiative consists of seven points; Lebanon neither accepts nor rejects these and says they are still under consideration. Hariri meets John Major in London and says the French initiative is more positive. In a unique step, France sends a delegation to help fix the destruction caused by the Israeli raids on the power stations in Beirut (headlines, TL news, 119.30, 17.04.96).

President of Lebanon, Elias Hrawi (a Christian Maronite) headed a ministerial meeting in the presidential palace. The meeting discussed the developments in South Lebanon and both the American and French initiatives for a ceasefire. The ministerial meeting concluded with a recommendation to start broadcasting the news of the ‘aggression’ via satellite.

It was agreed during today’s meeting to establish an operations centre under the supervision of the Ministry of Information for the satellite transmission that will be devoted to broadcasting what is happening in South Lebanon. This transmission aims at exposing the brutality of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon. [Information Minister Farid] Makari said the final formal decision on this matter would be taken tomorrow in an emergency cabinet meeting (TL news, 19.30, 16.04.96).

A crew from Tele Liban accompanied the Lebanese Prime Minister on his tour to the so-called ‘world capitals of decision’ and was supplying the prime time news with daily packages of the outcomes of each of his visits. On that day a long report was broadcast covering his meeting with John Major, the British Prime Minister at the time, and included a press conference he held in London with the British media.

British journalist: Are you optimistic towards achieving a political solution? Hariri: Yes I am. Nobody can continue bombarding civilians and killing children and women indefinitely. That is what the Israelis are doing now and not achieving anything. Yesterday Hezbollah launched Katyushia after 7 days of bombardment and Hezbollah is still intact. What does this mean; it means a military solution cannot solve the problem … Mr Major will do his best to stop the actual military action now and that is what we want. Even if we do not achieve an effective political solution, we want to stop the military actions now. To achieve a political solution Israel has to withdraw from the land it occupies in South Lebanon (Hariri, London, TL news, 17.04.96)
Hariri meant to use the phrase ‘Hezbollah fighters’ when talking about the resistance military operations in South Lebanon to international audiences. However, he was identifying Hezbollah fighters as ‘resistance fighters’ when communicating to the Lebanese and Arab audiences. National and regional audiences recognise Hezbollah as a resistance movement, while many in the western media label Hezbollah as a ‘terrorist group’, supported by the fact that it is listed on the United States terrorist organisations list (see Harik, 2004). In all his statements to the Western media he was relating Hezbollah’s activities in South Lebanon as part of the legitimate fight to resist the occupation. He was detaching the government from being able to pressure the resistance to stop its activities, but at the same time did not criticize those activities. He was insistently bringing all foreign journalists questions on Hezbollah to the government’s initial argument, saying that if Israel withdraws from South Lebanon the problem would be solved.

In accordance with this a national conference was held in Ashrafieh (in a predominantly Christian area) attended by representatives from all religious sectors and all parties (and thus the whole spectrum in Lebanon). They all condemned the Israeli aggression, declaring their full support for the resistance and emphasising the people’s unity in backing the refugees in what they needed. Hezbollah was represented at this conference and was addressed as the foundation of the resistance.

By that day, it was announced officially that the number of displaced people from South Lebanon exceeded 400,000. Tele Liban declared the establishment of an emergency team from among its employees and other volunteers to receive appeals and phone calls from refugees regarding their conditions. The team, as announced by its leader at TL, Samar Shalak, on the evening of 17. 04.96 had also conducted field inspections.

An emergency team made up of TL employees, volunteers and NGOs has been established. We are conducting visits to all schools that accommodate refugees and then we can announce what the problems and needs are on air at the end of the news bulletin. The team started working last night, visiting 29 schools to date. Thirteen families in Al Rimaleh and Karantina have not received any help so please do send aid for them. Gas, candles and cleaning products and drinking water are mostly what is needed..... [She started going over them, school-by-school].
There are four dedicated phone lines for people to call if they need help or if they want to help, and these are running on-screen right now.

They were called the “Tele Liban emergency team” and after three days of its launch this was given a special one-hour spot ahead of the prime time news.

On that day a TL crew was able to enter two besieged villages with one of the UN convoys. The convoy was bringing in food, milk, water and medical supplies. I was the reporter who accompanied the convoy from TL and to my surprise the besieged families in Bute Al Siyyad in the central sector recognised me and were concerned about my safety more than theirs. One little detail that made me realise how much those people were connected with the small screen was when they noticed that I did not have time to change my clothes for three days. They thought of this as being an act of solidarity with them and expressed their appreciation to me. In Zbqeen, the other village, the conditions were even worse. The villagers were gathering inside a UN position on the outskirts of the village. They asked if we would record their messages to their families - who had fled the village earlier to other parts of the country. We recorded more than 20 messages, and promised to broadcast them as soon as we get to our OB van. On that day, the villagers also asked the UN officer in charge of the convoy, to take two old men with the convoy, so that they would be able to join their peers in Tyre to go to Hajj.

The wife of one of the two elderly men came to me and asked me to take care of her husband, Abu Abbas, “for he is old”. She started crying and I cried with her and hugged her, and this was shown on TV. When we all arrived safely in Tyre, I addressed Um Abbas, the wife, live on air that Abu Abbas arrived safely in Tyre and that he was on his way to Beirut to go to Hajj. The footage of me hugging Um Abbas and crying was later used in a promotion for TL’s live coverage from the south with the slogan “TL, compassion”.

After seven days of coverage this promotion was broadcast to say: we are not detached from people’s suffering and we are on the people’s side. We sympathise with them and try our best to be of help to them.
We were not neutral. Our audiences did not expect us to be neutral, but expected us to be ‘objective’ and highlight the aggressions. This was a clear case of the ‘contextual objectivity’ discussed in Chapter Three. According to Iskandar and Nawawi (in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 320), such contextualization reveals ‘a situational position, a way by which collectivism among participants within the same “context”—whether cultural, religious, political, or economic — is realized and engaged’. Iskandar and Nawawi state that ‘it is precisely this contextualization that aggravates and complicates the pursuit of “objective” coverage within the news media setting’ (ibid). They believe that

Contextualization further confuses attempts at even-handedness and efforts to cover all sides of a story. Particularly in times of war, it is the context within which a reporter operates that makes communication with the “enemy” unacceptable (ibid).

Iskandar and Nawawi’s notion of ‘contextual objectivity’ explains the absence of any attempt by Lebanese journalists, including myself, to communicate with any Israeli official or spokesperson.

During the days of the Israeli ‘aggression’ Tele Liban was transformed into a transmission centre for some of the prominent international media organisations. To mark this, Nesrine Sadek put together a report on the facilities TL was offering foreign reporters.

Tele Liban (TL) has been transformed, due to the Israeli aggressions, into a meeting point between Lebanon and the world. Many foreign reporters have flown to Lebanon to cover the aggression. Tele Liban and mainly the Telet Al Khayat building has been transformed into a centre for international news agencies and TV stations to feed their home centres with their reports on the aggression. They are sending their information through the TL satellite station in Jouret Al Balout [North of Beirut]. Reporters and journalists from Reuters, APTN, and EBU are feeding images to almost all European channels, to the BBC in London, TV5 in Paris and ABC in America. They all transmit from Tele Liban, which is offering them the equipment and technical facilities to send their reports and inform the world about what is happening here (Sadek, TL news, 19.30, 17.04.96).

Additionally, CNN and its correspondent in Beirut, Brent Sadler, were given permission and technical support to operate a link up directly from Tyre through the TL satellite station in Jouret Al Balout to CNN’s headquarters in Atlanta.
One headline dominated the news coverage on 18th of April: “A day of massacres from Nabatiyeh to Qana”. Around two o’clock that day I was at Najem hospital in Tyre investigating the ambulance massacre for the weekly current affairs show I was co-producing and co-presenting with Zaven Kouyoumdjian, *Khamseh ala Sabaah* (Five over Seven). While I was interviewing the director and owner of the hospital, Dr Najem, a nurse interrupted the interview to tell us they had received an appeal for help from the UN headquarters in Qana. Israel had bombarded the compound and the human casualties were massive. Minutes later, injured people started arriving at Najem hospital, the nearest to the compound. The bloody scene at the hospital was horrendous; I was not even able to keep up counting the injured. I called the news room in Beirut and the news team in Sidon and fed them the story, emphasising the fact that something horrific had happened in Qana and that the bloody scenes in Najem hospital indicated a massacre. We called upon all medic units and ambulances to head to Qana to help in the rescue process. My cameraman was filming the wounded and the dead lying in the hospitals’ corridors non-stop. Blood was everywhere. Within a few minutes another TL cameraman arrived at the scene. I asked one camera crew to take the tape to the transmission unit in Sidon and head with the second camera crew to Qana. In less than 15 minute the rushed footage taken at Najem hospital was running on air just as it was shot, with no editing.

What we noticed while we were in Najem hospital is that the hospital was full of victims just ten minutes after the attack took place and the calls for help started. Maybe our presence there partially assisted in spreading those appeals. We were asking every ambulance in the area to head to Qana and help with the rescue mission (Harb, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

When we arrived in Qana, the scene was clearly drastic. The moment the villagers saw us; they started shouting at the camera, waving their hands in every direction asking us to film and to tell the world what Israel had done to the innocents. They guided us to one of the containers where the villagers were sheltering, but the UN soldiers refused to let us in; within moments the civil defence rescuers were pushing us into the container challenging the UN soldiers. There, we stood in the middle of the shattered bodies of women, children, and old people. We then only heard the voices of the rescuers asking us to film, to record the images and transmit it to the world.
When we left the container, the foreign and local reporters were all over the place and most of them were crying along with their cameramen. Some of the UN soldiers were weeping too. When we approached them they had one word to say: ‘massacre’. The UN soldiers’ reaction towards what happened was emphasised in my piece to camera; there was no exaggeration in what we showed and told you. It was a massacre and those soldiers who were viewed as ‘neutral’ were evidence of that.

I just want to end up by saying, no one will forget the tears of a UN soldier who was crying today over the body of a child whom he was playing football with minutes before the attack took place … It is a horrific massacre, those are the words of the UN soldiers serving in Qana (Harb, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

An hour after the mass crime took place, shocking images of the massacre were running uncut on air from Sidon. The tape we filmed in Qana was broadcast on TL without any editing. Through TL, and only shortly after the massacre, the pictures of Qana were distributed to all Associated Press Television (APTV) subscribers around the world. According to Ahmad Hindawi, APTV’s operations manager at the time and the regional manager of APTV Middle East now, no one knew the scale of the massacre in Qana. When TL broadcast the images of the casualties in Najem hospital, he thought that the images were worth sending to the AP newsroom in London:

I was at the TL centre in Telet Al Khayat [in Beirut] standing by the set linked to the satellite station in Jouret al Balloot [North of Beirut] preparing to send TL’s exclusive footage from Najem hospital to the London bureau, when TL broadcast the images of the massacre from Qana. I took TL’s permission and plugged their live footage to the set connected straight to our bureau in London. The whole newsroom in London was in shock, as I was told. I could hear the person who was on the other end of the phone line in London crying. Since that day the Qana massacre became the symbol that marked the whole operation (Hindawi, interview with author, 2004).

The whole nation was in shock and we, as journalists, were at that point a crucial part of the nation. We did not need to do much or say much to express the cruelty of the aggressive attack that hit Qana. The Qana massacre added to the growing feeling among all Lebanese that the nation was under unjustified attack by a huge military force, which was already occupying 10% of Lebanon (see Assafir, 19.04.96).

What made the national feeling grow more bitter was that Qana was preceded on that day by another massacre. Early that morning an Israeli jet fired three to four rockets
over a three story building in the southern city of Nabatiyeh, killing 11 members of
the same family. Among them was a four day old baby called Nour. Images of a
rescuer carrying Nour’s dead body, after recovering it from underneath the rubble,
crowned the images of the Qana victims.

Nour Al Abed - a new name added to the ongoing tragedy south Lebanon is
suffering since the intensive hostile attacks started 8 days ago.
[Background sound of people shouting, asking the rescuer who was showing
Nour’s body to the camera to wrap the body and put it away from the camera].
Nour was born on the fourth day of the aggression, but she didn’t know how
her tragedy would end [An image of a civil defence rescuer carrying Nour
between his arms and driving her to hospital is run on screen with no
comment] (Kouyoumdjian, TL news. 19.30, 18.04.96).

Stories and memories of previous massacres committed by the Israeli army in
Palestine, Egypt and Lebanon were brought up in our coverage. These related what
has had happened in Qana and Nabatiyeh to previous Israeli practices towards Arab
civilians since the establishment of Israel in 1948 (see chapter Four). Thus, TL’s
prime time news on the eve of the massacre was full of historical connotations:

Israeli bombs have spread since sunrise over the fragile bodies of children and
newborn babies and the weak bodies of the elderly, tearing them into pieces,
cropping 106 lives and more than 200 injuries. In response to the tragic
footage of the massacres. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was not able to
justify what happened except by asking, apparently surprisingly: ‘Why were
there civilians in Nabatiyeh’. However, he was not able to explain the barbaric
bombardment of the UN headquarters in Qana, which resulted in a massacre
that goes beyond what happened in the Dier Yassin massacre and that of
Baher Al Bakar and Al Haram Al Ibrahimyxii. Peres called his cabinet for an
emergency meeting this evening to evaluate the situation after the massacres.
Tele Liban reporters and cameramen were among the first to arrive in Qana.
Their memory and cameras recorded a day that would never be forgotten in
the history of humankind. Tele Liban ran exclusively the first footage of the
massacre on air, which enabled International TV channels to feed these images
from Tele Liban to the world. In all cases the images do not need any
commentary. We go straight to South Lebanon with Tele Liban’s team. Zaven

I was the reporter who covered the massacre and Zaven Kouyoumdjian was the
anchor-producer of the day in Sidon. and we were thus the team that broke the story
to the nation. We both used sentimental words. He was asking me about the children
of Qana, about the eyewitnesses, and the UN soldiers who broke down in tears. I was
talking about those whom I called ‘Those who suffered the survival, those who lost
most of their family members and wished they were among the dead’. The images of
the massacres were repeated over and over again, and stories of the survivals and the
situation of the injured were revealed minute-by-minute.

While the prime time news program was running, a helicopter flew over Sidon, but no
one was able to identify whom it belonged to until Hammoud hospital called and told
us that it was a UN helicopter transferring an injured child from Qana to the hospital.
He was unconscious. They were not able to identify his name, so they gave him the
name ‘baby helicopter’. Zaven [Kouyoumdjian] adopted the name and called upon
those who have missing children in Qana to come to Hammoud hospital to check if
‘baby helicopter’ was their child (Kouyoumdjian. TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96). We
were both expressing our bare feelings and wanted to communicate these to whoever
was watching. We were emotionally involved and we wanted them to be involved too.

Lebanese were dying and I was covering it. It is very normal and human to be
affected by such horrific scenes. I was involved. Using sentimental words or
sentences were part of the 24-hour live coverage “show”. Today it reminds me
of reality TV. The more it was emotional, the more people were involved. I
think the whole coverage was a very sentimental moment in post-war
Lebanon, because people were really afraid to be back in the war mood. There
was no room for objectivity and neutrality. I was under fire. Lebanon was
being attacked. I was Lebanese, reporting to a Lebanese audience on a
Lebanese channel. It was very clear to me; objectivity and neutrality were no
longer relevant issues. The issue was how much we interfered with the
pictures and how much the pictures were real. In such moments, it is not a
question of objectivity and neutrality. It is what you feel and what the nation
feels. I was angry at what Israel was doing - and I showed this through my
work (Kouyoumdjian, interview with author, 2004).

Zaven’s questioning the need of objectivity on occasions when a journalist is an eye-
itness of acts of injustice and war crimes meets with what Kate Adie and Martin
Bell. BBC veteran war reporters, expressed in their biographies presented in Chapter
Three.

David Mannion, Editor-in-chief of ITN, equally questioned the ability of reporters on
the ground to be balanced and detached during their coverage of the latest Israel-
Lebanon war in July 2006. Mannion told Broadcast magazine on August 4th 2006 that
he tells his reporters to strive to be accurate, fair, and honest. Mannion added:
As for balance, it’s my belief that it would quite impossible to ask an individual reporter covering one incident on one day in one war to be always balanced. Imagine this. A reporter is standing in the middle of a hospital ward. Children, some with arms and legs blown away; others blinded by shrapnel are screaming in fear and agony. It is tough, but it is still necessary in my view to be fair and honest, but it is not reasonable and / or necessary in my view to ask him or her to be balanced. It is even ok to be angry (Mannion, Broadcast. 4.8.2006).

If being balanced was a dilemma for foreign reporters covering a war far away from home, imagine what would be like to be reporters like TL reporters (including myself) who had been reporting a war taking place in their own land and affecting their own people.

The Qana massacre came to be a means to ‘demonise the enemy’, and to provoke hatred against its perpetrators. We were provoking patriotism among our audiences, implementing unconsciously one of the propaganda techniques discussed in Chapter Two: ‘shaping audience perceptions’ (see Jackall 1995 and Jowett et al 1999). This relates with one of Goebbels principles of propaganda, which states that propaganda must ‘facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets of the hatred’ (Doob in Jackall. 1995: 214). Additionally however, what was happening falls within what Jowett (1999: 15) classifies as ‘white propaganda’, where ‘the source of information is correct and the information in the message is accurate’.

Our unit in Sidon became the centre of communication between hospitals and rescuers, civil defence rescuers and their headquarters, and between Lebanese officials on the one hand, and hospitals and civil defence organisations in South Lebanon on the other.

Sidon Municipality has called upon all hospitals and rescue teams operating in Qana and Nabatiyeh to bring the martyrs’ bodies to a special morgue set up to accommodate the bodies of both massacres. The morgues at hospitals in the south cannot accommodate them as they are not able to take this large amount of casualties in their morgues.

We should remind our viewers that hospitals in the south and especially Najem hospital in Tyre are calling upon all government agencies and civil health organisations to supply the hospital with blood of all types. There is a shortage of blood supplies. Najem hospital is also asking for equipment and medical supplies to set up a second operating room (Kouyoumdjian, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).
All Lebanese officials who headed south that day and the days after paid TL’s live studio in Sidon a visit and made statements on how were they going to answer the humanitarian appeals we were receiving from Southerners, hospitals and civil defence organisations. One hundred and six civilians died in Qana and more than two hundred were injured, including four UN soldiers. Qana’s footage dominated the screens of all local TV stations. They all had reporters in there at different times. Nevertheless, TL had the privilege of operating live from the south while the others had to drive back to Beirut with their material. However, after Israeli warships cut off the coast road between Beirut and Sidon their mission became more difficult.

Lebanese TV stations from different political and religious backgrounds were unified in the language they used to address the massacres. Anyone who died in the massacres was called a “martyr” and what Israel did was described as hostile, aggressive and a war crime against humanity. Even within TL itself, the employees who classified themselves as ‘right wing’ and journalists who used to believe Israel was their ‘friend’ during the years of the civil war in Lebanon adopted the same speech of condemning Israel for what it was committing at the time (see Chapter Five for information on the divisions among TL employees and journalists during the civil war in Lebanon).

The Qana massacre shocked and moved them. The images had their effect on them, as it did with the whole nation. The tragedy made them stop being argumentative about how their colleagues in the south are covering the attacks. Qana made them adopt their colleagues’ line of coverage (Awada, interview with author, 2004).

· TL Chairman Fouad Naim, head of news Aref Al Abed and the ten reporters and producer-anchors who operated from South Lebanon all assured their people that they were not exaggerating or inventing stories in their coverage. For Naim it was ‘the propaganda of the truth’.

We were not hiding anything. On some other occasions we emphasised and highlighted the aggressive nature of the attacks because it was happening on our land and affecting our own people. But with Qana what the Israelis were doing did not need exaggeration. I believe what we did was reflect the reality of the attack. We were showing the images of destruction and massacres as they were. In covering the Qana massacre, I believe we were completely objective; we did not need to decorate the coverage with any national slogan.
or metaphor, because the images were talking for themselves (Naim, interview with the author, 2004).

So there was a “crafting” of messages for a purpose – a kind of “information war”, but the aim here was to communicate what was demonstrably the “truth” of the Israeli aggression.

As mentioned before, Naim and Abed denied any interference from the government, the prime minister, or his communication advisor in editorial decisions. TL journalists interviewed for this research assured us of this and revealed that no one was telling them what to say or what not to say. The only guidance they were receiving was how to prioritise events. All were guided by their cultural, social and political backgrounds, in addition to their professional expertise (Kandeel-Yaghi, interview with author, 2004).

We felt under attack. It was a war targeting our families, relatives and friends. We were feeling the urge to defend them. Being a citizen of this country meant that we as journalists and the people of south Lebanon were in one battle, the battle of defending our nation. One thing was clear to us; you could not be neutral in your feelings towards your nation (Kamounah, interview with author, 2004).

Patriotism and nationalistic attitudes ran high among all Lebanese journalists in the wake of the Qana massacre. Diana Moukaled of Future TV (owned by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri), who was among the first to get to Qana, revealed that when she returned to Beirut, she was completely devastated by what she had seen, such that she had almost collapsed. The Prime minister’s media and political advisor at the time, Nouhad Al Mashnouk, came to Future TV and calmed her down.

He said: ‘Today we won the war. We did not lose it. Those who died gave us victory. We will not let it go’ and that was what happened. Lebanon took advantage of the massacre politically on all three levels: locally, regionally and internationally (Moukaled, interview with author, 2004).

Moukaled, like the TL reporters, spoke of the relationship that connected her to the people of South Lebanon. She said that she knew what to say and what terminology to use without being guided. She grew up knowing the tragedies the Israeli occupation was imposing on the people of South Lebanon. This ‘living tragedy’ as she called it, was what had guided her through her work. However, Moukaled pointed out that on
The fourth day of the aggression the Prime Minister’s media and political advisor attended their editorial meeting and instructed them to focus more in their coverage on those who decided to stay in their homes and who had thus refused to submit to Israeli threats. Notably, though, such meetings with the media advisor did not take place at TL during the days of the Israeli operation. Discussions and consultations were only made with the head of news, and chief editor. However, what Diana said reminded me of the head of TL news, Aref Al Abed’s request at the beginning of our live coverage. He asked me to focus more on the people who stayed in their villages and towns rather than those who were leaving. He believed that we should not be encouraging people to leave their places, which meant that they were both trying to disseminate the same message. They were both encouraging journalists to craft the same message, a message of steadfastness. However, both Al Mashnoon in an informal chat and Al Abed in an interview asserted that there was no deliberate or contrived plan for crafting certain messages. For both of them it was ‘the logical thing to do in such circumstances’. Looking at it from a theoretical perspective, they were both fit the role of propagandists on that specific occasion. They were both encouraging journalists not to spread panic among the population of south Lebanon, which would be the case if they focused more on showing people fleeing their homes.

On the evening after the Qana massacre, most government ministers gathered at the presidential palace in Baabda and discussed with President Hrawi what should be done politically and humanitarianly in response to Israel’s open war against the Lebanese civilians and the infrastructure.

Those meetings were covered live on TL from the presidential palace. Additionally, full coverage was given to House Speaker Nabih Beri’s press conference in Baabda. Beri, as with others, related these massacres to previous Israeli massacres and made comparisons between what had happened in 1982 and what was happening then. His speech was patriotic, calling indirectly upon all citizens to support each other and stand against the occupier. He aimed at raising the spirits of those who had stayed in South Lebanon and warning those in other parts of Lebanon that Israeli aggression would not be bound to South Lebanon alone.
[Talking head] We can only insist on our right to stay steadfast in our land and fight the occupation until its army withdraws from the land it occupied. Since the United States has postponed the Security Council meeting for several days to liquefy the whole Lebanese request we are now asking for the postponing of the Security Council meeting for 24 hours. We want the members of the Security Council to watch closely the brutality of these massacres. I’ve just spoken to the foreign minister and to the president asking them to appeal for a United Nations assembly meeting urgently and to put one item on its agenda: the Israeli massacres committed against Lebanese civilians ... Israel should be unmasked in front of the whole world. No matter how much we sacrifice we will never give up our rights, which is to implement UN resolution 425 that calls upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories in South Lebanon (Beri, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

Again Beri’s appeal revealed elements of propaganda. By asking to withhold the UN security meeting on Israel aggression for another 24 hours - so that the UN Security members could watch the images of Qana - he was counting on the members’ emotional response to such images. Those images were the tool the Lebanese government was aiming at using to bring to the UN security members the “truth” about what was happening in South Lebanon, and thus they would force it to stop its aggression. The images were treated as evidence of Israeli “brutality”.

Lebanese Foreign Minister at the time Fares Bouize was more specific in relating what happened in Qana and Nabatiyeh to the historical aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was talking after his meeting with President Hrawi and House Speaker Beri in Baabda.

[Close up frame, talking head] What happened today I think will enter the history of international terrorism. And we want to tell Peres: congratulations you have taken the flagship from the Ergon and Stern Zionist groups with your brutality. ....

The Lebanese crisis has united the Arab countries for the first time since the gulf war in one step. Yesterday in Cairo all foreign ministers of the Arab world expressed solidarity with Lebanon and agreed on supplying it with all the aid needed in order to survive the attack (Bouize, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

Similarly, the Druze leader and head of the Socialist Progressive Party, Minister Walid Jumblat’s statement after meeting President Hrawi came to top up all the patriotic atmosphere that other statements had expressed. He said: ‘We are in a real war situation, full of blood and fire, and there is no nearby solution and we are not begging for anyone’s sympathy’ (Jumblat, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).
Israeli reaction to the casualties in Qana was not ignored in the coverage, but was dealt with suspiciously.

Israel gathered more military troops on the borders with Lebanon and international TV stations took this footage of troop enhancement heading towards the occupied zone in South Lebanon [voice over the footages of Israeli tanks queuing at the borders]. The Israeli cabinet is meeting urgently tonight to evaluate the situation after the massacre its troops committed against the Lebanese civilians today. Ehud Barak Israeli foreign minister confirmed the meeting. Barak said the bombing of Qana was a mistake and claimed that he feels sorry for the civilian victims and as usual he blamed the resistance for what happened.
The Israeli environment minister Yossi Sarid said even if Hezbollah is causing harm to our citizens that do not mean we allow ourselves to go and bomb civilians the way we did today. Sarid hoped the current government would learn from what happened with the Likud in 1982 (Awada, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

This story was followed immediately by a news story stating that the Islamic resistance had retaliated to the massacres and bombed Northern Israeli settlements.

The Islamic resistance retaliated and bombed the Israeli colonies in Northern Israel with 10 sets of katyushias. The Israeli army announced that one man was injured in the shelling. Timor Goksel UN spokesman in South Lebanon revealed that 500 katyushia rockets have been fired since the beginning of the aggression till now on the Northern Israeli settlements (Awada, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

On the evening after the Qana massacre Lebanese Information Minister at the time Farid Makari revealed that the cabinet would discuss in its meeting the next day the possibility of transmitting Tele Liban news on satellite ‘So the rest of the world can watch what is happening here’ (Makari, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96). At that point our target audiences expanded from audiences inside Lebanon to audiences in the Arab world and the Diaspora.

A national conference was held in Ashrafieh (a Christian neighbourhood in east Beirut), and every political and religious sector in Lebanon was represented.

President Hrawi addressed the meeting and said that this attack aimed at destroying all our efforts to rebuild our country. Hrawi said this aggression was an aggression against all of Lebanon and not just part of it. Representative of all political parties and all religious sectors, former Presidents of the republic, former Prime ministers, MP, and Ministers were there [Voice of Raja Kamounah, TL reporter to the conference].
[Deputy House speaker, Elie Ferizli, head of the conference, talking to camera]: “Israel has always tried to circulate the idea that Lebanon is not a unified body and the Lebanese are separated into different religious sectors and parties. This meeting today aims at telling Israel that we are united against your aggression and would always be united” (Ferizli speaking to Kamounéh, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

Kamounéh’s report was followed by a story from Agence France Press (AFP) to justify what has been said about the solidarity of all Lebanese sectors against the Israeli aggression.

AFP had a report today titled ‘the Christian area in Lebanon that hurried to show solidarity with and support for the resistance’. The report said: ‘The Christian area in Lebanon started a charity campaign to support the displaced people of south Lebanon, and that people are rushing from all over Lebanon to offer help and aid (AFP report. TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

The news program on that day had many supporting messages from different political and religious sectors in the Lebanese society. TL’s refugees’ emergency team had its usual spot on the refugees’ appeals and conditions and how some of the previous appeals were answered.

The program ended with a live interview with health minister Marwan Hamade, who stopped in Sidon on his way to inspect the situation in the hospitals in South Lebanon. Hamade emphasised what most Lebanese politicians and leaders were emphasising, the relationship between these massacres and the long list of Israeli massacres committed against Arabs since the establishment of Israel.

Israeli massacres today are episodes in the long history of Israeli massacres, starting with Deir Yassin to the massacres they committed during the 1982 invasion [Sabra and Shatila] to what happened today. I hope that, some day, Israeli leaders will be prosecuted as war criminals in the world tribunal, as happened to the war criminals in Bosnia (Hamade, TL news, 19.30, 18.04.96).

Zionist militias attacked Deir Yassin village in April 1948 and killed what was left of its inhabitants (see Chapter Four). For Arabs, Deir Yassin had since become the symbol of the ‘Zionist brutality and lack of mercy’ (ibid). By drawing parallels between the Qana massacre and Deir Yassin, Hamade brought to the surface all the negative perceptions of Israel that the Lebanese and Arabs carry in their collective memory. The psychological elements of significant symbols had been identified by Ellul (1965/1975) and Lasswell (cited in Thomson 1999) as the most favourable
elements of propaganda (see Chapter Two). However, propaganda here was not targeting the "enemy". It targeted the Lebanese and Arab audiences, aiming at achieving national solidarity, as well as regional, political and financial support.

The Lebanese ambassador to Washington at the time, Riyad Tabara, revealed that during the first seven days of the Israeli offence on Lebanon the American administration did not want to interfere and pressure Israel to stop its assault on Lebanon. Nevertheless, the American administration's position changed after the Qana Massacre's footage dominated the screens of most international TV stations. According to Tabara the images of Qana made them want to act quickly to negotiate a ceasefire (interview with author, 1999).

19.04.96

This was the first day after Qana. The countdown to end the escalation started. Days were then numbered as after or before the Qana massacre. The headlines of the prime time program read:

Efforts to achieve a cease-fire reached its climax in Beirut, Damascus. Washington and Tel Aviv.
[US envoy to the region Denis] Ross arrived in Israel and [American Secretary of State Warren] Christopher arrives tomorrow, while Herve de Charette spent his day in Damascus.
Images of Qana shocked the world and are pushing forward the international efforts to end the escalation.
The Ministerial Council met in Baabda and Beri heads to Damascus after meeting with Hrawi and Hariri (Headlines, TL news, 19.30, 19.04.96).

This was the Qana aftermath program. It was dominated by the images and sound bites of survivors, the injured and families of the dead. New images from Qana were revealed and old images were repeated. Horrific, graphic and detailed images of the massacre were played repeatedly.
The opening scene after the headlines was of a burned child swathed in bandages, lying in one of Sidon’s hospitals, telling the camera what has happened with him and his family

**The boy**: I was sitting beside my mother and father. I woke up here and I do not know where they are now.
The reporter: Why did not you hide?
The boy: I could not hide (ibid).

Later in the program we revealed the boy’s identity and that his father, mother and one sister died in the massacre and the boy was left with a sister who was also suffering from bad injuries. The program’s opening sequence continued with the camera moving to another 8 year old boy lying in bed describing in his words what happened and how he survived the massacre.

Then the camera moved to a woman sitting beside her child’s bed in hospital. She was full of tears, trying to tell us how she found herself surrounded by bodies:

[Weping voice] We were just sitting when the missiles started falling around our heads. I didn’t know what was happening, but when the bombardment stopped I looked around me and everyone was martyred, except us (ibid).

All anchors and reporters were wearing black in token of bereavement. The introduction (which in the Lebanese news culture tends to carry the same feature as a newspaper editorial) considered the opening sequence as testimonies to the survivors and was aiming to emphasise the brutal nature of the attack on Qana after the UN Security Council failed to meet Lebanon’s calls to condemn Israel.

These are testimonies from those who survived the massacre in Qana who took refuge with the United Nation forces, but the enemy’s burning bombs chased them even under their international shelter. These testimonies are hard proof of what happened in Qana, but the UN Security Council was not even able to come up with a verbal condemnation of this massacre. All they did is to call for a ceasefire - that is still far away from implementation (Al Ashi. TL news, 19.30, 19.04.96).

The program focused on the international condemnation of the massacre and highlighted Pope John Paul II’s condemnation, which was proceeded by the head of the Lebanese church, Nasrallah Sfeir, calling upon all Lebanese Christians and Muslims to stand behind their fellow brothers and sisters in South Lebanon. The live coverage from South Lebanon continued and details of the situation in the villages and cities permeated the program - that was extended to three hours, instead of half an hour in ‘normal’ situations. On that day we started coordinating the voluntary work, not just to help the displaced and those who stayed in their villages, but also to give
comfort to the martyrs’ families and organise search teams to reunite families after being scattered between different hospitals.

The story that shadowed the whole program was that of Muhammad Deeb, or what we identified earlier as ‘baby helicopter’. In a report on massacre survivors conducted by Nadine Majzoub, Nadine visited Hammoud hospital and met the four year old child Muhammad. Till that day neither of Muhammad’s parents had shown up, and all Muhammad was able to say after he regained consciousness was his first name.

His name, until this morning, was ‘Baby Helicopter’ and the reason is that a helicopter had brought him to Hammoud hospital from Qana the day before. All he knows is that his name is Muhammad. He asks for his mother all the time and does not know that his life will not be as comfortable as it was. [Images of a child connected to serum pipes showing that his leg was mutilated from the knee. His face looked beautiful, bearing only one minor injury that does not affect its innocence. Nadine approaches him with the microphone].

**N:** What is your name?
**M:** Hammoudi [diminutive for Muhammad]
**N:** How old are you?
**M:** Four
**N:** Where were you?
**M:** Up there ... [meaning Qana village]
**N:** Why are you sad?
[He did not answer and tried to remove the pipes and started moaning].
**N:** What’s wrong?
**M:** I want to drink Seven Up
**N:** You want Seven Up?
**M:** Yes
**N:** If we bring you Seven Up will you talk to us?
**M:** I want my mother [starts crying] ... I want my mother (Majzoub. TL ฯnews, 19.30, 19.04.96).

Nadine believed that Muhammad talking to the camera would reveal the ‘reality’ of Israeli army aggression. Thus, offering him Seven Up to talk did not raise any ethical concerns for her. In fact, talking to injured people in their hospital beds, showing graphic images of dead bodies was seen by most journalists as a normal procedure to reflect the tragedies of the war. Hence, for almost 20 minutes, the tragedies of the survivors were highlighted through their own voices. It was emotionally moving, to the point that the anchor, Souad Al Ashi, was in tears when she appeared again on air from Beirut after this transmission from Sidon.
The government met and announced that Monday 22nd of April would be a day of national mourning. The cabinet agreed to Information Minister Farid Makari’s proposal to allow Lebanese channels to broadcast news via satellite and called upon the establishment of a committee, headed by Makari, to supervise the transmission. Naser Kandeel, deputy chair of the National Media Council in Lebanon and a member of this committee at the time, explained that the committee had a non-partisan role to organise the output that TV channels would be sending to a dedicated channel established for the purpose of spreading Lebanon’s voice to the outside world (Kandeel. interview with author. 2004).

The Satellite transmission was an effective tool for us, and it was agreed that we should use it fully. The government thought that our media performance should meet with the sacrifices our people were making to keep Lebanon standing in the face of the Israeli aggression. Qana made the whole difference; it was our golden card, we might say. Because of Qana, two decisions were made: Firstly to go to the United Nations, and, secondly, to operate the satellite channel. We felt we had a winning card that should be used, and, if exposed correctly, it would gain international support. Otherwise, the Israelis would repeat … [such massacres] again and again until they have destroyed our country (ibid).

It was the coverage of the Qana massacre and the reaction of solidarity that it generated on the national level that brought the government’s attention to the importance of using the media as a tool of disseminating its message to audiences in the Arab world and abroad. Kandeel then agreed that TV coverage had become an important tool of the war.

In the wake of the Qana and Nabatiyeh massacres, the whole nation adopted the slogan ‘a nation at war’. As part of this, studies were suspended in all schools till the end of the attacks, people opened their houses for the displaced, voluntary workers from all over Lebanon joined the health and social ministries’ and NGOs’ teams to help the victims. The Lebanese were, for the first time since 1975 (see Chapter Four), united around one cause: fighting the Israeli aggression. TL was the channel that helped the Lebanese express that unity. The unity was not just expressed inside Lebanon, as we had reports and images on solidarity demonstrations taking place in Washington, Bonn, Istanbul, Oslo and Paris organised by Lebanese and Arab communities in those countries. TL started broadcasting messages and statements of support sent by such Lebanese and Arab communities around the globe.
Even though none of this was organised or orchestrated by one body or party, they all translated to a great input into a form of the information war. Transmitting the images of these demonstrations and broadcasting the messages and statements made these movements seemingly contagious and ever more people were stepping up to show solidarity and support. It was an un-planned clear implementation of ‘the band wagon’. a propaganda device introduced and theorised by Jackall (1995: 222). It is a device to make us all follow the crowd and do the same. The theme here is: ‘Everybody’s doing it’ (ibid).

20.04.96

This was the second day after Qana. International political initiatives to put an end to the escalation increased. Foreign ministers of the United States, France, Italy, and Iran arrived in Damascus.

On the 10th day, the enemy’s warships separated South Lebanon from other parts of the country to put more pressure on Lebanon.

[American Secretary of State Warren] Christopher started an American initiative from Damascus aiming to achieve an understanding that ends the conflict.

[House speaker] Beri visits Damascus and expects a solution in the coming 24 hours.

Urgent Meeting for UN assembly on Tuesday and the Arab league is preparing to hold an Arab Summit (Headlines, TL news, 20.04.96)

While political discussions were taking place in different world capitals, Israel kept its military operation going.

We had a team sent to Qana village to file a report on the situation in the village two days after the massacre.

Qana is empty. Its inhabitants left it hoping to come back soon, but it is still empty. The echo and heavy silence is filling the space in Qana as if it is grieving those who lost their lives two days ago in the massacre. The village is still a target of Israeli bombs, though a few people decided to stay - despite the dangers. Words, it seems, cannot express what is in their hearts. [Sound bite of an old lady; addressing the TL team with tears]: God protect you from any harm. God protect you from any grief (Majzoub, TL news, 19.30, 20.04.96).
Images of the massacre were repeated for the third day and along with them reports on the conditions of the injured and those who survived. Attention was given to the solidarity movement that was sweeping Lebanon.

In the face of the aggression Lebanon is showing solidarity during its crisis in a way that has never been recorded before. This solidarity is recorded in the largely condemnation of the aggression and the support the refugees received in their crisis from all the religious sectors, factions and all the political parties, in addition to all the medical, social and cultural committees and organisations. This afternoon hundreds of students from different religious sectors and political factions gathered in the martyrs square in down town Beirut and protested against the international incapability to stop the Israeli aggression against Lebanese civilians. The demonstrators carried pictures of the children who died in Qana.

Political parties and social and cultural movements and committees all over Lebanon have called for another sit in tomorrow in front of the National Museum under the slogan “Grapes of Unity in the face of Grapes of Wrath” (Ousi, TL news, 19.30, 20.04.96).

On that day a delegate from the Association of Banks in Lebanon visited Prime Minister Hariri and donated one and a half million dollars to the High Relief Committee to help in aiding the refugees and the displaced people of South Lebanon.

From this day, TL’s emergency aid team reported on the daily situation of the refugees, transforming it into a one hour daily program called ‘Emergency Team’, preceding the prime time news.

On the international level, the Lebanese situation was on the agenda of the G7 Summit in Moscow after it had been introduced by French President Jacques Chirac. This step was referred to as the “internationalisation of the Lebanese crisis”.

According to TL prime news of the day, American President Bill Clinton, attending the summit, did not welcome this step, but did not veto it either (ibid). Prime Minister Rafic Hariri invested his personal relations with the world leaders to support the Lebanese cause. Iskandar (2006) explained the importance of Hariri’s relations:

Hariri secured [French President Jacques] Chirac’s undiluted help in responding to the tragedy, convinced [British Prime Minister at the time] John Major of the enormity of the butchery, persuaded [the then Russian President] Boris Yeltsin to champion the Lebanese cause and to chastise Israel at least verbally, and passed a convincing message to the German chancellor. In the United States, Hariri depended on the support of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the
Saudi ambassador who had developed close ties with President Clinton, as he had with George Bush Sr. Clinton was fearful of the loss of his Middle East peace initiative and therefore instructed his Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to do everything possible to address the impact of the Qana Slaughter (Iskandar, 2006: 80).

21.04.96

On the 11th day of the aggression, Israel suggested an immediate truce, but Lebanon was sceptical about it. TL prime time news editorial’s introduction read:

On the 11th day of the aggression the aggressors called for an immediate truce after the world was stirred with the news of the massacres they had committed in Lebanon. The enemy’s government announced the truce would be a step forward to achieve a long-standing cease-fire agreement. AFP reported, according to an Israeli governmental source, that [Israeli Prime Minister at the time] Shimon Peres asked American Foreign Minister Warren Christopher to carry an offer for immediate truce to the Syrians and the Lebanese and that the ceasefire could start this evening (Salemeh. TL news introduction, 19.30, 21.04.96).

Despite the ‘truce offer’, Israel continued its shelling and kept the coastal highway that connects South Lebanon to other parts of the country closed by fire. However, it was the news of Muhammad Deeb’s death that marked the news program of that day. Raja Kamouneh, the anchor-producer in Sidon, and Nadine Majzoub, the reporter who interviewed Muhammad when he arrived at hospital, broke the story emotionally to the nation. They transformed the death of Muhammad Deeb into a very personal and emotive incident.

[Kamouneh’s lead]:
One of the Qana massacre’s witnesses, a very young witness he was, brought in to hospital here in Sidon in a UN helicopter four days ago. He fought to stay alive, resolutely showing the renowned Lebanese resistance and persistence, but Muhammad the four year old decided to follow his brothers and mother to the other world. His heart stopped pumping last night and he died with a heavy lung bleed. From Qana to Sidon, he died away from his home town, like many other children. Details with Nadine Majzoub:

[Nadine Majzoub’s Report]:
Muhammad Deeb or Baby Helicopter, as we knew him, died yesterday at the age of four after being critically injured during the Qana massacre. The massacre that killed children, women and old people, killed with them humanity’s conscience. We met him in Hammoud hospital and felt that childhood must defeat the brutality and hostility of the occupier, even if this brutality has cut out parts of this fragile body [shot of Muhammad mutilated
leg], but it seems that God has answered Muhammad’s calls and made him rest beside his mother whom he asked for several times during our interview with him. He also asked for Seven Up. [Repetition of the interview with him when he was calling for his mother and asking for the drink]. Muhammad was moved from the care unit to the recovery suite after his situation was recorded as stable, but late last night his heart stopped after being affected by a clot. Dr Ghassan Hammoud, the head of the hospital explained for us the reasons behind his death.

Sound bite: ‘Fat emboli’ due to the condition of his bones after the injury. [Shocking images of Muhammad in the morgue. After we’ve seen him talking and moving his hands and playing with his hair, we see him lying in the morgue]. Muhammad Deeb and other innocent children who died in these massacres are the pictures we are going to carry in our memories of these dreadful days. [Pictures of the Qana Massacre are repeated here] (Kamouneh and Majzoub. TL news. 19.30, 21.04.96).

Because Muhammad was considered the last martyr of the Qana massacre, Nadine’s interview with him, two days before he died, became greatly newsworthy. According to Majzoub (interview with author. 2004) most TV channels in Lebanon wanted to broadcast the only interview recorded with him.

At the beginning, the interview by itself was sentimental, because of the interviewee’s age and condition and the words he was using. His death later was a shock to me. I felt deeply sad. It was not intentional to use sentimental words. I did not think at all of influencing the audience. By the end of the day, this war was against all Lebanese parties and people. I wrote this story for no one in particular and for everyone, nationally and internationally. Knowing the capability of Tele Liban and the Arab media at that time, I wanted the voice of Muhammad to reach out to the world. My words came from the bottom of my heart (ibid).

Nadine, as with other TL reporters, questioned the term objectivity in such circumstances. She was crafting a message of influence, and emotions were her guide. Nadine’s uncertainty, as a journalist covering war in her own country, about the meaning of objectivity and neutrality in such circumstances has been a common feature among all TL reporters who covered April 96 events. Many scholars recognise the difficulty of achieving ultimate objectivity in certain circumstances. Among them is Williams (2003: 126) who speaks of a time when the media were supposed to be partial, such as during a time of war when not supporting their own country’s war efforts would seem ‘inappropriate’.

Tele Liban’s (TL) journalists and camera crews were portrayed as an example of the will to defeat all obstacles the ‘enemy’ were forcing on the Lebanese. Thus, the story
of how the TL crew managed to cross one of the rivers that connects Sidon to other villages in Iqlim Al Kharoub (at the foot hills of the Chouf Mountains southeast of Beirut), without the need to go via the coast road became a news item.

We drove through Iqlim Al Kharoub and when we arrived at Alman we had to cross the Awali River [North of Sidon]. We used a big stump to get to an old bridge that was in use before the opening of the coastal highway. The wooden bridge was forgotten after that, but the villagers in Alman led us to it, and here we are in Sidon after a trip of 4 hours, which usually takes half an hour (Kammouneh, TL news, 1930, 21.04.96).

On that day, the Lebanese army started the process of installing a metal bridge over the river, reconnecting the South to other parts of the country away from the eyes of the Israeli warships.

22.04.96

On the 12th day of the aggression, TL’s prime time news introduction read what most Lebanese realised on that day. ‘It sounded clear the news about an immediate truce that Israel leaked last night was only a mirage’ (22.04.96). While Lebanon was in mourning, Israel escalated its attack and kept the Southern region cut off from the rest of the country by targeting everything that moved on the coastal highway.

Mourning covered Lebanon from South to North, grieving for the victims of the Israeli Massacres. [Pictures of closure. They took out the headlines jingle]. Eyes are looking towards Damascus to monitor the results of [Warren] Christopher’s meeting with [Syrian President Hafez] Assad. [Lebanese president Elias] Hrawi heads to New York and [House Speaker Nabih] Beri and [Prime Minister Rafic] Hariri leave for Damascus. The road to south Lebanon is still under fire and Israeli raids, for the first time, are on Annaanemeh heights on the outskirts of Beirut (Headlines, TL news, 19.30, 22.04.96).

On 22.04.96 the TL prime time news program was broadcast via satellite. A new channel was introduced called ‘News of Lebanon’ using a frequency owned by Prime Minister Hariri on the Arabic Satellite ‘ARABSAT’.

The channel was operating 18 hours a day with a news program running every hour, on the hour. Six TV channels that had been granted licences earlier that month were asked to participate in supplying news programs to the channel, in addition to another nine channels that were running without licences.
However, the main supplier of news to the channel was Tele Liban (Kandeel, interview with author, 2004).

Kandeel revealed that a meeting with the heads of these TV channels took place before the channel went on air. The discussions centred on four main aspects: the need to emphasise that we were subject to an aggressive attack; the need to highlight the resisting will of the people who had decided to stay in their villages to confront the Israeli threats; the need to emphasise national unity; and the need to highlight that international and Arab public opinion could make a difference in this crisis (ibid).

These were the key messages the government wanted TV stations to address in their news coverage. This was the first meeting a government official had organised with representatives of Lebanese TV stations to present them with guidelines. However, these guidelines were crafted along the same lines that TL journalists and administrators had adopted since the first day of the aggression.

On the same day, President Elias Hrawi left Beirut for the United Nations to deliver Lebanon’s speech at the General Assembly meeting. Hrawi carried with him a video tape, compiled by TL’s news department, on the human and material losses Lebanon suffered during the Israeli continuous attack on its soil (Al Abed, interview with author, 2004). President Hrawi referred to this while talking to the journalists that accompanied him on the plane to New York.

I’m not going with a complaint, but carrying the voice of Lebanon. What are those children’s faults? Why have we to pay for other people’s politics [referring to the Israeli elections that were due to take place in July 1996]. Because of the mourning situation [full of tears] I refused to have an official farewell at the airport. My faith in my country is stronger than anything else. I’m with those who are grieving today, with those ringing the churches bells and those praying in mosques (President Hrawi, TL news, 19.30, 22.04.96).

President Hrawi’s speech and his clearly genuine tears on the plane could be considered or related to the “plain folks” propaganda device suggested by Jackall (1995) in Chapter Two, where the leader will present himself as one of the public, sharing their feelings, fears hopes and anxieties.

Meanwhile, news stories on the Qana massacre’s survivors were presented. For the first time we heard the story of Saadalh Balhas, who had lost more than 20 members
of his family in the massacre. Further, another story marked this program: that of Israa Al Lakees, a four year old child who had gone into a coma after being critically injured by an Israeli raid on her home in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The reporter, Wasef Awada, filed the story on Israa’s condition, and came to celebrate her recovery from the coma.

Yesterday Muhammad Deeb, the 4 year old boy closed his eyes after he had appeared full of life moving and talking, despite the critical injuries he had received in the Qana massacre. Today, Israa Al Lakees, another 4 year old, opened her eyes after she fell unconscious for a whole week because of her injuries caused by the Israeli air raid on Mreijeh [a neighbourhood in the southern suburb of Beirut]. Israa had almost entered the toll of martyrs after being in a coma for a week, but divine intervention kept death away from this innocent child. She opened her eyes today in the intensive care unit in Jesus Heart Hospital. Israa al Lakees compensated us with the hot tears we shed on Muhammad Deeb yesterday. Thank you God. [Images of Muhammad in bed in the morgue, then images of Israa in hospital moving her eyes] (Awada. TL news. 19.30, 22.04.96).

23.04.96

Negotiations around the American and French political initiatives to achieve a cease-fire continued in Damascus, Beirut and Tel Aviv. However, the news showed uncertainty on whether Secretary of State Warren Christopher was heading to Beirut to finalise the cease-fire or not.

The focus in TL.’s introduction that day was on drawing the map of meetings that had taken place in the three capitals. However, the first item on the running order remained the situation in South Lebanon. A report on the latest attacks on the Southern villages and the coastal road was presented, then the story of a graveyard that was being prepared to host the martyrs of Qana.

[Background ambience of bulldozers in action]: The graveyard is just meters away from where the Massacre took place. The UN’s headquarters overlooks the space in which 106 martyrs are going to rest. The bulldozers work whenever the shelling stops and the chosen land should be ready in two days. One of the people working on setting up the graveyard told us that part of the land is a public asset and part of it belongs to an immigrant from the Al Bourji family and was donated to build the Qana Massacre’s graveyard. Families and relatives of the victims agreed on the collective funeral and graveyard, and the burial ceremony awaits the end of the Israeli aggression. Meanwhile, the
bodies of the martyrs are lying in special fridges in Al Wastani area in Sidon (Harb, TL news, 19.30, 23.04.96).

The story of Muhammad Deeb continued, and we were able to interview his father. We found him sitting beside his niece in a hospital in Tyre. He had lost his wife, four sons, his sister and her three children, and the one remaining alive of the family was his niece.

I was looking in hospitals for my wife and sons till I was told that my wife and three sons Ali, Kasem and Sadek were dead. Then I started looking for my son Muhammad. People told me they’d heard on Tele Liban that there is a child in Hammoud hospital called Muhammad. I headed to the hospital and found my son. I hugged him and Muhammad asked for Seven Up. When I saw him I felt like hope has returned to my life, but on the second day there were complications and they took Muhammad to the intensive care unit, then they came and told me he’d died. He had asked me for a Seven Up and I brought him one. [Repetition of Muhammad’s interview] (Deeb, TL new, 19.30, 23.04.96).

Through our detailed coverage we were able to guide many people to their families or lost ones and we were assisted, as mentioned before, by hospital administrators. NGOs and civil defence crews.

24.04.96

Predictions that had dominated the previous days’ news materialized. American Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to Chtaura (east of Lebanon) and met with House Speaker Nabih Beri, and Prime Minister Rafic Hariri to finalise an understanding to end the escalations. The implementation of a cease-fire was to be expected in 48 hours.

[American Secretary of State Warren] Christopher in Chtaura, meets Hariri and Beri and heads to Jerusalem to meet Shimon Peres.
[Syrian] President [Hafez] Assad discussed the Pact of Understanding with Christopher for four and a half hours.
The road to South Lebanon is still cut off at Awali, but safe to cross at the temporary bridge in Alman (Headlines, TL news, 19.30, 24.04.96).

Israel meanwhile accelerated its aggression against Lebanon ‘neglecting all the efforts made to achieve a cease-fire’ (Introductory headlines, Ibid.) and launched an aerial
bombardment against the villages of South Lebanon accompanied with heavy mortar shelling.

The raids today targeted the river crossings and public roads that link villages together and those linking the villages to the main cities. We will be back to you with the details of the military escalation during the bulletin (Harb, ibid).

A summary of the attacks, village by village, was presented. On that day we called upon people to stop risking their lives by trying to drive on the coastal road. We were asking them to start using the temporary bridge installed by the Lebanese army over Al Awali River, an area the warships guns could not reach. Besides the reports on the shelling, we ran reports on people who resisted Israeli threats and stayed in their homes in the villages and cities of South Lebanon. People were interviewed, showing their insistence on resisting the aggression by not leaving their land. The meeting between Lebanese President Hrawi and American President Clinton were covered in detail and given priority.

[Talking head at press conference] We are working to end the violence. We support the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and implement the UN resolutions. The only way to end Lebanon’s problems is to achieve a comprehensive peace in the region and no one is working on that. We are sorry for the death of the civilians. We will offer President Hrawi emergency aid supplies to help restore some of the destruction caused by this cycle of violence. The cease-fire should have had been achieved yesterday or the week before. It is taking too long and should be resolved soon, and that what is [Warren] Christopher is trying to do now (Clinton. TL news, 19.30, 24.04.96).

Clinton’s address to the Lebanese journalists accompanying the Lebanese President was repeated twice in the news program.

Next, another story was introduced from Washington. A demonstration had taken place outside the White House while the meeting between the two Presidents was in progress. The demonstrators were calling for American intervention to stop the Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

Lebanese immigrants came today to Washington, from Detroit and many other American cities. Among them is Mrs Bitar. She lost her two sons, Hadi aged eight, and Abed Almouhisen aged nine, in the Qana massacre. They had both been spending their vacation with their grandmother in Qana. She did not say
a word. All she did is carry her sons pictures on a poster that says: ‘Israel killed my two sons’.
Another demonstration is expected today outside the Israeli embassy in Washington (Salemeh, TL news, 19.30, 24.04.96).

The Lebanese army was issuing a daily detailed summary of the attacks and we were presenting it as quoting the Lebanese army. However, our own coverage of the attacks came first. We were using the army’s communiqué to sum up the attacks of the day. As mentioned before, the army was in a defensive position, shooting when they were shot at. They did not have the artillery to attack, and thus their units in the South took the responsibility of supporting the villagers and inhabitants who had decided to stay. The soldiers all resolutely stayed at their positions among the villagers, encouraging them and giving them confidence that they would be protected if Israel decided to invade, and performing at the same time a humanitarian role by supplying food and water to the besieged people.

By the 11th day of the aggression, we started running reports on these army units. Every day we tried to visit a different unit and file a report on their activities. By doing this we were trying to emphasis two matters: Firstly, that people would not be questioning of the army’s role at that time, and, secondly, we were telling people around those army positions that they could come and seek help from these units if they needed it. TL journalists were functioning as conduits between the inhabitants and the army units that were embedded in the community and we were supporting both of them.

25.04.96

The aggression on its 15th day continues and aims to separate the villages and cities of south Lebanon from each other.
Christopher and De Charette in Damascus and the American spokesman believe today to be decisive. There are busy diplomatic negotiations in Beirut: French and Iranian foreign ministers and the Russian envoy visited the Presidential Palace. De Charette and Prime Minister Hariri visited the power station in Bsaleem, assuring the people of their will to rebuild what has been destroyed (Headlines, TL news, 19.30, 25.04.96).

Despite the political attempts to end the escalations, Israel continued its bombardment. Again, they were targeting bridges and public roads.
The raids destroyed 30 public roads and 4 bridges. The collaborators radio station [Lahed station] warned the Lebanese army and the people of the villages not to fix the roads because they will subject themselves to danger, and that the Israeli army will bomb it again. so it’s better if they don’t try mending them (Yaghi, TL news, 19.30, 25.04.96).

More stories on Qana victims and survivors kept coming, and we kept reporting them. Every news program after the Qana massacre carried a story or two about the victims and the survivors. One of those stories was the story of Mariam and her brother Ibrahim. Highlighting their condition in a previous report led to facilitating their trip to France for expertise not available at that time in Beirut.

Mariam Ismaeel, aged 12, and Ibrahim Ismaeel, aged 8, think their mother, father and sister are in one of Beirut’s hospitals. They don’t know they all died in the Massacre. Mariam and Ismaeel both lie in hospital in Sidon, next to each other where we met them.

[Mariam talking to the camera. Her face was severely damaged by fire in Qana]
I want to tell my parents if they are watching me that I’m fine here in the hospital and so is my brother and all we want is to hear from them, and to know that they are ok.

[The camera moves to Ibrahim]
I want to tell my mother and father that I am fine and I want to go and see them in Beirut.

Mariam and Ibrahim were transferred to Jiatawi hospital in Beirut and from there they will be taken to France for hospitalisation because of their critical injuries (Harb, ibid).

26.04.96

The cease-fire was announced from Beirut and Tel Aviv and would take place at four o’clock the next morning.

Homecoming journeys to South Lebanon start tomorrow morning at six o’clock. House Speaker Beri declared this evening. An understanding has been achieved and announced by Prime Minister Hariri with Foreign Minister De Charette on his side in Beirut and Shimon Peres with [Warren] Christopher on his side in occupied Jerusalem. Prime Minister Hariri announced that this understanding closed the door completely against any chance to repeat what happened and it is going to lead to a long-term stability and protection for civilians. Hariri assured that the Lebanese authorities will protect this understanding by all means and that the resistance exists within the framework and principles that serve national interests and approaches. However, Prime Minister Hariri offered assurances that the just and permanent solution will
only come when Israel leaves our land and withdraws from South Lebanon
(Awada, TL news, 19.30, 26.04.96)

The understanding protected civilians on both sides, but gave legitimacy to military resistance to fight the occupation in South Lebanon. For the first time in the history of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, through the auspices of the United States, Israel admitted the Lebanese right to fight the occupation in South Lebanon. Lebanon considered this a political victory and it was clearly portrayed as such in TL news.

House Speaker Nabih Beri called through the media for all displaced people to organise their return home from six o’clock on the second morning. We started broadcasting the places where the Lebanese army and public transport buses would be waiting the next morning to carry people south to their homes and villages. We had to run that several times during our program.

Meanwhile, however, Israel kept shelling the coastal road and we were calling upon people not to start their trip back to south Lebanon before the implementation of the cease-fire at four o’clock the next morning.

27.04.96

It was the day of return. The cease-fire was implemented and refugees packed their personal things and headed south. We were broadcasting live from several points on the roads to major areas in South Lebanon

We went live to crossing points for Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyeh.
A hundred and thirty buses were dedicated by the Lebanese army to carry displaced people to their villages.
Public transport was also used to transfer people.
Beri in Qana announces the funeral of Qana martyrs will take place on Tuesday.
Mansouri and Nabatiyeh martyrs would be buried tomorrow at the same time (Harb, TL news. 19.30. 27.04.96).

It was a long day of live coverage. We ran reports on the destruction caused by the attacks in several villages and interviewed some of the displaced people arriving at their homes, but had found them ruined. Displaced southerners were declaring that they would set up tents and sleep in them until they had rebuilt their houses.
The Education Ministry announced that schools would reopen on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of May, in order to give time to prepare schools occupied by refugees during the crisis to accommodate students again.

We broadcast reports on the political implications of what became known as the “April Understanding” on the Lebanese-Israeli conflict. We also ran a report on what we called the constructive and brotherly role France had played in support of Lebanon.

By the end of the program we ran a report on the work of the TL emergency team that had soon become the ‘connection between the displaced people and the Lebanese officials and NGO organisations’ (TL news, 19.30, 27.04.96). The report presented the work of TL team as compassionate, supportive and helpful. It emphasised the fact that TL was a public service TV station and that serving the public in every possible way was its primary aim during those ‘days of suffering’ (ibid.).

\textbf{Reflection-conclusion}

The memories encapsulated in this chapter brought many tears to my eyes, as if the stories were taking place now and not ten years ago. Memories of the emotional distress and frustration I felt in witnessing the killing of innocent children reminded me of how those emotions changed into anger. For sixteen days I tried to be the victims’ voice to the world, or, as I felt at that time, to whoever was watching.

I realised that objectivity as a journalistic norm, and especially in covering wars, could hardly be an absolute measure of conduct. The way we, the Tele Liban journalists, interpreted objectivity identifies completely with the way we were reporting, even though we were emotionally involved with what was happening. Our ‘objectivity’ fell within the cultural, national and social context we were operating in. What the narrative or the story of this chapter suggests is that journalists cannot detach themselves when covering a war launched on their country. Patriotism and nationalism thus mark the Lebanese journalists work during these 16 days of coverage. They identified themselves as members of the nation; they sympathised with their fellow citizens and were emotionally involved.
I still remember my cameraman trying to lead the way for me with his camera to get into one of the targeted containers in Qana. The container was full of shattered bodies of innocent men, women and children. The UN soldiers were trying to keep people away. He was shouting in despair ‘let me go in, these are my people’. They were ‘our people’ it made all the difference for me and my colleagues.

Partisanship in TL journalists’ commentaries became clearer in the wake of the Qana massacre. However, they dismissed the word ‘propaganda’, as they too think of it as a negative practice. Only the chairman of TL, Fouad Naim, answered to the question of whether our coverage was propaganda by saying: ‘If anyone accuses us that we were conducting propaganda, then yes we were. It was propaganda of the truth’.

Looking at it retrospectively and from a distance, it was surely a ‘positioned truth’, a ‘truth’ told through the eyes of one side of the conflict, but none of us saw it as such at that moment. It was our version of the ‘truth’, which then—because it was believed in so fervently and so nationalistically, because it is lived and embodied in the daily encounters with shattered and innocent bodies—comes to seem to be an ‘objective truth’.

We were all driven by our experiences as Lebanese citizens over the course of a lifetime, by our sense of the wrong being done to our country. We were driven by the need to report and highlight the scale of the Israeli offence and to communicate the suffering of the residents of South Lebanon to the rest of the Lebanese public. Additionally, our coverage aimed at achieving national unity against the Israeli aggression. So what the Lebanese journalists are arguing here and what they did then come to seem to be not propaganda (in its negative form)—but ‘truth’ as Naim said and a form of what I have argued earlier in this thesis to be a context-specific form of liberation propaganda.

However, as the detailed presentation of the events and the coverage shows, many aspects of propaganda techniques were evident during this coverage. The propaganda conducted here was mainly propaganda ‘to the home front’ the term that Goebbels used to differentiate between two kinds of propaganda - one that targets the home front and one towards the enemy (see Chapter Two). Although the ‘propaganda’ we
conducted does not match with most of Goebbels 19 principles, it nevertheless corresponds with at least two of them: firstly ‘to diminish the impact of frustration at home’, and secondly to ‘specify the target of hatred’, in this case the Israeli aggression (see Goebbels principals in Doob in Jackal, 1995: 214).

Further, the devices of name-calling and glittering-generalities identified by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis mentioned in Chapter Three were also applicable in our coverage. We (the journalists who covered the events) used terms like, ‘aggressor army’, ‘the enemy forces’, ‘a state thirst for blood’ and a ‘blood-loving government’. We used rhetoric like: “the Grapes of Wrath operation exploded with hate”. We were appealing to people’s emotions of love, brotherhood, honour and freedom. We were also appealing to people’s political and historical heritage, which is in fact quite similar to what Al Manar journalists were doing and will be illustrated in Chapter Seven.

None of the Lebanese journalists covering the April events was operating in accordance with previous structured plans drawn up by a propagandist. However, the work that I and other Lebanese journalists were doing was absolutely ‘intentional’. 

Our training, our experience as Lebanese citizens over the course of the Arab Israeli conflict, our sense of the harm and damage caused to our country, all made it possible for us to be totally sure and focussed about what had to be done and could be done.

Applying *illustratively* some of Jowett and O’Donnell’s (1999) divisions of propaganda analysis, discussed in Chapter Two, to TL journalists’ performance during the April 1996 events show the following:

1- There was no orchestrated or managed campaign. Journalists were acting upon their own beliefs and ideas. Israel was an enemy state that was occupying their land and was launching an attack on their civilian people. Their ideology was simply generated from the history of the Arab-Israel conflict and the Lebanese-Israeli part in this. They did not agree to the fact that they were applying or implementing the government’s political and humanitarian messages in their coverage. However, looking through the chronological narration of that coverage shows that coverage was in many ways reflecting the government’s messages and mainly those put forward by
Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The purpose was to unify the people against one enemy, Israel, and stay defiant, which, as will be illustrated in Chapter Seven, was a common denominator with Al Manar journalists as well.

2- The media campaign took place amid a war that was launched on Lebanon’s civil population and infrastructure by a foreign country, Israel, which occupied 10% of its territories. The Israeli military operation was associated with the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It took place while Lebanon was trying to stand on its feet as a unified civil society after 15 years of civil war, which included two Israeli invasions of its territories. Thus, the shared ideas and ideals, the shared experiences, the shared threat, the interpersonal relationships, produced a very consistent and common approach, which became very deliberate in terms of personal commitment. So the way we reported was intentional, though the media campaign was not managed or planned.

3- No propagandist, as identified in Chapter Two could be branded here. There was no person or group of people who had put a clear and structured plan to conduct a propaganda campaign.

4- The media campaign targeted the Lebanese audiences in the first place. After broadcasting began on satellite, the target audiences widened to cover Arabs and Lebanese in the Arab World and in the Diaspora. The images then became a propaganda tool beyond the home front. It was not targeting the enemy (which, as discussed in Chapter Seven, was the case with the Al Manar campaign) but the wider Arab and international audiences, non-domestic audiences - seeking support, help and solidarity. It should be recognised that these images and stories became powerful tools in propagating the Lebanese victim hood, which can readily be argued to have led in the July 2006 war to Israeli military attacks on transmission centres of several Lebanese TV stations, including Tele Liban. The attacks destroyed Al Manar TV station’s headquarters in the Southern suburbs of Beirut in an attempt to silence its images and messages (more about the role of Al Manar will be presented in Chapter Seven). These attacks are new and different aspects of the media war between Lebanon and Israel, which opens the way for new research questions.
5- As the narration of events shows, the Lebanese and Arab audiences responded to TL messages for help, unity and solidarity in clear and demonstrable ways. The late prominent journalist and writer Samir Kasir\textsuperscript{xv} described the performance of TL during the April 1996 events as highly professional. He said in an article in the French magazine *L’Orient Express*, published in May 1996, that TL as a public service TV station proved to have ousted all competition in its wide and accurate coverage. Kasir praised what he called the ‘calmness and professionalism’ of my performance specifically, which in his words ‘projected the voice of an emblematic figure of the coverage of TL’ (Kasir, *L’Orient Express*, 05.1996).

The media campaign conducted by TL journalists during the events of April 1996 has many features that match with propaganda principles, devices and definitions illustrated in this chapter and discussed in Chapter Two. Nonetheless, it also differs in several respects.

Our coverage was factual. We did not fabricate news; we did not deceive our audiences. The footage of guiltless victims killed by Israeli bombardments and air raids spoke for itself. We all believed that we were ‘objective’ in our reporting. However, as discussed earlier, ultimate objectivity was actually unachievable. Journalists are affected by the historical, cultural, social and political context they operate within. Thus, the objectivity all journalists interviewed for this research claimed is contextual. Journalists reporting war when their country or nation is under threat can hardly achieve any other kind of objectivity than precisely this.

The Lebanese journalists (both TL’s and Al Manar’s journalists, as will be demonstrated in the coming chapter) believed they were serving their ‘people’s cause’ by highlighting and exposing the Israeli aggression. I was personally affected by the scale of the Israeli brutality in killing civilians and destroying homes, and felt compelled to report this Israeli brutality to my audiences. In most of my coverage I remember that the only people who were on my mind were those poor and powerless villagers whom I had met during our regular attempts to break the siege Israel had imposed on them. I wanted to help these villagers, and images and words were my only tools.
However, looking back at my performance in a retrospective and reflexive way, I realise that my reporting was affected by the horror I had lived through and witnessed at the time. As a journalist I went ‘native’, in the anthropological and ethnographic sense (see Chapter Three), and, as anthropologists have come to understand, objectivity and distance are impossible in such a context, where the only truth is that that is positioned or contextual. Impartiality in such circumstances is more than difficult to maintain. But these complexities, as I have argued above in elaborating a meaning for the term liberation propaganda, are exactly what were involved in what the TL journalists were doing in this context.

Summary

In this chapter I have tried to outline the news values and norms that characterised the work of the Lebanese journalists in their coverage of the April 1996 events and the impact of the historical, political, social and cultural contexts on the ways in which they operated. It tried to indicate features and performances related to propaganda notions and principles.

This chapter demonstrates that Lebanese journalists were applying some of the propaganda tools and techniques I have outlined earlier in this thesis, without realising that many aspects of their performance match with some of propaganda norms. However, it nevertheless also clearly demonstrates that they were propagating the cause of their people by avoiding deception, lies and the fabrication of news. Their aim was to help Lebanon achieve its sovereignty and freedom by ending the Israeli occupation of its southern occupied territories.

The April 1996 Israeli military operations against Lebanon gave prominence to the Islamic resistance in South Lebanon to operate against the Israeli forces inside the occupied territories. Almost without exception, the whole of Lebanon was united around the right of resistance. The role the media played in uniting the people of Lebanon against the one enemy paved the road for Al Manar TV, which is affiliated to Hezbollah, to announce itself as Resistance TV and to start a media campaign aimed at highlighting the rightness of the resistance and demonising the abilities of the Israeli army. What started as an un-planned and un-structured media campaign
with TL became a planned and structured media campaign with Al Manar. Driven by
the same aim as the TL journalists (that is liberation) Al Manar’s campaign expanded
the target audience to cover the enemy’s soldiers and some sections of the enemy’s
society, in particular, the soldiers’ mothers. Chapter Seven will therefore look into the
performance of Al Manar TV during certain military incidents that highlighted the
period between 1997 and 2000, the year that Israel withdrew from most of the
territories they occupied in South Lebanon, except for seven farms that border both
Syria and Israel.

1 The Israeli government code-named its operation after the famous novel of John Steinbeck ‘Grapes of
Wrath’ relating rhetorically its operation with the theme of ‘fighting for existence’.
2 A village in Western Bekaa valley.
3 The two main southern cities, respectively 84 and 48 kilometres south of the capital Beirut
4 Shiite religious title.
5 TL anchor-producers that covered the “Grapes of Wrath” operation from South Lebanon were:
Zahra Harb on 13/14/15/04.96; 23/24/25/04.96, and 27/04.96
Zaven Kouyoumdjian on 16/17/18/04.96.
Dalal Kandeel on 19/20/04.96 and 26/04.96
Rajaa Kamouneh on 21/22/04.96
Head of news (1993-1997) Aref Al Abed described the teams that covered the events from South
Lebanon as suicidal. He praised most the first team that agreed to go south at a time where others were
reluctant and were questioning the benefits of doing so (Al Abed, interview with author, 2004).
6 28 kilometres south east of Beirut.
7 Soviet-made, multiple rocket launchers with short-range rockets.
8 Called Sour in Arabic, 83 kilometres south west of Beirut, the fourth largest city in Lebanon.
9 In Lebanon, the word martyr is used to refer to innocent civilians who die from an aggressive act and
thus not just to fighters. The term has been used during the last 32 years to refer to persons who died in
conditions of oppression, no matter to what religious sect they belong.
10 Referring to Hezbollah relations with Iran. For more information on the link between Hezbollah and
Iran see Hamzeh (2005).
11 The committee was established at the end of Lebanese civil war, early nineties, to coordinate the
actions of public agencies and NGOs in relation to social affairs.
13 Muslim Shiite, Druze and the minorities of Muslim Sunni and Christians predominantly inhabit
South Lebanon and Western Bekaa areas.
14 To know why Lebanese Christians’ support for the resistance was an important feature. see Chapter
Four on the historical background of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict.
15 Samir Kasir was assassinated on June 2nd 2005 in Beirut, a bomb having been planted under his car
seat. He was one of Independence 05 movement in Lebanon’s political architecture. The movement
followed the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14th 2005.
Chapter seven: Al Manar’s coverage: Aiming at liberation

‘We are less qualified in one respect: the propaganda. They are trying to hit our weak points and we have to hit back’ (General Kobi Maroun, head of the Golani regiment serving in South Lebanon, Yediot Ahronot, 5.1.98).

The Israeli ‘Grapes of Wrath’ operation in April 1996 against Lebanon served to give new status to Hezbollah’s Islamic resistance. Despite the great destruction it inflicted on Lebanon and despite all the display about ending Hezbollah’s Katyusha rockets (short-range rockets) attacks against northern Israel, the number of rockets raining down on Galilee appeared to have increased during the military operation. The Hezbollah military apparatus was intact, and, as Hala Jaber in her book Hezbollah indicates, their popularity became unquestionable.

The guerrillas whom Israel was set on destroying at the start of the campaign had suffered few casualties and their popularity has risen. For the first time since the group had come into being, Lebanese of all religions, sects and classes rallied around the Party of God’s Islamic resistance in an unprecedented show of support and solidarity. Even Israel’s old-time allies of 1982, the Christian Maronites, managed to put aside their political differences and supported the resistance (Jaber, 1997: 196).

After the events of April 1996, the Lebanese society as a whole showed a tendency towards defending the choice of resistance. The head of Hezbollah’s media relations (2001-2004) and former press officer, Hassan Eizddine, believed that the Lebanese TV stations and mainly Tele Liban (TL) were able to present the real ‘aggressive’ image of the Israeli attacks against Lebanon:

They were able to reflect the fact that Lebanon was the victim and that Israel is the aggressor. The Israelis attacked every village, town and city in south Lebanon. They destroyed the country’s infrastructure. They killed innocent people and the Lebanese stations were able to show that in detail, minute after minute. This resulted in the wave of support the refugees received all over Lebanon, and the amount of support the resistance received morally and financially from all sectors of the Lebanese society. The message the media was able to deliver - along with their resolute position in support of the resistance and images of the steadfastness of the resistance fighters - helped in achieving the victorious April Understanding that made the enemy itself recognise our right to fight their soldiers to liberate our land (Eizddine, interview with author, 2003).
Hezbollah’s new popular political status produced a new media strategy and performance, and this chapter will explore Hezbollah’s media plan, its structure and units, and the role Al Manar TV, affiliated to Hezbollah, played in implementing this media plan. To illustrate this, the chapter will analyse Al Manar’s journalists’ performance during certain military incidents and encounters between the resistance and the Israeli army in South Lebanon. What started with TL as un-structured and un-organised media campaign aiming at defying the enemy by uniting the nation around its government and resistance fighters translated with Al Manar into a strategic organised plan to use the media systematically as one of the tools to achieve liberation.

This chapter will consist of a chronological narration and analysis of Al Manar’s coverage of ten major military incidents, mainly in South Lebanon, between 1997 and 2000, the Liberation year.¹ The narration is based on twenty hours of Al Manar’s news coverage. Unlike the previous chapter, I will not be using the first person voice here, as I did not work with or for Al Manar TV, but shared common cultural and national aspirations and principles and had close connections with them. As suggested in the Methodology, such accounts that tell a story (though not with the same reflexivity as in the previous chapter) are carried along by the major events reported upon – and developed by Hezbollah’s personnel through Al Manar (in this case). The events were looked at chronologically, rather than thematically, as it also fits the pattern established in the previous chapter.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, I am studying the Lebanese journalists’ performance and conduct as a ‘complete participant’. Having close connections with Al Manar journalists and being given access to their archive helped in building the ethnographic story of their coverage. Narration is also aided by interviews conducted with these journalists and the administrators, who were directly involved in the coverage studied here. It is also aided by interviews with Hezbollah’s media personnel. Press archives from Israeli, Lebanese and pan-Arab papers are also used to highlight or support the story told. These clips were collected from Lebanese newspaper archives and from two documentation centres in Beirut: the Arabic Centre for Information and the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation.
Importantly, the performance of Al Manar journalists during the 1997 to 2000 period will be presented and examined in relation to propaganda principles and techniques and journalism’s norms of objectivity, neutrality, accuracy and impartiality introduced earlier in Chapters Two and Three. The narration is produced by transcribing and translating the TV news archive. Field-notes are derived from journalists’ memories of the events under investigation. This chapter will follow the same process of narrativising data and carrying out analysis as applied in the previous chapter.

Thus, it will draw on the theoretical framework discussed earlier – particularly centred around norms and values of journalism and their implementation during times of war. It will aim at outlining the news values and norms that characterised the work of Al Manar journalists in their coverage of major encounters between the resistance and the Israeli troops between 1997 and 2000 and the impact of the historical social, cultural and religious context on the way they operated. It therefore also seeks to pinpoint features and performances related to the propaganda notions and principles presented in Chapter Two. Specifically, the chapter identifies similarities and parallels between Al Manar journalists’ performance and that of Tele Liban journalists during their coverage of the April 1996 events discussed in the previous chapter. Necessarily, the work relates concepts, actions and what is revealed by those who were witnesses to these events to the literature on propaganda discussed earlier in this thesis. This chapter is divided into two sections: Hezbollah’s media plan and the Al Manar TV coverage.

1- Hezbollah’s media plan

According to Professor Muhammad Mohsen, an expert on propaganda and public opinion at the Lebanese University, Hezbollah had had a clear and organised media plan since the early nineties. However, this plan was re-enforced after the events of April 1996.

In 1996 Hezbollah realised the importance of a professional and organised media performance and also recognized the importance of building on the people’s consensus around the resistance. I believe that the 1996 war was a turning point in Hezbollah’s media performance and conduct. They became more organised and precise in the content and style of the messages (Mohsen, interview with author, 2004).
Mohsen pointed out that there was a clear transition in Hezbollah’s media policies in the wake of the events of 1996, due to the fact that they had new audiences that they needed to address – beyond their ‘natural’ constituency, their party members and close supporters. Thus, they considered the shift in their audiences’ construction. They institutionalised their media performance as units and centres (as discussed below). They opened up to receive around 1200 foreign reporters in their offices during the ’96 events alone (Mohsen, 1998). They granted interviews with Hezbollah’s political figures, and dedicated English- and French-speaking personnel to explain Hezbollah’s (and Lebanon’s) position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Mohsen says that Hezbollah’s media performance had thus developed dramatically since 1982, the year the idea of forming a party came into existence (see Saad Ghorayeb, 2004, Qassem, 2005 and Jaber. 1997). He reveals that, by the year 2000, Hezbollah’s media management reached its climax. It was the year Hezbollah fighters were able to celebrate the defeat of the Israeli army in South Lebanon and the withdrawal of its troops from the territories Israel had occupied for 22 years (Mohsen, 1997).

According to Mohsen (interview with author, 2004) Hezbollah’s media strategy went through three main phases:

1- The period from 1982 to 1986 was the ‘preparation’ and ‘populist media’ period. Hezbollah came into existence in 1982, following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. However, its existence was not made official until 1985, when Israeli occupation troops retreated into south Lebanon and established what it called their ‘security zone’, which constituted 10% of the Lebanese territories (see Saad Ghorayeb, 2004, Qassem, 2005, Hafez. 2005, Jaber 1997, 1999). Between 1982 and 1986 Hezbollah’s media messages were distributed through flyers, leaflets, banners, signs, wall pictures and political and religious festivals. These were the tools for what Mohsen calls the ‘populist media’. Mohsen related these tools to those used by the communists in their build up to the October revolution in 1917 (for more on the role of media in the Bolshevik revolution see Thomson, 1999).

2- The period between ’86 and ’90 was the ‘to be in the picture’ period, ‘whether positive or negative’. In other words, this was the phase to publicise Hezbollah and its role in fighting the Israeli occupation.

3- At the end of the 1980s, cameramen started joining the resistance fighters during combat. In 1993 the filming of operations reached its climax, and cameramen were
killed during combat (see below for discussion of the role of the resistance cameramen as part of the Military Media Unit).

4- The year 1996 was seen as the turning point in constructing new, more organised and precise media plans that Mohsen asserts had clearly helped in achieving liberation in 2000. As witnessed by Mohsen above, the strategy towards more organised media plans was due to the governmental and public support the Islamic resistance gained in the wake of April 1996 events. This support was of course enhanced by TL journalists’ coverage of the events presented in the previous chapter.

The legitimacy and international acceptance the resistance achieved through the April Understanding⁷, which had given international legitimacy to the Islamic resistance (Hezbollah’s military wing) to fight Israeli forces in the occupied territories in South Lebanon, led Hezbollah’s leadership and its media personnel to think of new media strategies. As suggested above, this strategy aimed at targeting new groups of audiences inside and outside Lebanon. According to Muhammad Haider, the head of Al Manar TV and a member of the Hezbollah Political Bureau, and Moufaq Al Jammal, Hezbollah’s press officer between 1996 and 2000, these five groups were: the resistance fighters and their families, the Lebanese community at large in all its religious sectors and parties,⁸ the wider Arab community, the Israelis (soldiers, their mothers and their military and political elite) and the international community (Jammal and Haider, interviews with author, 2000, 2003) Thus, the audiences grew beyond just the Muslim Shiite community in Lebanon, or other Hezbollah supporters, to cover all the groups mentioned here.

Hassan Eizddine considered the years between 1997 and 2000 to be the climax period. They were the years that ‘preceded the liberation’ and witnessed the ‘countdown to victory’, marked by the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon (Eizddine, interview with author, 2004). This came after a unilateral decision, taken by the Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ehud Barak, to withdraw without any prior conditions. One of the experts who worked on drawing up and finalising these new strategies and plans (who asked for his own security to remain anonymous) revealed that a group of experts in political propaganda and psychological warfare was appointed to draw up Hezbollah’s new media strategy. One of the things they achieved was outlining the organisational structure of the media war with Israel. The expert added (interview with author) that
these media plans took into consideration previous media policies and propaganda techniques developed and tried in previous wars, such as Granada and Vietnam. For instance, they decided that it was important to give alternative access to information to local and foreign journalists. Hezbollah viewed its position as being like that of the Vietcong or the revolutionary government of Granada that the United States wanted to overthrow. (For more information on war and the media in Vietnam and Granada, see Hudson and Stanier, 1997 and Knightley, 1975/2000).

So what had been largely unplanned (in the sense of being reactive) and not deliberately structured with a propagandistic intent, as seen in TL journalists’ performance (discussed in the previous chapter), became a clearly outlined, planned and structured system of media operations by Hezbollah’s media people, and consequently by Al Manar. This development meets two of the main criteria Taylor (2003: 5-6) identifies in defining his understanding of propaganda: the connection between ‘truth’ and propaganda, and revealing the truth and gaining credibility. Importantly, for Mouffak El Jammal, the latter was at the core of these media policies and strategies — for they were basically trying to counter Israeli propaganda.

We have faced the necessity of confronting the Israeli propaganda - that was full of lies and hatred against all Arabs, and especially against us [Hezbollah and the resistance]. We were aiming to try and convince media organisations worldwide to change the term terrorists into fighters seeking to liberate their own occupied land, the word gangs into resistance groups, the phrase terrorist attacks into resistance operations (interview with author 2000; emphasis added).

They were equally aware of that connection between ‘truth’ and propaganda and how, according to Goebbels, propaganda has nothing necessarily in common with truth and objectivity (Thomson, 1999: 4). Hezbollah’s media personnel were convinced that the real motives and causes behind their struggle were distorted by the Israeli PR machine and that they therefore had to disseminate their side of the story. They therefore needed to disseminate the ‘truth about their struggle’ said the anonymous expert. The words ‘truth’ and ‘credibility’ were emphasised more when talking about the resistance’s military operations in South Lebanon, and particularly the military losses Israel was encountering in the occupied territories. Importantly, they considered deception a flaw that would affect their cause negatively.
Naif Krayem, Chairman of Al Manar and the Hezbollah-affiliated radio station El Nour (1997-2001), and former head of Hezbollah’s Central Media Unit (1996-1997), who was identified as the man behind the development of this political propaganda, told the *Daily Telegraph* in April 2000:

For 40 years the Arab media were useless. But we have learned from the failures of the past and the success of the Israelis in this field. Of course, the Israelis are stronger than us worldwide but in this conflict there is no doubt we have the upper hand. (Krayem in Philips, *Daily Telegraph*, 12.4.2000)

Krayem was referring to what Rugh (2004) categorises as the ‘mobilising’ and the ‘loyalist’ media systems in the Arab world. The first is characterised by the almost total subordination of media system to the political system and state regimes, and the second is the privately owned media that is loyal to the state regime (Rugh, 2004). These media systems tend to exaggerate the strength of the state, and one of the examples that Krayem related was that of the Egyptian broadcaster Ahmad Said, of Swat Al Arab vii, during the 1967 war with Israel. Ahmad Said kept telling the Arab listeners that the Arabs were winning the war - while the residents of Jerusalem were watching the Israeli tanks taking up positions near their houses.

This version became known as the Ahmad Said war. The Arab population felt the defeat and shock, and many commentators believed that the Arabs lost the 1967 war not just because of military inabilities, but because of Ahmad Said’s misleading information and exaggeration (see Khoury, 1995). The late head of the Journalists Syndicate in Lebanon, Riyad Taha, dedicated his book *Media and the Battle (Al laalam wal Maaraka)* (1973) to a discussion of the Arab media’s failure to present the Arab side of the story to the international community and the way the Zionist movement had succeeded in putting its argument forward. He argued that world’s leaders view the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of Israeli eyes (Taha, 1973).

Supporting this, Edward Said, in Gauri Viswanathan’s book *Power, Politics and Culture* (2004), speaks of how it is Israel’s version of the history of its conflict with the Palestinians and the Arabs is what is widely circulated in the West. Said (2004) additionally asserts the need to emphasise the facts and realities which support the Arab and Palestinian cause of liberation and independence. In the same way, Greg Philo and Mike Berry in their book, *Bad News from Israel* (2004), speak of the effectiveness of the Israeli PR machine in building contacts with journalists and
passing information and views to journalists on issues related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Hezbollah’s media people were aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the messages Israel tended to circulate to the international community and they started drawing up plans and strategies on how to counter it. Krayem wrote (in Mohsen 1997: 49) that Hezbollah media’s main aim was to counter Israel’s ‘false’ messages - that aimed at demonising the resistance fighters’ motives and abilities, and claiming themselves as the army that could not be defeated. Countering Israeli messages was also practised by TL journalists during the coverage of the April events (see Chapter Six). However, Hezbollah media people and consequently Al Manar journalists took it to a more strategic level and applied organised counter-propaganda policies. These policies, as in the TL journalists case, fall within the framework of defensive as opposed to offensive, and integrative rather than subversive, forms of propaganda discussed in Chapter Two.

The kind of liberation propaganda this thesis is arguing for involves aspects of the kinds of defensive, and integrative counter-propaganda that both the TL journalists and the Hezbollah media people, including the Al Manar journalists, were applying.

However, in contrast to the TL journalists’ unstructured coverage, Hezbollah’s media strategies and policies were practised through particular devices, units and practices, and what follows is a summary of these.

**Al Manar’s Political Propaganda Unit**

At the end of 1997, Al Manar put together all the media production related to the resistance into a new unit, calling it in Arabic ‘Qsem Al Diaayah Al Siyassiah’, which translates literally into the ‘Political Propaganda Unit’. Hussien Hmiad, the head of the unit at the time, explained that after the 1996 events they felt the need to organise and develop their performance in promoting the conduct of the resistance. ‘In the administrative structure we were part of the programming and promotion department’ (Hmiad, interview with author, 2003). This unit was only responsible for producing patriotic video-clips and flashes that praised the resistance fighters and sought to demoralise the Israeli soldiers and the Israeli military institutions. Some of these were
broadcast in Arabic, some in Hebrew, and in some cases translated into both languages.
The unit lasted till the Liberation and then it became part of a new department called the Resistance Department.

The Military Media Unit

Most Hezbollah media personnel interviewed for this research talk about the ‘media traps’ they planted on several occasions for the Israelis. One of these took place in 1994 when the resistance attacked an Israeli position called Debshe, in occupied south Lebanon. They raised the flag there after destroying the position. The resistance distributed a press release about the operation without showing any pictures, and the Israeli army denied the operation, saying that none of their soldiers had been killed and that nothing had changed in Debshe. The Hezbollah media people, at that point, released the videotape of the operation, which showed dead soldiers and how the fighters had climbed the hill and planted their flag (Jammal, interview with author, 2000). The Israeli Army was then under attack by the Israeli press for lying, using such phrases as "Hezbollah media humiliated the military institution" (Assafir 21.9.96, np). This directly led to the idea of having a cameraman as a fixed member of every operation that took place, thus becoming part of the team. Copies of films became routinely distributed to the local TV stations, as well as the offices of international and Arab media organizations and news agencies in Lebanon. An embargo on the timing of the release of such film, however, remained in the hands of Hezbollah’s media people.

The use of such a cameraman had started in the late eighties, though this was not particularly professional until after 1996, when trained personnel came to accompany the groups. These had the ability to film day or night with equipment that was able to catch detail from a great distance, and, as the head of the Military Media Unit, Haj Maitham, says, it became a priority for the fighters to keep the camera safe and keep the tapes with them (interview with author 2004).

Before 1996 there was no specialised unit responsible for filming operations. We used to depend on volunteers and not professional, trained and equipped personnel. In 1996 an organised formation was introduced that was given hi-tech equipment and a specific space. [Additionally] the problems the unit faced
were studied and solutions were sought. For example, at the beginning, we did not have a person dedicated to looking after how this unit was operating, but after 1996 a small section was introduced within the resistance to take care professionally of this issue (ibid.).

The films shot by the Military Media Unit cameramen would first be broadcast on Al Manar and then distributed to the local and international news agencies and TV stations in Lebanon. and one of the targets of showing these films, besides documenting Israeli losses, was to tell the young Lebanese, "If these guys can do it, you can do it too" (Krayem, interview with author, 2000).

Tel Zalmnobites, of the Israeli magazine Bmsehneih, wrote a report about the effectiveness of the filming of the resistance's operations headed: "A film directed by Hassan Nasrallah" (Secretary General of Hezbollah). The report reveals how the footage of Debshe (see above) left its imprint. since "[an Israeli] soldier has been always told that the Israeli army never leaves its position and the Israeli army could not be defeated" (Bmsehneih 21.9.96: np).

So successful has the Hezbollah campaign been that the Israelis are about to withdraw from Lebanon—a practically unheard of example of the most powerful army in the Middle East retreating before Arab guns. Israeli losses in Southern Lebanon are not enormous - about 25 killed a year - but the fact that Hezbollah cameramen have caught the moment when Israeli mother's sons are killed has had a fatal effect on public opinion, making it impossible for the [Israeli] army to continue (Philips, Daily Telegraph. 12.4.2000: np).

Similarly, the Israeli daily Yediot Achronot, in an article in April 1997, discussed the power of 'Hezbollah's propaganda war' against Israel, saying that: "They have succeeded in driving us towards despair" (Yediot Achronot, 25.4.97, np). The paper quoted one of the Israeli military psychiatrists as saying that 'Hezbollah's propaganda war' had been far more effective on the Israeli soldiers than the military one:

The main targets for the Israeli air force at the moment are Hezbollah's TV and radio stations' transmitting areas - the Israeli intelligence is planning to hit the Manar TV station and El Nour radio station - and this indicates the real danger Hezbollah's [propaganda war] is having on the morale of the Israelis. Sixty-five percent of the Israeli soldiers that serve in south Lebanon are less determined to fight after watching the video tape Hezbollah released about its "martyrdom battalion" while preparing for new operations in south Lebanon (Ibid).
Elihu Katz, the Israeli media scholar, told the Pan Arab newspaper *Al Hayat's* correspondent in Jerusalem, Saad Hamd, that the images Al Manar broadcast which were then re-transmitted on Israeli TV (Channel One) highlighted and drew Israeli public opinion and attention to what exactly was happening in South Lebanon. He believed that these images had deepened the feeling of Israeli public opinion about the pointlessness of staying in South Lebanon, especially with the April Understanding that bounded the Israeli army’s freedom of movement. He explained that these pictures were seen as ‘bloody clear evidence on the situation’ (Hamd, *Al Hayat*, 16.4.2000, np).

Katz was referring to the fact that the Israeli army occupation of South Lebanon was not bringing security and strength to Israel, but rather images of death and humiliation. However, Tamar Liebes, professor of communication studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, points out that it was very difficult to define the limit of the effectiveness of these images on Israeli public opinion that became largely in favour of immediate withdrawal from South Lebanon. She explained that no surveys had been conducted within Israeli society on this shift of positions, and if this shift has happened it would be difficult to identify what really made it take place. However, Liebes does not exclude the possibility that the Israeli audience’s discovery of what was happening on the battlefield (watching the wounded soldiers so closely and hearing their moans) had added to the cumulative process that led Israeli society to conclude that staying in Lebanon with such losses would be useless (ibid).

**The Media Relations Centre**

Hezbollah’s liaison officer for all Lebanese, Arab and international media outlets, Haidar Dekmak, speaks of two phases of change that the media relations unit went through. In the early organisational structure, this unit was called the Central Media Unit. Between 1987 and 1996 it used to be responsible for all Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets: Al Manar, Al Nour (the radio station), *Al Intiqad* (the magazine) and Hezbollah’s official internet website. It also used to be responsible for what Hezbollah calls the ‘popular media’: posters, regional parades, political festivals, sports and cultural activities and banners (interview with author, 2004).
Later, in 1996, the centre witnessed ‘a restructuring phase’ when Al Manar and Al Nour stopped being under the auspices of the Central Media Unit and became solely run by an elected board of directors in accordance with the Lebanese audio-visual law (see Chapter Five on this). Additionally, delivering Hezbollah’s political messages to party members and supporters was no longer centralised. This responsibility was transferred to the regional party sectors in different parts of the country (ibid.).

The Central Media Unit’s responsibility instead became to organise relations with other media outlets and journalists, whether Lebanese, Arab or international. They became the source of information to all media outlets in relation to Hezbollah and the resistance (Eizddine, interview with author, 2004). As suggested, the resistance’s video tapes, filmed by the Military Media Unit, which was identified as a separate section within the military apparatus of the resistance, would come to the central office first, and would then be distributed to other stations and news agencies. However, Al Manar came to have direct access to the Military Media Unit. Thus, the central office’s responsibilities could be summarised as:

- Issuing detailed press releases on the resistance’s military operations and Hezbollah’s political statements.
- Establishing contacts with media institutions all over the world, inviting foreign and local journalists to meet leaders of Hezbollah and arranging visits to the Islamic resistance’s military positions on the front lines in south Lebanon.
- Establishing several web pages and exploring the "third wave propaganda", as defined by Taylor (1999). This is propaganda and counter-propaganda waged on the net, which is beyond the scope of this study.

Because of this re-structuring, the central media office was re-named in 2000 the Media Relations Centre. The emphasis of its work was on the relationship with other media outlets and journalists from all over the world.
The Hebrew Monitoring Unit

Al Manar used to broadcast news flashes in Hebrew after every resistance operation against the Israeli soldiers in south Lebanon. They were also re-broadcasting every commentary the Israeli TV or press presented on the ‘failures’ of the Israeli army and the ‘abilities’ of the resistance. They also broadcast what the Israeli TV had re-broadcast from Al Manar in Hebrew subtitled in Arabic, such as clips and films of military resistance operations. The target audience of these broadcasts was the Lebanese domestic audiences, particularly as these meant to say that the ‘enemy’ was admitting to the abilities of the resistance fighters. Importantly, they were also intended to raise the morale of the fighters themselves, and their families. and to encourage new people to be recruited to the resistance.

Further, two working units were created to monitor the Israeli media outlets, to transcribe and translate what was related to Lebanon, Hezbollah and the resistance. One came to be based at Al Manar and the other in the Military Media Unit (MMU). However, importantly, both units became integrated in terms of their staff, who could work interchangeably in either unit (anonymous member of MMU, interview with author. 2003).

The team of translators came to consist mainly of ex-detainees from Israeli prisons, who had perhaps ironically spent their years in detention studying Hebrew. One of the programs they transmitted became called "The image coup" - highlighting problems inside Israeli society and playing clips that demonstrate this, taken from Israeli TV. The target audiences here being Arabs generally and particularly the Lebanese, to show that the ‘ideal’ community, which ‘Israeli propaganda’ tries to emphasise ‘hardly exists in reality’<Al Manar 2000>.

Such an ideal Israeli society is pictured as utopian, where there is no crime, no corruption and with ultimate freedom of speech. What this program sought to do is to demonise Israeli society through using its own TV material. The program therefore highlighted crimes of rape, military censorship, official corruption and discrimination against non- European Jews and Arab Palestinians within the Israeli society.
Demonising the ‘enemy’ has been one of the basic tools of propaganda throughout history (see the history of propaganda discussed in Chapter Two).

Some of the Hebrew clips were addressed to the Israeli soldiers’ mothers: ‘Why let your son die in south Lebanon? Stop him from joining the troops in the Lebanese occupied territories!!’ Naif Krayem says these are obviously designed to work on their emotions. addressing the core feature a propagandist should appeal to in order to influence their targets. The clips were seen in Israel through both Manar and Israeli TV. Israeli TV used to show the Hebrew clips made by Al Manar and make comments on how the Hezbollah media is developing (Israeli Channel 2, September, 1996), which for Krayem was a bonus the Israelis were presenting to the resistance in terms of providing free publicity:

We used to produce a new clip whenever we saw the old one on Israeli TV, which we monitor 24 hours a day. The Israelis later stopped broadcasting our clips, but the press kept writing about them (Krayem, interview with author 2000).

Muhammad Budiar, who works at both Al Manar and the Military Media Unit as a translator (from Hebrew to Arabic and vice versa), is considered by Al Manar as an expert on Israeli affairs and his analysis seen as essential. He was detained in Israeli prisons for 10 years after being captured while conducting an operation against the Israeli army in South Lebanon. He obtained a degree in political science from Tel Aviv Open University during his years of detention. Budiar speaks of eight individuals working in both Al Manar and the Military media unit on monitoring the Israeli media and translating what is related to Hezbollah, the resistance and Lebanon. Six out of eight are previous detainees in Israeli prisons and the other two had learned Hebrew in Lebanon (interview with author, 2003). He reveals that the outlets that are monitored twenty-four hours a day are: news programs of Israeli channels 1 and 2, Israeli army radio, the Israeli Arabic radio station, and the Russian Bet network (ibid).

In addition to monitoring what the Israeli press say or write on Lebanon, Hezbollah and the resistance, the Hebrew unit monitor political developments within the Israeli society. Some of Hezbollah’s communiqués, activities and statements are produced to address the weaknesses within the political institutions inside Israel, aiming at demonising its supposed moral superiority. Taithe (1999: 1) defines this as counter-
propaganda, where one party denounces the other’s lack of credibility and its dishonesty at all levels, including within their political and military institutions.

Throughout their work, aspects of Hezbollah’s media strategy devices can be identified as those listed by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis as propaganda techniques (Jackall 1995: 217). Among these are: name calling (giving pejorative names to the enemy); transference (having the religious leaders and government back their campaign); testimonials (making use of narratives, such as those given by people affected by the Israeli attacks); plain folks (we are all plain folk, identifying true-life stories from all sections of Lebanese society and their involvement in the struggle - which underlines that this does affect all parts of society); the band wagon (adjoining everyone to become involved - follow us, everybody is doing it); targeting the emotions of all parties (as mentioned above, this seeks to appeal to such people as the mothers of the Israeli soldiers). However, the main feature that characterised their media performance was the credibility of their messages, which was also identified as a main feature in the TL journalists’ performance presented in Chapter Six. Credibility was expressed mainly in what Hezbollah media people and Al Manar journalists identified later as ‘media traps’ which refer to footage of operations taken by resistance cameramen and only revealed to counter the Israeli army denial that such military operations had taken place. By revealing the real footage of certain losses denied by Israel. Al Manar and Hezbollah media people were undermining the credibility of the ‘enemy’ and keeping their credibility high. Being truthful and credible are two essential features of the liberation propaganda this thesis is exploring. Examples of how devices such as ‘media traps’ were implemented will follow as this chapter unfolds and will be illustrated in Al Manar’s coverage of certain incidents, mainly in South Lebanon between 1997 and 2000.

2- The coverage of Al Manar

Assayed Hassan Nasrallah said on the eve of the Liberation celebrations on the 25th of May 2000, “If it was not for Al Manar, the victory would have not been achieved”. Al Manar was the prime place where all the media strategy devices were put into practice. The coming section will look into the coverage of certain incidents in the three years
prior to the Liberation. These incidents are considered landmarks in the development of Hezbollah’s media strategy that worked alongside the military achievements in building up towards victory in the year 2000 (Al Husiency, interview with author, 2003). Thus, as suggested above, the incidents are presented chronologically to reflect how Hezbollah media strategy has developed.

These incidents are: Killing collaborator Salim Risha on 20/10/1997; the Beir Kalab operation on 27/2/1998; exchanging detainees and martyrs in June ’98; the killing of Erez Gerstein, head of the Israeli army in South Lebanon on 28/2/99; Israeli attacks on the Lebanese power stations in June 1999; capturing Sujud Position on 27/04/ 99; the Beit Yahoun Operation 15/05/99; killing Akel Hashem, the South Lebanon Army’s (SLA) second in command, commander of SLA Western Brigade, on 30/01/2000; reports on surrendering collaborators in January 2000; and, the Liberation days on 23 and 24th of May 2000.

In addition some of the Arabic and Hebrew clips broadcast will be presented in detail. What follows is a detailed account of this coverage.

**Killing collaborator Salim Risha on 20/10/1997**

On 20th of October 1997 the Islamic resistance conducted an operation targeting one of the main figures in the SLA, the Israel proxy militia in the occupied territories in South Lebanon. Salim Risha, who had direct relations with the Israeli army and was accused of running an intelligence network for the Israelis outside the occupied territories, was killed. It was a sophisticated operation and Al Manar devoted time and space to explain in detail what happened and what the resistance achieved by killing what was known as ‘collaborator Salim Risha’.

The Islamic resistance has achieved a new security breakthrough inside the enemy’s military and intelligence institutions. This is shown in the accurate and precise operation conducted today inside the occupied territories and targeted at Salim Risha, the head of Jezzine sector, and his bodyguard (Al Mousawi, Al Manar News. Introduction, 19.45. 20.10.97).

These words aimed to emphasise the achievement of the Islamic resistance fighters who were often referred to as *Mujahdeen*, which gives the battle against the Israelis a
divine connotation related to those who fight evil and the oppressors. The operation, which was filmed minute by minute from a distance, was also used to emphasise the weakness and problems the Israeli army (which was referred to as the Zionist forces or army) and its collaborators were facing in South Lebanon, which in this case related to their inability to stop the resistance from targeting and killing high-ranking SLA people. The resistance was clearly emphasising the failure of the Israeli intelligence in South Lebanon to protect their soldiers, officers and their collaborators from its operations.

... Zionist sources spoke of problems the Zionist forces are facing in South Lebanon. That is what the enemy's government is discussing today. Salim Risha, who is directly connected to the Mossad [Israeli intelligence] and runs an intelligence network outside the occupied areas [of South Lebanon, which were known as the liberated parts of Lebanon] ...( Al Mismar, ibid)

This editorial statement, which reflects Hezbollah’s political position, (according to Hussein Rahal, Al Manar’s former head of news 1997-1999) (interview with author, 2003) was followed by a detailed report showing minute-by-minute how the van that carried Risha exploded when targeted by a side-road bomb. The report covered in detail the resistance communiqué that explained how the ‘collaborator execution’ took place. It also revealed that the “enemy’s radio and the collaborators’ radio stations admitted the killing of Risha”. It included written information on the personal history of Risha, when he was born, his mother’s name, and that he was prosecuted and given a life sentence by a Lebanese court for collaborating with the occupation forces and being responsible for the deaths of many civilians and resistance fighters. This information was provided to make sure the point that the target had been thoroughly studied and that the killing was not random. The report goes on to count the number of Mossad operations he was involved in and the names of Mossad officers he used to meet (Amhaz, Al Manar News, 19:45, 20.10.97). The report was careful to point out that the road bomb was planted in the outskirts of Jezzine, and in a remote and unpopulated area.

This kind of coverage targeted the members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), the Israel proxy militia in the occupied zone, their families and also the Lebanese sectors outside the occupied territories. It is a message of capability, strength and justice to the Lebanese audiences, as Rahal pointed out (interview with author, 2003).
Beir Kalab operation 27/2/1998

This operation was labelled a ‘media trap’. The Islamic resistance fighters attacked the Israeli and SLA position of Beir Kalab in the occupied zone in South Lebanon. The resistance announced that they had been in control of the position for some time, killed and injured many of its soldiers and planted the flags of the resistance at the top of its barracks. Al Manar broadcast some general shots of the position, which did not show the fighters breaking into it. The Israeli army denied the killing of its soldiers and the planting of the resistance flags, and said that the army managed to kill two of the attackers and the other two ran away (*Al Liwaa*. 4.3.98, np). They claimed it was a fabricated operation and that the footage Al Manar broadcast had been used before and was of previous operations that took place a year earlier (ibid). At that point, Hezbollah’s Military Media Unit released the detailed footage of the operation and the surveillance that preceded the operation. Al Manar was the first to broadcast the images with a detailed explanation from the leader of the resistance group. Al Manar’s introduction to the breaking news emphasised the superiority of the resistance, its credibility and the weakness of the ‘enemy’:

> A new defeat hit the enemy today after the resistance dragged them to another media trap. This trap revealed the volatility of the Zionist Army, especially in relation to Israeli public opinion. They are faced day after day with one defeat after another. These live images and the explanation from the leader of the group that conducted the Beir Kalab operation indicate, without any doubt, that the Islamic resistance has taken the initiative in overcoming the dangers and surprise the occupation forces inside their positions through monitoring and surveillance, as is shown in the following tape (Reslan, Al Manar breaking news, 2.3.98).

At this point the audience saw the leader of the militant group that attacked Beir Kalab standing in front of a big screen in a dim room explaining to the reporters every image that ran on the screen. During this time we could only see his back and hear his voice.

> This is when I asked brother Hamza to go with the camera and explore the area around the position. [He is explaining minute-by-minute what they were doing. The attack was all recorded on tape]. The cameraman suffered a leg injury, but he continued filming. Now they are inside the position. [We can hear the sounds of battle] the cameraman is now crawling to get nearer to the resistance fighters to get better images. This is the Sujud Position, which contradicts the enemy’s lies that this was an illusive attack [real-time sound, the fighters crying *Allah Akbar*, God is Great]. Here we can see the *Mujahed* [fighter] planting the flag of Hezbollah inside the position and handing the other flag to his brother to
plant it on the other side. We destroyed the barracks and then we withdrew. While we were withdrawing the Israeli army started bombing the position heavily. Brother Murtada was martyred and the head of his team, brother Hamza, was injured (Abu Yasser, ibid).

Abu Yaser, as he was introduced, moved on to specify in detail what these barracks contained and the amount and kinds of weapons that they found there. He then explained the plan of attack on a map.

In an interview with Assafir newspaper, one of the cameramen involved in the Beir Kalab operation, revealed that three cameramen covered the operation, of whom two were responsible for filming outside the position and the third was responsible for filming inside the barracks. He explained that one of the cameramen was, during the surveillance operation, only 15 meters away from one of the soldiers, but the latter could not see him because he was camouflaged (Assafir, interview with Marmal, 10.3.98).

This was a show of ability and credibility. It was mainly aimed at demonstrating to the Lebanese public that the resistance was able to destroy the ‘enemy’s’ best defences and fortifications. It also aimed at demonising the ‘enemy’ by undermining its credibility and accusing it of deception. Because Hezbollah media people were aware that the Israeli TV would rebroadcast the tape of the operation or would talk about its existence, the disclosure of the tape aimed at undermining the Israeli army’s credibility in the eyes of the Israeli public.

Whaley (in Lasswell 1980: 341) spoke of how important and dominant the element of deception is in what he called propaganda efforts to control and influence public opinion. By showing the operation tape on Al Manar, the resistance had countered the ‘enemy’s’ propaganda and revealed the Israelis ‘deception’. This is what Hatem (1974) identifies as ‘psychological warfare’. He believes that in applying counter-propaganda during confrontations and conflicts to influence mass opinion, propagandists need to calculate and manage psychological effects (Hatem, 1974: 58).
Exchanging detainees and martyrs on 25/06/1998

On the evening of September the 5th 1997, 16 Israeli commando soldiers from the Special Forces fell into an Islamic resistance bomb trap near the village of Ansariyeh north of Tyre, 20 kilometres away from the occupied zone in south Lebanon. The unit had landed on the Adloun beaches after midnight in an attempt to reach the adjacent village of Ansariyeh and kidnap or kill, if necessary, one of the resistance leaders (Haaretz, 7.9.1997: np). Twelve Israeli soldiers of this unit were killed and the others injured. The Israeli rescue forces that flew to the scene were then subjected to heavy fire from resistance fighters and the Lebanese army. The Israeli helicopters had to leave without being able to collect all the remains of their dead soldiers. The resistance celebrated what it called the Israeli forces defeat and presented some of the Israeli soldiers’ remains and the weapons left behind to the public through Al Manar TV (Al Manar news, 5.6.97). Again, the aim behind broadcasting and distributing these images was to show strength and ability.

Eight days later Hadi Nasrallah, the son of Hezbollah secretary-general Assayed Hassan Nasrallah, was killed during a resistance operation in the occupied zone. Hadi’s body was taken hostage by the Israeli forces. The whole country showed sympathy and unity with Hezbollah and its leader (Shararah, 1998: 180). On that day, Nasrallah had to deliver a speech ‘in memory of the resistance martyrs’ at a festival in the southern suburbs. Nasrallah spoke for more than an hour, emphasising the fact that nothing would stop the resistance from continuing the fight to liberate the occupied lands in South Lebanon and free Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. The speech was broadcast live on Al Manar TV. Nasrallah told Talal Salman, publisher of the Lebanese daily Assafir, that while delivering his speech he was sweating because of the high numbers of TV crews spotlights. Despite this, he refused to wipe his sweat on TV so the Israelis wouldn’t think that he was weeping for his son. He told Salman that he wept in silence, as any father would do in such circumstances, but didn’t want the Israelis to use his tears in public as a sign of weakness or defeat (Salman in Mohsen, 2001: 38).

In the same month, negotiations to exchange the remains of the Israeli soldiers and Lebanese prisoners and bodies taken hostage by Israel were started through a third
party, the International Red Cross (Shararah, 1998: 216). To the Israelis surprise, Nasrallah did not put his son’s name ahead of other resistance fighters’ bodies.

... He [Nasrallah] has been transformed into a ‘national symbol’, says Avigdor Kahlan [former Israeli army general and Public Security Minister at the time]. He reveals: ‘We kept his son’s body, but nothing changed’. The Western correspondents see in Assayed [Nasrallah] more than a symbol; he is charismatic, articulate, straightforward and a mastermind in politics. With Hassan Nasrallah the political scenery seems to be different. He is ready to accept and answer any question, no matter how complicated or critical. He answers these with a calm smile. For him no question should be put aside (Al Bourji, Al Kefah Al Arabi, 18.3.98).

Nine months later the exchange took place. It was regarded as a ‘victory’, being achieved by the combined group efforts of the government, Lebanese army and the resistance, supported morally and financially by Lebanese people. Forty martyrs and sixty detainees were released. Some of them belonged to other Lebanese parties, such as the Communist Party and Amal movement. The relationship between the Ansariyeh operation and the exchange deal was made clear in Al Manar’s coverage of the event:

After 9 months the Islamic resistance Mughadeen followed their achievement in Ansariyeh with a new one. From the heroic operation of Ansariyeh crawled the beams of freedom for the detainees in the Israeli detention camps. Because of the fighters blessed heroism in Ansariyeh it was possible to bring back the martyrs to their motherland. From that southern spot, which witnessed the victorious confrontation between the Mughadeen and the Zionist army’s elite unit in September 1997 came God’s blessing. In that spot, the Zionist soldiers were obliged to flee and leave the bodies of their colleagues behind. From that moment began the first step towards the Lebanese feeling of joy and pride mixed with sadness. Because of the resistance fighters’ bullets, explosives and their open eyes in Ansariyeh, Lebanon was able to receive in Kfar Falous and Majdalyoun [two towns on the border of the occupied zone] today the group of Mughadeen freed from their detention. Before that they received their resistance martyrs at Beirut airport. This only shows that the enemy does not understand the language of peace and that the only language they understand is the language of resistance. Without the resistance we would not be able to free the other 125 detainees in Khiam detention centre and the other 42 detainees in Israeli prisons inside Occupied Palestine and to liberate our occupied land (Al Mousawi, Al Manar news introduction, 27.6.98).

The first report in the news program was a report on Hezbollah secretary general Assayed Hassan Nasrallah visiting the place where the fighters’ bodies, retrieved from Israel, were kept. Among them was the body of his son Hadi Nasrallah. The anchor
praised Nasrallah’s courage and the credibility that lies within his leadership (Dhiany, op cit).

For the master of resistance [Nasrallah] to be known as the ‘father of all resistance martyrs’, that is expected. But for him to receive the body of his own son [Hadi] today with the bodies of those martyrs brought back home, is an indication of truth and honesty in his leadership. For ten months the ‘father-leader’ had been waiting to be reunited with his son who was martyred in Jabal Al Rafee on the 13th of September 1997 (ibid).

The report took us to inside the Imam Al-Mehdi School in Ouzai on the outskirts of Beirut, where 28 coffins were laid out in a row. Outside the school we saw men preparing for the funeral. Then a small convoy of cars arrived carrying, among others, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Assayed Hassan Nasrallah. The coffins carried the Hezbollah fighters who had fallen in past battles with Israeli forces in South Lebanon. They were among the forty Lebanese fighters whose bodies were brought back to Lebanon on that day.

We saw Nasrallah entering the hall in ‘solemn dignity’, as expressed by Al Manar, accompanied by Jawad, his younger son. The report followed Nasrallah’s steps in full detail:

He stopped before each coffin and offered the Fatiha [the Muslim equivalent of the Lord’s Prayer] until he reached the one marked 13. He beckoned an aide and spoke to him in a whisper. The aide summoned two workers of the Islamic Health Association [Hezbollah’s health organisation]. They opened the coffin, exposing a body wrapped in a white shroud. Sheikh Nasrallah’s eyes closed, his lips trembled as he offered the Fatiha. Slowly, he bent over and tenderly stroked the head of Hadi Nasrallah, his eldest son, who was 18 years old when he died in battle. Jawad, the younger son stood still and pale next to his father. A deep silence fell on the room while his right hand rested on his son's chest. It was broken by the clicking of a reporter's camera but promptly returned when Sheikh Nasrallah looked up in cold surprise (Al Manar news, 27.6.98).

The report praised the secretary-general’s thoroughness and selflessness:

The secretary-general meant to read the Fatiha over every coffin before he went to see his martyr son Assayed Hadi. There he stood strong, whispering to his son and touching his virtuous body from above the shroud [Kafen] before he left him with a smile that carries all the determinations of a leader (ibid)....
Journalists like Iqbal Ahmed of *Al Ahram Weekly* described the event that she witnessed on TV as an ‘awesome scene’ (Ahmed, *Al Ahram weekly*, 30.7-5.8.1998: np).

To express the solidarity and support the resistance received from the Lebanese army and government, the *martyrs* were given an official military welcome at the airport and were saluted by an army brigade before moving their coffins into the ambulances. The President of the Republic, the House Speaker and the Prime Minister were all at the airport to receive the bodies of the resistance fighters. This honorary ceremony was broadcast live on Al Manar TV where emphasis was driven to the high position these fighters occupied in the hearts of the Lebanese and Arab peoples and ‘in God’s heaven’ (Al Mousawi, op.cit).

Ellul (1965/1973) speaks of symbols as one of the two most favourable elements of propaganda that emerge from mass society. Nasrallah plays the role of a national symbol. He is respected and trusted, and thus accepted and believed. By allowing his son to take part in fighting the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, he is seen as a credible leader who is treating himself and his family on equal grounds as those that follow and support his calls. He has identified himself as a leader with other resistance fighters’ families. Al Manar’s coverage aimed at highlighting this fact.

They were applying what Jackall (1995) identifies as ‘the plain-folks device’ in propaganda - a device aiming at allowing leaders to win confidence by appearing to be like them: ‘just plain folks among the neighbours’ (1995: 220). Al Manar did not have to fabricate this fact, it was there and they succeeded in giving it prominence. Pratkanis (1991) points out the importance of having an authoritative figure that people are willing to believe in order to let a message be accepted by them. Nasrallah as a symbol has been used to instil a massive wave of patriotism and heroism among a national audience in order to achieve a common objective. This is what Jowett (1999) asserts to be one purpose of propaganda. The objective here is to liberate the occupied land in South Lebanon from the Israeli occupation forces and its allies.

Additionally, by highlighting the role the government and the Lebanese army played in achieving the exchange deal, Al Manar was trying to emphasise that the resistance and
thus that Hezbollah is not alone in their struggle to liberate the land, thus calling upon all sectors of the Lebanese society to join and help the resistance in every possible form.

The killing of Brigadier General Eretz Gerstein 28/02/1999

On the 28th of February 1999 Israel lost its highest-ranking officer in Lebanon. The Islamic resistance killed Eretz Gerstein, the head of the occupation forces in the occupied zone in South Lebanon, with three other officers. They were killed by a roadside bomb as his car passed in a military convoy. The incident came hours after hundreds of Lebanese youth and university students removed a fence put in place by the Israeli army to separate Arnun village from the neighbouring liberated villages, and claim it as part of the occupied zone.

On that day, Arnun was witnessing a huge national celebration and most of the TV stations were covering these celebrations live. I was reporting live from Arnun when we heard the news from Al Manar journalists in the village that the resistance had succeeded in killing the highest ranking Israeli commander in South Lebanon. News of the operation resulted in more celebrations among thousands of Lebanese who marched to Arnun from all parts of the country to celebrate what was known then as the liberation of Arnun. However, we had to cut short the celebrations and remove all the live coverage equipment in response to a request put to us by Lebanese army officers. They feared that Israeli retaliation might target the huge civilian gathering in Arnun. While most of us at Arnun were still guessing who the targeted Israeli officer was Al Manar had the full story:

A new victory has been achieved for the resistance, a unique victory for Lebanon, and a setback, a defeat for the enemy. The head of the Israeli enemy in South Lebanon was crushed at the feet of the Mujahedeen and was burned in the fire of their explosives. The echo of this operation was huge. It went beyond Lebanon, around the Arab world and to the world in general. Eretz Gerstein, the head of the occupation forces in South Lebanon, was killed today with three of the collaborators’ high figures on the road between Hasbiah and Marj Ouyoun [in the heart of the occupied zone]. The Mujahedeen revenge in killing him for the children of Lebanon, the victims of the Zionist Massacres, to the martyrs of Kfour [where five of the resistance fighters were killed by roadside bombs planted by Israeli forces] and all the resistance Mujahedeen. With this
operation a promise has been made to keep going until the occupation is
defeated (Al Duhani, Al Manar news, 28.2.99).

Clearly, the rhetoric used in this introduction is one of ringing victory. No line was
drawn between the resistance and the TV station. They were part of ‘us’ against ‘them’
or the ‘other’M, which stands here for the occupation forces. In addition to the great
sense of victory, revenge, and power, the introduction held clear praise for the good
intelligence network the resistance had established in order to accomplish its mission.
The images played over the anchor’s voice marked Israeli losses during the operation:

The head of the Zionist occupation forces in south Lebanon, General Eretz
Gerstein, and three of his assistants were killed and three other soldiers were
injured during a … well-organised operation conducted by the Islamic
resistance this noon on the road between Marjayoun and Hasbyeh [pictures of
helicopters, then soldiers walking near an ambulance. Some people are standing
by an electricity pylon crying loudly, while a policeman is trying to calm them down] Reuters, AFP and Associated Press revealed the killing of Gerstein
according to well informed sources in the Lahed Militia. While security sources
from the occupied zone spoke of 5 enemy soldiers being killed, AFP has
mentioned in a telegram from Marjayoun the death of 4 Israeli officials in the
attack [footage of an Israeli soldier crying]. Associated Press pointed out the
fact that Gerstein is the highest ranking officer killed in Lebanon since the 1982
[Israeli] invasion, when the resistance killed General Yukteel Adam in Khaldeh
[south of Beirut] (Al Mousawi, ibid).

Anchor Hussein Al Duhaini read word-by-word the Islamic resistance’s communiqué
on the operation. File pictures of Gerstein were used with the voice-over of Duhaini.
Al Manar has identified itself as the ‘channel of the resistance’, thus communicating
the fact that resistance messages, ideas and ideologies was part of its responsibilities.
Again, the message here was that of strength, capability, power and supremacy.

The news program went on to present how and what the Israeli media had said about
Gerstein when he undertook his responsibilities as a leader of the occupation forces in
South Lebanon. By doing so, Al Manar was trying to emphasise, to the Lebanese
audiences, that Gerstein was not a low ranking officer and that he belonged to the
Israeli army elite, and which allowed the resistance to claim his killing as a military
achievement.

A file report presented by Hakam Amhaz referred to the fact that Gerstein was not the
only officer that the resistance had killed. He went on to list all Israeli officers killed or
subject to such attempts by the resistance. Among them was Gerstein’s predecessor, Eli Amitai. The archive footage used was taken from Israeli TV and Lahed militia’s TV station.

The Islamic resistance crowned its chasing of the occupation leaders by killing the leader of the occupation forces in South Lebanon, General Eretz Gerstein, with three other officers (Amhaz, Al Manar news, 28.2.1999).

Al Manar’s intensive coverage of Gerstein’s killing was picked up by Israeli Channel 2, which in return was monitored and re-broadcast by Al Manar TV.

The battle has moved to the media front. The enemy’s TV was monitoring Al Manar transmissions all day yesterday on the killing of the Zionist General Eretz Gerstein. More in this translated report … (Al Mousawi, Al Manar news, 29.2.1999).

Israel’s Channel 2 dedicated four minutes to analysing Al Manar’s coverage. The screen was divided into two windows, one with the anchor and the other with a military analyst:

**Anchor:** Hezbollah has expressed its exultation for what happened today.

**Analyst** [full screen]: Hezbollah television transmitted and repeated this news all afternoon yesterday, and because of this I have to say that there was clear pre-planning for the “assault” on General Eretz Gerstein in particular. What I mean is that what happened was not a coincidence and that they have been monitoring him and investigating his movements …

**Anchor** [interrupting him]: Is this because they were transmitting information on him and details of his biography?

**Analyst:** Yes, since Al Manar’s first breaking news in the early afternoon they spoke for 20 minutes on Eretz Gerstein’s life as part of the well-documented archival material, and this is not an easy process you can do in one day. What they have broadcast has to do with various occasions and various tours he used to conduct since he was appointed to this position a year ago, including recorded material from Israeli TV (Israeli Channel 2, on Al Manar news, 29.2.1999)

The Israeli anchor repeated Al Manar’s story on how and where the incident took place:

According to Hezbollah this was done with two explosive packages; the first exploded at 11.50 [ten minutes] before noon and killed the four and the second was at 12.15 exploded in one of the jeeps a kilometre away from the first explosion (ibid).

Then he asked the audience to listen to the anchor that broadcast this on Al Manar.
Kowthar Al Mousawi’s introduction, presented earlier, ran with Hebrew subtitles. The piece Al Manar re-ran from Israeli Channel 2 ended with the Israeli military analyst highlighting the effectiveness of the Hezbollah intelligence network inside the occupied zone.

What is important is that the operation was conducted inside the security zone that lies completely under Israeli control. We know two important points from the past: one is that Hezbollah has very effective intelligence and that they clearly have intelligence agents inside this area. These members gather intelligence information and take it to the leadership in south Lebanon and based upon that information Hezbollah plans its operations (ibid).

Through re-broadcasting the Israeli TV analysis, Al Manar wanted to emphasise the resistance’s superiority in ‘the words of its enemy’. Such words proclaiming their effectiveness were viewed as words of praise. And coming from ‘the enemy analyst’s mouth’ were believed to strengthen the credibility of the resistance in the eyes of Lebanese and Israeli audiences. This act is related to counter-propaganda techniques, when the propagandist Goebbels (Doob in Jackall, 1995: 204) suggested utilising the enemy’s propaganda to diminish the enemy’s prestige. However, what was happening here was not that the ‘enemy’s propaganda’ was used, but that the ‘enemy’s admission of failure’ was used and highlighted.

_**Ha’aretz**, the left-wing Israeli daily, wrote on 8.10.99, six months after the killing of Gerstein, that the incident was a defeat for Israel. Shohat Orit of _Ha’aretz_ expressed his belief that the Israeli involvement in Lebanon was not a ‘stunning military achievement, but rather a crushing moral defeat’ (Orit, _Ha’aretz_, 8.10.99). He explained that the ‘victories’ Israel claimed in Lebanon were ‘ephemeral and accidental’ and they would last only until the death of the next senior Israeli army officer or until the number of Israeli soldiers killed in Lebanon exceeds what he described as ‘the emotional capacity of Israeli society’ (ibid).

Five years later, Daniel Ben-Simon of _Ha’aretz_ described the death of Gerstein as a means for Barak to withdraw from Lebanon.

Gerstein is considered one of the unnecessary victims of an unnecessary war that exacted the deaths of more than 1,000 Israeli soldiers. The senior officer’s death shocked the country’s leadership and served as a catalyst for Prime
Minister Ehud Barak’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon (Ben-Simon. *Ha’aretz*, 22.11.2004, np).

*Ha’aretz* journalists’ comments illustrate the effect news of Israeli human losses in South Lebanon had on the Israeli political and civil society.

**Capturing the Sujud position on 27/04/99**

This was the third ‘media trap’ that Israel fell into after the Debshe and Beir Kalab operations mentioned earlier. The resistance attacked the Sujud position (a fortified strategically positioned military installation on a hilltop) in memory of the April 1996\textsuperscript{xi} martyrs. They marched into the position and planted the resistance flag on its tops. However, the Israeli army denied the operation had taken place and claimed that the resistance had fabricated the operation (Smaha, *Al Hayat*, 20.5.99). The head of the military media unit Haj Maitham\textsuperscript{iii} believed that the Israelis denied the operation when they saw the first images Al Manar broadcast on the operation. They were general shots of the position from a distance. ‘What they did not know is that we had detailed footage of the operation filmed by the military media unit cameramen’ (Maitham, interview with author, 2004). The ‘media trap’, as Maitham branded it, was staged by Al Manar TV in three stages. First Al Manar announced that the operation took place and declared that they would broadcast the footage as soon as they received it.

Again, the government is busy dealing with the budget and the trade union demands, the Islamic resistance implemented a new strike against the Israeli occupation enemy forces. This strike took place as the head of the Israeli military intelligence was still issuing his threats against Lebanon. The Zionist leader threatened to target positions deep in Lebanon if the moral and political support given by the Lebanese government to the resistance changes to a logistical support. In this context, the resistance Mujahedeen targeted one of the enemy’s positions in Sujud. They defeated it and planted the resistance flag on the top of it. We will be with you with live footage on the confrontation as soon as we receive them (Arslan, *Al Manar* news, 27.04.99)

This was presented without any footage. Then, in a later bulletin, Gada Assaf Nemer repeated the news of capturing Sujud, introducing a detailed report of the resistance communiqué on the operation.

It was a hot southern day. Air raids and random military aggression injured a mother and her son in Jarjouaa (a southern village in the liberated central sector of South Lebanon). The Islamic resistance raised its flag another time on the
top of the Sujud position. The enemy is trying to minimise its casualties, only admitting to six injuries among its soldiers and three [SLA] collaborators (Nemer, Al Manar news, 27.04.99).

Bahaa al Deen Al Nabulsi read the communiqué, accompanied by general shots of the Sujud position from a distance. The communiqué emphasised that the operation was set off in response to Assayed Hassan Nasrallah’s orders issued 24 hours earlier.

The third stage came on the second day of the operation. This news report had step-by-step footage of what they called a triumphant raid on the Sujud garrison. Arslan was guiding the audience step-by-step through the footage in live narration. His narration was intended to assure the viewer of the genuineness of the footage. The report intended to dismiss Israel denials that the operation took place and their claims that Al Manar’s images of the operation were fabricated.

Since the early hours of the morning, the Islamic resistance’s eyes have been wide open. The camera is monitoring the Israeli position minute-by-minute, observing the movements and preparations of the enemy. [10:11 camera time slot appears on the screen with complete silence]. In these scenes [12:30], you can notice the precise surveillance through the military media camera. Also you can notice the time difference between the scenes. The reinforcements are well focused and obvious in these images.

Spiral razor-wire fences, huge reinforced buildings and small hidden underground facilities; in addition you can see the monitoring positions and the land mines planted around the position. The Israeli war-planes are in the sky and so are the drones, but the Mujahideen [fighters] are disguised in colours that match the colours of the land where they are hiding. They can not be recognised from the sky … (Arslan, Al Manar news, 28.04.99)

Arslan continued his narration to indicate how close the fighters were to the position. He then mentioned that the orders to open fire came at 4 o’clock in the afternoon from the resistance leaders.

[Sounds and pictures of shooting and fighting] We notice here the accurate shooting of the fighters’ fire in hitting the barracks. And in a few moments they were able to silence all sources of fire from the enemy. [Clear sound of resistance fire] The orders are given to the combat groups to move forward into the position. Here we can see one of the fighters moving forwards towards the highest point in the garrison, overcoming the obstacles of the barbed wire and the land mines, opening the way for the other resistance teams to conquer the position where the enemy has always felt proud of its defences. [Images with sound are running … a group of fighters is moving forward … one of them is carrying a Hezbollah flag and waving it and we are still hearing gun shots] (ibid).
The camera and the narration followed the fighters till they planted the flags and withdrew ‘victoriously. The flags remained waving on the top of the hill till the late hours of yesterday’ (ibid).

While conducting the operation, the fighters were calling the name of the Shiite religious and historic Imam, Imam Hussein (grandson of the Prophet Muhammad), whom they believe had fought and died for justice and against oppressioniv. Additionally, calls of Allah Akbar (God is Great) were accompanying all their steps and movements while destroying the entrenchments. The fighters were saluting the Hezbollah banners as they were planted. According to Naser, one of the cameramen involved in filming resistance operations, the filming aimed to reflect confidence, heroism and power in the face of the Israelis to destroy their morale. On the other hand, filming and broadcasting of certain operations tended to emphasise the ability of resistance fighters to defeat the Israeli army, which helped in raising the morale of the Lebanese people (interview with author, 2003).

Naser added that ‘these pictures show that we are the land owners who carried their guns to reclaim the land from its aggressor’ (ibid). He feels he is a fighter and a cameraman at the same time. However, his priority during operations was to film and not to fire. The gun that he carried was for defence if subjected to life-threatening actions by the ‘enemy’s soldiers’. He called himself a ‘resistance cameraman’. The cameraman’s role within the resistance group was seen as highly important, and the fighters would try to protect the cameraman (ibid).

The camera proved to be a primary weapon which the resistance used cleverly to demonise the ‘enemy’s credibility’, and was the main tool used to achieve credibility for the resistance. It was the tool to propagate the idea of the capability of the resistance to the home front and also to demonise the ‘enemy’s’ credibility and superiority in the eyes of its own people.

Nayef Krayem, former head of Al Manar, explains that they had monitored the Israeli army’s behaviour for a long time and they were aware of their usual responses to any military losses. He adds that the resistance knew they would deny true army losses.
The only way to counter Israeli army denials was to have proof of them, and the operations’ footage was that proof (interview with author 2000).

Sujud was liberated ten months later, on 4.2.2000, after the resistance claimed the position 6 times and conducted 33 traps, 33 explosions, 9 sniper operations, 475 attacks, 2 Katyusha shelling, and 241 mortar shelling - a total of 799 operations. These numbers were repeated several times a day in a clip prepared by Al Manar following the Israeli army withdrawal from the position (Al Manar, clip, February, 2000). The images of fighters waving and planting flags inside or on the top of this position marked the role the camera played in achieving this ‘victory’. The resistance camera was a major player in the resistance’s media war against Israel. One objective of this war was to undermine Israel’s army motto: ‘The army that could not be defeated’ (Krayem, interview with author, 2000).

**The Beit Yahoun Operation 15/05/99**

On the 15th of May 1999, the resistance fighters attacked the occupation forces’ position at Beit Yahoun in the occupied zone in South Lebanon. The position was heavily reinforced. It served as a protection point and controller to the main Israeli military crossing point between the occupied zone and the liberated areas in South Lebanon. It controlled the movement of the residents of the occupied towns and villages in their visits into and outside the occupied territories.

The fighters re-gained the position from the Israeli soldiers and their collaborators (S.L.A.), captured two of them and a troop carrier and drove it to the liberated areas after attacking the crossing point and clearing the way for a troop ship to cross. The event was filmed by the military media cameramen and the communiqué of the resistance on the operation came to match the pictures frame-by-frame. This operation generated a ‘media event’ on Al Manar.

This took place two days after the operation. A parade was organised in the Southern Suburb of Beirut to celebrate what became known as the ‘the conquest’. Thousands of resistance supporters gathered in the town of Haret Hriek in the southern suburbs, celebrating the Mujahedeens’ ability to capture the troop carrier and drive it safely to
where they were gathering. Al Manar cut all its regular programming to transmit live, from an early hour, footage of the supporters marching towards the gathering point, with live commentary from a spot overlooking the square where the gathering was taking place.

As mentioned earlier, the operation itself was covered extensively on Al Manar, the day before. The prime time news on the night of the operation started with the story of the operation. The first two lines of the introduction made clear reference to historic events in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They referred to the matching date between the Beit Yahoun operation and the day when Palestinian Arabs were deprived of their homeland (see Chapter Four). The introduction read as follows:

First Anchor: Kouthar Al Mousawi
The 15th of May - the day of Al Nakba (day of catastrophe) for the Arabs in occupied Palestine has been transferred by the Islamic resistance Mujahedeen to a date of Nakba (catastrophe) for the occupation forces in South Lebanon. The Mujahedeen scored a triple strike today. The resistance heroes attacked and broke into Beit Yahoun position. They took over a [Israeli] troop carrier and detained two collaborators from the Lahed militia. They drew the first out from inside the position and hunted the second on their way out from the occupied zone into the liberated areas. The Syrian and Iranian Presidents emphasised from Damascus their continued support for the Lebanese resistance until it liberates its occupied territories [a summit between the two presidents was taking place in Damascus on the day].

Second Anchor: Hussein Al Dhiany
The collaborators had yet not woken up from the preliminary attack on their position in Beit Yahoun, when the Islamic resistance Mujahedeen broke into their position and planted the Hezbollah flag. Factual details and footage of breaking into Beit Yahoun position will be given in the following report (Mousawi and Dhiany, Al Manar news, 15.05.99).

The report that followed gave a full presentation of the resistance’s communiqué. It was accompanied by pictures taken by the Military Media cameramen. It sounded as if the words were written for the pictures, as every word read matched with the pictures shown. The first images of the fighters storming into the position matched with a Koran verse that promises sinners and oppressors God’s punishment, even if they were hiding ‘behind reinforced castles’, which was used in the opening sentence of the communiqué. So the written communiqué or statement gained visual authority.
The Khiam detainees group, the Islamic resistance special force, at 5 o’clock this morning launched a remarkable attack against the Beit Yahoun position using different kinds of weapons. They succeeded in establishing a gap within the enemy’s defences, overcoming the barbwire and land mines. The fighters entered the barracks and warned its escort of the collaborators’ militia. They gave them time to surrender. When they refused to consent and opened fire on the resistance, the fighters had to fire back and kill them all, except for one guard who was captured alive [pictures of the prisoner being taken out of the barracks]. The Mujahedeen have controlled the situation in the position completely and raised the flag of Hezbollah and gained a troop carrier (Al Haji Hassan, Al Manar news, 15.05.99).

This was one of the few operations when the footage was released on the same day as the shooting. Haj Maitham, head of Hezbollah Military media unit, explained that the resistance leaders usually need time to edit the pictures and remove whatever might jeopardise the security of their work, thus they tend not to release the footage immediately. However, the timing of the operation of Beit Yahoun was important because of its historical connotations. That was why they had to release it on the same day (Maitham, interview with author, 2004). It was important to show the troop carrier captured and that it left the occupied territories. The resistance communiqué broadcast on Al Manar gave evidence of the ability of the resistance to drive the troop carrier safely outside the occupied zone:

Meanwhile, another group from the resistance was attacking the Beit Yahoun check point and destroying it over the heads of its members, opening the way for the fighters to drive the troop carrier towards the liberated areas. [Ambience, images of the carrier driving fast on the road towards the liberated areas. The resistance fighters are taking the captured SLA soldier away from the position] The Islamic resistance said that alongside this, the Islamic resistance groups attacked the enemy’s positions at Hadatha, Barasheet, the Fawj Al Ishreen headquarters, Al radar, Tair Harfa, Rshaf, Al Jamousa, Mouhiadeeb, Dahr Al Assi, Masharoon, Sujud and Beir Kalab. The Mujahedeen used automatic weapons and small range rockets and caused clear damage and destroyed the targeted positions (ibid).

The Islamic resistance’s communiqué ended by promising all Lebanese detainees in the Israeli prisons that the resistance fighters would not sleep until they had freed them and brought them back to their families. The same communiqué referred to the fact that Israel had admitted the attack and acknowledged the injury of one soldier while the collaborators admitted the capture of one militia member and the injury of seven others in the series of attacks that targeted their positions in the central sector of South Lebanon.
It should be mentioned that most of the resistance’s communiqués tend to state the number of casualties the ‘enemy’ would claim - to emphasise the deception in the ‘enemy’s’ story. They were aiming at destroying the ‘enemy’s’ credibility.

Doob (in Jackall, 1995) revealed that Goebbels, in his principles of propaganda campaigns, stated that ‘credibility and intelligence, determine whether [an enemy’s] propaganda materials should be censored’ (Doob in Jackall, 1995: 203). The ‘enemy’s’ communiqué was recalled here and used to harm its credibility.

The story did not end here. Two days later, Al Manar went live to cover the mass ceremony outside Hezbollah headquarters in Haret Hriek (Southern Suburb of Beirut) celebrating the capture of the M113 troop carrier. Again, Al Manar’s reporter at the time Abass Naser,\textsuperscript{xvi}, who was doing the live commentary from a spot overlooking Hezbollah’s headquarters, made links between this event and others that marked the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Naser’s tone and words were sharp and full of excitement, praise and pride. He sounded as if he was talking to himself first, then addressing the audiences of Al Manar.

... The day of shame and dishonour, the day when the enemy tried to drag Lebanon into signing an insulting and offensive treaty with them.\textsuperscript{xviii} God’s glorification, the phrase \textit{Allah Akbar} [God is Great] is on everybody’s lips. [Crowds of thousands of people surrounded the carrier. On it were fighters wearing their military fatigues, black berets and black sunglasses. People were throwing rice on the carrier, and a clergyman climbed to the top of it and stood there with the fighters. People were carrying the flags of both Hezbollah and Lebanon]. \textit{Allah Akbar} is uttered by thousands of people who have been waiting here for hours to receive the captured Zionist carrier. [General wide shot of the place of gathering, showing the huge number of people assembled there. Patriotic hymns are played in the background]. The M113 Zionist military carrier is still struggling to move forward towards the Hezbollah headquarters yard. It is trying to penetrate the lines of thousands of citizens, old and young. [Sound of people chanting slogans against Israel] (Nasser, Al Manar, 17.05.99).

Later in his commentary, Naser informs his audience that the fighter who was driving the carrier is the same person who had driven it from the Beit Yahoun position to the liberated areas. He also informed his viewers that the fighters standing on the top of the carrier were those who conducted the operation. The whole coverage was implying that the act of resistance is an act that everyone could do.
Thus, the coverage relates to ‘The Band Wagon’ Propaganda device that Jackall (1995) discussed. It is a device that ‘makes us follow the crowd, to accept the propagandist’s program en masse. Here his theme is: “Everybody’s doing it”’ (Jackall, 1995: 222).

Nasser’s commentary also drew references to other ‘heroic’ operations that would make ‘the defeat of the Israeli Army in south Lebanon close at hand’.

What shame the enemy and his collaborators are living this year, from the defeat of Burkat al Jabeur to the failure of the enemy’s air force in chasing one Mujahed [singular of Mujahedeen in Arabic] in Markaya, to the killing of their leader Gerstein and his escorts, to the targeting of the collaborator Joseph Karam Aloush, and then the killing of his successor Muneh Tuma, to the capturing of four collaborators in different positions and, last but not least, the defeat of the military machinery and its falling into the hands of the resistance fighters and to … and to … and the list will not end. The fighting (al Jihad) has not ended. What an honour and ultimate superiority the resistance and its people are living with today. The people have gathered here today to express their pride and to call upon the resistance to continue the fight till the land is liberated. The leaders of the resistance ride victoriously on the troop carrier. What a day of honour, here are the flags of resistance flying over the heads of thousands and over the captured Zionist vehicle [Sounds of the crowd] (ibid)

The coverage of the ceremony continued, the disguised fighter driving the carrier stepped down, carrying a machine gun. He was marching, his head up, towards the secretary general of Hezbollah to present the vehicle and the machine gun captured from the Israeli army in Beit Yahoun. The crowd was hailing and saluting him till he stood in front of Assayed Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah.

At that moment, the crowd went silent. The fighter presented the machine gun to Nasrallah and addressed him, saying: ‘To the master of resistance, their weapons are under your feet’. Nasrallah hugged him and decorated him with a resistance medal.

All was prepared and set to show the respect and pride the resistance fighters were surrounded by. According to Eizddine, former head of the Hezbollah media relations centre, the resistance managed to portray its superiority over the Israeli soldiers in films shot during operations or during resistance festivals (Interview with author, 2004) and this was one of them.
Targeting the power stations 24 June 1999

On 24th of June 1999, Israel launched a nine-hour attack on Lebanese civil constructions, from bridges to power stations. The most affected were the two main power stations that supply Beirut with electricity. Those two stations were still recovering from the 1996 April attacks, which had left them severely damaged. According to Bechara Merhej, a Member of the Prime Minister’s parliamentary group at the time, Israel aimed, through this attack, to send a message to both the Lebanese government and people, which says: ‘If you want to keep supporting the resistance you have to pay the price’ (Merhej, Al Manar news, 25.6.1999). He added, ‘Israel wanted to create a dispute between the resistance and the people’ (ibid).

The 9-hour long night time aerial blitz killed eight people, wounded 62 and left much of the country’s electricity, telecommunications and road networks in a mire. The attack on Al Jamhour power station, some 10 kilometres east of Beirut, killed five fire-fighters who were trying to put out the blaze when the warplanes bombed the plant for the third time. Hours later they bombed Bsleem on the outskirts of Beirut. The attacks injured 18 of the fire-fighters and civilians living near the stations. Al Manar’s coverage reflected the collective damage these attacks were causing for all Lebanese, and arguing that the only response would be in more resistance operations against the occupation until they leave south Lebanon.

The nine-hour siege that the Zionist enemy orchestrated against the civil infrastructure in Lebanon caused many wounds on the Lebanese side, but at the same time lifted up the people’s resolve in the face of the challenge the occupation is imposing by terrorism and fire. The air raids, which every member in the Zionist government refused to acknowledge full responsibility for because of its implications on the international level, revealed deep contentions within the Israeli government regarding the way to deal with the situation in South Lebanon (Al Dhiany, Al Manar news introduction, 25.6.1999).

Israel ‘unleashed’ its fighter jets hours after Hezbollah resistance fighters fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, ‘in retaliation against the Zionist state’s week-long raids on southern villages which wounded six people’ (Al Ahram weekly, 1-7.7.1999). Al Manar’s introduction to its prime time news of 25.6.99 asked the question of whether the attacks on Bsleem and Al Jamhour were ‘a message or
revenge of some helpless, vindictive nature?’ (Irslan, ibid). The report on the
destruction of the power stations featured the blood of the fire-fighters mixed with the
water they were using to put the flames out. The language used was full of anger and
condemnation:

More than 15 hours have passed since the Zionist aggression that targeted
Bsalem and Al Jamhour power stations and the smoke of fire was still coming
out of the generators and the blood of the five fire department martyrs is mixed
with water on the country’s soil, witnessing the enemy’s vindictive hostility
and crimes. This aggressive crime is not an Israeli political message to
Lebanon, but a desperately vengeful act (Amhaz, Al Manar news, 25.6.1999).

Hakam Amhaz, who reported the raids, paid tribute to the five martyrs by name and
revealed that the fire-fighters took six hours to put the fire out. He then specified the
amount of damage caused to the generators and asked how long it would take to fix
them - and at what cost? Amhaz revealed the role the Lebanese army had played in
clearing the destruction from the power stations, emphasising the argument made
earlier that the army and the resistance are united in fighting the Israeli aggression (Al

The report was followed by details of an alternative plan to enable Beirut and its
neighbouring districts to have electricity and phone lines, as if to say, ‘we will not be
defeated’. A statement from Naser Al Saidi, Finance Minister at the time, came after.
He called upon people to take part in civil and economic resistance and to stand side-
by-side with the military resistance (Al Saidi, ibid).

According to Amhaz, one of the main aspects that Al Manar’s reporters have to
consider in their reporting is national unity. This is revealed through the emphasis on
the aggressive nature of the Israeli attacks, which do not differentiate between sectors
of Lebanese society, and the focus on the fact that destroying the prosperity of
Lebanon was their main aim. Amhaz points out that the resistance has always been
portrayed as the defenders who fight back against the Israeli aggression (interview with
author, 2003).

This relates to Goebbels’ propaganda principle 18, which states that ‘propaganda must
facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets of the Hatred’ (Doob
in Jackall, 1995: 214). The hatred here is directed at the Israeli army for its aggression against the Lebanese civilian infrastructure. The emphasis is on national unity against one aggressor, thus giving legitimacy and support for the resistance actions. The resistance’s actions should not come under negative scrutiny from its own people.

That was how the Islamic resistance response to the bombings was portrayed: ‘The Islamic resistance retaliated by firing rockets at settlements in northern Israel and killing two people’ (Al Manar news, 25.6.99). Hezbollah gave its own warning: the only way Israel can protect its northern settlement from attack is by renouncing the attacks on civilians and civilian installations in accordance with the April 1996 Understanding. Hezbollah’s Secretary General Assayed Hassan Nasrallah was quoted on Al Manar saying: ‘The cease-fire bans attacks on or from civilian targets on both sides of the border but permits the resistance to launch operations against Israeli troops in south Lebanon’ (Nasrallah, Al Manar, 26.6.99). Emphasis was also put on reporting the reaction of the Lebanese Prime Minister at the time, Salim Al Hoss, who said that the government would continue to resist attempts to change the Accord and back resistance groups as long as Israel is occupying Lebanese territories (Hoss, ibid).

Propaganda’s ‘transfer device’ that Jackall (1995) identified, can be seen here. It is a device by which ‘the propaganda carries over the authority, sanction, and prestige of something we respect and revere to something he would have us accept’ (ibid: 219). Thus, figures of authority were quoted defending the right of the resistance to fight the occupation and to liberate the land. In a multi-sectarian country it is important to have all religious groups supporting such military acts of resistance conducted by one sect and not the others. Al Manar was giving prominence to the support the resistance was getting from other groups and was emphasising the importance of national unity and solidarity with the resistance.
Killing Akel Hashem, the South Lebanon Army’s (SLA) second-in-command, Commander of SLA Western Brigade: 30/01/2000

On 30th January 2000 the resistance killed Akel Hashem, who was known to be the most prominent candidate to replace Antoine Lahed, commander of Israel’s proxy army in the Lebanese occupied territories SLA. Hashem was killed in a well concealed bomb set off by a remote control device inside his ranch in the occupied zone.

According to Naomi Segal, of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency <4.2.2000>, Ehud Barak, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, called the killing of Hashem a "difficult and sad" loss for Israel. He said he had known Hashem for more than 20 years and that his killing would be avenged (ibid).

Hezbollah hailed the killing of Hashem as a breakthrough <BBC News, 30.01.2000>. It was a breakthrough on two levels: the intelligence and the media. Hashem had been tried and sentenced to death in absentia by a military tribunal in Lebanon for his role in the Israel proxy militia SLA. The resistance was not just able to track him down and kill him, but also filmed the operation as it took place step-by-step for more than six hours. This was then edited and broadcast on Al Manar as a three minute story on the ‘execution of collaborator Akel Hashem’. The narration came to match the pictures the resistance cameramen filmed on the spot:

The resistance has followed him for a long time through a precise and close surveillance of his movements at his private ranch in Debil, away from people’s eyes. Collaborator Akel Hashem appears in the middle of the circle. Beside him stands one of his assistants; also you can see a watchdog moving away from them [silence, then background sound]. So collaborator Akel Hashem is walking in his country house, in the midst of very tight security measures. As we mentioned earlier, a trained watchdog that can detect explosives accompanies him. As you can also see, his assistant and bodyguards are surrounding him. Now you can see beside Hashem an armoured Hammer Jeep that Israel gave him for more security protection. [Silence] the resistance camera is following Akel Hashem closely. This is a clearer picture to the farm that Akel Hashem takes as a refuge away from people, for his own pleasure and rest. [Silence. background sound] He is talking now to his assistants near the Hammer Jeep. He is preparing to leave the place. [Silence, background sound] The Hammer Jeep is moving as cover to mislead any surveillance that might be tracking him (Al Mismar, Al Manar news, 30.1.2000).

There was emphasis on the watchdog that can sniff out explosives, as if saying that even this trained dog could not detect the resistance’s explosives. The report
highlighted the tight security measures, which provided evidence that the resistance fighters were able to outwit the collaborator’s security personnel. The story continues to underline the fact that Hashem’s ranch stood remote from any residential areas. Referring to this fact implied that the resistance considered the safety of the civilian inhabitants in the area.

A few moments from now, we will see the explosion that took the life of Hashem to what is his dreadful fate, going to hell. The place at which the explosion happened is certainly away from civilian residential areas. It is on the outskirts of Debl village. Moments later, the explosion takes place. Here it is. We will repeat the images in slow motion. He is headed towards one of the cars where the explosives await him. This is a moment that will never be forgotten (ibid).

Two days later, Al Manar aired a five-minute report on the 1st of February of an interview with both the guerrilla commanders who masterminded the attack that killed Akel Hashem. The fighters, who were only identified as Jawad, 25, and Hadi, 28, wore military uniforms and black berets and both kept their backs to the screen as they spoke. Jawad said:

I led my squad through Israeli defences and reached the vicinity of Akel’s ranch-house in Debl before dawn. We laid the explosive charges in a semicircle in the garden and withdrew to a hideout about a hundred feet away … Shortly after, Akel came out of the house and paced back and forth in the garden as two body-guards with police dogs watched at a ten meter distance … Family members quickly came to keep him company and we had to wait until they returned to the house to detonate the charges by remote control (interview with Al Manar, 01.02.200).

Both Jawad and Hadi said that they retreated from Debl half an hour after the explosion took place, implying that there was no immediate danger to their safety. While narrating their story the two fighters were talking with confidence and certainty. There was no hesitation in their voices, an image most resistance fighters tend to have when seen on screen.

Killing Akel Hashem and presenting the details of his ‘execution’ on TV aimed to send a message to the collaborators that they would not escape the resistance punishment (Rahal, interview with author, 2003). The film of Akel Hashem’s assassination was used later in a clip produced on Al Manar and was repeated over and over. The clip
had Akel Hashem telling his fellow collaborators in the SLA (also known as the Lahed Militia) TV:

We believe in the Israeli government and in the Israeli Defence Force. Hezbollah hides many of its casualties and its victories are illusive. In contrast to what they say the south Lebanon army is falling apart. The South Lebanon army is not a mat they step on. The South Lebanon Army will cut any hand that comes near it.

At this point the picture of Hashem faded into images of the resistance’s explosion that killed him at his ranch. The image faded again into a fighter rising up from the bushes, holding his gun and aiming it. This image of the fighter is sound bridged with Nasrallah saying: ‘The resistance should sentence those collaborators with the toughest verdicts for being traitors to the Lebanese people, their country and their nation’. The clip ended with a slogan ‘to hell, their worst fate’ (Al Manar clip, February, 2000). However, the collaborators were later given the chance to surrender to the resistance and to the Lebanese army prior to the liberation day, a call initiated by Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah.

The killing of Akel Hashem, having the process filmed and broadcast, emphasised that he was a traitor and could not escape the death sentence, and was intended to undermine the authority and morale of the SLA. The name-calling device presented by Jackall (1995) was implemented here. It is ‘giving “bad names” to those individuals, groups, nations, races, policies, practices, beliefs, and ideals that he [propagandist] would have us condemn and reject’ (ibid: 218). The coverage thus also aimed at undermining the ability and credibility of SLA leaders and their masters, the Israelis, to protect their proxy militia in south Lebanon.

Liberation coverage 24.05.2000 and 25.05.2000

By February 2000, Israeli soldiers serving in South Lebanon were calling for an immediate withdrawal from South Lebanon (Al Anbaa, 10.2.2000). Israeli radio quoted one soldier as saying: ‘I don’t want to be the last soldier to be killed in South Lebanon’ (ibid), while another said: ‘We cannot win this war. We are many, they are few and we cannot control them … there is nothing for us to win if we stay in South Lebanon’ (ibid).
The Lebanese daily *Addiyar* gave prominent space on 27.2.2000 to discuss an Israeli documentary, made by one of the soldiers who served in Lebanon and broadcast on Israeli TV. The documentary reveals that the Israeli newspaper *Shaair* published lately in its obituary announcements news of the death of some of the Israeli soldiers who had died in south Lebanon. They posted the pictures of the dead soldiers and left an empty frame at the end of the sequence with a question mark, as if asking who would be next. The newspaper revealed that they had received permission from the dead soldiers’ families to put this question mark.

Hezbollah’s media personnel believed that, in addition to their military achievements, part of the fears expressed by Israeli soldiers and their families was caused by, or came as an answer to, the media campaign launched by Al Manar TV. The core aspect of this was the number of clips produced by Al Manar in Hebrew - addressed to the Israeli soldiers in south Lebanon (Al Manar, February 2000). One of these clips repeats in Hebrew the slogan "Why do you have to wait till June to leave Lebanon? Why be the last soldier to be killed on our land?" while another shows the bodies of Israeli soldiers and the moaning of the wounded after the bombing of their positions in the occupied villages. The clip ends with the slogan "Lebanon is a cemetery for the Israeli soldiers" (in Arabic and Hebrew). About this, the Head of Al Manar at that time, Naif Krayem, said:

> The audiences targeted by these clips are the locals and the Israeli soldiers, their mothers and leaders. Locally we wanted to say "This is an enemy that can be defeated - after decades of Israeli propaganda asserting that their army could not be beaten". Concerning the Israelis, we wanted to make the soldiers feel insecure and losing their faith in their leaders, and for their mothers to put more pressure on the Israeli government to withdraw from south Lebanon. We wanted to make both audiences aware that liberating our occupied land was indisputable (interview with author 2000).

The words of the Israeli soldiers, quoted above, meant that Al Manar achieved one of its objectives: to bring insecurity and fear to the Israeli soldiers serving in South Lebanon. The soldiers were clearly affected by the content of Al Manar’s clips.

Goebbels 4th principal of propaganda was met here. He stated that ‘propaganda must affect the enemy’s policy and action’ (Doob in Jackall, 1995: 197).
Meanwhile, the Four Mothers movement in Israel was growing. This had been started on February 4 1997\textsuperscript{xviii} by four mothers of Israeli soldiers serving in South Lebanon, and grew to become, as the Jerusalem post put it, ‘one of the most successful grass-roots movements in Israeli history’.

Extensive media coverage, mounting casualties in Lebanon and, ultimately, Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s election promise to withdraw the army from the security zone all helped galvanize more support for the movement and its goals. It soon counted among its members not only mothers, but fathers, sons and citizens from all over Israel, and at one point it collected 25,000 signatures for a petition to withdraw from Lebanon (Frucht, Jerusalem Post, 08.06.2000).

According to Frucht of the Jerusalem Post, the movement gained respect and support for being mothers in the first place and for being connected to highly-placed individuals:

They were mothers of soldiers serving in Lebanon and among their ranks were bereaved mothers who had lost their sons in Lebanon. That touched a deep chord in Israeli society ... A more prosaic explanation is that these women ultimately won respect and attention because they were well connected. Many not only had sons serving in elite units in Lebanon, but had husbands in the military as well. At one point, for instance, the Four Mothers movement included the wife of OC Northern Command Maj-Gen. Amiram Levine (ibid).

Lemish and Barzel, in their article ‘Four Mothers, the Womb in the Public Sphere’ (2000), quote a letter sent by one of the mothers called Zabarie to an Israeli weekly, Ha’ir. The letter reads:

Woman, mother! Why do you give them your son, so they would sacrifice him? Your flower is 18, and he is the most important thing for you in the world – more than yourself. You won’t eat because of him. You won’t sleep because of him. And now, you let him go straight to hell, instead of telling him: ‘My child, they die there! Don’t go there!’... Lebanon is a monstrous altar. Tell him the truth, don’t let him go so easily. Don’t give them your child. He wants to live (Zabarie in Ha’ir, 07.02.97 in Lemish and Barzel, 2000. Vol 15(2): 148).

According to Krayem, Al Manar were aware of the mothers’ movement, who had contacted him personally via e-mail and tried to open a bridge of dialogue between them and the resistance leaders through Al Manar. Because of this, some of the Hebrew clips were addressed to the soldiers’ mothers: ‘Why let your son die in south Lebanon? Stop him from joining the troops in the Lebanese occupied territories!!’ Krayem said these were obviously meant to work on their emotions, addressing the
core feature that they should appeal to in order to influence one of their targets (interview with author, 2000). As mentioned before, the clips were seen in Israel through both Al Manar and the Israeli TV that used to copy the clips and re-broadcast them as news stories.

Meanwhile, the Israeli army proxy militia (SLA) was collapsing; many of its members were escaping from their military positions towards the liberated areas (Al Diyar, 27.2.2000). All of this led to the sudden decision by the Israeli government to complete its withdrawal from South Lebanon, but without any negotiations that might lead to pre-conditions, on the 25th of May 2000.

The withdrawal started on the 21st of May. Positions and villages were emptied one after another, leaving the collaborators’ militia behind unable to keep its positions in the face of local inhabitants and those who marched from the liberated areas towards the occupied villages, towns and cities that some had not even had the chance to see before because the occupation had lasted for 22 years.

For Lebanon in general and Hezbollah in particular this was victory. The time for celebration had arrived. Al Manar spread its reporters in several positions at the checkpoints to the occupied zone and dedicated its air time to the ‘first returnees’ trip’ as it was known. There was one news item on their news programmes’ running order: the Liberation.

Welcome to this detailed bulletin that is dedicated to the day of Liberation. The returnees to their liberated villages spent a busy day celebrating the Liberation (wedding) ceremony, while the collaborators spent a bitter day on the edge of the abyss. Most of the central sector areas were reunified with the other parts of the country in less than 24 hours - after 22 years of defiance and resistance (Areslan, Al Manar news, 24.05.2000)

Images of people singing, hanging on cars and vans with flags of the resistance and Lebanon, expressing their joy and happiness with words, flowers and symbolic rice filled the TV screen.

Hours were enough after yesterday’s vehement scenes to break the chain of the Zionists and their collaborators, the Lahed Militia. Village after village fell into the hands of the massive flow of our citizens who announced, through ululating and shrill calls to God the Great, the end of an occupation and the beginning of
a new era. By liberating their land, the Lebanese today have brought victory and pride and added to the history of Arab defeats of Israel (Nasser, Al Manar news, 24.05.2000).

Scenes of massed crowds marching towards their villages were all over the screen. Some people were crying others were throwing rice over the returnees’ heads, xix hugging and kissing them and waving the flags of Lebanon and Hezbollah. People were jubilantly uttering welcoming and victorious phrases to the camera: ‘Thank god for your safety and return’, ‘God is Great’, ‘The village is full of light with your presence and we missed you’. In another scene three old women came towards an Al Manar reporter and sang him songs of joy, asking him to give their greetings to Assayed Hassan Nasrallah.

The start was from Houla, where thousands of citizens gathered on the outskirts of Shaqra village and waited for the signal. It was given to them at 9.30 in the morning and stirred a flood of people towards the village. In front of them drove a caterpillar to remove any obstacle left by the Israelis and their collaborators in the face of the people’s movement towards their villages. After that, what happened could be watched, but it would be impossible to adequately describe (ibid).

The coverage was full of compassionate scenes; people distributing tissues and water, songs of resistance, glory and victory were coming out of amplifiers hanging on cars.

A quarter of an hour and the news arrived: what happened in Houla had also happened in Taloussa. The masses entered from Majdel Silm. They arrived in a land they loved without even having been able to visit it before. From these two villages, the beads of liberation started rolling. The Lebanese continued their march and reached village after village - Mias al Jabal, Aitaroun, Markaba, Roubb Talateen, Bent Jbeil and others which, if we had wanted to talk about them in detail, we wouldn’t have finished our report on the day (ibid).

The people were conveying the euphoria and jubilation all the way through to the resistance and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, which again was the centre of focus for Al Manar’s coverage to express the support the resistance were getting from the Lebanese people. Shouts of ‘may God protect you and may God prolong your life’ were addressed to Al Manar reporters and the resistance leaders. Through this coverage, Al Manar was also trying to ensure the unity of the people and that the taking over of the villages and towns from the Israelis was going as smoothly as possible. There were many references to the fact that the resistance did not take revenge on any of the collaborators. They were either surrendering or fleeing towards the Lebanese-Israeli
borders, leaving their offices and machinery behind them. In less than 24 hours, the
villages of the central sectors were liberated. It was a ‘smooth Liberation’, as Assayed
Hassan Nasrallah put it on that day.

If the Zionists knew what would happen to them in Lebanon, would they have
thought of entering this exceptional country? If Lahed militia members were
expecting what their fate would be, would they have started their collaboration
with an enemy that throughout history fought everyone who were different to
them? Only the resistance was sure of the end and, based on that, chose the
clear course of Liberation. Victory was its ally (Naser, piece to camera, Al
Manar news, ibid).

Coverage from various villages and sectors followed. The most emotional moments
were when the people knew that the Israeli soldiers and the collaborators had left the
Khiam detention centre without setting the detainees free. The people, with camera
crews, crawled towards the centre and broke into the cells where the detainees did not
know what was happening outside. Suddenly, those who had been behind prison doors
were celebrating their freedom.
The 25th of May was named ‘Liberation day’ and was announced by the government as
a national day that Lebanon would celebrate every year. Additionally, Al Manar gained
the celebrated name as the resistance TV station by officials, journalists, academics
and the ordinary people.

**Reflection-conclusion**

The only thought that came to my mind on the 24th of September 2006, standing on the
rubble of the Al Manar complex in Haret Hreik in the southern suburb of Beirut was:
“This is the evidence that Al Manar’s media campaign or psychological warfare
against the Israeli army was effective.” This is a huge assumption on my behalf, but it
was also what most of my colleagues in Lebanon believed. In our informal discussions
following the July 2006 war there was huge sympathy for Al Manar. Israel, by
bombing Al Manar’s headquarters and the transmitters of the Lebanese Broadcast
Company (LBC) and Tele Liban, declared its military war on the media in Lebanon. Al
Manar journalists were embraced, and technical help and support were given by most
Lebanese TV stations to Al Manar to help keep its broadcasts on air. Al Manar’s
broadcasts were interrupted for less than two minutes after the Israeli F16 jets flattened
the complex to the ground. Journalists from Al Manar reassured me that, because of
earlier threats from the Israeli army to bomb their station, Al Manar had an evacuation plan ready. They had prepared an alternative centre to broadcast from if they should feel that the danger was close. Only two technicians were wounded in the attack on Al Manar. Soon after Beirut airport was attacked the evacuation plan was put to action. It was not long after they attacked Beirut Airport\textsuperscript{\textit{xiii}} that they hit Al Manar’s top floors, ‘clipping off its antenna with a missile, but failing to put the station off air’ (Fisk, \textit{The Independent}, 07.14.06). A few hours later, the station’s headquarters was demolished.

Avi Jorisch, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, published a study on Al Manar in 2004 in a book titled \textit{Beacon of Hatred Inside Hizballah’s Al Manar Television}. Jorisch, refers to Al Manar (\textit{Beacon} in English) as the beacon of hatred. He accuses Al Manar of inciting hatred against Israel and the United States. Jorisch had attached a CD-ROM at the end of his book, containing what he called ‘real Al Manar footage’. He used this footage as evidence of what he calls the ‘beacon of hatred’. Most of these are clips my study looks at as part of Hezbollah’s psychological war against Israel. Inciting hatred against the enemy is one of the key points in propaganda techniques. Al Manar, and subsequently Hezbollah, wanted to channel hatred in one direction—at the ‘enemy’—Israel. The resistance was seeking domestic and Arab support to achieve its aim of liberating South Lebanon. Jorisch made his study look as if he has achieved a breakthrough with his discoveries inside Al Manar. However, as revealed in his study, Al Manar’s staff and personnel received Jorisch and gave him full access to the TV offices. He conducted interviews with Al Manar journalists and administrators and they were clear about their aims and targets: they were trying to influence the public, both inside Israel and in Lebanon, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of liberation.

After the liberation their target audience on the Satellite channel was the Palestinian public. They were aiming at gaining support for the Palestinian resistance. As for the United States the campaign targeted its military and financial help to Israel to be able to maintain its occupation of the Palestinian occupied territories. Jorisch recommended that the United States put Al Manar on its list of terrorist organisations (Jorisch, 2004: xvi) and that is what happened. Al Manar was put on the US terrorist list in 2004 to become the first media institution on the state department’s list of terrorist organisations. The reasons Jorisch argued in his study that Al Manar should be banned,
are its planned and structured campaigns to influence the Lebanese public to unite and to support the resistance in its fight to end the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. A unified mass society or group and the feeling of togetherness are essential elements to the propaganda this thesis is exploring, which both Al Manar and TL journalists were trying to achieve. However, what was new in the Al Manar media campaigns and complemented TL’s campaign was that Al Manar tried to undermine the occupation forces’ ability and credibility with images of killed and wounded soldiers, as well as with its ‘media traps’ (explained earlier in this chapter). Accordingly, both the Al Manar and the TL media campaigns matched the positive understanding of propaganda discussed in Chapter Two. What they realised were campaigns that accomplished, and intended to achieve, collective national public support for a cause or a mission, with mass media being a core tool in disseminating political, social and patriotic messages to the public. In addition to this, their media campaign sought to bring national unity and support for the resistance groups fighting the occupation forces within the sovereign independent state of Lebanon. This summarises the core aspects of liberation propaganda explored in Chapter Two. We will come back to it later in the summary of this chapter.

Al Manar journalists, like the TL journalists, believed that they were fighting for a cause with right on its side, and, consequently, none of them claimed impartiality. For them, being one-sided did not affect their professionalism. They were on the side of the victims. Objectivity for them too is not a norm that exists in a vacuum. For them, objectivity becomes negotiable when a journalist is faced with aggressive acts against his or her own people. ‘Being fair and being objective are not the same thing’, Amira Hass of the Israeli daily Ha’aretz told the independent veteran Robert Fisk (Fisk, 2005: 558). Hass, who lives among the Palestinians in Ramallah and writes a daily column of what she describes as ‘life under occupation’ believes that ‘there is a misconception that a journalist can be objective’ (ibid). She says: ‘Palestinians tell me I’m objective, [and] I think this is important because I’m an Israeli. But being fair and being objective are not the same thing’ (ibid). In a later narrative, Hass, a critic of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. admits that she herself as an Israeli could not be objective towards those who commit suicide attacks against Israeli civilians, nor to their families (ibid: 559).
Al Manar journalists, like TL journalists, did not have this clear-cut differentiation between objectivity and fairness. In their own understanding, they were objective by being factual, by being fair to the victims of an ‘aggressive occupation’. The word objectivity was not dismissed, but was related, as Iskandar and Nawawi suggested (in Allan, and Zelizer, 2004), to their collective religious, cultural, social and ideological backgrounds. It was also related to their audiences’ sensitivities and historical collective memory. Their objectivity was ‘positioned’ or ‘contextual’, as El Nawawi and Iskandar (2003) put it. Al Manar journalists were aware that they were part of a planned and structured campaign targeted at concentrating the clear loathing within the Lebanese people towards Israel, which after the 1996 events hardly needed much effort, and support for the resistance. They were aware of the campaign aimed at maintaining national unity – and which could protect and promote the resistance till it achieved its goals of liberation. However, most of them didn’t need instructions on how to report and what to say or not to say. It was, as in the TL journalists’ case, a personal commitment to what we all believed to be a ‘sacred cause’. However, for Al Manar journalists, it was not just a patriotic, nationalistic commitment that was guiding them, but also a religious Shiite ideology, which demanded fighting the oppressors and aggressors and never accepting humiliation or subjugation (Amhaz, interview with author, 2003). Propaganda as a term was dismissed by Al Manar journalists, even though its literal translation in Arabic, Al Diaayah Al Siyasiyah, was the title given to a section in Al Manar dedicated to producing the video clips mentioned earlier in the chapter (Hmiad, interview with author, 2003). The propaganda they denied, as did the TL journalists, was the propaganda of deception. Those in the higher administrative positions preferred the word psychological warfare. However, it can readily be seen that many of the propaganda techniques and principles discussed in Chapter Two were at the core of their conduct. Moreover, what they were doing is another, different, and much more deliberately orchestrated version of what I have defined as a very specific kind of liberation propaganda.

The propaganda they were conducting was of two kinds: propaganda targeting ‘the home front’ and propaganda targeting ‘the enemy’. Many of Goebbels principles were identified in the media coverage of Al Manar and the most important among these was pursuing credibility. To achieve that, their propaganda output had to be true and not false, as Goebbels (cited in Doob in Jackall, 1995: 199) put it. However, Al Manar’s
propaganda was white and not black, which contradicts another principle of Goebbels. Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) state that if propaganda devices are spotted through analysing media messages then they fall into three categories:

Propaganda is also described as white, grey, or black, in relationship to an acknowledgement of its source and its accuracy of information. White propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate … Black propaganda is credited to a false source and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Black propaganda is the “big lie”, including all types of creative deceit … Grey propaganda is somewhere between white and black propaganda. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain (ibid: 12-15).

According to Jowett (1999: 21), national celebrations with their ‘overt patriotism and regional chauvinism, can usually be classified as white propaganda’. and this characterises most of the Al Manar coverage. Jackall (1995) presents the devices that the Institute for Propaganda Analysis use to detect propaganda. They call them ‘the seven common propaganda devices’ (see Chapter Two). As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, all were detected in Al Manar’s coverage except for one: the card-stacking device in which the propagandist employs all the arts of deception to win people’s support for himself, his group, nation, race, policy, practice, belief or ideal. ‘He stacks the cards against the truth’ (Jackall, 1995: 221). Al Manar journalists were giving their account of what happened, they were not fabricating stories or being dishonest with their audiences. They were glorifying certain incidents and giving them prominence and importance through repetition and space, but none of those incidents were made up. They were factual, and thus they believed that they were being fair to the victims of the occupation.

Jeremy Bowen. BBC Middle East editor, wrote in his book War Stories (2006) that every journalist starts from somewhere. He believes that no human being can be truly objective. Bowen explains that it is impossible because ‘we all have a series of experiences, from parents, from teachers, from what we have seen in the world, that shape the way we think’. For him ‘every reporter, every morning, has to decide how to cover the story and those decisions don’t come out of nowhere’. However, Bowen concludes that this should not make a journalist biased (2006: 124). Nor does it make taking up a position on an issue a form of negative or unbalanced propaganda. Al
Manar journalists, as with TL journalists, challenge the word ‘biased’ when covering wars that are affecting their people and nation. They also agree that if they are to be labelled biased then, yes, they confirm that they were biased ‘towards the victims, the oppressed and those affected badly by the occupation’.

Summary

Notions of impartiality, objectivity, and balance are challenged in this chapter, as in the previous chapter, by journalists who believe that they were subjected to and affected by the same experiences as their audiences, so distancing themselves from the suffering of their people would be difficult to achieve. There was a deep sense of patriotism, nationalism and religious commitment (with Al Manar journalists) guiding them in their reporting. On the one hand they were addressing the collective mind of the people who were subjected to the same conflict. Their objectivity was contextual in that sense. On the other hand, Al Manar journalists’ national and patriotic commitment was a core aspect of the media campaign launched by the resistance and operated by Al Manar TV. This was a campaign planned and structured, firstly, to influence domestic audiences and hold national unity and secondly, to influence Israeli soldiers and their families - to raise their voices and to refuse service in South Lebanon, was implemented to achieve liberation. Propagating the right and ability of the resistance to fight the occupation and the fears and failures of the enemy’s soldiers were the aims of the resistance media campaign against the Israeli army.

Thus, propaganda techniques were implemented. Taylor (1995: 6) speaks of propaganda used for ‘good reasons’. Related to this, Hatem (1974: 63) speaks of ‘honest propaganda’ and ‘psychological warfare’ when propaganda targets the enemy in war time, while Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 12) speak of ‘white propaganda’ which can characterise national celebration. Hezbollah and Al Manar’s propaganda is a combination of all of these aspects - and I therefore, as I have argued in earlier chapters, I call it liberation propaganda.

¹ For full information on Al Manar TV and its structure see Chapter Five.
² On the 25th of May 2000, Israeli troops completed their withdrawal from the majority of the occupied territories in South Lebanon, keeping a small piece of disputed land called Shebaa farms. The area is
located at the junction of Syria, Lebanon and Israel. It is 14 km (9 miles) in length and 2.5 km (2 miles) in width. Israel claims it is Syrian land and Lebanon says it is Lebanese land. Syria says it is Lebanese, but has not supplied the United Nations with any written documents on the issue yet.

Mohsen is one of a few researchers who conducted studies on the media performance of Hezbollah and published two edited books on the issue listed in the Bibliography.

In April 1996 Israel launched a military operation against Hezbollah and Lebanon code-named 'Grapes of Wrath'. The operation lasted 16 days, causing hundreds of Lebanese civilian causalities and infrastructural destruction. The operation ended without achieving its objectives which was mainly aimed at rooting up the resistance from South Lebanon. On the contrary, Hezbollah and the Islamic resistance gained huge public support in response to the Israeli assaults.

See chapter 6 for more details on April Understanding.

Lebanon consists of 18 religious sects. Christians and Muslims constitute almost equally the majority of the population; in addition to a Jewish minority (see Picard, 2002).

'Egyptian state run radio station.

Shiite religious title.

Another Shiite movement headed by House Speaker Nabih Beri.


On April 11 1996 Israel’s launch of the military operation ‘Grapes of Wrath’ was marked by the Qana massacre where Israeli army bombed the UN headquarters in Qana, killing 106 civilians sheltering in the compound. See Chapter 6 for more details on the events of April 1996.

He refused to disclose his real name and introduced himself as Haj Maitham. I was told his real name could not be revealed for security reasons.

For more information on how Imam Hussein was the role model by Hezbollah fighters see Qassem 2005: 43.

Dayan and Katz (in Tumber 1999) state that ‘the most obvious difference between media events and other formulas or genres of broadcasting is that they are, by definition, not routine’. They explain that media events are ‘interruptions of routine; they intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and outlives. Like the holidays that halt everyday routines, television events propose exceptional thing to think about, to witness, and to do’ (ibid: 49).

Naser moved to work for Al Jazeera as their correspondent in Lebanon.

Naser is referring to 17th of May 1983 when Lebanon signed a peace treaty with Israel under the protection of Israeli tanks. The treaty was cancelled two years later. For more details see chapter three.

The night two helicopters over one of the northern settlement en route to Lebanon collided, killing all 73 soldiers on board.

A traditional gesture of celebration, welcoming and joy.

A Lebanese village on the border line with Israel.

Names of villages in the occupied zone of South Lebanon.

Re-named as Hariri international airport after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005.
Reflection/Conclusion: Achieving Liberation Propaganda

The day the Israeli army withdrew from South Lebanon on May 25th 2000, I called the late Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, to congratulate him on this historical moment. He responded by praising the role the Lebanese media played in achieving this liberation. At that point, I began to feel the need to ask questions about the role we, the Lebanese journalists, played in achieving that liberation.

The most poignant question to me was whether or not we had conducted propaganda. If so, what kind of propaganda? Did it match with aspects of twentieth century propaganda models discussed in the west? Did it meet all its criteria, techniques and principles? If it was propaganda, then what defined ‘our propaganda’?

What was very clear was that we were deeply proud of the ‘objective coverage’ delivered, starting 11th of April 1996 till the liberation - yet Hitler’s propaganda mastermind, Goebbels, had said objectivity and propaganda do not match (Goebbels in Doob in Jackal, 1995: 190). What kind of objectivity were we adhering to? How then do journalism norms and values fit with certain kinds of propaganda?

To try and achieve answers to these questions, a reflexive ethnographic approach was argued to be essential – importantly because it offers the tools that help relate theory to practice. It allowed me, as a researcher, to distance myself, look critically at, and reflect on, earlier events and performances in which I was a complete participant.

I was enabled to judge my performance by trying to match what I had learned in the west about being an ‘objective reporter’ and what I had actually done on the ground. I equally had to assess my colleagues’ performance to try to identify the trends and norms of their journalistic conduct in reporting military escapades and the wars with Israel in relation to propaganda techniques and principles.

Ethnography and the methodologies related to it were applied to explore the social, cultural, religious and political contexts in which journalists operate to achieve the latterly mooted understanding of propaganda. This thesis thus sought to establish how
different cultural contexts might generate different understandings about, amid the implementation of, the same set of news values. Therefore, journalistic norms of objectivity, neutrality and balance were explored in different contexts.

This research suggested that different interpretations of news values and norms might produce different journalistic performances and that contextualizing these news values and norms is essential to identifying the suggested propagandistic performances.

**Objectivity and war reporting**

The journalism culture was studied in this thesis in relation to propaganda, and not as a sociological object in itself. Thus, defining objectivity was not the aim of this research, nor was defining the sociology of the Lebanese TV news room, though they were necessarily touched upon. Aspects of history, politics, society and religion that define the Lebanese broadcast journalists’ culture were discussed to highlight the performance and techniques used by Lebanese journalists and to gauge their congruence with normative propaganda techniques and principles. Therefore, notions of ‘truth’, ‘impartiality’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’ were problematised in this thesis.

It seems the work I and other Lebanese journalists were doing was clearly ‘intentional’ - our training, our experience as Lebanese citizens over the course of our lifetimes, our sense of the wrong being done to our country, all this made it possible for us to be quite sure and focussed about what had to be done and could be done. What we did was therefore very much connected to our ‘professionalism’ and our role as ‘disciplined’ journalists and media personnel. This is why I was able to remain ‘calm and professional’ while covering April events, as demonstrated in Chapter Six.

The ‘truth’ we were intent on showing was the Lebanese version of ‘truth’ at that moment – there is always another version (or several others) available. It is thus a ‘positioned’ truth – which then, because it is believed in so passionately and so nationally, because it is lived and embodied in the daily encounter with shattered and innocent bodies – it comes to seem to be an ‘objective’ truth. This has much to do here with the way the body lives this horror – we also came to live the same horror as the victims of the Israeli assaults. The normal sense of objectivity and distance are
impossible in such a context and the only truth that is even remotely possible is a positioned or contextual truth – as this thesis argues. Thus, seeing it as ‘contextual truth’ or ‘contextual objectivity’ could not have been achieved without the ethnographic approach that this thesis adopts. It is only afterwards and from a distance that I can see our ‘contextual objectivity’ for what it was.

The ‘contextual objectivity’ that the Lebanese journalists adopted when covering military incursions by Israeli forces in South Lebanon could relate to war reporting in general – and can be generalised to that. As was seen, journalists reporting war when their nation is under threat can hardly have any other kind of objectivity than precisely this. When journalists encounter the horror of crushed innocent bodies while covering wars could not have any other kind of objectivity but a ‘contextual objectivity’, and this is demonstrated in Chapters Three, Six and Seven. Balance too became questionable when covering the massacres of innocent children and women, as illustrated and emphasised by the ITV news editor, David Mannion, in his commentary on claims of bias while covering the July 2006 Lebanon war (Mannion, Broadcast, 4.8.06).

Along with objectivity, there is the concept of impartiality. The terms ‘positioned’ and ‘contextual’ deny the very possibility of impartiality or a distanced position when making decisions in this kind of context (as illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven).

**Liberation Propaganda**

This thesis sought to present the history, definitions, principles and analysis of the various notions of propaganda, as seen by the major scholars on this subject at different times through the twentieth century and the beginnings of the twenty-first. Chapter Two, along with Chapter Three, aimed at setting the theoretical basis for an analysis of the Lebanese journalists’ performance during major incursions by the Israeli occupation forces in South Lebanon. It looked at the different definitions and characteristics of propaganda and explored the new understanding of liberation propaganda.
As this thesis has demonstrated, propaganda has been seen and identified throughout its existence in very different ways. Some are positive, but mostly negative connotations were attached to it. However, none could claim a definitive description. This thesis tried to restore Edward L. Bernays (1928) old argument that ‘the fine old word, Propaganda’ in itself has certain technical meanings which, ‘like most things in this world, are neither good nor bad but custom makes them so’ (Bernays, 1928: 20) – and then to use the word again in a positive sense to describe what might also be called a media campaign or indeed something else.

To reinforce Bernays’ point, this thesis adopted Barlett’s approach to propaganda which states that ‘Propaganda must be defined by reference to its aims’ (Bartlett, 1942: 6). The propaganda this thesis argued for fits within the framework of Ellul’s (1973) propaganda of integration. ‘Propaganda aims at making the individual participate in his society in every way’ (Ellul: 1973), but this can be accomplished even when the campaign is part accidental, part improvised, part an almost unconscious (because professionally informed) response to desperate situations. ‘Deliberate’ here acquires context-specific meanings which are not entirely contradictory with its quasi opposites ‘automatic’, ‘unwitting’.

Nevertheless, by propaganda, I mean a campaign which accomplishes, and intends to achieve, a collective national public support for a cause or a mission with mass media being a core tool in disseminating political, social and patriotic messages to the public. In accordance with that, the notion of liberation propaganda this thesis investigated is certainly of a media campaign that seeks to bring national unity and support for the resistance groups in fighting the occupation forces within a sovereign independent state. It is a propaganda of integration not (internal) subversion. It is an ‘honest’ (Hatem: 1974) ‘white’ (Jowett and O’Donnell: 1999) propaganda. Its sources and aims are acknowledged. It is a propaganda that claims dependency on objective and factual information. It is a propaganda that aims at dismissing fear of the enemy and denouncing the enemy’s credibility and abilities, and highlights the ability and credibility of the resistance groups and its leaders.

It therefore rejects Goebbels’ assertion that ‘objectivity has nothing in common with propaganda, nothing in common with truth’ (cited in Thomson, 1994: 4). This
propaganda uses national symbols and relates draws upon the history of the conflict between the occupied and the occupier, to achieve its fundamental goals.

Previous use of the term – 'liberation’ propaganda - has been related to different contexts than this study. It was Gerhard von Glahn (1966) who first introduced the term in an article submitted to the journal *Law and Contemporary Problems*. His article talked of the use of propaganda for use in foreign countries, and as a device to abet and arouse ‘revolutionary tendencies’ and violence to overthrow the rulers. It is very important to distinguish this use of the term ‘liberation’ from the one I wanted to develop. The propaganda this thesis investigated is one that is conducted by domestic governments, alongside domestic resistance movements, with the aim of achieving liberation from a foreign occupying army. Indeed, it could be said that the liberation propaganda I described in Chapters Two, Six and Seven is something like a domestic variant of von Glahn’s externally driven version. What I described is a propaganda that seeks loyalty that binds citizens to their governments and their resistance groups in their fight against a foreign enemy. It is what Karl von Clausewitz would call ‘pursuit of an armed struggle by other means’ (cited in Thomas 1996: xi). It is propaganda of integration and, where it is a propaganda of subversion, it is subversive of the activities of a foreign enemy. It is, like most forms of propaganda, context specific. It borrows some, and rejects other, aspects of the principles and tools of propaganda which are identified in different academic studies in the twentieth and twenty first centuries.

With TL journalists (see Chapter Six) there is no orchestrated and managed propaganda campaign – but the professionalism, shared ideas and ideals, shared experiences and shared dangers, and the interpersonal relationships do produce a very consistent common approach that is very deliberate in terms of personal commitment and therefore not ‘unintentional’- yet, in the case of TL, not ‘managed’ or ‘planned’.

In contrast, for Al Manar journalists (see Chapter Seven) the campaign developed to become ‘managed’ and ‘planned’, aiming at achieving a clear set of goals. It aimed at unifying the nation in support of the resistance, promoting faith in the resistance fighters' ability to defeat the enemy’s army, demonise the enemy’s military capabilities and make the people believe that the dream of liberation was achievable.
As Chapter Four illustrates, the histories of the Arab-Israeli conflict of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict occupy much of the collective memory of the Lebanese people, including the journalists under investigation. Thus, history was used in the messages constructed to address both ‘home front’ audiences and Arab speakers abroad, whom the TL and Al Manar stations were able to reach through satellite broadcasts.

The conflict with Israel had clearly fractured Lebanon’s stability and security, causing divisions among its different religious communities, which indicates and explains the emphasis that was placed, by both TL and Al Manar journalists, on the need to achieve national unity. Uniting the nation, as Chapters Six and Seven revealed, is what propaganda on the home front was aiming at, whether planned or unplanned.

Liberation propaganda is defined as a national media campaign aiming at freeing occupied land from foreign occupation forces. It is propaganda to the home front that seeks to keep the nation united to achieve emancipation. It additionally aims at diminishing the fear of the enemy and emphasising the ability and credibility of the resistance fighters to lead the nation towards liberation. It is a propaganda that aims at demonising the enemy’s abilities and credibility. Liberation propaganda also importantly seeks to establish fear of the resistance among the enemy’s audiences – yet centrally is a propaganda campaign that considers credibility and factuality as its main features. It is a propaganda campaign that dismisses deception and fabrication. It is a media campaign that does not contradict the journalistic norm of ‘objectivity’ in its ‘contextual’ form. It is thus a positive model of propaganda.

Areas of future research

During the July 2006 war on Lebanon, Israeli jets deliberately targeted and bombed several Lebanese TV studios and transmission centres, including those of TL and Al Manar. Al Manar’s headquarters in the southern suburb of Beirut was completely destroyed, and was among the first set of targets. It was hit in two separate attacks. The second attack destroyed the building completely. It aimed at silencing the voice of Al Manar and other Lebanese stations and stops it from reaching audiences locally, whether local or via satellite.
It was when the images and stories of Lebanese journalists beginning to leave Lebanon and operate in a global arena – the power of those images to become ‘propaganda’ to non-home audiences – and the recognition of that power which led to military attack on the sources of those images. These attacks brought in a new departure in this kind of media war – a war where media organisations became military targets for their role in reporting images of destruction and innocent casualties. It was a war against the reporters who resisted the attack on their country by doing their job in such a way as to hold the nation together.

What makes the notion of liberation propaganda particularly valid is the way the Lebanese media reacted towards the Israeli attacks during the July 2006 war. All domestic political differences were put aside and they were following the same line of solidarity and calls for unity that characterised the April 1996 events and the years that followed till Liberation day on May 25th 2000.

Hezbollah media people and Al Manar TV introduced new techniques to their propaganda campaign that deserve future analysis. For instance, the direct role that the TV speeches of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s played in the propaganda campaign to the home and non-home audiences warrants research.

Moreover, the Lebanese Bloggers diaries that emerged daily from Beirut through the Internet during the July war are worthy of future study. They illustrate the role of citizen journalism in liberation propaganda campaigns. Perhaps most significantly, the model of liberation propaganda can be tested in future research – where the necessary conditions of foreign occupation and a national unity engendered by media that seek to deal in ‘truth’ (even if positioned), rather than deception, as a weapon of that liberation. This media need to be able to effectively communicate their messages, it must be said. It can be suggested that the conditions could potentially exist and be explored in Kurdistan (in whichever territory it is variously divided), and certainly in the Palestinian occupied territories. Iraq, however, currently lacks the necessary condition of undivided nationhood. The ongoing sectarian struggle, feudalism, old rivalries and privilege-driven relations with the occupiers make it difficult to achieve a unified nation.
 Nonetheless, in none of these three cases is there currently the necessary condition of a unifying media or medium to help drive the fight against occupation. This necessary pre-condition underlines the success in the Lebanese case, where the media were able to act openly and effectively. It was possible in this thesis to examine in considerable detail what precisely the Lebanese version/s of context-specific liberation propaganda looked like. This thesis, thus, provides a case study basis for continuing research in similar kinds of national contexts.
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**TI News Archives:**

Tele Liban prime time news programs (19.30 pm)

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<td>11/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Nada Saliba;</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Tony Salameh;</td>
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<tr>
<td>13/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Souad A Ashi; Producer-Producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb;</td>
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<td>14/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Naeemat Aazouri; Producer-producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb;</td>
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<td>14.04.96</td>
<td>Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Interview with CNN correspondent Brent Sadler (Re-broadcast)</td>
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<td>15/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Souad Al Ashi Producer-Producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb</td>
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<td>16/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Souad Al Ashi Producer-producer from Sidon: Zaven Kouyoumdjian</td>
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<td>18/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Wasef Awada Producer-producer from Sidon: Zaven Kouyoumdjian</td>
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<td>20/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Naamatt Aazouri Producer-producer from Sidon: Dalal Kandeel</td>
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<td>21/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Tony Salameh Producer-producer from Sidon: Rajaa Kamouneh</td>
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<td>22/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Naamatt Aazouri Producer-producer from Sidon: Rajaa Kamouneh</td>
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<td>23/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Nada Saliba Producer-producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb</td>
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<td>24/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Tony Salameh Producer-producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb</td>
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<td>25/04/96</td>
<td>Presenter from Beirut Studios: Souad Al Ashi Producer-producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb</td>
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</table>
26/04/96  Presenter from Beirut Studios: Wasef Awada  
Presenter-Producer from Sidon: Dalal Kandeel

27/04/96  Presenter from Beirut Studios: Souad Al Ashi  
Presenter-Producer from Sidon: Zahera Harb

Al Manar News Archives

Presenters: Ali al Mismar and Kouthar Al Mousawi

Prime time news programs (Time: 17.45)

27/02/1998  ‘Beir Kalab Operation’  
Presenter: Abed Allah Reslan ..

25/06/1998  ‘On exchanging detainees and martyrs’  
Presenters: Kawther Al Mousawi and Ali Al Mismar

28/02/1999  ‘On the killing of Israeli Brigadier General Eretz Gerstein’  
Presenter: Abed Al Hussein Al Dhihani

Afternoon news program (Time: 2.45 pm)

27/04/99,  ‘On capturing the Sujud Position’  
Presenter: Abed Allah Arslan.

Prime time news programs (Time: 17.45)

27/04/99  ‘On capturing the Sujud Position’  
Presenter: Ghada Assaf Nemer

28/04/99  ‘On capturing the Sujud Position’  
Presenter: Abed Allah Areslan

15/05/99  ‘On the Beit Yahoun Operation  
Presenters: Kawther Al Mousawi Noun  
and Abed Al Hussein Al Dhiany

Al Manar special report:

17-05-99  Live coverage of the ceremony of capturing the troop carrier M 113 in  
Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb  
Reporting Live: Abbas Naser

Prime time news program (Time: 17.45)
25/06/99 On targeting the power stations
Presenter: Abed Al Hussein Al Dhiany

Al Manar special report:

26/6/99 Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s speech
Introduced by Ali Al Mismar

Prime time news program (Time: 17.45)

30/01/2000 On killing Akel Hashem, the South Lebanon Army’s (SLA) second-in-command, Commander of the SLA’s Western Brigade
Presenter: Ali Al Mismar

Al Manar special report

01.02.2000 Exclusive interview with Jawad and Hadi, perpetrators of the Akel Hashem assassination
Prime time news program (Time: 17.45)

24/05/2000 On liberation coverage,
Presenter: Abed Allah Areslan.

26.12.1996 (7.45 pm) Re-broadcast of Hezbollah Media from Israeli Channel 2
(Tel Aviv) broadcast 25.12.1996

29.2.1999 Re-broadcast of special report on Al Manar’s coverage of the Gerstein killing from Israeli Channel 2 (Tel Aviv) broadcast earlier that day

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Al Housieni M., Al Manar producer/journalist; Al Manar’s headquarters, Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 18.12.03, not recorded (notes taken)

Amhaz, H., Al Manar reporter; Al Manar headquarters, Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 09.01.04.

Anonyms, member of Hezbollah Military Media Unit, Hezbollah media relations centre, Haret Hriek, Beirut, 19-12-03.

Awada, W., TeleLiban news editor; his office, TL headquarters, Telet Al Khayat, Beirut, 19.04.04.
Boudie, M., Al Manar’s Hebrew translator, newsroom journalist and member of the Israeli TV monitoring unit at Al Manar; Al Manar headquarters, Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 10.01.04.

Dukmak, H., Hezbollah media coordinator; his office, Beirut Southern Suburb, 12-01-04.

Eiz Addine, H., Head of Hezbollah media relations; his office, Beirut Southern Suburbs, 12-01-04.

El Musawi, I., Al Manar’s English language news editor; Al Manar headquarters, Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 13.01.04.

Haidar, M., Al Manar Chairman, Al Manar headquarters, Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 09.01.04.

Haj Maitham, Head of Hezbollah Military Media Unit, Hezbollah media relations office, Beirut Southern Suburb, 08.01.04.

Haj Naser, Hezbollah military cameraman; Hezbollah media relations office, Beirut Southern Suburb, not recorded upon his request, 08.01.04.

Hamied H., head of clips and propaganda unit for Al Manar; Al Manar headquarters, Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 09.01.04.

Hindawi, A., Head of APTV regional operations; his office, Beirut, 04.01.04.


Kamouneh, R., TL Presenter-Producer; her office, Lebanese Foreign Ministry, 17.04.04.

Kandeel, D., TL Presenter-Producer, her house; Haret Hriek, Beirut Southern Suburb, 06.01.04.

Kandeel, N., Deputy Head of National Media Council; Lebanese parliament, Beirut, 15.04.04.

Koumedjian, Z., TL Producer-Presenter, Future TV, Beirut, 20.04.04.

Krayem, N. Head of Al Manar TV and Nour Radio Station. Al Manar headquarters, Beirut Southern Suburb, 12.4.2000.

Majzoub, N., TL reporter, via e-mail, 05.04.04.

Mohsen, M. Lecturer in political communication; Lebanese University, Al Saha Café’, Airport Road, Beirut.
Moukaled, D., Future TV reporter; Future TV offices, Raoushe, Beirut.

Naim, F., TL Chairman; via phone from Paris, 06.02.04

Mousa, H., Israeli media expert; Assafir newspaper offices, Hamra, Beirut, 17.04.04.

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