

SOCIAL FREEDOM IN A MULTICULTURAL STATE

A Normative Theory of the Politics of Multicultural Integration

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


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
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
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To the memory of my father who was affectionately known among my family members as Dada and among his patients and colleagues as Dr. A. Kathirgamanathan.

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SUMMARY OF THESIS

This thesis develops a normative account of the politics of multiculturalism within the paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture while avoiding the pitfall of ‘plural monoculturalism’. In so doing, it contributes to the ongoing critiques of essentialist notions of culture and attempts to overcome the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism, which tends to lead to the subordination of post-immigration ethnic minorities in accessing common institutions and to collapse a multicultural society into plural monocultures. To overcome these deficiencies, this thesis draws upon Benhabib’s critiques of essentialist notions of culture and seeks support in Dilthey’s works, even though these are not the obvious point of reference for multiculturalism. However, they do help present a model of culture without ossifying individuals within culture and reifying culture. Dilthey’s idea of meaning in history, along with Dworkin’s account of well-being, allows us to develop a normative account of well-being without succumbing to reductionism, and thereby to argue – similarly to Benhabib’s as well as Arendt’s emphasis – that we must be concerned with the circumstances of injustice that affect human conditions within the problematic social world, rather than with a universal human nature. Based on this premise, this thesis shows that social justice is a prime parameter of the ‘right circumstances’ because unjust circumstances may prevent individuals from pursuing their well-being, which is constituted by engaging in meaningful activities in accord with their genuine convictions. It argues that social freedom is essentially ‘agency-freedom’ – the notion of freedom as non-domination that is central to modern republicanism – which is tied to social justice, and that an assault on one’s capability to participate as a citizen of equal status negatively affects one’s social freedom. Drawing from Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approaches, this thesis shows that multicultural social justice should be understood as minorities’ ‘capability to function’ as citizens of equal status, especially in deliberating on claims for recognition as cultural practices are normatively contestable. It argues that the minimal and common normative conditions – social recognition and non-domination – rooted in self-respect must be met without reifying culture and identity. Moreover, it argues that social virtues are important to ensure the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status. Based on this normative premise, the politics of multicultural integration needs to satisfy a set of criteria. The set of criteria developed as a main part of the thesis has the capacity to normatively discriminate in a principled manner among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity. This thesis concludes that modern civic republicanism, mainly derived from Honohan’s works, better fulfils the conditions of the normative criteria than liberalism or communitarianism.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis addresses an important issue of the contemporary politics of multiculturalism within Western and neo-Western democratic states: How to provide ‘normative grounds for multiculturalism without relying on or reinforcing potentially coercive notions of bounded or unified cultures’, while preventing multiculturalism from collapsing into a plural monoculturalism.¹ In doing so, this thesis contributes to the ongoing recent critiques of essentialist notions of culture, as well as critiquing the normative underpinnings of Will Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism, and attempts to develop a normative theory of the politics of ‘multicultural integration’ within the paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture. Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is considered as the ‘clearest’ point of departure in ‘anglophone political theories of multiculturalism’ (Modood 2007, p. 21) against which other multicultural ‘revisionists’ have reacted. One of the aims of this thesis is to overcome the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka’s (1995) theory of liberal multiculturalism. In deriving the set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration, this thesis critiques some features of liberalism for multiculturalism and adopts key concepts of modern republicanism. This thesis finally shows that the criteria enable us to normatively discriminate among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity in a principled manner and that modern republicanism is more conducive to the sort of multiculturalism advocated by this thesis than liberalism and communitarianism, even though a coupling of republicanism and multiculturalism is generally considered contentious.²

In his theory, Kymlicka differentiates three types of minorities – indigenous peoples, ‘substate’ national minorities and immigrant groups; he argues for group-differentiated rights and aims at integrating ‘polyethnic’ – ethnic immigrant –

¹ I am indebted to Professor Anne Phillips for succinctly highlighting the importance of the issue this thesis addresses.

² I am indebted to Professor Anne Phillips for raising this concern and I shall discuss this in Chapter 7 under republicanism.

minorities within a multicultural state. In his recent works, Kymlicka (2001 and 2007) identifies the rise of three different forms of liberal multiculturalism, and refers to multiculturalism with regard to immigrant groups as ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ for integrating immigrants so as to access ‘common institutions’ of the wider society within Western and neo-Western liberal democratic states. My focus is on immigrant multiculturalism, especially with respect to ‘post-immigration’ ethnic minorities within Western democratic states.³ I refer to the term ‘multicultural integration’ in order to distinguish it from the politics of ‘integration’ which mainly refers to the politics of assimilation, especially, by politicians in Europe (see Modood 2007).⁴

Contemporary scholars on multiculturalism are not against integration, but are concerned about policies of assimilation or separatism (Modood 2007; Parekh 2000). Kymlicka (2001, pp. 162-163) points out that policies of multiculturalism at various levels of the states in Canada, Australia and the United States can be defended as promoting fairer terms of integration. He argues that most of the demands of immigrant multiculturalism do not lead to ‘balkanization’, but rather to ‘integration’, accommodating diversity *within common institutions* (2001, p. 164). For example, he lists twelve reforms which can be considered under the ‘rubric of multiculturalism’ to integrate immigrants (2001, p. 163); these reforms include affirmative action programmes, revising dress codes and work schedules so as to accommodate immigrant groups’ religious faiths, multicultural school curricula revising history and literature to give recognition to immigrants’ contribution, anti-racism educational programmes and bilingual educational programmes for the children of immigrants. Moreover, Kymlicka emphasises that many aspects of public policy, such as naturalisation, education, job training and professional accreditation and civil service employment, including national defence, are the ‘major engines of integration’ (2001, p. 155). I do not disagree with these reforms and policies per se, but the key issue is the normative basis on which to derive and justify fair terms of integration within common institutions, avoiding policies of assimilation, isolationism and separatism.

³ I use the term ‘post-immigration’ from Modood (2007).

⁴ I adopt the term ‘multicultural integration’ from Vink (2007).

This thesis is not in complete opposition to Kymlicka's aim of 'fair terms of integration' for non-Western post-immigration minorities in Western democracies.⁵ However, I argue that his theory has normative deficiencies, and that the policies derived from the normative foundation of his theory have a propensity to subordinate post-immigration ethnic minorities and to collapse a multicultural society into plural monocultures. The normative deficiencies in Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism arise from two sources: 1) cultural membership and a sense of belonging are morally significant; 2) he defines 'societal culture' as a national culture complete with an institutional structure encompassing both private and public spheres of activity. In addition, his theory requires unnecessary 'culturalisation' of certain minority groups, when in fact members of those minority groups are discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, class or some other social endowment rather than culture per se (see Barry 2002, p.308). As this thesis shows, the ongoing critiques of the essentialist notion of culture as bounded, holistic, deterministic and static, as well as the recent discussion and revision of multicultural policies that are integral to the critique of the essentialist notion of culture in the Western democracies, do not mean that culture does not matter and thereby deal a fatal blow to multiculturalism; rather, this thesis demonstrates that we can engage in the politics of multiculturalism within the paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture.

Drawing upon Seyla Benhabib's (2002) critique of the essentialist notion of culture, I turn to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) to lend support to an anti-essentialist notion of culture.⁶ Although Dilthey's works on the study of the human sciences and meaning in history are not the obvious point of reference with regard to multiculturalism, I show that his ideas of intersecting 'cultural systems' and interacting social organisations rooted in social life reinforce Benhabib's critique of the essentialist notion of culture and allow us to emphasise individuality and agency without reifying cultures and groups, with a notion of dynamism, change and continuity, and thereby avoiding collapsing a multicultural society into plural

⁵ I refer to the term 'fair terms of integration' from Kymlicka (2001).

⁶ I am indebted to Professor David Boucher for introducing Dilthey's work to me as well to Professor Bruce Haddock for suggesting I refer to Benhabib's critique on the essentialist notion of culture.

monocultures.⁷ Dilthey's understanding of the social world also allows us to capture its problematic nature by emphasising dominance and dependence. Dilthey's ideas make sense of the relationship between the individual and culture in a way that remedies the deficiencies in the accounts relied on by liberals and multiculturalists on the importance of culture and well-being. Dilthey's ideas on culture and community accept the liberal critique of monoculturalism, but still provide a basis from which to identify a distinct multicultural politics that is more appropriate than the 'difference-blind' politics of liberalism, in which the state is supposed to be neutral over the concepts of goods. Furthermore, Dilthey's philosophy mediates between realism and idealism, relativism and universalism via subjective and objective values, and attaches importance to individuals and individuality within a socio-cultural matrix of interacting systems rooted in social life that helps to derive a moral account for deliberating on claims for justice.

This thesis is developed from the premise that we are 'thrown' into a multi-faceted, necessarily problematic, social world given the following three basic social facts of a modern multicultural social world.

1) *Human diversity* is inevitable. We differ in our capabilities and identities (including gender), and we individuate with our unique personalities within the socio-cultural matrix. According to Dilthey, an individual is a socio-cultural being, for 'we experience life *ab initio* in common-lived relations (*Lebensbezüge*) with others'; however, Dilthey also insists that there is always a part of the person that remains independent of all social, legal and cultural authority: 'in his ultimate depths the individual is for himself' (Ermarth 1978, p. 122 & 125). In our endowments we differ in many dimensions: physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual.

2) We live in an *ethical plural society*. We differ in our convictions of good or meaningful lives. Our ethical convictions can be incommensurable, or complementary, or conflicting.

⁷ It is to be noted that I am only adopting some relevant parts of Dilthey's works in advancing my arguments; 'despite the important influence he has had on several leading twentieth-century thinkers and the growing attention paid to him in the English-speaking world, Dilthey's work is still not as well-known, nor as well received, nor as accessible as it might be'; his works 'extends over the whole range of human sciences' and although his '*Collected Works* run to nineteen volumes' many works appear as partial or introductory; furthermore, his works are difficult to grasp due to his style of writing – a 'convoluted style' using several abstract idioms (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, pp. 10-11).

3) We are *interdependent* beings within the social world. 'Due to the limitations of human existence, the needs inherent in human nature are satisfied, not through the isolated activity of the individual, but through shared labour and through what is inherited from previous generations' (Dilthey 1989, p. 94).⁸ Dilthey emphasises that every individual is involved in the 'interactions of socio-historical life' to realise a multiplicity of purposes and is a 'point of intersection' of many different functions and systems of social interaction (Dilthey 1989, p. 94; Ermarth 1978, p. 122). In a modern industrialised society, unlike in an undeveloped agricultural economy, economic and social mobility enable a high degree of interaction and interdependency between groups (Parekh 2000, p. 206). We are not only interdependent in an inter-generational way, but also on the environment and other species.⁹ We interact and engage with the social world directly and indirectly to realise our multiple purposes according to our different convictions and different personal and social endowments.

Members of minorities and the majority in a multicultural state directly or indirectly interact and engage with one another, participating in various social institutions and associations including economic and political, and carry out activities spanning both public and private spheres that comprise the social world. People develop skills as they participate in the social world; discover opportunities to pursue interests; form relationships and make commitments; take on multiple roles within both the private and public spheres; and engage in diverse activities. The above basic social facts, however, lead to common vulnerabilities and asymmetrical power relations between power holders and powerless members of society, and I shall refer to these groups as the majority and minorities respectively within a different socio-cultural-political context. The differences are not about the numerical figure per se, rather about how social and political endowments interacting with the social and political structure give rise to those asymmetrical power relations.

⁸ The recent global financial crisis shows how we are interconnected and interdependent globally; however, this thesis focuses on the basic social facts within a multicultural state.

⁹ Awareness of climate change through human activity shows how we are interdependent on the environment; see the recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which shared the Nobel prize for peace in 2007.

We are vulnerable to differences in our endowments and ethical convictions which introduce power relations that are asymmetrical through dominance and dependence; they can lead to treating the powerless members of society as subordinated and partial or excluded members through arbitrary interference and systematic discrimination, exploitation, marginalisation and exclusion. Moreover, an anti-essentialist notion of culture presumes that meanings of cultural practices are contestable and individuals are not ossified within culture, and hence the normative underpinnings of those practices cannot be granted recognition pre-emptively but need to be deliberated in claims for recognition and justice. However, it is also important to recognise individuals' particularities without reifying their identities and groups, as individuals have multiple intersecting collective identities and belong to many organisations and associations.

The above two conditions – problematic pluralism due to the three basic social facts and the anti-essentialist notion of culture – constitute our challenge to the politics of multiculturalism, and this thesis attempts to address this challenge. We cannot start to engage in the politics of multiculturalism from the fact of problematic pluralism alone, as it will not capture the anti-essentialist notion of culture, which is also problematic due to contestable and contesting cultural practices and does not ossify individuals within culture. The point is that one can presume within problematic pluralism a concept of culture with an essentialist notion of culture – bounded and distinct. By the same token, we also cannot start from the premise of differences in culture alone, even with a notion of anti-essentialism, as it may overlook the problematic nature of pluralism, and how it may interact with plural social structures, for example gender differences. Hence, we need to ensure that the politics of multiculturalism captures both problematic pluralism and the anti-essentialist notion of culture along with complex interactions in the social world.

Given the paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture, on the one hand, and given that we are thrown into the problematic social world, on the other, then deliberating on contesting normative claims for recognition and justice can be loaded in favour of certain interests of the power holders. Hence we face an important question: How should freedom and multicultural social justice be understood? This thesis attempts to answer this core question by developing a normative account of

well-being based on certain insights drawn from Dilthey's idea of meaning in history along with Ronald Dworkin's (2000) concept of well-being from a liberal standpoint. Both Dilthey's and Dworkin's approaches emphasise our complex structure of convictions and how our meaningful context is integral to our well-being, resisting a reductionist view of well-being or a meaningful life. Hence their approaches allow me to show the complexity of ethical convictions and their formation, without deriving a theory of well-being with a reductionist view of what is a good or meaningful life, and thereby help me to argue, in a similar vein to Benhabib's as well as Arendt's emphasis, that we must be concerned with the circumstances of injustice that affect human conditions, within the multi-faceted, necessarily problematic, social world, rather than with a universal human nature. This argument allows us to ask whether minorities have an ethical situation in which they can pursue their meaningful activities according to their genuine convictions with fair challenges. Within a multicultural social world, people have various convictions of what is a good or meaningful life, but we must be concerned with the ethical situation and the preconditions – the right circumstances of justice – that ought to be given. Asymmetrical power relations can lead to ethical situations that are unjust, with unfair challenges to certain members of society in pursuing their well-being. Moreover, unjust ethical situations through the social conditioning of oppression can result in people being prevented from forming or revising and endorsing their convictions genuinely.

Given the three basic social facts and the vulnerabilities arising therefrom in the pursuit of well-being, as well as the anti-essentialist notion of culture, I argue that social freedom, rooted in the notion of freedom as non-domination – the republican concept of freedom – is a necessary normative parameter tied to social justice, which can accommodate other notions of freedom – 'option-freedom' and freedom of association and exit. I am arguing neither for assimilation, nor for isolation and segregation of post-immigration minorities. Rather I argue that justice of the right circumstances requires of members the 'capability' to participate in the social world as citizens of equal status. This implies their ability to pursue well-being by engaging in their meaningful activities according to their various as well as different ethical convictions. One's citizenship does not necessarily mean automatic entry into

each and every organisation, but rather not being unjustly denied membership based on one's particularities. And equal status implies that one is not treated as an inferior or a subordinated member of the society through lack of recognition or misrecognition of one's particularities or dominated through arbitrary interference. Mere membership does not necessarily mean equal status. I show that assault on one's equal status of citizenship is detrimental to social freedom, and hence it is an ethical concern. Hence multicultural social justice should be concerned with minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status, in their particularities, participating with the social world, without shame and subordination.

However, moral and cultural dimensions of both the majority and minorities are intertwined in a way that can lead to moral dilemmas and clashes. We cannot set out to resolve these dilemmas and clashes based on the idea that there is a singular notion of what is a good life that is applicable to all, or according to the majority's moral values, or with a notion that every life style practice should be publicly valued. This thesis maintains that we need to take into account our complex structure of ethical convictions and how our lived experiences and ideas of life interact in forming our convictions and hence that well-being or a good life cannot be reduced to a single 'master value'. Thus, I argue that multicultural social justice must ensure the minimal and common conditions of non-domination and social recognition for minorities' *capability* to deliberate as *citizens of equal status* in their particularities, that claims for recognition and justice should not violate these conditions, and that individuals and social institutions and, most importantly, the state have responsibilities in ensuring that these conditions prevail.

I show how the normative premise of multicultural social justice overcomes the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism on the politics of multicultural integration, especially for post-immigration ethnic minorities, whether they are based on cultural or social (including racial) aspects or both. I also show that multicultural social justice must also be concerned with many public policies that affect minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status. As a consequence, this thesis evaluates, against the set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration, the efficacy of the competing contemporary political theories of liberalism, communitarianism and civic republicanism. It

concludes that modern civic republicanism seems to comply with the set of normative criteria better than liberalism and communitarianism, even though it is generally presumed that the relationship between republicanism and multiculturalism is contentious, like that between republicanism and feminism. Contemporary republicans take freedom as non-domination as a central theme in the idea of republicanism along with how we should be concerned with asymmetrical power relations that give rise to common concerns and vulnerabilities, and therefore take responsibilities seriously.¹⁰ This conclusion that republicanism is a friend rather than a foe to the sort of multiculturalism that thesis advocates is not surprising, as the thesis critiques some aspects of liberalism and incorporates focal concepts of modern republicanism in relation to freedom, recognition, civic virtue and participation and deliberation as citizens of equal status in deriving the set of normative criteria.

This thesis consists of seven chapters. In Chapter 1, drawing mainly from Benhabib's (2002) critique of the essentialist notion of culture as well as from the works of other contemporary scholars who do the same (Carens 2000, Parekh 2000, Modood 2007, Phillips 2007 and Song 2007), I critique Kymlicka's liberal multiculturalism (1989 and 1995) and show that it has a propensity to fall into the trap of an essentialist notion of culture. Kymlicka's normative underpinning of his theory – cultural belonging for meaningful choices – is inadequate and has a tendency to lead post-immigration minorities into a second-class subordinate status. I also show that the recent retreat from multiculturalism in the Western democratic states is integral to the ongoing critique of the essentialist notion of culture, but does not represent a fatal blow to multiculturalism. I then present a model of culture drawing on Dilthey's ideas of culture and community that is sophisticated enough to highlight the nuances of an anti-essentialist notion of culture such as interaction, an element of dynamism, change and continuity as well as multiplicity of belonging. Dilthey's idea of interaction between 'cultural systems' and the 'external organisations of society' – social organisations – rooted in social life overcomes the essentialist notions of culture such as that it is deterministic, distinct, monolithic and static. Moreover, Dilthey places importance on individuals within the socio-cultural context. Instead of being enveloped by culture, Dilthey shows that we stand at the

¹⁰ It is to be noted that I am referring to contemporary republicans in relation to political theory and philosophy rather than to the politicians of republican politics.

centre of a whole series of interacting cultural systems, which enables us to adopt different personas depending on the context. He emphasises both the richness of cultural interactions and their diversity.

A person's memberships in and affiliations with associations and communities are important to the pursuit of activities in the social world. Many associations and the cultural content of activities are antecedent to an individual's birth and not entered into through a social contract. Choosing meaningful options and carrying them out according to cultural and social practices takes place within functionally differentiated intersecting 'cultural systems' such as language, religion, economics, arts, sports, etc., and interacting social organisations of the majority such as the public institutions of education, healthcare, utilities, as well private corporations. Hence, the minorities' participation – interaction and engagement – with the social world, consisting of cultural systems and the social organisations of the majority, gains significance. Liberals, including Kymlicka, attach importance to individuals being able to lead their lives according to their convictions of a good life; however, our convictions may be mistaken. Therefore, for liberals it is important that we can stand back and assess our convictions in the light of new experiences and ideas of life. However, as I discuss, in attaching importance to this assumption and placing normative weight on cultural membership, Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism falls into the trap of essentialising culture. As Benhabib (2002) argues, we should defend intercultural justice in the name of justice and freedom without essentialising culture.

In Chapter 2, I postulate that we should be concerned with the circumstances of injustice that are an *ethical concern* in order to raise an important question: Do the minorities in a multicultural state have the 'right circumstances' or a 'just society' to genuinely endorse their convictions and face 'fair challenges' in pursuing their meaningful activities based on their ethical convictions? In order to justify the above ethical concern we should attempt, as Benhabib maintains, to take into account the

meaning of the interacting systems and one's life from the 'social agent' herself rather than from the 'social observer'.¹¹

From the above perspective, I then outline the hypothesis in order to develop a normative basis of the theory. From Dilthey's idea of meaning in history, one's life is meaningful within one's socio-historical context and one stands at the intersection of cultural systems and the external organisations of society. Liberals and communitarians have either ignored or misunderstood the importance of this context; liberals attach importance to individuals and autonomous choices, whereas communitarians attach importance to communities; neither camp sufficiently addresses the context in terms of intersecting cultural systems and interacting social organisations in relation to an individual. Using the insights of Dilthey's notion of meaning in history, I propose a hypothesis for how a third person can understand an individual's meaningful life within a multicultural state, because within a multicultural state it is important that the state be able to evaluate any claims for justice.

Developing this viewpoint I show in Chapter 2 our complex structure of convictions and how a meaningful context is integral to our well-being, by understanding an account of a meaningful life. Individuals formulate their ethical convictions by interacting with the social world through 'lived experiences', which are expressed as 'experiences of life', and 'ideas of life'. The point is not to develop a theory of well-being but rather to show that the context is integral to one's meaningful life as well as the structure and complexity of our convictions. Dworkin cautions, in a similar vein to Dilthey's concept of a meaningful life, that we must suppress the 'reductionist impulse' of what is a good or meaningful life and 'accept not only the complexity but structure within the idea of well-being' (2000, p. 242). Moreover, his concept of well-being is in accord with liberalism, which Kymlicka relies upon. Hence, I attempt to integrate Dworkin's (2000) insights into the concept of well-being in order to emphasise ethical integrity with authenticity for a meaningful life. This allows me to show that individual well-being is important, and is constituted by engaging in meaningful activities; activities are meaningful according to one's

¹¹ I shall refer to a non-gender-specific person as 'she' instead of 'he / she' for the sake of economising words.

genuinely endorsed ethical convictions. One's context is integral to one's well-being, and gains normative significance, which is misunderstood by liberals and multiculturalists. Justice figures as a prime normative parameter of the ethical situation of the 'right circumstances' (Dworkin 2000). An individual's socio-cultural-historical-political context provides means and challenges in pursuing her meaningful activities; the right circumstances of justice provide her with fair challenges; however, incorrect normative 'parameters' of the circumstances applying to her ethical situation can lead to 'unfair challenges' – 'limitations' (Dworkin 2000).

In Chapter 3, within the normative context integral to well-being, I discuss a descriptive account of the 'limitations' minorities face as they participate in the social world. Post-immigration minorities are also interdependent social beings within the multicultural social world comprising the majority's intersecting cultural systems and external organisations. I show that some social aspects may become limitations to minorities in pursuing their well-being. Meaningful activities span both private and public spheres, and dichotomising private and public spheres according to the liberalist approach is problematic and can lead to marginalisation of ethnic minorities. Moreover, I show, on the one hand, that stigmatised and marginalised group identities cannot be ignored, and on the other, that people should not be confined to a singular identity, as both can restrict them from engaging in their meaningful activities, which is an ethical concern. I also briefly discuss the challenges that a state faces when integrating post-immigration minorities within the common institutions of the majority. The challenge is to provide meaningful 'cultural means' and options to minorities within the common institutions. The other challenge is that minorities' own external organisations, such as family, religious organisation and community, may dominate members of a minority group. I illustrate such challenges with some examples that are mostly discussed within the debate of multiculturalism.

We should be concerned with the ethical situation that ought to be given, and the right set of parameters is a precondition for the right circumstances. The ethical concern is not whether an individual might have her values or ideas of meaningful life objectively mistaken, but that she might never have had the opportunity to

participate as a citizen of equal status, to form her convictions with authenticity (Sumner 1996). However, cultural practices are normatively contested and contestable, even within a cultural group in which those practices are predominantly practised. Given that ‘cultures are internally contested sites for normative discussions among individuals “thrown” into situations that are loaded in favour of certain interests rather than others’,¹² we should be concerned with whether individuals, especially members of minorities, can deliberate on claims for justice on an equal footing, as citizens of equal status, and how we should resolve competing claims for justice and determine necessary normative parameters. The above concern sets our core problem of multiculturalism for us. The following three chapters, 4, 5 and 6, attempt to address the core problem.

I show in Chapter 4 that authenticity along with information may mitigate the ethical concern, but only partially as one may still be blocked or burdened when accessing one’s meaningful options, and hence informed autonomy – authenticity – alone is not adequate for the right circumstances of justice. Autonomy is affected by both the option-factor – meaningful options – and the agency-factor – accessibility of options – and is misconceived within the debate of multiculturalism. Hence, Phillip Pettit’s (2003) distinction of ‘agency-freedom’ and ‘option-freedom’ is useful to argue that the former can accommodate the latter, but not the other way round. However, agency-freedom is affected by both the burdening and blocking of meaningful options subjectively, or objectively, or both. Social freedom is essentially agency-freedom, the notion of freedom from domination through arbitrary interference, and is a necessary normative parameter tied to social justice for overcoming the ethical concern. It is to be noted that the notion of freedom as non-domination is one of the key features in the revival of republicanism (Pettit 1997b). Denial of one’s equal status deprives one not only of agency-freedom, but also option-freedom. Social freedom of citizens is undermined by domination through arbitrary interference, and by a lack of social recognition or misrecognition of their particularities which can lead to systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exploitation and exclusion; both situations can lead to denial of equal status for social participation. That is,

¹² I am indebted to Professor Bruce Haddock pointing out this concern.

multicultural social justice must be concerned with minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status, in their particularities, participating with the social world.

The above point raises important questions: What are the normative conditions that are necessary for multicultural social justice? Multicultural social justice may require several normative parameters, but how shall we go about determining them and what should be the minimal and common normative conditions? I show that Dworkin's normative framework of distribution of resources is inadequate to determine these conditions, as it is unable to overcome the asymmetrical power relations due to social endowments interacting with the social and political structures. Amartya Sen's and Martha Nussbaum's capability approaches provide a better normative framework to determine the necessary normative conditions, as it can take into account the politics of distribution and its deficiencies. Hence, what I shall refer to the 'politics of capability' helps me to argue that multicultural social justice must be concerned with minorities' 'capability to function' as citizens of equal status participating with the common institutions. That is, we should take into account both the politics of capability and freedom as non-domination more seriously within the politics of multicultural integration.

I show in Chapter 5 that the minimal and common normative conditions are social recognition and non-domination. How should social recognition be understood? Should the politics of distribution or the politics of recognition matter, or both, and should the politics of recognition be equated to the politics of identity/difference? I argue that social recognition has to go beyond the toleration and anti-discrimination of the group identity-based recognition that liberalism is concerned with. I first critique group identity for a normative theory of the politics of recognition equating to the politics of identity/difference. As Benhabib maintains, we should turn to democratic theories that are concerned with 'the public manifestation of cultural identities in civic spaces' rather than to multicultural theories that are based on the normative basis of 'classificatory taxonomies' of group identities (2002, p. 18). Hence she urges that democratic theorists should support movements for the space of 'narrative self-determination' and 'voluntary self-ascription' (2002, p. 19).

I therefore discuss some core aspects of both Nancy Fraser's and Axel Honneth's (2003) contemporary theories of recognition, which adopt non-essentialist approaches to problematic pluralism that include multicultural aspects of society. Although their theories contribute to some important normative foundations of claims for recognition without reifying identity and culture, they face challenges and dilemmas in evaluating competing claims for recognition. Nevertheless, their theories demonstrate that the normative foundation should be rooted in self-respect rather than in self-esteem or collective self-esteem. Claims for recognition must take into account the vulnerabilities that arise out of the three basic social facts. I show that Iseult Honohan's (2002) approach to the republican idea of social recognition along three dimensions of 'acknowledgement', 'authorisation' and 'endorsement' is helpful in addressing claims for recognition through deliberation within our problematic social world as citizens of equal status. However, recognition along these three dimensions cannot overcome domination, and therefore we need to ensure that the other minimal and common normative condition of non-domination – freedom from arbitrary interference – prevails for multicultural social justice. Non-domination and both social recognition and non-domination are complementary and founded upon the normative core of self-respect, not on self-esteem. I conclude that both conditions are necessary for minorities, in their particularities, to deliberate as citizens of equal status for claims for justice and recognition.

Within a multicultural state, moral as well as cultural dimensions of both the majority and minorities are intertwined. Individuals have various reasons for engaging in activities that are meaningful in accord with their convictions. Hence it is important that we look for moral obligation on the part of individuals rather than representatives of cultural groups, and that we show that individuals have responsibility for deliberating in claims for justice. In Chapter 6, I attempt to demonstrate that Dilthey's account of morality within T.M. Scanlon's 'contractualist' framework provides a better approach to emphasising individual moral responsibility than other contemporary accounts debated in multiculturalism (Raz 1986 & 1994, Parekh 2000 and Kukathas 2003), and I consider these contemporary moral accounts as I evaluate their theories within liberalism as well as communitarianism in Chapter 7. Scanlon's contractualist framework is useful in advancing my arguments of Dilthey's moral account, because Scanlon also gives an

account of well-being in similar vein to Dilthey's and shows that we cannot reduce well-being to a single overarching value of good or solely to the quality of experience. Scanlon gives a moral account based on how we should value something in terms of what kind of actions and attitudes are called for rather than how valuable it is. Dilthey's account of morality within Scanlon's framework of 'contractualism' provides a better account than Parekh's 'pluralist universalism' to seek moral obligations from individuals rather than from representatives of cultural groups. Morality should be acceptable (at least in the minimalist sense) in a way individuals cannot, as Scanlon says, 'reasonably reject'. Dilthey's account mediates between relativism and universalism on the one hand, and subjective values of individual and objective values of the society on the other. In doing so, it shows that it mediates between Parekh's (2000) account of plural universalism and Scanlon's 'benign' relativism and offers a better normative account than Parekh's and Scanlon's. Dilthey's account of double-sided morality regulates activities of individuals, externally through the purposive systems of society – law and a system of morality – and internally through one's conscience. It is not a minimalist universalism and a system of morality is expressed in a 'multiplicity of forms' taking into account 'peculiarities of locale'.

I demonstrate that social justice is the responsibility of both the state, other external organisations of the society and of the citizens. It is not that rights do not matter, and rights and responsibilities are in general symmetrical, but by taking responsibilities seriously we can ensure responsibilities are not forsaken even in cases where rights do not have counterpart responsibilities. Hence, civic virtues are important in fostering self-respect among the citizens enabling those responsibilities not to be forsaken; moreover, they are also important not to undermine others' self-respect, which is conducive to the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status. It is to be noted that republicanism takes responsibilities and civic virtues more seriously. However, I argue that the state has a moral responsibility – a duty with a sense of justice, and the capacity to deal with moral conflicts stemming from the practice and endorsement of minority-held convictions which are in opposition to those of the majority and to ensure fairer terms for the integration of post-immigration groups into the majority's relevant external organisations and intersecting cultural systems. An ethical situation of the right circumstances of

justice may require other important parameters for certain individuals or for certain groups; however, I shall argue that claims for recognition of multicultural social justice require that these parameters have to be tested against the minimal and common conditions of social recognition and non-domination as these very conditions are conducive for deliberation as citizens of equal status. I illustrate with examples, especially in relation to the Rushdie affair, the importance of these two conditions; furthermore, I shall also demonstrate using some other examples the importance of many aspects of public policy that are an integral part of the politics of multicultural integration. I conclude that the normative premise of multicultural social justice that I have been arguing for overcomes the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism, including unnecessary 'culturalisation' of certain groups who are discriminated against not on culture but on race or gender or class, to integrate post-immigration minorities into the wider society, and illustrate with some examples on deliberation of claims for justice. Finally, based on the development of the theory, I specify a set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration.

This thesis is intended neither to defend republicanism nor to develop a multicultural theory of the state, although it does critique some aspects of liberalism and incorporates some key features of republicanism in deriving the set of normative criteria. As a consequence, this thesis evaluates, in Chapter 7, the three main contending political theories of liberalism, communitarianism and what I term modern civic republicanism as they have been debated for multicultural citizenship. In so doing, Chapter 7 demonstrates the efficacy of the set of normative criteria in discriminating among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity in a principled manner. Although the coupling of republicanism and multiculturalism is considered contentious, I show that a 'modern' or 'neo-' civic republicanism is conducive to accommodating the sort of multiculturalism that this thesis advocates. Liberalism claims to be an advanced theory that effectively deals with human diversity and ethical pluralism, and Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism is a form of liberal multiculturalism. I critically evaluate whether or not the core notions of liberalism, both anti-perfectionism and perfectionism, focused on in contemporary debates meet the normative conditions of the criteria. Communitarianism, on the other hand, disputes the liberal conception of an

‘autonomous individual’; it claims that communitarian values are conducive to protecting communities against the eroding effects of the individual autonomy of liberalism (Kymlicka 2001, p.19). I do not engage in the debate about liberalism versus communitarianism; rather, I evaluate significant features of communitarianism against the set of criteria. I consider the role and structure of the communitarian state, in particular Parekh’s guidance on political integration for a political structure of authority to accommodate cultural communities on an equal footing.

Republicanism has been undergoing a revival over the last three decades (see Honohan 2002, p. 6) and there are several variations. Moreover, republicanism as a tradition is ‘constituted not of a single thread but of multiple interwoven strands’ (Honohan 2002, p. 5). However, the modern revival of republicanism as civic republicanism is mainly concerned with the freedom of individuals within an interdependent society and the political construction of community. I mainly follow the contemporary debates on civic republicanism by Honohan (2002) along with Pettit (1997) and Maurizio Viroli (2002) and evaluate the main features of civic republicanism of common goods, freedom and political community, deliberation and participation and civic virtue in meeting the set of normative criteria. One of the main reasons that I consider Honohan’s work is that I have also argued in favour of her concept of three-dimensional recognition which enables deliberation to authorise viewpoints acknowledging individuals’ specificities for endorsing practices. Moreover, I consider Pettit’s work on republicanism as I have also argued, using his work, that social freedom is to be understood as agency-freedom, the notion of freedom as non-domination, that can accommodate the notions of freedom of association or external organisation and exit. I show that modern civic republicanism attempts to overcome the limitations and challenges of both liberalism and communitarianism in complying with the set of normative criteria of the sort of multicultural state this thesis advocates.

In conclusion, both Benhabib’s critique of the essentialist notion of culture and Dilthey’s ideas of cultural systems and the external organisations of society help me to critique the essentialist notion of culture and to engage in the politics of multiculturalism within the paradigm of the anti-essentialist notion of culture.

Furthermore, the contemporary republican theories of Pettit and Honohan assist me in incorporating focal concepts of republicanism in deriving the set of normative criteria. Social freedom – the republican concept of freedom as non-domination – allows other notions of freedom – option-freedom and freedom of association and exit – to be accommodated. Multicultural social justice must be understood as minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status and it requires the minimal and common conditions of non-domination and social recognition along the three dimensions of specificity, authorisation and endorsement rooted in self-respect, which is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct. This normative underpinning of multicultural social justice overcomes the normative deficiency of Kymlicka's theory on liberal multiculturalism, and integrates post-immigration minorities within a multicultural state. The criteria developed in the main part of the thesis have the capacity to normatively discriminate among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity in a principled manner. Modern civic republicanism seems to offer a better prospect for meeting the set of normative criteria of the politics of multicultural integration than liberalism or communitarianism. It may be plausible to modify liberalism, taking into consideration the strengths of republicanism, to meet the set of criteria, but that would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

CHAPTER 1

A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contributes to the recent ongoing critiques of essentialist notions of culture (Carens 2000, Parekh 2000, Benhabib 2002, Modood 2007, Phillips 2007 and Song 2007) and presents a model of 'culture' within the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture. My point of departure is Will Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism (1989 & 1995), which is considered as 'the single clearest starting point in anglophone political theories of multiculturalism' (Modood 2007, p. 21).¹³ Kymlicka has been at the forefront of debates surrounding multiculturalism and his is illustrative of the type of theory against which 'revisionists' react. His theory of liberal multiculturalism (1989, 1995, 2001 & 2007) has a propensity to fall into the trap of an essentialist notion of culture and thereby collapses a multicultural society into plural 'monocultures', which is problematic in attempting to integrate post-immigration ethnic minorities into the wider society. The recent discussions on the 'retreat from multiculturalism' (Joppke 2004; see Phillips 2007, pp. 21-25), especially multiculturalism towards ethnic immigrant minorities within the Western liberal democratic states, seem to suggest, and I shall illustrate, that the underlying problem of multicultural policy is exactly this notion of cultural essentialism to which Kymlicka appears to be committed. Seyla Benhabib warns that the essentialist notion of culture based on a faulty epistemology of 'reductionist sociology of culture' has 'grave normative political consequences for how we think injustices among groups should be redressed and how we think human diversity and pluralism should be furthered' (2002, pp. 4-5). This thesis attempts to address intercultural injustices, human diversity and pluralism within a paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture.

¹³ Modood (2007, p. 21) points out that Kymlicka's book *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995) is one of the most cited and discussed texts in relation to political multiculturalism.

In developing my argument, I draw upon some important arguments proposed by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), the significance of which is to show how each society is a multiplicity of cultures of interaction, both formal and informal, which cut through and across individuals. Dilthey may not be an obvious point of reference in the contemporary debate, but he introduces an element of dynamism, movement and change that is largely suppressed in essentialist notions of culture. A multicultural social world consists of intersecting cultural systems and interacting social organisations, and individuals stand at the intersection of these systems engaging in their multiple and diverse activities. I demonstrate that Dilthey's concept of culture can be developed, with reference to Benhabib's (2002) anti-essentialist notion of culture, to address the multicultural political challenge in interesting and original ways. Benhabib adds to Dilthey the issue posed by a Heideggerian sense of 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*), i.e. that we are 'thrown' into 'webs of interlocution' within a multi-faceted and, necessarily, problematic social world. This is developed by Hannah Arendt in her emphasis on the human condition, rather than on a universal human nature.¹⁴

As I discussed in the Introduction, the human condition, being-in-the-world, consists of three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – resulting in the modern multicultural social world. This multi-faceted world is problematic to members of minority groups because of vulnerabilities posed by asymmetrical power relations, which can lead to domination through arbitrary interference and systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation due to non-recognition of minorities' particularities when participating with the social world.¹⁵ This not only fails to facilitate their becoming unique individuals through 'narrative self-determination in cultural terms' within webs of interlocution (Benhabib 2002, p. 19), but also, most importantly, hinders them in developing their *capabilities* to pursue activities according to their convictions. Thus, this thesis attempts to highlight the problematic multicultural social world and to derive a set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration.

¹⁴ I am indebted to Professor David Boucher for his clarification on Arendt's contribution.

¹⁵ I shall discuss these aspects in detail in Chapters 2 and 4.

Dilthey's notion of culture emphasises the importance of individuals and their individualities without reifying groups and communities. Our multicultural challenge is to justify the claims of culture relying not on a theoretically impoverished essentialist conception of society, but rather on one which gives importance to individual agency. The anti-essentialist notion of culture does not mean that culture does not matter; culture matters; but the point within the multicultural debate should be in what ways and in which context culture matters for claims for justice. I attempt to show that we need to reframe the debate on multiculturalism, but not on the basis of cultural membership as a primary good, for which Kymlicka argues. Rather, we have to combat circumstances of injustice due to cultural differences and practices of citizens with their particularities in multiple dimensions – economic, social, political as well as cultural.

Thus this chapter focuses on how to take cultural diversity into account within the politics of multicultural integration without collapsing a multicultural society into plural monocultures with the essentialist notion of culture, which is holistic, static and deterministic, and to give importance to individual agency without reifying groups and communities. To address this question, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first critiques Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism and shows that his theory falls into the trap of an essentialist notion of culture and thereby collapses a multicultural society into plural monocultures. I shall show that his theory suffers from normative deficiencies in attempting to integrate post-immigration ethnic minorities into the wider society. The second section briefly discusses the recent retreat from multiculturalism within Western democracies and argues that the anti-essentialist notion of culture has become an integral part of the critique of multiculturalism. But I argue that it does not deliver a fatal blow to the politics of multiculturalism. The third section attempts to model culture within the paradigm of the anti-essentialist notion of culture by drawing on Benhabib's critique of the essentialist notion of culture and by taking on the insights of Dilthey's approach to culture and community. I argue that Dilthey's notion of culture in terms of intersecting cultural systems and interacting social organisations is helpful in a deliberation of cultural practices for the claims of recognition. I shall show that Dilthey's account of the relationship between individuals and culture is important.

Individuals do not merely interact with cultures that are external to them. Rather, they are at the intersection of myriad cross-cutting cultural systems (of many different sorts), and this entails a sophisticated model of culture that captures dynamic complex interaction, change and continuity. Hence, Dilthey's focus on relations of dominance and dependence as well as the issues of social/cultural misrecognition and non-recognition become important in that both strike at the heart of who we are in our complex interactions within the social world pursuing our meaningful activities. The above aspects of domination and social recognition are central to this thesis, which focuses on claims for justice of differing cultural practices within our multi-faceted, and necessarily problematic, social world.

KYMLICKA'S THEORY OF LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM AND THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE NORMATIVE PREMISES

In this section, I first outline Kymlicka's arguments that account for the rise of liberal multiculturalism, which he sees in terms of three distinct minority groups – indigenous peoples, 'substate national' groups and immigrants – as well as the normative premises of his liberal theory of multiculturalism. The first two categories of minorities are generally referred to as national minorities, whereas the last category especially refers to ethnic groups or post-immigration ethnic minorities within Western democratic states. Black Americans are treated differently and are a special case for him. I shall attempt to show not only that his demarcation of national minorities versus immigrants is problematic, but also that his normative premise of cultural membership from a liberal standpoint has deficiencies when applied to immigrants or to any other groups that are not culturally differentiated and delineated. The deficiencies, I argue, stem from the preferential treatment of national minorities versus immigrants along with Kymlicka's concept of culture: 'societal culture', which is an essentialist notion of culture – holistic, distinct and static.

In his recent book *Multicultural Odysseys* (2007), Kymlicka gives a clear account of the reasons for the rise of liberal multiculturalism, addressing the rights of three different kinds of minorities – indigenous peoples, 'substate national' groups and immigrant groups. Liberal multiculturalism, in a variety of forms, has arisen as a response to three interrelated ideas. First, the state is not neutral as between the majority and minorities, but it invariably belongs to the dominant group. Second, the

state's nation-building policies of national homogenisation are exclusionary and assimilationist towards the minorities (the non-dominant groups) and favour the majority (the dominant group). And third, there is historic injustice towards the indigenous peoples and the non-dominant national minorities. Kymlicka (2007, p. 64) asserts that virtually every Western democracy, including post-communist and post-colonial states, has pursued the model of 'national homogeneity' at one stage or another, and has created unfavourable conditions for minorities within social, economic and political domains.

As a result, Kymlicka points out that the various substate groups have contested the states' attempts to construct homogenous nation-building states and have advocated instead a 'more multicultural model of the state' (2007, p. 65). He demonstrates (2007, pp. 65-66) the general principles common to the struggles of the different types of minorities for a multicultural state: 1) 'the state must be seen as belonging equally to all citizens'; 2) 'individuals should be able to access state institutions, and act as full and equal citizens in political life, without having to hide or deny their ethnocultural identity'; and 3) the state should acknowledge the 'historic injustice' done to minority (non-dominant) groups. However, each minority group has responded differently to majority nation-building. National minorities have typically responded by fighting to maintain their institutional structure including their language and territory, or by adopting their own nation-building programme. Kymlicka agrees that such measures by national minorities seem fair. With regard to immigrants, Kymlicka argues that they cannot adopt their own nation-building programme, as they have accepted that their own as well as their children's 'life-chances' are tied to participating in the majority's institutions that function in the majority's language (2001, p. 30). But he accepts that immigrants can demand 'fairer terms of integration'.

Kymlicka (2007, pp. 88-91) explains that liberal multiculturalism has been built over time in Western democracies due to a number of facilitating conditions at different stages. One of the conditions is the human rights revolution. This brought about a set of ideas of ethnic and racial equality and political movements that challenged ethnic and racial hierarchies. The other conditions are racial desegregation, which was initiated by the African-American civil rights struggles, and civil rights liberalism.

The latter effectively contests ethnic and racial hierarchies in the forms of exclusions, stigmatisations and inequalities that prevail in Western democracies. These facilitating conditions, as Kymlicka emphasises, have most importantly led historically subordinated groups to demand equality as a *right* and to believe that they are entitled to it *now* (2007, p. 91).

Kymlicka (2007, pp. 66-77) observes three general trends of liberal multiculturalism within Western democracies, and identifies three key features of liberal multiculturalism. The first trend concerns the treatment of indigenous peoples; since the early 1970s many specific policies have been targeted towards recognising indigenous peoples as distinct societies with the land claims, cultural rights and self-government rights to sustain themselves as distinct societies. The second trend concerns the treatment of 'substate national' groups. This trend is 'a shift from suppressing substate nationalisms to accommodating them through regional autonomy and official language rights' (2007, p. 70). Kymlicka acknowledges that although these two minority groups – indigenous peoples and substate national minorities – do not use the term 'multicultural approach' to describe those specific policies of accommodation that are different from assimilation, he lists those specific policies as 'emblematic or representative of the new multicultural approach' (2007, pp. 67 & 71). It is to be noted, however, that the policies adopted by various countries towards these minority groups differ in scope and depth.

The third approach concerns the treatment of immigrant groups. The shift towards a multicultural approach to treating immigrants from an assimilationist approach stems from two related changes. The first one is the adoption of 'race-neutral admissions criteria' in immigration policy since the late 1960s, and the second is the adoption of a more 'multicultural conception of integration'. These two changes have occurred in varying degrees in those Western democracies that traditionally admit immigrants. There is a link between immigration policy and multiculturalism; however, it is complex and in general theories of multiculturalism do not include immigration policy (Kymlicka 2007, p. 74, n. 13). As my concern in this thesis is with the multicultural integration of post-immigration ethnic minorities, I shall not include the issues related to immigration policy under the politics of multicultural integration.

Kymlicka (1995, p. 11) points out that immigrants do not usually have complete institutional structures as the national minorities do. They do not seek self-determination as a nation as they have voluntarily accepted migration and integration into the wider society. Therefore, they do not require their own complete institutional structures, but they require policies of multiculturalism that modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences. Kymlicka (1995, pp. 30-31) notes that immigrants of ethnic groups first demanded the right to freely express their particularity without fear of prejudice or discrimination in mainstream society. He further points out that the most controversial demand ethnic groups make is for exemptions from rules and regulations that disadvantage them due to their religious practices. He also correctly notes that the 'group-specific measures' are usually intended to promote 'integration into the larger society' so that ethnic groups and religious minorities can express their 'cultural particularity and pride', and engage with economic and political institutions without impediments to their success (1995, p. 31).

Kymlicka lists eight policies, excluding immigration policy, as the most emblematic forms of immigrant multiculturalism (2007, p. 73). These include 'affirmative action policies, mechanisms for political participation and consultation, and the development of health care and social service delivery models that are adapted to the needs of minorities' (2007, p. 80). Several policies are intended 'to enhance access to state power, public services, and economic opportunities' (2007, p. 80). Kymlicka concludes that these trends with regard to the three different types of minorities – indigenous people, substate national minorities and immigrant groups – show three different key features of liberal multiculturalism. Let me briefly describe them.

The first is that Western liberal multiculturalism is highly 'group-differentiated' and that countries target different groups with different specific policies with very different speed and scope, and of course not all countries have these three different types of minorities – indigenous peoples, substate national minorities and immigrant groups. The second is that 'liberal multiculturalism as it has evolved in the West is not restricted to questions of symbolic recognition or identity politics. It also addresses issues of power and resources, in particular in relation to the national

minorities (2007, p. 80). The point he makes is that claims by minority groups address ‘multiple forms of subordination’ within political, economic and social dimensions:

Some groups, like indigenous peoples, are disproportionately concentrated in vulnerable economic positions, politically marginalised, and subject to demeaning or silencing cultural representations—and their claims address these multiple forms of subordination (2007, p. 81).

Third, the ‘strength of multiculturalism’ in various countries ‘does not track the extent to which these states have repudiated nation-building, but rather, the extent to which nation-building has been transformed in a more pluralistic direction’ (2007, p. 84). He concludes that state nation-building taking a multicultural approach ‘not only recognises particular minority identities, but seeks to transform the economic opportunities, political powers, and social status available to bearers of that identity’ (2007, p. 81). The point is that the politics of liberal multiculturalism attempts not to exclude certain types of identity bearers – indigenous peoples, substate national minorities and immigrant minority – from participating in the social world in economic, political and social spheres. But my question is why only these three minority groups are considered under the politics of liberal multiculturalism and the normative justification of differentiating these groups for group-differentiated rights. I shall therefore discuss Kymlicka’s reasons for differentiating immigrant multiculturalism against the multicultural approach to national minorities, and the underpinning moral significance of cultural membership to justify claims for justice of specific multicultural policies.

From the standpoint of political liberalism, the normative underpinning of Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship is the moral significance of cultural membership. Kymlicka (1995, Ch. 7; 1989, Ch. 8) stresses the importance of people belonging to a cultural group, i.e. of them having a sense of ‘cultural belonging’, because he argues that cultural membership is a ‘primary good’ (1989, p. 166). Primary goods, according to Rawls’ theory of justice, are those that any citizen would need irrespective of any particular conception of the good he or she has (Rawls 1999 & 2005). Moreover, all the primary goods are necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers that are constituent of

the political conception of the person, ‘a capacity for sense of justice and a capacity for the conception of the good’ (Lægaard 2005, p. 337; cf. Rawls 2005). Rawls considers one of the most important primary goods is ‘the social bases of self-respect’. Kymlicka argues that cultural membership provides both the meaningful options and self-respect. With regard to meaningful options, Kymlicka argues that we do not decide how to lead our lives in a vacuum and many options are given, and ‘a context of choice provides us with different ways of life’ (1989, p. 164):

In deciding how to lead our lives, we do not start *de novo*, but rather we examine ‘definite ideals and forms of life that been developed and tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes for generations’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 164; cf. Rawls 1971, pp. 563-564).

Kymlicka emphasises that ‘[t]he idea of seeing the value of our activities is very important’ and hence he considers self-respect, according to Rawls’ understanding the ‘sense that one’s plan of life is worth carrying out’, as a *precondition* of any rational life plan (1989, p. 164; cf. Rawls 1971/1999, p. 386).¹⁶ According to Rawls, liberty is so important in order to ensure self-respect by examining our life plans, and to confirm if they are worth pursuing. Rawls attaches the utmost importance to self-respect in his theory of justice and argues that the representatives in his hypothetical original position ‘would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 166; cf. Rawls 1999, p. 386). Within this context, Kymlicka sees that one of the social conditions that can undermine self-respect is ‘the loss of cultural membership’ (1989, p. 166). The point is that cultural membership is crucial for an individual’s self-respect, and therefore it deserves the status of primary good.

Kymlicka argues that the centrality of cultural membership to self-respect is entailed by the way in which it shapes our identity: ‘Cultural membership has a “high social profile”, in the sense that it affects how others perceive and respond to us, which in turn shapes our self-identity’ (1995, p. 89). For Kymlicka, cultural identity provides an ‘anchor’ for one’s ‘self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging’ (1995, p. 89). Hence, Kymlicka construes, respect for a culture is crucial

¹⁶ It is to be noted that Rawls sometimes uses self-esteem and self-respect interchangeably. In Chapter 4, I shall discuss self-respect versus self-esteem and define self-respect as constituted by autonomy, character and conduct enabling one to pursue meaningful activities within an interdependent society.

for members' self-respect and dignity. As he puts it: '[P]eople's self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which their national group is held. If a culture is not respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened' (1995, p. 89; also quoted in Song 2007, p. 24; cf. Margalit and Raz 1990, pp. 447-449).¹⁷ Kymlicka is careful in emphasising that he uses 'culture' to refer to 'cultural community' or 'cultural structure' itself, not the *character* of a historical community (1989, pp. 166-167). By character he means 'the norms, values, and their attendant institutions in one's community (e.g. membership in churches, political parties, etc.)' (1989, p. 166). The point is that 'the cultural community continues to exist even when its members are free to modify the character of culture, should they find its traditional ways of life no longer worth while' (1989, p. 167). Hence, he stresses: 'It is the existence of a *cultural community* viewed as *a context of choice* that is a *primary good*, and a legitimate concern of liberals' (1989, p. 169; emphases added; see also Song 2007, p. 25).

However, Kymlicka is not clear about what cultural aspects make a minority group a cultural community. He concedes that defining a minority cultural community is a 'vexed problem'; however, he suggests that any definition will contain 'an objective component dealing with such things as a common heritage and language' (1989, p. 179, n. 2). Hence, he seems to associate language, history and heritage as significant cultural aspects of the cultural community (1989, p. 168), as he stresses their importance for the range of options for leading a valuable autonomous life.

The decision about how to lead our lives must ultimately be ours alone, but this decision is always a matter of selecting what we believe to be most valuable from the various options available, selecting from a context of choice which provides us with different ways of life.

This is important because the range of options is *determined* by our *cultural heritage* (1989, pp. 164-165; emphases added).

Our *language and history* are the media through which we come to an awareness of the options available to us, and their significance; and this is a *precondition* of making intelligent judgements about how to lead our lives (1989, p. 165; emphases added).

¹⁷ I shall argue importance of self-respect in Chapter 5 which is not tied to respect for culture.

The distinction that Kymlicka attempts to draw between cultural structure and character faces difficulties. First, he does not take into account religious practices as significant to a cultural community, as they are part of the character of culture rather than the structure itself (1989, p. 168). It is problematic when communities give significance to their religious practices for their meaningful context of choice. Second, some communities may attach importance to their customs, rituals, norms and practices, which are the particular character of a culture that may constitute what it means to be a member. And, third, a context of choice provided by a culture cannot ignore norms, customs and practices of a culture, to which Kymlicka seems to attach less importance than to the cultural structure – the community (Song 2007, p. 26). Therefore, Sarah Song argues that ‘it is hard to make sense of cultural structures on the verge of extinction without some account of the particular character or content of cultures’ (2007, p. 25). This is not to argue for the preservation of culture per se; rather, I want to point out the difficulty of differentiating cultural structure and character. But it seems that Kymlicka gives importance to language and history, and hence one may argue that these should be the aspects to be preserved. Kymlicka argues that any significant change in people’s religious affiliations does not destroy the old ‘culture’, but he emphasises that culture should be defined as ‘a viable community of individuals with a shared heritage (language, history, etc.)’ (1989, p. 168). Yet it is not clear how these cultural aspects of language and history may provide a member of a minority cultural group with a context of choice for leading a valuable autonomous life engaging in many activities in the social world, for example within the economic and social spheres which are interdependent of the majority’s many social and economic institutions.

Kymlicka makes a move to address the above concern in his 1995 work *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. He describes ‘a culture as synonymous with a “nation” or “a people” – that is, as an intergenerational community, *more or less institutionally complete*, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history’ (p. 18, emphasis added). His emphasis is that culture is not only about sharing a distinct language and history, but, most importantly, it is also about many institutions that support a wide range of human activities. Taking this aspect into consideration, he defines what he calls a ‘societal culture’ – ‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of

life across the *full range of human activities*, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, *encompassing both public and private spheres*' (1995, p. 76; emphases added). Kymlicka takes into account 'common institutions and practices', covering 'most areas of human activity', acknowledging that 'in the modern world, for a culture to be embodied in social life means that it must be institutionally embodied – in schools, media, economy, government, etc.' (1995, p. 76). The important point is that 'the availability of *meaningful options* depends on access to a societal culture...' (1995, p. 85; emphasis added). He argues: 'Given the enormous significance of social institutions in our lives, and in determining our options, any culture which is not a societal culture will be reduced to ever-increasing marginalisation' (1995, p. 80). Hence, he equates a societal culture with a 'nation', arguing that 'for a culture to survive and develop given the pressures towards the creation of a single common culture in each country, it must be a societal culture' (1995, p. 80).

The capacity and motivation to form and maintain such a distinct culture is characteristic of 'nations' or 'peoples' (i.e. culturally distinct, geographically concentrated, and institutionally complete societies). Societal cultures, then, tend to be *national cultures* (1995, p. 80; emphasis added).

Kymlicka argues, from a liberal standpoint, that cultural membership in a societal culture is important for the citizens' freedom to engage in a variety of activities in order to lead meaningful lives in the modern world. Kymlicka points out that the 'defining feature' of liberalism 'grants people a wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life' (1995, p. 80). It requires that we have two preconditions for leading a good life (1995, p. 81): 'The first is that we lead our life from inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life'. However, we can be mistaken about our beliefs. Deriving from the liberal tradition of 'John Stuart Mill to the most prominent contemporary American liberals, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin', Kymlicka emphasises the liberal assumption 'that our beliefs about good life are fallible and revisable' (1995, p. 81). Therefore, the second precondition is required, which is that we be free to question our beliefs. Hence, individuals must have 'the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views of good

life'. Kymlicka however states that the second precondition requires that we be free to examine those beliefs 'in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments *our culture can provide*' (1995, p. 81; emphasis added). But it is not clear how one is able to question those beliefs within one's own societal culture, which may be restrictive in terms of the conceptions of good life, and one would also require awareness, perhaps even the availability, of others' societal cultures in order to compare and evaluate (see Knight 2004, p. 190; also Parekh 2000, p. 226).

Nevertheless, on the basis of the moral significance of cultural membership, Kymlicka argues for substantial group-differentiated rights of national minorities as nations with complete institutional structures providing meaningful choices to the members of the national minorities. He considers the members' 'homeland' to be an important aspect. The point is that national minorities may have been involuntarily integrated 'through conquest, war and even the purchase of territories' (Benhabib 2002, p. 63). As Kymlicka puts it:

For one thing, majority cultures would have a perverse incentive to destroy the societal culture of national minorities, and then cite that destruction as a justification for compelling assimilation. We should not establish a system which enables majorities to profit from their own injustices (1995, p. 100).

In a democratic society, the majority nation will always have its language and societal culture supported, and will have the legislative power to protect its interests in culture-affecting decisions (1995, p. 113).

Moreover, according to the liberalist camp of state neutrality, the state should not interfere with the cultural marketplace – 'it should neither promote nor inhibit the maintenance of any particular culture. Rather, it should respond with "benign neglect" to ethnic and national differences' (Kymlicka 1995, p. 108). However, Kymlicka maintains that the state cannot be truly neutral with 'benign neglect' in responding to cultural differences.

The idea of responding to cultural differences with 'benign neglect' makes no sense. Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognising, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups (Kymlicka 1995, p. 108).

Therefore, Kymlicka argues, 'we should aim at ensuring that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as distinct culture, if they so choose.

This ensures that the good of cultural membership is equally protected for the members of all national groups' (1995, p. 113). Hence, Kymlicka supports the view that the national minorities must also engage in their own competing form of a modern, state-sponsored nation-building programme, which consists of, for example, 'standardised public education, official languages, including language requirements for citizenship and government employment, etc.' (1997, pp. 55-56; see also Carens 2000, p. 63). As far as immigrants are concerned, according to Kymlicka, they have fewer claims to cultural rights because they have voluntarily accepted migration and integration into the wider society (Benhabib 2002, p. 63). One of those claims for immigrants has primarily involved some accommodation or recognition of cultural heritage in the private sphere due to their rejection of 'Anglo-conformity' (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 78-79).¹⁸ The key point is that Kymlicka expects immigrants to be able to participate in the majority's societal culture in the public sphere. Thus the question arises whether a post-immigration ethnic minority meets the conditions for participating within the majority's societal culture as equal status members. In this regard, this thesis focuses on the necessary and minimal normative conditions for minorities to participate in the social world. I shall argue in Chapter 4 that these conditions are 1) non-domination and 2) social recognition.

Kymlicka is correct in arguing that state neutrality is an impossible goal when the state unavoidably recognises the majority's cultural norms and identities (see Modood 2007, p. 24). This leaves the others in a disadvantageous position, which is unjust to the minorities. I agree that forced assimilation of minorities, whether national minorities or immigrants, is wrong (see Carens 2000, p. 60). It may appear to be somewhat successful in improving the social standing of the minorities, but in many cases the ethnic minorities suffer and lose dignity (see Young 1990, pp. 164-165; cf. Mason 1999, pp. 268-269). The minorities who resist forced assimilation often face a subordinated status in the economic, social and political arenas, and are marginalised or excluded from participating in the institutions of the majority. It is not that assimilation per se is bad. Members of a minority group may voluntarily

¹⁸ Parekh stated that in the case of Australia the country was committed to multiculturalism in the early 1970s because of its 'Asianisation' and the presence of 'nonassimilable types' (2000, p. 5). It is to be noted that Australia adopted multiculturalism as a policy after abandoning the racially discriminatory 'white-only Australia policy' it had held for 150 years. This policy was officially overturned in 1973, while some of its related policies extended until 1982.

assimilate into many aspects of the majority's norms, practices and ideas of good life. However, there is still a concern as to the conditions under which minorities may wish to assimilate. The question is whether the conditions are just or unjust, and I shall show in Chapter 2 that circumstances of justice are integral to one's well-being. As I mentioned, even coerced assimilation may have some prudential benefits to the minorities. But multiculturalists claim that there is still a significant loss in assimilation even if all members of minority groups benefit from, or agree to, it. Minorities lose their dignity when their cultures are holistically rejected as inferior to the majority's.

It may be that certain cultural practices of minorities clash with the majority's moral values and ethical norms. But the presumption of a holistic notion of culture is wrong and problematic and does not allow us to deliberate on cultural practices without assimilating or isolating cultures as wholes. First, even a majority's culture is heterogeneous and dynamic and its members lead their lives with different ethical convictions of good life. For example, Swiss society, in addition to social differences based on sex, sexuality, and family status, is heterogeneous in terms of language, religion and politics at the cantonal level. There are multiple modes of being Swiss, and some of the values of each mode are incommensurable with the other modes. Furthermore, moral values and ethical conceptions of good life go through changes, and there are ethical and moral dilemmas even among the majority. For example, the majority may differ in their convictions regarding homosexual marriages, euthanasia, abortion and stem cell research. Therefore, the demand for assimilation of immigrants cannot be based on a single mode of being of the majority and its socio-cultural practices in all areas of life. Second, minorities want to lead their lives according to the modes of being that are meaningful to them. I shall show in Chapter 2 that when people engage in activities that are in accord with their convictions, then these activities are meaningful. Any demand for a mode of being dictated by the majority will lead to a 'mode of oppression' (Modood 2005, p. 159).¹⁹ But this does not mean we cannot deliberate on cultural practices for intercultural justice and freedom, and this thesis attempts to do that.

¹⁹ I address these issues from an identity perspective in Chapter 3.

Moreover, Kymlicka's concept of societal culture as a context of choice seems to move away from giving significance to a distinct shared language, history and territorial integrity, and towards attaching more importance to institutions for providing a full range of human activities in many dimensions. However, I shall show that his normative premise of cultural membership for claims of group-differentiated rights encounters difficulties for several reasons. First, differentiating national minorities from ethnic immigrants is problematic even at a 'descriptive level'. Second, it is problematic from the standpoint of the liberalism committed to individual freedom. And, third, his argument for a secure sense of identity in connection with self-respect through cultural membership is also problematic. These difficulties arise, as I shall argue, from his concept of societal culture, which falls into the trap of cultural essentialism.

On *prima facie*, Kymlicka's argument for differentiating between national minorities and immigrants and their claims appears valid, 'since the basis of all political legitimacy must be some form of the governed' (Benhabib 2002, p. 63). However, as Benhabib argues, 'it is no longer distinctiveness of societal cultures and the differences between their cultures that permit us to make such claims, but rather it is claims about justice, about democratic inclusion and exclusion that justify our disparate treatment of groups' (2002, p. 63). Even if we accept these differentiated claims about justice, Benhabib cautions that differentiation of national minorities and ethnic immigrants may lead us down the path of cultural essentialism (2002, p. 63). She argues that, on the one hand, the conquered groups may assimilate successfully into the larger society, especially when the 'history of annexation, conquest and incorporation' lies far back, and they may then come to 'resemble ethnic minorities more than do separate nations'. And, '[t]o insist upon the historical genealogy of their incorporation, particularly if their own historical memory and life conditions do not actively keep this alive, may be tantamount to *cultural essentialism*' (2002, p. 63; emphasis added). On the other hand, some of the 'successfully integrated minority groups at some point may *rediscover* their separate path out of what seemed a common journey'. The point she makes is that, '[t]he distinction then between multinationals and ethnocultural groups is not static but *dynamic*, and it alone cannot suffice for us to differentiate between the recognition claims and aspirations of distinct human groupings' (2002, p. 64; emphasis added).

As Joseph Carens argues, on the one hand, not every national minority may have (or could have) a complete set of institutions of its own – a societal culture, including, as Kymlicka suggests, ‘some control over immigration policies’ with a ‘political body or political unit which they substantially control’ (2000, p. 62; cf. Kymlicka 1997, p. 54). And, on the other hand, even immigrant communities establish some institutions and practices that may provide a context of choice in ‘social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic dimensions and exist in the public as well as private sphere’ (see Carens 2000, p. 62). But, Kymlicka argues, ‘weakened and oppressed cultures can regain and enhance their richness, if given the appropriate conditions’ (1995, p. 100). He goes on to state that ‘It is the potentiality of societal cultures that matters, not just their current state, and it is even more difficult for outsiders to judge the potentiality of a culture than to judge its current state’ (1995, pp. 100-101). Kymlicka’s point is that the differentiation of national minorities and immigrants is based on the argument that national minorities have a societal culture, even if it is weakened and oppressed, and have the capacity to carry out a nation-building programme, whereas immigrant groups have ‘neither motivation nor the capacity’ to undertake such a nation-building programme (Carens 2000, p. 63). Furthermore, Kymlicka claims that immigrants voluntarily leaving their homelands have ‘waived’ the right to their culture and have consented to become integrated into the mainstream society (1995, p. 96).

I agree that immigrants are not seeking nationhood with a complete set of institutions, but Kymlicka’s above justification for immigrants having waived their right is problematic. He considers a particular type of immigrants who have voluntarily emigrated and accepted integration into the wider society, although he concedes that it is difficult to draw a line between involuntary refugees and voluntary migrants, ‘especially in a world with massive injustice in the international distribution of resources, and with different levels of respect for human rights’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 99; see also Carens 2000, p. 81). Post-immigration ethnic minorities have emigrated for various reasons and under various circumstances. As Modood (2007, p. 33) points out, the various circumstances include a legacy of the British Empire; for example, ‘the view of many migrants of the 1950s was that they were being called to the “mother country” to assist in its economic reconstruction

and in its new health services'. One should also remember that colonisation entailed genocide and the exploitation of native people, and that during the post-colonial period, internal ethnic wars and economic hardships led many people from these colonised countries to migrate to previous colonial countries. Should they be considered voluntary or involuntary immigrants?

In addition, as Benhabib (2002, pp. 62-63) argues, differentiation between national minorities and immigrants is 'hard to sustain' even at the 'descriptive level'. For example, the large German-speaking minority in Eastern European, Baltic and Russian territories is united through a common language without claiming a homeland in every state. Should the minority be considered a national minority or an ethnic immigrant minority? A national minority may become more like an ethnic minority through political and historical developments. As Benhabib points out, arguably, Puerto Ricans have become one of the largest ethnic and immigrant groups in many cities of the United States through frequent immigration, intermarriage with Central American and Spanish-speaking communities and through the seasonal labour market. Should they be considered as a national minority outside of Puerto Rico but within the United States, or as an ethnic immigrant group?

Kymlicka concedes that it is hard to fit many groups such as refugees, guestworkers and African-Americans neatly into the categories of national minorities and immigrants (1995, p. 101; see Benhabib 2002, p. 63). He also admits that 'there are many such hard cases and grey areas' (1995, p. 101); for example, some groups have 'given rise to nationalistic movements, even though they do not fit the usual pattern of "national" groups' (1995, p. 217, n. 26). He also observes that in some cases even an existing national group as a distinct nation has undergone deep divisions along racial or religious lines, that it has developed into two or more groups as distinct nations, even though they continue to share a common language (1995, p. 217, n. 26). But Kymlicka maintains that 'national minorities have societal cultures and immigrant groups do not', even though he admits 'there is of course no necessity about this' (1995, p. 101). For example, Kymlicka points out that, on the one hand, it is possible to settle immigrants collectively as a group and empower them to become in effect national minorities, and on the other, it is also possible 'to tear down and disperse national minorities so that in effect they become indistinguishable from

uprooted immigrants' (1995, p. 101). However, he maintains that his emphasis on the distinction is not to resolve the 'hard cases' but to be clear about the 'relevant interests'. For him, from a liberal standpoint, what matters is that people have access to a societal culture that provides them with a context of choice. But his distinction between national minorities and immigrants on the basis of societal culture equating to a nation leads him to fall into the trap of cultural essentialism. I shall show that even if we accept his insistence on the differentiation between national minorities and immigrant groups, his normative premise along with his concept of societal culture in his theory disadvantages post-immigration ethnic minorities and has a propensity to subordinate the members of these minorities whether or not they have emigrated voluntarily and whether or not they want to maintain their cultural practices.

Kymlicka's normative premise rests on the justification of cultural belonging as crucial for self-respect, as well as for individual freedom. A societal culture provides freedom of choice and therefore it supports the pertinent liberal value of individual freedom. Individual freedom entails meaningful choices, and therefore members of a national minority require a context of choice provided by their own societal culture. The point is that members of national minorities should have access to their *own* societal culture that provides a full range of meaningful options. If those are only found within the members' own societal culture, then why should ethnic immigrant groups be deprived of their societal culture, which can undermine ethnic immigrants' freedom? This is against the liberal value of individual freedom. Kymlicka's response is that the immigrants have waived their right to their culture in choosing to emigrate from their home countries. Besides the problem of what type of immigrant has voluntarily chosen to emigrate, why should post-immigration ethnic communities give up their rights to their societal culture if it is a primary good? As Parekh notes, 'it is difficult to see how one can abandon one's right to it any more than to one's life or liberty' (2000, p. 103). Moreover, if cultural membership is so crucial for self-respect, then why should post-immigration ethnic minorities be deprived of their self-respect, which requires a range of meaningful choices provided by the members' own societal culture?

This is not to argue for separate societal cultures for each and every ethnic immigrant group, but to point out the difficulties that arise due to the normative weight Kymlicka places on cultural membership in one's own societal culture. First, state funding for each and every immigrant group may ultimately bankrupt it. Second, creating societal cultures for each and every different immigrant group treats culture under an essentialist notion as separate, holistic, distinct and static. Third, not every member of an immigrant group wants to choose options, for various reasons, only from his or her own societal culture in the host country. For example, there are immigrants who have left behind their homeland and societal culture in order to lead a good life integrating with the majority's social, economic and political institutions. Fourth, a societal culture may even restrict certain choices by its members. And, finally, by attaching importance to cultural membership of national minorities, Kymlicka privileges certain historical collective identities and marginalises other possible identities – for example, gender and sexual preference – and thereby forces him into 'an illegitimate reification of "national" and "ethnocultural" identities over other forms' (Benhabib 2002, p. 60). From a liberal standpoint, why should historical identity claims take precedence while marginalising other forms of identity? This is also against the liberal value of individual autonomy to make free and informed choices (Benhabib 1999, p. 55).

Anne Phillips (2007, p. 105) points out that Kymlicka gives importance to 'a secure and strong *cultural community* as the context in which people are enabled to develop as autonomous beings', not *culture* as a determinant of individual action. Kymlicka expects the members of a cultural community to question and modify their beliefs and practices, the character of culture, using 'the moral resources' of their community (Phillips 2007, p. 105; cf. Kymlicka 1989, Ch. 8). For Kymlicka, cultural belonging – a membership of a cultural community along with its societal culture – provides the moral resource for a secure sense of identity and meaningful choices for autonomy. If so, then failing to support the diversity of distinct cultural communities along with their societal cultures for post-immigration minorities will deprive them of those moral resources through which they too can develop as autonomous beings.

Kymlicka argues that immigrants should have equal access to the majority's societal culture for meaningful options. If the meaningful options of the members of the

majority are only available within their own societal culture, which is 'separate and distinct', then how can he expect to have those options accessible to immigrants, on an equal footing, within the majority's societal culture? Besides, if the societal culture provides members with a primary good of cultural belonging and a secure sense of identity, which is a moral resource, then immigrants, who are not supported in building or maintaining their own societal culture and are expected to access the majority's, which is separate and distinct, are not treated as equally worthy moral members of the society, which again is against the liberal value of equality.

The above difficulties arise because Kymlicka's concept of societal culture as a national culture reifies culture as an all-encompassing homogeneous, distinct, holistic and static monoculture (see Benhabib 2002, pp. 60-61; see also Carens 2000, Ch. 3). In addition, his claim that individuals have a strong bond to their language and culture and that their secure sense of identity and self-respect are derived from their sense of belonging to their cultural communities is also problematic. It reifies individuals' identity and ascribes them only a monolithic identity. I shall discuss the complexity of identity in Chapter 3 as well as in relation to recognition in Chapter 4. By equating a culture to a nation, Kymlicka, for various reasons, in effect, falls into the trap of cultural essentialism (Benhabib 2002, p. 61).

As already mentioned, cultural essentialism presumes that a culture is holistic, homogeneous, distinct, static and deterministic, ignoring the fact that cultures are heterogeneous, dynamic and consist of many functionally differentiated interacting systems. A societal culture, as a nation, cannot remain completely isolated from other nations without any interaction. Even within a nation, there are many and variety of associations and communities, and the context of choice and a sense of belonging cannot be equated solely to membership of a nation as people differ in their sense of belonging to different associations and communities. As Carens argues, regarding societal culture as a context of choice 'homogenises culture, excluding many of the other cultural differences *within* states that ought to fall within the range of his concerns' (2000, p. 69). Kymlicka acknowledges that even an 'ethnically homogeneous state', for example Iceland, contains a 'diverse array of associations and groups based on class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, moral belief, and political ideology' (1995, p. 18). But he considers this array of

associations as subcultures within a national culture and focuses on the difference between national minorities and ethnic groups.

People have multiple affiliations to and are members of different associations, social institutions and communities. There are sub-communities and overlapping communities, and they are also dynamic. But Kymlicka argues that ‘most people, most of the time, have a deep bond to their own culture’ (1995, p. 90). As Song (2007, p. 27) argues, many people have ‘deep bonds’ to groups, but not necessarily to their respective cultural communities. People do have affective bonds to various groups including family, friends, co-workers, co-religionists, etc., and people have multiple loyalties and bonds to more than one nation as well as ‘smaller, larger and cross-cutting communities’. Why should cultural communities be given priority over other associations or communities for a sense of belonging, when people have varying degrees of attachment to various associations and communities? And why should one’s identity and self-respect be derived only from cultural membership, when one has cross-cutting multiple collective identities, and expresses different identities within different socio-cultural-political contexts? Song argues that ‘the assertion that *most* people have strong attachments to their own ethnic or national culture needs more support than multiculturalists tend to provide, and its truth cannot be established by philosophical arguments alone’ (2007, p. 27). Furthermore, individuals’ identity and affinity with groups depend on social, economic and political conditions, as these conditions affect individuals’ self-respect and well-being:

The work of sociologists who study ethnic and cultural identity suggests that the nature and strength of individuals’ identification with groups varies across groups and across individuals within groups and is deeply affected by social, political, and economic conditions (Song 2007, p. 28).

Moreover, as Benhabib points out, Kymlicka’s theory pays ‘very little attention’ to ‘*dynamic constructions of identity*’ (2002, p. 64). She (2002, p. 64) argues that his ‘*objectivist criteria*’ of distinguishing national minorities from ethnic immigrants based on homeland, the viability of societal culture or a shared language ‘ignores the fact that the kind of group one views oneself to be a member of may itself emerge and change through the process of political struggle’.

Kymlicka says that his focus is on the ‘sort of multiculturalism’ which arises from national and ethnic differences (1995, p. 18). These differences are, however, as I have argued, based on the notion of cultural essentialism. Kymlicka admits that he takes for granted that cultures are ‘separate and distinct’ (1995, p. 101). He also acknowledges that interaction of cultures is unavoidable and indeed desirable, but he maintains that ‘cultural interchange does not undermine the claim that there are distinct societal cultures’ (1995, p. 105). The main concern of Kymlicka is that, although interactions with other cultures are desirable, they may take place ‘in *circumstances of serious inequality in power*’ (1995, p. 105; emphases added). For example, he states that ‘the aim of self-government is to enable smaller nations to interact with larger nations on a more equitable basis’ (1995, p. 104). Kymlicka’s claim for ‘group-differentiated self-government rights is to compensate for *unequal circumstances* which put the members of minority cultures at a *systematic disadvantage* in the cultural market-place’ (1995, p. 113; emphases added). This notion of circumstances of inequality in power that leads to systematic disadvantage of minorities seems to be a plausible argument for claims for justice. I shall also argue in the following chapter that circumstances of justice gain normative significance for individual well-being, and challenges faced by minorities in pursuing their well-being in an unjust society are unfair. But the above argument for claims for justice then leads to important questions with regard to post-immigration minorities, namely, whether these minorities are in unequal circumstances through asymmetrical power relations when interacting with the majority’s societal culture, and whether they are systematically disadvantaged in the cultural marketplace.

One may point out that certain ethnic minorities may even be content with their second class unequal status.²⁰ But I shall argue in Chapter 2 that circumstances of justice are integral to one’s well-being, and therefore we should be concerned with injustices towards minorities. As Benhabib maintains, ‘intercultural justice between human groups should be defended in the name of justice and freedom’ (2002, p. 8). I

²⁰ Recently a Professor of Political Science from the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka, Jayadeva Uyangoda, stated that the representatives of national ethnic minorities of Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka accept their second class unequal status and are even happy to be under the rule of the ethnic Sinhala majority after 25 years of civil war; they do so in exchange for other benefits in the name of ‘development assistance’ to their community (www.Tamilnet.com; 13th November 2008; cf. ‘Weekly Issue of Economic and Political’, October 25th 2008).

shall show in this thesis that justice and freedom for intercultural justice requires both social recognition and non-domination. The politics of multiculturalism focuses on the politics of recognition, identity and difference. However, I shall show in this thesis that the politics of non-domination is complementary and is important. If so, then we should address whether liberalism is capable of mitigating asymmetrical power relations leading to domination through arbitrary interference and systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation. This thesis argues that liberalism within democratic states faces difficulties in alleviating asymmetrical power relations and may even reinforce those that exist in the public as well private spheres, whereas republicanism attempts to mitigate these concerns.

Kymlicka accepts that the integration of immigrants is a 'two-way process – it requires the mainstream society to adapt itself to immigrants, just as immigrants must adapt to the mainstream' (1995, p. 96; cf. Parekh 1990). I agree with this statement. Kymlicka suggests that enabling integration of immigrants requires language training, strong measures to combat prejudices and discrimination, and also modification of the dominant culture's institutions (1995, pp. 30-31; pp. 96-97; p. 114). Kymlicka acknowledges that enabling integration of immigrants requires some group-specific 'polyethnic rights', not national rights, and that 'immigrants can rightfully insist on maintaining some of their heritage' (1995, p. 97). But it is not clear why immigrants should be given any polyethnic rights and why the majority should modify their institutions accommodating immigrants, when he argues that immigrants have waived their right to culture (Carens 2000, p. 57). Neither is it clear what the normative basis should be to combat prejudices and discrimination, when he already discriminates against the ethnic immigrant minorities in favour of the national minorities. Moreover, if the policy of immigrant multiculturalism is to maintain some of ethnic immigrants' heritage, then is it sufficient to integrate immigrants into the wider society? I shall attempt to answer this question.

Kymlicka (2001, pp. 162-163) says that policies of multiculturalism in Canada, Australia and in the United States, at various levels of the states, can be defended as promoting fairer terms of integration. He argues that most of the demands of immigrant multiculturalism are not leading to 'balkanization', but rather to 'integration', accommodating diversity *within common institutions* (2001, p. 164).

For example, he lists twelve reforms which can be considered under the ‘rubric of multiculturalism’ to integrate immigrants (2001, p. 163), including affirmative action programmes; revising dress codes and work schedules so as to accommodate immigrant groups’ religious faiths; multicultural school curricula revising history and literature giving recognition to immigrants’ contribution; anti-racism educational programmes; and bilingual educational programmes for the children of immigrants. Kymlicka emphasises that many aspects of public policy such as naturalisation, education, job training and professional accreditation and civil service employment, including national defence, are the ‘major engines of integration’ (2001, p. 155). For example, Kymlicka presents Canadian multiculturalism policy as ‘just one small piece of pie’ while ‘other policies’ – the many aspects of public policy – directly or indirectly promote integration (Joppke and Morawska 2003, p. 11; cf. Kymlicka 1998, p. 24 & p. 38). It is not clear how the smaller scale multiculturalism policy effectively integrates immigrants within common institutions that can affect immigrants in many dimensions – economic, social and political. Neither is it clear how the normative basis of cultural belonging along with the distinction of national minorities and ethnic immigrants on the basis of culture can address and justify fairer terms of integration of many aspects of public policy within common institutions, whilst avoiding, on the one hand, policies of assimilation and, on the other, isolation and marginalisation of minorities within social, political and economic dimensions.

Moreover, by giving recognition to cultural groups and their moral significance, Kymlicka is unable to accommodate groups that are discriminated on the basis of race, gender or class without unnecessary ‘culturalisation’ of groups (see Barry 2001, p. 308). For example, racial discord affecting African-Americans in the US is not due to the differences between the black and white cultures (see Barry 2001, p. 308 & 316). As Appiah notes: ‘it is not the black culture that the racist disdains, but blacks. There is no conflict of visions between black and white cultures that is the source of racial discord’ (quoted in Barry 2001, p. 306; cf. Appiah 1997, p. 36). There are also members of certain groups who are ‘racialised’ on the basis of

cultural prejudices, irrespective of whether or not the members engage in cultural practices that are the object of cultural prejudice (see Modood 2005).²¹

Even if language training and measures against discrimination and prejudice are undertaken, members of immigrant groups may not have the options that are meaningful to them to pursue their well-being, which is an ethical concern. Options are meaningful when they enable members to pursue their life plans that they believe worthwhile to pursue. As already mentioned, I shall also argue in Chapter 2, in a similar vein, that activities are meaningful when they are in accord with one's ethical convictions of a good or meaningful life and one's well-being is constituted by engaging in meaningful activities. Moreover, even if the majority's societal culture includes a range of meaningful options to immigrant groups, members of immigrant groups may be restricted in their access to many of these options as equal status members for various reasons, which may include not only non-recognition of members' particularities, but also domination due to differences in power rather than differences of culture (see Carens 2000, p. 89); I shall discuss these issues in Chapter 3. It is one thing whether there are meaningful options or not in the wider society; it is quite another matter whether they are accessible or not to ethnic minorities. I shall discuss these two aspects – 'option-freedom', i.e. the availability of meaningful options, and 'agency-freedom', i.e. the accessibility of those meaningful options – in Chapter 4, and argue that, although both aspects are important, agency-freedom gains significance within asymmetrical power relations among citizens and groups. This is not to deny that meaningful options are unimportant; my point is that if they are restricted due to domination and non-recognition of members' particularities both subjectively and objectively, then the members are deprived of the opportunity to pursue their meaningful activities and, thereby, are hindered in pursuing their well-being. Hence, in this thesis, I shall develop my arguments of claims for justice, for fairer terms of integration, based on an analysis of the circumstances of injustice that lead to systematic non-recognition and domination through arbitrary interference which negatively affect agency-freedom. In this sense, this thesis aims to emphasise that the freedom of individuals is not only about freedom of choice, which liberalism promotes, but also about

²¹ I will address this aspect of 'cultural racism' in Chapter 3.

freedom from domination, which is crucial within republicanism, and I shall discuss this aspect in Chapter 5. I shall now illustrate that Kymlicka's defence of liberal multiculturalism also suffers from neglecting the issue of freedom from domination.

Kymlicka's defence of maintaining separate societal cultures for national minorities encounters difficulties from a liberal standpoint when these minorities engage in illiberal practices. Kymlicka argues for a demand for 'external protections', which reduce a minority's vulnerability to the decisions and actions of the majority in order to promote equality between groups. And he correctly states that '[e]xternal protections are legitimate only in so far as they promote equality between groups, by rectifying disadvantages or vulnerabilities suffered by the members of a particular group' (1995, p. 152):

Any plausible theory of justice should recognise the fairness of these external protections for national minorities. They are clearly justified, I believe, within a liberal egalitarian theory, such as Rawls' and Dworkin's, which emphasises the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities (Kymlicka 1995, p. 109).

The point is that a system of minority rights that promote *equality between* groups and *freedom within* the minority groups is 'consistent with, and indeed promote[s], basic liberal values' (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 152-153). Kymlicka rightly points out that 'internal restrictions' that limit individual freedom or personal autonomy violate the liberal defence of protection of the minority's societal culture. However, Kymlicka further argues that when national minorities have internal restrictions, the majority cannot impose liberal principles by force. Although 'there is relatively little scope for legitimate coercive interference', whether it is within a domestic or international context, he says that liberals have 'a right and a responsibility' to speak out against any illiberal acts of injustice, and says that 'liberal promoters inside the culture should seek to promote liberal principles' (1995, pp. 167-168). When the members of the culture are subjected to domination, then it is only wishful thinking that these members would have a voice and procedures to change the rules within the community. Feminists are rightly concerned with the liberal policy of non-intervention, which can allow subordination of powerless members such as women and children within national minorities. As Ayelet Shachar puts it:

In the multicultural context, a *non-intervention policy* that defers to a group's traditions, even in instances of the 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability', when a group's practices might systematically injure certain categories of at-risk group members, such as women (1999, p. 91; emphasis added).

In such a case, even if these members may have affection to their groups and families, it is arguable whether they have self-respect, which is important according to Kymlicka for cultural membership. Moreover, Shachar expresses her concern that in certain cases, an impact of 'systematic maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated groups' can be 'so severe that it nullifies these individuals' rights as citizens' (Benhabib 2002, p. 104; cf. Shachar 2000, p. 386). Kymlicka's argument for liberal multiculturalism promoting equality between minority communities and the wider society is, on the one hand, coherent with the principle of equality of liberalism. But, on the other, it is open to criticism in cases where restriction of choices of certain members within minority communities through domination leads to the limitation of individual freedom. Moreover, as Song worries, liberal toleration and ' [t]he legal accommodation of sexist practices within minority cultures, as in the cultural defense cases, may boomerang back and to threaten the struggle toward gender equality within the wider society' (2007, p. 109).

To sum up: Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism based on the idea of cultural membership provided by a societal culture as a primary good encounters difficulties when differentiating national minorities and ethnic immigrant groups. I have argued that these difficulties and normative deficiencies stem from his concept of societal culture, which falls into the trap of cultural essentialism. Moreover, his immigrant multiculturalism integrating ethnic immigrants by allowing equal access to the majority's societal culture has a propensity to subordinate members of ethnic immigrant groups through domination. Although he is concerned with inequality of power between national minorities and the majority due to circumstances of injustice, his justification for claims of substantial group-differentiated rights to national minorities on the basis of differences in culture leads to cultural essentialism, and allows circumstances of injustice within national minorities to prevail. I shall now discuss in the following section how the recent 'retreat from

multiculturalism' also exemplifies that liberal multiculturalism is rooted in the notion of cultural essentialism.

THE RETREAT FROM MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURAL INTEGRATION

In this section, I shall attempt to show that the recent discussion about the retreat from multiculturalism (Joppke 2004) reflects the fact that anti-essentialism has become an integral part of the critique of multiculturalism; but I shall argue that anti-essentialism does not deliver a fatal blow to multiculturalism. Moreover, the essentialist notion of culture leads to an emphasis on cultural stereotypes and reinforces the difference between dominant groups and ethnic immigrant minority groups. Christian Joppke argues that the retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state is not about promoting one-way assimilation of ethnic immigrants into its dominant culture, but about asserting liberal culture (Joppke 2004; see Phillips 2007, p. 22). Joppke demonstrates that Australia, which officially declared its commitment to multiculturalism, and Britain and the Netherlands, which have also committed to multiculturalism in Europe, have retreated in their multicultural policies and in their official statements. Australia is 'downscaling' multiculturalism. Britain and the Netherlands, which consider multiculturalism with respect to immigrants, are moving toward civic integration. Joppke states that European multiculturalism, unlike in Australia and Canada, has always been for immigrants only (2004, p. 247). He argues that there are three factors at play in the retreat:

1. the lack of public support for official multiculturalism policies (a cause largely outside the liberal spectrum),
2. these policies' inherent shortcomings and failures especially with respect to socio-economic marginalisation and self-segregation of migrants and their children, and
3. a new assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its descendents (2004, p. 244).

So, the question is what is the underlying policy premise that might have led the above three factors to impact multiculturalism negatively. I shall attempt to show that it is due to the essentialist notion of culture.

I shall first discuss the second and third factors, and turn to the first factor later. According to Joppke, the second factor stems from the policy approach of treating ethnic minorities as distinct ethnic groups within their 'own parallel institutions',

‘fuelling their segregation and separation from mainstream society’. In the Netherlands, the multicultural policy – the ‘ethnic minority policy’ (*Minderhedennota*) – was introduced in 1983 in line with the tradition of ‘pillarisation’ (*verzuiling*), which ‘refers to the division of society in terms of faith groups—the Protestants and the Catholics—a third social pillar, and a secular liberal pillar’ (Benhabib 2002, p. 78).²² According to this policy, ‘[w]hen an ethnic group attains an official minority, then the claims of such groups to housing, education, employment, and other forms of social support are granted’ (Benhabib 2002, p. 77).²³ Those official minority groups then ‘acquire the rights to establish cultural, religious, and educational organisations, and to carry out second-language instruction in their own language’ (Benhabib 2002, p. 77). As Benhabib states, ‘[t]he Dutch practise a model of “cultural enclavism” and “cultural preservation” that is very close to the one advocated by Kymlicka’ (2002, p. 77).

However, establishing separate institutions such as religious schools and ethnic broadcasting has led to ‘segregation’ and ‘exclusion’ (Joppke and Morawska 2003, pp. 14-15; see also Benhabib 2002, p. 79). As Joppke stresses, ‘the ethnic minority’s policy was incapable of remedying the most pressing problem among immigrants and their offspring, unemployment and economic marginalisation’. As Benhabib argues: ‘there is a tendency in Dutch culture to resist acknowledging the heterogeneity of culture and religion, and to want to reduce cultural differences to faith-based ones’ (2002, p. 78). Arguably, the treatment of ethnic minorities as distinct groups within their parallel institutions is a subscription to the notion of cultural essentialism. Many activities invariably intersect institutions of both the majority and the minorities. Individuals are at the intersection of many systems and social organisations such as associations, corporations and communities, and are interdependent in carrying out their activities. They are not only members of involuntary associations, but also of many voluntary associations of the majority.

²² Vink (2007) criticises the idea that Dutch accommodating integration policies are an extension of the historical tradition of ‘pillarisation’. However, group-oriented ethnic minority policy reflects pillarisation.

²³ The National Advisory Council of Ethnic Ministries, which was founded by the Dutch government in 1982, designated Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians, Surinamese, populations of the Netherlands Antilles, Moluccans, as well as Greeks, Spanish, Portuguese and Gypsies as ‘official minorities’ (Benhabib 2002, p. 77). According to Vink (2007) the ‘official’ minority groups comprise Chinese, Turks, Moluccans, Southern European communities, Caribbean Dutch, Surinamese, Moroccans and refugees (see www.minderheden.org).

The new 'integration' policy focuses on immigrants as 'individuals' within the mainstream society rather than isolated ethnic groups in parallel institutions (Joppke 2004, p. 248). Benhabib states that new policies supporting 'intercultural' centres along with citizenship rights for all foreign residents and third-country nationals encourage 'the integration of foreigners into Dutch society through more fluid, egalitarian, and democratic means, all the while acknowledging the complexity of the constitution of collective identities...' (2002, p. 79).²⁴ Arguably, the retreat of multiculturalism in the Netherlands is not about withdrawal from multiculturalism per se, but rather about revising policies of, 'in subtle ways', what Benhabib refers to as 'the strong mosaic multiculturalism' (2002, p. 79).²⁵ What she means by strong or mosaic multiculturalism is basically an essentialist notion of culture collapsing a multicultural society into plural monocultures with 'clearly delineated and identifiable entities that coexist, while maintaining firm boundaries, as would pieces of a mosaic' (2002, p. 8).

The third factor identified with the retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state is the 'civic integration' programme, which includes language training and 'civic lessons', not only in the Netherlands, but also in many other Western states. This also contributes to the critique of the notion of cultural essentialism within liberal multiculturalism. Civic integration presumes that there is no dominant monoculture into which immigrants are expected to integrate (Joppke 2004, pp. 248-251). For example, Germany accepts that there is no such dominant culture, but expects immigrants to adhere to the political principles of liberal democracy. The Federal Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Germany stated in a recent report in 2000 on the 'Situation of Foreigners', in its section on integration, that there is no 'German

²⁴ As late as 1997, a new Law on the Consultation of Minority Policy (*Wet Overleg Minderhedenbeleid*) was adopted with the goal of contributing to the development of a 'harmonic multicultural society', and within the framework of the National Minorities Consultation, the government meets at least three times per year to discuss with the eight subsidised minority groups on integration policy (Vink 2007, pp. 341-342).

²⁵ It is to be noted that, in March 2006, a new Civic Integration Abroad Act (*Wet Inburgering Buitenland*) was introduced, mainly aimed at restricting immigration through family reunion; it obliges persons who apply for a residence permit to take a civic integration exam, which includes testing the knowledge of Dutch language and society. However, in December 2006, a new Civic Integration Act (*Wet Inburgering*) was adopted, replacing the relatively recent act from 1998. The new Act obliges not only 'newcomers', but also so called 'old-comers'— all non-Dutch/EU residents between ages 16 and 65 – to take part in a 'civic integration course' (Vink 2007, pp. 346-347). As Vink notes, 'the effect of these measures on the actual integration of immigrants in the Netherlands remains to be seen' (2007, p. 347).

monolithic culture' (*deutsche Einheitskultur*) which immigrants must share, the reason being that German society is acknowledged as consisting of a 'multiplicity of coexisting life styles' (Joppke and Morawska 2003, p. 5). In Britain, the Cattle Report, which was produced in response to a government-commissioned investigation into the causes of riots in 2001 in various northern cities of England, emphasises the need to 'move beyond multiculturalism' with a 'greater sense of citizenship' (Joppke 2004, pp. 250-251). However, it also stressed that the move is not about going back to the idea of the pre-multicultural past of 'a dominant or monocultural view of nationality' (Joppke 2004, p. 251). The retreat from multiculturalism is not about assimilation to a monolithic majority's culture, but adherence to liberal democratic principles. However, from a liberal perspective, it is problematic to justify the obligatory nature of civic integration. I shall argue in Chapter 7 that republicanism more plausibly entails the civic virtues and duties which are conducive to this revised politics of multicultural integration. I shall use the term 'the politics of multicultural integration' in order to differentiate from the politics of integration, which mainly refers to policies of assimilation – one-way integration – espoused by many European politicians (see Modood 2007, p. 47), or even from civic integration, which mainly implies little or no regard to individuals' particularities, which include socio-cultural practices different from those of the mainstream society.

Kymlicka (2007, Ch. 4) argues that the retreat from multiculturalism is based on the fear of the risk factors of security and human rights violation. He lists five factors that contribute to the rise of multiculturalism: 1) 'Increasing rights-consciousness'; 2) 'Demographic changes'; 3) 'Multiple access points for safe political mobilisation'; 4) 'Desecuritisation of ethnic relations'; and 5) 'A consensus on human rights'. He argues that the last two factors are key to help establish multiculturalism as a 'low-risk proposition'. Yet at the same time Kymlicka believes that these two factors also explain the retreat from multiculturalism, especially towards immigrants. Kymlicka asserts that retreat from multiculturalism has not affected state policies towards national minorities; however, immigrant

multiculturalism has come under attack (2007, pp. 122-123).²⁶ The question is, why is this so?

Kymlicka argues that as long as multiculturalism is a low-risk proposition, then 'dominant groups are more likely to *acquiesce* in it' (2007, p. 120; emphasis added). The point is that the two factors – the desecuritisation of ethnic relations and a consensus on human rights – only 'reduce the risks associated with multiculturalism, but do not provide any positive argument in favour of it' (2007, p. 120). Kymlicka states that '[t]he two key factors that reduce majority opposition to multiculturalism have both been put in doubt in the context of Muslim immigration into Western Europe' (2007, p. 124). He explains that there are two major reasons why this is so. The first is concerned with human rights issues: 'These fears extend back at least to the Rushdie affair, and have been reaffirmed by the Danish cartoon affair, as well as by persistent reports about coerced arranged marriages, honour killings, or female genital mutilation' (2007, pp. 124-125). The second is concerned with the 'resecuritisation' of state-Muslim relations after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Madrid and London bombings. Kymlicka emphasises that, for the above reasons, 'support for a liberal multiculturalist approach to the integration of Muslim immigrants faces an uphill battle in Western Europe' (2007, p. 125).²⁷ For example, the Netherlands and Britain initially adopted immigrant multiculturalism to accommodate predominantly Christian immigrants; however, the public support within these countries waned with the influx of Muslim immigrants – from Morocco and Turkey to the Netherlands, and from Bangladesh and Pakistan to Britain – which seemed to drive multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007, p. 127). Kymlicka goes on to point out that 'Islamophobia is not the only source of the recent backlash against immigrant multiculturalism in Europe' (2007, p. 126). The sources also include the

²⁶ Modood argues that in Great Britain there is no retreat of multiculturalism; rather, it is about 're-balancing' of multiculturalism as the government so far has been implementing the recommendations of multiculturalism from Parekh's report (Political Studies Association – Annual Conference 2008, April 1-3, Swansea, UK).

²⁷ Kymlicka notes that the differences between Europe and North America in terms of a partial backlash to liberal multiculturalism are due to the fact that the majority of non-European immigrants in European countries are Muslims – up to 80 per cent in countries like France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, etc. Hence in Europe the category of 'immigrant' is equated with the category of 'Muslim' (2007, pp. 125-126 and note 41).

public's 'free-floating' anxiety about diversity, racism and xenophobia.²⁸ Although there may be some who dislike ethnic diversity for irrational reasons, we cannot discredit the concerns with resecuritisation and human rights as European irrationalism. There is certainly a rational basis for these concerns, for example in the form of the bombings, female genital mutilation, honour killings and forced marriages referred to above.²⁹ But, the point is that these practices and concerns need to be dealt without essentialising culture and discrediting culture holistically and without stigmatising members who are identified with that particular 'culture'. The essentialist notion of culture 'solidifies' non-Western cultures as illiberal, conservative and threatening to the values of liberal democracies. I shall show in the following section that Dilthey's idea of cultural systems allows us to deliberate about cultural practices without solidifying a culture as a monolithic entity.

In her recent book *Multiculturalism without Culture*, Anne Phillips states that the retreat from multiculturalism can be problematic if it 'reinforces stereotypical distinctions between liberal and illiberal, modern and traditional, Western and non-Western cultures' (2007, p. 23). She also states that cultural stereotypes can help to secure such 'binary divisions' and emphasise differences between cultures as 'profound differences of value' between 'us' and 'them' which can negatively affect multicultural policies:

Differences of culture and religion are seen as suggestive of profound differences of value, and these are being mapped onto opposing sides of a liberal/illiberal divide. This way of understanding cultural difference has, I believe, played an important part in the haemorrhaging of support for multicultural policies (Phillips 2007, p. 23).

Groups are then identified in a totalising way with either the liberal or illiberal camp. When this happens, the political theory of multiculturalism encourages precisely the kind of cultural stereotyping it was designed to dissolve (Phillips 2007, p. 24).

²⁸ Kymlicka (2007, p. 126) points out that those who dislike ethnic and racial diversity and do not want to be identified as xenophobes or racists attempt to look for 'acceptable' reasons, such as 'fears about illiberal practices or security threats – (or crime, economic burdens, abuse of asylum procedures, etc.)' to oppose immigrant multiculturalism. The most important aspect to understand is what causes crime etc., rather than finger-pointing at immigrants; for example, in Great Britain, the growing problem of youth-gang violence, irrespective of whether they are whites, blacks or immigrants, with the imposition of e.g. 'anti-social behaviour orders' by the authorities, is more likely rooted in class issues than in immigration per se (see *Heute* 20th March 2008, Zurich, pp. 18-19).

²⁹ I am indebted to Dr Peri Roberts for this argument.

The above concerns arise when cultures are considered holistic, static and deterministic, and policy initiatives based on such an essentialist notion of culture can serve to reinforce cultural stereotypes and confine ethnic immigrants into ethnic enclaves. As Benhabib (1999, p. 55) correctly points out, cultures cannot be differentiated according to their values if the right to culture is derived from individual autonomy; it is individuals who value cultures through their activities. Therefore, it is important to understand how culture is valuable to individuals and groups, and on this particular point many scholars have recently critiqued the essentialist notion of culture and groups. This chapter attempts to contribute to the ongoing critique of the essentialist notion of culture, and develop a model of an anti-essentialist notion of culture.

I shall argue in the following section, taking on board the literature of recent critiques of the essentialist notion of culture and Benhabib's understanding of ourselves in the Heideggerian sense of 'thrownness', that Dilthey's concept of culture and community helps us capture the interaction of an individual within the context of culture and community in a plausible manner and suggests ways in which we may overcome the deficiencies of the essentialist notion of culture relied on by liberals and many multiculturalists. They seem to under-emphasise the heterogeneity of people's values and ethical convictions, multiple affiliations and intersecting collective identities and the dynamic nature of interaction and interdependency, and emphasise monoculture and a single overarching collective identity based on cultural membership, and collapse multicultural society into multiple monocultures with little interaction.

DILTHEY'S APPROACH TO CULTURE AND COMMUNITY – AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST NOTION OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL GROUP

In this section, I shall describe Dilthey's approach to culture and community and show, taking on Benhabib's notion of narrativity and the self, in the Heideggerian sense of 'thrownness' into 'webs of interlocution', that we can overcome the fallacies of cultural essentialism within the problematic social world. As Benhabib maintains, 'all analyses of cultures, whether empirical or normative, must begin with distinguishing the standpoint of the social observer from that of the social agent' (2002, p. 5). The social observer's view of cultures is an essentialist notion of culture

– ‘clearly delineable wholes’ – for the purposes of ‘understanding and control’. However, a social agent is a participant in the culture and his or her view, by contrast, is an anti-essentialist notion of culture – internally contested and contestable narrative accounts. The point is that we should give importance to an individual agency and the interactions of an individual within ‘culture’ and ‘community’ without falling into an essentialist notion of culture and community. I shall show that Dilthey’s distinctive account of culture is useful in ways to give importance to individual agency and individuals’ complex interaction with the social world with an element of dynamism and change without ossifying individuals within culture and without reifying culture and community. This kind of sophisticated model of culture is also useful in deliberating on cultural practices without evaluating culture as a whole to reject or preserve cultures as holistic and distinct entities. Moreover, I shall show that Dilthey’s account highlights vulnerabilities of individuals in terms of dominance and dependence in their complex interactions within the multi-faceted, necessarily problematic, social world. And such an account is useful for deliberating on intercultural justice and conditions for freedom to pursue individuals’ meaningful activities, and to highlight that these conditions encompass both social recognition and non-domination.

As Benhabib puts it: ‘We are born into webs of interlocution or narrative, from familial and gender narratives to linguistic ones and to the macronarratives of collective identity. We become aware of who we are by learning to become conversation partners in these narratives’ (2002, p. 15). Although we are thrown into the webs that we do not initially choose, ‘our agency consists in our capacity to weave out of those narratives our individual life stories, which make sense for us as unique selves’ (Benhabib 2002, p. 15). Our identities are ‘defined through many collective affinities and through many narratives’, opposed to a monocultural identity as a master narrative (2002, p. 16). As Benhabib argues, our individuality is not ‘construed as equally unified and harmonious beings’, because culture is not homogeneous as it is ‘internally riven and contested’ and influences our visions. Hence, she views our ‘individuality as the unique and fragile achievement of selves in weaving together conflicting narratives and allegiances into a unique life history’ (2002, p. 16). Our individuality requires ‘practical autonomy’, which she defines, in the ‘moral and political sphere’, ‘as the capacity to exercise *choice and agency* over

the conditions of one's narrative identifications' (2002, p. 16; emphasis added). And she adds an important point: 'Such *capabilities* include disposition of material resources, such as income and access to education and professional development as well as to public institutions and spaces' (2002, p. 16; emphasis added). However, the point I want to emphasise is that within a multicultural social world, given the basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – our capacity to exercise choice and agency, which include capabilities in many dimensions – economic, social, political as well cultural – is necessarily problematic. The vulnerabilities that arise out of these social facts in the social world into which we are thrown set our problem for us, and this thesis focuses on this problem. I shall show that Dilthey's account of culture and community captures well our problem in the multi-faceted social world with a non-essentialist notion of culture taking into account Benhabib's critique of an essentialist notion of culture.

Although we are social beings and belong to various associations and communities as members and have affinities, we are individuals with our individualities varying in our capabilities and identities (including gender) in pursuit of our complex of purposes. This is the first basic social fact, as discussed in the Introduction. We follow the social and cultural practices that we are accustomed to and/or endorse as meaningful, and these practices structure our lives individually or collectively according to our various ethical convictions; we live in an ethical plural society, which is the second basic social fact. We are interdependent beings in the modern society, which is the third basic social fact, not only among ourselves, but also inter-generationally as well on the environment to pursue our activities. With our various convictions, we participate in many different institutions, taking on various roles and identities, interacting and engaging with one another, directly and indirectly, and individually and collectively, within various activity spheres that comprise the social world to pursue our complex of purposes. These activity spheres consist not only of the systems of particular cultures such as language, religion and entertainment, but also of many institutions, governmental, non-governmental, religious and many other institutions of affiliations based on one's interests and projects. These activity spheres are not isolated entities, but rather interacting systems, and are dynamic.

Given our differences in our endowments and ethical convictions, these may, within an interdependent social world, introduce power relations. If these power relations are asymmetrical through dominance and dependence, they can lead to treating the powerless members of society as subordinated and partially or wholly excluding them through domination – arbitrary interference – and through non-recognition or misrecognition of their particularities, which can lead to systematic discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and marginalisation in many dimensions – social, political, economic as well as cultural. The debate on multiculturalism should address these concerns effectively, and as I have argued, the essentialist notion of culture within liberal multiculturalism underpins an account of multicultural politics that seems to marginalise ethnic immigrants in economic, social and political dimensions as well as allowing domination and systematic oppression to prevail within national as well within ethnic immigrant minorities towards certain members.

From the above perspective of the social world, I adopt Dilthey's (1988/1923; see also 1989, and Ermarth 1978) ideas of 'purposive systems', in his *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, in terms of interacting systems of 'cultural systems' and the 'external organisations' of society rooted in human social life. According to Dilthey, a purpose is grounded in some aspect of human nature, or in the natural articulation of social life, and purposive systems arise through individual interactions to realise a multiplicity of purposes (1989, p. 94). Dilthey shows that we can distinguish two kinds of enduring formations of purposive systems that come into existence, which are cultural systems such as language, religion, law, myth, poetry, science and philosophy within society, and the external organisations of society – social organisations – such as the family, the state, church, corporations and associations.

One may point out that Dilthey's idea of cultural systems and the external organisations of society refers to a society which is not multicultural per se, as he was writing during the period in the late nineteenth century of an unchallenged colonial world, before anti-colonial nationalism or post-colonial migration. And, therefore, one may wonder about the relevance of Dilthey's ideas of society to the debate about multiculturalism. The point I want to emphasise is that it is a fallacy to

consider a ‘complex human society’ as homogeneous, internally not contested and riven, even during the period before post-colonial migration. As Benhabib puts it:

Any complex human society, *at any point in time*, is composed of multiple material and symbolic practices with a history. This history is the sedimented repository of struggles for power, symbolisation, and signification—in short, for cultural and political hegemony carried out among groups, classes, and genders. *There is never a single culture*, one coherent system of beliefs, significations, symbolisations, and practices, that would extend “across the full range of human activities” (2002, p. 60; emphases added).

Dilthey’s account of society recognises this. His theory is an attempt to conceptualise cultural diversity, and how each individual is the site through which this diversity interacts.

Dilthey’s idea of cultural systems and the external organisations of society captures well Benhabib’s critique of the essentialist notion of culture and the importance of individuality, human interaction, interdependence and power struggles against dominance and dependence within a multiplicity of interactions. Dilthey is, of course, not the only theorist to have theorised about cultural diversity; the point is that he suggests levels of interaction and societal structures that are particularly pertinent to the type of multiculturalism I am presenting. He presents us with a much less rigid account of cultural and social structures whilst always recognising the important roles they play. Furthermore, I shall also show in Chapter 2 that Dilthey’s work on meaning in history provides an account of how individuals who interact with the social world seek and give meaning to those systems and to their lives. This is also important for me in developing a normative account of well-being for the normative basis of my theory, which I shall do in Chapter 2. In addition, I find Dilthey’s two-sided account of morality giving importance to both internal (conscience) and external (system of morality) forces is useful in deliberating on moral and ethical convictions, and I discuss this aspect in Chapter 6.

The interactions and interdependencies are not only among individuals, but also among the external organisations of society – social organisations – directly or indirectly, through dominance and dependence, that lead to asymmetrical power relations. Dilthey’s concept of culture is capable of addressing the element of dynamism of the multiplicity of interactions, and dominance and dependence,

without descending into an illegitimate holism. These aspects of culture are important, and a concept of culture that does not take these aspects into account brackets off asymmetrical power relations, allowing domination to prevail when evaluating the claims of culture. This thesis argues for a normative premise giving importance to non-domination. Moreover, a holistic view of cultures leads us to evaluate members' life-worlds as a whole; such an evaluation may lead us to either 'rank or order' members' life-worlds or 'disrespect them by dismissing their life-worlds' altogether (Benhabib 2002, p. 41). It does not permit us to make the 'fine-grained differentiations' that we need for 'cross-cultural judgement and evaluation' (Benhabib 2002, p. 41). The point is that a holistic view of cultures leads to binary division of cultures, using Phillips' terminology, 'us' versus 'them', or Western versus non-Western, or modern versus traditional, or liberal versus non-liberal practices. And such a division has a propensity to invoke culture in a selective way and to ascribe 'all aspects of behaviour' to the culture of a racialised immigrant minority, and to stereotype ethnic and racialised minority groups, while relating the behaviour of the other members of the Western society to their 'personal choice' (Phillips 2007, pp. 29 & 93; cf. Volpp 2000). As Phillips states:

Culture, it seems, has been redefined as something that characterises non-Western or minority groups. It has become a prominent component in stereotyping and disparagement of people from minority ethnic groups that everything they do is attributed to their culture (2007, p. 29).

The challenge is to judge and evaluate cultures for the claims of culture without succumbing to reifying culture while bracketing off individual agency and reinforcing stereotypes associated with 'disparaged identity' (Phillips 2007, pp. 29 & 31). In order to meet this challenge, we need to move away from the notion of cultural essentialism within the politics of multiculturalism, without disregarding culture, and to understand in what ways and in which contexts culture matters, giving importance to individual agency. Individuals differ in many ways, not on the basis of culture alone, and to argue for claims for justice based on the differences in culture alone leads us onto the path of cultural essentialism, which in turn may lead to reinforcing of 'stereotypical distinctions' between cultures. Those who critique the essentialist notion of culture do not deny the importance of culture, but they differ in their assessment of the ways and the context in which culture matters. For

example, Benhabib does not deny the importance of culture; as she puts it: ‘Culture matters; cultural evaluations are deeply bound up with our interpretations of our needs, our visions of the good life, and our dreams for the future’ (2002, p. 129). Although it seems that Benhabib shows ‘a strong sense of the normative significance of culture’ (Phillips 2007, p. 29), she argues against a holistic and homogeneous idea of culture: ‘To the participants and actors, their culture presents itself as a set of competing as well as cohering accounts’ (2002, p. 103). Phillips also argues that culture matters: ‘As part of the way that people give meaning to their world, culture will always be inescapable. As part of what currently allocates us to *unequal positions in society*, it is also contingently so’ (2007, p. 15; emphases added). Phillips’ point is that culture also matters ‘as one of the mechanisms through which social hierarchies are sustained’ (2007, p. 15):

It correlates with differences of gender, race, ethnicity, and national origin, and does so in a structured manner that goes beyond questions of identity or choice. The individuals concerned may have no interest in defining themselves by reference to their sex, ethnicity, or supposed culture, but they cannot thereby escape all forms of discrimination or disadvantage visited on “their” group (Phillips 2007, p. 15).

Hence, Phillips cautions that we cannot address what currently allocates us to unequal positions in society by ‘pretending cultural differences away’. Nor, at the same time, should we be seduced into cultural essentialism with stereotypical distinctions of culture. So the important question is how the politics of multiculturalism should address differences in power through unequal positions in society in relation to differences in ‘culture’ and practices, which may lead to domination and systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation of the powerless members within many domains – economic, social, political as well as cultural – without reinforcing the existing asymmetrical power relations and falling into the trap of cultural essentialism. In this respect, I shall show that Dilthey’s idea of cultural systems and the external organisations of society provides a model of ‘culture’ within the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture that emphasises individuality, individual agency and power relations of dominance and dependence and brings these aspects into the normative significance of the politics of multicultural integration of ethnic immigrants without disregarding ‘culture’. Let me explain.

Dilthey's point of departure for understanding the concept of systems of societal life is to ascribe importance to the richness of life of individuals as components of society (1988, p. 105). The most important point he makes is that social activity does not constitute a single system; instead, it consists of a plurality of systems, for two main reasons. First, individuals in a society interact not only directly, but also indirectly. A horizon of direct interactions for individuals can be very diverse; however, indirect interactions in society are limited by the mediating conditions of the external world (Dilthey 1988, p. 105). A system like this, with both direct and indirect interactions, may begin as a basic system, a system of means for the needs of society, out of the interactions of individuals based on a common characteristic of human nature, but it eventually necessarily exhibits a 'property of increase and development' (Dilthey 1988, p. 106). For example, the economic system has developed into many different specialised systems of economic activities, including political economy, and it continues to develop. Second, although one precondition for communality is that the individuals are similar, the richness of the individual with his or her perceptions and thoughts, feelings and acts of will makes possible a variety of systems in the life of society (Dilthey 1988, pp. 105-106). An essentialist notion of culture does not consider the dynamic nature of cultural systems and their property of increase in complexity and development through the interactions of individuals. Social activities, even if they are intended to meet the needs of human nature, inevitably consist of a variety of systems. And, within a multicultural social world, the systems also vary with different cultural content and practices. Parekh makes a similar point that 'human nature is also culturally reconstituted and diversified' (2000, p. 123). For example, art and religion are not monolithic systems; there are a variety of such systems, and even within a single system there are internal contestations and differences in norms and practices. Each of these systems is constituted as a mode of activity based on an aspect of human nature, but each has developed in a different way in the context of society to satisfy one of that society's ends (Dilthey 1989, p. 101).

Individuals express themselves within a social and cultural context. This context includes institutions, traditions, rules and conventions which modern anthropologists call the 'culture pattern', and which Dilthey (1962, p. 18) refers to as 'the objective

mind' or the 'objectifications of life'. He proposes that the study of these 'culture patterns' can be made more effective if we distinguish various functional systems such as education, economy and religion. This is an important point in conceptualising culture, not as a holistic structure but as functionally differentiated interacting systems. These systems can be understood in terms of the way they are organised to realise the 'complex of purposes' of individuals (Dilthey 1962, p. 18). From this perspective, Dilthey identifies 'cultural systems' in society, which embrace such pursuits as religion and art, language and science, in which people 'freely engage and cooperate for commonly felt purposes' (1988, p. 38). And each of these systems is a cultural system serving the complex of purposes operative in social life (Dilthey 1988, p. 107).

Dilthey maintains that human cooperation within a cultural system does not proceed in a purely mechanical or rational way, the point being that human interactions require other permanent associations. Besides the systems of culture, Dilthey (1988, p. 107) refers to the 'external' or 'outer' organisations (*äussere Organisationen*) of society that are related to cultural systems. Cultural systems endure through the external organisations of society. These include the state and other powerful entities that embody collective will and relations of 'mastery', 'dependence', 'property' and 'community', and establish the context in which the complex of purposes are pursued. The outer or external organisations are not outside of society; rather they are publicly manifest institutionalised aspects of social life; they differ from the cultural systems in achieving primarily practical social functions (Ermarth 1978, p. 124). Dilthey provides examples of the external organisations of society: the family, the state, church (a religious organisation), army (a public organisation), class (an identifiable group functioning as an organisation), and corporation (a private organisation). The organisations may be deliberately designed and controlled or they may arise gradually and persist (as a state or church) or be transitory and subject to voluntary dissolution (as a holding company), and are responsive to historical conditions in comparison to cultural systems. The external or social organisations are rooted in the social nature of human beings without us having to treat them as if they were a consistent and designed whole.

Dilthey emphasises that the external organisation of society is based on consciousness of community and relations of dependence and dominance of the wills in the society. From an individual's perspective, *subjectively*, one's will is 'in a nexus of external connections, in relations of *dominance and dependence* with regard to persons and things, and in relations of community' (Dilthey 1988, p. 115; emphasis added). The same undivided person is at once a member of different associations and takes different roles. A person's will can therefore be intertwined in a complex web, resulting in a mixture of feelings of power and domination, a sense of belonging to community and self-interest, external obligation and freedom. Dilthey (1988, p. 115) refers to all the above feelings as substantial parts of our feeling of self. *Objectively*, individuals in society are neither connected to one another through the mutual correspondence of their activities, nor as self-sufficient individuals, nor even as individuals committed to one another's moral freedom; instead, everyone is united by a 'nexus of community relations and obligations' into which individuals' wills are brought together (1988, p. 115). Dilthey therefore argues that two psychological facts underlie all external organisations in society. One is a feeling of togetherness and community and the other is the relation of dominance and dependence between wills. Multiculturalists' demand for recognition of cultural groups highlights the first psychological fact of feeling of togetherness and community; the later psychological fact of a relation of dominance and dependence of wills within a cultural community is hidden in their demand for justice, and this leads to blindness towards certain sorts of injustice. Parekh (2000) as well as Kymlicka emphasise the former, not the latter. I argue in this thesis that the latter is important within a modern polity in which interdependent citizens require freedom from non-domination to pursue their meaningful activities, not only between communities but also within communities.

Multiculturalists who attach importance to the feeling of togetherness and community are also prone to collapse multiculturalism into plural monoculturalism and bracket off individuality. Dilthey emphasises that people belong to multiple associations and communities and gives importance to individuality. Dilthey's main interest in studying society in terms of its external organisations is that these systems arise in relationships of domination and external constraint of wills through the interaction of individuals. Dilthey recognises that one of the important

characteristics of human beings is our social nature. We have enduring feelings of belonging together, and do not engage in 'cold calculations of relationships'. It is our passions, inner needs and 'feelings for community' that make us human and members of the external organisations of society, of communities and of associations (1988, p. 104). He emphasises that 'in a modern life it is common for a person to belong to several associations', and 'even if a person belonged only to *one* association, his entire essence still does not go into it' (1988, p. 125); 'the individual is ultimately for and by himself' (1989, p. 123). Dilthey's idea of the sense of belonging to a community allows for a multiplicity of belonging and at the same time gives importance to individuality rather than emphasising belonging to one's cultural community as many multiculturalists do, which can lead them to reduce multicultural society to plural monocultures.

Dilthey maintains that people form associations to further their common interests that go beyond a sense of belonging together. Dilthey defines an association (*Verband*) as a purposive system with a volitional union of several wills (1988, p. 118; 1989, p. 120). It is an important point to consider with regard to one's context of choice and self-respect. Dilthey points out that there are three features common to all diverse associations. First, that the union of wills goes beyond a mere 'amorphous sense of belonging together' and community, and beyond a private mode of close interaction based on individual choice. Second, the kind of union of wills has a structure. Third, the wills involved are bound together in a determinate form of cooperation. A permanent complex of purposes introduces a structure into the organisation of individuals subject to it, as well as the goods it requires. Although not every purpose produces an association, associations provide a context of choice. Dilthey (1988, p. 104) emphasises that the forces that coerce different wills into associations are interests and compulsion. However, according to Kymlicka, as I discussed in the first section, the sense of belonging to one's cultural community provides a context of choice and self-respect. But people form associations to further their interests that contributes to their self-worth and self-respect in a Rawlsian sense going beyond a sense of belonging. As Dilthey puts it: 'A group of individuals joined in an association is never completely swallowed up by the latter' (1988, p. 125). And, therefore, individuality remains even if an individual is only a member of a cultural community, and members of a cultural community form other associations

to further their varied interests. Hence, Dilthey's concept of culture and community, by giving importance to individuality, avoids stereotyping individuals by their culture and community and does not ossify an individual within culture.

Dilthey's account of culture also captures the complexity of culture and dynamic interactions with the social organisations and individuals. The systems of culture constantly relate to and interact with the external organisations of society, and this relationship in turn conditions the further development of the systems, and an individual is 'the point of intersection of the plurality of systems'. An essentialist notion of culture as static and homogeneous is unable to give an account of the dynamic nature of interactions of plural systems with the institutions and the significance of individuals relating to the systems and institutions and the development of these systems. The systems become objectified when the mode of activity is a component of human nature and satisfies one of the purposes of the society. For example, systems such as law, art and religion are permanent; 'but particular individuals themselves make their entry onto the stage of life and then pass on' (Dilthey 1988, p. 106). For each of these systems takes shape as a mode of activity, which is founded upon a component of the nature of persons; 'this mode of activity satisfies one of the purposes of the societal whole and is equipped with the means, either established and permanent in the external world or self-renewing through activity itself, which serve the purpose of this activity' (Dilthey 1988, p. 106). An individual interacts with plural cultural systems. Dilthey emphasises that 'a single individual is *a point of intersection of a plurality of systems* which continue to become ever more subtly specialized as a culture moves forward' (1988, p. 106; emphasis added). For example:

If a scholar writes a book, this event can be one more link in the chain of truths which comprise science; it is also the most important part of an economic process transacted through the manufacture and sales of copies; moreover it has its legal aspect as the fulfilment of a contract, and it can be a part of the scholar's professional functions, which is fitted into the general administrative picture. Writing down each syllable of this work is thus a part of all these systems (1988, p. 106).

The individual makes the difference in the variety and complexity of systems of culture. The richness, not only of the individual's ideas or of their self-reflection, but also, and more importantly, of their acts of will and of feelings creates the variety

and complexity in the systems. Parekh (2000, p. 123) also considers cultures to be subject to changes brought on by self-reflective individuals. But self-reflection itself is not enough to make changes; one must also have the will to make them, and in some cases they are against the dominant collective will. Members belonging to an association or a community are vulnerable to the dominant collective will. Although the collective may provide freedom through restricting individuals from exercising arbitrary interference towards other members, the collective itself may dominate a certain faction of members or all members who may attempt to make changes within the organisation. Any claims for group-differentiated rights must take this aspect of domination into account, and Dilthey's idea of culture and community addresses this concern.

The individuals' acts of will and of feelings take place through interactions. Dilthey notes the importance of such interactions: it is '*by means of this interaction of particular individuals—their emotions, their vanities and their interests—that the necessary complex of purposes in the history of humanity is realised*' (1988, p. 108). Even if the minorities have numerous particular cultural systems, their systems invariably interact with the systems of the majority; minorities too are points of intersection with many of the majorities' interacting systems. People interact with one another within a variety of cultural systems to pursue their complex of purposes within the social world, and as such the politics of multicultural integration should give importance to interaction and engagement with one another – social participation – and, as I have already emphasised, this thesis attempts to do that. Hence, it is not, at base, a question of integration, assimilation or separation. These are not real options, as we are always already entangled with all others in this web of cultural systems. Rather than 'Should groups assimilate?', the question should be 'Given that we are all part of an unavoidable and shared process of interaction, how should we regard and regulate it?'³⁰ In this regard, Dilthey's concept of culture and society allows us to address the above concern.

Dilthey's account of culture exemplifies the overlaps and contradictions between cultures as well addressing the problem with Kymlicka's differentiation of character

³⁰ I am indebted to Dr. Peri Roberts for raising this question.

and structure of culture that I discussed in the first section of this chapter. Through the mode of activities, although subject to changes and variations, cultural systems persist through generations. The mode of activities is particularised; for example, in a multicultural state one can expect to have different religious cultural systems such as Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, each practised with different sets of faiths, norms and rules of conduct. However, a cultural system is not a closed, but an open system; cultural systems influence each other and sometimes they even overlap. An Islamic religious cultural system, for instance, has influence over many modes of conduct, including ways of dressing. In a multicultural state, one can expect to encounter overlapping cultural systems that may conflict, complement, compete with, or be incommensurable with, each other. For example, Tamils with different religious cultural systems (Hinduism, Christianity and Islam) interact within a linguistic cultural system of the Tamil language. In this case, they have the same linguistic cultural system, but have incommensurable values within the religious cultural systems. Likewise, Catholic Swiss-Germans and Catholic Tamils will have incommensurable linguistic cultural systems, but share the same religious cultural system. Furthermore, a cultural system itself could have 'complementarities and contradictions'.³¹ For example, within the Christian religious system, Protestants and Catholics have complementarities and contradictions of faiths and values. A cultural system may have conflicts of values within itself, but complementarities across other seemingly contradictory cultural systems. For example, there are deeper conflicts of values or ways of life between ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews than between Jews and Arabs (Levy 2000, p. 106). The point here is that a cultural system is not necessarily internally consistent. There are conflicts and contradictions; and on the other hand, there can be similarities among seemingly different cultural systems. An essentialist notion of culture as holistic, homogeneous and distinct ignores the internal conflicts and contradictions within cultures, and the overlapping commonalities across different cultural systems. In doing so, it is blind to significant problems with, and opportunities in, diversity. Dilthey's concept of culture overcomes these aspects of fallacies of the essentialist notion of culture. For example, as I discussed in the first section, Kymlicka considers religion as part of the

³¹ Archer (1996, Ch. 6): her definition of a cultural system is very similar to, though not identical with, Dilthey's; she argues that there are complementarities and contradictions within cultural systems. For example, Christian beliefs and scientific theories have contradictions within Christian and scientific cultural systems.

character of culture and community as the structure of culture, and he gives importance to the structure; however, as I discussed, this separation is problematic when a community gives more importance to religion than community per se and communities can divide without changing their religion along language or territory. In this case, Dilthey's concept of culture overcomes such a problem. Dilthey considers religion as a cultural system rather than separating religion from culture, and there are many other systems that intersect and interact with a community. This idea of functionally differentiated systems also allows us to deliberate on cultural practices that are of concern to intercultural justice without evaluating culture as a whole.

One may state that Dilthey's approach to culture shares some aspects of the cosmopolitan nature of culture without making membership in a culture irrelevant. However, I shall briefly explain that Dilthey's concept of culture is different from a cosmopolitan idea of culture. Jeremy Waldron (1992), who emphasises the cosmopolitan nature of culture, argues that membership in a particular culture does not have any relevance when people choose meaningful options from a variety of cultural sources. However, people have different affiliations to which they attach a range of senses of belonging and importance, including affiliations and memberships that were given at birth. Furthermore, it is these affiliations that give some people their sense of pride and purpose in life, though they too are members of many other affiliations through which they pursue their complex of purposes. It is also true that many cultural practices are derived from various cultural sources.³² But what I wish to emphasise, drawing on Dilthey's ideas of the cultural system, is that cultural practices exist within various systems, such as religion, language and entertainment, interact with other cultural systems, and that individuals are always at the intersection of many cultural systems and are members of many associations and organisations. For example, one can simultaneously be a member of more than one nation or nationality, a profession, one's family, interest groups and many other affiliations of political, social and economic institutions, and one's meaningful activities can intersect many systems of practices. This aspect of culture in terms of

³² See Sen (2006, pp. 156-157) for a similar point; for example, India did not have chilli until it was brought to India from America by the Portuguese; curry powder was an invention of the English; tandoori originated in West Asia, although it was later 'perfected' in India.

multiple belongings and memberships is also useful in understanding in what ways identity matters, and I shall argue that the politics of identity for recognition is inadequate for social recognition. Individuals have multiple intersecting identities and the politics of identity emphasising a monolithic identity of a cultural membership is restrictive.

As I have already discussed, Benhabib also shares a view that individuals should be able to self-ascribe their identities through their unique narratives. I shall discuss this aspect of identity in Chapter 3 and the normative (in)significance for social recognition in Chapter 4. These memberships encompass both private and public spheres; people's meaningful activities cut across both public and private spheres, which are themselves interdependent (see Modood 2005, pp. 134-135). This aspect of culture is also important in understanding whether ethnic immigrant groups' cultural activities are confined to the private sphere alone, and I shall discuss this issue in Chapter 3. I shall show in Chapters 3 and 7 that the dichotomy between private and public as clearly delineated spheres within liberalism encounters difficulty when deliberating on cultural practices and justice. Moreover, in liberalism the economic and political spheres are too clearly delineated, and this too is problematic when private institutions engage in activities in offering social goods.³³ Dilthey's concept of intersecting cultural systems and interacting external organisations of society allows us to deliberate on practices that cut across economic and political spheres. I shall show in Chapter 7 that republicanism overcomes the problematic delineation of the private and public spheres as well as the separation of economic and political spheres.

To sum up: Dilthey's concept of intersecting cultural systems and the interacting external organisations of society reinforces and extends Benhabib's anti-essentialist notion of culture. It also emphasises individuals' multiplicity of interactions, interdependencies and belongings, and their vulnerability to domination. It is important in the development of a normative argument for non-domination and

³³ For example, the UN Global Compact programme encourages private firms to engage in activities taking social responsibility – Corporate Social Responsibility; many global multinational companies engage in activities to provide social goods that are, traditionally, the responsibility of the states within liberal democracies. See Palazzo and Scherer (2008) for a critique and challenge of the neoliberal private/public and business/politics divide.

therefore favours republicanism's ideal of freedom as non-domination, which I will argue in Chapter 7. However, Dilthey's concept of culture in terms of various systems and organisations rooted in social life that allow people to pursue their complex of purposes and engage in meaningful activities also acknowledges, as Parekh does, that culture provides structure to people's lives with meaning and significance, along with recognising the importance of economic and political structures that are closely tied to a society's culture. As Parekh (2000, p. 151) points out, no society develops culture first, and then economic and political institutions, or vice versa. Defining culture in terms of systems and organisations also captures Kymlicka's point in taking into account many areas of human activity encompassing private and public spheres, without condensing them into a monolithic structure. Dilthey's approach to culture can effectively deal with interaction, and does not isolate and reify culture. Dilthey's approach to culture and community can also overcome the problematic dichotomy of private and public spheres that arises when meaningful activities encompass both spheres or are interdependent of the spheres.

Most importantly, Dilthey's concept of culture in terms of intersecting cultural systems and the interacting external organisations of society allows us to deliberate on cultural practices without disparaging or stereotyping culture as a whole and reifying groups and constraining individuals within culture, whether the practices are part of the majority or minority groups. For example, we can deliberate on practices that are a concern for animal rights activists without evaluating culture as a whole entity and practised by the community – for example, the practice of bullfighting in Spain without disparaging Spanish culture, the practice of polar bear hunting by Inuit in Canada without evaluating Inuit culture as a whole, and the manner of slaughtering animals for consumption by the Jewish and Muslim communities. These practices intersect many cultural systems. I shall discuss, in Chapter 3, the challenges of a multicultural state in providing minority 'cultural options' that clash with the norms, practices and convictions of the majority.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has aimed to contribute to the ongoing critique of the essentialist notion of culture and to develop a sophisticated model of culture with an anti-essentialist notion of culture that is useful for evaluating practices without collapsing the

multicultural society into plural monocultures for cross-cultural justice and freedom within our problematic multicultural social world. My point of departure has been Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism, which is a comprehensive theory on the subject and is the clearest starting point within the anglophone literature on the political theory of multiculturalism to which many revisionists attempt to respond. I have attempted to show that Kymlicka's theory falls into the trap of cultural essentialism. Furthermore, his theory suffers from normative deficiencies due to his differentiation of national minorities from ethnic immigrants on the basis of cultural membership along with his concept of societal culture. His concern for the inequality of power between national minorities and the majority due to circumstances of injustice is justifiable, but his claims of substantial group-differentiated rights to national minorities on the basis of differences in culture leads to cultural essentialism, and inadvertently fosters circumstances of injustice within national minorities. Moreover, his conception of immigrant multiculturalism, which integrates ethnic immigrants into the majority's societal culture, has a propensity to subordinate those immigrants through domination. The retreat from multiculturalism highlights the point that liberal multiculturalism, based on the essentialist notion of culture, has a tendency to marginalise minorities within economic and social domains. However, the critique of the essentialist notion of culture is not a fatal blow to multiculturalism, and we cannot reject the aims of multiculturalism for cross-cultural justice and freedom.

Taking into account Benhabib's notion of culture and her critique of cultural essentialism, I have attempted to show that Dilthey's ideas on culture and community overcome the fallacies of cultural essentialism. Although Benhabib's notion of narrativity and the self captures the anti-essentialist notion of culture, as I have demonstrated, Dilthey's concept of culture exemplifies our dynamic interactions within the problematic social world of dominance and dependence, while giving importance to individuals who are at the intersection of cultural systems and interacting social organisations. We are thrown into the social world, which is necessarily problematic given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – that introduce asymmetrical power relations through dominance and dependence. Every individual is a point where a plurality of cultural systems intersects. People belong to various external organisations of

society and their activities intersect many cultural systems, and as such cultural belonging and membership in *a culture* are misleading to the politics of multicultural integration. It is important to understand how cultural systems and the external organisations of society affect individuals. Minorities are points of intersection of many of the majorities' interacting systems. They invariably have to interact with the systems of the majority to carry out their complex of purposes. Within this context, cultural differences through asymmetrical power relations can lead to domination and systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation of the powerless, and set up the problem for us in the politics of multicultural integration.

Dilthey's concept of culture and community not only reinforces Benhabib's anti-essentialist notion of culture, but also highlights that we need to be concerned with the vulnerabilities of minorities as regards their capabilities to pursue their meaningful activities interacting within the problematic social world of domination and non-recognition or misrecognition of their particularities. Hence, I find Dilthey's concept of culture is useful in an interesting way to contribute to the debate on the politics of multicultural integration within the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture, and to develop a normative account of multiculturalism without collapsing a multicultural society into plural monoculturalism. The claims of culture must take into account the circumstances of injustice for intercultural justice and freedom. In this regard, in the next chapter, I will develop a normative account of well-being from a Diltheyan standpoint and argue that one's well-being is constituted by meaningful activities within one's socio-cultural-historical context, and therefore, social justice is tied to providing conditions for one to pursue one's well-being.

CHAPTER 2

THE NORMATIVE CONTEXT OF WELL-BEING

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, I argued that the normative basis of cultural belonging – membership in a culture – encounters difficulties when it comes to justifying the claims of culture from a liberal standpoint, and reifies culture through being founded on some notion of cultural essentialism. Seyla Benhabib (2002) argues that we should defend intercultural justice in the name of justice and freedom without essentialising culture. Hence, in this chapter I shall develop a normative account on the basis of the circumstances of justice within the multicultural paradigm of the anti-essentialist notion of culture that I expounded in Chapter 1. My point of departure is the liberal assumption of Will Kymlicka, discussed in Chapter 1, that is endorsed by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin in their doctrines of liberalism. The liberal camp attaches importance to individuals leading a good life according to their beliefs, on the assumption that these beliefs are fallible and revisable (Kymlicka 1995, p. 109; also Kymlicka 1989, Ch. 9; cf. Rawls 1999; Dworkin 1981). Therefore, for liberals, it is of fundamental importance that individuals be able to rationally assess their convictions ‘in the light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are not worthy of our continued allegiance’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 81). That is, liberals assume individuals are ‘capable of revising and changing’ their conceptions of the good life as ‘they can stand back from their current ends to “survey and assess” their worthiness’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 81; cf. Rawls 1980, p. 544; cf. Mill 1982, p. 122; cf. Dworkin 1983). As I discussed in Chapter 1, in attaching importance to this assumption and placing normative weight on cultural membership, Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism falls into the trap of essentialising culture.

I shall show, *pace* Kymlicka, that the moral significance of the above liberal assumption should be attached to circumstances of justice without reifying culture and group. As Benhabib points out, we should ‘seek to understand the totality of

circumstances of which culture is an aspect' in order to explain human conduct. Moreover, Benhabib maintains that, in order for us to understand the 'narrative view of actions and culture', we should take into account the viewpoint of the 'social agent' rather than the 'social observer', because social observer may see the meanings of interactions differently from the social agent who is part of the those interactions (2002, p. 5). Hence, we should take into account the meaning of the interacting systems and one's life from the social agent himself or herself rather than from the social observer. From this perspective, meaning in history from the individual participant's point of view is more important than the meaning given by a historian or a philosopher. Dilthey's work on meaning in history provides us with a way of understanding meaning in life and actions from the viewpoint of the individual participant who stands at the centre of intersecting cultural systems, and their institutional manifestation in external organisations of society.

As I explained in Chapter 1, we are thrown into the multicultural social world, which is necessarily problematic given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – and the vulnerabilities arising out of them. Hence, I postulate that we should be concerned with the circumstances of injustice that may shape our ethical convictions, as we may be unable to stand back and assess those convictions, and, even if we are, circumstances of injustice may hinder us from revising and changing them. Conversely, even if individuals are not mistaken about their ethical convictions, they may face unfair challenges in pursuing their meaningful ends due to circumstances of injustice, and may in some cases adapt or revise their convictions according to those circumstances. Both situations are an *ethical concern*. The important point is whether this ethical concern is justified, and I shall argue that it is. To that end, in this chapter I shall argue that one's well-being should be understood as the pursuit of meaningful activities according to one's convictions, and hence that the right circumstances of justice are integral to one's well-being. This then allows us to ask the important question: Do the minorities in a multicultural state have the 'right circumstances' or a 'just society' to genuinely endorse their convictions and face 'fair challenges' in pursuing their meaningful activities based on their ethical convictions? I shall attempt to answer this question in the following chapter.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, I shall attempt to show the link between meaningful activities and well-being by developing a normative account of well-being, drawing on Dilthey's ideas on meaning in history. I shall show that a meaningful life should be understood in its complex structure without reducing it to a particular concept of the good life within the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture. In the second section, I shall attempt to integrate Dworkin's (2000) insights into the concept of well-being in order to emphasise ethical integrity with authenticity for a meaningful life, as his concept is not a reductionist view and considers the complexity of ethical convictions. Moreover, his concept of well-being is in accord with liberalism, which Kymlicka relies upon. This synthesis allows me to argue that justice should figure as a prime normative parameter for the 'right circumstances' to ensure one is able to genuinely endorse one's convictions and to pursue one's meaningful activities with 'fair challenges'. This conclusion is essential for answering the main question of the thesis, namely how we should understand multicultural social justice so as to enable us to deliberate on intercultural justice in terms of justice and freedom.

MEANINGFUL CONTEXT AND CONVICTIONS

In this section, I propose a hypothesis based on Dilthey's work on meaning in history in order to answer the question of how one can understand an individual's meaningful life within a multicultural social world. Dilthey argues, *pace* Hegel, that in human life it is 'a matter of empirical fact and not metaphysical speculation that we experience life in terms of patterns, connections and relationships which constitute for us the meaning of our experiences and indeed of our lives' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 30). Hegel's philosophy claims that history is comprehensible as an intrinsically rational process, in spite of the presence of 'blind passions and sufferings in individuals and groups' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 25); for Hegel, the sequence of events represents this process – the unfolding of the absolute spirit. From the Hegelian perspective, the meaning of individuals' lives is bracketed off from the meaning and patterns attributed to the unfolding absolute spirit. Individuals experience meaning within the social world in which they join in common actions and create common institutions for common purposes. Dilthey emphasises that there is no meaning in history other than the meaning experienced and given by the

participants; that is, there is meaning in history, but it cannot be imposed on it in retrospect by a philosopher or historian. In other words, Dilthey is rejecting Hegel's speculative philosophy of history.

This leads us to an important question: How can we understand meaning expressed in the life of an individual within a multicultural social world? In attempting to answer this question, we need to start with 'the meaning of things for an individual and the way he appreciates meaning around him' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 31). Dilthey gives an account of how meaning is rooted in the awareness of individuals and becomes embedded in the meaning of institutions, organisations and historical processes. Meaning can be recaptured through the individuals' conception of understanding and interpretation (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 33); a process he calls the 'hermeneutic art' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 43) through which the meaning of human activity, which reveals the qualities of human life, can be understood.

Dilthey argues that not only does life have meaning, 'but it is also articulate; it expresses its own meaning which we can understand' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 41). Understanding is an insight into the working of a human mind, and the human mind can understand whatever it has created (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, pp. 39-40). For example, one may understand a poem as well as the working of a gadget. For Dilthey, understanding is the process of grasping meaning. This mental operation can be defined in terms of other mental operations, and it is an inside view of human nature. One cannot, however, understand by intuitively penetrating into the minds of others. Dilthey circumvents this dilemma by arguing that one can understand by realising what others' 'expressions' mean within their context.

Individuals have thoughts, feelings and intentions, and express themselves within the context of their social world. Dilthey acknowledges that there are different forms of expression. For example, a factual statement is an expression, but it cannot tell us about the person who asserts it. The intention of an individual becomes transparent in an action within a particular context. But actions alone cannot reveal all the varied potentialities of a person; an action is carried out with a particular intention within a particular context. Hence, an action reveals one of the varied potentialities within a

particular context (Dilthey 1962, p. 114).³⁴ There are also emotive expressions such as tears in the eyes, shouts of joy, etc. However, these can be misleading as well. It must be acknowledged that these expressions do presuppose the social and cultural context within which they occur. These contexts, which Dilthey refers to variously as ‘the objectifications of life’, ‘the objective mind’ and ‘the mind-affected world’, are the creations of the human mind. It is to be noted that Dilthey’s concept of ‘objective mind’ is different from Hegel’s. Hegel construes the objective mind from the universal, rational will, and therefore brackets off individuals’ relation to the context. Dilthey rejects Hegel’s claim and emphasises that we cannot understand the objective mind through reason. We must start with its reality (1962, pp. 125-126), which is the individual’s context that consists of the relations between human beings and creations of the human mind. These include traditions, beliefs, practices, a shared language and membership of various organisations, such as a church, a branch of an industry, a political party or an art society (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 41). As I discussed in Chapter 1, individuals belong to and are members of multiple organisations. As these organisations are created to serve human purposes, they can be understood – but how?

Dilthey’s concept of the objective mind can roughly be considered as what social anthropologists have called the ‘culture pattern’, and ‘embraces social organisation, beliefs, traditions, institutions, languages, religions and philosophies; in fact, everything human beings have created in which they have embodied their thoughts, feelings and intentions’ (1962, p. 114). Dilthey argues that the culture pattern can be understood in terms of functional systems and social organisations, which Dilthey refers to, as pointed out in Chapter 1, as cultural systems that include arts, religion, education and entertainment, and the external organisations of society such as family, church, communities, associations and the state.

In a multicultural state, people interact and engage within various cultural systems and have affiliations with and are members of the different external organisations of society that interact with the cultural systems. The lives of individuals are enriched as well as affected by their relationships to their environment, other people and

³⁴ This is contrary to the position taken by other philosophers, for example Sartre, for whom man is what he does.

things. For Dilthey, every individual is 'an element in the intersections of society, a point of intersection but at the same time reacting consciously in will and behaviour to the effects of these systems' (quoted in Ermarth 1978, p. 122). In the politics of multicultural integration, this aspect of the social world is very relevant in emphasising that minorities are not only interdependent of the majority, but also the points of intersection of the majority's cultural systems and social organisations. They, in turn, are affected by the relations to the majority and react to the effects of the systems and organisations of the majority, and therefore we should be concerned with the multicultural context that may be unjust to minorities. The expressions of human life become embedded in the meanings of institutions, organisations and historical processes. Therefore, understanding the meaning of an individual's life requires an understanding of the socio-cultural-historical context of their life; that is, the social world in terms of the cultural systems and the external organisations of society in place during the individual's lifetime. Hence, we must take into account the totality of circumstances including the social, political and economic context into which minorities are thrown into in order to understand their lives.

The life of an individual or an activity can only be understood in relation to their place and time. For example, in order to fully appreciate the work of an artist or writer, it is important to understand the rules, conventions and traditions within which they operated. (cf. Dworkin 2000, p. 258). We cannot properly understand the life of an individual in the past based on our own notions of politics or government, or our own ideas and valuations. This is relevant to this thesis as it relates to citizens' well-being in the modern multicultural polity, in which post-immigration ethnic minorities do not have all their cultural systems and external organisations of society, and we must attempt to understand minorities' lives within the given totality of circumstances. Dilthey insists that 'we must understand a period of history as being centred upon itself and not just a preliminary stage to our own time' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 47). Here, again, Dilthey makes his point in opposition to Hegel's idea of the historical process as intrinsically rational, such that 'we can only understand the past life of an individual in terms of the institutions then prevalent, the ideas which animated the people who lived in it and the purposes which were then pursued' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 47). There is meaning in history, but

there is no meaning outside of it, and this meaning can only be experienced as coming into being within the context of the systems of interaction by the actors.

Dilthey, however, cautions that although the meaning experienced by the actors is a valid starting point, it is not the whole story. This is for two reasons: first, the agent himself may not fully understand his own action, or even misinterpret it.³⁵ Second, the agent cannot know all the effects his action will have on others. Therefore, when we consider the meaning of an agent's actions, we must take their consequences into consideration.³⁶ Based on this premise, Dilthey also emphasises that 'history has to be rewritten from time to time, though past histories may retain some abiding value and truth' (1962, p. 49).³⁷ The point here is that when a chain of events unfolds with new links in it, the original meaning may acquire new meaning. Benhabib also cautions that those who want to understand human affairs 'should not take groups' and individuals' cultural narratives at face value', but should seek to understand the totality of circumstances (2002, p. 7). Multiculturalists must seek to understand the diversity and interdependency in the present-day circumstances in which meanings of cultural practices are contestable and contesting, rather than taking meanings at face value that are interpreted in different ways in different times and places.

Drawing upon these insights, I propose a hypothesis for how a third person can understand an individual's meaningful life within a multicultural state, because within a multicultural state it is important that the state be able to evaluate any claims for justice. A third person must take account of two conditions: 1) an individual's meaningful life can only be understood in the context of her meaningful social world (constituted of cultural systems and social organisations – communities and voluntary and involuntary associations); and 2) an individual is authoritative of what is meaningful within her context of life as she experiences her life within the

³⁵ Rickman gives the example that we may know from a person's behaviour that he is beginning to fall in love before he knows it himself (1962, p. 48). However, we, too, may misinterpret it based on our own conceptions of falling in love.

³⁶ Rickman (1962, p. 48) provides an example of the consequences of the assassination at Sarajevo, which triggered the First World War: the assassin's act was a patriotic defiance – the meaning of the act for the assassin – but it had consequences which we must also take into account to fully understand the meaning of the action.

³⁷ Rickman provides an example: 'The football pool coupon filled in on Wednesday acquires a new meaning when it is found to have won a large sum on Sunday and new meaning again three months later when the winner has drunk himself to death.' (1962, p. 49).

context, but her account of it could be incomplete or even mistaken, or may change with changing circumstances and acquire new meaning.

Based on the above hypothesis, I shall attempt to provide an account of meaningful life, and, most importantly, discuss what constitutes a normative context. One may argue that 'meaningful life' is a loaded term, and we can comfortably argue that people's ethical convictions of meaningful life vary without elaborating Dilthey's work on meaning in history. But my point is to exemplify the normative context for a meaningful life that may lead us to argue for the importance of circumstances of justice. In this respect, I shall argue that Dilthey's philosophical position of 'idealism-realism' (*Idealrealismus*) is helpful to show that one's convictions are not formed in a void based on one's ideas of life, but within one's context, which is not unidimensional or essentialist, but multifaceted and dynamic (Ermarth 1978). This is important because the liberal assumption that people can stand back and step outside their lived experience in order to evaluate their convictions is problematic because those very convictions are formed within their context. What, then, makes a meaningful life?³⁸

First, it is important to differentiate Dilthey's concept of 'lived experience' (*Erlebnis*) in comparison with experience (*Erfahrung*) in order to appreciate how one's lived experience shapes one's convictions. Dilthey maintains that the core of life is instincts, feelings, passions and volitions, not thought or reason (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, p. 13). He does not deny the importance of thought and reason, but these are about life and must try to explain life; they exist to express and articulate experience. The notion of *lived experience* is primordial; it is neither 'given' nor 'thought', and it is that 'behind which one cannot go'.

The expression *Erlebnis* designates a part of this process of life itself. As such, it is a reality appearing immediately as such, of which we are aware without subtraction [*ohne Abzug*], not given and not thought (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, p. 23).

³⁸ Dilthey's (1962, p. 95) epistemological position is a continuation of the Kantian Critique, a Critique of Historical Reason, and hinges on the answer to the question: How is meaningful experience possible?

The notion of experience (*Erfahrung*) entails 'taking an attitude toward an object and evaluating it' (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, pp. 13 & 23):

These experiences come into one's consciousness through a crucial process of what Dilthey refers to as 'expression' (*Ausdruck*) and 'understanding' (*Verstehen*). That is, lived experience produces an expression, which is known through understanding, the content of lived experience expressed in judgements and concepts (Ermarth 1978, p. 99). It is a process and the manifold of psychology that we all share, and which stands as the foundation of the human sciences. Experiential meanings are mediated within the socio-cultural-historical context, and are not only subjective but also inter-subjective. It is important that we seek to understand inter-subjective relations and meanings between the majority and minorities in a multicultural state. I shall look into this aspect in the following chapter. For Dilthey, 'experience of life' (*Lebenserfahrung*) is 'the coherence of processes through which we explore the values of life and the value of things' (quoted in Ermarth 1978, p. 227). Experience of life includes what Dilthey calls 'life-values' (*Lebenswerte*), which 'have general validity which extends beyond the personal subject' (Ermarth 1978, p. 229). Understanding of meaningful experience depends not only on the primacy of experience of life, but also on how it is structured within. Let me explain with reference to how this translates into conceptualising and understanding our lives within a modern multicultural society without ossifying individuals in culture.

According to Dilthey, our experience is organised in different ways (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 31). First, there are 'structural relations between our mental acts'; for example, thoughts arouse feelings and feelings prompt resolutions. Second, there is a 'dynamic interaction with an environment' which can either please us or frustrate us, and therefore affect us, not as detached observers, as liberals state in a stand-back position, but as beings that feel, evaluate, hope and strive. Therefore, we, in turn, affect the environment in accordance with our plans and purposes. Third, we perceive the 'significant relationships with our experience'. The point here is that even though one may analyse how experiences are organised in different ways, 'together, they constitute the ways in which we experience the world as meaningful' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 31). It is through these experiences that Dilthey emphasises the relationship of 'I' to the people and things around it. Therefore, it is

important to emphasise that our relationships in a multicultural state are interdependent and dynamic among all citizens, whether they belong to the majority or a minority, intersecting cultural systems of the majority and minorities, the interacting common institutions and the environment. It is not, as many multiculturalists argue, that one's relationship and meanings are centred on one's cultural membership.

Dilthey argues that the meaning of experience is comprehensible as 'the special relation' which the parts have to the whole within a life (1962, p. 107). He emphasises that these parts have meanings, and yet the whole resolves meanings to those parts. It is analogous to a sentence in which words have meanings, and yet the meaning of the sentence itself then resolves what the meanings of those words are. He approaches the meaning of experience through categories of life:

For life is only to be found in *the special relation* between a whole and its parts; and, if we abstract these relations as categories, we find that the number of these cannot be determined and their relations to each other cannot be reduced to a logical formula. Meaning, value, purpose, development, ideal, are such categories (1962, p. 105; emphasis added).

Dilthey acknowledges that categories are derived from experience itself, and therefore cannot be wholly formalised or exhaustively listed.³⁹ For example, the categories consist of value, purpose, development, ideals and power; 'value – something is meaningful insofar as it is valued, that is, appreciated, loved, hated, resented, by a person', and 'purpose – something is meaningful insofar as it forms a person's goal or serves as a means to that goal' (1962, p. 96). The point is that we cannot reduce our experiences and meaning of life into a single category, or even to a list of categories. However, Dilthey maintains that all categories 'depend on the fact that the *connectedness of a life* can only be understood through the meaning the individual parts have for understanding the whole... Meaning is the comprehensive category through which life becomes comprehensible' (1962, p. 105; emphasis added). Meaning arises in relation to the process of understanding. The meaning of a life depends on understanding the meaning of the individual parts in relation to an

³⁹ Rickman points out that Dilthey means by categories by and large the same as Kant did. However, Dilthey differs from Kant by stating that categories derived from experience cannot be wholly formalised, nor exhaustively listed (Dilthey 1962, p. 96).

understood whole. The whole must also be understood in terms of its individual parts, the individual parts in terms of the whole.⁴⁰ How can we make sense of the whole in relation to one's life?

There are several reasons why one cannot wait until one's life ends to understand the meaning of one's life and its parts. First, waiting does not make sense to the person concerned. Second, at the end of one's life, the meaning would only be a meaning constructed or interpreted by others. Third, our understanding of life is only a 'constant approximation' and life reveals quite different sides to us depending on our point of view (Dilthey 1962, p. 109). 'Our conception of the meaning of a life is constantly changing. Every plan for a life expresses a conception of the meaning of life... The actual pattern of life is judged in terms of the meaning we give to what we remember' (Dilthey 1962, p. 106). However, as Dilthey puts it: 'Only in the relation of the meaning of events of life to *the understanding and significance of the whole* do connections found in life receive adequate representation' (1962, p. 109, emphasis added). Hence, categories of life, which are individual aspects of the understanding of life, become part of the comprehensive context of understanding. But life as a whole, as Dilthey points out, is enigmatic:

If, from our varied experiences, we try to understand life as a whole it appears to contain contradictory elements; creative, though controlled by natural laws, rational yet arbitrary, it continually reveals new aspects; so it is clear in detail but *enigmatic as a whole* (1976, p. 136, emphasis added).

As Dilthey notes, at the centre of the incomprehensibility of human life are procreation, birth, development and death. The living know about death, but cannot comprehend it; they attempt to do so through religion and metaphysics.⁴¹ The strangeness of life is further reinforced when people observe the cruelties of the world in society and nature: wars, poverty and natural disasters such as floods,

⁴⁰ This introduces a hermeneutical circle, as Schleiermacher observed.

⁴¹ Dilthey points out that worship of the dead, veneration of ancestors and the cult of the departed produce the basic ideas of religious faith and metaphysics (1976, p. 136). Different religious and cultural practices give different meanings to death (and also to rebirth). For example, Hindus believe in rebirth. Cultural and religious practices provide meanings and significance to many events in life such as birth, marriage and death; but not all the members take those meanings and significance as given. People develop their own views about them.

earthquakes and tsunamis.⁴² The mind tries to unify life's relationships and the experiences based on them to make sense of a life as a whole. Nevertheless, the challenge of making sense of a life as a whole is overcome through a process which Dilthey describes as formulating one's 'worldview' (*Weltanschauung*).⁴³ I shall explain what this means for the relationship between an individual and culture and for autonomy, given the fact of cultural pluralism.

Man has an overwhelming need to put together a pattern of meaning for his life as a whole; 'a general sense or feeling about how life as whole hangs together' (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, p. 29). It is not just a mere reflection of a concept or an idea of the world, but also encompasses 'the whole range of feelings, attitudes, and evaluations of reality', which makes up one's '*Lebensstimmung*, one's mood or sense or feeling of life as a whole' (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, p. 30). Each individual gradually acquires a particular comprehensive sense of her life in relation to the world, a sense that 'relates one's own inner awareness to the world at large' which Dilthey calls the 'worldview'. It is a 'meaning-structure that gives coherence to the individual's ongoing experience' (Ermarth 1978, p. 119). One's life in relation to the world is not defined and determined solely by one's membership in one's culture, and, as I have emphasised, minorities too are at the intersections of majority's cultural systems and the common institutions.

Dilthey argues that all worldviews have the same structure and 'always take the form of a system in which questions about the *meaning and significance* of the world are answered in terms of a conception of the world' (1976, p. 137; emphasis added). There are two major components of a worldview: 'ideas of life', and the other is 'experience of life'. These two components at different strata formulate one's worldview. They affect each other, so that one's worldview continues to develop gradually; in the course of time, it achieves permanence, definiteness and power. As Dilthey maintains, worldviews are not products of thought and 'mere will to know', but 'emerge from our attitude to, and knowledge of, life and from our *whole mental*

⁴² For example, in Sri Lanka, Tamils who live in the Northern and Eastern coastal areas have suffered not only through the prolonged civil war, but also due to the recent Tsunami which struck the island. Some Hindus consider their sufferings are due to their bad *Karma* of their previous lives.

⁴³ The word *Weltanschauung* has no exact parallel in English as it combines two concepts in one: a way of perceiving (*anschauen*) reality (*Welt*), and experience (*anschauung*) of the world (*Welt*); see Crowe (1996).

structure' (1976, p. 141; emphasis added). These consist of thoughts, will, activity, feeling and values and are present in every person. But, the relative weight one gives to each component varies, and 'each person tries to make his view of the world a coherent meaningful whole that enables him to live around the core of meaning and to arrange all the elements of his experience with reference to it' (Betanzos in Dilthey 1988, p. 30). The actual mental structure even for a simple situation is complex, for it encompasses many different 'effectuating coherences' (*Wirkungszusammenhänge*) and the relations among them (Ermarth 1978, p. 217).⁴⁴ The point in relation to multiculturalism is that one may have ideas of life based on some significant cultural systems, but the experience of life one may go through is not completely expressed within those systems, and individuals – even those who may give significance to those particular cultural systems – may vary in how they make their experiences of life along with their ideas of life into coherent meaningful wholes. The point is that individuals' convictions are not determined by cultural systems alone, and multiculturalists who support such a view fall into the trap of the essentialist notion of culture as bounded and deterministic.

Moreover, we must resist the temptation of reductionism to express our ethical convictions, and thereby to reify a cultural group with certain convictions only, but attempt to understand the complexity of the structure. At the lower stratum of the worldview, the structure is determined by the mind's system of interactions with the apprehension of reality that becomes the basis for evaluating circumstances and objects in terms of 'pleasure and displeasure, like and dislike, approval and disapproval' (Dilthey 1976, p. 138). The worldview becomes a regular formation in which the structure of mental life is expressed, and thereby 'circumstances, people and things receive a meaning in relation to the whole of reality and this whole itself acquires significance' (1976, p. 138). Dilthey goes on to state, 'as we pass through these stages in the growth of our emotional attitudes, a second level of the structure of the worldview develops; the conception of the world becomes the basis for the

⁴⁴ Ermarth (1978, p. 217) points out that Dilthey in his later theory attempts to define what is meant by structure, and that even the simple act of eating is deeply implicated in a pattern of means, expectations, and memories. Furthermore, Dilthey also warns that the mental structure has no analogies in the natural world to be compared to the causal relations in nature, and emphasises that the 'inner intentional relation is an utterly unique characteristic of mental life' (1978, p. 217). Ermarth quotes Dilthey: 'In structure, we are concerned not with a viewpoint under which mental processes are explained but rather with the structural relation among different coherences' (1978, p. 217).

evaluation of life and the understanding of the world' (1976, p. 138). It is important for us to differentiate these two strata in order to ensure that we do not succumb to defining our meaningful life in relation to either one of the strata; for example, some may conclude that what pleases us and what we like are meaningful, and hence assign a normative significance of our convictions only to the lower stratum. That is, we should not attempt to understand a meaning of the good life with a reductionist view, and must take into consideration of the complexity of our convictions (cf. Dworkin 2000, p.242; see also Scanlon; Parfit 1984).⁴⁵

One's convictions develop from intention to permanent purposes in accordance with one's worldview:

They are directed towards the realisation of an idea, the relationship of ends and means, the choice between ends, the selection of means and, finally, the combination of purposes into the highest order of our practical conduct - an embracing plan of life, a highest good, supreme norms of action, an ideal to shape personal life and society (Dilthey 1976, p. 139).

One's meaning of life is constituted of one's convictions in accord with one's worldview, and activities that are directed towards those convictions are meaningful. One's engagement of convictions requires meaningful options, means and ends. Hence, the politics of multicultural integration must pay attention to such meaningful options, means and ends, and to how these can be made available to the members of minorities who invariably have to interact with the majority's systems. I shall discuss some challenges that a multicultural state may face in providing these in the following chapter.

Dilthey points out that individuals' attitudes to life as a whole change as life reveals ever new sides of itself, and that 'individuals adopt different basic attitudes according to their make-up' (1976, p. 137). For example:

Some cling to the down-to-earth, tangible things and live in the enjoyment of the day; others, in spite of chance and fate, pursue great purposes which give their existence enduring significance: there are grave natures which cannot bear the ephemerality

⁴⁵ I shall discuss Dworkin's concept of well-being in the following section and Scanlon's account of well-being in relation to morality in Chapter 6. These authors acknowledge the complexity of ethical convictions and Scanlon and Parfit critique many accounts of well-being that attempt to reduce to a 'substantive good' (Scanlon 1998, p. 113).

of what they love and own; to them life seems valueless, as if woven from vanity and dreams, and they seek something abiding beyond the earth (1976, p. 137).

Dilthey emphasises that although optimism and pessimism are the most comprehensive of the major attitudes to life, they occur in various nuances. It is these responses to the world in their innumerable nuances expressed as attitudes towards life that make up the lower stratum in the formation of worldviews. In the higher forms of worldviews, one's procedure is particularly prominent – 'understanding something which cannot be grasped as it is given to us by means of something more distinct'. But 'what is distinct becomes a means of understanding or basis for the explanation of the incomprehensible' (1976, p. 137).

Dilthey acknowledges that there are many forms of worldview in many hybrid and nuanced combinations. He points out that differences in worldviews develop under the special conditions shaped by several factors such as climate, race and nationality which are determined by history; 'the life which originates under such specialised conditions is varied, so are the men who apprehend it' (1976, p. 139). Today, climate change and its effects and acts of terrorism shape people's worldviews.⁴⁶ In a multicultural social world, people are likely to develop different worldviews through their interaction with the social world, their ideas of life and their lived experiences mediated within the socio-cultural-historical-political context; the worldviews go through changes and only gradually acquire permanence. Therefore, the meaningful activities a person engages in will vary depending on the individual's convictions, and these convictions in turn depend on one's lived experiences (the first level of the structure) and the ideas of life (the second level). The point is that individualities matter and our attitudes to life change, and, as I have already pointed out, we cannot reduce what is meaningful to either one of the strata and give significance to a particular concept of ethical conviction derived from a particular cultural system; hence multicultural policies should not ossify individuals in a culture and cultural group. From a Diltheyan standpoint, the multicultural social context gains meaning and significance for individuals leading their meaningful lives constituted of meaningful activities according to their convictions that are in accord with their

⁴⁶ It is to be noted that the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2007 was awarded in recognition of understanding and raising awareness to combat man-made climate change to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Mr Al Gore Jr.

worldviews. The context is the multicultural social world, which includes the majority's cultural systems and the external organisations of society, and post-immigration ethnic minorities stand at the intersection of these systems interacting and giving meaning to their lives. However, as the multicultural social context is multi-faceted and, necessarily, problematic, I shall argue in the following section that the normative context calls for the circumstances of justice for one to pursue one's well-being according to one's genuine endorsement of one's convictions with fair challenges.

NORMATIVE CONTEXT OF WELL-BEING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

In this section, I shall argue that one's context is normative, integral to well-being, and a matter of social justice. I have argued in the previous section that one formulates ethical convictions not in isolation from the social world but interacting with the cultural systems and the external organisations of society, and one is in an interdependent relationship with other citizens and the environment. One's lived experience and the ideas of life affecting each other form worldviews. The context is integral to one's meaningful life and that is what a multicultural state must be concerned with. However, as I have argued, we cannot reduce what is a meaningful life to a certain conviction of a good life. One's ethical convictions are complex; Dworkin cautions, in a similar vein to Dilthey's concept of a meaningful life, that we must suppress the 'reductionist impulse' of what is a good or meaningful life and 'accept not only the complexity but structure within the idea of well-being' (2000, p. 242).

Drawing insights from Dworkin's (2000, Ch. 6) account of well-being, which is constituted by 'critical interests' within the 'model of challenge', I shall formulate a framework to argue for a normative context of 'right circumstances'. From this perspective, I will argue that one's right circumstances, not only for one to genuinely endorse one's convictions, but also to pursue one's meaningful activities accordingly and face 'fair challenges', should be tied to social justice to overcome the ethical concern that I pointed out in the introduction of this chapter. This justification will then allow us to ask the important question: Do the minorities in a multicultural state have the 'right circumstances' or 'just society' to genuinely endorse their

convictions and face ‘fair challenges’ to pursue their meaningful activities based on their ethical convictions? I shall attempt to answer this question in the following chapter. It is important in order to address the main question of how we should understand multicultural social justice within the anti-essentialist multicultural paradigm that does not reify culture and ossify individuals in culture.

Dworkin identifies two forms of interests that people have: ‘volitional’ – what one wants – and ‘critical’ – what one believes will make one’s life better. Both contribute to their well-being; however, he argues, for the standard of judgement, one should pursue critical interests (2000, p. 244). These interests are nevertheless interconnected in two ways: first, critical interests arise from volitional interests; for example, if one has a desire of great importance, then it is normally in one’s critical interest to succeed. Second, volitional interests normally stem from critical interests: ‘people generally want what they think it is in their critical interests to have’. Nevertheless, people do not always actually want what they believe it is in their critical interest to have, even though this seems contradictory (Dworkin 2000, p. 244).⁴⁷ For example, one may think it desirable to have a family-work balance of life in a critical sense; yet one may not want it, or not want it enough, to actually put it into practice.

Dworkin argues that even though one is tempted to trade off between these interests to achieve overall well-being, the standard of judgement about what sort of life one should have supports pursuing critical interests for one’s critical well-being. I shall, however, show later in this section, from a Diltheyan standpoint, that both interests can be included in one’s meaningful life. But Dworkin maintains that morality cannot be a comprehensive category of well-being that includes both volitional and critical well-being as morality provides different standards for conduct based on the standards of critical well-being. Dworkin, therefore, attempts to give an account of what actually counts as critical interests.

The account of critical interests has to resolve what counts as critical values. This leads to what Dworkin calls a set of ‘worries and puzzles’ (2002, pp. 246-250).

⁴⁷ Dworkin points to this contradiction as part of a complex philosophical problem called *akrasia*.

The fourth of the puzzles and worries is that there are two views when judging a person's good life. The first is the 'additive view', an objective ethical view, which holds that we can judge a person's life to be a good or bad one without asking their opinion. The second is the 'constitutive view', a subjective ethical view, which posits that no component can contribute at all to the value of one's life without one's own endorsement. If we take ethical value to be objective and not subjective, then it will support the 'additive view'. This view discounts one's independent view of the good life, and in some cases it may make sense. As Dworkin illustrates with some examples, some of our intuitions seem to be in conflict with the additive view, and 'ethics seems more mysterious as a result' (2002, p. 249).

The last puzzle is concerned with the unit of ethical value, i.e. 'whose life ethics aim to make good'. The issue here is whether the ethical value should be collective or individual. Although one may be ultimately responsible for one's own life, one's good life is also somehow tied to the group or community that one is a member of. This connection may make any member of the group or the community want to know whether *its* life is going well. If ethics are indexed rather than transcendent, then the right life for one depends on one's cultural group or community, within the context of the nation and the period one lives in. This line of argument raises a puzzle about whether, as one's life and critical success depend on one's community, ethics should be concerned with the community. Communitarians emphasise this line of argument, but I shall discuss in Chapter 7 whether the communitarian political idea is conducive to the sort of multiculturalism that I am advocating. The above-mentioned issues raise two questions: First, why are there such puzzles and worries? Second, how can we give a coherent account of ethical values?

Dworkin points out that the various puzzles and worries are due to our 'ethical instincts and impulses' that reflect different and in some respects antagonistic ways of conceiving of the 'metric of ethical value' (2000, pp. 250-251). The puzzles arise because we have too many rather than too few ethical convictions and because some of them seem to conflict with others. As I discussed in the first section, from a Diltheyan standpoint, it is plausible for people to have lived experiences and ideas of life in conflict, and as a result they may change their convictions. People's worldviews form gradually and are subject to changes. Dworkin, however, presents

two different possible models for resolving the conflict of ethical convictions and argues that one of the models resolves the conflicts better than the other.

His first model, the 'model of impact', holds that the value of the good life lies in its consequences for the rest of the world. According to this model, people pursue activities for their ethically valuable consequences to make a difference to the objective value of the world. Examples of people whose activities had ethically valuable consequences are Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Mother Teresa; their lives increased the objective value of the world. The second, the 'model of challenge', adopts Aristotle's view that a good life has the intrinsic value of a 'skilful performance'.

The model of challenge holds that living a life is *itself* a performance that demands skill, that it is the most comprehensive and important challenge we face, and that our critical interests consist in the achievements, events, and experiences that mean that we have met the challenge well (Dworkin 2000, p. 253).

The point emphasised here is that 'events, achievements and experiences can have ethical value even when they have no impact beyond the life in which they occur' (Dworkin 2000, p. 253). Hence, the model of challenge accommodates critical interests that may not have any impact beyond one's life. The value of performance in facing a life challenge is complete in itself. Therefore, the model of challenge does not depend on any distinct and independent value, as the model of impact presumes. I will now examine the model of challenge against the model of impact and argue that, although the former provides a better account than the latter, from a Diltheyan standpoint both can be reconciled. However, I will also show that it is the model of challenge that provides a framework to argue that the normative context of one's well-being is tied to social justice.

Dworkin argues that the model of challenge resolves the worries and puzzles better than the model of impact. He maintains that the point of these models is to organise our convictions, so far as possible, into a coherent account. While recognising Dworkin's intentions to provide a coherent account for our ethical convictions, from a Diltheyan standpoint I will argue later in this section that critical interests may include volitional interests within the specific context of one's life that is meaningful to the person concerned according to her worldview. Moreover, she could have



critical interests that are in line with the model of impact which are meaningful as well. Dworkin himself acknowledges that there are people whose convictions, which may be in accord with the model of impact, are unchallenged.

For many, a good life does not necessarily depend on choosing a substantial project to make an impact to the world. It is to lead a meaningful life according to their convictions. As Dworkin notes: 'Many people set wholly adverbial goals for themselves; they want to live, they say, with integrity, doing things their way, with the courage of their convictions' (2000, p. 253). These goals may or may not have an impact. One may criticise as self-indulgent goals that have no impact beyond one's life, even goals based on critical interests. One's critical interests can be based on one's ethical convictions that do not have an intentional positive impact on the world, and Dworkin's model of challenge addresses those. There are people who pursue goals, not to make an impact on others or a positive contribution to ethical value, but because the goals are meaningful within the context of the social world according to their ethical convictions. Therefore, one's circumstances gain importance in judging one's life. If we are to judge whether people's lives are meaningful, we have to take into account their circumstances. Dworkin's model of challenge exemplifies the significance of one's 'right circumstances' for a good life.

The first puzzle, the problem of significance, is that the model of impact has to accept objective value, which can be based on aestheticism, theological anthropomorphism, utilitarianism or any other objective value. However, the model of challenge resolves this puzzle in a different way; since an exercise of skill in the face of a challenge is complete in itself, it does not depend on any distinct or independent value. The point Dworkin makes is that 'treating achievements as having ethical value in that way, rather than just in virtue of their impact alone, allows more subtlety in our judgments of the success of our own and other people's lives' (2000, p. 256). Although the model of challenge seems to provide a better judgement, what ultimately counts is whether the individual would find the challenges meaningful, which may very well include whether the individual's activities have any positive impact on other lives as well.

The second puzzle is that the model of impact ties ethical value to an independent value and therefore must be transcendent; an independent value cannot be dependent on time and place. Although what makes people happy may vary, depending for example on their country's state of economic development, the metric of independent value must be the same under the model of impact. The model of challenge, on the other hand, takes the view that ethical value is indexed rather than transcendent. However, it is also plausible for someone to accept transcendent values under the model of challenge; and this, of course, depends on how one's ethical convictions give meaning to one's life within one's context of life. Although Dworkin takes into account the context of one's life situation, he nevertheless argues for indexed ethical values; he illustrates the point by drawing an analogy to art: the skilful performance of an artist's challenge has to be appreciated in its particular historical context, and the 'artistic' value, for example, of a painting reflects the challenge and 'our respect for the performance that produced it' (2000, p. 258). But indexing ethical convictions objectively does not make much sense when the contexts of individuals are different. Dworkin acknowledges that the ethical challenge of a particular time and place is very different from its artistic challenge, but what matters, he maintains, is to respond in an appropriate way to one's situation.

The challenges one faces depend on one's situational context, constituted by socio-historical-cultural-political domains. This context provides one, using Dworkin's terminology, with a set of 'parameters' and 'limitations'. Some of one's circumstances provide a set of parameters that 'help define what a good performance of living would be', and others act as limitations 'on the degree to which the ideal can be achieved' (2000, p. 260). Dworkin's main concern is to arrive at a standard of judgement of a good life on the basis of how well one faces challenges in life. The challenges one faces vary according to one's circumstances, which are, as Dworkin notes, complex and include several factors such as health, physical ability, age, material resources, friendships and associations, commitments, family, traditions, race and nationality, etc. One can treat some of them as parameters and the others as limitations in light of one's context of life (Dworkin 2002, pp. 260-261). But one cannot count everything as parameters or as limitations without destroying ethics for oneself. As Dworkin points out, we can note that 'many of our parameters are

normative: they define our *ethical situation* not in terms of what our actual situation but in terms of our situation as we suppose it *should be*' (Dworkin 2000, pp. 261-262; emphases added).

Even if we do the best we can in the circumstances we do face, we do badly measuring our success against the chance we believe we *ought* to have been given, and it is the latter that defines a good life for us (Dworkin 2000, p. 262; emphasis added).

If the normative parameters define how the ethical situation should be, then the question is, 'What normative parameters ought to be given?' Dworkin (2000, p. 262) defines a 'hard parameter' as that without which one is bound to fail, and therefore essential. But it also helps to define one's ethical convictions of a good life. So, which should be the hard or the prime normative parameter?

Dworkin (2000, pp. 263-264) introduces justice as a hard normative parameter and argues that 'a good life is a life suited to the circumstances that justice requires'. It also resolves the puzzling interplay between ethics and morality, between living well versus living a moral life. There are two issues here that call for justice. One is that one may engage in activities that are unjust and lead a successful life, and the other is that one's life is affected by an unjust society. Dworkin points out that the model of impact answers the puzzle poorly compared to the model of challenge. For example, if someone amasses wealth through immoral business dealings, and then uses some of that wealth to carry out projects to make a positive impact on the world, should we then assess that person's well-being more positively than a person who is poor and unable to make a positive impact? (2000, p. 264). The model of challenge performs better. According to this model, Dworkin argues that, as long as some aspects of our circumstances count as normative parameters, it is not difficult to regard 'justice as figuring among those normative parameters' (2000, p. 264). However, he assumes that resources must also figure as parameters in some way, and I shall discuss the politics of distribution and the politics of recognition in Chapter 4. For Dworkin, living well means 'responding in the right way to the right challenge', under the '*right circumstances of justice*'; 'injustice, just on its own, is bad for people' (2000, p. 265; emphasis added). What should the right circumstances of justice be within a multicultural social world? And, most importantly, who should decide what should be the right circumstances of justice, and on what basis? This

thesis attempts to answer these important questions in Chapters 4 and 5. To be able to do so, the remaining puzzles first need to be addressed.

The next dilemma of the set of puzzles and worries is whether ethical value is additive or constitutive: ‘how far and in what way does my having a good life depend on my thinking it good?’ (Dworkin 2000, p. 267). The model of impact presumes that ethical value is fully objective and as such additive. It cannot depend on what ethical value one thinks one is adding to the universe. Therefore, the model of impact also accepts the theoretical basis of ‘critical paternalism’ (Dworkin 2000, p. 268). That is, a state could claim a right or even an obligation against its people’s convictions (Dworkin 2000, p. 268). On the other hand, the model of challenge rejects such paternalism and takes into account the agent’s performance and the person’s *genuine endorsement*, ‘not the result of another person’s thoughts being piped into his brain’ (2000, p. 269).

But there is a dilemma when it comes to judging one’s life as good. For example, one may be leading what others judge to be a successful life while believing it to be a ‘false, distorted life’ and at conflict with one’s own ethical sense. Dworkin maintains that the dilemma can be resolved by accepting the challenge model and insisting on the priority of ‘ethical integrity’ (2000, p. 270), which he explains thus:

Someone has achieved *ethical integrity*, we may say, when he lives out of the conviction that his life, in its central features, is an appropriate one, that no other life he might live would be a plainly better response to the parameters of his ethical situation rightly judged (2000, p. 270; emphasis added).

Dworkin thus judges one’s life as a critically better life when one lives according to one’s convictions with a better response to the parameters of one’s ethical situation. I shall, however, show later that Dworkin’s concept of ethical integrity for one to lead a critically better life can be reconciled with the Diltheyan standpoint of meaningful life. Dworkin nevertheless is quick to point out that ethical integrity can fail for many reasons: people may live their lives mechanically, set their convictions aside and serve their volitional interests; they may believe, rightly or wrongly, that their ‘correct normative parameters’ have not been met for them; and they may be made to live, by the ‘fiat of other people’, in a way they regret and never ‘endorse’ (2000, pp. 270-271).

Dworkin raises some very important points here. First, one has to *genuinely endorse* one's ethical convictions; otherwise one is merely living one's life according to conformity to the convictions of others. Second, one has to have one's *correct normative parameters*. As I have discussed, from a Diltheyan standpoint, one believes one's ethical convictions are meaningful according to one's worldview. Although people do not spell out their worldviews, they have ethical convictions, which they believe are meaningful, and as such they are subjective. However, Dworkin maintains that ethical values are objective, and one's priority of ethical integrity does not make ethics subjective in the first person (2000, p. 271). On this basis, he argues that the challenge model integrates both value and choice. He maintains that treating an individual's convictions according to her ethical integrity requires her to evaluate what is 'right or wrong' rather than she hypothesises about ethical value. However, he agrees that when it comes to judging a third person's life, we have to take her settled convictions into account. But Dworkin points out that one's ethical integrity may take into account 'cultural paternalism': 'People do not make decisions about how to live in a cultural vacuum. They respond in various ways to what their culture makes available by way of possibility and example and recommendation' (2000, p. 272).

One forms one's convictions according to one's lived experiences mediated within the socio-cultural context and ideas of life. One may, however, despite one's ethical integrity, be mistaken about one's convictions as these are subjected to one's socio-cultural conditioning. Dworkin himself argues that paternalism of any kind cannot improve the critical value of a person's life, unless that person acknowledges the improvement (Dworkin 2000, p. 274). In this view, 'living well is responding appropriately to circumstances rightly judged' (Dworkin 2000, p. 273). But the judgement begs the question: Which circumstance provides the correct normative parameters within a multicultural state that justice requires? Put differently, the pertinent questions are how we should understand multicultural social justice, and whether and what correct normative parameters are preconditions for our ethical situation that ought to have been given. This thesis attempts to answer these core questions and I shall address them in chapters 4 and 5. But in the last dilemma of the

set of puzzles, I shall now discuss whether ethical value should be tied to community.

This last dilemma concerns whether ethical value is social or individual. The model of impact answers that one does well when the group does well, if one is 'ethically integrated' into a group. Based on the 'prisoner's dilemma',⁴⁹ the model of impact is valid. Individuals will be worse off if they act rationally to advance their self-interests, but they will be better off when they act to have an objectively valuable impact on the world. But Dworkin points out that the most common convictions and institutions do not provide similar contexts. He argues that the challenge model responds to ethical integration appropriate to one's circumstances, as an appropriate response. People enter into a joint project when ethical integration makes sense collectively, but not vice versa. The point is that the challenge model shows one's ethical integration as an appropriate response to an important parameter of an individual's circumstances.

Dworkin seems to be correct in pointing out that critical interests do matter in leading a good life, with convictions one believes one should have rather than convictions one actually has or wants to have. However, one should also genuinely endorse those convictions. The model of challenge resolves the set of worries and puzzles of critical interests and provides a standard for judging a life. However, Dworkin is ambiguous in defining what one's critical interests consist of. I argue that activities may include volitional interests, depending on one's context and convictions. As Dworkin points out, critical interests and volitional interests are interconnected in various ways, and one's volitional interests may become critical interests depending on one's situation and convictions. Moreover, I will try to show that critical interests may include not only volitional interests, but also interests

⁴⁹ In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation and self-interest are in conflict. In this game, two prisoners are charged with a crime and each is faced with the choice of giving evidence against the other. Both are in separate cells and cannot know what the other will do, and let us also assume that they are not relatives. If neither of them defects (testifies), then the police cannot charge either of them and thereby it reduces the length of stay in prison for both; therefore, both have to be released within a short time period (say, 1 year). In other words, if both cooperate to be silent, then they have to be in prison for only 1 year. However, if one of them defects and the other does not, then the one who defects would be let free immediately and the other will be imprisoned for 10 years (maximum sentence). If both defect, then both will be imprisoned for 5 years.

based on one's convictions that may be in line with the model of impact, rather than the model of challenge, that are meaningful according to those convictions.

Dworkin clearly states that what counts as critical interests are interests based on the life one thinks should have, rather than wants to have, because one believes that unless these critical interests are pursued and achieved partially or wholly, one's life will be less successful. Dworkin also agrees that what one believes leading a good life to be is based on one's convictions, whether according to the model of challenge or impact. However, the point of emphasis here is how one could give a coherent account of one's convictions; Dworkin argues that one is able to do this based on critical interests interpreted through the model of challenge. But can one still give a coherent account of one's convictions if volitional interests form part of one's convictions of a good life? Dworkin, in fact, considers a third category of well-being to be more elemental than volitional and critical well-being. This is biological well-being concerned with one's health and freedom from pain, sexual or other frustration (2000, p. 488, n. 3). He certainly includes some of these biological interests in the categories of volitional or critical interest, or both. For example, he says that since avoiding pain is something I want, it counts as part of my volitional interests; but he adds that 'avoiding pain counts as part of my critical interest as well, though in a different and generally smaller way' (2000, p. 488, n. 3). Dworkin acknowledges that fighting pain and disease is important no matter which category it belongs to; well-being depends on it. On the face of it, this is a volitional interest, but it must also count as a critical interest for one's well-being given the context of physical pain and suffering through diseases. Someone who is suffering from a serious illness is bound to have recovering from it or coping with it as a major part of her critical interest.

Someone's volitional interests can be part of critical interests, affecting her well-being positively or negatively, given that person's situation facing challenges in her life to carry out her meaningful activities according to her convictions. One may even put one's volitional interests of one's wellness in jeopardy, in order to carry out one's critical interests. As Amartya Sen notes: 'one may sacrifice one's personal

well-being, wellness, to achieve one's agency goals' (1992, pp. 60-61).⁵⁰ One's critical interests are based on one's convictions and one's volitional interests are part and parcel of one's critical interests and give meaning to one's ethical convictions within one's context of life. In fact, Dworkin himself acknowledges that one can intelligently want something without thinking it makes one's life a better life to have, and 'indeed a life in which someone wanted only what he thought it in his critical interests to have would be a sad, preposterous mess of life' (2000, p. 486, n. 12).

Can one's critical interests also incorporate convictions based on the model of impact? Dworkin maintains that ethical values are objective; however, he says that ethical values are finally up to what one's convictions are; he gives priority to ethical integrity. One formulates one's convictions from various sources in one's life, including family, cultural community and role models, by learning from one's own experiences and sharing experiences with others, and through religion, education, shared meanings of events and collective memories. One may embark upon activities that may lead to a positive impact on other people's lives: for example, Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King Jr. engaged in activities which made an impact on other people's lives because of their convictions. Perhaps these people who made an impact on the world had convictions about the value of positively impacting the world, and therefore pursued those critical interests, which could be considered within the model of impact. However, another interpretation could be that these people's convictions were convictions about helping others or fighting injustice; they lived their lives facing those challenges and performed well. In this case, the critical interests are interpreted within the model of challenge. Dworkin too notes that even though ethical value is objective, it has features that tempt us to call it subjective as well (2000, p. 274).

The important point here is genuine 'endorsement'; one should subjectively embrace even objective values as meaningful. For example, a robot could be programmed with objective values, but it cannot endorse them. Dworkin is aware that ultimately

⁵⁰ Mahatma Gandhi did this when he chose to fast, degrading his personal well-being, as part of his principle of *ahimsa*, non-violence, to achieve India's independence from Britain. Nelson Mandela engaged in activities to end apartheid in South Africa knowing that he would be imprisoned; he ended up serving almost three decades in prison to achieve his goals.

what is good must make sense to the person concerned and that person must genuinely endorse her ethical convictions. People engage in activities that suit their life stages and circumstances, and find them meaningful accordingly. Dworkin also points out that ‘people have different sorts of reasons, and these operate at different strata of their moral and ethical imagination’ (2000, p. 244). One’s interest is invariably tied to one’s personal goals; however, one’s meaningful goals may concern not only one’s own well-being in terms of critical interests and volitional interests, but also the well-being of others. For example, a father may be more concerned with his children’s well-being than his own. However, his overall goal may include both goals for himself and goals for his children’s well-being. A self is situated within a social matrix and people are in social relationships that include love, nurture and care. As Sen notes: ‘within an ethical context, one’s well-being is often affected by the nature of other people’s lives’ (1992, p. 37), and therefore, one may take on critical interests that have an impact on others.

I have argued that an individual’s well-being is constituted by engaging in meaningful activities based on her ethical convictions in accord with her worldview. Although one’s worldview may attain some permanence, it is subject to development and change. Dworkin’s account that well-being is based on critical interests within the model of challenge resolves the attendant worries and puzzles to give a coherent account of ethical convictions. However, one’s convictions could also be coherent within the model of impact and still form the basis for one’s meaningful activities; therefore, what matters then is one’s *genuine endorsement* of the *ethical integrity* of one’s convictions. The whole point Dworkin makes is that

interpreting the convictions we already have as convictions about skilful response to a complex challenge gives them *more sense and coherence* than the alternate general interpretation—that they are convictions about having the best impact—can give them (2000, p. 276; emphasis added).

The above point poses an ethical concern for citizens’ well-being in a multicultural context from two aspects. First, one formulates one’s convictions within one’s context and can be mistaken on one’s convictions due to one’s socio-cultural conditioning, which may be unjust. Second, when one attempts to pursue a meaningful life according to one’s ethical convictions within an unjust context, one may either face unfair challenges or continue to struggle, or change. On the one

hand, one's situational challenges could become one's ethical convictions, and on the other, they become limitations. Therefore, as I have argued, justice as a normative parameter enters within one's context for well-being and raises the following pertinent question: Given the three general social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – are the 'limitations' that ethnic minorities face 'just'? I shall attempt to provide a descriptive account of limitations in the following chapter, and then develop the set of normative criteria for the claims for justice.

CONCLUSION

Given the difficulties surrounding the normative significance of cultural membership, which has a propensity to lead to cultural essentialism and to collapse a multicultural society into plural monocultures, this chapter has endeavoured to develop an alternative normative account within the anti-essentialist multicultural paradigm by taking on Dilthey's anti-essentialist concept of culture, without disregarding the importance of culture and community, but at the same time without reifying culture and community while giving importance to individual agency. My point of departure was the liberals' assumption of the fundamental importance of individuals leading their good life according to their ethical convictions and the revisability of those convictions. Both Dilthey and Dworkin refrain from reducing what is a good or a meaningful life to a particular ethical conviction and show that one's convictions of a good or meaningful life consist of a complex structure and are interdependent on one's circumstances, which include according to Dilthey various intersecting cultural systems and the interacting external organisations of society both of the majority and minorities. Deriving from Dilthey's work on meaning in history along with Dworkin's concept of well-being based on the model of challenge, I have shown that we need to be concerned with the circumstances of injustice. That is, the normative account is concerned with the circumstances of justice rather than one's membership in a culture, which can lead to reifying culture and community. According to the synthesis of Dilthey's idea of worldview and Dworkin's concept of well-being, I have shown that the well-being of an individual is constituted by engaging in meaningful activities according to her ethical convictions shaped by her worldview. This worldview is formed through one's lived

experiences and how they are expressed and understood, interacting with one's ideas of life. The formation of one's worldview is a process. It is a meaning-structure, which gives (in)coherence to the individual's ongoing experience and meaningful goals.

People interact and engage with one another directly or indirectly within the social world constituted of cultural systems and the external organisations of society, carrying out meaningful as well as meaningless activities individually or collectively. This is the context in which well-being constituted by meaningful activities gains purchase. People's deeper reality consists of being authentic to themselves, carrying out meaningful activities towards their goals and facing challenges according to their convictions. One's well-being depends on one's genuine endorsement of the ethical integrity of one's convictions. In a multicultural state, this account of well-being raises a major ethical concern from two aspects from a liberal standpoint. First, can minorities genuinely endorse their ethical convictions within their ethical situations? Second, does the ethical situation of a multicultural state provide the minorities with fair challenges? If not, what should the necessary normative conditions for the right circumstances of social justice be for minorities not only to genuinely endorse their convictions, but also to face fair challenges? I will attempt to answer these questions in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I shall focus on the limitations to social participation that give rise to an ethical concern regarding the pursuit of well-being.

CHAPTER 3

LIMITATIONS TO SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I have argued that it is an ethical concern when minorities limited in pursuit of their well-being, which is constituted by engaging in activities consistent with their ethical convictions. I also have argued that one's context is integral to one's well-being. Post-immigration minorities pursue their well-being within the multicultural social context which consists of the majority's cultural systems and the external organisations of society. This chapter explores the post-immigration ethnic minorities' limitations to social participation within the multicultural social world, which may hinder their pursuit of well-being. Post-immigration minorities are also interdependent social beings pursuing a variety of meaningful activities according to their different ethical convictions. They partake of these through social participation within the multicultural social world comprising the intersecting cultural systems and the external organisations of the majority. I shall attempt to show that some social aspects may become limitations to minorities in pursuing their well-being.

This chapter consists of two major sections. In the first section, I shall describe three aspects of the social – the norms and traditions of the majority; the dichotomy of private and public spheres within liberalism; and the stereotyping of minorities based on their identity and socio-cultural markers – that affect minorities' well-being. I demonstrate that when minorities in a multicultural state are treated, for various reasons, as inferior social status members interacting with the social world, they are unable to engage in their meaningful activities. For example, their options or the means to pursue those may not be accepted as norms within the public sphere. Or the minorities may be marginalised or denied social interaction and engagement because their collective identities are considered inferior. Or they may be stereotyped and misrecognised in respect of their particularities. They may also be oppressed through dominating social relationships within their external organisations. All of these

factors hinder the pursuit of their well-being. I also show how identities in relation to culture and groups affect minorities, which is also an ethical concern. In the second section, I briefly discuss the challenges that a state faces when integrating post-immigration minorities within the common institutions of the majority. The challenge is to provide meaningful 'cultural means' and options to minorities within the common institutions. I shall illustrate with some examples that are mostly discussed within the debate of multiculturalism.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS

In this section, I attempt to show that three social aspects affect minorities in their pursuit of well-being. As I have argued, according to Dilthey's approach to culture and community, individuals are at the point of intersection of cultural systems and the external organisations of society, and post-immigration minorities depend on the majority's common institutions to pursue their meaningful activities within social, economic and political realms. Basically, 'social' means that one is interacting with people directly or indirectly through institutions and intersecting cultural systems. In general, within a multicultural state, publicly recognised social practices and traditions follow those of the majority, and the minorities have to interact with the institutions of the majority to carry out their meaningful activities. But, to pursue their well-being, the majority also depends on many activities of the minority. Majority and minority are interdependent. I shall show, however, that interdependency invokes power relations. According to Dilthey, power is a category of life arising in relation to 'doing and suffering' in realising purposes, and it is a continuous process of life (1962, p. 110). Within this context, first, I show that some of the norms and traditions of the majority can become limitations to the minorities' social participation. Second, within a liberal tradition the public versus private dichotomy can further marginalise the minorities. And third, stereotyping of minorities based on identity markers, whether they are voluntarily or involuntarily ascribed to them prevents them from social participation as citizens of equal status.

Let me first introduce the crucial aspect of interdependency and recognition, as it is relevant to discuss power relations. Since individuals' meaningful activities intersect many cultural systems, and people belong to various external organisations of

society, multicultural citizens are interdependent; this is one of the three basic social facts. Citizens are not, in an absolute sense, independent. Neither are they dependent in every aspect of their social activity. Otherwise, as Dilthey states, the social activity would constitute one system (1988, p. 105). Interdependency takes many forms because there are many different modes of dependencies which are multi-dimensional along the physical, emotional/psychological, intellectual and spiritual dimensions. As I discussed in Chapter 1, according to Dilthey, interdependency does not eliminate the relation of dependency and dominance within the external organisations of society. For example, in a commercial enterprise, the employer is dependent on employee's labour, and the employee is dependent on the employer's wages. Both are interdependent. The mode of dependency from the employer's point of view is labour, whereas from the employee's point of view it is wages. But the relationship of dependency may not be equal, in which case it is a power rather than a 'consensual relation'. Dilthey maintains a person's will is intertwined in a complex web resulting in a mixture of power and domination, a sense of belonging, self-interest, external obligation and freedom. For example, parents and children are emotionally interdependent within a family – one of the external organisations of society, and the mode of dependency is reciprocal feelings of love and affection and a sense of belonging. This example also shows that interdependency is a state of being affecting many dimensions: growing children are dependent on parents to fulfil their needs; however, in their old age the parents may become physically dependent on their children and emotionally so long before. The mode of dependency can change according to the social context of the situation, and therefore, the dependency/dominance relation can change, too. The interdependency between subjects can also be indirect, taking place through the external organisations of society.

A very relevant mode of interdependency for intersubjective relations among individuals in the multicultural state is recognition. The politics of recognition has roots in Hegel's concept of self-consciousness. Hegel asserts that 'self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it only exists in being acknowledged' (quoted in Yar 2002, p. 59). One's self-awareness is dependent on others through social recognition. Contemporary scholars have emphasised the importance of mutual recognition as a precondition for self-

realisation, as well as a vital human need (see Honneth 1995 and Taylor 1994).⁵¹ A member of society cannot be expected to interact and engage as a full social member without recognition in equal standing with others. Subjects are therefore interdependent on recognition for interaction and engagement as equal status social participants. The mode of social recognition is immediate and continuous; it is an intersubjective state of being. Interdependency on recognition does not eliminate power relations; it introduces them. As Hegel argued, even master and slave are in an interdependent relationship, but certainly not free of power relations of recognition.

The mode of interdependency of recognition can become a power relation between the collective will of an external organisation of society and its members. Dilthey emphasises, as I discussed in Chapter 1, that power relation of the external organisation of society and the individual is ‘always subject to the general control of the external organisation of society, which both assures a margin of free play to independent and reasonable activity of individuals and sets limits to it’ (1988, p. 108). The last point is essential if the freedom of an individual is to be understood as non-domination by the external organisations of society, and I emphasise the importance of this aspect in the course of development of this thesis. Benhabib also emphasises the importance of institutions in the public sphere that the ‘struggle for the recognition of cultural differences and the contestation for cultural narratives’, of the ‘other’ can take place ‘without domination’ (2002, p. 8).

The first limitation stems from the minorities being dominated by the majority due to its norms and traditions that are represented as universal. As Iris Marion Young (1990, pp. 58-59) puts it, ‘cultural imperialism’ involves the universalisation of a dominant group’s experience and cultural practices as the norms. In this case, moral values of the majority and their practices are represented as the universal morality. Even if the minorities seek the same ends but through different means, this may become a limitation to them. The minorities may be subjected to systematic denial, exclusion and marginalisation limiting their social participation. Minorities’ norms

⁵¹ I will argue that the normative basis for recognition is vital for citizenship of equal status in the social world in the following chapter; see Fraser and Honneth (2003), where Fraser argues for parity of social participation on the two-dimensional axis of distribution and recognition. I will discuss this issue in Chapter 4.

and traditions may be denied by the majority; for example, dress code and religious days in a working week. I shall discuss this in the second section on illustrative cases.

The second limitation stems from the dichotomy of the public versus the private sphere. The majority's practices, norms and traditions take place in the public sphere and gain status and significance. The minorities engage in their own traditions and social practices within the private realm, but are marginalised in the public realm. For example, marriage, as a social institution within the state, grants recognition to heterosexual couples as families with legal rights and responsibilities. In many states, homosexual partners are not granted the same rights giving them recognition in the public sphere, although they live together in the private sphere. As the minorities follow their cultural practices privately, these are not given recognition in the public sphere and hence they are reduced to second-class citizens. One may argue that most of us (even the majority) find our projects in the private sphere. However, the difference is that the majority do have the option to pursue their projects within the public sphere without shame, whereas the minorities do not.

Dichotomising public and private practices is problematic, as it marginalises minorities. Identification of the institutions of the majority as public and any minorities' cultural-related activities as private, limits many meaningful activities to private spheres, although many of those activities are interdependent on both spheres. From a Diltheyan sense of interacting systems, meaningful activities interact with many systems such as the economic, educational, entertainment, athletic, religious, artistic and linguistic spheres, and may encompass both public and private spheres. It is problematic to confine an activity within a certain sphere. The cultural systems of the majority are institutionalised within the public realm and given power and resources, whereas the minorities' cultural systems are pushed back into the 'relative privacy of the family and communal associations', and hence 'the public realm in every society generally enjoys greater dignity and prestige than the private realm' (Parekh 2000, p. 204). The minorities may either access the cultural systems of the majority as inferior social status participants, or accept uncritically the activities of the majority, or retreat into their communal ghettos to practise their meaningful activities.

However, many liberals who advocate multiculturalism do not adequately address interdependence between the public and private spheres (Modood 1999, p. 89; 2005, pp. 132-135).⁵² The dichotomy between the spheres is problematic, and drawing a clear boundary within a meaningful activity sphere in the social world is ambiguous. In the contemporary society of globalisation, it is also difficult to delineate economic and political spheres (Crane et al. 2008). Individuals interact within both private and public realms when conducting their meaningful activities. As Parekh (2000, p. 203) notes, 'religion also defies the private-public distinction.' People's many meaningful activities and social relations span across both realms. This does not mean there is no privacy. Intimate relationships require privacy. However, exploitative or oppressive relationships in the private sphere should not be sanctioned.⁵³

The third limitation stems from how people experience their everyday interactions within an intersubjective realm, and this intersubjectivity can give rise to limitations to those considered 'other' and of inferior social status. People interact with others in their day-to-day life; this interaction is initiated as soon as people gaze at each other irrespective of any engagement of social rituals. People experience the social presence of others subjectively, so their social interaction with others is an intersubjective mode of experience; this experience is felt even before any social engagement takes place.⁵⁴ As I discussed, people not only interact with, but also and more importantly engage with others to pursue their activities within the social world. These 'others' include both persons and the collective wills of the external organisations of society.

Any experience of social oppression one may have when engaging in social interaction is felt subjectively; however, social oppression can become objectified within the social world through institutions, constitutions and the reinforcement of the majority's social norms. In a multicultural social world, people who are

⁵² Cf. Habermas (1994) and Rex (1986, Ch. 7). I will also consider this issue in Chapter 7 on liberalism.

⁵³ Feminist scholars are concerned about issues arising from this situation; for example, see Anderson (1999), Fraser (1997), Frazer and Lacey (1993), and also Young (1990).

⁵⁴ Social interaction does not exclude interactions and engagement in the virtual world such as the Internet, and one-way interactions with the people in the media and entertainment. However, the intersubjective experience in these cases is indirect rather than direct.

considered different, inferior, or not normal according to the norms of the majority may find their social presence and interaction ignored, marginalised or denied, and their social status for full social participation thereby reduced. This marginalisation or exclusion from social participation may even be legally sanctioned; segregation, based on ethnic or racial identity or non-legal status within certain social institutions, is some form of restriction on social participation as citizens of equal status. Even if social participation is legally sanctioned for minorities, the mainstream social participants may, covertly or overtly, exclude these minorities as ‘outsiders’ in their day-to-day social situations as well as within social institutions that are dominated by the majority. This exclusion may stem from the majority's xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners, arising from their fear, insecurity, prejudices and ethnocentrism.⁵⁵

Cognitive psychologists note the value of people's tendency to categorise what they perceive for the efficient processing of information.⁵⁶ But this categorisation involves stereotyping and can result in the social categorisation of people in terms of in-groups and out-groups (see Cudd 1998, p. 196; cf. Tajfel 1981). The groupings can take many forms according to various traits and markers and allow construction of polarities – racial markers such as colour of skin: white versus black or non-whites (coloured); gender: male versus female; sexuality: heterosexual versus homosexual; age: older versus younger; physical ability: able versus disabled, and nationality: indigenous versus foreign-born. Other forms of identification and stereotyping may be based on the dress codes associated with religious and cultural practices. Moreover, media institutions such as films often amplify the minority's stereotyped characteristics and behaviours. Consequently, the behaviours and capabilities of individuals are interpreted according to stereotyped characteristics, which can distort the capabilities of stereotyped individuals and inhibit them from engaging in their meaningful activities. Stereotypes of both positive and negative characteristics can affect individuals pursuing their meaningful activities, which are different to the

⁵⁵ For example, a recent study in Switzerland concludes that xenophobia, misanthropy, and right wing extremism are not exceptional in Switzerland, but present in the ‘core society’ (Cattacin et al. 2006); even though the majority acknowledges differences in nationality, culture and religion as part of its wealth, and accepts that foreigners do the work that the Swiss no longer do or want to do (p. 28).

⁵⁶ Efficiency does not mean effectiveness, as efficiency means only the quickest way of doing things which may not be effective. Many people are reluctant to process much information, and hence take a minimum effort to understand the context of an issue.

stereotyped capabilities. There are several types of identity markers that are exploited for stereotyping, and I will illustrate a few: racial, nationality or ethnic, social construction of new markers based on the survival context imposed upon by the majority and socio-biological traits.

Racial markers play a significant role as they are not easy to hide or erase, and people who are identified with racial markers of phenotype appearances including colour of skin associated with cultural prejudices, which include group behaviours and attitudes, are stereotyped based on the visible markers.⁵⁷ As Gerd Baumann states, 'the term 'race' itself is a fallacious nineteenth-century fiction, and the term 'ethnicity' in its presumed biological sense is its late-twentieth-century photocopy' (1999, p. 20). Stereotyping can reinforce some of the stereotyped individuals' behaviours in line with others' expectations of the stereotyped categorisation.⁵⁸ However, debates on multiculturalism have conveniently incorporated 'language of race' and ethnicity into a 'language of culture'; as Anne Phillips (2007, p. 57) notes, racism is concealed behind a language of culture especially in North America and Europe. As Modood (2005) points out, in Great Britain, 'a noncultural Asian might still be targeted as an Asian by a community, which means Asian by background, which means birth and ancestry' (2005, p. 9). The point is that a 'noncultural' Asian is still stereotyped with Asian cultural motifs as 'alien, backward, and undesirable' (2005, p. 7).⁵⁹ A group may be subjected to racism without cultural prejudices that is based on ethnicity, and vice versa, but when both are affecting a group, then individuals who are identified as members of the group can be severely affected in their social participation as equal social status members even in their day-to-day lives (see also Modood 2005, p. 8).⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Prejudices operate both ways; they are not only the majorities' beliefs about the minorities, but also the minorities' opinions about the majorities; however, the majority has the power to reinforce their prejudices within the social world. People's prejudices are based on ignorance, which results from lack of interaction and engagement with each other.

⁵⁸ Modood (2005, p. 7) notes that blacks are, for example, stereotyped based on the physical characteristics – 'strong, sensual, rhythmical, and unintelligent'; thereby, they are expected to perform in sports and music, and may not be encouraged by the institutions to enter into other careers.

⁵⁹ Asians in Great Britain means South Asians, and cultural motifs include language, religion, family structures, exotic dress, cuisine and art forms.

⁶⁰ Individuals who are identified as inferior in social status based on their ethnicity and have visible markers find themselves in their day-to-day lives being ignored, marginalised and excluded by the majority in public places such as public transport, pubs and restaurants. Also, the majority avoid living in the neighbourhood of minorities considered inferior. A state can also sanction segregation in

The majority associates post-immigration ethnic minorities' behaviours, interests and, most importantly, capabilities to nationality of origin, which is often entwined with ethnicity. For example, in Switzerland, a recent explorative study shows that nationality is the most frequent factor in discrimination, among other factors such as sexuality and religion (Cattacin et al. 2006, p. 24).⁶¹ The report further notes that people with discriminating factors are mostly affected in workplaces, followed by public places for social interaction such as restaurants, discothèques, and clubs and also in spare time activities such as sports (Cattacin et al. 2006, p. 25).⁶² However, interestingly, the discrimination is much less often based on 'ethnic' origin than on foreign nationality.⁶³ In this case, the explanation may be that Switzerland as a multicultural nation-state has been constructed with four different ethnic groups, with greater autonomy of Cantons, along with 'alien Other' of foreigners – foreign nationalities, which unites the differences of ethnic origin among nationals (Räthzel 2002, p. 85).⁶⁴

The social status hierarchy based on nationality of immigrants seems to be a reflection of the international power relations of the nation-states and their positions within the 'international social order' (Yuval-Davis 2002, p. 46) including previous colonial power relations.⁶⁵ However, if a nation is an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991), then nationality is an imagined identity on which a social hierarchy is established. First of all, immigrants' nationality of origin often consists of different ethnicities based on language, religion and shared history; and second, ethnicities are not deterministic of individual's behaviour, interests and capabilities even though many

excluding certain factions from public places, housing, schooling, etc., as was the case during the apartheid regime in South Africa.

⁶¹ Discriminatory factors are nationality (37%) and sexual identity (19%), followed by religion (8%), and others such as subordinated position at the workplace (8%), handicap (5%), etc. Switzerland also adopts discriminatory policies on immigration based on nationality.

⁶² People are discriminated mainly at the workplace (34%); followed by public places (34%), spare time activities (15%), and others.

⁶³ Discrimination based on ethnic origin is only 4%; on nationality, 37%.

⁶⁴ For example, Swiss Italians are part of the nation, whereas Italian migrants from Italy are 'aliens' (Räthzel 2002, note 14, p. 97).

⁶⁵ Ethnic citizens are treated accordingly to the 'international social order'. Yuval-Davis (2002) compares the relative power and freedom between an American student and a Somali refugee living in London. In Saudi Arabia, expatriates' salaries are mainly based on nationality even if qualifications and experience are similar. Ethnic markers play a role in the international social order; at immigration control, it can be observed that citizens are subject to different treatments based on their ethnic markers, even if they are citizens of a country of comparatively equal social order.

of the members may engage in collective pursuits and shared interests as the majority. To be sure, a nation's infrastructures of economic, social and political institutions provide context and constraints for people to carry out their meaningful activities. For example, a nation's communications systems along with policies on freedom of speech and press; a transport system along with policies on freedom of movement of goods and people; and financial institutions along with policies on the economy and social institutions along with policies on social welfare shape people's capabilities to pursue their activities. But these institutional aspects and policies do not warrant essentialising nationality of origin or ethnicity. But treating post-immigration minorities with an essentialist notion of ethnicity entwined with their nationality of origin restricts minorities' freedom to be who they are according to their convictions when participating with the common institutions as equal status members. As I discussed in Chapter 2, individuals vary in their convictions as these are formed through both the ideas of life and lived experiences and these differ even among people from the same nation and ethnicity.

Moreover, stereotype characteristics can be easily introduced on the minority based on their context and constraints imposed by the majority. For example, Sri Lankan Tamil men who sought asylum in Switzerland as refugees during the civil war in Sri Lanka were initially given opportunities to work in the gastronomy industry helping cooks in kitchens; some of them gradually became cooks, waiters and barmen. Today, they are associated with the gastronomy industry and are stereotyped as good cooks and restaurateurs even though many Tamils stress education and value professional jobs such as engineering, medicine, law and accounting. Interestingly, most of them are not in the habit of dining out.⁶⁶ Stereotyping by the majority reinforces the tendencies of individuals identified as members of a stereotyped minority to behave, and develop interests and abilities in line with what is expected of them, and thus it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Modood, 2005, p. 59;

⁶⁶ With my portrayal, I do not want to stereotype Sri Lankans either. The point here is that stereotyping, whether in positive or negative aspects, can affect individuals who are identified with those characteristics as well as those whose meaningful activities are different. Sri Lankans, especially Tamils, who have immigrated to Switzerland for highly skilled work, are also stereotyped as gastronomy workers. It is to be noted that highly skilled Sri Lankan Tamils mainly migrated to English speaking countries. Indians in Switzerland, although identified as ethnically similar to Sri Lankans, are associated with the information technology industry as many of them have worked in this industry as expatriates. I am not saying that one type of work is better than the other; but wish to highlight the stereotyping of a particular identity.

also Eriksen 2002, pp. 23-25). Stereotyping restricts people from engaging in their meaningful activities according to their ethical convictions, and forces them to form their worldviews according to stereotyped characteristics.

Socio-biological traits such as gender and age are also exploited to stereotype people and therefore discriminate against them in employment. There is another factor based on prejudices and stereotypes of culture – ‘cultural racism’, which can amplify discrimination based on socio-biological traits, especially racial traits in many areas of social life such as employment, housing, schools, social services, etc. (Modood 2005, pp. 41-42).⁶⁷ In addition, post-immigration minorities’ nationality of origin in combination with the above factors can affect them adversely (see Bradley 1996, Ch. 4, 5 & 6). For example, an employer may not prefer ethnic older men with a different nationality of origin, believing that they may not ‘fit-in’ within a dynamic younger, white, male-dominated industry; although that may not be the case in reality. Sometimes, the combination of discriminating factors may be offsetting; for example, an older female may be preferred to a younger female for a job, as older females are unlikely to take maternity leave. Biological age may not be a suitable parameter for categorisation in many areas of life and activities. People’s different lived experiences and varied abilities make them differ physically, emotionally and intellectually which do not necessarily correlate with biological age. Stereotyping individuals along with prejudices on the basis of their race, ethnicity including nationality of origin, sexuality, gender or age, or any combination of more than one of them, limits them in pursuing their interests that give meaning and significance to their lives, even if some of the stereotyped characteristics are positive within certain economic and social contexts.

Young (1990, Ch. 2), following Marx’s theory of exploitation, points out that women and racialised groups are exploited in the labour market. In the United States, Blacks and Latinos mainly do ‘servant jobs’ in the gastronomy industry. Marginal people include not only racially marked groups, but also other social categories of people such as the old, single mothers and the mentally and physically

⁶⁷ In Switzerland, cultural racism is often equated with an idea of a cultural group’s ‘mentality’ (*Mentalität*) – culture is seen as determining individuals’ actions without any regard to circumstances and individuality.

handicapped. Young (1990, pp. 56-57) refers to the powerlessness of the non-professionals; in addition to being exploited, they suffer a form of oppression – lack of autonomy, because of their standing under the authority of professionals. But, this powerlessness is also common among female or racialised professionals compared to white male professionals in the corporate world in terms of their chances for promotion, their opportunity to take on more responsibilities and their salary levels. The powerlessness may curtail their development of capacities and decision-making power in working life and increase the exposure to disrespectful treatment.⁶⁸

The members of minorities who are identified as the ‘others’ against the majority are ‘systematically unlucky’ with ‘comparative disadvantage’ (in comparison to the majority as a group) even if some or many of them are competitively better, with ‘competitive advantage’, than the members of the majority within the relevant contexts. For example, individuals who are identified as members of certain minorities can systematically be denied in getting jobs within the institutions dominated by the majority, and admissions to the institutions of higher education with limited placements even for those who are competitively better than the members of the majority. Moreover, the members of the minorities may become the target for systematic violence, and in extreme cases, to genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’.⁶⁹

The above discussed limitations to social participation as full and equal status members affect the psychological/emotional, physical, intellectual and spiritual dimensions of the minorities’ life at two levels: the structural (through the institutions and constitutions of the majority) and the phenomenological (invoking intersubjective experience that is attuned stereotyping of the minorities). Both situations affect the well-being of minorities in many dimensions giving rise to an ethical concern. For example, extreme cases of physical violence, such as torture and rape, can affect the psychological/emotional dimension of the victim’s life. In the psychological/ emotional dimension, people who are oppressed by being excluded or

⁶⁸ For example, disrespectful behaviour includes ignoring participants in communication. Although subtle, this behaviour can affect one’s autonomy and self-respect (see Cattacin et al. 2006, note 8, p. 25 for a similar point made). I will take up these issues of autonomy and self-respect in Chapter 4.

⁶⁹ For example, in Sri Lanka, Tamils are discriminated in getting jobs within public institutions and admission to universities. They are also victims of frequent riots and civil war. For a good illustration of these issues, see Kapferer (1998), also Burger (1993) and De Silva (1986).

ignored and thus denied their social participation lose their self-respect and feel alienated. Effects of marginalisation and exploitation in the physical dimension include physical suffering, economic hardship and deprivation of material wealth, notably decent housing. In the intellectual dimension, people who are oppressed lack opportunities to further their education, to develop their skills and abilities, and to engage in their meaningful activities. And, in the spiritual dimension, people of different religious faiths may be ridiculed by the majority and denied the opportunity to follow their religious practices. All of the above oppressions inhibit minorities from forming meaningful social relations with others, especially with members of the majority and this, in turn, deteriorates their social status as equal social participants even in day-to-day social situations. All of the oppressive social relations affect their capability not only to carry out their meaningful activities, but also to form their worldviews in a just society, which is also an ethical concern as I discussed in Chapter 2.

To sum up: I have argued that three social aspects of the multicultural social world are limitations to the minority in pursuing their well-being. First, the social norms and traditions of the majority can be limitations to the minorities' social participation when they have to interact with the majority's cultural systems and the external organisations to carry out their meaningful activities. Second, the public versus private dichotomy further marginalises the minorities. Giving recognition to the norms of the majority within the public sphere leaves the minorities with inferior social status, or pushes them back to engage in their meaningful activities in their private sphere. Third, stereotyping includes many factors such as racial identity and markers, nationalities of origin and ethnic markers, characteristics imposed by the majority within the social context constructed by the majority and social traits such as gender, sexuality, age and class; often combined. Stereotyping and prejudices prevent minorities from engaging in their meaningful activities that are incongruent with the stereotyped characteristics, and forces them to form worldviews according to the imposed stereotyped characteristics. The social relationships of the majority towards the minorities can be oppressive, both at the phenomenological and the structural level, preventing minorities from engaging in their meaningful activities as citizens of equal status, which is an ethical concern. All these forms of oppression inhibit minorities and individuals who are identified as members of the minority or

out-group. Therefore, how an individual is identified as a member of a minority group is an essential element in the politics of multicultural integration to which I will now turn.

Culture, Group and Identity

In this subsection, I attempt to show how identity affects social participation. People have to deal with their identities in real life situations in the decisions they make and the actions they take (Levy 2000, p. 9). The members of the minority groups may ascribe their collective identities voluntarily or be ascribed them by the majority. The majority has the 'power to ascribe' and identifies the minorities as lower in social status; for example, heterosexuals' identity of gays and lesbians as deviant in comparison to the accepted norms of the majority. The power to ascribe can take place along both axes of power – political and social. The meaning of identities affects people in their every day lives.

Social interaction is influenced by and affected according to the identities that people ascribe to themselves and to others within various social contexts. These identities may be cultural or racial or social, or a combination. When the minorities are identified with an inferior social status identity, they may be subjected to direct or indirect discrimination marginalising them or excluding them from social participation.⁷⁰ Charles Taylor (1994, p. 32) argues that we understand ourselves and form our identities through dialogical interaction with others. But, when one is identified with a single overarching identity with inferior social status, then it becomes a limitation to social participation. Therefore, a stigmatised identity cannot be ignored. In this respect, Tariq Modood (2007) argues that multicultural policies must ensure that stigmatised identities are given respect. I shall discuss the normative implications of the politics of identity and recognition in Chapter 5. In this section, I shall focus on whether and how identities matter to social participation.

⁷⁰ One might point out what does matter is one's personality to interact and be socially accepted. I am not denying that individuality and personality do not matter for social interactions. Even when some members of the majority accept someone of a stigmatised minority group, they may still stereotype and have prejudices against that minority. They may still believe that the minority group in question has 'major adjustment problems (chips on the shoulders, and so on)', whereas the accepted one is an exception to the stereotype (Modood 2005, p. 39). And, such attitudes of the majority not only prevent themselves from interacting with the stigmatised minority group, but also result in the members of the minority who are willing to interact with the majority to shy away and withdraw to their groups.

One has multiple affiliations and is a member of the various external organisations of society, and takes on multiple roles. For example, a medical researcher in a scientific community may also engage in religious activities. He cannot be identified with either one of those identities in every social context. Members of particular communities or organisations are identified as belonging to those communities or organisations. Members may seek a sense of belonging to the group or to the community or to an organisation, and share an identity although they may not all engage in the same purposeful activities. One's identities are multiple and intersecting, and, as Dilthey emphasises, one is at the point of intersection of intersecting cultural systems and the interacting external organisations of society. Therefore, a singular identity with a sense of belonging to various affiliations raises an important question: who identifies with what identity, within what context, and does the person who is identified with such an identity also subscribe to it, or contests?

Cultural or ethnic groups can be identified in several ways. They can be based on, for example, language, religion, or shared history. This can lead to a person ascribing to herself more than one identity trait, and thus having multiple identities. For example, a Muslim Indian immigrant in Britain may be identified as a Muslim along with Muslim immigrants from Pakistan within the Muslim community, as well as an Indian of the Indian community along with Indians of other religions. The multiple roles one takes, the multiple affiliations one has, the variety of cultural systems with which one engages in and their interactions, the meaning and significance one assigns to according to these, make it difficult for one to identify with a particular cultural group in every social context.

One may argue that a certain identity matters more than others. A Muslim man may prefer to be identified as a Muslim based on his religious identity rather than identify with his language. In Sri Lanka, where non-Muslim Tamils identify themselves as Tamils even though they belong to different religions (Hinduism and Christianity), whereas Muslims, even though they predominantly speak Tamil, identify themselves as Muslims. The identification depends on the socio-cultural context of the contesting identities; the importance of which can either be assigned by the persons

themselves or by others, and who assigns it can also become contestable. For example, a man from Corsica although speaking French may not attribute significance to the language. He may attribute significance to his place of origin and want to be identified by his birthplace. Nonetheless, others may identify him as a Frenchman. If one wants to be identified with a particular group, one may want to be identified with the shared identity and with whatever differentiates it from the others.

A group may subscribe to a single collective identity, which prescribes significant cultural systems and practices, as Modood refers to a 'mode of being' (2005, pp. 106 & 159). A collective identity of a minority may become political when the majority subjects members of the minority to the shared fate of oppression or domination; what Modood calls a 'mode of oppression' (2005, pp. 106 & 159). A mode of being of a minority group can become a mode of oppression. Non-western ethnic minority groups are identified not only within an ethnic or cultural dimension, but also within a racial dimension; ethnic identities and cultures are often 'racialised'. Debates about multiculturalism mainly consider minorities within the dimension of ethnicity and culture, paying little attention to how racial aspects exclude, marginalise and subordinate minorities under cultural or ethnic dimensions.⁷¹ Racism can be hidden within a group's cultural and ethnic identity. As I have already pointed out, Modood describes what he calls 'cultural racism' as a form of racism, 'in which colour racism is triggered by, and only becomes potent in combination with, cultural antagonisms and prejudices' (2005, p. 38). Therefore, racialised groups that have distinctive cultural identities or a community life defined as 'alien' will suffer an additional dimension of discrimination and prejudice (Modood 2005, p. 38).⁷² Modood further notes that cultural racism is on the rise in Britain, and that it is particularly aggressive against those post-immigration communities that want to maintain some of the basic elements of their culture or religion to assert this difference in public, and demand that they be respected just as they are; 'beyond the colour of their skin' (2005, p. 39). Even if colour racism may be on the decline, cultural racism is on the rise. Modood (2005, pp. 39-41) offers evidence of such a trend in Great Britain,

⁷¹ In a similar vein, anti-racist politics have paid little attention to the cultural aspects and how they could affect discrimination and the possibilities of change (Anthias 2002).

⁷² This, I believe, especially includes Islam as a threat to other religious and / or non-religious ways of life.

comparing English prejudices against West Indians and Asians; he observes that anti-Asian racism appears to be on the rise.⁷³

Anne Phillips (2007, pp. 57-58) notes that racism based on colour is a somewhat 'narrow definition' and she endorses Balibar's more inclusive definition, which does not delineate what counts as racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious but instead stresses the practices of segregation articulated around 'stigma of otherness' (cf. Balibar 1991, pp. 17-18). I tend to agree that racism cannot be based on the binary division of colour – black versus white – which can lead to ignoring racist attitudes towards other socio-biological-cultural parameters including religion, nationality of origin, names and ethnicity.⁷⁴ Racism based on a colour line of black versus white gives less importance to those people who are discriminated against and subject to intolerance based on other markers, including colour, other than black. In the US, the population is categorised with an 'ethno-racial pentagon' dimension: African-American, Asian-American, Euro-American, Indigenous and Latino segments (Hollinger 1995/2000, p. 8). Historically, the US was mainly interested in the black/white divide and applied the 'one drop of blood' rule, identifying a person as 'other than white' if she had even one black ancestor among eight (see Benhabib 2002, p. 73). Hollinger notes that people who ascribe a single identity to individuals cling to the doctrine that 'culture and colour go together' and believe that one cannot really choose one's culture because 'one's culture is indissolubly bound up with one's colour' (quoted in Benhabib 2002, p. 74; cf. Hollinger 1999, p. 122).⁷⁵ It should also be noted that the Latinos, who are not identified either black or white, are also subjected to discrimination.

⁷³ The Fourth National Survey, conducted in 1994, found that all ethnic groups, except the Chinese (but including the Caribbeans), believe that prejudice against Asians is by far the highest of all ethnic, racial, or religious prejudices (Modood 2005, p. 40). Moreover, a recent survey of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002) finds that, on average, OECD countries do not give importance to immigrants' racial background being white (Citrin and Sides 2008, p. 39).

⁷⁴ Phillips notes that the disaggregated studies revealed that it was South Asian Muslims of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin who constituted the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Britain, not the African Caribbean blacks (Phillips 2007, p. 57, cf. Modood 2005, p. 153). It is also to be noted that the different ethnic origins, which include Sri Lankans – Sinhalese and Tamils, and Nepalese among the Indian sub-continent ethnicities, cannot be lumped together as Indians against the African Caribbeans either. A study on discrimination of minority groups against one another is also required; for example, how Indians treat Blacks, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans against how they treat the mainstream Whites in the UK. Again one cannot treat all Indians as the same – there are differences among how they identify themselves and how they are identified by others; for example, North versus South, Hindus versus Muslims, and Sikhs versus others.

⁷⁵ Post '9/11', 'Islamaphobia' is on the rise and non-white culture is strongly associated with Islam.

Identities of ethnic groups are defined in relation to other groups. Moreover, ethnic minorities have multiple identities not only based on ethnicity, but also other social identities that intersect. As I have argued, according to Dilthey, people belong to many social organisations and take on a variety of roles and stand at the intersection of interacting organisations. Hence, it is arguable that which one of the identities becomes salient depends on the socio-cultural context of social relations and interactions with others. The identity, even if salient, takes on multiple meanings and is internally inconsistent or heterogeneous. For example, the identification of Asians as opposed to Westerners is only meaningful as a categorical identity within a particular social or political context. But an Asian identity itself can take on multiple identities and associated meanings within different socio-cultural-political contexts. Any categorisation with an overarching identity can lead to bracket off people's individualities and their specific needs, and their ethical convictions which are shaped through both ideas of life and lived experiences.⁷⁶ As Benhabib argues, 'our individual life stories, which make sense for us as unique selves' (2002, p. 15).

Social constructivist accounts portray identities as socially constructed and these in turn can be politicised. The social construction of an identity will also inevitably result in multiple identities and varieties of meanings based on a number of social parameters, such as language, place of origin, gender and religion. These identities themselves will have multiple internal identities. Postmodernists argue that identities of individuals are not rooted in any particular group identity, and such identification will only constrain an individual with 'negative characteristics of essentialism, closure, and conflict'; the norm for an individual identity is therefore 'multiple, shifting and, at times, nonsynchronous identities' (May et al. 2004, p. 10). Nevertheless, what we can observe is that people tend to attribute some salient characteristics to groups based on ethnicity or on other parameters; especially, in their opposition to the majority. Minorities are, in their day-to-day lives, affected by such characteristics associated with their group identities. Even individuals who do

⁷⁶ A recent graduate of social anthropology from the University of Bern in Switzerland, in a personal conversation, surprisingly endorses a stereotype that Asians 'eat the same food and have the same mentality' and therefore she justifies the practice in Switzerland of putting together asylum-seeking Asian refugees in refugee camps.

not want to be identified with a particular collective identity are still constrained by it when others identify them with the collective identity.⁷⁷

The concept of the group may be contestable. Groups themselves may have shifting and poorly defined boundaries. Nevertheless, one cannot say that groups themselves are ephemeral phenomena as they are only socially constructed and therefore mutable. We hear of genocide and ethnic cleansing based on group identities. People are willing to fight for their ethnicity and for their rights may use social mobilisation based on identity to seek justice or to let the injustice they face be known. The main reason, I believe, is that their collective fate, including how they are treated in their daily lives, is based on their group identities. As I discussed in Chapter 1, stereotyped distinction of non-Western minorities' culture represents all types of behaviour of the members attributed to their culture.⁷⁸ Therefore, group identities cannot be ignored when they affect the members who are identified with and are subjected to a mode of oppression.

Some individuals, who are ascribed lower social status because of their salient identities, may adapt various strategies in an attempt to move upward in the social status hierarchy. They usually have prejudices against their own ethnic origin and less respect for themselves and for other people of their ethnicity due to their inferior social status assigned to them (see De Vos 2006, p. 22; cf. Goffman 1963). This does not mean that members should not critically evaluate their cultural practices and values. Moreover, those who redefine their identities may face psychological distress or even self-hate. When a collective identity negatively affects individuals whose collective identity is mainly an ethnic identity based on the past, they may assert an identity based on their present- or future-oriented identity (De Vos 2006, pp. 13-15). For example, one may assert one's identity based on one's occupation – say a physician, rather than on one's ethnic identity, and gain a sense of belonging to the

⁷⁷ I will further address the issue of collective identity under social recognition and domination later in this chapter as well in Chapter 4.

⁷⁸ For example, domestic violence in Western mainstream society is not taken as part of its cultural practices; however, when non-Western post-immigrants conduct it, then it is considered as part of their culture (Phillips 2007, pp. 28-29; cf. Norton 2001). The same goes with gun shooting at university campuses and schools in the US; when an individual from an ethnic minority carries it out, then it is represented as part of ethnic behaviour, not an aberration of an individual. To be sure, I am not in any way supporting such acts from individuals; what I am concerned about is stereotyping any wrongdoings of ethnic individuals as part of their cultural practices which stigmatises the group.

professional association. Future-oriented identities can be based on ideologies. Individuals may change their social status by changing their religion, adopting a new language, or moving to a new region, or collectively redefining their identity.⁷⁹

Not everyone can attain a new identity when salient features such as skin colour, or accent are identity markers of one's ethnic origin. Some withdraw from their ethnic group and focus their lives on their economic and professional achievements. Nevertheless, most of these people also go through the important life stages themselves or their children, such as puberty, marriage and death, according to their cultural practices of their ethnic origin (see De Vos 2006, p. 20; cf. Erikson 1968). People who attempt to redefine their identities for the sake of moving upward in the social stratum face social and psychological costs. First, not everyone with the lower status identity attempts to make such a move, so those who do redefine their identities feel alienated as they sever their old ties and past social relations. People who distance themselves from their ethnic groups are usually ostracised by members of their ethnic group. Second, collective identities provide individuals with what Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005, Ch. 3, p. 22) calls scripts, narratives that people use to shape their pursuits and tell their life stories. People who sever their collective identity are cut off from their narrative unity. Third, even many of those individuals who make such moves are not sure of their new identities and end up rekindling their original ethnic identities. Finally, those who redefine themselves to be accepted by the mainstream or by the majority may find their newly established identities are not accepted or recognised. They may be treated as outcasts by both their own group and the majority, and become alienated in the social world. One who is in the minority camp cannot pretend to be a member of the majority, because doing so is inauthentic. 'The social pressure to disguise oneself and to act as a white, a macho, or an "Anglo" (a WASP) in order to achieve a condescending and fragile acceptance is humiliating...' (Galeotti 2002, pp. 98-99).

According to Dilthey, everyone is united by a nexus of community relations and obligations into which individuals' wills are brought together such as the family, and

⁷⁹ For example, some lower-caste Hindus in India have attempted to change their religion to Buddhism, albeit with relatively little success; in the US, Blacks have been redefining themselves in ethnic terms (De Vos, 2006, p. 16).

any other external organisations of society. But, should this union of community relations be identified with ‘family resemblance’? Modood argues that ‘groupness’ is neither an essence nor a fiction, but is more akin to ‘family resemblance’; as Wittgenstein originally put it, ‘a family, a group may be identifiable even though its members are different’ (2007, p. 96; cf. Wittgenstein 1958/2001). The point Modood makes is that ‘family resemblance may be enough to characterise group membership’ (2007, p. 96). Moreover, Modood (2007) argues that cultural norms and ethnic identities affect agency. As he points out, based on a comparative analysis of self-employment among Asians and African-Caribbeans in Great Britain, one needs to take account of ethnic group-based characteristics.⁸⁰ The point he makes is that even though many factors are required to create self-employment opportunities, the characteristics related to an ethnic group cannot be ignored and agency cannot be understood without reference to cultural norms and ethnic identities. But taking ethnicity is deterministic of agency which leads us into the trap of essentialist notion of identity. One should also note that taking on the survival strategy of self-employment in ‘corner shops’ does not mean that Asians migrated in order to take on such jobs, nor are they only good for such jobs, nor do they endorse them as their ethical convictions of good life. I will address this point in Chapter 4. Agency needs to be understood within one’s context of parameters and limitations.

However, when people are treated according to an identity based on groupness, in line with the notion of family resemblance, then such a social acceptance precludes differences among members; but, the differences in preferences, interests and ethical convictions make each one of the members individual. The members may still identify with a single family name, but they individuate differently with their lived experiences and ideas of life.⁸¹ Nevertheless, they may share a common interest and ethical convictions, and have a concern for each other – solidarity. They may also have common experiences through shared cultural systems and practices. Cultural

⁸⁰ Modood (2007, p. 100) points out that self-employment among South Asian men between the mid-1970s and early 1980s more than doubled in Britain, whilst nationally there was just a small increase. Asians created their economic opportunities through self-employment during the recession period coupled with racial discrimination, whereas African-Caribbeans did not.

⁸¹ In some cultural naming practices, the family name is not carried on; for example, Hindu Tamils from Sri Lanka do not carry family names; it is said that one should make one’s own name for oneself, not depend on one’s father’s name for pride or popularity (or be affected by shame or unpopularity associated with his name).

practices are most likely to be adopted by those who identify with and endorse such practices; as Parekh (2000) argues, to structure and give meaning and significance to their lives. From a Diltheyan standpoint, they may share significant aspects of their worldviews. However, assuming that common interests, characteristics and ethical convictions in every aspect of human activity are based on groupness is therefore a stricture to their genuine endorsement of their convictions to pursue their meaningful activities individually or collectively.

Modood (2007, Ch. 6) also emphasises that not all group members, even in a given group, are members in the same way. They differ in how they relate to their groups and in their attitudes towards their group identities. Moreover, groups themselves differ in terms of their structure of the external organisations of society, significant cultural systems and their interactions with other groups. Individuals are members of and have affiliations with many different groups. They are not part of a single mode of being, but rather part of multiple and different modes of being. Although Modood does not emphasise that individuals have multiple affiliations and different modes of being within different groups, he nevertheless acknowledges that each minority should be offered its own appropriate 'mode of representation' – group representation. He certainly does not suggest a single mode of representation, but warns we cannot sensibly consider every possible intra-group variation. The point is that intra-group variations and individual variability should not lead us to entirely disregard the various levels of 'multi' family resemblance of groups. Therefore, Modood concludes the politics of multiculturalism must give importance to the ideas of group and identity:

the justification – both normative and pragmatic – for multiculturalism is the need to give respect to stigmatised or marginalised identities that are important to people and cannot be disregarded in the name of the individual, or for that matter, social cohesion, integration or citizenship (2007, p. 121).

But the question is in what ways should the politics of multicultural integration take into account groupness and identity?

As Taylor (1994, p. 28) emphasises, one's authenticity, being true to oneself, is an ethical good for one to lead one's life, and may include one's significant group identity. One should be authentic to oneself in order to pursue one's meaningful

projects. Authenticity is based on who people are with their genuine endorsement of convictions. Hence, what people want is recognition for their authentic selves.

There is a certain way of being human that is *my* way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's life. But this notion gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for *me* (Taylor 1994, p. 30).

My way and my life are based on my projects, my character, my relationships, my achievements, the roles and identities that I take in different social contexts, and interaction with others. The collective identities are part of my narrative self, but that is not the only determinant of my way and my life. However, I cannot lead my way and my life in isolation. I live in the social world. Taylor notes that the 'crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally *dialogical* character' (1994, p. 32). We learn modes of expression through interaction with others. There are also people who make collective identities central to their individual narrative self (Appiah 1994, p. 160). Therefore, the 'imposition' of a 'false' or 'distorted' identity on a person denies her authenticity (Lægaard 2005, p. 329).⁸²

Characteristics of individualities are marred by socially represented inferior collective identities. K. Anthony Appiah draws a connection between personal dimension and collective identity:

Each person's individual identity is seen as giving two major dimensions. There is a collective dimension, the intersection of their collective identities; and there is a personal dimension, consisting of other socially or morally important features—intelligence, charm, wit, cupidity—that are not themselves the basis of forms of collective identity (1994, p. 151).

Appiah acknowledges that even though each dimension has properties that are relevant to social life, the social categorisation is based on the collective identities. Theories of social identity are based on the premise that people categorise themselves and others. Categorisation is a primitive function and is inevitable in social interaction as it is a necessary feature of human cognition, but it should be noted that the categorisation itself is flexible (Prentice and Miller 1999, p. 4). One can talk about social categorisation in terms of religion, language, ethnicity, gender

⁸² Cf. Markell (2003, p. 40).

and others, but, as Appiah points out, one cannot talk sensibly about the social categories of the witty, or the clever, or the charming.

The identification of a minority as a group different from the majority in the social world is usually based on certain traits commonly associated with or shared by the minority. These traits are considered to be 'different' from those of the majority, and are then socially represented as 'different', if not as deviant or inferior. The majority has the social power to decide what traits are normal from their point of view. For example, 'whiteness' is not considered a 'difference', and being white is not seen as being 'different' or the 'other' (Galeotti 2002, p. 8). The same is true, for example, of being Christian or heterosexual in the Christian heterosexual-dominant social world. A majority of the heterosexuals identify homosexuals as deviant; and, likewise, a majority of white men identify women and blacks (or coloured) as inferior to men and whites respectively. One who is ascribed to be part of the collective identity of traits that are despised is prevented from actively participating as 'fully functioning' social members in the social world (Galeotti 2002, p. 9). This inability is intrinsically linked to the negative social perception of minorities and the public exclusion of them as 'different'; 'being marked by such an identity, socially despised and publicly invisible, usually leads to an incapacity to function as a "normal" social agent and as a full citizen' (Galeotti 2002, p. 98).

When one is ascribed with a singular identity that reflects a particular aspect of groupness, it may become a stricture to one's multiple affiliations and ethical convictions. Moreover, when people emphasise a singular identity within various social contexts, that identity could be exploited to differentiate 'us' versus 'them'; such a singular identity not only restricts one's plural identities and multiple loyalties, but could also lead to violence (Sen 2006, Ch. 2). I have been emphasising Dilthey's point that people engage in activities that intersect many systems, and are members of or affiliated with many external organisations; hence, maintaining a singular identity to exclude others or marginalise people can only lead to disparity in social participation. This does not mean that people do not have competing and contradicting identities and affiliations. One's plural identities and multiple loyalties are expressed within different social contexts (see Sen 2006, Ch. 2). Modood also points out that many people from ethnic minorities today do not ascribe to a singular

identity, and identities are more fluid (2007, pp. 107-108; see also 1997). However, we need to consider what identities the majority ascribes to those minorities, and whether the majority accepts the identities that minorities ascribe to themselves with equal status. As Sen acknowledges, 'the freedom to choose our identity in the eyes of others can sometimes be extraordinarily limited' (2006, p. 31).

As I have discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, a person is always at an intersection of many systems, and therefore, a point of intersecting multiple collective identities. Many different collective identities based on race, class, gender, nationality and age come together and may result in multiple intersecting oppressions (see Crenshaw 1995). Modood emphasises that multiple group identities, such as multi family resemblance, cannot be ignored when people are systematically discriminated against, stigmatised and marginalised based on those group identities. When one of the collective identities becomes a mode of oppression rather than a mode of being, then members of the minorities can adopt one of two strategies. First, they can demand such identities are significant and they be allowed to express their collective identities in public without shame. Second, minorities may start to shy away from those collective identities and express themselves with other collective identities. Both are an ethical concern as the minorities are not able to express themselves with authenticity and be citizens of equal status with those collective identities to pursue their meaningful activities. One's authentic self is recognised as being important to one's social participation; one's collective identities should be neither ignored nor discriminated against. However, the collective identities of the 'others' or 'different' have historically been discriminated against. On the other hand, people who enjoy citizenship of equal status may choose to exercise their ethnic identity options, when such identification does not jeopardise their social standing. It may even give them a sense of satisfaction; for example, many middle-class Americans of third- or fourth-generation immigrant descent are content with their ethnic affiliations, which in the current cultural and political environment, cost them little (Hollinger 1995/2000, p. 40; cf. Waters 1990, p. 147).

Identity and its relevance are emphasised along both the axes of power: the political and the social power axes. The socio-ethnic-cultural groups are affected in their relations and the well-being of the members along both the axes of power relations.

Hence, identities are both politicised and socialised (and anti-socialised). The state may adopt active policies along the political power axis to maintain the boundaries between the majority and the minorities. The minorities may therefore be marginalised from participating as citizens of equal status, or the majority may keep their social boundaries from the minorities by socially excluding, stigmatising and dominating them along the horizontal social power axis. In such cases, the minorities are impaired in carrying out their activities that require interaction and engagement with the institutions of the majority. They are, therefore, castrated of their dignity to be equal status social participants and are deprived of their well-being. From this perspective, it is important to keep in mind, on the one hand, that having identities that are stigmatised and marginalised can affect the well-being of people, and on the other that maintaining a singular identity can also be restrictive. How can we then make claims of culture and address stigmatised identities? I shall address this issue in the following chapter, and argue that we need to focus on the cultural differences in terms of practices and the power relations between groups as well as individuals among the external organisations of society rather than group identity per se.

To sum up: I have argued that significant aspects of the social world can become limitations to minorities' social participation as citizens of equal status within a social world dominated by the majority. One of these limitations stem from collective or group identity and how it is represented both politically and socially. Group identity can become a mode of oppression rather than a mode of being. People have to deal with how they are identified not only in their day-to-day lives, but also in pursuing their meaningful activities within various interacting cultural systems and having multiple affiliations and memberships with various external organisations. Therefore, on the one hand, stigmatised and marginalised group identities cannot be ignored, and on the other, people should not be confined to a singular identity, as both can restrict people engaging in their meaningful activities, which is an ethical concern. Multicultural policies based on bounded conceptions of culture with singular identity may then lead to, on the one hand, limiting members' 'ethical horizons' and, on the other, stereotyping culture and identity; in this case, people may be forced to either repudiate 'all aspects of their supposed cultural

heritage' or embrace it uncritically.⁸³ I will address the normative implications of identity-based recognition and how its ethical concern could be overcome in the section of social recognition in Chapter 5. The limitations to minorities that I have discussed are challenges to an ethically concerned multicultural state to which I shall now focus.

THE CHALLENGES TO A MULTICULTURAL STATE

In this section, I shall illustrate the challenges a state may face in overcoming the limitations of minorities in pursuing their well-being. An ethically concerned state enabling the minorities to pursue their well-being faces major challenges.⁸⁴ As I discussed in Chapter 2, using Dilthey as a guide, the meaningful activities people pursue differ in their ends, means or both as they intersect different cultural systems and interact with the external organisations of society. I showed that limitations stem from the majority's norms and traditions, dichotomising the public and private sphere, stereotyping the minorities in relation to their particularities and the domination of the members of the minorities by the external organisations of society. I also argued individuals' identities that are stigmatised may limit those individuals' participation as full and equal status members. The challenge is to provide meaningful 'cultural means' within the common institutions. The state faces challenges in providing both the means and the options.

Both relevant means and options may face a challenge accommodating differences in consciences and public opinions of the minorities against the 'ethical conscience' of the majority. We may call this the challenge of 'cultural conscience'. Minorities' restrictions from interacting with the cultural systems can also be due to moral conflicts between the majority and the minority. Given that a multicultural state already has an established law that binds together the cultural systems and the external organisations of the majority, and that this law is a universal law according to the conscience of the majority and its norms and traditions, then how can a multicultural state ensure that the laws reflect a sense of justice to the minority whose customs, traditions and conscience differ from those of the majority? The

⁸³ I am indebted to Professor Anne Phillips for succinctly summarising the above point in her written feedback.

⁸⁴ I will argue the moral responsibility of the state in Chapter 6.

members of minorities have to adhere to the norms set by the majority even though they may not be meaningful to them. On the other hand, if the majority have to accommodate the minority then they have to make exceptions to or change the existing laws, and the majority may feel threatened that their norms are no longer the norms. I shall address this aspect of challenge in Chapter 6 in relation to morality and responsibility.

The other challenge is that their own external organisations, such as family, religious organisation and community may dominate members of a minority group. Examples include female genital circumcision, forced marriages, child marriages and honour killings. In the following section, I will illustrate these challenges to the state and the limitations of the minority with some examples, which have been discussed by scholars on the debate over multiculturalism (see Barry 2002; cf. Poulter 1986 and 1999).

Illustrative Cases

In this section, I shall illustrate with some of the cases that are widely discussed within the debate of multiculturalism to show how ends and means of both the majority and minorities intersect and give rise to challenges to the state in terms of recognition of meaningful options, norms, conscience and domination.

A Muslim community and a Jewish community in a multicultural state that is predominantly a Christian society want the option to have *Halal* and *Kosher* meat, respectively. This is a choice of 'the good'. *Halal* meat is a meaningful choice for Muslims, as is *Kosher* meat for Jews. This 'cultural option' raises challenges to the state in terms of means, as well as in terms of the conscience of the majority. This choice of the good requires one to have a particular means to pursue such a good. The choices and means intersect different cultural systems. The cultural system of animal farming intersects with the cultural systems of Muslim and Jewish traditional slaughtering of animals. This also intersects with the free market economic system of retailing *Halal* and *Kosher* meat. In this example, in a predominantly Christian multicultural state, the choice of the good of minority Muslims and Jews, which is different from that of the mainstream society, requires different 'cultural means'.

This involves intersecting different cultural systems for meaningful activities to achieve those goods. This challenges the state on the means based on the conscience of the majority and on the law. This difference in conscience raises the challenge of 'cultural norms' (see Parekh 2000, p. 274).⁸⁵

Let us consider another case in which the majority and the minority have the same ends or goods. In a multicultural state the means to pursue these goods may however intersect different cultural systems of both the majority and the minority. This poses a challenge to the state. The issue here is the lack of social recognition resulting in the lack of parity of participation of the minority. There are examples in which the majority has not accepted the dress code of a minority with equal recognition. Thereby, it has become one of the 'limitations' to the minority to pursue 'the good' as an equal standing social member. Cases include banning Sikh children from wearing turbans in some schools in Britain, and prohibiting Muslim girls from wearing head scarves (*hijab*) in the state schools of France (see Parekh 2000, pp. 241 & 249). Other cases leading to litigation in Britain have involved Asian women who wanted to follow their traditional dress codes where they worked in the hospitals, stores and schools and were not allowed to (see Parekh 2000, p. 246). In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police initially denied entry into the police service to Sikhs wearing turbans (see Parekh 2000, pp. 244-245). And in the USA, a Jew wanting to serve in the Air Force wearing his yarmulke was requested to resign (see Parekh 2000, p. 245). In these examples, the cultural system of the dress code of the minority intersects with the cultural system of the dress code of the majority. The majority did not accept the visible norms of the minority's dress code based on religious and cultural values with equal recognition. The norms of the majority, which include uniformity and tradition, have become limitations to the minorities wanting to follow their faiths and values and pursue the same goods as the majority. The minority wants to have the freedom to pursue the same goods as the others, while keeping to the norms of their cultural system of religion and being authentic and faithful to their religious beliefs. Other cases include Sikhs who wanted to wear turbans instead of helmets while riding motorcycles, while working in the construction industry, and while serving in the armed forces. These cases have

⁸⁵ Kosher and Halal meat is allowed in Great Britain. But they are banned in Switzerland.

challenged the state to follow the rule of law on the one hand, and, on the other, to recognise religious ways of life and make appropriate exemptions (see Parekh 2000, pp. 243-245).⁸⁶ There are other cases in which minorities do not have the equal social recognition of their abilities to progress in their careers, whether due to their different mother tongues, their visible identity markers including their dress code, their racial markers or their gender or sexual identity, especially female or gay. For example, professionally qualified immigrants and females do not receive the same recognition of their skills and abilities and equal social standing as the other counterpart male members of the majority do.

Another example, in which the ends are the same, but the means are different due to intersecting cultural systems with different norms, is the closure of businesses on Sundays. This topic has also been discussed within the debate on multiculturalism. This norm is based on the Christian tradition and allows Christians to go to church on Sundays. Jews, on the other hand, have their Sabbath on Saturdays and therefore want to have the freedom to close on Saturdays and open their businesses on Sundays. Of course, Jews are allowed to close their businesses on Saturdays, but currently in the UK, they are not at liberty to open them when they like on Sundays. They can, like everyone else, open them for 6 hours (10am to 4pm or 11am to 5pm). One can point out that their business potential may be limited if the majority does not want to do business on Sundays. This case also illustrates the challenge of law based on 'cultural norms' and a limitation to the minority.

Institutionalised recognition of traditional forms of family results in a limitation to those who want to embrace other forms of family life. For example, gays and lesbians' lack of social recognition is a limitation to them as they form relationships and commitments based on love and try to pursue their convictions to lead their family lives differently from the traditional family life. In contemporary society, there are different kinds of challenges based on the forms of family and are equally challenging. For example, living single – unmarried and without children, or single parenting is equally challenging in different aspects to being married and living with

⁸⁶ In Great Britain, Sikhs are exempted from the law requiring crash helmets and are allowed to work in the construction industry and to serve in the armed forces wearing turbans. See also Barry (2001, pp. 40-54) for his discussion on the 'rule-and-exemption' approach. I will discuss this issue in Chapter 5.

one's spouse and children. Some cultural and religious groups allow polygamy, which includes both polygyny (more than one wife) and polyandry (more than one husband). These forms of family are banned in all western societies (Parekh 2000, p. 282). Even though in principle the equality of sexes is formally neutral, whether it is monogamy or polygamy, one may argue that monogamy provides women with a sense of dignity, self-esteem and security (Parekh 2000, pp. 282-292). There are, however, arguments for polygyny as favourable to women, which suggest that it offers women increased status and power, security and strength of solidarity among women, sharing of domestic responsibility and the flexibility to support each other in their careers. Muslim societies that allow polygyny offer several arguments in favour of it, but they tend, however, to violate the principle of equality of sexes (Parekh 2000, pp. 282-284).⁸⁷ Even in the Muslim societies where polygyny is allowed, the trend now is to move away from polygyny (Parekh 2000, p. 292). However, a lack of social recognition of different forms of family life can become a limitation to the minority who want to lead a meaningful life with different forms of family life.

There are also cases where the domination of the majority's will becomes a limitation to the minority. For example, immigrants and female workers in lower-paid jobs may be dominated by their employers (see Galabuzi, 2005).⁸⁸ Having left their country for various reasons, including political and economic ones, immigrants are vulnerable to exploitation through the domination of the employers. Moreover, immigrants are stereotyped and do not have an equal chance of being promoted or of making full use of and further developing their skills and abilities. Feminists have the same worries about the 'glass ceiling' when it comes to the career progress of women within a male-dominated profession and workplace. There are also considerable concerns about sexual harassment at the workplace. There are cultural practices that oppress, especially female members in many aspects of their lives. Liberal societies have criticised the practice of arranged marriages without the consent of the females, and female circumcision, although those, especially males, following these traditions argue otherwise (Parekh 2000, pp. 274-282).⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Parekh argues against the Muslim fivefold defence of polygyny.

⁸⁸ The study focuses on 'racialised' groups in Canada.

⁸⁹ Parekh provides arguments against circumcision; female circumcision is practised in at least 25 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

As I discussed in Chapter 1, according to Dilthey, the external organisations of society provide members not only with a feeling of togetherness, but also with the relation of dominance and dependence between wills. Hence, members of a minority's external organisation can be subjected to domination and dependence within the external organisation itself. For example, in the cases of child brides, female genital circumcision, domestic violence, honour killings, forced marriages, violent exorcisms, etc., the members are subjected to domination by those external organisations which they belong to and for which they even have a sense of belonging. I shall now illustrate the case with female genital circumcision as it has been discussed within the debate of multiculturalism.

Parekh (2000, pp. 275-276) describes three types of female genital circumcisions: one of them is traditional – *sunna*, which causes minimal physical harm; the other two involve some degree of mutilation.⁹⁰ There are defences of this practice, such as conforming to religious or cultural norms, guaranteeing the girl's virginity and hence her suitability for finding a husband and confirming important values of a culture as well as regulating the girl's sexuality, sexual self-discipline and self-control. Parekh (2000, p. 277) argues that these arguments do not measure up to 'the gravity of the harm'.

One may question why non-Western females should be prohibited from female genital circumcisions (cuttings) when Western women perform cosmetic surgery on their breasts and genitals which also involves certain risks. The issue here is not only about the surgery and its subsequent harmfulness, but also, most importantly, about the coercion in the form of family and 'cultural' pressure on females who undergo genital cuttings. However, it may also be argued that Western women who undergo cosmetic surgery are also under social pressure to look beautiful or attractive to their potential or current partners according to Western social standards. However, the degree of harmfulness of female genital cuttings is much higher than cosmetic

⁹⁰ The other two forms of circumcision are practised in at least 25 countries in Africa, the Middle East and parts of South Asia (Parekh 2000, p. 276). UNICEF reports three million females go through female genital mutilation / cuttings each year worldwide, which includes four types according to WHO – World Health Organisation, and 130 million women living today have undergone it (Der Bund, Switzerland, 23 February, 2008, p.43).

surgery of breasts and female genitals.⁹¹ I believe the main contentious difference besides irreversible harm to females who undergo genital cutting is that they do not have a meaningful choice to exit. In many cases, female genital cutting is performed on females between the ages of four and fourteen.⁹² Those parents who do choose to exit face a sense of loss of belonging to their community, isolation and stigmatisation by their community for having unmarriageable daughters, whereas these exit costs are not borne by Western women who may choose to undergo cosmetic surgery or not.

Phillips (2007, p. 46) describes the problem of families allowing female genital cutting as a kind of 'collective action problem', and this kind of problem can arise in any society but can be overcome by, what she refers to as, a 'collective pledge'. For example, in Senegal, a 'village-led campaign' against female genital cutting led to success.⁹³ This case shows that there is an ethical concern of the members' socio-cultural conditioning, which is attributed by a collective action problem and socio-cultural conformity.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has been intended to show that some social aspects including the issue of identity can become limitations to minorities' participation in the social world with the common institutions as citizens of equal status. Citizens live in a web of social relations and pursue their meaningful activities through social interaction and engagement, interacting with cultural systems and external organisations, at the intersection of which they stand. People are interdependent in pursuing their activities within the social world. One of the crucial modes of interdependency is recognition, and this can also lead to power relations of dominance and dependence.

⁹¹UNICEF warns that females who undergo genital cutting face irreversible lifelong health risks, including pain and trauma, and their failure to heal properly can lead to infections; unhygienic methods of cutting can lead to increased susceptibility to blood-borne diseases including AIDS/HIV.

⁹²http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_genitalmutilation.html; retrieved on 25th February 2008; in some countries like Ethiopia, even female infants go through female genital cutting.

⁹³ Gerry Mackie illustrates with an example how a non-governmental organisation (NGO) campaigned against female genital cuttings through education in the villages of Senegal, and he argues that even though villagers were aware of 'dangerous and painful practice', their main concern was that their daughters would become 'unmarriageable if their family was the only one opting out' (Phillips 2007, p. 46; cf. Mackie 2000; also Tostan 1999; also Der Bund, Switzerland, 23 February, 2008, p. 43).

Minorities, especially immigrants who have left behind familiar cultural systems and social organisations, have to find ways that are often disadvantageous to them, of participating in those of the dominant culture. There are several limitations for minorities participating in the social world along both the axes of power: political and social. The social norms and traditions of the majority can be limitations. A clear distinction between public and private spheres is difficult to make when people engage in activities that cut across both spheres, and when it is demarcated, the minorities are pushed back into their private spheres to conduct their cultural activities attaining inferior social status.

Minorities' collective identities that are considered different from the majority's are often stereotyped and stigmatised and this may result in a limitation to pursue meaningful activities. A minority's mode of being based on a significant collective identity and cultural practices may become a mode of oppression through domination and lack of recognition by the majority. An individual is also a point of intersection of multiple collective identities and belongs to multiple affiliations and takes on many roles. People have to deal with how they are identified not only in their day-to-day lives, but also when pursuing their meaningful activities within various interacting cultural systems. On the one hand, stigmatised and marginalised group identities cannot be ignored, and on the other, people should not be confined to a singular identity, as both can be restrictive.

These limitations pose challenges to an ethically concerned state in terms of differences between the majority and minorities on cultural means, conscience and norms. Moreover, members of minorities may be subjected to oppressive social relations within their own external organisations through domination and non-recognition or misrecognition of their particularities, which can lead to systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation. These challenges are an ethical concern to the an ethically concerned multicultural state. So, the pertinent questions are: how we should understand multicultural social justice; what should be the necessary normative parameters that should be tied to social justice; and what normative conditions that claims for justice must meet? I shall attempt to answer these questions in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL FREEDOM AND JUSTICE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 critiqued the essentialist notion of culture and showed the problematic normative premise of moral significance of cultural membership upon which Will Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism is based. In Chapter 2, I went on to argue the importance of the right circumstances of justice for people's well-being as an alternative normative premise within the paradigm of the anti-essentialist notion of culture. And I have shown in Chapter 3 the limitations faced by minorities in pursuing their well-being and illustrated the challenges faced by an ethically concerned multicultural state in providing meaningful means and ends, and in resolving differences in moral conscience between the majority and minorities. Furthermore, we cannot ignore minorities' stigmatised identities, as they limit members' social participation as citizens of equal status; however, recognition of those identities may lead to their reification and limit members' ethical horizons. These limitations and challenges are an ethical concern for minorities to genuinely endorse their convictions and to pursue them with fair challenges. I have argued from the liberal standpoint that we should be concerned with the ethical situation that ought to be given, and the right set of parameters is a precondition for the right circumstances. Hence, it is important to ask how multicultural social justice should be understood without reifying 'culture' and identity and what the necessary parameter(s) of the right circumstances should be.

This chapter attempts to answer the above question. Axel Honneth remarks in an exchange with Nancy Fraser in their debate on theories of recognition and social justice that both agree 'the goal of social justice must be understood as the creation of social relations in which subjects are included as full members in the sense that they can *publicly uphold and practice their lifestyles without shame or humiliation*'

(Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 259; emphases added).⁹⁴ However, this statement begs the question whether we should accept all kinds of lifestyles and recognise those related practices for acceptance. We cannot endorse every cultural practice that one might value, and give pre-emptive recognition to an individual's cultural group identity endorsing all cultural practices, because these are normatively contested and contestable, even within a cultural group in which they are predominantly practised. Hence, claims for recognition of cultural practices have to be deliberated for intercultural justice (see Honohan 2002, p. 257; also Tully 2004, p. 858). However, as 'cultures are internally contested sites for normative discussions among individuals "thrown" into situations that are loaded in favour of certain interests rather than others',⁹⁵ we should be concerned with whether individuals can deliberate on claims for justice as citizens of equal status, as well as with the normative criteria for recognition and endorsement of practices. This sets our main problem, and this and the following two chapters attempt to formulate a set of normative criteria for multicultural social justice.

Moreover, it is to be noted that the policies of immigrant multiculturalism are only one part of many public policies that affect minorities' well-being, and cannot be treated in isolation as activities invariably intersect with other spheres. In this regard, Dilthey's concept of intersecting cultural systems and interacting common institutions helps us to be concerned with multicultural social justice within many spheres – social, economic and political, rather than within the cultural sphere only.

As I have discussed, although Kymlicka acknowledges that many public policies are important and affect minorities' participation with the common institutions, his theory, based on the normative premise of cultural membership by classifying cultural groups, is focused on justifying 'group-differentiated' rights and falls into the trap of the essentialist notion of groups and 'culture'. As I have argued in Chapter 1, multicultural policies based on the essentialist notion of culture can lead us to allow practices that may dominate certain powerless members within certain cultural communities. As Benhabib maintains, one should have the conditions that

⁹⁴ I shall address the normative underpinnings of these authors' theories of recognition in the following chapter.

⁹⁵ I am indebted to Professor Bruce Haddock for alerting me to this problem.

permit the 'most extensive forms of self-ascription and self-identification possible' (2002, p.19). Hence, multicultural social justice must address intercultural justice and freedom for members of minority to engage with and express themselves within the social world as citizens of equal status.

This chapter shows that the idea of freedom as non-domination, which is central to republicanism, is significant for multicultural justice and freedom; however, I shall show it is not adequate alone without being supplemented with the idea of social recognition of one's particularities for the right circumstances of justice. I shall argue that we should be concerned with minorities' 'capability to function' as citizens of equal status when participating with the common institutions. That is, we should take into account what I shall refer to as the 'politics of capability' rather than politics of distribution and freedom as non-domination more seriously. I shall explain in detail in Chapter 5 how social recognition should be understood. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 I shall discuss morality and responsibility in facing the multicultural challenges with respect to deliberation of claims for justice.

This chapter consists of four sections. In the first section, I briefly discuss the context of the ethical concern and point out that autonomy along with information for authenticity may mitigate the ethical concern, but only partially as one may still be blocked or burdened when accessing one's meaningful options, and hence informed autonomy – authenticity – alone is not adequate for the right circumstances of justice. In the second section, I show that autonomy is misconceived within a multicultural debate, and confusion arises due to giving importance either to the agency factor or to the option factor, and I clarify these factors that constitute autonomy. Hence, it is important to differentiate agency and option factors within the context of freedom. In the third section, I draw on Philip Pettit's (2003) distinction of agency-freedom and option-freedom in determining how each is affected in social participation and argue that, although both are important, social freedom is essentially an agency-freedom, which can make room for option-freedom rather than the other way round. Most importantly, I show that assaults on one's agency-freedom – that is, the denial or marginalisation of one's equal status through domination as well as non-recognition or misrecognition of one's particularities – will deprive one not only of agency-freedom, but also of option-freedom. Hence,

freedom as non-domination should be tied to social justice; on its own, however, it is inadequate, as account needs to be taken of these other possible assaults on one's status. How, therefore, should we understand multicultural social justice and determine the necessary parameters?

In the final section I attempt to answer the above question. I first explore Ronald Dworkin's (2000) normative framework of distribution of resources as a plausible framework to determine necessary parameters. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, he maintains that liberals must insist on including resources as a parameter within the normative context of the right circumstances of justice. But the question is whether his normative framework can help us to determine the minimal and common normative conditions of social justice within the problematic multicultural social world. I argue that it is inadequate for determining those conditions. It is not that distribution of resources per se does not matter. Rather, the normative framework of distribution of resources is deficient in addressing inequalities due to socio-cultural endowments which interact with social and political structures and may subject minorities to domination through arbitrary interference and systematic discrimination, marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation through non-recognition or misrecognition of their particularities in many intersecting activity spheres.

I also show that John Rawls's (1971/1999) justice as fairness with reference to the distribution of primary goods addresses 'inter-end' variation – ethical pluralism – but not 'inter-individual' variation – human diversity – which interacts with the social and political structures and can negatively affect minorities' participation as citizens of equal status. I show that Amartya Sen's (1992/1995, 1993, 2000 & 2002) and Martha Nussbaum's (2000 & 2003) capability approaches provide a better normative framework in deriving normative conditions overcoming the deficiencies of distribution of resources, although both have their own limitations. On the one hand, Sen's approach is open and does not provide a set of capabilities for all citizens to function as citizens of equal status within a multicultural state; on the other, Nussbaum's approach provides a list of capabilities, but it is questionable whether it is applicable to all multicultural citizens and whether it is complete in itself. However, the politics of capability allows us to show that multicultural social justice should be understood as minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal

status and emphasises the importance of non-domination and recognition. However, the important question remains what should be the minimal and common normative conditions for deliberating on claims for justice? In the following chapter I shall answer this question and show that both non-domination and social recognition are the minimal and common normative conditions and are complementary and rooted in self-respect that allows us to deliberate on claims for justice as citizens of equal status. I shall also elaborate on how we should understand social recognition in the following chapter.

THE CONTEXT OF ETHICAL CONCERN AND AUTHENTICITY

In this section, I discuss the context of ethical concern and whether authenticity along with autonomy can mitigate the concern. I have argued, in Chapter 2, that people's well-being is constituted by engaging in the social world by participating in meaningful activities according to their ethical convictions, and hence their context is integral to their well-being. And, for one to pursue one's well-being, the right circumstances require the hard or prime normative parameter of justice for fair challenges. I have also discussed, in Chapter 3, the limitations and challenges that minorities face in their pursuit of meaningful activities participating in the social world. People who face unfair challenges due to circumstances of injustice may either adopt survival strategies, changing their convictions according to their lived experiences mediated within the socio-cultural-historical-political context, and may even endorse their lives as meaningful, or they may continue to face their unfair challenges struggling to carry out their meaningful activities according to their convictions of meaningful lives. Both situations present the ethical concern.⁹⁶

First, as I discussed in Chapter 2, my concern is not about ethical convictions per se, rather about the context that shapes the formation of one's convictions and genuine endorsement. For example, a 'dominated housewife', an 'exploited labourer' and a 'hopeless beggar' may form convictions based on their social conditioning, which affect both ideas of lives and lived experiences, and continue carrying out their daily chores and activities; the subordinated housewife may even endorse her life as meaningful according to the social conditioning of her cultural norms about being a

⁹⁶ This situation is different from one's having expensive tastes, for example. In this case, one is neither dominated to develop such tastes, nor are others dominated not to develop them.

good wife within the community she belongs to. Sen (1987, pp. 45-46) points out that these people adopt survival strategies and 'it would be ethically deeply mistaken to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being' (quoted in Sumner 1996, p. 162).⁹⁷ Second, even when one endorses one's convictions with authenticity, it is also an ethical concern when one faces unfair challenges in pursuing one's meaningful activities.

L.W. Sumner (1996, pp. 164-166), referring to Sen's above-mentioned ethical concern, argues that the main issue is people's social conditioning, which could distort their self-assessment through the process of systematic indoctrination and exploitation. But, if these people genuinely endorse their lives and practices as meaningful (i.e. endorse with authenticity), should we still be ethically concerned about their lives? Sumner correctly points out that 'the problem is not that their values are objectively mistaken, but they might have never had the opportunity to form their own values at all' (1996, p. 166). Anne Phillips also makes a similar point: 'Perceptions of what is desirable are formed against a backdrop of what seems possible, and choices are made from what appears to be the available range' (2007, p. 39). And she points out (2007, p. 39) that although lived experience is certainly an important one, people who are not constrained by a particular belief or practice may be in a better position to recognise its limitations or injustice. She goes on to argue that culture cannot be employed to explain everything individuals say or do, and therefore, we have to give more weight to individual autonomy and take individuals' voices more seriously as representing their choices. Sumner (1996, pp. 156-171) also gives importance to the authenticity of individuals, which requires autonomy along with information, and argues that authenticity may mitigate such an ethical concern.

The core notion of personal autonomy is that individuals manage their personal affairs, and that their beliefs, values, aims or decisions are, in some important sense, their own. Individuals are the ultimate authorities on their authenticity in endorsing their 'level of life satisfaction', as long as they are autonomous; 'their self-assessments are therefore determinative of their well-being unless they can be shown to be inauthentic, i.e. not truly theirs' (Sumner 1996, p. 171). The point Sumner

⁹⁷ Sen's concern is mainly with economic inequality; he does not mention the multicultural aspect of domination and subordination.

makes is that ‘the requirements that these assessments be informed and autonomous spell out the conditions of authenticity’ (1996, p. 171). Autonomy with sufficient unbiased information may mitigate the ethical concern of the genuine endorsement of one’s convictions, and I agree that we need to be ethically concerned with the conditions of authenticity. But autonomy with information, the condition of authenticity, is not adequate for the right circumstances of justice, that is, for one not only to genuinely endorse one’s ethical convictions of a good or meaningful life, but also to pursue them with fair challenges. Even if one has autonomy and sufficient information, one may be blocked or burdened when accessing one’s meaningful options, and may be given unfair challenges to pursue them due to injustice. I shall turn to this issue first by clarifying the factors of options and agency that constitute autonomy.

PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTICULTURALISM

In this section, I attempt to show that the concept of personal autonomy is inadequately conceived in the debate about multiculturalism, and I shall clarify two integral factors that constitute autonomy, which are options and agency. The confusion arises due to conflating both the factors and giving predominant emphasis to one or other aspect within different contexts. For example, Kymlicka notes ‘autonomy’ means ‘different things to different people’; he refers to ‘the capacity to rationally reflect on, and potentially revise, our conceptions of the good life’ (2001, p. 307). In the above definition, Kymlicka seems to give importance to agency; however, as I discussed, he gives importance to options by belonging to a culture, which provides autonomy in terms of choices. Bhikhu Parekh argues that not every society values autonomy equally in terms of choices in every aspect of life, including people in the West (2000, pp. 92-93). Parekh (2000, pp. 93-94) argues that autonomy cannot be considered as a universal value in terms of choices, and it is wrong to believe that any culture that does not promote autonomy is inferior. Parekh seems to give importance to choices. Both of these factors also invoke different notions of freedom, and I shall clarify the notions of freedom associated with both the option-factor and the agency-factor in the following section.

Autonomy does not mean that people – whether from the East or the West – make choices in every aspect of their lives and revise every choice that is given to them. People of the Western world are generally known for valuing their personal autonomy; nevertheless, they also make choices based on traditions in many aspects of life. Often people adhere to social norms without self-reflection and without actively choosing them. Social relationships of kinship and social hierarchy, social activities such as rearing children and looking after the elderly, choice of career, and even marriages are based on traditions, faiths and values. These traditions, faiths and values are most often transmitted to people through parents, relatives, peers and members of the communities they belong to. The core notion of autonomy is generally considered to be that choice is possible and people can conceive of themselves as having willingly and reasonably chosen their values or roles.⁹⁸

One may point out that communities that make collective decisions about the collective way of life do not have full autonomy. For example, communities of aborigines in Australia are said to value collective decisions to lead a collective way of life (see Kukathas 2002; cf. Maddock 1972). However, these people also make decisions about several aspects of their lives, even if some of these may be subject to the approval or disapproval of the communities they predominantly belong to. If these people conceive of these as choices to pursue their meaningful activities according to their convictions, then it can be said that they too have autonomy. But one may be concerned that in these communities it is mostly the men make those decisions and hence women may not have autonomy; in this case, if women do not approve of those decisions and have their concerns heard under domination, then it is an ethical concern, as I discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. In this regard, this thesis attempts to show how we should understand multicultural social justice. Now, let me clarify the two factors – options and agency – that constitute autonomy.

First is the option-factor. The range of options is not always chosen, although the option-factor invokes the notion of freedom of choice; some of these choices or options are ‘given’ through one’s birth. They are involuntary choices, through involuntary associations. As Michael Walzer puts it: ‘Many valuable memberships

⁹⁸ I am indebted to Dr Peri Roberts for the clarification. Anne Phillips (2007, p. 101) also gives a similar account of autonomy following Friedman’s formulation (cf. Friedman 2000, p. 37).

are not freely entered into; many binding obligations are not entirely the product of consent; many strong feelings, many useful ideas, come *unchosen* into our lives' (2004, p. 2; emphasis added). I shall argue that what is important is one's *meaningful* options; i.e. options that are in accord with one's convictions, as I discussed in Chapter 2. One's meaningful options may include some of the givens, not plenty of choices per se, as well as other options, which may be chosen with deliberation as meaningful in accord with one's convictions. However, one does not necessarily go about reflecting and revising their givens and, indeed, many of them are non-revisable, and one may even consider one's meaningful options that are given, such as one's family one is born into, which may include one's caste, race and ethnicity, the place and country of birth; and in some or even many cases one's religion.⁹⁹ However, one may consider some givens as constraints. Walzer (2004) considers four kinds of involuntary constraints. The first kind is familial and social; we are born into a kin group as male or female members of a nation or social class. The second kind is associational; for example, the cultural practice of marriage. The third kind is political association. And the fourth is moral; he acknowledges that some may not consider this association a constraint.

However, one may not consider all of the involuntary associations as constraints, and whether one does or not depends on one's ethical convictions of the good or meaningful life as well as the circumstances of justice. Even though people have the freedom to exit from some involuntary associations, they may not exercise it. This is not to argue that personal autonomy is not required to lead one's life. The key to autonomy here is the claim that one should not be prevented from leaving one's associations or, if one does, should not be punished.¹⁰⁰ That is, in this case, the notion of freedom of exit is significant. Although one's autonomy entails choices or options, these can very well include the givens, some of which may even be considered as constraints. But what is important is whether one considers the givens as constraints and meaningless due to circumstances of injustice. This thesis attempts to address this issue of the circumstances of justice within a multicultural state. It is

⁹⁹ For example, Hinduism believes that one is a Hindu by birth as long as one is born to Hindu parents, even if one does not practice Hinduism, and it is also true for one's caste in a Hindu society, even if one does not practice one's profession according to one's caste system.

¹⁰⁰ For example, it can be said that members of the Amish community have autonomy; when Amish children become adults, usually around the age of eighteen, they must choose whether to stay or to leave (Spinner 1994, p. 91).

to be noted that options are not necessarily opportunities; one's opportunities of course include options and are usually presumed to mean that one is not blocked or burdened in pursuing those options within one's given circumstances. In this sense, opportunities are also conflated with the option-factor and agency-factor.

Autonomy is not about choices per se, but rather about *meaningful* choices according to one's convictions. For example, plenty of choice in varieties of meat will not make any sense to a committed vegetarian: for example, one who values animal rights and is against the killing of animals, or one who was born into a vegetarian family and is not used to eating meat, and has no desire to experiment with eating meat. One may argue that a vegetarian still has a choice to eat meat, but chooses not to. The point is that the option has to be a meaningful option according to one's convictions in accord with one's worldview, which may be shaped by one's particular community's beliefs, faiths, traditions and social relationships. The fact that individuals have the mental faculty to form, revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good does not mean that they want to in every aspect of their givens. Most importantly, even if one scrutinises the givens or acquired characteristics and finds them to be prudentially disadvantageous to one's economic and social status, as long as they are consistent with one's convictions, one may regard them as meaningful. One's worldview is not writ large; as I argued in Chapter 2, it develops gradually and is subject to change based on one's ideas of life and lived experiences mediated within the socio-cultural-historical-political-economic context. Autonomy is not about choosing as much as one can as often as one can – which the notion of freedom of choice implies; a choice or an option must be meaningful according to one's convictions. One might argue in line with Sumner that if one is informed of the choices one has, one could overcome social conditioning and change one's convictions. *Prima facie*, this is a valid point. But, as I argued, one's convictions depend on both the ideas of life and lived experiences within one's context. From this perspective, one should have the opportunities to formulate and genuinely endorse one's informed convictions, and to pursue, modify or revise them. In light of this, autonomy also entails the agency-factor to which I now turn.

The second is the agency-factor. Autonomy should also entail one's capability to revise, modify and create new meaningful options, and to pursue these genuinely endorsed options with appropriate means. People are not completely constituted by the givens. They take on new values and meanings by learning about and experiencing life within the social world of intersecting different cultural systems; they also revise some of their beliefs and ideas by reflecting on their experiences and the events in their lives. Moreover, as activities intersect many different cultural systems, some options require revision and adaptation. The agency-factor of autonomy means that an agent can pursue meaningful options through means that are consistent with the person's ethical convictions.

According to Dilthey, as I discussed in Chapter 1, cultural systems arise through individuals' engagement in activities for 'commonly-felt purposes', and individuals are members of many of the external organisations of society, which also include associations. Individuals voluntarily form or join associations that entail the notion of freedom of association to further those activities that require coordination, cooperation and collective action, for example, a business association. The structure of a multicultural social world, in terms of cultural systems and the external organisations of society, provides the means, and gives meaning to these means.

To sum up: autonomy to pursue one's meaningful activities requires two factors: the option-factor, which is the notion of meaningful options including genuinely endorsing one's givens, and the agency-factor, which is the notion of one's capability to pursue those meaningful options. Both the factors are important, as they constitute autonomy, and these factors invoke different notions of freedom. In the following section I shall explore these factors and clarify the notions of freedom within the context of social freedom.

FREEDOM OF OPTIONS AND AGENCY

In this section I clarify 'agency-freedom' and 'option-freedom' using Pettit's distinction. I show, using Pettit's arguments, that although both the notions of freedom are important, social freedom is essentially an agency-freedom, which allows us to accommodate option-freedom rather than the other way round. Most

importantly, I show that assaults on one's agency-freedom will deprive one not only of one's status as a free agent, but also of one's option-freedom. Pettit, however, is mainly concerned with one's status being protected from domination through arbitrary interference. But assaults on one's status can result not only from domination through arbitrary interference, but also from systematic oppression through discrimination, marginalisation, exploitation and exclusion due to one's particularities being non-recognised or misrecognised. Hence we should be concerned with the circumstances of injustice of both domination and non-recognition or misrecognition that affect one's equal citizenship status among fellow citizens. I conclude in this section that social freedom should be tied to the right circumstances of justice and is essentially freedom from non-domination, which can accommodate option-freedom as well as freedom of external organisation and exit.

Pettit points out that recent debates about social freedom generate three views: freedom as non-limitation, freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination. Social freedom is sometimes identified as option-freedom and sometimes as agency-freedom due to the different directions taken by the theories. He argues that the approach to freedom as non-limitation mainly focuses on option-freedom, whereas the approach to freedom as non-domination is essentially agency-freedom. And he argues that freedom as non-interference is ambivalent and does not resolve decisively whether it targets option-freedom or agency-freedom. He notes that most contemporary writings about freedom, especially by libertarians, focus on option-freedom that is determined by 'the amount of choice available to an agent', which is essentially an approach to freedom as non-limitation (2003, p. 402). However, he points out that, 'In the longer history, the antonym of freedom is slavery or, more generally, subjection to the will of another' (2003, p. 394). Pettit contends that:

the notion of being free is associated with being a freeman, as distinct from a bondsman. It is an ideal that turns on how a person relates to their fellows, not something that is fixed just by the quantity of choice they enjoy. It is a matter, essentially, of *social standing or status*.

Freedom in this status-related sense means not having to depend on the grace or mercy of others, being able to do one's own thing without asking their leave or permission. (2003, p. 394; emphasis added)

Pettit's concern is about the recognition of the protected status against domination through arbitrary interference; 'agency-freedom that is fixed in a more complex way by the status of the agent – *the recognised, protected status of the agent* – in relation to his or her fellows' (2003, p. 402; emphasis added). I shall argue that, even though social freedom is essentially an agency-freedom – the theory of freedom as non-domination that is central to republicanism – which can 'make room for a secondary level of concern with option-freedom', the status of agent is also vulnerable to systematic non-recognition and domination which leads to systematic oppression – exploitation, discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation.

Pettit writes that option-freedom is a function of two things: 'first, the character of the options that are accessible to the agent; second, the character of the access to those options that the agent enjoys' (2003, p. 389). The character of options, he argues, depends on the number, diversity and significance of the options. I would like to emphasise the significance of options. As I argued in Chapter 2, whether a person recognises an option as meaningful depends on her convictions. As for the accessibility of options, scholars on freedom from the measurability point of view have argued that all that matters is the physical possibility of access (Pettit 2003, pp. 389-390). Pettit correctly points out that it cannot entirely be based on measurable accessibility alone. Other factors must be considered, even if less measurable. This more inclusive view of accessibility may reveal actual freedom of access to be less than it appears when only measurable factors are considered. Pettit points out that a particular choice of an option is 'burdened' or 'blocked' for an agent when it is too difficult or entails a penalty. The blocking or burdening factors can also be subjective, in the sense that one believes or is led to believe that there is a certain block or burden, when in fact there is none. Access to choices may be reduced due to both subjective and objective factors of blocking or burdening, thereby reducing one's status as a free agent. Therefore, option-freedom has to take into account the means to access meaningful options. One's option-freedom is affected by external influences, which can be impersonal or interpersonal. Although Pettit points out that the source of the external influence is irrelevant for the standardised definition of option-freedom, he acknowledges that the effect is not. From this perspective, the agency-factor gains significance.

Agency-freedom, as I already mentioned, is generally contrasted with slavery; it implies not being subjected to another's will. Pettit suggests that people enjoy agency-freedom among their fellows when their option-freedom is protected as effectively and as extensively as that available to any of their fellows and when it is a common awareness in the society. However, he adds that there are many ways in which someone may not enjoy full agency-freedom; these could be due to partial deprivation of objective protected status. Lack of public recognition or non-recognition or misrecognition of one's particularities also reduces one's status in social participation through systematic exploitation, discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation (see Bader 2005); but Pettit does not take account of this aspect of recognition explicitly. I shall show that this aspect also deprives one of equal status, which is important for minorities' participation with the majority's cultural systems and the external organisations of society.

Pettit positions agency-freedom orthogonal to option-freedom, pointing out that it is logically possible that these two forms of freedoms vary independently. He illustrates with the comparison of a 'lucky slave' who has a kind master and has access to all the options, but has no freedom, and, a 'free indigent' who has all the freedom without any of the options (2003, pp. 395-396); however, he acknowledges that the logical distinction is sociologically very unlikely. The main point is that option-freedom may be affected by external influences, independent of the sources of influences, whereas agency-freedom depends on the sources. Pettit maintains that it is only interpersonally sourced influences that have direct impact on agency-freedom. He admits that it is possible for some impersonal influences to affect indirectly how a person is treated interpersonally, also affecting the freedom as agent. He states, leaving aside indirect effects, that freedom is only affected within the interpersonal realm; 'people enjoy agency-freedom by grace of protection and recognition they are accorded among the fellows' (2003, p. 396). In this regard, he maintains that arbitrary interventions have a negative impact on one's agency-freedom; hence, one's position relative to others affects one's agency-freedom even when there is no one intentionally affecting one's agency-freedom. The upshot of Pettit's arguments for agency-freedom is that 'burdening options, or blocking or burdening them subjectively, is sufficient to deprive a person of their status as a free agent' (2003, p. 398).

Pettit goes on to argue that any assault on agency-freedom, first, will invariably represent a deprivation or a denial of status and, second, will tend to reduce option-freedom. Pettit points out, for example, that laws reducing a group of people to second-class status will usually burden choices with the threat of legal sanctions even if the sanctions threatened are not capable of being effectively enforced. It is also to be noted that a non-arbitrary law will not offend one's agency-freedom, but may reduce option-freedom; but an arbitrary threat to one's status through burdening or blocking or both will reduce both agency-freedom and option-freedom. Moreover, one's agency-freedom can also be assaulted by systematic exploitation, discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion, which deny or marginalise one's equal status. Hence, the denial or marginalisation of one's equal status will deprive one not only of agency-freedom, but also of option-freedom.

Both domination and non-recognition or misrecognition can deprive one of equal status; however, Pettit considers domination to affect negatively one's status, and equates agency-freedom to freedom as non-domination. He maintains that the theory of freedom as non-domination, which is central to republicanism, is 'primarily concerned with agency-freedom rather than option-freedom' (2003, p. 399). He clarifies that the theory of freedom as non-limitation, which is central to libertarianism, is a theory of option-freedom; 'given its sustained indifference to the source of the influences whereby freedom is reduced, [it] is clearly meant as a theory of option-freedom' (2003, p. 399). For Pettit, the core notion of agency-freedom is non-domination through arbitrary interference, and hence he is only concerned with the recognition of one's protected status from non-domination (2003, p. 401).

I agree with Pettit that domination, which results from arbitrary interference, affects one's equal status among one's fellow citizens; but non-recognition of one's equal status is a different kind of assault on agency-freedom. Non-recognition of one's particularities deprives one of agency-freedom through systematic exploitation, exclusion, discrimination and marginalisation. It is possible for one to be dominated without exclusion, for example in the case of a housewife dominated by her husband and an employee by her employer; one may be excluded but not dominated, for example, in selective immigration (Macedo and Williams 2005, p. 4). To be sure,

under domination, one is denied recognition of equal status; but, as I discussed in Chapter 3, one could be denied recognition of equal status due to various factors. For example, one could be treated as an inferior social status member due to one's collective identity, not necessarily through domination, but through non-recognition or misrecognition. Being treated as being of inferior social status can burden or block one's agency-freedom subjectively, or objectively, or both.

A member of the minority may be, subjectively, ashamed at not receiving social recognition and may withdraw from wider social participation – self-segregation. Objectively, she may be excluded from social participation overtly or covertly, and both effects assault her agency-freedom and reduce her status to that of social 'pariah'.¹⁰¹ Both of the effects are limitations for one to pursue one's well-being by participating with the social world. As I argued in Chapter 2, the hard or prime normative parameter of the ethical situation is the right circumstances of justice. And justice also helps to formulate one's ethical convictions of a good life. Minorities who are under a burden to exit their cultural systems or to abandon their givens due to non-recognition of their particularities by the majority are unable to participate in the social world as citizens of equal status. When minorities are treated as subordinates they are also unable to participate in the common institutions as citizens of equal status. Restriction of one's agency-freedom through domination and lack of recognition of one's particularities inevitably affects one's freedom to pursue one's well-being, and hence results in an unjust ethical situation.

As Pettit acknowledges, each of the freedoms, whether option-freedom or agency-freedom, is important and is an irreducible good, and each is irreducible to the other as each is capable of varying independently. However, the left-libertarian camp is concerned with advancing option-freedom whereas the republican camp is concerned with advancing agency-freedom; I will be looking at the merits of republicanism later, in particular in Chapter 7. There are arguments to support both camps. But

¹⁰¹ Originally, the term 'pariah' referred to a lower caste group – 'untouchables' – whose main tradition is playing drums at Hindu Tamil funerals (caste categories being based on the hierarchy of traditional occupations). Here it is merely intended to signify lower social status in its English language meaning of 'outcast'. I believe the use of the word 'pariah' is stigmatising to this group and perhaps should be dropped from use.

Pettit argues, freedom as agency-freedom, which is central to republicanism concept of freedom, can make room for option-freedom, not the other way round:

It is not so easy, however, to see how the left-libertarian theory can make room for agency-freedom. If freedom is conceptualised and hailed primarily as something fixed by the options accessible to an agent, in whatever mode of access is thought suitable, then it is not clear how any particular value can be ascribed to the status of the agent relative to others (2003, p. 401).

In this regard, republicanism can give primary concern to agency-freedom, freedom as non-domination, and secondary concern to option-freedom. Hence, Pettit maintains that republican government's primary goal should be to 'guard people against domination, the secondary to maximise the range in which, and the ease with which, people can exercise their undominated capacity for choice' (2003, p. 401; see also 1997b and 2001). However, I emphasise that we should be concerned with non-recognition in addition to non-domination for the right circumstances of justice, and I shall discuss this point later in this chapter as well as in Chapter 5. The theory of freedom as non-interference advocated by liberals, as Pettit shows, given the distinction of option-freedom and agency-freedom, faces a dilemma: 'The theory looks like a theory of option-freedom, so far as it is concerned with quantity of choice rather than social status. Yet it looks like a theory of agency-freedom, so far as it gives attention only to those obstacles to choice that other, interfering agents put in the way of the chooser' (2003, pp. 401-402).

Moreover, agency-freedom, freedom as non-domination, allows other notions of freedom to prevail in addition to option-freedom. As I have pointed out, autonomy also entails freedom of association and exit. Social freedom, understood as the notion of freedom as non-domination, can also accommodate freedom of association and exit. Multicultural citizens should be able to form external organisations or enter the existing external organisations of society. The external organisations of society provide individuals with the opportunity to carry out their complex of purposes collectively. In addition, they provide a sense of belonging to members. However, as I have discussed, the collective will of the external organisation may come to dominate its members; therefore, social freedom, freedom as non-domination, is essential and should be tied to social justice. And freedom of external organisation

must comply with freedom of exit. Benhabib also lists freedom of exit and association as one of the three normative conditions and argues that it is quite compatible with a 'universalist deliberative democracy model' (2002, p. 19).

To sum up: I have argued that although both option-freedom and agency-freedom are important, social freedom is essentially agency-freedom – the notion of freedom as non-domination which is central to republicanism – which can accommodate option-freedom and other notions of freedom – freedom of external organisation and exit. To deny a person equal status negatively affects his or her social freedom, and thereby creates an ethical concern. A minority's citizenship of equal status can be assaulted subjectively, or objectively, or both when participating with the majority's cultural systems and the external organisations, by domination as well as by non-recognition or misrecognition of one's particularities – which include both cultural practices and collective identities. Members of minorities may also be dominated within their own social institutions, the external organisations of society, and it is also an ethical concern. Therefore, freedom as non-domination should be tied to social justice; however, it is inadequate on its own as one's status may be assaulted through non-recognition or misrecognition of one's particularities. Hence, how should we understand multicultural social justice and determine the necessary parameters? I address this question in the following section.

DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES VERSUS CAPABILITY APPROACHES

As I discussed in Chapter 2, identifying justice as a prime or hard parameter, Dworkin proposes that resources must figure as parameters in some way; 'we cannot describe the challenge of living well, that is, without making some assumptions about the resources a good life should have available to it' (2002, p. 264). In this section, I argue, Dworkin's normative framework of distribution of resources is inadequate to determine the necessary normative parameters for the right circumstances of justice within the multifaceted, necessarily problematic, social world. As I have discussed, we are thrown into this problematic social world of dominance and dependence, and asymmetrical power relations. I shall show that Sen's and Nussbaum's capability approaches, although they have their own limitations, provide a better normative framework overcoming the deficiencies of

Dworkin's distribution of resources approach to show that multicultural social justice must be understood as minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status. The capability approach enables us not only to determine the required set of normative conditions, but also to emphasise that non-domination and recognition figure as minimal and common normative conditions of multicultural social justice.

Dworkin does not explicitly address the issues of multiculturalism and minorities, but he acknowledges that 'we live in ethically pluralist societies: People disagree about how, concretely, to live well' (2002, p. 277). He considers the 'right circumstances' to be tied to economic circumstances. He argues that once we accept the challenge model, as ethical liberals, 'we must insist that distributive justice is a matter of what resources people have, not of what well-being they achieve with those resources' (2002, p. 277). Dworkin's point is that once we take care of inequalities due to natural endowments, then it is up to individuals' choices whether they achieve their well-being or not. As Jude Browne and Marc Stears put it, 'What matters, for Dworkin, is that individuals' material resource holdings do not reflect their "brute luck", but rather reflect the decisions they have made and the ways in which they have chosen to live their lives' (2005, p. 357).¹⁰² But I shall show that Dworkin's distribution of resources approach is deficient in determining the necessary normative conditions to overcome the ethical concern that arises due to differences in socio-cultural endowments interacting with social and political structures can lead to domination and subordination, within the problematic multicultural social world.

Dworkin's distribution of resources framework is a '*tabula rasa* approach' as it presupposes an ideal society in which 'social institutions are the result of genuine choices of the members of society against a background of equality of opportunity and non-discrimination' (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 141). The principle of *authenticity* and *independence* ensures choices are not biased by prejudice and stereotypes; that is, in an ideal society the members of society have authentic preferences and do not engage in actions or choices that are influenced by prejudice. As Roland Pierik and Ingrid Robeyns state, Dworkin's egalitarian theory is

¹⁰² I am indebted to Professor Anne Phillips for referring me to the article by these authors.

developed in a context in which all socially generated inequalities such as ‘discrimination, prejudice, racism, gender bias, homophobia or ethnic divisions’ are ‘*assumed away*’ (2007, p. 141). However, as they point out, ‘when the principles of justice are established, and the theory is applied to our actual societies, the bracketed issues need to be taken on board again’ (2007, p. 141). In a multicultural state, some ethnic or minority groups may be deprived of their well-being by their lack of opportunities, oppressive social relationships and other discriminatory state practices even leading to civil war.¹⁰³ If these situations arise from the norms and practices of the existing social and political institutions, it is doubtful how mere distribution of resources could overcome the domination of the minorities or their lack of recognition as citizens of equal status.¹⁰⁴

Dworkin proposes a *theory of improvement* to meet our unjust real world with the benchmark of ideal egalitarian distribution of resources, and its ‘liberty / constraints baseline’. The objective is to reduce a person’s ‘equity deficit’, ‘which is the shortfall between what a person would be entitled to under the ideal egalitarian distribution and their actual situation’ (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 142; cf. Dworkin 2000, pp. 162-164). An equity deficit consists of two components: a resource deficit and a liberty deficit. Pierik and Robeyns point out that there are three points in relation to how to rectify liberty deficits, which do not, however, address how to rectify inequalities in relation to socio-cultural endowments. ‘First, Dworkin limits liberty deficits to those being caused by *legal* constraints and the lack of *legal* protection’ (2007, p. 142; cf. Dworkin 2000, p. 175). Dworkin maintains that: ‘A liberty deficit is a loss of power, *in virtue of legal constraint*, to do or achieve something that one would have had power to do or achieve following a *defensible distribution*’ (2000, p. 175; emphases added). Dworkin assumes,

we can rank defensible distributions in order of plausibility, and identify some set of such distributions as most plausible. If someone’s position would be worse, *in virtue of a legal constraint*, than it would be in most members of the set of most plausible defensible distributions, then it is worse than it would most likely have been in such a distribution (2000, p. 176; emphasis added).

¹⁰³ For example, in Sri Lanka more than two decades of civil war has cost several thousand lives and displaced several thousand families.

¹⁰⁴ In Sri Lanka, minority Tamils have been discriminated against in terms of jobs and opportunities for higher education (limits on university admissions) (see Horowitz (2000/1985, 244); see also Kapferer (1998) who compares unfavourable conditions of Tamils of Sri Lanka to the Aborigines in Australia; see also Burger (1993), Fearon and Laitin (2000) as well as De Silva (1986).

Moreover, when discussing authenticity in relation to personalities, which are not fixed due to the fact that ‘people’s convictions and preferences change and can be influenced and manipulated’, Dworkin focuses on the absence of legal constraints (2000, p. 159). Even though he acknowledges that most ‘personality-forming constraints’ and other influences are cultural, he states that in order to explore how ‘governments treat people as equals, the special concern with legal constraint is legitimate’ (2000, p. 484, n. 27; also Pierik and Robeyns, 2007, p. 142). Dworkin sets aside violations to the principles of independence and authenticity that stem from ‘non-legal sources’, such as socio-cultural norms and differences in cultural practices, and are not accounted for in the liberty / constraint baseline (see Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 142).

Second, and following on from the above, all Dworkin’s examples regarding liberty deficits are ‘cases where it is up to the government to decide whether or not to impose a prohibition, like legal restrictions on spending on political campaigns, or the prohibition of private health care’ (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 142; cf. Dworkin 2000, pp. 176-179). The point is that these cases focus on socio-economic inequalities, not on issues related to socio-cultural inequalities. Third, and somewhat related to the above, Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market deals with, for example, health care and welfare, which stem from one’s brute luck (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 143). Dworkin (2000, p. 300) claims that his hypothetical insurance auction scheme can cater for inequalities resulting from physical impairments of illness and physical handicap, for example, by increasing the ‘impersonal resources’ for those whose ‘personal resources’ are in different ways impaired. Dworkin defines personal and impersonal resources as follows:

[A person’s] personal resources are his physical and mental health and ability—his general fitness and capacities, including his wealth-talent, that is, his innate capacity to produce goods or services that others will pay to have. His impersonal resources are those resources that can be reassigned from one person to another—his wealth and the other property he commands, and the opportunities provided to him, under the reigning legal system, to use that property (Dworkin 2000, pp. 322-323; also quoted in Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 135).

Dworkin only considers two forms of 'brute luck' – handicaps and differentiated talents – for his ideal insurance scheme; in a real world many factors can interact to bring about brute luck in different forms to different people (Farrelly 2007, pp. 857-858). Those factors stem from the differences in socio-cultural endowments such as race, gender, ethnicity, religion and cultural practices of ethnic minorities interacting with the majority's cultural systems and the external organisations. And these differences, as I have discussed, given the general social facts, introduce limitations to minorities in pursuing their meaningful activities. Pierik and Robeyns point out that Dworkin 'does not deal with the question of how actual liberty deficits can be rectified or compensated for' (2007, p. 143). For example, Dworkin does not develop his principle of independence, which he claims to be able to deal with prejudice, into actual public policies in relation to gender inequality or racial prejudice, although he discusses whether affirmative action is an effective policy against prejudice (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 143; see also Browne and Stears 2005).

Dworkin is correctly concerned with prejudices, which are circumstances of injustice and not preferences per se; however, his definition of prejudices can also be taken as preferences (Browne and Stears 2005, p. 366). According to Dworkin,

Just as some people are at a disadvantage because the tastes of others do not allow their services to command a premium in the market, so other people suffer because they belong to a race, or have other physical or other qualities, that a sizeable number of their fellow citizens dislike or for some other reason wish to avoid (2000, p. 162; also partly quoted in Browne and Stears 2005, p. 366).

But the distinction he makes between preferences and prejudices is ambiguous as it is not clear what should be the sizeable number of their fellow citizens whose unfavourable preference becomes a prejudice. As Browne and Stears point out, Dworkin's distinction between simple preference versus racial prejudice is better captured in his discussion about affirmative action; prejudicial attitudes can be considered as 'those which can be directly related either to a history of intentional unequal treatment or to a history of treatment which is the direct consequence of exclusion from political power' (2005, p. 366). The above distinction points to the circumstances of injustice that shape preferences into prejudices, which is an ethical concern, although Dworkin mainly considers the direct consequence of political

exclusion. As I discussed in Chapter 3, minorities may also be excluded or marginalised in social participation along the social power axis through stereotyping and prejudices when interacting with the social institutions.

As Browne and Stears correctly point out, ‘detecting roots of prejudice’ seems ‘inappropriate for the liberal project in general, and is certainly inappropriate for the resourcist one’ (2005, p. 368). They propose that a more successful ‘route is to turn instead to the *conditions* under which preferences are formed rather than the nature of the preferences themselves’ (2005, p. 368). They go on to point out that it is necessary to identify and investigate two dimensions. First, ‘it is necessary to identify currently existing ‘structural faults’, characteristics of formal or informal institutions, public policies, and established social practices, which may be thought themselves to violate *principles of equality of concern and respect* and may shape preferences accordingly’ (2005, p. 368; emphasis added). Second, ‘it is also necessary to investigate historical institutions, policies and practices, which were themselves constructed from previous generations’ more explicit prejudice and which may leave an unacceptable preference-shaping legacy as a result’ (2005, p. 368). They conclude that a revised Dworkinian approach may be able to capture the potential injustices behind preferences. However, they do not offer a revised distribution of resources approach that could address and rectify structural faults and historical prejudices that shape people’s preferences, and it is not clear how equality of concern and respect is to be interpreted and understood. The ethical concern that I am concerned with is not only about the circumstances of injustice that may shape people’s ethical convictions, but also about their capabilities to pursue their meaningful activities with fair challenges.

Dworkin’s equality of resources ‘supposes that the resources devoted to each person’s life should be equal’ (2000, p. 70). However, equal distribution of income or resources does not go far in giving citizens the required capability to choose meaningful options or genuinely endorse the given options according to their convictions and to pursue those options. For example, a disabled person may have resources, but if these resources cannot be converted to alleviate her disability and allow her to function normally to pursue her options, then the equal distribution of resources cannot contribute to her capability to choose, endorse and carry out

meaningful activities in the same way as an able-bodied person. Ethical pluralism, which is one of the basic social facts of the multicultural social world, presumes that ethical convictions are varied and that the means to carry out meaningful activities also vary. For example, a Buddhist monk leads a spiritual life and has less concern for material resources than others who may require material resources to pursue their meaningful activities. Moreover, one may utilise the resources to face one's life challenges and perform well according to others' judgement; however, if a person does not endorse those challenges as meaningful to lead a 'good' life, then should we consider the life of that person successful? The answer is no. As I discussed in Chapter 2, Dworkin would also agree that as long as one does not endorse one's critical interests, one is not genuinely leading a good life, even if one is using distributed resources to face the challenges.

As I argued in Chapter 2, well-being is constituted by engaging in meaningful activities. These activities contribute to well-being in different dimensions: physical, emotional/psychological, intellectual and spiritual. The activities in these specific dimensions may require certain types of resources. Physical well-being requires material resources; emotional/psychological well-being requires social relations and arrangements; intellectual well-being requires opportunities to pursue rational projects or artistic endeavours; and spiritual well-being requires religious faiths to be practised. Is the fair distribution of material resources adequate to allow the pursuit of meaningful options in those dimensions? Moreover, as I have argued, activities intersect many different cultural systems and interact with many external organisations. One may have material resources but may lack the recognition and freedom to practise one's religious faith in public, for example, by wearing a veil or turban.

But one could argue that choosing and distributing the essential resources, both material and non-material such as respect, will enable citizens to engage in their meaningful activities. The choice of goods and distribution could follow Rawls's scheme for allowing everyone access to primary goods. Although Rawls (1996/2005) is not necessarily concerned with the well-being of multicultural citizens, his aim to find fair terms of cooperation for all participants of the polity for their mutual benefit may enable citizens of a multicultural state to pursue their

meaningful goals. The idea behind Rawls's primary goods scheme is that individuals' ends are diverse, and their access to primary goods constitutes their means to pursue different ends. What Rawls identifies as primary goods can be divided into three categories: 1. Liberties and opportunities, consisting of basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, and the powers and prerogatives of offices and of positions of responsibility; 2. Resources, consisting of income and wealth; and 3. The social bases of self-respect (Johnston 1994, p. 161; Rawls 1971/1999). One could argue that the distribution of these primary goods is adequate for multicultural citizens to achieve well-being.

Rawls's conception of justice as fairness based on the idea that individuals can come to an agreement under a veil of ignorance, without knowledge of their particularities and their ends based on the particularities, in the original position – 'a hypothetical state of primordial equality' – on the choice and distribution of primary goods, is untenable (see Sen 1992, pp. 75-79).¹⁰⁵ Individuals are at least partly constituted by their given ends within their socio-cultural realm (see Caney 1992). Individuals who are stripped of their experience of living and of their challenges in life within their respective socio-cultural-historical-political realm cannot meaningfully agree upon the choice and fair distribution of goods. For example, minorities who experience oppressive social relations and subordinated status would identify meaning and requirements of social bases of self-respect, one of the primary goods of Rawls's scheme, as different from the majority's conception.¹⁰⁶ The meanings of social goods differ within different socio-cultural communities, and distribution must also take this into account (see Walzer 1983). But individuals under the veil of ignorance cannot know the meanings of social goods without prior experience.¹⁰⁷

Amartya Sen points out that human beings are diverse in two ways: in their ends and objectives, and in their ability to convert resources to achieve ends (1992, p. 85; see also Johnston 1994, p. 129). Rawls's theory of justice promotes a set of primary goods, focusing on *inter-end* variation, on the diversity of ends and objectives. His theory does not take into account *inter-individual* variation, i.e. the differences in

¹⁰⁵ Communitarians argue that individuals are constituted by their ends (see Sandel 1998). I will discuss this issue in Chapter 7.

¹⁰⁶ I discuss the issue of self-respect in more detail in Chapter 5.

¹⁰⁷ I discuss this aspect also in Chapter 7 under the section on Liberalism.

people's ability to achieve ends, one of the basic social facts. Even among able-bodied persons, there are great differences in mental and physical abilities, because of, among other things, age, gender, and physical size. As Pierik and Robeyns point out, for Sen, both personal and impersonal resources do matter in terms of 'people's valuable ends; i.e. people's capabilities'; for example, 'it is not the bicycle itself that is valuable – as an impersonal resource – but the fact that the bicycle facilitates the capability to be mobile' (2007, p. 136; cf. Sen 1983). Sen is concerned with valuable ends rather than means, and these valuable ends, people's capabilities, depend on three types of conversion factors, which are *personal*, *environmental* and *social* characteristics (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p.136; cf. Sen 1992, pp. 79-87). I would also add that political, religious as well as historical endowments also affect minorities' capabilities.¹⁰⁸ Sen seems to suggest that Dworkin addresses personal characteristics in his distribution of resources framework, but does not address people's inequalities of valuable ends due to both the environmental and social characteristics (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 136).

The inter-individual variation in minorities' capabilities in pursuing their meaningful goals can be negatively affected as a result of social and political arrangements, an important aspect to be considered in a multicultural state. That is, asymmetrical power relations on both social and political axes affect minorities' capabilities to pursue their well-being. Dworkin's distribution of resources, including the insurance scheme, without changing the existing norms of the institutions, will only reinforce the existing social hierarchy, domination and oppressive relations (see Anderson 1999).¹⁰⁹ Dworkin's insurance scheme 'can only be truly egalitarian if the preferences people bring to the auction are the authentic, true preferences of the

¹⁰⁸ For example, in Sri Lanka both political and historical factors affect Tamils in pursuing their well-being. The state empowered Sinhalese as 'first-class' citizens versus Tamils who were considered 'second-class' citizens. Since 1956, after independence in 1948, the government introduced a 'Sinhala-only' policy, in which the Sinhala language was officially recognised as the only state language. Moreover, in 1972, a new constitution ignored Tamils' demands and conferred state patronage on Buddhism, the religion of most Sinhalese (Horowitz 2000/1985, 244). The post-colonial nationalism of Sri Lanka has been mainly to recognise the Sinhala Buddhist community and its history, and religious and cultural practices. Sinhala myths portraying Sinhala mastery over Tamils have been reproduced as historical facts in school texts by the state (Fearon and Laitin 1998, 860; cf. Kapferer 1988, 34-35). The worst riots against Tamils by Sinhalese occurred in 1977, 1981, and 1983, coinciding with the period of heightened religious activity according to their Sinhala Asala calendar. The ministers of Sinhalese government who represented the state had been waxing lyrical about the Sinhala myths during these periods (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 860; cf. Kapferer 1988).

¹⁰⁹ Anderson argues that equality which is concerned with fortune and welfare ignores unequal social relations and fails to consider respect for the beneficiaries, and thereby reinforces oppressive relations.

agent, not imposed upon them by others, and if the prices of the auctioned goods are fair and not distorted by market failures such as those caused by prejudice' (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 139). His scheme cannot restructure the existing asymmetrical power relations and oppression between the majority and minorities.

Individuals vary in their capabilities to convert resources to fulfil a particular function or a state of being. These capabilities are based not only on one's personal characteristics of physical, emotional and intellectual attributes – natural endowments – but also, more importantly, on one's social endowments – one's collective identities that include gender, sexuality, religion, nationality of origin and how these interact with the social as well as political structure of a multicultural state. Dworkin's conception of the distribution of resources including the insurance scheme can take care of inter-individual variation of one's natural endowments (see Pierik and Robeyns 2007). But his scheme, as I pointed out, cannot alleviate the inequality of capability of minorities that arises from social and political orders to choose meaningful options and to pursue them. I shall now show that Sen's (1993) along with Nussbaum's capability approach overcome deficiencies of Dworkin's normative framework of distribution of resources.

Pierik and Robeyns consider Sen's capability approach is different from Dworkin's in the sense it 'very much remains grounded in reality' although it is developed from 'some abstract philosophical concepts' (2007, p. 142). The capability approach can take into account inequalities generated through socio-cultural endowments, which is an important factor to be addressed with regard to minorities' social freedom, and hence multicultural social justice. The capability approach is based on the notion of 'functionings', which 'represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life' (Sen 1993, p. 31). These functionings vary from the very elementary, such as being adequately nourished and in good health, to the complex, such as achieving self-respect or being socially integrated. Functionings are valued by all, but the weight an individual assigns to different functionings may vary depending on the individual and his or her social situation that defines the individual's 'capability', which 'reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection' (Sen 1993, p. 31). The capability approach can

take into account the context of the social and economic situation; for example, Sen points out that the capability approach can be applied to a social and economic situation of extreme poverty. In this context one is concerned with people's ability to be well-nourished and well-sheltered, their capability to escape avoidable premature mortality, and so on.

Dworkin, however, argues that Sen's capability approach collapses into either equality of welfare, or into equality of resources. Dworkin rejects equality of welfare as 'it does not hold people responsible for their expensive tastes and ambitions, and therefore compensates them for inequalities resulting from differences in preferences' (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 135; cf. Dworkin 2000, pp. 48-49). I agree with his rejection of equality of welfare but shall show that the capability approach is a different approach from Dworkin's equality of resources approach. Andrew Williams demonstrates the point (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, pp. 136-137; cf. Williams 2002; pp. 30-34).

Ann and Bob are twins and have equal personal and impersonal resources, and both are heterosexuals and want to combine careers with raising a family. Williams assumes that their society consists of three different preference categories of people with regard to career and raising a family: homeworkers (people who are primarily responsible for domestic work and child caring), co-parents (people who share domestic and market work roughly equally) and ideal workers (people who prioritise market work and have no significant domestic duties). As both Ann and Bob prefer to be co-parents, they need to find partners of the opposite sex. However, given that in contemporary societies more women are willing to combine a career and raising a family, it will be easier for Bob to find a partner than Ann. Therefore, Williams concludes, according to the capability approach, Ann is worse off than Bob in terms of capabilities. On the other, according to equality of resources both are equal as both have equal personal and impersonal resources. Hence, Williams suggests that the capability approach is different from equality of resources as it gives a different judgement without collapsing into a welfarist account.

Dworkin, however, argues that Williams' conclusion is unwarranted. Dworkin points out that, although it is true that Ann does have smaller capacity than Bob when

finding a co-worker partner, Bob also has a smaller capacity if he chooses to find an ideal worker as partner. Therefore, both of their capability sets are intersecting and non-dominated, and therefore we cannot decide that one has a better capability set than the other. But Pierik and Robyens present another example in which they show that one's capability set dominates the other. They consider another pair of twins, Amy and Ben, with equal personal and impersonal resources in a society in which authentic preferences prevail for the work-life balance of ideal workers, homeworkers and co-parents. Both Amy and Ben want to pursue their careers and to raise a family by finding partners of the opposite sex. Pierik and Robyens assume that the preferences of adults in the society are as follows: 50 percent of men strictly prefer to be co-parents while the other 50 percent of men strictly prefer to be ideal workers. In the case of adult women in the society, 50 percent of women are indifferent between an ideal worker or a co-parent, 40 percent want to be either a co-parent or a homemaker, and the remaining 10 percent strictly prefer to be ideal workers. Given this distribution of preferences, Ben has a 40 percent opportunity of becoming a partner and a father while being an ideal worker, a 90 percent opportunity of being a co-parent and a 60 percent opportunity to be a homemaker. But Amy has no opportunity at all to be an ideal worker, a 50 percent opportunity to become a co-parent with a family and a 50 percent opportunity to become a homemaker. Assuming the preferences are authentic without any prejudices, which comply with Dworkin's principles of authenticity and independence, Amy's opportunity set is dominated by Ben's as Amy has no opportunity to become an ideal worker and to raise a family, since no man wants to be a homemaker. In this case, the capability approach would determine that Amy and Ben have different capability sets, whereas according to Dworkin's distribution of resources framework, as other people's authentic preferences cannot form a basis for a claim for injustice, there is no claim to be made as there are no morally relevant inequalities between Amy and Ben. The point is, then, to ask whether the capability approach can determine morally relevant claims and to determine the normative conditions of social justice. I shall attempt to answer.

An individual requires a capability set to carry out her meaningful activities according to her convictions. The capability of a person depends on both natural and social endowments, which interact with the social structure of the society. Social

structures include not only the current formal and informal institutions and public policies, which may in some respects provide unfair challenges to minorities in interacting to pursue their meaningful activities, but also historical injustices towards race, gender, ethnicity and sexuality that produce interactive patterns affecting those individuals belonging to these categories (see Pierik and Robyens 2007, p. 144). The capability approach includes, in contrast to Dworkin's distribution of resources approach, those non-legal sources of inequality in its framework (Pierik and Robeyns 2007, p. 142). It therefore seems plausible to apply Sen's capability approach to identify a capability set required for members of minorities to function as citizens of equal status, which may overcome the concern of assault on one's social freedom.

In the case of a multicultural state, we need to identify the context of citizens and the required capability set taking into account their natural and social endowments interacting with the social world to realise social freedom; that is, to function as full social members with equal status within the problematic social world. This could then be the basis on which a multicultural state can develop policies to ensure the well-being of the citizens. The required capability set depends on the status of the multicultural state, for example, the economic, social and political conditions hindering minorities from pursuing their well-being. If the economic conditions are such that some of the multicultural groups are worse off than others, then one has to take these into consideration. This approach has some merit. The politics of capability can accommodate the politics of redistribution as well as taking into account its deficiencies. But then we should identify a capability set that particular minorities are deprived of. Sen does not identify a particular set of capabilities required by all humans, but Nussbaum (2000 & 2003) does. Her list of capabilities falls into ten categories: 1. Life; 2. Bodily health; 3. Bodily integrity; 4. Senses, imagination and thought; 5. Emotions; 6. Practical reason; 7. Affiliation; 8. Other species; 9. Play; and 10. Control over one's environment. These capabilities reflect an essentialist notion of human nature (see Armstrong 2006, p. 302). As Browne and Stears point out, 'her neo-Aristotelian perfectionism still begs the questions of who decides upon the priorities and why' (2005, p. 363). As I have argued so far, what we should be concerned with is the unjust conditions that lead to the ethical concern.

Nussbaum's concern is what an individual is actually able to do and to be, rather than whether the person is satisfied with the given conditions of life. Although she is correct in arguing the importance of what the individual is able to do and to be, one cannot come up with a list of universal categories that matches everyone's convictions. Nussbaum encourages individuals to become independent of oppressive social relationships, unfair or exploitative commitments and to be able, irrespective of the socio-cultural context, to make rational choices.¹¹⁰ Hence, multicultural social justice should be understood as minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status. However, some members of a cultural community may object to emancipating women as citizens of equal status, which may destroy some traditions.

As Dilthey maintains, cultural systems are enriched and shaped by individuals and moral codes are not fixed in time. As such, traditions are not writ large and change for many reasons. I discuss the issue of morality in Chapter 6. However, on the one hand, when minorities' traditions are under pressure to change due to domination and non-recognition or misrecognition of their particularities, then they are not treated as citizens of equal status. On the other, powerless members of minorities within their external organisations may be under oppressive social relations. Hence, it is important that members of minorities groups' functioning should include their capability to deliberate on claims for recognition and intercultural justice as citizens of equal status. The following chapter argues that multicultural social justice must ensure that the minimal and common normative conditions of social recognition and non-domination, which are complementary and rooted in the normative core of self-respect given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency, allow minorities' capability to deliberate as citizens of equal status. Hence, these conditions themselves are the criteria for endorsement of practices, and I shall discuss how we should understand recognition in detail in the following chapter.

CONCLUSION

I have shown that although informed autonomy – authenticity – may mitigate ethical concerns of social conditioning to endorse our genuine ethical convictions and to

¹¹⁰ She is especially concerned for women from a feminist perspective.

pursue our meaningful options with fair challenges, it is not adequate, as our access to meaningful options may be blocked or burdened. Hence it is important to understand what constitutes autonomy. I have shown that autonomy is misconceived in the debate about multiculturalism due to conflating agency and option factors, and these factors invoke different notions of freedom. I have argued that social freedom is essentially an agency-freedom, the notion of freedom as non-domination which is central to republicanism, which can accommodate other notions of freedom – option-freedom as well as freedom of association and exit. An assault on one’s equal status can deprive one not only of one’s agency-freedom but also of one’s option-freedom, and therefore the vulnerability of one’s capability to function as a citizen of equal status is an ethical concern. One’s status can be assaulted not only through domination but also through non-recognition or misrecognition of one’s particularities. Hence, multicultural social justice should be concerned with the notion of freedom as non-domination and recognition of minorities’ particularities that may negatively affect their ‘capability to function’ as citizens of equal status. The politics of capability can accommodate the politics of redistribution as well as taking into account its deficiencies, which includes addressing asymmetrical power relations through socio-cultural endowments interacting with the social structure in many dimensions. However, claims for recognition should be deliberated, as cultural practices are normatively contestable and contesting. Hence, multicultural social justice should be understood as minorities’ capability to function as citizens of equal status, and their functioning should include their capability to deliberate claims for recognition and intercultural justice as citizens of equal status. However, within a multicultural context, there may be several conditions that figure as necessary parameters for a minority’s capability to function as citizens of equal status. Hence the pertinent question is: what are the minimal and common conditions of multicultural social justice? I shall attempt to answer this question in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL RECOGNITION AND NON-DOMINATION

INTRODUCTION

Social freedom satisfies Dilthey's concern for freedom, meaning that individuals can express themselves according to their individual character, requiring a range of possible responses and choices within a concrete situation (Ermarth 1978, p. 121). However, as cultural practices are normatively contesting and contestable, multicultural social justice requires that cultural practices be given recognition not pre-emptively, but through deliberation treating citizens as being of equal status. As Iseult Honohan puts it: 'Liberals and others agree that justice requires equal "respect" for all citizens, but they disagree on what is meant by and required by respect' (2002, p. 252). In this chapter, I shall show that both non-domination and social recognition are the minimal and common conditions, and that they are complementary and rooted in the normative basis of self-respect that enables us to invoke the 'egalitarian reciprocity' of treating one another as citizens of equal status. This is conducive to deliberation on claims for intercultural justice and recognition rather than claiming respect for 'culture' in advance, as many multiculturalists demand. However, we should determine how we should understand social recognition without reifying identity and culture, and this chapter sets out to do that.

This chapter consists of two sections. In the first section, I first critique group identity for a normative theory of the politics of recognition equating to the politics of identity/difference. Seyla Benhabib maintains that we should turn to democratic theories that are concerned with 'the public manifestation of cultural identities in civic spaces' rather than to multicultural theories that are based on the normative basis of 'classificatory taxonomies' of group identities (2002, p. 18). Hence, she urges that '[d]emocratic theorists should support movements for equality and justice and for increasing the space for narrative self-determination in cultural terms' (2002, p. 19).

Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) have made valuable contributions to addressing these issues in theorising recognition. They adopt non-essentialist approaches to problematic pluralism that includes multicultural aspects of society. Their theories contribute important normative foundations to claims for recognition without reifying identity and culture. However, I show that Fraser's 'status-model' of recognition and Honneth's theory of recognition for 'identity-formation' face challenges and dilemmas in evaluating competing claims for recognition. The problems arise partly, in the case of Honneth's theory of recognition, because normative weight is assigned to self-respect as well as to self-esteem, and partly, in the case of Fraser's theory of recognition, because recognition is delineated within two dimensions – social and economic.

I clarify the difference between self-esteem and self-respect for claims for recognition; it is important to note that claims for recognition should be founded upon self-respect, which is constituted by autonomy, 'character' and 'conduct'. Claims for recognition must address the vulnerabilities that arise out of the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – of our multi-faceted problematic social world. I show that Honohan's (2002) approach to the republican idea of social recognition along three dimensions of 'acknowledgement', 'authorisation' and 'endorsement' is helpful in addressing claims for recognition through deliberation treating citizens as being of equal status. However, recognition along these three dimensions cannot overcome domination, and therefore we need to ensure that the other minimal and common normative condition of non-domination prevails for multicultural social justice.

In the second section, I emphasise that non-domination is an absence of arbitrary interference (Pettit 1997b), and show that both social recognition and non-domination are complementary and founded upon the normative core of self-respect, not on self-esteem. I conclude that both conditions are necessary for minorities to deliberate as citizens of equal status interacting with the common institutions. However, competing claims for recognition may challenge differences in morality. This raises important questions: How should we resolve differences in morality and endorse practices, and what are the underlying responsibilities of individuals and the external organisations of society including the state in ensuring that multicultural

social justice prevails? I shall discuss this aspect in the following chapter and set out a set of normative criteria for the sort of multiculturalism that this thesis attempts to advocate.

SOCIAL RECOGNITION

In this section, I attempt to show that social recognition is a necessary normative condition of social justice for a citizen to participate with the social world as a citizen of equal status with authenticity, and should go beyond tolerance and non-discrimination, with an underlying normative core of self-respect. That is, egalitarian reciprocity of treatment of minorities as citizens of equal status cannot be based on tolerance and non-discrimination. Neither can it be based on giving recognition preemptively to the essentialist notion of cultures as distinguishable wholes. As I have argued, cultures are not neatly distinguishable wholes, but consist of internally riven contesting and contestable practices, and these practices and meanings change. As Honohan puts it: 'If cultures are not clearly distinguishable wholes but changing ensembles of practices, there are three problems with identifying recognition with guarantees of cultural practices: of negative side effects, of coherence and of desirability' (2002, p. 255). First, the negative side effects include ossification of 'certain cultural practices at the expense of others and limit as much as facilitate the autonomy which culture is seen to support'. 'Second, it is not possible to respect all cultures equally, because at least some different cultures have opposing and irreconcilable beliefs and practices' and third, 'it may not be normatively desirable to guarantee all cultural practices' (2002, pp. 255-256). As I have discussed, multicultural policies based on the notion of bounded culture and singular identity may constrict individuals' ethical horizons and may lead to stereotyping culture and identity. According to Dilthey's idea of intersecting cultural systems and interacting organisations, one is at the intersection of these myriad of systems and hence the demand for recognition of culture as a whole and a singular cultural group identity is fallacious. Therefore, claims for recognition of cultural practices have to be deliberated among citizens and hence recognition calls for minorities' capability to deliberate as citizens of equal status without reifying culture and identity. However, we cannot ignore people's particularities, including their multiple intersecting identities, in which their convictions and concerns may be rooted within particular contexts. This poses a dilemma. I shall attempt to overcome the dilemma by arguing

for the normative basis of self-respect for egalitarian reciprocity of treating people as citizens of equal status *in* their multiple intersecting identities to enable them to deliberate on claims for recognition of contesting convictions.

Let me map out this section. I shall first briefly describe the development of the politics of recognition and the problems with the politics of identity/difference. I shall argue that the difficulties arise due to the normative weight that the politics of identity/difference assigns to group identities. Although group-identity cannot be ignored for social inclusion and 'parity of participation', identity-based recognition has several drawbacks that restrict one's ethical horizons. We need to turn to theories of recognition that adopt an anti-essentialist approach to group and identity. In this regard, I first turn to contemporary theories of recognition based on the core concepts of liberal tradition while taking on an anti-essentialist notion of identity. I explore the merits and limitations of Fraser's and Honneth's normative theories of social justice with regard to recognition. The normative basis of these theories approaches claims for recognition without reifying identity and groups. However, both theories suffer from some dilemmas in resolving competing claims for recognition. I shall attempt to show that recognition should be based on self-respect as a normative foundation, not self-esteem. I clarify what is meant by self-respect, which is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct. Claims for recognition are not predetermined, but should be deliberated going beyond simple tolerance and non-discrimination. In this respect, finally, I shall show, drawing upon Honohan's republican ideas, recognition along three dimensions of acknowledgement, authorisation and endorsement. These dimensions of recognition take account of the common concerns resulting from the three basic social facts of human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency.

Under the 'politics of recognition', a variety of theories have been put forward and debated by various scholars, and in general, the claims for recognition are concerned with authenticity, identity-formation, parity of participation and social inclusion of minorities (see Lægaard, 2005). As I argued in the previous section, multicultural social justice must be concerned with minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status participating with the common institutions within the multi-faceted, necessarily problematic, social world. Hence, I am mainly concerned with theories

of recognition focusing on social inclusion and parity of participation enabling minorities to genuinely endorse convictions while avoiding social conditioning to pursue meaningful activities.

If the objective of social recognition is social inclusion and parity of participation with authenticity within the multicultural social world, then we need to understand what it is to be recognised, and whether there are any normative claims that can be justified. A multicultural citizen's formal status of citizenship entails legal rights as a citizen of the state, but it 'does not entail being capable of fully enjoying the status of citizenship and *functioning as a full member in the polity*' (Galeotti 1999, p.41; emphasis added). Moreover, when legal rights are only based on the norms of the majority, many minorities may not be able to engage in meaningful activities requiring a different set of norms. For example, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, marriage is an institutionalised practice based on the norms of the majority that often denies 'legal rights' to homosexuals. In those states where heterosexual as well as homosexual couples may cohabit without getting married, one may argue that homosexuals are equally socially recognised. But the issue here is that heterosexual couples have the option to practice their 'legalised' institutionalised marriage, whereas homosexuals do not and are therefore not considered as being of equal status.

Claims for recognition are mainly concerned with the minorities' practices and identities within social, cultural and political spheres based on various categories. My main emphasis in this thesis is on minorities, especially post-immigration ethnic groups identified by cultural practices and/or collective identities; however, as minorities' meaningful activities intersect with many cultural systems and require interaction with the external organisations of society, minorities may fall into any category that contrasts with a majority. The claims for recognition by the proponents of multiculturalism emphasise the recognition of cultural, religious and ethnic minorities. The normative parameters for recognition put forward by various scholars are essentially related to respect, confidence, esteem and dignity. However, the meanings of these terms have undergone historical transformations (Honneth

1995, p. 126). Some of these terms have sometimes also been used interchangeably.¹¹¹

The politics of recognition argues for recognition claims in many ways. Identity-based claims for recognition, within the politics of authenticity, argue that authenticity is important, and therefore, to have authenticity, individuals' identities must be recognised (Taylor 1994). If so, the notion of recognition denotes the 'public valuing' of such identities (see Lægaard 2005, p. 328). I will address this in more detail later in this section. It is also argued that 'identity-formation' requires recognition, because self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem crucially depend on identity (see Honneth 1995). 'Parity of participation' claims for recognition decry minorities' unequal social status and claim recognition as equal social status members within the social world (Fraser and Honneth 2003, Ch.1).¹¹² Social inclusion claims for recognition point out that the legal status of citizenship does not eliminate inequality of social status and asymmetrical power relations in social participation (see Galeotti 1999, p. 41). The identity-based claim for recognition, I shall show, even though it is argued on the basis of authenticity, has drawbacks for social freedom with normative deficiencies.

The negative or excessive emphasis of one's collective identity can restrict one from engaging in meaningful activities. As Anna Elisabetta Galeotti notes, 'given the social construction of differences as ascriptive marks of the different group, the individual member is, so to speak, forced from the outside into his or her collective identity, with very little room for personal individuation' (1999, p. 41). As Galeotti points out, the received social identity of an individual based on the individual's group identity is 'rarely innocent, in which the individual is often socially encapsulated beyond the individual's own will' (1999, p. 41). She maintains that 'the intolerance, discrimination and invisibility experienced by the members of the minority group are not simply individual misfortunes, but are intrinsically attached to their membership and collective identity' (1999, p. 41). Hence, she claims that

¹¹¹ For example, Rawls (1999, p. 386) uses self-respect and self-esteem interchangeably; however, I will clarify that these two concepts are different.

¹¹² Fraser calls for parity of participation which concerns equality of status; see also Fraser (2003).

being the bearer of a different identity brings about something more than having less opportunity and resources: it constitutes a special barrier to becoming a functioning citizen and social actor; it is a matter of having less *capability* for making use of resources and opportunities (Galeotti 1999, p. 42; emphasis added).

The politics of identity and difference argues for the acceptance of individuals based on, rather than irrespective of, such collective identities. One will not have self-esteem and self-respect when one is accepted ‘*despite* being a woman, a black, an Arab, or a gay’ (Galeotti 1999, p. 46). The politics of identity argues for the acceptance of the identities represented as inferior. The main motivation for the politics of difference is that there is a single identity factor that pervades every aspect of the life of a person; it must be recognised and accepted for integrity and authenticity. The politics of difference and identity claim equal acceptance and respect for the differences based on, often, a singular cultural group identity.

As I argued in Chapter 3, a person’s identity is multi-dimensional and constituted by multiple intersecting collective identities. The integrity and authenticity of a person should not emphasise only one of the multiple intersecting identities, whether considered inferior or superior; this could lead to restricting her ethical horizon. A single collective identity is only a part of a person’s multi-dimensional identity. Even if the person’s mode of being is primarily based on this identity, many members who share the same identity may consider their modes of being as different because of their different convictions. The point is that a single collective identity should not become a restriction for those individuals who share the identity but have different ethical convictions that emphasise other identities. Demanding recognition of a group’s singular collective identity and assigning a singular mode of being denies authenticity to individuals who share the same collective identity but differ in their convictions, and therefore restricts their participation with the social world. As several intersecting collective identities determine one’s personal identity, claiming the recognition of a singular collective identity and assigning a singular mode of being is an ethical concern.

Charles Taylor argues that our identities crucially depend on our ‘dialogical’ relations with others (1994, p. 34). However, if others emphasise only one of the multiple identities to judge and screen or to assign a singular mode of being to a

person who does not ascribe to it, then such an emphasis becomes a mode of restriction to her social participation. This will hinder the development of the self, including the development of the individual identity. As Benhabib maintains, one should have the conditions that permit 'most extensive forms of self-ascription and self-identification possible', which is, according to her, one of the three normative conditions for a 'universalist deliberative democracy model' (2002, p.19).

Benhabib argues that giving importance to a particular group identity is illiberal:

Why should the individual's search for an authentic selfhood be subordinated to the struggles of any of these collectivities, unless we have some ontological or hierarchical ordering of the groups to which the individual belongs, so that one group, more than other groups, can be said to portray a more authentic expression of one's identity? Surely this is an extremely illiberal conclusion that would subordinate the individual's search for authentic identity to the self-assertion of particular groups (2002, p. 53).

The point is that, as Benhabib maintains, 'It is both theoretically wrong and politically dangerous to conflate the individual's search for the expression of his/her unique identity with politics of identity / difference' (2002, p. 53). It is theoretically mistaken because of the 'homology drawn between individual and collective claims, a homology facilitated by the ambiguities of the term *recognition*' (2002, p. 53). And she cautions that it is politically dangerous because one's moral autonomy is subordinated to 'movements of collective identity' (2002, p. 53). As Fraser notes, the 'identity model', by positing group identity as the object of recognition, 'puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to group culture' (Fraser 2002, p. 24). And it restricts people's freedom to have voluntary self-ascription.

Moreover, emphasising a single group identity based on a particular aspect of a cultural system can lead to endorsing the essentialist notion of culture as reified, holistic and deterministic, and ignores the reality of multiple intersecting cultural systems and interactions with many external organisations of society. As Fraser (2002, p. 24) points out, recognition of group identity tends to promote separatism, restricting intergroup interaction and denying internal heterogeneity. Fraser (2000) calls this the 'problem of reification'.

The identity model with the problem of reification presents several drawbacks that restrict social freedom. First, it can restrict freedom to engage in meaningful activities that intersect and interact with the cultural systems and the external organisations of society that are considered different to the mode of being assigned to the identity. As I have argued, individuals have multiple intersecting collective identities, and reifying one of them would be misleading and would not acknowledge authenticity and thus restrict individuals' meaningful activities by confining them to activities that are associated with such a reified collective identity. Second, individuals who are identified with a group are expected, by both the members of the group and outsiders, to conform to the group's mode of being based on its norms, customs and traditions, and therefore are prohibited from emancipating themselves from any oppressive norms and traditions of the group. Third, it will lead to the homogenisation of norms and values ignoring the internal heterogeneity, preventing members of the group from critically evaluating their own differences, and following their different meaningful options. Fourth, it may also lead to conflicting identities and misrecognition, and may therefore restrict the formation of new collective identities and convictions. Let me explain the latter point.

The identification of post-immigration groups based on the nation-states of origin, or on the overarching category of geographical region, or on other categories of language or religion, is misleading as the meanings and significance of identities differ and can change. To take the first case, collective identification based on the nation-state of origin will ignore differences in cultural systems such as language and religion within the nation-state. For example, Sri Lankans identify themselves at one level as Tamils or Sinhalese based on language, at another based on religion as Buddhists, Hindus, Christians or Muslims, and at yet another level based on their place of birth and family background.¹¹³ Dilthey's theory enables us to accommodate such distinctions in terms of cultural systems and the external organisations of society.

¹¹³ Tamils of Sri Lanka, although they consider themselves as a nation, differentiate themselves according to religion, place of birth and caste and whether they are descendants of immigrants from South India under British colonial rule or indigenous Tamils from the North and East of Sri Lanka. The former, who have mainly settled in the upcountry region, are identified as upcountry Tamils.

The differences based on collective identities do not stop at a certain level, and collective identities are based on many intersecting cultural systems. The boundaries of nations and nation-states have been drawn and redrawn over time and consist of many different cultural groups. Even within Europe, the identification of nation-states has changed through the World Wars, the Balkan war, and the cold war. Many citizens of ex-Yugoslavia today identify themselves as Serbians, Bosnians, Croatians, or Macedonians.¹¹⁴ The European Union is becoming an overarching identity that includes former member states of the Soviet Union. Many Italians who immigrated to North America before Italy as a nation-state was constructed did not identify themselves as such, but as Sardinian or Neapolitan or Venetian (Spinner 1994, p.25).

Moreover, as many marriages take place among different ethnicities and races, the second generations have difficulty in identifying with a single collective identity based on their ethnicity or country of origin (Spinner 1994, p. 66). As I discussed in Chapter 3, individuals have intersecting collective identities that are subject to changes.¹¹⁵ Thus, assigning a meaning of a single collective identity is misleading; identity changes and takes on new meaning and cannot be reified with a singular collective identity with an old meaning. As I have argued, according to Dilthey's view of meaning in history, meaning changes and takes on new meaning with the unfolding chain of events.

However, when members of a minority are categorised according to a singular group identity and are humiliated, denigrated and considered inferior to the majority, then they suffer the collective fate of a disadvantageous lower social status restricting their social freedom. They are thus hindered in carrying out their meaningful activities within the public realm and are pushed back into the private realm as discussed in Chapter 3. This does not mean that the majority do not carry out many

¹¹⁴ Today, Kosovo which was part of Serbia, has claimed independence. On 17th February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Both Serbia and Kosovo aspire to become members of the European Union. It is also to be noted that, while mainly consisting of ethnic Albanians, Kosovo also includes minorities of Serbs, Roma and Turks.

¹¹⁵ For example, in her life, a woman goes through several identities, such as virgin, bride, wife, mother and widow, and can even have multiple identities at the same time. In Hinduism, the goddess Shakti is known to have all the identities mentioned. A modern woman takes on many other identities like having a career and other roles within political and social spheres.

meaningful activities within the private realm, but they have the option doing so and are recognised as full members in public realm. Therefore, we cannot ignore that when certain collective identities are ascribed a lower social status, recognition of individuals based on a singular collective identity is flawed. Moreover, group identity recognition based on esteem is also problematic, as I shall explain.

Group identity-based recognition rooted in esteem can lead to treating outgroup members as inferior while treating ingroup members as superior. Groups identified with lower status based on esteem may encourage ingroup members to behave in such a way as to increase their collective self-esteem and lower the esteem and dignity of outgroup members. And, when the collective identity of a group is associated with visible cultural or racial markers, or practices conducted in the public arena, then these markers and practices can become the means for others to denigrate and humiliate individuals with such markers even if not all of them subscribe to those ascribed identities or practices. Collective self-esteem encourages individuals to positively evaluate their sense of collective identity (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990). It is similar to self-esteem towards personal-identity. Collective self-esteem can be defined within four dimensions: membership esteem (a person's attitude towards his or her performance as a group member); private collective self-esteem (a person's attitude towards the group); public collective self-esteem (outgroup attitude towards the group); and importance for identity (the extent to which group membership contributes to a person's self-concept overall) (Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003; cf. Crocker and Lawrence 1999; Crocker and Luhtanen 1992). Of these four dimensions, three are intragroup variables and only 'public collective self-esteem' is intergroup. I believe all may affect a person's self-esteem, but what I am mainly concerned with here is the intergroup variable of collective self-esteem, i.e. the groups' attitude towards each other. The intergroup variables of collective self-esteem can lead to the reification of collective identity, which in turn may encourage the members of the ingroup not to respect the members of outgroups. The motivation to behave in such a way as to elevate a group's sense

of superiority may lead members of ingroups to denigrate, humiliate and persecute members of outgroups (see Sennett, 2003, p. 55).¹¹⁶

Therefore, as Benhabib points out, it is extremely important that we distinguish the analytical differences between the politics of recognition and 'identity politics of group affirmation'. She goes on to suggest that 'we can and should do justice to certain claims for recognition without accepting that the only way to do so is by affirming a group's right to define the content as well as the boundaries of its own identity' (2002, p.70). As she puts it:

Social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication, which oppressed minorities and excluded groups justly criticise, can also be transformed through an acknowledgement of the fluidity of group boundaries, through the telling of stories of the interdependence of the self and the other, of "we" and "them" (2002, p. 70).

Benhabib maintains that the politics of recognition can encourage 'critical dialogue in public life' without leading to 'cultural separatism or balkanisation' (2002, p.70). In this sense, she urges that we should turn to democratic theories with a non-essentialist approach to identity that allow increasing space for narrative self-determination. It is also important that one's narrative self-determination allows one to pursue one's ethical convictions with fair challenges.

From the above perspective, I shall consider both Fraser's and Honneth's theories of recognition, as both theories adopt anti-essentialist approaches with regard to culture and identity within problematic pluralism. First, I shall show that although Fraser's status-model of recognition for parity of participation overcomes the flaws and drawbacks of identity-based recognition, her theory of justice on a two-dimensional view of distribution and recognition suffers from limitations in resolving competing claims for recognition. On the other hand, Honneth's theory of recognition for identity-formation based on three spheres of recognition – love, law and achievement – although overcoming the drawbacks of reifying identity and giving significance to social relations for social integration, also suffers in terms of resolving competing claims for recognition among the three spheres. However, we can draw upon the merits and limitations of these two theories to lay the foundation

¹¹⁶ He also argues that social honour can be a zero-sum game: 'to affirm the honour of our group, we have to denigrate the honour of yours.'

of a normative basis for claims for recognition, which I shall argue should be based upon self-respect.

Fraser's claim for recognition of the 'social status', 'the status model of recognition', overcomes the flaws of group identity-based recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 29). Her normative core of the status model of recognition is 'parity of participation', according to which 'justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 36; also quoted in Toppinen 2005, p. 428). 'On the status model, misrecognition is neither a psychological deformation nor an impediment to ethical self-realisation. Rather, it constitutes an *institutionalised relation of subordination* and a violation of justice' (2003, p. 29; emphasis added). As she puts it: 'To view recognition as matter of justice is to treat it as an *issue of social status*. This means examining *institutionalised patterns of cultural value* for their effects on the *relative standing* of social actors' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 29; emphasis is also added). That is, when 'institutionalised patterns of cultural value' constitute certain social actors or groups as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, their ability to participate as 'full partners in social interaction' is reduced. And these members are 'misrecognised' and subjected to 'status subordination', in line with the arguments I presented in Chapter 4 with regard to social freedom. Fraser, rightfully, demands justice for parity of participation of these members capable of participating on a par with one another in social life. Hence, for Fraser, the aim of claims for recognition is to overcome subordination by 'deinstitutionalising patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 30-31). She claims at least two conditions must be satisfied for parity of participation to be possible.

First, the *objective condition* is that 'the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and "voice"' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 36). This precludes 'forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality that impede parity of participation' and 'social arrangements that *institutionalise* deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 36; emphasis added). The second, the

intersubjective condition, ‘requires that *institutionalised patterns of cultural value* express *equal respect* for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 36; emphases added). This precludes ‘*institutionalised value patterns* that deny some people *the status of full partners* in interaction – whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed “difference” or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 36; emphases added).

Following this premise, she proposes a concept of social justice with two-dimensions: economic redistribution and recognition oriented to the norm of parity of participation. She further asserts that even though both dimensions vary in terms of degree of subordination, every practice should be assessed from both these perspectives, and therefore, she calls her approach to social justice a *perspectival dualist* approach. She argues further that her theory of justice is grounded on the idea of modern liberalism: ‘the equal autonomy and moral worth of human beings’; but she claims that participatory parity represents a ‘radical democratic’ interpretation of equal autonomy (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 228-229). She concludes that her theory of justice is compatible with a plurality of reasonable views of the good life. Her justice to demand parity of participation as full partners in social interaction ensures respect for the equal autonomy and moral worth of individuals.

Fraser’s notion of recognition as equal status in social interaction has merit in enabling individuals to function as full social members with their convictions. Her status model attempts to avoid the reification of identity, while recognising the need for institutionalised patterns of cultural value to express equal respect for all participants. Fraser’s status model, therefore, has merit in arguing that people’s distinctiveness, in terms of their cultural values, needs to be recognised but not reified as a collective identity. Her theory of justice supports ethical pluralism without constraining one to choose a particular concept of good. Everyone has the freedom to pursue his or her convictions of a good or meaningful life as a full member without status subordination. She also wants to ensure that distribution of material resources enables participants to be independent and their voice to be heard. Moreover, she grounds her idea of social justice on the respect for individuals’ autonomy and equal moral worth rather than on social esteem. Therefore, her theory

of justice has a better normative ground as her concept of respect is owed universally to every person in virtue of shared humanity and equal moral worth, whereas esteem depends on the person's traits, accomplishments, or contributions and the opinion of others, which is not universally applicable (2000, p. 99, n. 32).

Despite the above merits, I shall show that Fraser's theory of justice, based on the two-dimensional view encompassing both economic redistribution (the objective condition) and recognition (based on the intersubjective condition), has some challenges and limitations. First of all, claims for recognition for parity of participation due to political oppression, or exclusion, or marginalisation are not explicitly taken into account. Fraser acknowledges that a political dimension may be required in addition to her two-dimensional justice as it also impacts parity of participation (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 68; also 2000, n. 1; see also Toppinen 2005, p. 433). I believe it may be plausible to adopt the normative basis as one's capability to participate with parity without subordination, which may allow one to derive appropriate context specific dimensions of subordination; but she insists on her perspectival dualist approach, limiting the number of dimensions to two, which undermines her singular normative basis of parity of participation (see Toppinen 2005, p. 431). She maintains that neither dimension is reducible to the other and all the complex patterns of subordination arise out of these two dimensions (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 60-63; see also Toppinen 2005, p. 427). It is plausible, at least hypothetically we could assume, that a society has no more subordination over the material resources, but has political oppression. Her insistence on economic redistribution as of one of the two dimensions then becomes superfluous. Notwithstanding the above limitation, her objective condition of economic distribution for parity of participation faces difficulties.

First, as there will always be economic inequalities, we need to know the threshold of economic inequality that would impede parity of participation on the basis of class subordination (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 101, n. 41; see also Toppinen 2005, p. 433). This is not easy to determine, and there can be multiple levels of class subordination, for example, between lower and middle class, and between middle and upper class. Even if one were to eliminate the lower class through distribution of resources, the middle class may yet cluster into lower and upper class stratification,

leading to subordination or segregation or both. Second, Fraser believes that distribution of material resources would eliminate the social structure of power relations that lead to exploitation and marginalisation. As I argued in the previous section, redistribution of material resources without rectifying the structural problems that give rise to inequalities can result in demeaning the recipients and reinforcing the underlying asymmetrical power relations in favour of the 'fortunate' citizens. For example, financial support for unemployed persons that fails to rectify the underlying causes of unemployment and create opportunities demeans those who receive such benefits against those who keep their employment and position of power. The skills and abilities of those who are unemployed may not be recognised and they may not be given opportunities to develop appropriate skills. The reasons for this lack of recognition and opportunity could be their 'ethnic' backgrounds, or that their qualifications and skill set are not considered equal in standing based on the standard set by the majority, or differences in gender and sexuality, or simply categorisation as 'old' or 'disabled' or 'ugly'. These reasons may be considered as 'unfortunate'. As I argued in the previous section, inter-individual variations interacting with social structure can lead to inequalities of individuals' capabilities and can introduce relations of domination and subordination. Redistribution, on the basis of 'equality of fortune', without addressing and correcting the underlying structural problems will result not only in further insulting self-respecting social members as 'invalid', 'not talented', or 'ugly', but also in reinforcing the existing social structure that produces asymmetrical power relations (Anderson 1999).

Fraser may argue that we need what she refers to as 'cross-redressing', 'using distributive measures to redress misrecognition and recognition measures to redress maldistribution' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 83). However, the distribution of resources may in certain cases reinforce the social structures that yield to inequalities and subordination and hence undermine the objective of equal respect among individuals. Honneth, on the other hand, argues that even 'distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of social disrespect' – 'unjustified relations of recognition' and I shall consider his theory of recognition shortly (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 114).

Moreover, even though Fraser wants parity of participation of all (adult) members of society, her attempt to redress through replacing institutionalised patterns of cultural value that are represented as inferior with those patterns that give equal status as full partners may indirectly reinforce 'institutionalised group classifications'. As Fraser notes, 'although no one has a right to equal social esteem in the positive sense, everyone has a right not to be *disesteemed* on the basis of *institutionalised group classifications* that undermine her or his standing as a full partner in social interaction' (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 99, n. 33; emphasis added). That is, she maintains, what matters is that 'everyone has an equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 32). That means, even if we take measures that do not reinforce institutionalised group classifications, it is plausible that those who achieve higher social esteem may not treat other members who attain lower social esteem and may even subordinate them intersubjectively even if other members' cultural practices are accepted by the institutions.

In addition, she points out, when institutionalised patterns of cultural value pervasively downgrade, for example, femininity, "non-whiteness," homosexuality, and 'everything culturally associated' with those individuals, then those individuals do not have equal opportunity to pursue social esteem (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 32). There are also other cultural values and practices which are pervasively downgraded for example fascism, neo-Nazism, child marriages, forced marriages, female genital mutilation and honour killings, and members who practice such practices or endorse such values may attempt to achieve social esteem within their groups. However, as Honohan maintains: 'It is not possible to distinguish radically the moral and the cultural dimensions of life' (2002, p. 256). Hence, we should deliberate on these values and practices, and it is not clear how Fraser might go about ensuring parity of participation equally respecting members who may practice and value those practices which are contestable in social interaction.

Fraser's status model has both merits and limitations, and Honneth argues that struggles for redistribution can be represented as struggles for recognition. I shall therefore now look into Honneth's claim for recognition, which is concerned with the social suffering and feelings of discontent within the three spheres of love, law

and achievement. I will show that his theory of recognition has not only merits over identity-based claims for recognition, but also against Fraser's status model of recognition in giving significance to social relations and individuality within the three spheres of social integration. However, as I shall demonstrate, his theory of recognition also suffers from an incoherent normative basis of claims for justice and thereby faces dilemmas and challenges in resolving conflicting and competing claims for recognition. His normative core is that when such feelings of discontent and suffering are 'social', then 'society is doing something unjust, something unjustifiable' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 129). Honneth maintains that 'an institutional rule or measure that, in light of generally accepted grounds, violates deep-seated claims on the social order, is experienced as social injustice' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 130; cf. Moore 1978). He, however, ties different claims to a common goal explaining that 'what subjects expect of society is above all recognition of their *identity claims*' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 131; emphasis added). He recommends a 'basic conceptual shift to the normative premises of a theory of recognition that locates the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and *disrespect*' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 134; emphasis added). He locates three different attitudes of social relations, within the three spheres of love, law and achievement, which follow different principles of reciprocal recognition similar to Hegel's idea of three spheres of recognition, the family, civil society and the state (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 142-143; see Toppinen 2005, p. 429).¹¹⁷ In intimate relationships, which are based on mutual affection and concern, subjects reciprocally understand themselves as individuals with their own needs. In legal relationships, subjects learn to understand themselves as legal persons who are entitled to the same autonomy, equal rights and duties as are all other members of society. In social relations, individuals learn to understand themselves as possessing abilities and talents that are valuable to society.

Honneth considers his ethical goal of the theory is rooted in individual autonomy like in Fraser's theory of recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 176; see Toppinen 2005, p. 439). He maintains that identity-formation in modern societies

¹¹⁷ However, Honneth argues that his project differs from Hegel in two perspectives (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 144-146).

depends on three forms of recognition based on the sphere-specific principles of love, equal legal treatment and the social esteem of achievement. The egalitarian principle here is that 'all subjects must have the same chance of individual self-realisation through participation in relations of recognition' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 185). His claims for recognition are to be justified if they result in potentially contributing to the 'expansion of social relations of recognition' along two dimensions of individualisation and social inclusion in the 'direction of a rise in the moral level of social integration' which he considers as normatively grounded (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 187). For example, he considers the break-up of legal respect and social esteem with the emergence of bourgeois capitalism as moral progress (2003, p. 140). Honneth's conclusions reverberate with the Hegelian philosophy of history of progress, which Dilthey opposes, as I discussed in Chapter 2. Honneth, however, maintains that his model provides a general criterion for moral progress by expanding rational or legitimate demands of morally justified claims of recognition through identification of states of affairs that have not yet been considered.

Although Honneth's social integration gains significance for social freedom, he is not clear as to how it could be achieved. His concept of justice based on the three spheres of recognition has drawbacks. First, as his criterion for progress is based on the conditions of social recognition along the two dimensions of individualisation and social inclusion within the three spheres of recognition of love, law and achievement, it is not clear how conflicting claims for recognition, which are normatively grounded, will be resolved and by whom (Toppinen 2005, p.432). Second, the spheres of recognition may not be neatly delineated; the spheres overlap and may require the shifting of boundaries for particular claims for recognition. Although Honneth acknowledges this issue, there is no clear answer as to who should resolve this and how (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 189). Third, personal identity-formation may very well include collective identities; as such, the criterion to determine moral progress with regard to intersubjective recognition of one's personal autonomy, needs and particular capacities may present dilemmas.

Fourth, although the aim of his normative premises, as I pointed out, is to locate the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social recognition, in the

phenomena of humiliation and *disrespect*, his normative criterion of esteem within the sphere of achievement is an anomaly to the normative criterion of respect within the other spheres of love and law (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 134; emphasis added). Honneth distinguishes three types of experiences of disrespect that arise from the different concepts of respect that have normative justification for claims for recognition. The first type of experience of disrespect results from the destruction of one's 'basic self-confidence' within the sphere of love. Within this sphere, Honneth argues that physical abuse such as torture or rape makes one lose one's trust in the social world and hence destroys one's basic self-confidence (1995, p. 133).

He then extends a person's moral disrespect to include the denial or exclusion of certain rights through structural forms. The point he makes here is that when a person is considered a 'fully-fledged member' of a community, systematic denial of certain rights means that person is not being accorded 'the same degree of moral responsibility as other members of society' (1995, p. 133). He explains that beyond being the 'forcible restricting of personal autonomy', the denial of rights results in a 'feeling of not enjoying the status of a fully-fledged partner to interaction, equally endowed with moral right' (1995, p. 133). He connects the experience of this type of disrespect to a loss of self-respect, i.e. to a loss of 'the ability to relate to oneself as a legally equal interaction partner with fellow humans' (1995, p. 134; cf. Boxill 1976). Hence, the second type of disrespect arises in that the denial of equal moral responsibilities within the legal sphere represents a loss of 'self-respect'.

And the third type of disrespect, Honneth maintains, is rooted in the loss of personal 'self-esteem', which depends on one's achievement as a 'productive citizen'; he considers 'self-esteem' (commonly referred to as one's self-worth in everyday speech) as a category parallel to the concepts of 'basic self-confidence' and 'self-respect' (1995, p. 129). I agree with his normative claims for the first two types of respect, but disagree with the third one. I shall illustrate that respect conferred on self-esteem based on achievement in paid-work is destructive to social relations.

Within the sphere of achievement, Honneth is concerned with the 'social-esteem' of a person as associated with her 'manner of self-realisation within a society's inherited cultural horizon' (1995, p. 134). Within this sphere, he argues that when

the hierarchy of values is so constituted as to denigrate the individuals' forms of life and manners of belief as inferior or deficient, the individuals in question are robbed of their 'personal self-esteem' and lose their opportunity to regard themselves as beings whose traits and abilities are esteemed. He argues that the type of disrespect, in this case, is associated with cultural denigration of forms of life. In his later works, however, Honneth argues, based on the historical account of honour with the emergence of 'bourgeois capitalism', that esteem, which is the individual's social standing, is no longer dependent on the 'estate-based principle of honour' in which one's honour is associated with one's membership in an estate and possessions, but rather it is conferred on individual achievement 'within the structure of the industrially organised division of labour' (2003, p. 149). For Honneth, one enjoys social esteem according to one's achievement as a 'productive citizen' according to one's skills and abilities 'competing for professional status' (2003, pp. 141-142). Therefore, one's esteem is hierarchically determined based on one's paid-work within the capitalist economic sphere. He also argues that solidarity among the citizens is attained through 'mutual esteem' engaging in 'shared praxis' (1995, p. 129). In this sense, one's self-esteem is tied to one's abilities and skills within the structure of division of labour. Should we then consider that, when one is engaged in unpaid or low-paid work such as charity work, family work including household work and childcare, or in any other meaningful activities according to one's cultural pursuits such as art or religion that are less attractive according to market-based remuneration, one is less esteemed and therefore disrespected?

Honneth argues for the normative claim in the form of mutual esteem through recognising 'the individual achievements of all members of society fairly and appropriately' (2003, p. 149). However, as esteem is tied to one's achievement as a productive citizen there is inequality of esteem and therefore it is problematic how to attain mutual esteem. He considers one is entitled to a minimum of social esteem which can be transformed into individual right, and explains that this was the case within the social-welfare state where an individual was accorded a minimum of social esteem independent of actual achievement (2003, p. 149). However, he is not clear on what should be the minimum of esteem when one is accorded esteem by one's individual achievement as a productive citizen. Moreover, within the capitalist economy certain skills and abilities once considered productive can become obsolete

with technological advances and through globalisation. Moreover, capitalist production has historically ignored external costs on the environment, destroying one of the important social goods. Should those individuals' skills once considered esteemed in the capitalist production system now be considered as disesteemed because of displacement, redundancy and/or the environmentally unfriendly nature of production and therefore disrespected? One's esteem based on achievement is vulnerable to market forces, business practices and regulatory constraints.¹¹⁸

Moreover, feminists are concerned that household and family care work are not considered as productive work or 'gainful employment' within the capitalist society but as 'private domestic work' and not as 'public paid work' (Rössler 2007, p. 138). Therefore, those individuals who engage in meaningful activities that are considered non-productive are less esteemed. Moreover, monetary recognition of family work to raise esteem is also demeaning when love, affection and duty are involved (see Rössler 2007, p. 142). Beate Rössler maintains that family work is largely denied social recognition because, historically, it is considered a typical female activity compared to male public work, and payment for such work more likely to reinforce the gender specific division of labour (2007, pp. 146-147). Iris Marion Young, in a similar vein, argues that 'caring and achieving remain highly gender-segregated spheres' and the provision of care through for-profit organisations can only degrade services (2007, p. 209). The point is that recognition of household and care work within the public sphere of achievement cannot go far enough to esteem these types of 'work' and are demeaning (Young 2007, p. 210). Moreover, Honneth's argument for solidarity through mutual esteem is also problematic when there is competition for a limited number of paid jobs and restructuring of organisations for economic efficiency along with the hierarchical structure of professions.¹¹⁹ People engage in

¹¹⁸ Numerous entrepreneurs, stock market traders, investment consultants and managers are rewarded with profits and bonuses in recognition of their achievement; however, they can suffer in achieving the same performance during market turmoil and downturn; therefore, the market performance is a major component of their esteem. There are entrepreneurs who were hailed as great achievers but later turned out to be guilty of illegal practices and ended up serving long jail terms. For example, Bernie Ebbers, the co-founder and CEO of WorldCom, is currently serving a 25-year prison term due to false financial reporting; media mogul Conrad Black was sentenced to a 78-month jail term. These cases show that esteem-based achievement is not stable and reliable. The recent financial crisis also challenges managers getting paid bonuses when their companies had to be 'bailed-out' by the state; examples include the insurer AIG in the US and UBS bank in Switzerland.

¹¹⁹ There is a high tendency for managers to safeguard their jobs through engaging in "office politics" during transitions and restructuring of organisations.

meaningful activities that have no monetary remuneration outside the economic sphere, in addition to their economic activities, to gain a sense of achievement. In this case, individuals' achievements are not determined by the productive nature of 'work' within the economic sphere.

In addition, there are people whose skills and abilities are not recognised due to their immigrant status, or ethnicity, or race, or gender. Even if immigrants' skills and abilities are recognised for economic productive work, they are only esteemed within their work environment. They are not esteemed in day-to-day social situations. For example, there are many entrepreneurial and highly skilled immigrants who are recognised and esteemed in their work environments but not in public places as they are identified with the collective esteem of their respective ethnic groups. Individuals who are identified with their ethnic groups, based on their ethnic or racial markers, are not given recognition of their individual achievements within the public sphere rather to their group esteem. On the other hand, individuals who are identified as members of the majority are treated with high esteem in the public sphere, even those who do not attain or have esteem based on their individual achievements, because of the comparative advantage of their identities. Honneth's idea of social esteem based on one's achievements within the economic sphere along with legal rights is not adequate for an ethnic, non-Western immigrant or one is differentiated based on gender or on sexuality to be treated as citizens of equal status.

Furthermore, there are those who are fortunate enough to inherit wealth and enter risky ventures compared to others who may have similar or even better skills and abilities but are not able to enter risky enterprises contributing to social goods. Should we then consider the former with high esteem and the latter with low esteem? Honneth's claim for recognition within the sphere of achievement is only concerned with the esteem differences of 'capitalist economic order'. He is not clear on how to resolve claims for recognition, based on esteem, of those minorities whose cultural practices differ from the cultural hegemony of the majority when he clearly states that 'demand' for social esteem for one's culture is not meaningful (2003, pp. 168-169). For Honneth, social esteem is based on an individual's contribution accepted as valuable by the entire community and not just one subculture; it is unclear what determines the boundaries of the community (Anderson 1995, p. xviii). For example,

if a Muslim man is a religious scholar of Islam, should his contribution be valued by the entire community including other religions to have social esteem? He is most likely to have esteem within his religious community. Honneth (2007, p. 77) acknowledges that one's social self-justification for feelings of social disrespect is ambivalent when it is based on esteem; for example, a neo-Nazi youth who does not have social esteem in the wider society can seek social esteem in his neo-Nazi youth groups whose 'code of honour is dominated by the practice of violence'. Social disrespect cannot be linked to lack of esteem to qualify as a normative basis for a claim for recognition. The point is that a claim for recognition based on esteem, within the achievement sphere, is problematic against other claims for recognition within the sphere of love and legal rights which are rooted in self-respect. Moreover, recognition based on esteem within the capitalist economic order can also lead to destruction of social relations that are based on self-respect.

To sum up: Both Fraser's and Honneth's theories of recognition have merits, but face limitations and difficulties in resolving conflicting justifiable claims for recognition. Their merits stem from approaching claims for recognition without reifying identity and group and arguing that claims for recognition are issues of social justice. Fraser's theory of social justice is grounded on equal moral worth and autonomy of individuals – a 'thick deontological liberalism' rather than a thin 'procedural formalism'. Her social justice is restricted to addressing subordination along two dimensions arising out of the distribution of material resources and of misrecognition of institutionalised cultural value patterns for individuals' social interaction as peers. Hence, her theory of social justice may not be able to address individuals' capabilities to function as full members with equal status in light of the domination that may arise out of complex interactions of other dimensions; for example, one may be dominated through political, hierarchical social esteem as well as inter-individual variation interacting with the underlying social structure.

Honneth attempts to overcome the limitations of Fraser's perspectival dualist approach to social justice through a monistic view of social justice, arguing that even distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of social respect. Honneth's concern is about unjustified relations of recognition that lead to social disrespect within three spheres – love, law and achievement – which is an

impediment for individual self-realisation of identity-formation. However, his normative basis of disrespect within the sphere of love and law is rooted in self-respect, whereas in the sphere of achievement it is rooted in self-esteem, which is problematic. As Honneth points out, both agree that social justice matters and 'every conception of justice must have an egalitarian character from the start' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 176). Although both take equal autonomy as their starting point, their approaches to what matters differ. For Fraser it is about parity of participation, while for Honneth it is about the 'most intact possible identity-formation'. Both of their approaches face difficulties and dilemmas. Fraser 'admits that her conceptual argument will not persuade anyone who rejects the ideal of equal respect' (Toppinen 2005, p.431; cf. Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 230-232). She maintains that the intersubjective condition requires that institutionalised patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants. However, as cultural practices are normatively contestable and contesting, it is not clear how equal respect may be maintained when people have to deliberate on competing claims for recognition on those practices that have opposing moral values.

As I mentioned, although liberals and others agree that justice requires equal 'respect' for all citizens, they disagree on 'what is meant by and required by respect' (Honohan 2002, p. 252). I shall argue that egalitarian reciprocity should mean treating one another as citizens of equal status rooted in self-respect. First I clarify what is meant by self-respect and in what ways it differs from self-esteem, and argue that self-respect is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct. Then, I shall argue that recognition should be normatively grounded on *self-respect* of individuals and should go beyond the liberals' idea of tolerance and non-discrimination, without reifying identity, group and culture, in their intersecting identities of their capabilities to function as citizens of equal status deliberating for claims for justice.

As I have already discussed, a claim for recognition based on respect has inherent merits over one based on esteem. Self-esteem is a psychological concept grounded in theories of self-concept, whereas self-respect continues to be a central issue in contemporary moral philosophy (see Roland and Foxx 2003). Both self-respect and self-esteem have an impact on individual functioning through interaction of cognition, affect and behaviour (Roland and Foxx 2003, pp. 268-271). But, as

Roland and Foxx (2003) argue, self-esteem without a foundation of self-respect can lead to disrespectful behaviours and will not contribute to individual functioning.

Self-esteem is a 'subjective measure', an emotional response to self-evaluation in terms of liking or feeling good about oneself; it depends on how one feels about one's capacities, performance and perception of others' opinions. Studies show that 'competency ratios' and the 'regard of significant others' impact significantly 'global self-esteem', which is based on the perception of one's physical appearance and social acceptance across all age groups (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 262). As social acceptance is an inherent need for human survival and reproduction, people tend to monitor others' responses for cues that indicate disinterest, disapproval, avoidance or rejection (see Barash 1977). Based on this premise, it is argued that, psychologically, self-esteem is important because social acceptance promotes psychological well-being (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 264; cf. Leary & Downs 1995; Leary 1999). It is therefore believed that low self-esteem causes emotional distress and dysfunctional behaviour and high self-esteem is related to optimal mental health. Social psychologists have claimed that high self-esteem increases one's likelihood of treating others with respect, kindness and generosity, and is a causal factor in personal and social responsibility (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 265; cf. Branden 1994; Mecca *et al.* 1989). However, none of these claims have much empirical support (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 265).

People who engage in strategies such as 'self-serving attributions' to increase self-esteem can get into social difficulties when others realise that this tactic is being used (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 265; cf. Forsyth *et al.* 1981). When these people's egos are threatened, they allow 'self-enhancing illusions' to affect their decision-making processes and commit themselves to unattainable goals (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 265; cf. Baumeister *et al.* 1993). There are studies indicating an association between excessively high self-esteem and dysfunctional behaviour such as childhood bullying, rape and violence in youth and adult gangs (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 265). Moreover, a multidisciplinary review of studies related to aggression, violence and crime shows that violence seems to be associated with threatened egotism; that is, 'highly favourable views of self that are disputed by some person or some circumstance', and that people who had a 'sense of superiority' believed that they

had the “right to manipulate, dominate, and harm others” (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 265; cf. Baumeister *et al.* 1996, p. 5). These findings, however, do not support the assertion that all individuals with high or low self-esteem are psychologically dysfunctional. People who have repeatedly experienced successes may have high self-esteem, but not all of them necessarily engage in dysfunctional behaviours; those who experience repeated failures and setbacks are supposed to have low self-esteem, but, again, not all of them do.¹²⁰ What makes these people function well despite their repeated failures and setbacks? Rowland and Foxx suggest that people who have *self-respect* believe ‘that they are worth the effort it takes to consider their disappointments and failures as closely as their triumphs and successes’ (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 271). Self-esteem is a “relational concept”, and it means one has a favourable opinion of oneself (Walzer 184, p. 274) and is not conducive to one’s functioning taking responsibilities for oneself; whereas self-respect seems to advocate proper conduct of oneself. What is the normative basis for self-respect?

The moral significance of self-respect, also known as ‘magnanimity’, ‘proper pride’ and a ‘sense of dignity’, has been discussed in moral philosophy by Aristotle, Augustine, Spinoza, Rousseau, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche and many others (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 248; cf. Dillon 1995). In short, one may define self-respect as ‘a sense of one’s own dignity’ or ‘a sense of personal dignity and worth’ (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 249; cf. Dillon 1995, p. 7). However, Kant introduced a new perspective to the concept of self-respect when he suggested that all persons deserve respect, regardless of their character: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ (quoted in Roland and Foxx 2003, p.249; cf. Kant 1967/1785, p.91). Kant’s statement of respect is based on the premise that individuals have the ability to engage in rational actions and therefore the moral duty to respect others and themselves. A self-respecting individual has the responsibility and moral duty to reflect on herself as a moral being, which is a precondition for respecting others as moral beings. Philosophers previous to Kant identified the concept of respect with two characteristics: the ‘recognition of

¹²⁰ A classic example would be the past president of the US Abraham Lincoln, who was defeated many times before he became president; he did not lose his self-confidence that he would become the president of the US.

something important', and the 'evaluation of the quality of something'. Kant brought these two characteristics together for the concept of self-respect, the importance of person and the quality of the person's conduct (Roland and Foxx 2003, pp. 249-250; cf. Dillon 1995).

Contemporary moral philosophers who write about self-respect drawing upon the above-mentioned historical accounts of self-respect can be divided into four distinct groups, namely those who consider it as (1) the proper appreciation of being a person; (2) as grounded in character and conduct; (3) as having two aspects, the importance of personhood and the quality of personhood; and (4) as an integrated aspect of personhood without differentiating the importance of and quality of personhood (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 250; cf. Dillon 1995). The first group's concept of self-respect arises from Kant's idea (see Thomas 1995; Hill 1991). According to this concept, individuals have two duties to maintain the status of rational beings: to respect the moral law that provides individuals with their rights, and to respect the self by affirming their moral rights in their thought processes and behaviours (Roland and Foxx, 2005, p. 250; cf. Thomas 1995; Hill 1991). This concept of self-respect could lead to conflicts within a multicultural state when moral laws that give rights to individuals are universalised based on the norms of the majority without taking into account the minority whose moral values may differ from those of the majority. One may argue from a Kantian point of view that the moral laws are categorical imperatives and apply universally. However, universal human moral values are differently interpreted within different cultural norms within different cultural systems (see Parekh 2000, Ch. 4).¹²¹ When legal rights acknowledge only the meaningful activities of the cultural systems of the majority, then minorities lack the legal right to conduct their meaningful activities (see Honneth 1995, pp. 119-120). Minorities whose legal rights are curtailed will lack their dignity in the public space (see Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 250; cf. Meyer 1989). The second group of contemporary philosophers treat self-respect as grounded in character and conduct. According to this concept, one must be self-aware and exercise autonomy to develop and commit oneself to a set of personal standards for conduct and character that are central to one's self-conception (Roland

¹²¹ Parekh, for this reason, argues for cross-cultural dialogue in order to make the moral values as universal as possible (2000, p. 128).

and Foxx 2003, p. 256; cf. Hill 1991; Taylor 1995). The third group argues that there are two kinds of self-respect: recognition and appraisal (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 257; cf. Darwell 1995). 'Recognition self-respect' motivates people to engage in worthy conduct and expect respect from others. It also motivates people not to tolerate disrespect; whereas 'appraisal self-respect' is the positive appraisal of oneself as a person (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 257; cf. Darwell 1995). The final perspective of self-respect is an integrated concept and suggests that there is a triadic relationship among attitude, behaviour and object (Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 257; cf. Meyers 1995). What are the essential components that constitute self-respect?

Dilthey maintains that the following characteristics are fundamental to individuality: 1. 'A prime feature of the individual is that he has a will of his own' 2. 'Individuation is a fundamental trait of human life'; and 3. 'Individual acquires a distinctive core of personality which is unique and irreducible'; however, 'it is also deeply implicated in a wider coherence composed of other persons and the patterns of society and culture' (Ermarth 1978, pp. 120-121). Hence the concept of self-respect should highlight autonomy, character and conduct as essential components. Autonomy entails taking responsibility for oneself and leading a meaningful life by facing one's challenges in life. Character reflects a relational aspect of personality (Sennett 2003, p. 52; cf. Gerth and Mills 1953). Character is an 'expressive life' in human relations, which includes communication through 'social instruments', such as rituals, laws, media, codes of religious belief, political doctrines and social virtues, and enables people to communicate and interact with the social world (Sennett 2003, pp. 52-53).¹²² Conduct is the manner in which a person carries out her meaningful activities through social participation.¹²³ As I discussed in Chapter 1, according to Dilthey, the individual is a point of intersection of many different functions and systems of interaction, and therefore, one's conduct as a socio-cultural being, the manner in which one carries out activities, is also a constituent of self-respect.

¹²² I will discuss social virtues in Chapter 7 dealing with republicanism.

¹²³ Raz (1994, p. 38) also states that to have self-respect is to take responsibility in conducting oneself appropriately.

The upshot of self-respect is that those who respect themselves and take responsibility will be considerate of others' social freedom within the context of an interdependent web of social relationships.¹²⁴ Two components develop and shape one's self-respect constituted by autonomy, character and conduct. The first component is the self and its will, and the other is the structure of the society, including cultural systems and the external organisations of society and therefore the will of others. The major attribute of the self in this regard is self-control, which is required to develop self-confidence, one's underlying trust in oneself, which Honneth refers to as 'a practical relation-to-self'; however, one's self-confidence can depend both on one's recognition by others and on the will of others acting through the social structure (1995, p. 133). One cannot have self-respect when one is ashamed of oneself, hates oneself, not only in one's activities, but also in one's being (Raz 1994, p. 25). This aspect reinforces the importance of one's self-confidence through self-respect rather than self-esteem. Hence, one's recognition and non-domination by the will of others gain purchase in contributing to one's self-confidence, allowing one to take responsibility for one's appropriate conduct.

Moreover, without self-respect as a basis, the collective self-esteem of a group can give rise to three problems. First, those individuals who lack self-respect but are identified as members of a group with higher collective self-esteem may take a 'free-ride' based on the group's success rather than taking responsibility for their own achievement. Second, individuals who lack self-respect and are identified with a group of lower collective self-esteem may want to exit or disassociate themselves from the group and to associate themselves with groups of higher collective self-esteem. They could thus attain higher collective self-esteem without taking responsibility for their own achievements. Third, individuals who are identified with lower collective self-esteem may not be respected for their achievements by non-self-respecting members of the higher collective self-esteem group, and may even be

¹²⁴ Character and conduct arguably include manners of accepted rules of polite behaviours, avoiding bad manners, and even reaching out to help one who is in need to show respect one deserves; see Buss (1999) for a good discussion on this issue of "appearing respectful"; she argues that the most important lessons in manners are the lessons in how to avoid being discourteous, impolite, rude, inconsiderate, offensive and insulting, and 'one who flouts these lessons behaves in a manner that is immoral as well as impolite' (pp. 795-796). However, one should also take into account that behaviours considered as impolite or disrespectful may differ across different traditions within different contexts. I believe what matters is one's sincerity in courteous behaviour towards others.

denied opportunities for achievement. Those individuals who are blocked or burdened when seeking success and achievements due to their identity with lower collective self-esteem are in 'double-jeopardy' compared to those individuals who get a free-ride due to their identity with a group with higher collective self-esteem. Although self-respecting individuals can engage in meaningful activities without needing to compare their successes and achievements against others', they should not be oppressed when carrying out their meaningful activities.¹²⁵

People who are only concerned with their self-esteem and have no self-respect are likely to view others' success and achievements as a lowering of their esteem. They may even prevent others' achievements through blocking or burdening of meaningful options. And a person who is only concerned with self-esteem is likely to suppress feelings of shame (disgrace or dishonour) and guilt (responsibility for wrongdoing) for the sake of self-esteem, whereas a person who has self-respect is likely to accept these feelings to preserve her self-respect (see Roland and Foxx 2003, p. 272; see also Sennett 2003, p. 123). When one has self-confidence based on self-respect one can respect others and their achievements and success unconditionally without treating success as a zero-sum game (see Sennett 2003, p. 123). One's meaningful goal is not necessarily based on achievements for the sake of success compared to others. One's meaningful activities are based on one's genuinely endorsed ethical convictions. So, the pertinent question is what should be recognised in order for one to have self-respect?

As I have emphasised throughout this thesis, an essentialist notion of cultures is a fallacy and hence recognition is neither about equally respecting all cultures, nor about 'equal recognition of individuals on the recognition of all cultural practices' (Honohan 2002, p. 256). As Honohan points out: 'It is not possible to distinguish radically the moral and the cultural dimensions of life' (2002, p. 256), and therefore, she adds that '[c]ultural claims, just as moral claims, have to be subject to debate and deliberation' (2002, p. 257; see also Tully 2004, p. 858). As I argued in the previous chapter, we must understand multicultural social justice as individuals' capability to function as citizens of equal status. And in this case, at a minimum, we must ensure

¹²⁵ Sennett (2003, p. 99) puts forward a similar point.

minorities' capability to deliberate as citizens of equal status for claims for justice, whether they are claims for recognition in cultural or in any other dimensions such as economic, social and political. Therefore, we must take misrecognition and domination seriously.

I have argued that self-respect is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct, and as Honohan maintains, 'Republicans can value culture as the context for personal autonomy, and see that treating identities and cultures derogatively affects this autonomy' (2002, p. 257). Moreover, she claims that republican recognition offers a better account than liberalism; '[t]he liberal combination of private confirmation and legal protection for all may supply only a partial account of recognition' (2002, pp. 257-258). I shall discuss the shortcomings of liberalism and the merits of republicanism in Chapter 7 for the sort of multiculturalism that this thesis attempts to advocate. However, one may argue that republican recognition at the one extreme is only a political recognition that reflects and reinforces existing shared values and identity, and at the other extreme it is a political identity that supersedes all other identities (Honohan 2002, pp. 258-259). However, according to modern civic republicanism, '[b]eing a citizen does not have to mean abandoning other identities or values' (Honohan 2002, p. 259). Hence, I shall argue drawing from Honohan's (2002, pp. 260-266) republican approach to recognition and taking into account the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – that recognition entails three aspects along three dimensions: acknowledgement, authorisation and endorsement, and that social recognition along these dimensions provides a better normative account of recognition for deliberation of claims for justice.¹²⁶ The first basic social fact is that human diversity is inevitable; we differ in our identities and capabilities. All citizens cannot be treated as if they were all alike in their identities with equal capabilities in all aspects of their lives. They are to be acknowledged with their specificities, as Honohan puts it, '*in* their identities rather than *of* their identities' (2002, p. 261). There is no single overarching identity and our identity is constituted by multiple intersecting collective identities, and, as I have pointed out in this thesis, we cannot reify the individual's

¹²⁶ It is to be noted that Honohan evokes respect rather than self-respect for recognition in all three dimensions. However, I emphasise self-respect than respect, as respect can differ among different cultural systems and the external organisations of society.

identity with a singular identity and individuals can fall into a category of minority based on many different identities. However, we cannot ignore when one of those identities is stigmatised. Hence we must acknowledge multiple intersecting collective identities; for example, an ethnic black or Asian or Arabic disabled Muslim woman has social, religious as well as cultural aspects of intersecting collective identities and some of these identities may be stigmatised and disparaged by others and all of the collective identities may fall into the minority category.

‘Acknowledging specificity’ is one of the aspects of recognition and inclusion (Honohan 2002, pp. 260-261). This aspect of recognition allows citizens to appear in public in their identities, however they are expressed in public, without shame. In this case, identities are recognised through acknowledging the specificity of individuals, but are not reified as a group. This aspect of recognition allows people to have self-respect taking responsibility for their lives with self-confidence without being stigmatised as ‘inferior’ or ‘social pariahs’ due to the identities imposed upon them. People are stigmatised not only upon their cultural and racial markers, but also upon mental or physical disabilities. For example, individuals who are stigmatised and socially excluded due to AIDS or leprosy are unable to lead their lives with self-respect and unable to face their life challenges.¹²⁷

As Honohan argues, ‘[t]he remedy here calls not for unequal treatment, but for difference-conscious strategies needed to provide equal treatment in the interests of autonomy’ (2002, p. 260). The point she makes is that we should be concerned with ‘group-differentiated individual rights’ rather than group rights for those ‘who fall into different categories’ (2002, p. 260). As I pointed out in the introduction to the previous chapter, many public policies affect minorities, and therefore deliberation for claims for justice is not only about cultural practices, but also about many policies that affect individuals falling into many minority categories. There are many such policies to address these requirements, such as:

¹²⁷ Today, there is a very effective cure for leprosy, MDT, and AIDS sufferers also have medical treatments available to prolong their lives. However, due to the high stigma associated with these diseases they are unable to fight against discrimination and social exclusion to take responsibilities to lead their lives. See IDEA, The International Association for Integration, Dignity and Economic Advancement for more information on integration of people affected with leprosy.

child-care provisions for parents; access for the disabled; special language rights for minority groups in their interactions with government, education provisions, procedures and funding to increase minority participation in politics; some kinds of special representation; consultation bodies; and exemptions from legal requirements, where these are not strictly universally required – for example, allowing Sikhs to wear turbans rather than helmets on motor bicycles on in building work (Honohan 2002, pp. 260-261).

The second basic social fact is that we live in an ethical plural society. This presumption calls for the recognition of plural society and acknowledgement of differences in opinions and views of goods and meaningful life according to people's differing ethical convictions. This means recognition calls for citizens' 'viewpoints' to be fully heard without marginalising or excluding any category of citizens based on any preconceived worldviews and norms. This aspect of social recognition – 'authorising viewpoints' – allows people to express themselves in their identities, their viewpoints, to evaluate interests and to pursue their meaningful options.

Although Fraser's status model calls for parity of participation, it is not clear whether individuals' concerns and issues will be seriously heard for deliberation in their identities. Some individuals may consider one or more of their intersecting collective identities are meaningful spiritually or otherwise, and therefore recognition must entail authorising their viewpoints in their identities without reifying or transforming them through modifying institutionalised cultural value patterns without giving them a serious hearing. It is not about celebrating stigmatised identities or endorsing cultural value patterns that are disparaged, but about hearing people's deepest concerns and values as citizens of equal status without prejudgement and evaluation according to majority's cultural value patterns and evaluation. As Pettit puts it: 'Being a person is intimately tied up with enjoying a certain status in communion with others, and perhaps the best marker of the required status is that your voice is authorized by those others' (quoted in Honohan 2002, p. 261).

It is to be noted that this dimension of recognition cannot be achieved through institutional provisions alone; it also requires 'civic virtue in citizens who are open to consider and engage with other points of view' (Honohan 2002, p. 263). Benhabib, in a similar vein, argues in her 'two-track deliberative democratic model:

‘it accepts both legal regulation and intervention through direct and indirect state methods in multicultural disputes, and it views normative dialogue and contestation in the public sphere as essential for a multicultural democratic polity’ (2002, p. 115). She further emphasises that ‘[t]he process of “giving good reasons in public” will not only determine the legitimacy of the norms followed; it will also enhance the civil virtues of democratic citizenship by cultivating the habits of mind of public reasoning and exchange’ (2002, p. 115). The state and other external organisations of society can promote civic virtue through education, public forums and campaigns, for example ‘anti-racism campaigns, and equality programmes, which promote perceptions of minorities as equal members, or deconstruction stereotypes or images of them as inferior, or backward’ can contribute to achieving the second dimension of recognition – authorisation of viewpoints (Honohan 2002, p. 263). I shall discuss this aspect of civic virtue in the following chapter as well in Chapter 7 in relation to republicanism. However, it should be noted that ‘authorisation does not mean that all practices, viewpoints and values will be given public endorsement’ (Honohan 2002, p. 263) and I shall discuss the third dimension of endorsement shortly.

The identification of mere tolerance as respect, respect as tolerance, does not promote citizens who are identified as members of a minority based on their cultural practices or on any other identities or capabilities as citizens of equal status.¹²⁸ Mere tolerance allows minorities to co-exist without attaining full status in social participation; it isolates them allowing them to express their views only in the private sphere (Honohan 2002, p. 262; cf. Lara 1998, p. 158). Hence, it may allow the ethical concern of social conditioning. However, as I mentioned that recognition along the dimension of authorisation does not mean accepting all the viewpoints put forward, but it means the possibility of transforming politics as ‘the women’s movement and disability advocates have achieved’; the point Honohan makes is that these advocates ‘have not just gained greater equality for their members, but have to varying degrees changed the framework of values and practices in politics and social life’ (2002, p. 262).¹²⁹

¹²⁸ I will also discuss this issue in Chapter 7 with regard to liberalism.

¹²⁹ Bhikhu Parekh (2000) argues in a similar vein that ethnic minorities can also shape practices in politics and public culture, and I shall discuss his communitarian aspect of multiculturalism in Chapter 6 & 7.

The third basic social fact is that we are interdependent, and republicanism takes this aspect seriously. Non-recognition of the practices of minorities that are different from the norms and traditions of the majority that intersect with many cultural systems of the majority will lead to the minorities being treated with a subordinated status disparaging their self-respect. As I have argued, self-respect is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct in the social world. The above two aspects of social recognition, acknowledging specificity and authorising viewpoints, cannot alone allow minorities to engage in meaningful activities according to their genuine endorsement of convictions when they are not recognised for their differing practices in the public realm. This means recognition should go a step beyond authorising viewpoints to ‘endorsing practices’ (Honohan 2002, pp. 262-266). As Parekh points out, in many cases it is possible to endorse more than one culture or way of life simultaneously (Honohan 2002, p. 264; cf. Parekh 2000). For example, Switzerland recognises multiple languages – German, French, Italian and Romansh – within the public domain. It is also possible to support different religions and practices within the public sphere, recognising religious festivals and religious institutions. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the distinction of the public and private sphere within liberalism does not make sense when meaningful activities intersect many cultural systems that permeate both spheres. Endorsing practices, as a third aspect of recognition, may entail extending the public dimension or redefining the public sphere, which I will address in Chapter 7 in relation to republicanism (see Honohan 2002, p. 264).

However, one may question, for example, how one may endorse the practices of fundamentalist religions that may oppose endorsing the practices of other religions. As Honohan maintains, the kind of recognition ‘does not depend on a priori idea of the equal worth of cultures or the promotion of diversity’ (2002, p. 264). Endorsement must take place through public deliberation among individuals participating as citizens of equal status. The first two dimensions of recognition, acknowledgement and authorisation, allow us to ‘grant equal recognition without endorsing either the values of all, or the values of none, in the public sphere’ and hence ‘neutrality is not a real option’ (Honohan 2002, pp. 264-265). It is plausible that in a multicultural state, two moral or cultural groups may hold ‘diametrically opposed values’ and these values cannot be endorsed simultaneously, and in some

cases only one value may be embodied in public. The point Honohan (2002, pp. 264-265) makes is that the third dimension of recognition cannot be regarded as 'an absolute right of a group', but with the other two dimensions of recognition, conflicts are acknowledged and can be deliberated by participants as citizens of equal status on claims for justice. That is, the third dimension of recognition, as Honohan remarks, is 'at the opposite end of the spectrum from liberal neutrality in endorsing or publicly adopting practices and values' (2002, p. 263), And she argues that republican deliberative politics allow us an equal chance to deliberate cultural practices that shape public culture:

On the republican view, it does not follow from arguments for recognition that all cultures should be publicly embodied. Republican deliberative politics gives all an equal chance to influence the public culture, and engages with underlying concerns without taking them as final, unmodifiable or of equal value (2002, p. 264).

I shall discuss deliberation and the test of minimal and common conditions in the following chapter in relation to morality and responsibility as well in Chapter 7 in connection with republicanism.

The above three dimensions of social recognition go beyond tolerance and non-discrimination to allow minorities to appear in public without shame and with self-respect, which are conducive to treating one another as citizens of equal status, and hence allow minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status to deliberate on claims for justice. Moreover, recognition in all three dimensions of acknowledgement, authorisation and endorsement can also curb systematic oppression, exploitation and exclusion. Minorities do not have to be oppressed 'within a template fitted to a dominant culture or lifestyle', and they too can contribute to the common institutions and shape the template through the three-dimensional recognition (Honohan 2002, p. 252). As I discussed in Chapter 1, the liberal state's neutrality is an unattainable goal, 'institutions of the liberal state recognise some cultural and moral values at the expense of others' (Honohan 2002, p. 252). Galeotti argues for the revision of neutral liberalism for 'the use of public reasons in political argument and decisions' (2002, p. 15; also Tully 2004, pp. 857-858). James Tully observes that the recent literature on recognition and discursive democracy marks a point of departure on the above point, and shows that

the question of which individuals, minorities, and nations are to be recognised as members of a political association is not to be determined by *preemptive theory of recognition of any kind*, but, rather, on the grounds of which claims to recognition can withstand the test of the exchange of public reasons (2004, p. 858; emphases added).

To sum up: Recognition along the three dimensions makes the shift from a preemptive theory of recognition, which many multiculturalists argue for, to what Benhabib calls for, democratic theory of recognition, which does not reify identity, culture and group but considers conceptions of cultures as ‘essentially contested and internally riven narratives’ and ensures inclusion and participation, as citizens of equal status. It also allows distinct multiple intersecting identities to be recognised without ghettoisation and allows the possibility for change of identities and meanings and practices and avoids the ethical concern of social conditioning. Hence, the politics of recognition that I am advocating allows us to engage in the politics of multiculturalism, on the one hand, without collapsing multicultural society into plural monocultures and isolating or balkanising groups, and, on the other, avoids assimilating minorities into the dominant culture.

Justified claims are not only about whether they are concerned about parity of participation as adult members of society, as in the case of Fraser’s status model, and also not about whether they are about moral progress, as in the case of Honneth’s theory of recognition. As we are at the intersection of many and varied cultural systems and the external organisations of society, we have to be concerned with our capability to pursue our meaningful activities within the problematic social world. I have so far argued that recognition along the three dimensions allows individuals to deliberate on their claims for justice as citizens of equal status. I shall take up the issue of endorsement of practices further in the following chapter in relation to morality and responsibility. But, as I have been pointing out, within our problematic social world, due to vulnerabilities arising out of the basic social facts, one may still be constrained by the domination of the collective will of an external organisation or an arbitrary will even when one is given social recognition along the three dimensions, and I take up this issue in the following section.

NON-DOMINATION

In this section, I shall attempt to show that non-domination, the absence from arbitrary interference, is a necessary complementary normative parameter of social recognition for social freedom, which is tied to multicultural social justice. I shall show that the normative foundation of non-domination is also self-respect. Both social recognition and non-domination are necessary minimal and common conditions for citizens to function as citizens of equal status for deliberation of claims for justice. Hence, I conclude that any claims for justice must ensure that these two conditions are not violated, and I shall illustrate with examples in the following chapter in relation to morality and responsibility.

As I have suggested, given that one of the basic social facts is that we are interdependent in pursuit of our meaningful activities, we are vulnerable to asymmetrical power relations. People are not always independent or dependent on others for every aspect of their lives. As I discussed in Chapter 1, people are always in social relations, direct and indirect, engaging in activities interacting with others and with the external organisations of society. The varying degrees of dependency individuals have in carrying out their activities can result in asymmetrical power relations among people and the external organisations of society, rendering individuals vulnerable to domination by the will of external organisations or the will of individuals arbitrarily. The notion of freedom to pursue chosen meaningful options or endorsed givens also requires coordinated actions and collective pursuits through the external organisations of society. As I discussed in Chapter 1, according to Dilthey, the 'collective will' of an external organisation, while providing the freedom to pursue collective pursuits, the coordination of activities and a sense of belonging, can also dominate members of the organisation.

Non-domination is different from non-interference, in the sense that non-domination is concerned with arbitrary interference (see Pettit 1997b; Maynor 2003). Pettit (1987b) differentiates freedom, as non-domination is free from arbitrary interference, while non-interference is free from intentional blocking or inhibition by others on choice. However, the external organisations of society may interfere to regulate activities for the benefit of all members. In this case, what matters is whether the

collective will interfere arbitrarily. When the collective will of the external organisation interferes arbitrarily with the members' activities, the members suffer. As I discussed earlier, even a threat of arbitrary interference by the will of an external organisation will subjectively burden members in carrying out their meaningful activities. Members under the threat of arbitrary interference experience 'anxiety or uncertainty' that is not conducive to pursuit of their well-being (Maynor 2003, p. 44). Moreover, members who need to defend themselves from such arbitrary interference may have to use resources, both psychological and material, which could otherwise be utilised for pursuing their meaningful activities. The threat of arbitrary interference, not only from the collective will of an organisation, but also from fellow members, even if it is not carried out, assaults the social freedom of the members. Therefore, as I also discussed in Chapter 4, arbitrary interference subjects members to a subordinated status (Pettit 1997b, p. 88). Members may be given recognition in all three dimensions, of acknowledgement, authorisation and endorsement, but arbitrary interference can subordinate them; hence, they are unable to function as full members with equal status.

Should domination only be concerned with arbitrary interference? Pettit argues that arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary: 'To suffer the reality or expectation of arbitrary interference is to suffer an extra malaise over and beyond that of having your choices intentionally curtailed' (1997b, p. 85). Non-domination as absence from arbitrary interference cannot ensure recognition in all three dimensions will prevail. Systematic denial of recognition in one or more of the three dimensions, even in the absence of arbitrary interference, can also lead members to a subordinated status. As I have discussed, Pettit is only concerned with freedom from arbitrary interference comparing a person who is exposed to arbitrary interference to a slave:

A person is free, and a person acts freely, just to the extent that she is not exposed, in the way a slave is exposed, to the arbitrary interference of another: to the sort of interference that only has to track the *arbitrium* – the will or judgement – of the interfering power (Pettit 1998, p. 84; quoted in Maynor 2003, p. 41).

Slaves are not only under the arbitrary interference of their master, but are also systematically oppressed, exploited and excluded. It is an ethical concern, as I have

discussed, even if the slaves are socially conditioned to serve the master through oppression and exploitation, and consider their activities meaningful.

Systematic discrimination, exploitation, marginalisation and exclusion can assault the recognition of individuals or groups in all three dimensions. Non-domination free from arbitrary interference does not mean there is recognition in all three dimensions. The first two of the three aspects of social recognition, acknowledging specificity and authorising viewpoints, may go far enough to ensure the recognition of minorities; however, when it comes to the third aspect, endorsing practices, an external organisation of minorities may be systematically restricted, either by other external organisations of the majority, or by the state. Therefore, both non-domination and recognition are complementary conditions.

The external organisations of society do not have equal power, so the collective will of one may come to dominate others. Various external organisations may dominate other external organisations even if the members of those organisations are not dominated by the respective organisations. The state, the collective will of the whole society, can dominate other external organisations of society and restrict their engagement with the social world. When the majority dominates the state, the majority may use the state as an apparatus to restrict activities of minorities.¹³⁰ As Condorcet has pointed out, the majority are more likely to be right, according to the 'ask the audience' principle, and in such cases, the minority is regarded as mistaken (Honohan 2002, p. 92).

As I discussed in Chapter 1, Dilthey acknowledges that every kind of external organisation works with two psychological facts: a feeling of togetherness and community, and the relation of dominance and dependence between wills. These psychological forces can generate social conformity among the members. Multiculturalists and communitarians mostly focus on the aspect of sense of

¹³⁰ Democracy is not without its perils when it gives rise to cultural hegemony, in which a dominant cultural group controls the state. As Michael Mann (2005) argues, 'the dark side of democracy' includes many types of violence such as institutional coercion, policed repression, violent repression, unpremeditated mass murders (ethnocide), and premeditated mass killing (genocide); he further argues that 'ethnic cleansing' arose within our own civilisation, and not in primitive societies. In many ethnic conflicts, the dominant ethnic groups have used the state as an effective apparatus of violence and power; the vulnerable groups are mainly minorities (see Levy 2000, p.6 & 31).

belonging and ignore or underplay the aspect of dominance and dependence between wills. The collective will of a community can dominate all members when they are isolated from other intersecting communities (see Honohan 2002, p. 128; cf. Arendt 1958, p. 53). It can also lead to corruption based on a sense of belonging, which can simply be based on private relationships or on collective identity, restricting entry of new members who are not identified with the rest of the members of organisations (see Honohan 2002, p. 128).¹³¹ A recent Canadian study of the population identified as ‘racialised groups’, that is formally identified ‘visible minorities’, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour (excluding Aboriginal people), shows that the overall economic performance of these groups is far inferior to that of other Canadians (see Galabuzi, 2005).¹³² One of the main causes has been segregated low-end jobs among the ‘racialised groups’.

When an individual from a minority group seeks membership in an organisation of the majority, the individual, first, may not be accepted, and even if she is, may be subjected to the domination of the majority. For example, females and immigrants of ethnic origin, even if accepted into an organisation in which the majority is constituted of white males, may be subjected to domination. The recognition of a master and slave relationship does not remove domination and subordination from their respective roles, even if acknowledged to be interdependent. Hegel claimed that the dialectical aspect of recognition would ensure freedom. Recognition of roles alone is not enough. As long as there is a hierarchical relationship, there will be an asymmetrical power relation, and domination will prevail, whether explicitly or implicitly. As I discussed in Chapter 4, a ‘lucky slave’ may have a ‘kind master’ and access to all the material options, but is under the arbitrary will of the master, and therefore has no agency-freedom. The normative core of non-domination is that slavery is not good, because domination restricts one’s agency-freedom (Pettit 1997b, 2003). Although slaves have equal status among themselves along with

¹³¹ Arendt suggests that corruption emerges when private relationships spill over into the public sphere.

¹³² The median income before tax of ‘racialised’ minorities was 28 per cent less than the white majority’s during the period between 1996 and 1998. The study also shows that white immigrants did better than racialised immigrants. The term ‘racialised groups’ is used to describe non-Aboriginal people of colour: referred to by Statistics Canada and the *Federal Employment Equity Act* as ‘visible minorities’. However, Galabuzi (2005, p. xvi, n. 1) prefers to use the term ‘racialised’ minorities as this denotes the social construction of the category better than the use of ‘visible minorities’ or ‘racial minorities’, which has the effect of masking the oppressions.

option-freedom, they do not have agency-freedom as long as they are under the arbitrary will of their master. They lack self-respect due to constrained autonomy which can lead to a lack of self-confidence when interacting with the master with equal status; the slaves, although recognised for interdependency by the master, are under status subordination. Therefore, non-domination is a complementary necessary condition to recognition for social freedom, and is rooted in the normative foundation of self-respect. One may argue that a self-respecting individual will not be servile to another nor allow herself to be subjected to the arbitrary will of another, but, as I have discussed, one may be socially conditioned under domination. In this case, it is an ethical concern.

CONCLUSION

Both recognition, in all three dimensions – acknowledgement, authorisation and endorsement, and non-domination are necessary minimal and common complementary normative conditions, rooted in self-respect, for multicultural social justice. The normative basis of self-respect is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct. Given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency, these two conditions allow us to deliberate on claims for justice as citizens of equal status rather than claiming respect for ‘culture’ in advance as many multiculturalists demand.

As I illustrated in Chapter 3, the multicultural state faces challenges endorsing practices with regard to the ends, means and conscience. For example, moral conflicts arise in cases such as whether homosexuals should be allowed to become priests, fascists should be treated as citizens of equal status, and whether a book such as “The Satanic Verses” should be banned (the case of the *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie). I will address the above issues of morality along with the responsibility of individuals, external organisations of society including the state on deliberating claims for justice in the following chapter. As Dilthey puts it, ‘the state as a regulator’ should ensure that society can engage in ‘rational purposeful activities’, and I shall discuss this role of the state.

CHAPTER 6

MORALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

Within a multicultural state, moral as well as cultural dimensions of both the majority and minorities are intertwined. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, both cultural and moral claims should be deliberated for claims for justice (see Honohan 2002, pp. 56-257; also Tully 2004, p. 858). I have argued that the minimal and common conditions are non-domination and social recognition along the three dimensions – acknowledgement, authorisation and endorsement – for deliberation as citizens of equal status. In this chapter I shall explore morality and responsibility for deliberation by individuals and the external organisations of society, including the state, within the problematic social world. I shall argue that any necessary parameters for meeting claims for intercultural justice and recognition should not undermine the minimal and common normative conditions required for deliberation ensuring the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status. I shall show that the above normative premise of multicultural social justice overcomes the deficiencies of the normative premises of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism, which I described in Chapter 1, for integrating post-immigration minorities as citizens of equal status.

Contemporary political philosophers such as Joseph Raz (1986), T.M. Scanlon (2000) and Ronald Dworkin (2000), whose theories attempt to deal with problematic pluralism within liberalism, have argued different approaches to morality. Ends reflect people's varying ethical convictions. Even individuals who hold similar or identical ends pursue them with different means. In general, what is good is associated with ethics, and what is right is associated with morality. John Rawls (1971/1999), however, asserts the priority of right over good, and his theory of justice is a deontological ethic, whereas theories based on the priority of good over right are teleological (e.g. utilitarianism). Michael Sandel (1998) criticises Rawls' deontological ethic from a communitarian perspective. On the other hand, Will Kymlicka (1989, Ch. 3) argues that whether what is right takes precedence over what is good is not really the issue. The real issue, he argues, is one of responsibility.

In this regard, I will focus on responsibility rather than whether good or right takes precedence.

Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised that culture is not bounded, distinct and deterministic. In this regard, I have shown that Wilhelm Dilthey's concept of culture and community provides a model to understand culture with an anti-essentialist notion without reifying culture and ossifying individuals within culture. Moreover, his model allows us to give importance to individuality and to the activities of individuals participating in a context of intersecting cultural systems and interacting external organisations of society. I have also shown, from Dilthey's perspective, our complex structure of ethical convictions and how our lived experiences and ideas of life interact in forming our worldviews, whereby these are not mere reflections of our concept or idea of the world, but consist of the whole range of feelings, attitudes and evaluations of reality. Hence, I have emphasised that we should not attempt to understand a meaning of the good life and well-being with a reductionist view but must take into consideration the complexity of our convictions. Individuals have various reasons for engaging in activities that are meaningful in accord with their convictions. Thus it is important to look for moral obligation on the part of individuals rather than representatives of cultural groups, and to show that individuals have responsibility for deliberating in claims for justice.

This chapter attempts to demonstrate that Dilthey's account of morality within Scanlon's 'contractualist' framework provides a better approach to emphasising individual moral responsibility than other contemporary accounts debated in multiculturalism. Scanlon's contractualist framework is useful in advancing my arguments of Dilthey's moral account, because Scanlon also gives an account of well-being in similar vein to Dilthey and shows that we cannot reduce well-being to a single overarching value of good or solely to the quality of experience. Scanlon emphasises that one's well-being is constituted by many goods, including such things as friendship, personal relations as well as pursuing many worthwhile ends in life. The point is that, for Scanlon, it is not the idea of well-being as a 'master value' that matters, but the various moral reasons one gives for one's pursuit of 'meaningful' or 'worthwhile' ends. Hence, Scanlon is concerned with the way in which a person's obligations or 'substantive responsibility' to others and 'his claims

against them depend upon the opportunities to choose that he has had and the decisions that he has made' (1998, p. 249). Dilthey's account of morality attaches importance to respect for individuality and moral conscience, on the one hand, and to a system of morality and law, on the other. It mediates between relativism and universalism by taking into account subjective values of the individual, on the one hand, and objective values of society, on the other. Moreover, I shall show that Dilthey's moral account also attaches importance to the state and other external organisations of society taking responsibility with a sense of justice and the development of law, and I shall illustrate with some examples how deliberation as citizens of equal status could overcome the dilemmas and difficulties of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism in integrating post-immigration ethnic minorities into the wider society.

This chapter consists of two sections. In the first section, I argue that Dilthey's two-sided moral account within Scanlon's 'contractualist' framework allows us to show the obligation of morality among individuals without reifying culture and without depending on responsibilities of representatives of cultural communities. This section first critiques moral monism, relativism and minimum universalism. I discuss Raz's approach to the morality of freedom, as I shall be evaluating his liberal perfectionism in the following chapter for the sort of multiculturalism that this thesis advocates. Raz attempts to overcome moral relativism and scepticism by giving importance to independently valuable pursuits that are recognised by society. However, I shall show that his approach may lead to 'moral majoritarianism'. My point of departure is Bhikhu Parekh's 'pluralist universalism', as I shall also evaluate his communitarian approach to multiculturalism in the following chapter. However, I shall show that Parekh's moral account faces challenges, and I attempt to demonstrate that Dilthey's account mediates between Parekh's pluralist universalism and Scanlon's 'benign relativism' and overcomes difficulties with both of the approaches. I conclude in this section that the systems of morality and law jointly regulate the activities of individuals with a sense of justice, and hence one's activities should be, at least in the minimalist sense, using Scanlon's terms, acceptable in a way one could not 'reasonably reject'.

In the second section I discuss the role of the state, and the external organisations of society, especially in relation to the law. I argue that social justice is the responsibility of both the state, other external organisations of society and of the citizens. However, I argue that the state has a moral responsibility – a duty with a sense of justice, and the capacity to deal with moral conflicts stemming from the practice and endorsement of minority-held convictions which are in opposition to those of the majority and to ensure fairer terms for the integration of post-immigration groups into the majority’s relevant external organisations and cultural systems. I show the importance of deliberation for moral dilemmas and how the state may test the normative criteria using some examples, especially in relation to the ‘Rushdie affair’. I also illustrate with further examples the importance of many aspects of public policy that are an integral part of the politics of multicultural integration. I conclude that the normative premise of multicultural social justice that I have been arguing for overcomes the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism for integrating post-immigration minorities into the wider society, in many dimensions – social, economic and political. I conclude with a set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration, and in the following chapter I evaluate the type of state that complies with these criteria within the different competing ideologies of liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism.

MORALITY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM

In this section, I develop a moral account drawing on Dilthey’s insights into morality while arguing within Scanlon’s ‘contractualist’ framework. I show that contemporary multiculturalist moral theories do not attach importance to individual moral responsibility. I take Parekh’s ‘pluralist universalism’ as my point of departure in mediating between relativism and universalism. Moreover, I attempt to show, from the Diltheyan perspective of purposive systems of society, how law and a system of morality regulate activities of individuals. This aspect of regulation is important in addressing the role of the state and society.

Are there universal values and norms, and if so, how do we judge cultural particularities? Parekh (2000, pp. 126-127) points to the following three theories: monism, relativism and minimum universalism. Moral universalism, also referred to

as absolutism, or monism, is based on values ‘worthy of allegiance of all human beings’ (Parekh 2000, p. 127); what is valid or binding is based on human nature, and therefore it is argued that moral universalism is applicable to all human beings irrespective of differences in their cultural practices. Relativism, in contrast, takes the view that moral values are embedded in culture; it assumes culture is a self-contained whole and, as such, it argues that moral values are relative to each society. Therefore, searching for universal moral values is logically incoherent. Minimum universalism, on the other hand, takes an intermediate position; it argues for a set of minimum universal values that are applicable to all cultural particularities. Parekh, however, argues for what he calls ‘pluralist universalism’ in favour of universalism and minimum universalism. Additional views include ‘moral majoritarianism’, which is based on the standards and moral authority of the dominant group of a multicultural state, and moral scepticism, the belief that no moral theory can be true.

These views do not satisfactorily resolve the moral conflicts between the majority and the minority. People, especially of the majority or the dominant group, generally believe that moral relativism may threaten their way of life with respect to standards of conduct. Moral standards that do not fit the norm challenge the moral authority. However, according to Scanlon (2000, p. 330), moral relativism denies the possibility of a single set of standards that can have ‘the kind of authority properly called moral’; ‘moral relativism is the claim that there is no single consistent set of principles that people have reason to regard as having this kind of authority in all contexts’. Scanlon (2000, p. 333), however, defends what he calls ‘*benign* relativism’ which is ‘non-sceptical’. According to this, ‘the requirements of morality vary but are not for that reason to be taken less seriously’. Scanlon’s premise for the defence of benign relativism is that different people can have good reasons, perhaps different reasons, for attaching a ‘special kind of significance’ to different standards (2000, pp. 333-334).¹³³ Hence the question arises of how we should understand the values that people attach to their activities. I shall attempt to answer.

Raz, who also seems to advocate multiculturalism within liberalism, attempts to overcome moral relativism and scepticism by giving importance to independently

¹³³ In a similar vein, Parfit (1984/1987, pp. 452-453) argues that if we consider all kinds of reasons, including moral reasons, for people’s actions, then we do not need to be moral sceptics.

valuable pursuits that are recognised by society. I shall discuss his perfectionist liberalism in Chapter 7. For him, 'people adopt and pursue goals because they believe in their independent value, that is their value is believed to be at least in part independent of the fact that they were chosen and are pursued' (1986, p. 308). However, he also claims that 'a person's well-being depends to a large extent on success in socially defined and determined pursuits and activities' (1986, p. 309). For Raz, a 'morally good person' is one who pursues goals that advance intrinsic values and the well-being of others; it is impossible to separate one's personal well-being from one's moral concerns (1986, p. 320). Raz argues that there are incommensurable goods; he nevertheless ties morally acceptable goods to the existing social forms (1986, Ch. 13). For Raz, 'a person can have a comprehensive goal *only* if it is based on *existing social forms*, i.e. on forms of behaviour which are in fact widely practised in his society' (1986, p. 308; emphases added).

He expects people to 'whole-heartedly' choose 'comprehensive goals', which permeate large areas of their lives, (1986, p. 293) and to succeed (1994, p. 3); comprehensive goals are valuable within the existing social forms. But, in a multicultural social world, moral projects that are based on the existing social forms exclude minorities whose moral projects are not consistent with the existing social forms. Raz expects these goals to be chosen as valuable goals because they are valuable independent of the person, but dependent on the existing social forms. The reasons are that, first, 'individual behaviour would not have the significance it has but for the existence of social forms', and second, 'even if the first were not the case, individuals would not have been able to acquire and maintain their goals except through continuous familiarity with the social forms' (1986, p. 310). It seems Raz, *pace* Dilthey, gives less importance to individual creativity and changing practices. Independent values cannot fully account for one's meaningful goals that accord with one's worldview and are likely to be shaped by one's cultural practices that may not be widely accepted by the majority within a multicultural social world. For example, one may like bird watching, but if bird watching is not recognised as a valuable activity in the existing social form, then despite the person valuing bird watching, according to Raz, it is considered a non-valuable activity. This kind of valuing raises many questions: By whom one's activity is valued? What is the measure of value?

Does everything have to be useful, for example, or can activities be valued for their own sake?¹³⁴

Raz makes the point that ‘engaging in the same activities will play a different role, have a different significance in the life of the individual depending on social practices and attitudes to such activities’ (1986, p. 311). I do not disagree with this point. But, in a multicultural society, the majority may hold different attitudes to minorities’ socio-cultural activities even if they are meaningful according to minorities’ ethical convictions. However, Raz maintains that ‘our continued awareness of the *common culture* continuously nourishes and directs our behaviour in pursuit of goals’ (1986, p. 312; emphasis added). For example, he gives as an example how spouses may treat a friend in need and the expected behaviour of each spouse is derived from the common culture. Raz gives importance to the common culture, ‘shared social forms’, and in a liberal multicultural state the common culture is often the public culture, which is inevitably coded by the majority, and minorities’ cultural practices are tolerated in the private sphere. Raz, however, makes room for personal variations: ‘It is not that a person cannot, through the development of his own variations and combinations, transcend the social form’ (1986, p. 312). He gives the example of ‘open’ marriage, which is a deviation from conventional marriage but still includes some elements of the existing social forms of conventional marriage and of sexual pursuit, in this case kept free of emotional involvement (1986, p. 309). What about gay marriages in a society in which heterosexual marriages are practiced by the majority as moral pursuits according to their religious and social norms? The point is that Raz’s moral account encounters dilemma and difficulty within a multicultural society according to his definition of valuable activities.

Raz’s moral account can lead the majority to claim that their predominant social forms provide the moral authority and the standards, ‘a moral majoritarianism’, by which the conduct of the minority may be scrutinised for moral acceptability. But minorities also want their shared way of life based on ‘customs and traditions’ which provide good reasons for them to continue with their meaningful activities; on this basis, minorities’ customs and traditions can be defended as the authority for their

¹³⁴ I am indebted to Professor David Boucher for raising these questions.

moral standard (see Scanlon 2000, pp. 335-336). Raz, however, in his later work, *Ethics in the Public Domain*, emphasises that 'peaceful coexistence and participation in one political society require becoming acquainted with the customs of all the people and ethnic groups in one's country' (1994, p. 187) apparently because this creates 'the possibility of mutual peaceful existence' (1994, p. 187). This seems to be a prudential reason, as opposed to accepting the moral standards of the minority according to their customs and traditions. How can we accommodate differences in morality between the majority and minorities? Scanlon seems to provide a framework to accommodate differences in morality in terms of 'benign relativism' within liberalism, overcoming difficulties in valuing activities within Raz's moral account, and I shall now look into this.

Scanlon notes that there are two good reasons for relativists to hold that 'the authority of all moral standards derives from the fact that they are part of people's ways of life' (2000, p. 336). First, as already mentioned, a person's way of life is of great importance and moral motivation; it provides people with meanings and structure to conduct their lives according to their customs and traditions. Second, a way of life, by which I mean cultural practices within different cultural systems, is shared with others who follow the same practices, and is therefore essentially tied to intersubjective meanings, which appeal to moral reasons. Michael Walzer (1983, pp. 6-20), in similar vein, argues that 'social meanings' of what is good differ according to people's social practices. But Scanlon is quick to point out that there are problems with a moral relativism of this kind, and he correctly notes that 'customs and traditions' are, in an important sense, optional (2000, p. 337) rather than compulsory. People can choose to continue practising those traditions and customs that give meaning to their activities within their cultural system. Others may want to adopt the traditions and customs of a different cultural system within a multicultural state; they, too, have reasons for carrying out meaningful activities according to different norms.

Scanlon (2000, Ch. 8) argues for his 'contractualist' account, whereby the idea of justifiability to others largely guides moral motivation; an action that would be wrong in one context might for various reasons be morally acceptable in another. Scanlon (2000, p. 339) correctly points out that there is a need for some principle to

govern a particular kind of activity, and he adds that there are a number of different principles that would be acceptable in a way that 'no one could reasonably reject'. He argues that if one of these principles is 'generally (it need not be unanimously) accepted in a given community, then it is wrong to violate it simply because this suits one's convenience' (2000, p. 339). However, he quickly points out that, 'by contrast, it would be reasonable to reject any principle permitting people to violate one of these established practices whenever they wished to do so or preferred some alternative' (2000, p. 339). Scanlon emphasises that 'social meanings of goods', which Walzer uses (cf. Walzer 1983, pp. 6-20), mainly 'refers to the way in which social factors determine the reasons people generally have for wanting to have a certain good or to be able to use it in a certain way', and, as such, social meanings of practices can have 'moral force', but by placing them 'within a larger contractualist moral framework' (2000, p. 342); he does not claim that 'social meanings alone determine what is right and wrong' (2000, p. 342). The point here is that one does not need to appeal to one's conventions in order for those practices to be accepted, but rather the main appeal to determine what is right are the reasons that no one could reasonably reject.

Dilthey also saw the difficulties in moral scepticism within the philosophy of historicism (1962, p. 58), and he provides some accounts of moral judgements. His account starts with our belief that human life is of great value. But this is a great claim and we need to support it with reasons, according to Scanlon's contractualist framework, that no one can reasonably reject. As Scanlon puts it, 'we all agree human life is of great value', but 'the question is how this value should be understood' (2000, p. 103). For Scanlon, 'to value something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it' (2000, p. 95). People value different things for different reasons and may even value the same things for different reasons. They may also value things without claiming those things to be more valuable than what others value. Scanlon points out that something is good or valuable due to other properties that constitute reasons for people's behaving in certain ways with regard to it. He calls

this the 'buck-passing' account of value (2000, p. 96).¹³⁵ Based on this account, Scanlon maintains, 'understanding the value of something is not just a matter of knowing *how valuable* it is, but rather a matter of knowing how to value it – knowing what kinds of actions and attitudes are called for' (2000, p. 99). This is a better a framework for how to value one's activities than Raz's one, which, as I have discussed, seems to assume that the majority's social practices and customs are valuable, and it is problematic when minorities' customs and traditions challenge the majority's accepted social practices.

I shall argue that when individuality is respected, people's actions and attitudes naturally reflect a value for human life. I will attempt to show that although Dilthey's account of morality can be considered part of the 'pluralist universalism' that Parekh (2000) argues for, and also satisfies Scanlon's benign relativism, his account differs from both. Both Scanlon and Parekh emphasise reasons for holding moral values. For Scanlon, these reasons should support a special kind of significance that a moral authority requires, although he acknowledges that there is disagreement as to exactly what kind of significance this is. But Scanlon maintains that it is possible to describe the requirements of the kind of significance in question (2000, p. 334). Parekh also agrees that there is no indisputable objective basis for moral values, but emphasises that we do have 'grounds in the form of intersubjectively discussable reasons' (2000, p. 128). From both perspectives we need to have some ground for agreeable reasons. Although Parekh goes on to provide a moral ground with some agreeable reasons, I will attempt to show why Dilthey's moral account is preferable.

Parekh takes minimum universalism as a point of departure in arguing his account of pluralist universalism. He states that 'minimum universalism' is a body of universal values that lies between universalism and relativism, functioning as 'a moral threshold' – 'a kind of floor' (2000, p. 126). But it suffers from the assumption 'that the minimum universal values do not come into conflict, and that they are univocal and self-explanatory and mean the same thing in different cultures' (2000, p. 127). Parekh's point is that those values considered within minimum universalism might

¹³⁵ Scanlon states that he follows reflections on Moore's opening question argument about 'good'; cf. (Moore 1903).

come into conflict with one another, as ‘we are culturally embedded and prone to universalising our own values’ and that is why we need a ‘cross-cultural dialogue’ – ‘moral values have no indisputable foundations in the sense of an indisputable and objective basis, but they do have grounds in the form of intersubjectively discussable reasons and are not arbitrary’ (2000, p. 128).

Parekh (2000, pp. 129-131) attempts to provide a ground for moral values in his moral account of ‘pluralist universalism’. However, it faces some challenges. His moral ground is that human beings have equal worth and dignity. He sees capability and achievement as reasons for valuing a human’s worth: ‘As beings capable of creating meaning and values, they deserve to be valued themselves, and have *worth*’ (2000, p. 129). Parekh reasons that dignity is neither inherent to human beings, nor based on an individual’s status, but rather the collective status of a species. He conjectures that ‘the individual acquires it by virtue of belonging to the human species and possessing certain species-specific capacities’ (2000, pp. 130-131). The uniquely shared capacities of human beings function as a ‘moral practice regulating their relations with each other’ (2000, p. 130). In addition to certain distinctive capacities, Parekh points out that human beings also possess desires and needs. Based on these premises, he argues that human beings require ‘certain common conditions’ to grow and flourish, and it is these conditions which provide for their well-being (2000, p. 132). Since human beings are equal in their dignity and worth, their claims to the ‘common conditions’ necessary for well-being deserve ‘equal consideration and weight’ (2000, p. 132). Therefore, he maintains ‘minimally, that we should acknowledge the equal dignity and worth of all human beings, accord them *equal respect*’ (2000, p. 133, emphasis added). Based on this moral ground, Parekh concludes, it is then possible to arrive at ‘a body of moral values which deserve the respect of all human beings’ (2000, p. 133).¹³⁶

At first glance, this appears to be an agreeable reason for valuing equal respect; however, a closer look points at problems in the premise. The first point of contest is that if individual interests and needs differ according to ethical convictions, and may

¹³⁶ Parekh admits that the manner in which he has arrived at universal moral values of ‘recognition of human worth and dignity, promotion of well-being or of fundamental human interests, and equality’ is not only sketchy, but also illustrative (2000, p. 133).

even conflict with one another, is it possible for people to then accord each other equal respect? Moreover, people respect others for varying reasons, such as their social standing or achievement. Some people also lack the ability to reason morally, as can be the case with young children or the mentally ill or disabled. Parekh is aware of this criticism. But he argues,

[i]t is true that some categories of humans such as the mad or mentally handicapped may lack some of the distinctively human capacities and would therefore appear to have less or no worth. However, they are rarely devoid of these capacities altogether, and are mad and handicapped in a way that only humans can be' (2000, p. 131).

And, moreover, what is considered respectful differs from culture to culture.¹³⁷ Parekh acknowledges these concerns and points out that we cannot draw upon a list of universal moral values that is applicable to all societies. He further adds that even if we did, their practice would vary according to the society. Therefore, he concludes that we can only demand that a society justify its decisions with a 'strong and reasonably compelling defence' when they appear unacceptable to us (2000, p. 136). This is a fair demand.

However, Parekh's demand for compelling reasons and the duty of equal respect lies with the representatives of society, not the individual. Individuals belong to and have affiliations with many different external organisations and their activities intersect a myriad of cultural systems. Parekh's demand that a society provide a strong and compelling defence for apparent deviant conduct falls short of demanding moral responsibility from the respective individuals. Dilthey (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 58) argues that an individual life constitutes an intrinsic as well as an objective value, because each human being values his or her life unconditionally and for its own sake. Human life also constitutes a universal or objective value, because human beings, throughout history and over the course of changes in value-systems, have believed in the value of their own existence. Intrinsic and objective values are not metaphysical assumptions but an expression of the fact that all human beings value their own existence for their own sakes (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 58). This is a substantial claim given that some people are willing to die for various causes and

¹³⁷ For example, within Asian communities, showing respect means not having direct eye contact and avoiding smoking or drinking in front of those people one respects. But in Western society, not making direct eye contact may be considered as evidence of not being trustworthy, especially during interview sessions (see Parekh 2000).

others choose to commit suicide or allow euthanasia. As Scanlon correctly points out, the value may be tied to the reasons one has for living, from the point of view of the person whose life it is (2000, p. 105).

There are various reasons for wanting life to go well, and as Scanlon (2000, p. 106) suggests, we must choose from those reasons that apply to all human beings in a way that recognises 'the capacity of human beings as rational creatures, to assess reasons and to govern their lives according to this assessment'. Scanlon points out that 'appreciating human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well' (2000, p. 104). Scanlon appears to argue in a similar vein to Parekh. But Scanlon's point is not about respecting humanity per se, but about respecting individual life. Scanlon argues that 'many of the most powerful reasons, however, are matters of respect and concern for the person whose life it is rather than of respect for human life, or for this instance of human life, in a more abstract sense' (2000, p. 104). Respect for the individual human life is the key point here because each individual has unique and varied reasons for conducting life in the way he or she deems meaningful.

Morality should appeal to individuals if they, rather than the collective, are to carry the ultimate moral obligation. It should also be acceptable (at least in the minimalist sense) in a way individuals cannot, as Scanlon says, 'reasonably reject'. For Scanlon, these are principles of mutual governance which give recognition to our distinctive capacities as 'reason-assessing, self-governing creatures' (2000, p. 106); this point is similar to Parekh's. Although this capacity is applicable to human beings in general, we must be careful when applying it to individuals specifically (e.g., the mentally ill or disabled). Scanlon, however, is quick to acknowledge that he does not claim his to be the only possible response to the challenge of understanding the requirements necessary for valuing human life (2000, p. 106).

I argue, in line with Dilthey, that the basic requirement for valuing human life is respecting individuality; 'respect for individuality is the anchorage of moral judgements and is not subject to historical relativity' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 58). I also believe it satisfies Scanlon's contractualist account of morality as that

which one could not reasonably reject. Dilthey's moral imperative to respect human beings implies 'the freedom of those to whom it is directed' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 59). As I have already pointed out, one's life goes best when it is conducted pursuing meaningful activities which are in accord with one's convictions. These activities depend on the socio-cultural-historical context of one's situation. According to Dilthey, 'history is not the orchestration of an externally fixed theme, but the story of the creative struggle of man to come to terms with reality' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 59).

Dilthey correctly criticises the belief in 'timelessly fixed moral codes and static eternal values' because he is concerned that such a belief denies the true freedom and creativity of an individual. Creativity is an essential human characteristic that allows one to adapt to varying circumstances by appreciating new values (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 59); 'it enters innumerable activities such as the theory-making of the scientist, the creative work of the artist, the preparation of tasty meals, the understanding of other people and the writing of history' (Rickman in Dilthey 1962, p. 44). Multiculturalists often neglect this essential human characteristic of individuality and creativity, which supports one of the basic social facts of human diversity in identity and capabilities. Multiculturalists who do not take into account individuality and creativity reify cultural practices, which goes against autonomy and hinder 'moral imagination'. Dilthey emphasises that the relativity of values is inevitable for humans' creative freedom.

The point, as it seems to me, is that Dilthey even challenges minimal universalism. It is not about whether we agree to a minimal universal morality or not, but rather, according to Scanlon's contractualist framework, it is about reasons that no one could reasonably reject within the context. For example, despite the Catholic moral code in contemporary society, many Catholics advocate the use of condoms for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and also as a means of birth control.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, a moral standard based on respect for individuality can be criticised as being morally sceptic because such a standard implies that individuals have the

¹³⁸ It is to be noted that Pope Benedict XVI, in his recent visit to Cameroon, Africa, in March, 2009, made a controversial statement that condoms are not the answer to the AIDS epidemic in Africa; see <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article5923927.ece>; March 17, 2009.

freedom to espouse any value, or to consider anything they do ethical while disregarding any moral obligation.

Dilthey does not deny the existence of a moral system, but on the contrary, he acknowledges that this system is not a timelessly fixed moral code, but is 'richly graduated, maturing through a long historical process, in many ways determined by peculiarities of locale, expressed in a *multiplicity of forms*' (1988, p. 112; emphasis added), and argues that it is 'one of the greatest systems which functions in the life of society' (1988, p. 114). The point is that the moral system does not imply a universal or a minimal universal morality, as Dilthey opposes Hegel's teleological rational historical process; but the moral system can be expressed in a multiplicity of forms that cannot not be reasonably rejected within the context. Dilthey does, however, differentiate between custom and morality: 'custom is sharply delineated according to peoples and states', whereas 'morality makes a single ideal system merely modified by difference in structures, communities, and associations' (1988, p. 113). The system of morality is therefore not comprised of the actions of men but of a 'definite group of facts of consciousness' (1988, p. 113). Dilthey acknowledges that it is difficult to analyse moral motivation: 'even though the connection between motive and action is clearly apparent to us, motives themselves appear quite mysterious to us' (1988, p. 113). However, he goes on to identify how 'morality as a system dominates the broadest spectrum of society and governs the most diverse sorts of motives in it' (1988, pp. 113-114). Let me explain.

His moral account mediates between relativism and universalism by taking into account both subjective and objective values via an individual's moral conscience and society's objective views. Dilthey explains that we encounter two forms of ethical consciousness: one functions directly to cultivate moral consciousness, and as a result, regulates activity; the other works indirectly in society by exerting pressure on the individual. Dilthey argues that an individual's ethical conduct is subject to both a subjective, internal motivation – which he refers to as the 'living power behind motivation' – and an objective, external motivation – a 'power which responds externally to behaviour of other individuals in non-partisan approval or disapproval' (1988, p. 113). For this reason, what is ethical should include both subjective and objective views. Dilthey correctly argues that if we take only the

observer's view, then 'the inner connection of motive with the entire contents of the mind, which is revealed so clearly and powerfully in the ethical struggles' that an individual wages, is not given appropriate prominence (1988, p. 113). From this perspective, Dilthey claims that he disagrees with other philosophers on what is ethical; others, the 'one-sided schools of morality', take either one of the views, not both (1988, p.113).¹³⁹ Through these two kinds of forces, internal and external, an independent system of morality takes shape in society. I shall show that one-sided morality is deficient.

Chandran Kukathas (2003), for example, argues for morality based on one's conscience, a one-sided school of morality, and attempts to organise a multicultural society according to people's differing consciences. Kukathas, however, acknowledges that people interact and are not isolated according to differing consciences and it is not clear in those overlapping activity spheres whose conscience would prevail and who has an authority to resolve moral conflicts. For example, people who are non-vegetarian may have a different conscience from vegetarians with regard to consuming meat; but there can be differences and similarities among non-vegetarians with regard to animal rights, environmentalism and how animals may be slaughtered and what kind of animals may be hunted. The point is that although cultural practices have a moral dimension, cultures, as I have been critiquing, are not distinct bounded wholes and cultural practices are normatively contesting and contestable. I shall evaluate Kukathas' liberalism for multiculturalism in Chapter 7 as part of evaluating competing contemporary theories of multiculturalism.

According to Dilthey, morality as a system exerts pressure on an individual, creating a kind of 'internal compulsion', while the law acts as an 'external compulsion' to regulate behaviour (1988, p. 114). The internally motivated power is regulated by one's conscience and the externally motivated power is exerted by society in the form of psychological power over an individual (1988, p. 113). For Dilthey, 'public opinion, the judgement of other people, and honour' are important because these

¹³⁹ For example, Dilthey claims that Kant and Fichte, on the one hand, considered the ethical as an active motivating force, internal, and on the other, the prominent British moralists and Herbart considered it as an external force in response to the actions of others (1989, p. 112); in both the cases, they belong to one-sided schools of morality.

function as ‘powerful bonds which hold society together where compulsion wielded by law fails’ (1988, p. 114). He gives importance to the regulatory power of public moral conscience because it provides for the overall effect of moral culture, and he argues, ‘no one would be able to produce that effect completely and independently for himself at every moment of his active life in all its manifold ramifications’ (1988, p. 114). Morality, for Dilthey, is not a ‘mere sum total of imperatives that regulate life of the individual’; rather it is ‘one of the greatest systems which function in the life of the society’ (1988, p. 114).

The importance Dilthey grants an individual’s conscience and, in particular, the regulatory power of public conscience, raises questions regarding the shaping of a system of morality in a multicultural state in which the majority and the minorities carry differing moral opinions with regard to certain practices. Dilthey acknowledges that one can be part of a group that supports one’s opinion, which in turn is counter to public moral opinion. For example, a homosexual person can unite with other homosexuals in opposition to public moral opinion regarding homosexuals’ sexual practices. A system of morality can take on a multiplicity of forms taking into account peculiarities of locale, and yet it is inadequate to regulate the reasonable activities of individuals, and hence Dilthey argues for the importance of a system of law alongside a system of morality.

As Dilthey maintains, individuals interact with their emotions, vanities and interests to fulfil their complex of purposes interacting with the systems of culture and the external organisations of society. According to Dilthey, the relationship between the systems of culture and the external organisations of society are ‘inextricably linked’, and this ‘reality is law’ (1989, p. 104). Given that both the systems are complementary structures rooted in social life, ‘in the domain of law, just as at the root of human social life, cultural systems are not yet separated from the external organisation of society’ (1989, p. 17 & 104). The point is that ‘every legal concept contains an aspect of the external organisation of society’ (1989, p. 104). Although ‘law is a purposive system based on *a sense of justice* as a constantly operative psychological fact’, it is ‘directed toward an external binding of wills into a stable and universally valid order’ (1989, p. 105; emphasis added). The order is achieved

by defining individual spheres of power in relation to one another, to the world of affairs, and to the collective will.

Dilthey acknowledges that although customary law varies according to customs and places, in general, law is a system of purposes grounded in the consciousness of justice (1988, p. 108). However, 'law, as the purposive system within which a sense of justice is operative, must presuppose the collective will' (1989, p. 105). The collective will – the unified will of a group – which resides in the external organisation of society, whether a community, a state or a church, intends to enforce law, which arises only in the 'form of imperatives' (1989, p. 106). The systems of morality and law jointly regulate the activities of individuals with a sense of justice. Although legal development has its locus in the collective will of an external organisation, individuals work together with a sense of justice and remain 'dynamic, law-forming forces' (Dilthey 1989, p. 107). For an individual to have a sense of justice is to recognise that other individuals are agents as well, with their own convictions for meaningful activities and projects that may impose limits, through the collective wills of the external organisations of society, on pursuing their projects and activities (see Johnston 1994, pp. 72-73). This point is important when defining the responsibilities of the state, other external organisation of society and individuals, and I will discuss this aspect in the following section.

To sum up: Moral and cultural dimensions of both the majority and minorities are intertwined within a multicultural state. Cultural systems of both the majority and minorities intersect and interact with the external organisations of society and can give rise to conflicts and moral dilemmas in an ethically plural society. Although, as I have argued, the minimal and common conditions of multicultural social justice allow individuals to deliberate on claims for justice as citizens of equal status, we need to establish a normative framework for resolving differences in morality. The key to resolving these differences lies in how we should value activities and the kind of attitudes and actions that are called for. I have argued that respect for individuality is the basis for valuing activities because individuals have many different reasons for conducting their meaningful activities according to their convictions. If we are to seek moral obligation from individuals, morality must first be appealing to them. Multiculturalism often insists on directing respect at cultures and groups rather than

individuals, leading to the reification of cultures through preservation. Moreover, reification of cultural communities leads, as Parekh promotes, to the representatives of the cultural communities having responsibility for supporting cultural practices that are not in agreement with the morality of the majority, not the individuals who engage in those practices. Regulatory powers attached to representatives of cultural communities can lead to moral authoritarianism (see Phillips 2007, pp. 168-169). This is, on the one hand, ineffective when people belong to various communities, and, on the other, can lead to domination by their representatives.

Morality based on Dilthey's account overcomes both the reification of culture and dependence on responsibilities of representatives of cultural communities, and demands moral responsibility of individuals. Individuals should be respected for their individualities and agencies rather than owing respect to culture per se or to a cultural group. One's activities should be, at least in the minimalist sense, using Scanlon's terms, acceptable in a way one could not reasonably reject. Activities of individuals and members of the external organisations of society are regulated by the system of morality, which includes a multiplicity of forms taking into account peculiarities of locale, along with the system of law. However, one may argue that the system of law, which is largely a legacy of the majority, can be oppressive towards certain factions of minorities in a plural society, even though the law may have been changed through e.g. the introduction of anti-discrimination measures and equal employment opportunities for the benefit of minorities. For example, banning homosexual marriages and female genital mutilation may be considered as oppressive by certain factions of society. Hence, on the one hand, multicultural social justice requires minorities' participation in shaping the law; however, as I have argued, it cannot be left to representatives of minorities, and individuals should play an important role with their sense of justice. On the other hand, the state, one of the external organisations of society, and its importance, especially in relation to the law, cannot be ignored. In the following section, I shall show the importance of individuals, and the external organisations of society including the state, in terms of their responsibilities in shaping and developing law resolving claims for justice and recognition.

RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

In this section, I argue that a state has a duty to ensure that multicultural social justice prevails while acknowledging and regulating the activities of individuals through a system of morality and law. I argue that the responsibilities of individuals and society in terms of external organisations stem from fostering self-respect, which is conducive to treating one another as citizens of equal status. Moreover, I address the responsibility of the state in resolving conflicting claims for recognition and illustrate with some examples, especially in relation to the Rushdie affair. I also illustrate many aspects of public policy that are integral to the politics of multicultural integration, and conclude that the normative foundation of social freedom tied to social justice overcomes the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism for integrating post-immigration minorities.

Let me first clarify the idea of the state from Dilthey's idea of the external organisation of society, and the importance of the state in relation to the establishment and enforcement of rules of law. As I discussed in Chapter 1, not every purpose produces an association and many tasks are performed through coordination of individuals within a purposive system. There are, however, purposes that can only be achieved through an association. In an association, individuals carry out tasks through the volitional unity. Dilthey, however, maintains that a sense of solidarity and community for a common purpose cannot yield to the volitional unity of several individuals (1989, p. 120). The reason, Dilthey argues, is that the 'unbridled force of human passions' does not allow a person to fit himself into such a purposive system with 'deliberate self-control', and hence there is a need for a 'strong hand' to hold each person within his limits (1989, p. 126). Dilthey argues that the strong hand is provided by the state.

The association which executes this task—which thus must surpass every other power in the sphere where it exerts its authority and where it must therefore be *sovereign*—is the state, regardless of whether it is still bound up with the unity of family or the tribe or the community, or whether its functions have been already separated from such associations (1989, p. 126).

The point is that the state is the important external organisation of society as it is 'the very condition for every such [form of] coordination' (Dilthey 1989, pp. 126-127). The state has its protective function that is 'directed outwards in the defense of the

subjects and inwards in the establishment and enforcement of the rules of law' (Dilthey 1989, p. 127).

As I discussed in the previous section, law is a function of the external organisation of society, and its basis is in the collective will of this organisation. According to Dilthey, law is also a purposive system, as every will generates a purposive system and therefore, 'the will of the state also does so in each of its manifestations, whether it builds roads, organises armies, or produces law'; 'this will of the state is dependent on the cooperation of its subjects in each of its manifestations, as well as in the law' (1989, p. 127). However, as I argued in the previous section, 'the purposive system of law has special features stemming from the relationship of our sense of justice to the legal system' (1989, p. 127). 'A sense of justice cooperates with the organised collective will in generating and maintaining the legal system' (Dilthey 1989, p. 128). As law is the condition of all consistent action of individuals within cultural systems, a sense of justice must be ensured in the external organisations of society providing the conditions for the pursuit of activities within the social world, as the cultural systems and the external organisations of society are inextricably linked (see Chapter 1).

I shall now illustrate what it means to a multicultural state to ensure a sense of justice in realising and maintaining multicultural social justice. I have argued that social freedom is a necessary parameter tied to social justice for citizens to pursue their well-being, given the three basic social facts of a modern multicultural society – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – and the vulnerabilities that arise from these social facts. I also have argued that multicultural social justice must be understood as ensuring individuals' capability to function as citizens of equal status and it requires that the preconditions of the minimal and common normative conditions of social recognition and non-domination prevail along both axes of power – political and social (which includes the economic aspect as well). However, minorities, given their ethical context, may then deem additional parameters essential to their capability to function as citizens of equal status. Ensuring multicultural social justice requires that the state resolve any claims for recognition by minorities or even by the majority and rectify unjust ethical situations. How should the state go about resolving competing and conflicting claims

for recognition? And do other external organisations of society and the citizens also have any responsibility in ensuring the minimal and common conditions of multicultural social justice?

I shall now argue that the state along with other external organisations and the citizens should take their responsibilities seriously to foster self-respect, as the minimal and common conditions are complementary and rooted in self-respect. Individuals' rights derived from their responsibility to maintain self-respect would ensure responsibilities associated with rights are not ignored. But as Onora O'Neill (1996, p. 128) points out, by taking rights seriously, obligation is often treated as the 'subordinate notion', although 'obligations are neither banished nor undercut'. Although by definition a right always carries some obligation, by giving rights serious consideration obligation is often neglected. For example, freedom of speech is based on the right to freedom of expression, but what is often neglected is the obligation that goes along with it – individuals wishing to enjoy such freedom are also morally obliged to treat their fellow citizens with their rights to freedom of expression, and I shall take up this point in relation to the Rushdie affair later in this section.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, as O'Neill (1996, p. 129) states, 'unless obligation-bearers are identifiable by right-holders, claims to have rights amount only to rhetoric...'. If a right to social freedom is formed on the premise that I am responsible for treating myself with self-respect, which is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct, then the attached responsibilities gain emphasis to ensure one does not treat others undermining their self-respect, hence social freedom. It is neither about equal respect for cultures and cultural groups, nor about the self-esteem of individuals and collective self-esteem of groups.¹⁴¹ Moreover, as I pointed out earlier, showing one's respect towards another can vary according to one's cultural context among different cultural systems and the external organisations of society. By taking obligations seriously, one can also identify special obligations that lack counterpart rights (see O'Neill 1996, pp. 136-141), for example social virtues that are conducive to social interaction ensuring others' social freedom is not undermined. I will address social

¹⁴⁰ One could also examine this issue with respect to the recent Danish Cartoon affair (see the Journal compilation, *International Migration*, vol. 44(5) 2006).

¹⁴¹ It is to be noted that, especially, American popular psychologists and motivational speakers stress self-esteem, one's positive self-cognition. As I already argued in Chapter 5, self-esteem and collective self-esteem can lead to the destruction of self-respect.

virtues in Chapter 7 under the topic of republicanism. Social virtues are important, taking dignity and respect into account, in how we treat and relate to ourselves and others, including individuals who are unable to take full responsibility for their lives, e.g. the mentally ill or severely disabled, as citizens of equal status.¹⁴²

Given the three basic social facts and the associated vulnerabilities, the individual, the external organisations of society and the state carry responsibilities, in relation to autonomy, character and conduct to foster one's self-respect, which in turn engenders treating one another as citizens of equal status (see Sennett, 2003, pp. 63-64).¹⁴³ First, acquiring skills and abilities enables an individual to function autonomously in society. Human diversity in skills, abilities and identities including gender must be taken into account. Second, we live in a pluralist society with differing ethical convictions. Third, autonomy does not imply that one should have absolute self-sufficiency in every aspect of one's life within an interdependent society with human diversity (see Honohan, 2002, p. 123; cf. Arendt 1977, p. 163-164). With our differences in physical and social endowments along with differing ethical convictions of a meaningful life, we are living in an interdependent society and many activities and pursuits require coordinated actions and a collective will. As previously discussed, from the Diltheyan perspective, the intersecting cultural systems and the interacting external organisations of society that are rooted in social life – the complementary structures of the social world – gain significance. Each individual is responsible for assessing her convictions in order to ensure others may pursue various and differing ethical convictions. This responsibility shapes one's character and conduct as one interacts and engages with the social world without burdening or blocking others' engagement of meaningful activities. The external organisations of society such as family, religious organisations, educational institutions, corporations etc., are also responsible for shaping social virtues by means of its institutional structures in order to nurture self-respect in its individual citizens. How should the state go about ensuring its duty to foster self-respect?

¹⁴² Klein (1998) defines dignity as a social phenomenon; it is about one's outward behaviour in relations with others. Modood, however, differentiates between dignity and respect. For Modood, dignity relates to what people have in common, and respect relates to the difference, and both are important in 'conceptualising and institutionalising relations between individuals' (2007, p. 51).

¹⁴³ Sennett argues that society shapes one's character in three ways so that one earns, or fails to arouse, respect.

People differ in many socio-economic-cultural and physiological traits – such as gender, sexuality, wealth, religious faith, talents and physical abilities. Assimilating all citizens in to a ‘single model’ of equal legal rights by simply treating everyone alike in everyday life will not ensure self-respect and acceptance of an individual’s uniqueness. As I have discussed in Chapter 5, providing minorities with social recognition requires going beyond tolerance and non-discrimination. For example, in order for the state to recognize and provide the necessary conditions for autonomy in a disabled person, it must ensure that public infrastructures are equipped to meet their special mobility needs. The state should also play a role in shaping social virtues and certain social instruments such as the media and civic education that foster citizens’ self-respect. I shall discuss merits of republicanism in this aspect in Chapter 7.

Should the state also be responsible for ensuring that minorities’ endorsed practices are accommodated within the system of the majority? Apart from the systems of culture and the external organisations of society that ‘directly realise the purposes inherent in the constituents of human nature’, Dilthey points out that there are ‘systems of instruments’ which serve the direct purposes of social life. He gives the example of education as an instrumental system of this sort. This system, he explains, had very ‘unpretentious beginnings’ arising in response to the needs of society, and ‘only gradually and partially has the system of education been subsumed into the organisation of the state administration itself’ (1988, p.114). His main emphasis is that systems are in some ways like organisms, making them capable of adapting to society’s needs, which stem from human life goals.

Human life goals are formative forces of society, and systems split off from one another by reason of their differing places in the whole, so these systems in their mutual relationships make up a corresponding organization of a higher order. The ultimate regulator of this rational purposeful activity in society is the state. (1988, p. 114)

The state as a regulator has to provide the necessary condition(s) conducive to accommodating the minority’s cultural systems intersecting the majority’s systems. This entails the constant adaptation of one activity to another for the common purpose of the group. How should the state go about deciding which practices of post-immigration ethnic minorities are to be accommodated into the system of

morality and law, facing the challenges of conscience, norms, means and domination by the external organisations of society I discussed in Chapter 3? Claims for justice and recognition may require several parameters for minorities' capability to function within the given context that may also address the differences in norms and means between the majority and minorities. However, as I argued, multicultural social justice must meet the minimal and common complementary normative conditions for minorities' capability in deliberating for claims for justice and recognition as citizens of equal status. Therefore, the state has a duty to ensure, by means of testing, claims for recognition and intercultural justice in relation to the minimal and common complementary normative conditions, in order to introduce any other parameters, modifications of institutions and laws to accommodate systems and practices of minorities. In this sense, the state is an enabler for citizens to pursue their meaningful activities without demanding or coercing a particular way of life.¹⁴⁴ Multicultural social justice can also include many aspects of public policy related to welfare services such as housing, education and healthcare as these aspects affect minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status. However, the state must ensure that any competing claims for recognition and intercultural justice comply with those minimal and common conditions rooted in self-respect.

Welfare reforms, for example, that do not promote self-respect are demeaning to recipients; 'if welfare-state indulgence demeans recipients, it also springs from a collapse of dignity' (Klein 1998, p. 39). Welfare programmes based on a 'feeling of pity' for those who are in need would destroy their self-respect.¹⁴⁵ As voiced by an individual with leprosy:

We have to rely on ourselves, not on others. Relying on the welfare is only a short-term relief. It can never bring us self-esteem and the dignity. To reduce stigma, we have to use our own hands, even though they may have disabilities, to become self-supporting and self-dependent (quoted in Chen, 2001).¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ This is what is called the enabling state; 'hindering the hindrances' to self-realisation; I am indebted to Professor David Boucher for this reference (Bosanquet 1965).

¹⁴⁵ Sennett (2003, pp. 149-150); cf. Arendt (1963, pp. 74-75) makes a similar point that pity 'always signifies inequality'; See also Anderson (1999) for similar point of views.

¹⁴⁶ It is to be noted that the person is using the commonly used terminology of self-esteem rather than self-respect.

The state and society in terms of social organisations should motivate citizens to take responsibility for their lives, and to act in the face of fair challenges with self-respect and not undermine the self-respect of others. Programmes such as ‘micro-credit’, although not state-funded, enable many women in poverty in India and Pakistan to regain their self-respect and take responsibility for their lives.¹⁴⁷ However, the state should ensure that lenders do not become domineering parties – for example, through arbitrary interference and systematic exploitation – and facilitate such programmes. Economic redistribution that does not meet the minimal and common normative conditions rooted in self-respect can eventually destroy human dignity. There will always be inequalities among people, in their wealth, talent, or physical attributes; equalising one of these social or physical endowments will very likely create another area of inequality. And people who are only concerned with self-esteem but have no self-respect are likely to emphasise or construct inequalities in order to esteem themselves without much regard to others’ self-respect. The state must ensure that non-domination and social recognition in all three dimensions are not violated for multicultural social justice to prevail.

The state can facilitate the first two aspects of social recognition – acknowledgement of specificity and authorisation of viewpoints – for example through participative democracy in the form of public forums. Yet failing to ensure these two dimensions of recognition along with non-domination can exacerbate moral dilemmas and lead to treating powerless members not as citizens of equal status. Moreover, the third aspect of recognition – endorsing practices – is critical because the majority may oppose certain practices that go against their ethical convictions. The test then is to see whether these practices violate or undermine any one of the minimal and common complementary normative conditions. I shall now illustrate with the example of the Rushdie affair.

The publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel *The Satanic Verses* in 1988, which gave rise to the ‘Rushdie affair’, is an illustrative example of a clash of moral values. On the one hand, Muslims were offended, considering *The Satanic Verses* to be

¹⁴⁷ The micro-credit programme supports especially women’s small business projects and allows them to repay the loans in an affordable manner. It is to be noted that the 2006 Nobel Prize for peace was awarded to Muhammad Yunus along with Grameen Bank (‘Bank of Villages’) in Bangladesh, who successfully implemented the idea of micro-credit.

blasphemy. Therefore, it is arguable that the book should have been banned. On the other hand, banning of publication would have violated freedom of expression and free speech, which are core values of Western liberal democracies. Therefore, it is equally possible to argue against a ban. I shall focus this issue in relation to British Muslims in Britain. As Parekh points out, '[u]ntil recently Britain had no Bill of Rights, and hence free speech lacked formal constitutional protection. It also has an anti-blasphemy law, and the legal power to restrict free speech on religious grounds' (2000, p. 312). Therefore, according to Parekh, British Muslims 'felt that they were not acting improperly in asking for a ban on *The Satanic Verses*' (2000, p. 312). I would like to raise three points in relation to this affair and the normative criteria of multicultural social justice. The first point I would like to highlight in this case is the issue of deliberation whether British Muslims, who were concerned about blasphemy, were given recognition in the first two dimensions – acknowledgement and authorisation. As I have argued, social recognition must go beyond mere toleration and anti-discrimination by allowing minorities in their identities with their specificities to express their viewpoints and be seriously heard as citizens of equal status. I shall show in this case that the Muslim community was not given proper recognition in acknowledging their specificities and hearing their viewpoints seriously as citizens of equal status.

According to Wendy Martineau's (2008, Ch. 5) analysis on this issue, although the Muslim community initially wanted to express their 'anger and hurt' through 'democratic means',¹⁴⁸ the lack of response by the government as well as the recognition given to the book – awarded the Whitbread monthly prize for fiction – frustrated the community, which took actions such as the ritual burning of the book in Bolton; however, this action 'barely attracted any media attention' (cf. Ahsan & Kidwai 1993, p. 27 and Pipes 2003, p. 23). Martineau notes that the initial demand by many, according to Parekh, was not to ban the book but to insert a statement that 'it was a work of fiction and did not give a historically accurate account of Islam' (cf. Parekh 1990, p. 75). The second burning of the book in Bradford, in January 1989, 'outraged' Westerners and received 'wide press coverage' (cf. Pipes 2003, p.

¹⁴⁸ 'In October 1988, the 'UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs' was formed to combat the *fitna* (outrageous issue)' (Martineau 2008).

23).¹⁴⁹ These unfolding events show that the Muslim community members were not recognised in their identities and were not seriously heard through democratic means until the second burning. Even then, one should consider the historical background and the status of Muslims in deliberation. As Parekh points out, ‘Muslims brought to the debate their memories of centuries of European Islamophobia, colonialism and racism and their current experiences of demonization and marginalization, and saw in the favourable British reception of *The Satanic Verses* a further proof of this’ (2000, p.310) In addition, there was prejudice and prejudgement of Muslims as illiterate, barbaric and anti-intellectual and fundamentalists (cf. Malik 1996, p. 76 and Parekh in Appignanesi and Maitland).

The second point I want to highlight is non-domination as one of the minimal and common conditions for deliberation on claims for justice. In the case of the Rushdie affair, Salman Rushdie became the target of a death threat, which was sanctioned by Ayatollah Khomeini pronouncing *fatwa*,¹⁵⁰ ‘sentencing Rushdie to death and calling upon “all zealous Muslims” to ensure the sentence was carried out’ (Martineau 2008, p. 123; cf. Jones 1990, p. 416), without proper hearing and deliberation. As Parekh points out, ‘[i]f British Muslims had dissociated themselves from Khomeini’s *fatwa* and shown some appreciation of the British commitment to free speech, they would have allayed some of the prevailing fears and perhaps encouraged a section of liberal opinion to view their demands with sympathy’ (2000, p. 311).

My third point is that, given those minimal and common conditions of multicultural social justice, then it would be possible for deliberation to take place among the concerned parties as citizens of equal status, although we cannot guarantee whether the parties may come to any sort of agreement. But it is important that these conditions are maintained in order to ensure that deliberation is not skewed towards the power holders. Hence, it is the duty of the state to ensure that these minimal and common conditions prevail. In the case of the Rushdie affair, given the events that have already taken place, we cannot predict the outcome bracketing off those events,

¹⁴⁹ Although there were only 1000 Muslim demonstrators in Bradford compared to 7000 in Bolton, this time local non-Muslim supporters attended, including politicians and the bishop of Bradford (cf. Pipes 2003, p. 23).

¹⁵⁰ A *fatwa* ‘in the Islamic faith is a religious opinion on Islamic law issued by an Islamic Scholar. In Sunni Islam any fatwa is non-binding, whereas in Shia Islam it could be binding, depending on the status of the scholar’ (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatwā>; retrieved on 6th April, 2009).

although one could speculate that it might have been possible to come to an agreement that a ban on *The Satanic Verses* was not required with a statement from Rushdie to defuse the tension over misrepresenting Muslim religious doctrine. Endorsement of practices may require ‘moral imagination’; it may be plausible ‘to solve moral dilemmas in new ways without compromising the integrity of moral principles at hand’ (Maak and Pless 2006, p. 43).¹⁵¹ However, moral imagination would not be possible without deliberation listening to others’ viewpoints seriously.

However, the issue of free speech remains open, and I shall address it now. The question is whether freedom of expression and free speech are to be curtailed within certain contexts, and in the case of the Rushdie affair within the context of blasphemy. First of all, I would like to highlight the difficulties in determining what may be considered blasphemy. As we know, looking back into the evolution of the major monotheistic religions, religious practices and faiths have gone through changes, and there are differences in practices and faiths even within well established monotheistic religions. Furthermore, there are fundamental differences between monotheism and polytheism, and certain beliefs in polytheism are not acceptable in monotheism. There are also alternative religions. Freedom of religion allows people to hold on to different faiths and change faiths or to renounce their religion, and it is compatible with freedom of association and exit. Freedom of expression and free speech allow people to express their views and critique religious as well as political ideologies and orthodoxies. As Rushdie puts it:

What is freedom of expression? Without the freedom to offend, it ceases to exist. Without the freedom to challenge, even to satirise all orthodoxies, it ceases to exist. Language and the imagination cannot be imprisoned, or art dies, a little of what makes us human (quoted in Parekh 2000, p. 317).

According to Rushdie, as Parekh notes, ‘*he* is free to offend others and satirize their deeply held beliefs, but does not explain why *they* should put up with this’ (2000,

¹⁵¹ Maak and Pless (2006, pp. 43-44) provide an example where a moral dilemma in corporate governance was resolved honouring both international labour laws and local customs and law: jeans manufacturer Levi Strauss’s suppliers in Bangladesh employed children under 14 years of age, which was not forbidden according to the local law, but was a violation of both ILO (International Labour Organisation) as well as Levi Strauss norms. However, given the situation that prohibiting children under age of 14 would most likely leave them worse off socio-economically and might even force them to take on worse jobs, Levi Strauss management decided to offer salaries to these children until they reach age 14 so that they could continue their education and then re-enter the work force.

p. 317). Parekh goes on to argue that as ‘the law is a blunt instrument and we are rightly uneasy about giving government the power to censor creative writing, we may not ban such a work, but we would be right to express our sense of outrage...’ (2000, p. 317). Hence, he emphasises that ‘no literary work can be exempt from moral and social responsibility and norms of decency’ (2000, p. 318). Although I share Parekh’s views and concerns that are expressed here, my arguments differ. As I have argued, one who exercises freedom of expression must also take into account that others too have freedom of expression and take responsibility in ensuring others’ freedom is not undermined. We should take responsibilities seriously, including in the cases where there are asymmetrical relations between rights and responsibilities. And in those cases where there are no responsibilities directly associated with rights, as I have argued, social virtues of self-respect can help to foster taking responsibilities, as self-respect is constituted by autonomy, character and conduct. However, I have also argued that the state has a duty to ensure that the minimal and common conditions are maintained for multicultural social justice to prevail. Based on this premise, it is then arguable for the state to intervene, in a non-domineering manner, to ensure these conditions are not violated. Therefore, it is not freedom of expression per se that is the issue, rather whether one dominates others through arbitrary interference and systematically undermines social recognition in those three dimensions, so that others’ capability to deliberate on claims for justice as citizens of equal status is assaulted. Hence publication of a work which may have views contrary to others, even though others may consider it as an offence, does not warrant censorship. As Parekh correctly points out, refusal to ban a piece of writing does not imply its endorsement (2000, p. 311). As I have argued, cultivating social virtues may ensure one takes into consideration others’ self-respect, although giving respect to something or to a person can vary within different cultural systems and the external organisations of society. However, if others are coerced to follow certain beliefs and practices that undermine their capability to function as citizens of equal status, then it is justifiable that those practices are to be banned. For example, should fascists be recognised as citizens of equal status entitled to their own unique viewpoints and practices? They have their rights to freedom of expression, and not banning their viewpoints does not entail endorsement of them. And endorsement of the practices of fascists would violate the minimal and common conditions of social justice and destroy or limit the social freedom of their fellow citizens. Hence, it is

also an illustrative case emphasising the importance of two-sided moral account and morality must appeal to individuals that they cannot reasonably reject. I shall illustrate this point further.

In a multicultural society, what is morally acceptable for one group within a certain cultural system may not be so for another. For example, should homosexuals be allowed to become priests? I argue that homosexuals should have the right to enjoy social freedom. They should be entitled to recognition and the freedom to express their unique sexual preference. But should they be allowed to practise priesthood? Answering either with a yes or a no already violates one of the minimal and common conditions – non-domination (see Maynor 2003). The decision lies with the members of the external organisation of society, the collective will of the religious organisation. However, the members must participate if they seek to amend the organisations' laws or rules. As I have discussed, individuals, relying on their sense of justice and in conjunction with the collective will of the organisation, need to deliberate and agree upon a change of rules ensuring the continuation and preservation of the minimal and common normative conditions. However, in the event that the external organisation of society conducts practices that are not in line with these minimal and common conditions, then it is the state's duty to intervene to ensure those conditions are maintained. For example, forced marriages, child marriages, female genital circumcision of children and adults with family and cultural pressure for cultural conformity and honour killings would all violate one or more of the dimensions of social recognition as well as non-domination. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the external organisations of minorities, the families, religious organisations and community, may coerce the members to accede to forced marriages and female genital circumcisions. Therefore, the state has a duty to intervene, without violating these conditions itself, to ensure the other external organisations of society do not violate the minimal and common conditions. However, the state must also ensure that the exit costs of those members are not prohibitive in order for the citizens to genuinely endorse their convictions. In the case of arranged marriages, when these are with the consent of the marriage partners they do not violate the conditions; however, it is difficult to distinguish clearly where an arranged marriage is not coerced through family and cultural pressure (see

Phillips 2007, pp. 119-123); I will address this issue in particular in the following chapter.

I shall now illustrate with an example the way in which recognition can go beyond toleration and non-discrimination to endorse practices. There are nearly 2.5 million Turkish immigrants and their descendants currently living in Germany. Many of them have limited education and work in the kebab industry. Their immigrant Turkish identity is closely tied to the kebab industry¹⁵² although many of them are working in this industry for economic reasons and others are not excluded.¹⁵³ It is arguable that kebab making may be considered as one of their cultural practices intersecting the economic system, because from a Diltheyan perspective, kebab making can be considered as a cultural system of culinary intersecting with other culturally differentiated culinary systems, and these systems interact with the social organisations such as institutions of gastronomy as well as economic systems and institutions. As I have emphasised throughout this thesis, cultural aspects are only a part of the totality of circumstances but intersect many other systems. Hence multicultural social justice must ensure minorities' capability to function in many intersecting dimensions – social, political and economic – as citizens of equal status. Until recently kebab making was not accredited by the Vocational School for Gastronomy and Nutrition in Germany, although many in Germany's mainstream society enjoy eating kebabs. Recognition of this practice through endorsement is a way forward to integrate Turkish immigrant minorities within the common institutions of the majority. And it allows not only Turkish immigrants but also others to adopt this practice without shame and with a sense of pride. Through a government initiative to improve job prospects for young immigrants, the Vocational School for Gastronomy and Nutrition in Hamburg has now started to offer an accredited six-month course, the first 'kebab diplomas', officially known as 'Meat Processing Doner Kebab Production Specialisation'.¹⁵⁴ This is a welcome step in the integration of the post-immigration Turkish minority in Germany, a clear example of

¹⁵² Similarly, Tandoori – an Indian cuisine – is closely associated with Indian culture; a recent Swiss German movie called 'Tandoori Love' (directed and co-written by Oliver Paulus, 2008) illustrates this point, and also depicts stereotypes of Bollywood movies and about Sri Lankan Tamils in Switzerland.

¹⁵³ There are more than 10,000 doner stands across Germany, and new ones are opening every week; in 1995, Germans ate an average of 10 doners each, and the industry employs an estimated 70,000 people (*New York Times*, June 26, 1996).

¹⁵⁴ See latimes.com, April 5, 2007.

the mainstream recognising particularities of a minority group and endorsing its practices.¹⁵⁵ It is also an example of what I discussed earlier: a minority's cultural system can be adapted and integrated into the majority's cultural system and the external organisations of society. As many cultural systems are intersecting and interacting with the external organisations of society, multicultural policies must include many public policies that affect minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status.

As I pointed out in the Introduction as well as in Chapter 1, several aspects of public policy are the major engines of multicultural integration. These aspects are (Kymlicka 2001, p.155):

- Naturalisation
- Job training and professional accreditation
- Human rights and anti-discrimination law
- Civil service employment
- Health and safety
- National defence.

The above example could also be considered as constituting an aspect of public policy on job training and professional accreditation for multicultural integration. However, I also want to point out an example of policy under naturalisation and education with regard to the Turkish immigrant minority in Germany which led to isolationism. Up until the 1980s in some German states (*Länder*), the government separated the Turkish children from German classes and taught them a specialised curriculum in the Turkish language in separate classrooms, preparing them to lead their lives back home in Turkey (Kymlicka 2001, pp. 170-171). From a Diltheyan perspective, education is a cultural system interacting with the social organisations of educational institutions, such as schools, universities, the ministry of education etc. In the above case, the educational system of Turkish immigrants intersects with the educational system of the majority Germans as well interacting with the educational institutions of the majority – the common institutions. Although one

¹⁵⁵ Although it is only a small initiative in Germany, it is acknowledged by the organisation Entrepreneurs without Borders that integration in the labour market is essential for integration of post-immigration minorities in Germany (see latimes.com, April 5, 2007).

might argue that the above action by the government could be considered a policy under the 'rubric of multiculturalism', the effect was isolationism. The reason was that the German government did not consider Turkish immigrant minorities eligible for German citizenship and denied them citizenship as they were only considered as 'guest workers', and therefore prepared the Turkish children only to be part of the Turkish community and did not consider them part of the wider German society. Kymlicka points out that these children were expected by the German government to lead their lives back home in Turkey as they were only considered as children of temporary visitors. A state which gives serious consideration to multicultural integration must take care to implement policies that encourage integration. Many aspects of public policy interact and are part and parcel of multicultural integration; the state must ensure minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status for an effective integration. Today, there is a considerable population of Turkish immigrants belonging to an older population of Germany and in need of being integrated into the older German population.¹⁵⁶

I shall now present an example of the problematic pluralism in terms of diversity and identity and show that the three dimensions of recognition tackle these sorts of problems. In the Netherlands around 1990, the Centre for Culture and Relaxation (*Cultuur en Ontspannings Centrum, COC*), 'once the vanguard for the homosexual liberation movement' came under attack by homosexuals themselves (van Gunsteren 1998, p. 42). The accusation was that COC was pretending to represent 'the homosexual' through information on what homosexual 'is' among young school children and stimulating them to acknowledge openly their homosexual identity. However, homosexuals critiqued COC's approach in that it 'attempted to ossify homosexuality by presenting it as a definite choice of identity, thereby ignoring that homosexual activity may be a transitory experiment and may be accompanied by heterosexuality' (van Gunsteren 1998, p. 42). The point is that: 'These people refused to be trapped in a specific homosexual identity, opting instead for a more autonomous definition of who and what they were' (van Gunsteren 1998, p. 42).

¹⁵⁶ According to Federal Statistical Office data in 2006, about 18% of immigrants in Germany are over 55, and according to the most recent German report on aging, published in 2005, older immigrants should be one of the highest priorities. The report found that in 2002 about 79% of Turkish immigrants older than age 65 were drawing a pension, compared to 96% of Germans (International Herald Tribune, Friday, February 22, 2008).

Social recognition in three dimensions captures this dilemma. People expect to be acknowledged in their particularities and their concerns to be seriously heard without reifying their identities. However, listening to their viewpoints does not mean endorsing them, and also endorsement of practices does not mean that they are set in stone and they are always contestable. As I have pointed out, endorsement of practices may require moral imagination.

Integration is a two-way process and cannot solely be based on testing out whether non-Western cultural practices pass the minimal and common conditions; most importantly, majorities' practices towards the minorities should also be tested. For example, these practices may include how minorities are treated in the workplace (whether they are subjected to exploitation and 'mobbing' – harassment, based on gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity or immigrant status) and in other social situations, and whether they are given opportunities to develop skills and abilities and treated as citizens of equal status. The public policies must address the disparity of participation of immigrants and their opportunities for engaging in meaningful activities interacting with the common institutions of the majority. Therefore, public policies must pass the test of minimal and common conditions of multicultural social justice.

Kymlicka maintains that integration is a two-way process in accommodating the practices of immigrant minorities into the societal culture of the majority. Hence, he acknowledges that the integration of immigrant minorities requires language training and measures to inhibit discrimination in order to provide access to the societal culture of the majority, and emphasises that many aspects of public policy are the major engines of integration. As I pointed out in the Introduction as well as in Chapter 1, Kymlicka (2001, p. 163) lists twelve reforms, which include affirmative action programmes, anti-racist educational programmes and regulating guidelines about ethnic stereotypes in the media, and claims these are often promoted under the rubric of multiculturalism to provide fairer terms of integration. I agree with Kymlicka that the reforms he lists can lead to fairer terms of integration; however, as I have argued, the normative basis of his theory is deficient for the purpose of deriving these reforms, which aim to make the terms of integration fairer.

Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 1, Kymlicka's theory cannot address groups that are disadvantaged on the basis of race, gender and class without bringing in an unnecessary culturalisation of those groups. His theory of the moral worth of culture argues for: 1) a secure sense of identity and cultural belonging; and 2) meaningful options only available within one's societal culture. However, his favouring of certain groups – national minorities – for their own societal culture is flawed from a liberal standpoint. His insistence on the integration of post-immigration minorities and others who are racially discriminated lacks a normative foundation on which to justify fair terms of integration. It results only in keeping disfavoured groups in a subordinate status.

Kymlicka (2001, p. 47-48) points out that there are at least three distinct arguments for the justification of minority rights within liberalism: 1) by emphasising 'the importance of respect for *identity*', one could argue that 'minority rights satisfy needs for recognition'; 2) by providing instrumental reasons on 'the role that cultural membership plays in promoting individual *freedom* or autonomy', one could argue that 'minority rights protect these cultural contexts of choice'; and 3) by emphasising 'the intrinsic value of the *diverse cultures* present in a society', one could argue that 'minority rights preserve these intrinsically valuable cultures'. However, he acknowledges that there is no consensus among scholars as to what should be the normative basis on which to derive policies and what we should do when these justifications lead to different policy directions. From this perspective, as I have argued, how we should understand multicultural social justice, and the minimal and common conditions of social recognition and non-domination rooted in self-respect, provides a normative basis on which to derive claims for recognition that overcome the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism.

Claims for recognition on fair terms of integration must satisfy all aspects of the minimal and common normative conditions, as they are complementary and rooted in self-respect for deliberation as citizens of equal status. This would allow the state to correctly assess any ethical situation in order to ensure multicultural social justice prevails. In the light of this assessment, the state can provide additional normative parameters or modify current practices to accommodate post-immigration groups or any other racial or racialised groups. The state, by taking these measures, can

effectively deal with the challenges of cultural norms, means and domination that I illustrated in Chapter 3.

CONCLUSION

Cultural and moral dimensions are intertwined and differing cultural practices can lead to moral conflicts among citizens, in particular between the majority and minorities. This is one of the challenges, the challenge of cultural conscience, which I illustrated in Chapter 3. Drawing from Dilthey's account of morality and Scanlon's framework of contractualism, I have argued that individuals have the moral obligation to act, at least in the minimalist sense, in ways that one could not reasonably reject. Dilthey's account of morality overcomes the concerns of reifying culture. It gives freedom to express individuality and creativity, while placing moral responsibility on individuals rather than representatives of cultural communities. Individuals are members of the external organisations of society, and individuals also engage in activities that may not be endorsed by the external organisations. Moreover, placing moral responsibilities on representatives in order to justify members' actions and attitudes may lead to domination by the representatives. From a Diltheyan perspective, the system of morality, which includes a multiplicity of forms, regulates the activities of individuals alongside the system of law. Although the locus of law resides with the collective will of an external organisation, individuals with their personal sense of justice participate in the legal development of the organisation. Therefore, individuals should assume their responsibilities with their sense of justice in the legal development of the organisations. As Dilthey emphasises, 'freedom is perceived in the inner experience of responsibility, the consciousness of accountability to one's fellows, and the possibility of regret for one's acts' (quoted in Ermarth 1978, p.121).

I have argued that the state, the most important external organisation of society, has a duty to ensure multicultural social justice prevails given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – to pursue citizens' well-being. The state has a duty to test and justify claims for recognition and resolve conflicting claims that may require providing additional parameters and modification of the common institutions for multicultural social justice, understood as minorities'

capability to function as citizens of equal status. Moreover, the other external organisations of society too, such as the family, religious organisations, educational institutions and corporations, have responsibilities to foster self-respect, as the minimal and common complementary normative conditions of social justice are rooted in self-respect. The state has a duty to intervene without violating the minimal and common conditions itself to ensure the other external organisations of society do not violate the minimal and common conditions, for example by dominating arbitrarily or exploiting their members.

The point of departure of this thesis was a critique of Kymlicka's liberal theory of multiculturalism, and Chapter 1 showed his theory's normative deficiencies. This thesis subsequently elaborated how we should understand multicultural social justice without reifying culture and ossifying individuals in culture, and without giving recognition to 'culture' pre-emptively. The normative foundation of multicultural social justice is self-respect constituted by autonomy, character and conduct, not self-esteem, which enables the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status on deliberation of claims for justice and recognition without demanding respect for culture in advance. Hence this normative premise overcomes the normative deficiencies of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism, which has a propensity to collapse multicultural society into multiple monocultures, leading post-immigration minorities to status subordination.

Although the ideal structure of the state is beyond the scope of this thesis, in the following chapter I shall examine the extent to which existing theoretical positions of liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism can assist in achieving the sort of multicultural state for the politics of multicultural integration that I have advocated.

The state must ensure multicultural social justice, given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – and the common vulnerabilities arising out of these facts, by promoting social practices, virtues and institutions that ensure individuals' capability to function as citizens of equal status.

In order to succeed, the competing theories of liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism must meet the following *set of normative criteria*:

1. *They must be committed to the well-being of diverse, but equal citizens.*
2. *They must be committed to agency-freedom rather than option-freedom.*
3. *They must be committed to going beyond tolerance and anti-discrimination in their promotion of social recognition.*
4. *They must be committed to the duty of the state with a sense of justice to enable citizens to pursue well-being.*
5. *They must be committed to ensuring citizens' social participation as citizens of equal status, with a sense of justice, promotion of which is the duty not only of the state, but also of social organisations and citizens themselves.*

These conditions are, of course, interrelated and I shall evaluate, in the following chapter, the competing theoretical positions of liberalism, communitarianism and 'modern/neo-' civic republicanism against these conditions with respect to integrating post-immigration ethnic minorities in a multicultural state.

CHAPTER 7

EVALUATION OF COMPETING CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORIES FOR MULTICULTURAL INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION

I have developed the normative criteria in the main part of the thesis, drawing upon various aspects of political approaches, and specified them in Chapter 6. This chapter attempts to show whether the criteria can enable us in the difficult normative decision-making in discriminating among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity in a principled manner.¹⁵⁷ In this regard, this chapter primarily considers the challenges and limitations of the competing political theories of liberalism, communitarianism and ‘modern’ or ‘neo-’ civic republicanism¹⁵⁸ as these three ideologies have been discussed most prominently with regard to citizenship theory in recent decades (van Gunsteren 1998, pp. 16-17). I have argued that the ethical situation rather than a particular ethical conviction is important and that multicultural social justice must be concerned with individuals’ capability to function as citizens of equal status. I have also argued that the preconditions of non-domination and social recognition along the three dimensions of specificity, acknowledgement and endorsement that are rooted in self-respect must be met for multicultural social justice to prevail. I have already indicated throughout that modern republicanism may be best compatible with the theory of multicultural integration presented here. This chapter will explore that possibility further and consider how far the three political ideologies go towards accommodating the sort of multiculturalism that I am advocating without having to resort to the notion of cultural essentialism.

¹⁵⁷ I am indebted to Dr. Peri Roberts for clarifying the objective of this chapter.

¹⁵⁸ Differentiating in each case from classical republicanism, Honohan refers to civic republicanism and van Gunsteren to neorepublicanism; the latter ‘includes elements of communitarianism, republican and liberal-individual thinking’ (van Gunsteren 1998, p. 24). I shall refer to the republicanism that I am discussing as modern civic republicanism. It is to be noted that the political ideology of republicanism is not to be confused with the ideologies of the Republican Party in the US although it may contain some common elements.

This chapter consists of three sections dealing in turn with liberalism, communitarianism and modern civic republicanism. I shall evaluate these political theories against the set of normative criteria in terms of the five conditions specified in the previous chapter. Political liberalism claims to be an advanced theory that deals with diversity. At the core of liberalism lies the idea of the 'autonomous individual', and based on this notion Kymlicka (2001 and 2007) promotes liberal multiculturalism. Communitarianism disputes the concept of an autonomous individual and argues that people are 'embedded in particular social roles and relationships' (Kymlicka 2001, p.19); it is claimed to be conducive to the protection of communities. Republicanism attaches importance to the interdependency of citizens and the political construction of community, and claims to support citizens as equal status participants. Although classical republicanism is considered contentious in regard to accommodating multiculturalism, I shall show that what I term modern civic republicanism is conducive to accommodating the sort of multiculturalism that I am advocating.

LIBERALISM

In this section I show, within the context of multiculturalism, how the core features of liberalism present limitations in meeting the set of criteria. Although there are several variations of liberal ideals (see Johnston 1994), basically, there are two approaches to accommodating diversity. Classical liberalism takes an anti-perfectionist approach, attempting to accommodate different conceptions of the good through state neutrality: the state not taking a stand on how people should lead their lives and treating everyone as equal legal citizens. The other, the perfectionist approach (Raz 1986 and 1994), supports the state's promotion of certain ideologies and takes a stand on the conception of the good in order to ensure the well-being of citizens (see Galston 2002; also Wall and Klosko 2003, p. 13). However, both hold that human beings should be autonomous individuals (see Johnston 1994, p. 71). I consider both anti-perfectionist and perfectionist positions.

I shall first discuss anti-perfectionism, which is based on the principle of state neutrality.¹⁵⁹ Since the state does not interfere with the different competing

¹⁵⁹ See Sher (1997, Chapter 2) for several interpretations of neutrality.

conceptions of the good, nor promote any particular one, the choice lies with the individual. Hence, it can be said that anti-perfectionist liberalism is committed to the well-being of diverse, but equal citizens. However, I shall show that state neutrality is not conducive to post-immigration ethnic minorities' well-being.

The problem stems from dichotomising the social world into public and private spheres to support ethical pluralism. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, the public and private distinction is a limitation to the minorities' pursuit of meaningful activities. First, it allows an oppressive relationship within the private sphere to go unnoticed (Benhabib 1992, pp. 95-99; see also Ackerman 1980). A private sphere can lead to an ethical concern in which individuals who are under oppressive relationships may not be able genuinely to endorse their convictions. Second, as the public is controlled relatively more by the state (see Honohan 2002, p. 158),¹⁶⁰ the states' nation-building practices even within liberal democracies favour the dominant culture. Members of the dominant culture have privileges of economic and political power (Parekh 2000, Ch.7). Hence, the members of post-immigration minorities are in an ethical dilemma whether genuinely to endorse their convictions or to adapt the convictions of the majority. Third, it is a limitation to post-immigration ethnic minorities whose activities and values span across the boundary into the public sphere. For example, Muslim women are expected to wear a veil or a headscarf in public. Finally, as Parekh argues, the state has to take some stand on morally contentious issues such as polygamy, euthanasia and homosexual marriages etc. If the state does not legislate on these matters, it does not take them seriously for the well-being of the community, but if it does legislate, then it has to take a moral stand. It is in a moral dilemma: 'A morally and culturally neutral state which makes no moral demands on its citizens and is equally hospitable to all cultures and conceptions of the good is logically impossible' (Parekh 2000, pp. 201-202).

Perfectionist liberalism, on the contrary, explicitly promotes certain goods, and overcomes the dilemma. However, I shall show that it is restrictive to the pursuit of the well-being of post-immigration minorities. Joseph Raz lays out the foundations of perfectionist liberalism, 'which bases the liberal respect for freedom on a political

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Benn and Gauss (1983) and Pitkin (1981).

concern for the well-being of individuals' (1994, p. 121). As such, it is to be expected to satisfy the first condition. For Raz, one's well-being consists in the successful pursuit of 'worthwhile' activities (1994, p. 36). As I pointed out in Chapter 6, Raz argues that valuable options are available within the existing social forms, which are inevitably those of the majority, and not all forms can accommodate the minorities' options.¹⁶¹ Options only available within the existing social forms are limiting to the minorities' genuine endorsement of their convictions, and his theory is conservative. Raz however gives priority to equal access to adequate valuable options even if it has to transform or modify existing valuable options (1994, p. 24). Therefore, Raz claims that his theory is radical in equality of access than conservative of valuable options; but he is not clear how the state could decide which options are valuable and what range of options is adequate (see Brink 1997, p. 79). To sum up: Liberalism of both kinds although attempting to promote individuals' diverse well-being, face limitations enabling post-immigration minorities to pursue their well-being.

Let us look into the second condition, and determine whether liberalism is more committed to agency-freedom than option-freedom. Personal autonomy within liberalism is associated with self-determination (see Sher 1997). Self-directing activities presume the notion of freedom to choose options, and therefore liberalism gives importance to autonomous choices. Arranged marriages are cited as non-autonomous choices,¹⁶² but, within certain traditions, arranged marriages make sense and are meaningful to the members, and as long as neither party is coerced into marrying, they cannot be considered non-autonomous choices. In contemporary society, the methods for finding a partner are more or less the same, but the criteria for making the choice differ between the traditions of arranged and love marriages.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, liberals who value autonomy have objections to such choices, which are not chosen with self-direction, even if those choices are meaningful to the people

¹⁶¹ For example, if the existing social form of marriage is monogamy, then it cannot accommodate polygamy, but not vice versa.

¹⁶² In Sri Lanka, most of the arranged marriages among Hindu Tamils are made with the consent of both man and woman; however, the parties may be expected and even pressured to consent by their families who value stable marriages based on the idea of compatible horoscope, family status, caste and dowry.

¹⁶³ In contemporary Western society, people seek marital partners via the Internet, marriage agencies, and introductions by friends or relatives. The same methods are also being used within the traditions of arranged marriages, for example, in India and Sri Lanka.

who endorse them. Forced marriages, however, without consent of the partners are non-autonomous choices, and liberals rightfully object to these.

The main issue with arranged marriages, as Anne Phillips (2007, pp. 119-122) points out, is that marriage partners may be subject to coercion through family and 'culture pressure' including blackmailing.¹⁶⁴ Phillips notes that Western liberal states, for example, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom have introduced a 'blanket ban' approach to curtail forced marriages by raising the age barrier for arranged marriages.¹⁶⁵ However, as Phillips argues, such a blanket ban approach may unfairly treat those who genuinely find partners through arranged marriages without coercion. One's options are meaningful when in accordance with one's convictions, whether voluntary or involuntary. In order to decide whether non-autonomous choices should be allowed, the conditions under which such choices are made have to be considered. This leads to the question, how does liberalism understand freedom?

In the liberal tradition, freedom is generally understood to mean non-interference (see Pettit 1999, pp. 8-9).¹⁶⁶ The underlying goal of liberalism is that individuals make rational choices for their well-being. Freedom as non-interference means the self can determine what is good or bad. Liberalism gives priority to the projects, ensuring the self can make right choices and pursue them. They then also have the freedom to revise and change their plans and projects (see Kymlicka 1989, p. 49). According to Kymlicka, liberals assign importance to our projects, not to freedom

¹⁶⁴ Anne Phillips (2007, p. 119) notes that arranged marriages are common among families from parts of North Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Turkey, East Asia, and the Middle East. However, she acknowledges that there is an overall decline of arranged marriages; in the UK, young people often choose their marriage partner from a short list of approved candidates, or choose their future partners themselves and seek approval from their parents.

¹⁶⁵ It is to be noted that Norway has introduced a specific legislation against coercing people into marriage (Phillips 2007, p. 120). Denmark introduced the age barrier to twenty-four of either party to bring in overseas spouses or cohabitee, but this law is exempted to citizens of European Union and other Nordic countries. The UK introduced the age barrier of eighteen for entry. Moreover, the UK also established the Forced Marriage Unit with a helpline for young people to seek help against forced marriages (Phillips 2007, pp. 121-122). In Switzerland, Swiss political parties have been engaged in debate on legal restrictions for forced marriages (*Der Bund*, February 6, 2008, p. 5).

¹⁶⁶ Pettit goes on to state 'liberalism has been associated over the two hundred years of its development, and in most of its influential varieties, with the negative conception of freedom as the absence of interference' (see also Larmore 1996, p. 123). According to Isaiah Berlin's (1995) concept and terminology, non-interference is a negative freedom; however, as Taylor (1985b) notes, the concept of negative freedom somewhat presupposes elements of a positive concept of freedom, and cause confusion (see also McCallum 1993).

for its own sake, and if so, then freedom of non-interference may be a limitation. Let me explain.

Freedom understood as non-interference can limit social interaction, to guide, challenge and even assist people to pursue their projects. Freedom as non-interference is often criticised as lacking the external interference to curb excesses and domination. Liberalism is in a moral dilemma when it comes to confronting illiberal practices within the private sphere, for example, forced marriages, and any other practices that undermine liberal values of autonomy. Therefore, in essence, freedom as non-interference promotes options rather than agency-freedom. And, I have argued in Chapter 4 that agency-freedom can accommodate option-freedom not the other way round. I shall now look into freedom of association and whether it can satisfy the requirements of the first and second conditions.

In this regard, I consider Chandran Kukathas' (2003) justification of liberalism as a doctrine of toleration rooted in a respect for freedom of association and, ultimately, liberty of conscience for ethical plural societies. According to Kukathas' approach, a multicultural society is an open society, which has many associations with differences in consciences, each with its own authority and the members of each association are able to lead their lives according to their conscience. They are voluntary as there is freedom of association and disassociation and members have freedom to exit even if they choose not to (2003, pp. 93-96). Each association is grounded in liberty of conscience, and therefore, the differences, incompatibilities and contradictions of consciences of all associations are expected to be mutually tolerated. From this perspective, arguably, freedom of association grounded in different consciences is committed to well-being of diverse, but equal citizens.

Kukathas, however, ignores the fact that members of an association may differ in their conscience in specific aspects.¹⁶⁷ Kukathas homogenises each association and ignores its internal heterogeneity and effectively reduces a multicultural society into plural monoculturalism, which I have argued is a fallacy. Moreover, it is difficult to

¹⁶⁷ For example, some members of an association with conscience of animal rights may adopt an attitude to not killing animals and choose to be vegetarians, and yet others may opt for humanely killed animals for meat consumption; moreover, these members may differ in their conscience about abortion.

form a community of conscience, with all the relevant cultural systems. Kukathas concedes that even though associations may be based on different practices and morals, interaction among them is unavoidable. This interaction creates a public realm (2003, p. 133). Kukathas maintains that a public realm is ‘a form of social order whose underlying characteristic is toleration’ (2003, p. 133).¹⁶⁸ But, Kukathas does not make clear what is to be tolerated and what is not, and how to determine what is to be tolerated in the public realm, which is an intersection of several authorities, as each association is also an authority to its members.

In addition, a community may possibly dominate its members, which is against agency-freedom. But, for Kukathas, members can choose to exercise their freedom to exit. Not only freedom of exit can be costly, but also defecting members have to find another association that will accept them. In Kukathas’ scenario, the associations are expected to be liberal, at least in accepting new members though they may not ensure equal status for the new members. The members may not defect their associations for reasons of domination, unless the accepting associations ensure non-domination towards the new members prevails. They also need to find other associations or communities that are liberal, but have some familiar practices and values that may reduce the costs, but such options may be limited.¹⁶⁹ To sum up: Kukathas’ freedom of association based on conscience faces limitations and challenges to both the first and second conditions.

I shall verify whether the notion of liberal tolerance is adequate for social recognition, which is the third condition, to go beyond mere toleration and anti-discrimination of post-immigration ethnic minorities. Toleration implies that one is putting up with the other even though one does not approve of or like whatever makes the other different. The difference that is tolerated may be an object, the subject itself, or both. The object may be a form of conduct, a value, or even the display of a cultural marker, such as dress code, which can be an authentically defining feature of the subject tolerated. Toleration is an intersubjective process.

¹⁶⁸ His point is that greater toleration is required not for social unity, but for the existence of associations recognising the public realm for interaction, akin to an international society, but within the domestic realm (2003, p. 164).

¹⁶⁹ For example, people who defect from the Amish community tend to join the more liberal Anabaptist communities, particularly the Mennonites (Spinner 1994, pp. 101-102).

And, as I discussed in Chapter 3, the intersubjective interaction invokes the mode of interdependency of recognition and power relation. The relationship between the tolerator and the tolerated is asymmetrical; the tolerator has power over the tolerated. Toleration lies in the restraint of the power: the one who is tolerated acquiesces (Galeotti 2002, p. 22).¹⁷⁰

If one is tolerated despite the fact one is despised, then the tolerated is not considered as a citizen of equal status, as the tolerator has power over the tolerated, even arbitrarily to decide what, when and how to tolerate. There is no basis for what is to be tolerated and what not, and how one should tolerate, whether whatever tolerated will always be tolerated or whether there is any possibility of accepting what is tolerated is normal and not anomalous. One may argue that it is possible to have mutual toleration without power relations. However, given the asymmetrical power relations between the majority and minorities, then the majority has the power to decide what is to be tolerated both intersubjectively and objectively. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti argues that society's power is with the majority to define 'the characteristics, physical traits, habits and practices, and beliefs of other groups as deviant compared to their own, which they assume, implicitly, to be normal' (2002, p. 90). The traits that are considered different are not necessarily values per se, in the way we understand value pluralism.¹⁷¹ They are social differences, which includes race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and cultural practices (2002, p.6). These traits are considered to be "different" from those of the majority, and are then socially represented as 'different', if not as deviant or inferior. For example, 'whiteness' is not considered a 'difference', and being white is not seen as being 'different' or the 'other';' (Galeotti 2002, p. 8).¹⁷² As I pointed out earlier in this thesis, the category of minority is context dependent; individuals who are considered as members of the majority in one context can be minority within another; for example, homosexual white men is a minority among homosexual men although

¹⁷⁰ Cf. King (1976, p. 62) who draws attention to the power relations; also Weale (1985, pp. 16-35); When a power relationship is symmetrical, on the other hand, then there is no issue of toleration; the issue is of anarchy or accommodation. Likewise, if the object of toleration is insignificant, then the issue is indifference (Galeotti 2002, p. 22, footnote).

¹⁷¹ See Phillips (1993) for the distinction between various types of pluralism.

¹⁷² The same is true, for example, of being Christian or heterosexual in the Christian heterosexual-dominant social world. Heterosexuals have socially discoursed homosexuals as deviant, and, likewise, women and blacks (or coloured) have been socially discoursed as inferior to men and whites respectively.

they are part of the majority categories of 'white' and men. Hence it is to be noted that my reference to the majority is not a notion of cultural essentialism. Under state neutrality, the majority, who are in power in the social world, continue to display their traits, accepted as normal in public, and consider others different. Hence, liberal neutrality does not change previous asymmetries in the parties' positions (Galeotti 2002, p. 59).¹⁷³ On the contrary, the previous asymmetries are reproduced and strengthened, and hence vulnerabilities of minorities that arise out of the three basic social facts remain an ethical concern. Social reality of 'different' against 'normal' leads to unequal membership for social participation, even if they have equal legal citizenship (Galeotti 2002, p. 67). Liberal notion of toleration cannot assert on one's particularities are recognised.

I shall now explore whether Rawls' social bases of self-respect within political liberalism (1999 and 1996/2005) can meet the condition of social recognition rooted in self-respect. Rawls proposes one of the primary goods is the social bases of self-respect, not self-respect per se, for citizens to pursue their rational projects (1996/2005, p. 181).¹⁷⁴ Rawls (1996/2005, p. 23-24) attempts to achieve fair claims of equality including social bases of self-respect through a hypothetical situation of the 'original position' with a feature called 'the veil of ignorance' in which representatives are not allowed to know their particularities. Representatives derive the social bases of self-respect considering the least advantaged basic social positions. Rawls' intention is to ensure that no one bargains the outcomes based on his particularity.¹⁷⁵

The question is what should be those basic social positions? Rawls proposes that the basic social positions should reflect the 'basic structure of the society' with two relevant criteria: 1). equal citizenship defined by equal liberty and fair amount of opportunities, and 2). one's place in the distribution of income and wealth (1999, p.

¹⁷³ Cf. Montefiore (1975); also Raz (1986, pp. 113-114) argues that neutrality does not guarantee fairness.

¹⁷⁴ It should be noted that Rawls conflates both self-esteem and self-respect, which I have argued are different.

¹⁷⁵ For example, with regard to their social statuses, and are not allowed to know the particular circumstances of their own society and their conceptions of good (Rawls 1999, pp. 118-119). However, they are allowed to know general information with regard to political affairs, the principles of economic theory and the basis of social organization.

82). But, both the criteria in combination can lead to several basic social positions. Hence, Rawls suggests that the relevant positions can be chosen based on the three main kinds of contingencies: family and class, natural endowments and fortune and luck. But these contingencies can also be part of many social positions. And, one cannot ignore gender, race, ethnicity and culture and how these affect the basic social positions. Rawls agrees, but he is reluctant to take these into consideration; he worries that 'such inequalities multiply relevant positions' (1999, p. 85). Rawls is not clear on how to choose those basic social positions that would not ignore some factions of society.

Moreover, the representatives of men for example may not judge social and economic inequalities of women. One may argue that there is no reason to assume that the parties cannot know general facts about the inequalities of the social positions.¹⁷⁶ The pertinent question is what is the basis of choosing those representatives if they are not allowed to be known of their particularities? On the other hand, if those representatives are known of their particularities, then they may agree upon the conditions that give them the power and the social bases of self-respect, ignoring others. For example, heads of the family within a patriarchal society may only consider the social bases of self-respect from the men's perspective and may not represent what means to women having self-respect, and thereby may not include the conditions of the social bases to ensure self-respect of women (see Okin 1989; see also Wolf-Devine 2003).

To sum up: Although Rawls gives unequivocal importance to self-respect, he does not sufficiently address how and on what basis to identify the least advantaged social positions which can lead to not recognising certain factions of society. Moreover, it is not clear the basis of choosing representatives and they may not consider all the relevant conditions of social bases of self-respect to certain social positions.

¹⁷⁶ The veil of ignorance is raised in stages, first for a constitutional convention, then for the act of legislation and finally in judicial decision-making. At each stage more specific facts about particular societies are available and must inform the decisions. The two principles function at a very abstract level (constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice) and are supplemented by many rules in particular societies. I am indebted to Dr. P. Roberts for his clarification on this issue.

I shall now explore the fourth condition – the duty of the state with a sense of justice – within liberalism to enable citizens, especially of post-immigration ethnic minorities, to pursue well-being. In this regard, I shall consider Brian Barry's (2001) position on equality and impartiality.¹⁷⁷ A liberal state has a duty through law to ensure the ideal of state neutrality and impartiality within the public sphere is upheld.

Proponents of multiculturalism have argued for 'difference-sensitive' policies in order to overcome some barriers to minorities' traditions followed within the public sphere. Such policies exempt minorities from rules that are based on the dominant majority's traditions. Some cases that have been discussed within the multiculturalism debate are British Sikhs' exemption from the law requiring motorcyclists and construction workers to wear safety helmets and Muslim and Jewish meat makers' exemption from the law that animals must be stunned before slaughter.

Barry is sceptical about 'difference-sensitive' policies and argues for 'difference-blind' policies endorsing liberalism (see Caney 2002). Barry argues that if there is a good case for the rules, then the rules should apply to everyone irrespective of differences; in case, there is an exemption that should only apply to some, only with good reasons, not for all (see Caney 2002). Nevertheless, Barry does accept several exemptions that proponents of multiculturalism argue for. But the key question that we should ask is on which grounds these exemptions are justified. As Simon Caney points out, there are many examples of exemptions to rules that are not based on cultural differences but which are nevertheless justified.¹⁷⁸ The pertinent question should then be, on what ground an exemption is not justified within liberalism. For Barry, the exemptions are unfair and breach equality within liberalism when exemptions provide more freedom to those who are exempted (Caney 2002, p. 88; see also Levy 2000, p. 132). An example that Barry discusses is a rule prohibiting bearing dangerous weapons and Sikhs' exemption from this rule to carry *daggers*. In this case, the majority is restricted from doing what the minority is allowed to do,

¹⁷⁷ Barry holds the same position as Rawls.

¹⁷⁸ For example, diplomats are exempt from some laws, conscientious objectors may be exempt from military service, and there are exemptions to laws on protectionist grounds (Caney 2002, pp. 85-87).

and therefore there is inequality of liberty. As Caney suggests, this case adds some weight to Barry's argument; but not all cases do. However, it is to be noted that the intention is important. In this example, Sikhs carry daggers for religious reasons, not with the intention of committing a crime, although Barry may point out that Sikhs do have an option to use daggers for defence whereas others do not have that particular option. Equality of liberty can be maintained even with exemptions; for example, as Caney suggests, pacifists can be exempted from military service only if they make up for it by doing, for example, medical work. A policy of 'rules-plus-exemptions' does not always result in unequal liberty; a condition of policy may be that an exemption is only legitimate as long as those who are exempted compensate in some way (Caney 2002, p. 88).

However, Caney, along with many other advocates of multiculturalism argues for establishing a new rule rather than keeping the old and granting exemptions. As Caney puts it, 'what is being called for here is not an exemption but the repudiation of an obtuse rule' (2002, p. 88). First of all, a rule is established under the conditions of the dominant majority's norms and traditions in favour of the majority and an exemption would only equalise liberty, not enhance it. But a fair game would have new rules set up in such a way that all have equal liberty.¹⁷⁹

To sum up: Barry's defence of equality and impartiality without either allowing rules plus exemptions or changing the rules cannot be conducive for the minorities to engage in their meaningful activities within the public sphere as well interacting with common institutions.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ For example, as I discussed in Chapter 3, in the United Kingdom the existing rule of closing for trade on Sundays is based on Christianity; Jews would rather trade on Sundays and observe their Sabbath on Saturday. The Jews' norm about when not to trade contradicts with the existing norm that is based on Christianity and set as a rule. In this case, the notion of freedom to pursue an activity, trade, with equality, with equal recognition and non-domination, can be resolved either by making an exemption for Jews that allows them to trade on Sundays and close on Saturdays, or by changing the rule itself to allow everyone to trade any six days of the week and close on one day a week (see Caney 2002, p. 89). An example cited by Caney is a bus company that insisted that its bus conductors follow the dress code, including a hat and be clean-shaven; both norms are opposed to the norms of Sikhs (2002, p. 88); See Poulter (1999, pp. 285-286) more details.

¹⁸⁰ Although I have only considered Barry's rule and exemption arguments, he argues there are basic human needs for conditions of flourishing, that all would choose, that should be guaranteed to all as a matter of justice in parts II and III in his book *Culture and Equality*. He argues that liberalism does this best. I am indebted to Dr. P. Roberts in pointing out this aspect. However, I argued in Chapter 2 that universal basic needs cannot figure as a necessary normative context for well-being.

I shall now explore whether liberalism enables individuals to engage with their sense of justice in developing a legal sphere and fostering self-respect that is conducive for treating one another as citizens of equal status, which is the fifth condition. Liberalism values autonomy and reasonableness, which are essential for a sense of justice. Reasonableness is considered as a virtue of liberal citizens and it means that liberal citizens are aware of ethical pluralism and ‘understands and accepts that her reasonableness lays particular burdens of judgement on her’ (Brink 1997, p. 75). Liberalism prefers and even favours social practices and virtues that integrate liberal values, which are arguably conducive for social participation among individuals as citizens of equal status. Kymlicka (2001, p. 296) identifies four virtues: ‘public spiritedness’, ‘a sense of justice’, ‘civility and tolerance’, and ‘a shared sense of solidarity or loyalty’. Kymlicka argues liberal full citizenship requires ‘a significant range of civic virtues’ (2001, p. 300). Therefore, Kymlicka (2001, p. 307) maintains that citizens who choose to exercise their rights as full citizens must accept citizenship education in common schools, at least at some point in the education process, in order to become responsible citizens. However, if liberalism is tolerant of illiberal practices, then why should liberalism promote liberal virtues? As I pointed out earlier, liberalism faces a moral dilemma – ethical pluralism with a single moral doctrine, and finds itself difficult to overcome the dilemma (see Brink 1997).¹⁸¹ Moreover, liberalism is mainly concerned about rights than responsibilities that go along with the rights.

Perfectionist liberalism, on the other hand, explicitly promotes duties and responsibilities to foster perfectionist values, which include autonomy. For Raz, autonomy is only valuable when it is exercised for morally good choices. In this case, for the multicultural state, both the society and the state have a duty to ensure that valuable options are available to the multicultural citizens (1986, p. 408). Raz advocates three kinds of duties of the state to promote an autonomy-based doctrine of freedom (1986, p. 425). The first duty is to help create capacities for autonomy of the citizens by providing them with an adequate range of valuable options, and of the mental abilities necessary for an autonomous life. The second, the state has the duty not merely to prevent denial of freedom, but also to promote it by creating the

¹⁸¹ Brink refers to as *the tragedy of liberalism*, the title of the book.

conditions of autonomy. The third duty is to ensure non-domination; i.e. not to infringe people's autonomy by the coercion or manipulation of others. On the first duty, Raz relies on the state to choose the valuable options and to promote them for the right reasons. However, if the state decides the valuable options, do the citizens have autonomy to choose what is good for them? When the choices are restricted by the state, how can we expect the individual to take responsibility and have self-respect? If the valuable options are pre-determined by the state, then the value of autonomy is meaningless.

To sum up: Liberalism of both kinds faces problems and dilemmas in fostering liberal virtues. Anti-perfectionist liberalism is in a moral dilemma, and whereas Raz's perfectionist liberalism get trapped into a paradoxical situation of valuing autonomy on the one hand, and making autonomy less valuable on the other. As I have shown, liberalism of both kinds has deficiencies in meeting the set of normative criteria. I shall now evaluate communitarianism in the following section.

COMMUNITARIANISM

Communitarianism became a challenge to liberalism, although it is not a fully developed comprehensive political doctrine, to face the challenges of multiculturalism. Bhikhu Parekh (2000) argues for a political authority of a multicultural state based on the ideas of communitarianism – valuing community and culture. I shall therefore outline Parekh's proposition of a political authority for the politics of multicultural integration. I attempt to show that communitarianism faces several challenges and limitations on multicultural integration of post-immigration ethnic minorities.

One of the main critiques communitarians make against liberalism is that a self is not prior to, but rather constituted by, the ends (Mulhall and Swift 1996; Sandel 1998).¹⁸² Further communitarian criticisms of liberalism are: 1) liberalism presupposes that individuals are atomistic (Taylor 1985a); 2) liberalism ignores the value of community (Walzer 1983); and 3) liberalism is unnecessarily universalising (Bell 1993). Communitarianism, in contrast, supports a theory of social construction both

¹⁸² Communitarianism took ground within political philosophy mainly in response to Rawls' theory of justice, which was published in 1971.

of the self and of social reality, which includes culture, values, social institutions and social relations (Frazer and Lacey 1993). Communitarians, however, are not clear on how they define a community.¹⁸³ Communitarians within the philosophical discipline do not specifically address this question; rather, they limit their focus to the values of a community in contrast to liberal values based on individualism.

Orthodox communitarianism is based on the philosophical work of Alasdair MacIntyre, who presupposes that we are defined by our 'history and tradition' and hence our identities are 'bound and predetermined' (Little, p. 61). Political orthodox communitarians, especially Amitai Etzioni, based on the above ideology, attach utmost value to traditions including family and argue for a homogenous moral community (Little 2002, Ch.3). While acknowledging cultural differences within a large community, Etzioni particularly emphasises the wider integrated whole, which must impact on the behaviour and beliefs of the multiple communities (Little 2002, p. 68; cf. Etzioni 1996, Ch.7). Orthodox communitarians separate private from public spheres, allowing the common good to be defined by the moral community that predominates in the public sphere (Little 2002); this situation leads to moral authoritarianism. For example, the majority practising of values of male-domination, with hierarchical relationships of domination and subordination and conservative ideals of family, neighbourhood, schools and churches, will undermine female voices and values (see Friedman 1992, p. 104). Therefore, I shall not focus on the ideal of orthodox communitarianism.

I shall take on Parekh's (2000, p. 154) definition of cultural community as 'a body of people united in terms of a shared culture'. He states that cultural communities are of several kinds depending on what is shared. Some share religion, and some share common ethnicity. However, he maintains, 'since every culture is the culture of a particular group of people, its creator and historical bearer, all cultures tend to have an ethnic basis' (2000, p. 154). For Parekh, a cultural community is an ethnic community which has two dimensions: cultural and communal. Cultural aspect provides the content and communal aspect provides sharing. On this basis, it is

¹⁸³ A community may be a community of place, such as a city or a community bound to a geographical region; a community of shared history, such as a nation or an ethnic community; or a small community, where people interact in face-to-face situations, such as a village or a church. See Frazer (1999, Ch. 2), for a good discussion on the types of communities and the concept of community.

plausible to identify post-immigration ethnic minority into ethnically different communities, which may embody different values, and require different social forms and institutions to retain the existing social relations and ends. These values are generally captured within the aspects of community, according to Mason's concept of community in an 'ordinary sense', which are sharing values, a way of life, identifying with the group and its practices and recognising each other as members of the group.¹⁸⁴ I shall hereafter mainly refer to cultural community in an ordinary sense.

Parekh (2000, Ch. 7) emphasises diversity of a multicultural society is inescapable, and therefore, diversity is neither desirable to eliminate nor to ignore. However, he also holds the view that a sense of unity is required to hold that society together and to nurture its diversity. Parekh (2000, p. 206) acknowledges the need for social and economic mobility and interactions between groups in an industrialised society and individuals belong to many communities such as the ethnic, the religious and the cultural that they may not overlap (2000, p. 206). Arguably, Parekh's concerns essentially capture the three basic social facts. Do the members of cultural communities have the conditions to pursue their diverse well-being as equal citizens?

Communitarians promote cultural practices and institutions that recognise and reaffirm community-based values. It is debated whether a community confers significance from an individualist sense (directly to individuals) or from a collectivist sense (to the groups as wholes). Charles Taylor argues that there are goods that are irreducibly social goods, such as language and culture, from a collectivist sense (see Mason 2000, p. 47; cf. Taylor 1995).¹⁸⁵ Michael Walzer (1983) emphasises that social goods acquire meaning within a community from the shared understanding and practices of the members. In consequence, meanings of social goods can differ among different communities. For example, education and

¹⁸⁴ Mason (2000, p. 26) differentiates between aspects of community and degrees of community; degrees of community are expected to show all aspects of the community to some extent.

¹⁸⁵ Social goods can be what welfare economists refer to as public goods, such as public transportation, or parks, as well as public education. Mason points out that membership in a community for example, could also be considered one of the social goods (2000, p. 47).

healthcare are social goods and each community may value them differently according to its shared understanding and practices.

It is arguable that what is good for a community may also be good for an individual. For example, social goods such as education and healthcare contribute to the well-being of individuals. Mason argues that collectivist account of values do have values from the individualist sense, although he takes a neutral stand on whether a community provides values from the collectivist sense or from the individualist sense (Mason 2000, pp. 45-49). But, if community is understood in a collectivist sense, and values are stressed from the utilitarian perspective, the well-being of some individuals may be exploited for the overall benefit of the community. Communitarians seem to emphasise community's ethical convictions and well-being rather than individuals'. Moreover, communitarians also under-emphasise domination and heterogeneity of values within a community. These tendencies can lead individuals to conformity of the existing cultural values and practices, and thereby not conducive for genuine endorsement of individuals' convictions of good life. I shall now examine Parekh's proposal on the political authority which addresses to overcome the challenges faced by post-immigration ethnic minorities.

Parekh (2000, Ch. 7) proposes a political structure of multicultural society in order for cultural communities to engage in intercultural dialogue on an equal footing. It is rooted in diversity of 'collective life', to attain peace in the long run through building up common interests, mutual trust and goodwill. He considers six parameters as 'navigational devices' to construct a structure of political authority. The first parameter is a 'consensually grounded structure of authority', by which he implies a constitution acceptable to all under its authority. However, it is not about the constitution as an 'ideological document', but a 'body of procedures and norms' (2000, p. 207). He acknowledges that it is difficult in a multicultural society to agree on the basic principles of the constitution, but these should integrate both the judicial and political process. The second parameter is the state's role within a multicultural society in fostering 'a sense of justice and common belonging' (2000, p. 209). The state should be impartial in enforcing the law and maintaining order. Parekh therefore points out that people's experiences of a law-enforcing body such as the police are important within a multicultural state. Moreover, the state should ensure

its citizens have equal opportunities to pursue their goals effectively. They need to have equality of treatment in all significant areas of life such as employment, criminal justice and public services. Parekh supports decentralisation of power to ensure justice within a multicultural society. However, he wants to ensure that a multicultural society has a 'spirit of collective responsibility', which may require the state to redress memories of real or imagined past acts of injustice towards any particular ethnic communities through a system of 'transitional' or restorative justice.

Third, he advocates a political structure justifying certain communities' claims to collective rights under certain conditions (2000, pp. 213-219). He lists a set of overlapping conditions a community should meet to have a claim to rights. The collective rights should be morally of great importance to the community and its members should wish to preserve them. Their availability must meet the basic interests of its members. The collective rights would enable a community to overcome its insecurity and to integrate into mainstream society. They would enable a community long-subjected to systematic suppression to overcome its lack of confidence and to compete with the rest of society on equal standing, as well as to potentially make a unique and valuable contribution to the wider society. Lastly, they would allow a community to be the "custodians of its shared doctrine" in order to benefit its members' and wider society's well-being. Parekh, however, admits that the above set of conditions of collective rights should be debated and articulated. He further points out that the collectivities must be able to act as collective agents with a mandatory institutional structure to make and enforce their decisions.

Fourth, Parekh argues for a common culture – a shared culture – for a multicultural society to sustain it. He points out that such a shared culture is a common phenomenon in a culturally diverse society (2000, p. 219; cf. Appiah 1994, p. 1996). As Dilthey maintains, when cultural systems intersect each other, it is also inevitable that they have some influence over each other. Parekh encourages intercultural interaction both within the public and private realms without an officially engineered development of a common culture. He emphasises that the public realm requires a different pattern of intercultural interaction as it is already dominated by the majority. The objective of a common culture for Parekh is to ensure a common sense

of belonging among citizens without ‘fragmentation and ghettoisation’ (2000, p. 224).

Fifth, Parekh argues for multicultural education; but he warns that cultivating it either for creating a national culture, or to sustain pupils’ ethnic identities is a ‘misguided philosophy of education’ (2000, pp. 224-225). Parekh argues for multicultural education to facilitate a ‘multiculturally constituted common culture’ (2000, p. 222); monocultural education is ‘Eurocentric’ and ‘underplays or ignores achievements and contribution of others’ (2000, p. 225). Moreover, he maintains that it stunts the growth of critical faculty, and breeds arrogance, insensitivity and racism. The educational system should address the students as ‘members of their ethnic and cultural communities, citizens of their political community, and also human beings’ (2000, p. 227). One should bring the pupils to a ‘fruitful dialogue’ within different cultures of religion, texts and systems of belief: ‘Ideally, histories and experiences of minority communities should not be taught separately but integrated into the general history of the community’ (Parekh 2000, p. 229). Parekh is not only concerned about the curriculum, but also about the way it is taught. He emphasises that multicultural education should aim to bring different cultures into a fruitful dialogue through ‘freedom *from* ethnocentric prejudices and biases and freedom *to* explore and learn from other cultures and perspectives’ (2000, p. 230).

And, lastly, the sixth parameter as a navigational device for the political structure is national identity. Parekh acknowledges the dangers of a national identity and lists a set of conditions to meet valuable purposes and to avoid the dangers. Parekh emphasises that a shared sense of national identity should be defined in ‘politico-institutional rather than ethno-cultural terms, in terms of the institutions, values, mode of public disclosure and so on’ (2000, p. 232). It should not be based on the members’ ‘habits, temperament, attitude to life, sexual practices, family structure, body language and hobbies’. It should be open to accommodate members belonging to different ethnic, religious and cultural groups. The definition of national identity should accept all citizens as ‘equally valued and legitimate members of the community’ (2000, p. 233).

Prima facie, the above parameters ensure the state's duty has a sense of justice to enable communities to interact on equal standing with the wider society. Parekh also emphasises that the granting of any kind of rights to a community ultimately promotes its members' or the wider society's well-being. He, however, promotes individual's well-being that are congruent to her ethnic community's values and existing social relations. This leads to several challenges and limitations of its own kind; they affect the conditions of the normative criteria.

First, cultural communities may not have clear boundaries in every aspect of the cultural systems. For example, the linguistic boundary of one community may cut across the religious boundary of another, and the collective identities of the members, as I discussed earlier, are multiple and intersecting. Some individuals may give significance to religion, while others may give significance to language. Community members do have multiple modes of being and their activities intersect many cultural systems, cannot be confined to their ethnic basis alone. Moreover, cultural communities may not agree upon on many aspects of cultural systems that are competing and conflicting at both inter- and intra-community level.

Second, as feminists have pointed out, the significant cultural systems and traditions of some cultural communities are based on male domination and female submission, and non-acceptance of women as full social members. Although feminists acknowledge and appreciate the importance given to social relations within communitarianism as compared to individual-centric liberalism, they disapprove of the reproduction of norms and roles that are oppressive towards women within a community (see Frazer and Lacey 1993). Feminists are rightfully concerned when such relationships and practices are accepted within the doctrine of communitarianism (see Chambers 2002). For example, social recognition and non-domination may not prevail in a community in which a caste system is practised.

The third challenge is related to individual agency to have freedom of exit and entry. As I discussed in the previous section, there are problems associated with the notion of freedom of entry and exit. If members of a cultural community want to exit, then they may suffer exit costs; furthermore, not all other cultural communities may welcome or give entry to another member of a different cultural community. If the

individuals decide to stay on they may still suffer the ostracism of other members of the community for their lack of faith or for challenging the beliefs of the community. The point is that an individual who exits from or enter a cultural community may be subject to domination and treated with lack of respect or may not be given equal social recognition.

The fourth challenge is that some cultural communities may not encourage certain aspects of the notion of freedom by failing to promote them, and thus offer a constrained notion of choice. Cultural communities based on significant cultural systems provide options only within their established traditions. They maintain existing social forms and relations at least within the context of significant cultural systems and practices. One may then be sceptical about whether communities are tolerant of and accommodating to any challenges and changes to the existing cultural practices, and whether they allow sufficient space for individuals' or sub-groups' creativity. Communitarians presume that individuals are constituted by the ends; and that these are based on a shared way of life and its practices. Nevertheless, communitarians are reluctant to claim that individuals are *wholly* constituted by the ends (see Mason 2000, p. 10). Therefore, there should be room for an individual or a sub-group to choose options through rational scrutiny and creativity.

People who follow its rules and norms reproduce a cultural system. However, members of the cultural system must have freedom not only to follow the rules, but also to enrich the system or to exit the system. Changes may be introduced for the benefit of the members, or a member may, after reasoned scrutiny decide to adopt another system. However, these changes should not come as a result of coercion by the external systems of society, or because one's cultural practices are not recognised within the society or are denigrated by the members of other cultural systems without deliberation including those whose practices are concerned as citizens of equal status.

To sum up: Communitarianism, incorporating cultural communities with their own authorities, is challenged and limited in meeting the set of normative criteria of the politics of multicultural integration. In the following section, I show that civic

republicanism attempts to overcome the limitations and challenges of liberalism and communitarianism in meeting the conditions of the normative criterion.

MODERN CIVIC REPUBLICANISM

The relationship between republicanism and multiculturalism, on the face of it, is considered contentious. The concern about such a contentious relationship, I believe, arises mainly due to two factors: 1) it is presumed that republicanism promotes *a singular* common good, and as such multiculturalists are concerned with whether it can accommodate various concepts of good; and 2) multiculturalists who are concerned with the contentious relationship appear to presume that cultures are bounded and distinct wholes and thereby consider that each comes with a distinct and differing concept of good. Both presumptions are mistaken and have been undergoing revisions. First, contemporary republicans do not appeal to *a unified common good*, but rather to common concerns among interdependent citizens that I shall also emphasise, and second, along with many contemporary scholars on multiculturalism, I have been critiquing the essentialist notion of culture in this thesis. It is also to be noted that feminists, in general, are also concerned with the ‘relationship between feminism and republicanism’ as the tradition of republicanism was born of ‘masculine origin’ that promoted a masculine model of public interests (Phillips 2000, pp. 279-293). Anne Phillips, however, shows that the relationship has ‘recently undergone a marked transformation, from erstwhile antagonists to possible friends’ (2000, p. 279). According to Phillips, the increasing attraction of republicanism for feminists is that this tradition gives ‘an alternative to the liberal tradition’ which contests the ‘liberal hegemony’, as ‘[f]eminism was born (in a sense) out of liberalism, but has nearly always been at odds with its origins’ (2000, p. 293 & p. 284). As I have argued, liberalism tends to reinforce asymmetrical power relations, and feminists are rightfully concerned with such relations as ‘pre-given and fixed’ with regard to gender differences (Phillips 2000, p. 284). Although republicanism is ‘a tradition that offers a different way of conceiving the relationship between self and others, and a different way of thinking about public life’, Phillips cautions that ‘[a]ny attempt to swallow it wholesale would be seriously mistaken (difficult, anyway, given that “it” varies significantly in its current incarnations)’ (2000, p. 293). I agree that it is difficult to give a particular version of modern

republicanism that allays all the concerns of feminists and multiculturalists. Republicanism has been undergoing a revival over the last three decades (see Honohan 2002, p. 6) and there are several variations. Moreover, republicanism as a tradition is ‘constituted not of a single thread but of multiple interwoven strands’ (Honohan 2002, p. 5).

Although there are many variations and disputes over what republicanism means today, and although republicanism is also considered as sharing some aspects of liberalism and communitarianism, it is clearly distinct from neutral liberal theories as well as from communitarianism in certain traits and emphases. On the one hand, republicanism emphasises the responsibility for realising common goods through political deliberation, setting it apart from neutral liberalism, which excludes ‘substantive questions of values and the good life from politics’; on the other, republicanism emphasises ‘the political construction of the political community’, distinguishing it from communitarianism, which gives importance to ‘the pre-political shared values of community’ (Honohan 2002, p. 1).

I shall attempt to show that a version of civic republicanism mainly deriving from Honohan’s *Civic Republicanism* (2002), along with some aspects of republicanism of other writers – Philip Pettit (1997) and Maurizio Viroli (2002) – addresses effectively many of the concerns that arise out of both liberalism and communitarianism that I have discussed above with regard to the sort of multiculturalism this thesis advocates. One of the main reasons for considering Honohan’s work is that I have also argued in favour of her concept of three-dimensional recognition, which enables deliberation to authorise viewpoints acknowledging individuals’ specificities for endorsing practices. Moreover, I consider Pettit on republicanism as I have also argued, using his work, that social freedom is to be understood as agency-freedom, the notion of freedom as non-domination, rather than option-freedom. I shall focus on key features of civic republicanism, which is mainly concerned with the freedom of individuals in an interdependent society and the political construction of community.¹⁸⁶ I have already argued and emphasised in this thesis that cultures should be considered from the

¹⁸⁶ Classical republicanism is chiefly identified with Machiavelli, and emphasises ‘the common good of citizens who do not want to be oppressed and have no ambition to dominate’ (Viroli 2002, p. 5).

anti-essentialist standpoint, and I shall show that modern civic republicanism is mainly concerned with a common fate and vulnerabilities rather than a particular concept of common good and hence it allows multiple common goods and attempts to overcome the limitations that stem from common vulnerabilities through asymmetrical power relations. Moreover, I shall also show that the feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy is also addressed in modern civic republicanism to incorporate feminists' as well as multiculturalists' concerns.

Let us look into the first condition of well-being and examine whether republicanism is committed to the diverse well-being of equal citizens, in particular of post-immigration ethnic minorities. I have argued that personal autonomy is important for citizens to pursue their well-being. Republicanism enhances citizens' personal autonomy through the idea of 'republican political autonomy' as a 'natural extension of personal autonomy', allowing people to follow the purposes that they endorse as theirs, and giving them a say in 'shaping the practices through which they pursue their lives in society' (Honohan 2002, p. 187). Republican political autonomy is achieved through political participation as 'collective self-government' which contributes to shaping 'collective social practices' (Honohan 2002, p. 189). Civic republicanism does not endorse socio-cultural practices in a pre-political form but rather within the framework of a consensus political authority. But if the political authority collectively shapes social practices, how can it shape them collectively in many varied ways, especially since it can be expected that the collective will be dominated by the dominant culture? Moreover, it may be argued that certain social practices followed by minorities may undermine personal autonomy. How does republicanism deal with these concerns?

In order to respond to the above concerns, we need to understand the republican conception of common good. There are various conceptions of the common good, for example 'the corporate good' of a society directed towards a single purpose or 'the aggregate of individual goods' (Honohan 2002, p. 151). But a simple aggregate of individual goods cannot be considered the common good, as it is not shared. Any conception of common good should take into account that citizens are 'intrinsically social as well as significantly separate'; Honohan points out that there is an *intersubjective-practical* sense of the common good which satisfies the above

condition (2002, p. 152). She emphasises that we may not be able to speak of ‘*the* common good’, but of ‘common goods’ that can be realised through interaction with others (2002, p. 152). As these common goods are understood in an intersubjective-practical sense, it is important to understand citizens’ ‘common concerns’. In a multicultural state, citizens may consider their common concerns are vulnerabilities resulting from the three basic social facts of a modern multicultural society – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency. However, the question remains how individuals who differ in their convictions of a good life can agree upon common goods.

I shall attempt to show that the second condition of agency freedom for political participation plays an important role. The concern is that how can republicanism ensure that personal freedom is not undermined by collective self-government, which may be dominated by the majority. Honohan emphasises that ‘political equality’ is essential to the idea of ‘freedom as participation’ in collective self-government (2002, p.190). In order to ensure that socially dominant positions and non-political relations do not hamper the collective decision-making to reinforce those power relations, she argues that non-domination is ‘an essential complement to the idea of freedom as participation in self-government’ (2002, p. 190). However, it may still be emphasised that where participation is an issue numbers count for a lot – how does the majority not simply dominate by default?

I shall show that civic republicanism is concerned with freedom from the perspective of how interdependent individuals could live freely within both the social and political context taking into consideration asymmetrical power relations. Pettit (1997, Ch. 3) argues that republicanism’s liberty as non-domination is superior to liberal notion of freedom as non-interference, because arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary interference. Republicans want to avoid the threat of interference or coercion (cf. Skinner 1998, p. 84), and subordinated status can lead to threat of interference (Honohan 2002, p. 183). The concept of freedom as non-domination, as Honohan puts it, is that ‘it is more important *not to have* a master than to be a master’ (2002, p. 184).

It is argued that a system of laws ensures against interference by an arbitrary power and thereby enables the realisation of freedom in the form of non-domination. Although coercion by law and dependence on the will of another infringes upon freedom (cf. Skinner 1998, pp. 82-84), for Pettit, a law properly made is compatible with freedom (Honohan 2002, p. 184). A recognised legal status that deters arbitrary power of domination and ensures freedom as non-domination, protects citizens not only from the public domination of the state, but also in the private – non-political – domains such as family and work (Honohan 2002, p. 184). But the recognised legal status cannot be enjoyed only by a few privileged citizens or only in certain areas of life. In a republican state, all citizens in all areas of their lives are entitled to this status. If this is not the case, then there is a threat of interference into the lives of the powerless and underprivileged, and can affect their autonomy. Pettit argues that when people are protected from domination, they can look after their own autonomy, although he acknowledges that ‘freedom as personal self-mastery’ is a ‘richer ideal’ than freedom as non-domination (2002, p. 81). But, he emphasises that ‘there can hardly be any meaningful form of self-mastery without non-domination’ (2002, p. 82). Although Pettit is correct in arguing that non-domination is essential to autonomy, as Honohan points out ‘personal autonomy is affected by our vulnerability to one another’ (2002, p. 187). Our vulnerability cannot be mitigated through non-domination alone. Although republicanism gives importance to agency-freedom, which is essentially freedom from arbitrary interference, as I already argued in Chapter 4, freedom from arbitrary interference cannot curb systematic discrimination, exploitation, marginalisation and exclusion of those people who are not given recognition for their particularities. This leads to the third condition of social recognition of the set of normative criteria.

Contemporary republicans are concerned with a political recognition that reflects and reinforces existing social identities, which, as I argued, is a core feature of communitarianism (Honohan 2002, pp. 258-259). I shall show that recognition from the perspective of a republican political community overcomes the concern of pre-political cultural values and social relations that may reinforce asymmetrical power relations within communitarianism. It is also to be noted that the model of liberal polity ignores common concerns arising out of the general social facts; as I argued that liberalism does not mitigate asymmetrical power relations. A republican

community may include people who hold different ethical convictions, who participate by interacting and engaging in the social world within a common political realm; citizens' commitments come from their 'mutual vulnerability in the practice of self-government' (Honohan 2002, p. 268) and the good of citizenship through 'a sense of sharing a common fate' (Mason 2000, p. 133). In this regard, it is arguable that there is a common concern among citizens that may lead to recognition of the others.

However, some argue that republican membership should be rooted either in membership to the nation – nationalism, or in love of one's country, patriotism – in order to evoke political recognition among citizens who accept interdependence and responsibility for their fellow citizens. As I discussed, nationalism has its disadvantages, and it is a concern of Parekh within communitarianism. Liberal nationalism is heavily based on the public values of the majority and is exclusive (Honohan 2002, pp. 277-279; cf. Mason 2000). Ethnic nationalism gives importance to the political or moral value in 'the unity and ethnic homogeneity of a people' (Viroli 2002, pp. 89-90). Viroli (2002, Ch.6; 1995, p. 176) argues that patriotism is superior to nationalism, both civic and ethnic, for members committed to the 'way of life of the republic', and is centred on the recognition of the 'moral and political importance of values of citizenship'. Viroli also points out that republican patriotism differs from civic nationalism in that 'it proclaims allegiance not to culturally and historically neutral political principles but to the laws, constitutions, and ways of life of specific republics, each with its own history and culture' (2002, p. 90). However, Honohan points out that Viroli's account of republican patriotism places 'too much emphasise on a specific way of life or history than is compatible with republican equality of recognition' (2002, p. 271); not all citizens may share a positive view of a shared history. In a multicultural state, people from different ethnic and historical backgrounds may not all identify themselves with a shared history of the majority. People's pride in a shared history can lead to the exclusion or marginalisation of others (see Honohan 2002, pp. 270-271). Moreover, patriotism encourages a motive based on collective self-esteem to be proud of a shared history or a specific way of life. Viroli bases his account of republican patriotism on self-esteem rather than on self-respect: 'Just as a person with low self-esteem becomes either servile or arrogant, a people with no national pride cannot but be a people of servants or

clients, easily transformed into cruel oppressors of the weak' (2002, p. 94). As I have argued, recognition based on self-esteem cannot lead to treating one another as citizens of equal status in social participation. A sense of belonging based on nationalism, whether civic or ethnic, excludes, or marginalises minorities in participating as citizens of equal status.

As Honohan maintains, republican citizenship does not rest on 'pre-political commonality', but on the political recognition of 'multiply reiterated interdependencies, and on interaction within the framework of a state' (2002, p.275). Hence, republican solidarity should neither be based on nationalism whether civic or ethnic, nor on patriotism based on a specific way of life, nor on a shared historical account.¹⁸⁷ It should be understood based on the idea of 'a commitment to the people with whom we are interdependent in the polity' (Honohan 2002, p. 281). How can we achieve such solidarity with differing convictions of good or meaningful lives without marginalising minorities. I shall now discuss how it can be achieved through political participation and deliberation.

Participation and deliberation within republican thought gain importance over communitarianism and liberalism. Therefore, it is crucial to understand whether and how participation and deliberation can take place and ensure that all citizens have the capability to engage on a platform that is not tilted towards the powerful and influential. Critics of republican deliberation point out that a deliberative public realm may exclude or marginalise those who do not conform to certain norms, as for example, in a particular 'masculine rational model' (Honohan 2002, p. 226). Moreover, the existing moral or cultural practices or values may dominate the deliberation, and may exclude the minorities who do not conform to those values and beliefs. As Honohan points out, 'comprehensive moral views and publicly shared principles of justice are hard to separate'; but, at the same time, 'excluding comprehensive doctrines from public deliberation has the effect of privatising values and limiting the possibility of recognition of values to the private sphere' (2002, p.

¹⁸⁷ For example, French Republicanism promotes a homogeneous national culture that is based on strict secularism, republican *laïcité*, which is in a sense a liberal nationalism with greater demands on state institutions and its citizens to adhere to strict secularism; see Laborde (2001 and 2005). Modood (1999, p. 86) argues that the ideal of republicanism have 'strong expectation, even pressure, for individuals to assimilate to the national identity.'

227). People lead their meaningful lives according to their ethical convictions, and excluding those convictions with the aim of pre-empting conflicts may alienate them from the public realm (Honohan 2002, p. 227). Citizens are recognised along the political power axis through political participation and they should be allowed to put forward their deepest convictions. In this case, conflicts of conviction are publicised instead of restrained by the state apparatus. Republican public deliberation needs to accommodate conflicting ethical convictions; this could be achieved through plural forms of public realms along with multiple levels of authorities without dominating each other.

There are benefits in deliberation through citizens' active participation rather than via representative politics (Honohan 2002, pp. 215-216). Citizens' active participation ensures that the state tracks their interests rather than pursuing its own agenda. The authoritative decisions of the state can yield to exercising its arbitrary power, corruption and setting limits to institutional safeguards. The citizens can value the agreements reached when they are allowed to express their convictions and to engage in making decisions. The citizens gain recognition among their peers. So, the important question is how republicanism can ensure deliberation is not tilted towards some factions of the society who have the power, or to the state itself, which has the ultimate authority in conducting organised violence, or to the majority, which can lead to 'majority tyranny' (Honohan 2002, p. 219). Moreover, how can we be sure citizens' participation results in making the right decisions, if they lack the necessary information, interest and competence while the representatives are perhaps better at making decisions?

Policy decisions cannot be achieved through simple aggregation of voting preferences. The legal status of citizenship of voting entails only 'one dimension of participation' (Honohan 2002, p. 223). The decisions have to be reached through discussion and reflection, promoting people's self-respect, which is constituted of autonomy, character and conduct. Individuals should be provided with adequate information and forums to discuss and engage in deliberation as citizens of equal status.¹⁸⁸ Honohan argues that republican deliberative politics is better at realising

¹⁸⁸ New technologies such as the Internet can enable as platforms for participation and deliberation.

non-domination and political autonomy than a 'simply extended participatory politics, for example, more popular voting on more issues' (2002, p. 222).

The public spaces are central to deliberation on the 'shape of their society and its social practices' (Honohan 2002, p. 157). However, those practices accepted in the public realm gain status; therefore those members who follow such practices are privileged by the political community (cf. Sandel 1998, p. 329), and those whose practices are not accepted in the public realm may be pushed back into their private realm. This raises the issue of the public versus private dichotomy within liberalism. I argued that such a dichotomy is not conducive to social freedom. How does republicanism overcome this issue?

Honohan points out that the republican distinction between public and private is 'paradigmatically different' from the distinction under liberalism. For the latter, as I discussed, the distinction relates to the control of the state, whereas for republicans, it relates to 'interest or relevance'; that is, what is public is concerned with the interests of everyone, whereas what is private is relevant to one or a few (Honohan 2002, p. 158). The point is that the distinction mainly arises within individuals; 'the primacy of the public over the private reflects not the good of the majority over the minority, but division within each citizen' (Honohan 2002, p. 159). Hence, Honohan insists that people need to give more importance to the public goods – common goods such as the wilderness, as they are endangered under current social conditions. She also points out that markets are good at satisfying individual interests, but 'notoriously inadequate at providing – indeed tend to erode – public goods' (2002, p. 159). Nevertheless, people who are power holders may control what goods have to be recognised as the common goods. I shall show that republican deliberative politics can implement several mechanisms in order to ensure participation and deliberation as citizens of equal status.

Republican deliberative politics is concerned with engaging citizens in dialogue. I shall show that it goes beyond Parekh's advocacy of intercultural dialogue between cultural communities and the wider society taking into account all three dimensions of social recognition and non-domination. The process of dialogue has to acknowledge citizen's specificities and viewpoints – the two dimensions of

recognition. Acknowledging specificities does not mean unequal treatment, but rather requires 'difference-conscious' treatment in the interest of autonomy (Honohan 2002, p. 260), which is a constituent of self-respect. The specificities are not just about cultural specificities; they include social particularities, for example, women and disabled people. This may require 'group-differentiated' individual rights, not necessarily group rights; some examples, as I cited in Chapter 6, are child care provisions for parents, access for the disabled and special language rights for minorities in interacting with government institutions and provisions in order to increase their participation in politics (Honohan 2002, p. 260).

Authorising viewpoints recognises the marginalised and excluded people's contribution to the public realm by addressing the problem of stigmatisation by others, increasing thereby their self-confidence in expressing their concerns and ethical convictions. This does not mean that their viewpoints are wholly accepted for implementation, but rather that they need to be tested against the minimal and common conditions. However, listening to their viewpoints enables the possibility of transforming politics (Honohan 2002, p. 262). For example, as I pointed out, Honohan notes that the women's movement and disability advocates have achieved a voice that has transformed politics. The same is possible for culturally disadvantaged minorities, which is also a concern of Parekh. Moreover, the process should ensure that no faction of society or predetermined values of what constitutes a good life dominates powerless and vulnerable groups.

Second, deliberation does not mean consensus and agreement on every issue area. In fact, deliberation can lead to more disagreements in politics and 'conflict has to be recognised as an intrinsic part of politics' (Honohan 2002, p. 230). As Honohan puts it, 'learning to deal with conflict is part of being a republican citizen' (2002, p. 230). Deliberation maintaining non-domination and acknowledging specificities and viewpoints of citizens may lead to changes in each other's viewpoints, or endorsing practices, which is the third dimension of recognition. Republicanism may provide constitutional, symbolic or material support in endorsing practices (Honohan 2002, p. 263). This may also involve redefining the public realm. This would not mean the endorsement of and public embodiment of every cultural practice. However, all practices must be given equal opportunity for deliberation.

Third, the public sphere of liberalism is inadequate for deliberation; as I pointed out, the state controls the public space. The republican conception of the public is not under the control of the central state and its authoritative decision-making (Honohan 2002, p. 231). Under republicanism, participation requires ‘expansion and pluralisation of public spaces’; what is considered the public in association with the central state has to be pluralised in terms of other formal and informal public spaces for discussion and deliberation. In similar vein, contemporary feminist philosophers attempt to define the public space; for example, Seyla Benhabib attempts to define the ‘public sphere in relation to certain types of activity, and argues that any matter can enter public space once it becomes matter of public dispute’; Nancy Fraser also argues that ‘it is misleading to talk of “the” public sphere—conjuring up as this does images of a parliamentary chamber—and more illuminating to refer to a multiplicity of publics, organised around different networks of public communication’ (Phillips 2002, p. 292; cf. Benhabib 1998 and Fraser 1997). Complex social problems cannot necessarily be addressed by means of legislative institutions and measures; they require social discourse that raises social consciousness and commitment (see Honohan 2002, p. 233).¹⁸⁹ But care must be taken to avoid any factions of civil society in terms of churches, unions, sports clubs etc., promoting their self-interests, which may lead to ignoring the common concerns and vulnerabilities of all citizens (Honohan 2002, p. 233). It can generate unequal power relationships and delineate public versus private and undermine citizenship and civic activity in the political arena. (Honohan 2002, p. 235; cf. Walzer 1992, p. 104). Several elements such as publicity, accountability and informal social interaction with the political decision-making are essential for expanded public spaces for deliberation (Honohan 2002, p. 235).

Finally, republican institutions should be designed to reflect the core notion of freedom as non-domination; Pettit argues for ‘contestability’ of all decisions (Honohan 2002, p. 236; cf. Pettit 1997b, p. 193). However, Honohan doubts whether

¹⁸⁹ Corporations are increasingly expected by the governments and civil societies to take on corporate social responsibility (CSR) seriously; for example, UN Global Compact promotes CSR (www.unglobalcompact.org). Although corporations’ main objective is profit maximisation, their activities are, from a Diltheyan sense, intersecting social sphere and are rooted in social life, and hence it is arguable that corporations are also social actors.

contestability is enough to ensure non-domination. Institutions should attempt to integrate many levels in order to include those who are marginalised from taking deliberative participation. For example, a federal system with local governments can better expand participative deliberation than direct democracy; the aim is not maximisation of participation, but expansion (Honohan 2002, p. 240).

To sum up: The above measures on deliberation neither promote differences nor assimilate a single conception of what is considered a good life, but rather promote equal citizenship to pursue differing ethical convictions complying with the first three conditions. But these cannot be achieved without the responsibilities of the state with a sense of justice along with civic virtues and responsibilities of citizens. This leads to the fourth and fifth conditions to meet the set of normative criteria.

Does the republican state have a duty to ensure a sense of justice to promote individual's diverse well-being? Republican equality is concerned with conditions that allow citizens to live with dignity and self-respect.

Republican equality does not consist solely of equality of civil and political rights; it also affirms the need to ensure all citizens the social, economic, and cultural conditions to allow them to live with *dignity* and *self-respect* (Viroli 2002, p. 66, emphasis added).

It is generally argued that the roles of the republican state include preventing domination, promoting autonomy, realising common goods and ensuring that undistorted preferences prevail (Honohan 2002, p. 195). As I have argued, republicans are concerned about domination within both the public and private realms along political and social power axes. As such, a republican state justifies protective legislation that reduces the vulnerability of citizens within the private realm where asymmetrical power relations exist; for example, between an employer and employee, between multinational corporations and small enterprises and consumers, between doctor and patient, husband and wife, father and daughter etc. (Honohan 2002, p. 196). Multiculturalists may argue that such a protective legislation would erode family structures based on cultural norms they would want to protect. How can these be acceptable?

The republican state is justified in enhancing the autonomy of citizens within the public and private realms in order to allow equal participation. A republican state has a regulative role to play in contract law to eliminate the possibility of one party dominating the other (Pettit 1999, pp. 164-165). Therefore, for example, forced marriages would not be allowed while arranged marriages would be as long as both potential adult partners are consenting. Moreover, the state may scrutinise the legal protections that could lead to unequal public status of citizens in participation.

Honohan argues that state action is also justified in cases where ‘the expressed preferences of agents appear to damage their autonomy’ (2002, p. 201). As I already argued that liberals are unable to justify state intervention even though they give importance to individuals’ autonomy. According to republicanism, when freedom exists in the form of non-domination – an absence of arbitrary interference – the state can intervene to promote autonomy in a non-arbitrary manner. The state’s intervention to modify citizens’ preferences may not be justified without ensuring the citizens are informed and have equal opportunities with fair challenges to pursue their ethical convictions. It may be necessary to stop someone from selling herself into slavery, but without changing the ethical situation that led her to do so would be ineffective in stopping slavery.

The state may take a role in enabling the excluded and powerless citizens to pursue their collective pursuits. The state may provide support by empowering these people, for example, with the necessary skills and training, i.e., language, etc. and recognition of those traditions deemed meaningful by them. Moreover, a republican state can ensure the availability of resources required for future generations to flourish; for example, by enforcing laws protecting the environment and rare species.

Let us look into the responsibilities of citizens – the fifth condition of the set of criteria. Republicanism emphasises duties more than rights in contrast to liberalism, which gives importance to individuals’ rights, and therefore fails to take obligations seriously (O’Neill 1996, p. 146). Republican rights take into account interdependencies of citizens and therefore set limits on what can be demanded of individuals (Honohan 2002, p.208). Republican emphasis on duties before rights has an advantage; from this perspective, one requires one’s duties and justifications to be

more realistic; but beginning with rights emphasises recipients other than agents, and disconnects the recipients and their corresponding agents (O'Neill 1996, p. 135 & 140). Within republicanism rights are not absolute, but are limited by the equal rights of others (Honohan 2002, p. 209); these rights take into account duties of citizens to conduct their activities within an interdependent realm. Moreover, Honohan points out that rights are interpreted differently within republicanism than within liberalism. For example, the right to speech and the right to expression are context dependent.

Republicanism considers rights to be neither natural nor absolute, but as politically constructed and evolving. However, rights cannot impede people's autonomy and rights to privacy are better regarded, as feminists argue, 'as granting respect to personal autonomy than as an area of non-interference' (Honohan 2002, p. 211). As I argued, autonomy is a core attribute of self-respect. The state may have powers, but citizens' rights, rooted in their political autonomy, set limits on them, which ensure what I refer to as a 'self-respecting state', rather than a 'power-hungry state' dominated by certain power holders, or a dictator's 'totalitarian state', or a 'corrupted state', in which a few self-interested individuals reap the benefits for themselves at the expense of common goods, or organises itself with systematic corruption.

The state may have extensive powers to prevent domination, promote autonomy, counter distorted preferences, and realise common goods agreed in deliberation. But these powers can be limited by rights of citizens, grounded specifically in their political autonomy (Honohan 2002, p. 213).

Republican tradition promotes a mixed government, not a single sovereign or pure democracy, in which the power is tilted towards the citizens; this tradition ensures better security for the citizens (Honohan 2002, pp. 49-50; see also O'Neill 2000, p. 184). First, states established on a division of powers with internally divided sovereignty go to war less often than monolithic states (cf. Doyle 1983). Second, the state is not intrinsically weakened by the division of powers in their constitutions (O'Neill 2000, p. 184). Third, when the power is tilted towards the people, the common good and freedom are better achieved than in a monarchy or aristocratic republic (Honohan 2002, p. 50); factions can provide a 'constructive tension' and struggle between them can ensure freedom, identifying and intervening with

distorted preferences. These aspects of a republican state ensure that the power holders of the society do not dominate and exploit the powerless.

I shall now look into the idea civic virtue which is a long-standing theme within civic republicanism and is not unequivocally promoted as it is considered incompatible with freedom. However, Honohan gives two underlying reasons supporting civic virtues. First, laws and institutions may provide some control over the collective goods, but they alone cannot ensure democratic politics and a flourishing society. Second, when politics is concerned with individuals' interests, the importance of common goods may be ignored. Therefore, civic virtue is needed to ensure not only individual interests, but also common good. As I have argued, civic virtues fostering self-respect are conducive to social participation treating one another as citizens of equal status. As O'Neill (1996, Ch. 5) argues, there are obligations that do not have corresponding rights. Belonging to this category, even if imperfect, are the civic virtues that shape the character and conduct necessary for social participation in the realisation of common good taking into consideration of common vulnerabilities. Virtues must be internalised within a person's conscience and cannot be enforced.

One may object to fostering civic virtues, viewing it as social and psychological engineering by a dominant culture, and hence, minorities would not regard this as liberating or as recognising their particularities. For Honohan, civic virtue is a 'predisposition to act voluntarily in some wider interests' (2002, p. 160). There is neither civic virtue per se nor are its obligations inherently oppressive, but any attempt by the state to force citizens to fulfil their obligations is oppressive; nevertheless, the state can foster the capacities required of citizens to fulfil these special obligations (Honohan 2002, p. 160). Civic virtues have to be accepted by all citizens and must be internalised if they are to be effective. If any of the aspects of civic virtue follows the norms of the majority without giving recognition to the minority, it can be oppressive. For example, feminists argue that civic virtues based on the characteristics of masculinity for political participation cannot promote equal status participation of women (Honohan 2002, pp. 166-167).

Honohan specifies some aspects of civic virtue, including awareness, self-restraint and deliberative engagement (2002, pp. 160-161). Citizens need to be 'aware' of their 'multiply reiterated interdependencies' to fellow citizens, rather than their commonality based on race, culture or religion. In recognising interdependencies, citizens need to have some 'self-restraint' in pursuing their own interests; that is, they also need to accept the duties of social justice that allow other citizens to participate equally and pursue their interests. It is a constituent of self-respect – character and conduct that I have argued for. Citizens' 'willingness to deliberate' is an important aspect of civic virtue. It also fosters one of the aspects of recognition, listening to others' points of view and allows people to be prepared to revise their own positions. But as I discussed in Chapter 4, for example, individuals opposed to Nazi views would object, stating that the more they listen to Nazis, the less they like them nor want them to make political decisions, or use the public forum to shape social practice. How should such a concern be addressed?

Civic virtues that promote self-respect in citizens, and constituted by autonomy, character and conduct, engender the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status. People's willingness to deliberate is a two-way process. In the case of Nazi points of view, it is also essential that they listen to others' points of view and are willing to change their views that promote their self-respect. Moreover, this aspect of civic virtue fosters an attitude of 'active solidarity' with other fellow citizens as citizens of equal status. Such an attitude among citizens enables them to become vigilant of common concerns, not passively obeying laws that are oppressive and unjust to fellow citizens, including laws that allow the abuse of power within the public or private realms, but most importantly actively promoting a just society. The above aspects of civic virtue are compatible with the minimal and common conditions of social recognition and non-domination that are founded on self-respect. But how should the state foster civic virtues?

The republican state plays an active role in civic education as a means of cultivating civic virtues. Republican civic education aims to fulfil two principal dimensions: 'awareness of interdependence and capacity for deliberation' (Honohan 2002, p. 174). However, there is much debate about the curriculum and the structure of the educational process. Republican citizenship entails both rights and responsibilities.

Civic virtue and civility play a key role in bringing awareness of responsibilities to others and the state (Maynor 2003, p. 182). Republicanism emphasise virtues which call for individuals to express their interests in a non-dominating manner, without subjecting others to arbitrary interference.

Multiculturalists however, obviously support multicultural rather than monocultural education or civic virtues of a dominant culture. Parekh's concerns can be addressed as well in terms of republican citizenship education in common schools. Republican citizenship education also emphasises responsible citizenship through the structure of education and a strong system of state schools (Honohan 2002, p. 175). The importance of civic education is not about promoting commonality or difference, but about acknowledging the importance of interdependence and taking responsibility not just for oneself but as a member of society (Honohan 2002, p. 174). There are many ways these could be achieved.

To sum up: The role of the republican state consists in preventing domination in the public and private realms by promoting autonomy – a constituent of self-respect. Moreover, the state also plays a role in civic education to cultivate civic virtues that foster self-respect, enabling citizens to take responsibility not only for themselves, but also as members of the interdependent society. Republicanism also gives importance to responsibilities that go with rights. These aspects comply with the fourth and fifth conditions of the normative criterion.

CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this thesis is not to defend republicanism per se for the politics of multiculturalism, but rather to derive a set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration. This chapter has demonstrated that the criteria developed in Chapter 6 can inform and help us in the difficult normative decision-making of discriminating among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity. I have attempted to evaluate three main political ideologies – liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism – as they are mainly debated with respect to multicultural citizenship against the conditions of the normative criteria for the kind of multicultural state I have been advocating for the politics of

multicultural integration. This chapter does, however, conclude that the version of modern civic republicanism presented seems to comply with the set of normative criteria better than liberalism and communitarianism. Admittedly, this result is unsurprising to the extent that: 1) the set of normative criteria consists of some key elements of republicanism; 2) this thesis has critiqued some aspects of liberalism in deriving the set of criteria; and 3) this thesis has also critiqued the essentialist notion of culture.

I have attempted to show that liberalism of both kinds – anti-perfectionism and perfectionism – has challenges and limitations in meeting the conditions of the normative criteria. The limitations and challenges of anti-perfectionist liberalism stem from: 1) the public versus private dichotomy; 2) the principle of state neutrality; and 3) the liberal notion of toleration and freedom as non-interference. Kukathas' freedom of association grounded in conscience and liberal toleration also faces limitations and challenges: he effectively reduces multicultural society into plural monocultures, allows domination of members by the associations, and does not effectively address members' freedom of exit and entry. Rawls' political liberalism to ensure social bases of self-respect also faces challenges and limitations: he does not provide clear guidelines on the choice of representatives as well as the choice of the least advantageous social positions. An anti-perfectionist neutral stand on the policy of equality and impartiality within the public sphere can also lead to restriction of minorities interacting with common institutions, in terms of both recognition and domination. However, it is plausible to maintain equality and impartiality with rules-plus-exemptions, or to change the rules themselves to take social recognition and non-domination into account. Moreover, liberalism emphasises rights, and it is in a moral dilemma promoting liberal values. Perfectionist liberalism also faces challenges enabling post-immigration minorities to pursue their well-being, and it is also in a dilemma in promoting autonomy; on the one hand, it encourages people's autonomy, and on the other, it undermines making the choices of good for citizens.

Communitarianism with cultural communities of their own authorities faces several challenges and limitations promoting individual agency and well-being. Cultural communities that attempt to preserve the existing social relations and values are not

conducive to individuality and creativity, and subject members to conformity. Moreover, communitarianism also faces the same critique of liberal freedom of association on exit. Orthodox communitarianism adheres to conservative values that may be oppressive to women and socially excluded communities. Parekh's proposal of the political structure of multicultural society, with attention to the structure with consensus, justice and equality, fundamental rights including collective rights and common culture and national identity could accommodate cultural communities on an equal standing. However, communitarianism has challenges and limitations of its own in meeting the conditions. I therefore turned to modern civic republicanism, which attempts to overcome the limitations of communitarianism and liberalism to meet the set of normative criteria for the politics of multicultural integration.

Modern civic republicanism seems to be able to promote common goods that arise out of common concerns, which can address the vulnerabilities of the general social facts. Republicanism promotes freedom as non-domination along with republican political autonomy, which enhances personal autonomy in shaping social practices in society. Moreover, republicanism emphasises political equality to ensure the idea of freedom as participation in collective self-government. The republican approach to recognition of cultural particularities is preferable to the communitarian ideal of a single fixed conception of the common good and imposition of an overarching political identity. Cultural particularities are not pre-politically determined, but are politically determined through deliberation and participation. Moreover, civic virtues tied to self-respect can foster social recognition along the social power axis. Republican deliberation and participation can adopt several measures to ensure that social recognition along the three dimensions prevails, and republicanism neither promotes differences nor assimilates to a single conception of a good life as communitarians do. It can also deal with multiple interacting authorities and public versus private realms more effectively than liberalism and communitarianism. Civic education to foster civic virtues can also accommodate merits of multicultural education. The state and society in terms of social organisations as well as individuals have responsibilities in ensuring the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status in social participation.

Modern civic republicanism attempts to overcome the limitations of both liberalism and communitarianism and meet the set of normative criteria of the politics of multicultural integration. In qualification, it may be noted that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to show whether liberalism could be modified to accommodate the sort of multiculturalism it advocates. It may be plausible: for example, Kymlicka argues that liberal egalitarianism and civic republicanism are friends not foes: 'liberal egalitarians and civic republicans can and should work together to find imaginative proposals that promote both social justice and participatory democracy' (2001, p. 346).

CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to address an important issue of the contemporary politics of multiculturalism within Western and neo-Western democratic states, namely how to provide normative grounds for multiculturalism, without relying on or reinforcing potentially coercive essentialist notions of culture, and without collapsing multiculturalism into a plural monoculturalism. In addressing this issue, it contributes to the ongoing critique of essentialist notions of culture – bounded, unified, static and deterministic. It also shows that debate on the recent retreat from liberal multiculturalism within Western liberal democratic states, although integral to the ongoing critique of essentialist notions of culture, is not a fatal blow to the politics of multiculturalism. It demonstrates that we can engage in the politics of multicultural integration in an interesting and unique way by providing a normative ground within the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture – internally riven, intersecting and interacting, normatively contestable and contesting, an element of dynamism, change and continuity – without collapsing multicultural society into plural monocultures.

This thesis developed an alternative normative premise to the normative underpinnings of Kymlicka's theory on multiculturalism, which is considered as the clearest starting point within Anglophone political theories of multiculturalism against which other revisionists have responded, for integrating post-immigration ethnic minorities within the Western and neo-Western democratic states. It mainly drew from Benhabib's critique of essentialist notions of culture and adopted Dilthey's works on human sciences and meaning in history, even though his works are not the obvious points of references to multiculturalism. Dilthey's works helped to provide a model of culture exemplifying Benhabib's critiques and concerns and to give a non-reductionist normative account of well-being, which was the point of departure for developing an alternative normative premise and the set of normative criteria. Subsequently, this thesis examined the core features and concepts of liberalism, communitarianism and civic republicanism, as identified in contemporary debates within multicultural citizenship, to meet the set of normative criteria for the sort of multiculturalism that this thesis advocates. It showed that even though

republicanism is considered a contentious coupling with multiculturalism, a version of modern civic republicanism, mainly derived from Honohan's work on civic republicanism, seems to comply with the criteria. It shows that modern republicanism is a plausible friend rather than a foe to the politics of multiculturalism. This conclusion is not surprising, given that the set of normative criteria was derived critiquing some features of liberalism and adopting key concepts of modern republicanism.

People belong to various social organisations and have multiple affiliations and identities that provide them with a sense of belonging within different social contexts and the capability to carry out activities individually and collectively. As such, the notion of cultural belonging – membership in *a* culture, and a *singular* identity mainly constituted by monoculture – is misleading when attempting to understand how individuals relate to culture. This thesis is not in complete opposition to Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism, which attempts to integrate ethnic immigrant minorities into the wider society. However, it argued that there are deficiencies in the normative premise of his theory and that policies based on his theory have a propensity to subordinate post-immigration groups and to collapse a multicultural society into plural monocultures. Moreover, Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism cannot effectively address problematic pluralism without unnecessary 'culturalisation' of certain groups who are discriminated against not based on culture but on race or gender or class, in order to integrate post-immigration minorities into the wider society.

This thesis attempted to address the challenges stemming from both problematic pluralism, given the three basic social facts – human diversity, ethical pluralism and interdependency – and the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture. In addressing the anti-essentialist notion of culture, this thesis mainly adopted Benhabib's critique of essentialist notions of culture and turned to Dilthey's works on understanding human sciences and meaning in history, because Dilthey gives importance to individuals within the context of interacting systems rooted in social life in terms of cultural systems and the external organisations of society – social organisations. Individuals are at the point of intersection of myriad of intersecting cultural systems and social organisations; individuals seek meanings to

their activities and lives and in turn also give meanings to the interacting systems; however, meanings are not writ large and they do change. Individuals belong to many social organisations such as family, communities, church, corporations and the state, and take on many roles and are vulnerable to dominance and dependence in social relations. Activities intersect many cultural systems such as economics, politics, religion, science and technology, arts and literature, and sports, and interact with many external organisations of society. Hence, Dilthey's concept of cultural systems and the external organisations of society shows how culture matters to individuals without ossifying individuals within culture and exemplifies nuances of an element of dynamism, change, continuity and contestable meaning structures of culture, without reifying culture. Moreover, this understanding allows us to consider multiple intersecting identities rather than subscribing to a notion of an overarching singular monolithic cultural group identity that constitutes one's identity.

The point of departure to develop a normative theory is an account of well-being derived from a Diltheyan standpoint of meaning in history as well as Dworkin's account of well-being, as both their accounts emphasise that we should understand our complex ethical convictions and their formation through our lived experiences and ideas of life without reducing to a single overarching value of well-being or a meaningful life. Dilthey gives importance to human life and history from the point of view of the individual who has participated, and this is also in line with Benhabib's emphasis on the point of view of a social agent rather than a social observer to understand how culture matters to the individual within culture. The well-being of an individual is constituted by her engagement in meaningful activities; activities are meaningful when they are in accord with her ethical convictions that she genuinely endorses, which are formed within her socio-cultural-historical context. Thus, one's socio-cultural-historical context is integral to well-being and gains normative significance. Accordingly, this thesis argued, in a similar vein to Benhabib's as well as Arendt's emphasis, that we must be concerned with the circumstances of injustice that affect human conditions, within the multi-faceted, necessarily problematic, social world, rather than with a universal human nature. Citizens live in a web of social relations and pursue their activities through social interaction and engagement, at the intersection of which they stand. Hence, this thesis emphasised that the politics of multiculturalism should be concerned with whether minorities have an ethical

situation in which they can pursue their meaningful activities according to their convictions with fair challenges.

As individuals are authoritative of how well their lives are going based on their ethical convictions which are formed within the context of the social world, comprising cultural systems and the external organisations of society, ethical concern is centred on individuals' social conditioning and their capabilities to pursue their convictions with fair challenges. Therefore one's genuine endorsement of one's convictions is a prerequisite. However, people are vulnerable, given the basic social facts in a modern multicultural state, in carrying out their convictions. Benhabib, Dilthey as well as Sen caution that the social agent's account of well-being is not the whole story. One could form convictions based on a mistaken assessment of how well one's life is going, for example, in an oppressive and exploitative social context. However, the person whose well-being is concerned has the authority to assess whether she is leading a meaningful life. Therefore, it is important for one to have the right circumstances of justice. This demands authenticity of oneself. Authenticity in turn requires the conditions of one being informed and autonomous. But these conditions are not adequate for minorities to overcome their limitations due to their socio-cultural endowments interacting with the social and political structures that can lead to unfair challenges in carrying out their meaningful activities within the multicultural social world. They may not be given the opportunities to carry out their meaningful activities and may face oppressive social relations. Alternatively, minorities facing unfair challenges may adopt survival strategies, and subsequently change their ethical convictions. But either situation is an ethical concern. This thesis argued, therefore, that social justice, as a prime parameter, ought to provide the right circumstances for the citizens to endorse their convictions genuinely and face fair challenges rather than facing limitations.

Minorities, especially ethnic immigrants who have left behind familiar cultural systems and the external organisations of society, have to find ways of participating in those of the dominant majority's systems. The ways they find are often disadvantageous to them. There are several limitations which keep minorities from participating in the social world as citizens of equal status within both the political and social domains. The social norms and traditions of the majority can be

limitations. A clear distinction between public and private spheres is difficult to make when people engage in activities that cut across both spheres, and when the boundary is demarcated, the minorities are pushed back into their private sphere to conduct their cultural activities. Inevitably, they are left with an inferior social status. What matters for one's well-being is one's capability for social participation, as citizens of equal status, in the multicultural social world to pursue one's meaningful activities; however, this requirement poses challenges to an ethical state. These challenges set limitations on a minority's capability to engage in meaningful activities and stem from differences between the majority and minorities in terms of cultural means, conscience and norms, as well as domination by the minorities' external organisations.

Those minorities' collective identities considered different from the majority's are often stereotyped and stigmatised, which can lead to social oppression. Some may adopt strategies to move upward in their social hierarchy by asserting different identities and may fail, and those who pretend to have the identities of the majority may be humiliated and are not genuine; and yet others may take on extremist views of asserting themselves with their particularities. These situations are an ethical concern as well. A minority's mode of being based on a significant collective identity and cultural practices may become a mode of oppression through domination and lack of recognition or misrecognition by the majority. An individual is also a point of intersection of multiple collective identities and belongs to multiple associations and organisations and takes on many roles. People have to deal with how they are identified not only in their day-to-day lives, but also in pursuing their meaningful activities within various intersecting cultural systems and interacting social organisations. Therefore, on the one hand, stigmatised and marginalised group identities cannot be ignored, and on the other, people should not be confined to a singular identity, as both situations can limit people's ethical horizons – forcing people either to repudiate all aspects of their supposed cultural heritage or embrace it uncritically.

Restriction of minorities' social participation as citizens of equal status is an ethical concern not only for minorities, but also for the majority. This thesis maintained that the minority versus the majority is context-dependent within asymmetrical power

relations of dominance and subordination. It argued that autonomy is constituted by both agency and option factors, and it is often misconceived within the debate on multiculturalism due to conflating both and giving importance to one or the other. Adopting Pettit's distinction of agency-freedom and option-freedom, it argued that social freedom is essentially agency-freedom – the notion of freedom as non-domination, which is central to republicanism – that can accommodate not only option-freedom, but also the notion of freedom of association and exit. Social freedom is a necessary parameter tied to social justice. Being deprived of equal status through non-recognition or domination or both negatively affects one's social freedom leading to social oppression, which includes systematic discrimination, exploitation, marginalisation and exclusion. Individuals vary in their capability, due to both natural and social endowments, to carry out meaningful activities even if their ends are the same, and both can affect participation in the social world. Sen's and Nussbaum's capability approaches, compared to Dworkin's distribution of resources approach, have merit in addressing inequalities arising out of socio-cultural endowments interacting with social and political structures. The politics of capability can accommodate the politics of distribution and address its deficiencies. Hence, this thesis argued that multicultural social justice should be understood as minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status with their particularities within the social world. It advocates that we take the politics of capability and freedom as non-domination seriously within the politics of multicultural integration.

However, the multicultural paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture emphasises that cultural practices are normatively contestable and contesting; therefore, claims for recognition and inter-cultural justice have to be deliberated among the citizens. This thesis showed that our challenge is to ensure minorities' capability to deliberate as citizens of equal status within the problematic social world on competing claims for recognition and inter-cultural justice. In meeting this challenge, this thesis showed that multicultural social justice should meet the minimal and common normative conditions of social recognition and non-domination. However, the question is how we should understand social recognition without reifying identity and culture while allowing individuals to express their deepest concerns and convictions, within their relevant contexts, in their multiple intersecting identities. This thesis critiqued equating the politics of recognition to the

politics of identity/difference, as it may lead to the problem of reification of identity and culture. Social recognition must go beyond mere tolerance and anti-discrimination. As Benhabib maintains, democratic theories should allow individuals' voluntary self-ascription and self-determination.

This thesis considered the contemporary democratic theories of recognition of both Fraser and Honneth, which do not reify identity and culture. Based on the analysis of their theories, it emphasised that social recognition should be founded on self-respect rather than on self-esteem or collective self-esteem. It showed that these two normative conditions – social recognition and non-domination – are complementary and rooted in self-respect, which constitutes autonomy, character and conduct. Adopting Honohan's republican idea of recognition for deliberation, this thesis showed that social recognition includes three aspects: acknowledging specificity, authorising viewpoints and endorsing practices; these three aspects go beyond recognition as mere toleration and non-discrimination. Non-domination is a different aspect from recognition, as non-slavery is an absence of arbitrary interference. Both the conditions are necessary for minorities' participation in deliberating on claims for justice and recognition in their particularities without reifying identity and culture.

As cultural and moral dimensions intersect both the majority's and minorities' cultural systems, moral clashes and dilemmas have to be deliberated for multicultural social justice. This thesis argued that an account of morality must accompany responsibilities and showed that Scanlon's contractualist framework is useful in advancing Dilthey's moral account, because Scanlon also gives an account of well-being in similar vein to Dilthey's that we cannot reduce well-being to a single overarching value of good or solely to the quality of experience. Scanlon emphasises that what matters is that we should value something in terms of what kind of actions and attitudes are called for rather than how valuable it is. Dilthey's account of morality within Scanlon's framework of contractualism provides a better account than Parekh's pluralist universalism to seek moral obligations from individuals rather than from representatives of cultural groups. As individuals are authoritative of their genuine convictions, the morality should appeal to individuals if we are to seek moral obligations from them. The appeal to an individual should be,

at least in the minimalist sense, using Scanlon's terms, one the individual could not 'reasonably reject'. The concern for morality must take into account respect for individuality to value human life that provides the kinds of actions and attitudes that are called for, which include a sense of justice. Dilthey's account of double-sided morality regulates activities of individuals, externally through the purposive systems of society – law and a system of morality – and internally through their conscience. A one-sided morality account, for example Kukathas's account, based on conscience, or a system of morality and law, is deficient in regulating activities of individuals. Dilthey's account is not a minimalist universalism, and a system of morality is expressed in a multiplicity of forms taking into account peculiarities of locale.

This thesis demonstrated that multicultural social justice is the responsibility of both the state, other external organisations of the society and of the citizens. Hence, civic virtues are important to foster self-respect, thereby ensuring responsibilities are not forsaken, and moreover they are conducive to the egalitarian reciprocity of treating one another as citizens of equal status. The state has a moral responsibility – a duty with a sense of justice, and the capacity to deal with moral conflicts. Claims for recognition and justice require that any necessary parameters for the right circumstances of justice have to be tested against the minimal and common conditions of social recognition and non-domination.

The normative underpinning of multicultural social justice rooted in self-respect in which each member of society is treated in their particularities as citizens of equal status overcomes the normative deficiencies in Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism. Minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status is affected by many public policies. As Benhabib emphasises, cultural aspects are only part of the totality of the circumstances and individuals' meaningful activities intersect many spheres – economic, social and political. Kymlicka also acknowledges that many public policies are the major engines of integration. Hence, the state that seriously considers an effective multicultural integration must ensure that many aspects of public policy are integral parts of the politics of multicultural integration. These policies must pass the test of the minimal and common conditions

and ensure minorities' capability to function as citizens of equal status participating in the problematic social world.

This thesis specified a set of normative criteria that need to be met for the efficacy of competing political theories for the sort of multicultural state that this thesis attempts to advocate. The normative conditions give importance to individuals' diverse well-being but participation as equal citizens, agency-freedom rather than option freedom, social recognition beyond tolerance and anti-discrimination, the state's duty with a sense of justice to promote diverse well-being of citizens, and the duties and responsibilities of social organisations along with those of individuals ensuring multicultural social justice prevails. It is to be noted that this thesis critiqued liberalism and adopted key concepts of modern republicanism – freedom as non-domination, recognition for deliberation and participation and civic virtues and responsibilities – in deriving these normative conditions.

Subsequently, this thesis examined the core features and values of liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism in terms of their potential in meeting the set of normative criteria of multicultural integration, and showed that modern republicanism is a plausible ally to multiculturalism. In so doing, it also demonstrated that the criteria developed in the main part of the dissertation have the capacity – 'normative bite' – to help us discriminate in a principled manner between several political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity.¹⁹⁰

The anti-perfectionist attitude of liberalism – neutrality of the state – dichotomises the social world into public and private spheres and applies the principle of tolerance within the private sphere. The dichotomy, combined with the liberal concept of tolerance, can reinforce existing asymmetrical power relations between the majority and the minorities in the public domain. A neutral state, a policy of equality and impartiality within the public sphere, can become restrictive to minorities, in terms of both recognition and domination, as they carry out their meaningful activities which intersect with the systems of the majority. However, it is plausible to maintain equality and impartiality with rules-plus-exemptions, or to change the rules

¹⁹⁰ I am indebted to Dr. Peri Roberts for making this point.

themselves to take social recognition and non-domination into account. Moreover, this thesis showed that Rawls' distribution of social bases of self-respect has problems of its own, and Kukathas' freedom of association with liberal toleration faces limitations and challenges in meeting the conditions. The liberal notion of freedom as non-interference cannot effectively deal with the unjust ethical situations in the private sphere. It also showed that perfectionist liberalism faces limitations and challenges in meeting the set of normative criteria.

Communitarianism challenges liberalism. However, orthodox communitarianism adhering to conservative values may be oppressive to women and socially excluded communities. Parekh's political structure of multicultural society taking into consideration many limitations of liberalism could accommodate cultural communities on an equal standing; however, his concerns may be better served within a modern civic republicanism that enables individual agency and well-being integrating post-immigrant ethnic minorities as citizens of equal status.

Modern republicanism has been revived over the last three decades and there are many variations. This thesis mainly considered Honohan's work on civic republicanism as it adopted her key concept of recognition along the three dimensions – specificity, authorisation and endorsement. Although republicanism and multiculturalism are generally considered a contentious coupling, this thesis showed that this concern is based on the idea of a singular concept of common good and an essentialist notion of culture, both of which ideas have been undergoing revisions. Contemporary republicans are mainly concerned with common vulnerabilities among interdependent citizens, and many contemporary multiculturalists critique essentialist notions of culture. Modern republicanism takes into account interacting and interdependent citizens engaging in the pursuit of their goals without fear of domination along the political and social power axes. Moreover, civic virtues tied to self-respect can foster social recognition along the social power axis. Republicanism also enhances people's autonomy through political autonomy. Several measures can be taken under republicanism to ensure social recognition on all three dimensions – specificity, authorisation and endorsement – along with non-domination for deliberation and participation. These measures aim neither to promote differences nor to assimilate to a single conception of a good life,

but rather to promote social freedom to pursue different ethical convictions. These positive aspects of modern civic republicanism attempt to overcome the limitations of liberalism and communitarianism in meeting the set of normative criteria of the politics of multicultural integration.

At a minimum, this thesis has demonstrated that the criteria developed in the main part have the capacity to discriminate in a principled manner among competing political approaches to multiculturalism and diversity. Thereby it shows that modern republicanism – despite its contentious coupling with multiculturalism – cannot be discredited ‘wholesale’ for multiculturalism within the paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture. Republicanism poses a good challenge to the liberal tradition and communitarianism, which challenges liberalism within the liberal/communitarianism debate, to be considered as an alternative tradition. However, using Phillips’ remarks in relation to feminism and republicanism, as I discussed in Chapter 7, we should be cautious in attempting to ‘swallow it wholesale’ either, as there are many variations; as pointed out by Honohan, whose work on civic republicanism this thesis mainly adopted, republicanism as a tradition is constituted of multiple interwoven strands. It may be plausible, as Kymlicka suggests, that liberal egalitarians and civic republicans could work together to find imaginative proposals that promote both social justice and participatory democracy; but such an enterprise is beyond the scope of this thesis.

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