Musical eutopias:  
A positive critique of popular musics & mediated listening, with particular reference to the BBC & public service radio  

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Summary

Musical eutopias offers positive critiques of the socio-cultural aspects of popular musics, the medium of radio in general, and the British Broadcasting Corporation in particular. Marxian critiques of what 'is', together with normative, socialist visions of what 'ought' to be, are reviewed with reference to radio's listening subjects and broadcasting ideals. Arguably, popular musics embraced by radio only offer a dystopian standardisation for a mass audience. However, it is mooted here that socio-cultural knowledges mediated by a public service broadcaster can contribute positively to a subject's negotiation of modernity and the objective world.

The humanistic potentials of music and broadcasting are considered using two conceits: (1) Sir Thomas More's diagnostic benchmark of desired alternatives and perfection: Utopia; and (2) Utopia's 'desublimation' in More's quasi-antonymic term, eutopia which is an actual site of resources and relative goodness. To sift for music's utopia and the eutopian aspects of Theodor Adorno's 'music in radio', the writings of Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas are reassessed and joined by new utopian theory from Caryl Flinn, Stephen Eric Bronner and allied thinkers. The cultural and allegorical dimensions of music, and the institutional histories and ideals of the BBC are examined through the work of Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, Michel Foucault, David Levin, Christopher Norris, Simon Frith, Georgina Born and others.

A near-Kantian sensibility, imagination and understanding are argued to develop (after Marcuse) in the musical eutopias of public broadcasting. There, a dialectic of utopian musical desires, socio-political philosophies and independent professional agency promotes rich aesthetic content and an equitable discursive framework for all. The study concludes that such in-common, public service eutopias of musical and moral dimensions are still of value for subjects becoming rational, empathetic species beings. Such eutopias might even counter new media solipsism and any instrumentally driven calls for broadcast reform.

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Declaration and statements

Declaration
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed
Kevin Edge
Date: 29.4.2009

Statement 1
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD.

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This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of John Peel (born John Ravenscroft) listener, disc jockey and broadcaster (1939 - 2004).
PART ONE | Preliminaries
Art cannot redeem its promise, and reality offers no promises, only chances.
Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension* (1979, 48)

Imagine all the people/Living life in peace/You may say I'm a dreamer, but I'm not the only one.
John Lennon, lyrical extract from the song *Imagine*, 1971

PHILOSOPHERS, SINGERS AND DREAMERS, alienated and frustrated by the socio-political realities of their times, have long imagined and articulated alternatives to present conditions; but how to picture something better, how and where to begin to render actual change and fulfillment? If the utopian promises of art (or song) in themselves fail to render emancipation, is it by engaging with the chances of a concrete reality that we might begin deliver better things? For instance, might an imperfect public corporation of culture like the British Broadcasting Corporation, with its technological reach, musical output and universal remit be regarded as a good place and space, a *eutopia*, or should we, after Ernst Bloch, a key critical thinker on music and Utopia, ignore its possible virtues and just continue to daydream and sing endlessly to ourselves in an unending lone search for a knowledge and freedom? Where might we effectively fuse art's undoubted imaginary force with the technical forces of a contemporary world? Is it possible to use music and broadcasting in concert as a point of eutopian departure, helping us collectively to move away from present-day oppressions towards freer, happier lives where commercially-conceived audiences are replaced by critically alert, mutually respecting publics listening to music and to each other in a benign public space? Is the mature, listening subject only ever a directed social construct, a “well-tempered” citizen consuming mediated, affirmative culture, or is s/he also an agent who can, in the presence of publicly shared musics, begin to think and act intersubjectively and with a rational freedom?

The above questions and utopian conceit may today seem romantic, naïve or at best, metaphysical. However, it is important to understand that during its early development in the 1920s and 1930s, the BBC, British governments and
listening public clearly understood the social implications of the new public service broadcaster’s remit in respect of the formation of a nationwide ‘space’ with amongst other modern features, unprecedented cultural juxtapositions. From the outset, British public service broadcasting was Paddy Scannell’s “unique totality”, possessing a “communicative intention” reflecting “public service as a cultural, moral and educative force for the improvement of knowledge, taste and manners” (Scannell and Cardiff 1991, xi, 7). The BBC was, and still is, a place, a space and idea. Material, pragmatic and quasi-philosophical contexts, then and now, have shaped the production and reception of BBC programming. Not just critical theorists, but agents within the BBC, critics and listeners have expressed strong opinion on the BBC’s cultural output. The merits and otherwise of on-air musical culture are therefore explored in this study with sustained reference to the complex ambivalences of critical theory, BBC history and to written views of a contemporary BBC audience.

The study adopts the broad-based methods and perspectives of critical theory, fusing concerns for the sociological apprehension and import of culture, audiences and media, with philosophically situated readings of the more enduring issues of aesthetics, public ethics, self-knowledge and hope. It is joined by a case study of a nationally broadcast and politically supported BBC Music Live event in 2000 and the results of a qualitative questionnaire undertaken by a selection of individuals attending a BBC Radio Wales music event in 2003 (See Appendix A). It is, in effect, a combination of sociological delineation, history and philosophical concepts that explore the practical potentials of the ‘is’ of empirical reality and the ‘ought’ of normative philosophical aspiration.

More specifically, this study is driven by Kantian-inspired aesthetic and ethical concerns; by a dialectical, subject-object imperative inspired by Hegel (1807a) and by careful re-readings of critical theory’s socio-cultural analyses and normative impulses from Adorno to Habermas. Such an articulation of observed social reality and prospective philosophy is achieved via sustained deployment of the utopian conceit to address desire, lack and social prospect as experienced in music, spatially arrayed through public service radio, and articulated through discourse and linguistic tropes.

This study, in short, seeks to expose more distinctly the utopian sensibilities hidden by the prevailing pessimism of Adorno and Marcuse; shore-up
dialectical thought and intersubjectivity and assemble reasons for the continuance of a humanistic, non-instrumental public radio, manifested intermittently in the activity of the BBC. Underscoring this aim throughout are three propositions.

1.1 Three propositions

(1) Language, discourse and discussiveness are ever-present features of musical dissemination, reception and interpretation. They play a significant part in the ‘meta-musical’ articulation of utopian and eutopian conditions, critiques and potentials in music’s presence. Utopian discourse can be deployed to comprehend the character and value of all musics (serious and popular) as a locale of anterior recollections and anticipatory prospects. It can also be revised with reference to public service music radio to become an ‘inclusivist’, ‘here and now’ eutopian reality and spatially situated process of intersubjectivity. Such meta-musical readings are played out across this study, but are given particular attention in PART THREE, Chapter 6.

(2) Musics *per se* and broadcast music constitute mediating substrates of subjectification and intersubjectivity. Such mediation can be of two kinds: (a) a negative socialization of passive audiences: one of false promise and instrumentality (typified by Adorno’s conception of the culture industry) or (b) one of a more positive social potential of Adornian “debarbarisation” and improved socio-cultural “navigation” for an engaged public (Adorno 2006a, 99). The latter is arguably identified in and informed by the intellectual history, social reality and agent-led practices of the likes of the BBC. Whilst a constant theme, intersubjectivity is given particular attention in PART THREE, Chapter 7. Reference to the BBC and intersubjectivity is to be found throughout this study, but sustained articulation of its role as a space of positive cultural array is offered in PART THREE, Chapter 8.

(3) Whilst the negative dialectics and critiques of Adorno *et al* still dominate much theoretical cultural analysis and discourse, this study proposes that the positive utopian gleams present in their work, are perhaps too often overlooked. It examines such tendencies, situates them in relation to Kant and Hegel, but, *contra*
Adorno et al, seeks a less ambiguous position in relation to particulars and hopes to locate conditions for, and moments of, a "positive dialectic of enlightenment" (Sherratt, 2002, 16). In these positive utopian traces, we can perhaps observe a fragile thread running between unalloyed prewar optimism and dialectical utopianism (Weill 1993, Mannheim 1960) and postwar, post-Adornian critical utopian thought (Harvey 2000, Levitas 2001). Such positive traces are set out in PART TWO, Chapters 4 and 5 and in PART THREE.

1.2 Central thesis

Peel's radio show was [...] a place to go where every person who listened felt welcomed into a fairer, warmer world, one in which anybody who felt they had something musical to say could say it, and be heard. A community not built on commercialism or hierarchy. A John Peel fan, John Peel homepage: www.bbc.co.uk. November 1 2004

Arguably, popular musics are a social institution for individual and collective expression, participation and becoming. Such musics are doubly effective when mediated, shared, engendered and framed by public service radio. This can effect a wider subjectification, intersubjectivity, representation and social emancipation.

Though neither popular musics nor public service radio constitute a utopia, they can combine to figure what we might term 'sites of felicity' (eutopias). Musical material offers the non-linguistic surplus, which, when set within public service discourse and programme 'flow' initiates critical articulation. This can transcend the socio-economic 'system' and ideological baggage from within as part of a still vital public sphere. Music and radio may not be the sole components of any immanent social transcendence, but they may be reasonable points of departure affording answers to Kantian questions of knowledge, conduct and hope. This is no idealistic proposal but more a Fabianist one. Even in the presence of political reality and the ideological cooption of culture, hegemonic forces by their very nature, have to admit independence and reflexivity within their walls to preserve credibility and enjoy cultural energy from 'counter-cultural' sources.

Here, in contrast to any absolute, utopian ambition of exclusion or insularity, additive, inclusivist, aspirations thrive in a place of intersubjective
processes and are thus a ‘eutopia’ amplifying the imaginary through its own constructions of popular musics, representation, and discursive reflection. In short, after the likes of William Wordsworth and G. W. F. Hegel ‘our better selves’ are mediated (formed) here and now by the institutional spaces of an ethical public body as the hopes and desires of the subject are educated.

1.3 Perspectives, concepts, themes

Whilst as human beings we all desire, think, imagine and act as individual persons, we are, in sociological terms, subjects formed by unconscious impulses, material needs and the external forces of history and society (cf. Giddens, 1993). Dialectical encounters with affairs as they actually are, and others through familial, paternal and proxy institutions, introduces us to a rich socio-cultural and linguistic brew of some potential. We are not discrete, essential subjects, but sociological subjects with urges, frustrations and intentions, conditioned by interactions with the family, schooling, current cultural forms and social contexts. Listening to the music of others affords us perspectives on, and potentials for, empathy, imitation and change.

How does philosophy read this? For Hegel, state institutions of a nation operated as a rational locale for the progressive development of the self-contained subject. Hegel’s mature work moved from descriptive historical considerations to speak of an idealist philosophy which saw the estranged mind of a human being work dialectically toward a final identification with Mind, a ‘metaphysical state’ of Absolute proportions and insights. Marxism preserved this general dialectic of interaction as a mechanism of ‘becoming’, but instead, posited a materialist account of a human alienation, not from an otherworldly Mind, but from nature and from others which might be resolved as a free, mundane identity, through a dialectical movement towards an ordinary, but true consciousness achieved through agency and historically-situated change. Moreover, the state was given little or no credence in this Marxist liberation. In the hands of critical theorists (Max Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) psychoanalytic, aesthetic and cultural analyses joined materialist accounts and normative critiques of a subject’s domination, highlighting the alienating effects sustained by a standardising
‘culture industry’ and administering institutions. For these critical theorists, commercially produced deception in the arts and entertainment, allied to the distorting, phantasmagoric reach of the mass media corrupted any epistemological and ethical imperative which might have emancipated the individual subject. Moreover, in the 1930s, the possibility of a benign Hegelian state authority had become, in Germany at least, the reality of totalitarian power using art and technology to extend its control over their people, extinguishing all positive possibilities. All that remained for Western Marxist thinkers was a hope for change: the hope of a technologically resolved life; the hope invested in a body of avant-garde art, and a hope for a decisive withering of any state-administered, socio-cultural sphere.

As subjects, our sense of a ‘better self’ works with objective reality and a kind of psychoanalytical ‘reality principle’ to transform needs and desires aesthetically experienced, into reflection and comprehension on the part of us all as highly diverse individual beings.5

**Intersubjectivity**

Following Hegel and Crossley (1996), intersubjectivity is understood to be a dialectical process of socialisation and enculturation for those individual beings as they encounter the objective world which includes other subjects. It also implies a mutual recognition through agreement in the presence of an objective material and social world. An example of near Kantian, intersubjective sentiment comes from writer Nick Hornby reflecting on the central place of music in his life:

I was sitting in a doctor’s waiting-room the other day, and four little Afro-Caribbean girls patiently sitting out their mother’s appointment, suddenly launched into Nelly Furtado’s song *I’m Like a Bird*. They were word-perfect and they had a couple of dance moves, and they sang with enormous appetite and glee, and I liked it that we had something in common temporarily; I felt as though we all lived in the same world, and that doesn’t happen so often. (2003, 20-21)

Adorno characteristically expressed something similar in a less sentimental fashion several decades earlier, and found:

In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of subject and object would lie in the realisation of peace among men as well as between men and their
Other. Peace is the state of distinction without domination, with the distinct participating in each other. (2000c, 500)

In response to first generation critical theory, *Musical eutopias* seeks to develop a defence of popular musics and public service radio in relation to intersubjectivity without entirely ignoring perennial debates such as cultural domination and socio-political legitimacy. The views of one individual questioned in a minor qualitative data questionnaire for this study (see Appendix A) provides some support for a positive view of popular musics, even as they veer close to a near-visceral antipathy to commercialised music which would have found sympathy with Adorno:

I am close to losing all faith in popular music. Never before have I seen freedom of artistic expression so choked and stifled by the opinions of cocaine-fuelled London muso types who are prepared to sacrifice integrity, talent and the joy of live performance to the safe haven and guaranteed profit margin that the market system provides. [...] If the BBC can stand as even a temporary bulwark against this cancerous growth then it is not just valid, but vital.

Questionnaire respondent number 124, attending *The Big Buzz*: a live music event staged in Cardiff Bay and broadcast by BBC Radio Wales, July 27 2003

[Hereafter: *(Big Buzz respondent no. [ ], 2003)*]

Yet can the modern civil polity with its imperfect bureaucracies and socio-cultural institutions like that of public service radio *really* assist in this task? Can it continue to hold its own, preserve and promote the best of all cultures, and an abstract humanitarian ambition amid the imperfect particulars of the instrumental world? How might music, politics and philosophy combine to construct rational, cultured individuals as subject and society meet? There is always the danger of a banal tuning-in to other cultures, but preserving particulars and the scepticism of critical thought, we ourselves can avoid the pitfalls of dominating tendencies towards others and the Other. This last term, whilst not addressed in a sustained way is of value and to be understood in the context of Hegelian subject-object relations and works with the idea that the Other is one of a radical, prior alterity. The Otherness of others however can be ethically addressed via common aesthetic and intellectual grounds.

*Musical eutopias* then seeks to evaluate popular musics and broadcast spaces in response to these problems of intersubjective activity. It supports the
view that there is a continuing need for a bulwark against pseudo-individuated narrowcasting and instrumentally forced deregulation whereby all music and associated discourses might remain fully public as significant subjectifying and intersubjective components.

_**Utopia & eutopia**_

Unable to effect social progress from within the polity, many socio-political images and critiques have appeared in the form of critical literary works like Plato’s dialogue, _The Republic_ of c.380 B.C (1955), and Sir Thomas More’s _Utopia_ of 1516 (1965). As allegorical figurations of legal, political and social perfection, they are now to be viewed as precursors of the normative socialist utopias and socio-economic and political critiques of later centuries.

It is the sixteenth-century Latin allegory _Utopia_ of More: lawyer, member of Parliament, envoy and writer, which initiated a literary genre that has informed much socialist thought and which initiated the conceit of eutopia at work in this thesis. In consulting More’s _Utopia_ (1965) and _The Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary_ (1989), we see that in his original Latin text of 1516, More played with Latinised Greek homonyms: _utopia_ (utopos - noplace) and _eutopia_ (eutopos] - a good or well-place. The _OED_ defines eutopia thus: “A region of ideal happiness or good order”. It quotes from R. Robinson’s second English edition of 1556: “wherfore [sic] not Utopie, but rather rightly My name is Eutopie, a place of felicitie.” In Louis Marin’s study of utopics, this is rendered as “place of happiness” (1984, 91). Line five of the poem in More’s _Utopia_ from the Poet Laureate Anemolius, translates eutopia as not a mythic, Platonic republic, but a real place comprising “_viris et opibus, optimisque legibus_” i.e. “men, resources and excellent laws” (Marin 1984, 92).

The utopian trope _per se_ emerged then with the literary _Utopia_ of More. This now well-known conceit of a perfect, far off place, or an impossible reality became, in subsequent centuries, a socialist device in diverse quarters, connoting a normative vision of an attainable, ethically better place and time. More’s island was notionally extant as a place, albeit a distant one. It could, for the purposes of More’s story, be reached under sail. Subsequent interpretations have transformed Utopia into a regime that is nowhere other than in the future. As either far away
place or future temporal space, the intellectual conceit of an ideal socio-political situation has inspired writers and fuelled socialist utopian thinking. In ‘designing’ other places and other times, it is both a better past and a better future that are viewed inspirationally from the present. Importantly, nothing can be figured, proposed or changed, without us setting forth from where we are now.

The semantic precision and allegorical richness of a literary utopian narrative like E. Bellamy’s *Looking Backward* (1888) and those discussed in Alexander and Gill (1984) have a substantial amount of immanent utopian material built on semantic, figurative detail, inviting any reader so disposed to decode the extended metaphors and allegories to effect social critique.

Utopian studies are now extensive and diverse (Alexander and Gill, 1984; Levitas 1990; Goodwin 2001), but it is within the socialist ambit of a return to reinvigorated, *non-literary* utopian thought running from the abstract and concrete utopias of Ernst Bloch (1995) through the Frankfurt School to David Harvey (2000) that this study largely remains. What all utopias do, to a greater or lesser extent, be they literary, abstract or concrete is to exist as systematic figurations of better places; sites of Bloch’s anticipatory ‘traces’; that proffer a “experience of lack” (Levitas 1999), or otherwise operate as “a crucial vector of desire” (Williams 1980b, 199) in the absence of historical development. These are potentials which tap into individual and collective hopes, imaginations, discontent or somatic impulse and are thus socially-constructed to an extent through language. An awareness of changing desires is important in understanding any and all utopian and eutopian proposals. Sean Homer for instance observes that Jameson sees utopian thought today in its more provisional, (perhaps near-eutopian) form as a means to transformative politics (Homer 1998, 7). Here, eutopia is to be understood as a site of transformative aesthetics, and linguistic and conceptual discourse which may change consciousness and *later* instigate action.

Of some relevance at this point is social theorist Karl Mannheim (1960). He preserved the concern for the alienated, individual subject with alternative personal visions, but also took utopian conceit, theory and speculation a little further into a utopian, situated reality when he wrote *Ideology and Utopia* in 1936. In this account of utopian and ideological aspects of the sociology of knowledge, he was to explicate one eutopian idea now at work in the present study, namely the need for the active participation of agents of change amid social realities. He
wrote “A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality with which it occurs” (1960, 173). Here we see Mannheim’s combined interest in an individual’s conscious sense of dissatisfaction, and his awareness of the imposition of social ideologies which offer false pictures to society to legitimise and stabilise present regimes. Mannheim wrote however that it was not:

[His] intention [...] to establish purely abstractly and theoretically some sort of arbitrary relationship between existence and utopia, but rather if possible to do justice to the concrete fullness of the historical and social transformation of utopian in a given period [and that] the relation between utopia and the existing order turns out to be a ‘dialectical one’. (1960, 179)

So, we can usefully position a eutopia as a locale of intellectual and material departure driven by desire and mediated by agents.

Musical eutopias

How do we move from utopias and eutopia as a general intellectual and linguistic device to this study’s musical eutopias? More’s etymological play with the homophonic terms ou-topia (no place) and eu-topia (a good, happy place) and Mannheim’s thought allows us to consider the possibility of the latter being an extant place, a provisional site of social betterment we might discern and describe, not merely propose. Musical eutopias particularly identifies a locale wherein the processes of becoming: dialectical self-development and intersubjectivity (the acknowledgement of and agreement with others) occurred through the cognitive, pleasurable experiences afforded by culture and music per se, which was shared, engendered and framed by the technology and discourses of public service radio.

Public service radio has been, at times, a legitimizing site for affirmative culture. But as a eutopian ‘space’ of representation, pleasure and fulfillment, it is also one of debate and praxis, pointing us beyond our current experiences, descriptions and knowledges of a static, ‘here and now’ - what has been termed an ‘is’ - to direct us all to a normative, socialist ‘ought’ of humanistic alternatives. Hegel in his The Conception of Artistic Beauty tells us that there’s an antagonism between an earthly what is, and an ideal, what ought to be, and that art and philosophy have a role in expressing and exploring this antagonism which can only be a sublated truth in their mutual mediation:
We see man a prisoner in common reality [...] entangled in matter, in sensuous aims and their enjoyments; on the other side, he exalts himself to eternal ideas, to a realm of thought and freedom [...] Such a discrepancy in life and consciousness involves for modern culture and its understanding the demand that the contradiction should be resolved. (Hegel 1993, LXXIII 60)

Music’s ‘powers’

Given its centrality in the manipulation of affect, social formation, and the constitution of identity, music is far too important a phenomenon not to talk about, even if the most important questions cannot be definitively settled by means of objective, positivistic methodologies. For music is always a political activity, and to inhibit criticism of its effects for any reason is likewise a political act. (McClary 2002, 26)

The exposure of music’s ‘truths’: its contingent, historical formation; its tendency, whether radical or orthodox, to be affirmatory and thus lacking in critical power; its cooption as solace and its construction of escape while devoid of actual transformative value are concerns found in the work of Adorno.

Music certainly cannot be regarded a field divorced from history and politics - yet for traditional musicologists and many genteel audiences (consider the BBC’s own Henry Wood Promenade Concerts) it had, in the face of modern social, cultural and technological developments, retreated to an autonomous, aesthetic realm.13 This assumed epistemological and social evacuation of music should, by rights render music valueless and without meaning or consequence. Yet it is its emotive power and accessibility (consider again the Promenade series and The Last Night of The Proms) that exposes it to control and recuperation, both by hegemonically motivated forces and by cultural transgressors. As Adorno concluded, music is indeed art and social fact (Adorno 1997, 304).14 Music is a rarefied art form of disinterested creative play, but undeniably it is also a socially potent institution amongst Marcuse’s “established order of things” (1972, 95). It is not an unmediated, ‘second nature’ entity, and its socially imbricated condition sharpens its desirability amongst musical audiences as a force for stasis or change.

Adorno, in spite of being materialist, socialist and perforce, a dialectician, was, when it came to musics, a lapsed dialectician. He never overtly sought to dampen his predominant critiques of things popular, nor reconcile his observations and diagnoses in respect of serious musics and the culture industry.
As is known, his social and aesthetic theory asserted that serious and popular musics were the torn halves of an integral, pre-industrial freedom; his cultural criticism judged popular musical forms to be bankrupt. Adorno’s ‘serious music’ on the other hand supposedly represented for him an autonomous, universal substance of Culture for people in which diverse minds could perceive and grow. Via the aesthetic, a social Truth might emerge allowing subjects to transcend the ‘here and now’. The popular was for him, a corrupted music that was surely once of people - a one time folk music that had been coopted by the technology and commerce of a capitalist modernity. This is where Adorno’s dialectical nature is found wanting slightly.

Adorno’s passing attention paid to the residual glimmer of utopian hope in the popular was but a faint echo of a more robust view developed by Bloch and Marcuse and later refined by Fredric Jameson (2000a) and British scholarship.

We should continue to scrutinise the popular musics of both culture industry and public service broadcasting to ask what is their ‘truth content’? Do they ‘lie’ - as Adorno would have it - and in so doing reveal the truth about an absent freedom? Might they invoke lost freedoms, ‘lack’ and a sense of the Blochian ‘not yet’? Might we, (after Roland Barthes, 1977c) hold musical works in language to articulate their utopian content and frame them as allegorical texts capable of continual re-interpretation?

There exists an intersubjective route of personal growth ‘through music’, an intermittent succession of brief, particularised insights happening under the rubric of a publicly formulated concern for universality. This is because music is an art which mediates between what Norris (1989b, 317) calls “the otherwise insurmountable split between thought and perception, subject and object, concepts and sensuous intuitions.”15 We should be able to join musical and broadcast agents to form our own critical readings. As Marcuse said in one response during a question and answer session following his The End of Utopia lecture:

The interstices within the established society are still open, and one of the most important tasks is to make use of them to the full. (1970c, 77)

These interstices are Marcuse’s ‘chances’, and radio arguably constitutes one of them.
Radio, subjectivity & community

Radio, as the first live mass medium, coopted music as a ‘draw’ for its national and international ‘listeners-in’. Today we too often take radio for granted; it is a commonplace, ‘secondary medium’. In reality it offers an intimacy, a personal address and a local platform, but is also a public space, and a national and international socio-cultural arena connecting government with the governed; individual with wider community and society. On air a nation can speak to itself. We apprehend radio in this ocularcentric world of ours with the ear - the organ of night time alertness and wonder. Our ears reach out through the radio to an objective world of other subjects. This is perhaps radio at its best.

It is encouraging to note that radio and broadcast scholarship has gathered pace in the past four decades or so, to counter dismissive notions of radio’s minor status to posit a thoroughgoing historical and theoretical critique of the medium which constitutes a legitimising and lively academic literature (For example: Briggs (1961), (1965), (1995); Scannell and Cardiff (1991); Barnard (1989), Chapman (1992), Berland (1993), Garnham (1995), Hendy (2000) and Rayner, (2001).

Tuned-in we can all, at least in theory, meet and communicate with everyone else. Indeed the directness of today’s phone-in dialogues and incessant, live news updates on most radio stations may be argued to be a more irresistible mode of engagement with government and the public sphere than even the most popular of musical programming. Nevertheless, music on air has a continuing role in the processes of selfhood and intersubjectivity and, most importantly remains the site, not only of the dissemination of contemporary popular musics but frequently also their constitution.

Music radio offers domesticed cultural intimacy for listeners and public exposure for participants. It is thus private and local, authentic and immediate, particularly in the broadcasting of new recordings and performances. With reference to Adorno’s reservations about transmissions being always “especially for you” (1998c, 43), it is, at the same instant - and largely because of this seductive form of address - a somewhat deceitful, insincere entity, acting in the important commercial arm of an international record industry and mass media organisations.
All this and more is eloquently set out by Frith who is worth quoting at some length:

I think of radio as the most important twentieth-century medium. Clearly the record industry depended on radio for its commercial growth, but radio used recordings in a context that was clearly public [...] It was [...] trying to put together some sense of community [...] People are individuals, but always in the context of wanting to be part of something else. Radio to this day is a way of feeling part of a broader conversation, a wider community. The fact that you don’t know what is going to be played to you next on a good music programme, you literally don’t know how it’s going to fit with how you’re feeling, means that you are having to think about what you’re doing as a listener in the context of other people. Radio has done that much more significantly than any other medium. Frith in Oliver (ed.) (1999, 263)

Musical experiences can, with associated discursive glosses, be ‘recovered’ and shared through broadcast practices wherein intersubjectivity at both community and international levels combine to effect a clear comprehension of (1) our natural selves (the somatic); (2) our socio-political selves (the ideological) and, with an understanding of Otherness, (3) our moral and ethical selves. Ideologically loaded meanings and beliefs in affirmative culture influence and bind us, but - as will be argued - they can also spur independence and contestation around which alternative readings, voices, and visions are raised. The exact forms, relevance and ideological gravity of broadcasting have already been widely debated by international delegates in radio study conferences around the globe, attesting to its humanistic potentials.

1.4 Evaluation, control & reproduction of public culture

Intellectual ‘worry’ about music’s power to control and weave myth, or expose truth and foster goodness in the hands of institutions with access to the public has an interesting history. Adorno’s concern for the use of culture and the loudspeaker in the public sphere - by state or industry - touches on some older and wider issues and debates. From Plato to Hegel, from Thomas More to Matthew Arnold, and from mid twentieth-century dictators to postwar democracies, discussion of such matters as music’s influence, individual fulfillment, cultural leadership, public education and civic enlightenment have peppered the margins and subtexts of
Western philosophy, the arts and mass communication discourses. In short, culture is a social medium of significance and influence and is thus prone to contestation for political gain. Cooption and usage of creative agency glossed by social and political philosophy are manifest in the state-institutions and cultural policies of many modern polities. The polity of the United Kingdom has indeed recently registered a number of keenly contested debates on the direction and value of public institutions and public projects.

Plato’s critique of poetry’s rhetorical and aesthetic enchantments as obstructions to independent reason, and his judgments of music’s moral power, when set before the young may be said to prefigure many of the concerns of Adorno. Of course, Plato was thinking about auratic, directly shared performances, not technologically mediated ones. But when we compare bardic delivery (and sometimes screened-off, acousmatic delivery in Greek theatre) and live radio transmissions that concerned Adorno, the distance between them is not so great. Adorno never accepted that ‘radio’ literally and metaphorically means a direct, (apparently ‘immediate’) line of live transmission from musician to listener which might be real rather than simply realistic, non-rhetorical and non-seductive. Adorno’s difficulty was of course with the modern fusion of art, commerce and politics which, for him could only result in aesthetic distortion and political deception; he never accepted that they too might be reconciled in a finer balance of independent creativity and well-meaning dissemination. Interestingly, what Plato and Adorno did have in common, was a concern for the presence or absence of legitimate authority and moral probity in those ‘philosophers’, whom we would term ‘cultural agents’.

It was very clearly the political cast and economic rationale of the broadcast media which most troubled Adorno in the twentieth century. His views have been extended by Stuart Hall writing of popular culture and state broadcasting in 1980s Britain. Hall concluded that “hegemony” was “to become increasingly reliant, in mass democracies, on the enlarged cultural role of the state” (1986b, 48). Similar concerns still trouble many today with questions about its narrow control and usage of media channels for cultural output. Certainly, whilst class exclusion and cultural bias may be just two of many criticisms leveled at the BBC, the hegemonic tendencies and imperatives of the corporation do, in
some measure admit of the representation of groups underrepresented elsewhere, and thus encourages a positive critique of the extant and indeed allows this study to value to the monitored, subtle and relatively autonomous constitutional status of that particular creature of the British state and polity, the BBC. Ultimately, it is issues of state intervention; social legitimacy and value that determine the breadth, character and probity of subjectification and intersubjectivity through the ether. Such issues are addressed in the final part of this study in relation to Habermas's turn to legal philosophy as a means of prescribing ethical communication.

*MUSIC, ELECTRICITY & RADIO AS 'A WORKING SOCIAL POWER' *26

One important critique of music and radio to be considered is Theodor W. Adorno's somewhat ambivalent and hitherto unpublished *Current of Music: Elements of a radio theory* (Adorno, 2006a). It was begun in the late 1930's and was shaped significantly by Adorno's concern for the aesthetic consequences, phenomenological reception and psychological impact of administered, technologically-mediated music. Published by Suhrkamp from the Adorno Archive, it is a posthumous, edited assembly of Adorno's published articles on popular musics and radio, and his unpublished writings on the same; the whole generated as a methodological and theoretical response to his collaboration with Paul F. Lazarsfeld and others for the wartime Princeton Radio Research Project. *Current of Music* was planned and part drafted in 1938-9 by Adorno and offered as an outline proposal to Oxford University Press in 1940. *Current of Music* 's rudimentary phenomenology of radio listening for those familiar with C. Shannon and W. Weaver's post-war information theory for Bell Laboratories (1949), and those familiar with high fidelity stereophonic reproduction or digital narrowcasting and podcasts will see, at best, a work driven by an individual, curious and fearful in the face of the increasingly mundane technological ability to disseminate music and voices across the ether. Adorno in his *A Social Critique of Radio Music* (1945) reflected on his wartime radio research in the United States and commented on commercially-skewed investigations into radio, characterising it as no more than an "administrative technique" geared to assessing (for exploitative purposes) the manipulating influence of music radio on the masses. He contrasted this instrumental perspective with what his colleague Lazarsfeld,
(according to Adorno) "calls benevolent administrative research, putting questions such as, 'how can we bring good music to as large a number of listeners as possible?" (Adorno 1945, 272), an encouraging instance of Adorno's willingness never to cease probing music and radio technology for latent qualities and opportunities.

It was not only Adorno who was fascinated by music and electricity fused together by the new techniques of electrical recording, amplification and transmission in the late-1920s and 1930s. In Britain, the first Director General of the BBC, John Charles Walsham Reith, Baron (1889-1971), also saw electricity and music as the essence of the new public service for which he had prime responsibility. Anthony Smith recalls the occasion of "Reith interviewing a nervous undergraduate who says he is not proficient in music or electricity 'then you are applying for the wrong job' said Reith 'for those are the two things with which the BBC is principally concerned. Music and Electricity' " (1986, 1).

Adorno's radio theory is condemnatory of its technocratic control and impoverished content, the latter being Adorno's "what" of radio (2006a, 77), but he is not necessarily dismissive of its potentials and technology per se - his 'how' of radio still held out, in true Marxist fashion, a means of transforming the quality of people's lives (2006a, 77). Adorno wrote: "Radio was not invented 'for the sake' of monopolistic society" (2006a, n. 1, 148). He also wrote that "The stubborn condemnation of mechanically reproduced music would deprive it of possibilities which, no matter how it may be criticised, should be developed and improved with the help of criticism", and added that he was not trying "to save an island of genuine and live music against the threatening seas of mechanisation and reification" [but was wanting to confront this development, rather than flee to any remote] "cultural islands [and wanted to remain in order to effect] better navigation" (2006a, 102). This is realism and ambition given further impetus in the pages that follow.

In Current of Music, Adorno had laid down a critique of what, in a letter to Benjamin he had termed the question of "music in radio"24 It is Adorno's theoretical insights and critical readings of broadcast music as "musical reproduction" (2006a, 97) which this study seeks to address and try to (re)invest
popular musics (commercial and autonomous), radio and service practices of the postwar period with an optimistic gloss he himself would never fully articulate.

What then of a more positive reading of broadcast music? In the 1920s, the transmission via electromagnetic radio waves of culture, news, commerce and politics to large numbers of mass-manufactured radio sets became a common place, not least in the homes of Europe and North America. Acting as a mediating locale between domestic privacy and public intercourse, radio, as a instrument of 'direct' engagement, cultural exposure and socio-political influence, soon became a communicative tool of veneration for several radical artists and thinkers, and it is these responses that serve as one point of historical reference for this study of music and radio.

Musical places & the spaces of British public service broadcasting

What place for public service radio today? As new digital broadcast technologies are being set in place and new commercial paradigms begin to dominate, radio listening figures in the United Kingdom have increased. Meanwhile, long-running debates about the funding and content of public service broadcasting have recently assumed the character of a serious economic and socio-philosophical end game. Witness the scrutiny in 2004-05 of the BBC’s 2006 Royal Charter renewal, intensified for many by the bitter Gilligan-Kelly affair between Government and the BBC. Residual respect and an awareness of public sentiment toward the corporation have meant that commercial and governmental pressures on the corporation have been less than might have been anticipated. However, recent debate about matters of truthful representation and of trust has surfaced together with the announcement in July 2007, that the radio consortium 4 Digital - led by Channel 4 - Britain’s other public service broadcaster has won the second national Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) radio licence and will run some ten entertainment and news stations. These latest incidents and developments will again invite external and internal scrutiny of the BBC’s policies and raison d’être.
1.5 Summary

This study seeks to draw upon both Frankfurt School and postwar Anglophone cultural theory and criticism to contend that music and its accompanying discourse can, on air, effect a praxis and a linguistically based intersubjectivity. Such communicative action educates subjects through cultural diversity and an ethical response to the Other. Using Kantian and Hegelian notions; Blochian and other utopian tropes; Adorno’s late reappraisal of radio; Marcuse’s aesthetic theory and Habermas’s accounts of the public sphere14 (as part of an ethically maintained life-world), this thesis will argue that a process of imagining, reflecting and ‘becoming’ for self and society can offer Stephen Eric Bronner’s Mannheimian “immanent transcendence” for society and individual (Bronner, 1994, 350), whereby the utopian assumes a role as a conceptual ‘yardstick’ of goodness against which the present can be ‘measured’ and where necessary modified using existing utopian resources and people.

There are, of course, strong arguments dismissing the possibility of experiencing or even articulating conceptions of human Identity, ‘authenticity’, knowledge and freedom, particularly in the channels of any constitutionally-framed and regulated system of public broadcasting. Arguments suggesting that these spaces can be dismissed as class-excluding and class-inflected conceptions are certainly acknowledged, however, in exploring the possibility of ‘good places’, with Arnoldian examples of ‘the best’ in play for all to witness (Arnold, 1993), this thesis gives equal consideration to socio-philosophical perspectives that might propose the existence of, or at the very least a need for a creative, critical sphere effected through the ether. Moreover, public service broadcasting is a spatial locale where, at the point of reception, capitalist exchange values have been historically at some distance from the activity of broadcasting and listening per se. Far from there being a dead hand of centralisation doing the bidding of capitalism and a global record industry, public service radio can still foster an arena for positive cultural developments - genuine experimentation and risk - which commercial organisations have yet to match. It is for us all to judge the continuing value of the BBCs and the public service model as new media hasten to undermine the qualities of broadcasting.
Notes

1. Bloch wrote of a primitive, pre-socialised condition whereby we ignore the outside world hearing only ourselves "As endless singing-to-oneself" (1985, 1).
3. As some might argue, the distant, ideal 'best' has long been the enemy of that which is currently 'good'.
4. The Fabian Society was founded in London in 1884. It argues for gradualist socialism and change from within the establishment. A Fabian maxim: "Remould it nearer to the heart's desire" appears in a stained glass window in Beatrice Webb House depicting Sidney Webb and G. B Shaw hammering a globe on an anvil. See www.modjourn.brown.edu/Essays/Fabianism.htm.
5. The notion of 'better selves' occurs in several places in this study and in relation to the 'I' is touched on by Inwood (1992, 121) with a passing reference to "his better self (besseres Ich)" which whilst Hegelian, almost invokes a Freudian notion of a directing super-ego.
6. The term popular music is adopted and used whenever diverse musical practices, traditions and functions need be taken into consideration that are demotically produced and consumed, either within or beyond the standard catalogues of contemporary commercial sounds. For further definition see Appendix B. Cf. also Dalhaus (1998).
7. Public service broadcasting is cogently defined by O'Sullivan as the "provision of radio and television channels as public goods rather than private commodities [...] as national cultural institutions dedicated to extending public resources of information, representation and entertainment. In the UK context, the 'core' components of public service broadcasting have tended to include the following principles. First as a public service, broadcasting should be universally available to all citizens and attempt to cater for diversity as well as unity within the national culture and its communities. Second, the service should be financed and accountable [...] which allows for the [...] insulation of broadcasters from the vested interests of governments, political parties, commercial or corporate power. Finally, the services provided should be of good 'quality' and responsive to the needs of all groups in modern culture regardless of their power, status or influence. The erosion of this facility is understood as a political weakening of an important historical right of citizenship as well as an index of modern social and cultural fragmentation" O'Sullivan et al (1994, 251-2).
8. For a fuller discussion of Otherness, see Levinas (2003).
9. More wrote and published Utopia whilst in The Low Countries. Its printing was overseen by Erasmus. It was first translated into English by Ralph Robinson in 1551.
11. Felicity is defined thus by The Oxford English Dictionary: "1. The state of being happy; 2. That which causes or promotes happiness; a sources of happiness, a blessing; prosperity, good fortune, success. 4; A happy faculty in art or speech".
12. See the passage from the verse penned by More which prefixes Utopia (1516) and entitled: Hexastichon Anemolii Poete Laureati. It reads, in part "Itopia proscis dicta ob infrequentiam, nunc ciuitatis aemula Platonicae [...] Eutopia merito sum vocanda nomine." The Poet Laureate's lines are translated by Turner (More, 1965, 27) as: "NOPLACIA [utopia] was one my name/That is, a place where no one goes/Plato's republic now I claim/To match, or beat at its own game/For that was just a myth in prose/But what he wrote of, I became/Of men, wealth, laws a solid frame/A place where every wise man goes;/GOPLACIA [eutopia] is now my name" More (1965, 27).
13. See generally Leppert and McClary (1987) for challenges to this assumed autonomy.
14. In respect of social fact: Paddison tells us that "Adorno uses the term 'social fact' (fait social) in the sense given to it by Durkheim and other 'founding fathers' of sociology." That is, following Paddison's adopted definition it is an external, objective force [of history, people, institutions] " 'not directly observable' " (1993 n.4, 318). For Adorno on sociology in general, see Adorno (2000d).
16. Whilst undertaking her own research into the daily habits and routines of radio listeners, the radio scholar Jo Tacchi (2000) reflected on the 'everydayness' of radio for listeners which she characterised in a short anecdote. The essence of Tacchi's argument is reformulated in the following imaginary monologue that supports and extends her inference. "Radio? well I never really listen to radio - except when waking-up with the radio alarm clock of course; having a
shower (I was given a waterproof one last Christmas) - making breakfast - there’s my dad’s old Roberts set by the toaster - driving to work - our staff canteen always has it on lunchtimes - driving home so I can unwind a bit - cooking supper, kids listen then too - having a bath, Late Junction on Radio 3 is quite good -oh, and yes, when I can’t sleep at night, The World Service is pretty good too.

17. The fundamental difference between (1) mediated political debate where semantic content and discursive activity is overtly ‘commonsensical’, pragmatic and dialectical and (2) a diffuse ‘rationality’ of aesthetic work prior to discourse is duly noted.

18. For further and more general evidence of the growing concern for radio as a highly significant medium for ‘ethical discourse’ and cultural promotion, note should be taken of (1) the second International ‘Radiocracy’ Conference, September 2001 - Durban SA. Its publicity noted that “ ‘Radiocracy’ as a term comes from John Hartley, after encountering the ideas of President Tambo Mbeki.” Hartley was responsible for the inaugural conference held in Cardiff, November 1999; (2) Radio for Development - a media consultancy (founded 1995) that promotes public education through the media, particularly radio. It is supported in its aims by UNICEF, the EU and Oxfam.

19. In his Republic, Plato sketched for us the growth of luxuries beyond life sustaining necessities which include “painting, embroidery, music [...] reciters, actors, chorus trainers, producers” (Part 2, Book 2, § 2 Civilized Society 337 1955, 107). He argued that children need to be told stories by those deemed suitable for the important task of educating morals, bodies and the development of opinion and aesthetic judgment. Plato wrote of good and bad rhythm and good literature and good music (Part 3, Book 3, § Secondary or Literary Education, Summary 1955,141). Aristotle observed that leisure requires education in many things, not least in music. In The Politics music was “a stimulus to goodness capable of having an effect on the character [...] and surely has a contribution to make to the intellectual and cultivate pastimes” (Book VIII, Chapter 5, 1962, 306).

20. During the Tory leadership campaign of 2005, the now party leader David Cameron was reported to have appeared on a community radio station with a youthful profile and to have shouted: “Keeping it real on Life FM”, source: PM Programme, BBC Radio 4, October 21 2005.

21. Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell spoke at the Radio Academy, Manchester, July 10 2001. She praised Radio 1 for its championing of live music. She also picked up her predecessor Chris Smith’s view that one should aim to make the good popular and the popular good.

22. Witness perennial discussion about subsidy and investment at the Royal Opera House Covent Garden. Consider too the intellectual and cultural implications of the initial success of Director Serota’s Tate Modern Gallery and the relatively poor attendances at the Centre for Popular Music sited in the City of Sheffield’s cultural quarter which closed in c.2002. And, at a more partial but no less informative level, consternation and puzzlement at the decision in 2000 to remove disc jockey Andy Kershaw’s ‘world music’ broadcasts from BBC Radio 1.

23. See principally Adorno (2006a, 75 et seq.). Radio, the invisible medium, remains close to the idea of presentational communication; through the loudspeaker, sound is as much focussed, produced and ‘neutrally’ conveyed as it is represented. Orality is thus reclaimed and technologically extended. McClary points out in her essay on Laurie Anderson that “The advent of recording has been a Platonic dream come true, for with a disk one can have the pleasure of the sound without the troubling reminder of the bodies producing it” (2002, 136).

24. Electromagnetic radio waves travel at the speed of light, which is itself electromagnetic radiation, i.e 299,792 km per second in a vacuum.

25. Mark Thompson writing in 2004 argued that “There’s no need to change the BBC’s essential mission or its values. Reith’s phrase, about a public broadcasting enterprise dedicated to the ‘service of humanity in its fullest sense’ still feels right. But to preserve that idealism, to go on delivering that mission to audiences worldwide, almost everything else does have to change”. Thompson asserted that he had “come back to the BBC at a critical moment in its history; a moment which calls both for a spirit of conservation - for the nurturing and protection of some of the BBC’s greatest strengths and traditions - but also for a spirit of quite radical change.” He added “The BBC is a unique, some would say anomalous, British public institution. Even as I speak, the great and the good are furrowing their brows, trying to devise the perfect constitutional model to hold the BBC fully to account” Mark Thompson “Skate boarding with a Ming Vase” lecture extract, The Guardian (December 8 2004, 24). For details of the proposed changes, deemed by some to be necessary to make the BBC leaner and more able to argue its case during charter renewal see: ‘Morale at all-time low as director general tries to save corporation by cost-cutting’ (ibid). For a critical stance towards the BBC’s perceived unaccountability see: bbcwatch.com.
26. Robert Hullot-Kentor alludes to the conjunction of music and electricity in his Introduction to Adorno’s *Current of Music* (2006a, 13) as does Adorno in his outline structure for this book to a potential British publisher. See Hullot-Kentor again in Adorno (2006a, 54). Radio as a “working social power expressing underlying social laws” is a phrase used by Adorno (2006a, 530).


29. Radio’s potential was spotted by David Samoff a wireless operator who had received the names of Titanic survivors in 1912. In 1916 he wrote a memo to his Marconi employers: “I have in mind a plan of development which would make radio a household utility. The idea is to bring music into the home by wireless. The receiver can be designed in the form of a simple ‘radio music box.’ [...] arranged for several different wavelengths [...] this proposition would be especially interesting to farmers and other living in outlying districts” Samoff cited in Settel (1960, 31-2). Reith recalled that “Broadcasting [...] had emerged from the first flush of scientific wonder. It had to be accepted as part of the permanent and essential machinery of civilisation [...] an instrument of social good. The BBC had founded a tradition of public service and of devotion to the highest interest of community and nation” (1949, 103).

30. The word Radio comes from Latin: *radius*, meaning staff or spoke; a straight line. By extension: ‘I radiate from here to there, as the first live mass medium, instantly.’

31. In recent years changes in methodology have resulted apparently greater accuracy of measurement. The impact of Internet and television as channels for radio has also boosted listening figures at least in the UK.

32. See Daviss [sic] (2004, 24-27). New technology will allow radio content to move freely through the ether obviating the need for orthodox licence and transmitter restrictions, lessening the need for national bureaucratic oversight. There’s now a trend termed podcasting: the practice of competent individuals using the Internet and free software to disseminate their own personal ‘radio’ programming (speech and music) on a regular basis which can be downloaded onto portable digital audio devices. For an early account of podcasting, see: Goldberg (2004, 11). The BBC in the Spring of 2005 began to make radio content available as MP3 files via websites facilitating an off-air, time-shift cultural economy of narrowcasting. (In November 2006, Channel 4 Television announced it would be making all of its programme content available online, this, coupled with the rapid rise in the profile of *YouTube* now owned by Google any claim that the broadcast model is dead seems more credible than ever before. On March 2 2006, the BBC announced an agreement with *YouTube* whereby BBC clips of old and current programming is made available). The BBC’s Charter was renewed in 2006, and will now run for another decade. The enduring issues of mass media representation, access, independence, funding and quality remain, and are joined by the BBC-led governmental project of conversion to digital platforms and now colour all serious debate about public service broadcasting in Britain. See Robins (2000) for an early account of digital public spaces that deals in passing with their utopian and eutopian aspects. We must acknowledge the existence of the MySpace.com phenomena. The popularity of MySpace on the Web as a site for the sharing of musical discoveries and musically derived identities is an interesting one. Is this the simultaneous model of transmission predicted by Breitsameter (2001) where everyone talks and no one listens? Of course, users do take cognisance of the content, but so does the owner of this particular networking site: Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.

33. *Chris Smith* [argued that] “the BBC has been “too much the judge and jury of its own cause” [...] he announced that the forthcoming white paper on broadcasting and regulation would include an extensive review of the public service role and the governance of the BBC [...] The BBC must [...] focus on its core services, the two main channels and the radio stations, and reinstate BBC1 as the centre of British cultural life” Janine Gibson ‘Blow for BBC means Dyke must get tough’ *The Guardian* (February 22 2000, 6). On air in 2000, Sir Christopher Bland (then BBC Chairman) said that the BBC and public broadcasting offered: “distinctiveness, quality, range and universality", BBC Radio 4 February 22, 2000. If the licence fee were scrapped, resultant subscriptions (at least to TV) would end universal access and impact on public perceptions. Wholesale commercialisation would undermine levels of content and journalistic independence. Direct governmental grant would likewise undermine the institution’s independence.
34. Habermas summarises his concept thus [by] "'the public sphere' we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens [...] private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like business or professional people [...] nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy [there is] the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions. In a large public body this kind communication requires specific means for transmitting information, and influencing those who receive it. Today, newspapers and magazines, radio and TV are the media of the public sphere" Habermas (2006, 73).
2 Framework, theories & foundations

2.1 Introduction

Given the "multitude of radios [...] a heterogeneous domain, on the levels of its apparatus, its practice, its forms, its utopias" (Weiss 1995, 2), Adorno's descriptive and critical phrase, "music in radio" effectively establishes a central topic of investigation for us here, namely Adorno and Horkheimer's culture industry (1997) and three major fields of humanistic concern within that topic: socialization, aesthetics and administered mass communication. This complex topic and contexts are fundamentally addressed in this study within a critical, cultural theory framework which Horkheimer and Adorno might recognise. However, familiar Frankfurt School references are joined by a later twentieth-century linguistic turn, a (re)turn to a Gramscian account of agency; and a renewed interest in utopian analysis and socio-spatial concerns, particularly in Anglophone socio-philosophical studies.¹

The method underpinning this inquiry is therefore not singular and distinct, but more an evolving, cross-disciplinary one in the spirit of critical theory's own self-reflective, contingent methodology. In its range it aspires to be a constellation of thoughts and is thus a plurality of old and new analyses, each of them fundamentally Kantian, Hegelian and Marxist-inspired academic perspectives interested in the rational and historical development of human beings through knowledge, aesthetics and hope. In addition to some ongoing Mannheimian and Gramscian influence too, this study also proposes a re-evaluation of the liberatory aspects of aesthetics via Marcuse; interest in a proper use of the dialectical dynamic and a recognition of the significance of language and everyday social action via Schütz and Habermas. Such an approach (to be seen in the following pages) is joined by various accounts and interpretations of the BBC's history and intellectual principles then and now - Reith (1924), Scannell and Cardiff (1991) and Born (2004), and by a case study of The BBC's Music Live event of 2000 (for a general record of this see British Broadcasting Corporation, 2000b), and a qualitative survey of a live BBC Radio Wales Big Buzz event, which took place in the Summer of 2003.
These analyses can assist in addressing the contingent conditions of modernity and its cultures; the character of broadcast technology, the motivations of public institutions and the fates of individuals set amongst such ideological and/or emancipatory conditions. Whilst arguably thus a complex method, it is to be broadly understood as critical socio-cultural theory and philosophy and a part of the critical theory project interpreting and evaluating historical and observed social and cultural data.  

It is hoped this synergetic approach will not only go some way to address Douglas Kellner’s call for “productive dialogue” between the Frankfurt School and British cultural studies (Kellner, 2002), but also to identify the potentials in music *per se* and in music and radio as a socio-cultural artefact of organised sounds proffering an immanent transcendence whereby expression, self-development and social mutuality might, at least temporarily have the upper hand over the irrational rationalities of instrumental forces.  

*Structure in outline*

Following the preliminaries of Part One; Part Two comprises three chapters considering the relevance of music’s sensory, imaginative and comprehending powers in the evolving thought of Bloch, Adorno and Marcuse. Positive and negative accounts of radio are set out here too.

In Part Three, Chapter 6 problematises the mediation of music through language, Chapter 7 explores music as a participatory medium and Chapter 8 looks at the BBC and visits Foucault’s claim for alternative, heterotopian sites and spaces.

The two chapters of Part Four provide institutional observation and analysis of the BBC to set alongside Gramscian and Habermasian accounts of agency and communicative potentials. Chapter 11 *Sensibility, imagination & understanding* turns more directly to Kant and concludes the thesis.

### 2.2 Marxism

Fredric Jameson usefully reminds us that pioneering British political economics (the study of the present day, the ‘here and now’ present) had been combined with
utopian socialism (a prospective philosophy) and Hegelian dialectic (dynamic encounters and change); and effectively gave us Marxism (2000b, 361). This study uses the twentieth-century critical social theory of the Frankfort School in its description and analysis of music radio, publics and audiences, theory which had very much grown out of the Marxism as formulated by Jameson. This study uses the School’s post-Marxist Western Marxism with its greater interest in culture, power relations and superstructure, together with its critique of ideology of the Enlightenment’s positivistic and instrumental tendencies.

Moreover, this study acknowledges contemporary social theory, social science, cultural and media studies, particularly their collective perspectives on audiences and their triviality, fragmentary nature and passive character. Additionally, it brings to these analyses and readings of mass audiences, Western philosophy’s sustained conceptual interest in knowledge formation, publics and their address, subjective autonomy and hope. With this articulation, the study thus becomes a critical socio-cultural theory and philosophy that moves beyond the descriptive and interpretative to reinvigorate a praxis, and self-understanding as a dialectic between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ takes place, determined by normative ethics and the moral imperatives of Kant (1998) with interests in independence, mutuality and good will.

*Mannheim & Gramsci*

The study as a whole seeks to proceed in the spirit of Mannheim’s utopian impulse and re-invigoration of ‘here and now’ circumstances and potentials. This was clearly set out by Mannheim and is worth quoting here:

[B]y laying the evaluative emphasis on utopia and revolution, the possibility of noting any kind of evolutionary trend in the realm of the historical and institutional is obscured [...] The conception of utopia [...] strives to take account of the dynamic character of reality, inasmuch as it assumes not a ‘reality as such’ as its point of departure, but rather a concrete historically and socially determined reality which is in a constant process of change [...] we do this because [...] we wish to single out the living principle which links the development of utopia with the development of an existing order. (1960, 178-9)

It is not only a Mannheimian pragmatic utopianism influencing this study. It is also coloured, to a fair extent, by the work of Gramsci (1971). His pragmatic
Marxism and theory unified his discursive analysis of the hegemonic and ideological with a solid, orthodox understanding of base, superstructure and the renewing potentials of active and informed individuals. Rejecting the rigidity and determinism of 'scientific' Marxism and its privileging of the socio-economic base as the determinant in social relations, locus of alienation and the 'damaged life' of 'the species being,' Gramsci returns us to the importance of a liberating individual agency. Attention paid to the organic intellectual and agent within history, saw him well placed to effect a move that presages the more gentle and oblique accounts of Raymond Williams (1989) and the intermittent, but immanently situated agents of well-motivated institutions mooted directly and indirectly in the work of Benhabib (1986), Levitas (1990), Born (1993a), Bronner (1994) and others. What we have, in effect is Gramsci's 'war of position' - that slow, complex struggle in modern life, fuelled by an intellectual-moral nexus of enlightened individuals, sensitive to national or global conditions which can operate in the interstices of hegemonic givens.

In essence, Gramsci turned, not to hope figured in music and the arts like Bloch had done throughout his writings on culture, hope and society, but to the systems of the cultural superstructure where ideological messages are produced, held in place and mutated. For Gramsci, the power of the leading classes (hegemony) is maintained through the social relations of work, politics and persuasively arrayed through the cultural realm where ideological (mis)representations of real conditions are formulated and "held in language". However, because ideology is consciously constructed in reality, it does not exceed or represent the whole of reality, and there is therefore, the chance for oppositional sketches too. Gramsci's wish for a democratisation of knowledge and for 'dialogue and compromise' is attainable and it is these elements in his philosophy which seems to have provided the very necessary intellectual, critical arc into which can be inserted accounts of agency and figures like BBC disc jockey John Peel.
2.3 Critical theory & its thinkers

Critical theory has long devoted itself to the analysis and then critical evaluation of the constitution of the self, studying the relationship between people; community and society; art and reality; and cultural imagination and present-day society. In asking what art and communicative technology reveal, promise, and change, much of the groundwork executed by critical theorists is preserved here. Indeed, in their studies of alienation, critical theorists had viewed the arts as a locus for the discussion of domination, hope and refusal. First Bloch, then Frankfurt School thinkers like Adorno and Marcuse, in studying the fate of individual subjects in society, often focussed on art and particularly music’s utopia to articulate these options. In the aesthetics of critical theory, music is considered as an emotive, open form of communication, capable simultaneously of being within and without affirmative social settings. Music for the likes of Bloch, Adorno and Marcuse could be put to work as a metaphor, symbol or an allegory of social reality, but also perhaps, more directly, aid ongoing social process and progress.

It is important to note here that none of the critical theorists and intellectuals whose writings are deployed in this study conducted empirical investigations into the BBC model of non-commercial, monopolistic public service broadcasting and none, even though many were active in the 1960s and 70s, sought to consider the symbiotic relationship of popular musics and the state on the airwaves. It is important to be aware too, this study seeks to break the loop of Adorno and Horkheimer who saw only recurrent audience oppression when examining the culture industry. Here it is suggested that alienation can be challenged, and capitalism and economics challenged too, in part, by way of the public corporation. Adorno did argue that a better world, indeed a “real possibility of utopia” and of “the reconciled” might follow “given the level of productive forces the earth [which] could here and now be paradise” (1997, 9, 33). Of course, for Adorno, the political and bureaucratic realities of culture and the media would always preclude this.

In contrast to Adorno, Marcuse, whilst being critical of unfocused countercultural activity and artful illusion, did recognise the presence of desire and opportunity amid established order realities more fully. This is the very dialectical
process stressed in this study: Marx’s, “motor of motion” extrapolated says Engels (1940), from nature. This is where dualities, be they concepts, antagonisms or separate entities, are mediated (modified but not fully negated) by each other or by a third, mediating term, that acts as a site of transition.

Bloch, music & hope

Bloch’s attention to music was profound, and whilst his musical history, imagery and interpretations may be dismissed by some as overly romantic with their allusions to music’s ineffability, he was undoubtedly alive to music’s visceral qualities and its near palpable call for our attention. For Bloch, music imparted somatic stimulation and pleasure, and familiar music showed us the comfort of past times in contrast to a present sense of discontent that goads us into imagining a better tomorrow.

Bloch’s work is additionally important in that for all of its romantic expressionism, it is, at root, a Marxist philosophy (albeit it in the form of a utopian rather than scientific socialism). As such, Bloch’s highly personal readings of music and the subject do discern social ills and proffer normative changes, not least through the dialectical engagement of the subject with a wider objective world.

Adorno, music & language

Following Bloch’s sometimes gnomic accounts of musical origins, Adorno’s explications of organised sound was much more intellectually thorough. For him, musical form was a loaded locale where subjects, society and history were made and reconciled. As such, music exhibited, even exuded socio-cultural morphologies. At the same time, and perhaps with some connection to the ideas of Bloch, music could be an artistic sphere free of mundane ties in which ideals ran free.

For Adorno, music was socio-cultural artefact and autonomous zone, but understood that both artefact and zone existed ultimately as philosophically and discursively invoked constructs. Whilst not totally dismissive of the ineffable
'power' of music's aesthetic surplus as privileged to some extent again after Adorno by Marcuse, this study holds fast to the ultimate need for linguistic analysis in the presence of musical expression. *We need the proximate and approximating interpretative medium of language to promote the human in music.*

Certainly, of all the arts, perhaps it is music which most often delivers a large measure of ambiguity resulting in frequent meta-musical reinterpretation as writing and talk. Popular music's pre-linguistic physiological impact, participation, yearning, lyrical nonsense and stylised delivery, establishes both the traditional and contemporary popular song as a site of diverse personal and collective significance, heavy with (1) an immanent utopian potential and then (2) a consequent, *extrinsic* potential for utopian conceits and allegorical discourse. We listen to music, experience its emotive force, and then, through cognitive and rational processes, begin to make sense of it through language. To recognise music's own ambiguities and the consequent interpretative freedoms conferred by language, it is necessary therefore, to understand music's potency as a clean slate but also anticipate its fate as a palimpsest.¹¹

Music, Adorno told us, is a-conceptual. It “is not identical with language” and “creates no semiotic system”, but nevertheless musical sounds “say something, often something human” (1998b, 1). The challenge is to (re)articulate that human element either as (1) a sensitive, creative musician interpreting a musical score, or as (2) someone reflecting upon and writing about music and its meanings. It is this second, hermeneutical task that concerns us here.¹²

Many of the theorists in the following pages work with the premise that music, language and utopia are allied concerns. This is evident in Adorno whose analytical writing respected composer intentions and immanent musical syntax; his sociological writing preserved accounts of musical production and distribution in a capitalist society; his philosophical and aesthetic work respected beauty and invoked utopian conceits. Undeterred by music's own lack of inherent meaning and critical decisiveness, he persevered with writing about it all his life.¹³ For Adorno, music required a constant gloss from many quarters; its sounds are a form of expression caught in a necessary “unending mediation in order to bring the impossible back home” (1998b, 4). This mediation was evident not least in Adorno himself, being one of sensual and intellectual (re) interpretation through
performance and language: (re)interpretations that were to invoke the impossibly utopian desire for a past or future home. As Adorno wrote: "because for art, utopia - the yet-to-exist - is draped in black, it remains in all its mediations recollection; recollection of the possible in opposition to the actual that suppresses it" (1997, 135).

Marcuse, music & technology

If Bloch floated music's potency and Adorno laid down the problematics attendant upon "Music in radio", it was Herbert Marcuse who offered a way of opening up the increasingly interlaced fields of music, society and mediated communication that respected Adorno's aesthetic theory and caution in the face of social facts, but which also seems to proffer utopian possibilities more distinctly in the presence of art and reality. Marcuse wrote:

The sensuous immediacy which art attains presupposes a synthesis of experience according to universal principles, which alone can lend to the oeuvre more than private significance. This is the synthesis of two antagonistic levels of reality: the established order of things, and the possible liberation from it - on both levels, interplay between the historical and the universal. In the synthesis itself, sensibility, imagination, and understanding are joined. (1972, 95)

It is Marcuse's thoughts which effectively prefigure some of the themes and assertions of this thesis. His work moves illuminatingly between a grand philosophical overview of a Hegelian and Kantian cast, an interest in art works, and in individual bodily 'desires'. The utopian and aesthetic theories of Adorno and Marcuse together argue broadly that, as semblance, the arts, (particularly music) offer subjects something critical of the present but also something new: a sense of that which has not yet been attained, or a sense of that now lost, but still recalled. In short, art's qualities contribute to a common understanding of our own and others circumstances and desires. Music, be it sublime, uncompromising and 'serious' or (contra Adorno) popular, instrumentally tainted and somatically situated, is a specially fine substrate for human imagination and empathy.

Marcuse's argument in his 1978 essay The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (1979) is, for the purpose of illuminating the present study broadly thus: art (including all music, although Marcuse focuses on
literature) is (1) ideologically implicated (it is constructed from and is a reflection of the material and ideological status quo) and is (2) also a means of resisting and transcending the said status quo. Marcuse argues for art having the capacity to effect, via the sensuous and the utopian, a useful, ethical self-reflection as a prelude to a concrete utopia of praxis (rational thought and action). Some might view this as a compromising provisionality here in the present, but it is surely also a critical first step towards a mindful dissemination of culture.

*Intersubjectivity as a common conceptual concern*

What does link all of the many perspectives and concerns of this study is surely the nexus of philosophy, social theory, broadcast principles and action, where the pre-eminent concern is with intersubjectivity – that locus of change via agency, language and institutional spaces where aesthetics and discourse reflect a Kantian valuing of mutuality and others as ends rather than means. Mediated intersubjectivity is neither just an opportunity for oppression nor one of unbridled emancipation – it is of course both. The challenge is to secure the means of mediation and enculturation by intersubjective and objective forces which expound ‘good will’ and pursue ‘right’ aims – a decision aided by observation and debated through philosophical engagement.

Emancipatory possibilities are potentially effected when any subject encounters any other subject or object through cultural forms and their supporting discourses. This intersubjective encounter results in a synthesis: a reasoned transformation of consciousness as a sort of triangulation between subject, art and objective world takes place. It is important of course to remember that not all encounters are emancipatory. When the aestheticisation of politics combined with the exclusivist ideology of Nazi Germany many, Adorno included, became exasperated and fearful.

### 2.4 Music & intersubjectivity

How credible is music as a site of explicit allegory and philosophical discourse? What can it sustain, what might it engender in socio-political terms, particularly if lyrically banal or devoid of words?
Music as an immaterial semantically ambiguous form is a rich site for utopian "sketches". All musics socialise and indoctrinate, but also through figuration, allegory and social representation, freely educate and enlighten the 'listening self'. Through musical participation, subjects become 'knowing' individuals, members of society in respect of the self, the everyday and the Other, but also develop a relation to the past, the economic present, and any number of political futures. Such an optimism in the face of reality can be found well beyond even the reaches of critical theory's more positive moments. Here is writer Salman Rushdie reflecting on some of life's more intense experiences:

We live in a world of disappointment. You begin with great hopes and the beautiful innocence of childhood but you discover that the world isn't good enough, nor are our lives and nor are we. But there are moments in life when we can have an experience of transcendence, feel part of something larger or simply our hearts burst inside. Falling in love and the birth of a child can do that. So can hearing the voice raised in song. It is one of the keys to ourselves. Salman Rushdie in conversation with Nigel Williamson about his novel, *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* [1999] Times Metro April 3-9 (1999, 16-17)

Here is another contemporary figure's awareness of such utopian or perhaps, more accurately, a 'eutopian' condition: Orchestral conductor Daniel Barenboim has called his East-Western Divan Orchestra a 'utopian republic', a real social place of resources and agents where, he argues, there's equality of expression and interdependence. It is for the conductor, a somewhere where you can he says: "try to understand the other."[15]

[M]usic holds out the promise of a radical transformation, not only in our habits of aesthetic response but in every sphere of thought - ethics and politics included - where the relation between knower and known is a field potentially open for creative reimagining. (Norris 1989b, 312)

With likely allusions to Kant and Marcuse, Norris is suggesting that music is an art and social institution that can connect us all through its ability to foster a common affinity of sensibility, imagination and rational understanding. Through music's many forms and settings, people connect and experience shared emotions and ambitions. Yet, how does the simple vibration of air particles do this? Musical structures and codes (rhythm, consonance, cadences, scales) effect subjective anticipation whenever music is heard, and thus allow for practical or imaginative participation. We can live and think 'in concert' through shared music. Music both
played and heard is, in large part, the immediate, pre-lingual preserve of bodily actions and responses. We hear, feel and sing music. It is an aesthetic experience which fuels both instinct and reason. Music connects with the body and thus, initially avoids intellectual reification, but it can also provoke nostalgia for a lost childhood, or underscore a sense of hope: an optimism for a better tomorrow. Bloch’s recognition (anagnorisis), Adorno’s personal, experiential “shudder” (Erfahrung), (1997, 245) and Marcuse’s “sensuous immediacy” (1972, 95), felt in the presence of music are each a moment of independence, empowering the listener prior to any wider domination and reification.

Music’s condition as sensuous but shared art makes it a prime candidate for discursive exploitation and interpretation by all comers as soon as the final notes fade. Indeed, Born sensibly cautions us against an excessive utopianism when thinking about politicised musical potentials: “Music, with its pedagogic, ritual and emotive functions, has also been the medium par excellence for ideological conditioning and depoliticization” (1993a, 270). However, this thesis will argue that whilst music is ideologically vulnerable to linguistic exegesis, it is also where its broader emancipatory potential lies. Ben Watson argues that “For Carducci and Rotten, proletarian music-making is a utopian anticipation of a new way of doing things: it is ‘sensuous human activity’ [Marx]” (1999, 93). Watson is interesting as he, like Reynolds (1990), argues for the need to engage with the ‘physicality’, subjectivity and ‘use value’ of the work produced by a Barthes-like musica practica (Barthes 1977b), and try to avoid dismantling the phenomenon’s categories in any analytical or textual fashion. Of course, this last request is a vain one, as no one listening to the generation of musica practica can escape the wish also to speak and write of it.

How do individuals constitute themselves cognitively and socially through music? If we tune to public service radio do we hear the real music of others or a distorted, managed, realistic imitation, bereft of any socio-cultural richness?

Whilst acoustic distortion may occur, a rational compensation or a ‘dialectical illusion’ in the ‘public-linguistic realm’ emerges of which we are fully cognisant and use to imagine social emancipation. Human consciousness becomes aware - through the senses - of some other thing or is ‘called’ or
interpellated by it (a sound, another person, a crowd) which it acknowledges and assimilates as an object beyond itself. The individual is initially alienated by the phenomenon - ‘this is not me, it is another person, or a cultural sign,’ but subsequently is reconciled to it and assimilates it as an ontological knowledge about one’s limits and the cultural expressions of others. Such engagements all draw an increasingly modulated individual more fully into the social. How might this work in relation to music? Well, DeNora writes of music saying it is “a resource for agency”, that “its perception is acted upon” and “is constitutive of the social” and an element in “knowledge formation” (2003, 57, 65). With this, critical judgement about the objective world ensues.

This thesis develops the view that the cognitive development of the self and inter-personal engagement is a succession of social and cultural acts - a symbolic sharing and negotiating of art works and ‘texts’ between individual, community and mass. This can either be direct, immediate communication in a real place, or a mediated address across the ether. The subject receives enough contextual information to process the content in the latter, and can compensate for any aesthetic or ideological distortions, thus the individual finally becomes a ‘knowing’ individual. In this two-tiered act of intersubjectivity, this thesis draws to an extent on Crossley’s understanding of what he terms the (1) radical ‘I-thou’ relationship which corresponds to the presentational relationships of a Gemeinschaft (a place of live musical participation) and (2) the egological ‘I - it’ relationship a more abstracted (public broadcast) relationship between aggregated people who reify others in a modern, mass-mediated Gesellschaft (Crossley 1996).

Crossley’s particular understanding and the approach used here comes by way of Hegel’s early work on the historically situated reasoning subject, his theory of alienation and growth Honneth (1995); the social theory of Alfred Schütz (1964a), the social behaviourism of George H. Mead (1962) and the allied auditory-social model of David Levin (1989). This account of intersubjectivity is also one that takes us generally, in both Crossley’s radical and egological relationships from a phenomenologically constructed ‘I’ of the senses, to a ‘we’ of mediated mutuality.
2.5 Utopian & eutopian foundations

There is no one way of looking at and understanding the complex phenomenon that is music. However, using the conceits of Utopia and musical eutopias is a useful way of understanding the socio-cultural potentials of music in a study of social idealism and social reality because it respects both the emotive, pre-lingual impact, and its subsequent mediation in language and reproductive technologies. Equally importantly, in its ambition to vault the limits of present reality, music stimulates imaginative, dialectical activity. Von Boeckmann points out that:

Dialectic is the desire of the mind, as Jameson puts it, 'to lift itself up mightily by its own bootstraps' (Marxism and Form, 307) to widen its object to include its own habits of mind in the act of apprehension. For Jameson, not only is dialectic the means of transcending the limitations of the individual, it is none other than the figure for that mode of future thinking for a social formation not yet come into being - the collectivity. Dialectic then, becomes the form for utopian thinking itself. (1998, 39)

Eutopia then is More’s “pseudo-homonym” and “quasi-antonym” as Marin (1984) rightly claims. The latter sees here an instance of what he terms utopic play in language with Utopia as a paradigmatic ideal, and eutopia as a happy, grafting reality of people, materials and effective legislation. The deployment of Utopia and eutopia within an allegorical, socio-political conceit allows us to move, not just playfully between concept and object, history and universals, but in a dialectically productive way too. Utopia for Marin is also a disruptive literary and spatial concept which hosts a restless, ‘playful’ utopics, that raises the possibility of an immanent critique of the present (Marin 1984, 196, 198).

Postmodern utopias & eutopias

An understanding of the social potency of the alliances of music and language is to be seen in the work of Caryl Flinn (1992) and can be inferred in the postmodern readings of Ruth Levitas (1990, 1999) and David Harvey (2000) where the utopian conceit is revivified as an experiential and discursive guiding process for imagination and critique.

Ruth Levitas is a Utopia scholar who offers us a postmodern reading of the concept while at the same time preserving the fundamental hopes and aspirations
of critical theorists in a convincing synthesis. Her book, *The Concept of Utopia* (1990) is deemed to be the key contemporary survey and investigation of the field, a field she readily says must extend beyond traditional literary utopias. She views the term as a way station, a provisional location of ‘work in progress’, a site of contingency and minor narratives.

Utopia for Levitas is now all about provisionality, pluralism, a shift from specified content to process and framework, i.e. the ontological process of becoming. Levitas embraces the contingency of new utopias, but she says we must have a position, a value; our best selves there to transform life while avoiding moral absolutes. Her term: “Interstitial utopias”: small, standing between or carved-out spaces and co-operatives might correspond to this study’s account of eutopias and be represented not only by large institutions, but by the likes of local, community or pirate radio where abstract aspiration for something different and better finds concrete expression. Levitas has looked carefully at Bloch’s distinction between abstract and concrete utopia and sees socio-philosophical value in Bloch’s articulation of an “undisciplined dreaming” and a “disciplined” one (Levitas 1997, 65). The abstract utopia is the realm of desire, retrospection and compensation. It is one exploited and sustained by ideologically and hegemonically inflected forms of affirmative culture. It possesses an element of regression and fatalism in the face of the extant social order, but it is, for Bloch, the raw material of ‘being’ for his *docta spes* - his educated hope where it is preserved and used more progressively (for the becoming of the subject as a species-being) in a sublated form.

2.6 The BBC

It is still recognised both home and abroad, as a bastion of independent thinking. It also offers the only chance for a lot of people to understand the styles/tastes of different societies. (*Big Buzz* respondent no. 83, 2003)

Philosophical speculation and social theory has to be about some thing. The thesis therefore looks at the principles behind the BBC’s early formations (well-delineated by Scannell and Cardiff, 1991), its postwar public service broadcasts and their political and cultural settings. In a post-colonial Britain of the late 1940s
and early 1950s, industrial realignment, a maturing welfare state and new educational provision joined growing consumer affluence and distinctive sub-cultural expression in youthful quarters.

It is during the brief period between the formation of Radio 1 (1967) and the broadcasts of MTV (c.1980) that we can perhaps best register institutional change, chart critical intellectual positions and test and apply socio-philosophical explanation with reference to eutopias. In Britain at least, this period marked a shift away from strategic, near-monopolistic prescription toward increased pluralistic activity in those institutional spaces assigned a ‘watching’ cultural brief.²⁵ It will be suggested that this period was a transitional phase from a strategically shaped time of modernising collectives, prescribing a socialist Utopia to a tactical set of contingent ‘interstitial’, individualistic eutopias (temporal and spatial).

The BBC is undoubtedly a complex, evolving institution. It is neither wholly private, public or governmental. It is at once an institutional ‘space’ of the British State polity swayed by government complexion and a relatively autonomous mediating socio-cultural locale between government, commercial interest and the governed. It can be seen to occupy a Habermasian public sphere of civil interaction which seeks to resist state dictates. The ground on which such independency and agency can flourish is outlined by Durkheim:

If the collective force, the state is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is, by those secondary groups [...] And it is out of this conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born. Here again, we see the significance of these groups; their usefulness is not merely to regulate and govern the interests they are meant to serve. They have a wider purpose; they form one of the conditions essential to the emancipation of the individual. (Durkheim, Professional Ethics cited Nisbet 1970, 161)

Institutions may indeed be Althusserian “Ideological State Apparatuses”, (Althusser 1992), but they are also spaces of conscious progress and social betterment facilitated through laws, education and the arts. Whilst a traditional Gemeinschaft may limit; the flux of a modern Gesellschaft may offer possibilities.²⁶ There is certainly a need for Durkheim’s “corps intermediaries” liberated by the emancipatory facets of society a place of opportunity and individual agency.²⁷ Here, within institutional settings, the will of individual and
group can be played out in the objective world. Idealism meets materialism in society. As one individual has commented:

The BBC [...] is far enough removed from the quick-response popularity game so as to be able to offer us the chance to listen to music that maybe of a quality level that is not instantly accessible. This is vitally important. (Big Buzz respondent no. 124, 2003)

This is an idealism in the face of commercial reality that takes us on to a consideration of the BBC. Today however, national public institutions and national politics have become outmoded by new technologies; unbridled free market ideology and international corporate strategy. The day of the national, state-sanctioned public service broadcaster might not quite be over, but the impact of the said sphere has changed as media technologies increasingly question the state’s legislative reach, consensual presence, territorial remit and singular cultural perspectives of ‘the state.’ Academic awareness of the subject at work in relation to music are found in Chapman (1992), Bennett et al (1993), Born (1995, 2004) and Shuker (1998). Shuker (1998, 287) called for more study of musics and state policies. Consideration of the ‘civilisation’ and intellectualisation of popular musics by the state where there is stress on formalism, craft, authenticity and labour can be seen in Chapman (1992, 266). Pragmatic readings of the BBC informed by some optimism and a knowledge of Habermasian thought comes by way of Nicholas Garnham (1986, 1992 and 1995).

**BBC case studies & questionnaire**

In order to insert some of the much-needed empirical evidence of the role of a present day BBC within national psyche, this study includes results of detailed written responses to a questionnaire furnished at the annual BBC Radio Wales Big Buzz event 2003, a live broadcasting and performance event which attends to a youthful audience through the appeal of popular musics (see Appendix A).

Whether eutopian gleams prevail now, and operate as breaks on total ideology and reification will be looked at theoretically and empirically with recourse to recent BBC musical events. Has the state and its institutions simply been engaged in a process of cultural reproduction sustaining the status quo? Might it instead, in the hands of intelligent, independent individuals, have educated
equally independent, fulfilled individuals capable of discerning in its musical and allied output ontological truths, social realities and projected social betterment? Has the BBC been both a mirror allowing society to “commune with itself” and facilitating self-recognition and a window looking out onto a world of dialectically significant alterity?

The aims of the minor qualitative questionnaire were to: (1) solicit ‘rich’ opinion on the purpose of a free, outdoor BBC music event in the form of respondents’ detailed written replies to a number of open questions. (2) Solicit considered reflection on the BBC as an institution in the form of respondents’ written replies to a number of prepared evaluative statements. (3) Elicit an articulation of ideological awareness and critique of public service music radio amongst a contemporary listenership. Its chief objective was to provide qualitative background field material to the central socio-philosophical study which might allow for a ‘triangulation’ of living opinion and perspective and either corroborate or temper the study’s claims.

Whilst modest in scale and relatively narrow in respondent profile, the discursive data sought was of adequate reflection, detail and fluency to be of value to the central study. Opinion was strong across the board in respective of what might be termed an ideology critique, or immanent critique of the BBC, but equally, many were clear about their readiness to defend public service broadcasting in relation to national socio-cultural matters. The extent to which written responses were mere rehearsals of prejudicial populist rhetoric or instead, instances of more authentic critiques could only be fully determined with face-to-face-interviews. Time constraints precluded this option.

This minor qualitative data questionnaire might be regarded as a pilot which could be revisited as a larger, more detailed questionnaire which might be applicable as a study to complement or temper any BBC-commissioned investigations of this kind. A more extensive questionnaire would need to ensure a greater cross-section of respondent profiles so that, for instance, mature reflection might be tempered with the views of more females, and those younger and older than those who did participate.
2.7 Summary

Music radio is the topic central to this social and philosophical study of socialisation, aesthetics and administered mass communication. In seeking to theorise its place in the dialectical, socio-cultural processes of subjectification and intersubjectivity, this chapter has outlined a number of allied Kantian, Hegelian and Marxist-inspired concepts and modes of inquiry deemed necessary and suitable for their study.

The dialectical processes of socialisation examined in this study move us through listening, towards others and ultimately our 'better selves'. We are mediated (formed) as much by 'public intellectuals' and bureaucratic manifestations of state and nation as we are by family, civil sensibilities and local, more 'immediate' cultural activity. Public service music radio is effectively identified as an ontological and epistemological space; a kind of forum lying between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. It is certainly capable of driving the ethical/economic modelling of the individual, but is equally capable of forming and extending his or her socio-cultural experiences for the better. Public service transmission is not just an ideological/discursive device of instrumental and affirmative socio-cultural activity, but importantly an independent cultural motor, historical repository and necessary discursive substrate for individual growth and wider public good.

Here there is discursive and structural exchange, agency and the generation of provisional, contingent knowledge. It is not Hegel's progress to a pre-existing, larger absolute but perhaps closer to Gianni Vattimo's plurality of voices which, in their cacophony can negate the singular call. 32

In exploring the places and spaces of these processes, this study uses the familiar concept of Utopia as a discursive conceit of exclusion and purification but crucially conceives of provisional, localised 'places' of cultural inclusivity in the guise of musical eutopias - current places, or good public moments or spaces from which to approach the future.
Notes

1. Today, what is broadly termed cultural theory has, in large measure developed from social philosophy and a range of methodologies in the social sciences and humanities. All of these allied perspectives seek to analyse, explain and evaluate the place of cultural processes in the formation and reproduction of power.

2. Such cross-disciplinarity perhaps echoes Fredric Jameson in his search for a plurality of entrees to given phenomena: here, the complex mediatedness of the modern individual. (See generally, Hardt and Weeks 2000). This is also akin to Adorno's view that a constellation, or better still, a train of 'constellations' can reveal some of the substantive character of needs and particular contingencies. Bernstein, in discussing Adorno's fragmentary yet at the same time broad theoretical engagement with his materials has written: "Through the multiplication of diverse perspectives a complex portrait of the phenomenon in question is produced" (Adorno 2001a, 8).

3. The German Kulturkritik tradition has tended to critique capital and the culture industry; privilege autonomous, high art, and avant-garde practice in music as the only sites of 'alternative visions' and praxis. Dialectical in inspiration it has foundered, post-Auschwitz on the particular, the sundered rather than the universal. That of the Anglophone tradition meanwhile, from Richard Hoggart (1957) to John Fiske and Simon Frith, has privileged and reclaimed the popular again as a marginal musical activity that is one of 'alternative visions' and praxis. Cultural theory in Britain was studied with a necessary respect for the two paradigms identified by Stuart Hall (1986a). The one he calls the 'culturalist' a strand prompted by the likes of Hoggart and Raymond Williams which address specific cultural manifestations, the second strand he terms 'structuralist' which is partly reflected in the work of Levi-Strauss but which of course also touches on Marxist models, Althusserian reification of the subject and upon non-historically and contextually sensitive semiotic practices. German and Anglophone traditions of cultural criticism have given us respectively an intellectual 'Faith' in serious music's transformative, Apollonian potential and an opposing but comparable intellectual faith in Dionysian contemporary popular music. It is hoped that the evaluative aspects of established German critiques will be extended by the greater optimism of the anglophone cultural and socio-philosophical theory (Bennett, Mercer and Woolacott 1986; Frith 1983, 1996; Giddens 1993) which overtly or implicitly looks to Gramscian identification of the dependence and independence of popular cultures.

4. Hegemonic force operates where there's not just a belief or acceptance of prevailing conditions, but where the promise of participation - the essential articulation of the deferential gesture - becomes reality. Regarding hegemony, Gramsci wrote that "The ruling class maintains dominance through achieving a popular consensus mediated through the various institutions of society including the schools, mass media, the law, religion and popular culture" (Gramsci cited Shuker 1994, 27).

5. "Critical theory is ultimately a defensive philosophy, protecting the fragile maturity already won, in contrast to Lukács's offensive drive to communism in History And Class Consciousness" (Edgar 1987, 282-3). It is a mode of critical inquiry that identifies ideological points of origin but respects the uniqueness of a cultural text and specificity of context and does not elide entirely, creative agency, the individual subject and his or her drives and psyche.

6. Norris tells us that "Since Schiller, philosophy had held out the notion of art as a healing or reconciling power, a realm of experience where the conflicts and antimonies of alienated consciousness could at last find an image of perfect fulfilment in the 'free play' of human creativity, of sensuous cognitions in a state of ideally harmonious reciprocal balance" (1989b, 330).

7. In the same passage, Adorno was as ever, quick to conjure the alternative "possibility of total catastrophe" when considering art in the company of productive and technical forces.

8. Engels wrote: "The general nature of dialectics is to be developed as the science of interconnections, in contrast to metaphysics. It is therefore, from history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself, And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three: the law of transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; the law of the interpenetration of opposites; the law of the negation of the negation" (1940, 26).

The dialectic as it is understood here is a special kind of logic predicated on antimonies - oppositional entities resolved by synthesis; a theory of logical reasoning seeking a clearer version of what is true, devised by post-Kantian idealists Fichte and Hegel, then developed by Marx. It is actually some rational, analytical knowledge and sensory experience of the real set about with
language and contexts that fuel the constitution of the conscious subject as a reconciliation of self and other, 'you' and 'I'; me and not me.

9. Mediation is an active process of construction, say of subject by objective world of social facts (cultural phenomena with coercive impact). This objective world comprises media channels which, as agents, 'mediate' (convey) content but also shape our experiences, perception and knowledges. Individuals are mediated; they are brought together by art and by radio, formed by them but can also be isolated by the representational errors of art when art is coopted by the economic and political use of culture and broadcast technology. See Paddison (1993, 110-11) regarding Adorno and mediation.

10. Geoghegan (1996) reminds us that for Bloch, the "Whirring, drumming, rattling" of music belonged to the ruling elite (presumably as martial and ritual sounds). The lyrical yearning for the absent lover heard in the pastoral flute is where music of value and expression originates (Geoghegan 1996, 53).

11. McClary tells us that: "Like any social discourse, music is meaningful precisely insofar as at least some people believe that it is, and act in accordance with that belief. Meaning is not inherent in music, but neither is it in language: both are activities that are kept afloat only because communities of people invest in them, agree collectively that their signs serve as valid currency. Music is always independent on the conferring of social meaning - as ethnomusicologists have long recognized, the study of signification in music cannot be undertaken in isolation from the human contexts that create, transmit, and respond to it" (McClary 2002, 21). Cf. Born (1995, 19).

12. Acoustic works are phenomena that become works of art as we talk about them as such and as we turn them - using words - from object into textual and discursive locales. There is a great variety of writing about music that does just this. These range from (1) the formal and musicological concerned with the intrinsic analysis of musical production: technical construction, style, intentionality and subsequent interpretation (Dart 1967; Palisca 1968) through (2) an interest in precise musical expressivity via an analysis of idiom, genre and lexicon (Cooke, 1989) to (3) sociologically and culturally sensitive studies of musical consumption, keen to contextualise works in broader, extrinsic settings (Leppert and McClary 1987; Clayton, Herbert and Middleton 2003). In addition, there is the great swathe of music criticism and reviewing, particularly now for Rock from the likes of Marcus (1993).

13. Andrew Edgar has kindly brought to my attention the importance of enduring ambiguity in musical work and cites the example of Shostakovich's Symphony number 5 in D minor (opus 47) addressed by Richard Taruskin in his 1997 book, Defining Russia Musically, (Princeton, 1997).

14. Silbermann (1963, 154) tells us that organised sounds are in themselves "socio-musical institutions", viewed here as 'spatial' and temporal places well-suited to utopian scrutiny.


17. Duttmann's Between Cultures (2000) looks at identity formation as a cognitive process using mediated culture giving what he terms a repeated recognition (wiedererkennen) which "refers to the identifying act through which one finds oneself in the other, or through which one finds something in what it is not, thereby overcoming otherness" (2000, translator's note, ix).


19. Hegel, says Inwood (after Schiller) conceives of education and its concomitant process of enculturation as one for subject and group of "alienation and opposition" and presumably reconciliation and synthetic progress. F. Schiller posited an aesthetic education for the fullest development of individuals: "The only way to develop the manifold potentialities was to set them in opposition to each other. This antagonism of forces is the great instrument of culture" Schiller (1795) On The Aesthetic Education of Man in a series of letters, VI cited Inwood (1992, 69). Hegel suggested that "estrangement" and "reconciliation" are key stages in the educational process for infants, children and youths. Inwood adds: "The infant's self-absorption - disrupted by awareness of an external world, which at first, strange [become] increasingly familiar - its natural inclinations are subjected to ethical and social norms, which, at first alien and expressive eventually become a second nature - the end product, the cultivated man, though he has fully absorbed the culture of his society, has more independence of thought and action owing to his stock of universal conceptions" (Inwood, 1992, 70). More generally on aesthetics, see Hegel (1087b, 1807c and 1993).

20. George Herbert Mead (1863 - 1931), was a social philosopher of an earlier generation whose accounts of socialisation through language, participation, and empathetic reflection are regarded as important for Habermas and his formulations and possibly colour the thinking of Simon Frith in his accounts of empathy for the other through shared cultural participation. See also Habermas (1992c).
21. We return to Crossley in Chapter 7 *Music, radio & intersubjectivity*. His account of subjectification and intersubjectivity is a contemporary one which is not only consonant with the Hegelian model of personal development, but is an account that throws some light on Adorno's theorisation and critique of immediate and mediated encounter. Additionally, Crossley's model touches on the communicative politics of intersubjectivity and thus takes us into the ambit of Habermas.

22. The egological model of Crossley is a more mediated/objectifying relationship and is about what is experienced, reflected on and used rather than being a direct, face to face mutuality. The value of Crossley's 'I-it' formulation is that it allows for art and language to instigate and enhance an engagement with the other, i.e. it is not immediate. This is potentially an unequal relationship where one displaces the other in the act of 'empathy', but it surely is better than an insincere 'I-thou' relationship or the instrumentality of a cold 'I-It' as it calls for a more imaginative consideration of the Other which requires language and culture to assist in an editing and adjudicating role.

23. Barbara Goodwin writes that Ruth Levitas's “answer to the question ‘What is Utopia for?’ is that it functions are compensation, critique and catalysing change. Postmodern thinkers have a negative view of Utopia as a monolithic, totalizing form of thought based on truth, morality and grand schemes. Recent utopias reflect the postmodernist ‘turn’, dwelling on process rather than on plans or blueprints for a better society: they are provisional, reflexive and pluralistic. These features Levitas argues, can lead to a ‘pathological’ pluralism which reduces the critical capacity of utopia and jeopardises its transformative power. As a defence [...] she advocates moral commitment and substantive content” (2001, 3).


25. In the sphere of public broadcasting, BBC Radio 1's preeminence amongst daytime audiences was increasingly being challenged by advertiser and format dominant commercial radio stations. At the same moment, reliance in personnel terms on a succession of public school and Oxbridge educated individuals with their particular 'great and the good' ideology and commitment to delivering edifying material to the nation was subject to an emergent market-inflected critique of public sector broadcasting exploiting populist rhetoric and imbibing managerialist ideology. On the rise of Radio 1 generally and the BBC as first a pluralistic, non-establishment body, then something offering a musical orthodoxy, day and night, see Chapman (1992). Sidestepping both state and commercial modes of communication is community radio broadcasting, both pirate and legitimate. Cf. Partridge (1982), Land (1999), Hilmes (2001).

26. Durkheim sees society, the *Gesellschaft* of Tonnies (1957) as “community writ large” Durkheim initially saw it as the progenitor of “the individual” in a legalistic sense - a less mechanistic structure away from the constraints of the community.

27. Durkheim argued in his social model that in the past, people lived in smaller communities where conformity and homogeneity was the norm. In more complex and extended societies, patterns still govern much of our socialisation but their details and combinations are more diverse. To some extent, the ‘perfect’ but now lost immediacy and authenticity of agency in the community and independent of collective incorporation is actually a construct of those situated in our mass media age. The insularity and hermetically regulated state of More's *Utopia* is inverted to become a community of all-comers which preserves its equilibrium and that of its subjects by becoming what has been termed a ‘community of strangers’ held at a distance from one another by technological distance. Held in such a mass mediated field, pluralities can be accommodated. “The only way to resolve this antinomy is to set up a cluster of collective forces outside the state, though subject to its action, whose regulative influence can be exerted with greater variety. Not only will our reconstituted corporations satisfy this condition, but it is hard to see what other groups could do so. For they are close enough to the facts, directly and constantly enough in contact with them, to detect all their nuances, and they should be sufficiently autonomous” Durkheim, *Suicide* (1896) cited Nisbet (1970, 157). Durkheim is here talking about pensions, atomised souls and the like but it could be extended to the provision of cultural support.

28. Arato hints that Adomo followed Durkheim (and Marx) in saying that we are products of the social. “The individual is a product of the general, Adorno insisted. Mediated consciousness is not bad, unreal consciousness, but the only consciousness available”. Arato goes on: “Even a false consciousness may be a true consciousness in this sense and a harbinger of transcendence, a map of new territory” (Arato and Gebhardt 2000, 397).

29. Cf. Born, who has called the “nation-state” an “inadequate unit of analysis” (1993a, 268).
30. Individual engagement in culture is now at once individualistic and privatised, homogenised and public but neither of these conditions respect humanistic identity or fulfilment.
32. Vattimo argues that the mass media brings everything into view and might just be for a moment or two, before it is critiqued, Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit: the perfect self-consciousness of the whole of humanity, the coincidence between what happens, history and human knowledge” (Vattimo 1992, 6). Consider J. S. Mill’s view that social diversity and multiplicity is “a public good” (*On Liberty* 1859), cf. Edgar and Sedgwick (2002, 162).
PART TWO | Music’s utopia
3 ‘Venturing beyond’: Bloch & the utopian trope in music

3.1 Introduction

Until we become idealists and Utopians we cannot be effective and practical people.

Music is the supreme art of utopian venturing beyond, whether it drifts or builds.
(Bloch 1995 III, 1057)

This thesis is driven by an account of utopian desire as experienced in the presence of music - mediated or otherwise - and its subsequent linguistic articulation. For any such account, Ernst Bloch is a sensible point of philosophical departure as his ideas serve as prelude and gloss to the aesthetic and utopian accounts of the likes of Adorno and Marcuse which are attended to in the next two chapters.

Bloch’s view of music’s possession of immanent powers and the demands music makes on us for a hermeneutical rendering is here amplified, reexamined and extended in this chapter through the work of Caryl Flinn (1992) so that both the pre-lingual emotive power of music and its discursive contexts (philosophical or socio-cultural) are acknowledged and used to inform this study’s recurrent themes of music, language, intersubjectivity, and spatial conceits. The present chapter specifically explores the relation of music, Utopia, eutopia and language by way of Bloch; considers Bloch’s account of music’s part in subjectification and intersubjectivity, and outlines the wider implications of such perspectives.

Bloch’s philosophy was essentially two-fold in character: (1) it sought to outline what was wrong with the conditions of modern life through a focus on the past happiness and present condition of individual subjects, and (2), it sought to articulate a normative, hopeful counter of improved future conditions with recourse to a sustained deployment of the utopian conceit. Much of Bloch’s work on alienation and non-identity was couched in the guise of what he termed ‘the not yet’, a deferred, partly-modelled utopia that was constituted firstly as an abstract utopia of feelings and then secondly as a more directed and articulated concrete utopia of potential remedies.
Bloch’s philosophy then was diagnostic and curative. It detected a condition of non-identity on the part of individuals who might, through a dynamic utopian ‘spirit’ crystallise anterior or anticipatory longings for a now lost past, or yet-to-be future. Importantly, desires could be felt, not least in musical encounters. Bloch prosecuted a socialist agenda for a fulfilment in work, relationships and pleasure within a dialectic of history, a awareness of objective reality, possibility and the value of art as a site of manifest possibilities. He looked constantly to works of high and low culture as profound and banal sites of imaginative recall or suggestive ‘traces’. In these traces, a subject might experience intimations of hope and utopian longing. For Bloch, music in particular was a profound source of subjective utopian speculation and guiding principles that would resonate whenever played, heard then later represented in words. Such musical texts were to be read and reread allegorically and thus escape any symbolic, ideologically fixed ‘meanings’ (See Norris 1989b, 327).

3.2 Utopia, music & language

If Adorno has proposed for us ‘music in radio’ and Marcuse the challenge of using art and reality as a source of promises and practical chances, we must now fully introduce the theoretical motor which drives this study, namely the utopian trope in music and in so doing, turn to the writings of Bloch. Utopian tropes are, to a large extent, a particular set of interpretations that are driven by romantic notions, historical glances, and a deferred or blighted sense of hope. This thesis argues (in part after Flinn) that music’s utopia is for Bloch and many others simply a hermeneutical product, prompted by music’s emotional immediacy. As meaning resides in language, generated in the presence of the work, philosophical and allegorical readings of the aesthetic and contextual particulars must supplement the pre-linguistic aesthetic moment itself. The theoretical model proposed here which reflects this, is directly after Bloch, and is thus: music’s utopia accompanies musical works as first a subjective internalised, abstract focus of longed for change that is then, as a constituent part of an external, concrete utopia, more fully articulated and understood as extrinsic conceptual cooptions. This second utopian phase is regarded as the element of docta spes - Bloch’s educated hope, where
longing and passion in the presence of a potent cultural artefact is directed by way of cognition and extrinsic linguistic and institutional evaluation toward praxis.  

In short, Music’s utopia is first an aesthetic, expressive and social expression, then a ‘concrete’ Blochian form as a more distinct social imaginary that may ultimately, as a eutopia, reside in the real spaces and discourses of a well-disposed institutional or other socio-cultural entity.  

Allegory’s lack of closure is important for Bloch and the other critical theorists in their accounts of musical meaning, and so deserves some explanation here. It is attended to further in Chapter 6. An allegory (from the Greek: αλλοσ [other] and αγωρα [speaking]) is regarded as any creative, figurative work (a song, drama, or painting) that contains an implicit, partially hidden meaning (usually an abstract political or spiritual one) that sits ‘underneath’ any overt narrative, conventionally fixed symbol or denotative feature. It is, to some extent, a kind of sustained metaphor wherein the kernel of the work is enclosed in a visible outer shell. So, for example, More’s *Utopia* is a politically allegory of socio-political perfection, John Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress* of 1678 an allegory of spiritual development. These meanings are intentionally ‘encoded’ by the work’s originator, but in the pursuit of religious exegetical precedent, anagogical conceit or political sensitivity, the work speaks additionally and alternatively, and thus requires some hermeneutical excavation.  

For Walter Benjamin, everything - every sign and story of fixed significance - invited allegorical decipherment and reinterpretation akin to the cabalistic revelation of dozens of likely meanings. Unlike symbols, which for Benjamin connoted a precise idea or romantically imagined presence, allegories were constructed to invoke the more obtuse, often absent, transcendent qualities of the artistic work. Bloch seemed to apply this allegorical approach to his catalogue of cultural works in his divination of hope and anticipated change. For Benjamin (as for Bloch) it was a stratagem of tactical, contingent readings taken from sacred practices and applied to the profane and ordinary to reveal the absent and the profound. Benjamin particularly wished to wrest commodities away from the aural, fetishistic immanences conferred on them by capitalism so that they might be first of all redeemed for their intrinsic worth, then allegorically reworked for some greater, non-capitalist purpose. Thus we have in the writings of Benjamin,
Bloch and later Adorno, a keen ability to explicate abstract concepts and absent, deferred states such as the utopian in the presence of the mundane - be it a comic book or popular song - once it was taken away from the market. (See Kearney 1986, 153-6).

One question that needs to be asked is whether critical theory's allegorical exercises in discerning the utopian are textual readings off, or textual inscriptions upon a work. The answer is that it is often the context rather than musicological form or content of an ordinary object's history: say its nostalgic, spiritual, erotic or emotive significance for the owner or listener which encourages highly personal allegorical readings of consequent latitude and subsequent philosophical potential.6

Benjamin and Bloch, even as they wove elaborate allegorical readings of music and the like, were surely aware of the potency of a work's remaining ambiguities and arbitrary purposes and turned them to their advantage in the presence of music and utopian thinking. As Norris writes, it is the "condition of deferred interpretative grasp" which is so prevalent in the presence of music and which avoids "the delusive promise of fully achieved understanding" (1989b, 327).7

Musical discourse & a critique of Bloch's romantic tendencies

Whilst Bloch's interest in the role of popular culture and the need to go 'bare' to others anticipates many of the themes of this thesis, his subjective temperament did not really see him going much beyond introspective musing or a 'singing-to-oneself'. This reserve precluded any suggested Blochian praxis in which individuals might not just feel or even articulate that which was felt to be 'wrong' but actually deal with the absences, losses and alienations his philosophy detects. In spite of his own extensive writings on the subject, Bloch underplays the role of musicological discourse perhaps as some fear of reification which might obscure the potency of imagination and hope. He in fact decries language: "People [...] attach to it [music] fondly cherished feelings of which the musical work knows nothing. They attach little images which they have painted in their own minds or hackneyed, allegedly explicatory words [...] Music is surrounded by grouping colloquies that never cease" (1985, 183).
Yet if we simply nod, wordlessly in the direction of music’s ineffable qualities, are we not guilty of romanticising a creative medium that is also shot through with social facts? Equally, not to speak or write of music so to preserve its ‘autonomy’ is to run the risk of there being a single song and a thousand meanings for a thousand different listeners. Music’s meanings have long been represented in language by musicians, critics and national leaders. Why shouldn’t philosophers take their turn? So how then is this shifting, often contested balance between the immediate and felt sense of music and any consequent logical reading to be carried out? How do we balance romantic readings with reasoned analyses?

Romanticism pictures the individualistic, struggling ‘voice’ against enlightenment certainty and classical order. Yet why must we, in avoiding the romanticisation of music, dismiss any image which helps us see perhaps hope in a Wordsworthian retreat back into nature from the modern world, or Adorno’s Beethoven struggling against society and his own physical disability? Why must personal imagery necessarily imply any sort of diminution of the individual? To dismiss romanticism and alienation in relation to music and utopia, is to reject the energies of aversion and hope.

Romanticism, according to Flinn valued “music for its distinction from language, its lack of mimeticism, and its irrationality, believing that these features enable it to express important spiritual resonances, hidden from the phenomenal world” (1992, 48). Yet how are such resonances to be shared and articulated to useful effect? In studies of alienation in industrialised society, critical theorists have viewed the arts generally as a locus for the representation, detection and discussion of domination and refusal. Music for them could be a ‘social deposit’ put to work as index, metaphor or allegory. Music itself does not constitute a language imparting concepts, but does, as Adorno asserted, have an intentionality, and whilst he claims we can only interpret it through a performance or score reading, we also might reasonably regard it as an aesthetic form prompting common emotive comprehension amongst every listener too. Additionally, as Paddison (1990, 209) reminds us, Adorno did not see any final internal significance, and that music must always be heard in context.
3.3 ‘What has gone wrong?’ non-identity, subjectification & intersubjectivity

Alone, many people are slightly insane, they sing a piece of that which used to be wrong with them and has not yet been fixed. They are distorted and imagined puppets, because they have been forced to grow up even more distorted and desolate. (Bloch 1997, 216)

Bloch here wrote of music’s presence alongside the alienated self. He suggested music has an ability to provide a sort of rudimentary ontological or psychoanalytical insight, writing “Having started as a physical phenomenon, musical tension turns into a psychical one” (1985, 200). He also wrote that “in music everyone understands without knowing what it signifies [it] says everything and decides nothing” (1985, 72). In effect he seems to be suggesting that music’s intense presence allows listeners to move away from their empty, inner self to encounter the music of others and then (jointly), through language give meaning to the musical notes.

Identity

A concept of importance to discussions of utopian yearning in the presence of music is the attainment of identity for the individual. The culture industry it would seem, had sundered socially autonomous musical activity of authenticity and intrinsic value, thereby foisting alienation amongst music-makers and listeners alike. An inauthentic, estranged human condition, a ‘non-identity’ resulted, whereby the subject was alienated from their own creativity, community and society, and was now, moreover a reified element: part of a consuming mass audience in a larger, instrumental system of commodity exchanges. Such a mechanism and consequences have been exposed by theorists adopting a critical stance in the study of all modern cultural forms, not least those of popular musics.

Cultural product as well as labour promoted alienation from benign, natural conditions and intersubjective respect. Here was a non-identity where the self was misaligned with the self; where self was isolated from the Other, and where there was also alienation from nature and a removal from one’s own productive powers. On a striving for identity, Bloch wrote:
From early on we want to get to ourselves. But we do not know who we are. All that seems clear is that nobody is what he would like to be or could be [...] Attempts have always been made to live commensurately with ourselves. (1995 III, 927)

Utopian readings pertinent to our interest in music and radio attend to the experience, representation and possible eradication of such non-identity. These readings do so in a number of ways. (1) As accounts of anterior states, of ‘what was’; of abandoned ideals or instances of fond remembrance - in short, recourse to romantic, historical, personal or familial evocations from the past with regulative and inspirational value for present and future. This sort of account corresponds to Bloch’s compensatory “recollection”\(^\text{16}\) (anamnesis), which includes the concept of Heimat\(^\text{17}\) (the childhood security and community of home) and more generally nostalgia, but it also relates to his potentially radical “recognition”\(^\text{18}\) (anagnorisis) - the shock of the old where an unexpected reappearance or relived sense of previous contentment can be transformed into a more active, prospective wish for a re-united self or community. (2) A utopian reading as an optimism founded on recent or incipient socio-cultural action. This seems to correspond with Marcuse’s sense of “a golden age”\(^\text{19}\) - a better past, as for example where the Great Refusal of the 1960’s countercultures is today framed as a momentous movement of creative and political progress. (3) Interest in the dissemination of radical and affirmative popular arts grounded in current technologies and further potentials. (4) As a pragmatic focus on present realities and tactical advances articulated throughout this study’s conceit of eutopia.

**Music’s other potentials**

Grounded in the everyday, but still loaded with subjective, aspirational inferences; music remains an emotive social institution. As Bloch wrote:

> On the one hand music is not a thing apart; it is, as it were, too promiscuous for that [...] On the other hand music is not a merely generalised thing either, since it is in turn too strong for that, too unabstract, too gripping, too fraught ontologically. (1985, 72)

Music certainly moves us. It is a universal palliative, a site of unity, ‘safe’ dialectical exploration and the expression of repressed voices as in jazz; and is
also a site of potential wholeness. The challenge is first to articulate these emotions and give them some political relevance. Imparting subjective expression through our voices, or by playing a musical instrument to effect a lyrical, sonorous or rhythmic music, alerts us to the physiological and emotive power of organised sounds. Music - as part impulsive gesture and part historically and culturally structured form - inserts performers and listeners into a familiar ‘place’ of close, meaningful ‘association’. Martin expresses music’s social role thus:

In the modern world, it [music] provides one of the ways in which people can live in communities, however amorphous, illusory or fantastic they turn out to be. The close-knit communities of Romantic mythology have given way to the quest for a sense of belonging, which is satisfied less and less by locally-based networks of family and friends. Instead, individuals may seek to identify themselves with symbolic entities [...] organisations [...] teams [...] heroes [...] In both simple and complex societies, it seems, there is an awareness that the satisfaction of material needs tends to pull people apart from each other, and it is often in music that they seek to repair the social damage. (Martin 1995, 275)

Whilst music is, today, integrated into channels of production and dissemination, there are few who would doubt the initial or even residual if ultimately ‘ineffable’ potency of much music as a still unadministered human resource.

No other cultural form exudes such collective potency and, it could be argued, music making or listening to music constitute one of our single most profound, aesthetic, cognitive and intersubjective experiences as Homo sapiens.

Music can certainly afford Marcuse’s “sensuous immediacy”; a true engagement with will, instincts and even the ecstatic. Conceptual reification and ideological choreography can be avoided for a while as we ourselves listen, sing and dance. But Schopenhauer argued we should also seek to transcend the Will via our reason to reach greater insights.20 This move from sense to reason can be understood, suggests Simon Reynolds in his account of the ecstatic in Rock music, as a translation from Barthes’s transient “jouissance” into his “plaisir” - where fleeting feelings of an exposed but ultimately larger self are fixed and articulated in cultural discourse of “secure enjoyment of identity through time” (1990, 9). In short, music might be said to move us so that we first of all feel and then articulate pleasure, loss and hope. In music the past can be recalled, the present enjoyed and tomorrow anticipated - and all three prospects discursively addressed. Reynolds resists any comprehending account of music’s aesthetic
surplus in favour of the somatic and the confounding which is an a-conceptual phenomenon that "holds (a) culture together" (1990, 10-11). Yet his call is a belated, forlorn one, as to some degree it is contradicted by his own act of writing.

Bloch's own early account of music is expressionist and very particular, arguing as it does for an inwardness that renders it private and discrete in contrast to the visual arts, yet capable of configuring a mental image of what could lie ahead. What is unclear is whether the powers of speculative reception he attributes to it are immanently encoded and aesthetically 'decoded' or extrinsic thoughts summoned in its emotive presence. In Bloch's model, human expression and reflections of the socio-economic are joined by a "visionary hearing" (Hellhörren) which would replace Hellsehen (second sight or clairvoyance). It would be better to understand this attribute, less as precise prediction and more as anticipation - that in the presence of subjects engaging aurally with the world, something might be imagined but not in any detailed, certain fashion.

Music's a-conceptual, uncommodified excess of feeling - Bloch's abstract utopia - has an initial subjective impact and also becomes, consequently, his concrete utopia a site of self-reflection and reason. Set within an actual historical and empathetic social context, it then also becomes an accompaniment to the eutopian. This combination of the sensuous, rational and pragmatic allows us to use music as a utopian trope detecting emotion, intersubjectivity and then a route to eutopian praxis. Humanistic improvement can only happen in the presence of music that is felt and heard by the listener, and subsequently articulated using utopian tropes and eutopian settings. In music per se, there is no 'as of right' ascent, either to any Hegelian Absolute, or any drift to a benign socialism through simple acoustic exposure. Music is always heard, felt, and then assimilated, thought about, explained and re-explained in words. The fluidity of music's interpretation is its source of emancipatory power in wider settings.

Bloch, intersubjectivity & agency

Just what do I seek when I hear something? I am seeking, when I listen, to grow richer and greater in content. But I shall receive it by fetching it myself, going further in terms of content, beyond passive enjoyment. (Bloch 1985, 84-5)
Whilst we can continue to simply ‘sing-to-oneself’, Bloch recognised the ability of music not only to take the subject away from the present but also into society.22

Bloch wrote:

In order to know itself, the bare self must go to others. Intrinsically it is sunk within itself, and the inwardness lacks its counterpart. But through the Other whereby a normally clouded inner life comprehends itself, it readily enters foreign realms and travels away from itself again. Only sound and that which is expressed in sound, is referred back to an ‘I’ or a ‘we’ [...] this agitated life now listens to itself, as a song travelling on its own or mingling with others. (Bloch 1985, 195)

In a sense, Bloch was living out his own subjective development in the presence of texts, including music which can also sharpen the consciousness of other subjects too and who may detect their own ‘traces’ of something better. We read:

People thought they had discovered that everything present is loaded with memory, with the past in the cellar of the no-longer-conscious. What they had not discovered was that there is in present material, indeed what is remembered [...] an impetus and a sense of being broken off [...] and an anticipation [...] this does not take place in the cellar of consciousness, but on its Front [...] it is a question of the psychological processes of approaching, which are so characteristic above all of youth, for times of change, for the adventures of productivity [...] The anticipatory thus operates in the field of hope; not taken only as emotion [...] but more essentially as a directing act of a cognitive kind. (Bloch 1995 I, 11-12)

The Introduction to Principle of Hope reminds us that “Bloch was no utopist, he considered his philosophy to be concretely utopian, mediated with real possibility, and his philosophy advocates engagement with, rather than contemplation of, the world” (Plaice, Plaice and Knight, 1995, xxxiii). In Bloch’s general insistence on the ‘concrete’, and by implication historical possibilities we see a parallel with the work of Antonio Gramsci, who argued strongly for the transforming powers of individual genius and intellectual agents within the superstructure and given, historically informed social settings.23 This is a view which encompasses the ideas of informed activity and edifying work.24 Moreover (and perhaps unsurprisingly), Bloch seems confident in assigning the task of mediating difference through the cultural superstructures of society - something Gramsci also advocated as a corrective to the more deterministic versions of Marxism, fixated on the primacy of economics and material production.
**Bloch & popular musics**

We should note that Bloch’s severe stance on ‘rationalised’ forms of expressive culture like jazz can be explained, as in the case of Adorno, as largely a generational perspective, as much as one of musicological insight. However, Bloch did hint at the importance of youthful energy in historical enterprises that seems to foreshadow some of Marcuse’s insistence on seeing revolutionary youth in the 1960s as a potentially transforming body of hope. Geoghegan writes that “The Not-Yet-Conscious is deemed to be present in the excitement, the sense of endless possibility, and the strong but dimly understood desires of the young” (1996, 34). If wary of Jazz and the hedonism of its white, affluent supporters, Bloch did have undoubted patience with other banal, popular works which could be subjected to hermeneutical interrogation guaranteed to expose the latent utopian trace beneath an ideological gloss. This is a practice and ‘faith’ clearly demonstrated in the exegetical readings of popular forms such as film that we later see in Fredric Jameson - a contemporary theorist determined to offer a prospective diagnosis of current culture.

3.4 Caryl Flinn on Bloch & music’s utopia

Music’s utopia is undoubtedly complex in character. However, we can turn to Caryl Flinn’s important 1992 study of Hollywood film scores for some guidance. Flinn says ‘music’s utopia’ is an alternative sign system referring to memories, social and emotive excesses and anticipated alternatives (Flinn 1992, 9, 10-11, 101). Flinn says that context determines the utopian sketch:

[A]n idea, a sign, or a piece of music is going to appear utopian only to certain listeners, much as in the same way that its overall significance will depend on its particular social, historical, and institutional context. [Bloch] suggests that utopian meaning is fixed within the trace itself. That its significance is somehow immanent [...] and not shaped by reading. (1992, 103)
Flinn is central to an understanding of Bloch and Music’s utopia and she too stresses the pre rational, pre-linguistic role of music and the place of context and discourse. She writes that:

Music [...] has the particular ability to ameliorate the social existence it allegedly overrides, and offers, in one form or another, the sense of something better. Music extends an impression of perfection and integrity in an otherwise imperfect, unintegrated world. (1992, 9)

Flinn summarises and theoretically situates for a more contemporary readership, what is a long-term fascination for music’s capacities. Flinn, writing about music’s utopia observes that many studies attending to music and film assert in their different ways and to different degrees that:

Music offers something more than conventional language; that it reveals glimpses of a better, more unified world (or a more profound experience of our own); that it unveils universal truths or essences and opens doors to exotic situations or lands; and lastly [...] that it can capture the sense of lost integrity and grandeur. (1992, 91)

Flinn’s own study considers the role of sound cinema as a maturing mass entertainment and site of social imagination. She looks at emigré German composers and deals poignantly with exile, escapism and hope in a commercial context. Her study suggests that utopian activity in relation to music can be either (1) an anterior interest in ‘loss’, manifest in psychoanalytic, Romantic, historical or nostalgic readings or (2) theoretical speculation on music’s prospective potency as an allegorical cultural entity. (1) and (2) are two accounts that broadly correspond to Blochian abstract and Blochian concrete utopias respectively. This is a clear regimentation of utopian thought, which, when joined by another category of utopian musical activity made possible through technology, allows accounts here of Bloch, Adorno, Marcuse and others to be systematically addressed. This basic schema is developed in more detail below. It is Bloch, who anticipates Flinn’s work and, in spite of expressionist and metaphysical tendencies most comprehensively and optimistically fuses anterior concerns for future development in a here and now setting and has thus been the focus of this opening chapter.
How might evocations of the past assist any utopian prospects? Nostalgia, reminiscence and retrospection, can function in a dialectical context, not simply as remembered states but interestingly as continuing benchmarks. Nostalgia might be understood with reference to what Flinn terms, in part “bygone wholeness” (1992, 53-4). This is the false ‘universality’ of the new subject prior to their dialectical particularisation and individualisation. This might be regarded as the rehabilitation of our experiences of that false ‘Universality’ of our infancy which with maturity and particulars continues to promise a yet to be occupied ‘home’ of Identity. This antagonistic, subjective presence of the past as a spur for summoning nostalgic ‘traces’, and a better objective tomorrow we see in Bloch with his interest in childhood texts. In no way does this sort of anteriority suggest to Bloch the likelihood of any ‘dangerous’, stalled maturity or regression that so exercised Adorno. Adorno’s dismissal of a return to young, adolescent forms as regressive might be reassessed in the light of Levin’s constitution of the listening self where a recollection of this kind adds to the ontological picture and ethical strength of the individual. Much of the present writer’s memory of Radio 1 is quite possibly bound-up in this recollection of a never to be regained, safe, domestic, pre-adult past. It may even extend back to Kristeva’s Chora - the site of maternal sound and security as discussed in Flinn (1992).

Fantasies do not only emanate from the depths of the mind, but just as often from newspapers, from adventure books with their wonderfully glossy pictures. From Booths at the fair where chains rattle and are broken, where the song to the evening star is sung and the half moon shines. (Bloch 1995 I, 25)

Flinn usefully surveys these anterior states to some effect. She talks of Barthes, Kristeva and Adorno who viewed music’s utopia as “an impossible, plenitudinous, and nostalgic condition” and she then observes Adorno, Ballantine and Shepherd seeing music as:

An abandoned ideal. [An] idealized moment [...] conceived of as an irrecoverable prior moment in history - just as psychoanalysis conceived of it as a lost period within the history of the subject. [...] notions of lost wholeness, integrity, and cohesion, even when this wholeness is itself put into question. (1992, 75)
Flinn argues that sound, particularly early maternal sounds that are somatic, pre-lingual and then latterly lingual, are important elements of experience and construction for the young subject. This enculturation, this primary socialisation at the breast and in the home is, forever, subsequently longed for or nostalgically recalled.32

The paternal voice of the family home is later superseded by the secondary socialisations of school, peers and the mass media. Bloch himself argued that home and school condition people for later life (1995 II, 928). In technical or Grammar school, the aim was “the compliant member of bourgeois society [who is] one who never regrets what has been learned, but also never makes use of it to find out and to learn what could be awkward for those who invigilate from above” (1995 II, 929).

Notions of one’s early listening experience do of course invoke psychoanalytical interpretations of the now suppressed or forgotten, infantile or even pre-cultural states that are but dimly felt by adults. These deserve some attention as they perhaps offer some way of perceiving a primary stage of development that might be rooted in our earliest experiences (if not the commonality of some deeper ‘collective unconscious’) of music and operate as a focus for comparative discontent. In any event, early recollections most likely do inform the enculturation of individuals and may well resurface intermittently in the ecstatic, joyous, ‘free’ activities of dance. Bloch suggested that it was dance that:

\[\text{A}l\text{lows us to move in a completely different way to the way we move in the day, at least in the everyday, it imitates something which the latter has lost or never even possessed. It paces out the wish for more beautifully moved being, fixes it in the eye, ear, the whole body, just as if it already existed now. (1995 I, 394)\]

The pull of home is a strong one. Kellner (1997, 80-95) reminds us that Bloch not only attended to libidinal desire but the more childlike and domestic desires for food and security which, he tells us is where such needs are neglected by socialists but attended to by fascists.33 Could there be a real private space or sense of family community, shielding us from public travails? Flinn tells us that:
Maróthy argues that this communality, this potential socialist utopia, can in fact be reactivated within existing social, historical and representational orders. His position does not so much promote the actualisation of an impossible otherworldly “no-place” as it uses portions of it as model for future change. (1992, 95)

**Bloch & the Anticipatory**

Bloch’s anteriority is perhaps, in a final analysis somewhat overly subjective and regressive in character, but he offered much more beside which we can incorporate into an account of music’s utopia. Bloch was, both in respect of cultural forms and social potentials, more comfortable than any other thinker in moving between past, present and future. Considered dialectically, the terms Bloch used to articulate his intricate philosophy where a better tomorrow can be addressed today include: “Latency” – “the possible content of the future, lying latent in the present” (Geoghegan, 1996, 33) and “The Not”, which is a primary element in the account of Utopia’s driving force - that sense of lack, or absence which is consistent with accounts of non-identity. Adorno’s utopian prospects are, by comparison, muted observations about absences and deception, shaped very much in relation to a personal history. Adorno’s interest in current potentials late in life, possessed none of Bloch’s energetic certainty or interest in a wider humanity’s likely future. Benjamin’s work, whilst tinged by a degree of ‘old world’ spirituality, had the intellectual range of Bloch, and more readily accepted artistic and technological transformations as likely repositories of radical insight. Bloch’s utopian reserves often lie in a pre-modern (often musical) past, rather than a bourgeois-negotiated progressivist present (cf. Jameson 1980, 210).

3.5 In conclusion

Much of Bloch’s reading is predicated on a belief in music’s power to exceed the given. Without it projecting beyond the ‘established order’, back into the past or on in to the future, it is of little speculative value. Might unencumbered popular musics and radio wavelengths on which they are transmitted be entitled to join Bloch’s ‘utopian canon’ in an honorary fashion? They can be argued in some configurations to have affinities with his outlook, and might at least deliver his
prospective hopes for a changing world. Of some significance, and one that
chimes with Adorno's late conversion to radio's value as cultural repository is
Bloch's idea of a continual trawling of past accomplishments.

The role of nostalgia and tradition in the explication of musical forms is
important and is different from Adorno's more historically specific longing for
past composers and more traditional modes of performance which must, to some
extent, have populated his own privileged youth. Bloch's approach accepted the
emotive quality of these losses or memories as they preserve a relationship with
the past for the present in order to deal with the future whilst finding a secure,
cosy place to hide. He wrote: "The hidden boy is [...] breaking out. He is
searching for what is far away [...] because outside is still indistinct, it becomes a
place of wonder" (1995 I, 23).

Bloch's life's work was dedicated to the prospect of hope - giving succour
to imagination and nostalgia through its exegetical detection in texts past and
present, high and low. Critics might argue that Bloch's encyclopaedic survey
might be most easily and swiftly described by cataloguing those cultural
phenomena he fails to log, but this would be to miss the essential point about the
need for what has been called his 'decipherment' and which receives renewed
energy in the hands of Jameson.34

Bloch taught us that whilst music is instrumentally directed, it exceeds it,
and that whilst music is 'immediate' and sensuous, it also brings forth
interpretation and discourse. At its best it 'promises' and urges us to go out into
the world. Whilst music is escape, it is also, to borrow from John Blacking on the
African Venda tribe: "an adventure into reality [...] It is an experience of
becoming, in which individual consciousness is nurtured within the collective
consciousness of the community" (1976, 28). Bloch's readings of music are neatly
summed-up in the following quotation:

It is always the consumer sector and requirements, the feelings and aims of the
ruling class which are expressed in music. Yet at the same time, thanks to its
capacity for such directly human expression, music surpasses other arts in its
ability to absorb the manifold griefs, wishes and rays of hope common to the
socially oppressed. And again, no art so outstrips a given age and ideology -
although this, of course, is an outstripping which never abandons the human
sector. (1985, 201)
Music’s utopia offers a chance, in terms of Marxist aesthetics to (1) experience the condition of non-identity; (2) serve as the ground for discursive and philosophical debate (immanent and overtly as lyrics) that offer anterior and anticipatory exegesis with reference to those experiences of non-identity.

Ernst Bloch and thinkers like Adorno and Marcuse when studying the fate of individual subjects in society, often focussed on musics as an morphological index of existing social conditions; aesthetic works of ideological power and, when viewed from a suitable angle, metaphors and allegories of resistance and latent social change. For them, when subjected to critical study seemed to offer itself as a substrate both for a hermeneutics of despair and a potential for affirmative utopian projections.

Bloch’s musical philosophy appears to attach itself, in part, onto music’s aesthetic surplus, its ineffability. Critics might surely see this somewhat indistinct musical vision come close to what Norris claims Bloch would have dismissed as “mystical irrationalism”. Does the accusation of a private metaphysics evaporate in the simple act of constructing a coherent, and shared hermeneutical strategy that can absolve the theorist of any such charge of romanticism or solipsism? Surely matters improve when we look to Bloch’s suggestion of a concrete, immanent transcendence and there see his philosophy begin to bite.

Any listening that might well summon subjective romantic notions, and childhood memories could usefully, in addition, focus our senses, memories and mind to educate conscious desires and hopes in the direction of objective social improvement. Vattimo writes “With the end of metaphysics and the faith in progress, utopia’s only possible content is that of inventory, nostalgia, revival” (1992, 86). However, Geoghegan writes that Bloch’s particular locus for change was the present as a:

Concrete utopia [...] rooted in objective possibility; it is grounded in the ascending forces of the age and is the most pregnant form of the utopian function. Concrete utopia is Bloch’s reformulation and further development of Marx’s concept of praxis, the unity of theory and practice [...] At the level of consciousness the best elements of historical abstract utopia need to be refined, and the dross of contemporary abstraction removed, to produce docta spes (educated hope) which in turn, becomes an intellectual and material force in the production of concrete utopia [...] This requires both the warm stream of passion and imagination, and the cold stream of rigorous analysis: ‘enthusiasm assists sobriety’. (1996, 38-9)
Bloch looked ahead to praxis and place but indeed avoided specifics claiming “The utopian function is [...] the only transcendent one which has remained, and the only one which deserves to remain: One which is transcendent without transcendence. Its support and correlate is process” (1995 I, 146).\(^{37}\) In short, Bloch is reviving utopian and scientific socialism where, through the latter, universal emancipation is achieved via an historical awareness, but was seeking to privilege culture and individuals as the locale and prime movers of progress. Properly framed, music can illustrate non-identity, alienation and estrangement which can, as part of a concrete utopia ‘educate’ hope and desire side by side to disrupt the extant. This is why music lends itself so well to utopian discourse - bodily desire and the hermeneutical impulse meet in the social expression and experience of sounds.\(^{38}\) Neither Adorno nor Marcuse assimilated or sanctioned this Blochian rationalisation of desire. Perhaps, in the wake of the evident failings of what Marcuse termed “the great refusal”, Bloch thought it necessary to ask mischievously for the suspension of Utopia in his 1974 radio broadcast Farewell to Utopia? (Zipes 1997, 11).

Might not contemporary art, the socio-cultural spaces of broadcasting and yes, even language sometimes combine to sponsor a non-reified activity where there is a momentary experiential surplus and an independent discursive moment at least prior to any use or exchange values?

Ernst Bloch’s reappraisal and reformulation of utopian desire in the context of a search for immanent, non-revolutionary, secular transcendence is of particular interest. Both on its own terms, and as an illuminating parallel or precursor to sympathetic theorists, Bloch’s all-encompassing account of culture, social prospects and deferred human progress stands here as an important foundation in a study of popular musics and public service radio. Let us preserve Bloch’s hope and his discursive radicality in the face of an established order and its hegemonic, affirmative culture. His accounts, in the presence of music of that which is lost and that which is still to come constitute his utopian trope that is a fusion of instinct and reason with which we might now seek to identify ‘eutopian’ places and spaces.
Notes

2. Jameson characterises Bloch’s relationship to the utopian by stating that for him it was more a technique of decipherment than cultural diagnosis. (2000b, 364).
3. Bloch explored the utopian images of various secular cultural works: William Blake’s Jerusalem (set to music by Parry), Mozart’s Magic Flute; Robinson Crusoe, Beethoven’s 9th Symphony; also myth, folk and fairy tales, Robin Hood, Eldorado, Atlantis, The Big Rock Candy Mountain. All share immanent or extrinsic accounts of ethical worlds, lost worlds or the pleasures of real life perhaps now passed.
4. See Levitas (1997) for a lucid account of Bloch’s abstract and concrete utopia.
5. Cf. the relationship of the utopian and scientific socialism of Frederick Engels whereby the former drives the activity of the later (Engels 1995). Norris tells us that Bloch asks us to draw on past dreams and ideas, rather than seeking radical revolution. (Norris, 1998, 306). Fredric Jameson has noted that “It is not, of course, necessary to limit ourselves to Bloch’s own formula, and Marxists ought to be in a position to identify any number of variations which a Utopian principle might take, from that of a renewal of a collective life to that of justice, or instinctual gratification, as well as the nightmare opposites of all these things. By tapping such powerful sources of collective fantasy, mass and commercial culture not only provides itself with an energy power but also puts itself in a position to manipulate and control such energies as well” (2000b, 366).
7. In the postwar period, Paul de Man was critical of allegorical readings rich in mystifying, rhetorical flourishes in the name of objective philosophising as they tended to obscure any reasonable or inherent truths, and ignore any deconstructive gaps and tensions. There is some overlap in the work of critical theory and de Man with regard to the personal reading having some wider, real-world significance. Norris (1989b) writes of a return to a purposeful Marxist faith in utopian exposition and devotes space to an account of Bloch, de Man and Jameson in relation to music as a resistant artistic form.
8. See Edgar (1999) for one resolution.
9. Paddison usefully discusses the reification of individuals as they invest themselves in music as commodity, contrasting this with a more dynamic musicological investment of the self. (1990, 198-9).
10. Flinn also flags up Attali’s (1985) admonishment of the elision of Otherness in unifying moves seeing it as colonial control and effacement. The “will to construct a universal language operat[es] on the same scale as the exchanges made necessary by colonial expansion: music of a flexible code was dreamed of as an instrument of world unification, the language of the mighty” (cited Flinn 1992, 27). This Eurocentric position is also addressed more generally by Born and Hesmondhalgh (2000). To read thematic development as a morphological representation of individual estrangement or enlightenment as Adorno has done requires not simply a firm musicological understanding, but a creative mind which may discern clues about social conditions but will supported ultimately only by its own metaphors and self-imposed encodings.
11. Bloch was close to Kracauer (1995a-j) in attending to popular cultural products, both possessing belief that the banal can serve as a profound text. whilst Bloch sought utopian traces or incipient hermeneutical threads, Kracauer however sought more to develop a Marxist aesthetics which would detect morphological representations, or at least symptomatic impressions of socio-economic conditions in the works themselves, prior to any discursive reading. And it is this ‘faith’ in the fabric and morphology of music which stimulated Adorno who seemed to take from both.
13. Adorno noted how improvisation and embellishments: “In daring jazz arrangements worried notes, dirty notes, in other words false notes [...] are apperceived as exciting stimuli only because they are corrected by the ear to the right note” (1990, 309). This is interesting as an instance of harmonisation in the face of the disharmonious - perhaps where promise of unity is addressed in its superficial absence. Adorno’s objection would be that this is a confection of harmony in musical language, not any deeper sense of intersubjective unity.
14. Musicological codification of musical forms deemed part of the Western tonal canon has given us metaphors of wholesome conditions or dialectical terms seeking closure. We have for example terms like consonance, dissonance and harmony, tension and resolution, ‘the home key’ antiphonal call and response. All, in some degree, allude to actual or anticipated wholeness and
correspondence — what might be understood as a utopian aspiration. For Adorno of course, dissonance is an expressive force that is antithetical to the harmony of semblance: "Dissonance is affectively expression; the constant and harmonious want to soften and eliminate it. Expression and semblance are fundamentally antithetical" (1997, 110).

15. As far as music itself is concerned, 'identity' is in one respect, a somewhat loosely configured romantic formula, located by Adorno within his negative dialectics which proves to be the crucial but absent condition in his discussions of degraded, reworked, reiterated classical forms and 'deceitful' popular musics.

16. See Zipes (1997, 4). Adorno, anxious not to romanticise any past ideals wrote: "The object of art’s longing, the reality of what is not, is metamorphosed in art as remembrance [...] Ever since Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis the not yet existing has been dreamed of in remembrance, which alone concretizes utopia without betraying it to existence. Remembrance remains bound up with semblance: for even in the past the dream was not reality" (1997, 132).


18. See Zipes op cit.


20. Norris tells us that, "For Schopenhauer especially, music gave access to a realm of primordial experience - the Will in all its ceaseless strivings and desires - which the other arts [...] could only express at a certain distance" (1989b, 309).


22. Cf. John Blacking (1976, 28) on music’s ability to integrate us socially.

23. With perhaps some allusion to the progress of the Hegelian Geist from private to public settings Geoghegan, writing of Bloch, explains his “Objective hope is the concrete possibility generated by each successive age, which enables subjective hope actively to develop the world. Together they constitute the ‘subjective and objective hope-contents of the world’ ” [Bloch] (1996, 34).

24. Geoghegan writes: “Bloch is particularly interested in the mode of transformation which, in effect, creates true consciousness out of false consciousness; work, which while displaying the marks of the age, none the less transcends it” (1996, 48).

25. “Nothing coarser, nastier, more stupid has ever been seen than the jazz-dances since 1930. Jitterbug, Boogie-Woogie, this is imbecility gone wild, with a corresponding howling which provides the so to speak musical accompaniment” (Bloch 1995 I, 394).

26. Jameson writes: “For Bloch’s work suggests that even a cultural product whose social function is that of distracting us can only realize that aim by fastening and harnessing our attention and our imaginative energies in some positive way and by some type of genuine, albeit disguised and distorted, content. Such content is for him what he calls ‘hope’, or in other words the permanent tension of human reality towards a radical transformation of itself and everything about it, towards a Utopian transfiguration of its own existence as well of its social context. To maintain that everything is a ‘Figure of Hope’ is to offer an analytical tool for detecting the presence of some Utopian content even within the most degraded and degrading type of commercial product” (Jameson 2000b, 366).

27. Flinn carefully traces historical and contemporary variations on this theme which see music as an influential source of emotional control (Plato); a route to the spiritual realm (St. Augustine), an echo of celestial harmony (in the European Middle Ages), a Romantic, transcendent phenomenon beyond immediate contingency, or a subversive, late-twentieth century form for youthful resistance. Flinn explains that “Like Hollywood’s interest in romanticism, romanticism’s own interest in Hellenic totality can be understood in terms of a desire to exceed contemporary experience, to get beyond the sense of social, economic, and subjective fragmentation or impotence” (1992, 50).

28. νοετος - [nostos] - Greek, ‘return home’ and αλγια, [algia] a pained condition. Flinn asserts that music in film [and elsewhere] “repeatedly bears the burden of these nostalgic enterprises. [...] It has functioned as a sort of conduit to connect listener - and commentators - to an idealized past, offering them the promise of a retrieval of a lost utopian coherence. But, because it is tied to anterior moment, music is obliged to operate as an outside term, an elsewhere removed from contemporary social relations and from the production of meaning” (1992, 50).


30. Even John Peel (a subject in a later chapter) betrays and idealises or perhaps even privileges his earlier life in his Home Truths programme on BBC Radio 4 (See July 7 2001, Peel sentimentalises and stresses his own humanity with a readiness to admit tearfulness, reflecting on
the death of Billy a retired Liverpool FC player ("Give it to Billy"). Interestingly however, in an appearance on the TV programme *Stars and Cars* (Channel 5 July 6, 2001), Peel argued that he did not listen to old music, preferring the new. However, when he listened to a Roy Orbison greatest hits his partner knew some emotional crisis was immanent.

31. The *chora* of Julia Kristeva is described by Flinn as: "A receptacle which houses the subject before its entry into language, inhabited [...] by gestures, rhythms, sounds, and movements offered through the maternal body" (1992, 58-9). Flinn says: "The *chora* is a pre-Oedipal, imaginary place in which the infant cannot distinguish self from mother, subject from object [...] for the subject it offers a place of self-fulfilled plenitude, a utopian moment within its early history" (1992, 59).

32. Norris writes of psychoanalysis and its interest in "the place of the musical within the early history of the subject, for whom it is linked to a pre-Oedipal, pre-linguistic condition [...] Theorists argue that the infant enters the auditory realm before it has access to visually encoded information, asserting that the child can distinguish its mother's voice from other voices before it can distinguish her visually" (1992, 53). As Flinn puts it after psychoanalyst Guy Rosolato, "As a primordial fantasm, one that endures throughout subjectivity, sounds have a certain regressive nature, but sounds and music *per se* do not: they merely put into play a series of fantasies of lost representations" (1992, 54).

33. Geoghegan tells us that Bloch concludes *The Principle of Hope* on this note: “‘once he has grasped himself and established what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet been: homeland’ (Heimat.) The term is also meant to evoke the emotions and connotations of being at home, at ease, in comfort and of having a sense of belonging; of familiarity, freedom and so forth. Coming home is not meant to suggest finality or closure; home is the arena in which humanity will flourish” (1996, 41).

What Geoghegan *omits* are the following sentences which reconcile but also lay down (as a call to action) his metaphysical sentiments meeting with ever-present reality: "all and everything still stands before the creation of the world, of a right world. True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical, i.e. grasp their roots. But the root of history is the working, creating human being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts" (Bloch 1995 III, 1375-6).

34. Today, cultural studies feeds off the popular incessantly but in critical theory ease in the presence of the mass produced has been hard won. We see it of course most convincingly in Jameson (2000a). Norris tells us that "In Bloch's collaboration with Otto Klemperer on a 1929 Vienna production of *The Flying Dutchman* [his] contribution was a programmatic essay - *The Rescue of Wagner through Surrealistic Penny Dreadfuls* - which argued for the vitalising power of popular culture, the intimations of a better world that could be glimpsed in 'debased' modern forms like the comic strip, sentimental romance, advertisements and adventure stories" (1989b, 342).

35. Norris says music was “For Bloch, as for others. [...] Schopenhauer and Nietzsche [...] at once the most-humanely revealing form of art and the form most resistant to description or analysis in conceptual terms. But this was no reason, he argued, for retreating into an attitude of mystical irrationalism which denied music any kind of cognitive import, or (conversely) for adopting the formalist standpoint which reduced it to a play of purely abstract structures and relationship devoid of expressive content” (1989b, 307-8).

36. Derrida is more assertive in claiming a right - enshrined in law to access all previously-aired representations. In Britain The British Library National Sound Archive, British Film Institute and BBC now systematically collect and make available audio, filmic and programme content. In this case, Bloch’s bottomless cultural repository is extended and Derrida’s critical interrogation of mass mediated communication addressed. (Derrida, 2002).

37. To this, Norris adds a comment on negativity: “Bloch’s philosophy makes common cause with that strain of rigorously negative thinking espoused by theorists like Adorno and de Man. To keep faith with music's utopian potential may require an effort of demystification that appears superficially far removed from any hopeful or affirmative standpoint. But it is precisely this undeceiving ‘labour of the negative’ - this testing of hope through a hard-won knowledge of
everything that presently conspires against it - which marks the difference between Bloch's and other, more naive utopian creeds" (1989b, 343).

38. McClary offers a positive reading of the music of Madonna "a musician who dares to create liberatory visions" (McClary 2002, 161).
4 “La Promesse du Bonheur”: Adorno, music & radio

4.1 Introduction

Whilst being supposedly materialist and Marxist at root, what we have just seen in Bloch’s elaborate philosophy of music and popular texts, are thoughts enmeshed in quasi-romantic accounts of authentic, pre-modern freedoms. Bloch’s socialist intimations of hope were conjured in the presence all manner of cultural texts, high and low. For Bloch, they ever preserved an aesthetic excess, a residual autonomous potential for listeners, and a potential for utopian exegesis, regardless of the weighty structural matters of contemporary economic production and technological distribution. More generally, Bloch’s utopian theory built on this unproblematised reading of cultural works and texts and offered a model comprising anterior and prospective views with which an abstract sense of personal loss or socio-political latency might be delineated. We must now turn to Adorno and a more sophisticated and directly informed account of culture and its mediation that nonetheless preserves a utopian spirit.

Adorno’s position on radio and music radio was complex. It was somewhat influenced by his grudging respect for its technical reach and musical potentials but these positive facets were - as most accounts of Adorno’s philosophy relate - obscured by his fundamental critiques of all things popular and mediated. With this complexity in mind, this chapter seeks to achieve several things, namely: a brief rehearsal of Adorno’s critiques of subjects and music in radio; an outline of his relation to the more positive thoughts of Benjamin and Brecht; identification of the discursive example he offers of writing in music’s presence, and his often oblique but important allusions to utopian spatial conceits. This chapter also strives to foreground his coy sympathies for music in radio.

A re-reading of Adorno is important for the tenor and structure of the present study because in his often bleak but by no means hopeless accounts, we can see a bridge between Bloch’s subjective, inclusivist hermeneutics, and the slightly more populist and somatically informed analyses of technology and popular arts by other contemporaries. A re-reading teaches us that whilst we might accuse Adorno of offering a personal, partial account of our subject, and did not
always operate as a strict dialectician, there is still much to consider and carry forward. His empirical brushes with the real business of radio, life-long dialogue with music and broadcasting and his philosophical dalliance with utopian possibilities show us that musical experiences and their conceptual articulation provide epistemological grist and the prospect of transcending closed thought, so as to admit of humanistic good will and optimism. As one writer has expressed it:

It is Theodor Adorno's great achievement to have revealed the affinity between philosophical and musical thought, and hence, by distilling musical processes through the mesh of social functions, to have realised music's ability to undermine closed thought - patterns which are the medium of political repression. (A. Williams 1989, 187)

I hope to show that this reading of Adorno will acknowledge his critique of standardised popular musics as a spur to fetishisation, regression, illusion and distraction but equally consider his suggestion to Benjamin that in the hands of 'enlightened' individuals privy to cognitive experiences, discourse and independent popular musics can, in fact consciously acknowledge and engage dialectically with, the non-identity of cultural product and be there when "truth is glimpsed in the determinate negation of what is false" (Jarvis 1998, 51).

4.2 Re-reading Adorno's critiques

While radio marks a tremendous technical advance, it has proved an impetus to progress neither in music itself nor in musical listening. Radio is an essentially new technique of musical reproduction. But it does not broadcast, to any considerable extent, serious modern music. (Adorno 1945, 275)

Bloch and Adorno each sought an educated desire and hope whereby passion and reason could unite to deliver human emancipation. Yet the latter's œuvre is, in the main, more pessimistic than that of Bloch. This was so because Adorno, given his specialist musical training, Frankfurt credentials and experience of broadcasting provided a more distinct musicological and mass media critique. Adorno's readings in contrast to Bloch's are, in his early writings, more thorough-going, relatively contextualised and bleak. A good deal of music he heard was now indeed commodified; being sold or broadcast by a culture industry to a reified mass of consumers who were then likely to fetishise its standardised qualities as
they listened to it atomistically at home. Music no longer offered any redeeming features as a realm of autonomous expression, but instead became a form for compensation. The best that could be done would be to open it up to critical scrutiny, expose its repressive, ideological dimensions, and highlight its ability to offer illusions of authenticity rather than truth itself. For Adorno this was a requisite aesthetic illusion and subsequent allegorical exposition of an otherwise inaccessible reality. Adorno indeed averred that “since the image of utopian happiness has vanished from great music, it is preserved only by inferior music, but in caricatured form” (1998c, 38).

Yet are people really condemned to settle simply for Stendhal’s promise of happiness, “la promesse du bonheur”, as a kind of emancipatory limbo, or might a compensatory utopian attitude of resignation be challenged by a more assertive utopia of ‘recognition’ in the face of capitalism, lost community qualities and by those ‘irreconcilable’ musical spheres, the serious and the popular which can flourish together in the right settings? Instrumental creation and distribution of music by state or commerce for Adorno was likely to diminish aesthetic integrity and thus have a significant impact on the experience and understanding of listening subjects who were listening to nothing other than the ‘phantasmagoria’ of radio with its intimacy, immediacy and cultural riches.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Adorno as musicologist, philosopher and social and psychological researcher specifically considered the tearing apart of music’s autonomy and energies into two separate halves - the serious and the commodified. Music was being torn apart, and aesthetically and ideologically distorted. Adorno’s accounts of the problematics of musical translation across the ether are best set against his dialogue with Walter Benjamin, careful critic and sometime advocate of new modes of mass communication like cinema. We can read a retrospective interpretation of Adorno’s own motivations and preoccupations in a transcript of a radio lecture Adorno gave in 1968.

The text on the fetish character was intended to conceptualize the recent musical-sociological observations I had made in America and to sketch out something like a ‘frame of reference’ [...] At the same time the treatise also represented a sort of critical reply to the work of Walter Benjamin on the Work of Art [...] I underscored the problematic of production in the culture-industry and the related behavioural responses, whereas it seemed to me that Benjamin strove all too directly to ‘rescue’ precisely this problematic sphere. (1998k, 218)
Adorno’s critical stance in the presence of the popular is well known. Whilst undoubtedly not the prejudicially flawed set of precepts as many casual encounters with his work conclude, it is a critique of the popular that does have some (perhaps intentional) shortcomings. These are usefully summed up by Born (1993b, 224) who has rightly characterised much of Adorno’s work as “reductive and polemical”, a body of work ignoring the discursive cultural politics of autonomous music, and his own politico-cultural institutional situation as he intently figured his oppositional categories of commodified and independent music. The main accusation Born has levelled at Adorno is that he had “an inadequate theory of power in culture, one which - focusing on the dynamics of capitalism renders benign the differently hegemonic apparatus of subsidized and administered culture, as a refuge” (Born 1993b, 226). It is, to an extent, the aim of the present study to detect such a refuge, but it is hoped this is not at the expense of any disregarded hegemonic and discursive matters, nor any disregard for artistic work per se. Sensing shifts away from a close scrutiny of the aesthetic, towards a more conventional Marxist reading of institutional contexts, authority and power, Born (1993b, 233-4) indeed warns that a call like that of Tony Bennett (1990) for an internal, ‘strategic’ influencing of cultural policy, can, if we are not careful, minimise the inherent power of the aesthetic. At all times creative production, aesthetic import and institutional context must inform any and all readings of mediating institutions and technologies.

In this chapter, Adorno’s critical engagement with music and radio is addressed and shown to be an evolving one which, from time to time, alighted on the progressive possibilities and chances they contained. Adorno’s formulation of what he termed “intermittent dialectics”, partial, provisional activities affording praxis and structured, mediated glimpses of better times is positive, but ultimately, even as a fragmentary strategy consonant with his method, fails to be sufficiently rigorous, empirical or liberal.

In revisiting the insights that run alongside Adorno’s more one-sided analyses, several writers have sought (often within the spirit of Adorno’s own relentelessly self-critical procedures) to rehabilitate Adornian perspectives which can deal usefully, and perhaps more synthetically with contemporary cultural commodification. The present work too seeks to look more closely at his thought
(especially his late thought) which is more sophisticated than headline objections might allow, and thus go beyond ‘theoretical’ resistance to the popular by those, like Adorno, who were accused of ‘resignation’ and look closely at the likely presence of immanent optimism and resistance.  

For much of his career, Adorno did not build positively upon his critiques of popular musics, and so he failed to deliver any prospective optimism, any distinct ‘utopian projections’ in their presence. Quick as he was to condemn much musical content and the extrinsic conditions of music’s dissemination, any thoroughgoing dialectical activity in the face of transgressive musicological content or creative broadcasting is effectively absent. As much as seeing music as a homological or even morphological analogue of social realities, Adorno was granting music the task of figuration and afforded it a role in a symptomatic reading of subject and society but would not grant it an emancipatory role. However, music *per se* as aesthetic work cannot change anything, its power resides in those who bring it forth as a linguistic text and with those who also give it a context.

Adorno, in most of his arguments worked with the assumption that the culture industry converted legitimate cultural form into commodities whose only non-commercial ‘use value’ for music lovers in their form of sound recordings or radio broadcasts was in their continuing promise of happiness and delivery of compensation. Moreover, commerce reduced works of art of all descriptions to an exchange value and, more significantly, objectified the subjectivity of any work of art conferring a simple, transactional exchange value devoid of genuine human intercourse.

*Adorno’s philosophy*

What underscored Adorno’s critical theory? Adorno drew his philosophy in part from Kant’s epistemological approach which equipped him with an interest in matters of synthetic epistemological processes: the senses, representational illusion and an individual’s innate rational faculties and categories of philosophical analysis which might direct their understanding of the objective world and their moral obligations to others. Adorno also seemed to retain much of Hegel’s dialectical motor whereby (partially formed) subjects would encounter
objective difference as they mature in historical conditions but, in the interests of preserving art and philosophy as ongoing, mutually beneficial realms of experience and rationality, Adorno always rejected Hegelian Idealism and its march towards any absolute condition of assumed conceptual and actual correspondence and consequent rational stasis.  

Marxist analyses furnished Adorno with the lexicon of material base, technological and social relations of distribution and superstructure, alienation and history. The culture industry and its content as conceptualised by Adorno and Horkheimer (and typified by cinema and radio broadcasts) seemed to affirm rather than critique contemporary modes of its own production and technological distribution. The omnipresence and near omnipotence of Adorno and Horkheimer’s “instrumentaliz[ed] science” led technologies of communication to constitute nothing more than an “applied science”, effectively “paid for with an increasing diminution of theoretical awareness” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, xiii, xi). The atomising, alienating experiences of tailored culture limited the likely emergence of autonomous, thoughtful subjects.

Cinema and radio for Adorno and Horkheimer were, in reality, media which foreclosed civilised progress. Under these circumstances, the Enlightenment project falters and “social freedom [which] is inseparable from enlightened thought” is absent. All that remains is “blindly pragmatized thought [which] loses its transcending quality and, its relation to truth” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, xiii). All that is left is a degree of resignation and a vague, ideologically maintained belief in social improvement promised by modern technologies and their commercialised culture.

Weber’s account of rational modernity additionally presented Adorno with a picture of a “totally administered society”, a controlling whole of structure (manufacture and distribution) and superstructural positivism, politics and intellectual life - what Adorno termed “an open air prison”, overseen jointly by capitalism and its state allies. Presumably, any Marxist instinct of Adorno’s to call for the withering of the state was curtailed on his arrival in the freemarket economy of the USA where an absence of regulation heightened the effects of capitalism. Yet in Adorno’s Theses about the Idea and Form of Collaboration of the Princeton Radio Research Programme we read:
Radio is to be regarded as an instrument influencing and ruling the masses. [...] As far as suggestions for the improvement of radio are concerned, we must be fully conscious of the fact that improvement of radio is by no means *a priori* identical with tendencies of the visual type of educational broadcasting or cultural uplift. [...] Under present-day conditions, we should not regard radio regimented by the state as progressive, and commercial radio as reactionary. Under certain circumstances more progressive tendencies might be realized under the form of free competition. (2006a, 675)

*Adorno on music & torn halves*

An obstacle for us in seeing music as a substrate of happiness were the “Torn halves” Adorno identified. An image of the sundered is surely more than the creation of a binary model with which he perpetuated some sort of elite perspective. How and where might his torn halves be reunited? Can music reveal social iniquity, and the reality of a humanistic non-identity to the subject through the ether as a prelude to a truer consciousness? Adorno seemed to be saying that we should not discard the torn halves. Apart, they would still have a dialectical value independent of any commercially driven or institutionally driven reunification and therefore their potential is preserved even in their divided state. Adorno asked the question: “How can we bring good music to as large a number of listeners as possible?” (1945, 272). Here his assessment of denuded musical potency is set out prior to another exposition on music’s potential residual worth in the here and now:

> The power of the street ballad, the catchy tune and all the swarming forms of the banal has made itself felt since the beginning of the bourgeois era. Formerly it attacked the cultural privilege of the ruling class. But today, when that power of the banal extends over the entire society, its function has changed. The diverse spheres of music must be thought of together. (Adorno 2001b, 34)

4.3 Radio: “A format worthy of the human”

The mid-century fascination for, and scrutiny of the radio in a time of totalitarian regimes and a constrictive ‘culture industry’ was not the preserve of Adorno. For some, might radio increase, rather than reduce, the creativity and freedom of composers, performers and the listeners. Adorno as we know was largely reluctant to value the more positive, cultural and socio-political potentials of technically
modified acoustics. In time, popular musics were to take full advantage of electrical technologies, be that with instruments, recording facilities or reception. (One cannot fully conceive of the popular record without amplified voices and instruments heard on mobile transistor radios).

Many artists and critics, unlike Adorno were open to the creative possibilities of new, mass media forms. Some wrote expansively about its ethereal, otherworldly qualities, whilst the likes of Benjamin were more specific in their evaluations. The notion of the radio as both collective oracle and mesmeric device is well charted by the poet Velimir Khlebnikov who was alive to early radio’s seductive, phantasmagorical powers:

The slightest halt in the working of the Radio would produce a spiritual swoon of the entire country, a temporary loss of its consciousness. The Radio becomes the spiritual sun of the country, the great sorcerer and ensorcerer.

Khlebnikov surmised that “The programme of national education would be put into the hands of the Radio” and imagined that as an all-pervasive medium “the radio will forge the unbroken links of the world soul and fuse together all mankind”.

Benjamin

Of significance are the somewhat complex views of Benjamin on radio which, as is well known, run counter to those of Adorno in the 1930s. In his 1931/2 essay Theater & radio: toward their mutual control of their work of instruction, we read of Benjamin’s support for radio as a fine medium for the drama of his creative partner Bertold Brecht, and is dismissive of the idea of the assumed superiority of theatre simply because it was a presentational, “living medium” (1993, 30). Benjamin offered praise for radio’s experimental potentials, and commented on its suitability for audio montage. However, Benjamin had reservations, uncertain perhaps about the combination of instruction and critical listenership fostered by Brecht. Brecht’s somewhat didactic, epic theatre on air had incorporated alienating formal effects to disrupt both audience absorption and the mimetic in order to foster and/or maintain a critical self-awareness (Verfremdungseffekt). With such Brechtian distraction, critical self-reflection and analysis, why was it
that for Benjamin, these particular didactic-experimental modes of production were suspect? We might look to Adorno for one explanation. Adorno, in *Aesthetic Theory* suggested that Brecht’s certainties and presuppositions precluded *ambiguity* in the face of the work and thus, as a consequence, prevented *genuine* analysis, evaluation and synthesis on the part of the audience (1997, 242). Benjamin too warned against moments when “Instruction (and judgement) take the place of culture (and knowledge). It is especially incumbent upon radio to go back to a kind of “cultural core curriculum” but not, he says as a “gigantic folk culture factory” but as “a format worthy of the human” (1993, 29-31).

Thus Benjamin preserves the pre-lingual power of art (important for Adorno) but in so doing, undervalues, or even precludes rational self-reflection brought on by Brecht’s directing and alienating formal effects. It was Benjamin’s subsequent 1936 essay which so provoked Adorno, for it not only dismissed any concern for the disappearance of aura (as works of art were now casually and easily reproduced for the masses), it additionally argued positively for the *democratic* opportunities afforded by new media, principally film. (Benjamin was perhaps ignoring popular, mainstream cinema and looking more to European, avant-garde techniques). The essay also now suggested that unlike that written 1931/2, (1993), avant-garde, modernist techniques were new modes of visualisation that could indeed empower artists and ‘make strange’, hitherto mimetic representations of contemporary life which would challenge audience perspectives. In short, film and radio would take art into a more politicised arena affording closer engagement for all, and which, if carefully allied to a *progressive* prospectus could have a radicalising role. Art could be *more* useful than heretofore - if mediated carefully in a guise free of any singular Brechtian instruction. The earlier subtleties of Benjamin’s and Adorno’s calls for aesthetic and thus cognitive ambiguity seem here to be overshadowed by a more radical Benjamin, privileging intentionality and the techniques of alienation, but, importantly also trusting in the emergence of an enlightened and enlightening discourse between radio and audience.

Adorno’s response to Benjamin’s assessment was a fear that only barbarism would remain once art was handed down to the masses. There’s no real
sense of Adorno either trusting the masses, or detecting or even simply hoping for a mediating institutional discourse:

The laughter of the audience at a cinema [...] is anything but good and revolutionary; instead it is full of the worst bourgeois sadism [...] despite its shock-like seduction I do not find your theory of distraction convincing - if only for the simple reason that in a communist society work will be organized in such a way that people will no longer be so tired and so stultified that they need distraction. [...] the idea that a reactionary is turned into a member of the avant-garde by expert knowledge of Chaplin films strikes me as out-and-out romanticization. (Adorno 1980, 123)

On the subject of avant-garde techniques, Adorno said he saw little avant-garde technique used in the German film studio. “You under-estimate the technicality of autonomous art and over-estimate that of dependent art; this in plain terms would be my main objection” (1980, 124). In a 1938 letter to Adorno, Benjamin argued that:

I tried to articulate positive moments as clearly as you managed to articulate negative ones [...] Your analysis [in On the Fetish Character of Listening] of the psychological types produced by industry and your representation of their mode of production are most felicitous [...] I see more and more clearly that the launching of the sound film must be regarded as an operation of the cinema industry design to break the revolutionary primacy of the silent film, which generated reactions which were hard to control and hence politically dangerous. (Benjamin 1980, 140)

Was Benjamin at this point in the discussion, capitulating in the face of Adorno’s strong critique, or was he also again paying more attention to what must have been, in 1938, an increasing fear that the provocation and directing of instincts would fall under the control of domineering, totalitarian forces. This refinement and adjustment of an intellectual position by Benjamin is not unlike the ambivalences and qualifications we later encounter in Marcuse. Both do present an intellectual trajectory that is at once certain and yet contingent.

_Bertold Brecht_

Brecht requested that: “A communications apparatus for the general benefit of the public should be made out of the radio. This is an innovation, a suggestion that seems utopian and that I myself admit to be utopian” (2000g, 45).
Brecht was intrigued by representational media, and was involved in radio dramas broadcast on public radio. For both, film, radio and popular culture offered a challenge to the exclusivist aura and the high art canon. They also offered a chance to attract attention via sensation and formalist devices which could activate listeners so they might became engaged, more critical ‘producers’.

Acknowledging its role as distribution channel and its character as a device for cultural monologue, but not dialogue we read of radio that it was for Brecht “In its first phase as substitute; a substitute for theatre, opera, concerts, lectures, coffee house music the local pages of the newspaper, etc.” He added: “From the beginning, the radio imitated practically every existing institution that had anything at all to do with the distribution of speech or song” (2000g, 41). Brecht continued:

It is only a distribution apparatus, it merely dispenses […] it must be transformed from a distribution apparatus into a communications apparatus. The radio could be the finest possible communications apparatus in public life […] if it understood how to receive as well as to transmit [and] bring him [the listener] into a network instead of isolating him. (2000g, 41-3)

Brecht pushed hard for radio to develop a political, democratic facet too. Here, Brecht seemed to offer radio a new, participatory role which might meet his “call for a kind of rebellion by the listener, for his mobilization and redeployment as producer” (2000f, 39). With reference to the potential role of the state given its actual socio-economic interests he concluded:

*The Flight of the Lindberghs* [radio play] has no aesthetic and no revolutionary value independent of its application and only the state can organise this. Its proper application, however, makes it so ‘revolutionary’ that the present day state has no interest in sponsoring such exercises. (2000f, 40)

Brecht’s optimism is also tempered in a minor way when he reflected on radio’s likely day-to-day content and bourgeois direction. For him, [radio] “was a colossal triumph of technology at last able to make accessible to the entire world a Viennese waltz and a kitchen recipe. An ambush so to speak. A phenomenon of the century, but to what end?” Brecht (2000d, 36-7). In a passage worthy of Adorno for its refusal to be singular or final, Brecht offered the following:
I strongly wish that after their invention of the radio the bourgeoisie would make a further invention that enables us to fix for all time what the radio communicates. Later generations would then have the opportunity to marvel how a certain caste was able to tell the whole planet what it had to say and at the same time how it enabled the planet to see that it had nothing to say. (2000d, 37-8)

Ironically, given the cooption of radio by the Nazi party in the next few years we also read in one of Brecht’s unfinished typescripts:

Art and the radio must be put to pedagogical purposes [...] The possibility of implementing such a direct pedagogical utilization of art does not seem feasible today because the state has no interest in educating its youth about collectivism. (2000e, 38)

We see then that Brecht’s reflections on radio technology and output in the late 1920s and early 1930s are ambitious, optimistic and cautious. In tone they are the thoughts of a socialist and cultural modernist seeking positive social transformation through technology in the hands of a well-meaning polity. His writings do not anticipate the totalitarian co-option of radio, but instead promote the achievement of a culturally beneficial independence. Whilst we see Brecht using the term ‘ambush’ in relation to popular radio’s likely content, neither he nor even Benjamin, writing in 1936 - and touching on the aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of aesthetics - really grappled with radio’s propagandistic, dystopian potentials.28

We should not forget either Brecht’s ambitions for radio as a modern, channel for intersubjectivity. In his 1932 essay, The Radio as a Communications Apparatus, (2000g) he wrote of active listeners who might become producers. He argued for technological innovation to bring about what he termed the “formation of the other order”. This might not have been for him, a fully fashioned socialist state but, at the very least, an arena of cultural and political participation. In Explanations [about The flight of the Lindberghs], Brecht records a passage from the radio play (music by Weill and Paul Hindemith) where he encourages audience participation - promoted by the state - which will “be obliged to have many skills” and in relation to music “shall provide whatever requires special apparatuses and special skills” (2000f, 39).29

To summarise: Adorno’s critiques of radio music and its listeners were often severe. Benjamin and Brecht on the other hand saw, for a time, the new
technology at the very least offering-up some interesting possibilities. Benjamin talked of new aesthetic perceptions offered by 'mechanical' and electrical reproduction, namely close-ups and intensifications. He conceded that art in reproduction would not preserve any hermetic purity, but could continue to exist (usefully) as significant content within a new perceptual ground and moves too from work to text. Significance in a work of art can be 'translated', but not faithfully reproduced.

Benjamin had welcomed the large audiences cinema engendered, but ultimately for him, individuals would have been most likely to have been in a state of distractedness, seduced by the phantasmagoric qualities of the cinematic mainstream and the experimental devices in progressive film derived from the likes of Eisenstein. Adorno was certain that cinema (and radio) precluded the development of an audience of autonomous, thinking subjects who could reflect on sights and sounds, and who would not be diverted and passive. Whilst the discontinuity of montage and experimental editing in cinema might be thought of as a device that would encourage audiences to be aware that they were looking at a technological confection, Adorno felt it was more likely to be embraced as a mesmersing, formalistic device in its own right or, at the very least, a supportive rhetorical trope that would be a sort of metaphor for the arbitrary, pacy quality of modern society.

For Benjamin and Adorno then, cinema offered an intriguing but uncertain balance between the potential mass mediation of significant content and the pitfalls of a distracting formalism. Filmic realism and exciting edits might together offer narratives and themes worthy of public attention, but of course, verisimilitude and motage were equally likely to fulfil a propaganda role for commerce or state, a fear Benjamin and Adorno shared in 1930s Germany in equal measure.

Born is quick to dismiss technological and phenomenological readings (past and present) which de-couple the cultural politics of institutional and aesthetic factors (1993b, 227-8). She writes: “It is meaningless to consider technologies themselves in the abstract as a sufficient basis for a cultural politics” and adds “technologies themselves do not amount to an aesthetic” (1993b, 228, 230). She qualifies this with:
While I agree on the benefits of examining the materiality of particular media and how this may set the limits to aesthetic or indeed cultural political possibilities, my point is that the technological/phenomenal cannot stand in for an aesthetic politics, let alone for a politics of cultural production. (1993b 230-1)

Consideration of the selection and administration of content and form by the culture industry is undoubtedly as important as an examination of its technological means and manifestations.

Adorno’s critique of music on air was consistent with (1) his strident musicological analyses of commercialised music; (2) his Weberian and Lukácsian influenced critique of bureaucratic, reified tendencies of state and capital and (3) his witnessing of the Nazi exploitation of film and radio and his subsequent empirical, sociological analysis of U.S music-devotees and radio listeners. It was a critique given some impetus by Adorno’s earlier correspondence with Walter Benjamin on art and technical reproduction.

4.4 Current of Music: Adorno’s radio theory & the autonomous subject

Adorno unambiguously took sideswipes at technology. He touched on what he termed “gadgeteering” or “instrumentalization” - where means dominates ends - and argued that this precluded a stable subjectivity, any autonomy and a stable, subjective voice:

Subjectively, all this is promoted by the anthropological phenomenon of gadgeteering, the affective investment in technology that exceeds every form of reason and inhabits every form of life. [...] McLuhan is right: the medium is the message. The substitution of means for ends replaces the qualities in people themselves. (1998n, 270)

We have seen above his dismissal of cinema. Radio too atomises and mythologises; yet it is perhaps the most invisible of technologies. Adorno saw it (initially) as a circuit of vain musical reproduction and repetition until all was unintelligible:

In the face of the culture industry art maintains [...] dignity, it enrobes two measures of a Beethoven quartet snatched up from between the murky stream of hit tunes while tuning the radio dial. (Adorno, 1997, 39)
The title of *Current of Music* (2006a) must allude to the dynamic unfolding of a musical motive (or human subject) - the individual element as a score is performed and heard. If this is the case, there is a certain irony in this given that radio listeners could move from station to station fragmenting their evening’s listening, whilst radio professionals too might offer arbitrary, ‘dismembered’ selections. Music for Adorno should be heard without disruption. Compositions from the classical tradition could introduce and develop a theme which the expert listener might trace across an entire symphony. The training, memory and confidence required to do this was alien to many ordinary audiences. Moreover, the fragmented nature of radio broadcasting and listening (alluded to above by Adorno’s account of Beethoven on air), was akin to the montage of cinema delivering less of a cogent current than an aural collage and most unlikely to encourage informed listening. It could be argued that because of the nature of the mass media in question, the word ‘current’ implies a movement passing between people in a broad, unlimited fashion. Indeed the Latin root *cuere* - ‘to run’, implies the swift passage of a signal. Etymologically, the notions of a communication of consensus, an unending passage movement, electrical flow or present occupation are evoked. Adorno may well have considered these or similar definitions with which to allude to radio as a channel of musical dissemination. It is surely no coincidence that the derogatory term ‘tap listening’ has been applied to indiscriminate radio listening and the wide notion of ‘flow’ as a succession of planned content, meaningful across time was later deployed by Raymond Williams in his studies of the mass media (1974, 86-96).

*Adorno: aesthetics & the phenomenon of radio reception*

Adorno’s central objections to radio as an aesthetically limiting channel of social domination are well summarised here:

The step from the telephone to the radio has clearly distinguished the roles. The former still allowed the subscriber to play the role of subject and was liberal. The latter is democratic: it turns all participants into listeners and authoritatively subjects them to broadcast programs which are all exactly the same. No machinery of rejoinder has been devised [...] Any trace of spontaneity from the public in official broadcasting is controlled and absorbed by talent scouts, studio competitions and official programs of every kind selected by professionals. (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, 122)
Frank A. Biocca (1988) asserts that “Three aural technologies - the telephone, the phonograph and the radio” led to “A whole new environment of structured and meaningful sound” (1988, 61-2). He draws attention to the likes of conductor, composer and later Bell Labs researcher Leopold Stokowski and to composer Davidson Taylor who, unlike Adorno, looked in a more measured and open fashion on the possibilities of aural reproduction and transmission as they stood in the 1930s (1988, 68). Biocca also draws our attention to the first international Conference on Radio Music, held at Baden Baden in 1929 and lists a number of new musical instruments using radiophony to generate musical sounds and control (1988, 65). In short, Biocca shows us a good deal of progressive, optimistic musical activity in the presence of radio, not least what Stokowski regarded as a consequent development: a more receptive, perceptually expanded ear of the listener attuned to modern music and life (1988, 70-71). Stokowski, Biocca notes, set down many of his utopian views in an article entitled New Vistas in Radio in The Atlantic Monthly 155, of 1935. Adorno was dismissive of such “selecting professionals” like Stokowski, a composer, conductor and acoustic scientist participating in new technological and cultural arenas. Whilst he and others might profess to embrace opportunities for creative and democratic reasons and influence developments to meet their own, radical agendas, they were effectively legitimising radio’s fundamental technological character, socio-cultural reach and impact. A charge Adorno could have levelled equally at the amateur radio enthusiasts, the radio hams who are discussed below.

Adorno argued then that listening was now ‘framed’ by mediating forces. So, not only did radio mediate production, consumption, and intersubjectivity, it also articulated the discourse of interpretation. The challenge was to consider the intentions and legitimacy of the media institutions in question (see generally, Adorno 2001b, 45).

“Especially for you”

Radio listeners for Adorno were commanded or seduced as part of the obedient mass or as an egotistical bourgeois individual.
The inherent tendency of radio is to make the speaker's word, the false commandment, absolute. A recommendation becomes an order. (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, 159)

Adorno, as we have now seen loved radio and hated radio. He enjoyed hearing Cage's Piano concerto on air, hated what tinny transistor radio speakers could do to Beethoven. Peters tells us: "The danger of radio [for Adorno] was not its rabble-rousing, but its individualizing ability, its skill at tucking the listener into a cocoon of unreflective security" (Peters 1999, 221). "Especially for you" - Adorno used this saccharine address in English in the original after the work of Karl Kraus (Adorno 1998c, 43) - is a sentiment heard in American popular quarters said Adorno.

"Especially for you" the birds are singing 'Especially for you the bells are ringing.' [...] The cynicisms has a precise function. By telling the consumer he has no influence [...] he is meant to realise that he is being mocked. [...] he has no choice but to conform, whether as buyer, singer, lover or as a simple member of what is gradually turning into an organization of cosmic proportions. The truth is made explicit [...] by a warning. "Any copying of the words or music [...] makes the infringer liable to criminal prosecution under the U.S. copyright law." After reading this, anyone who had harboured the illusion that an object existed especially for him [...] will dismiss the idea. (Adorno, 1998c, 44-5)

Radio for Adorno rendered people politically inactive and self-satisfied whilst creating the illusion for the listeners that they were part of a cultural project of high public ideals. Participating they might be in the 'free market' of the United States, they were, Adorno reflected, unaware of the culture industry's sleight of hand. This was not unsullied exposure to high culture. He wrote:

Radio music's ideological tendencies realise themselves regardless of the intent of radio functionaries [...] music under present radio auspices serves to keep listeners from criticizing social realities; [...] The ruined farmer is consoled by the radio-instilled belief that Toscanini is playing for him and for him alone, [...] radio is giving him culture [...] In this respect radio music offers a new function not inherent in music as an art - the function of creating smugness and self-satisfaction. (Adorno 1945, 275)

Did Adorno confuse real with realistic? Surely many listeners would have understood this distinction. The view that radio cannot deliver a full interaction has been shown, in part with reference to John Durham Peters, to be a somewhat harsh understanding of the medium of radio, which, like any can only deliver an approximation or partial system of interactivity. "Adorno's negative dialectics
constantly undermines the dream of reconciliation between people - in the name of that dream. Removing false hope is a fine service so long as it does not damage our animal faith, since all action rests on strategic illusion" (1999, 224). John Durham Peters also asks whether "we are more afraid of being suckered by power or deprived of hope" (1999, 224).

*Current of Music* objections to "music in radio" were then as follows: (1) radio’s impact on musics, as a sensuous, atomising "technical tool" (2006a, 76, 97); (2) radio’s general “illusion of closeness” and its influence on the subject as both an “objective and infallible [...] voice ‘and a substitute ear’ [the radio microphone] which replace the listener’s own” (2006a, 81-3). As these tendencies increased, such a modern “public mechanism” as radio would attempt, Adorno argued “to conceal [itself] behind a facade of the individual’s adaptability, privacy and intimacy” (2006a, 114), and added that with regard to need for a subject’s identification with others, “one of the only psychological refugees is identification with those very powers just as a prisoner may grow to love the barred windows of his cell” (2006a, 161). Thus, any later cultural theory (the present study included) which might argue for the liberatory, or simply educative, aspects of radio already has objections laid down which are to be acknowledged. One justification for the present study’s accent on the positive is Adorno’s philosophical and stylistic penchant for articulating a synthesis of analytical inferences which often touches on potentials for immanent critique and thus transcendence. For example, having pointed to radio’s powers of musical diminution and listener dependency, for much of *Current of Music*, Adorno then held that these characteristics were already prior traits, possessed by mass produced art and most individuals. Consequently for Adorno a brief ray of hope appears, and if this is so then: “radio, like other means of communication, would be less an instrument of influence than of social revelation: it would demonstrate to the individual the identity of the inner and the outer and thereby continue to reconcile him with the reality which otherwise he would find hard to bear” (2006a, 533).

If art did not always preserve truth in its translation, it might still convey mutually beneficial knowledges about the human condition in the form of a story and might even give on to a sort of epistemological critique of its own technology. Adorno is elsewhere dismissive of what he sees as a psychological dependency on certain forms of radio music:
Music today is largely a social cement [...] a means by which they achieve some psychical adjustment to the mechanism of present-day life. This ‘adjustment’ materialises in two different ways, corresponding to two major social-psychological types [...] the ‘rhythmically obedient’ type and the ‘emotional’ type. Individuals of the rhythmically obedient type are mainly found among the youth - the so-called radio generation. They are most susceptible to a process of masochistic adjustment to authoritarian collectivism. (Adorno 1990, 311-12)

Adorno in discussing fetishisation is dismissive of the radio ham and is here quoted at length:

The eager person who leaves the factory and ‘occupies’ himself with the music in the quiet of his bedroom. He is shy and inhibited, perhaps has no luck with girls, and wants in any case to preserve his own special sphere. He seeks this as a radio ham. [...] He patiently builds sets whose most important parts he must buy ready-made, and scans the air for shortwave secrets, though there are none. [...] he becomes the discoverer of just those industrial products which are interested in being discovered by him [...] Of all fetishistic listeners, the radio ham is perhaps the most complete. It is irrelevant to him what he hears or even how he hears; he is only interested in the fact that he hears and succeeds in inserting himself, with his private equipment, into the public mechanism, without exerting even the slightest influence on it. (2001b 53-4)

In a few sentences, Adorno was able to be critical of the radio industry, hobbyists, and immature listeners weaned on the childhood adventures presumably enjoyed by the likes of Bloch. The utopian moment of becoming someone active (true amateur radio was a two-way activity), someone making a domestic transmitter as well as receiver is followed by their reabsorption into the system of commercialised radiophony as a whole as they condone its capabilities. 34

Standardised musical product was tempered by what he termed pseudo-individualism. He concluded by arguing that radio music (serious and popular) was “entertainment” only, arguing that “entertainment may have its uses, but a recognition of radio music as such would shatter listeners’ artificially fostered belief that they are dealing with the world’s greatest music” (Adorno, 1945, 276-9). A more positive gloss runs that hobbyists were using radio kits and sets as way of retaining some element of choice and participation in the face of capitalist pressures, and thus radio is a resource for individuals as much as a tool for reification and socio-cultural programming. Radio therefore not only reinforces exposure to infantile tunes, it also extends our tastes by running, dialectically, the familiar alongside sounds of alterity.
4.5 Adorno’s mature thought

*Empirical work and aesthetic theories*

A pivotal moment in Adorno’s career was his time in New Jersey. Here, his perspectives on broadcast music and popular preferences were at once confirmed, but it also might be suggested, subtly challenged; both by interaction and observation faced with the diversity and vitality of American musical life. Whilst on his return to Germany Adorno the critical theorist reasserts himself, this period of empirical engagement was not without influence on his later work.

Adorno had moved to New York in February 1938 to work on the Princeton Radio Project. Because of his Institute of Social Research ties, he was allowed some latitude and undertook a fair amount of self-directed research and writing. Adorno claimed to enjoy the discursive interviews, but suggested that such responses were probably already conditioned ones, not immediate and thus demanded scrutiny of the system which of course he was not encouraged to do.

In *Aesthetic Theory* Adorno conceded a benefit for the subject in an exposure to the presence (albeit as semblance) of alterity and a wider world.

Whoever, rightly, senses unfreedom in all art is tempted to capitulate, to resign in the face of the gathering forces of administration, with the dismissive assertion that ‘nothing ever changes’, whereas instead, in the semblance of what is other, its possibility also unfolds. (1997, 18)

More radically, certainty about the invasiveness of the ideological is replaced by a growing respect for independent thought. In a 1968 radio lecture, Adorno warned that ideological content was not directly taken-up by the listeners, a superficial form may have only a superficial impact, or it may not entirely coincide with the outlook or unconscious of the listeners: “There are established limits to manipulation” (Adorno 1998k, 227). In a study of the mass media coverage of the marriage of Princess Beatrix of Holland we read:

It was possible to detect symptoms of a split consciousness. On the one had people enjoyed it as a concrete event in the here and now [...] What the culture industry presented people with in their free time [...] is indeed consumed and
accepted, but with a kind of reservation [...] The real interests of individuals are
still strong enough to resist [...] total inclusion [...] but I think we can here
glimpse a chance of maturity (Mündigkeit), which might just eventually help turn
free time into freedom proper. (Adorno 2001e, 195-197)

Of interest is Adorno’s reply to a question concerning overwhelming social
conditions that preclude individual action in a discussion following a lecture “The
Meaning of Working through the Past” Appendix 1 (Adorno 1998d, 298).

Question: How can the working-through succeed if self-examination already
assumes abilities the majority of people doesn’t have? Prof. Adorno: This is of
course correct. And here you precisely define the problem, that is, it would be
wholly wrong if we were to preach self-examination and then expect that because
of this sermon people will examine themselves. That is illusory. What we can do
is give people contents, give them categories, give them forms of consciousness,
by means of which they can approach self-reflection. (ibid. 300)

One can almost hear Adorno plead with broadcasters to take stock of the medium
they administer and the responsibilities it might perform in providing a positive
epistemological framework:

The radio [...] both wears out music and over-exposes it [...] perhaps a better hour
may at some time strike even for the clever fellows: one in which they may
demand, instead of prepared material ready to be switched on, the improvisatory
displacement of things, as the sort of radical beginning that can only thrive under
the protection of the unshaken real world. (Adorno 2001b, 59)

He also sounded a note of caution:

Snobbishness toward the mass media is idiotic. Only by changing the function of
the mass media can the intellectual monopoly of the Culture Industry be broken;
it cannot be accomplished by retreating into social impotence. Today the radio
also can provide a shelter for new music, separate as it is from the market, and
can take up its cause, which is that of human beings, in its battle against human
beings. (2000e, 37)

In the years following WWII, the development of recording technologies using
magnetic tape (developed in Germany), became highly significant for all music
and for music radio. The experimental impulse of creative and technically minded
amateurs meant that local performing talent was given an opportunity to record in
small regional studios, the results receiving airplay across the hundreds of small
radio stations of the USA and Europe to bring diverse popular voices to new
audiences. Creative and technically minded professionals led to avant-garde
experimentation and cultivation by seriously minded radio broadcasters. The 1950s might indeed be seen as a moment of eutopian activity in eutopian places. In *Vers une musique informelle*, Adorno (1998p) addressed post-formalist musics and acknowledged the part some radio stations have played in their development. Jameson (1990, 246-7) notes that “this essay documents his sympathy and support for the new postwar musical production organised around the Cologne radio station and the experimental music concerts in Kranischstein and Darmstadt.”

Adorno finally made space for postmodern potentials and activity in music that has let go of the totalizing modern systems of composition for an ambit of the localised fragment more truly subjective and direct. In a call to promote musical understanding, Adorno also advocated the broadcasting of rehearsals: “to open the meaning of works to audiences” (Adorno 2000a, 38). Radio may indeed comprise a wholly experimental, progressive remit permitting experiment and development.

While speculating on “the autonomy of the radio, to fend off the organised commercial pressure” Adorno is critical of the ghettoisation of high culture: “the most obvious manifestation of this is the institution of the Third program [...] Indispensable though such segregation may be on occasion” (2000e, 36-7).

### 4.6 Adorno & the dialectic

What Adorno extracted from the cultural commodity form was a non-identity, a highlighting of the absent presence of any humanistic identity whose shape is there only in outline, traced by feigned aesthetic expressions of human unity and pseudo-community, an unfulfilling, ideological space of false consciousness and false promise. These misaligned representations which promised listeners a concordance between individual and society, subject and object were formed by hidden socio-economic realities and glossed by distorting ideological rhetoric.

How was the ordinary listener to move beyond their accommodation with and dependency upon the culture industry? How might an immanent critique be conducted upon music and radio without simply resorting to new conceptual generalisations? S/he had to call upon art and music, but also on two vital means of their translation: language and radio. In addition, the non-identity of
consciousness where ego and id are misaligned and a socio-cultural non-identity exist between subjects there is Adorno’s dialectical dynamic there to foster a resourceful philosophy. Finally, there had to be a fruitful tension between free-thinking agent, material conditions and reductionist accounts of ideological subjectification and intersubjectivity, of which, he himself was an example. Thus Adorno’s negative dialectics constitutes a dialectical dissonance between things inexpressible, enduring truths, free conditions and the realities of economic, cultural and technical illusions. As such, it qualifies as somatic and rational modelling moving from a Blochian abstract sense of something better, to an educated ego amid concrete particulars of the real world. Like Bloch, Adorno wanted to see a balance struck between sensuousness and enlightenment in music: popular, Dionysian musics and Apollonian musical refinement where Nature might be tamed in a culture that delivers both a physical and intellectual freedom. Whilst Adorno would not admit of this as close to the eutopia detailed in the present study, he is surely quite close to the romantic, nostalgic realms of Bloch’s anterior state and the ‘good place’ of an informing, culturally heterogeneous BBC concerned with the technical translation through broadcasting of many cultural forms high, low Western and non-Western that feeds an additional ‘discussive’ facet of an enduring public sphere, midway between commerce and state prescription. Sensibility, imagination and understanding emerge here amongst listening subjects as the genuine creativity that is expressed and experienced within and about radio’s ambit, and importantly, we then talk to each other about it in our immediate life-world and in a wider public sphere. The facts of perception and conscious discussion attest to a rationality and a freedom. So:

Art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of the unreconciled: This is the true consciousness of an age in which the real possibility of utopia - that given the level of productive forces the earth could here and now be paradise - converges with the possibility of total catastrophe. (Adorno 1997, 33)

Whilst aware of the dangers present in affirmative culture and capitalism, Adorno did not always counsel despair in the face of their institutional sites and technologies of mediation, rather he promoted insight and scepticism to fuel the promotion of a Blochian, concrete utopia and, late in his work we might even detect arguments for a eutopia as a place of enlightened process. He begins by
attending to art in freedom: “Drawing on the Hegelian conception of art as the sensuous illusion of the truth content of the Geist, Adorno argues that a work of art does not merely encode the contemporary social structure, but through its immanent struggle with aesthetic problems, and specifically its own existence as an illusion, presents a criticism of the illusory existence of society” (Edgar 1987, 5-6). This of course requires an exposition which Paddison neatly sets out for us the illusions and divisive character of music:

The truth of the work is revealed through philosophical interpretation. This both makes use of immanent analysis and sociological critique as well as going beyond them to suggest how the ‘authentic’ autonomous musical work is not only isolated from society (even though deriving its material from society) but also points to something beyond existing society through its emphasis on non-identity. (1993, 62)

Adorno, Utopia & eutopia

Adorno had a nostalgia for early years spent in a safe, childhood home. We witness it in *Minima Moralia* where Adorno talks about the hopes and fears conjured in the presence of childhood songs (Adorno 2005, 128). Michael Rosen, in a review of Adorno biographies (2005) states that:

Music was central to the Wissengrund-Adorno’s family life. They sang together, played piano duets and were a fixture at concerts and the opera house. His happy childhood was a beacon that was to guide Adorno for the rest of his life. The decisive reason why he came back to Germany after the war, he later explained, was that ‘I simply wanted to go back to where I had my childhood; my feeling is that, in the end, what one does in life is little more than the attempt to recover one’s childhood in a transformed way.’

Without memory, without recollections of what has be lost, intensified by time and (in Adorno’s case) distance, where would the spur for a better life come from? Flinn successfully points to Adorno’s ambivalent relationship to ‘ideal’, absolute musical pasts and regressive, ‘maternal pasts’. As he later conceded, radio allows for experiment and archival replay Flinn terms his position prior to this point a ‘knotted lament’ (Flinn 1992, 84).

Toward the end of his life, Adorno began to rework the concept of Utopia. Adorno indicated his imagined future, his deferred Utopia as an absent presence in commodified art and an aesthetic trace in the avant-garde. Adorno argued that
although reasoned projections and hopeful possibilities for improvement might constitute a ‘utopian’ element in thought, this was always an imagined state of completion, not in any sense an attainable situation. In conceding this, Adorno was not ruling out permitting the postulation of a here and now eutopia which may be a compromise with the status quo but does at least deliver praxis, immanent critique and a collective consciousness of commodification, ideology and power.

Adorno’s identification of radio as a musical shelter may seem like a bankrupt gesture towards a shallow, marginal ‘home’, hosting little more than nostalgically charged performances or ‘difficult’ aesthetic experiments. However, one senses on the page, a continuing hope for a subjective transcendence of non-identity and revised social relations in any cultural place, however remote that may be.

Adorno seems to have had his visions and stance tempered as postwar pluralities and reality hardened against pre-war elitist cultural discourse. Adorno’s position here was not one of disillusioned compromise or desperation, but more of strong resolve to relocate the site, form and duration of utopian intimations. It is telling that we now witness the identification by Adorno of potential locales for his ‘intermittent dialectics’. Surely these are allied to Levitas’s interstitial, postmodern utopias and the ‘good places’ of *Musical eutopias* as postwar philosophies and actualities have dictated and sanctioned?

4.7 In conclusion

What shifts of outlook permeate Adorno’s later work; what opportunities did he forsake, and might he in fact be more an exasperated optimist than negative dialectician? Are we right to imagine that serious, singular Western Art with universalist ideals has ever joined with the particulars of a diverse set of popular musics? Might we not even deconstruct Adorno’s priority of the first over the second, and thus regard popular musics as a mode of comprehending elevated commonalities?

In the 1930s, Adorno’s presence in Oxford and the direct links of Adorno’s musical associates Krenek and Webern with the BBC - the former
seeking to have Adorno’s music performed - attest to his knowledge of the then fledgling broadcast institution early in his career. Indeed, in *Current of Music*, he refers to the positive readings of music in the medium by Krenek, who in 1938 saw some aspects of domestic radio listening as an enhanced mode of understanding (Adorno 2006a, 104-5).

Adorno’s analytical project exposing the workings and limitations of the culture industry and his consequent, near-fatalistic knowledge: his ‘melancholy science’ are intimately bound-up in his musicological, sociological and philosophical preoccupations. Both his purpose and cross-disciplinary perspective have travelled extensively as two shadows across most of the interrelated academic fields which are of importance to *Musical eutopias*.

The road from observation through critical interpretation and on to glimpses of the metaphysical is, for Adorno, a long and circuitous one in some ways. This does not however preclude the emergence of concepts and arguments of great value *en route*, which can well serve a study of this kind.

Adorno’s concept of ‘non-identity’ and the recognition on his part of the possibility of a change in consciousness leading to greater self-knowledge and potential socio-economic mutability are all to be considered as useful in understanding the human condition of aspiration, hope and activity. As such they suggest that Adorno’s philosophy is not totally bleak, but indeed contains an optimistic strain demonstrated in part by his own ‘transcendent’ analytical activity. Surely Held is wrong to ask whether Adorno’s “vision of potentialities” has “anything more than a formal or logical status”? (1990, 383-4).

Adorno offers us socio-philosophical inquiry in the presence of art, reason and reality. He neither mounts the barricade nor glides across the dance floor. A musical synthesis of popular material and serious, avant-garde ambition situated for Adorno somewhere “between Schoenberg and the American film” does not crystallise on his watch. His contribution lies in his rigorous reluctance to allow music and radio to become the handmaids of ideological activity or equivocal ethics.  

Adorno regarded popular musics as serving the affirmative but also, in their semblance, and ‘lack’ i.e. what they were not, he gave them a somewhat dialectical role. Pop of course began to give us, in the years immediately before
and after Adorno’s death in 1969 what might be termed avant-rock, and also free and improvised musics. For Adorno, music was a site of mediation. In its presence there would be the mediation of the individual and social; subject-object; material-spiritual contact and change. Music, and music in radio is thus always a site of (eutopian) becoming, thus precluding Adorno’s fears of conceptual reification, dialectical closure and idealist conclusion.

Choosing to put music into the ether is part of a modern Gemeinschaft that rebuilds relationships by challenging anomie and alienation. No representational medium is ‘whole’ in its translations of content and emotion from subject to subject. As intense, auditory artifact, radio provides new modes of near-immediate, near-presentational communication that reconnect, connect and subvert. Everyone is again in the same ‘space’ at the same time listening to the same exchanges.

It is not Adorno’s reduced communication that is bereft of the artistic. Radio can serve to deliver content that bridges the gap between public idealism, individual desire and cultural particulars. By transmitting both, the torn halves may still not add up, but at least their ‘rending’ can be discerned. What the mediation of subjects does seem to constitute is a just, socially configured site of dialectical activity which, because of its material rootedness and critically aware listening subject generates an awareness of non-identity.

How then might mass communication in the hands of a public service broadcaster offer autonomous art, authentic intersubjectivity and emancipatory potential with its hegemonic and atomising tendencies? Whilst Adorno long resisted technology as arms of the ruling class of a capitalist society, others, like Benjamin and Brecht saw the value early on of new technologies as opportunities to foster aesthetic estrangement and disrupt the harmony of immediate intersubjective presentation.

In sum, with Adorno, we detect a tardy set of potentials but even as a fragmentary strategy consonant with his method, it fails to deal sufficiently positively with popular musics and people. Adorno, though surprisingly ‘positive’ was still hamstrung by his fear of totalitarian technologies and his musicological biases.

Born (1993b) offers us a contextualising approach which incorporates institutional dimensions and, at the same time, presents a way of ‘repairing’
Adorno’s unbalanced readings of the popular and the serious so as to fuel the negation of his particular critical model. Born accuses Adorno of “evading the completion of his own project” with a “theory that is opportunistic” (1993b, 225). She seems to suggest that his distinction allowed for his sustained “aesthetic and sociopolitical critiques” through oppositional negation (ibid.). Born suggests we must draw on Adorno’s more thoroughgoing critique of the popular, and extend it to accounts of autonomous and avant-garde forms. If we do consider institutional matters and the aesthetic of high art in relation to his torn halves, we can says Born, begin to:

Analyse cultural production as a constellation of simultaneous social, institutional, technological, aesthetic and discursive forms - as a complex, multitexual and intertextual composite. In this way Adorno points towards a cultural theory which avoids the twin poles of formalism or sociological reduction; and which may allow for the politicization of each or all of the mediations - aesthetic, technological, social, institutional - of cultural production. (1993b, 224-5)

This it might be argued gives us a more complete approach for a consideration of the diverse cultural production and reproduction of the BBC.

While there were indeed ‘intermittent dialectics’ in evidence in his later work, a life-long antipathy to popular musics and the mass media precluded any full-blown dialectical study of contemporaneous avant-garde and popular forms. This serves to illustrate Adorno’s own frequently appraised ideological fixity - verging on the metaphysical - precluding any truly trans-generational, populist or democratic impulse that might exploit critical exposures faithful to Marx’s own belief that social transformation may come through happy, ‘in and for itself’ activity and positively-applied technologies. If popular musics and authentic music are, for Adorno, torn halves of a humanitarian whole, every effort must be made by musicians, broadcasters and not least theorists to transcend the extant and, in a truly utopian way, deploy dialectical activity to advance society through a plurality of cultural expressions.

So with an eye to Adorno’s writings, what do we see and infer?

(1) Music is a regulative principle of mutual understanding effected at somatic, pre-lingual, phenomenological, performative and discursive levels. For Adorno,
what mattered was one’s ‘identification’ with nature and one’s true self. Subjects should not be reified or dealt with conceptually, but we can however use concepts alongside subjects and particulars and thus delimit what Held terms “a space for freedom - creative, spontaneous thought and action” (1990, 214). Indeed, concepts for Adorno “comprehend more than a particular object [...] they point to a set of ideal properties” and for Held “there is a utopian aspect in concepts” (1990, 215).

(2) That if correctly ‘read’, lack and Utopia can fuel negation to destroy reification and fuel emancipation. Intermittent dialectics can exist in discrete moments, in the commodified, the kitsch, the more radical aesthetic works, even though the latter might also have at least some ‘compromising’ dalliance with mainstream channels, institutions and pressures.

(3) That radio can serve as a site for such avant-garde work and that radio and records can serve as a radical historical repositories re-presenting past liberations or sketching-out new possibilities.

(4) In this space where idea and reality meet, we can perform an Adomian immanent critique of institutional ideals and ideas. Perhaps by his strict reckoning, the BBC fails, as it does not meet its own high standards. But the BBC does give us a eutopia which is a socio-cultural flux and process. What we can encounter is what Held says is “historically crystallised standards [that] suggest what the object sought and seeks to be. They also suggest possibilities which are rarely, if ever realized” (1990, 215).

(5) A late admission that some people are aware of the deceitful nature of the culture industry, enjoy it anyway, and are not subsumed.

Notes

1. “Because all happiness found in the status quo is an ersatz and false, art must break its promise in order to stay true to it. But the consciousness of people, especially that of the masses who in an antagonistic society are separated by cultural privilege from consciousness of such a dialectic, hold fast to the promise of happiness; rightfully so, but in its immediate, material form. This provides the opening for the culture industry, which plans for and exploits the need for happiness” Adorno (1997, 311).
2. His condemnation of popular musics as regressive, deceitful products of the culture industry is well charted by the likes of Robert W. Witkin (1998) and Max Paddison (1993) and (1996). See also Adorno (2001c and 2001d). It is not the aim in the thesis to repeat such easy attacks.

3. After her first encounter with Adorno, one of my undergraduate students in the Cardiff School of Art & Design characterised him as "the guy who hated stuff", a description that has resonated with many other students since.

4. In Adorno's defence he is briefly seen alluding to the Invitation to Music: A Study of the Creation of New Music Listeners by the Radio, a study by Edward A. Suchman in Radio Research, 1941, 140-188, which dealt with the varied levels of musical taste between concert-goers and radio listeners. Adorno concedes this has much to do with one's upbringing. (Adorno 1998k, 228-9).

5. From the 1930s until his death in 1969, Adorno argued that music was an autonomous, a-conceptual entity and a socially marked artifact. However he condemned music (and art) in general - both high and low - as 'semblance', mere images or at best, utopian intimations of something better, not a site of social transformation.

6. Paddison explores the reification, the fixing of the subject in music per se and, in contrast, the more dynamic progression of freer subjects in more organic musical structures as explained by Adorno (1990, 198-9).

7. For his own defence see Adorno (2001f).

8. Consider commercial music's cliched lyrics, standardised cadences and rhythms, sonic novelties or instrumental solos which can be read as analogous to society conventions, production line drudgery relieved by vain expressions of individuality.

9. Paddison explores the reification, the fixing of the subject in music per se and, in contrast, the more dynamic progression of freer subjects in more organic musical structures as explained by Adorno (1990, 198-9).

10. Focussing on the false consciousness of the present wherein identity and emancipation are merely feigned as people seek 'wish fulfilment' and catharsis, Adorno insisted on deploying his "negative dialectics": a philosophical logic that is, in its contradictory character, a 'positive', ultimately optimistic gesture of defiance to counter intellectual stasis.

11. Adorno from Prisms, cited in Lechte (1994, 178). Here is additional comment from Adorno on administered, bureaucratic culture suggesting that even those of good will are ham strung: "Administration [...] is no longer merely a national or communal institution existing in clear separation from the free play of social forces. The tendency of every institution towards expansion - both quantitatively and qualitatively - was designated as immanent by Max Weber in The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation [...] the immoderate size of even those institutions not concerned about profit - such as education and radio - furthers the practices of administration through the demand for organisational gradation. These practices are strengthened by technological development; in the case of radio, for example, that which is to be communicated is concentrated to the extreme and disseminated as far as possible" (Adorno (2001g, 111).

12. Adorno wrote: "'Les extrêmes me touchent' [Gide], just as they touch you - but only if the dialectic of the lowest has the same value as the dialectic of the highest, rather than the latter simply decaying. Both bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements of change (but never, of course, the middle-term between Schoenberg and the American film). Both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which however they do not add up" (Adorno from London 18 March 1936, to Walter Benjamin as notes to his The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction in Bloch et al Aesthetics and Politics London, Verso 1980, 123).

13. "The seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy; the seriousness of the lower perishes with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total" (Adorno 1991, 98-9).

14. For Adorno, what were the positive qualities of the popular namely "impulse"; "subjectivity" and "profanity" and which were once "adversaries of materialistic alienation now succumb to it" (Adorno, 2001b, 32). And that now the "fundamental characteristic of popular music is standardization" (Adorno 1990, 302). Popular music for Adorno is often revived: "the famous old hits which are revived set the patterns which have become standardized. They are the golden age of the game rules" (1990, 307). Regarding distraction, Adorno asserted that "The frame of mind to which popular music originally appealed, on which it feeds and which it perpetually reinforces,
simultaneously one of distraction and inattention" (1990, 309-10). “People want to have fun. A fully concentrated and conscious experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort simultaneously” (Adorno, 1990, 310). For Adorno, regression of listening is “listening [...] arrested at the infantile stage” (2001b, 46). “Thus the popular is undemanding, ‘pre-digested.’ The composition hears for the listener. This is how popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity and promotes conditioned reflexes” (1990, 306). “Hits conform to genres both dance and ‘character’ e.g. ‘mother songs’, ‘home songs’, ‘laments for a lost girl ’” (1990, 302). Adorno on regressive listeners wrote: “Whenever they have a chance, they display the pinched hatred of those who really sense the other but exclude it [...] The regression is really from this existent possibility, or, more concretely, from the possibility of a different and oppositional music” (2001b, 47).

15. The quotation is from Benjamin’s call for radio to be a civilising locale (1993 29-31).
16. The technological utopia is a fairly common theme. Stimulating is the 1978 essay of Raymond Williams, *Utopia and Science Fiction* which viewed Utopia to be a place of moral, social and material improvement. Williams quotes Wordsworth: “Not in Utopia [...] but in this very world [...] we find our happiness or not at all!” He then identifies four types of utopian fiction including: “The technical transformation in which a new kind of life has been made possible by a technical discovery” (Williams, 1980b).

Allen S. Weiss in his *Phantasmic Radio* (1995) lists the radio art of: “F. T. Marinetti ‘wireless imagination’ and futurist radio; [...] Leon Trotsky: revolutionary radio; Dziga Vertoz: agit-prop and the ‘Radio–Eye’ [...] Glen Gould: studio perfectionism and ‘contrapuntal radio’ [...] the labyrinthine radio narratives of Hörspiel; the diversity of community radios; free radio; guerrilla radio; pirate radio” (Weiss 1995, 2). One needs to add the experiments typified by Cage, and later AMM, see Prévost (1995, 18). In Edward Bellamy’s *Looking Backward* (1888) another utopian text we find: “it appears to me, Miss Leete,” I said, “that if we could have devised an arrangement for providing everybody with music in their homes, perfect in quality, unlimited in quantity, suited to every mood and beginning and ceasing at will, we should have considered the limit of human felicity already attained, and ceased to strive for further improvements’ ” (Cited in More 1965, 19).

17. He acknowledged that improvements in studio tape and the introduction of Stereophony and high fidelity later render some of his criticisms redundant (Adorno 1998k, 227). “Yet I believe that this affects neither the theory of atomistic listening nor that of the particular ‘image character’ of music on the radio” (ibid.).

18. Born refers us to an account by Thomas Y. Levin as an instance of what she terms Adorno’s “redemptive reading” of the popular, particularly with regard to the vinyl record as an autonomous, transcription of musical intent, free of institutional misrepresentations; a reading which is still sensitive to the record’s commodified condition (Born 1993b, 226-7). Thomas Y. Levin, *For the record: Adorno on Music in the age of its technological reproducibility*, in *October*, no. 55 23-47, Winter 1990.


21. Andrew Edgar has drawn my attention to a footnote in Benjamin (1992b) where, in a discussion of *Faust* he acknowledged that theatrical delivery would preserve an auratic relation between actor and audience and would thus be better than any representational, cinema version. It is thus not completely clear whether Benjamin values, or seeks to supersede the auratic and its powers. More generally, it also raises the question as to whether the live radio voice and musical performance preserve the auratic, and if so, what the implications are.

22. “Benjamin, following Brecht, insisted that these characteristics of film produced a distanced estrangement (verfremdungseffekt) on the part of the audience that led to a critical-active attitude to what is seen. The audience as a result, acting collectively and critically has a chance to reject or complete an intrinsically unfinished work” (Arato and Gebhardt 2000, 210). Kurt Weill’s views on radio are also of some interest. In 1926, he commented on conservative opposition to radio in some music circles, and whilst conceding there was room for acoustic improvement in the radio sets themselves, he wrote that greater knowledge would overcome these difficulties and added: “It isn’t clear to us why radio should be viewed as such a dangerous enemy of creative or performing artists” (Weill 1993, 26-8). Weill argued, radio performances would replace concerts of “social occasion” to serve as “uplifting, festive hours for the broad mass” Weill (1993, 26-8).
Weill looked beyond technical limitations and ignored claims that it was detrimental to live musical events. He prefigures Benjamin’s hope that mass mediation would strip the aura of sacred place and uniqueness, but preserve and extend music’s aesthetic and perhaps by extension, its moral kernel.

23. Works of aura produce concentration, empathy, absorption and identification on the part of the reader, or audience - modes of response that lead according to Brecht and Benjamin to political and esthetic passivity. Benjamin depicts the decline of aura primarily in terms of technology but also economy and social tendencies. The growth of technical methods of reproduction which Benjamin deduces from the Marxian dialectic of forces and relations of production leads to a ‘tremendous shattering of tradition’ (Arato and Gebhardt 2000, 209). It is interesting to note that Benjamin delivered a number of radio talks for children.

24. Kate Lacey writes: “By the 1920s, film was being theorized as the new sense organ presenting a distracted, modern (and potentially progressive) way of seeing. But the really new medium of the 1920s was the radio, which quickly became defined as a secondary medium broadcasting fragmentary, ephemeral content” (2000, 279).


26. A superficially similar vision is presented a year later by Nazi propaganda minister Paul Joseph Goebbels in his opening address to the tenth German radio show (Deutsche Funkausstellung) in Berlin, a view which may have been responsible for Benjamin’s reconsideration of the medium and which proved to be a chilling dystopian command of extant conditions and emerging forces: Radio was for Goebbels the “chief mediator between the Movement and the Nation, between Idea and Man […] We need a broadcasting that is in step with the nation, radio that works for the people” (Bergmeier and Lotz 1997, 6).

27. In this essay, Brecht advocated outside broadcasting with compact equipment to cover debate in the Reichstag (Brecht, 2000c, 35.)

28. We should note that as early as 1929, Hitler had appointed Goebbels as Reichspropagandaleiter. Bergmeier and Lotz record that just four days into his new role, Goebbels wrote the following in his diary: “Broadcasting is now totally in the hands of the state. We have put a stop endlessly swinging this way and that; we have thus ensured that there will be uniform control” (1997, 4). On the development of the Volksempfänger people’s set of 1933 and the smaller Deutscher Kleinempfänger of 1936, see Bergmeier and Lotz (1997, 8-9). They estimate that by 1939 what they describe as ‘Greater Germany’ had approximately 50 million radio listeners.

29. Brecht wrote: “Where music is concerned the state shall provide whatever requires special apparatuses and special skills, but the individual shall provide an exercise. Unchecked feelings aroused by music, special thoughts that may be conceived when listening to music, physical exhaustion that easily arises just from listening to music, these are all distractions from music. To avoid these distractions, the individual participates in the music, thus obeying the principle: doing is better than feeling, by following the printed music with his eyes and adding the passages and voices reserved for him, by singing to himself or in conjunction with others” (2000f, 39).

30. ‘Current of music’ is a fine metaphor for dialectical development and if space allowed could form a separate part in this study where retrospective glances and prospective fortunes in a musical score are given a suitable utopian gloss. Cf. Paddison on August Otto Halm (1993, 73-4).

31. “Radio, the progressive latecomer of mass culture is a private enterprise which really does represent the sovereign whole and is therefore some distance ahead of the other combines. Chesterfield is merely the nation’s cigarette, but the radio is the voice of the nation […] The radio becomes the universal mouth piece of the Führer; […] The National Socialists know that the wireless gave shape to their cause just as the printing press did to the Reformation. The metaphysical charisma of the Führer invented by the sociology of religion has finally turned out to be no more than the omnipresence of his speeches on the radio, which are a demoniacal parody of the omnipresence of the divine spirit” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, 159).

32. In his refreshingly optimistic account of our collective ‘speaking into the air’, John Durham Peters (1999) privileges humanistic hope over technological limits and philosophical ‘worry’ in the presence of communicative acts. He writes: “ ‘Communication’ is a registry of modern longings […] a utopia where nothing is misunderstood, hearts are open, and expression uninhibited […] Only moderns could be facing each other and be worried […] it is a rich tangle of intellectual and cultural strands […] an apparent answer to the painful divisions between self and other, private and public […] it is a sink into which most of our hopes and fears seem to be poured” (1999, 2).

33. “The sheer trashiness of radio! The tedium and garbage and fruity pomposity and Mr. Hennesy’s maudering about the Emerald Isle in that warbly voice […] the false bonhomie of
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fatheads like Leo (‘Hey, have we got a barn-burner for you tonight, folks, and here’s a little girl you’re gonna love’) [...] ‘Evening folks, and welcome to the Best is Yet to Be and I just want to say how much it means to us to know that you’re there’. Bullshit. But that’s what radio was all about! False Friendship. That was radio in a nutshell. Announcers laying on the charm to sell you hair tonic” (Keillor 1992, 50).

34. For a postwar account of Ham radio as an autonomous activity see Ullyet (1976).

35. Adorno worked “half-time for the Institute of Social Research and half-time for the Princeton Radio Project. The latter was directed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, with Hadley Cantrill and Frank Stanton, at that time still Research Director of the Columbia Broadcasting System, as co-directors” (Adorno 1998k, 217-8). The Princeton Radio Project was located in an old Newark brewery. Adorno saw that data was prepared for the industry or for “cultural advisory boards and similar bodies” - what he termed “administrative research” (Adorno 1998k, 219). “The project’s charter, which came from the Rockefeller Foundation, explicitly stipulated that the investigations had to be carried out within the framework of the commercial radio system established in the USA” (ibid.). There were moves for Adorno to develop a music education radio programme for The New York City Radio Station (WNYC) in 1940 he had “half an hour completely at my disposal [...] with an audience of literally hundreds of thousands of young people [...] I have an almost unlimited archive of recordings [and] a staff of collaborating artists. One cannot yet imagine the consequences.” This project was abandoned, see Adorno (2006b, 43). He did introduce some concerts for the station in that year, see Adorno (2006b, 47, 51). In 1941 he moved to California, returning to Europe in 1949. In 1952-3 he was in Los Angeles to work with Hacker Foundation to undertake social psychology. This was when he undertook his two television studies. See also Adorno (1998e and f) for his views on television.

36. “In the theoretical texts I wrote for the institute at that time, I formulated the standpoints and experiences I then wanted to evaluate in the radio project. In the first instance, this work concerned the essay On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening [also] In Search of Wagner [that] endeavoured to combine sociological, technical-musical, and aesthetic analyses [to look at internal matters] on the other hand - and what seemed to me more essential - the internal technical findings in turn should be brought to societal expression and be read as ciphers of societal conditions”(Adorno 1998k, 218).

37. “It would be incumbent upon research first of all to investigate to what extent such subjective reactions of the experiment’s subjects are in fact spontaneous and immediate as these subjects suppose, or rather to what extent are actually involved not only the mechanisms of dissemination and the apparatus’s power of suggestion, but also the objective implication of the media and the material with which the listeners are confronted - and ultimately the comprehensive societal structures all the way up to the societal totality” (Adorno 1998k, 220).


39. Concerts involved Pierre Boulez, Karlheinz Stockhausen, John Cage. See generally also Adorno (1998g-j) for more insight into his late thought.

40. Adorno had a deep interest in the significance of the musical avant-garde, a set of ‘difficult’ peripheral forms that challenge the homogeneity of the commercial sphere. Aesthetic dissonance detectable here may serve as an allegory of alienation, non-identity or a preliminary immanent critique for musician and the listener.

41. Adorno is referring here to the common practice of public radio stations transmitting their serious output on a third station, distinct from those dedicated to mainstream entertainments, news and sport. It is not a direct reference here to the BBC’s Third Programme, even though the Third Programme in Italy for instance was named after the BBC’s. See also Brecht (2000b) for pre-war views on how the radio industry should engage with significant music.

42. Adorno came late to psychoanalytical concerns. Might his ‘yearning’ for a past in any way be understood with reference to Jung as well as to Bloch? Anthony Storr stated that: “poetry, like music, can transmute the mud of the banal into the gold of the transcendental. One of Jung’s central
ideas was that modern man had become alienated from this mythopoetic substratum of his being, and that therefore his life lacked meaning and significance for him" (1973, 42).

43. The only thing that can exist in philosophical materialism is an *a priori* utopia and a eutopian referential condition of 'becoming'. The former, once figured and articulated in art and politics, once pursued by a cognisant, politicised class as part of the onward march of history it is no longer a potentially 'free' goal as it is a directed state of becoming effected by social reality and philosophical discourse.

44. Adorno never gave any credence to popular musical forms as he encountered them and moreover seemed wilfully neglectful of any Afro-American musics or progressive jazz or rock from the 1960s. Imagine Adorno arguing away the difficult, but liberating avant-garde qualities of the ecstatics of John Coltrane and Jimi Hendrix, the experiment of Sonic Youth, the formal informalities of Derek Bailey or the intense textures of Radiohead. See Paddison (1996, 100-1) who cites: Zappa, The Velvet Underground, John Cale, Henry Cow and Carla Bley and Paddison (2001) where he returns to the avant-garde aspects of Frank Zappa's (post)modern musical bricolage, quotation and parody as a critique of the Culture Industry. See also Cutler (1993, 75-85; 103-40) who has looked at progressive musics in Britain with accounts of The Residents, Slapp Happy and Henry Cow.

45. The return home is not without its dangers. Andrew Edgar has drawn my attention to the feet it is present in Adorno and Horkheimer’s reading of *The Odyssey* where to get home, one has avoid hearing the sirens - we must perhaps have to rely on the aristocratic leader to take the longer view, and shield the others from distractions.

46. These issues of exile are touched on by Edgar (1987, 281-2).

47. Born tells us that "Adorno's essay *Culture and Administration* which considers Weberian themes indicates the limits of his approach to subsidised high culture. Rather than critical analysis, the essay depicts it as a refuge from consumer society - a space in which 'spontaneous consciousness' might still be able to 'create centres of [cultural] freedom' " (1995, n. 26, 343).

48. Bernstein tells us that this collapsing, this dovetailing falsely reconciles the universal with the particular. (Adorno 2001a, 23).

49. See Doctor (1999 316, 324).

50. For Adorno, to saddle music with a role of cold instrumentality or, at the very least, degrade it through its reproduction and broadcast was to render it highly suspect. Music in this way was denuded of its 'relative goodness'; any authentic origin or radical potential. The phrase "the middle term between Schoenberg and the American film" comes from Adorno's letter to Benjamin in Bloch *et al* (1980, 123).
5 Technology, art & liberation: Marcuse reviewed

5.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of a review of Herbert Marcuse's formulation of human instincts, particularly as it plays out in relation to popular musics, intersubjectivity and the disembodying processes of broadcast technologies. Marcuse tends to echo Adorno's presiding suspicions in the face of the all-conquering loudspeaker and offers accounts of listening and liberation that run counter to the more optimistic and unproblematic one's of Benjamin and Brecht. In contrast to their work, Marcuse tends to offer a more overt psychological gloss, and a clearer articulation of the involvement of the dialectical process in the act of transmitting and receiving. Marcuse's work is additionally relevant and important in a consideration of mediated listening as he returns us to the work of art, addresses the liberatory potentials of a near-Blochian desire and is more sympathetic towards popular cultural movements but not their culture. He therefore at once offers a critical supplement to Adorno but also a more overtly positive prospectus, and in so doing serves as a bridge between Bloch's utopian project; 'ideology critique' and subsequent, more populist readings which thus maintains a significant momentum towards the eutopian readings of this study which privilege chances over promises.

5.2 Technology & mediated listening

Writing of "the dialectic of civilization" in his 1956 book Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical inquiry into Freud, Marcuse had suggested that:

Under the rule of economic, political and cultural monopolies, the formation of the mature superego seems to skip the stage of individualization [...] the ego seems to be prematurely socialized by a whole system of extra familial agents and agencies. As early as the pre-school level, gangs, radio and television set the pattern for conformity and rebellion [...] the experts of the mass media transmit the required values; they offer the perfect training in efficiency, toughness, personality, dream and romance. (Marcuse 1998a, 97)
Here, Marcuse has given us a complex model of listenership, and has crucially observed the omission of the development of a maturing individual who might be in a position to demonstrate a modicum of independence, free participation and self-reflection. Marcuse’s words echo Adorno’s concern that established order realities and media were tainting music’s autonomous powers and thus bring about a premature social adjustment akin to unreflective obedience. (see Marcuse, 1968a, 88-133 on affirmative, extant culture).

Is there anywhere in Marcuse, a tentative reconciliation of humans and technology whereby authentic art is more sensitively and usefully disseminated? In Marcuse’s retreat away from radio and into art (for him the only radical medium of resistance) we seem to have come almost full circle whereby Adorno’s ‘difficult’ art and ‘nostalgic’ art are where things once again begin and end. For subjects to engage and ‘meet’ with others through music, Marcuse’s simple answer was, contra Benjamin and Brecht, to switch off our domestic televisions and radios: “Massive socialization begins at home and arrests the development of consciousness and conscience” (1968b, 192). Marcuse went on to outline the consequences of a switching-off which, unlike the prediction of a spiritual swoon of the nation from Khlebnikov (in Strauss 1993, 32), is a moment that liberates in its disorientation:

The mere absence of all advertising and of all indoctrination media of information and entertainment would plunge the individual into a traumatic void where he would have the chance to wonder and to think, to know himself (or rather the negation of himself) and his society. (1968b, 192-3)

However determined he was to privilege the aesthetic, and however critical he was of technology, Marcuse could do nothing other than embrace the technological means and potentials of mass mediation as he invested hope in those who used such channels for expressing resistance.

The brutal state response to social unrest in Europe and the USA during the late 1960s had seen an abandonment of street action and an emergence of alternative cultural expression and personal development, typified by the mediating role of popular musical forms and their allied technologies of mass distribution. The creative empowerment of communities with access to musical production and distribution was to become a feature of both countercultural and
politically sponsored activity in Britain, the USA and Europe in the 1970s. The former was in the ambit of commercially driven spheres of recording and pirate radio, the later in the care of socialist authority decree, keen on promoting access to recording and broadcasting technologies. Whilst Marcuse would have regarded such intense engagement with the popular media as being inimical to emancipation, he did find it within him to credit mass media technology with some potential. Interestingly, as a professional media researcher during the war Marcuse had, elsewhere, distinguished between technology as: (1) a system of oppressive manufacturing and reified relationships where human qualities are handed-down in a standardised form paying scant attention to the distinct, aesthetically motivated individuals and (2) technics as 'neutral' devices that might well be humanistically advantageous when in the 'right' hands. This grudging acceptance of technical creativity in some respects prefigures the postwar ideas of Hans Magnus Enzenberger who believed democratically distributed media technologies might empower everyone, both creatively and through the acts of wider representation and alternative modes of transmission. Marcuse's hesitancy and qualifications make it hard to decide if his views on radio are more or less advanced than those of Adorno who, by this time, had himself often been 'on air'. Marcuse at least wrote positively of radio's 'technics':

Utopian possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of advanced capitalism and society: the rational utilization of these forms [...] would terminate poverty [...] but we know that neither their rational use nor [...] their collective control by the 'immediate producers' (the workers) would by itself eliminate domination and exploitation: a bureaucratic welfare state would still be a state of repression. (1969, 4)

He went on to explain what was needed:

In order to become a vehicle of freedom, science and technology would have to change their present direction and goals; they would have to be reconstituted in accord with a new sensibility - the life instincts. Then one could speak of a technology of liberation, product of a scientific imagination free to project and design the forms of a human universe without exploitation and toil. (1969 19)

Marcuse, whilst intrigued by technical potentials, turned to address the prior significance of human desire in any emancipatory exercise.
5.3 Desire

A character in Garrison Keillor’s period novel Radio Romance exclaims:

Radio is not lines [...] radio is air! [...] literary principles of form mean nothing - radio has no linear content whatsoever. It is dreamlike, precognitive, primitive, intimate. It has less to do with politics or society, than with sex, nature and religion. (1992, 146)

The presence of the human body and acts of artistic expression are never far from Marcuse’s accounts of mediation, and require some explanation here as ideas connect with the work of Bloch and Freud in Marcuse’s analyses of postwar social and cultural circumstances. We see Marcuse’s interest in the power of impulses in *Eros and Civilization* (1998a). Here he insisted that we seek to overcome what he termed the performance principle - where technocratic logic and the reality principle together had manufactured a conforming, affirmative culture - a sublimating ‘civilisation’ that in its insistence on self-control precluded somatic self-expression and consequently any initiating change for the better. Contrary to Freud (who had feared the unleashing of human instinct and so was resigned to an unhappiness in the presence of a controlling elite), Marcuse wanted individual desires and instincts to be acknowledged and liberated, not commercially exploited or socially suppressed. Marcuse, with reference to psychoanalytical thinking, sought to liberate unconscious energies, longings and desires as might be accompanied in song and expressed though play. Passive, unfocussed longing (music’s abstract utopia) might be given positive expression in a libidinally charged praxis. For Marcuse, “sublimation and domination hang together” (1998a, 215), but might be overcome he argued by consciously directed instinct (as a component of a concrete utopia) which “In accordance with Freud’s notion of *Trieb* [impulse], refers to primary ‘drives’ of the human organism which are subject to *historical* modification; they find mental as well as somatic representation” (1998a, 8).

For Marcuse, a great refusal of desublimated, abstract desire and wishes could occupy an historical reality populated by youthful individuals, dissident thinkers and Non-Western peoples. For Marcuse, any continuing, ego-weak dependence on mere immature fantasies, or the safety of parental mores or
paternalistic substitutes (be they totalitarian leaders or phantasmic technologies) could be set aside in the pursuit of physical pleasure: a "jouissance" which invites the company of music and is usefully sustained as a knowing "plaisir". Basic instincts which many national governments had feared and sought to control could, Marcuse believed be positive, not destructive forces which might be desublimated to liberate individuals from personal alienation. Adorno himself had elicited Freudian discourse and the concepts of id, ego and super-ego in which to locate his account of "ego-weakness"; a non-autonomous ego in the face of a paternalistic media constructing the sort of collective individuality Marcuse had also condemned.5

Orpheus & Eros

In theorizing the erotic as a liberating urge, Marcuse placed importance on the mythic figure of Orpheus wherein notions of genuine freedom and creativity might join art. Specifically, Marcuse argued that the image of Orpheus offers "redemption", "peace" and "salvation by pacifying man and nature, not through force but through song [...] His language is song, and his work is play" (1998a, 170-1). Marcuse effectively concocted his own 'aesthetic dimension' of sensuousness and reconciliation, but little is said here about the erotic as a force for uncompromising change. It is only in a later chapter that Marcuse spelled out the potential for instincts. It would be a regression to instinct, but one inflected by reason where sustained work and social relations could be forged. But Marcuse did not say where such an awareness and discourse might reside to best effect. At one point, Marcuse praised Fourier’s utopia (New Amorous World) where sexual pleasure and work were allied, but he dismissed this proposal, for apparently Fourier had abrogated its implementation to "a giant organisation and administration and thus retains the repressive elements" (1998a, 218). Whilst at once more hedonistic, ‘realistic’ and critical than the likes of Benjamin and Brecht, Marcuse was still perhaps overcautious in the face of radicalised subjects of his ‘great refusal’ and was presumably unable to imagine a marriage of technology and oppositional culture in a way implied by the perspectives of Enzenberger, and unable to foresee any institutional involvements. Whilst welcoming youthful resistance, Marcuse detected an absence of rationality and yet
was unable to sanction any intervention from the very forces of quasi-independent cultural institutions themselves like the broadcasters of Europe or the United States, or their technologies which might mediate the energies and music of the young but preserve their utopian desires. The remembrance of pleasure seems to have been a more potent process for Marcuse.

Recollection & phantasy

The memory of gratification is at the origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past gratification is the hidden driving power behind the process of thought. (Marcuse 1998a, 31)

For Marcuse, unconscious and partially conscious memory joined one’s clear recollection of early experiences of gratification (and in most cases domestic security) which together fuelled a Blochian, abstract sense of past bodily satisfactions which presaged useful thought. Marcuse wrote that:

If memory moves into the center of psychoanalysis as a decisive mode of cognition, this is far more than a therapeutic device; the therapeutic role of memory derives from the truth value of memory [where memory can] preserve promises and potentialities which are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, civilized individual. (1998a, 18-19)

In accordance with the Blochian embrace of our childhoods, but contra Adorno, Marcuse boldly asserted that:

Regression assumes a progressive function. The rediscovered past yields critical standards which are tabooed by the restoration of the present. Moreover, the restoration of memory is accompanied by the restoration of the cognitive content of phantasy. (1998a, 19)

Marcuse wrote that “Phantasy is ‘protected from cultural alterations’ and stays committed to the pleasure principle” (1998a, 14). It is allied to childhood play and persists in us all as the adult’s day dream. In short, phantasy joins a subject’s unconscious and imagination with reality and, at a mature level, is manifest in the work of art. Phantasy can thus also be argued to be a connecting principle between an abstract utopian sense of remembered pleasure, and a more concrete utopia of embodied, articulated and orientated action. Marcuse argued that indeed it was a
bridge from the unconscious, through imagination to serve as a cognitive vehicle that would contest alienation:

As a fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its own - namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality. Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason. While this harmony has been removed into utopia by the established reality principle, phantasy insists that it must and can become real, that behind the illusion lies knowledge. (1998a, 143)

We must then distinguish between individual experience, memory and phantasy, and a more societally considered and situated hope. For Marcuse, this subsequent state of socialisation is characterised by a more reasoned ambition or concretised 'desire' achieved through reality's opportunities for intersubjectivities which modulate the individual impulse in the form and content of art.

5.4 "Between the dance floor & the barricade": Marcuse & art

Musical participation for Marcuse seemed to hold out the prospect for an articulated, situated hope; if it had to be the likes of radio which melded impulse and praxis then there were those willing to try. In 1967, the BBC used the first ever communication satellites orbiting the Earth to link-up 24 countries for a live transmission of the Beatles singing *All You Need is Love*.10 This programme was titled *Our World* which was "bringing man face to face with mankind as far apart as Canberra and Cape Kennedy, Moscow and Montreal, Samarkand and Soderfors, Takamatsu and Tunis" (Sweeting 2002, 5). This was an early, post-colonial attempt by the BBC to capitalise on technological opportunities and proffer a vision of multicultural harmony, safe in the hands of a globally successful, English-speaking rock band. Amusingly it featured snippets of both *The Marseillaise* and Glen Miller's *In the Mood* in an echo of Marcuse's barricade and dance floor.

At this time, Marcuse's own sceptical resistance to radio content and impact as a whole remained steadfast, whilst his search for freedom and political change in popular musics also remained set about with reservations.
Whilst seeing much art as a site of ‘truth’, happiness and refusal for liberated individuals, Marcuse asserted that popular cultural artifacts were not, in themselves, elements of any coherent political praxis. Indeed he had distinct reservations about the ‘individuation’ and emotive content of popular musics. Marcuse seemed to be caught between somatic pleasures and radical activity, unable to resolve the dialectical potential to his own satisfaction. Today it might be argued that the visceral, often overtly sexual content of rock music and the expressive abandonment of audiences at music festivals is consonant with Marcusian wishes for libidinal emancipation, yet Marcuse was never willing to accord even playful popular musics any role as ‘work’ (artistic or otherwise) as he saw it, nor see it take any role in the articulation of the political. Whilst he flirted with what he perceived to be a useful, conceptual space ‘between the dance floor and the barricade’, for him it was only serious art, and more specifically literature that tended the flame of resistance, not popular musical expression. If popular music did not exactly lead to Adorno’s regressive listener it was then for Marcuse at the very least, a ‘politically mute’ medium. Likewise, a suspicion of media technology as false experience lingered in Marcuse’s mind for much of the time. As we have seen, television and radio for him were, at that time, ‘dangerous’ channels of a still extant dominant performance principle and an enduring, sublimating reality principle. Most significantly, they stripped out physical contact, sexual consummation and human contact of any immediate kind.

We read in the transcript of a Richard Kearney interview with Marcuse:

Marcuse: I am wary of all exhibitions of free-wheeling emotionalism and as I explained in Counter-revolution and Revolt, I think that both the ‘living’ theatre movement [...] and the ‘rock’ cult are prone to this error [...] the ‘rock-group’ cult seems open to the danger of a form of commercial totalitarianism which absorbs the individual into an uninhibited mass where the power of a collective unconscious is mobilised but left without any radical or critical awareness. (Kearney 1984, 75-6)

Whilst retreating from an embrace of the popular, it is fair to point out this is less due to any uneasiness with the Afro-American forms and conceits heard within rock and jazz (as was the case with Bloch and Adorno), but simply due to its effect of immediate stimulation rather than articulate reflection. Adorno, as one would expect, had long before formulated his response to music and
countercultural activity in the 1960s, and chose to repeat it in a passage from *Aesthetic Theory*. Adorno’s identification of the inevitability of recuperation by the culture industry of countercultural threads is also outlined:

> The recently adopted insistence on cultivating uncultivation, the enthusiasm for the beauty of street battles, is a reprise of futurist and dadaist actions [...] recommending jazz and rock-and-roll instead of Beethoven does not demolish the affirmative lie of culture but rather furnishes barbarism and the profit interest of the culture industry with a subtefuge. The allegedly vital and uncorrupted nature of such products is synthetically processed by precisely those powers that are supposedly the target of the Great Refusal: these products are the truly corrupt. (1997, 319-20)

In the same 1976 interview with Kearney, Marcuse laid renewed stress on the aesthetic (in a broad sensory way) as a mode of revelation and transformation, overlooked by Karl Marx (Kearney 1984, 71-88). He additionally suggested what its limits were. For Marcuse (after Adorno) art was an emotive, imaginative, promissory substrate which belonged to a larger, emancipatory formula. Marcuse stated “Art can never and never should become *directly* and immediately a factor of political praxis. It can only have effect *indirectly*, by its impact on the consciousness and on the subconsciousness of human beings” (Kearney 1984, 74). We have already observed that in his last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a critique of Marxist aesthetics*, Herbert Marcuse wrote “Art cannot redeem its promise, and reality offers no promises, only chances” (1979, 48). As with Adorno, art for Marcuse seemed only to be illusory promise in need of a critique. And whilst Marcuse, unlike Adorno, did try to turn his attentions to the ‘chances’ and opportunities history and the established order might afford society, ultimately he still seemed to be in the thrall of the elder Adorno, and unable to truly clarify his positions on popular musics and the mass media. In Marcuse’s 1969 *Essay on Liberation* we do find what reads like a repairing of cultural ‘torn halves’ and a combining of the serious and universal with the culturally popular and more specific. Marcuse here argued for a free society where “the aesthetic truth” of higher culture is no longer isolated but “dissolves in desublimated ‘lower’ and destructive forms, where the hatred of the young bursts into laughter and song, mixing the barricade and the dance floor, love, play and heroism” (1969, 25-6).
Let us take Marcuse at his word here. After all, at the heart of critical theory is a willingness to step down from metaphysical thought into the real world. Let us look at the chances reality gives us so that we can get past timidity, prejudices and blind spots. The actualities of music-making and broadcasting surely do more than sustain the deceit of a culture industry, might they not foster community action and communication? Indeed as we shall see, Marcuse himself argued for the possibility of activity in the interstices of institutions.

While Adorno suffered student criticism at the end of his life, Marcuse, the younger man was always quick to praise youthful refusal but, in his last years, was still reluctant to acknowledge any element of praxis within popular musical activity. For all of his love for the potential of erotic energy and his awareness of world revolutions, Marcuse refused to credit popular art with effective political power. For him, art offered an independent critical picture of enlightenment but not liberation and this was its strength. For him, popular movements of resistance might stimulate and ‘touch’ people, yet were, ultimately, mass-mediated commodities symptomatic of failure, not sites of immediate, articulate progress.

5.5 Marcuse, aesthetics & intersubjectivity

The critical function of art, its contribution to the struggle for liberation, resides in the aesthetic form. [...] Art is committed to an emancipation of sensibility, imagination and reason in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity. (Marcuse 1979, 8-9)

One of the essential mechanisms of advanced industrial society is the mass diffusion of art, literature, music, philosophy; they become part of the technical equipment of the daily household and of the daily work world. In this process, they undergo a decisive transformation; they are losing the qualitative difference, namely, the essential dissociation from the established reality principle which was the ground of their liberating function. (Marcuse 1970b, 58)

How then is human emancipation achieved in a ‘here and now’? How do we move from a social idealism of individual happiness and freedom to a social reality of intersubjectivity where mutuality, happiness and freedom replaces subjugation? Marcuse suggested that in the face of disembodiment by radio, and the retreat of collective libidinal potentials, we must turn instead, once again to literature and the traditional arts. Art affords engagement with our unrepessed (animal) selves
and our human intellect. It shows us, via a felt and imagined 'estrangement' from ourselves, the truth of reality’s deceit in the present; it shows us what once was in the past and shows us what ideally could be again.  

This thesis to a great extent accepts Marcuse’s positive evaluation of high art, but argues that indeed, popular music and musical places can also deliver opportunity for instigating the process of self-reflection and change. It also wants to suggest – perhaps in the spirit of the pre-war enthusiasts - that music in radio, by extension, can provide cultural plenitude and, more importantly, spaces for socio-philosophical discourse and the ‘discussive’. If Marcuse’s ‘neutral’ technics are allied to the hopes of the pre-war generation and benignly nurtured in popular cultural expression, then things are possible.

How exactly does art allow us to transcend or, at the very least, move us on to a cognitive and ethical level? Marcuse argued that “the encounter with the fictitious world restructures consciousness and gives sensual representation to a counter-societal experience” (1979, 44). Developing from the work of Bloch and Adorno, we (according to Marcuse) encounter art as a mediating site that allows us to glance backwards to an anterior state of greater happiness. This comparison with the present shows us what might be called a concentrated, sensuous truth, namely that the current joys of the culture industry are illusory and simply perpetuate a non-identity where, said Marcuse, “In all its ideality art bears witness to the truth of dialectical materialism - the permanent non-identity between subject and object, individual and individual” (1979, 29). The Schein of art is the revelation of the truth that it is deceit and promise alone. Art, and in particular music, makes us aware - through work and text - of the Other, not just others. It is in this opening out, this engagement with the objective world of others that a concrete utopia is activated as frustration and enlightenment collide. Art takes on the role of perception, self-reflective process and intersubjectivity where subjective experiences are shared, imagined and consciously acknowledged. Such a formulation as intimated in Marcuse should not exclude the popular.
5.6 Art, radio & Otherness

To hear other people is not however an automatic apprehension of Otherness. Tuning-in to music radio we perhaps initially attend to our own moods and existing tastes. However, the act of admitting new sounds consciously presented to us in a challenging format like that of John Peel on night time Radio 1 in the 1970s does invite a reasoned response to the unfamiliar. An initial stage of listening of this kind would involve attending to the immediate agendas of songwriters and performers. Of course, given background information on the artists, we may be in a position to attend also to any values and aspirations of the contextualising community. For example, Peel’s fascination for dub reggae in the 1970s brought an hitherto experimental popular music to a wider British audience, largely ignorant of the formalistic practices of musicians and producers in the studios of Kingston Jamaica. The echo and reverberation treatments of lyric-free backing tracks were not directly accompanied, when broadcast, by any overt references to their possible psychoactive inspirations. Nor were any allegorical accounts offered of their intriguing musical soundscapes as sites of free expression - and by extension, analogous socio-cultural development outside the limitations of a record industry mainstream. The act of selecting and sharing tracks by the likes of King Tubby and the Upsetters was certainly sufficiently meaningful for many of Peel’s non-black listeners to process the sounds attentively. Whilst many attacked Peel for giving black music airplay, night after night, those more confident in their sense of self, and more sensitive perhaps to Britain’s post-colonial issues such as immigration, engaged in a serious way with Peel’s airing of the unfamiliar.

One of radio’s many features is its extensive use of live transmission. Unlike television that requires set construction, rehearsals and the like, radio (until the advent of studio web cameras) only needed turntables, a playlist, a producer and disc jockey. Whilst listening to Peel in the 1970s was not, in any way a dialogic activity, there was, because of radio’s ‘liveness’ an ‘interpellation’, an invitation to listen and, in return a willingness to hear and think. This was more than a pleasurable but passive enjoyment of the entertaining or novel. It was the beginnings of thoughtful engagement with others and Otherness. For a short
period, the homogenising tendencies of record industry and mainstream radio were evaded by this sort of alternative spatial framing.

To encounter these sounds on record and on air is, of course to encounter a mediated subject and a mediated art. However, the audio recording and radio station are as much apparatuses for aesthetic experiment and engagement as they are tools of commercial distribution. Without the relative freedom of some of the BBC’s radio spaces, many popular musics would remain rooted in communities and be reported on only by ethnomusicologists and well travelled music journalists. If recording contracts and playlists objectify and distort marginal voices as sins of commission, their total absence in the homes of others is possibly a greater sin of omission.

We might turn to Marcuse’s argument that art’s distance from any situated political action or praxis is probably its strength, yet without ‘situated’, discursively handled music of ‘rebellion’ it surely remains impotent and its undoubted, Marcusian promise rendered dumb for any practical purpose.15

5.7 In conclusion

Art is where idealism and reality meet. Bloch and Adorno suggested that educated desire, hope and knowledge reside in art amid the messy realities of the established material and socio-economic order. In so doing, an encounter might allow us to act ethically. But can music really (as an art) do any more than simply promise? Can it join reality to become a site for chances? Where exactly might music with such potentials be made and shared?

Music might be an emancipatory chimera as demonstrated by Adorno and restated in part by Herbert Marcuse, however, a way forward is spelled out by Marcuse himself. His approach is summed up in his 1976 interview with Kearney (1984). for Marcuse, Marx:

did not fully realise that a purely economic resolution of the problem can never be enough, and so lacked the insight that a twentieth-century revolution would require a different type of human being and that such a revolution would have to aim at, and, if successful, implement, an entirely new set of personal and sexual relationships, a new morality, a new sensibility and a total reconstruction of the environment. These are, to a great extent, aesthetic values (aesthetic to be understood in the larger sense of our sensory and imaginative culture which I
outlined in *Eros and Civilisation*, following Kant and Schiller), and that is why I think that one viewing the possibility of struggle and change in our time recognises the decisive role which art must play. Kearney (1984, 74)

In the face of rapid, postwar changes in social and cultural sensibilities, Adorno and Marcuse were, in most of their writings, incapable of allowing for the possibility of immanent cognitions and discourses effecting a new consciousness and consequent praxis. As we have already seen, concessions regarding radio came late to Adorno’s thought and arguably in a form that has the appearance of a resigned, grudging concession in the face of radio’s embrace of new music rather than to any perspective formed by any pragmatic re-readings of Walter Benjamin or the likes of Brecht. Nor do the thoughts of Adorno or Marcuse in the 1960s seem to presage later critical thought in Britain and elsewhere which have been more alive to the astute readings of base, superstructure and agency offered by Antonio Gramsci. Of course, the writings of Fredric Jameson, and to some extent Jürgen Habermas do rework the Germanic project, and there are efforts elsewhere to revitalise Adorno’s resolute negativity in the face of a postmodern passivity that are not without a certain sense of purpose.16

Despite its place as a bridge between Germanic cultural critique and populist sympathies, Marcuse’s work is complicated throughout by the ambiguities set in train by his long loyalty to the independence of the aesthetic, his attraction to the potency of the libido and his residual uneasiness in the presence of mass-mediated culture. It is a somewhat subtle, shifting set of positions, but, for this very reason, it is not to be entirely rejected, for many of Marcuse’s concepts and his intermittent accommodations of the young and their expressions serve to inform the dialectically determined ambivalences and sublations of this study and its topics as a whole.

There’s much in Marcuse’s accounts of culture that builds on Blochian interest in recollection glossed with allusions to Freudian interest in phantasy and Eros that might be said to extend the notions of abstract and concrete utopia respectively. Marcuse’s interest in the erotic, and his hopes for collective refusal, are each underscored with psychoanalytical readings that outline useful prospects for desire, libido and music. The crucial ingredient for Marcuse was undoubtedly the play of these forces and prospects within an historical and technical reality. Whether he ever truly gave free reign to these forces in his philosophy and
critiques is a moot point. Adorno had singularly failed to trust such impulses amongst the masses, and Marcuse was, in the case of popular musics, reluctant to saddle instinctive, youthful expression with any immediate rational awareness. This chapter has looked at the 'somatic turn' of Marcuse which is a move away from more orthodox Marxist concerns to those of the body, senses and art. A subject's emancipation for Marcuse was to come from an embodied realisation of suppressed desires, which might be given expression in art and a general 'refusal' of hegemonic conditions. What Marcuse does retain of Marxist origin is the continuing belief in technological possibilities. However, he fails to consider the somatic alongside the technical in any overt way, and also refuses to see a musical genre like rock as a likely site of praxis and articulate political expression. What Marcuse does contribute, is his continuing optimism and his willingness to maintain an expectation of progress offered by reality's chances. In short, his prescriptions are complex, sometimes ambivalent, and shot through with an Adornian fear of technocratic forces.

Adorno and Marcuse were too timid to concede the possibility of praxis in popular musics. Cultural emancipation of the social was, for them, a stalled project. I want to argue, contra Adorno and Marcuse, that in fact, there has been, in Marcuse's own words, the "mixing of the barricade and the dance floor"; that there's some evidence of conscious political insight, and free, social action in the presence of popular musics - off and on air.

Early optimism from Brecht is salvaged in the wake of the Second World War by Marcuse who suggests the superstructure of culture contains (in its gaps) the power to change the economic base which itself might 'carry' the good news. And if, as Marcuse argued, art could not directly bring down a government, might it not fuel desire or, at the very least, serve as a catalyst for educated desire and hope?

Whilst Marcuse ultimately offers us an ambivalent set of thoughts, the worth of seeking to identify places and spaces of likely praxis in the midst of current order is finally suggested by Marcuse himself which should serve as a useful step forward for this study: "In established societies there are still gaps and interstices in which heretical methods can be practiced without meaningless sacrifice" (Marcuse (1970c, 76-7). We will turn to the precise nature of such gaps
in due course, but we must first look more closely at art, and intersubjectivity so that we then might assess the formation, form and survival of the later in mediating places and spaces.

Notes

1. See Some Social Implications of Modern Technology [1941] in Marcuse (1998b, 41-65). It should be noted that Marcuse worked with the American Intelligence Bureau of the Office of War Information between December 1942 and March 1943 analysing Nazism and advising on U.S. approaches to mass media propaganda. Hans Magnus Enzenberger cited McGuigan (1996) seems less certain of the radical potential of the mass media in the 1960s because of tight ownership and control in private and public sectors. Many who might become creative were, according to Enzenberger, destined to remain consumers only. McGuigan notes that although "Enzenberger's youthful belief that everyone could and should become a cultural producer in relation to the major media of public communication was hopelessly utopian", yet he sees in the ensuing decades a ground-swell of public and community arts and recently a strong interest in video, and home music making which attests technological competence and individual creative agency (1996, 79-80).


3. In Freud's case, Marcuse argued the psychoanalytical to be "in its very substance 'sociological' " (1998a, 5). For Adorno on Freud and fascist propaganda, see Adorno (2000b).

4. On the eclipse of the father figure; resistance to institutional paternalism and the dialectical facet of instinct and culture, see Marcuse (1998a, 64, 74, 78 et seq.).

5. See Held on the rejection of the father/family and subsequent attachment to a false, paternalistic/technocratic alternative (1990, 133).

6. Here is a characteristic Adorno opinion on regressive listening: "The research finding that among radio listeners, the friends of light music reveal themselves to be depoliticized is not accidental. The possibility of individual shelter and of a security which is, as always, questionable, obstructs the view of a change in the situation in which one seeks shelter. Superficial experience contradicts this. The 'younger generation' - the concept itself is merely an ideological catch-all - seems to be in conflict with its elders and their plush culture precisely through the new way of listening. In America, it is just the so-called liberals and progressives whom one finds among the advocates of light popular music, most of whom want to classify their activity as democratic. But if regressive hearing is progressive as opposed to the 'individualistic' sort, it is only in the dialectical sense that it is better fitted to the advancing brutality of the latter (Adorno 2001b, 55).

7. On the subject of imaginative play, we should not overlook Simon Frith who perceptively writes: "An identity is always already an ideal, what we would like to be, not what we are. In taking pleasure from black or gay or female music I don't thus identify as black or gay or female. (I don't actually experience these sounds as 'black music' or 'gay music' or women's voices') but, rather participate in imagined forms of democracy and desire, imagined forms of the social and the sexual. And what makes music special in this familiar cultural process is that musical identity is both fantastic - idealising not just oneself but also the social world one inhabits - and real: it is enacted in activity. Music making and music listening, that is to say are bodily matters; they involve what one might call social movements. In this respect, musical pleasure is not derived from fantasy - it is not mediated by daydreams - but is experienced directly: music gives us a real experience of what the ideal could be" (1996, 274).

Frith continues: "We all hear the music we like as something special, as something that defines the mundane, takes us 'out of ourselves', puts us somewhere else. Our music is from this perspective, special not just with reference to other music but, more important, to the rest of life. It is this sense of specialness (the way in which music seems to make possible anew kind of self-recognition, to free us from every-day routines, from the social expectations with which we are encumbered) that is the key to our musical value judgments. 'Transcendence' is as much part of the popular as of the serious music aesthetic, but in pop, transcendence articulate's not music's independence of social forces but a kind of alternative experience of them [...] Music constructs
our sense of identity through the experiences it offers of the body, time and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives. Such a fusion of imaginative fantasy and bodily practice marks as well the integration of aesthetics and ethics" (1996, 275).

8. Marcuse later adds: "Phantasy is cognitive in so far as it preserves the truth of the Great Refusal, or positively, in so far as it protects, against all reason, the aspirations for the integral fulfillment of man and nature which are repressed by reason" (1998a, 160).


10. In the late 1960s, records in the hands of George Martin and the Beatles became the new radical art form produced for radio listening and domestic playback.

11. We might couple this with Marcuse's "socially useful aggression" (Marcuse 1998a, 23).

12. The common equation of non-Western musics with fundamental urges is neatly problematised by Frith (1996, 127-143).

13. When asked in an interview in 1976 whether art for the masses might, after Benjamin, radicalise them, Marcuse replied: "Any attempt to use art to effect a 'mass' conversion of sensibility and consciousness is inevitably an abuse of its true functions [...] Its true functions being (1) to negate our present society, (2) to anticipate the trends of future society (3) to criticise destructive or alienating trends, and (4) to suggest 'images' of creative and unalienating ones" (Kearney 1984, 76-7).

14. Marcuse claimed that: "Art can give you the 'images' of a freer society and of more human relationships but beyond that it cannot go. In this sense, the difference between aesthetic and political theory remains unbridgeable: Art can say what it wants to say only in terms of the complete and formal fate of individuals in their struggle with their society in the medium of sensibility; its images are felt and imagined rather than intellectually formulated or propounded, whereas political theory is necessarily conceptual (Kearney 1984, 75).

15. Marcuse did see some hope in "the protest against the definition of life as labor, in the struggle against the entire capitalist and state-socialist organization of work [...] in the struggle to end patriarchy, to reconstruct the destroyed life environment, and to develop and nurture a new morality and a new sensibility" (1979, 28). This, it may be argued is what the Live8 body of musical concerts coinciding with the G8 economic summit in Edinburgh, July 2005 was moving toward. "More than 5.5 billion people will be able to tune in through a variety of media" to witness free popular concerts. "Producers estimate that 85 per cent of the world's population will be able to see the live broadcast", David Smith and Ned Temko 'Billions will hear Live8's poverty plea', The Observer, July 26, 2005, 6.

16. Buchanan (1998, 24) tells us that Jameson identified a "weaker form of Utopian thinking, namely the attempt to change the world by transforming its forms." Yet in condemning such a Fabianist approach with his uncompromising call for pure utopian reach Buchanan reminds us that Jameson's slogan "always historicise" invites us to project back from the ideal future to the present where we indeed might effect reasoned change.

17. Musical activity can sustain what is termed praxis - that "synthesis of thought and action" - (The Oxford English Dictionary - D. McLellan, 1969). Praxis is for Marxists (Marx, Gramsci and Lukács) "the free, conscious, creative, essentially human activity, alone capable of generating a new and better social order" (Mautner 1997). Interestingly, Marcuse refused to grant the arts such a radical, articulated role of communicative action. Andrew Edgar writes: "At its simplest, and most dramatic, praxis suggests revolutionary practice. As such it is a fusion of theory and practice, and thus the point at which philosophers have ceased to interpret the world [...] and have developed a (materialist) account of the world that will allow the proletariat to understand their place in it and thus transform it" (Edgar and Sedgwick 2002, 309).
PART THREE | Musical eutopias
6 Meta-musical readings & the utopian conceit

6.1 Introduction

The acoustic, physiological phenomenon that is music is received prior to any aesthetic, sensible logic, and before any extra-musical, reifying language of explanation. ‘Unmediated’ musical works promote aesthetic and imaginative responses, and, because they are made with intent and received within socio-cultural contexts, also make for reasoned interpretations articulated in language. This study terms such interpretations meta-musical readings.

Some meta-musical readings may be shaped by subjective, highly personal recollections of nostalgic yearning or by impatient, rebellious desires. For example: an adult re-encountering a wistful theme from a childhood television programme or a counter-cultural line from a popular song of their youth may lead to the crystalisation of a subjective, abstract utopia, as a synthesis of past feelings and current frustration. These mental ‘crystalisations’ appear as the music mediates objective realities and autonomous subjective wishes. These elements, these sensibilites and imaginings are recollections and urges that may prompt, for writers and philosophers discursive, allegorical glosses which may remain private or become more widely shared. Adorno indeed averred that any intelligible insight into an acoustic work cannot simply be intuited. There must be external interpretation and discussion. Adorno wrote: “The spiritual mediation of the artwork, by which it contrasts with the empirical world, cannot be realized without the inclusion of the discursive dimension” (1997, 98). Adorno affords us a reception and reading of music as artwork that is first experience and then textual reflection. It is, in a sense, Bloch’s abstract and educated utopian conditions. Adorno was unhappy about bodily responses to music: “Mistrust is called for in face of all spontaneity, impetuosity, all letting oneself go, for it implies pliancy toward the superior might of the existent” Adorno (2005, 25). Sensuous immediacy left Adorno concerned that it reduced the subject’s experience to one that was merely physical and somatic rather than felt then considered. Without a reasoned reflection on experience the subject might become a reified object. Bronner tells us that “Adorno maintains his rejection of ‘false’ immediacy, of
enjoyment, in the name of a structured experience capable of grasping the utopian” (1994, 193). However, the immediate experience and the subsequent reflection are linked. The essential character of humanity is arguably its mix of residual natural desires and civilised culture. The former is a sphere of Dionysian sensuality, erotic impulse and a fundamental phenomenological engagement with here and now being, the sensory world and our place in it. The later, an Apollonian musicality of civilised communality and rational ‘becoming’.

The experiential elements of the musical work fuse with imagination, thought and language to foster rich, meta-musical texts and discourses. Whilst the meta-musical does determine the construction of the utopian, we must not overlook music’s sensuous immediate and excess that allows for the transcendence of the given present. The acoustic, sensory excess forming the immediate phenomenon is not eclipsed as musical artwork becomes text, but remains as a sensory pendant that is often a spur to an abstract utopian state of emotion and desire.

It is the intention of this chapter to focus on this triangulation of music, emotion, and in particular, discursive, meta-musical activity. We begin with the problematic of divining and articulating the utopian in the presence of the artwork.

Utopia can only exist in, and through language, it cannot be seen.
(Tremlett 1999)

Is Paul Tremlett right and if so, must we infer that Utopia cannot be heard in the musical arts either? However, might it be that at the very least, intimations of alternative existences in the visual or musical arts can be ‘seen’ or ‘heard’, courtesy of one’s sensibility: a receptivity and an orientation towards the presentational qualities of a work which, in combination with a productive imagination and a discursively fulfilled understanding may furnish us through language, with metaphorical, allegorical and meta-musical readings?

Tremlett is right to stress Utopia’s existence in verbal articulations, and indeed, this study relies significantly on the manifestation of utopian theory in philosophical discourse, but to exclude the abstract utopian state of desire from a tentative appearance in the arts as apprehended by the subject, is to misunderstand the importance of the acoustic per se. Musical vibrations whilst often a system of codified cultural communication, will tend to exceed the intentions of composer
and performer to constitute amongst other things, an array of ‘empty’ sonic signs ‘fulfilled’ through interpretational language. Music is a discursive locale because, as both mute art and social fact, it so often elicits subjectively and collectively significant linguistic translation and interpretation. It is the acoustic reception and subjective experience of music which precedes its interpretation (musicological, utopian or otherwise) in words. As Adorno wrote: “Experience culminates in aesthetics: It makes coherent and conscious what transpires in artworks obscurely and unelucidatedly” (1997, 264). We experience much of our music in common, and as we do so, we are sensitive to it, to imaginative prompts and to each other. We ‘trade’ experiences and cultural interpretations of that music in communicative, but not necessarily linguistic ways (think of dance steps or dress codes). Whilst music can then indeed serve as a language of affect and identity, it is, says Schütz, also “a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme” (Schütz cited Martin 1995, 198).1

Whatever a composer’s or performer’s artistic intention, and whatever semantic detail lyrics may contain, musics do attract broad interpretation. Indeed, Adorno observed that one problem in the interpretation of musical experiences was the “difficulty of verbalizing what music subjectively awakens in the listener, the utter obscurity of what is so blithely called ‘the lived experience of music’ ” (Adorno 1998k, 220). Thought and language must be brought to bear on that experience: “Every artwork, if it is to be fully experienced, requires thought and therefore stands in need of philosophy” (Adorno, 1997, 262). However, as Martin has argued (1995, 143), before wholly accepting Schütz’s separation of meaning and any subsequent conceptual cooption, we must accept that music cannot be ‘read’ philosophically to mean whatever one likes. The meta-musical interpretation of music must be rooted in the presence of the music, its emotional, analogical ‘tenor’ and all existing socio-cultural musical contexts. Music must, at the very least be a point of departure, not a mere pretext for predetermined expositions, a position that Schütz himself would surely support.

Of course, Schütz and Martin are both right. Music’s ambiguities create Schütz’s possibilities of decoupling its affective, aesthetic communication from any precise, non-negotiable content. But it is this very ambiguity that so often
influences that formation of the particulars of the socio-cultural context and meta-musical discourses to which Martin alludes.

To recap, personal feelings, memory and ambition are fired-up in an abstract musical utopia; a more directed collectively significant and representationally concrete utopia is subsequently constructed as meta-musical readings appear to provide a gloss on our complex emotional and reasoned responses to the music we hear, be that Beethoven's Symphony number 9 in D minor (opus 125), or Jimi Hendrix performing Bob Dylan's *All Along the Watchtower* at the Isle of Wight Festival in 1970. These pieces touch us and may resonate with us in highly personal ways. The wider socio-cultural meaning of these two pieces of music is, however, bound-up in two considerations: (1) the historical specifics of their composition and performance and (2) the meta-musical inscription in language of additional but still germane interpretations that respect immanent acoustic qualities, musicological and textual content and the attendant issues implicit in the music itself, which give rise to subsequent and highly plausible re-interpretations.

Many of us will have been emotionally and somatically moved by music, but careful recollection will probably see us deflecting that ‘ineffable’ moment into some contextualising frame - be it one of nostalgia, a family event, cinematic moment or collective celebration to make sense of it. Music certainly moves us bodily and emotionally and may, within the logics of the experiential, also add to our common sense view of ourselves and others via the discursive. Powerful though music is for us all, its aesthetic, social and philosophical currency demands (paradoxically) that we speak and write of it. It is at these moments of articulation that music’s qualities are both ‘revealed’ but also sometimes ideologically exploited.

In this chapter, such matters as the importance of language in the interpretation of music; our obligation to talk about music’s ineffability and the role of song lyrics are all addressed. The general theoretical stance is one where musical works are not regarded as absolute, formal exercises, or prefabricated symbolic works, but as likely spurs to emancipatory allegory.

Norris (1990b) has demonstrated how music as an ‘empty sign’ ushers in the sublime and a Kantian reason (by way of sensibility, imagination and
understanding) in the individual which opens-up ethical considerations. In short, music stimulates us physically, imaginatively and intellectually. Lone subject and social group ‘play’ with music using words that allow for conceptual games of hope that can inform Knowledge and praxis. Norris reminds us that in the nineteenth century, music was regarded:

As a language ideally removed from the crass contingencies of everyday usage or referential meaning, a language *sui generis*, existing in the space of its own self-authenticating truth. This tradition goes back to Pythagoras and the belief that music, like mathematics, embodies certain ultimate laws or reason, proportion or formal harmony which cannot be grasped by way of mere sense-perception. (1990b, 208-09, 216)

The problem here is that to make any sense of this, we are then back in the realm of non-negotiable linguistic symbol. Such ‘readings’ in the present study will be rather a search for preferred allegorical meaning that is locally and historically sensitive but also flexible. If we simply assume musical meaning is internal, fixed, and not open as an allegory to historically or redemptively driven re-interpretation, then it cannot ever ‘mean’ anything new. Meaning would be confined to formal play, number, programmatic content or nostalgic recall. Far from denuding music of its power, language amplifies its writ and import. It is in this context that this chapter considers utopian potentials and eutopian conceits. Once the inevitability of linguistic mediation is accepted in the presence of music (and other cultural forms) then one needs to adopt a critical position to discern ideological ‘command’ and intent which is never too far behind music’s ‘suggestiveness’.

Philosophically, the semantic blankness of musical composition for some may mean it is a *tabula rasa*, ready for discursive inscription. Music’s non-linguistic, sensual character gives it an attractive air of autonomy and resistance. Notionally free of explicit ideological command, it promotes for many an emotive framework or a formalistic, self-referential language. Whilst Adorno has written convincingly about music’s internal, non-verbal grammar, he did not regard music simply as a work governed by an inner, non-semantic syntax and nothing more. Music for him could also be a mute historical text which might be analysed to reveal historical forces and potential. If we are unable or unwilling to conduct
any musicological or historical readings, what do we face when we hear music? Are we simply invited momentarily into a sonic field created for us by active musicians wherein our bodies, but not our minds might respond in some kind of kind mimetic correspondence?

Adorno himself could not accept the reduction of music to a simple ‘sensuous immediacy’ of momentary identity for musician and listener. For him, such an ‘irrational’, somatic state would render it prone to uncertain domination and reification. But the alternative approach, arguing that music only has content so remote from ordinary experience, intellect and language that it can only ever be alluded to elliptically means it is forever ‘ineffable.’

So how credible and robust then is music as a site of linguistic discourse? What can music sustain, with or without words? What might it engender extrinsically in socio-philosophical terms? Eyerman and Jamison (1998) rightly aver that musical works and even songs are, in themselves, not at all prescriptive. A time signature, cadence, patriotic chorus or programmatic title may steer the listener towards certain cultural conventions as part of some traditional hermeneutics that respects composer, performer and audience. However, there is still an opportunity in the presence of all music for ‘meta-musical’ readings that may be more suspicious and critical, or even utopian and allegorical. Musical meanings inflected with matters utopian can be an historically situated instantiation of community knowledge and self-comprehension or an unfolding, constantly reworked social reading (in the form of an extended metaphor) which draws on a wider, more diffuse sense of loss or anticipation.

Music per se cannot safely be said to signify anything approaching firm semantic meaning, let alone an articulated politics. Undoubtedly, lyrical readings, discourse and allegory can illuminate authorial intentions or suggest radical interpretations, but all such interpretations are negotiated. Together or alone, negotiated readings operate as constitutive and productive codes: if one person hears or imagines they hear a nostalgic tone, ‘utopian strain’, or another person proposes a suggestive allegory, then the act of articulating this will fashion a discourse and, in time, influence the perspectives of many others attending to the music.
6.2 “With hope in your heart?”: Lyrics, protest & eutopia

Sacred and profane songs ‘tell’ of experience and hope. Coupled with the affects of the musical arrangement, they stir feelings of desire, longing and nostalgia. For example, spirituals and gospel songs use biblical texts and stories to express discontent, injustices, and desire for something better; some secular lyrics deal with the particular injustices of the day.¹⁰

The insights of disenfranchised individuals and whole communities are sung and (it is assumed) emotionally understood by everyone else. Eyerman and Jamison (1998) say that “the civil rights movement made it possible for black music to bring a new kind of truth into American society, a redemptive, visionary, even emancipatory truth.” They argue that “By momentarily resolving, or synthesising, the contradictions and tensions inherent in their own condition and their own music - African-Americans could hold up a mirror to American society and show a path to what Martin Luther King Jr. called the promised land” (1998, 44). Eyerman and Jamison see that “in the songs of social movements, concepts are humanised and made less abstract, but there are visions of a better day, of a different world, of a not-yet-existent reality”. “This utopian aspect” they suggest “expresses in symbolic form what a movement stands for, what it is that is to be overcome” (1998, 167).

However, remote listening contexts can sideline original import and preferred exegetical reading. Additionally, the impassive quality of a particular performance can obscure rather than stress the discontented sentiments of the song.

In the 1960's this writer sang and heard on the radio such ‘radical’ songs as Blowing in the Wind, Little Boxes, Big Rock Candy Mountain, and If I had a Hammer (the last, a Pete Seeger song, interpreted sweetly by Peter, Paul and Mary). They each made direct or indirect lyrical allusions to ‘radical’ social affairs largely unknown to me. When sung in the context of a school music lesson, or heard on children’s radio programmes, each devoid of any informed gloss, the intended imagery and political import of the songs considerably lessened. British broadcaster and writer Charlie Gillett recognised this as part of a bigger problem and wrote: “despite their genuine political beliefs which they expressed by singing
free at political rallies [...] the sound of Peter, Paul and Mary was soft and easy on the ear [and] unlikely to stir activity in the passive pop audience” (Gillett 1983, 297).

Not all songs relevant to this study are strictly spiritual or utopian. Some songs can express a desire to be somewhere else - precisely - and thus be about a better here and now that is only just over the horizon. Lyman Tower Sargent refers us to a nineteenth-century Irish emigrant song that sketched a more positive reality that was not only desirable, but (largely) attainable for the price of a steerage ticket. It is a seductive lyric subtly defining a ‘eutopia’ - a place of actuality and graft but still contains the more utopian (and unrealistic) promise of a government-free existence. Its value resides in its potential to effect immanent change in the lives of many thousands exploited in nineteenth-century Europe.

If you labour in America/In riches you will roll/There’s neither tythes nor taxes there/Nor rent to press you down/It’s a glorious free country/To welcome everyman/So sail off to America/As soon as e’er you can.  

Music and song are most interesting when they move into a discursive realm and stir an entire generation. This is seen when social movements and their political aspirations are bound-up by well-loved, widely known musical styles and arrangements.

Eyerman and Jamison (1998) identify such momentary coalitions that address more than just particulars and can come to be a much more widely adopted mode of social expression. Their view is not one dependent on any transcendent quality within music, but simply on music’s role as a social medium. For them, music:

...can communicate a feeling of common purpose, even amongst actors who have no previous historical connections with one another. While such a sense may be fleeting and situational, it can be recorded and reproduced and enter into memory, individual as well as collective. (1998, 162)

A good example of this was witnessed at the March 2003 UEFA football Cup tie when singer Gerry Marsden led a crowd of nearly 70,000 Liverpool and Glasgow Celtic fans in a rendering of the supporters’ anthem which the two clubs share, namely Rogers and Hammerstein’s You’ll never Walk Alone from the musical Carousel. It was a song that transcended national and football rivalries to unite
them and expose deeper Roman Catholic affinities and working class docker roots. Eyerman and Jamison write:

Social movements emerge in particular times and places [...] they create new contexts, new public spaces for addressing the particular problems of their time. They are not to be reduced to the organisation or institutions that they eventually become; what is central is their transience, their momentariness, their looseness. (1998, 21)

They continue: “Social movements [...] are contingent and emergent spaces which are carved out of existing contexts; they are creative, or experimental arenas for the practising of new forms of social and cognitive action” (1998, 21). What we perhaps have are Foucauldian heterotopias, alternative realities of wider significance as shortly addressed in Chapter 8. Eyerman and Jamison suggest that social movements fuse their knowledges and the discourses of their ethical “vision” with what they term other “knowledge interests” found within contingent institutional settings and is an “integration of its utopian vision” with what they identify as “specific practical activities and organisational forms” (1998, 21).

John Lennon

A similar instance of meta-musical exegesis comes from Richard Middleton who has discussed John Lennon’s class-bound social critique in the song Working Class Hero and the utopian strains of Imagine. Lennon, a Merseysider and artist, carefully wove together a class-bound politics with the strains of American popular music and an avant-garde, metropolitan sensibility. Middleton plausibly positions Lennon in the protest song tradition and writes of:

[The] important junction of politics is to bring [class] differences into dialogue [...] and one sphere in which that process can take place is ‘culture’ - because culture is never a simple class possession [...] What there is, is a body of practices, materials, habits and values which, in particular circumstances at particular times, can be identified with particular social interests and positions [...] the outline of a life is figured, performed out; it’s possible to imagine a social reality [...] for as long as the performance lasts - and maybe longer. (2001)

Middleton goes on to discuss the significance of Rock in the fifties, as novel cultural space for the construction of youthful identity and expression. Participation in, and the purchase of popular musics, and their accompanying
fashion codes also has to be understood as participation in an attainable affluence, and thus may be at times, little more than a politics of consumption. Even so, radical lyrics, social movements and individual agents produced imagery and debate which has remained a corpus of lyrical and discursive potentials.

6.3 Expressive obligation

'The spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which [...] makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, [...] language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. (Marx 1974, 50-1)

This chapter has so far suggested that without language, and without a discursive frame, the value of music remains, at best, one that is an abstract array of inarticulate, subjective hopes. Above, Marx suggested that spiritual release is, in part, found through bodily sounds. Marx has clearly laid stress on a semantically precise symbolism, namely a language of representation and intercourse which he seems to imply has a practical, socially useful rationality beyond any mere expressive role. Whilst the Marxist aesthetics of Marcuse and Adorno offer a seductive account of art's sensuous immediacy they are, like so many other aesthetic theories, also reliant on an extra-linguistic gloss to be comprehensible and useful. Fortunately there's adequate precedent for meta-musical readings in the literature of critical theorists, Adorno's socio-musicological work and the wider corpus of utopian writings. If we ourselves acknowledge that music exerts an emotive influence on us, we must surely be prepared to elucidate and preserve that influence. We can do this through symbol, allegory, metaphor, discursive spaces and all with the ordinary tool that allows us to do all of this - verbal language, the 'conscious, agitated air' of Marx.

If physiological apperception precedes anything rational and representational, then music's autonomy and potential is never truly going to be sullied in speaking about it. A map as an analogical representation of place might encourage visitors to trample enthusiastically across the most pristine of territories, but it cannot be held responsible for any subsequent overexposure or
destruction of sensitive sites. Moreover, without the map, and agreed signs, subtle configurations remain hidden, and any collective attempt at preservation and sharing is made harder. In short, those believing in music’s value are obliged to chart it for others with words - whatever the risks.

As we have already seen, one of the most plausible and subtle ‘readings’ of Utopia and cultural form comes from Caryl Flinn whose thoughts on film music, expressed in her book, \textit{Strains of Utopia} (1992) have furnished us with a useful means of addressing Bloch in Chapter 3. In her general interpretations of music’s utopia, Flinn argues convincingly that music can only be heard in the present. For her, its nostalgic, Blochian ‘anteriority’ or prophetic tendencies are effectively subjective, and are generated close to hand as a text by the writer. Flinn is able to reflect on her linguistic methods of interpretation even as she offers them to us. Here she writes of her own discursive incursion:

\begin{quote}
The responses and readings I have offered here are not so much contained within the film scores ‘themselves’ as they are produced by the audition and analysis of a specific critic […] this is the only way that utopia is broached at all - as a strategy, a way of reading and of negotiating the texts around us. (1992, 150)
\end{quote}

Flinn exemplifies the way in which meta-musical readings of an academic kind can be sensitive to ideological, historical and social conditions but can also, in a creative and critical manner, offer a verbal ‘projections’ of music’s potency in the form of ‘discursive ideals’. Flinn tells us:

\begin{quote}
Utopian projections need to be acknowledged as theoretical constructs; utopian fullness and integrity cannot be treated as if they had actually existed or could be currently actualized. The purported integrated subjects or harmonious culture of utopia exist only as a result of critical interpretation; they are nothing more than discursive ideals [and] do not identify conditions that really existed. (1992, 89)
\end{quote}

Frith, has also identified the seductive space between sounds and semanticity and insists on the consequent pleasures but also \textit{necessity} of us responding linguistically to music. He writes:

\begin{quote}
The gap in music between the nature of the experience (sounds) and the terms of its interpretation (adjectives) may be more obvious than in any other art form, but this does not mean that the pleasure of music doesn’t lie in the ways in which we can - and must - fill the gap. (1996, 264-5)
\end{quote}
In summoning utopian readings of music then, care must be taken to remember what they are, namely Frith’s pleasurable filling of the “gap” and Flinn’s “discursive ideals”. This is not to decry any attempted interpretation. In a reference to pre-literate musics, Flinn says that it is now the conditions of modernity that calls for a utopian music, and, presumably by extension, following her arguments, a modern, utopian gloss (Flinn 1992, passim.). We can perhaps regard Flinn’s discursive ideals as a contemporary variation on the configuration or constellation metaphor of Benjamin and Adorno. In seeking to view current socio-economic conditions from alternative perspectives, those we may term dreamers and thinkers of a utopian persuasion might, as they look eidetically at such conditions from an alternative vantage point, not only begin to articulate what they see in a variety of ideal utopian figures of rejection or change, but also begin to comprehend what it is to be a human in expressing dissatisfaction and hope. Such a ‘linguistic philosophy’ effecting a momentary model of comment and comprehension may not ultimately change conditions in any prescriptive, ‘here and now’ resolutions, but reflecting on them provides us with a broad critical philosophy of the subject’s (and thus our own) developing consciousness.

How might such critical perspectives be formed? A utopian gloss may begin as a reading of certain aesthetic elements of expression, emotional analogues of genuine desire say on the part of a singer present in a performance which become for the listening subject, metaphorical exemplars which call forth particular qualities. These expressions might sometimes only be conventionalised modes of vocal delivery or simply a lyrical yearning denoting a presumed utopian desire, but these and the more intensive of expressions may be connotative and suggestive for the listener who is able to bring to them, their own metaphorical and allegorical interpretations. This later move towards the associations of the subject’s imagination and understanding is not to misread or distort the original cultural text as the metaphorical and allegorical readings are fashioned. As Nelson Goodman suggested: “expression is by intimation rather than imitation” (1976, 46). The detection (assumed or divined) of a Blochian trace of the ‘not yet’ for a sensitive listener primes the work for personal textual readings beyond any immediate intentionality. The emerging metaphor or allegory of the listener might, at this point articulate the utopian conceit more fully or simply ‘drag’ the work
into a new realm of meaning belonging to the listening subject. As Goodman further suggested: "a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting [...] metaphorical application defies an explicit or tacit prior denial of [a] label [...] to that object" (1976, 69). In short, music and its aesthetic surplus can support the determined utopian reader, even if overt utopian intent or referents are absent.  

**Fluid interpretations**

In invoking the utopian in an allegorically driven discourse of interpretation, a critical, socio-philosophical dynamic is established. This is best explained by Jameson who, in a few sentences, marries allegory, convention and dialectic to describe active, modern interpretations in the presence of the cultural text:

The newer allegory is horizontal rather than vertical: if it must still attach its one-on-one conceptual labels to its objects [...] it does so in the conviction that those objects [...] are now profoundly relational [...] When we add to this the inevitable mobility of such relations, we begin to glimpse the process [...] as a kind of scanning that, moving back and forth across the text, readjusts its terms in constant modification [...] which one would be tempted (were it not also an old-fashioned word!) to characterize as dialectical. (1991, 168).

Norris too suggests we must look to the dialectical aspects of the here and now, the material, the ideological and the resistant and find a place for reinserting what he tells us (after Jameson) is the "literal, moral, allegorical and anagogical" (1989b, 306). If this is not done, we simply end up with a crude, Althusserian set of determinations. As Norris puts it, this is to [reduce]: "consciousness, history, culture and subjective agency to mere effects of a dominant structural complex whose workings can only appear under the aspect of detached theoretical knowledge" (ibid.).

Adorno (2000f) wrote of the dialectical value of the essay form. Whereas much of the philosophical writing tradition for him sought to offer a clear summation of invariants and essences, any dialectical thought predicated on a preclusion of absolutes and a critical acceptance of contingency needed a more fluid form of exposition. For Adorno this was the essay wherein provisional, contradictory and speculative ideas could be give a free reign. In relation to this O'Connor (2000) argues that in the writing and reading of the essay, writer and
reader were able to draw on sensory and historical experiences to engage in the creative interpretation of a cultural work. This was for Adorno a subject's autonomous, "dialectical consciousness" at work (not a inauthentic consciousness formed by ideological forces) but one freed by understanding and purposeful, prospective imagination and "as such" says O'Connor, "it is a praxis" concluding that the "essay is especially suited to the task of interpretation" and that "Adorno is attempting to establish a freer, though rational, approach to the understanding of experience" (2000, 91-2). We might conclude at this stage that for the autonomous, imaginative, understanding individual to listen and then write of things utopian, is a process which is a legitimate, meaningful translation of music into prose.

6.4 Aesthetics & the dangers of language

In spite of a wish to articulate music's power verbally, some defence of Music's ineffable, 'inexpressible' qualities seem to be central to many of the ideas of Bloch, Adorno and Marcuse. This is partly explained by the attitude that any linguistic articulation of music's power to effect personal recollection, shudder, or aesthetic surplus is perhaps to lay music open to the corrupting influence of language as social fact and the inevitable imprecision of language as a tool of conceptual correspondence. Bloch was aware of the need to objectify subjectivity and clearly saw the need for the discipline of aesthetics so that our passions might be comprehended. There must be 'emotional insight' Bloch wrote: "intellectual contact [...] with the emotions is necessary for every piece of self-knowledge" (1995 I, 72-3). In order to avoid accusations of protecting a natural musical essence or primitive human urge, Bloch and others turned to words without ever abandoning reservations. In discussing Wagner's Meistersingers, Bloch asserted that words "may imitate music's secret, immoderate power of action by ways broadly connected to it, but with its demystifying, 'more logical' resources it cannot readily prove itself up to the mark that the music requires" (1985, 80). Marcuse had argued that aesthetic sensations foster an autonomous, pre-lingual reason, free of instrumental and economic factors. Whilst this is
clearly not entirely true of any work of art, but true for the aesthetics of Marcuse, the extra-linguistic, aesthetic surplus of the arts at their moment of perception is powerful, and gives them the apparent and perhaps actual potential to silence their factual origins for a moment or two. Simon Reynolds (1990) sets a great deal of store by the somatic impact of much rock music, and continues to defend creative works as autonomous sonic forces. Everyone - Marcuse to Reynolds - can only effectively isolate and address such a force through speaking and writing - the process which may distort or fall short.\[18\]

The bodily sensation, it is implied, is pure and immediate; that pre-linguistic moment is where music's power resides.\[19\] Whilst a seductive proposition, this is little better than a silent conspiracy and may be fallacious. If one does not then try to articulate assumptions about music - turn a 'work' into a 'text' (after Barthes) one is surely failing to test one’s experiences, faith and philosophy *intersubjectively*.\[20\] One is also failing to contribute to, on a more civic level, any socio-cultural discourse. A silent belief about music’s powers is as much an indication of intellectual limits as it is one of philosophical fear. Epistemological and social projects are surely confounded in the presence of the sacrosanct and ineffable. An absence of articulated critical theory about music is also to leave it open to the ideological glosses of other, less reputable discourses. To deny music a story is also to deprive it of an important cultural role. Lawrence Kramer claims, quite plausibly that:

*Music does important cultural work by being spoken of, and would not be what we call 'music' otherwise. Words situate music in a multiplicity of cultural contexts [...] words invest music with the very capacity to 'speak' of its contexts that is usually thought to lack [...] Neither the speech nor the contexts [...] are 'extrinsic' to the music involved. (2003, 124-5)*

*Beyond* music, conventionalised intellectual fixities address the phenomenon of music and instigate interpretative dialogue. It is in language that hermeneutical readings are capable of generating tropes, figurations caught in the wake of musical experience. Discursive analysis and interpretation follows the artistic work (as it does in the present study).\[21\]
6.5 Allegory & music

Having suggested that literary tropes are post facto conceits, it can be conceded that there may be with metaphor, a conscious solicitation of meaning, or analogous form and effect in music which itself operates alongside cognate sensory experience. Allegory on the other hand revels in the fluidity of language and operates without too many difficulties as an extrinsic and post facto trope, less dependent on the senses.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the inevitability of meta-musical readings in music’s presence. Whilst interpretations of all kinds can stress music’s artistic and historical import, care must be taken to guard against any foreclosing discourses. One literary aspect of language, which keeps meanings and potentials alive and supple, is the allegory. Allegory is usefully defined as “a figurative narrative or description conveying a veiled moral meaning; an extended metaphor”. Such a definition lends itself to More’s Utopia and is the ultimate point of departure for all subsequent accounts of music which are, in effect, allegories - elaborated metaphors describing musical fields loaded with critical potentials to delineate the Blochian ‘not yet’. Street tells us that symbolism sees the artwork as a static, spatial figure. Radio and music are by contrast temporal domains re-presented across time and within ongoing discourses of interpretation. Allegory is thus comfortable within musical contexts of several kinds. Street writes:

Allegory prolongs its interpretative message in recognition of a continuous and ineluctable temporality. From this viewpoint, music could be said to take its place as the allegorical art par excellence, in de Man’s words, it becomes “the diachronic version of the pattern of non-coincidence within the moment”. (1998, 89)

Rereadings over time as music is heard and heard again is what fosters a dialectical dynamic in pursuit of better circumstances. Norris reminds us that:

For Bloch, as indeed for de Man, music is allegorical through and through, since its significance can never be grasped once and for all in an act of fulfilled, self-present perception [...] Just as melody unfolds through a temporal process [...] so musical works take on their significance through time, in a history of successive re-encounters whose meaning can never be exhausted. (Norris 1989b, 341)
Just as important as the ability to revisit and re-read a work is the knowledge of allegory's limits, and thus operate as what Norris says is "a powerful, demystifying trope" (Norris 1989b, 318). Hardt and Weeks, explain, with help from Jameson:

In contrast to the symbol [...] allegory is a discontinuous form of representation that highlights its disjunction from what it represents. "In our time [...] the referent - the world system - is a being of such enormous complexity that it can only be mapped and modelled indirectly, by way of a simpler object that stands as its allegorical interpretant" [...] allegory presupposes the impossibility of representation in any naïve or mimetic sense and highlights its own status as an interpretation. (2000, 24)

Care must be exercised when discussing music and Utopia. Flinn says that the nostalgic, utopian interpretations of music, predicated on perceived loss, ideological cooption or non-verbal, nonsensical loss actually deprive it of any immanent potential, "the utopianization of music forecloses its ability to interact within a larger social and discursive context and essentializes [...] Music consequently, is barred from generating meaning and participating in discourse at all" (1992, 88-9). However, more modest readings do seem to find favour:

The partial and preservable traces of [more recent] utopias are more humble than conventionally conceived utopian thought. They are simply fragmented moments of hope, of desire. But they also raise the possibility of change, returning to representation, discourse, and perhaps even social action the fantasies and hopes that were prompted by these circumstances in the first place. (Flinn 1992, 154)

6.6 Radio & discourse

It was not the music which gave meaning to music radio, but music radio which gave meaning to the music. (Bennett et al 1993, 100)

Radio as instrumental force has long stimulated music-making and recording and it is this 'social fact' which stimulates categorisation and 'meaning'. Local talent aspires to national and international recognition which is best achieved through the broadcasting of recordings. Radio as creative and commercial platform inevitably is dependent on instigating and regulating a broadcast 'flow' of content (after Williams) within an 'industrial time' (after Berland 1993) which it does through scheduling, selecting and speech. Radio broadcasting is saturated with
language and we may enjoy the disc jockey glosses as much as the music. (Many seem to enjoy live interjections and ‘of the moment comment’ as much as the pre-recorded sounds they frame). Popular genres and sounds from musical history rely very much on the lexicon of music radio. Frith tells us: “It was radio that created the musical map that we now use to distinguish high and low music, youth and older people’s music, the specialist musical interest, and the mainstream” (2003, 96). Diverse popular musics are selected, labelled, broadcast and discussed. Differences and similarities are articulated and in such a process, a useful dialectic and praxis for musicians and the listening public is created. These broadcast points of reference articulate a mutually dependent professional and listener discourse comprising tour news, interviews dedications and stories.

The term discourse is here broadly defined after J. A. Walker (1989, 14) as a flow of artifacts, texts and conversation which produce and sustain knowledge. David Howarth has defined discourse as an institution of coordination, a “cognitive schema” which presumably effects a useful intersubjectivity (Howarth 2000, 3). Such a discourse of flow and cognition resides in the language of social spaces where subjects are mediated.

Discourses, whilst being ‘stable’ repositories of social meaning are, at the same time competing ‘world views’ emanating from base and superstructure. These take shape within institutional settings and are mapped onto individuals and groups who are constituted by these discursive perspectives. Harvey says that:

To accept the fragmentation, the pluralism and the authenticity of other voices and other worlds poses the acute problem of communication, and the means of exercising power through command thereof. (1990, 49)

To offer a response to Harvey, what is important to remember is that no listener is ever wholly dependent on one source of discursive formation. Family, school, peers and press also mediate (change) the individual. Official national discourses do tend to dominate because of the support received from seductive and rational argument claiming national legitimacy as it stands above parochial interest. Broadcasting, with a brief to embrace and share a range of discourses, is positioned above the fray as an index of benign rule. Broadcasting further rules by consent and receives an injection of authenticity and independency from the
presence of intellectual agents who use the ether to reach communities and wider society they themselves value.

In the hands of other classes such as 'intellectuals', gatekeepers and Peel's 'gateways', cultural diversity is praised, and any social divisiveness challenged and transcended. These albeit imperfect contestations or figurations of contestations on radio are the groundings of immanent critique and dialectical movement.\(^\text{26}\)

Foucault, in his 1966 formulation of the heterotopian saw the language of such alternative locales as one that would be able to confound dominant language, discourse and common sense. He seemed to be suggesting that 'new', somewhat hermetic languages are formed and known only to a few. However, a secret language operating without conventional signifiers is limited. Foucault does not seem to have developed this idea much further, perhaps because of his insistence on the need for the exchanges of interwoven discourses (normative and alternative) between groups and sites as generators of power, potential and resistance. In contrast to heterotopias, Foucault saw the utopian mode as one which might encourage a common discourse. Surely, it is when his alternative languages are shared that their utopian import is nurtured and extended? Foucault wrote:

Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality, there is nevertheless a fantastic untroubled region in which they are able to unfold [...] Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language [...] Utopias permit fables and discourse; they run with the very grain of language. (Foucault cited Harvey 2000, 183)

Utopian discourses may in fact be discrete, and operate in these heterotopian spaces of Foucault but, through wider discussion can also be offered up too for broader contemplation. Such a linguistic turn containing a Habermasian communicative exchange is an opportunity for articulate cognitive activity and praxis that is within agreed norms and conditions. This surely takes place in real spaces and channels of communication and is therefore a supply of ready utopian referents and consequent eutopian praxis. It is this culturally configured but socially deferred utopia that provides the excess and fuel for a continuance of 'sensibility, imagination and understanding'.
Discourse & dialectics, stability & progress

To be effective, articulate, socio-cultural exchange depends on agreed codes and rules. Indeed, even the philosophical articulation of things dialectical is highly dependent on extant language; on its signifiers, concepts, relations and referents. It is the contention of this thesis that Structuralism (linguistic, semiotic and anthropological variants) can be used to explain the dialectical inception of ‘sensibility, imagination and understanding’ because of the platform it constructs of useful, stable cultural codings and mechanisms. Of course there are philosophical objections to the use of structuralist binaries. There is for instance the critical exposure of the falsity of language at the very moment we construct a theory reliant on such a device, particularly when it entreats us to work with the formula of subject and object. Adorno, always alive to the deceitful non-identities of language, nevertheless bracketed his ideological objections to it in order to articulate and share potential for betterment, hermeneutical reading, critique and praxis. So, Adorno too had to live with concepts and binary opposites. Adorno wrote: “necessity compels philosophy to operate with concepts [...] the substance of concepts is to them both immanent, as far as the mind is concerned, and transcendent as far as being is concerned” (1973, 11-12) In effect, conceptual thought addresses objective realities and subjective aspirations and they contribute to a dialectical process. With regard to its application in utopian theory Adorno argued that “Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things” (1973, 15), and must involve an imaginative ‘what if’ element. Adorno wrote: “Even after breaking with idealism, philosophy cannot do without speculation” (1973, 13). Importantly, what he sought was a critical, independent subject who might use their own experiences and creative and intellectual agency to produce novel concepts such as that of the utopian that might dialectically exceed constitutive reality and dominating concepts. As he wrote: “Philosophy [...] must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept” (1973, 15).

As stable codings, these binary opposites assist musicians, the culture industry and listeners in a day-to-day labeling of the myriad cultural forms we encounter. Concepts and binaries move through social and cultural discourses to name, grade and define; dialectical transformation and ‘growth’ is then applied to
these ‘agreed’ terms, finding expression and circulation through new referents and structures of meaning. This infusing of the structuralist schema of intercourse with immanent historical detail, latent change and individual agency provides a means of productively accommodating what might appear to be incompatible theories - namely dialectical mutation and the communicative fixities of discursive structures.

Adorno’s concession to extant, linguistic structural devices, and his call for an evolving, self-critical philosophy allows us here legitimately to consider moving from conceptual fixities to something more fluid as outlined above, and is effectively there in his account of the essay (2000f), which to some extent prepares us for Habermas and his linguistic turn whereby individual emancipation is founded on collective, linguistically constituted norms of ethical communication as a prelude to praxis.

We can surely continue to use binaries to understand our lifeworld. However, in order to effect the dialectical movement advocated by Adorno and others we must, even more effectively than he did, move towards a post-structuralist, deconstructive position where we can effectively (1) ‘weaken’ stable binaries to expose their interdependence as differentially related terms and (2) usefully invert the implied hierarchies of these binaries. A short exercise in a deconstructive inversion of the binary opposite of the highly valued live musical venue and the somewhat inferior representational phenomenon of radio broadcasting is carried out in the next chapter.

6.7 In conclusion

The ability of subjects to will, project, imagine, and recreate are familiar human characteristics that are found within the individual and are expressed in culture and social institutions. Cultural production and allegory together in socio-cultural settings ensure the survival of a sort of dialectical hermeneutics where alternatives come and go, a sort of fluidity of meaning ensuring that whilst comprehension and interpretation is never deferred, symbolic finality and closure is.

The ‘musical eutopia’ in particular, when wedded to the strong metaphorical and allegorical force that is Utopia and to the presence of music in
radio is a useful, meta-musical locale combining epistemological awareness, reflection, discourse, hope and praxis. As Norris writes: Utopia is a political form that offers “counter-hegemonic readings” (1989b, 319) and, when allied to music and its sonic qualities, utopian allegory’s potency is further increased (1989b, passim).

Desire, freedom or nostalgia are experienced and imagined in music’s presence, but anything more intelligibly utopian must, as per Tremlett’s assertion at the start of this chapter operate as a conceit that can only be properly explicated by language. Because language can be deterministic in both instrumental or utopian contexts, it is important to be sympathetic to music’s ambiguous qualities and its enduring potentials which precede the meta-musical. The provisionality and contingency of a critical allegory - of which Utopia is an example - is a positive mode of guaranteeing ongoing emancipatory readings in the face of ideological command.

Careful movement between music’s sonic impact, aesthetic potentials, its allegorical readings, and a critical linguistics offers much for music in society. We must not dismiss the instinctual “primordial experience” of music as Norris puts it in his account of Schopenhauer’s denigration of the other arts but it is certainly not “the truth to which philosophy aspired but which could never reach” (Norris 1989b, 309). It is a subsequent, interpretative, dialectical process that we should seek in the presence of music. Cultural production and allegory together ensure the survival of that which is forever new.

Music’s inherent lack of semantic meaning is the reason for its continuing prominence as a locus for glosses of affiliation, import and contestation across all societies. It is not only nature that abhors a vacuum. Human imagination and culture rushes in to attend to works lacking overt and fixed meaning, converting them into texts. Whilst Nietzsche warns against imputing music’s forms with ‘meaning’, many have sought to burden it with philosophies of hope or despair. Whilst this thesis is perhaps guilty of a disregard for musical ‘autonomy’, it is intended that whilst perhaps neglecting singular works, it does identify some of the more concrete, and potential features of musical activity when shared across the ether. As Jameson (1980, 2000a) argues (following Bloch), it is the enticing, residual or ‘yet to become’ utopian ‘content’ of popular culture we must attend to as we critique the ideological.
Notes

1. The difference between sônos (instrumental sound) and phonê (the spoken and sung word) is explored by Steve Sweeney-Turner (1996). Sweeney-Turner explains that music is an emotive, non-representational end in itself, language, a symbolic means to an end.

2. Beethoven’s last symphony contains a setting of Friedrich Schiller’s 1785 ode to Joy (Friede schöner Götterfunken - ‘Joy [or Freedom] thou glorious spark of heaven’). Dylan’s All along the Watchtower opens with: “There must be some kind of way out of here”.

3. Prévost (1995) contains the writings of a musician - not a sociologist of music - keen to gloss, post facto, the production, ‘meaning’ and implications of improvised musical performances that float momentarily as non-mimetic, non denotative sound waves, outside verbal discourse. The term meta-music is one deployed specifically by Prévost to describe a continuing musical presence where by it fosters considered action. (1995, 36).

4. Norris (1990b) has reminded us that the presence of any immanent articulations of emotion, truth and knowledge have long been disputed. What is relevant for this chapter is that the exegesis of such immediate power has, from Pythagoras to Schopenhauer taken the form of linguistic representation - the very form of intellectual reiteration and poetic interpretation deemed inferior to music’s immediacy.

5. Cf. Born: “One reason for attention to multitemporality is to foreground the social character of music, whether the immediate social relations of musical performance or the macrosociological dimensions addressed by institutional and political-economic analysis” (1995, 17).

6. Immanent musicological logics can create the impression of a musical language comprising phrases, resolutions and the like, but these are themselves formalistic or structural, generating immanent musicological difference and development only. They do not literally ‘mean’ anything (cf. Adorno 1998b).

7. For an explanation of how this applies to Adorno, we can turn to Paddison who wrote: “For Adorno, truth lies in the particular which evades the universalizing tendency of conceptual thought. But the ‘truth content’ of musical work is historical and concerns the way in which it works, through the particularity of their form, attempt to deal with the antinomies of the handed-down musical material, which are seen as social in origin” (1993, 15).


9. Nietzsche had called essential emotive content into doubt when wrote the following about music: “Its primeval union with poetry has deposited so much symbolism into rhythmic movement, into the varying strength and volume of musical sounds that we now suppose it to speak directly to the inner world [...] it was the intellect itself which first introduced this significance into sounds” (1977, 128).

10. On slave song see Lawrence Levine (2002). Consider too the ‘Red Songs’ of Hanns Eisler. Shusterman advises us that “Rap not only insists on uniting the aesthetic and the cognitive; it equally stresses that practical functionality can form part of artistic meaning and value. Many rap songs are explicitly devoted to raising black political consciousness, pride and revolutionary impulses” (1992b, 213).


12. ‘A Working-Class Hero is Something to Be’; Pop music, class and Utopia, a seminar paper given to Cardiff University Music Department April 2001. I am most grateful to the author for providing a copy of this paper. For more about the significance of popular lyrics see Middleton (1990).


14. Lest this be seen as illegitimate as a hermeneutical and creative response, we should not forget that we find many inspirational responses to music’s expressive forms in the visual arts and, of course in dance.

15. “For Bloch, as for others before him in the German philosophical tradition - notably Schopenhauer and Nietzsche - music was at once the most humanly-revealing form of art and the form most resistant to description or analysis in conceptual terms. But this was no reason, he argued, for retreating into an attitude of mystical irrationalism which denied music any kind of cognitive import, or (conversely) for adopting the formalist standpoint which reduced it to a play of purely abstract structures and relationships devoid of expressive content” (Norris 1989b, 308-9).

16. Music can be ‘framed’ as a ‘tabula rasa’ of uncertain meaning. But this simply renders it a sensuous moment of ’pre-rational’ excess free for subsequent discursive, dialectical colonisation.
Richard Dyer (1993) in his discussion of utopia and entertainment writes of “non-representational signs” in a discussion of the predominance of signifiers over signifieds (Flinn 1992, 11). Of course, such a readiness to mark-off, encode parts of music as being ‘uncolonised’ can lead paradoxically to hermeneutic overload where music simply means ‘everything and nothing’.

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17. See the introduction to Marcuse’s A Note on Dialectic in Arato and Gebhardt (2000, 444). Consider Marcuse’s preoccupation with liberation.

“[T]he senses are not only the basis for the epistemological constitution of reality, but also for its transformation, its subversion in the interest of liberation. Human freedom is [...] rooted in human sensibility: the senses do not only ‘receive’ what is given to them [...] rather, they discover, or can discover by themselves, in their ‘practice’, new (more gratifying) possibilities and capabilities, forms and qualities of things, and can urge and guide their realization” (1972, 71-2).


19. I am grateful to my colleague Clive Cazeaux who explains that our senses do receive discrete information, but they are fused in a ‘logic of the senses’ (after Alan Beck, University of Kent). One set of data prompts parallel sensory awareness. With sound alone, there is a sound world that offers an incomplete engagement. This, concludes Cazeaux, is a positive factor that calls for ‘supplementation’ i.e. memory, imagination, etc.

20. As Barthes said: a work is held in the hand - or in our case body within a site of socio-philosophical and cultural significance; as a text - it is held in language (1977c, 155-64).

21. See also Kramer (2006), a collection of essays exploring the conditions in place for our responses to music and also Nattiez (1990) for another discursive interpretation of music based on the semiological signifier that is the acoustic object and upon consequent signifieds.


23. Frith reminds us that: “Radio is still the most important source of popular musical discourse, defining genres and genre communities, shaping music history and nostalgia, determining what we mean by ‘popular’ in the first place [...] Radio is important not least as a means of access to music otherwise inaccessible, whether the BBC’s systematic policy of musical education or in the furtive use of Radio Luxembourg, the American Forces Network, and pirate radio stations as windows on another world” (2003, 96).


25. Mikhail Bakhtin’s interest in ‘texts’ and ‘carnival’ may prove useful. For him, ‘texts’ constitute instances of discourse; contributions to an ongoing social dialogue made in a particular historical situation. Although Bakhtin developed this idea on carnival and discourse in the field of literature, a friend and colleague Ivan Sollertinsky developed his argument on carnival as discourse undermining the universality of political and cultural authority, particularly with reference to music. See Hirschkop (1989).

26. As Born has argued, high-profile institutions can accommodate discursive oppositions within its own walls. Born in looking at IRCAM argues (after Bourdieu) that this is a knowing consensus of oppositions (i.e. what’s in, or out). This is a tamed, affected ‘opposition’ within a field (say Radio 1), different from an absolute opposition between fields (1995, 27-8). “The musicians’ meetings were imbued with an implicit utopianism expressed most obviously in the open and egalitarian character of debate, but also by two aspects of the content of discussions, both touching on the social. The first was the concern with small systems and real-time networks for live performance. This had utopian leanings in a revealing of an awareness of IRCAM’s relations with the outside world, through projections of the needs of users beyond IRCAM and of the institute’s potentially wider progressive effects. The second dimension was internal: the proposal for a new social organisation of research as a ‘musical think tank’. The quality of communal utopian projection - of predicting necessities or desires - was shown by the common use in meetings of the phrase ‘Imaginez que...’ ” (1995, 207).

27. Norris has argued that “there is simply no conceiving of society except in terms of a differential system that must always to some extent - even in ‘primitive’ cultures - rest upon distinctions of class, gender, kinship and other such socially-imposed categories [...] any ‘language’ that lacked the identifying marks of structural relationship and difference would in fact not be language at all, but merely a string of pre-articulate sounds with some possible emotive significance” (1989b, 337-8). This at once calls forth structural sharing of knowledge but also hints at the non-verbal potencies of so many musics.

28. Jarvis writes: “We will need to continue to use, even whilst criticising the language of concept and intuition, subject and object” (1998 150).
7 Music, radio & intersubjectivity

7.1 Introduction

What most encourages harmonious, self-integrating, self-developing, and self-fulfilling processes are conditions of interaction, within the family, the larger society, and the life of the culture, that respect the inherent needs and norms of individual ‘human nature’ and work in harmony and attunement with them. (Levin 1989, 61)

Musical eutopias is addressing enduring, socio-philosophical dualities: subject and object; individual and society; private and public; self and the Other; particular and universal. These are more than differential relations; they are taken to be terms of a rational, dialectical process of ‘becoming’ mediated by communicating cultures, technologies and institutions. The resultant synthesis (the meeting and changing) of subject (and object) is catalysed in ethical, moral and politically sanctioned ways which may be characterised as eutopian. In such processes and practices, listening is an indispensable ontological, epistemological and social attribute. This chapter is an inquiry into communicative processes of intersubjectivity, and the role of music and radio as mediating, socio-cultural phenomena contributing to these processes. It begins by setting out a social and philosophical model of self-development and intersubjectivity with some reference to Adorno’s formulations. There is reference then to music as it is directly experienced and intersubjectively addressed. This is followed by critiques of radio and mediated intersubjectivity’s ‘illusions’ of mutuality and a rejoinder by way of a positive modelling and critique of the mediated intersubjectivities of radio.

The main proposition is that subjective development and an intersubjective mutuality is achieved through listening and importantly, concomitant, ordinary interaction. A Habermasian ‘lifeworld’, a common sense corpus of experiences, behaviour and resultant knowledge is gained as we engage aurally and orally, both in socio-cultural places of local musical performance and with the wider space of the determining social systems of music in broadcast media. Whilst the first interaction in an immediate lifeworld is acknowledged to be an intense
communicative, dialogical relationship - typically found as far as this study is concerned in places of immediate musical engagement formed by families, schools and communities - it can also be an enhanced experience when allied to the latter sphere: a socially systematised, 'second-order' mediated and mediating locale of consensus-forming national and international socio-cultural space. One such a space is that constructed by the BBC, complete with its culturally active disc jockeys and producers: its agents of change. The systematised, 'colonised' and 'totally administered' society 'on air' is without doubt a problematical 'second nature' sphere regarded as it often is as one of free communication, but it is arguably also a space never wholly disabled by technological distortion and political power, and will thus always be a eutopian space of opportunity. The next chapter deals with the dialectical possibilities of these immediate and mediated locales - of lifeworlds and socio-cultural systems - but we must first look carefully at human interaction itself.

7.2 Sociological & philosophical models of intersubjectivity

The perceiving subject is dialectically constituted (socialised, educated, 'cultivated') by its interconnection or synthesis with the perceived/known object (another person, social group, the natural world). This mediation can be 'immediate' as in simple, face-to-face, so-called presentational communication and thus, through a direct sensory experience, be a radical intersubjectivity within the Gemeinschaft. Modern subjects can also be mediated, brought together by channels that stand between them and other subjects they have never met.

Self-estrangement

Consciousness 'divides' itself into 'me' and 'not me'; the subject confronts the objective and, at the same time senses itself as an outsider, an object lacking unity and affinities. This selbstentfremdung - self-estrangement - is not only a prerequisite of development, but is useful in the development of 'understanding' and empathy. Armed with an epistemology of self and subject, the culturally 'educated' individual matures to take their place as part of society.
Dynamic presentational and representational communication is mediated variously by collective cultural expression and macro-social structures; in other words by the arts, language, public institutions (museums, colleges), and networks of dissemination (press, broadcasting and new media), these latter in a more abstracted Gesellschaft.

Hegel outlined a theoretical development of subjects in his early writing. This stressed the historical situatedness of all subjects in their self development as they moved intersubjectively through social, political and cultural institutions towards an ethical interaction with others. His was a social and political philosophy which moved beyond Kant’s philosophical paradigm of prior consciousness and self-interpretation which had privileged a more autonomous subject, and which had drawn upon regular categories of cognition and morality prior to the impact of any external contingencies. Marxism too provided an account of historical materialism which re-sited humans in the ebb and flow of the political and economic here and now. Twentieth-century theories of socialization sensitive to the philosophical, materialist and psychological accounts have been dialectical in their understanding of subjective engagement and growth. These have been offered by the likes of Mead (1962), Schütz (1964b), Habermas (1987d), Levin (1989) and Crossley (1996). All of them offer some useful insight in support of this study with accounts of autonomous agents and what is termed, after Habermas and his philosophical and ethical paradigm of interaction: ‘communicative action’. This communication takes place in the day-to-day ‘lifeworld’, and privileges ordinary cultural signs and language. Adorno et al had sketched philosophies of intersubjectivity that have drawn upon Hegel and Marx, but tended to deliver protracted critiques of technological distortion and institutional ideologies bound up in such processes of interaction at the level of the modern social system. Some of these critiques are woven into the account which follows in order to recover what is useful from Adorno, but it also moves beyond his shortcomings where necessary, to effect more positive critiques which ally themselves with the thoughts of second generation critical theorist, Habermas.
Subjectivity & Intersubjectivity

Whilst acknowledging the objections to a philosophy of any essential and subjective consciousness, subjectivity here is dealt initially with theoretically as a ‘prior’, asocial state for the purposes of forming a system of personal becoming or subjectification on the part of the animal object. It is the subsequent, socially situated formulation of a ‘fabric’ of mutuality where such subjective attention is directed that consequent interpersonal ‘collocution’ occurs. The ‘raw’, unmediated subject or Mead’s ‘I’ is quickly particularised on encountering others before it assumes, over time, the state of a cultivated individual: the socialised ‘me’ of Mead that is empathetic to broader moral and politico-legal concerns.5

Intersubjectivity is essentially a state of mutual attention, recognition and agreed (linguistic) significance in the face of a shared, ‘objective’ reception of natural and social data. It is a logic of epistemological engagement effecting change and critical insight; a secular phenomenon where the species-being is grounded in history, ideology and encounters with socio-cultural particulars.6

Whilst individuals have the potential to impose atomisation and alienation on others and the Other too through reification and control, we also have a somewhat more innocuous process of objectification. Subjects may not only knowingly externalise their own feelings in a work of art or commodity in order to increase self-understanding, but also where one subject may regard some other person or group as an object of attention for the purposes of empathy and understanding. However dangers can of course surface when the assumption is that such intersubjective objectification is always an equitable act of openness and equality, thus discounting the need for any moral investigation.

Adorno & intersubjectivity

Adorno’s views on mediated intersubjectivity are discussed shortly but it is interesting to look first of all at his social theory of (and hopes for) subjectification and of intersubjectivity which seems to be somewhat at odds with the socio-cultural critiques he levelled at radio as a means of sincere, equitable interaction. Adorno certainly recognised that an ontological and intersubjective
‘cohabitation’ with others was conceivably a rational route to personal fulfilment and a contingent happiness.

Adorno’s social theory was founded on a socially grounded intersubjectivity drawing on both Durkheimian structural patterning and an account more sensitive to subjective agency whereby shaped individuals might also contribute to emergent conditions as independent agents in practical and conceptual ways. It was therefore, in many respects, akin to a Hegelian model of ongoing subjective development and social interaction through experiences by a conforming but also potentially independent subject-cum-agent. Adorno’s position was thus: “[I]t is an illusion sharply criticized by Goethe and Hegel that the process of humanization and cultivation necessarily and continually proceeds from the inside outward. It is accomplished also and precisely through ‘externalization’, as Hegel called it” (1998k, 240). Because of the emancipatory potentials offered to the subject by such a dynamic, Adorno cautioned against any undue resistance by anyone to the formation of what he regarded as an outgoing character. He wrote:

We become free human beings not by each of us realizing ourselves individually, according to the hideous phrase, but rather in that we go out of ourselves, enter into relation with others, and in a certain sense relinquish ourselves to them. Only through this process do we determine ourselves as individuals. [my stress] (1998k, 240)

Central to Adorno’s thought as a left Hegelian was the role of the aesthetic, particularly music which could serve as a substrate for subjective engagement with self and society, where we can be “touched by the other” (1997, 331). Art and music could, when being experienced, ‘mirror’ or intensify one’s sense of non-identity and unhappiness but could also offer the listening subject the ‘face’: the physiognomy of a modern social world which might give on to a comprehension of others’ predicaments and perspectives.

Adorno as we know valued all live and ‘authentic art’ which when experienced delivers “shudder” as he called it which was for him “a memento of the liquidation of the I, which shaken, perceives its own limitedness and finitude. This [personal] experience [Erfahrung] is contrary to the weakening of the I that the culture industry manipulates” (1997, 245). He returns to the business of shudder later in Aesthetic Theory writing:
Ultimately aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, [...] That shudder in which subjectivity stirs without yet being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic comportment assimilates itself to that other rather than subordinating it. Such a constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in aesthetic comportment joins eros and knowledge. (1997, 331)

It is interesting too to consider matters of mimesis in relation to understanding the Other. Adorno wrote of what he called “mimetic comportment [in art] - the assimilation of the self to its other” (1997, 329).10 In listening to music we readily slip into an affinity with performers and other listeners. It is a process of ‘following’ and echoing perhaps an action, vocal inflection or dress code. After the formative years of childhood, adults usually renounce such ‘copying’ and instead develop affinities and empathies in a more rational, less imitative way. However imitation is a particularly rich way of learning and empathising. Levin is quoted here on the matter:

When I first read Horkheimer’s argument for the utopian, emancipatory significance of mimesis, I was taken aback. I could think of imitation only as a reactionary process. [...] many years later, my work with the texts of Merleau-Ponty’s last phase enabled me to appreciate the utopian, emancipatory potential for which Horkheimer was pleading. Moreover, I realised giving mimesis an interpretation which locates it in the reversibilities of the flesh, I could connect it to the corporeal schematism of reciprocity, a fundamental process in the life of the body politic we are struggling to achieve. (Levin 1989, 165-6)

Adorno & Mündikeit (maturity)

Whilst uncharacteristically willing to conceive of the erotic aspects of an aesthetically instituted ‘shudder’, and presumably being in agreement to some extent with Horkheimer on the value of physical imitation at a certain stage in one’s life, Adorno equally stressed the need for a subject’s rational thought which would facilitate mature, individual opinion and decision-making:

Critique and the prerequisite of democracy, political maturity, belong together. Politically mature is the person who speaks for himself, because he has thought for himself [...] he stands free of any guardian. (1998, 281-2)

We see here for Adorno the importance of language and rationality in the mature person, who is at once independent and aware of others through experience and ‘externalisation’. Pickford in his notes to Adorno’s essay writes “Adorno here
draws on the definition of ‘political maturity’ [Mündigkeit] from Kant’s essay *What is Enlightenment?* (1784) and draws implication from the formulation itself: *mündig*, literally ‘come of age’, [...] no longer requiring a guardian [Vormund], who makes one’s decisions for one [bevormunden]. All these expressions in turn stem from the mouth [Mund]; hence political maturity also means deciding and speaking for oneself, not parroting another” (1998m). Allying things popular with things youthful this is where Adorno (and later Marcuse) refuse to observe “political maturity”.

### 7.3 “The listening self”: intersubjectivity & music

The general proposition in the present study is that there is, in all music and its transmission by radio, an opportunity for the maturation and construction of the self as others are listened to and heard. This epistemologically primed self is more than a condition of potential, it is, dialectically speaking, already a synthetic third term - a maturing subject that has sublated (incorporated but not fully transcended) its own being and the antithetical concept of ‘society’ in the process of becoming a fully socialised subject through aesthetic and intersubjective encounter then reflection.

The dialectical process for infant, rebellious youth and mature individual is perhaps most usefully understood with reference to Levin (1989) who seeks to construct a practice of what he terms “the listening self” whereby an individual may engage more fully via social and cultural discourse and, in the process, become a more complete, moral and knowing being. Levin’s account initially offers a Blochian or a Marcusian listening to one’s own felt needs as a subjectification that he identifies as an attentive listening “that enables us to listen to our own body of felt needs [and] what they are calling for” (1989, 38). This Levin says may involve a return to an infantile recollective state, but he argues, it is not a “pathological regression” (1989, 55, 74-5). With careful, empathetic attention to ourselves but then also to others, we can avoid ideologically constructed need and instead “steer public life towards the fulfilment of more authentic needs” (Levin 1989, 88). What is interesting here is Levin’s
determination to proffer a route to Habermas's communicative ethics by way of a close reading of subjective and intersubjective listening and hearing.\textsuperscript{12}

This section now raises the question of music and its contribution to intersubjectivity and engagement with others, and pays attention to the generation of authentic as opposed to any ideological subjectification and patterned social interactions.

\textit{Crossley, Schütz & music’s 'inner time'}

In a model of listening and hearing that privileges the temporal dimension of the musical work as a locus of interaction, we turn to Crossley and Schütz. The temporal in music is argued here to be a significant ontological, ‘chronotopic’ substrate which can support positive intersubjective engagement. Time itself is an evasive notion, and may best be conceived of as being temporal and metaphorically spatial in its capacity to be occupied as it is measured (objectively) or experienced (subjectively) between significant events such as the short interval between verse and chorus where joining others in singing the familiar refrain is anticipated or the more drawn out but still important intersubjective process moving from unknown and ‘yet to meet’ to the now familiar and well met. Listening to each other \textit{at the same} moment enhances our experience of the objective world and allows for collective synchronisations. Crossley argues this point well: “temporality is equally important in the constitution of an interworld, however, as is shown by Alfred Schütz’s notion of ‘mutual tuning-in’ [1964b, 161] the meanings of our actions and utterances are not given at once, Schütz argued. They unfold through time, with a rhythmic and melodic structure. Subjects ‘must share the same time line horizon’ ” (Crossley 1996, 37). This can, of course occur during the reception of a piece of music performed live for the listening subject. Schütz (1964b, 159) called this an ‘intermediary’ locale, connecting us with composer, fellow dancer or performer. Such a sonic place of cultivation and intersubjectivity is both real and imaginative in its dimensions: a temporal place for cognitive, epistemological understanding and the expression of one's personal identity but, importantly for this study, a place of shared moments too of imagination important for intersubjective education and respect. Writing of Schiller and the aesthetic, Habermas similarly argues that art (and by extension
music) is a critical ‘third space’ of ideals, free from the direct constraints of reality and that Schiller “conceived of art as the genuine embodiment of a communicative reason” addressing human interaction and understanding (1987c, 48). Thus at this point we can pause to align the thoughts of Hegel and Schiller, Adorno, Schütz and Habermas because each has valued the place of the aesthetic (including auditory attentiveness and cognition) in human communication. Habermas has argued that the Schiller’s work:

Sketches out an aesthetic utopia that attributes to art a virtually social-revolutionary role. Art is supposed to become effective in place of religion as the unifying power, because it is understood to be a ‘form of communication’ that enters into the intersubjective relationships between people. (1987c, 45)

In a brief overview of mutuality, Schütz referred directly to what he identified as:

Sartre’s basic concept of ‘looking at the Other and being looked at by the Other’ (le regard) [...] what might be called the ‘mutual tuning-in relationship’ upon which all communication is founded. It is precisely this mutual tuning-in relationship by which the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ are experienced by both participants as a ‘we’ in vivid presence. (1964b, 161)

This participation in a vivid presence must equally extend to musicologically founded interaction. What Schütz suggests is that music occupies time (a three minute song, a weekend music festival) and as it does so, it possesses what Schütz identifies as ‘inner time’ for writers, performers and listeners is a shared sequence of musically instigated intersubjectivity. As both a work then a text, it impacts on the subject to elicit an abstract utopian suite of concerns: In the words of Schütz “It evokes in the stream of consciousness participating in it as interplay of recollections, retentions, protentions and anticipations which interrelate the successive ornaments” (1964b, 170). Schütz went on to say that the ‘flux’ of organised sounds allows the listener from a specific point of a performance to recall the opening and anticipate the ending. Schütz explained that “The beholder thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relationship such as prevails between speaker and listener” (1964b, 171-2). Thus Schütz is proposing both a Blochian abstract utopia likely to provoke an emotive engagement with others, and an Adornian theory of musical
aesthetics whereby interaction is less emotive and more musicologically and metaphorically rooted.

So far then, we have a musical inner time where the teleology of a piece can be mentally mapped, so that after Schütz, sounds can be productively shared (1964b, 173), but by extension, emotional recollections and anticipations can also, in the context of utopian theory, be intuited, metaphorically implied and lyrically or intellectually articulated as Chapter 6 has tried to show.

**Popular musics & intersubjectivity**

If all music can effect this social synchronicity through its temporal and musicological character, it is possibly the intense experiential, visible and participatory dimensions of popular musics which most lend themselves to a profound subjectification and intense intersubjectivity. Preoccupations with the erotic, expressivity and allied notions of identity formation and validation have long made make popular musics a prime medium for the drawing-out of the subject into a wider world (consider the social centrality of dancing). This is usefully articulated by Middleton who writes that since the 1700’s:

Popular music has been centrally involved in the production and manipulation of subjectivity [...] popular music has always been concerned, not so much with reflecting social reality, as with offering ways in which people could enjoy and valorize identities they yearned for or believed themselves to possess [...] The thrust of modernization [...] has resulted in an increasing stress on the sphere of culture, and especially popular culture, as the primary site for the interpellation of subjects. (1990, 249)

Frith, in a way consonant with the theoretical model explored here identifies the emotional and cognitive qualities of the sonic pop encounter, and in quoting the musical anthropologist John Blacking, he articulates its function and situation as a prelude to collectivisation and a rudimentary intersubjectivity:

In responding to a song, to a sound, we are drawn [...] into affective and emotional alliances [...] music is especially important for our sense of ourselves because of its unique emotional intensity - we absorb songs into our lives and rhythm into our own bodies. In John Blacking’s words, ‘because music is concerned with feelings which are primarily individual and rooted in the body, its structural and sensuous elements resonate more with individuals’ cognitive and emotional sets than with their cultural sentiments, although its external manner and expression are rooted in historical circumstances’. Music, we could say,
provides us with an intensely subjective sense of being sociable [...] it both articulates and offers the immediate experience of collective identity. (1996, 273)

Frith then quotes Paul Gilroy who was “provided by black music with a means to gain proximity to the sources of feeling from which our local conceptions of blackness were assembled [...] the most important lesson music still has to teach us is that its inner secrets and ethical rules can be taught and learned” (Gilroy in Frith 1996, 273). In short, Frith applied a number of roles to music in the process of intersubjectivity. In it he identifies insights into the real, the fantastic, and ‘somewhere else’. More importantly, he writes of “imaginative cultural narratives” and “imagined forms of democracy and desire” (1996, 273-5), which might, in a mature subject given on to ethical considerations.

Music & ‘interworld’

In attempting to move beyond the more metaphysical conceptions of mutual interaction, the concept of a lifeworld as the arena for socio-cultural sharing has been proposed by the likes of Schütz and Habermas. Does the aesthetic and social aspects of music fully constitute or at least contribute to such an arena? Nick Crossley says that social discourse -intersubjectivity- requires an “interworld”, an interval; a lifeworld and has to be “Space and its (mutual) occupation” (1996, 37). He in fact uses the term ‘fabric’ as a metaphor describing the weaving of individual lives into a coherent, functional set of relations. Whilst this thesis favours concrete ‘places’ of mediation for intersubjectivity - in its bid to rescue culture and society from the ‘no-place’ of distant or future utopias - clearly a conceptual ‘space’ is a logical adjunct which lends itself well to considerations of the more amorphous cultural and discursive ambits of music and radio broadcasts where we can elect to hear others. It would perhaps be wrong to see Habermas arguing in actual fact for named places of exchange per se (it would be hard however to think of Habermas’s eighteenth-century coffee house in London as anything other than a real place of resort and social exchange), but his argument that “we can think of the lifeworld as represented by a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of imperative patterns” (1987d, 126) must hint at the possibility of real places framing a lifeworld’s socio-cultural patterns (and variants) which might be amplified finally in both ‘system’ and
'non-system' broadcast channels. Habermas claims that "speakers and hearers come to an understanding from out of their common lifeworld about something in the objective, social or subjective worlds" (1987d, 126). Armed with this knowledge, we can, in the presence of music, start to reflect on ourselves, on others and on contingent social realities. In fact, Habermas writes of the role of situated reason and everyday language in relation to the construction of what might be termed 'finite lifeworlds' and what he call 'particular totalities' which do seem to have concrete substance:

Concrete forms of life replace transcendental consciousness in its function of creating unity. In culturally embodied self-understandings, intuitively present group solidarities, and the competences of socialized individuals that are brought into play as know-how, the reason expressed in communicative action is mediated with the traditions, social practices and body-centred complexes of experience that coalesce into particular totalities. (Habermas 1987b, 326)

7.4 Adorno & critiques of mediated intersubjectivity

As we have seen, Adorno's social theory of subjectification and intersubjectivity made clear reference to the development of mature, considerate individuals through an engagement with the aesthetic. It was for Adorno a surprisingly bold theory, including as it did, references to the erotic and the mimetic, references to somatic and infantile concerns which, in his critiques of contemporary culture society elsewhere he tended to dismiss as ones remote from reason, autonomy and maturity. Unfortunately, as already alluded to above, this social theory never allowed him to be more forgiving of popular music. In addition, when reflecting on technological mediation and the mass media, his social theory mutated into severe, socio-cultural critique. He was unwilling or unable to admit of the possibility that a wholesome (albeit different) subjectification and intersubjectivity might accrue across the ether. Adorno's model of personal development continued to be guided by a philosophy of immediate dialectical exchange between subject and object, but it failed to analyse or problematise in detail, the real and actual channels and socio-cultural arenas of these exchanges, something even Habermas later criticised. The wartime Princeton Radio project failed to suggest any postwar European empirical work to Adorno. Content to rest
easy with a positive critique of social realities that admit of his theoretical dialectics in the ‘presence’ of ‘real’ art and music, Adorno railed against the actualities of an insincere culture industry and the impact of its rationalising media channels. For him, prospects of resistance, emancipation and fair understanding taking place in a systematised, technologically driven society were unlikely.

Yet does technology for instance offer a potential emancipation or does it only produce a simplified cultural array and a domination of the subject? There are certainly arguments for and against mass-mediated encounters in the contemporary world. With the introduction of radio technology, human experiences and interactions are at once both extended and curtailed. Face-to-face social contact in the market place, and immediate aesthetic experience in the theatre is replaced by an ersatz, diminished level of interpersonal engagement. Similarly, the balance between equitable social interaction and domination in the presence of communication technologies has always been a fine one. E. L. Krakauer (1998) draws attention to Adorno’s concern that technologies (including language) simply render the objective world (especially others) for the subject as little more than ‘data’. For Adorno this was a mastery and “preparation of the object” which lent the subject a dubious superiority (ibid., 33-37). However Adorno did also concede that “it is not technology that is the catastrophe but its imbrication with the theoretical relations that embrace it” (Adorno, 2003b, 118). Again, matters of control and intention were crucial in his critiques of mediated culture.

7.5 Intersubjectivity & radio: positive critiques

What are the attitudes of some British music lovers and radio listeners on the topic of mediated listening and public service broadcasting?

It is often the only way we have any ‘contact’ with some sections of the community and our opinions may in part be derived from how other sections of the community are portrayed. (Big Buzz respondent no. 61, 2003)

It is by far the most available medium to all demographic groups within the country, thereby helping to break down the barrier between the various groups by fostering knowledge and understanding. (Big Buzz respondent no. 83, 2003)
Public service broadcasting can provide a powerful insight into the lives of others - it can provide a voice for the community, but be both representative or misrepresentative. (Big Buzz respondent no. 114, 2003)

These short responses from *The Big Buzz* questionnaire of 2003 (see Appendix A), give on to a number of questions about its value and returns us to the question of sincerity through the ether. John Durham Peters neatly sums up the enduring concern:

> In the apparently innocuous questions whether Kate Smith can be sincere over the air and whether such a performance can afford a ‘mutual’ experience, then, is found the intellectual and political heart of mass communication theory, the question of mediation - in other words, the possibility of interaction without personal or physical contact. (Peters 1999, 224)

Peters lays down a challenge to Adornian perspectives on the ‘unreality’ of the mediated by proposing notions of a ‘realistic’ communion between speaker and public. He argues persuasively that individual and society ‘meet’ sincerely through broadcast sound, though this is more a *witnessing* than a one-to-one, experiential mode, and moves from Crossley’s radical I-thou intersubjectivity which is immediate, interactive contact, to become the egological: a more diffuse engagement. It is this second form of contact which is less to do with dialogue and more to do with the dissemination of radio. Peters in not alone is seeing a positive side to mediated encounters. John B. Thompson (1995) has a three mode model of communication comprising face-to-face engagement (involving “co-presence”), mediated interaction (for example by telephone), and what he terms “mediated quasi-interaction” (1995, 83). For Thompson, this third mode lacks “interpersonal specificity”, but “creates a […] social situation in which individuals are linked together in a process of communication and symbolic exchange” and this process affords “bonds of friendship, affection or loyalty” (Thompson, 1995, 84). This “mediated publicness” is for anyone who, as an objectified subject is part of a mass audience, what Thompson calls “a plurality of non-present others” (1995, 245).

Music radio delivers a set of ‘foreign’ sounds into the private sphere. Experience tells us that sounds have physical origins and, moreover are the results of human actions so that they possess, I would argue, a residual ability – even through a loudspeaker to quicken the heart and prompt some feint mimetic
impulse. Radio does even more, in that in its representations, it also presents a public mode of hearing and joins other technological spheres of representation and intersubjectivity from print to cinema that have extended our perceptions and offered similarly remote encounters. So radio, as a medium conveys or at least, fabricates a sense of immediacy even as it represents a distant, often previously recorded event. The ‘liveness’ of the instant transmission of a live performance retains the experiential aesthetics of the work so that it remains intimate and felt as much as it is subsequently heard, ‘read’ and understood.

Technologically mediated intersubjectivity is, undoubtedly, problematic. But, as Frith points out, on hearing a disembodied voice we can easily “picture” its corporeal source, and, moreover, imagine its socio-cultural and emotional origin (Frith 1996, 196). This is no inferior mode of intersubjectivity. For Schütz, ‘tuning-in’ does not only involve a ‘vivid presence’:

> It is of no great importance whether performer and listener share together a vivid present in face-to-face relation or whether through the interposition of mechanical devices, such as records, only a quasi simultaneity between the stream of consciousness of the mediator and the listener has been established. The latter case always refers to the former. (1964b, 174)

As he continued, Schütz touched on the qualities of mediated intersubjectivity which troubled others:

> The difference between the two shows merely that the relationship between performer and audience is subject to all variations of intensity, intimacy and anonymity. This can easily be seen by imagining the audience as consisting of one single person, a small group [...] a crowd filling a big concert hall, or the entirely unknown listeners of a radio performance [...] in all these circumstances performer and listener are ‘tuned-in’ to one another, are living together through the same flux, are growing older together while the musical process lasts [...] the social relationship between performer and listener is founded upon the common experience of living simultaneously in several dimensions of time. (1964b, 174-5)

Levin is aware of the constraints technology imposes on the ‘traditional’ human acts of perception and communication but offers a positive reading of technological potentials: “there are other factors, some of them generated by technology which [increase and refine] our communicative possibilities” (1989, 113). We should therefore not just heed Marcuse and turn off all televisions and radios (1968b, 192).
So, technological mediation does not necessarily result in regression. Just to recall the limitations of mediated subjectivity and its associated, regressive and ego-weak features we return briefly to Adorno’s critiques: “Modern communications media have an isolating effect […] Communication establishes uniformity among men by isolating them” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 221-2). Yet might not this passive, isolating form of listening have be seen by Adorno as an opportunity for an Apollonian modulation of Dionysian impulses, privileging the rational and collective? Adorno is clearly unhappy with what he regards as unreflective, mass-mediated listening. Paddison has devoted some space to considering Adorno’s listening types which suggest that at best, when the majority lack Adorno’s musicological expertise needed for a “structural reading,” the listening is regressive or, at best “adequate”. 

To hear music, we can tune in to the transistor radio privately under the bedclothes or play music on our car radios. Music heard alone can create an insulated, private ‘place’ that could be seen as a decisive disengagement from others. But radio listening can be an act of reaching out - a symbolic, intersubjective sharing through the ether, a reconciliation of subject and object beyond any immediate lifeworld that can help to bind as a community or nation. This is, in a sense, a cultural interpellation of music between subject and object, self and the ‘other’. 

Arguably there is enough in intersubjective theory, to begin to build an optimistic account of subject encountering subject (through listening and hearing) as long as equality is preserved and the dialectical dynamic remains. Music (live, recorded and broadcast) certainly provides what may be seen as a field of intersubjective engagement. Profound ontological development may ensue as sounds are temporally encountered. They may simply propose a gentle engagement with composer or performer, or perhaps reveal and invite the sharing of socio-cultural codes. It might indeed even offer the chance to enter into an imaginative alliance with others and Otherness. It is important to distinguish between what Born and Hesmondhalgh term “ontologically and sociologically prior identities” represented, encountered and acquired through an attentive hearing and cultural participation (often a musica practica) and Born’s concept of
the musical imaginary where it is argued here that such identities are merely
listened to (Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000, 35). Whilst it is the latter encounter
which they argue is subjected to much criticism as a spur to “psychic tourism”
(2000, 35), it does, as a collectivised mode of imaginative understanding, have a
significant role to play, and is the conceit of a constructed site of hearing used in
this study which envelops and publicly shares prior, localised musical places of
listening and more direct interaction.

The problematic of listening to & hearing others

Far from greater understanding arising from the sharing and encountering of
others’ music there are, of course, many issues of domination: in seeking to
overcome self and other, there can be an eradication or colonisation of the Other.
It can be argued that listening to music fosters the self, immediate collective
belonging and a wider appreciation of other traditions, yet clearly there are also
issues of exploitation, ownership and ideological justification. Synthesis cannot
negate the prior qualities of subject and object, but results in a sublation
(Aufhebung) both in the original subject and in the place or instrument of
connection. In this way, the privileging of an invasive, dominant object (for
example the socio-political world) over a relatively passive, subordinate subject,
must be considered more carefully, and we should ask to what extent subjective
agency also mediates (changes) its object. Consider American radio’s first all­
black station WDIA, Memphis in the postwar decades wherein the newly
discerned potential of Black consumers was exploited. It however gave Bluesman
B. B. King his first break; was regarded as the most racially integrated place until
the 1960s, and still operates today as a community-driven station. Without
‘intervention’ and ‘sponsorship’, much talent would remain marginal and unheard
in the West. Questions of ownership do however remain. Commenting in the last
quarter of the twentieth century on white musicians (The Rolling Stones)
reworking his rhythm and blues songs, one Afro-American musician. Muddy
Waters is reputed to have wryly quipped ‘They stole my music, but gave me my
name.’ Born, in discussing Paul Simon’s Graceland (1986) album points out, with
some justification, that the music may feature Black musicians alienated by an
apartheid regime, but it belonged to Simon (and presumably his record company).
(Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000, Introduction). Ry Cooder relates that a memorandum from President Clinton afforded him a 12-month period to work with the musicians of Cuba, unencumbered by the United States' embargo on US-Cuban collaborations - whilst laudable in aims and musically powerful, again we must question 'ownership'.

The West cannot deny its past colonial engagements or fail to provide cultural representation of other communities. Refusing to acknowledge the now widespread engagement with other musics prevents opportunities for common experience, pleasure and more benign musical exchanges where economic benefit and cultural representation can counter oversensitivity to the representation of non-Western musicians. Those who do over-sensitise matters of commercial cooption or cultural integrity do not readily engage with the fact that many musical forms and musical instrumentation have always leaked from one culture into another.

Criticism sensitive to social relations - where it exists - tends to disregard, or at least, fails to appreciate the creative outcomes of the dialectical process of cultural engagement. White appropriation, for example (the 'bleaching of jazz') and other forms of musical syntheses are varied, both across and within traditions. British-Asian Musicians like Talvin Singh use broad taste and technology to deliver a World music, fusing Western and Non-Western textures, rhythms and structures. Whilst American Bluesman Taj Mahal is seeking, through his North American Blues, to reconnect with the blues inflections and sentiments of fourteenth-century Mali. As local purity is invaded so that anthropological field recordings of the authentic and untainted are no longer possible, local musics are feeding freely off imported forms. At the same time, ethno-cultural diasporas are carrying musics into new territories.

Debate about World Musics as art and economic fact are frequently debated on BBC radio where we witness BBC Radio 3 now present its own World Music awards on an annual basis; broadcast coverage of Womad (The World of Music and Dance Festival, founded in 1982) and transmit the culturally diverse musical 'discoveries' of disc jockey Andy Kershaw each week. The organisers and audiences at the Womad festivals see it as an instance of "two worlds colliding" in a place of "inclusivity and equality". Womad today is effectively a
brand and has a worldwide profile, supported by the world music label, Real World Records. However, an enduring interest in all opportunities for “engineering dialogue” has seen the organisers remain loyal to music and dance, but extend the offerings to include international foods too.25

What is at issue are matters of objective representation and discursive interpretation. In the hands of public service broadcasting there is, perhaps, a greater chance for equitable engagement with the Other, and a cautious response to the overtly exploitative. An insightful position of evaluative compromise in respect of socio-cultural crossovers and fusions is presented in Born and Hesmondhalgh’s introduction (2000). It comes from Richard Middleton who observes the “astonishing confluence in a twin triumph, of global capital circulation in the political economy, African musical diaspora in the sign economy”.26 Later in their Introduction, Born and Hesmondhalgh acknowledge the possibility of positive cultural fusions but then remind us of the essentialist assumptions of such a process where the distinct and pure of one place meets another.27 Theirs is a stimulating collection of essays and set of problematisations. Their phrase “differential permeability of the boundaries of various cultural lineages and forms” may, or may not represent a intellectual ‘holding position’ on the subject for the moment (2000, 27). One might ask how one can develop a sensitivity to the existence and predicament of others if cultures are not (re)presented to us? Where they are encountered, we can, with ethical representation, identify and acknowledge cultural hybridity and thus acquire a new truth in the presence of popular musics.28

So, how do intersubjective interactions play out in the ether? Radio extends a subject’s egological (but disembodied) engagement with the wider world. Subjectification and socialisation take place as the maturing individual develops imaginatively beyond family and locality in the presence of incoming social and cultural data from remote sources. As Christos Barboutis has expressed it: “enhancement of the individual’s sensory, spatial and temporal horizons resulted in them being in a position to acquire ‘non-local’ knowledge of information and communication without being in thrall to the aura” (2001). The subject engages with a technology of mass communication and hears but does not see a modern experience of social flux, ‘perils and possibilities’ where, to
paraphrase Marx further, all that was solid and enduring has been taken up and scattered across the ether. The hearing subject understands this for what it is, namely the familiar physiognomy of modern life. S/he is able to process it easily as radio concocts what Barboutis has called a semblance of interpersonal interaction that deploys the ‘presentational’ devices of location, time and personalities in a recreation of the collective, concrete experience, right in the middle of the hearer’s actual lifeworld.

Peters and Thompson above have argued for the positive aspects of “mediated quasi-interaction”. Their perspectives can be supplemented by the work of Scannell on radio, (1996, 2000) who identifies broadcasts as everyday matters for the personal use of listeners who engage with radio’s “intentionality” and conceptual “Common ground” with its “sociable” affect as its “basic ethos”. (1996, 16, 4) This ‘ground’ is where I am addressed along with anyone else (1996, 13); a mode of broadcast address that Scannell characterises being not just for anyone, but one within a “‘for-anyone-as-someone’ structure” (2000), a standard functional ‘service’ received and used in personal ways by some individual. This is a modern mode of address I know to be for everyone else as well as myself, but one which Scannell says “expresses ‘we-ness’. It articulates human social sociable life” (2000, 9). Here there’s a recognition of the listener as anyone who is ‘out there’, but also a person complete with what Scannell says are social and cultural “entitlements” (2000, 12) recognised through this form of mediated intersubjectivity in a public manner.

As I hear, and as you hear, we know that the presenter’s musical choices and personal address is for us both, and for everyone potentially too. Stepping back from the artefact that is radio, we experience an array of disparate cultures and communities, not as anonymous listeners, eavesdroppers but as addressees.

This egological engagement with a sonic modernity, complements the localised, ontological experience characterised by seeing and listening and takes on an epistemological role. Radio’s musical output assists in an inclusive, general address which constructs an on-air discourse of an intersubjective character. It is potentially what Adorno would regard as a bourgeois, ideological fiction of social engagement, but also it is a discourse of shared curiosity and purpose. Here, each subject notionally acknowledges the broadcaster and others in the act of aural
encounter. This is equally a point of departure for a subsequent discursive, 'I-thou' intersubjectivity back in the localised lifeworld.  

It is being argued then that the process of dialectical engagement through intersubjective communication, the arts and the discursive realm of philosophy within social arenas (home, school, gallery, broadcasting space) facilitates a developing self-consciousness of life's truths about affinities, power and behaviour. The process is usefully summarised here by S. M. Weber:

As forms of praxis, aesthetic experience and self-reflection have in common the restoration of autonomy and reciprocity through the intervention of a reflective moment [...] both [...] refer directly to a model of the ideal reciprocal relationship between subject, others, and object; and both intervene directly on behalf of potential wholeness and autonomy. [...] it is the fact that aesthetic experience and self-reflection have this emancipatory process in common that has made them of continuing interest to critical theorists. They are both reflections of the ideal and avenues to it, and they will always be the necessary complements of strategic action. (1976, 102-3)

We can assimilate the truths about mediating cultures and mediated relationships without dismissing them out of hand as false instances of interconnectedness. Through cultural reflection and a eutopian participation in general, subjects become 'knowing' individuals, members of society in respect of (1) the self and the everyday, (2) the past, (3) the economic present, (4) instances of alterity and (5) any number of socio-political futures.

7.6 In conclusion

Productive transcendence for self and society must commence, in Eagleton's phrase with "self-understanding" (1997, 4). Self-understanding encourages the subject to seek out further cultural and/or technological mediation - in short, an intersubjectivity that facilitates a personal maturity and collective awareness of general benefit. Eagleton adds: "There is no need to justify this dynamic, anymore than we need to justify a smile or a song; it just belongs to our common nature" (1997, 19-22).
Music, it is proposed, serves as an aesthetic site supporting self expression and self reflection, but also an intersubjectivity as one hears and listens to representations of a wider world. As musician Prévost has expressed it:

The most fundamental reason for making music is to communicate and this ability and its fulfillment is fundamental to human existence [...] There may be no more important thing for a human being to do than make a sound and know that it is being heard by another [...] it is confirmation of individual existence and of species being. (Prévost 1995, 43)

Crossley says understanding the objective world is an intersubjective project, “it is a view of the world arrived at through mutual confirmation and negotiation [and] it requires language and listening”. He warns us however that it is not always a process of benign respect: “The intersubjective fabric is at once a site of sharing and agreement, and of competition and contestation” (1996, 23). For Crossley, ‘The Other’ is no mere conceptual trope and in the act of engagement: “we have obligations” (1996, 3). Ultimately, the intersubjective process sees us becoming “citizens because we can ‘take the attitude of the other’ transcending our particularism and assuming a communal view” (1996, 158). 31

Music moves us into society, but it can also be a regressive medium (but, pace Adorno, not necessarily in a destructive way where immaturity and dependence remain). It can take us back into ourselves, where we can recall happier times. Such memories and feelings spur the imagination and provoke the mind. They draw us into a personal dynamic between past, present and future where we can consider what has been lost, what is wrong with us today, and what therefore should change to improve tomorrow’s prospects. In communing with ourselves through listening, we, as subjects simultaneously engage a wide social world of family (our children and our elders), peers, commercial activity and state policy, but also our selves, individual feelings, and reminiscence are joined by an imaginative and rational understanding of others. In short, music as imaginative medium and socio-cultural institution facilitates personal and subjective cognitions; Marcuse’s ‘private significance, subject and society’.

As Chapter 6 has already shown, communication and shared comprehension in the presence of music takes place as someone listens, hears and then converses. This listening, hearing and glossing, effects a maturing awareness of others, and may take place in, and about, specific broadcast locales.
Without a state-regulated mass-media, and a state-sanctioned set of institutions providing diffuse, modern populations with common cultural arenas, neither individual becoming, nor desirable oppositional identities would thrive. Perhaps, without the delimiting forces of legislative and bureaucratic public institutions, intersubjectivity would be too instrumental or amorphous. The absence of singing and listening in common would simply hamper the dialectics of individual expression and realisation, and any enlightened public discourse and social rejuvenation.

Neither objective material nor social progress can accrue until the individual as a cognitive agent seeks to move with purpose beyond their immediate sense of lack, loss or deferrals into the wider world. The somatic and nostalgic self, wrapped in an abstract utopian world of desire must become a socio-political self as part of a particular, concrete utopia which may, in time articulate a more ‘universal’ suite of values. This is not far removed from the Hegelian shift of self and ‘rational spirit’ from the intimate to the public realm, and is consonant too with Marx’s view that our shared, essential condition as natural and social beings is one of ‘becoming’ through collective experiences. It is, however, less idealist than it is materialist, pragmatic and socialist.

Music’s appeal stimulates recollection of better times. Its most important role in the context of the present study is its ability to intensify the present and allow us to encounter other identities and moods. Once this is effected, better socio-cultural relationships might be conceived. Music is a vital element in concrete utopian ambition which manifests itself as eutopian chances. What is required is a distinctive space for this cognitive activity.

Notes

1. For Habermas’s account of lifeworlds and systems see Habermas (1987d, 113-153).
2. Bloch writes of Bildung as both the resultant form and the form in process of formation. Bloch (1995 II, 985). This is repeated by Inwood (1992), who tells us that Bildung stresses the end of education (a culture acquired), whilst the term erziehung is the process. For Raymond Williams, culture could be both process and outcome.
4. For an account of Hegel’s interest in social mediation of the subject and the postmetaphysical accounts of Mead and Habermas see Honneth (1995, Translator’s Introduction; 5, 68 and Chapter 2 and 4 of the main text). Hegel’s metaphysical modelling of his later years, which built on his
move in his System of Ethical Life (1802) from the situated and ethical to the Absolute is of less significance here. See also Dews (1999b).

5. Mead (1962, 173-178; 193-200) wrote of the ‘I’ as a free, independent and impulsive individual, an initiator of action and a ‘Me’ as a socially-mediated self. He wrote: “The principle which I have suggested as basic to human social organization is that of communication involving participation in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other” (1962, 253).

6. It can be argued that one’s particular being as a biological entity facing the outside world, is, in fact, not a natural or neutral state of pure being but, from infancy, a ‘mediated immediacy’ - a nexus of body and mind already touched and mediated by that which is external; the sensorium of the perceiving body and a conceptualising mind located firmly within the temporal, concrete and social world, and is receptive to further sensuousity, ideological, discursive and dialectical determination.

7. In 1968 Adorno spoke obliquely about the then Marcusian Great Refusal amongst countercultural movements: attesting to this motor of negation by individuals and critically-aware groups: “Only in more recent times have traces of a countervailing trend become visible among various sections of the younger generation: resistance to blind conformism, the freedom to choose rational goals, revulsion form the world’s deceptions and illusions, the recollection of the possibility of change” (2003b, 123-4).

8. Hegel had seen education as a drawing away from the natural towards a second nature that is ethical. Whilst Hegel's philosophy became increasingly abstract, Inwood points to an increasing awareness by Hegel and contemporaries of non-German culture and the consequent view that contact with diverse societies broadened the human picture and, at the same time, intensified knowledge of one’s own cultural peculiarities. Hegel suggested that ‘estrangement’ and ‘reconciliation’ are key stages in the educational process for infants, children and youths. “The infant’s self-absorption - disrupted by awareness of an external world, which at first, strange [become] increasingly familiar - its natural inclinations are subjected to ethical and social norms, which, at first alien and repressive eventually become a second nature [...] the end product, the cultivated man, though he has fully absorbed the culture of his society, has more independence of thought and action [...] owing to his stock of ‘universal conceptions’ ” (Inwood, 1992, 70). Such a theory, when particular and individuals are privileged over reified subjects makes for a fascinating parallel alongside Levin's phenomenologically constructed individual that can culminate in an informed and engaged ethical listener.


10. See Born and Hesmondhalgh (2000, 33) on the playful, postmodernist ‘trying on’ of diverse identities through music.

11. In a defence of the regressive we read Levin who says we can effect a hermeneutical return to his Stage I, a “recollection of being”. Stage I is redeemed not repeated (Levin 1989, 55, 74-5). This practice of the self is discussed at great length but is prescribed by four essential phases of listening. They are: (1) Zugehörigkeit. Primordial attunement; (2) Everyday listening (jederman); (3) Skillfully developed listening; (4) Hearkening: listening as recollection. (Levin 1989, 45 et seq.) These stages parallel the maturing individual but are not automatic. The final stage is not easily attained; it appears to require a knowing regression, the deliberate return to the primary phase to effect an ontological calibration of sorts beyond the ego. Tables are deployed to plot the subjective and phenomenological detail of these stages which are too extensive for reproduction here.

12. In setting up listening and hearing as a mode of humanistic engagement Levin tells us that: “Nietzsche expresses his contempt for the gift of hearing: ‘The ear, the organ of fear, could have evolved as greatly as it has only in the night and twilight of obscure caves and woods, in accordance with the mode of life of the age of timidity [...] in bright daylight the ear is less necessary” (1989, 218-9). Levin suggests that this is the contempt of a patriarchal male, typically privileging vision and bright daylight and putting our capacity for hearing lower down in the hierarchy of perceptual powers. Levin further states that “Nietzsche cannot understand the strengths and virtues of the ears, their distinctive contribution to the character of our moral and political life. He can see only their passivity [...] He cannot see their active role in communication, relationship and cooperation; he cannot see their capacity for responsiveness” (1989, 218-9).

13. Crossley informs us that the ‘lifeworld’ of Habermas comes from the later Husserl and Schutz, and focusses on the radical I-thou relation where assumptions, and expectations meet. Habermas
sees the lifeworld as a cultural system “with its own conditions of reproduction and operation” according to Crossley and thus is an immediate ethical locale which can also have relevance for the mediated forms of intersubjectivity which is of Crossley’s egological kind (1996, 101). Crossley: “Communicative action in the lifeworld, as Habermas defines it, is orientated in three directions: towards mutual understanding, towards the coordination of action and towards socialisation. Moreover it is mutually orientated and mutually negotiated. As such [...] it serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge, to achieve and maintain social integration and to form and sustain personal identities. Each of these three functions refers to a distinct structure of the lifeworlds: culture, society and the person” (1996, 103).

14. Talking critically of Horkheimer and Adorno’s narrow perspectives in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, Habermas spoke of their vistas that “render one insensible to the traces and existing forms of communicative rationality” (1987d, 129).


17. Kathryn Elizabeth Smith (1907-1986) was an American singer described as the ‘first lady of radio.’ She appeared in musicals, made nearly 3,000 recordings and an estimated 15,000 radio broadcasts. She had her own advice and variety radio programmes on air and was a highly popular patriotic figure, particularly during WWII. See in particular: www.nytimes.com/specials/magazine4/articles/smidil.html. Accessed August 8 2007.

18. For a sophisticated, sobering critique of Western broadcasts heard in secret in a pre-Glasnost Eastern Europe where they were often regarded as ‘promissory’ heralds of geopolitical change or only as compensatory pleasure, we simply need to look at the short essay ‘Radio’ by Deimantas Narkevicius, where he encountered radio as an abstract source of information which intensified his comprehension of East and West as separate ideological entities: “the difference gave rise to a distance, to a more abstracting picture of one about the other, and in the end, this sketchy image began to obstruct the ability of people to build other opinions” (Narkevicius 1997, 178).

19. See Sherratt (2002, 43-4). On the matter of the utopia of intersubjectivity in Adomo we should turn briefly to Sherratt who offers some general ideas and clarifications on subjectivity and also flags up the possibility that ongoing mediation is a site of a positive dialectic which has, as its target a utopia which is of a unified person: unification of ego and id, mind and body, humanity and nature. Utopia is thus the goal (i.e. utopia as Identity) striven for in an intersubjective dialectic within a mediating space; and thereby we might through history, culture and time, strive to reach values or at least an enlightenment of self-knowledge which well might be Adorno’s own utopia wherein ‘self-discovery’ (in contrast to Enlightenment teleology) takes place and negative dialectics are perpetuated. Sherratt matches Adomo’s enlightenment through time/history with Freud’s maturity of the self through time. (2002, 67-8). Sherratt argues: “For Adorno, reason and its concomitant maturity live in the whole self, not just part of it. And it is that whole self which needs to communicate with its external world or with other subjects. [...] Reason to be reasonable, must counterbalance itself with the opposite. The self to be whole must melt its boundaries, the mind to be rational, drown in pleasure, the self to maintain control, abandon itself, the identity to remain distinct, become absorbed. Enlightenment, to be enlightened needs Subjects who can communicate rationally, and to do so, they need not to attempt to ‘transcend’ their own humanity, or attempt to ‘civilise’ it in its coffee houses, they need to be so intensely receptive to their world, that they can be, in one moment fully rational and in the other, fully absorbed” (2002, 239).

20. Paddison (1993) writes: “Adorno’s sketch for a typology of listeners is speculative and, as we have seen is not directly grounded in empirical research (although it is clearly based on ideas which emerged from the empirical work he did in the United States). Like all aspects of his work it is value laden. At the same time, however, it is consistent in all respects with his music theory taken as a whole. That is to say, the conviction underlying it is that musical works are objectively structured and significant, and therefore call for a form of interpretation which is able to follow the inner logic of a work as experience while also being able to reflect upon and account for the ‘social content’ of a work ‘from the inside’, and its ideal is a form of ‘structural listening’ [...] Although Adorno takes the musical work as an ‘in itself’ as his starting point and constant point of reference, the work itself is, of course, inseparable from the various forms of experience and understanding - and of perception and interpretation - which also constitute its mediation” (1993, 209-13). Paddison tells us that Adorno’s types are formulated in his Enleitung in die Musik-sociologie 1962 and 1968 and range from “expert to musically indifferent listener”.
21. Duttmann's *Between Cultures* (2000) looks at identity formation as a cognitive process using mediated culture - what he terms a repeated recognition (wiedererkennen) which "refers to the identifying act through which one finds oneself in the other, or through which one finds something in what it is not, thereby overcoming otherness" (Duttman 2000, translator's note, ix).

Of course, 'overcoming' Otherness through assimilation has its critics. (See: Barthes, 1973, 151-2), and generally: Born and Hesmondhalgh (2000) and Hutnyk (2000). Of related interest is The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, drawn to our attention by Harvey (2000): "10. The right to difference including that of uneven geographical development The UN declaration (Articles 22 and 27) states that everyone should be accorded 'the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality' while also pointing to the importance of the right 'freely to participate in the cultural life of the community' and to receive protection of 'the moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary or artistic production.' This [says Harvey] implies the right to be different, to explore differences in the realms of culture, sexuality, religious beliefs and the like. But it also implies the right for different group or collective explorations of such differences and, as a consequence, the right to pursue development on some territorial and collective basis that departs from established norms" (Harvey 2000, 251).

22. Harvey (2000) writes about James Boyd White [1990] who set out how that balance between self and other is effected, how diverse aspirations are 'translated': Harvey cites White: "[Translation means] confronting unbridgeable discontinuities between texts, between languages, and between people. As such it has an ethical as well as an intellectual dimension. It recognises the other - the composer of the original text - as a center of meaning apart from oneself. It requires one to discover both the value of the other's language and the limits of one's own. Good translation thus proceeds not by the motives of dominance and acquisition, but by respect. It is a word for a set of practices by which we learn to live with difference, with the fluidity of culture and with the instability of the self [...] Our task is to be distinctly ourselves in a world of others; to create a frame that includes both self and other, neither dominant, in an image of fundamental equality. This is true of us as individuals in our relations with others, and true of us as a culture too, as we face the diversity of our world", White cited in Harvey (2000, 244-5).


27. We can detect an essentialist blind-spot in the following extract from an interview between Richard Kearney and Marcuse: "Kearney: What is your view of ‘living’ or ‘natural’ music which has always been associated with the oppressed classes in the West and particularly with the black culture? Marcuse: What originally stated out as an authentic cry and song of the oppressed black community has since been transformed and commercialised into ‘white’ rock, which by means of contrived ‘performances’ serves as an orgiastic group therapy which removes all the frustrations and inhibitions of the audiences, but only temporarily and without any socio-political foundation" (Kearney 1984, 78-9).


29. One might look to Charlie Gillett’s *World of Music*, for example on the BBC’s *World Service*. On July 16 2007, his half hour programme featured recorded songs from Nigeria, South Africa, Vietnam, Madagascar, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Whilst transmitted at 02:30 GMT and thus be regarded as an instance of a Ghetto-like approach to non-mainstream sounds, the BBC’s digital ‘listen again’ facility does allow British and non-British audiences alike to hear this programme and others like it at more convenient times.

30. Consider the current character of radio programmes with their discussion boards, email and phone texts linking station and audiences and also listener with listener. Consider too, the role of the now defunct BBC magazine, *The Listener*, 1929-1991.

31. “In rendering public life accessible to all” says Barnett in a similar analysis, “broadcasting cultivates a form of reasonable subjectivity, characterised by a willingness to listen and openness to other viewpoints that is essential to the maintenance of a shared public life. Private life and
public events are now intermingled in new spatial configurations, and public life is as much about pleasure and enjoyment as about reason, information and education" (2003, 45).

32. Marcuse tells us that the dynamic of the dialectic for Hegel was the subjective. This is presumably because as a maturing natural being, a person has latency and tendency and uses his/her self as a motor of development in that they experience and can use alienation, non-identity and lack, however, in Hegel's scheme the actual subject becomes a cipher. (For Hegel a subject is objectified and invested with rationality, a spirit (geist) an idea which 'knows' and through the person manifests the Idea. As ciphers, Hegel's subjects lack any human or societal will.)
8 Performative places & broadcast space

8.1 Introduction

The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. (Foucault 1967, ¶1)

When I was filming my Falklands film, Tumbledown, in the 1980s, I was in Wales in the rain when a prop man said to me: "I like working here, you get to make good programmes." "Here?, in Wales?" "No, no", he said "I mean at the BBC." Here was a territory of the mind, a heartland. (Richard Eyre, former BBC Governor, 2003)

This chapter is concerned with the dialectical relationship between local, concrete places of musical performance, and the extended, conceptual space of music broadcasting. Such places and space afford freedoms, but also an ordering of performer and audience, and both of them can operate as real, 'here and now' eutopian locales. Some musical places might indeed be alternative cultural and social locales (termed here heterotopias after Michel Foucault's 1967 concept of hétérotopies) but inevitably, as sites within a stable, local community, they can also be places of order and predictability. When this latter condition holds, those individuals inimical to such order may turn away from their locality to a wider, extra-community horizon of the air, which for those rejecting local order is a place of alterity. Broadcast space is never ever just an ersatz, ordering entity, marshalling illusions of a bigger world. Sometimes it is a liberating, tenable space that frees us socially and culturally from the domination and ordering of immediate places with its alterantive choices. For those alienated by neighbourhood tastes, broadcast space becomes itself, a Heterotopia, a space of cultural alternatives.

As David Harvey has argued: "Space for Foucault, is a metaphor for a site or container of power which usually constrains but sometimes liberates processes of becoming" (1990, 213). For musical performance, geographical and temporal points define for us Foucault's "near" and "side-by-side" concert locale whilst radio effects for us a metaphorical space of Foucault's alternative "far" and "dispersed" which together have a relationship of "simultaneity" and "juxtaposition". Lest we confuse the significance of places and space, we need to
remember that people occupy places; space on the other hand is for an abstract 'public'. Barnett usefully tells us that “The public is not a subject, [...] in democratic theory and practice, [it] is constitutively disembodied [...] It is the figure for the uncertain addressee of communicative acts oriented towards universality” (2003, 5).

This chapter deliberately seeks to sharpen Foucault’s useful but somewhat impressionistic 1967 account of Other spaces, - Des Espace Autres - into a more distinct picture of relatively informal, real places of human contact and an institutionally mediated broadcast space, where the later, in the words of singer Ian Curtis affords “touching from a distance”. This seeks to be a faithful resolution of Foucault’s concept of heterotopias, and is a necessary stabilisation of what is otherwise, in various socio-philosophical writings (Lefebvre 1991, Harvey 2000), a sometimes loosely applied set of locational and spatio-temporal conceits.

Specifically, Foucault’s heterogeneous ‘other spaces’ (heterotopias) are here, following his speculations, deliberately divided into two: the first diverse microcosmic socio-cultural nodes, and the second a more fully formulated ‘other space’ that is a Heterotopia: a single macrocosm for all subjects to encounter (as a public) institutional constellations of ‘other places’. With regard to the specific concerns of this study, Foucault’s term is equated specifically with two musical lieux: (1) real, dispersed places of alternative musical performance and (2) an extended, collective, broadcast space of public service music radio.

Here, neither performative places nor broadcast space are privileged, both have something to contribute to musical life. Place needs extended broadcast public space, and space needs place. Places need the unfamiliar and familiar musical codes (nostalgic and new) of space to use or resist; space needs place in order to take-up new content and deliver it as its flow, that is there is not only a differential relation but an ongoing dialectical relation “which shuttles productively from one standpoint to the other” (Norris 1991, 27).

This chapter shows that we can discern the identification of many alternative places and spaces in the writings of other theorists which can be characterized as eutopias because of their contributions to processes of musical creativity and communication. Jacques Attali’s compositional mode in Noise
and Hakim Bey's temporary autonomous zones (TAZ's) (2002), together with Born's site of "aesthetic imaginary" and the heuristic utopia of Williams, all seem to qualify as heterotopian locales of utopics and eutopian value. These examples are more than just theoretical conceits; they are locales in society's Gemeinschaft - community-led arenas that are immediate rather than remote. Upon technological mediation by microphone and transmitter such places (musical or otherwise) take on new roles. They can join a broadcast schedule and offer wider socio-cultural representation for the originating musicians and communities on the national platform of a Gesellschaft which might be regarded as a locale for Born's "social imaginary", a space for public encounter, imagination and understanding; put simply, a bigger eutopia of continuing opportunities as much as mainstream co-option.

To recap, the heterotopian concept is now extended to identify the mass mediated reflection of other places in what is here identified as a Heterotopian space: a cultural array of diverse popular and other musics, constituted by the technologies, programme flow and discourses of public service music radio. This mainstream institutional space of 'ordered' cultures will be shown to be of comparable socio-cultural value to the 'other places' of individual town, city and region, and moreover, will be shown to play a part in their cultural constitution.

Heterotopian space as sketched here is institutionally mediated, and thus its cultural merits are less widely acknowledged. Yet it too must to be regarded as a site of alternatives when local identities and ideologies become too constrictive for cultural innovators. To underline a positive critique of a broadcast Heterotopia, part of this chapter then also 'deconstructs' the usual hierarchy of superior and authentic performative places, and what is normally assumed to be an inferior, affirmatively orientated broadcast space under pressure to deliver the acceptable. It moves beyond binary opposites to establish a dialectic of exchange, influence, praxis - in short a 'process' which can be regarded as felicitous and good. Both are sites of some freedoms and some social order. Neither is superior nor prior to the other, and each requires the existence of the other.

This is perhaps postmodernism's utopia: a eutopian place and a eutopian space, a succession of interactions and continuous development, not a final destination. A progressive, 'here and now' set of solutions and change, music's
utopia, musical eutopias and a ‘universal’ Heterotopian space - a broadcast musical eutopia - can together usefully mediate subjects to give us, in combination and alone, Foucault’s epoch of space, simultaneity, juxtaposition and dispersal.

8.2 Historical & theoretical places & space

The emergence and interpretation of past places and spaces is of relevance and thus briefly recounted here. Foucault observed:

In the Middle Ages there was a hierarchic ensemble of places: sacred places and profane places, protected places and open, exposed places: urban places and rural places (all these concern the real life of men) [...] There were places where things had been put because they had been violently displaced, and then on the contrary places, where things found their natural ground and stability [...] the space of emplacement (espace de localisation). (1967, ¶2)

Foucault argued that, commencing with Galileo’s successful detection of the Earth’s mobile character, macro-spatial conceptions began to disrupt the insularity and stability of localised place. As Foucault expressed it: “extension was substituted for localization” (l’étendue se substitute à la localisation) (1967, ¶3). Development in secular society of scientific perspectives allied to aristocratic purview encouraged the formation of the Newtonian and socio-cultural ‘overview’. Harvey (2000) argues that by the eighteenth century, Europeans truly understood the political value of measuring and logging. Topos, time and people could thus be parcelled and ordered. Factories, maps, clocks and canals were commissioned, built and run by merchants, capitalists or an overseeing state. Overarching regulation inevitably bred social and cultural sites of resistance. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, social and cultural debate, conspiracy and revolution in heterotopic margins challenged mainstream political, legal and public spheres and their institutionalising and universalizing tendencies.¹²

Shortly after this collision of emergent modernism and radical reactions to it, a new wave of technological media emerged (such as the telegraph and radio).¹³ It was at this moment that institutional space could be constructed to connect into and recuperate isolated, alternate points of activity. As a consequence, discursive debate as to the relative merits of local, alternative and the more public spaces of
wider representation ensued. We return now to Foucault and the heterotopian. Heatherington sets out a definition of the term:

[The] concept [...] heterotopia, is a medical one that Foucault has introduced to the social sciences. Places of Otherness, sites constituted in relation to other sites by their difference [...] I define heterotopia as spaces of alternate ordering. Heterotopia organise a bit of the social world in a way different to that which surrounds them. (Heatherington 1997, viii)

Alluding to the anatomical origin of the word heterotopia in descriptions of “parts of the body that are either out of place, missing, extra, or like tumours, alien”, Heatherington explains that for Foucault, “places of Otherness are spaces, whose existence sets up unsettling juxtapositions of incommensurate ‘objects’ which challenge the way we think, especially the way our thinking is ordered” (Heatherington 1997, 42). Heatherington then adds that it is the outsider’s distinct presence, and their perspective on us, that allows us to regard what we see/hear in return as being in spatio-temporal relation to but at the same time, socio-culturally ‘incommensurate’ with ourselves (1997, 43, 51). In a way this is an adjunct to the self-estrangement of Hegelian subjectification whereby as we apprehend those who are not like us, we ourselves are simultaneously scrutinised and reflected upon, thus making us aware of another’s objectifications.

**Hakim Bey & the Temporary Autonomous Zone (The TAZ)**

In the ideas of Hakim Bey we find other finite, temporal sites; other places that challenge mainstream order. Hakim Bey’s 1985 conception of the TAZ is at once, a socio-culturally diverse catalogue, and a passionate call for creative liberty. “I don’t intend the TAZ to be taken as more than an essay [...] a suggestion, almost a poetic fancy” (2002, 115). He notes the absence of serious academic attention to insular activity (which he traces back to the somewhat anarchic islands of eighteenth century piracy) but observes contemporary alternative settlements of lived, politicised critiques. Moreover, Bey sees technology as a route to future autonomous zones. "Bey’s aspirations for society are clear, he asks:

*Are we who live in the present and doomed never to experience autonomy, never to stand for one moment on a bit of land ruled only by freedom? Are we reduced*
either to nostalgia for the past or nostalgia for the future? Must we wait until the entire world is freed of political control before even one of us can claim to know freedom? (2002, 114)

Contrary to Bom’s injunction to look to state-prescribed possibilities for dialectical progressions (Born 1993a, 282), Bey strongly dismisses any official interference:

The slogan ‘Revolution!’ has mutated [...] no matter how we struggle we never escape that evil Aeon, that evil incubus the State [...] if the State IS history, as it claims to be, then the insurrection is the forbidden moment, an unforgivable denial of the dialectic - shimmying up the pole and out of the smoke hole, a shaman’s manoeuvre carried out at an ‘impossible angle’ to the universe. (2002, 115)

What is the likely consequence of this momentary act of independence? Bey suggests “such moments of intensity give shape and meaning to the entirety of a life. The shaman returns - you can’t stay up on the roof forever - but things have changed. Shifts and integrations have occurred - a difference is made” (2002, 116). So, whilst an imperfect alternative, it is an act of defiance, and thus qualifies perhaps, as a eutopian moment or hideaway, even as the dialectic falters. Bey expresses the value of an immanent gesture of possibilities when he writes: “Because the TAZ is a microcosm of that ‘anarchist dream’ of a free culture, I can think of no better tactic by which to work toward that goal while at the same time experiencing some of its benefits here and now” (2002, 117).

8.3 Places, space, music & Foucault

What relations of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation, marking and classification of human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space takes up the form of relations among sites. (Foucault 1967, ¶ 5)

In 1967, Foucault stated that the sacred and secular places of the middle-ages ordered all things, all people. Everything and everyone had a place. With Galileo there came a stress on changing relationships and perceptual ‘extensions’. Places such as towns, kingdoms or churches might have looked stable but they were now, with the benefit of extended perspectives, on their way to some new purpose.
Foucault at this point raises the vital question as to how relationships should now be ordered and placed to bring about 'a given end.'

With reference again to music and intersubjectivity, one of the topics of the previous chapter, Eddie Prévost suggests that "music is the most gregarious of art-forms. Musicians gather, needing each other, to give meaning and direction to their activity" (1995, 43). Matless goes as far as to suggest that music can inscribe an environment with a "moral geography" (Leyshon, Matless and Revill 1998, 23). Relations are proximate and laterally disposed between families, peers and others in the immediate community. Indeed, John Lovering declares: "spatial proximity is a prerequisite for all sorts of creative musical activity" (1998, 47). This may be viewed as a somewhat localised set of tactically oriented places effecting socio-cultural reinforcement of identity. Equally, it may be a more oppositional set of musical forms, articulating alterities by using novel sets of musical expression. Here, there is both an intensification of being and also, through the making and preservation of a sense of alterity, a more radical experience of collective becoming. They are, after Lefebvre of "punctual" concern, (Lefebvre 1991, 88), a community, not a whole society. However - and this is important from a dialectical perspective - it is inside these relatively intimate places where, by means of the technological, wider society and its cultures are also received.\^15

The important term of place is then a topos, a situated, physically occupied locale of human activity, significance and immediate experience - Foucault's "emplacement" (1967, ¶2).

For instance, a situated musical performance takes 'place' on a concert stage in a very special place (Cornwall's Eden Project or Ronnie Scott's Jazz Club, London) prior to its (perhaps inevitable) technological projection into national and international socio-cultural spaces of mediated spectacle and discourse. In short, particular bodies and performances are mediated by a body politic. This first sphere is of musically inflected places of "lived concern" (Lefebvre 1991, 53). They foster individual becoming and collective identity. This would include family sing-alongs, bedroom music-making, rehearsal rooms, choirs, garage bands, brass bands, festivals, jazz clubs, free music groups like AMM, pirate radio, local choirs, amateur musical theatre and community radio.\^16
These are not utopias but eutopias. Foucault asserted that utopias have "no real place" and are merely "a perfected form of society"; they are "fundamentally unreal spaces" (1967, ¶11). These places express music's utopia and a collectivised resolve to act upon such feelings in a more externalised, concrete setting. Foucault himself then offers us a way forward to embrace the larger, all encompassing spatial eutopia:

There are also, in every culture, in every civilisation, real places - places that do exist [...] which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. (1967, ¶12)

Here, Foucault outlines a conceptual public space that produces an assembly of diverse activity. He writes: "Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias" (1967, ¶12), this equates to the Heterotopia of this chapter.

Foucault argues that heterotopias are likely to be a global phenomenon, and identifies six principles that give on to three types of heterotopias. Of interest here is Foucault's third principle where "The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites" (1967, ¶20). He discusses theatre's and cinema's projections of other places, and could easily have added the radio play, and music too.  

It can be argued that the musician John Cale's childhood bedroom (discussed in 8.7 below) was a heterotopian place where he could seek refuge from his immediate circumstances and, because of the liminality provided by his listening-in to the radio, this bedroom gave directly on to the broadcast Heterotopia of the BBC. Whilst seeing Cale's early exposure to radio as a possible 'compensation' it is surely, given his exceptional musicality, also an 'elective belonging' to sate his omnivorous tastes.

Foucault's mirror

In order to develop the idea of heterotopias and Heterotopia further, we need to introduce more of Foucault's theory. Foucault (1967) floated the idea of the
mirror as a heterotopian space ‘a placeless place’. This gently evokes the idea of
Otherness where a subject comprehends their own existence as they are
simultaneously represented/reflected in another space. We also know that the
larger image of the mirror is able to capture a wider world in which we do not
live.

What we have with the mirror is, perhaps, a phantasmagoria where
appearances and representations circulate. This is thereby, potentially, a condition
of order or compensation, but also scepticism and dialectical negations. In putting
forward our voice, and our culture’s collective affirmation of the beautiful for
instance, we, at every phase of socialisation, encounter others doing the same.
This is the first step towards questioning singular views but, importantly, also
raises questions about the possibility of representing otherness in any direct,
unmediated way in a modern world. Encountering reflections and representations
we become aware of our own mythic fabrications, what Vattimo calls fabulations
of “critical distance” which are aware of their own mediated, synthetic origins
(Vattimo 1992, 25). This mirror may not lead to radical, subjective emancipation,
but in rejecting solipsism, we perhaps realise that universality is, in fact, a
plurality of ideas and identities that can be usefully experienced aesthetically,
even when in reflective reproduction.

Foucault posits a Heterotopian space as both a no-place and a good place,
a social ‘mirror’ akin to the eutopian broadcast space of the BBC advocated in this
study. He argued that:

[In these] quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed,
joint experience, which would be the mirror [...] a utopia, since it is a placeless
place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space
that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of
shadow that gives my own visibility to myself. (Foucault 1967)

Foucault argued for the existence of such a ‘mirror’, not just as a utopia but a real
phenomenon too:

It is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts
a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy [...] I begin again to direct
my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror
functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the
moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with
all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal. (Foucault 1967, ¶12)
8.4 Praise & critique of eutopian places

How does all of this relate to real music making and live venues? Places are where we live and belong. With the addition of music, places gather us all together at a particular time and location. They are a fixed location in possession of aura, tradition, community values, even a *genius loci*. They are sites of agency, co-existence, and being. Places allow us to see and hear 'live' musical activity and effect cultural exchange. This is simply expressed by Frith: “Live music is music as a social event, an aspect of a social situation - play, display, celebration, beginning. It is an organic, a living aspect of public life, [...] whatever its technical or aesthetic qualities” (2003, 95).

Music locates us spatially, historically, culturally, and socially. It grants us a perspective and makes us look back to places of familial comfort, or look forward to better ‘times’. The deployment of either spatial or temporal references in matters of 'where one is right now’ is a common conceit. Poets and politicians have long exploited notions of better places, better times; for example, consider Winston Churchill’s political image of “Broad, sunlit uplands”, and more personally, our memories of places of one’s childhood. Places one has never been to can also loom large in the romantic imagination of musicians and music-lovers: consider such distant locales of potential in the musical life of the U.S.A. (New Orleans, New York). British Composers and musicians too are capable of exploiting, or at least summoning, lost temporal and geographic places nearer to home. (consider the broad and specific evocation of places in the music of Vaughan Williams, Lennon and McCartney, Ray Davies). Cultural histories can add to these evocations of lost places and past times that may serve as paradigms for future pride and sense of identity, for example, the late 1970s and 1980s Manchester of Joy Division and the Haçienda club. Sociologists studying musical habits in present-day Manchester have observed that “live performance is commonly discussed in connection to space and place, especially [...] with respect to the use of Manchester city centre. Live music was nearly always linked in respondent’s narratives to a particular venue, such as The Apollo or the Band On
The Wall. [...] live cultural performances continue to be importantly anchored in place” (Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst 2005, 169).

Community and local radio stations nearly always situate themselves within a geographical locality and region to appear to be relevant and trustworthy, whilst at the same time spin ‘golden oldies’ that allows presenters to hit the nostalgic nerve of listeners who can instantly recall moments and place of a lost youth whenever ‘their song’ is played. “In the first second or two [of an old record], people know where they are.” A song arrests us, places us, and when it is shared with a wider audience, lets us all reflect on such a common experience.

Yet we must be on our guard. Are we now guilty of fetishising places? Do they not exclude as much as they include? Do they actually order and regulate (as Foucault would have it) as much as they allow for free expression? Locations can sometimes become the norm rather than a site of freedom and critique. They can perpetuate notions of reverence, uniqueness and aura at the expense of accessibility or experiment. Gemeinschaft may be a place of continuity, but it is also a place of ritual and constraint. Places are frequently shot-through with established cultural codes that have to be acknowledged. In is his fifth principle, pertinent to local places, Foucault wrote that:

Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable. In general, the Heterotopia site is not freely accessible like a public place [...] to get in one must have a certain permission and make certain gestures. (Foucault 1967, ¶24)

For Rob Gretton and Joy Division the band he managed, Manchester and the North West were special places, honest places, familiar places: they were ‘home’. This ‘home turf’ contains mainstream cultural places such as night clubs and live venues. The Russell Club, Hume (the venue for Factory nights featuring Joy Division and others) would qualify as one such place, as might the Hacienda club in later years. This home turf also provides isolated, more discrete locales - pockets of refusal - that are short term, alternative sites. Rob Gretton would, for example, let Joy Division retreat to rehearsal Room Number Six - a studio antechamber in Manchester. The Monday-night Musician’s Collective and Band on the Wall proved to be a useful experimental site for the band. Joy Division
valued place and community, but they also tapped into a wider, alternative community of records, films and the music press. Curtis recalled:

The Collective was a really good thing for Joy Division [...] it gave us somewhere to play, we met other musicians like A Certain Ratio and The Fall, talked and swapped ideas. Also it gave us a chance to experiment in front of people. We were allowed to to take risks - The Collective isn’t about music that needs to draw an audience. Curtis, in Brian Edge (1988, 18)

Dave Haslam has alluded to the value of what he has termed “Cells”, and has stated that “If you are not at home, [i.e. feeling like an uncomfortable outsider] look instead to Warhol, the Peel show, not to local bands” (Haslam 2006). Musical subcultures are nothing if not spectacular. They demand to be seen, and urge conformity and embodiment. One way to avoid immediate, subcultural pressure is to tune in to a wider world where raw musical sounds are as important as haircuts and dress codes. Now we are in a position to turn to eutopian broadcast space for an alternative freedom and ordering.

8.5 Eutopian space & spatial conservatism

Whilst Adorno and even Marcuse (contra Benjamin) argued for the aesthetics of uniqueness and presence; to some extent, both still underestimated the significance of wider reality - real musicians yes, but also real radio stations, real debate, real people. Neither trusted technological and institutional mediation. A shift then to the emancipatory content of reality with its Marcusian ‘chances’ involves shifting from metaphysical thought, utopian strategies and bleak interpretations, to more modest instances and moments of positive actions and participation in the ordinary; with real people we should be able to encounter praxis critical of capitalist domination and ideology. The challenge is to move cleanly from subjective ‘insularity’ of cultural diasporas to an enlightened social agglomeration.

Through broadcast discourse and ‘framing’, space effects aesthetic and subjective defamiliarisation, a productive non-identity in the mirror of Foucault’s Heterotopian space. Listeners do not literally populate this space, but are disembodied, and only represented by institutional proxy (except when actually
recording for or performing in institutional places), there is much though that is preserved. Much radio output is still live, we still hear a direct (quasi-acousmatic) amplification reaching back into discrete domestic and community places.

Is broadcast space then in fact a superior locale? What are the advantages and disadvantages of collected, publicly available places? Space facilitates what might usefully be termed, after Benedict Anderson, ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991) wherein discrete socio-cultural groupings are integrated vertically by secular institutions and technologies to constitute a portrait of a nation. “A deep, horizontal comradeship” is invoked, even though it is a vertical integration of people, with no direct experience of each other (Anderson 1991, 6-7). For the way in which this is achieved in a specific instance of radio transmission we need only turn to the insightful work of Jody Berland who has analysed pan-Canadian radio public service transmissions which bind geographically diffuse bodies of North Americans inhabiting many time zones into a national unit that falls in step with a singular ‘radio day’ of shared, in-common ‘morning’ and ‘evening’ shows. This industrially organised time she argues is an overt, easily perceived division of a listener’s day, but that the implications of the act as spatial choreography are perhaps less apparent (Berland 1998, 129). Berland accurately observes how “we subjectify the source of sound, hearing it only as a speaking subject” (ibid., 130). Berland creates an accurate impression of such a united, spatialised (but geographically dislocated) society fuelled by music and whilst hinting at an ideological construction, also suggests the formation of a critical sensibility on the part of the listener:

In this musical imagination, everyone is together in the same place. It’s probably California [...] Listening to the sounds of these [...] vocabularies can make you feel as though you are everywhere, a universal self [...] America [...] Jamaica [...] Africa [...] or a particular place [a] suburb [...] where ever it locates you, the music reminds you of your place. It speaks to the heart of where you are, and tells you something about what it means to live there. And you the listener, might begin to hear the ongoing flow of music and noise differently, as something that both celebrates and evaporates the colonizing of that place. With this mode of listening, space and location become explicit; then space is recognised as a social construction, outside of nature and one of its codes. (Berland 1998, 130-1)

We should look carefully at space. ‘Space’ is encountered at a societal rather than community level. This second eutopian sphere is of a different scale and reach to the first. Strictly speaking it is an unbounded, infinite space, not a true, singular
place (though it may require real buildings for production and transmission). It is a conceptual, socially produced structure, ideologically constituted and technologically mediated (see Lefebvre 1991, 3). Such a space has been framed historically within public service Broadcasting. Musically speaking, spatial organisation serves to collect, encourage and amplify the specific, communal, topological entities and imaginings of musical place - be they traditional or avant-garde. This second sphere is summoned as an inclusivist, pluralist concern, reflecting the heterotopian dispersal of local identities and energies.

In this reflecting space, the discursive immediacy, identities and alterities of the former are marshalled, mediated and shared for wider epistemological and cognitive gains. Here, Crossley's egological form of the subject's encounter with the Other is effected, through mediated experience. This type of public sphere is rendered practical through institutions, technologies and discourses which incorporate and magnify to give us a grand spread of heterotopias, perceptible in what is, effectively, one mediating node which, says Harvey constitutes the coexistence in "an impossible space" of a "large number of fragmentary possible worlds, or more simply, incommensurable spaces that are juxtaposed or superimposed upon each other" (1990, 48).

Space also makes us listen attentively for the strange. Therefore, perhaps paradoxically, music and people in distant places can be heard via broadcast space in that most intimate of locations: the home. Domestic proximities and familiar ground are where we rest to hear the wider world.  

Frith asserts:

Radio was the most significant twentieth-century mass medium. It was radio that transformed the use of domestic space, blurring the boundary between the public and the private, idealizing the family hearth as the site of ease and entertainment, establishing the rhythm of everydayness [...] It was radio that shaped the new voice of public intimacy, that created Britain as a mediated collectivity, that gave ordinary people a public platform. (2003, 96)

On the matter of hearing alternatives, Frith adds:

Radio is important, not least as a means of access to music otherwise inaccessible, whether in the BBC's systematic policy of musical education or in the furtive teenage use of Radio Luxembourg, the American Forces network, and pirate stations as windows on another world. (Frith 2003, 96)
Spatial dangers

Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist perspective allows him to regard space with some suspicion, as an arena for politicised deployment of knowledge and for “concealing ideology”. He observes that this space, be it state-supported or otherwise, is not an “a priori condition of its institutions” but is determined by its intended uses, and therein lies its problems (Lefebvre 1991, 85). More positively, Lefebvre later suggests that social space gathers and instigates as a site of potential and actual ethical consequence: it is “a set of places whence energies derive and whither energies are directed” (ibid., 191). These optimistic glosses, anticipating the interpretations of this study is, nonetheless confronted with a more distinct critique too. A principle concern is the ‘invisibility’ of this second nature entity and its instrumental tendency to homogenise and dominate the places on which it alights. On a technical note which returns us to the debate of Benjamin and Adorno, Lefebvre asserts that in the removal of “place” to “space”, the specifics and authenticity of creative works are converted into mere “repeatable”, “reproducible” product (ibid., 422).

8.6 A deconstructive move

Standard evaluations of music events might be seen to be built on the following premise: local, immediate places of live musical performance are distinguished by the physical proximity and presence of real musicians and their rapt audience. The relation between performer and listener is distinct, and generates a Benjaminian aura of authenticity and uniqueness. The musical performances of a broadcast space on the other hand are, for a listener at home, characterised by the physical absence of real musicians. The isolated listener cannot see or touch the performer, and is simply receiving a generalised public address where no distinct performer-listener orientation exists. Performers are effectively, after Barnett “disembodied” (2003, 5). This theoretical binary opposition of the contradictory, socio-aesthetic values of each locale is one that is found to structure our cultural lives and is one to which Adorno subscribed.
Certainly we all seek an intelligibility, a modelling of the cultural world so that we can decide what it all means. A theoretical snap-shot is of course useful as far as it goes. Indeed, above we have just counter-posed performative places with broadcast space. In doing this we could equally summon the following associated ideological binaries:

live/recorded; spontaneous/rehearsed; free agency/social fact; active/passive; spectacular/invisible; art/commodity; authentic/fabricated; real/realistic; presentational/representational; musica practica/musica symbolica; particular/general.

There tends to be an ideological bias in our language. We might automatically assume that the local and immediate have more integrity than anything on a national stage; that a presentational performance, a face-to-face encounter, is better than one mediated through the airwaves. Liveness normally takes precedence over representational recording. Not only is the featured binary pairing one of opposites, it has an implicit hierarchy of prior, superior places and a secondary inferior space. This is because the musical space of public broadcasting is inferior, being ‘diminished’ by the ‘removal’ of the living performer.

However, can we deconstruct the differential relationship, the binary opposition between performative place and broadcast space and invert their importance, or, better still, argue for an equal significance which fosters interdependence and change? If we just invert the assumed hierarchy of place and space, and assume that broadcast space is superior to all things live and local, we replace one biased assumption with another. However, we can deconstruct the hierarchy legitimately by looking at the moments of dialectical ‘trade’ between homegrown stage personality and nationally transmitted star, as local musicians leave home to travel to radio station studios in London, and as national broadcasters leave the metropolis to visit the regional scene (for example: Radio 1 Live in Cardiff, October 20-26, 2000). The hierarchy is destabilised in such acts and moments as neither place nor space are superior or inferior locales as far as musicians, audiences and broadcasters are concerned, as both are equally valued. Moreover, the differential relationship of each theoretically incompatible and
critically evaluated term is evidently a dynamic relationship. Frith usefully identifies not a fixed relationship but a freely accepted dialectic:

Radio listening [...] is a constant movement between predictability and surprise. On “our” station we expect to hear our kind of music, without ever being quite sure what will come next. It’s as if we’re happy to let someone else have the burden of choice. And radio is also a way of suggesting a broader taste community [...] likes and dislikes are publicly confirmed, and deejays and presenters have a particularly important role in treating music as a form of social communication. (2003, 97)

It is to the movement of the predictable and surprising we now turn. As Born has observed: “Broadcast culture exists in a double relation with wider cultural and ideological movements: in a centripetal motion it draws them in, selectively metabolising them in its operations; and in a centrifugal motion it sends them out, refracted in its programming” (2004, 492).

8.7 Musical eutopias, Cale & the dialectical process

New music comes from ‘nowhere’ but in reality, the traditions of localities and regions have long provided the talent for record companies and broadcasters. At the same time, musical genres, traditions and individual songs from afar have heavily influenced emerging local talent. Whilst records per se have a significant role to play, radio stations - both popular and serious - do too. As a child, musician John Cale retreated to his bedroom in South Wales and listened to “All the music I could find on the Third Programme, Webern, Stockhausen [...] maybe some Ligeti.” In his autobiography Cale tells us he was also “hearing and learning about [Elvis, jazz and classical] on the radio” (Cale and Bockris 1999). Cale in fact confessed to Sue Lawley that “I had to get out” (Cale, Desert Island Discs, 2004). It seemed that Cale was seeking a cosmopolitanism and a liberty by associating himself with the cultural capital offered by the institution of the BBC, records and radio. He chose not to associate himself with Welsh culture, nor with his father’s English roots. Is this possibly an expression of Blochian dissatisfaction and ‘lack’, an abstract utopian desire for something else, locality critiqued by the very act of retreating to his own room so to cast abroad for what might be more fulfilling?
Was Cale seeking then, and is he still seeking, to assert status and distinction by being a middle class "cultural omnivore"? This is a term adopted from Peterson and Kern by sociologists Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, who state that:

[T]he omnivore is able to roam widely across cultural genres and references because of the capacities of the media to readily provide diverse cultural cues in an easy and accessible form. This mobility also involves spatial mobility, the capacity to appreciate cultural forms from different parts of the globe. (2005, 155)

Cale desperately wanted to be in Warhol's Factory in New York. He told Lawley in c.2004 that it was "comforting to have a place for all those crazy people with some really brilliant ideas, a little out of control themselves so they could exist and work." Whilst accepting firm musical encouragement from his mother at the piano, there seems to be an activation of his social and aesthetic imaginary which sees him want to exercise what Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst (2005), term an "elective belonging". Was Cale seeking respite, escapism or inspiration through such a belonging? Might he also have been seeking status and distinction by expressing an affinity with remote cultural sources so that he might satisfy his omnivorous tastes? The creative potentials of Cale, the rebellious local agent communing with the alternative sounds of a state radio broadcast, makes manifest a real dialectic that drives cultural novelty; maintains a struggle between localised constraint and spatially framed freedoms; the familiar and the Other. In effect, an ongoing, Adornian negative dialectic given precedence neither to home nor the rest of the world, but to the locale that mediates them both: a eutopian imaginary of difference and plurality, utopic play and becoming.

We can accept (with reservations) that public service broadcasts issue from modern institutions as spatial reflections of, and responses to, modern life. Space, howsoever regulated and occupied, is a modern substrate where we can experience defamiliarisation, understand new music or simply observe musical commerce at work. With public service broadcasts we can challenge our own social, temporal and cultural situations by looking further afield and back into the past. Whilst popular music is highly 'spectacular', not everyone needs to 'see' their musical idols on television or video. Radio can remove the need to witness and then imitate a dress code or a haircut. This is liberating for many. For others,
space reinforces our own local identities and pride. It puts our musical heroes on a
caller stage, and validates who we are, and where we come from. In short, places
and space have an ongoing relationship. As Harvey observes:

Modernism, seen as a whole, explored the dialectic of place versus space, of
present versus past, in a variety of ways. While celebrating universality and the
collapse of spatial barriers, it also explored new meanings for space and place in
ways that tacitly reinforced local identity. (Harvey 1990, 273)

Dialogue and interpenetration have already occurred, and will continue. Space
mediates the content of places; places require the inspiration derived from the
formal ordering of the Other. A mutuality which goes beyond structural need to
simply distinguish one concept from another. Energy for this comes from social
agents in both place and space. It is not an autonomous process but one that is
dependent on the cultural politics of place and space and is a continuing historical
process.

Harvey asks: “If materialized utopias went wrong because of the social
processes mobilized in their construction, then the focus switches to questions of
process. Can we think of a utopianism of process rather than of spatial form?”
(2000, 173). It is to the value of eutopian places, space and process in relation to
immanent transcendence that we now turn.

Harvey outlines the interrelatedness of ‘particularity’ and ‘universality’. He
argues that the former is real, the later more of an ethical set of values that are
consciously constructed. He says in relational dialectics there’s a connection
between the concrete and the reified concept or the ‘universal’, one influences the
other (2000, 16-7). Harvey asks:

How then, can a stronger utopianism be constructed that integrates social process
and spatial form? Is it possible to formulate a more dialectical form of
utopianism, construct, even, a utopian dialectics? [...] The task is to pull together
a spatio-temporal utopianism - a dialectical utopianism - that is rooted in our
present possibilities at the same time as it points towards different trajectories for
human uneven geographical developments. (Harvey 2000, 196)

In calling for this approach, Harvey (2000) draws attention to the limits of
Foucault’s account, and touches on the ethical implications of one culture
encountering another, equitably and neutrally. This latter reservation is taken up
below with reference to Born who has similar concerns. Harvey admits to being
drawn to Foucault's "multiple utopian schemas". He also accepts that a "simultaneity of spatial play [...] highlights choice, diversity, and differences" adding:

Alternatives might be explored not as mere figments of the imagination but through contact with social processes that already exist. It is within these spaces that alternatives can take shape [...] and so disrupt the homogeneity to which society (and by extension its utopian antidotes) typically clings. (Harvey 2000, 184)

However, Harvey raises important reservations in respect to Foucault's heterotopian schema. He cites political, discursive and ethical matters which could derail any rigorous dialectical progress. If Foucault's schema is too limiting, Born points to the pitfalls of a more fluid schema. She writes of the power of the "pleasure and prestige" of "culturally imagined community" for "producers and consumers" the latter:

invited to enter into complicit imaginary identification with the producers. The global strategy invokes the pleasure of overcoming boundaries [and] the reflected narcissism of seeing self and other as 'becoming one'; of banishing difference. (Born 1993a, 282-3)

Born, in sketching a sophisticated model of place and space, cannot help but allude to the dominating tendency of erasing Otherness, in an act of eradication rather than affinity. She also effectively appraises the construction and preservation of difference as an equally suspect socio-cultural approach: "The strategy of alterity enjoys the sense of continuing difference" (1993a, 283), which she later describes as "at once both utopian and tyrannically omnipotent" (1993a, 286). Born argues that if the urge to cultural globalisation is unavoidable, then the continuation of the local and diverse must now be a matter of policy, emanating from politically aware, reconstructed "social and institutional forms" (1993a, 288).

8.8 The BBC & Born's imaginaries

Born succinctly defines the task of the BBC and any other national institution charged with representational and unificatory responsibilities:
Public service media cannot only be about a proliferation of micro publics, but about achieving a unifying sense in which are displayed and in which mutual encounters take place between expressions of sometimes incommensurable component cultures of the nation. (2004, 515)

Reith had overseen the construction of a national cultural space that drew content from the regions in order that they might be acknowledged as components of a greater, socio-political whole. A more equitable plurality of diverse musical production is apparent in the post-war plurality of the BBC, where regionality is given greater credence as a source of diverse musical expressions and allied identities.

Born sees “cultural production” as generating works of labour that are “informal and amateur” or “formal and professional” (1993a, 285) but all produced with the influence of institutions and ‘the established order’ where these works then become texts. Social contexts are matched by continuing subjective and discursive actions “involving imaginative and aesthetic construction - projected connections both to imagined social communities, and to aesthetic genres” (Born 1993a, 272). In other words, cultural production generates works of art, shaped by social facts. These are held by institutional (often ideological) discourses, yet still retain an excessive and optimistic dimension that through independent agents and a collective imagination can help to see the use value of music’s contribution to matters of alterity and power. These aesthetic-discursive places are what Born terms “social and aesthetic imaginaries” - presumably to some extent after Benedict Anderson (1991) - strategies of imagining operating across communities, both out of and into communities from a national platform.

The first of these imaginaries - the social - she breaks-down into two: (1) a unifying vision of the “communal and consensual” which fosters an eliding of difference and which we might dare to equate with a Reithian cultural universality and (2) a localised, resistant, often more radical alternative. Each of these two social imaginaries is a strategy assisting in the process of subjective and collective constitution, relying on the production of, and subsequent affinity with, cultural works. Each is predicated on an initial construction of alterity which is either resisted or coopted and erased. Born rightly avers that any “institutional alterity does not [necessarily] produce aesthetic difference or political dissent, just as
inhabiting the institutional mainstream does not completely preclude them” (1993a, 285). The emancipatory problems of negation inherent in any subjective, collective or institutional construction of difference are identified by Born. She writes of “idealized ultimate reconciliation”, “phantasised pleasures of omnipotence” and the act of “bringing everyone under one’s own regime.” Born identifies these “psychic” tendencies with the universalising impulse. On the other hand, a localised, psychically configured alterity (socially or aesthetically embodied) can equally create and preserve “defensive phantasies of fragmentation”, “destruction of the unity” and a denigration of “the ordinary and dominant” (1993a, 282-3). (Many of these issues are later developed in Born and Hesmondhalgh, 2000). This study actually seeks to effect an accommodation of Born’s two social imaginary sites, whereby instances of difference in any process of subjectification might be seen for what they are, and thereby be mutually invigorating and supportive to inculcate what Born identifies in one of her co-essayists as “aesthetic and political value” - alterity as a marker inculcating moves for mutual respect, and representation - not a route to a negation of others (Born 1993a, 283). Born is in some ways supportive of the potential for, or actuality of, contemporary eutopian ambition and potentials of institutions like a contemporary BBC. (Cf. Born 1993a, 285 and more generally Born, 2004). Her belief in a benign “respublica” of cultural pluralities is foreshadowed in her Afterword to Bennett et al (1993) where she calls for reconstructed and reconstructive institutions that support the local to counter the universal imaginary, but not that of a paternalistic BBC, the universal social and aesthetic imaginaries of capitalism, nor its converse: endless instances of cultural novelty ascribed to ‘marginal’ authentic sites. (Born 1993a, 288).

In turning to Born we might discern a distinct manifestation of the musical eutopia sought in the present study that informs her all-important social imaginary. Prior to Born’s social imaginary stands her aesthetic imaginary, characterised by the presence of musical work and text available in places and broadcast space for local and national audiences to ‘encounter’ and make a musical judgement upon a plurality of musical forms. As a subject’s sensibility is triggered by an experience of the aesthetic imaginary, musical alterities - past and present, local, national or global are imagined in a more concrete utopian
form as actual communities. This, within the eutopian space commanded by the likes of the BBC, constitutes Born's social imaginary. In a national form, a sort of Reithian vertical integration of community musics is gathered. Whilst Born clearly states that her understanding of the aesthetic is as a phenomenon coopted for socio-political usage, her conceptual model does not preclude its critical articulation with the eutopian locale of a 'here and now' site presenting and representing such encounters. Born, even as she fights shy of any Kantian implications or conclusions seems, in her propositions to be drifting close towards a Kantian and Habermasian construction of subjective appreciation and collective, common sense discernment and understandings. Born's aesthetic and social imaginaries might be seen to run parallel to Kant's epistemological combination of the faculties of sense, experience and \textit{a priori} reasoning, and as such, are possibly additional instances of music's abstract and concrete utopian manifestations coming together in eutopian locales for the subject's sensory encounter, imaginative assimilation and cognitive understanding of an objective world occupied by others and Otherness.\footnote{35}

8.9 \textbf{In conclusion}

Heterotopias are at once places of alternative order and disorder/displacement, mainstream acceptance \textit{and} alternative resistance. Likewise, Heterotopias is both mainstream output and alternative space of discovery. What matters is their mutual relationship and consequent dynamic. 'Locality', 'community' and 'regionality' are shown to be immediate sites of musical activity that connote exclusivity, peripheral resistance and socio-cultural originality. They are also viewed as sites that suggest authenticity, presence and tradition. It is argued that their subsequent mediation by radio, television and commercial recording promote them to an extensive public sphere where for many, the aura and integrity of the music are lost. \textit{However}, for some, mass mediation arguably effects the transcendence of place to effect a benign, cognitively-rich encounter with Otherness. This process of mediation promotes, over time, not only renewed local resistances and heterotopias, but importantly, fresh stimulation at the performative level as other, 'foreign' musical heterotopias are broadcast back into a creative
community in exchange for yet further cooptions into an institutionally framed national Heterotopia.

This Heterotopia is a space occupied by difference and the locally produced. It makes them available to all through the ether. Its power is linear and 'live'. The potentials of both resistant human body and idealistic state institutions are preserved to effect a desublimated 'negative dialectic' that sustains cultural innovation; maintains struggle between order and freedom; the known and new. What we have is an ongoing dialectic, a postmodern condition which privileges neither place nor space and can thus be said to be a here and now eutopia.

The musical utopias and eutopias posited in this study are surely cultures held within a public sphere ordained by the state at the behest of the people. Though perhaps not the strictly neutral, 'other spaces' of Foucault, they are at the same time more than this. Such eutopias are rational, but also imaginative and revivifying locales for the population where repositories of the past and new activity bring about cultural improvement, expressive liberty and intersubjectivity. Here, creativity, taste and independence are collectively constructed and intersubjectively shared - often specifically through musical sounds - at a near-presentational, 'I-Thou' level, as music shapes as well as simply inhabits places.36

The spatial organisation amplifies static, topological entities, but the process can come to a halt if it is devoid of any dynamic. The challenge is to respect places and use their energy allied to the ambition of broadcast space to produce and maintain innumerable good places where positive values (but not moral absolutes) can be expressed and explored. Here, idealism operates with reality. 'Life as it is' constitutes the thesis, its antithesis is 'Utopia - an imagined perfection'; their synthesis is More's and our e/utopia - a society of enlightening institutions, imaginaries and praxis - a synthesis which, for too long has been deferred.

Notes

2. “The BBC is one of the few things in Britain that works” The Guardian, Saturday September 27 2003, 22.
3. Harvey tells us that in The Order of Things (1966), Foucault first “coined the term ‘heterotopia’ to describe the incongruity, the ‘enigmatic multiplicity’ and the fundamental disorder of which language was itself so capable” (2000, 183).
5. Whilst a stimulus to David Harvey, relational notions of places and spaces seem to be somewhat poorly regimented in his otherwise exemplary works. In spite of such reservations, inspiration for this chapter is taken directly from the work of Michel Foucault (1967), Henri Lefebvre (1991), David Harvey (1990, 2000), Georgina Born (1993a) and others. Discussion of the social production of space as proposed by Lefebvre (1991) is ongoing and is further considered by Clive Barnett (2003). The Sage journal Space and Culture: International Journal of social spaces is also to be noted. Specific accounts of musical places are to be found in Leyshon, Matless and Revill (1998). See also: Manchester: Music & Place, an international conference on music and place, held at the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture, Manchester Metropolitan University, June 8 - 10 2006. Each have looked exhaustively at real, material locations and metaphorical ‘locales’ of social construction, contestation and improvement.

6. Foucault was interested in the interaction of power relations of social groups, as seen in institutions and held in discourses. He saw that a modern world of perils and possibilities comprises social constraint that inevitably fosters social resistance. His concept of heterotopia allows for a consideration of discrete sites of conformity and alterity, but, importantly their combination in a unending dialectical sequence where dualities, be they concepts, antagonisms or separate entities are mediated (modified but not fully negated) by each other or by a third, mediating term that acts as a site of transition.

7. Jacques Attali argues for new ways of making and listening to music. For him, displaced organs or new entities which are foreign to the host can provoke fresh perspectives. This Attali advocates through his concept of ‘Composition’ in his final chapter of Noise (1985). He detects “Emerging, piecemeal and with the greatest ambiguity, the seeds of a new noise, one exterior to the institutions and customary sites of political conflict [...] the essential element in a strategy for the emergence of a truly new society [...] opportunities to grasp an aspect of utopia, reality under construction” (Attali 1985, 133). Here, the economy and state have no direct role to perform in music-making. It is a ‘do-it-yourself’ mode. Jameson remarks that Attali is looking for ways of “discovering and theorizing the concrete possibilities of social transformation within the new system. His utopianism is thus materialistic and immanent” (Jameson in Attali 1985, p. xiii).

8. Born, after Benedict Anderson’s notion of “Imagined Communities” (Anderson, 1991) gives us “musically-imagined communities”: an aesthetic imaginary of musical actions, “a strategy which constructs alterity, difference, marginality, the small-scale the ‘local’ the ‘independent’, the avant-garde” (Born 1993a, 282).

9. We might, in passing, consider Raymond Williams’s account of what he identifies as a heuristic utopia (in contrast to a systematic, holistic one) that is driven by “individualistic impulse”. He added, “It is not based on a new system as a form of critiques of an existing system, or as a whole worked-through alternative [...] its purpose, instead is to form desire. It is an imaginative encouragement to feel and to relate differently, or to strengthen and confirm existing feelings and relations which are not at home in the existing order and cannot be lived through in it. This kind of heuristic utopia has much in common with the practical movements of alternative, individual, or small-communal lifestyles”. See Williams (1985, 13-14).

10. Born offers us a social/institutional imaginary which she says: “seeks fusion and mergers, submersion into the dominant collectivity, which constructs the mainstream, the ‘global’, the communal and consensusal” (1993a, 282). In a written response to this present discussion Born has advised that her two imaginares were proposed “as general potentials or conditions; in principle they can both be experienced either live or mediated. I develop them as psychoanalytically-informed categories that can be derived from many empirical and historical accounts of distinctive forms of popular music practice (as in Bennett et al (eds.) 1993)”.

11. Heatherington might dispute this: “Heterotopia are not quite spaces of transition - the chasm they represent can never be closed up - but they are spaces of deferral, spaces where ideas and practices that represent the good life can come into being, from nowhere, even if they never actually achieve what they set out to achieve - social order, or control and freedom” (1997, ix).

12. In Europe, the likes of Karl Marx, J. M. W. Turner, William Blake, William Wordsworth and others functioned as socialists and romantics seeking to reinstate the value of locality, community and Identity as alternatives were conceived.
13. In 1911 a German group proposed the setting-up of a “world office” that would “unify all the humanitarian tendencies that run in parallel but disorderly directions, and bring about a concentration and a promotion of all creative activities” (Tafuri, in Harvey 1990, 270).

14. Bey says the TAZ is a critical aside. “The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage directly with the state, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself before the state can crush it” (2002, 117).

15. Consider the mediating status of record players and discs, transistor radios home taping, and now MP3 and i-Pod options.


17. Foucault’s sixth principle is suggestive for this study in that heterotopias can operate as vessels of illusion. Foucault writes: “Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space [...] or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill-conceived and jumbled. This would be the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation” (1967, ¶26). The challenge here is to ensure that compensatory music making is only an initial, abstract then concretised utopian urge, and not a withdrawal from any subsequent wider engagement and confrontation. In all of these musings we detect Foucault’s enduring fascination for the location of inferior discourses and isolated discourses where power relations are constituted prior to wider scrutiny. Harvey warns that “cultural institutions - museums and heritage centres, arenas for spectacle, exhibitions, and festivals - seem to have as the aim the cultivation of nostalgia, the production of sanitized collective memories, the nurturing of uncritical aesthetic sensibilities, and the absorption of future possibilities into a non-conflictual arena that is eternally present” (Harvey 2000, 168).

18. His fourth principle is concerned with time that is ended or perhaps accumulated. This gives on to a consideration of the museum and library and reminds us of Derrida’s call (Derrida 2002) for the state institutions to make past cultural content available.


20. Frith contrasts this with “Canned music [that] has been removed from its social origins. Like some alien force it moves relentlessly forward regardless of any human responses to it” (Frith 2003, 95).

21. Churchill’s ‘Battle of Britain’ speech, delivered June 18 1940.

22. A music radio scheduler explaining the targeting of a listenership using knowledge of music heard in a formative age range of between 12 and 22, and at its most intense at about 17. “If I play any one [of these songs] in a 20 minute sequence. I’m on to a winner” The Archive Hour, BBC Radio 4, February 18, 2006. Berland suggests that community radio “forefronts diverse local musics and nurtures a sense of difference-within-place.” She argues that it is more contingent than public service radio and “refuses to become homogeneous or habitual” (Berland 1998, 140-1). This is in contrast to the formulae of local, usually commercial stations.

23. Consider the BBC’s ‘listen again’, i-Player and archival ambitions. Foucault himself identified “heterotopias of indefinitely accumulating time, for examples museums and libraries” (Foucault, 1967).

24. Brian Edge tells us that in “early 1978 Joy Division took good advantage of equipment and facilities offered by the Manchester Musician’s Collective, a cooperative set up by Dick Witts of The Passage among others, to help local talent flourish outside the constraints of the music industry” (1988, 18).


26. Consider Raymond Williams’s mobile privatisations (Williams 1974). He offered a subtle understanding of subject and society in relation to radio. Comparing the notion of a mass radio audience to that of the common situation of domestic, relatively isolated listening he points to radio as a technology effecting both “social integration and control” (1974, 23-4), but importantly for this study also opportunities for “an at once mobile and home-centred way of living: a form of mobile privatisation” whereby Williams implied the social flux of busy external life could be represented and apprehended in private (1974, 26).
27. He asks: "Is it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations [...]? The answer must be no [...] I shall demonstrate the active - the operational or instrumental - role of space, as knowledge and action, in the existing mode of production" (Lefebvre 1991, 11).

28. Derrida has pointed out that there's a bias in favour of speech over writing. That the self-present is more faithful and embodied than the recorded and reproduced which are abstractions and pale imitations. Reversing the sequencing (and implied hierarchy) of the dualities above would be a start - valuing recorded over the live; the rehearsed over the spontaneous. Deconstructionists will at this point also argue there's also no broadcast space without place, and no place that does not contain the bigger spaces of radio. One needs the other to have any content and meaning. The family hearth and the teenage bedroom admit sounds from afar. What we are looking at is not the theoretical snap shot offered by the binary model, but a process of mutual influence.


31. Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst see this as being facilitated by what they identify as the mediascape and the technoscape of Appadurai which they outline (2005, 11).


33. Harvey is critical of Foucault's account of dispersed power which is in Foucault perhaps insufficiently dialectical in relation to wider forces and is thus frozen. In addition, Harvey points to Foucault's oversight which allows for ideological, dystopian sites to thrive equally well. It presumes that connections to the dominant social order are or can be severed, attenuated or, as in the prison, totally inverted. The presumption is that power/knowledge is or can be dispersed and fragmented into spaces of difference. It presumes that whatever happens in such spaces of "Otherness" is of interest and even in some sense "acceptable", or "appropriate" (Harvey 2000, 184).

34. Born points out that with regard to formats and aesthetic standardization, "local sites of production and divers aesthetics [are not] synonymous" and that "local production [cannot] guarantee diversity" nor that if it did, it would be with reference to "‘authentic’, traditional aesthetic forms [...] I do not buy into this equation [but] cultural policy can support both of these things autonomously, and [...] may well be correlated" (1993a, n.3 288-9).

35. Born suggests the BBC's cultural array "enables each genre to comment implicitly on the qualities and limits of other genres [reflecting] something of the increasingly complex and chaotic nature of modern urban life" (2004, 29).

PART FOUR | Communication, society & eutopia
Normative ambitions & institutional histories: Public service broadcasting & the BBC from Reith to Ravenscroft

9.1 Introduction

Thus far, this study has explored utopian desire and its linguistic articulation in relation to music; considered musical experience and music radio in the processes of subjectification and intersubjectivity, and developed the conceit of an ethical, eutopian space of mediated cultural content.

The fourth part of this study seeks to frame the normative ambitions and particular historical realities of British public service broadcasting by way of a contextualising intellectual history, present-day academic critique and accompanying philosophical gloss. The practice of mediating and delivering culture to a nation will be seen to be a potent mix of philosophical, social and political agendas. It is a wish to preserve and understand this mix and its eutopian aspects that in large part explains the historical-cum-socio-philosophical character of this study's final part.

The present chapter looks at public service ideals and realities, Arnoldian and Reithian hopes, and the public service agendas of one broadcaster in particular, the late John Peel (born John Ravenscroft). These embodied values are examined here with reference to some of the perspectives of Bloch, Gramsci, Adorno and other, more contemporary, thinkers to support claims for the efficacy of the BBC and its broadcasters.

9.2 Public service broadcasting & the early BBC

In the modern period, states and governments have protected property and individual persons in their prosecution of a public and national good. They have also facilitated education and inculcated citizenship. Locke (1984) in Two Treatises of Government (1689) saw government arise from agreement to progress beyond the 'state of nature' whereby the individual willingly ceded the application
of reason to the community in the form of a collective, more-or-less democratically accountable public body and related agencies. The modern state thus possesses not an absolute power but a delegated one. It is made incarnate via individuals, groups and institutions; it represents our ‘greater selves’. Such selfless activity is demanded and sanctioned by collective aspiration. Rousseau posited the theory of the general will (The Social Contract, 1762a) which supposed democratically formulated outcomes that transcended individual aims to serve the common good. Thus normative public ambition, and more political and even commercial realities in respect of mere ‘audiences’, play out in public institutions that are for us, but also of us.

Since the advent of modern economies, bureaucracies, liberal-democratic politics and concomitant national agendas; issues of creativity, leisure, education and technical dissemination have increasingly become concerns of national, state-monitored bodies. It is the so-called ‘positive function’ of such bodies in promoting pleasure and happiness, and the creative aspects of delegated public guidance and improvement in particular, assisted indirectly by state laws and taxes that concerns us here.

Public service broadcasting does not reach out to a specific individual, and neither to an anonymous mass audience. Instead it is offered up to millions of individuals (potentially) as what Scannell terms “a for-anyone-as-someone structure” (2000, 5), a standardized, communicative framework that “in its organization and design, presents itself as useable and useful for anyone” (2000, 6). For Scannell, such “structures register the play of the social, the dialectic of impersonal and personal, collective and individual historical processes” (2000, 16). Developed, public service broadcasting thus arguably encourages a mediated intersubjectivity for mature or maturing individuals within such a structure where they express themselves and encounter others.

Early public service broadcasting in Britain was motivated in a different way, and sought to educate and raise the cultural lives of others for reasons of national unity, public utility, and social control: albeit tempered slightly by a heartfelt obligation to ‘improve’. Central to national ‘cultivation’ has been the idea of the immature subject and the assumed maturity and even superiority of the paternalistic, or sometimes aristocratic cultivating body. Born writes of political
and intellectual worry about “the unready state of ordinary people for the responsibilities of citizenship” and the need to “create the kind of informed and rational citizenry” that would “support the development of an inclusive, participatory and enlightened democracy” (2004, 28).

Public-service broadcasting is a compound of a system of control, an attitude of mind and an aim, which if successfully achieved results in a service which cannot be given by any other means. The system of control is full independence, or the maximum degree [...] that Parliament will accord. The attitude of mind is an intelligent one capable of attracting to the service the highest quality of character and intellect [...] it must not be vitiated by political or commercial considerations. Sir Ian Jacob, Director General of the BBC, quoted by Greene (1960, 3)

Born is however right to characterise the formation of the BBC as one of “political intervention” and “political imagination” (2004, 26). And, like many academics, she is rightly sensitive to the class-bound impulses of the BBC, then and now (see Born 2004, 5). Scannell and Cardiff argue (after Raymond Williams) that “The Victorian reforming ideal of service was animated by a sense of moral purpose and of social duty on behalf of the community, aimed particularly at those most in need of reforming – the lower classes” (1991, 9). This impulse toward educational and cultural enlightenment, Scannell and Cardiff argue, was possessed by the middle class, and informed the ideals of public service broadcasting by the BBC from its founding in the 1920s through to the 1950s. It was first articulated in the writings of Arnold, and was echoed in the work and writings of Reith. Thus a means existed, in the BBC, of assuaging moral guilt and class tensions - particularly at the time of universal suffrage - when a new and ‘immature’ electorate of unknown potentials came into being.

In so doing, a national culture would arise where ‘anyone-as-someone’ would begin to experience their own sense of self as part of a larger, cohesive citizenry. As Scannell and Cardiff observe: “radio, in an organized social form, seemed to be one significant and unprecendedented means of helping to shape a more unified and egalitarian society” (1991, 13). What resulted was “a shared public life [as] radio and, later, television were potent means of manufacturing that ‘we-feeling’ ” (1991, 277). The true extent of present-day social (and by implication a class) inclusion is contested and constructively reviewed elsewhere (Born 2004 & 2006).
Arnoldian values & John Reith

In his book, *Broadcast Over Britain* (Reith, 1924), first Director General of the BBC, John Reith, demonstrated a knowledge of the English nineteenth century poet, cultural critic and school inspector Matthew Arnold, and his respective book, *Culture and Anarchy: An essay in political and social criticism* of 1867-9 (1993, 53-211). Arnold’s critique interestingly has much in common with the descriptive and normative approaches of the likes of Bloch and Adorno, observing that “perfection can never be reached without seeing things as they really are” (1993, 208). Moreover, Arnold recognised the need for an intellectually revitalised, independently minded critique of modern society’s habituated approach to education and culture, and a non-patronising attitude of experts to the education of the mass: “Plenty of people will try to give the masses, as they call them, an intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way they think proper for the action condition of the masses” (1993, 79). To effect this, Arnold advocated roles for “instrumental statesmen [and] creative statesmen” (1993, 208). He wrote:

We have not the notion, so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the State, - the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with general powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals. (1993, 83)

Such views instantly turn our gaze towards Reith, and the task entrusted him to head the new, state-constituted BBC. In the 1860s, Arnold witnessed British class struggles for power. For him, any revolutionary seizure of state powers by the masses would have been unacceptable, but, writing as he was in 1861, a post-aristocratic, democratically derived political emancipation was acceptable to him. Democratic though he was in this regard, he still advocated the promotion of older, aristocratic standards in culture, and sought to hitch cultural affairs to state ministration. The responsibility of enculturation should, for Arnold, be taken on at a national level. He wrote: “A good thing meant for the many cannot be well be so exquisite as the good things for the few; but it can easily, if it comes from a donor of great resources and wide power, be incomparably better than what the many could, unaided, provide for themselves” (Arnold 1861, 18). He seemed to favour the disinterested powers of fine culture and education for all as a means to a
reasoned and felicitous society, aided, even embodied, by a benign state. "What if we tried to rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community, the State, and to find our centre of light and authority there?" Arnold continued: "We want an authority, and we find nothing but jealous classes, checks and a deadlock; culture suggests the idea of the State. We find no basis for a firm state-power in our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our best self" (1993, 98-9). If we are to raise standards, we are to do so through state channels. Arnold here is Hegelian, and invites people to look positively at the state when it has everyone's higher interests and aspirations in view. He wrote:

It is not State-action in itself which the middle and lower classes of a nation ought to deprecate; it is State-action exercised by a hostile class, and for their oppression [...] For the middle or lower classes to obstruct such a State-action, to repel its benefits, is to play the game of their enemies, and to prolong for themselves a condition of real inferiority. (1861, 19)

Arnold was writing of schooling primarily here, but his principles do anticipate Reithian ones, both having an interest in democratic access to the best cultural diet, overseen by 'well-meaning' state institutions. Reith on the other hand, whilst also valuing culture and a state-sanctioned education of society as a route to national betterment, seemed less ready to embrace any elite as a sole source of improving culture. He wrote:

Like some other interests, the musical profession, and the general musical interests of the country, have tended to come under the sway of a limited number of individuals who exercise semi-dictatorial powers [...] and in whose hands has lain the organization of most of the musical pleasures with which at their discretion the country, or rather a very limited portion of it, is regaled. (1924, 102)

Reith did not abandon Arnold's faith in education however, and advocated a more pragmatic, 'earthed' approach the social matters:

There are two kinds of idealist: the dreamer who sees the ultimate vision and has no conception of how to overcome or circumvent the difficulties [...] and the practical idealist who builds up his Utopia on the foundations, and with the materials, already at hand [...] the practical idealist [...] looks to education as the hope of the nation. (1924, 181)

Reith then turned to the new medium of radio broadcasting as an educational, democratic vehicle: "Of a sudden, a new concern appears, exploiting music to an
extent hitherto undreamt of. There is a flutter in the dovecots” (1924, 102). Reith also was ready to admit a plurality of music, and refused to be swayed by either the serious or populist camps: “As in all our work, it must be remembered that every variety of musical taste has to be catered for [selections should be] perfectly good [...] quite popular, easily understood and assimilated, or capable of being understood and assimilated” (1924, 174-5). In addition, Reith looked ahead to when broadcasts might deliver even more:

The time is not far distant when for those to hear who care to listen, voices from the ends of the earth shall be brought to all the homes of Britain [...] they may hear the messages or the music of the East or the West, or may attend to that sent in return [...] in such a realization of world-unity, music will play its exalted part. (1924, 221-2)

Ideals & reality: 'Happier homes, good music and a new national asset'

In 1927, the British Broadcasting Company - an association of radio set manufacturers - was keen to assemble audio content for its members’ products. The broadcast of their varied, commercially inspired content rapidly became the prime concern of a Government anxious to exercise quantitative and qualitative controls on domestic radio transmissions. This wish for control translated itself into the ethics and pronouncements of many working within the BBC, and was joined (sincerely it can be argued) by high-minded pursuit of the nation’s cultivation. This combination of governmental overview, high-mindedness and the brute reality of BBC’s near monopoly in radio matters until the 1970s sits at the foundation of this particular point.

Near the start of his general managership of the British Broadcasting Company in 1924, Reith wrote of the anticipated demands which would be made on the new institution:

The responsibility weighs heavily with us; let there be no misunderstanding on that score [...] It is a burden such as few have been called upon to carry. Whether we are fit or not, is for reasoned judgement only, but at any rate it is relevant and advisable that our recognition of the responsibility should be known (Reith 1924, 34)

It is not difficult to view the ethos of a nascent BBC in the 1920s and that of Reith its first Director General coloured by the ancient philosophers, more modern
thinkers and contemporary cultural figures. Reith indeed asked whether radio might:

operate as a living force [...] as long ago it operated in the city state? It must cover more and more of the field of the social and cultural life; become more and more valuable as an index to the community’s outlook and personality. (1949, 135)

The Liberal enlightenment at work in a modern, public-service state is of a kind where the BBC allows a subject to encounter an objective world. Here, intimations of a Hegelian ‘ought’ are played against the givens of a Hegelian ‘is’, as progress towards human fulfillment ensues. Subject and society become something better in the presence of wider perspectives and an improving culture.

Karl Mannheim alluded to such a liberal character as Reith in his 1936 account of ideology and Utopia:

The fundamental attitude of the liberal is characterised by a positive acceptance of culture and the giving of an ethical tone to human affairs. He is most in his element in the role of critic rather than that of creative destroyer. He has not broken his contract with the present - the here and now. (1960, 198)

This process of ‘becoming’, of socialisation and cultivation seeking a given moral end favoured by Reith is nothing new. In previous eras, activity and ambition - with theological, scientific and philosophical ends in view - was sought through faith, secular education, science, civic activity or revolution. In the nineteenth century, a combination of Judeo-Christian and enlightenment impulses toward change and betterment coloured the thoughts of Marx and other reforming thinkers, and was paralleled in biological, ethnographic and ethnological quarters, and in urban, non-conformist congregations. The likes of Arnold and Reith were, it can be argued, products of this rich teleological ideology of active, ‘here and now’ faith and reason. We can look to Mannheim to identify the character of liberal humanists turning to education as a conduit for self-development and emancipation - development that would also be a good ‘end’ for the wider community. Mannheim identified a:

middle stratum that was disciplining itself through conscious self-cultivation and which regarded ethics and intellectual culture as its principle self-justification (against the nobility), and unwittingly shifted the bases of experience from an ecstatic to an educational plane. (1960, 205)
Reith was appointed BBC General Manager at the age of only 34. He later confessed that he did not really know what radio was, but that his ‘face’, that of a Scottish presbyterian and ex-services officer seemed to fit. Even so, he was neither entirely an establishment figure doing the Government’s bidding, nor was he a common man. He was surely of Mannheim’s middle rank. What was Reith like as an individual, and how did this impact on his administration of the BBC?

One insight appears in his postwar autobiography where he wrote of the Latin inscription inside Broadcasting House, Portland Place, London. The inscription is taken from Paul to the Philippians Chapter 4 verse 8 which reads: “In conclusion my brothers, fill your minds with those things that are good and those that deserve praise, things that are true, noble, right, pure, lovely and honourable.”

Reith wrote in his autobiography that:

There was publicity [...] much of it probably sarcastic about the [Broadcasting House] dedication *Deo Omnipotenti* [...] from *Philippians* iv, 8 in the entrance hall. It was Rendall’s composition; the inclusion of my name in the inscription was his doing. The sentiment was magnificent; I entirely approved of it; but was not sure if the BBC could live up to it. (Reith 1949, 159)

Interestingly, the whole tone of the final passages of the 1949 autobiography is a humble, almost disillusioned one. Here Reith commented on his lack of any certain knowledge in his later years that he might usefully pass on to his children. Reith’s BBC directorship had, in contrast, been coloured by his youthful certainties: respect for God, Sundays and education that he pursued by exploiting the BBC’s monopolistic position to deliver its three key duties. The BBC should he argued, inform, educate and entertain - what became the so-called Reithian trinity. Entertainment for Reith should be British in origin and character, and should serve a particular purpose. Entertainment (rather than ‘art’) for its own sake was inappropriate, but should be there to soothe tired individuals in their leisure hours. The BBC should encourage cultural discrimination and selective, active listening. This is a complex view of culture on the part of Reith that combines Kantian notions of moral agreement with a more mundane deployment of it for specific purposes of ‘improvement’ or compensation. In Reith’s case, it combines an elevated, ‘aristocratic’ perspective and the certainties and duty of an
earlier age, with a more middle-ranking, post-First World War commitment to national recovery and social responsibility. For Reith, radio transcended parochialism and partisanship. It mediated town and country, nature and city street, public figures and those at home and was “a return of the City-State of old. All that and more” (1949, 100). For him, broadcasting could overcome the problem of social fragmentation: “the modern problem was [...] not of sub-division but of integration; there was no unity of the nervous system of the body politic” (1949, 136). On unifying taste Reith wrote:

Integration is a process not of gross summation but of ordering and valuation. Broadcasting was not only the collector but the selector of material. Therein lay - and always will lie - its supreme responsibility. (1949, 136)

A responsibility aided, he conceded by the uncompromising power of what he termed “the brute force of monopoly” (1949, 99). A later director reiterated the idealistic ambitions of the BBC as laid out by Reith. Sir Hugh Greene, who headed the corporation between 1960 and 1969 wrote:

The true purpose of the BBC [was] concerned with the whole of life. The broadcaster opens a window on the world and for many, especially the young, it is a window opened for the first time [...] the new age of broadcasting which lies before us should not stand in the service of governments, political, political parties, big business or sectional interests. (Sir Hugh Greene, part of a US speech, 1961, cited in Briggs (1995, 325 [WAC file R44/548])

Reith’s (and the BBC’s) role then was always to be at once idealistic and discerning, whilst also mindful of social obligation, and all of this to be applied in a modern, technologically advancing democracy. Reith consciously trod a line between establishment principles and a reality of social and technological change. Interposed between the implementation of state duty via Government and the shifting socio-cultural realities, Reith’s mediating institution exhibited neither fear nor favour in its dogged determination to meet the necessity for an independent BBC, without which, no one and no institution, governmental or social could hope to thrive. Reith’s strict independence and patriotism succeeded in rebuffing American culture, but not its business models - which he witnessed firsthand - to extend an orderly, middle-class culture of liberal ambition that acknowledged the
existence of elite tastes cultivated through leisure time, but which also sought to improve the tastes and prospects of the lower orders through modern technical means.  

Briggs reminds us that Reith asked: “What ‘incalculable harm’ might have been done, if those in charge of the BBC had been without principles? What would have happened had the controllers of the BBC been content with mediocrity, with providing a service which was just sufficiently good to avoid complaint.” This view is articulated in class terms in the next decade when we look again to Mannheim:

We owe the possibility of mutual interpenetration and understanding of existent currents of thought to the presence of such a relatively unattached middle stratum which is open to the constant influx of individuals from the most diverse social classes and groups with all possible points of view. (Mannheim 1960, 143-4)

Mannheim’s point is that in the past, social antagonisms tended to be mediated by the bourgeoisie. Back in 1936, independent, “socially unattached intelligentsia” - more fully educated individuals not caught up in class particulars (ruling or proletarian) were well placed to effect, when together a sensitive, progressive synthesis. Reith and Peel (himself from the public school system) typify this twentieth-century agent of public service, expertise and respect.

Eutopian administration

Nineteenth century Arnoldian paternalism had articulated notions of a public good, proposing ‘the best’ for everyone. Implementation of this benign concept required three additional conditions that were to emerge at the start of the twentieth century. The first of these was broad, cross-party political will; the second, a selfless suite of new and reformed institutional platforms and the last, the technocratic-cum-socio-cultural phenomenon of broadcasting, regarded by the Sykes Committee in 1923 as “public property”. Only a new and distinct economic and political state polity could effect a broad educational and cultural substrate to stimulate the sharing of a common national purpose to tackle national reconstruction, economic challenges and, at the same time, transcend divisive class conditions. Jenny Owen observes that “by the 1920s, ‘public service’ could be understood as an increasingly coherent set of principles. These principles
embraced a definition of efficiency which stressed the 'human factor', a 'belief in
people rather than balance sheets' and a commitment to serve the community”
(Owen 1996, vii).

The BBC came into being as one institutional response of the British
national polity amongst many to modern social, economic and cultural conditions
offering a planned collective socio-cultural space of access implemented by what
Owen has identified as “technocratic expertise” and an administering, “aristocracy
of talent”.23 The liberal-democratic state could, and should take part in cultivating
subjects away from individualistic outlooks and towards a less selfish collective
ideal that might, at the same time, promote an individual ontogenesis which might
serve subject, family and national community. An interventionist liberalism might
not simply continue to espouse an Arnoldian sense of public service ideals but,
with the reform of a mature bureaucratic class, tackle the forces of hitherto
unbridled capitalism and the partialities of a market-inflected public sphere.
British government, at the start of the twentieth century had begun to exhibit the
necessary socio-philosophical outlook amid its political and administrative castes.
A public conscience, meritocratic policy and inclusivity were being promoted,
which would be, by the start of WWII, sufficiently mature to ensure that the
somewhat transitional phase of Reithian paternalism and cultural conservatism
could respond more generously and empathetically to popular taste.24

Music radio

“Before broadcasting, music did not exist as a unified cultural field...what existed
were particular musics [...] choral societies [...] brass and military bands [...] 
concert publics [...] background music [...] dance” (Scannell and Cardiff 1991,
182). Scannell and Cardiff tell us “Radio uprooted all these musics from their
particular social and economic settings and brought them together in a strange
new abstract unity” (1991, 182). This, from the outset, involved planning and
execution based on what Scannell views as the “standardization, classification and
evaluation of the whole field of music” (1991, 182). Born reminds us that almost
from the beginning BBC programming was “one of the first sustained experiments
in the juxtaposition of cultural genres” (2004, 29). Scannell and Cardiff explain
that “through a policy of mixed programming on a single channel [...] the BBC
quite unintentionally brought all these musics and their publics into collision with each other" and think "a plurality of choices was more likely to produce a negative response to one kind of music in order to affirm a preference for another" (1991, 207). They add that "there was no universal audience for the universe of music on radio. The ideal-typical listener who enjoyed everything from Henry Hall to Bach existed only in the corporate mind" (1991, 221). A shift towards an acceptance of demarcated class tastes and a simple wish for entertainment ensued in the war years and was further expanded by the BBC in the 1960s when it saw the need to represent hitherto unrepresented youthful tastes for the popular.

In short, the BBC's history has never been that of a singular politico-cultural project but, as Born expresses it, one of "ideas and of fashions in ethics and aesthetics as they attach to changing technological possibilities." (2004, 26.) Of course, it is this, allied to contesting and serious discourses (with and beyond) about the absolute and relative merits of various 'high and 'popular' genres, allied to the BBC's 'universal' array of available genres, which infuses the BBC with something more than a hegemonic duty. To be sure, it has always had a state-dependency, being set about by constitutional matters, funding pressures, committees, governors and now trustees, but, as Born explains, "the BBC is not formally a direct instrument of state [it has] a real autonomy, deepened over the decades by the growth of a powerful and recalcitrant professionalism" (2004, 31). To this, one must add an increasingly informed and articulate nation of individual expression, audition and debate.

9.3 Adorno, administration & culture

Where else do we look for an optimistic reading of administered culture and cultural agency within public institutions? Let's turn once again to Adorno. His views on culture and administration identified tensions as the content of the former was edited and marshaled by the latter. However, as is often the case with Adorno, some optimism can be inferred amid his dialectically negative analyses. We begin with his suggestion that cultural activity cannot be isolated from wider social realities:
The appeal to the creators of culture to withdraw from the process of administration and keep distant from it has a hollow ring. Not only would this deprive them of the possibility of earning a living, but also of every effect, every contact between work of art and society, something which the work of greatest integrity cannot do without, if it is not to perish. (Adorno 2001g, 119)

We then read that for Adorno, institutionalised culture might be critically inflected:

In the beginning nothing more can be demanded than a cultural policy [...] a policy which does not conceive of the concept of culture as a reified fixed configuration of values, but rather a policy which absorbs critical consideration in order to develop them further. (2001g, 127-8)

Might Adorno’s words on cultural administration describe the BBC’s sense of purpose as a space of integrity and cultural flux, sensitive to comment? If it were not a genuine, responsive space, it would be of little value, either to a ruling group wanting credibility to sustain their hegemonic reach, or to a diverse public wanting a national platform of wide cultural representation. Adorno’s position seems to betoken an argument for the BBC as a channel of factual truths and, perhaps more beside, in the way of cultural aspiration. In a rare utterance on the BBC, we read the following from Adorno in a discussion on exaggeration in relation to teaching and propaganda:

The more stringently one holds to the facts - which God knows speak for themselves, or against themselves - the better. If you will recall from the war, which I of course did not experience in Germany, the authority the BBC, the English radio, enjoyed precisely because it did not make propaganda [...] one knew that it was telling the truth. (Adorno 1998d, Appendix 1, 306)

Adorno saw an institution’s duty to be, ideally, that of an administrator of reality, but he also knew the task to be a more extensive and insinuating one as cultural administrators warmed to their power and responsibilities. Here Adorno identified the dialectical modification of ideal social and cultural content by politicised and partial bureaucratic systems. What he bemoaned was the synthesis that in its populist, homogenised form fails to keep up with his own standards of critical insight and judgement. Adorno drew attention to the inevitable role of administrators in cultural and ethical choreography that are closely bound together in public service output:
Whoever speaks of culture speaks of administration as well [...] The combination of so many things lacking a common denominator - such as philosophy and religion, science and art, forms of conduct and mores - and finally the inclusion of the objective spirit of an age in the single word 'culture' betrays from the outset the administrative view, the task of which looking down from on high, is to assemble, distribute, evaluate and organize. (Adorno 2001g, 107)

Adorno continued with references to the concept of "The Cultural World" that may be heard in radio broadcasting itself. Here he stated, is "a province where everything possible is encountered, in so far as it corresponds to a more or less precise idea of niveau and cultivation - in contrast to the sphere of entertainment" (2001g, 107-8). Adorno again alluded to the tension of cultural growth and its regulated delivery:

Culture is viewed as the manifestation of pure humanity without regard for its functional relationships within society [...] no half-way sensitive person can overcome the discomfort conditioned by his consciousness of a culture which is indeed administered. (2001g, 107-8)

So, has the BBC overcome the tensions identified by Adorno, and if so how? Is it forever bureaucratically hamstrung (and instrumentally tainted) and is culture on air in Britain merely an administered one? Does the BBC deliver pure values or serve as an administrative arm of capitalism and commodity distribution? It is perhaps the moment to delve into the histories of the BBC and its agents.

9.4 "Listen to auntie" - Critiques of the BBC

Look at its nickname - 'Auntie' (Big Buzz respondent no. 119, 2003).

Socio-philosophical contestation over the purpose and accountability of the nation's public service broadcaster surfaced in the post-war era, particularly as the commercial ITV channel launched in the 1950s; pirate pop music stations briefly applied pressure to staid BBC radio music policy in the 1960s, and independent commercial radio came to air in the mid-1970s. Additional debate ensued when, in 1982 Channel 4 television was launched, and offered a new economic model of public service broadcasting. This development, at the start of a long period of Conservative governance in Britain, marked the moment at which pure public
service ethos became subject to a rampant instrumentalism, conceived as a freemarket liberation of the entrepreneurial; a pseudo-democratic culture of enterprise which, in the corridors of the BBC developed into what is now known as Birtism. Under John Birt, old cultural ambition and representational impulses geared to a socio-cultural ‘effectiveness’, gave way to a financially driven agenda which taxed long-standing internal standards of creativity and, amongst many internal changes, saw the abandonment of the qualitative listener appreciation index for the BBC’s radio output. Born is clear that for her, the replacement of the corporation’s trust in its staff in the 1980s and 1990s was replaced by an auditing and structural model that saw a “Birtist management [...] responsible for eroding the BBC’s creativity” (2004, 5). Curran (1996), whilst noting that in the mass media generally of the West there were “staff with a commitment to professional goals” and a high degree of autonomy” there was, (in 1996), a situation where “more power has been ceded to professional managers concerned with market performance rather than the pursuit of ideological goals” (1996, 122).

Sir Henry Bunbury’s call back in the 1920s for the administration of public institutions to be one unhindered by political interference at managerial level - a view supported by Reith - might, under Birt, be seen as one plank of the public service ethos that had been stripped-out, never to return. However, such accountability, rather than evacuating any last traces of a public service ethos of cultural discernment, democratic representation, experiment and technical standards seems to have seen such an ethos remain deep within the BBC’s corridors and studios.

There are those who would rebut any benign reading of administered culture and who would condemn all public communications as bureaucratic, authoritarian acts of socio-cultural imposition. Certainly, arguments counter to the propositions of this chapter require some attention. The very process of culture for some is one of audition and subsequent regimentation. As Nietzsche wrote in Ecce Homo: “Culture begins with obedience”. We should not be surprised by the sinister imagery of Nietzsche’s listening subject, and can hear an echo of it in Levin’s quotation from Derrida’s Ear of the Other: “You open wide the portals [pavilions] of your ears to admit the state”. This conjures a similar picture of listening imposed from above. Levin surely presents us with Derrida’s stark image
of state intrusion into the life of subjects, but only to stress the equal presence of
the potentials of such a relationship. Derrida would argue that these alternatives
would have a deconstructive moment when subject and polity reveal a dynamic
interdependence that plays out equally between their respective locales, namely
place and space as addressed deconstructively in Chapter 8. This chapter accepts
this duality, but sympathises with Levin’s optimistic conviction that, whilst we are
exposed to both as we listen, possibilities outweigh perils as dialogue and dialectic
emerge between the universal values of an enlightening state and its rational
subjects.

There are, of course, some instrumental and hegemonic aspects to the BBC
that have been clearly identified. Edward Buscombe wrote of the BBC’s
“historical role, at least as defined by those in control, has been to function as a
support for those in power”, and it remains “to many people [...] essentially the
instrument of a single class” (1993, 155, 161). Its commercial origins;
governmental influence over Charter renewal terms and the propagation of a
compliant citizenry are features that cannot be ignored. Many, then and now of
course have argued “that broadcasters were not challenging enough and were
cowed by Government and vested interests to produce programmes which
bolstered up the status quo and concealed how a better society could evolve”
(Annan 1977, 15).

Until the early 1970s, many children in British schools and at home were
told by adults to listen, concentrate and obey. As a faux personal address and
invitation to concentrate, children were often asked by the radio presenter, “Are
you sitting comfortably? [pause] then I’ll begin”. What took place as we listened
attentively to the wider world was private and collective participation,
subjectification and cultivation. A considered response from any young adult
reflecting on their several years’ exposure to the BBC in the postwar years might
be, “I am the BBC!”. They may conclude that they have not only been “informed,
educated and entertained”, but thoroughly constituted in a socio-cultural and
political sense as an obedient citizen by a BBC reproducing the hegemonic
dominance of the nation’s ruling class. The following Big Buzz respondent may
allow critics of the BBC to dismiss them as expressing a false consciousness as
they recount the ‘value’ of BBC broadcasting as if by rote:
I listen predominantly to Radio 1 and Radio Five Live and they inform me on news, weather, sport, popular music, diverse society and different cultures to my own from which I learn. (Big Buzz respondent no. 119, 2003)

But what about the following response:

The attitude of the BBC is one of providing a service based on quality and depth rather than the dumbing-down of output from other media. They tell it like it is rather than what you want to hear. (Big Buzz respondent no. 118, 2003)

Consider this response too:

I don’t find any aspect of the BBC stuffy or arrogant, they are producing a wide range of programme appealing to a broad church of viewers and listeners. Why should they be accountable? [this] would inevitably result in more control from the government of the day. The fact that they have stuck two fingers up to Tony Blair and his insane preoccupation with controlling the media only increases their world standing in self-control and honest reporting. (Big Buzz respondent no. 118, 2003)

This last justification for rejecting any additional, government-led, external accountability overlooks the contemporary facts of government-approved, market-orientated efficiencies of Directors General like Birt and the politicised nature of the then Board of Governors and today the new BBC Trust. Perhaps then it is an expression of hope for independent and professional self-regulation founded on more enduring and profound values; a hope founded on the ethics expounded in earlier decades and still present in ordinary debate.

Critics aver that liberal apologists for the BBC perhaps exhibit a number of blind spots. Firstly, their own upbringing (and those of a ‘conservative’ majority) can colour perceptions. Curran (1996), in looking even-handedly at the mass media as either social mirror, ideological and emotional mirror, or one of consensus, warns that the liberal perspective is less than critical and too trustworthy (1996, 122-3). For him, there is often an assumed “underlying unity of interest in society” and that the “media are independent and socially neutral agencies” (1996, 128). Born writes: “The BBC is outmoded, our relations with it as drenched in nostalgia and sentimentality as they are with the monarchy or the Church of England” (2004, 7). Secondly, in spite of a wish to be ‘universal’ in terms of equal employment opportunities and social and cultural representation, “The BBC’s services have marginalized the interests and social expression of many of Britain’s minority
groups” (Born 2004, 10). Despite criticisms of the BBC’s public service mission and its advocates, one individual agent – John Peel – has, within the institution, striven hard to be socio-culturally inclusive in his pursuit of his BBC remit. It is to him we now turn.

9.5 Agency: Gramsci, Bloch, Adorno & Peel

“John Peel shaped me as a person - all I know about credible music is down to him [...] My world is a less pleasant place without him.” - Sean Fitzpatrick

“To build a bridge is one of the noblest of man’s endeavours. John built bridges between people and music and created joy for so many along the way.” - ‘H’ London

“He reached out to people of all colours, regions and ages; clearly a unique man, who introduced the world to a diverse, melting pot of music.” – Iketina

These, and many more messages were posted websites in the days following Peel’s death (October 25 2004) including the John Peel homepage: BBC.Co.UK, accessed in November 2004. They attest to the disc jockey’s importance to many listening subjects who understood his motivations, appreciated the independence he exercised and who believed they benefited from his unparalleled breadth of musical curiosity.

As British broadcasting history shapes particular subjects (employees and listeners) so do individual agents influence in turn, the history of the BBC. The BBC is argued to be a mediator of humanitarian values amid the imperfections of a real world. Universal values are crystallised in the outlooks and careers of particular BBC agents, and, because of that, we listeners encounter a testing, transforming idealism, encouraging us as rational subjects to become morally attuned individuals.

There is ample condemnation of the BBC as a paternalistic ‘ideological apparatus’ sure of its mission, and no more benign than any of its ‘free market’, New World or fascist counterparts.32 Some have detected a reproduction of class interest, others a capitulation of Arnoldian values as new technologies and changing commercial paradigms appeared. However, what receives relatively little attention is the cooption and usage of creative agency manifest within the
state-institutions and cultural policies of the modern British polity. A dialectic between society, institution and agent surely takes us from the optimism of Gramsci and his belief in individual agency, through the dynamic of Adorno's negative dialectics towards the reassuringly British compromise of Anthony Giddens and his theory of structuration where history shapes people as they shape it.33

Gramsci & organic intellectuals

Gramsci's attention to history, economics, people and institutions allowed him to effect the move from a bleak critical theory, to one that presages the 'process' accounts of Williams and Habermas, Benhabib,44 Levitas and Bronner. Gramsci's outlook was his 'war of position': a slow and complex struggle, fuelled by an intellectual-moral nexus sensitive to conditions which can operate in the interstices of material and hegemonic givens. Gramsci asked us to attend to infrastructure, supportive ideology, and the potential for the democratisation of knowledge and action within our existing superstructures, a position which somewhat prefigures that of Habermas. He gave credence to the ability of the individual to achieve influence in an institutional setting. His premise was one that has resurfaced in the sociological model of Anthony Giddens and also implicit in the thought of Garnham (1992), Harvey (2000) and Born (1993a and 2004). Curran (1996), whilst critical of a Gramscian, post-Marxist position for being too focused on culture per se, and for the stance offering a "'liberal Marxist' [...] Blank cheque", does aver that "the Gramscian legacy still has something to offer" (1996, 133). In order to breakout of the fate visited on subjects by any Althusserian structure, subjects not only survive social inscription but are able, in turn to exercise their resultant character within the workings of those same, formative institutions.35

As a good Marxist, Gramsci saw a potential for bourgeois forms and activity to serve as a well of potency and change. Kearney states that:

Gramsci saw a need for socialist, 'organic intellectuals' to organise information [...] Bourgeois culture Gramsci remained convinced, is capable of occasionally expressing progressive forms of moral protest against injustice and inequality and this 'native' tradition of protest should be fostered by socialism rather than summarily dismissed. (Kearney 1986, 171, 179)
Gramsci argued strongly for the transforming powers of individual genius and intellectual agents within the superstructure and given historically informed social settings. This is a view that encompasses the ideas of informed activity and edifying work.

So, how might agency inform any utopia proposition? Encouraging is comment from Jack Zipes who identifies the thread of thought which calls for radical agency in the ‘here and now’:

Bloch and Freire’s utopian hope is at the basis of self-transcending action and militant optimism that contest consumer capitalism and postmodern nihilism. [...] By positing the utopian impulse not as a fixed human essence but as one of existential necessity for bringing about social transformation [there emerge] critical utopias [that] enable educators to clearly see how the real-possible conditions for the utopian function can take root in the concrete materiality of daily struggle. (Zipes 1997, 8)

Adorno, commenting positively on free agency in an institutional setting wrote:

The spontaneous consciousness, not yet totally in the grips of reification, is still in a position to alter the function of the institution [...] For the present, within liberal-democratic order, the individual still has sufficient freedom within the institution [and] Whoever makes critically and unflinchingly conscious use of the means of administration and its institutions is still in a position to realize something which would be different from merely administrated culture. (2001g, 131)

Born provocatively calls for “elected musical experts [...] organic intellectuals” to move away from an uncritical populism or consumerism back to an engagement with deeper aesthetic concerns (1993a, 280-81). However, for Born this must not constitute a return to avant-garde thought whereby musical products “tyrannise the subject” (1993a, 281). She states it is “time to move beyond the rigid inhibitions instituted by the various structuralist and poststructuralist deconstructions of authorship and to begin tentatively again to talk of the author, his /her role, and his/her potential political engagement” (1993a, 274). For Born, the “political position of the author is not foreclosed” and that “cultural works are produced [...] through the conditioned interaction of originating subjects.” She adds “I am calling [...] for a return of agency in theorizing cultural production, and for acknowledgement of the place of originating creativity or, simply, work” (1993a, 275). For Born, “The author may
perhaps be conceived as an individual or collective subject [...] who inhabits or supervises a process of production, thereby marking the process aesthetically and socially in a pronounced way” (1993a, 275). Born wishes to insert authorial agency as a force impacting on what she terms the imaginary social and aesthetic dimensions of ‘enabling’ production, which constitute, in the cultural object, a potential site for Adornian homological readings and an aesthetic ‘use value’ as a political point of subjective and collective departure (1993a, 234-5). Thus we have, in popular cultural production, reification but also a residual authorial intent and, potentially as a still-possible site of ‘enigmatic’ potential.37

Born (2000), subsequently argues more extensively for the value of social, media and cultural theory addressing the sites and moments of cultural production. Born argues “for the ontological priority of production of consumption in the sociological analysis of culture” because “the power to represent and to create in sociolinguistic terms, to speak, to engage in the struggle for the sign – is foundational for cultural politics, as it is in some versions of cultural theory” (2000, 405-6). Attention paid in this way to a privileging of agency and the related discourse of production allows us, in Born’s view, to “attend to a category of specifically media intellectuals whose task it is to mediate the generic dynamics that bridge the past, present and future output [...] judging how to progress a set of generic possibilities [...] and how to balance the enhancement of the entertainment, pleasure and education of the audience” (2000, 406).

The Disc Jockey as agent

The relation between administration and expert is not only a matter of necessity, but it is a virtue as well. It opens a perspective for the protection of cultural matters from the realm of control by the market, which today unhesitatingly mutilates culture. (Adorno 2001g, 129)

As a prelude to a consideration of Radio 1’s individual agents, here is a brief impression of its musical remit and breadth exhibited across its first three decades.

Just Turn that dial, make the music worthwhile/Radio 1, you stole my gal, but I love you just the same/Radio 1, you’re the only one for me.
- Lyrical extract from an impromptu Jimi Hendrix jingle for Radio 1, recorded in 1967, Rebroadcast, Radio 1, 1994
The dialectic between ideals and realities are seen to be embodied in the history of Radio 1. As a daytime and night time operation, it deliberately embraced two socio-cultural agendas reflecting the idealism and realities of the BBC's position as a public service provider, caught between political conditions and a culture industry. The transience, artificiality, and particularities of pop presented a 'fantasy' culture for adolescents; after dark, those more serious, non-pop genres evolving from Afro-American roots pleased older listeners wanting to hear 'authentic' voices. Unchallenged during the day by any commercial popular music station, the new BBC Radio 1 popular music station used its mid-morning wavelength linkage in the late 1960s with Radio 2 to secure substantial daytime audiences of older listeners, who, out of habit were tuned to what was previously the BBC's Light Programme. During the early 1970s, an emergent 'night-time' Radio 1, was consciously presented as a serious antidote to its daytime profile and thus further broadened its listener base. To effect the development, early evening programmes promoted studio debate, interviews and aired 'vox pops' where listeners' expressions of affiliation for 'progressive' music were frequently heard. BBC music radio effectively supported the growth of rock music, in part by treating it as an authentic, blues-inspired expression that it viewed as a novel pendant to an experimental 'Western Art Music' and this, to some degree it still does. The four new BBC stations between them offered a universalist cultural diet which, at individual station level was also deepened with specialist output that could usefully 'entrap' the unwary as they search for the familiar. This breadth of content that not only satisfied existing tastes but also effected a 'cultural ramping' had previously existed in a narrower form. Ian Trethowan (Director-General 1977-82), writing in 1970 told us that:

[In earlier days, radio was based on 'mixed programming' and that this had the effect of drawing listeners into new experiences [...] Millions [...] sitting in their homes of an evening, would turn to Tommy Handley, and then would by accident hear Beethoven. (1970, 5)
Trethowan also argued that radio is a serious "cultural medium an art form in itself" that "there is ample evidence to show that the music programme is valued by millions, not only as casual refreshment but also as a ladder of music experience" (1970, 12). The existence of such a ladder today in a digital, highly segregated broadcast environment, even within the BBC, has to be questioned.  

There is certainly an argument for viewing state-sponsored disc jockeys as 'cultural gatekeepers' or more accurately 'gateways'. Perhaps they are indeed Gramsci's "Organic intellectuals", Said's "noble intellectuals" or Kellner's "public intellectuals". They might simply be the "bricoleurs" of Levi-Strauss there to construct a new explanation of the world.

**Peel as Disc Jockey**

John Peel came to Radio 1 by way of Shrewsbury Public School, National Service and pirate radio. On Radio London he developed the habit of giving airtime to long, uncommercial album tracks at a period when many pirate shows were in fact highly commercialised. His empathy for the popular musical voice and taste for the musically adventurous, allied to his 'establishment' credentials led to his appointment as a Radio 1 disc jockey in 1967. From then on, his reputation grew, and his name became synonymous with a serious, public service-orientated engagement with new musics. Any reference to 'ratings by day, reputation by night' automatically implied the work of Peel.

Peel made plain his neo-Reithian views on music in an early interview for the *Radio 1 Annual* (1969). They denote the presence of a thoughtful, serious individual, aware of the expectations his particular recruitment to the staff of the BBC implied. They contrast sharply with the more ephemeral, fashion-conscious portraits of other disc jockeys on other pages.

I know it sounds corny, but radio should be of the people, for the people, rather than dictated by a bunch of civil servants who constantly manage to hem in all programmes by such specifications that when I listen to the end result of radio I consider it an offence. [...] There are I think, some very fine things on, say Radio 3 [...] but, nevertheless, most of the programmes are either geared towards the ego of the jockey or else are a constant stream of musical baby food which is so
bland and superficial that it passes over without touching you at any level. What I do is incredibly insignificant, but it's much better being on the inside trying to effect some small change than on the outside shouting in vain. (Peel 1969, 90-1)

**Peel's studio sessions**

BBC music sessions intended for broadcast predated the well-known Peel sessions and owed their origin to the pressures of so-called 'needle-time' that involved record companies receiving payment from the BBC for the use of commercial releases. This was calculated according to the period of time each recording was aired. A BBC practice developed for economic reasons whereby in-house musicians would be employed to cover standards and current hits in preference to the use of commercial records. It was only in the 1960s and 1970s that this became an opportunity to feature unsigned talent and an economic necessity became a cultural virtue. In an interview, Peel argued that “a lot of the most popular things were the sessions. You know, unique things, things you couldn’t buy, performances you - everyone - could be at, for nothing” (Stump 1997, 92).

One, often quoted example of a significant session which went some way to establishing the reputation of a band is that of the Mancunian group Joy Division. Their exposure in the late 1970s as a provincial, post-punk act was way beyond the local or regional. At the same time they were were on the way to record Peel sessions, they played concerts well south of Manchester. Joy Division’s debut London show was at *The Hope & Anchor*, Islington. They also played a punk festival in the capital and undertook a small European tour. Most importantly for this study, they also took themselves and their music into the universal, public spaces crafted by the BBC. Everyone now had a chance to hear them.

Peel could be accused of indulging in a ‘radical chic’, but what so often seemed to move him to play a new release or demonstration tape was his discernment of human ambition, musical integrity and originality. Musical craft or lyrical sophistication were of little concern for him, he would still listen. Peel’s ready embrace of new or non-British musical genres, and a peculiar ability to recall the intensity of life as experienced by youth, would often leave his more conservative listeners behind. His breadth of selections attests to his sense of responsibility to those who would otherwise have no platform. Of course, this
developed into a persona of 'authenticity' to an extent but the cultivation of character which happens to promote an inclusivist agenda is not to be sneered at. More recently, extending his brief with advertising voiceovers, documentary presentations and broadcasting on BBC Radio 4's *Home Truths*, Peel not only revealed his commitment to the business of mass media communication, but in the confessional format of *Home Truths*, extended the claim to regard him as a persona yes, but as individual of some continuing empathy and humanity too. Scannell of course (1996) has written productively on the phenomenological aspects of radio presenter character in relation to sincerity and authenticity.

**9.6 “Creating a Perfect Day”: The BBC’s *Music Live* event**

Like music itself, BBC Music Live should touch and involve us all. Of course it will celebrate the great names [...] but it is first and foremost a peoples' festival, uniting communities and nations throughout the United Kingdom in a shared celebration of music making. Tony Blair, in the *Music Live* booklet, British Broadcasting Corporation (2000a, 11)

In May 2000, the BBC staged and broadcast a five-day national festival of live music. Music of all genres was played by professionals and amateurs at diverse live venues and transmitted to a substantial mass media audience. It was simultaneously recorded to serve as an archive “creating [...] a valuable legacy for future generations” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2000a, 10). Its aim was “to provide a fitting, distinctive and memorable broadcast contribution by the Corporation to the Millennium year celebrations [...] an all-embracing festival of musical discovery and participation.” Also it was to “celebrate and draw on the UK’s great music-making traditions, reaffirming the BBC’s stature and commitment as the world’s largest-scale patron of live music of all kinds and a leading sponsor of music education in the UK” (ibid. 2000a, 2).

Part music festival, part corporate justification, the BBC’s *Music Live* event was accompanied by corporate rhetoric and solicited quotation which spoke idealistically of a continuing belief in the value of music making and musical discovery as part of a culturally diverse but singular, mediated society: some authentic antithesis perhaps to the culture industry. The notion of the BBC as creative ‘patron’ and adept, mass-media organisation permeates the promotional
booklet. Was *Music Live* a strategic attempt to reaffirm public sector broadcasting, or an opportunity commandeered for the tactical defence of corporate monopoly and state-levied income? What might a positive critique of such events be?

Here is a description and analysis of the BBC-hosted musical event which whilst purporting to privilege music as a liberating, edifying medium, did seem to be somewhat crass politically, and as such after Seaton (2001) reminds us of the need to develop a watching brief in respect of individual governments, institutions and their attitude to culture and broadcasting which might be co-opted for both party-political and more insidious ideological influence:

> BBC Music Live will reach out via radio, television and online media [...] the festival’s inclusive wall-to-wall radio and television coverage will range from classical to jazz, country to choral, rock-n-roll to rhythm-n-blues, bhangra to baroque, be-bop to hip-hop, rap to reggae, soul to salsa [...] Through BBC broadcasting and its many partners, the UK can celebrate diversity of form and community - united by a shared passion for music. *Music Live* booklet, British Broadcasting Corporation (2000a, 4)

“Everyone can be heard” trumpets a singled-out phrase in the BBC’s *Music Live* booklet. This innocent phrase might be an inspiring call for many musicians and listeners. It suggests that the BBC still conceives of itself as the national arena for shared musical representation and potential participation. *Music Live* culminated with the creation of a ‘Perfect Day’, with some help from Lou Reed’s anthem to cocaine and a fair amount of broadcasting technology. Here is neither a Reithian inclusivist national imaginary of cultural improvement, nor a more pluralistic BBC of Sir Hugh Greene or John Peel. What we might see in fact is that under New Labour and Birtist principles: political, commercial and institutional interests combine and conspire with the complicity of some professional performers and sophisticated technical means to maintain extant hegemonic relations. Born avers that “while it espoused values of community and social responsibility, New Labour conceived of public institutions only as a variant of business” (Born 2004, 8). What is witnessed perhaps is less a utopian social imaginary than a dystopian, ideological one. Birt declared:

> Music is a universal currency [...] it nourishes the soul and stimulates every emotion. It helps to define our differences and yet it has the power to bring communities, peoples and nations together. the United kingdom continues to be a
world leader in so many areas of music making - both culturally and commercially. The BBC is proud to be the UK’s foremost patron of live music. *Music Live* booklet, British Broadcasting Corporation. (2000a, 9)

Adorno had offered a cutting critique of the administered festival which may have some pretence of radicalism:

Festivals are to be celebrated as they come; [...] Administrative reason which takes control of them and rationalizes them banishes festivity from them [...] This might well explain to no small degree the loss of inner tension which is to be observed today at various points even in progressive cultural productions - to say nothing of the less progressive efforts. Whatever raises from within itself a claim to being autonomous, critical and antithetical [...] must necessarily come to naught; this is particularly true when its impulses are integrated into something worked out previously from above. (2001g, 118)

Adorno would certainly have reserved criticism for the BBC’s television and radio transmission of the concerts that gave the day substance. For him it would simply have forged a ‘false immediacy’ for the millions watching at home. Pop in this form continues to foster passive pleasure, regression and diversion - nothing more. Social change is again deferred. Any oppositional grit in songs has been co-opted for the day.

*A positive critique*

What might we rescue from the event? There may be no unscripted, visceral performances here, but we cannot condemn the whole BBC enterprise by critiquing one heavily politicised moment. Has over seventy years of public service output from the BBC really been little more than a cynical exercise in ideological communication producing a culturally enfeebled nation? Has it not given us just a little bit of Arnold’s “sweetness and light”? Or did Birt’s managerialist strategy have to be implemented to maintain some independence for the BBC at that moment? The BBC’s ‘Perfect Day’ is a vivid instance of musical works that can be configured as a singular text that can be at a utopian moment, utopian allegory, eutopian effort and/or ideological deceit. Prey to the social imaginary of government, corporate institutional agendas and those critical theorists still committed to human emancipation through culture; broadcast music and its discourses are interpreted, analysed and immanently-critiqued to near
destruction. Institutionalised potentials are for some oxymoronic. Yet Bernstein offers one optimistic interpretation of the institutional impulse in the presence of cultural representation stating that: "providing something for everyone, may have the unintended consequence of revealing social alternatives" (Bernstein in Adorno 2001a, 20-1).

What, we must ask, is the alternative to mass-mediated cultural exchange, be it self-reflexive or otherwise in its delivery. Unmediated, discrete musical encounters away from exposure and sharing of the mass media fail to unite isolated subjects. In any case, how can contemporary cultural expression sidestep an inevitable, mass-media gaze or any institutional ‘encouragement’? At the very least, can we not insist on the day being a successful aesthetic encounter in the long tradition of the BBC’s remit of imagined nationhood which calls forth a imminent critique on the lines set down by Bernstein: “For the sake of gaining an audience and possessing credibility, mass media must reproduce social reality” the consequences according to Douglas Kellner, cited Bernstein is that they “deflate or undermine the ideological illusions of their own products and however unwittingly engage in social critique and ideological subversion” (Bernstein in Adorno 2001a, 20).

9.7 Broadcast space, aesthetic experiment & the BBC’s future

Research for this study began in 1998 when debates about broadcasting and public service values were largely the preserve of professionals and academics. As Royal Charter renewal approached, a more general debate about the BBC’s future funding and core purpose ensued. The following Big Buzz comments give some flavour of public opinion as it stood in 2003, prior to the 2005 national canvassing of views in the run-up to charter renewal:

Even though I pay a licence fee, I have no say in what goes on in the BBC, and the BBC are not accountable to the general public that pays for them. (Big Buzz respondent no. 119, 2003)

It is controlled mainly by middle-class, heterosexual men; it’s unaccountable because there are no obvious mechanisms to challenge this. (Big Buzz respondent no. 114, 2003)
Writing in 2009, after the renewal of the BBC’s charter and licence fee, the constitution of the corporation is once again no longer subject to widespread popular scrutiny. However, those professionals and academics that continue to ‘worry’ about the BBC and broadcast principles are now having to register the implications of radical technological change. Digital television and radio stations; ‘listen-again’ facilities and podcasting technology stand as testament to the growth of an increasingly interactive, fragmented listenership accessing digital, narrowcast content.51 The granting of a national digital radio licence to Four Digital, part of the other Britain’s other public service broadcaster Channel 4, in July 2007, undoubtedly now challenges BBC Radio even as PSB principles are given a renewed vote of confidence. What is the future for public service broadcasting in the traditional sense of a near-monopolistic, mass-reception service? If there is a broader message beyond the immediate conclusions of this thesis, it is that to dismantle, fragment or downgrade - knowingly or otherwise - a universal cultural platform such as the BBC would be to the detriment of us all.

From today, informed discourse in Britain must revolve around the BBC’s purpose as a publicly funded national (and international service) in a postmodern, deregulated arena of commercial competition and new technological and socio-cultural realities.52 One practitioner-scholar, Breitsameter (2001) has already questioned the narrowcast and democratic models offered by new media by asking if we all become atomised producers of content, what happens to collective reception? Is anyone listening, reflecting and talking in common anymore?

It has been important here to offer an historical and socio-philosophical account of the BBC’s past purpose and effectiveness as it may allow new technical options and the demise of popular listenerships to be evaluated in respect of preserving longstanding emancipatory activity across the airwaves.53

9.8 Defence of the BBC

Contemporary defence of the BBC as a relatively free public space and site of hope, touched by instrumental realities has been articulated by scholars like Garnham (1986, 1992, 1995), Scannell (1992) and Born (2000, 2004, 2006). Garnham has pointed to the general attempts of public service institutions to
construct social relations more on an independent political-cum-ethical footing rather than on anything driven by economic or state-agendas (Garnham 1986, 245-6, 251). It is this analysis that allows us to regard the BBC as an intermediate body of a national polity, situated equidistantly between successive governments, public and private spheres.

Garnham tells us that the early BBC made "efforts to address their listeners as rational political beings rather than consumers", and further suggests that Reith's ethos descends from the Scottish enlightenment (Garnham 1986, 245). Garnham (1997) argues that cultural policy-making must not languish amongst remote, disinterested ideals. Instead, practitioners and academics should tackle the instrumental realities of sophisticated, technological particulars that are likely to degrade those ideals. It is simply naïve to expect the BBC to deliver *in vacuo* what nineteenth century poet and educationalist Matthew Arnold's had termed (after Swift) 'sweetness and light' by way of Culture:

That pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been though and said in the world and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits which we now follow staunchly but mechanically. (Arnold, 1993, 190)

Economics and politics intervene, but that *does not* mean universal, humanistic values consequently evaporate from the minds and actions of socially minded public service agents. The BBC is still one such space where we can, with a good conscience seek, by listening-in, some self-improvement and join a wider collective awareness. BBC historian Jean Seaton, speaking at the *Radiodyssey* conference (2001) told her audience that her appointment as the BBC's official historian was, for her, a call to continue the work of Asa Briggs. Briggs had mapped out the complex internal and contextual affairs which had coloured the activities of the BBC and other British broadcasters, but Seaton argued this had become an academic activity rendered irrelevant with the triumph of late capitalism. Seaton made a passionate plea for everyone present at her conference seminar to not rest easy in what appeared to be a Damascene, post-Birtian moment for the BBC, but to understand the constant need for us all to remind present and future governments of the unique position and role of the BBC in a complex modern state.
Curran (1996), critical of the liberal reading of the mass media at the same time identifies a weakness in what he regards as radical perspectives which see dominant interests being too readily served. For him, this is too reductionist, overlooking the diverse “field of discourses” comprising countercultural and subcultural voice, together with a more ‘decentred’ socio-political reality of “state institutions” with their “contradictory and multicentred character” and on Curran’s part their (presumable) reflection of “the complex activity of economic political and cultural realms” more generally (1996, 131-2) when exposed to “Countervailing pressures” (1996, 148).

Born has fashioned a sophisticated reading (and model) – what she herself calls a “normative typology” of the BBC’s value and impact with regard to its role as cultural producer (2004, 491; 2006, 116). Rather than continue to lay academic stress on cultural reception, works and programmes as ‘texts’ or, alternatively, become mired in politico-philosophical musings we should look closely at a fruitful, Kanitian dialectic of creative output and its imaginative and comprehending consumption. Born thus offers a qualified defence of the universalist qualities of broadcasting per se, and of the BBC wherein a widespread trust can be reinstated and new technological means usefully deployed. Indeed, she has mapped out a detailed institutional ‘design’ (2006, 117) which might address what she terms “public service communications” as opposed to public service broadcasting (2006, 102); the potentials of new digital platforms; enduring matters of “the politics of difference […] “Self-representation” and “presence”. It is interesting to note that this ‘normative impulse’ is also evident in Curran (1991) wherein, a discussion of Habermas and the public sphere is joined by a revised public sphere model “designed to promote the expression of diversity” with “spaces for the communication of opposed viewpoints, and a common space for their mediation” (1991, 142-3). For Born, a future exists for the BBC as one of many media organizations that “in their social make-up and in their output - can be understood as the primary ‘theatres’ for contemporary pluralism” (2006, 112, 114) and that it is “forging the architecture of a free-to-air public service digital media system [in order to] respond to new political forms, to rejuvenate civic cultures, to encourage participation and to innovate in content” (2006, 111). Importantly, for Born, there should be a diversity of programming and transmission but “a continuation of mass or ‘universal’ channels” (2006, 116).
For Scannell (1992), broadcasting is a constructive place for everyday discourse "a totality, a universe of discourse" because "the public life of broadcasting is accessible to all, it is there to be talked about by all" (1992, 337). Indeed, rather than it being a rational, Habermasian sphere of rational communications, it is more simply a place of a "reasonable consensus" of mutuality and "entitlement" (1992, 342).

9.9 In conclusion

[Broadcasting] is a crucial means – perhaps the only means at present – whereby common knowledges and pleasures in a shared public life are maintained as a social good for the whole population. As such it should be defended against its enemies. Scannell (1992, 346)

In 1927, following the recommendations of the Crawford Committee and determined argument from its general manager - John Reith - The British Broadcasting Company ceased to be. What had begun as a modest commercial company of radio set manufacturers became, instead a Corporation, a publicly-funded service operating under government licence. Have the three generations of listeners since that time had our political and cultural lives subjected to a state-shadowed, technologically administered dystopia of the air, or have cultural ideals been promoted in the complex realities of a still extant, but mass-mediated public sphere?

The BBC is today only one voice amongst many and this might well undermine its socio-cultural legitimacy. John Birt (Director-General 1992-2000) spoke in a lecture in 1999 about an imminent "Digitopia". He drew attention to a "common collective experience" yet there is, a decade later, a profound breakdown of cultural commonality and therefore of socio-cultural consensus. Some commenting on Birt and the BBC remit of cultural representation suggested that common, simultaneous cultural experience, if it still existed was no guarantee of socio-cultural cohesion, and that if cultural breadth or the cultural high-ground was to be surrendered they argued, there were other values and ways of sharing.55

Today, as we all admit the pluralistic and unregulated spaces of the Internet into our lives, we simultaneously witness trenchant commercial and
political criticism of a BBC characterised as a monadic, moribund public
institution of little value in a globalised world. Should we simply reflect
somewhat nostalgically on its past achievements and significance or should we, as
we closely examine its shortcomings, also promote its strengths as an
enfranchising entity assisting in the collective and individual identity of millions?
Is it capable of remaking itself (again), this time to operate in the twenty-first
century?56

The broadcast model is perhaps a defunct model. However, universals and
ideals can, and perhaps must continue to receive attention and promotion. This is
the challenge for the BBC and its agents at the start of a new century. However,
populist, attention-grabbing activity may disrupt genuine subjectification and
culturally led intersubjectivity, even as it strives to meet democratic and
commercial imperatives in a bid to save itself. The challenge for any institution
attempting to create a musical eutopia is to avoid an imbalance where the
sensation and ideology of communications ‘deafen’ any rational understanding
receiving them. Many critical theorists have already attended closely to ‘the
damaged life’ of non-identity perpetuated rather than liberated by popular cultures
and the media. This fact must however be accepted as an ‘occupational hazard’ of
the dialectical process, as a search continues for the continuance of a Hegelian-
Gramscian ‘ethical state’, or, at the very least, a Durkheimian institutional
bulwark and a likely site for praxis.

So, what is the considered position of this chapter? The BBC as a public
service broadcaster has existed and continues to exist with its agents in the ‘here
and now’ of dynamic cultural, political and economic ecologies. Never an entirely
perfect embodiment of disinterested, ethical activity, or influence it was, and is
still, nonetheless a platform of representation and creativity, standards and
ambition, not least in the field of music. As such, it stands as a manifestation of
the possible: a provisional, happy space that has touched generations of listeners,
and is well-regarded by many who, whilst seeing its shortcomings would perhaps
be unable to formulate a better alternative. Born rightly observes that the BBC is
not “a paragon, nor […] has it covered all bases […] but that in their scope, they
are suggestive of the normative functions of dialogical flows between socio-cultural majorities and minorities, or dominant and subordinate groups" (2006, 116). As one Big Buzz respondent wrote in 2003: "You can’t please all the people all the time. Standards have to be set and someone has to do it" (Big Buzz respondent no. 39, 2003).

Notes

1. In *Emile* (1762b) Rousseau advocated the gentle guidance of a child so that she may develop morally and politically and eventually become fully civilized.

2. Edgar glosses developments in the social politics of Western states which is pertinent to Reith’s Britain and the new administrative caste of which he was a part: “under the welfare states and the mixed economies of the Western world, the mass of the population becomes more affluent, cared for and educated. The class distinctions that Marx could observe are further blurred and seemingly removed by the rise of the middle classes (dividing wage-labour) and the so-called managerial revolution that places capitalist enterprise under the control of a non-owning class” (1987, 283).

3. Reith (1949, 116). Briggs concludes that: Reith’s: *Broadcast Over Britain* (1924) was “written reluctantly and quickly [and] remains an impressive social document, the best statement of the public service character of broadcasting before the sittings of the Crawford Committee in 1925. Reith used it to set out his own ideals and objectives for the attention of ‘the great audience’ ” (1961, 234).

4. Crisell tells us that: “On 1 January 1927 the British Broadcasting Company became the British Broadcasting Corporation, a publically funded yet quasi-autonomous organization whose constitution and statutory obligations have remained largely unchanged for seventy years. It was established by Royal Charter, with a board of governors and a director-general, Sir John Reith, who was answerable to it. Although the charter determines the corporation’s structure, its activities are regulated by a licence and Agreement which is conferred by the government. It was, and is obliged to inform, educate and to entertain; to report the proceedings of Parliament; to provide a political balance; and in a national emergency broadcast government messages. It may neither editorialize nor carry advertising. Its income is guaranteed from broadcast receiving licences and it strives to maintain a position of editorial independence” (1997, 22).

5. “Among the works we’ve inherited from the past there are a great many grand old pieces of music [...] from which we should not hesitate to choose those suitable and appropriate for the society we are organizing. Censors of at least fifty years of age should be appointed to make the selection [...] absolutely unsuitable material must be totally rejected, and substandard pieces revised and re-arranged, on the advice of poets and musicians. (Although we shall exploit the creative talents of these people, we shan’t - with rare exceptions - put our trust in their tastes and inclinations. instead, we shall interpret the wishes of the lawgiver and arrange to his liking our dancing and singing” Plato, ‘The Regulation of Music’ from *The Laws* (Plato 1970, 290). *The Laws* has been argued to be an exposition on the realistically attainable, unlike his earlier *Republic* (see Plato 1970, Introduction, 27-28). Reith offers us: “It has been our endeavour to give a conscious, social purpose to the exploitation of this medium [...] we have broadcast systematically and increasingly good music; we have developed education courses [...] we have broadcast common sense Christian ethics which we believe to be a necessary component of citizenship and culture [...] We have tried to found a tradition of public service, and to dedicate the service of broadcasting to the service of humanity in its fullest sense. [...] We believe a new national asset has been created [it is] of the moral and not the material order- that which, down the years, brings the compound interest of happier homes, broad culture and truer citizenship” (Reith 1949, 116).

6. Witness the likes of William Paley (*Natural Theology* 1802) and *The Bridgewater Treatises* (1833-6), and ethnologist James C Pritchard (*The Natural History of Man* 1843), the social welfare concerns of Methodism and Booth’s Salvation Army, not to mention political and other social reformers.
7. Cf. Owen (1996) who rehearses the argument that in Britain, university-educated middle class professionals were removed from direct economic and political struggle and could thus remain loyal to mutuality, communitarianism and public service by way of culture and administration. State institutions became mediators of partial political interest where compromise for the national good was organised and articulated (Owen 1996, 145, 149).

8. The Good News Bible translation. This was placed there by Dr Montague Rendall, a BBC Governor and former Headmaster of Winchester.

9. On Reith’s views on an independent, monopolistic, BBC; its duty to offer national broadcasting of high content under a singular administration; and for parallel thinking on public ownership from the likes of Herbert Morrison and Hugh Dalton, see Briggs (1961, 235-9). Briggs sets out the four aspects of public service important to Reith. (1) ‘not being profit-driven’ (2) affording ‘national coverage’, (3) effecting ‘unified [technical] control’ and (4) ‘maintenance of high standards’ and ‘the provision of the best’ (1961, 236-8).

10. The ‘Reithian trinity’ derives partly from The Sykes Report of 1923 and can be traced to US pioneer radio listener and industry champion David Sarnoff: “broadcasting represents a job of entertaining, informing and educating the nation, and should therefore be distinctly regarded as a public service” cited in (Owen 1996, 84) who detects its widespread acknowledgement in other scholarly work. This public responsibility was, in the United States of Sarnoff an ethic overlooked in favour of democratic, free-market expression where the ability to be heard was deemed a superior principle. This so-called ‘anarchy of the air’ was the experience deemed to have persuaded British officials to reject American commercial models. The Radio Corporation of America (RCA) transmitted “Sustaining Programmes”: advert-free content to meet the “public interest and convenience or necessity” requirements of the 1934 Communications Act which seemed to address public interests (Spinelli 2000, 269 and note 1, 277).

11. It is widely held that Reith was keen to insert silences between early radio programmes so that listeners might contemplate what they had just heard.

12. To reinforce public service he set up advisory committees. The first Musical Advisory Committee, formed in July 1925, was chaired by Sir Hugh Allen of the Royal College of Music (Briggs 1961, 244).

13. It would be interesting to compare Reith’s notions of expertise with those of Adorno’s various grades of listener, culminating in the expert. Adorno wrote: “Administration which wishes to do its part must renounce itself; it needs the ignominious figure of the expert. No city administration, for example can decide from which painter it should buy paintings, unless it can rely on people who have a serious, objective, and progressive understanding of painting. In establishing the necessity of the expert, one immediately exposes himself again to every imaginable reproach - to the notorious accusation, for example that the judgement of an expert remains a judgement for experts and as such ignores the community from which, according to popular phraseology, public institutions receive their mandate, or that the expert - necessarily an administrator himself - makes his decision from on high, thus extinguishing spontaneity” (Adorno 2001g, 128).

14. Born, in alluding to Reith’s own honest assessment of the BBC’s powers argues that: “The BBC’s monopoly allowed a kind of cultural dictatorship, but one that was highly inventive” adding: “It was one of the first sustained experiments in the juxtaposition of cultural genres” (2004, 29).

15. Whereas Reith led and produced culture, Greene followed and reproduced it. Smith sees in the 1960s the “New cultural pluralism of Greene”. “It had to admit pop music and rock to its schedules. Where Reith might have tried to hire staff rock groups, the BBC of the Greene era established the compromise of Radio 1. Where Reith tried to fit the range of national tastes into an evaluative pyramid of services - Home, Light, Third - the Greene era developed a policy of cultural outreach, it invaded the cultural ghettos in search of talent” (1986, 14).

16. Smith identified Reith’s incumbency as that of the “total institution”, he wrote that “Reith sought to construct a BBC which itself recruited, trained and employed all those who provided the material of the broadcasts. The BBC [had] 11 house orchestras [...] published [its] own hymn book [and had] its own idiom of pure English” (1986, 13).

17. Reith’s position is exemplified by his steering the BBC deftly between Government and workers during the General Strike of 1926. Reith understood that if the BBC were to have a future he would have to maintain its independence. This was much to the frustration of both the Government and the unions.
18. "The BBC was run partly according to the principles of modern 1920's management which Reith had discovered during his years in America, and which a number of successful British firms in the private sector had also espoused - also some, such as the Post Office, in the public sector" (Smith 1986, 9).

19. As Marx wrote in the *Grundrisse* with reference to attaining personal freedom: "free time - which is both ideal time and time for higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject" - *Grundrisse* 1859 cited Lukes (1984, 161).


22. The Sykes Committee is addressed in Owen (1996, 61). Owen identifies further calls for public discourse and interest to be promoted in the pages of the 1936 *Ullswater Report* and the post-war *Beveridge Report* of 1951.

23. This modern, bureaucratic and polity development of which the BBC was a part, is charted in some detail by Owen (1996, 32, 60-61) who identifies a public service discourse - important for Reith - articulated by the likes of Sir Henry Bunbury, in the corridors of the Institute of Public Affairs (est. 1922), in the pages of their Journal, *Public Administration*.

24. Briggs informs us that Reith held no sympathy with the opinion that the broadcaster should give customers what they want (1961, 236-8). There was a Reithian fear of an 'Americanisation' of British radio (in all its anarchical commercialism predicated on freedom of trade) and a fear of totalitarian co-option of mass media as witnessed on the Continent. At this time, vivid popular musics tended to be tempered and moderated by BBC musicians and had to compete with anodine imitations or 'well-labelled' exemplars of high culture. For a contextualisation of the popular, see Doctor (1999). She has undertaken an exhaustive survey of the BBC's more progressive attitude to contemporary serious composers in the prewar decades.

25. *Listen with Mother* was a radio programme 'slot' dedicated to a pre-school audience. It was followed by *Watch with Mother* at the advent of regular television output. The reference to 'Auntie Beeb' comes from the somewhat affectionate term once applied to the BBC by its public as a matriarchal (rather than patriarchal) presence in the nurturing of the nation.


27. This fact supplied by a colleague at the ESRC radio seminar number 3, *Music, Youth, 'Taste' and Radio Genres* held at the LSE, April 14, 2000.

28. BBC employees set store by what they perceive to be standards of relative quality in terms of both technical competence and content. Independent production companies and short-term contracts are now breaking-down this sense of superiority. In interviews with BBC Wales music producer Paul Ford in June 2003, explicit reference was made to what he thought the BBC guaranteed, namely technical competence and high professional standards. Ford had a significant role to play in the organisation delivery of *The Big Buzz* day.

29. Important are the inevitable bureaucratic tendencies of any large institution engaging with a modern society and have been identified as such by Weber and amplified by Adorno: "Administration [...] is no longer merely a national or communal institution existing in clear separation from the play of social forces. The tendency of every institution towards expansion - both quantitatively and qualitatively - was designated as immanent by Max Weber in 'The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation' [...] In Weber's own view, bureaucracies, following their own law are destined to expand [...] the immoderate size of even those institutions not concerned about profit - such as education and radio - furthers the practices of administration [...] these practices are strengthened by technological development; in the case of radio, for example, which is to be communicated is concentrated to the extreme and disseminated as far as possible (2001g, 111).

30. Cited Levin (1989, 91). "Derrida attributes these words to Nietzsche in *Ear of the Other*".


32. For example, Barnard (1989). A more even critical account of Radio 1 that also provides useful historical detail and anecdote is to be found in Chapman (1992, 226-78).


34. Seyla Benhabib (1986) offers a subtle and complementary account of the utopian function in a postmodern polity recognising and celebrating culturally diversity as a potent site of social solidarity. She sees there being more than just a theoretical, speculative role for subjectively conceived utopias and politically driven utopian speculations. She sees the utopian function as one
of reviving, critiquing, strengthening and creating community bonds within the broader structure of civil society and its institutions. But for her this is more a community of diverse community need rather than a polity of administered equality.

35. "By reincorporating the 'subjective' dimensions of will, freedom, responsibility and action into the historical dialectic, Gramsci endeavoured to counteract the doctrinaire view that history unfolds according to 'objective' laws" (Kearney 1986, 180-1).

36. In relation to agents of selection, Born promotes thought by arguing for continuing aesthetic judgement undertaken by "a diverse, plural and volatile set of genre-specific panels, made up of elected musical 'experts' (organic intellectuals from those genres; but changing, evolving and above all interrelating" (1993a, 280-81).

37. Another defence of agency comes from Edward Said who saw the intellectual as:

"An individual with a specific public role in society that cannot be reduced simply to being a faceless professional [...] the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a [...] view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for a public. [...] someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments and corporations, and whose raison d'etre is to represent all those people and issues. [...] routinely forgotten [...] the intellectual does so on the basis of universal principles" Said, cited McGuigan, (1996, 185-6).

38. 'Western Art Music' is the category employed by the British Library NSA (National Sound Archive) to identify serious music which it contrasts with its 'Popular music' category. The NSA adopted its cataloguing system from the BBC. The present study sees this as a problematic division where the 'popular', plural and experimental meet, as in the music of Zappa or Radiohead. In the 1970s, Derek Jewell gave serious consideration to progressive rock on Radio Three. Today, Radio Three programmes like Mixing It (now removed from BBC schedules to be heard on Resonance FM in London only) and Late Junction increasingly position rock music in the Western Art Music fold. Progressive rock, evolving as popular musicians matured, side-stepped chart-led radio output and found favour with the likes of John Peel's Top Gear with a pirate-inspired formula of playing album tracks. Peel argued that: "it doesn't sound radical now, but at the time, people just didn't do it. One talks about the university circuit doing a lot for Progressive rock, but the BBC did a lot too - in the sense of an eighteenth-century patron of the arts" (Paul Stump's interview with Peel, Stump 1997, 92).

39. Briggs notes that in the 1930s at Reith's BBC: "listeners were not divided naturally into 'home' or 'light' and 'third', nor did 'highbrows' or 'lowbrows', it was felt, want necessarily to be highbrow or lowbrow all the time. Not only might the habitual listener to light music cultivate an interest in 'serious' music, but the habitual listener to 'serious' music might want occasionally at least to listen to light music" (1965, 122).

40. Music radio output is today so bespoke, there's little or no room for accidental exposure. Many of my undergraduate broadcast media students, whilst aware of diverse musical genres are somewhat surprised by the actual range of musics available to them should they venture beyond their regular choice of music radio station.

41. I am most grateful to Dave Laing for his suggestion in a 2001 conversation that Peel could be regarded as one of Gramsci's organic intellectuals. Douglas Kellner cited in McGuigan (1996) outlines his concept of the public intellectual: "Such an intellectual is not a privileged representative of any group but must engage, instead, in practical matters on the terms of those groups whose interests he or she may wish to advance and by deploying to this effect the most advanced technologies" (1996, 189).

42. We might think also of the likes of Steve Lamacq, Radio Three, Andy Kershaw, Late Junction presenters Verity Sharp and Fiona Talkington and latterly, Radio Six Music and Radio 1Xtra. Some, like BBC jazz programme producer and presenter Steve Shepherd had argued that such programming is little more than a high-culture ghetto and that the BBC's 'difficult' content needs to be more accessible (Writer's conversations with Shepherd, 2004-5). Lack of space permits an account of the BBC Orchestras and the BBC Promenade Concerts each Summer. Consider too The London Jazz Festival, 2005 sponsored by BBC Radio 3 and the BBC sponsoring on of the stages of the Cambridge Folk Festival.

43. It is interesting to note that Peel was often quick to disparage the work and personality of Tony Blackburn and Dave Lee Travis but that they, like he, were astute enough to be aware of the tasks their particular personas was expected to execute. I have been unable to find any overt criticism of Peel from fellow broadcasters. Peel's disparagement is, to an extent amplified by comments from John Walters: "I was Peel's producer from 1969. There was very clearly two Radio 1's - the third floor versus the fourth floor. the mainstream playlist Radio 1 - which was Noel Edmonds and the welly boots sticker Radio 1, the fun Radio 1 - was on the the fourth floor. Whereas Tommy Vance
and Peel and the people concerned with live recordings were on the third floor, where it was about music" John Walters in Garfield (1998, 5).

44. Cf. Ken Garner who has researched and written a book on the Peel sessions: *In Session Tonight*, (Garner 1993). The BBC’s Gramophone Department and live entertainment section generated an eclectic mix of musical output. The former reflecting a larger, more diverse music-loving radio audience, the latter a serious, record-buying audience. Educated producers drew-up what has been termed ‘spectrum’ and ‘hierarchies’ to understand audiences, Hendy, (LSE ESRC Seminar April 14, 2000). As Ken Garner (LSE ESRC Seminar April 14, 2000) explained to the present writer, producers of night-time Radio 1 and its live sessions from new performers drew on a tradition of live music making and its associated values while those from the Gramophone Department helped to shape day-time’s more formatted output. Hence the epithet; ‘ratings by day, reputation by night’. Continued support for new talent and the support for live music is evidenced by Radio 1’s *New Music First* policy in the 1990s, the BBC’s nationwide search for young talent c.2004 and the 2006 campaign, *This is what we do*, stressing the BBC’s continuing readiness to support and transmit the music of new, often unsigned bands.

45. Peel’s impact on popular music should not be dismissed lightly. On October 20 2005, one year on from death of Peel, the first ‘John Peel Day’ took place and comprised some 300 shows around the world including Zimbabwe, The Netherlands and Japan, i.e. places where Peel had travelled. Super Furry Animals’ Gruff Jones said of Peel’s show that: “songs gatecrash[ed] the radio”. “He loved the idea of his music being heard” said a former BBC colleague; [he was] “a very BBC man, steeped in it” *Music Biz*, BBC World Service programme with Mark Coles, October 20, 2005.

46. A John Peel studio session was recorded and later aired in February 1979. Early in the Autumn, Joy Division recorded a session for BBC television’s *Something Else* screened on BBC2. They also later recorded a second Peel session. A Peel show session, recorded 31 January 1979 BBC Studios, Maida Vale, London was broadcast on BBC Radio 1 February 14, 1979 and included the song *Transmission*, later released as a 12-inch Extended-Play release and on two BBC albums.

47. ‘Creating a Perfect Day’ - a phrase used in the *Music Live*, 12pp. colour booklet programme published ahead of the festival (Thursday 25 - Monday 29 May) kindly supplied by the BBC *Music Live* office, June 2000. It alludes to Lou Reed’s song *Perfect Day*, re-recorded by various artists initially for a television promotion (which extolled the BBC’s diverse musical output and the relationship of that output to the licence fee) and subsequently sung live across the UK as a “fitting climax to the Festival” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2000a, 8), “broadcasting more that 1,000 hours of continuous music with appeal for all ages and every imaginable musical taste” (ibid., 8).

48. The origins of ‘A Perfect Day’ in a promotional video and charity song of 1997 are charted by Born (2004, 256-59). It is instructive to compare this ‘project’ with the Department for Education and Skills *Music Manifesto* of 2004 which sought to promote access to music via a national platform of educators, local authorities (for example The London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham), NGO’s like *Music For Youth*, commercial interests (for example Roland UK) and composer/broadcasters (for example, Howard Goodall). “Music can be magic. It calls for and calls forth all human virtues: imagination, discipline, teamwork, determination. It enriches and inspires” (www.musicmanifesto.co.uk, December 2004).

49. Thought of in a different light, the phrase may have more dystopian overtones. indeed it might serve as a chilling, somewhat Orwellian reminder, not of public participation but instead, of public subjection to the voices of dictators; totalitarian domination and surveillance by anyone in command of the necessary technologies. Broadcast technologies throughout the twentieth century have been exploited by every power keen to be heard or seen by the populace.

Adolf Hitler wrote in his *Manual of German Radio* in 1938 that “Without the loudspeaker we would never have conquered Germany” (i.e the use of loudspeakers at rallies and in Germany’s *Deutschskleinemfanger* radio sets). It is interesting to note that Aristotle in *The Politics* observed the practical difficulty of speaking to and controlling large state territories. He asked: “who will be their [town] crier unless he has the voice of a Stentor?” [the name of a herald in the Trojan war] (1962, 264).

50. Concerts, music festivals and dance music raves function as real (albeit transient and economically coloured) instances of idealistic commonality from the point of view of performers and audiences; instances which may be argued to be ‘utopian’ (abstract and concrete) in character. For instance, the organisation and broadcasting of *Live Aid* by the BBC in 1985 (in support of the Ethiopian famine appeal) captured a public imagination and raised money. Critics would argue that
Live Aid salved Western consciences and simply masked underlying structural problems in world food economies.

51. The BBC has been charged by Government to effect the so-called digital switch over so that the analogue wave lengths of terrestrial stations might be sold. The ending in 2006 of the BBCTV's weekly Top of the Pops music chart television programme (first broadcast in 1964), is to be understood against MP3 developments and online access to new music. It is interesting to note that whilst MySpace is touted as a 'free space' for new talent and diverse audiences it is currently owned by Rupert Murdoch's Media Corporation. Clearly, the advent of the Internet has proposed a new mode of cultural production and dissemination which can transcend dominant base-superstructure constraints so that a monetary economy, class divisions, state control, multi-national companies may now dissolve in true utopian fashion. In place of capitalism is emerging a 'high-tech' exchange economy operating between producers and listeners. There are of course socio-philosophical implications for this new model of communication. See Spinelli (2000) who argues that radio and the Internet are "consumption-based parodies of what might have been".

52. In addition to leader comments and letters in the broadsheets, television debates and bespoke websites encouraging wide participation were to be seen in the long run up to charter renewal. The David Kelly affair intensified discussion and seemed to strengthen popular support for a relatively strong, unchanged BBC.

53. Questions about the form and role of public sector broadcasting around the globe have fuelled debate since the inception of regular and diverse radio transmissions in the late 1920s and 1930s. Discussions, policy formulation, legislation and disputes continue today in societies where questions of public funds, state ideology and the basic human right of access to mass-communications run alongside the production of vital musical forms in popular quarters. In Britain, discussion today revolves around the BBC's purpose, continued accountability as a publicly funded national (and international service) in a postmodern, deregulated arena of commercial competition and new technological potentials. Concerns about 'dumbing-down' are also expressed but are to be understood as part of a long-running discussion of raising and reflecting cultural values that has its roots in the 1920s. Should licence fee revenues be increased to facilitate BBC enterprise in the field of digital channels and the Internet? Is such 'public subsidy' an unfair advantage as the commercial sector argues? All such questions are indices of the BBC's vulnerability but responses from many quarters show a robust belief in the continuance of public sector broadcasting.


55. Roger Silverstone and Philip Dodd and Birt, The World Tonight BBC Radio 4, July 6 1999. Consider the following: "[The BBC] attempts to reflect the diversity of multi-cultural Britain — how well it does this, or whether it should do this is another matter" (Big Buzz respondent no. 38, 2003).

56. Born rightly avers that the BBC has "repeatedly invented itself" (2004, 69).
10 Justness for you: Habermas, the BBC & the public sphere

10.1 Introduction

This chapter is an account of the BBC in relation to Habermasian analysis and a normative ambition of mutuality and discursive intent. It also features a return to the ideas of Gramsci and a consideration of the perspectives of Raymond Williams and David Harvey, and a brief return to the thinking of Garnham, Born and Thompson.

The broadcast space as framed by the BBC is here further examined and argued to be a portion of a Habermasian public sphere consistent with Habermas’s words on the role of such a space in that it “mediates between society and state” (2006, 74). The BBC operates somewhat as a “disorganised public” representing diverse democratic wills and Habermas’s demotic “communicative power” yet is, at the same time, directed by an “organised public” entity of legislative, hierarchical and bureaucratic rule. The views, tastes and traditions of everyday existence are symbolically assembled and encountered in this space of considered judgement. Not just news and views have been shared, but entertainment and the arts from home and abroad, past and present, have occupied this particular arm of the British ‘public sphere’ wherein aesthetic encounter, imaginative projection and empathetic comprehension has taken place for subjects as they grow into competent members of society. Here, we might usefully consider BBC Radio 3’s Sounds Interesting with Derek Jewell, and Jazz Today with Charles Fox; BBC Radio 1’s, Sounds of the Seventies and Peel’s Top Gear. In more recent times, the impulse to represent and share new musics has been evident in Radio1Xtra, and Radio 3’s Late Junction, Mixing It and World Music Awards. The discursive and discursive instinct being evident in Radio 1’s Roundtable, and latterly the various musicological formats typified by Radio 2’s popular music histories and programmes on the popular American songbook tradition, written and presented by Russell Davies.

Whilst the BBC has increasingly fostered popular representation across its history through the work of its in-house administrative and cultural agents, how democratic and emancipatory is the business of British public service
broadcasting? Has it really led to the formation and maintenance of humanistic public opinion? Is the BBC a dystopian facility, elitist utopian vision or eutopia of imperfect but progressive socio-cultural processes? Is it a just, institutional site of ‘useful’ aesthetic encounter, cultural exchange and social discourse, or does it, through ideology, bureaucracy and instrumentally only ever exhibit an administered, improving art for obedient citizens?

We must not forget the BBC’s reasons for being: The BBC became a publicly funded institution in the 1920s. It did so as a consequence of governmental initiatives motivated by technological imperatives, political philosophy and cultural wariness of U.S. broadcast models. Such motivations coloured much that happened in British broadcasting in succeeding decades, and they are facets that can still impact on contemporary policy and debate. A picture of a flawed institution operating within the ‘established order’ but with independent agents responsive and accountable as much to a public at large as to any internal system of control or external intervention is for those who choose to see it, a picture of a eutopian entity of some democratic legitimacy and potential.

This chapter contends that: (1) The BBC as an institution is a product of the hegemonic realities and socio-cultural impulses of the British polity. However the BBC is argued to be an intermediary corporation, which is less an Althusserian ideological state apparatus than a political subset of the contemporary public sphere, never exclusively beholden to one constituency or agenda. (2) Because of the BBC’s position, communicative action, communicative reason and a critical ideal and their necessary conditions as constituted and prescribed by Habermas are actually present in the music radio output of the BBC. (3) As a consequence of (1) and (2), the BBC has a continuing social, political and cultural legitimacy, especially in its eutopian musical broadcasting touching the real, lifeworld of hearing subjects.

10.2 Broadcasting critiqued & redeemed

As modernity advanced in the twentieth century, culture, commerce and technology that had previously been features of a vital public sphere situated between society’s lifeworlds and its systems of national bureaucratic
administration now became detrimental forces. Certainly, as we have seen in the writings of earlier critical theorists, the all-pervasive complexity of modern life precluded any utopian site of 'ultimate' human emancipation. Yet any retreat to strict utopian or metaphysical thinking would not just be a waste of time, it would be to obscure the materialism and pragmatics of Engels and Marx, and undermine any eutopian praxis - that combination of critical thought and situated social action which must operate in all projects - personal or socio-political - and that address the founding of a good life. In Habermas's analyses of the 1970s (Habermas, 1975), which can be plausibly applied to a theorisation of the BBC, we read of a crisis of freedom for the public sphere that ensued in the mid-twentieth century as immanent cultural debate became simply cultural consumption of things external where quantity, legal contract and managed outcomes dominated personal relations and qualitative cultural experience. Moreover, political power and ideology invaded this modified public sphere formerly devoted to knowledge. As it did so, it eclipsed reason with power, and truth with authority. Intersubjectivity was now devolved to more rigid institutional and mass media channels exposing people to political power, administration and instrumentality. In its contemporary, technocratic guise, increased governmental involvement has sought to regulate the 'excesses' of 'liberal' public spheres and has administered the markets with laws.

Such constraining social and cultural conditions have been recognised by late capitalism itself, and has led to what is termed by Habermas a "legitimation crisis" whereby institutions (media organisations included) became aware that their legitimacy as a mediator of fine social and cultural values was in crisis as the 'reciprocal', hegemonic contract of the old state polity was compromised if not broken by the bureaucratic colonisation of the lifeworld. Such a breach also lead to a "motivational crisis" on the part of society's members as established trusts loyalties and familiarity were lost, or simply rejected by a younger generation.

It does seem then that a late-twentieth century society and state could only ever present us with (for instance) Marcuse's 'affirmative' culture as individuals were 'depoliticised', with only their more mundane ambitions and pleasures exploited and briefly satisfied.
It is not just senior critical theorists who are quicker to condemn than praise the public service bodies engaged with the modern lifeworld. Many ordinary listeners have expressed disenchantment and scepticism in the face of such 'institutionalised' channels running between lifeworld and system. Consider for example, the following 'class-aware' questionnaire response to the suggestion that the BBC might act as a legitimate cultural representative of the community:

It is not the community, but some Oxbridge BBC idea of the community talking down from on high. There is no such thing as a free space, the BBC operates from behind closed doors, who is allowed to pass those doors, and why, is the result of an office of hidden agendas - whether those agendas are political, moral or economic who knows? (Big Buzz respondent no. 38, 2003)

Academic condemnation of the institutional cultivation of subjects echoing the Frankfurt School analysis comes from Lloyd and Thomas (1998). In their account of the growth of modern corporate bodies, they identify intermediate cultural institutions but refuse to grant them any plaudits as they are, forever, state apparatuses. They write:

Culture increasingly came to designate and to frame a set of institutions along the locus of society's intersection with the state. These institutions occupy spaces of their own; for the very formulation of the space or spaces of culture demands its actualization in pedagogical institutions whose function it is to transform the individual of civil society into the citizen of the modern state [...] culture can oppose society only in theory, and at best with an anticipatory and ever-deferred utopianism, whereas in practice culture can and does serve the state quite directly (Lloyd and Thomas 1998, 146)

No doubt, respondent number 38 and Lloyd and Thomas listen to, and most probably enjoy public service radio broadcasts. However, they can only regard the cultural output as an institutionalized, behavioural tool where any possibility of representation, interaction and justness for artists and listeners is forever deferred.

For each of these observers, intermediate 'public sphere' bodies do not offer sincere representation, not even any hegemonic trade-off whereby something new, authentic and non-instrumental is delivered in exchange for the preservation of the socio-political status quo. So must we perhaps conclude at this point that the BBC is nothing other than an Althusserian, ideological state apparatus (an ISA) giving us aesthetic promise followed by deceit and continued domination? It is surely this very ability to be critical and self-reflexive on the part of our sceptics
and cynics, even in the face of overwhelming cultural ‘domination’ which should convince us all - theorists too - of a subject’s rationality, agency and dialectical ability to sift, critique and reconfigure. Indeed in his ongoing project of human betterment via extant channels, Habermas sees the advantages of a mass media relationship with society and argues, in relation to events in Eastern Europe that the revolution ‘was televised’ (in an allusion to 1960s radicals’ claims that it would not be; and that we should all be out of doors constructing street barricades). He concludes:

If I made another attempt to analyse the structural transformation of the public sphere, I am not sure what its outcome would be for a theory of democracy - maybe one that could give cause for a less pessimistic assessment. (Habermas 1992e, 455-57)

Not only the instrumentality of radio but the technical limitations of broadcasting - its ‘one-way’ character might preclude both ideologically-free ‘dialogue’ and direct dialogue, but today, participation is afforded through letters, phone-ins, online message boards and email. Moreover, the BBC does have an active policy of representation so that at the very least, whilst communication may be a succession of statements rather than a more immediate, ‘face-to-face’ exchange, people speak (or sing) as others hear and respond. McCarthy frames this as “an effective equality of chances” that are not simply pursuing a linguistic, analytical logic but a communicative situation where participants “have the same chance to express attitudes, feelings, intentions and the like, and to command, to oppose, to permits and to forbid, etc.” (McCarthy in Habermas 1975, xvii). This is not a present reality nor an abstract ideal, but a mutually beneficial condition to be striven for, it is a communication sustained by Habermas’s Unterstellung - a “reciprocal supposition” of respect and equality, present at the point of mutual address (McCarthy in Habermas 1975, xvii). Might we look to a Gramscian quid pro quo of hegemonic relationships for a positive mechanics that might animate a communicative ethics?
10.3 Gramsci & a social theory of the extant

The idea of a structurally transformed but still dynamic public sphere with residual potentials as mooted by Habermas are prefigured in some of Gramsci’s ideas. The historian Geoff Eley revitalises Gramsci’s account of hegemony, asking that it be disentangled from an automatic association with any ideological system alone, and be allied instead with a total mode of social life (1992, 322). Rather than linking the term hegemony with any dictatorial, ‘ISA’ activity, Gramsci says Eley “expressly links hegemony to a domain of public life (which he calls civil society, but which might also be called the ‘public sphere’) that is relatively independent of governmental controls and hence makes its achievement a far more contingent process” (1992, 323). Gramsci’s contingent hegemony (a balancing act between interests) is achieved through activities that cultivate an acceptance of ‘intelligent’, ethical dominance. It is the contingency of hegemony that makes the public sphere such a still vital site for cultural and political discursive contestation. Gramsci’s pragmatic socialism discerned the power and the potentials of hegemonic rule. If mass media channels could reproduce dominant social relations and economic conditions, then they can also (with its remit of consensus) proffer a nationwide ‘sociology of knowledge’ leading to praxis and the felicitous conditions of the eutopia argued here to obtain intermittently in the ethos and output of the BBC.

In essence, Gramsci turned, not just to culture per se like Adorno or Marcuse, but to the cultural superstructure where ideological messages are produced, held in place, disregarded and mutated. Gramsci’s wish for a democratisation of articulated knowledge and the founding of a ‘historical-bloc’ for ‘dialogue and compromise’ is attainable whenever dominant discourses are engaged.

Gramsci’s lessons are straightforward: pay attention to realities and their contingent potentials, and believe in the efficacy of ‘organic individuals.’ In addition, use reason and debate to extract emancipatory potentials. His is not a utopian philosophy, nor one much given to speculation on the power of music. It is however his philosophy that seems to provided the very necessary intellectual, critical arc into which can be inserted positive accounts of the BBC. Gramsci’s inclusivity, flexibility and theoretical breadth anticipate the more tactical,
contingent and provisional utopias of the likes of Levitas, and refurbishes a tired
dialectic. As Smith has put it:

We need the established institutions because they either are, or can be rendered
accountable. Through them, the inhabitants of the society, will have some access
to the new and still little understood processes by which societies today are
controlled. (Smith 1986, 21)

The BBC was, and is situated in the public sphere of non-domestic, apolitical,
non-governmental exchange as a mediating entity touched by all agendas and all
realities. It is because of this, rather than in spite of it, that the BBC has flourished
as a socio-cultural institution both respected and criticised by everyone. What the
BBC does, as one element of a modern public sphere, is to allow music and
popular cultures to be articulated through equitable discourses. The linguistic and
aesthetic work together, the former articulating the possible values of the latter,
the latter always exceeding and preventing linguistic and conceptual and critical
closure. As such, the BBC is perhaps the Habermasian “discourse model of public
space” to quote Selaya Benhabib (1992, 84). Here, consensus establishes “norms
of action”; subjects develop, not simply as actors, but as individuals able to reflect
on the particulars of their own lives. Any “appropriation of cultural tradition
becomes more dependent upon the creative hermeneutic of contemporary
interpreters”, Benhabib (1992, 85). This, for Habermas, is a positive central
feature of a modern polity, and constitutes a broad ‘political’ process, unlike
erlier understandings of more politically-partial public spheres (Benhabib. 1992
86-7). In the case of the BBC there is a way in which, as a corporation, it
continually counters governmental intrusion even as it employs government-
sanctioned governors, chairs and now a Trust. Of necessity, like any large
organisation, the BBC is not a fixed entity, but necessarily repositions itself
structurally and discursively to meet shifting political pressure. In so doing, it
undoubtedly maintains itself as an establishment conduit, but it also continues to
act as a responsive and strategic socio-cultural arena that is too complex and lithe
to be swayed by any singular governmental tactic. The BBC is, in the main, a state
and society creature, and whilst a parliamentary platform, it is not a governmental
tool but rather has a sophisticated relationship with the British public and the
British polity that transcends the particulars of any government or governmental
department ambitions. The cynic might say that governments tolerate the BBC to demonstrate their resilience in the face of satirical attacks or independent political comment and that it is ultimately a prime hegemonic device. In addition, many might argue that John Birt injected an external ideological and political agenda that pushed the BBC towards a model of accountability which disrupted much of its traditional ethical impulse in the 1990s. However, Birt’s internal market models that may well have given independent production companies access, did antagonise many. The public disquiet surrounding the sacking of Director General Greg Dyke is another instance of many ordinary people expressing a proprietorial interest in the ‘governance’ of their BBC.10

10.4 Habermas: analyses, critiques & normative propositions

Habermas in his normative mode does not give up on ‘modernity’ and the possibility of emancipated and enlightened subjects in such rigid and impoverished conditions. Kearney tells us that:

in response to this stalemate of late capitalism, Habermas proposes a praxeology capable of conjugating the radical principles of dialectical materialism with a critical theory of social evolution. The aim of such a praxeology is to secure an open system of communication enabling each subject to become self-reflective. (1986, 235)

This was a new epistemological and moral philosophy predicated on a system that is not fully devoid of cultural and political potentials.

We should turn in detail to Habermasian theory to understand both the socio-political context and the dialectical process of broadcasting and mediated listenership. In order to do this we must first briefly set out Habermas’s concepts and problematics.

Habermas & language

McCarthy cites part of Habermas’s inaugural June 1965 lecture at The University of Frankfurt where he set out his position on human language:
What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together (Mündikeit) comprise the only idea we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical tradition. (McCarthy, Introduction to Habermas 1991, xvii)

Habermas took what Axel Honneth called the linguistic turn in critical theory: but why? Class revolution has not happened, art alone as a tool for change was too vapid; social emancipation for Habermas had to begin with individuals engaging in ethical discourse. This is met by Habermas's theory of social action and labour (in the guise of hermeneutics, history and philosophy) together with his model of communicative action - a mutuality of discursive intent. Bloch's imagery, Adorno's rarefied reason and negations, Marcuse's ineffabilites each had to be replaced for Habermas by everyday encounters and talk.

Whilst radio doesn't reveal any profound Truth, it sets out common grounds of agreement and mutuality in a pluralistic world we hear ourselves; hopes coalesce, dialogue and intersubjectivity ensues; we can, in the public service sphere hear and discuss music as part of a mediated, communicative action.

Public service broadcasting contributes to the formation of a site for Habermas's ethical discourse by demanding a pragmatic attitude to intersubjective address. Such mutual recognition, coupled to a competent and truthful exchange of semantic content, is not just a conversation between people or a communicative exchange say on air, but the possibility of "the mediation of individuality and universality" and a "meta-communication, in which one communicates about one's own and others' communications" (S. M. Weber 1976, 94-5). This, says Weber "recapitulates Hegel's model of mutual recognition, each subject both experiences the uniqueness of his own experience and translates it into universal terms which can be understood by another" (1976, 100). The Hegelian starting point of the autonomous subject may be questioned by critical theorists like Adorno who prefer to see a prior, 'decentered' and socially inflected subject. Too much can be made of this. The Hegelian model, which to an extent informs the work of Habermas, is just that: a way of making plain the complex encounter and formation of subjects in the real world. Certainly Habermas demonstrates an awareness in his writings of the institutional, bureaucratic trap but does not
abandon it, acknowledging it as an inevitable component of a modern society. Frustratingly, Habermasian theory often tends to be about structural relations rather than specifics, and offers no picture of any actual lifeworld, any critiques of named public service institutions which might deliver the praxis and just, fair-minded communication his theory conjures-up for his readers. This is not to be insensitive to the Habermasian project, but to urge a move away from the dogged disinterestedness that befell Adorno in 1969. Habermas does seem to offer a Hegelian progression for the individual through a succession of self, group and legal/moral development, but Habermas offers a clear move from the ahistoric subject with a return to the subject as agent. He is surely illustrating Held’s beliefs on subjective development where “an essential tenet of historical materialism [is] that history, social reality and nature are all a product of the constituting labour of the human species” (Held 1990, 254-55).

Habermas & social life

How do we characterize the social? We first need to define the constituent parts of a state. These are its people, lands and polity. Of significance here too is the term polity. This, for Aristotle was the most equitable mode of social rule for a state, a reasoned and pragmatic compromise between stern oligarchy and unstable, pure democracy. The polity is directed at defining and communing with the whole of society (private and public) and those who live within the confines of the state’s politico-legal structures overseen by individuals invited to oversee the majority with a philosophically informed good grace. Habermas, tends to see the modern state as an administrative system concerned a little more with legal and political instrumentality than a polity of benevolence whose political and legal impetus impinges unhelpfully on the other component of Habermas’s society: the lifeworld. The lifeworld is a lived, unreflective condition of ordinary ambition, clear meanings and day-to-day pragmatics. In effect, a ‘natural’, second nature sphere of relative integrity for you and I of immediate experience shaped by Crossley’s radical ‘I-thou’ intersubjectivities. An untainted public sphere, a Gemeinschaft where independent communication might ensue. However every modern lifeworld is also addressed, indeed ‘invaded’ by the mass media of all persuasions that are not necessarily motivated by any pure pursuit of public
discourse. Not only is intersubjectivity from this source of a different order and kind as Crossley’s somewhat reifying ‘egological’, subject-object model, but it is a lifeworld exposed to external, *Gesellschaft* ambition, technologies and power glossed and directed by the state, cultural institutions and business. Thus one’s lifeworld is at once personal *and* externally administered. As Habermas has expressed it: the lifeworld is “me and us” [which must be] “defended against extreme alienation at the hands of the objectivating, the moralizing *and* the aestheticising interventions of expert cultures” (1992b, 18). Is it possible to activate such an intersubjectivity through the offices of the BBC but avoid “expert cultures”? Is it possible to operate a fair socio-cultural discourse without the utopian ambitions of a non aristocratic, non-demotic, generally non-aligned group?

In looking for a locational and socio-spatial riposte to a powerful state system, Habermas looks to a mediating social institution that can cultivate a cogent response. Habermas’s public sphere of the eighteenth century, sitting without the state polity, was one such arena which was neither wholly private, nor commercial in its constitution, and it is here that civil and commercial interests were aired. This public sphere reflected a bourgeois ‘public opinion’ in everyday situations where a political, non-aristocratic discussions on morality, ethics and the cultural (mediated through conversation and the press, at least in the eighteenth century) reflected upon both commercial and public activity, and at the same time, brought reason to bear on power relations. It served as a mediating space for the subjectification and intersubjective activities of the middle classes, but became compromised with the impact of demotic pressures in the nineteenth century and a consequent retreat into private, domestic space in the twentieth, intensified by newer modes of systematised and administered mass communication centred on the home. It might be that we can see a Reithian BBC consolidating this set of circumstances or, alternatively, see the BBC vainly trying to reactivate or re-occupy this middle, apolitical ground in this way, by connecting the domestic sphere with the stimulation of and discussion about wider, socio-cultural concerns. If this latter revitalisation is taking place in a BBC communing with the lifeworld, then Habermas’s search for a legally-constituted socio-cultural sphere of some account may exist from time-to-time to the extent that it can impact on the state as
much as the state and its systems can impact on it. Habermas in fact defines the public sphere for us. It is:

[A] realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. (2006, 73)

Leaving his pre-modern, eighteenth-century coffee house model behind, as we have seen, Habermas writes that: “Today, newspapers, and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere” (2006, 73). This is, of course, Reith’s world of ‘music and electricity’; culture and commerce where any benign, autonomous public activity is unlikely to remain inviolate for too long. Certainly, the Birtist production model at the BBC in the 1990s seemed to represent an invasion of corporate outlooks and instrumental, ‘value for money’ practices which nevertheless seemed ideologically indeterminate but very capable of bringing to an end the creative atmosphere and ethos of the institution per se.™

Might the pluralism of a less-commercially minded BBC however respond to effectively to postmodernity’s cultural diversity without recourse to any ‘cultural logic of late capitalism? (Jameson 1991). In the 1970s, Habermas reluctantly accepted the inevitability of a regulated, somewhat overbearing and complex mass media, and saw in this ordering compromise, a drive towards a technological rationality of increasing ubiquity which at least could stabilize conditions which might commission or preserve a space for the mimetic stimulant of radical arts, cognitive insights and what he terms a “moral-practical significance” (1975, 78, 118). For Habermas, a mass-media discourse allows us to initiate and take part in some working truths and some consensus. He argues that a discourse can lead to a rational, collection position wherein “all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded” leading to “a rational will” (1975, 107-109) where general interests are addressed, and in so doing, particulars and sedimented power relations are sidelined in favour of normative propositions. As far as cultural meaning systems are concerned, Habermas cites P. Berger who argued that society has a “craving for meaning [...] the ultimate danger [is] the danger of meaninglessness. This danger is the nightmare par excellence, in which the individual is submerged is a world of disorder, senselessness and madness [...]
to be in society is sane” (1975, 118). Habermas adds that “the fundamental function of world-maintaining interpretative systems is the avoidance of chaos, that is the overcoming of contingency” and sees ‘specialist’ institutions able to deliver a “meaning-giving function” (ibid.). So, a combination of steadily-disseminated culture and a vibrant, discursive engagement with values may well operate in the spaces of mass media systems. The possibility of a dystopian, totalitarian dissemination of approved culture needs to be avoided by regularly testing governmental and institutional legitimacy and ensuring socio-cultural inclusion and representation.

**Communicative action**

Dews argues that to desublimate reason:

> It is not enough for it to be theorised as a potential of social and communicative practice. It has to be actually progressively embodied in the activities and institutions of society. In other words, reason remains an impotent ideal unless as Habermas often says it is met ‘halfway’ by modern forms of life which are receptive to, and can foster, its democratic and universalising impulses. (Dews 1999a, 19)

This is Habermas’s social and communicative action: a kind of praxis in a person’s lifeworld, where debate is predicated on agreed topics, agreed methods and agreed practical ends. Habermas, well aware of the pitfalls of technocratic agendas, still sees institutions such as broadcasting and the public sphere in general as likely conduits for such edifying, progressive debate. As Morris observes: there is “a communicative rationality that draws upon the suppressed rational potentials of modernity, and hence offers theory a secure basis from which to criticize current conditions” (2001, 12). This Habermasian turn into the lifeworld of immanent critique and transcendence could well lead some to regard the theory of the younger Habermas as being one that was somewhat naïve and optimistic. This however is to ignore his achievement in preserving, updating and extending critical theory’s project of modernity with an antithetical counter to a distorted enlightenment dialectic.

Careful consideration might lead to the view that Habermas’s desublimated critical theory simply skates, in an abstract fashion, over the
awkward realities of social relations and power relations in his call for equitable contact, shared knowledge and universal participation. However, his use of the dialectic is one where we are led by the hand to seek and find, amid ideals and reality, particulars and universals; affinity and alterity; and each mediated through discourse to give us imperfect, but critically-aware individuals.

**Communicative reason & the critical ideal**

McCarthy reminds us of Habermas’s “validity claims” (*Geltungsansprüche*), which need to be present in equitable dialogue so that “the utterance is understandable; that its propositional content is true, and that the speaker is sincere in uttering it, and that it is right or appropriate for the speaker to be performing the speech act” (McCarthy in Habermas 1975, xiii-xiv). This gives on to the questions as to whether the BBC has ever truly facilitated such a site of communicative ethics - a mutual engagement predicated on experiential and rational transcendence of particulars in a search for more universal truths as the first stage of change. Of relevance here is Habermas’s “critical ideal” of communicative reason; a position of relative detachment and reflection, whereby intersubjective judgements, when in an ethical, equitable setting, are adjudged to be representative and are permitted to reject divergent views only on rational grounds that have some universally benign, collectively valuable moral position which defends the unwary against ‘insincerity’ or detrimental comment. Such a perspective takes us towards a reading of Kant’s *a priori* epistemology but brings to it a more pragmatic, vital and situated form of intersubjective relations. Might we not see the organic intellectual, John Peel, embody the linguistic requirements of dialogue, mutuality and intersubjectivity within an institutional setting?

**Habermas & legal philosophy**

Social institutions shaped by the statute book do not simply have to remain remote and unresponsive to whom we are. For Habermas, there can be a dynamic relation between people’s lifeworlds, their rational faculties and a mutual comprehension of others’ needs. What he terms “communicative power” operates in the lifeworld and impacts on governmental legislation and institutional administration that in
turn becomes an embodiment of who we are and where we would like to go. In fact, in Habermas's writing on legal philosophy in the 1990s, we see him construct a legalistic model that has little to do with any natural law concerned with abstract freedoms, and which, at the same time, sidelines any positivistic account of legal particulars because of their indifference to universal rights. Such a proposition could easily be read into the renewal process of the BBC's charter in 2005-6 where the British as ordinary people and citizens were encouraged to express views and debate the issues at stake in a number of public meetings. In this instance, it was the BBC itself which was the subject of reasoned public debate, but it is also the case that the BBC has an ongoing role as one of Habermas's conduits connecting people in the formation of a general will which is then converted into an administrative, executive power sanctioned by (an assumed) full democratic participation. Whilst not a perfect model, it does preserve a balance between stable, comprehensible structures and the more fluid substance of the subjective and collective will, a compromise between existing states and states imagined.

Certainly, the BBC's 2006 *Royal Charter* setting out the conditions for its continuance and the accompanying *BBC Agreement* are documents of some interest in that they not only set out detailed constitution matters but explicitly articulate a socio-cultural ambition for universal representation, creativity and the more general prerequisite for impartiality and ethical discourse. We should briefly note the following phrases and stipulations as indicators of the normative qualities of these two constitutional documents:

In view of the widespread interest which is taken by Our Peoples in broadcasting services and of the great value of such services as means of disseminating information, education and entertainment, we believe it to be in the interests of Our Peoples [...] that there should be an independent corporation which should continue to provide broadcasting services. (Opening Charter renewal greeting)

Objectives of the BBC are set out in Section 3 of *The Charter*. They are manifold but of relevance is the following objective:

(n) To organise, present, produce provide or subsidise concerts, shows variety performances, revues, musical and other productions and performances [...] whether live or recorded in connection with the broadcasting and programme supply services of the Corporation.
Section 3 of *The Agreement* sets out the following regarding programme content: “3.1 The Corporation undertakes to provide and keep under review the Home Services with a view to the maintenance of high general standards.” 3.2 requires that these Home Services: “(b) stimulate, support and reflect in drama, comedy, music and the visual and performing arts, the diversity of cultural activity in the United Kingdom; (c) contain comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs [and] support fair and informed debate at local, regional and national levels [and] (g) contain programmes which reflect the lives and concerns of both local and national audiences.” As one would expect, the need for educational content and high standards for children and young people is also expressed in (3.2 (e) and (f) and 5.1 (b) of *The Agreement*.

*Habermas & eutopia*

In the pragmatism of the critical theory project of the 1970s and 1980s, Habermas sought enlightened, emancipated individuals and social progress through rational thought and equitable discourse. He certainly reformulated the utopian impulse to be one framed by a clear awareness of history, societal aims and ambitions, and an understanding of unintended ‘dystopian’ trends. Supposedly conflicting terms such as technology and humanity, philosophy and materiality, function and value, are, in a Habermasian model, reconciled or at least synthesised in the expectation of new developments. As S. M. Weber told us:

> The crux of Habermas’s resolution of this conflict is a revised notion of interest which is both material and ideal. Basing himself primarily on Kant and Fichte, Habermas identifies certain interests which are common to the human species as such and which form quasi-transcendental frameworks within which knowledge is produced in the course of human social evolution. (Weber 1976, 93)

In essence, Habermas seeks an accommodation of everyday feelings, concrete particulars, institutional systems and universal thought that operate within our individual and collective lifeworld. This is a realism on the part of Habermas which advances beyond the restless negativities of Adorno and the ambivalences of Marcuse.

Habermas takes trouble to find eutopian circumstances in which aesthetics and humanity might flourish. In Habermasian thought, issues of desire, hope,
expression and intersubjective rationality - for so long contested by earlier critical theory - seem at last to be brought together as complementary elements of 'here and now.' Habermas foregrounds language and the will to reach agreement. Aesthetic communication, truth, appropriateness and sincerity are claims that can be offered, accepted and tested in the sounds and discourse of public service music radio. Radio as a technology of the self and of the social provides an ontological and socialising realm of personal and collective allegorical interpretation. Historical particulars in radio’s music (the nostalgic or novel) can lend itself to gentle musings or more determined considerations of an ethical life for those keen to weave new allegories out of the programming they listen to.

The utopian impulse in Habermas’s reading of the individual’s lifeworld is, at the moment of crisis, one that he surely modifies into a eutopian one, an idealist impulse toward change and improvement generated materially from within. To an extent it is predicated both on older community models and material practices and a Kantian call for a public rationality and ‘agreement’ (Habermas 1989, 117). With this state of affairs in view, Kearney suggests that:

The ultimate task of Habermas’s Critical Theory is therefore to predict and devise ways of depoliticising the dessicated public sphere of communication [...] True to the basic humanist inspiration of Critical Theory, Habermas holds fast to the notion of the human subject - albeit a radically politicised subject - as the irreducible source of both theoretical and social transformation. (1986, 237-8)

Habermas’s so-called communicative turn is, in a sense, dependent on an indirect return to Gramsci’s agents, and a direct one back to undistorted enlightenment potentials. To achieve necessary development, Habermas contends, we, as audience, must dare to work, think and act using hermeneutical processes and a mutual communication. This we do in large measure within imperfect but at least extant institutional channels. In short, individuals must move, communicate and act within history. If we use the technological systems positively (which Marx predicted capitalism would eventually provide), individuals can exercise a rationality to achieve fair intersubjectivity.

What we have in Habermas’s model is also personal growth. This is not achieved through the self-contained subject confronting an objective world in an already fully conscious, rational way; but a growth of a decentered, already socialised self, via a disinterested intersubjectivity through which subjectification
and maturity take place as a process. Morris (2001) suggests that Adorno’s philosophy, whilst seeing us all as historical formations and not autonomous beings, had sought to preserve the integrity of the individual (through what is termed Subjektphilosophie), who would only ever exhibit a passing intersubjectivity marked by distance and discrete consciousness. Morris refers us to Minima Moralia wherein Adorno typically wanted to effect a “nearness by distance” (Adorno, 2005, 112, 89-90) wherein says Morris:

difference could be maintained, even celebrated, in a process of self-reflective contemplation, learning and communication that would not require the kind of constitutive identification of traditional conceptions of community. (2001, 7)

It is in this Adornian distance that we find the required rationality and critique, untainted by external forces. What ultimately drives this process model and protects the subject is, for Habermas, a fundamental human predilection for learning. Habermas writes:

It is my conjecture that the fundamental mechanism for social evolution in general is to be found in an automatic inability not to learn [...] at the socio-cultural stage of development. Therein lies, if you will, the rationality of man. (1975, 15)

Habermas argues that whatever the economic and political conditions might be, human expression, imagination and spontaneity remain. These stand outside affirmative culture as an index of our inner-life and our social perspective. However, humour, irony and playfulness might be encountered within what Born (2008) suggests was the “expressive palette” of the DJ and their playlist. This, for Habermas is sustained by a broad human need to experience not just familial and community expressions, but those too from further afield which is possible through aesthetic exposure (cf. Habermas 1975, 78). Habermas concludes by arguing that society is the site where the randomness and meaninglessness of contingent reality is addressed through the institutions of language and art; the institutions of family and community and, importantly for this chapter, the state polity (1975, 118).
Efforts to apply Habermasian thoughts from abroad to a peculiarly British institution must now make way for thoughts from home. We first turn to Raymond Williams and his consideration of the postwar cultural landscape. We see in Williams, ambivalence rather than certainty and encouragement. In his book *Culture and Society* (1961), Williams acknowledged the likely impositions of a dominant power with access to the media: “Any governing body will seek to implant the ‘right’ ideas in the minds of those whom it governs [...] The whole theory of mass-communication, depends, essentially, on a minority in some way exploiting a majority” (1961, 301). However, we are then invited to entertain the possibility, not just of inculcation but of a reasoned, enlightened intent in any such situation. 

Williams continued: 

What of the case where a minority is seeking to educate a majority, for that majority’s ultimate good? Such minorities abound, seeking to educate majorities in the virtues of capitalism, communism, culture and contraception. Surely here mass-communication is necessary and urgent, to bring news of the good life and of the ways to get it. (1961, 302) 

Williams at this date still appeared to be working out his position on the finer points of public service broadcasting in Britain. First of all, Williams countered criticism of its shortcomings by mooting the alternative: a silenced public service conveying nothing to anyone at all. But he also did seem willing to chide the BBC for its tone. He wrote: “It is a question of how one tells them, and how one would expect to be told oneself [...] telling as an aspect of living, learning as an element of experience” (1961, 302). His was a perspective that was neither populist nor Leavisite and traditional. To understand this facet of Williams, we must touch briefly on the BBC at this time. In the late 1950s, BBC radio had absorbed the lessons of broadcasting to entertain during WWII, and would have learned much from American Forces Radio. Nevertheless, it would still have had a predominantly paternalistic outlook, and would have shown a relative lack of interest in American popular culture, most of which, in the view of Williams
would have been a product of the culture industry and would have therefore overshadowed any more authentic British forms.

Aware that the BBC was a bulwark and a platform, Williams seemed to suggest it adopt a more democratic policy and pitch to achieve a domestic, if not internationally coloured, postwar consensus. Williams referred again to the mode of address of broadcasters, but quickly moved on to sketch out a complex cultural diet (presumably of all matters high and low), to which everyone should have access:

The answer [...] does not lie in exhortation. It lies, rather, in conceding the practice of democracy, which can alone substantiate the theory. It lies in terms of communication, in adopting a different attitude to transmission, one which will ensure that its origins are genuinely multiple, that all the sources have access to common channels [...] We need a common culture, not for the sake of an abstraction, but because we shall not survive without it [...] A common culture is not, at any level, an equal culture. Yet equality of being is always necessary to it, or common experience will not be valued. (1961, 304-5)

Williams steps down from his abstracted notion of a society aiming for a common good, fuelled by diverse tastes cultures and seems to be writing about what might have been the particulars of a postwar, postcolonial Britain that had to admit of new communities of people defined by ages and backgrounds. To do otherwise would court conflict. Are there indications here of a nascent multiculturalism which was to find favour in liberal quarters in the last quarter of the century which here on the part of Williams reads to be something that is as much pragmatic as idealistic?

Williams outlined what seemed to be a pluralistic, non-interventionist policy on cultural ‘improvement’ that had an Arnoldian air about it: “Nobody can raise anybody else’s cultural standard. The most that can be done is to transmit the skills, which are not personal but general human property, and [...] give open access to all that has been made and done” (1961, 306). In his 1961 essay ‘Communications and Community’, Williams wrote the following, almost as a eulogy for the BBC. It reads:

The BBC has been a great and, in spite of everything, fortunate exception to the normal process of cultural development in modern Britain. It was an exception because people thought of it as important for national defence and security, and once you touch those things exceptions can be made. But it was right against the
ordinary trend in all our other institutions over the last hundred years. It was an island; and who would have thought ten years ago that it was an island that the sea would ever come up over. (Williams 1989, 28)

In this essay, Williams pointed to the populist tropes of British commercial television and, in what almost reads like a criticism of his own complex perspectives, wrote that “a deadlock came about, in thinking anyway, between people who were critical of paternal systems, certainly of authoritarian ones, and so saw the strength of some of the arguments of the commercial system” (1989, 28).

As with Adorno, Williams’s position on media and culture is hard to fix. As seen above, as early as 1961, Williams balefully recorded the inundation of the BBC “island”. As late as 1974, we read another rather negative account. He began positively by arguing that media technologies are both “incentives and responses” to social change, but then added that the “centralisation of political power” (1974, 20) demanded broadcasting to oversee “centralised entertainment” and the “centralised formation of opinions and styles of behaviour” (1974, 11). He added that television (and no doubt radio too) “in its character and uses, exploited and emphasised elements of a passivity, a cultural and psychological inadequacy” (1974, 12).

Williams never fully embraced popular culture as enjoyed by younger generations, but his theoretical perspective, bleak though it seemed to be in 1974, does, some three years later, argue at least for a continuing access to diverse cultural forms by way of “a lived hegemony” (pace Gramsci) which he must still have seen as a potential in Britain in 1977. It draws on his 1961 essay where he argued we must conceive of a “democratic system of communications” (1989, 28), whereby diversity reigns and what he termed “the false ideology of communications” is removed. He trusted neither commerce nor state to deliver it. Instead, Williams argued for a localised ownership of communication media (1989, 29). Was he in any way touched by the ‘do-it-yourself’ energies of Punk as a somewhat radical riposte to the domestic socio-political and economic crises of the early 1970s? In a renewed mood of optimism Williams wrote:
A lived hegemony is always a process [...] of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits [...] it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. (1977, 112-13)

For Williams, this is where the value of hegemonic activity resides, its constant, dialectical engagement with rival cultural options which it admits to preserve its legitimacy as a public platform. He concluded: “We have then to add to the concept of hegemony the concepts of counter-hegemony and alternative hegemony, which are real and persistent elements of practice” (1977, 112-3). Might places of heterotopian peripheral production and eutopian spaces of dissemination usefully combine?

Garnham

A more recent engagement with the imperfections of public service broadcasting comes from Garnham whose optimistic account of public service broadcasting has already been outlined in the previous chapter. He seems to be someone looking for a productive dialectic amid existing circumstances in matters of democratic expression, moving beyond theory, ambivalent critical flirtation or simple socialist aspiration. He writes: “Those on the left who are opposed to market forces in the press nonetheless have in general given no more than mealy-mouthed support to public-service broadcasting” (1992, 363). Garnham then chastises those on the left for their idealism and utopianism, falling “back either on idealist formulations of free communications with no organizational or material support or on technical utopianism that sees the expansion of channels of communication as inherently desirable because pluralistic” (1992, 364).

Garnham then argues that existing, mass mediated communication can deal better with the complex, ambivalent facets and decisions of modern life than can a simple democratic framework of majority acceptances and rejections: “The sifting of options necessary for such [complex] decision making can only be done by representatives [who] then require space for free thought; they cannot be mandated” (Garnham 1992, 366). But Garnham then adds that there still needs to be a universalist core of principles against which we might continue to “measure” things, “some common normative dimension” (1992, 368-9).
Richard Collins (1993) reminds us that it was Garnham who introduced Habermasian thought to the British broadcast debate, which, in the late 1980s and early 1990s comprised antithetical market argument and public service positions. Collins informs us of a defence of two kinds: (1) the empirical - a defence of PSB from historical and extant perspectives which focused on actual public service practice and broadcasters' beliefs and (2) the more idealistic, which concerned itself with public service broadcasting in the abstract and as a high calling. As a consequence of these two positions, confusion reigned on the part of those seeking to defend the likes of the BBC from commercial pressure. The empirical defence is implicitly an argument for the status quo, the latter a radical, 'utopian' stance, unlikely to be mapped onto any policy decisions in the real world (Collins 1993, 243-4).

In Garnham's view, the public service sense of public good could be argued to have been too class-based and altogether too weak in the face of emerging consumerist outlooks in mid-century Britain. However, he is right to claim that "this is to miss the point of the enterprise and its continuing importance as both historical example and potential alternative" (Garnham 1995, 245).

David Harvey, Universal values & concrete particulars

How might we begin to make any cohesive sense of the Habermasian model, the ambivalences of Williams and the pragmatism of Garnham? Useful insight comes from cultural geographer David Harvey whose book *Spaces of Hope* (2000) is a conscious, spirited continuation of William's *Resources of Hope*, but with a distinct air of practical engagement. In a distinct, normative fashion, Harvey suggests to us a way in which synchronic particulars intersect with the more stable, diachronic 'universals' of a public institution that possesses an ongoing ethical awareness. He writes: "Dialectics [...] teaches that universality always exists in relation to particularity" (2000, 242). Somewhat unfashionably, Harvey then adds: "The contemporary radical critique of universalism is sadly misplaced. It should focus instead on the specific institutions of power that translate between particularity and universality rather than attack universalisms per se" (ibid.). Even as he counsels the caution of a critical theorist, he readily inserts the historical subject as an embodiment of the greater good: "Universals cannot and do not
exist, however, outside of the political persons who hold to them and act upon them" (2000, 247).

Harvey rightly identifies the political nature of much supposed high-minded activity, yet his perspective, whilst rightly critical in the face of many contemporary contingencies, also carries with it a gentle defence of the institution as a dynamic place and space for hope. This perspective is one he frames almost as a warning, having presumably studied a number at close quarters:

Mediating institutions, no matter how necessary, cannot afford to ossify, and traditional utopianism is often powerfully suggestive as to institutional reforms. The dynamic utopian vision that emerges is one of sufficient stability of institutional and spatial forms to provide security and continuity, coupled with a dynamic negotiation between particularities and universal so as to force mediating institutions and spatial structures to be as open as possible. (Harvey 2000, 242)

This seems to be a prescription in the spirit of Habermas and his hope for a dynamic media of good intent and facility. However, Harvey seems to avoid the visitation of any universal values upon reality, but instead encourages us to detect even the slightest trace of self-less, non-instrumental agendas in the socio-cultural streams of the media that could, with careful political and legalistic fostering become ‘universal’ principles because of broad agreement as to their goodness. Harvey writes:

If we find in them [universals] successful guides to action [...] so they shape our world view and become institutionalised as mediating discourses [...] They become codified into languages, laws, institutions, and constitutions. Universals are socially constructed not given. (2000, 247)

**Thompson & Born**

In order to reconcile universal and particulars, and preserve some of the ideals and pragmatic positions of scholars and commentators from Gramsci and Habermas and from Harvey to Garnham, we should turn to the normative-cum-pragmatic tendencies in the writings of Thompson (1995) and those of anthropologist Born (2004) who both argue for a diverse media ‘ecology’ which can embrace both broadcast public service activity and alternate economic and cultural models.

Thompson reflects on a media that “has nourished a sense of responsibility, however fragile, for a humanity that is commonly shared and for a
world that is collectively inhabited” (1995, 264). Where and how might this sharing continue occur? Thompson alludes to the agora of the Greeks, but argues for a new conception of public space. He argues normatively for “a renewal of public life” via what he calls “the principle of regulated pluralism [...] the establishment of an institutional framework which would both accommodate and secure the existence of a plurality of independent media organizations”. Thompson qualifies this by stating “it is a principle which also recognizes that the market left to itself will not necessarily secure the conditions of freedom [...] it may be necessary to intervene [...] in such a way that diversity and plurality are not undermined by the concentration of economic or symbolic power” (1995, 241).

Born’s incisive reading of the radical musical institution in Paris, IRCAM (Born 1995) might lead one to expect an equally cutting reading of the BBC. Whilst her anthropological training exposes a government-led colouration of operations, she is more philosophical about its enduring ethical efficacy and promise. She writes:

The BBC’s role can no longer be primarily to represent a unified nation, as Reith believed. It is to provide a unifying space in which plurality can be performed, one in which the display and interplay of diverse perspectives can animate and reshape the imagined community of the nation. It is a space in which plurality not only of information and opinion, but of expression, of aesthetic and imaginative invention, must have full reign. The BBC’s task, now as always, is to be hopeful. The realisation of its vision will be uncertain; but the vision must be inspired. (Born 2004, 517)

Born (2004) identifies the BBC as a mid-point, politically inflected public sphere belonging to neither government, market nor a more neutral sphere of any critical ideal. This inspiration is provided by a BBC giving access to a Blochian education of hope and desire, articulated through a model of which Habermas would approve. Even as an institution inflected by the British polity, it still affords the representation and the sharing of many more ‘lateral’, socio-cultural identities than Williams ever imagined, and when necessary, still provides a vertical national integration uniting communities in a shared social purview of just intent. We cannot simply rely on historical evolution and hope. For Habermas, Thompson and Born, there must be a politico-legal dimension to inscribe and
reinscribe the existence of such a place and space in the face of an increasing administrative momentum and ever more powerful global communication industry.

10.6 In conclusion

Could the BBC and its agents really qualify as a contemporary locale of Habermasian rectitude, or is it too compromised by capitalism, politics and narrowcast fragmentation? What ultimately are BBC radio’s actual warrants - legal and social?

Has the BBC at anytime been both a mirror allowing society to “commune with itself” (James Curran cited McGuigan 1996, 27), a site for self-recognition and as a window looking out onto a world of dialectically significant alterity? Might public service radio as exemplified by the BBC posit a meaningful/significant context for the texts of musical creativity?

This normative tendency towards the unproblematised utopian ideal raises the fundamental issue of all utopian propositions rooted in an unquestioned rightness of development and fulfilment for humans. (This questioning of the normative utopian desire and expectation as a ‘given’ - positing ideal interaction and fair outcomes - is returned to this study’s the main conclusion which follows this chapter). What the BBC might be said to do is enframe the arts (including music) with their semi-formed utopian tendencies and meta-musical discussion in a situated eutopian present where all-comers, musicians, presenters and listeners can propose or reject utopian conceits. This very dialectical challenge to the utopian given serves to revitalise the dialectical process for more solid truths aided by a synthesis of what - with recourse to Freud and Marcuse - could easily be termed the pleasure and reality principles of various cultural expressions and discussion that sees immediate somatic and future-orientated emotional liberation run productively into the glosses of language. Mannheim averred that “the key to the intelligibility of utopias is the structural situation of that social stratum which at any given time espouses them” (1960, 187). The conclusions we might reach then about the class biases of listeners, musicians and broadcasters must therefore involve a problematisation of the class-based origins and intended and unintended
consequences, not only of any utopian imperative, but also any of eutopian ones such as that mooted throughout this study. In addition, this would also raise the need to problematise the assumption that the BBC fosters a Habermasian critical ideal when the corporation for many represents perhaps at best, only a particular metropolitan constituency, and at worst for others a now moribund body unable to deliver the rectitude and honesty of interactions between programme makers and listeners because of commercial pressures.  

Surely, far from seeing bourgeois elements of the British establishment taking advantage of a nation’s deference as it tunes-in passively to radio and television, intermediate institutions are nothing other than a mirror of a relatively classless collective will; it is (and is required to be) an adjunct of all our communities’ ambitions and tastes. If this analysis of the character and agenda of the British polity and its institutions is accepted, then there is for the moment, in response to the Habermasian call for legitimate, democratically approved control, a continuing legitimacy for the BBC and its technicians, producers and cultural agents. Of course, when a particular kind of politically motivated rule, rather than enduring state polity is in question, we should all scrutinise a government’s presidence over the enlightening medium that is public broadcasting. Ideals and dogged independence alone may not guarantee integrity of public service output. Therefore, any chance of subjectification, representation and any consequent intersubjective interaction via the airwaves requires politico-legalistic prescription guided by ongoing discussions of morality and ethics.

Notes

2. See Beebee (2002, 192-3).
3. One thinks of the British bureaucrats dismissing the United States model of commercial radio broadcasting which they encountered in the 1920s and characterised as an anarchy of the air. Viewed as an index of ‘free speech’ in the USA, the commercial content and brute triumph of the most powerful local and regional transmitters was anathema to those establishing a public service model in Britain set about with notions of national bodies and welfare. The story in the US was addressed by Michelle Hilmes in a conference paper (2001).
4. It is interesting to reflect on Terry Eagleton who sees the public sphere having special concerns at its heart: “not power but reason” and “Truth not authority”. He adds: “It is on this radical dissociation of politics and knowledge that its entire discourse is founded” (Eagleton [1984] cited McGuigan 1996, 24).
5. Habermas has written: “A public sphere that functions politically requires more than the institutional guarantees of the constitutional state; it also needs the supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns of socialisation, of the political culture, of a populace accustomed to freedom” (1992e, 453). Consider the impact John Birt had upon the creative culture of the BBC and, as a consequence, ultimately the quality of the lifeworld of audiences. On the “legitimation crisis” and on “motivation crisis” whereby ordinary trust in systems is called into question, see Habermas (1975).


8. As Hall reminded us when opening his 1986 essay on culture and governance with a quotation from Gramsci’s prison notebooks, a state’s ‘ethical’ cultivation of its subjects was motivated by the requirement “to raise the great mass [...] to a particular cultural and moral level [...] which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes” (1986b, 22).

9. Benhabib tells us that there are three public spaces, the one a competitive space of interests, what she terms ‘agonistic’ and characterises as republican to a large extent, the second she terms “legalistic” which is liberal and Kantian in outlook. The third she names “Discursive public space which involves a democratic-socialist remodelling of late-capitalist societies” and is linked to the work of Habermas (Benhabib 1992, 73, 78).


11. Held has suggested that Habermas has been involved in an “attempt to develop a theory of society with a practical intention: the self-emancipation of people from domination” (1990, 250).

12. A similar criticism has been levelled by Scheuerman (1999, 171).

13. Habermas’s ‘classical’ manifestation of the public sphere, designed by the middling sort and bourgeois groups to mediate anarchy and authority to their ends. See generally Habermas (1989).

14. For a defence of Lord Birt’s eight years as BBC Director General, see Geraldine Bedell’s ‘Peer with a plan’ in The Observer, August 21 2005 (accessed via Media Guardian/Guardian Unlimited, August 13, 2007). Birt is seen to have defended and revitalised a “complacent institution” strengthening its journalistic remit and getting it ready for digital developments.

15. Kearney argues that “A rational society characterised by universal and unrestricted communication remains for Habermas a realisable ideal. And such an ideal necessitates that we forego both the nostalgic quest for lost traditions (romantic hermeneutics) and the naive belief in a spontaneous activism of the present (revolutionary anarchism) in favour of a critical deciphering and reconstruction of language aimed at an ideal speech situation where each individual may freely participate in social interaction” (1986, 235-6).

16. The weakness of the Habermasian model of critical theory is that it lays itself open to the cardinal sin of reification in dealing with concepts (‘lifeworld’, ‘public sphere’).

17. Burns (1977) offers an interesting insight into the persona adopted by BBC broadcasters. See also Scannell on radio sincerity (1996, 58-74) and authenticity (1996, 93-116). Important questions of authenticity undoubtedly surface when the performances of Peel, Tony Blackburn and other radio disc Jockeys are considered in the light of Habermasian requirements. It might be said that Blackburn’s dogged presentation of his ‘entertaining self’ is of such longevity that it has become his sincere, mask-free self in some respects. Thoughtful comment on honesty in popular performance comes from Bruce Springsteen - someone often credited with an authentic, blue-collar essence on stage. In an interview with the Observer Music Magazine, 2004 he commented on the work ethic evident in his live performances; he tells the interviewer that it is only an act and asks how more honest and sincere could one be with that admission. One should never assume an artfulness in any performance invariably invalidates the ‘truth’ of the content.


20. Andrew Edgar has usefully observed that sincerity "becomes an issue of self expression and formation of a community identity" and argued that such an individualistic impulse should be compared to the more singular "cultural ambition of Reith".

21. McGuigan writes: "Hans Magnus Enzenberger's youthful belief that everyone could and should become a cultural producer in relation to the major media of public communication was hopelessly utopian"; yet McGuigan sees in the ensuing decades a ground-swell of public and community arts and recently a strong interest in video, and home music making which attests technological competence and individual creative agency (1996, 79-80).


23. Collins expresses reservations about the BBC's emancipatory project. He refers us to Kant's essay, 'What is Enlightenment?' which refers in turn to a self-inflicted 'tutelage' whereby others do our thinking and protect us. Collins quotes Kant: "It is so easy not to be of age. If I have a book which understands me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth, I need not trouble myself. I need not think, if I can only pay - others will readily undertake the irksome work for me." He adds that even if there is an "emancipatory project", it is "on the terms set by the broadcasting elites, rather than on terms set by the community as a whole" (1993, 255).

24. Consider the upset (summer 2007) over the British mass media's inept handling of audience phone-ins. BBC Radio 6 Music came in for some of this criticism.
11 Conclusion: sensibility, imagination & understanding

11.1 Introduction

Yet hath modern cultur enrich’d a wasting soil;
Science comforting man’s animal poverty
and leisuring his toil, hath humanized manners
and social temper, and now above her globe-spredd net,
of speeded intercourse hath outrun all magic,
and disclosing the secrecy of the reticent air
hath woven a seamless web of invisible strands
spiriting the dumb inane with the quick matter of life:
Now music’s prison’d raptur and the drowned voice of
truth mantled in light’s velocity, over land and sea
are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear,
into every heart and every home their unhinder’d message,
the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood.

Robert Bridges from *The Testament of Beauty* (1930) Book I
cited Briggs (1965, x)

*Eutopia, ‘music & electricity’*

As we have seen, Thomas More turned to Anemolius, the imaginary poet laureate
in his book *Utopia*, to describe his eutopian island of “men, resources and excellent laws”. Four and a half centuries later, Asa Briggs, writing his *magnum opus* on the history of UK broadcasting, opened his second volume, *The Golden Age of Wireless*, with an extract from real life poet laureate, Robert Bridges (1844-1930). Bridges’s words afforded Briggs the lyrical imagery of music carried out into society by radio wave: that potent combination of “music and electricity” that has been equally fascinating for Reith and Adorno. The human, material and technological foundations of More’s eutopia, Bridges’s ‘seamless web’ and Reith’s state monopoly making for “Happier homes”, all point to the key elements of the present work. More’s *Utopia* was a literary-cum political allegory
in the tradition of Plato’s *Republic*, an ideal, contrasting with reality. Utopia has,
since More’s day, become an independent political trope and social prospectus
which either alludes to better times and conditions in the critical spirit of More’s
book, or is used conversely as a dismissive adjective condemning as naïve, any
such hopes or actions directed towards a more equitable tomorrow. Utopia is thus
a ‘chronotope’ - a perfect place somewhere, and sometime in the political future. Sensitive to modern and postmodern academic readings of the ideological power of culture as a descending set of often technologically rendered social relations, this study has tried to preserve a place for the dialectical dimensions of socialist thought, and has proposed the present-day existence of a eutopia, a place of process and potential, set about with appropriate resources and socially minded agents. Has the cultural landscape of the BBC merely ‘informed, educated and entertained’ to create a modern citizen and state subject? If so, whose values and standards served as the model for judgements? Has the BBC simply ‘fed’ a passive individual to deliver John Locke’s “virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning” (1693), or have a priori Kantian concepts and a Habermasian ethical discourse given us something more robust?

What has been addressed in this study has been the likelihood of a state-mediated, musically and technologically grounded search for an improving humanity. What has been proposed throughout has been a place and space for mindful individuals engaged in a process of aesthetically and discursively formed ‘becoming’. Music radio, particularly that of the public service kind, has been proposed as a socio-cultural ‘vessel’ mediating between home, public and state spheres. Together, the ideals and universality of the public service project meet a never-ending confluence of particular musics, play and desire; hope, thought, socio-political contradictions, language and mutuality - in short a musical eutopia. A place and space where the experience of music’s abstract utopia has been channeled into a more apprehensible, concrete form of cultural and social import, susceptible to imaginative value and rational understanding. Individual listeners’ desires and imagination join with processes of an aesthetically and discursively rendered subjectification and intersubjectivity. Not only is Adorno’s “music in radio” then, the possible locale of a somewhat abstract (but ‘useful’) utopian sensibility; it is the index of a space of eutopian goodness and potential where art, democracy and communicative praxis have a home.

Radio does not proffer any profound Truth, but a common ground of mutuality where we ‘triangulate’ ourselves in relation to the desires and ambitions of others. Radio let us hear ourselves, our community and a modern world of others. It is in this space that mediated subjects attend to cultures beyond their
own. It is as an antithetical encounter with diverse expressions that music in radio is presented to 'common sense' as a pragmatic community of experiences wherein hopes coalesce and dialogue ensues. Here, ontological and ethical questions about subjectification and intersubjectivity emerge.¹

This study, which at root is a defence of, but not an *apologia* for, a certain kind of BBC, has sought to articulate this optimistic view of ‘music in radio’ in the following ways:

(1) Cognitive potential and communicative rationality reside in all musical experiences. It is, in effect, for musician and audience, a medium of participation: a socio-temporal 'space' and a fictive medium; a site for collective activity and utopian allegory. Not only does music proffer escape and compensation, it additionally throws into relief, a sense of subjective and social alienation or non-identity, lack and broken promises; we encounter the absent presence of matters utopian. However commercial a musical work might be in its production and distribution, its immediate sensory pleasures present supplementary acoustic data for the body and memory that exceed music's illusory, ideological tasks, and for many, get to the heart of our 'species being'.

(2) The mundane form of communication that is radio, is rich in subjectifying and intersubjective properties as it broadcasts music to subjects ‘listening-in’ to an outside world. Whilst we should continue to critique radio’s instrumental tendencies, we should also be prepared to defend it as a determining space for the aesthetic, discursive and discursive formation of knowledge as a prelude to humanitarian praxis. As Silbermann observed:

Radio’s present-day function as entertainer, patron, composer, interpreter, musical educator, impresario, programme planner, sound technician, organiser and generator of cultural homogeneity and its consequent inter factional relationship with both producer and consumer groups is all too frequently dismissed as presumptuous or dangerous to culture. (1963, 154)

The study's origins

The subject matter of this study was prompted by the present writer’s sense of his own enculturation through music, particularly that heard on BBC radio in the
1960s and 1970s. The realisation as a teenager that ‘I was the BBC’ was both a chilling and intriguing one and led to a host of questions about institutions, subjectification and general engagement with the objective world. Could music ever evade administrative cooption to preserve its immediate and authentic qualities, and if so, how might those autonomous qualities be preserved, even as they were experienced and named? Subsequent readings of Norris (1989b) and Flynn (1992) during the early stages of research provided a means of exploring the pre-lingual power of music in relation to a philosophically formulated account of music’s utopia. In conjunction with these, Born (1995) provided a successful precedent for an examination of state-sanctioned cultural institutions. The 2006 renewal of the BBC Royal Charter and long-awaited publication of Adorno’s Current of Music (2006a) provided an intellectual confluence of contemporary socio-political event, and historically situated radio theory that made for an appropriate moment to conclude the present study.

The approach

A provisional literature review in the late 1990s flagged-up the diversity of sources and approaches, offering insights into music, broadcasting and the listening subject. It has been engagements with this slew of academic publications, attendance at ESRC seminars on radio matters, and academic conferences, plus a shadowing of day-to-day debate on the subject of the BBC and new technologies which have fuelled this study’s pan-disciplinarity and synthetic ambition. It is hoped however that there is a sufficient marshalling of concepts and thinkers from the cognate socio-philosophical traditions of Marxism, critical and cultural theory - be they continental or Anglophone - to illuminate the central topic, and alert a patient reader to interesting philosophical alignments and further topics of investigation. Similarly, the inclusion of some qualitative data should be seen as a continuation of a critical theory which never wholly abandons socio-political realities, and which can join its socio-philosophical modes of inquiry to substantiate hypotheses.
Section & chapter summaries

Following the Introduction and Framework, theories & foundations of PART ONE | Preliminaries; PART TWO | Music's utopia, comprised three chapters marking out the relevance of music’s sensory, imaginative and comprehending powers in the evolving thought of Bloch, Adorno and Marcuse.

3 'Venturing Beyond': Bloch & the utopian trope in music considered Bloch's romantic yearnings and socialist inclinations that led him to outline hopes and utopian principles for a better tomorrow. As Zipes has observed, Bloch, whilst “essentialist” in his modeling of the subject and “teleological” in his expectations of change via an historical materialism, did propose an “existentialist” utopian impulse driven by sensibility and imagined alternatives, leading to articulated changes in “critical utopias” and “the concrete materiality of daily struggle” (1997, 8). Bronner has argued that it is in Bloch’s writings that we see “a new philosophy of history in which transcendence is linked with immanence.”

However Bloch’s utopian project “is still grounded in the ontological and teleological assumptions of an earlier time” (1994, 350).

4 'La Promesse du Bonheur': Adorno, music & radio showed that for much of his career, Adorno seemed to gainsay most of Bloch’s allegorical sites of “secular eschatology” and redemption as Norris has expressed it (1989a, 17). However, as Norris here also rightly avers, this would be to cast Bloch as an uncritical ‘utopian’ and Adorno as someone incapable of admitting any utopian conceit into the business of societal ambition for change. Whilst Bronner (1994, 350-1) has suggested that Adorno’s negative dialectics wrest the utopian concept away from any abstract teleological movement, it fails to afford the conceptual content any likely institutional form. Adorno gives us the following: “All music, however individual it may be in stylistic terms, possesses an inalienable collective substance: every sound says ‘we’ ” (2000a, 9). This is surely the intuitive, positive face of Adorno, but like Bloch before him and Marcuse in his wake, there’s a reluctance to really ‘depict’ a likely eutopian site. The present study has tried to look closely at Adorno, and in particular, his modified critiques of music in radio to detect an implicit, more positive dialectical position from where a quasi-autonomous music and philosophy even in the presence of commodified recordings and administered broadcasting can be found at work.

Chapter 5 Technology, art & liberation:
Marcuse reviewed marshalled a number of positive critiques of radio technology. We also saw Marcuse’s work address the business of recollection. This also took us directly back to somatic affairs, aesthetics and matters of sensibility. In much of his writing we saw concessions in the presence of communication technologies, which boded well for a defence of public service broadcasts. We also saw perspectives that seemed to promote the value of countercultural activity. Marcuse’s position however was in many respects, more guarded than earlier, more optimistic advocates of radio as a liberatory aesthetic and communication tool. Whilst supporting the postwar ‘Great Refusal’, Marcuse possessed an Adornian reticence, fuelled by doubt about the political sophistication of popular musics, and by the ever-present threat of technological manipulation.

In PART THREE | Musical eutopias, Chapter 6, Meta-musical readings & the utopian conceit problematised the mediation of music through language and explored matters of musically and technologically mediated subjectification and intersubjectivity. The intractable problematic of music’s ineffable artistic credentials and emancipatory promises caught in the web of ‘readings’ and conceptual appropriation was examined in regard to the presence of the popular lyric and its political appropriation. Recourse to utopian allegory was also examined here, and argued to be one way of constantly refreshing interpretation and possibilities as an open, discursive trope which respected the widely-experienced sublimity of music and the simultaneous Adornian fear of existential cooption and conceptual correspondence. Music, radio & intersubjectivity considered music as a participatory medium of cognition, personal development (subjectification) and a social mutuality (intersubjectivity). This was done for a number of reasons: (1) so that it might shadow a Hegelian dialectical development for the subject, attaining a degree of fulfilment in the public spaces of the state polity, (2) so that Levin’s complex account of the listening subject might be seen as a modification of this Hegelian model and a revision of Adorno’s listening types, (3) so that the pitfalls of ‘false’, egological dealings with others might be scrutinised and countered and (4) so that intersubjectivity be extended to reconcile instances of direct and mediated address predicated on a communicative ethics that involves sensitive cultural encounters which, through discursive activity, promote the beginnings of a revised social reality.
broadcast space looked at Foucault's claim for a heterotopian alternative to linguistically prescribed sites of discourse. It offered a development of his particular variant of the utopian which proposed the likes of the BBC as a legitimate Heterotopian site of representation, but also cultural otherness and inspiration for those ‘trapped’ in the realities of an unhappy home.

The two chapters of PART FOUR | Communication, society & eutopia, immediately preceded this Conclusion and provided a selection of the BBC’s institutional details to set alongside illuminating Gramscian and Habermasian accounts of agency and communicative potentials. In 9 Normative ambitions & institutional histories: Public service broadcasting & The BBC from Reith to Ravenscroft an historical mapping, theoretical reading of Reithian rhetoric, and an account of BBC DJ John Peel joined philosophical elaboration to present arguments for positive hermeneutical readings of music in radio as shaped by the BBC. 10 Justness for you: Habermas, the BBC & the public sphere showed how Habermas affords us the ‘here and now’ facilities for change. Here, utopian impulses and a conceptual, regulatory utopian content of social equity are turned into a communicative praxis of eutopian felicity and goodness. Bronner tells us that to be effective, Utopia must move beyond any reified, transcendent ‘content devoid of form’. It must become a prospective interpretation: “a regulative ideal [where] [t]he formal assumptions of a democracy are seen as prerequisites for an emancipated order.” Bronner concludes: “Utopia, from this perspective, is immanent within ‘justice’ rather than transcendent in its vision of the ‘good’ ” (1994, 351).

11.2 Sensibility, imagination & understanding

As outlined in PART ONE, 2.3, The Kantian faculties of sensibility, imagination and understanding were alighted upon by Marcuse, keen to explicate the way in which one’s own intense cognitive insights in the presence of art’s “sensuous immediacy” were dependent on it being grounded in a wider set of universally shared experiences (1972, 95). Thus for Marcuse, the aesthetic might connect historical reality with imagined alternatives, sensitive to common human desires and values. If such a socio-philosophical and aesthetic theory is to have any real
currency in the present study, we must effect a move from Kantian, aprioristic epistemology and a philosophy of a prior consciousness towards a sociologically inflected model of socialization and a more situated rationality. (It should be noted that this adaptation is a fairly open reading of Kantian aesthetics and epistemology, inflected by critical theory and is not one that directly attends to his analysis of music). This very move is to be witnessed in the work of the Frankfurt School and finds additional efficacy and relevance here by way of the linguistic turn of Habermas. Kant’s epistemological and moral framework still has a relevance, but aesthetic judgement has to be modified. Habermas argues that:

What remains for philosophy, and what is within its capabilities, is to mediate interpretively between expert knowledge and an everyday practice in need of orientation [but in a post-metaphysical climate] it can no longer place the totality of different lifeworlds, which appear only in the plural, into a hierarchy of those which are of greater or lesser value; it is limited to grasping universal structures of lifeworlds in general. (1992b, 17-18)

Habermas is suggesting that social expression, social relations and modes of communication are foregrounded in an ‘earthed’ epistemology given extra weight by history and circumstance. It then becomes possible for subjects to attend to themselves and everyone else too. An intersubjectivity comes into being as the hermetic, a priori self is modified by the inevitability of contingent objective realities. Habermas contends that:

The analysis of the necessary conditions for mutual understanding in general at least allows us to develop the idea of an interactive intersubjectivity, which makes possible both a mutual and constraint-free understanding among individuals [...] This intact intersubjectivity is a glimmer of symmetrical relations marked by free, reciprocal recognition. But this idea must not be filled in as the totality of a reconciled form of life and projected into the future as a utopia. (1992d, 145)

The conclusion of Musical eutopias then returns us to Kant. This however is a move away from aesthetic judgement and categorisation towards a more distinct comprehension of the processes of socially reality. Moral positions and ‘oughts’ which might now inform communicative processes critical diagnoses of ‘what is wrong’ are however preserved, and appear not least as Habermas writes of the four (validity) claims of truth, rightness, truthfulness and meaning, central to his post-Kantian pragmatics of human communicative relations which, in the final
analysis, nevertheless are still measured against non-contingent higher values. In short, pragmatism should never descend into a contingent ethics but be ever mindful of a higher human morality.

Validity claims have a Janus face. As claims, they transcend any local context; at the same time they have to be raised here and now and be de facto recognised [...]. The transcendent moment of universal validity bursts every provinciality asunder; the obligatory moment of accepted validity claims renders them carriers of a context-bound everyday practice [...] a moment of unconditionally is built into factual processes of mutual understanding. (1987b, 322-323)

The three human faculties of sensibility and imagination attended to here, connect subjects to the objective world. Sensibility according to Kant is aesthetic receptivity operating using a priori frameworks that receive sense data. The imagination is recollective and also creative. It is retrospective and also prospective. Finally, we have the Kantian understanding faculty, an every day reason that is one of some assessment and judgement using concepts and sensory experiences. Music radio stimulates all three: it provides new music, stimulates nostalgia, prompts a mimetic empathy, fuels social and aesthetic imaginaries and stimulates the understanding of alterity. As Marcuse has expressed it:

Authentic art never merely acts as a mirror of a class or as an ‘automatic’, spontaneous outburst of its frustrations and desires. The very ‘sensuous immediacy’ which art expresses, presupposes, however surreptitiously (and this is something which most of our popular culture has forgotten) a complex, disciplined and formal synthesis of experience according to certain universal principles which alone can lend to the work more than a purely private significance. (Marcuse in Kearney 1984, 79)

**Music & sensibility**

Music is an acoustic phenomenon made by people for people. Music, however and wherever shared, is itself a socio-cultural ‘space’ where we can belong as musicians and listeners. Heard in communities and in the mass media, it becomes a socio-cultural framework of refusal or conformity. Listening to that music shared in public involves a sort of Kantian sensibility or cognition that is more than just the passive reception of pleasurable vibrations or sensory, Lockean data. It is an immediate experience of ideas and a sort of interpellation of others; a premeditated attentiveness whereby we anticipate (listen out for), hear and register sounds. This is a sensibility in the presence of music that informs us that there is
something or someone other, that is distinct from ourselves. Once this possibility has been created, our faculties of imagination, understanding and reason become active. This is particularly so in the presence of non-lyrical music where music is in effect an 'empty sign'. This, in the context of this study, takes us firstly into the realms of Music's utopia then on to musical eutopias. The immediate phenomenon of music stirs our intuitions, invokes the 'ineffable' and sublime and then attracts our conceptual faculties. Desires, memories and alternative possibilities are stirred and created, as are sublime, supersensible ideas. Their figuration on our part, and moreover, their representation in institutional spaces can be viewed as a symbolic place of enlightenment or, even better, creative action and rational, communicative exchange. This combination of utopian, intuited desire in the presence of the aesthetic and its conceptual education in conjunction with the Kantian understanding may represent a sort of direct, Kantian hypotyposis of a better life. An institution like the BBC might then serve symbolically as another Kantian hypotyposis, as an abstract site, or analogue of ideas beyond phenomenal intuition formed by reason. Thus art provokes sensibility and imagination then the public institution brings ideas, the understanding and reason to bear on this most enigmatic of cultural forms. For Kant, art serves as a sensory and cognitive analogy for reasonable ideas and aspirations requiring a sensible form for everyone to apprehend and attend to by means of allegory or simple discussion.

Music then is art and social fact (Adorno 1997, 304); a socially determined cultural object mediated in a modern, technological world for profit. But it is also a cultural object disseminated with a socio-cultural and socio-philosophical 'purpose'. Art can beget humanistic reason, if not revolution. Exceeding its social facts, music has an insistent, 'sensuous immediacy' (Marcuse); a non-instrumental, a-linguistic, ability to stir and stimulate. Music comes to us via our senses, it touched the individual and it touches the collective - as Marcuse says above, it has 'more than a purely private significance'. Music is thus an intense art that that can free-up, and activate our sensibility. In the presence of aesthetic/acoustic experience, our sensibility draws out an experience of alternative realities and possibilities. Our sensibility responds to music, and joins with our imagination to effect a number of cognitively shaped responses: (1) a dissatisfaction with the extant, present day reality; (2) a negation of the present
using: (a) Memory of things now past (b); an anticipation of better conditions to come; (c) an imagined set of specific possibilities; (d) creative and allegorical responses that re-work, in new aesthetic forms; (e) illusory representations of unknowable phenomena and (f) evasive truths.

Thus we have here, in the presence of music, Marcuse’s intensified, somatic reception which gives on to sensibility and imagination which respond actively in spatial and temporal ways to sensory stimulation. What we have are thoughtful responses to actual experience in the guise of ideas. Such ideas as insightful truths (truths unknowable in any other form) lie beyond phenomenal experience and are themselves given collective expression as additional cultural works or in allegorical form (such as Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony or More’s Utopia). They might too, as has been suggested by Edgar, form the basis for a “Kantian grounding of alterity - that which exceed [one’s] known world.” These ideations promote necessary aesthetic illusions which should stimulate and prompt reflection on our reality and chances. The faculty of understanding, a set of categories, concepts and judgments is extended and refined by the faculty of reason which orders and connects singular aesthetic experiences and consequent ideations which can be promoted and further refined in praxis and discourse to admit of Otherness.

So, art provokes humanitarian reason that is set about with a synthetic, epistemological process and illusions of betterment in the form of language and praxis. Our own sense of desire may come to be understood, and the parallel desires of others comprehended when encountered in spaces charged with achieving such comprehensions. Cognitive reception of art in a historically situated reality, an ‘established order of things’ is joined by the Kantian categories of imagination, understanding and reason.

The essential proposition of this thesis has been that public service radio can deliver, as an intermediary institution and representational space, a ‘good’ cultural array for every listening subject. A listening subject’s cognitive faculties - their sensibility, their imagination (recollective, creative and prospective) and understanding - combine in a Kantian way (as reprised by Marcuse) in the presence of music in radio as perceptual, conceptual and rational knowledge to sharpen a picture of the self, and form one of the wider world. To be precise, the
BBC as a group ‘bearing ideas’ (alternative, Kantian ‘ideas’ and possibilities) affords us Born’s aesthetic and social realms of human discovery (1993a) and process that has been defended here as a eutopia, a provisional utopia of inclusivity and process. The combined cultural array of say Radio 1Xtra and Radio 6 Music, and the popular musicological output of Radio 3 does, as a deliberate consequence of cultural representation, offer some chances for sensibility, imagination and understanding.

Radio, perhaps uniquely, with its substantial investment in music as a draw for listenerships, is a space for a subject’s sensibility and imagination to engage with socio-aesthetic alterity. Positively framed cultural difference can be projected and mimetically shared to invigorate social empathy and equality, rather than simply fuelling international hostility or sustaining the global commerce of late capitalism. What Homer in his work on Jameson has called “a collective experience that will allow us to once more think the alternative to a global capitalist system” (1998, 149).

These processes are formed and experienced amid the flux and realities of Marcuse’s ‘established order reality’, affording his ‘chances’ and Bronner’s immanently situated regulatory insights and actions of historical transcendence. Additionally, as with all utopian conceits and play, it is a site that affords open, allegorical readings of broadcast space within the day-to-day talk of music and radio, cultural policy debate and philosophy. In this evolving institutional site, Western Marxist and Gramscian wishes for a liberated, enlightened self assisted by extant media technology, discourse and agency are fulfilled. Indeed, Marxism says Lukes is all about a “self-transforming present” not an “ideal future” (1984, 158).

We must turn to Bronner, whose thoughts on contemporary utopian principles are (alongside those of Levitas) some of the most thoroughgoing. Bronner writes: “Utopia is [...] asymptotically connected with practice as a phenomenological complex of procedural rules for communication” (1994, 351). In Bronner’s picturing of Utopia running alongside but never fused with the practical, we can perhaps see again the fruitful, eutopian alliance of transcendent possibilities and immanent conditions whereby the one attracts the other. It is in such an idea that we might begin to see a defence for the socio-cultural spaces of
radio, and the BBC in particular, as an essential one, and therefore go a step beyond the equivocations of Bloch, Adorno and Marcuse, and into the pragmatic but ethical reality of Habermas's contemporary order. Bronner adds:

[The utopian] concept retains practical relevance only when impulses towards the 'best life' are symbolically and institutionally mediated and their inherently transcendent character is given a degree of determination. Alternatives to existing institutions and forms of cultural production are concrete only when intertwined with existing interests, some intractable and some open to compromise, which are themselves in need of judgment. (Bronner 1994, 351)

This degree of determination is, for Bronner, effectively a design, a manifestation of an idea. Bronner uses the metaphor of the artistic sketch to advocate the benefits of provisionality and contingency in life. In fact he suggests that "the best life" is a sketch. Neither the drafter and the drawn subject, nor the viewer can know of the final outcome, but together they have a shared interest in working towards a fuller picture. Here's Bronner's metaphor: "Sketches are not paintings [...] They are often little more than half-visible outlines of a seemingly indeterminate content [...] Sketches however retain their inner logic. The best offer constructive insights [and] give a sense of direction. The sketch serves as a set of coordinates" (1994, 352).

Even now, in the face of asynchronous broadcasting and debate about the purpose of public broadcasting, radio technology might well provide conditions to both use and transcend the material and social present: capitalism and technological relations might still contain the germ of a sketch to transform or progress beyond extant social relations and ideological pressures.16

Music's utopia & imagination

As musician Eddie Prévost stated, "A piece of music is a precept of a particular possible world [...] It is the possible existence of other worlds, even the inkling that other worlds can be thought of, that makes possible the break with the hegemonic determinism of industrial clock-time" (1995, 35). This may be a compensatory 'recollection' of an actual anterior personal state (a lost domestic world, moment of authenticity, or condition of personal equanimity) recreated by the Kantian imagination, or it might be a more anticipatory image of something
yet to be, 'seen' in the mind and felt in the body. Here is our Blochian hunger for a past place of security, an abstract utopia - lost, or at least conceived of in body and mind with reference to the visceral and psychological. When these felt and imagined 'desires' are 'educated', set about with language, and understood by the listening subject as external musical expressions, Kant's active imagining of the objective world of others, and Bloch's, socially-directed concrete utopia give on to Born's imaginaries as outlined in PART THREE, 8.8.

The BBC, understanding & eutopia

When and where conditions are right for this sort of sensibility and imagination, a good deal of thinking and talking can take place and a rational, Kantian understanding ensues. New musical forms are heard by older generations, and new listeners access archived materials. Yes, there's a possibility of discursive cooptions, but a discursive and discusive freedom is instigated too, away from any mainstream authority, or compromising setting of power.

Thinking and talking constructs concepts and conceits that seek to make sense of actual experience: what is heard and imagined to exist. It is not a metaphysical exercise, but one rooted in the lived. It is where an Aristotelian noesis, an active thinking occurs. This is a use of concepts that avoids any predetermined finality of Hegel, or the linguistic reification feared by Adorno. Thus we have music, and music in radio, which is at once beyond explanation and at the same time caught in language with a social task to perform. The Kantian, 'purposeful purposelessness' (Critique of Judgement Section I, Book I § 10-17 1952, 483-91) is one where human creative expression, collective representation and dialectical encounter with others assists in the cognitive subjectification and intersubjective dialogue between mediating broadcasters and listeners. This meets Adorno's demands that art should serve a purpose beyond that of creating surplus and exchange values. Whilst this can be explained with reference to music's utopia, it is better to set it in the 'established order reality' of Marcuse, where just such a reality offers none of music's promises, but chances, and their reasoned articulation; a set of resources and agents creating broadcast spaces filled with processes, both materialistic and philosophical, and an unending set of dialectical transformations.
Music, sense & reason

This thesis has argued it is credible to view musics as all at once natural and immediate bodily expression, cultural repository and intellectual substrate. Imparting subjective expression through our voices or by playing a musical instrument to effect a lyrical, sonorous or rhythmic music alerts us to the physiological and emotive power of organised sounds. Music as part impulsive gesture and part historically and culturally structured form, inserts performers and listeners into a familiar ‘place’ of close, meaningful ‘association’. Such conventions, glosses and commodifications can of course overlay the spontaneous, so that it might now be difficult to locate what might be termed unmediated, ‘uncodified’, pre-lingual demonstrations of singular gesture or social harmony. Yet whilst music is today integrated into channels of production and dissemination, there are few who would doubt the residual if ‘ineffable’ potency of many musics as a still unadministered human resource. This makes musics a target for a critical hermeneutics anxious to highlight or imagine its pre-modern credentials and future prospects. How is this shifting, often contested balance between the sense and reason of music to be understood?

Norris tells us that: “For Schopenhauer especially, music gave access to a realm of primordial experience - the Will in all its ceaseless strivings and desires - which the other arts [...] could only express at a certain distance” (1989a, 309).

Music can certainly afford Marcuse’s ‘sensuous immediacy’; a true engagement with will, instincts and the ecstatic. Conceptual reification and ideological choreography can be avoided for a while as we ourselves listen, sing and dance.

But Schopenhauer argued we should also seek to transcend the Will via reason to reach greater insights. This move from sense to reason can, suggests Simon Reynolds in his account of the ecstatic in Rock music, be understood as a translation from Barthes’s transient “jouissance” into his “plaisir” - where fleeting feelings of an exposed but ultimately larger self are fixed and articulated in a cultural discourse of “secure enjoyment of identity through time” (1990, 9). In short, music might be said to move us so that we first of all feel and
then articulate pleasure, loss and hope. In music the past can be recalled, the present enjoyed and tomorrow anticipated - and all three discursively addressed. Reynolds resists any comprehending account of music’s aesthetic surplus in favour of the somatic and the confounding that is an a-conceptual phenomenon that “holds (a) culture together” (1990, 10-11). Yet his call is a belated, forlorn call, a call to some degree contradicted by his own act of writing. Music’s excess is its utopia of feeling, subjective impact and consequent site of self-reflection and reason set within an historical, social context. This combination of the sensuous, rational and pragmatic allows us to use music as a utopian trope to first of all detect then effect an intersubjectivity and praxis. In music per se, there is no ‘as of right’ ascent to the Hegelian Absolute, nor any teleological drift to a more mundane yet equally benign socialism through simple acoustic exposure. Humanistic improvement can only happen in the presence of music that is felt and heard by the listener then coupled with a utopian trope and universal reason.

Eutopia & Kantian principles

Eutopia, for the purposes of this study has been argued to be a ‘good place’. One cannot legislate for meaningful art, but one can legislate for its likely conditions of generation and dissemination. What do we mean by a good place and space? Unlike the utopian place of impossibility, a ‘good’ place is, after Kant, two things: (1) places and a space of public, common sense order (sensus communis); (2) a place of ‘concepts and principles’, a place of laudable, absolute worth, use or end where we can hear affirmative/ideological culture but also autonomous/free art. Caygill usefully explains that for Kant in his Logik of 1800, principles were points of departure and may be physical, ethical or logical. All philosophical principles for Kant were so-called acroamata (literally, something heard): discursive, temporally situated principles which, says Caygill are “analogies of experience, postulates of empirical thought […] open to constant discursive challenge and are legitimated through language” Caygill (1995, 46-7; 332-5).

What we have with music and principled discussion is a Kantian-cum-Habermasian opening onto a wider world where aesthetic affinities bring into focus cultural difference and the comprehension of ‘musics’. Here we have what is surely Kant’s “rationally determined faculty of desire”, that is, a disinterested,
absolute apperception of a sensuous kind, a second and higher *sensus communis* which through art, reason and language effects intersubjectivity and a resultant subjectification as, without prejudice, we put “ourselves in the position of everyone else.”

In sum: Music proffers agreeableness but also disinterested sensations beyond instrumental reason and immediate, personal pleasure and gives on to a second *sensus communis* employing *a priori* reason to both sense and then thought of the other. It thus has, additionally, a critical rationality developed to ‘oversee’ the senses and imagination. Art’s utopia shows us another place where mind and body become reconciled, *eutopia shows us where this ‘good’ can be delivered, figured or conceived*. We can turn to Karl Dalhaus who has written of Kantian subjectivity running alongside *sensus communis*:

The driving force behind the idea of ‘music’ (in the singular) - itself a result of ‘history’ ( in the singular) - was the classical utopia of humanity that, in Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* [*Kritik der Urteilskraft*], formed the basis of an esthetics in which judgements of taste are ‘subjective’ but nevertheless ‘universal’ to the extent that subjectivities strive to converge in a *sensus communis*, a ‘common sense’. If, however, humanity finds expression less in the discovery of a common substance than in the principle of respecting [...] untranscendable difference, one remains true to the idea of ‘music’ (in the singular) by relinquishing it as a concept of substance in order to reinstate it as a regulative principle of mutual understanding. (1998, 239-44)

**11.3 Utopian & Eutopian problematics**

It would be remiss not to raise the problematics associated with utopian striving and this study’s eutopian conceit. This is in part achieved with reference to Levitas (1990, Chapters 7 and 8). She concedes that one immediate difficulty is the absence in current utopian scholarship of a singular definiton of Utopia. She ascribes this to the interdisciplinary nature of utopian studies and seeks to answer this challenge by asking whether Utopia is a literary concern or a formal proposal of some alternative in another guise? Is Utopia she asks, simply a detailed socio-political description of ideal content, or is it, instead, an abstract philosophical function or critical device? The implied answer is one dependent on one’s academic interests, political outlook and ambitions. Definitions and deployment of the term are always going to be predicated on the sorts of questions one asks, and
the solutions chosen in the face of everyday difficulties and inequalities. Whose emancipation is being sought? What form would that take? The danger of converting a utopian prescription for human happiness into a dystopia or Mannheimian ideology is a real one.

In order to get at the root of the conceit, Levitas identifies desire as a motivating emotion allied to all utopian propositions, but cautions us against identifying any basic human propensity to imagine and dream something other than the facts of reality with any essentialist tendency towards "utopianising" or any "ultimate, universal utopia" (1990, 181). She writes:

> Utopia is a social construct which arises not from a ‘natural’ impulse subject to social mediation, but as a socially constructed response to an equally socially constructed gap between needs and wants generated by a particular society and the satisfactions available to and distributed by it. (1990 182-3)

Utopian images and critiques are situated, culturally and politically elaborated constructs generated and actioned by ourselves as biological entities and agents in a modern environment. They are to be analysed as such. Whether Utopia is now, only a relativist exercise in intersubjectivity, or a reinvigorated mode of abstract desire free from the need to be attainable from where we are today, there is arguably a role for this study’s, elaboration of the eutopian formulation.

Eutopia's own problematic is one centred on its existence in the socio-political present as it is thus potentially compromised as it might just as easily legitimise as critique the status quo. However, in the case of a eutopian music radio, it may originate from a political and technocratic centre, but it carries highly effective utopian texts in the form of music’s utopia. Moreover, it is an inclusive site of dialectical, discursive and epistemological value wherein human capacities can be figured and fulfilled. The inclusivity, independent agents and conversation of a good place, precludes the domination of any one faction. In aesthetic terms, eutopian public service radio mixes the here and now pleasures of popular musics, with higher notions of freedom tempered by reason and empathy which allows for a sober consideration of our own frustrations and futures and those of a wider world.
11.4 Omissions

In the preliminary stages of research, many additional topics and issues hove into view as music, broadcasting and the subject were examined. What follows is a brief account of some of those subjects and issues consciously omitted.

Television, it might be argued is central to the critical study of popular musics because of its ability to represent the spectacular nature of live performance and promotional video. Music television certainly constitutes a good deal of commercial and public service output, and is significant, not least, for adolescents sensitive to subcultural dress codes. However, its ocularcentric (rather than auditory) concerns; and the fact of television’s own extensive critical literature, has led to its exclusion in this study. Literature and film can be regarded as expressive, rational forms capable of supporting utopian and eutopian interpretation. Indeed, Caryl Flinn (1992) has amply demonstrated this in her work. Again, a separate specialist literature and a wish to avoid dilution or complexity has led to their general absence here. This thesis recognises the likelihood that illegal drug-taking within counter-cultural scenes may induce individual apprehension of ‘peaceable spaces’ and may indeed enhance collective feelings of well-being. Underground publications and communal living too, may be added to the list of eutopian arenas. Such considerations are regarded here as reactive socio-cultural factors pendant to the more central concerns of protracted musical policy disseminated locally, regionally and nationally over time by permanent cultural institutions. Whilst inspirational and colourful components, space has dictated that they are not given sustained analysis. Commercial and independent sound recording directly supplies content for music radio. Where relevant, instances of sound recording are referred to in brief, but a wish to avoid an over-complex set of musical media and practices in need of analysis, sees its omission. Overseas public service broadcasters and their interest in popular culture are undoubtedly intriguing and deserve close study, (consider state broadcasting in Canada, The Netherlands, Italy and Germany), but they are omitted here on the grounds of available space. Contemporary Internet and digital musical media offer a fascinating suite of issues and debates which are, by no means external to many of those in this study. It has largely been left to the reader and to other scholars to reflect on the pursuit of eutopian musical spaces as
mapped in the present study, and to consider such matters in the context of MySpace.com and MP3 music file sharing. Gender issues are not overtly addressed in this study, even though it is acknowledged that historically, divergent levels of male and female interest and participation in the medium of radio require further analysis and explanation.

11.5 Findings & general conclusions

On completion, I have come to appreciate the immense respect and fascination afforded music amongst the many sociological and philosophical investigators who view organised sounds as both an ideological trap and site of utopian freedom.

It seems that musical works and the textual, discursive readings of these works are inseparable. This linkage presents us with an ongoing tension: that between music's ineffability and its representation and examination in language. To avoid a romanticised, reverential 'silence' in the presence of music, we must continue to talk and write about it. In respect of Utopia, I have begun to trace out its shift as a literary conceit and transcendent condition in socialist thought, to become a simple conceit and ethical spur to benign, day-to-day social communication.

We must of course proceed with caution. Born sensibly suggests that music:

[O]ffers little resistance to discursive invasion and universalizing ideology. This analysis points, then to the omnipresence and centrality of metaphor and discourse as mediations of music-as-sound, and the need for attention, to their arbitrary and specific cultural character, their role in strategies of authority, legitimation and power, as well as for analysis of their intertextual connections with other, non musical realms of discourse, other areas of knowledge and practice. (1995, 20)

Street points us in the direction of Norris who has observed that “theoretical reflection [...] forfeits any claim to emancipated knowledge unless it show as willingness to acknowledge its own existence as ‘a product of textual understanding’ ” (1998, 71).
Underpinning the whole of this study has indeed been the relationship of two means of persuasive expression: music and language. The former has been held to be a site of the ineffable, extra-linguistic realm of direct and free creative expression. In musical participation, spontaneity occurs and authenticity can be sensed, much more so than in linguistic concepts and discourse where inevitably, there’s a constraining set of verbal equivalents tying music down. Prévost writes:

Sound can be laden with layers of meaning. It is a medium of subliminal impact as well as overt significance. Herein lies its real power and energy. Any appreciation or critique of music is inadequate unless it tackles this issue. (1995, 40)

However, in his praise of music’s provisionality and liberatory qualities, Prévost sets down the following challenge:

Our frames of reference, the tools we use to see and to get a grip upon the world, are themselves, embedded in ways of thinking [...] One of the deep paradoxes facing us may be that we need a concept to keep us free from the paralysing forces of unquestioned conceptualization. (1995, 5)

Might Utopia continue to exist as a concept that circles and protects the felt and imagined goals of musical experiences? And if so, might music and the concept of the utopian be somewhat protected from ideological incursions in a eutopian setting?

11. 6 Why should we turn to public service music radio?

A community is more than a medium. Broadcasting [...] cannot be more important than dialogue. (Big Buzz respondent no. 118, 2003)

It’s merely one voice in many. It’s hardly central - no media is! (Big Buzz respondent no. 46, 2003)

Even relatively emancipated political institutions do not necessarily generate emancipatory culture or expressions of subjectivity. An exclusive commitment to justice leaves the culture industry, no less than most regressive moves, intact. (Bronner 1994, 351)

As we can see, not everyone accepts the likelihood of immanent change. Bernstein argues that there is “a naive Lukácsian optimism involved in the belief that mass
media in reflecting social reality will, in so doing, deflate their own products, and, despite themselves, become vehicles for social critique” (Adorno 2001a, 23).

The thesis has certainly considered the arguments that consider broadcast culture to be less a eutopian space than an ideological instrument for a ‘well-tempered’ citizenry. Certainly, the more certain socio-cultural and educative potentials discerned in broadcasting are of course frequently confounded, diluted and inflected by mundane commercial concern and external political ideology. Consequently, any eutopian or utopian ‘condition’ may indeed be argued to be unattainable if not simply illusory - reflections of bourgeois-liberal or liberal-democratic desire - far short of any neutrality or political cogency.

Can the BBC provide radical pop and a palatable, non-commodified avant-garde? In serving as a patron of the arts driven by a particular set of ethics I believe it may have done so already, though Paddison doubts it is ever possible (1996, 104-5). Are we to conclude that state-sponsored cultural production can only ever be a fresh supply of product? As Benhabib has argued (1986), no one institution in a postmodern society, can lay claim to any singular perspective derived from a universal understanding. Thus legitimacy is compromised and the place of action shifts from a centre to a periphery. But, if this action is socially valid, why not at least make it subsequently audible for a wider audience as a Foucauldian Heterotopia?

Morris remarks:

Since art cannot replace authority or the political, a democratic society composed of competing, conflictual interests and diverse identities can best be governed in association with an institutional recognition of what is required for an undamaged selfhood that respects its aesthetic and non-identical elements and thus group identity. (2001, 188)

11. 7 Final words

The musical utopias and eutopias posited in this thesis are surely cultural spaces within the public sphere ordained by the state at the behest of the people. They are rational but also imaginative and revivifying spaces for the population where
repositories of past and new musical activity bring about cultural improvement, expressive liberty and intersubjectivity. Bronner suggests that:

The ideology of a given period is [...] never entirely ‘false’ as in ‘false consciousness’, since a set of ‘not-yet realized’ utopian possibilities remains ‘latent’ and waiting for self-conscious appropriation. The new society in short will not just ‘objectively’ appear. ‘Subjective’ action is necessary to interpret the unfulfilled possibilities of the past and reshape the repressed needs of humanity as they appear in the manifold set of cultural products through which history is understood. (1994, 68)

Some have come directly to the support of radio technology and public service culture that has taken advantage of the opportunity to address the many.

Frith makes a bold claim for the medium:

I believe that radio was the most significant twentieth-century mass medium. It was radio that transformed the use of domestic space, blurring the boundary between the public and the private, idealizing the family hearth as the site of ease and entertainment, establishing the rhythm of everydayness: the BBC ‘Children’s Hour,’ ‘breakfast Time,’ ‘Friday Night is Music Night!’ It was radio that shaped the new voice of public intimacy, that created Britain as a mediated collectivity, that gave ordinary people a public platform [...] Where radio led television simply followed. And it was radio that established the possibility of music as an ever-playing soundtrack to our lives. (2003, 96)

Born has already told us that the BBC is to “provide a unifying space in which plurality can be performed” (2004, 517), and calls for renewed trust and belief in the professionalism of an “ethically-imbu ed corporate being” (2004, 495). She concludes by seeing BBC activity that in her view “foments” and “forms” part of civil society. It “constructs our vivid social present and our social memory” (2004, 512-3). One self-completion respondent at The Big Buzz event, 2003, wrote that: “If the alternative is US-style corporate stations that respond to (and shape) viewer pressure, then I am more than happy to accept the BBC. Frankly the BBC is one of the main reasons I do not emigrate” (Big Buzz respondent no. 124, 2003).

If we wish to study that heady mix of culture, power, capitalism and the mass media, we can do worse than draw on the post-metaphysical engagements of critical theory. If we also adopt a pragmatic view on the chances offered by reality and temper visions of Utopia with those of a ‘eutopia’ then perhaps a continuing, humanistic dialectic through music can at least be formed, articulated and acted upon. We might at this point turn again to a powerful reading of ideology and
Utopia from 1936, and recall Mannheim’s ‘Fourth Form of the Utopian mentality: The Socialist-Communist Utopia.’ He wrote:

It is not sufficient to have a good intention in the abstract and to postulate in the far-off future a realized realm of freedom [...] It is necessary rather to become aware of the real conditions (in this case economic and social) under which such a wish-fulfilment can at all become operative. The road which leads from the present to this distant goal must also be investigated in order to identify those forces in the contemporary process whose immanent, dynamic character, under our direction, leads step by step towards the realized idea. (1960, 217)

It should be noted that Mannheim was a Frankfurt University colleague of Horkheimer. Mannheim is important because he extended the reading of ideology to embrace the idea that any framework of thought was constrained and tainted by its historical and social settings. The challenge for everyone is to think beyond the present. One way to do this is to access utopian desire but also adopt the negative dialectics of Adorno. Whilst Adorno’s view of culture and society is one of regression, that of Mannheim and Habermas is one of optimism and ascendancy. This range of thought, when carefully deployed does offer a sensitive means of progressive critique.

This study has exposed the proximity, or existence of a eutopia: an actual place of praxis, a provisional, sometime concrete utopia that also encompasses dialectical construction of self and community. Such a good place informs personal desire, acknowledges others, and through linguistic and rational address provides a dialectic that is future-orientated. In other words, a mediating institutional entity for individual and society still able to meet authentic need and preserve ethical behaviour akin to the Gemeinschaft of Tönnies. Its significance lies also in its power as a referent or group of referents in contrast to the regulative idea of ‘Utopia’ that can be felt and thought but not attained. In focusing on the history of the BBC’s early-twentieth century formation, national role, cultural agendas and postwar output of popular musics, Musical eutopias has sought to identify and provide a number of readings of state-sponsored popular musics that can supplement current debates addressing the continuance of public service broadcast output in its present form and set out to ‘unpack’ and evaluate the view that there is a continuing need for in-common listening by patient listeners as a bulwark against narrowcasting, instrumental deregulation and solipsism. Ultimately, ‘musical eutopias’ are perhaps more critical conceit than immanent,
self-explanatory, a-lingual devices, but for their attachment to the somatic and immediate nature of musical generation do surely play a role in any humanistic programme. Levitas had challenged us to defend eutopian possibilities:

If we have no idea how the world might be transformed, how we might get what we want, we may cease to be able to imagine alternatives [...] the loss of hope will end in the loss of desire; next come senility and death. (Levitas 1984, 29)

Here, there seems no alternative to aesthetic and political intersubjectivity. However, Levitas later offers us a revised, but still postmodern reading of possibilities which retreats to the body and away from places and spaces. She withdraws from any utopian programme and even any intermittent dialectical schema and reconnects us with human desire. With Foucauldian concerns for the body as a site of resistance, she seems to want to limit and locate opportunities to a sort of critical embodiment, a retreat from any wider cultural or social reality.

If utopian thought of all kinds is expressive of a desire for a better way of being, its projection onto the body, rather than the body politic, may be seen as an important retreat from hope, at least social hope, to desire. (Levitas 2001, 34)

Whilst this is perhaps a welcome (re)tum to somatic aspiration, it does seem to neglect discursive potentials and to some extent, as a discursive ‘ordering’ of that which is felt, seems to argue against itself.

Musical participation and listening mediated by broadcasting may be deemed by some (Barnard 1989) to be the construction of an atomised community or diaspora of the air. Certainly it can be argued that paternalistic programming does not encourage a mature, thinking for ourselves, as Kant and Adorno might demand. But for others (Anderson 1991) there is the construction and sustaining of such ‘imagined communities’ of listeners wherein traditional ties of belief, dynastic rule and even nationhood are either replaced or supplemented by a cultural community facilitating some secular understanding of the contingencies and dilemmas of life.

The next record played on air may not be literally ‘especially for you’. It could however, conceivably be for ‘us’ all. Consequently, even though the broadcast model is, as this is being written, dying if not yet dead, a majority of us may just still be listening-in to hear culture, rational discourse and each other. It is the valuing and preservation of this ‘in-common’ exposure to culture and 'good
quality' programming generally as afforded by the immediate, in-parallel broadcast model (at one remove from any commercial considerations), which will give depth and credence to the intersubjective and discussive activity of post-broadcast public spheres comprising podcasts, chat rooms, message boards, email and SMS dialogue.

Might the best of the one-to-many model combine with a new, technologically determined democratic turn to effect a good place of sensibility, imagination and understanding? To witness this, public service delivery needs to be technologically prepared and well-funded. One half of this equation is already in place as the BBC responds to external pressures for it to drive digital reception amongst audiences. Adequate funding not only requires political determination to preserve the licence fee or some twenty-first century modification (perhaps as a mixed funding model akin to that of Channel 4), but moreover a willingness to commission popular, high-grade content and promote in-common listening contexts as contingent, 'enlightening' sites of cultural rather than commercial exchange for subjects and society where inclusive audience engagement and a Habermasian public participation, trustworthy guidance and independent scrutiny continue to take place. Media technologies of whatever form, origin and legitimacy will remain a source of creative potential, dissemination and recall. Levin offers us a positive reading of technological potentials:

The increasing technocratic 'rationalisation' of our society, and what Habermas calls the 'systematic colonisation' of the lifeworld, may be significant factors in the deterioration of our ability to listen and hear one another. But I think we should also bear in mind that there are other factors, some of them generated by technology itself, which work against this tendency, actually increasing and refining our communicative possibilities. (1989, 113)

Levin moves us beyond critical theory's objections to mediation to see technology as a McLuhanesque extension of the human body and mind for musicians, programme makers, listeners and not least, thinkers themselves. Broadcast radio's 'music and electricity', and its places and spaces may no longer hold the monopoly on communication, but its lessons as to what is unique about being human today, namely the desire for free expression, the formation of individual identity and the community impulse of mutuality, may already have begun to seep into the more rational and ethical circuits of the cybersphere.
Notes

1. "The goal is not to arrive at the Truth with certainty but rather to produce adequate, practical knowledges" (Hardt and Weeks 2000, 23).

2. For an account of new media virtualities that touch on these ideas, see Poster (2006).

3. "In reality it is evil which triumphs, and there are only islands of good where one can find refuge for a brief time" (Marcuse 1979, 47).

4. Levin writes: "In listening to others, accepting them in their irreducible difference, we help them to listen to themselves, to heed the speech of their own body of experience, and to become, each one, the human being he or she most deeply wants to be. Moreover, by listening well to ourselves and to others, we can resist false, ideological interpretations of 'need' and steer public life towards the fulfillment of more authentic needs" (1989, 88).


6. Norris refers us to the active, Kantian imagination "where imagination is conceived as an active, form-giving faculty, a power that to some degree involved in our most elementary acts of cognition" (1990a, 216). S. M. Weber defends the aesthetic whilst articulating the role of concepts and communication in Kantian thought. She writes: "Kant begins his presentation of the dialectic of aesthetic judgment by noting that one feels impelled to dispute about matters of aesthetic taste even though it is impossible to settle such a dispute would involve turning the aesthetic into a form of knowledge, in which all particulars may be subsumed under concepts. This is another way of saying, I believe, that aesthetic experience is inseparable from talk about the aesthetic object. [...] the aesthetic object [...] Kant says [...] generates an infinitude of ideas, and it is this [...] which means that it can never be subordinated to a specific concept. Hence critical discussion and aesthetics as a philosophical discipline remain subordinate in turn to the particular aesthetic object" (1976, 98).

7. Music raises the passions, rather than serves as a representational, programmatic form that prompts internal, abstract ideas, i.e. music, says Norris "lacked any determinate content" (1990b, 211).

8. Norris refers us to Lyotard’s account of the sublime: "For Lyotard [...] the sublime figures as a strictly unthinkable category [...] but one which none the less exists (like Kant's 'ideas of pure reason') in a realm of an as-yet unrealised future potential. It is precisely by virtue of this tentative, open-ended character that democracy functions -in Lyotard’s view - as a discursive space where various narratives, language-games or ruses of legitimising reason are able to coexist without any one-truth-claim assuming ultimate power" [Norris is referring to Lyotard's 'The Idea of History' in Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington and Robert Young (eds.), Post-structuralism and the Question of History CUP 1987)] (1990b, 215).

9. Norris tells us about Kant’s view on the French Revolution. He saw a distinction between the "ultimate ideals - republican justice, universal peace, the progress of mankind toward a state of enlightened world government - which as yet had no demonstrable grounding [...] For Kant these were ideas of pure reason, and therefore not concepts that could ever be translated into the here-and-now of revolutionary action" (1990a, 217). He continues: "For Kant, as Lyotard reads him, '[T]he progress of a common being for the better is not to be judged on the basis of empirical intuition, but on the basis of signs.' That is to say, events like the French Revolution have a capacity to signify those ultimate values of progress, democracy and freedom despite what must appear as a sequence of disheartening set-backs and failures in the practical realm [...] To interpret them as signs in this specific sense - as what Kant calls 'hypotyposes', or ideas that possess a meaning quite apart from from all present or empirical evidence is to place the sublime at the very heart of socio-political thinking" (1990a, 219).

10. With regard to the ineffable, Norris traces an understanding of the Kantian sublime with reference to Edmund Burke's 1757 account of beauty and the sublime: whereby we observe "The highest reach of the creative imagination, that point where the mind, having failed to objectify its sense of wonder in the face of some overwhelming experience, falls back upon its own inward resources and thus gain access - albeit it momentarily - to the realm of 'supersensible ideas'. Hence the increasing tendency of thinkers after Burke to forms of sensuous cognition, and opening (as Kant was to argue) on to the realm of ethics or practical reason" (1990a, 210-1).
11. Kant writes in the *Critique of Judgement*: “By an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought [...] (concept) being adequate to it, and which language consequently can never get quite on level terms or render completely intelligible [...] an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea” Section I Book II § 49 (1952, 528).


13. Cf. Morris: “The mimetic receptivity of an undamaged identity is the presupposition of the fellow feeling, compassion, sympathy, and love toward other people [...] There is no doubt that this entails an extraordinary challenge, for it requires individual moral, ethical, and aesthetic self-formation (autonomy) and self-actualization (freedom) as well as requiring non-repressive collective identities that encapsulate intersubjective/subject-object relations of engagement (political life). It raises a (Hegelian) question of the proper mediation of individual and the polity” (2001, 188). Morris convincingly concludes by outlining a fulfillment of utopian aspiration built on a linkage of Adorno’s aesthetic, Marcuse’s new sensibility and Habermas’s communicative action (2001,199).


15. Jameson writes: “One wants to insist very strongly on the necessity of the reinvention of the Utopian vision in any contemporary politics: this lesson, which Marcuse first taught us, is part of the legacy of the sixties which must never be abandoned in any reevaluation of that period and of our relationship to it.” He then cautions: “On the other hand, it also must be acknowledged that Utopian visions are not yet themselves a politics” (1991, 159).

16. Kellner cited in McGuigan writes; “My argument is that, first broadcasting media like radio and television, and now computers, have produced new public spheres and spaces for information, debate and participation that contain both the potential to reinvigorate democracy and to increase the dissemination of criticism and progressive ideas” (McGuigan 1996, 189).

17. Kant in his *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* wrote: “By the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective. [...] This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else [...] The following maxims of common human understanding [...] may [...] serve to elucidate its fundamental propositions. They are these: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently. The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought, the second that of enlarged thought. [...] The first is the maxim of a never-passive reason. [...] This [...] still indicates a man of enlarged mind: if he detaches himself from the subjective personal conditions of his judgement, [...] and reflects upon his own judgement from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others)” *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, Section 1 Book II § 40 (1952, 518-19).

Weber explains: Kant’s aesthetic is “defined through negation, in terms of focus of experience which it is not identical to but nevertheless has something in common with. This is how it can be seen as linking the senses and reason. The essence of the aesthetic as Kant sees it is a paradox - subjective universality or sensus communis. Furthermore, the basic structure of the aesthetic as Kant sees it is reflective: the aesthetic subject’s experience of the aesthetic object includes his reflection upon the state of his own psyche, and the aesthetic judgement is based on the reflective discovery of his pleasure. At the same time, the aesthetic subject abstracts from his own position to put himself in the position of a generalized other and judge whether that of the other would presumably also feel pleasure in the particular object” (1976, 97).
Appendices

Appendix A: *The BBC Radio Wales “Big Buzz” event & questionnaire 2003*

Appendix B: Popular musics defined

Details of the event come from Paul Ford in an interview recorded June 19, 2003 11.00am - 12.00pm and from handwritten notes made at an initial meeting. Ford was a BBC Strand Producer aka ‘senior producer.’ B. Mus., Leeds University. He organised The Big Buzz stage programme.

BB 2003
Dates: Swansea July 5; Cardiff Bay: July 27

History of BB
Cardiff County Council in 2000 organised a youth event in 2000. BBC Radio Wales were invited to do an outside broadcast. Aim: to attract children who would bring parents. It showcased modest local performers. In 2001 the team decided to “secure some [bigger] acts”. 2002: The band Hear’say performed. At its peak, around 7-8,000 people were in attendance.

The event of 2003 featured:
Marc Almond, dancers and tape. Blazin’ Squad - a ten piece British boy band. Fewer hours of broadcasting this year. Cardiff Council provided the infrastructure (security etc.) and guidelines. The BBC determined the use of venue space. There were two stages: main stage run by BBC Radio Wales where there was a big turn over of acts who did three numbers; and a tent where longer sets - overseen by the council - were performed. Other attractions to cultivate ‘a festival vibe’ included a Motorcycle stunt man; ‘Sumo’ wrestling; a fun fair and information stands. BB had two key aims: attracting a youth audience and involvement with Cardiff area community groups one called Promo another called Community Music Wales.

Location details & date:
“From 10:30am till late and live all day on BBC Radio Wales. Tickets: FREE, so bring your friends and family. A spectacular day of music and events for all the family to celebrate Midsummer Day in 21st Century style!” (Big Buzz flyer copy).
Method:
With the permission of the BBC Wales Big Buzz event organisers (who agreed on my behalf to notify Cardiff City Council of this survey), self-completion questionnaires were distributed by hand during the hours of 2:30pm and 10:00pm to 150 male and female event attendees deemed to be between the ages of 15- 40. Individuals and groups were approached and addressed face to face. Questionnaires were given to all those who expressed overt interest, or who were otherwise likely to be motivated by the prospect of articulating their views on the event and on the BBC.

Participants were told of the questionnaire's independent status, and invited to complete the questionnaire after the event so that thoughtful responses reflecting their views on the event and on their relationship and evaluation of the BBC might be generated. A stamped and addressed envelope was provided for the return of the questionnaires. A prize in the form of a draw for compact disc tokens to the value of £25 was instituted to encourage completed returns. This was won by respondent number 38.

Results:
Responses
Replies received: 28 (18.7% of total distributed)
Male: 18 (64.28% of returns)
Female: 10 (35.71% of returns)

Results quantifying respondent's age groups
15 - 19 (2); 20 - 24 (5); 25 - 29 (3); 30 - 34 (7); 35 - 39 (6); 40 - 44 (3); 45 - 49 (2).

Length of stay at The Big Buzz event; 15 mins - 1 hour (2); 1 hour - 2 hours (5)
More than 2 hours (21).
Residential data
Cardiff & environs: (18); Other areas of Wales: Pontypool (1); Other UK origin: Bristol (1), Poole (2) Hertfordshire (2); Further afield (0); plus “village” (1), “city” (3).

Occupations
Student (4); Graduate (1); Consultant (1); P.A. (1); Accountant (2); Service controller (1); Marketing (2); IT/online services/technical support (5); HR (1); Beauty Therapist (1); Civil engineering/quantity surveying (2); Teacher (1); Musician/entertainer/artist (3); Management (2); Mental health worker (1).

*****

Qualitative responses reflecting commonly expressed views
NB: numbers in brackets in every question below are the respondent's questionnaire numbers.

Section 1, Q. 10. Sample responses
(Why do you think BBC Radio Wales stage the Big Buzz event?)

BBC matters/public service matters
“To support BBC and BBC Radio brand within the community as part of broadcasting edict” (146).
“Public service” (61).
“I assume the BBC [...] is allocated a certain amount of money which must be used to provide free events for the general public which provides its funding” (63).
“To give itself (BBC Radio Wales) an image less associated with highbrow art (the BBC in general)” (140).
“Has an obligation to provide ‘community’ events as an objective or condition of its service?” (114).
“To bring enjoyment to the community” (4).
BBC Radio Wales matters

"To raise awareness of BBC Radio Wales" (146).

"Win back listeners" (146).

"Advertising and announcements provides certain amount of hype for the radio station" (63).

"A PR stunt to vainly justify the licence fee, even though they present an almost identical diet of cheap commercial 'pop' [...] as the most crass commercial stations" (38).

"Compete with other local radio stations who cover other events" (31).

"Because they enjoy it as much as we do!" (145).

Civic matters

"To be part of the Cardiff Festival" (60).

"Increase the tourism to Cardiff and [...] Bay area" (12).

Welsh aspects

"To bring acts to Wales" (60).

"Provide a showcase for up and coming Welsh acts" (61).

Creative & cultural matters

"To promote local talent on a big stage" (60).

"To be cultural. An event like this always brings people together, creating a happier place and happier people. It would have been better to have [had ] more [cultural] diversity” (48).

"To be part of an ailing music industry” (118).

Other

"For the children [...] allowing parents a bit of a break” (48).

Section 2. Listening Choices

Stations named as ones listened to at least once a week for music (NB: many named several)

BBC: Radio 1 (18); Radio 2 (12); Radio Wales (7); Radio 3 (2); Radio Cymru (1); Radio Solent (1); Radio WM (1).
Commercial stations
Red Dragon FM (8); Vibe 101 (5); Real Radio (4); 2CR FM (2); Virgin (2);
Classic FM (2); Bridge FM (1); Fox FM (1); XFM (1)
Galaxy FM (1); GWR (1).

Section 3, Q. 1a).
“The BBC in general is a bit stuffy & arrogant” (It’s too serious & unaccountable)
Agree: 7, Disagree: 20 No opinion expressed: 1

Selection of responses that agree to be found in Chapter 9

Selection of responses that disagree
“Whilst the BBC maybe a little arrogant, it is also the authority (credible source) for news etc. Radio 1 is [a ] (?)service promoting new talent as well as established acts” (146).
“With the introduction of new [TV] channels [...] there is a greater choice of viewing and an alternative to more traditional programmes [...] However the station can sometimes be a bit ‘full of its own self-importance’ and can come across as the self-appointed moral guardian” (83).
“It simply isn’t true, take the Glasto [Glastonbury Festival] coverage” (145).
“[The BBC] attempts to reflect the diversity of multi-cultural Britain - how well it does this, or whether it should do this is another matter” (38).
“Whilst it may be valid to accuse the BBC of being somewhat stuffy and conservative, this is not surprising in a non-democratic institution. If the alternative is US-style corporate stations that respond to (and shape) viewer pressure, then I am more than happy to accept the BBC. Frankly the BBC is one of the main reasons I do not emigrate” (124).
“I disagree [...] I believe them to work hard at keeping their image up to date with the ‘times’ ” (12).
“Disagree. I believe the BBC is excellent at accommodating all age groups and not too serious but has quality and not tackiness about it, neither is it arrogant but has good standards” (97).
Section 3, Q. 1b). “The BBC in general has a bossy attitude” (it’s too paternalistic in tone and outlook) Agree: 10, Disagree: 14, No opinion expressed: 4

Selection of responses that agree

“In some areas [...] people are paternalistic, i.e. Radio Wales (from what I heard at the Big Buzz. [...] Less regional outputs do not seem ‘bossy’ ” (48).
“It is still male dominated in terms of management and programming” (61).
 “[Because] of its established nature it feels it can make or break a band. It’s also inflexible with its playlisting” (46).

Selection of responses that disagree

“In my experience I’ve found it fronted by lovely people who love their work” (145).
“I believe them to take all thoughts and ideas into account and to produce a programme which reflects this” (12).

Section 3, Q. 1c).

“The BBC must see that its programmes stimulate, support and reflect the diversity of cultural activity in the UK.” (BBC’s Licence Agreement document).

Agree: 25, Reservation expressed: 2, No opinion expressed: 2

Responses that expressed a reservation

“This is evident on Radio 4 but not noticeable on other stations” (56).
“It [the BBC] does reflect diversity of music and makes it popular, yet it doesn’t stimulate diversity of culture in other areas” (48).

Selection of responses that agree

“The BBC is a publicly-funded organisation [...] Britain is diverse [...] BBC has a duty to reflect this” (60).
“A wide variety of music and topics are broadcasted” (31).
“We pay a licence fee, thus it should reflect what/who we are” (43).
“I agree, [although] this of course is impossible” (38).
“It is a spokesperson for culture. It has the power to aid or destroy the careers of artists” (145).
“There are many cultures within the UK and this helps us to understand the differences between cultures, if we want to!” (39).

“We all pay the licence fee and should feel included. However BBC is British and should predominantly reflect English/Irish/Scottish/Welsh culture” (61)

Section 3, Q. 1d). “Public service broadcasting is central to how we understand each other. They allow our community to talk to itself.” Government White Paper 2000) Agree: 17, Disagree: 7, No opinion expressed: 4

Selection of responses that agree to be found in Chapter 7
Selection of responses that disagree are to found in Chapter 10 and 11 Conclusion.

Section 3, Q. 1e). “The BBC is a ‘free space’ for new musical talent from home and abroad that widens my understanding of other people, groups and societies.”

Agree: 15, Disagree: 12, No opinion expressed: 1

Selection of responses that agree

“I agree [...] but only in a limited way. It chooses a few new talents as a token to fit into the mainstream it promotes” (48).

“I have learnt much about different cultures using this medium” (12).

Selection of responses that disagree

“The ‘free space’ is heavily regulated and only reflects the tastes and views of a select few” (46).

“More ‘local’ input is required, I think the BBC sometimes just pays lip service to various groups” (81).

“Fame Academy is a prime example of how the BBC is a ‘free space’ [...] however, as soon as the final three were announced the support disappeared. The BBC needs to put its resources where its programming is going” (60).

“It is largely concerned with mainstream acts, with token space for everything else. BBC radio is driven by the ‘playlist’ which amounts to the editing of culture by a few individuals” (114).

“It’s not that easy to get a record broadcast on the BBC!” (39).
Section 3, Q. 2. data
Of the 28 respondents, 12 (42.85%) indicated that BBC radio was one of the three most important mass-communication modes by which they were able to develop into ‘a culturally-aware, socially-mature individual’. No one at all specified commercial radio. Of the 16 who did not specify BBC radio, 7 chose to specify BBC television. Of the 28, only 8 (28.57%) chose not to credit the BBC with any influence.

Section 3, Q. 3. A pertinent selection of “any further comments on the subject of popular music, BBC radio, society, culture and you?”
“I think it is important for people to experience a wide range of music [...] I feel that a cross section of music is important to provide a balanced individual” (35).
“The way we grow and develop depends very much on [the] society and culture we are born and brought up in until we are old enough to explore ourselves, e.g. through radio programmes” (97).
“I would like more broadcasts of minor local gigs. I think this would boost local culture and encourage others to be creative” (145).
“Music radio tends to dictate popular music rather than listening to and responding” (56).
“You can’t please all of the people all of the time” (38).
“I don’t find it [the BBC] relevant to ME. My music is rarely reflected” (46).

Section 1 profile data results
The majority of replies came from those between 20 and 39 years of age. A significant majority invested 2 or more hours of their day at the event. The event was promoted across Wales by BBC Radio Wales. The majority responding to the questionnaire however came from the City of Cardiff and its environs. There was a preponderance of professional occupations amongst the respondents. Understanding of the event’s promotional rationale was joined by a degree of cynicism and a minor expression of the socio-cultural advantages of such a day.
Interpretation of Section 2 data
Data showed a familiarity with public service and commercial radio output. A significant majority of respondents cited BBC Radio 1 and 2 as their regular music radio station. Relatively few named BBC Radio Wales.

Interpretation of Section 3 data
1a) A significant majority of respondents defended the BBC in considered fashion. Several who disagreed did qualify their responses with some reservations. Those who agreed with the sentiment seemed to fall back on a somewhat stock sense of disenfranchisement. 1b) A more even spread of opinion here, seemingly informed in many instances by personal experience of a long-standing, considered view. 1c) A clear sense of the social and cultural diversity of the UK is evident as is the view that reality should be represented by the nation’s major public service broadcaster which is expressed in many of the responses. 1d) A sophisticated expression of the media’s obligations, impact and limits in relation to representing and connecting communities is evidenced in responses to this question. 1e) Standard critiques of the BBC seems to colour this final question about ‘free space’ which was posited as a synonym for the eutopian, heterotopian space of the present study.

Interpretation of Section 3, Q. 2. data
A range of mediating socio-cultural and technological means of ‘becoming’ were selected by respondents showing no strong trends or aversions with perhaps the possible exception of the absence of any recorded acknowledgement of commercial radio output.

Interpretation of Section 3, Q. 3. data
A few respondents articulated personal wishes. Others were able to articulate a critique of commercial musics or a somewhat conceptual, overview of public service broadcasting with reference to its socio-cultural dynamic.

Overall Interpretation & methodological critique
Whilst a cross-section of respondents were sought, profile date suggests replies came from what may be characterised as a relatively homogeneous cohort of
young and mature professionals with some familiarity with the soliciting of data. The response rate of less than 1 in 5 was therefore not unexpected, given that:

(1) those in receipt of the questionnaires were encouraged to complete them without assistance to encourage reflectiveness and honesty. Whilst there’s likely to be an element of ‘meeting expectations’ implicit in any inquiry of this nature, a sense of confident objectivity can be detected in replies.

(2) The eliciting of simple profile data was outweighed by a relatively complex series of questions seeking discursive, qualitative data.

(3) People were advised that the questionnaire was estimated to take between 20 and 30 minutes and may have deterred the participation of many. Additionally, given the unsolicited nature of the approaches at the event, there may have been some unconscious bias on the part of this writer in the approaches made: those most likely to comprehend the exercise and furnish a response were perhaps spoken to and given questionnaires ahead of those less certain of the inquiry’s purpose. This guaranteed a level of useful, discursive data, but may have precluded a significant section of the audience and might be deemed to have generated a narrow, self-selected cohort.
The original questionnaire
[NB: original fields offered adequate space for discursive responses.
Some response fields have been compressed for this appendix version.]

An Independent Questionnaire
Time of issue:

Dear member of The Big Buzz audience

You are invited to complete this research questionnaire at home after your visit to
this year’s Big Buzz event in Cardiff Bay. This is an independent study and has no
formal links with the BBC, BBC Wales or Cardiff City Council. Findings will
inform my part-time PhD research at Cardiff University.

This should take no more than 20-30 minutes of your time to complete in full.
Please take longer if you wish. You can use extra sheets.

ALL COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED ON OR BEFORE
AUGUST 29 2003 WILL BE ENTERED IN A DRAW FOR A £25 CD GIFT
VOUCHER

DRAW NUMBER: /150

Please send your completed questionnaire to:

Kevin Edge, Cardiff School of Art & Design UWIC. Llandaff Campus Western
Avenue CARDIFF CF5 2YB

Thank you in advance.

Kevin Edge kedge@uwic.ac.uk
The Questions

*PLEASE READ ME BEFORE YOU START!*

The questions are in three sections. All questions are designed to help me understand a little more about music, BBC Radio and YOU the listener. Please answer them all with as many full and thoughtful responses as you can.

**Section One  You & The Big Buzz**

1. Name

   ____________________________

   (optional)

2. Contact phone number for prize draw

   ____________________________

   (optional)

3. When were you born?

   19_____

4. Are you male or female?

5. Where do you live? (village, town, district or city)

   ____________________________

6. What is your occupation?

   ____________________________

7. How long did you stay at the Big Buzz day? Please circle one of the following:

   Less than 15 mins | 15 mins to 1 hour. | between 1-2 hours | more than 2 hours.

8. Which Big Buzz act did you like most & why?
Because...

9. Which Big Buzz act did you like least & why?

Because...

10. Why do you think BBC Radio Wales stages The Big Buzz event?
Please give as many likely aims & reasons as you can. ('phone a friend' here if you wish!)
*
*
*

Section Two Your listening choices

1. Please list the names of all the radio stations you listen to at least once a week for music. Circle the one you usually stay tuned to longest.
(Do not forget to include all kinds: commercial, local, community, public service, satellite, digital, Pirate & Internet radio stations!)
*
*
*
*

2. If you listen regularly to BBC Radio Wales, why do you tune in and for how long?

3. How would you broadly describe the kind of music played on BBC Radio Wales?
Section 3  The BBC in our lives

This is the last but longest section.
Your responses here will be the most important ones for my study.

1. Please say why you agree or disagree with the following statements:

   a) “The BBC in general is a bit stuffy & arrogant” (it’s too serious & unaccountable) I agree/disagree because...

   b) “The BBC in general has a bossy attitude” (it’s too paternalistic in tone & outlook)
   I agree/disagree because...

   c) “The BBC must see that its programmes stimulate, support and reflect the diversity of cultural activity in the UK.” (BBC’s Licence Agreement document)
   I agree/disagree because...

   d) “Public service broadcasting is central to how we live our lives and how we understand each other. They allow our community to talk to itself.” (Government White Paper, 2000)
   I agree/disagree because...

   e) “The BBC is a ‘free space’ for new musical talent from home & abroad that widens my understanding of other people, groups and societies.”
   I agree/disagree because...
2. How central have the following influences been on your development into a CULTURALLY-AWARE, SOCIALLY-MATURE INDIVIDUAL in the past 5 years? (Please circle the three most important ones FOR YOU in each set)

SET 1: Family School/College Work Friends
Travel
Dance/Night Clubs Concerts Theatre Musicals Live Sport
Performing music with others being a DJ
Other (please specify)

SET 2: BBC Television Independent Television MTV BBC radio
The Internet Commercial radio Newspapers
Magazines Literature Films/video CDs
Other (please specify)

3. Do you have any further comments to make on the subject of popular music, BBC Radio, society, culture & you?

Thank you very much for your comments & time.
Appendix B: Popular musics defined

As with the definition of all cultural forms, description and ongoing (re)evaluation combine. History, social purpose, commercial interest and cultural significance certainly inform the aesthetic codings and consequent discourses determining the circulation of modern genres encompassed by the term 'popular musics'.

The plural term ‘musics’ has been used deliberately in this study in an inclusive fashion to allow for a consideration of a broad set of distinctive and distinguishing forms emanating from a diverse set of commercial and non-commercial; Western and non-Western circumstances. Dalhaus (1998) argued conclusively for the plural because for him we have moved on from a singular humanity and a singular aesthetic musical corpus to ones of alterity and plurality.

In this study, popular musical works are regarded as works and ‘texts’ of varied musicological traits and origins (though frequently rhythmic and Afro-American) which have emanated from diverse socio-cultural contexts (Western and non-Western) in amateur local form, and which have subsequently been professionally transformed into cultural commodities with spectacular facets for larger and remote audiences distributed with attendant visual and material product along mass media channels.

A useful musicological definition of popular forms is given by Frith (1987, 144-5). Frith writes that “The most important (and remarkable) feature of western popular music in the twentieth century has been its absorption of and into Afro-American forms and conventions [...] this means that pop is complex ‘intentionally’ ” (This is after Andrew Chester’s ‘Second thoughts on a rock aesthetic: the Band’ in New Left Review, 62 1970, 78-9). Frith cites Chester’s view on the external form of serious, ‘classical’ construction: “Theme and variations, counterpoint, tonality [...] are all devices that build diachronically and synchronically outwards from basic musical atoms. [they remain] discrete and unchanged in the complex unity.” In popular forms on the other hand, Chester sees “The basic musical units [as] the simple entity is that constituted by the parameters of melody, harmony and beat, while complexity is built up by modulation of the basic notes, and by inflexion of the basic beat.” Frith then
summarises Chester's 'simple dichotomy' as one of "a tradition of a linear musical development and a tradition of piled-up rhythmic interplay" (1987, 145).

Jones and Rahn (1981, 38-52) offer, in a consideration of differential relations, a number of interesting musicological factors such as aural rather than scored transmission, tactile facility rather than theory and praxis with regard to instrumental performance; degree of ephemerality and a listener focus on identification with performer rather than composer.

Roy Shuker's definition is perhaps the most comprehensive and useful, and takes us alongside Adorno's autonomous and commodified musics that have been fully explored by Paddison (1993, 1996).

It seems that a satisfactory definition of popular music must encompass both musical and socio-economic characteristics. Essentially, all popular music consists of a hybrid of musical traditions, styles and influences, and is also an economic product which is invested with ideological significance by many of its consumers. At the heart of the majority of various forms of popular musics a fundamental tension between the essential creativity of the act of 'making music' and the commercial nature of the bulk of its production and dissemination. Shuker (1998, 226-8)

A sophisticated structuralist definition of popular musics which replies on their relation to the serious and subsidised comes from Georgina Born, and is worth quoting at length. It stresses the contemporary nature and 'otherness' of the category as it stands in non-commercial or commercial relation to those forms heard and discussed in establishment discourses.

I use 'popular music' to delineate en gros the 'other' macrosociological sphere of modern and contemporary musics, a sphere subsuming all those musics that exist largely separate from the institutions of cultural subsidy. This knowingly elides commercial popular musics with those that are self-produced and marginal or external to commercial circuits [...] both have been, in different ways, 'other' to musical modernism and postmodernism. In its non-differentiation, then 'popular music' is a category constructed by the discourses of legitimate music, and it threatens to occlude the enormous variation of musical cultures and subcultures. However there are undeniable socio-economic differences between the two macrospheres. (1995 n. 12, 342)

Musicological and aesthetic analyses have significance for popular music's acceptance and rejection by public sector broadcasters and critical theorists alike, particularly in the inter-war period, and is a musicological distinction from which grows evaluative condescension. Pervading all definitions and accounts of
structural and dialectical relationships is indeed the subjective business of ‘evaluation’ which, driven by social distinction, is often at the heart of so much ‘objective’ description and interpretation.

Evaluatively, popular musics can, of course, be good or bad depending on one’s tastes and alignment with the people. It is therefore ‘good’ - authentic, democratic, subversive and independent, or ‘bad’: base and vulgar. In simple terms, popular musics are music of the people. A more critical definition argues that popular music is not an immanent, expression of community ‘by the people’, but a product, commercially manufactured and distributed for the masses as distracting entertainment. This view takes no account of the autonomy of ordinary people who copy and otherwise appropriate artificial, formulaic music for their own particular ends.

It seems clear that ‘popular musics’ can be generally regarded as musical works which either emanate ‘organically’ (as an unproblematic ‘second nature’) and with integrity from ‘the people’, as ‘folk’ musics ‘of the people’, ‘by the people’, ‘for the people’ which may, or may not, receive (as texts) commercial attentions, mediation and quantifiable ‘popular acclaim’ in sales charts; or are, alternatively, musics made for the people - a calculated production or a calculated cooption of local ‘folk’ forms by a ‘culture industry’. Might we add an additional popular form form, that brought into being by the ‘cultural subsidy’ of the BBC?

The BBC it can be argued delivers both popular musics of the people, popular musics for the people but also commissioned sessions from new talent.

Chris Cutler (1993, 4-17) sets down the common means of identifying popular music and touches on the importance of folk, art and pop discourses (by implication, somewhat taste-inflected) for its constitution. We see such discourses operating within the BBC.

When the early BBC and Reith chose to identify and evaluate popular musics, particularly those that were American and dance-orientated, they did so from an at once parochial and European high-art perspective. Many popular musics were dismissed as unsophisticated and ephemeral. Any popular music heard on the early BBC was fiercely vetted and frequently neutered. It could not be vulgar and hedonistic but had to be decorous, improving and light on the ear. When the early BBC discussed and evaluated popular musics from a compensatory perspective, it regarded them as commercial and false but also as a
necessary evil, providing pleasure and relaxation at the end of hard day. Philip Rayner (2001) identified what he termed “cultural dissonance” between the BBC’s aims for the Light programme (1945 - 55); and actual usage. His surveys reveal how it was used in everyday life, pointing to those listeners who felt that their experiences were unimportant, or did not fit with the stereotype of family listening.

The postwar period as a whole was, for much of the industrialised West, one of significant economic and social recovery, frequently in the politico-economic and cultural ambit of a buoyant United States. Wartime American Forces radio for example had widened the musical diet of British audiences, whilst domestic broadcasting in Britain became the prime channel for information and entertaining family distractions. Wartime faith in the ability and integrity of the masses and in their music and humour had seen the BBC seek to reevaluate and follow popular taste, admitting more of it to the microphone.

In a post-colonial Britain of the late 1940s and early 1950s, hesitant industrial realignment, maturing welfare state and educational provision eventually supported growing consumer affluence and distinctive sub-cultural expression in youthful, popular quarters. Much of this creativity was, by the late 1950s and 1960s driven, or at least allied to civil rights activity and counter-cultural alternatives. Consumerism and creative activity centering around independence, individual and collective identities. They were coopted by market forces, and studied by cultural and social commentators. Eventually, by the late 1960s, they were being represented, and in some degree produced in the increasingly pluralistic and progressive schedules of public sector broadcasting.

Progressive popular musics – in part promoted by the BBC - grew out of a dialectic with a Western and non-Western socio-cultural landscape, with the recording industry; Western compositional traditions, musical instrument producers, and mass tastes. Peel, as an observer of this pluralistic advance played ‘authentic’ older recordings, British blues revival material or radical, ‘progressive’ compositions. By playing music rejected by mainstream a moment of immanent cultural critique of ‘day-time’ output, a wider social critique and an invitation to young audiences to hearken and think occurs. Peel’s playlists did contrast sharply and deliberately with daytime playlists and, of course, gave the BBC an
opportunity to play the quality and quantity game when it came to justifying its continued existence.

Radio 1, created at the behest of Harold Wilson’s Labour Government had appeared at a time when education, popular music and Pirate radio occupied working group and Cabinet discussion. One suggestion was to introduce BBC Radio 1 as a short-term arrangement, prior to the formation of a new radio corporation and network which, with some advertising revenue would provide both a pop channel and another delivering a University of the Air (See Briggs 1995, 563). This potential dalliance of pop, pedagogy and commerce never took place. Wilson’s socialist government though populist by calculation was perhaps hamstrung by old-school paternalism and over-ambition. The BBC was quick to defend its new station and its potential to reflect and shape an evolving cultural landscape:

The audience for Radio 1 has amply confirmed that there is a demand for pop music, as distinct from the more traditional styles of lighter music. Any deficiencies which may be alleged against Radio 1 arise from shortage of resources and limitations on the use of records, not from any BBC inhibitions. (British Broadcasting Corporation 1969, 3)

Notes

1. According to twentieth-century criteria [...] humanity consists less in making the heterogeneous more homogeneous than in mutual acceptance [...] If so, the search in musical esthetics (as a derivation of the idea of humanity) for an underlying foundation common to the sonic phenomena of all ages and continents is less important than an awareness and mutual recognition of utterly different principles of formation. Dalhaus adds: The driving force behind the idea of ‘music’ (in the singular) - itself a result of ‘history’ (in the singular) - was the classical utopia of humanity that, in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* formed the basis of an esthetics in which judgments of taste are ‘subjective’ but nevertheless ‘universal’ to the extent that subjectivities strive to converge in a *sensus communis* (Dalhaus 1998, 243-4).

2. Born traces such a distinction to historical conditions: “ ‘Serious’, ‘art’, ‘classical’, ‘modern’, ‘avant-garde’ she observes are “drawn from the discourse of high music culture [and] refer interchangeably to the whole historical body of high-cultural and professional musics of church, court and concert. As ‘emic’ concepts the terms are used both descriptively and evaluatively: these musics are given high value often by implicit contrast with the ‘other’ of ‘low’ musical cultures - folk, popular, and mass commercial musics” Born (1995, n. 12, 342).
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