CRUSADER CASTLES OF CYPRUS

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF CYPRUS UNDER THE LUSIGNANS: 1191 – 1489

JAMES PETRE

Nearby Syria is an isle called Cyprus, most rich and good and full of all sorts of growing things. There were many lovely towns on the isle which I shall list for you.

The city where the knights dwell, chief among them all, is called Nicosia; it is inland. There is another, which is on the seacoast, called Famagusta; and another on the coast called Limassol; another on the coast called Paphos; and another on the coast, fortified, with its city enclosed by walls, called Kyrenia. Inland are three castles: Dieudamour, Buffavento, and Kantara. (Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119)

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, SCHOOL OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CARDIFF, 2010
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This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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INTRODUCTION

Historiographical overview

The study of Crusader Castles has preoccupied a number of scholars, predominantly French and British, since as long ago as 1871, when Emmanuel Guillaume Rey published his *Etudes*. Rey included Cyprus in this survey but the first scholar to write exclusively on the medieval buildings of Cyprus, of which castles were merely one type, was another Frenchman. This was Camille Enlart, whose voluminous *L'Art Gothique et de la Renaissance en Chypre* was published in 1899. It is still a most valuable tool, especially in respect of building work that has not survived. After Enlart, the history of the island and its castles came to be of considerable interest to...
British scholars, principally because of British rule there: from 1878, Cyprus was under British administration, first under the suzerainty of the Sultans of Turkey, then from 1914 annexed to the British Crown and finally from 1925 as a British Crown Colony until its independence in 1960. Accordingly, in 1918, the Curator of the island's Ancient Monuments – the architect George Jeffery FSA - produced his Description. Aspects of the medieval defences of the town walls of Famagusta were written up by T. Mogabgab in the Reports of the Department of Antiquities in the late 1930s and about the same time, Jeffery wrote a pamphlet supplementing his earlier book which is mainly of interest in respect of his thoughts that there were numerous lesser towers all over the island. Sir George Hill's great work of the 1940s is of value in tracing in detail the events in which the island's fortifications were involved; his general history of the island remains the fullest in the English language. Cyprus featured in general surveys that subsequently appeared (notably Fedden and Thomson - 1957; Muller-Weiner - 1966) and in the early 1960s the Department of Antiquities published a series of guidebooks which dealt with some of the castles. The partition of the island in 1974 left all but one (Kolossi) of the sites thus surveyed in Turkish hands and as a consequence they have not been updated. Nonetheless, they compare well enough with those produced, for example, by the contemporary Ministry of Public Building and Works in England. ² Most of these guidebooks were written by A.H.S. (Peter) Megaw, who later, in 1977, contributed the section on Cypriot fortifications in the Wisconsin History of the Crusades. During this period, from 1957 until 1983, Megaw, assisted in particular by John Rosser, led a series of excavations at Saranda

² Thanks are due to the Department of Antiquities for its permission to reproduce the diagrams of St. Hilarion, Kantara, Buffavento and Kyrenia from these guidebooks.
Kolones, Paphos. These produced a number of articles by both scholars. Megaw died recently and the full report on Saranda Kolones has still to appear.

Recent works dealing generally with Cypriot medieval Castles include Gianni Perbellini’s article of 1973, which though helpful for its many illustrations, is not without its problems. It depends very heavily on Enlart, does not appear to be supported by the author’s own direct use of primary material and contains a number of errors. It is of greater value in its treatment of the Venetian period – this being the matter he returned to in later articles in 1988 and 1992. Kristian Molin is another to have commented recently on the island’s castles. Although Molin’s works are based on primary sources, they make a number of interpretations which, certainly for Cyprus, are doubtful and in any case, attempt little more than a snapshot, or summary.

Megaw’s and Rosser’s conclusions on Saranda Kolones prompted others (Cadei; von Wartburg; Molin) to suggest alternative lines of thought. These in turn have induced John Rosser to restate his views, yet the history of the site should remain a cause célèbre for there are very good grounds to doubt the accuracy of what Rosser urges with regard to the castle’s origins and its occupants in the very early years of the Lusignan period. Over the last fifteen years three French scholars – Christian Corvisier, Nicolas Faucherre and Jean-Bernard de Vaivre - have written up their investigations into four other sites (Limassol, Kolossi, Gastria, Sigouri). They have summarised these articles and produced new observations on other sites in a volume

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1 Megaw’s publications are conveniently listed in Mosaic. Festschrift for A.H.S. Megaw – see Bibliography.

4 See the favourable review of Unknown Crusader Castles by Malcolm Barber in English Historical Review, 117 (2002), pp. 955-6 and the rather more neutral comments of Denys Pringle in Crusades.
published in honour of Enlart. These vary in detail and draw on some primary source material but look at the sites in isolation from each other and provide little or no analyses of such important issues as functions and hence the nature of the value of the castles to the Lusignan Crown or the military orders to which they belonged. In addition, rather too much focus on architectural analogies has led to some doubtful assertions of building periods and typologies.

Finally, among the many other recent works that help shed light on our subject, particular reference should be made to Peter Edbury's numerous articles and his general work on the period up until 1373. Though not specifically concerned with the island's castles, these works have brought a fresh assessment to many aspects of Crusader Cyprus, which help in understanding the context in which the castles were commissioned and alternately developed and neglected. It is with acknowledgement to all this earlier work that this essay is presented.

Chronicle source material

The dearth of relevant documentary material inevitably makes for heavy reliance on what narrative sources we have. These are of varying reliability in relation to how near they were written to the events they describe, whether they were first hand accounts or compilations from other sources and the degree to which they were biased or written to entertain particular audiences. I have given some account of these


5 Limassol received a thorough architectural investigation by Corvisier and Faucherre, while research by Catherine Otten-Froux supplied additional information on its occupation in the 1460s. Kolossi has been the subject of a lengthy monograph by J-B de Vaivre. Vaivre has also investigated the all but lost sites of Gastria and Sigouri. The volume of collected summaries and new monographs is cited as Vaivre and Plagnieux (see bibliography and gazetteer entries).
matters with regard to the chronicles dealing with the invasion of 1191 in an appendix to Part I, History and in respect too of some of the other narratives, primarily Philip of Novare and Leontios Makhairas within Part I itself. I have not, however, thought it necessary to deal comprehensively with this given that much has already been written on such matters, both in general and in the introductions to various editions of these chronicles.

That said, and for the narratives on which we mainly depend for events in Cyprus from about the beginning of the wars of 1228-33, readers are particularly referred to Dawkins’ excellent introduction to his edition of Makhairas⁶ and Hill’s notes.⁷ Makhairas in fact, is a very significant source for the history of later medieval Cyprus and I use him extensively in this thesis, especially with regard to the period after 1359 when his account is more dependable. Dawkins is especially illuminating in evaluating the various merits of the three recensions of his chronicle and the possibly related chronicle owned by Francis Amadi (d. 1566) that bears his name. As Dawkins says, Amadi’s author may have had access to certain source(s) that Makhairas drew from and is sometimes correct in detail over the Makhairas variants, but it is in any case hugely important for the events of Henry II’s reign from 1306 suggesting of course that its source for that period is of unparalleled significance.⁸ The Amadi chronicle appears to have been used as the main source for the narrative written in the later sixteenth century by Florio Bustron who otherwise drew mainly on the eye witness accounts of his father and his kinsman George Bustron or Boustronios. This does of course mean that Florio Bustron’s material that antedates the second half of the fifteenth century that is not found elsewhere has to be treated with circumspection,

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a point that is especially relevant to our study of Limassol (see below, p. 302). For his part, George Bustron’s chronicle is especially valuable for the reign of James II. George was that king’s contemporary and sometime companion so his is an eye-witness account, though as Dawkins commented, sometimes less intelligible that Florio’s where they covered the same ground. Finally mention may also be made of Stephen of Lusignan who, like Florio Bustron, wrote in the later sixteenth century. His works, the Description and the Chorography, provide some details relevant to this thesis but given that he is demonstrably unreliable especially for the early period of Lusignan rule, I have generally been sceptical of his information and consequently added notes of caution in my text when I have cited him and felt this to be appropriate.

Plans

In the main, the sites catalogued in the gazetteer in this thesis include plans and a list of these is provided above. A few sites are not, however, accompanied by plans. The explanation is that the remains of these are wholly or almost wholly lost (Nicosia, Yermasoyia) or so meagre or simple (Akaki, Alaminos, Khirokitia) that plans would add little or nothing to our understanding. The latter group includes Sigouri. This once important site in particular would benefit from thorough archaeological investigation but until that may happen, attempts to create a ground plan could only be vague and achieve little more than a reflection of what we may describe in just a few lines.

Objectives of the study (and the extent of archaeological investigation within the thesis)

The work that follows falls into four parts. In Part I, I attempt to provide a comprehensive and I hope accurate record of the fortifications in the history of Cyprus during the Lusignan years – how they influenced that history and were in turn affected by it. This focus – set on a chronological, island-wide framework – has not been carried out before. The exploration falls into halves: until 1373, Cyprus was generally a peaceful island and in this important respect very different from neighbouring crusader lands in the Eastern Mediterranean. After that, conflict with the Genoese and Mamlüks at a time of sharp economic and demographic decline changed the context altogether. It is clear that the development - and often the absence of development – of castles and town walls were both products and drivers of what occurred during both these periods.

Part II capitalises on the information contained in Part I and draws heavily too on the gazetteer (Part IV) through assimilating understanding on matters of fundamental importance that transcend interest on individual buildings. Castles and fortifications were a feature - a symptom - of the social structure, of the state’s economy and of a type of culture as well as constituting the tools of (in our case) kings and military orders as their residences, administrative centres and weapons of war. So the radical question that needs addressing is simply why the island’s fortifications were created, for all other interpretations of their value must stem from that. This is addressed in the sections entitled ‘Raison d’être and functions’ and ‘An Urban Aristocracy’. While being wary of the current tendency to underplay the role of warfare in the
development and maintenance of fortifications, it seems fair to conclude that in
Cyprus military exigencies did not always dominate castle planning. In this respect,
Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones may have been exceptions but they were not
necessarily the rule. Another section in Part II - ‘The Fortifications in War’ –
however, looks at the role that castles played in the conflicts in which Cyprus was
involved and attempts an additional dimension of understanding through comparison
with matters in England which, like Cyprus, experienced civil wars in the thirteenth
and later fifteenth centuries and foreign threats in the later fourteenth century. Part II
also pays specific attention to the matter of ‘Walled Towns’. The massive investments
involved in creating these at Kyrenia, Nicosia and Famagusta are to be inferred from
their respective entries in the gazetteer but what inspired that commitment? Once
again, we require an investigation into this – which Part II provides. The solution is
complex; it is made up of a number of lines of thought. These reflect that, like the
castles, the island’s town walls were constructed for a number of reasons of which
defensibility was merely one. The thesis aims to move us from a position where we
have visualised the castles and town walls as adequately or inadequately defending
Cyprus to a place where we understand these buildings in a wholly different light and
almost incidentally, through this exercise, see quite why some of our castles are
hardly fortifications at all.

Part III constitutes a section entitled ‘Architecture’ which summarises the principal
features of the fortifications and draws analogies with developments on the Syrian
mainland, Anatolia and Europe. It serves as an analysis and introduction to Part IV,
the site-by-site gazetteer. As noted above, the degree to which sites have already been
written up varies considerably but I have absorbed these findings and used them,
sometimes disputed them, in the catalogue. Debating theories and presenting alternatives as I have in places have occasionally required lengthy excursions into aspects of structures and analogies as with Saranda Kolones but generally speaking, I have tried not to repeat too much of the *minutiae* of what has already been satisfactorily presented. Rather, through my own field-work, I have taken a fresh look at the remains of our buildings and attempted to give a level of detail that is roughly even from one site to another. That said, where previous commentaries have not gone beyond summaries, or indeed where there has been no comment at all, I have tended to provide somewhat more detail. In every case, however, I have utilised and captured as much relevant historical material as could be quarried. So this longest section of the work serves two purposes. First, it contains new material both in terms of fresh information and conclusions and suggested revisions of those of others who have gone before. Second, it presents a survey of all the sites, benefiting from all the studies already undertaken on them, both archaeological and historical. Such a complete survey has not yet been undertaken.
PART I

HISTORY

THE FRANKISH CONQUEST OF 1191

The history of the Crusader state of Cyprus began with the conquest of the island by Richard I of England in May 1191 and its subsequent conveyance, first to the Templars and very quickly thereafter, in 1192, to the Lusignans. This Poitevan family was to rule their island kingdom until 1474, the Venetian widow of the last king then reigning until 1489. At the outset of the period, Cyprus had been ruled for several years by Isaac Comnenus – a member of the imperial Byzantine family who had broken with Constantinople, setting himself up as an independent prince. By his time, it appears that the island’s fortifications were in part decayed and in part in some order. Today nothing remains of any castle in Nicosia but as we shall see, it is clear that the Byzantine castle there was very weak, quite possibly even semi-ruinous. If we accept what little evidence we have that attests the existence of what were probably comparable towers at Limassol and Famagusta, then it is apparent that they too were very minor affairs and quite likely defunct. The Byzantine castle at Kyrenia was a more substantial fortification, originating in all likelihood in the mid-seventh century when the island was first subjected to Arab raids. As we shall see, the Franks were quite content to take it over, gradually developing it into the most important castle of the country. It is unlikely, however, that it also had town walls; careful interpretation of a reference of 1211, as discussed below, reflects that we have insufficient evidence for any such town walls. There was certainly a Byzantine fortification at Paphos but quite what this constituted in relation to the extant works and indeed whether they involved town walls or a castle or both, is a matter of much debate, discussed at length in the gazetteer. Conclusive evidence for Byzantine town walls elsewhere is
lacking.\(^1\) Finally, the three Byzantine mountain castles of St Hilarion (Dieudamour), Buffavento and Kantara crowned the heights of the northern Pentadakthilos or Besparmak range: like Byzantine Kyrenia, these were more substantial affairs, though they may have originated much later – probably no earlier than the eleventh century.\(^2\) There too, the Franks were content to take them over, ultimately adding considerably to all three.

This varied state of the island’s defences was reflected in the parts they played in King Richard’s conquest of 1191. The several, diverse sources for this are not entirely consistent but it does seem clear that only Kyrenia and the three mountain castles were of any significance. The sources for the 1191 conquest have been evaluated and assessed against each other by a number of scholars, most notably by John Gillingham in 1999 and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari in 2000.\(^3\) It is abundantly clear that the historiography of the conquest leads one into much complexity, necessitating an attempt to understand the relationships of the sources and their different versions to each other. A commentary on this is given in an appendix but in all of this it is essential to be mindful of what were first hand accounts and what were not.

What follows then is an attempt to trace the events of the conquest of 1191 in relation to the island’s castles, and from this, discern the existence of the various sites, infer what we can of their strength, what value was attached to them by their defenders and assailants, noting anything of relevance in relation to castle warfare of the time.

The *Itinerarium*, written about thirty years after the conquest,\(^4\) recorded that some of Richard’s men, who arrived on the island before the main body, were able to withdraw to a ‘*castellum vicinum*’, where they subsequently barricaded themselves in. Later still, deciding against the threat of possibly being blockaded there, they made a desperate sortie from this ‘*castellum*’, succeeding in surprising their Greek enemies. It is reasonably clear that this was Limassol. There are, however, difficulties in

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\(^1\) Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp. 9, 14, and in general, see below.
\(^2\) For commentaries on the political-military position of Cyprus in the century up until the Ricardian conquest, see A. Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 32-3 and Galatariotou, ch. 3.
\(^3\) Gillingham’s radical approach in dealing with the sources was to take the most reliable and adhere to that, refusing to ‘embroider’ it with details taken from those who were less informed. See his *Richard the Lionheart*, p. 10; Nicolaou-Konnari, *passim*.
accepting this and other matter not contained in sources written nearer 1191, as explained in the appendix. A slightly different version was given by Richard of Devizes, who wrote in the 1190s. He related that the early arrivals who reached the island before the main body took refuge in a Limassol church, and that near-by, ‘on a cliff of native rock was a lofty and fortified castle’ subsequently captured by King Richard on his arrival. This is arguably an excellent example of this chronicler’s tendency to indulge in rodomontade, as noted in the appendix (p. 60).5

Other sources, including Ambroise’s near contemporary Estoire also refer to these first arrivals, but say nothing of any castle.6 The Estoire and the Itinerarium and Roger of Howden make it clear that when Richard landed at Limassol shortly after, on 6 May, he had to fight a battle on the sand near by to effect a landing but they make no mention of a castle in this attack. Our very thinly detailed Greek/Byzantine sources do not even refer to fighting of any sort and certainly make no mention of any fortification.7

No fortification at Limassol is mentioned in Ernoul, this part of that narrative probably written in the late 1220s, or the principal recensions of The Continuations of William of Tyre written probably in the 1240s. In the Lyon version, it is said that Isaac had garrisoned Limassol with men-at-arms, both horse and foot (‘la garni de genz d’armes a pie et a cheval’) but it is not stated quite what in Limassol was garrisoned. This recension goes on to say that Richard forced a landing but again makes no mention of any fortification. The Colbert-Fontainbleau or b version (‘Eracles’) similarly makes no mention of a castle at Limassol and indeed its only reference to castles in the entire campaign comes at its end when we are told merely that ‘All the castles were surrendered to him’ (Richard).8

Whatever occurred at Limassol, it appears likely some sort of fortification existed and that it did not play a part in Richard’s landing, suggesting that it was of no military

5 Richard of Devizes, pp. 36-7.
6 Ambroise, pp. 51-2.
7 Stubbs, Itinerarium, pp. 190 - 1; Nicholson, pp. 183-5; Ambroise, pp. 51-3; Gesta Regis, 2, pp. 163-4; Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, pp. 105-7; O City of Byzantium, pp. 229 - 30.
8 Ernoul, p. 272; Lyon Eracles, (Morgan) § 116, pp. 117-9, and Edbury, Third Crusade, pp. 102 -3. For the quotation from Eracles, Edbury, Third Crusade, p. 178.
significance. As is the case at Paphos, it is perhaps not wholly clear whether this was
a castle or some town wall. Certainly a number of scholars have interpreted the
sources to indicate the latter. Thus Mas Latrie wrote that Richard established camp
outside Limassol’s walls, while Hill and following him, Perbellini believed that
Isaac Comnenus had improved its defences against Richard. Most recently, Megaw
repeated Mas Latrie’s inference of town walls in 1191. However, there is neither
clear historical evidence nor any archaeological evidence for Byzantine town walls in
Limassol. The complexities of unravelling the development of the present Limassol
castle and indeed serious doubt that the building we now have is even on the same site
as one that may have existed in 1191, are discussed in the gazetteer.

The sources are not consistent as to the strategy by which Richard’s army conquered
the island and correspondingly it is not wholly clear as to the order in which the
island’s castles were captured or surrendered but it is clear that whatever existed in
Nicosia did not impede its occupation. It appears that Isaac retreated here, to what the
Itinerarium called ‘castellum quoddam firmissimum’ – ‘a very strong castle ...called
Nicosia’. Our other sources for the 1191 campaign make no mention of a castle in
Nicosia in 1191 but one certainly existed for there are references to it in relation to an
incident in 1192 when the Templars retreated there. Those references are especially
interesting because they convey a quite different impression of the castle: Ernoul said
of that incident that ‘li castiaus n’estoit mie fors pour tenir encontre tant de gent’
while the Colbert-Fontainbleau Continuation similarly described it as ‘feible’ and
‘povre’. The Lyon Continuation also referred to the castle in connection with this
incident, though without any adjectival comment. No doubt these very different
ascriptions of strength and weakness reflected the impressions the authors wished to
convey in relation to their heroes: King Richard did well to capture it as it was strong;
the Templars were unable to defend it because it was weak. As it seems highly likely
that the Templars would have elected to remain in the castle had it seemed capable of

9 Mas Latrie, Histoire, 2, pp. 19-21; Hill, 1, p. 318; 2, pp. 15-16; Perbellini, 1973, pp. 44-5; Megaw,
Reflections, p. 148.
10 Stubbs, Itinerarium, p. 194; Nicholson, p. 188.
11 Ernoul, p. 285; Eracles, Receuil des Historiens des Croisades 2, p. 190; Lyon Eracles,
(Morgan), § 133, pp. 135 – 6. Later sources also record this incident. Amadi, p. 84; Fl. Bustron. pp.
50-1; Lusignan, Chorographia – Grivaud, ff. 14a, 48a and 49a; Lusignan, Chorography – Wallace,
§§ 39, 247 and 255-6 on pp. 20, 65 and 66; Lusignan, Description, ff. 31-2.
resisting the poorly equipped locals coming against them, it does appear that Nicosia castle was indeed very weak. 12

In the peace negotiations that followed, it is interesting to note that King Richard was careful to ensure that Isaac conceded control of the island’s castles as a pledge of co-operation, clearly indicating that they were of some importance at least. 13 Isaac rapidly reneged on such arrangements for collaboration, withdrawing as the Itinerarium relates, to the ‘castrum Famagustam’, from which he quickly moved on because he grasped that it was too weak to withstand a siege. 14 No other source makes reference to a ‘castrum’ at Famagusta and we do not have any other near-contemporary reference to what may be a fortification there until 1231/2 (see gazetteer), so there may be doubt over the interpretation of this allusion. That said, we can at least infer that any fortification there was insubstantial.

Shortly after his marriage in Limassol on 12 May, Richard sent his land and naval forces round the coasts taking control of its strongpoints – ‘civitas et castella imperatoris et munitiones’. 15 One such castle may have been Paphos, - ‘castellum quod dicitur Baffes’ - though here again we need to note that only one source specifically mentions this and that source is Roger of Howden’s later chronicle. It is nonetheless a valuable allusion, discussed in context in the Gazetteer. 16

Guy de Lusignan had landed on 11 May 17 and joined King Richard in his campaign to conquer the island. Plainly they agreed that the next, vital objective was the capture of Kyrenia Castle, though we have different reports as to which of the two in fact accomplished this. According to the Lyon Continuation18 it was Richard himself who took the castle ‘on his arrival’, capturing into the bargain, Isaac’s daughter and ‘great riches’. Roger of Howden similarly has Richard capturing ‘castello fortissimo

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12 I am grateful to Prof. P. Edbury for his correspondence on this detail.
17 Ambroise, p. 55.
18 Lyon Eracles, (Morgan), § 117, p. 119; Edbury, The Third Crusade, p. 103.
quod dicitur Cherin', 'on his approach', implying perhaps that it was surrendered without a fight.  

The more detailed western sources describe an attack on Kyrenia and credit this and its capture to Guy. Given that Richard was reported as stricken with illness in Nicosia about this time, it does seem likely that it was Guy who led the attack. According to Ambroise, Guy and his forces

...besieged it by land and sea, attacking in strength. The inhabitants had no support so could not hold out but had to make terms.

While similarly the Itinerarium had Kyrenia 'heavily besieged, with the army divided to attack from both land and sea', inducing a demoralised defence into a rapid capitulation, and thereby surrendering too Isaac's treasure and his daughter.

Kyrenia was plainly extremely useful to Richard, becoming in effect his headquarters, 'for he had found a base for himself and his navy'. This description of the military value of Kyrenia no doubt reflects too the view held by Richard and Guy and so says much about the importance of this sea castle and its harbours, even at this early stage in our period.

According to the Itinerarium and Ambroise, Guy then turned his attention to St Hilarion, the natural defensive site of which made it a considerable challenge. The Itinerarium recorded that:

It was very strong in situation and completely impregnable. Those within prepared to defend themselves and fired stones and darts at the besiegers for some days, until on the Emperor's orders the castle was surrendered to King Guy.

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19 Gesta Regis, 2, p. 167, repeated in the Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, p. 110, and in the Memoriale, 1, p. 442.
20 Ambroise, pp. 59-60; Stubbs, Itinerarium, pp. 201-2; Nicholson pp. 193-4.
21 Lyon Eracles, (Morgan), § 117, p. 119; Edbury, The Third Crusade, p. 103.
Ambroise similarly stressed the great natural defensibility of the castle: Didemus is a strong castle that could never be taken by force. Its defenders 'cast down large stones [on our men].'  

Ambroise similarly recorded that after thus resisting for some days, the castle was given up to Guy on Isaac's orders. Both these sources added that Guy then used St Hilarion as a secure place in which to hold Isaac’s daughter. Roger of Howden only mentioned the capture of 'castellum quod dicitur Deudeamour' in his later work, the lack of any detail suggesting that King Richard may not have been personally involved.

About this time, it appears that King Richard recovered and joined the siege of Buffavento - described by Ambroise as 'a most strong castle'. Buffavento was similarly described by Roger of Howden as 'exceeding strong' and by the Lyon Continuation as 'a very strong castle called Buffavento' ('un chastiau mout fort que l' on dit Buffe Vent'). This Lyon recension had Isaac in Buffavento and recorded that he accordingly fell into Richard's hands when the King of England duly captured it, though Roger of Howden had it that Isaac escaped to 'abbatia fortissimo quae dicitur Caput Sancti Andreae'. The later Meaux chronicle followed Howden, but added a detail that Richard 'ei machinas porrigebat' ('he was putting forward machines against it'). In another later chronicle, Peter of Langtoft also claimed that King Richard directed siege engines, and that these threw night and day. Some appreciation of these two sources is given in the appendix but in any event, given the nature of the site of the castle, this episode of bombardment seems unlikely, so one wonders if the Meaux Chronicle's 'machinas' might have been rams or other such devices of direct assault. The reference is of passing interest, however, as being the only allusion to the use of siege engines in 1191, with the sole exception of another difficult source -

21 Ambroise, p. 60.
24 Ambroise, p. 60.
25 Nicholson, p. 194; Ambroise, p. 60.
26 Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, p. 111.
Richard of Devizes. Devizes provided a confusing detail that after Limassol Castle was captured, a second castle was taken and Isaac was then besieged in a third castle: 'the walls were knocked down by huge stones hurled by stone throwers (ingentia saxa)'.

Ambroise and the Itinerarium did not locate Isaac in Buffavento and relate instead that for a short while, he skulked in 'son chastel' of Kantara. They continued that his men melted away and demoralised by the loss of his treasure and his womenfolk, he recognised that his position was untenable, so ordered the surrender of St. Hilarion as noted above and on 31 May or 1 June gave himself up to Richard. This 'castellum quod dicitur Candare' is another listed in Roger of Howden's later work as captured by King Richard.

The conquest of Cyprus had been an extremely efficient operation.

What more can I say? In two weeks, as I do not lie, since God willed it so, the king held Cyprus securely, so that it was inhabited by Franks.

The points of interest gleaned from this story of invasion and conquest so far as the fortifications are concerned is that in 1191, Kyrenia apart, coastal castles appear to have been defunct and hence were of little consequence, while inland, only the mountain castles were of sufficient strength to influence the course of the war. It is of course the case that even Kyrenia and the mountain trio did not cause any significant delay to Richard's and Guy's triumph, Indeed, it is interesting that King Richard himself, who undoubtedly appreciated fully the prime importance of fortifications in warfare, made only passing reference to the matter, for in his own announcement of his conquest of Cyprus in a letter of 6 August 1191 to his justiciar in England, he wrote merely that 'we have subjected... all its strong points'. This need not indicate, however, that Kyrenia and the mountain castles were of little military worth. Possibly they would have been capable of significant defence had they been resolutely defended. This is perhaps reflected by a conclusion written by the composer of the Itinerarium that 'the fortresses surrendered, which were so strongly sited that they...

29 Chronicon Monasterii de Melsa, 1, p. 258; Chronicle of Peter of Langtoft, 2, pp. 66-7; Richard of Devizes, p. 38.
31 Ambroise, p. 60. The Itinerarium too (Stubbs, Itinerarium, p. 203; Nicholson, p. 195) has 'quindecim diebus' – 'fifteen days'.
32 Epistolae Cantuarienses, p. 347, and translated by Edbury, Third Crusade, p. 179.
seemed impregnable to all siege machinery, [but] they were surprised by treachery'. Apart from our few unreliable references to one or more incidents of bombardment, as narrated above, it appears then that these castles were not really subjected to the full test of war in the campaign of 1191.

1191–1222

In little more than a month, King Richard's regime had to suppress a Cypriot uprising that was most likely staged by Isaac's ex-followers taking advantage of the small size of the English forces. The absence of any reference to the use of castles in respect of this revolt does not appear significant. It seems that the Franks did not have to resort to withdrawing into the castles which were certainly in their hands. Although the revolt was easily suppressed, very likely it helped induce King Richard to sell Cyprus on to the Templars. In April, 1192, they in turn had to deal with an uprising. This second Cypriot uprising appears to have been a popular and spontaneous incident localised to Nicosia. In the event, its castle played little more than an incidental role, very much in the same way that Limassol castle had done a year before, but this in itself gives us some impression of its state at the time.

We have already noted the contrasting references to the castle of Nicosia in respect of Richard of England's campaign in May, 1191 and in respect of this incident in April, 1192. As stated above, on balance, it seems highly likely that the castle was indeed very weak, as the sources for the 1192 episode assert. It appears that the local Greeks (the 'Grifons'), enraged at the Templars' oppressive regime, knowing how few Latins were in the capital, decided that an attack on these invaders from the West would be successful. The Templars' force was indeed small: we are told that they only had fourteen knights, twenty-nine other horsemen, and seventy-four people on foot. Under the direction of Hernaut Bouchart, this force withdrew into the castle, but rapidly realized that they did not have enough provisions to be able to hold out for long and

11 Nicholson, p. 194.
that the castle was anyway not strong enough to withstand the numbers opposing them (see the descriptions and references given earlier). Accordingly the Templars resolved to make a desperate sortie and having been to confession, armed themselves and issued forth – all bar ten who were too weak and whose role was to stay behind to open the gate should any return. As it happened, the ferocity of their desperation and no doubt their superior equipment and training, made up for their inferior numbers and they completely overwhelmed their ‘Grifon’ enemies. This castle must of course be the old Byzantine castle, the vulnerability of which had been demonstrated twice in short order.3

The Templar victory was a desperate affair and this no doubt persuaded them to relinquish the island, the recipient being Guy of Lusignan.35 Whether the Cypriots did indeed take advantage of the Templars’ departure to demolish entirely this Nicosia Castle, as Stephen of Lusignan asserted,36 Guy and his successors must have been minded to strengthen their hold on the capital as quickly as possible in order to overawe and guard against future opposition from a conquered people. Indeed, the Colbert Fontainbleau recension goes on to mention that in 1192, Nicosia castle was not as strong as King Guy made it later,37 which tells us that some work on this castle was undertaken during the short period of his lordship of 1192–1194. Perhaps this work was carried out as something of an emergency measure and was not seen as wholly sufficient for the needs of the new dynasty in its capital. This would explain quite why further work had either just been carried out, or indeed was still in commission when a German visitor, Bishop Wilbrand of Oldenburg, visited Nicosia in 1211. Wilbrand wrote that ‘nullam habens munitionem. In qua nunc temporis forte castrum elaboratum.’38 It seems that Wilbrand was making it clear that the town of Nicosia had no town walls but that there was a castle. As noted below (gazetteer), it remains uncertain whether the castle that Wilbrand saw was indeed a brand new castle or rather a further elaboration of the old castle, as the site remains unidentified. Either

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34 see fn. 11 above.
35 Edbury, Templars, pp. 189-90; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 61-6.
36 Lusignan, Chorograffia – Grivaud, f. 49a; Chorography - Wallace, § 256, p. 66.
37 Recettii, loc. cit. (see fn. 11 above). Amadi, p. 84.
way, it became sufficiently important, symbolically at least, to feature as Castellum Nicossie on the seal of King Hugh I (1205–1218).³⁹

Wilbrand had made landfall on Cyprus at Kyrenia which he described as ‘civitas parua, sed munita, castrum habens in se muratum et turritum.’ This certainly says something of the castle itself but it should not be taken as necessarily implying the existence of town walls. Wilbrand added that ‘in finibus... habet quatuor bona castra’. If Wilbrand was indeed referring to four castles in the area, then presumably these would have included two of the mountain castles (St. Hilarion and Buffavento) though he would have had no real personal knowledge of them. The reference is however difficult in relation to the number of sites. In the circumstances, it is tempting to question quite what the author had in mind in this reference to castra.⁴⁰

It has been proposed that Guy, or his immediate successors, established other elementary towers elsewhere: at Famagusta, Paphos, and possibly in Limassol.⁴¹ All three are mentioned by Wilbrand in the context of the paucity of their fortifications. Taking these in turn, the most recent detailed architectural analysis has repudiated the identification of a very early tower at Famagusta. This may well be reflected in Wilbrand’s report of his visit in 1211 when he noted that this port was ‘non multum munita’. He used exactly the same phrase of Limassol: the remains there are, however, very hard to disentangle. Indeed it is likely that the present castle is a quite distinct building altogether, any early Lusignan tower being on a now lost site. Finally, the large scale excavation at Saranda Kolones, Paphos, carried on over a thirty years period from 1957, revealed the remains of a tower and a connected wall. These have been ascribed to these first years of Lusignan rule and correspondingly they may be the subject of Wilbrand’s allusion to a ‘turris’ but there are particular

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difficulties here, both in relation to the archaeology and Wilbrand's reliability on Paphos – matters discussed in detail in the gazetteer.42

This matter of the scale of the first Lusignans' commitment to developing the island's fortifications is of special interest because of differing views as to the threats confronting the Lusignans in these initial years. Thus, Kristian Molin was at pains to emphasise that the Lusignans needed fortifications against the indigenous Greek nobility and the local population, while Edbury, and following him, Nicolaou-Konnari, took the opposite view. Edbury observed that, somewhat mysteriously, 'the Greek landowning class did not survive the Latin take-over';43 and as he and Nicolaou-Konnari record, after 1192, there were no revolts against the Frankish regime until those in 1426-7 and 1472, the indigenous population co-habiting peacefully with the Lusignan government.44

The native population was predominantly peasant and rural and from what one can gather, for generations had been largely unconcerned as to the identity of the ruling regime; all that really mattered to them was its harshness. In 1192, Guy was of course in an uncertain position: he was a newcomer and he could not be wholly confident in the obedience of the indigenous population. He would have known of the revolts of 1191 and 1192. It is reasonable to suppose therefore that he might think to establish fortified bases to overawe his new subjects and indeed we have noted that accordingly, work took place at Nicosia. But we should not overstate Guy's apprehension. The fact that three of the four first castles that have been attributed to the Lusignans were located on the coast where they would be unlikely to exert much influence on a restive population and the disinclination of the ruling house to allow even their tenants in chief to erect castles of their own, argue that Guy saw civil disobedience as merely a secondary threat. As the Lusignan regime became more established with the passage of time, Guy's successors must have seen it as no threat at all.

42 Wilbrand, xxix, xxxi, xxxii, (ed. Laurent), pp. 181-2; Wilbrand, in Cobham, p. 14. For the identification of very early Lusignan work at Paphos, see especially A Castle in Cyprus, p. 45 and plan on p. 43. In general – see gazetteer.
44 Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 69-71, 105; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 20-1; Edbury, Franco-Cypriot Landowning Class, p. 4; Edbury, Lusignan Regime, pp. 2-3.
Molin also considered that the Lusignans believed that they needed to protect the coasts against occasional pirate raids. He drew particular attention to a Greek called Cannaqui, who absconded with Aimery de Lusignan's family. On the other hand, it has been emphasised that Cannaqui's exploit was an isolated escapade of an individual malcontent and that we should not over-represent its significance.\textsuperscript{45} Even so, we know that the collapse of the imperial navy allowed an upsurge of piratical activities in Byzantine waters, so it would be odd if Cyprus was not also thus afflicted. Pirates were operating in Cypriot waters at the time of the Fifth Crusade for example.\textsuperscript{46} This does not mean, however, that the Lusignans commissioned small coastal towers as a consequence. It would have been clear that such fortifications would have neither deterred nor protected against sea-borne raids, so it seems very unlikely that we can adduce this real threat of piracy as a reason for creating fortifications on any scale.

More important, however, is the issue of a perceived threat of a Byzantine attempt to recapture Cyprus; any such attempt would of course be seaborne, thus involving the coastal towns and ports in the first instance, especially Paphos which was the closest port for Constantinople. For Peter Megaw, this threat was all important and explained the rapid transformation of what he identified as the very early Lusignan tower mentioned above into the much more elaborate quadrangular, concentric Saranda Kolones. For him, 'it can hardly be doubted that the ... fortification at Paphos arose from the attempts of successive Byzantine emperors to recover Cyprus, both when the island was seized by Isaac Comnenus and after Richard the Lionheart had taken it from him.'\textsuperscript{47} According to this view then, the tower of Paphos, its successor, Saranda Kolones and presumably, any other very early Lusignan work elsewhere, were all inspired primarily by the threat of a Byzantine reconquista. Owing to the debate on Saranda Kolones – its dating and builders – it is worth considering this argument to see if it holds up, for if it does not, Megaw's raison d'être for Saranda Kolones and by implication, the other coastal castles, appears doubtful.

\textsuperscript{45} Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{46} Oliver of Paderborn (ed. Peters), ch. 50, p. 107; Ahrweiler, pp. 289-92.
\textsuperscript{47} A Castle in Cyprus, pp. 45-8.
In fact, it appears extremely unlikely that the Empire posed a serious threat to the new Lusignan regime. From about the death of Manuel Comnenus in 1180, the Empire quite lost the initiative in controlling its subject peoples and dealing with its various neighbours, the more important of whom had been on peaceful terms with it until then. In the west, it survived the Norman war of 1185, but from the late 1180s it fought a losing battle in maintaining its authority in its Balkan territories over its Vlach and Bulgarian inhabitants. These peoples, aided by Cumans from beyond the Danube, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Byzantine army in 1190, ultimately, in 1202, gaining independence from Constantinople, leaving the Empire with considerably reduced territories. Factional squabbling, symptomised by several changes of emperor, helped paralyse central government, this in turn facilitating regional governors to declare their independence. Such separatism was especially marked in the east, where matters were further aggravated by raids from Turcoman nomads on border territories and the breakdown of the understanding that Manuel Comnenus had had with the Seljuk Sultan Kilidj Arslan (1155–1192).48

This loss of territory and control in turn meant loss of revenue through the inability to collect taxes which naturally weakened imperial resources further. Cyprus itself is a good example of just this. It had been heavily exploited by Constantinople, when in 1184, Isaac Comnenus took control in his own name. The Emperor Andronicus I Comnenus (1183–5) simply did not have the means to do anything about this and though his successor, Isaac II Angelus (1185–95) initiated an attempt in 1187, Isaac Comnenus of Cyprus was able to negate it with the aid of a fleet led by the Sicilian admiral and freebooter, Margaritone. There were no resources to attempt a further Byzantine expedition to regain Cyprus.49

Byzantine sea power similarly decayed. Manuel’s last attempt to create a large fleet was in 1172–3 but this programme was not continued. The navy’s vessels were not maintained and consequently decayed quickly. It shrank to a series of forces based on the principal imperial ports which could only offer some measure of protection for coastal commerce. Such as it was, the fleet thus became disconnected provincial

48 Brand, pp. 16-18, 47, 88-96, 113-4, 125-133, 156, 160-72; Angold, pp. 299, 300-1, 304-15; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 34.
49 Brand, pp. 62-3, 109-10, 172; Angold, pp. 308-9; Ahrweiler, pp. 284, 289; Edbury, Kingdom of Cyprus, pp. 4,10; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 34-5.
forces under local authorities, whose loyalties, as just noted, were not necessarily to
the Emperor. This disintegration of central, imperial power simply encouraged a
proliferation of pirate forces, whose depredations caused further damage. Ultimately,
the Emperor found his only course of action was to hire one lot of pirates to counter
another, the remnants of the imperial fleet itself being used, with or without the
Emperor's consent, for further piratical enterprises. In the end, it could not even
defend its own capital during the course of the Fourth Crusade.50

This dramatic decline of Byzantine sea power rendered the Empire even more
vulnerable than before to the attitude of Venice, on whom it had sometimes depended
as a naval counterweight to the Normans of Sicily in particular. Earlier Emperors,
from Alexius I Comnenus (1081–1118), had granted various concessions to the
Venetians and as matters became more difficult, there were frequent attempts by
different Emperors from the time of Andronicus to bribe Venice with subsidies. These
efforts appear to have achieved little other than to help deplete the imperial treasury,
for relations deteriorated, especially from the revolution which put Alexius III
Angelus on the throne in 1195. Further, in 1194, Henry VI had become King of Sicily
and through thus uniting traditional German and Norman hostility to the Empire,
Sicilian naval resources remained a danger to Byzantine interests.51

As has been commented, the Angeli must have wanted the return of Cyprus to
Byzantine rule. Recovering Cyprus was, however, of comparable insignificance to the
desire they must have had for the recovery of their far greater losses elsewhere as
mentioned above but they were powerless to accomplish this. Their efforts to retrieve
the island after the accession of the Lusignans amounted to nothing more than sending
an embassy (in 1192) which - even had it reached Cyprus - could hardly have hoped
to achieve its objective and seeking the aid of such disparate partners as Saladin (in
1192) and Pope Innocent III (in 1201): initiatives that seem to have been highly
optimistic. The Angeli could not have been surprised at the rejection of these
overtures and indeed it may be that the approach to Innocent III was merely a
negotiating tool to deflect his support for a crusade against the Empire. How far

50 Brand, p. 5; Angold, p. 322; Ahrweiler, pp. 257-8, 268-70, 280-92; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 34;
Edbury, Kingdom of the Lusignans, p. 226.
51 Brand, pp. 5-7, 15-16, 20, 41-2, 172, 195-206; Angold, pp. 168-9, 185-6, 226-33, 320-1.
Guy's successor, Aimery, really feared a Byzantine expedition may therefore perhaps be questionable. Taking the Emperor Henry VI as suzerain in 1195 was perhaps some evidence of this, but the 'fears of a Byzantine revanche' as expressed by Aimery's ambassadors at the papal court in 1199 may have been pure diplomatic manoeuvring.\(^5\)

In short, to quote Steven Runciman: 'The ancient Empire had become a third rate power with little influence in world politics'. On balance then, it is clear that Constantinople was not the threat to early Lusignan Cyprus that Megaw thought it was: it would be most odd if this reality had not become increasingly apparent to Guy, Aimery and their successors.\(^5\)

We have argued against the view that there were compelling military reasons for the first Lusignans to erect fortifications. Apart from the tower they commissioned in Nicosia to dominate the local population, our knowledge of other towers they may have built at the outset of their régime remains meagre as we have seen. Having said this, if we accept the alternative view - that Guy of Lusignan and his successors did in fact perceive some need to defend themselves - then is it reasonable to see such possible towers as the result? At best these would have been simple structures, presumably not dissimilar to those that had been constructed in the early twelfth century by their fellow Franks in the Holy Land. They could never have been seen as serious obstacles to invasion by a foreign power or to large scale domestic uprising. Similarly they could have had little value as refuges against passing raiders. We should not forget that the Lusignans did not feel sufficiently vulnerable to encourage their followers to erect their own fortifications, for, as with high justice and coinage, castellation appears to have remained a royal prerogative throughout the Lusignan period, the only exception being the fortifications that the military orders were permitted.\(^5\) Clearly then, a major reason – quite possibly the major reason – for the Lusignans' use of these towers was – as it continued to be throughout our period – to emphasise their own regality to their subjects. The establishment of the Lusignan

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\(^5\) Hill, 2, pp. 62-3; Courcas, Latin Church, pp. 8-9; Edbury, The Kingdom, pp. 10-11, 31-2.
\(^5\) S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 2, p. 429. For the alternative view - that the early Lusignans did apprehend a Byzantine attack: Edbury, The Kingdom, pp. 11, 31-2.
\(^5\) Fedden and Thomson, p. 108; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 21, 185.
dynasty and the consolidation of the Franks in Cyprus succeeded for a number of reasons and we should not overstate the importance in this of any fortifications they might have constructed, as Molin did. In conclusion, these fortifications constituted principally a statement of the Lusignans' success: their towers and castles were more a result than a cause of the establishment of their régime.

The other developments that we may assign with certainty to these first twenty years of Frankish rule, involve the works of the military orders, as just mentioned. On the north side of Famagusta Bay, the Templar fort of Gastria, must date from this period. It is a simple curtain on a promontory with a rock-cut ditch on the landward side. It was first mentioned in 1210 when Walter of Montbéliard fled there and then mentioned again, in 1232, when Imperialist fugitives sought refuge there after their defeat at the Battle of Agridi (see gazetteer entry, p. 205). It may have been partly dismantled by King Hugh III when he confiscated the Templars’ Cypriot possessions in 1279. The estate of Kolossi was granted to the Hospitallers in 1210 and their first building, most likely a quadrangular curtain, presumably dates from the ensuing years. Certainly no castle is mentioned in the narratives of the Ricardian conquest: in this respect, it is worth adding that the Colbert-Fontainbleau Continuation and the Lyon Continuation make specific mention of the village or casal of Kolossi in 1191: it seems highly improbable that they would have omitted to refer to a castle had one existed.

Kolossi and Gastria were perhaps administrative centres first and fortifications second. Elsewhere, the two orders also came to have towers or strong houses: the Templars at Nicosia, Limassol, Khirokitia and Yermasoyia; the Hospitallers also at Nicosia and Limassol. These too could have served only as residences, administrative offices and prisons. The Templars also acquired property centred on Paphos, a point that has been adduced in an argument that it may have been they who were responsible for the erection of Saranda Kolones. This is but one aspect of the debate

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* Molin, Clermont, pp. 198-9; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 109.
on the origins and end of that castle that has become something of a *cause célèbre* and is explored in the gazetteer. ⁵⁸

THE WARS OF THE IBELINS AND FREDERICK II 1228–1233

The accession of Henry I in 1218 when only a few months old provided the Emperor Frederick II with an opportunity to confirm his over-lordship of the Kingdom and to this end, he landed at Limassol in July 1228. He was met by the leading baron of the Kingdom, John of Ibelin, Lord of Beirut, but the two quickly fell out over Frederick’s requirements. Thus began a contest which was to continue until 1233, in which the island’s castles played a key role. Our principal source for these wars is the chronicle of Philip of Novara. Philip was a partisan of the Ibelins and accordingly his narrative is very much a justification of their cause and a glorification of their martial deeds. Nonetheless, he played a leading part in many of the events so the detail he provides is extremely valuable, the more so because he shows sufficient interest in matters relating to castles to record some helpful information about them.⁵⁹

It is significant that even at this very early stage in this conflict, the control of castles emerged as an important issue. We are told that Frederick was warned that John would provision the castles against him, which indeed John was mindful to do, certainly readying St. Hilarion where he took his family and from which he defied Frederick for a few days. However, John then agreed to Frederick’s terms, which involved placing imperialists in control of Cypriot castles and accompanying him to Syria.⁶⁰ In May 1229, when Frederick left Syria to return home to the West, once more he was very careful to arrange that the island’s castles were in the hands of his own supporters. On his departure for Italy, he gave control of Cyprus to five anti-

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⁵⁹ *Guerra di Federico II in Oriente* (1223-1242), a cura di Silvio Melani, and *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, trans. and ed. J. La Monte. References cited below are from these works, as noted in the bibliography. For his comments on Novara’s perspective, see P. Edbury, *John of Ibelin*, pp. 34-5. For the timing of Frederick’s arrival in Cyprus and his initial negotiations with John of Ibelin, see Novara, § 30 (126), Melani, p. 82.

⁶⁰ Novara, §§ 35 (131)-39 (135), Melani, pp. 96-100.
Ibelin Cypriots: *baillis* led by Aimery Barlais. Later in 1229, the Ibelins returned from Syria to Cyprus, quickly taking Gastria, no doubt with the co-operation of the Templars. The *baillis* retired to Nicosia, where they were defeated in battle on 14 July. After that, most of them, under Aimery Barlais and Aimery of Bethsan withdrew to St Hilarion where they already had the young King in their custody, though one of their number – Gauvain of Cheniche – occupied Kantara, while some of their men held Kyrenia. On the day after the battle, the imperialists’ castles were invested. John of Ibelin himself took charge at Kyrenia, while his three sons directed matters at St. Hilarion with Anseau of Brie in charge at Kantara. At Kyrenia, Philip of Novara arranged with the defenders for the conditional surrender of the castle if they were not relieved within a certain time limit, and accordingly it was ultimately given up to him. The capture of St Hilarion and Kantara did not prove to be so easy.

From Kyrenia, John of Ibelin went on to join his sons at St Hilarion. However, as in 1191, its strength rendered it impervious to assault:

> Le chasteau si est en mout fier luec et en mout fieres montaignes, et mout y covient de gent quy bien le veaut asseger, car de mout de leus n’en y peut l’on issir que par la porte, et il y avoit dedans mout de garnison de gens à cheval et à pié.

> The castle is in a very strong location in most high mountains and many men were needed in order to besiege it well, for one could go out by many places other than the gate and there was within a large garrison of men both on horse and on foot.

Accordingly the Ibelin forces settled down to a blockade. Knowing that the imperialists were famished slackened the vigilance of the besiegers and as a consequence the Ibelins dispersed, John going to observe proceedings at Kantara and his sons to Nicosia and their estates, leaving very few knights at the siege. The imperialists, under Barlais, exploited this complacency and made a sortie, capturing

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61 Novara, § 43 (139), Melani, p. 104; Hill, 2, pp. 97-9; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 59-60.
62 Novara, §§ 48 (144)-49 (145), Melani, pp. 116-120.
63 Novara, §§ 49 (145)-50 (146), Melani, pp. 118-120; Hill, 2, pp. 103-5; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 110; A.H.S.Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 1.
64 Novara, § 52 (148), Melani, p. 124; trans. in La Monte, p. 105.
the camp and the provisions of the besiegers. Swiftly returning, Balian of Ibelin
recaptured their siege encampment and drove the imperialists back into the castle, so
restoring the situation, but their capture of provisions enabled the imperialists to
prolong their resistance. This incident prompted John of Ibelin’s three sons, Balian,
Baldwin and Hugh, to arrange to take it in turns to remain at the siege for a month at a
time, with a force of a hundred knights and ‘a goodly number’ of foot. Philip of
Novara had joined the Ibelin forces outside the castle: he provides a spirited and no
doubt elaborated narration of events. According to his account, he was wounded by a
lance thrust, the iron tip of which remained embedded in his arm. Undeterred, he had
himself carried before the castle where he sang two stanzas of his own composition
taunting the besieged. Having been reduced to eating their own horses and even a
donkey, enduring such antics most likely completed the garrison’s demoralisation and
they surrendered in April or May 1230.65

A similar sequence of events can be followed at Kantara. Notables among the
besieging Ibelin forces included Anseau of Brie and Lord John of Caesarea, one of
whose crossbowmen killed the imperialist commander, Gauvin of Cheniche. Philip of
Novara relates that Anseau had a trebuchet constructed. This was the new wonder
weapon of siege warfare and excited much interest: it was to see this that John of
Ibelin left the siege of St Hilarion. Yet, though reportedly it had a devastating effect,
the castle was so strongly positioned on its rock that it still proved impervious to
assault and its garrison, now under Philip Chenart, like that in St Hilarion, capitulated
on terms only in April or May 1230.66

The fact that both castles had remained untaken for some ten months and were only
then given up rather than captured by assault, is ample testimony to their strength in
particular and a reflection of the superiority of defence over attack in general. That the
fighting had focused on just these three castles also suggests that at this time, only
these three were of any real consequence. Indeed, the only building work on the
island’s castles during this period appears to be some work carried out at St Hilarion
and Kyrenia, more fully discussed below. It is also worth noting that though the

65 Novara, §§ 52 (148)-55 (151), § 56 (152), Melani, pp. 124-8, 132.
66 Novara, §§ 52 (148)-56 (152), Melani, pp. 124-132.
outcome of the fight at Nicosia was clearly important, the occupation and siege of
castles were the dominant aspects of this war and in this, very typical of the period.67

Precisely the same conclusions may be derived from the second half of the war, which
commenced in Autumn 1231, when the Emperor sent large forces to the East, and
attacked John of Ibelin's lordship of Beirut. The Ibelins followed to Syria and while
they were absent from Cyprus, the *baillis* led by Aimery Barlais, took possession of
the castles except Kyrenia, St Hilarion and Buffavento, suggesting, incidentally, that
the others were either poorly guarded or incapable of serious resistance. Of the three
that were held for the King and the Ibelin faction, Kyrenia capitulated quickly but at
St Hilarion, where the king’s sisters had been taken for safety, Philip of Caffran, the
Castellan, and Arneis of Jubayl, the Baillie of the Sècrete, withstood a siege of the
imperialists. At Buffavento, whither Balian of Ibelin’s wife, Eschive of Montbéliard,
had gone, an old knight named Guinart of Conches held for the King.68

At the end of May 1232, the Ibelins returned from Syria, took Famagusta and took
Kantara on terms.69 On the 15 June, they defeated the Emperor’s men at
Agridi/Aghirda and relieved St Hilarion. Some of the Emperor’s men fled to Gastria
but the Templars did not admit them, so they hid in the fosse only to be captured.70

However, the Emperor’s men were in a much stronger position in Kyrenia. In
command were Philip Chenart who had been at Kantara and Walter of Acquaviva,
with a force of some 50 knights and 1000 crossbowmen and sailors and engineers.71
The Ibelins commenced the siege in mid June 1232 but at first they were unable to
prevent the garrison from being resupplied by sea. In December, the Ibelins made a
formal military alliance with Genoa, whose vessels enabled the siege to proceed by
both land and sea. Both besieged and besiegers constructed a number of ‘trebuchets,
stone throwers, and mangonels’. The Ibelins additionally made ‘many movable
shelters to bring against the walls’ and ‘two great wooden towers’ which were drawn

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67 For a slightly different view, see Edbury, *John of Ibelin*, pp. 43, 47.
68 Novara, §§ 62 (158)-83 (179), Melani, pp.146-174; Hill, 2, p. 114; *Kyrenia Castle*, p. 2;
69 Novara, §§ 87 (183)-90 (186), Melani, pp. 176-80.
70 Novara, §§ 92 (188)-100 (196), Melani, pp. 182-194; Enlart, pp. 473-4; Hill, 2, pp. 118-22.
71 Novara, §§ 195, 101 (197)-102 (198), Melani, pp. 192, 194 - 6; Molin, *Unknown Crusader
Castles*, p. 111.
over the fosse but the imperialists resisted all such assaults, setting fire to the towers. Clearly the fighting was intense and deadly 'for there was a great number of arbalesters': Anseau of Brie was hit in the thigh by a quarrel from one such crossbowman - the iron head broke off and he died six months later. There was treachery too: Martin Rousseau, a captain of sergeants among Ibelin’s men and an accomplice, secretly communicated with the garrison advising them on when to attack the besiegers. The Ibelins discovered this conspiracy; they executed the traitors and Martin’s body was thrown by a trebuchet against the castle wall.\footnote{Novara, §§ 102 (198)-103 (199), Melani, pp. 194-8; in La Monte, pp. 157-60.}

The siege went on for ten months with the Ibelins being unable to reduce the castle by assault and typically it was hunger and disease that, in the long run, proved the deciding factors. We know, for instance, that Queen Alice of Montferrat who was within the castle, fell sick and died. With no hope of relief, the Emperor’s men agreed to terms, surrendering the castle shortly after Easter (3 April), 1233.\footnote{Novara, §§ 98 (194), 102 (198)-105 (201), 113 (209), Melani, pp. 191-2, 194-200, 208; Hill, 2, p. 123; Kyrenia Castle, p. 2; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 111.}

1233-1373

While the Crusader states in Syria continued to survive, Cyprus was well behind the front line, insulated against Muslim attack by Christian naval dominance of the Syrian coast.\footnote{Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 236.} Moreover, after the Fourth Crusade of 1204 captured Constantinople, any possible apprehension that Byzantium would seek to recapture its one time possession, must have evaporated. The thirteenth century was then, very much a century of peace, and consequently was the golden age of the Frankish régime in the island. There were very occasional raids by pirates or by Muslim vessels in response to Crusading activities but nothing to warrant that significant attention be paid to the island’s fortifications. Not surprisingly, what effort there was, was located on the Syrian mainland – at Acre. There, both Hugh III and then Henry II added to its defences in the 1270s and 1280s by building a new round tower and a barbican at their most vulnerable point – the outer defences of the north-east
enceinte. Henry II was crowned King of Jerusalem in Acre in 1286 and consequently had both a duty and interest in augmenting its security.

In spite of Henry's presence and that of his brother, Amaury, in May 1291 Acre fell to the Mamlûks and by August, the remaining Christian strongholds were also lost. Thus the last vestiges of the Crusader state in Syria was extinguished. The general view taken is that this completely transformed the situation regarding Cyprus: that the island had now become the next objective of the resurgent Muslims. Indeed the sources provide some evidence that invasion was in fact expected.

But how fundamental was fear of invasion in the aftermath of 1291? Was it really the cause for a massive investment in the elaborate fortifications that clearly did emerge – principally in Famagusta and Kyrenia?

The answer is complex. It needs to be attempted against the realization that military works are built to exploit an opportunity for expansion as much as against the threat of attack. In the eighty or so years between the fall of Acre in 1291 and the outbreak of the Genoese War in 1373, both these motives are apparent. Let us begin by studying the threats to Cyprus.

Beginning with the threat of a Muslim invasion, we know now that invasion did not come and we are able to appreciate quite why. It is reasonable to believe that the Lusignans similarly understood the various factors that restrained the Turks in Anatolia and more especially the Mamlûks in Egypt and Syria and that consequently the fear of invasion from those quarters was not so great. Prior to 1291, Egyptian naval assaults on Cyprus had been very rare: a raid on Limassol in 1220 at the time of the Fifth Crusade and Baibars' abortive attack on the same port in 1271. The events of 1291 did not change matters. Even a provocative raid by a joint Genoese and Cypriot force on Alexandria in 1293 failed to trigger any expedition, Sultan al-Ashraf Khalîl's emirs preferring to assassinate him rather than endorse any possible plans he might have.

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75 Jacoby, p. 95; Pringle, Town Defences, pp. 84 and 96; Pringle, Secular Buildings, p. 15.
76 Nicolle, Acre 1291, passim.
77 Templar, § 524, p. 121; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234.
have had to sail against Cyprus. Amaury's charge against Henry II in 1306 that he was failing in his duty to fortify Cyprus against the Mamluks and Amaury's communique of 1308 to Pope Clement V regarding the Mamluks' readying of an invasion fleet, were not necessarily entirely based on a genuine apprehension of an assault from Egypt, for there is no evidence on either occasion that there was any such real threat. However, there were other powers who threatened attack on the island, powers who had the advantage of sea power and about which therefore the Lusignans must have been concerned.

The most significant of these powers was Genoa. There is evidence that in the early 1260s the Genoese and Michael VIII Paleologos planned an attack on the island. There were Genoese moves to attack in the early 1310s and in particular they prepared hostilities, notably in 1305-6, 1319-20, 1343-44 and 1364-5. Genoese raids actually occurred - in 1302 when privateers abducted the Count of Jaffa from his estate at Episkopi, then in 1312 on the coast near Paphos and on a larger scale in June 1316, when eleven galleys commanded by Nicholas of Sono, descended on the same area and caused much destruction. At the same time, there may well have been an escalation in Muslim pirate raids on the island. In this context, it is very significant that the charge brought against Henry II in 1306 that he had done nothing to improve the island's defences named the Genoese as well as the Mamluks as the main threats.

These threats were at least a pretext if not an actual cause for Amaury's coup of 1306 as a result of which Henry II was overthrown. Amaury remained in power till his murder in 1310 whereupon Henry II was restored. Of course, Amaury's dubious entitlement to govern merely added to the island's insecurity and in this respect it has been suggested that, from 1308, he was concerned that a crusading force might

78 For the 1220 raid, Emoul, pp. 429-30; Eracles, Receuil, pp. 345-6; Hill, 2, p. 87. See discussions in Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, pp. 236-40; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, p.102. Richard, in Vaivre and Plagnieux. pp. 64, 68.
79 Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, pp. 113, 120.
80 Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, p. 111.
81 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 116-7; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, p. 132, 135; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 231 for pirate attacks in 1302 and 1312; Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, p. 109. Amadi, p. 398 for the attack of 1316.
82 Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234; Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, p. 113; Housley, Cyprus and the Crusades, pp. 198, 200-1.
descend upon the island, either to restore Henry II or overthrow the Lusignans altogether.\textsuperscript{83}

Not surprisingly, one of Amaury's first actions on gaining power in 1306, was to secure the allegiance of Kyrenia (where he was initially resisted by Sir Eudes of Vis, the captain of the castle, who 'held the castle for the king'), Paphos, Limassol 'and all the castles'.\textsuperscript{84} As we will see, we know that work was in progress on Famagusta's fortifications in 1308 and though this may possibly have been initiated by Henry II it can hardly be doubted that Amaury had cause to continue the work.

These threats to the island coincide with, and are coupled with a clear expansion in Lusignan naval activity which was a further stimulus for developing the defensibility of the major ports. From shortly after 1291, campaigns were launched against the Turkish held Anatolian coast, sometimes in league with other Christian powers. These campaigns continued throughout the reigns of Henry II, Hugh IV and Peter I and were a considerable naval commitment.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed Peter I's initiatives against various parts of the Levantine coast and particularly his attempt on Alexandria in 1365 and his acquisition and then defence of Antalya and Korykos constituted an especially intense naval effort.\textsuperscript{86} Inevitably however, they prompted reprisals. One such was a surprise attack on 10 December 1347 on Kyrenia, where the Turks managed to enter the castle beheading the castellan and killing a good many of its other 'residents'.\textsuperscript{87}

As has been pointed out by Peter Edbury especially, these campaigns against various towns on the Muslim mainland were most likely an important aspect of the Lusignans' aggressive mercantile ambitions. Pope Nicholas IV's bull of 1292 banning trade with Muslims, created the circumstances in which the Lusignans could channel a large proportion of East-West trade through Cyprus, thus allowing them to benefit from customs and market dues. They achieved this by implementing the ban against western merchants sailing directly to Syria and Egypt, while encouraging Cypriot-based middlemen to trade at Muslim held mainland ports and deal with western merchants sailing directly to Syria and Egypt, while encouraging Cypriot-based middlemen to trade at Muslim held mainland ports and deal with western

\textsuperscript{83} Edbury, \textit{Kingdom of Cyprus}, p. 123; Housley, Cyprus and the Crusades, pp. 198, 200.
\textsuperscript{84} for Amaury's effective usurpation, see Templar, § 662, p.167 et seq. For Amaury's seizure of the castles and towns, Makhairas, § 54 on p. 53.
\textsuperscript{85} See, eg., Templar of Tyre, § 525, pp. 121-2; Edbury, The Crusading Policy of King Peter I, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{86} Edbury, The Crusading Policy, \textit{passim}.
\textsuperscript{87} Chronica Byzantia Breviora in Boustronios, p. 252.
merchants based primarily in Famagusta. Locally produced goods for export from
Cyprus itself added to business. Accordingly, the Lusignans established naval patrols.
There is a possible reference to one as early as 1294 and certainly they were well
established by about 1310. Indeed, the first reference to an admiral of Cyprus is in
1298. However, policing the seas did not make the Lusignans popular and in
particular their interception of Genoese vessels trading with Alexandria for slaves and
other goods was greatly resented, which in turn helps to account for the fear of Genoa
in Henry II’s reign.88

These marine campaigns and patrols must have made it essential to have defensible,
naval dockyards and certainly the obvious port to develop in particular for this
purpose, was Famagusta, in spite of the shallowness of its harbour. It appears to have
served as a base for naval operations against the Muslims from at least as early as
1247.89 Indeed, Famagusta was especially important to the Lusignans. From about
1265 an increasing number of immigrants arrived there from the mainland Crusader
states, so it was already expanding when the final flood of fugitives arrived in
anticipation of the eventual fall of Acre in 1291. Henry II welcomed them – their
arrival in Famagusta with their riches and mercantile traditions must have effectively
supercharged that town’s economy in a dramatically short time. In this context, 1291
was perhaps seen more as a wonderful opportunity rather than the start of a period of
fretful insecurity and indeed we know that Henry II’s government tried to establish
Famagusta as the monopolistic entrepôt through which all this trade could flow. The
construction of town walls was an obvious means to help achieve this – both to
provide some security for merchants and so attract them and also to facilitate royal
control and exploitation of this mercantile community.90 This was reflected in the
words of Stephen of Lusignan, who wrote in the late sixteenth century that ‘Henry II
fortified [Famagusta] and made it like Acre, placing there a market where all the
foreigners from the East would come and do business in all kinds of merchandise.’ 91

88 Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, pp. 117-8; Nicolaou-Konnari and Schabel, p. 8; Coureas, Economy,
p. 156; Otten-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 111.
89 Eracles, Recueil, p. 433.
90 Otten-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 111, and see Town Walls in Part II.
91 Lusignan, Description, ff. 24 and 25.
In this matter, it was especially valuable to have a wall with appropriate entry points on the harbour side, and indeed the Customs House was located close to the main gate on this side. This was supplemented by a system for regulating entry to port. We know that royal officials issued licences to vessels to enter and leave harbour and upheld a right to inspect vessels for prohibited cargoes. It is clear that while this policy worked, the income thus generated was considerable and Cyprus correspondingly wealthy. Perhaps inevitably however, it brought its problems. Merchants naturally sought to avoid paying dues and being searched and the powerful maritime city states of the western Mediterranean exerted pressure to have their citizens exempted. By 1365, the Lusignans were compelled to waive their right to search and license Genoese vessels in Cypriot ports. Similarly the demands of the Italian and later Catalan communities in Famagusta especially were to become increasingly difficult to accommodate as the fourteenth century progressed. 92

Opportunities to concentrate, control and tax maritime mercantile wealth, a need for a naval base and threats from hostile powers help account for the considerable works at Famagusta. We have certain knowledge of work on Famagusta in 1308 and after, as noted in the gazetteer. The work was part of a massive programme that resulted in a considerable quadrangular citadel, which itself was merely the centrepiece of newly erected town walls. It certainly impressed an unknown Englishman who visited in the 1344–5 as noted fully in the gazetteer. 93 No doubt the harbour defences were further developed at the same time and one can speculate that particular attention was paid to the chain and chain tower that already existed. 94 Kyrenia’s fortifications were also enhanced at this time if not before: it certainly possessed town walls in the reign of Henry II (1285–1324). 95

Elsewhere, it was later believed that Henry II ‘began the castle wall’ of Nicosia - which might have been connected with the pre-existing Frankish tower, though that remains unclear. He is also credited with building at Akaki and though that is not

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92 Edbury, Famagusta, p. 337. For the creation of town walls to promote and control trade, in general see H. T. Turner, Town defences... . Edbury, The Crusading Policy of King Peter I, p. 96; Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, p. 123. For the Customs House, Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 522.
93 Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, p. 448; Western Pilgrims, p. 61. See gazetteer entry.
94 Edbury, Famagusta, pp. 338-9 and see gazetteer.
95 Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119.
stated as being a castle, its scant remains reflect an element of fortification.\textsuperscript{96} It is improbable, however, that Paphos reacquired fortifications at this time, as Molin proposed was the case as a consequence of the Genoese raids (above) of this time.\textsuperscript{97} As noted earlier, it is difficult to accept that the sole reason for building coastal towers at any time was to guard against pirates. A raid on a prosperous town could simply by-pass a tower. True, they had value as observation posts but a vantage point did not require a tower and such small buildings were quite useless as protection for large numbers of townsfolk and their goods. Indeed, the island's continuing prosperity probably made pirate raids inevitable: it appears that there was always some danger from them and that this continued well into the fourteenth century and beyond.

By Henry II's death in 1324, if not before, the period covered by the chronicle of the Templar of Tyre had come to an end. Unfortunately, the last pages of the extant manuscript are missing, so it is impossible to be precise, but this approximation is of value as furnishing an impression of quite when the Templar may have been writing. In his chronicle, he wrote a description of the island which tells us something of the state of its fortifications at the time.

Nearby Syria is an isle called Cyprus, most rich and good and full of all sorts of growing things. There were many lovely towns on the isle which I shall list for you. The city where the knights dwell, chief among them all, is called Nicosia; it is inland. There is another, which is on the seacoast, called Famagusta; and another on the coast called Limassol; another on the coast called Paphos; and another on the coast, fortified, with its city enclosed by walls, called Kyrenia. Inland are three castles: Dieudamour, Buffavento, and Kantara.

The unknown author of this chronicle appears to have settled in Cyprus a little while after the fall of Acre, so his was first hand knowledge of the island and so is of prime importance. If he was writing up his history in the 1320s, it is odd to note no allusion to the emerging fortifications of Famagusta, the more remarkable because of his care to report on the defences of Kyrenia. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that this passage appears at a point in the narrative that describes the fall of Acre in 1291, so it is possible that the Templar's chronicle was something of a logbook that he had been

\textsuperscript{96} Makhairas, § 41, p. 43 for Nicosia, and § 597 on p. 593 for Akaki. The text of the Chronicle is contained in vol. 1 and all references cited below are from that, except where stated otherwise. See introduction above in respect of Makhairas' reliability for events before 1359. Molin, \textit{Unknown Crusader Castles}, p. 102; Hill, 2, p. 14; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{97} Molin, \textit{Unknown Crusader Castles}, pp. 116-7.
writing as events unfolded and that this passage may be taken as an accurate
description of the island's fortifications in the 1290s. Clearly, this would explain the
absence of commentary as to significant fortifications at Famagusta. Just as
important, it may confirm the absence of any fortification then in commission in
Paphos.  

It appears that Nicosia castle continued to be developed after Henry II's death and that
around this same time in the early fourteenth century that most of St Hilarion's
considerable residential and other domestic buildings were created. Similarly, it was
quite probably at this time that corresponding facilities were created at Kyrenia,
relatively near to both St Hilarion and Nicosia and in that respect, the most convenient
access point to the sea.

By the reign of Peter I (1359–69), the fortifications of both Kyrenia and Famagusta
were no doubt largely complete. At Famagusta the harbour chain may possibly have
been improved during the fourteenth century. Incidents in 1297 and 1368 might
suggest this. In 1297, the Venetians were able to sail right into the harbour and burn a
Genoese vessel, though whether this was because the chain was at that time of no
great significance or simply not raised, we do not know. In 1368, the chain may have
deterred an attack by two Moroccan pirate galleys: it seems to have been kept in the
'closed' position to protect the harbour. Indeed, during Peter's reign, Kyrenia and
Famagusta acquired additional importance as the fortified ports from which he
launched his expeditions to the Anatolian coast. There, he occupied Korykos and
Antalya from 1360 and 1361 respectively, strengthening the defences of both. At
Antalya, Peter I's captains:

filled up the ditches, because the Turks used to hide in them and leap out to
attack people, ...and...built up the wall of the castle and also heightened the
towers.
Sir John de Sur (Tyre) had... in many parts heightened the wall of the castle
and the keep.

99 For the incident of 1297, Hill, 2, p. 209; for the incident of 1368, Makhairas, § 221, p. 203;
Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 117.
No doubt partly as a consequence of these additional works, Antalya was able to withstand a number of Turkish attempts to recapture it, though as it transpired, it was lost quickly – in 1373. On the other hand, Korykos remained in Lusignan hands until 1448. Its defences are of particular interest. (see below in Part III, Architecture).

Peter I was no less assertive within Cyprus itself. In Nicosia, it appears that at last serious work began on the town walls. In addition, he constructed a new building on the outskirts of the city, called the Margarita Tower, as more fully discussed in the gazetteer. Its purpose and the harsh measures employed to accelerate its construction, appear to have considerably exacerbated his unpopularity. In 1369, he was assassinated.

THE GENOESE INVASION OF 1373–4

Peter I was succeeded by his son, Peter II. His reign is marked by the war with Genoa: a war which the Lusignans survived, owing principally to the strength of its greatest castle – Kyrenia and the resolution of its defenders. However, the war greatly impoverished the monarchy and the Frankish régime and accelerated a decline that had begun earlier in the century.

The war began with a Genoese attempt to capture Famagusta. Philip of Ibelin, Lord of Arsur, had been placed in command there early in 1373 and was ordered to take certain measures against the Genoese:

Et similmente ordinò de fabricar et fortificar le muraglie del arsinal de Famagosta et far mantiletti et altrì fortificamenti de la cità. 101

100 For the acquisition of Korykos in 1360, Makhairas, §§ 112-4, pp. 99-101. For the acquisition of Antalya in 1361, works on its fortifications and its return in 1373 to the Turks – Makhairas, §§ 121-2, p. 107, (and Makhairas, 2, pp. 102-3 for the inscription in the walls of Antalya recording Peter’s capture of the town), § 126, p. 111, § 132, p. 117, and §§ 366-8, pp. 345-7; Hill, 2, pp. 320-2; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 163-4; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 127-9.

101 Amadi, p. 439. See too Fl. Bustron, p. 294. (Makhairas omits any reference to these preparations.)
It is not known what Philip achieved. On the night of 12 May 1373, the Genoese launched two successive attacks with troops landed from galleys. Both assaults were driven off, the first by the watch on a tower close to the harbour who let fly with arrows and stones, and the second by knights and foot soldiers led by John of Colie, who assembled outside the round tower of the Arsenal, at the south-east corner of the enceinte, by the sea. The Genoese vessels fell back to the Island of the Oxen, but were quickly dislodged by a sortie of knights and foot under the command of the captain of Famagusta.102

The King’s uncle, James the Constable, took steps for the protection of the rest of the island. He left a thousand men to guard Famagusta, assigned others to Nicosia and distributed more around the coast. He seems to have been in personal command of a force of some 800 based around Morphou. Foiled at Famagusta, the Genoese sailed round the coast raiding at will. They were forestalled at Kyrenia where its captain had a strong garrison and had to avoid the Constable’s force further to the west. James was unable, however, to check the Genoese everywhere, for they appear to have had a free hand on the southern coast of the island. Here, they pillaged and sacked Limassol, freeing prisoners, which has been taken to imply their capture of the castle, though this need not be so. They collected 2000 Bulgarians, Romanian Greeks and Tartars and took the castles of Paphos. At that time the castles had low walls, and they set to work and heightened them, and they cut a trench, so that the sea flowed in and surrounded them with water, making the place so strong that, when the Cypriots brought up fighting-towers and soldiers in them, they resisted the attack without anxiety for the result.103

The Cypriots’ siege towers were evidently elaborate affairs, being equipped with springals and their top platforms protected by brattices.104 Makhairas goes on to describe two attempts by Lusignan forces to recapture the castles and it seems likely that the abortive use of the siege towers may belong to the first of these, although that

104 Makhairas, 2, pp. 157-8.
is not altogether clear. Thus, John, Prince of Antioch, the king's other uncle, was placed in command. He led 'a thousand good fighting men' from Nicosia to Paphos, where he was joined by the local commander and his forces. Together they attacked 'the tower of Paphos' on 3 July. The Genoese used their galleys to help ward off the Cypriots, the fighting lasting for some hours. Although Prince John's force used Greek Fire against the enemy galleys, the Lusignan attack failed because, we are told, the Genoese had great help from the Bulgarians; and our people were not carrying shields, and on this account many of them were wounded.

Prince John withdrew to Nicosia, leaving the Genoese in situ. With this base, they were able to raid at will, compelling local people to seek refuge in the hills. In response, the Lusignans made a further attempt to retake 'le fortezze' of Paphos, this time led by James the Constable. This too came to nothing, in part at least, because the Genoese again used their galleys in defence of the fortifications.

These are of course valuable references to what must be the harbour fortifications of Paphos that are still in evidence today. The inferences to be drawn from these references from Makhairas and Florio Bustron, along with others, are discussed under Paphos in the gazetteer.

With the attack on Famagusta, the loss of Paphos and then the arrival of many more Genoese, the Lusignans could have been in no doubt as to the threat that confronted them. In Nicosia, on 2 October, a curfew was imposed and the watch assigned to 'guard the walls of the castle'. On the following day, King Peter rode with his people and made the circuit of the town inside the walls. And the walls were very strong, but they were low; and he sent word to the country round, and men came together and built them up with earth and stones; and they dug out the ditch and constructed one hundred and thirty-three platforms to fight from in addition to the towers.

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105 Makhairas, § 378, p. 359. See too Amadi, pp. 444-5; Fl. Bustron, p. 301. Hill, 2, p. 390 gives a date of 30 July, but his source, Makhairas, is quite clear about this.
107 Makhairas, § 382, p. 361; Fl. Bustron, p. 302 ('fortezze' is Bustron's word). Cf Hill, 2, p. 391; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 204.
Fl. Bustron commented that these platforms were about 175–210 feet apart. If so, this indicates that the whole circuit of the city walls was just under five miles: considerably long by any standards. This whole emergency programme of works was reportedly rushed through in twenty days, which if true must have been a remarkable accomplishment. Armenians and crossbowmen were recruited and all males of fifteen and over called up. 109

Having arranged for the capital’s defences, which he left in the charge of John of Neuville, the viscount, the King led a force of 2000 soldiers to reinforce the defenders of Famagusta which was once again the focus of the Genoese. Fighting their way into the city, the King’s force was able to join the garrison, although this combined force was heavily outnumbered by the Genoese, reported as 6,000 strong, albeit all infantry. With the strength of Famagusta’s fortifications as a base and with the advantage of having a number of mounted troops, the Lusignans were able to keep the Genoese at bay and on 5 October, under James the Constable, a force of 500 volunteers made a punishing sortie from ‘the Cava gates’ at the north-west angle of the urban enceinte. 110

In spite of their defensible position, the King and his party were anxious to reach an accommodation with the Genoese, although, it would seem, for different reasons. Certainly a principal reason must have been a desire to bring about a cessation of hostilities so that Genoese depredations stopped, for it is clear that their pillaging was very damaging. Accordingly, after much debate, the King’s party agreed to withdraw his garrison from the castle and hold a parley there, the King’s representatives to enter via the Land Gate and the Genoese party by the Sea Gate. In the event, the Genoese exploited the occasion to occupy the castle by force and very shortly after, were able to secure the person of the King, his mother, and the Prince of Antioch into the bargain. 111 Thus ensconced in the castle, it appears that the Genoese maintained the initiative by consolidating their position with their own emergency works. This seems to have involved digging a trench outside the castle thereby separating it from the rest

of the city, which the Genoese quickly overran as well. They were to move on quickly from this success to another at Nicosia, where they similarly fortified their position, as noted below.

It is noteworthy that while these events were unfolding in Famagusta, James, the Constable, who had arrived in Nicosia on 6 October, was careful to take steps to ensure that Kyrenia castle remained secure. Alarmed no doubt by the report of a Genoese ruse to take that castle by means of a letter purportedly from the King ordering the garrison to hand over command to one Francis Saturno, James was careful to direct that Kyrenia's defenders received pay, funds for victuals and reinforcements. Acting on Peter's command, which on this occasion was plainly not at the direction of his Genoese custodians, on 21 November, James and his household, slipped out of the Saint Paraskevi gate, avoiding the capital's citizens who were loathe that he should go, to take personal command at Kyrenia. Whether Peter and James thought that Nicosia was adequately defended and being inland, unlikely to be attacked, or alternatively that James saw that it was really not defensible and so decided to abandon it, is impossible to say. However, that no less a personage as the King's uncle, holding the prominent military post of Constable, should go to Kyrenia at such a time of crisis, is ample testimony to the perceived and actual importance of its castle and town.

Shortly after James' departure to Kyrenia, in late November, the Genoese proceeded to Nicosia where they captured a long stretch of the capital's wall.

And they held the town and the wall of the castle from the Market Gate [or Lower Gate] to the Tower of St. Andrew, and they made the walls higher and held the place in great force. And the tower which stands near the Market Gate they filled with earth and stones and made it like a castle.

This should have provided the Genoese with a sound base from which to overawe the city but it is plain that this attempt to use fortification to underwrite their position was insufficient. The Genoese were too few and not prepared for the reaction of Nicosia's citizenry. As George Hill put it: 'In the irregular kind of warfare which went on the


\[\text{\footnotesize Makhairas, § 424, p. 405, and 2, p. 164. See too Amadi, p. 454 and Fl. Bustron, p. 312.}\]
Genoese seem usually to have been the losers'. 115 Given the role of the town’s defences in the series of Cypriot reactions to the Genoese invasion, it is worth tracing them in detail.

On 6 December, the citizens seized the keys to the Gate of St Andrew. The Genoese concentrated on the Market Gate, but the townspeople seized the keys to it as well. It was only at the Queen’s command that they desisted and the Genoese were able to regain control. 116 Next, on 7 December, James, the Constable came up from Kyrenia. Again, the citizens rose up, broke through the St. Paraskevi Gate and went out and joined him. As on the 6 December, the Cypriots are reported as having the better of the ensuing combat and once more, the Genoese were compelled to persuade the Queen to order that James and the citizens withdraw. 117 On 9 December, Armenians and Syrians took over the Gate and Tower of St. Andrew. Yet again the Queen intervened, ordering that they evacuate these fortifications. Though she was obeyed, very shortly the Syrians changed their minds and reoccupied the Tower and

the Genoese... placed two platforms one on one side and the other on the other side of the tower, and sent a good company of men at arms, and they took up their position and closely besieged the said tower.

The Syrians were eventually overwhelmed and the Genoese retook the Tower. 118

Meanwhile, James’ arrangements to victual Kyrenia, appear to have at least partly miscarried as a consequence of the greed of his lieutenant. Once alerted to this, James acted with energy and personally took charge of collecting provisions for the castle, overcoming Genoese attempts to impede this in the process. In addition, he took steps to provision St. Hilarion, which was very shortly occupied by his brother John, the Prince of Antioch, who had managed to escape imprisonment in Famagusta. 119
After their successes of October and November, the Genoese must have now realized that they were losing their impetus. Further attempts to contrive the acquisition of Kyrenia by pressurising the young king to order its surrender had failed, while they had even been threatened in Famagusta by a Cypriot knight acting on his own initiative. As a result, the Genoese naturally looked to their defences in Famagusta. Orders were issued to 'raise the height of the walls wherever they were low, and (they) tried to bring the sea all round the place, so as to make an island.' Judging by the description of the castle that we have from 1394, (see gazetteer), it appears that this work was carried out and the sea let into the ditch surrounding the castle that had been excavated only two months earlier.

The war now focused on the Genoese effort to take Kyrenia. From the start, they were confronted by considerable difficulty. To begin with, they were unable to force the pass over the northern mountain range, which was well guarded by Bulgarian archers and crossbowmen who had deserted the Genoese in favour of the Lusignans. Next the Queen mother defected, reaching the safety of Kyrenia where her money was well used in providing yet another round of provisions for the people of the town. At length however, the Genoese were able to gain control of the pass, inflicting about 100 casualties on its Bulgarian defenders who withdrew to St. Hilarion.

About the beginning of the last week of January 1374, the Genoese land forces arrived outside Kyrenia. This appears to have taken Kyrenia's defenders by some surprise in that they did not have time to bring their cattle within the walls. However, they raised the bridges and nailed up the gates and rejected a call for their surrender, unceremonially showering the Genoese with bolts and stones, and used perrieres as well. And the stones were hurled as far as the camp, and they had Greek fire also: many men were wounded.

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121 Makhairas, § 450, p. 435; 2, pp. 163-4, 168, and see too Hill, 2, p. 401.
123 Makhairas, §§ 468-9, pp. 451-3; Amadi, p. 460.
124 This date may be inferred from Makhairas, § 468, p. 451.
The Genoese promptly withdrew out of range and set their carpenters to make ladders, ‘and engines and mangonels in great numbers’ and stones for them. By 3 February, this initial preparatory work was complete.\(^\text{125}\)

Leontios Makhairas’ account of the six week siege that follows is fairly detailed and as usual for events of this period, fuller than other narrative sources which in any event corroborate it. Peter Edbury noted that Makhairas had a relative among the defenders and considered that this quite likely led the chronicler to exaggerate their exploits.\(^\text{126}\) Inasmuch as Makhairas wrote of heavy Genoese casualties with no mention of Cypriot losses, this may at first seem true and yet this imbalance is wholly plausible given the distinct advantage of defence over attack and the seeming recklessness of the Genoese assaults. That Leontios had a relative in the garrison – in fact he had two – his ‘brothers’ Nicholas and Paul – reflects of course the source of his information, drawing, as it does generally, from first-hand accounts. In this context, it is interesting to note that Leontios himself, conscious perhaps that he might be subject to accusations of bias, writes, a little after his account of the siege,

\[\text{you must not think I am doing this in any way to make a boast of our Cypriot armies as against the Genoese armies.}^{\text{127}}\]

In sum then, although in all likelihood he was not born until later so could not have been at the siege himself and although too he is incontestably hostile to the Genoese invaders and thus prejudiced, his is a detailed narrative drawing directly from the accounts of older contemporaries\(^\text{128}\) who were present. Consequently Leontios’ account deserves close attention from the student of the island’s Latin Castles. In it we have a description of a medieval siege and the various techniques used, that rank among the best we have from both the Latin east and indeed, the west.

On 4 February, a Genoese party bringing up ladders from Nicosia was intercepted by the Lusignans’ Bulgarians and severely mauled, losing twenty of their ladders. At the

\(^{125}\) Makhairas, § 470, pp. 453-5.
\(^{127}\) Makhairas, § 484, p. 467.
\(^{128}\) Makhairas, 2, p. 16 where Dawkins assigned Makhairas year of birth to around 1380 while L. Philippou, writing in 1937 suggested 1350-60 partly on the basis of his brothers being at the siege (Hill, 3, p. 1145).
siege, the Genoese filled in the fosse with branches and dry wood and set up ladders attacking under cover of large wooden *pavises* motivated by promises of rewards for planting banners on the walls. This crude attempt at taking the fortifications by escalade was pressed home for two and a half hours. The Genoese quite possibly imagined that their opponents would not offer any real resistance – a view the Cypriots encouraged by not showing themselves. Consequently this first assault proved to be costly – the attacking forces sustaining 400 casualties, a substantial proportion of whom must have been at the hands of the defenders’ crossbowmen. The employment of such specialist troops in the defence of fortifications was long established. The utility of the crossbow and its efficiency in these circumstances were clear. At the relatively short ranges involved, the crossbow bolt was lethal. Makhairas tells how his relative Nicholas, killed one Genoese with a crossbow bolt which penetrated right through the unfortunate Italian’s bascinet.\textsuperscript{129}

On 5 February, fifteen defenders ‘went out together from the hidden gate’ and captured two scaling ladders, demolished ‘the penthouse’, ten planks of which they took back into the castle, burning the rest and igniting brushwood in the moat. The fifteen then invited the Genoese to combat and as if permitting the Italians to the appointed spot, the defenders ‘opened the gate and let down the bridge of the castle, the outer and shorter part of which was so contrived with a pivot and counterpoise that when the Genoese came on it, they fell into the ditch, where they were peppered with crossbow bolts. A fresh assault by 500 quickly followed, led by Louis Doria, which was repulsed and Doria wounded.\textsuperscript{130}

The experience of the 4 and 5 February demonstrated for the Genoese their need to try other tactics – clearly Kyrenia’s defenders were made of sterner stuff than had been expected: they were unlikely to be beaten by a force equipped with little more than just ladders. Undermining was probably not an option: it was a lengthy process but more importantly, the natural defensive site on which the castle stood and the ditch skirting its southern, landward side, made this all but impossible. Short of a simple blockade, the alternative was bombardment, followed by a more sophisticated method of escalade. The construction of assault towers was of course a considerable matter:


they took some time to put together, so although such devices may now have been
commisioned, there was none for immediate use. Nevertheless, the besieging force
sent for help to their comrades in Famagusta and on the 10 February, Genoese vessels
arrived carrying

mangonels and perrieres, which hurled stones as far as a good bow could
shoot. And there was also a war-ship, which arrived on the tenth of February,
1374 after Christ. In her was a mangonel like a trebuchet, and it shot just like a
crossbow, but at short range, with a great stone.131

This vessel attacked the castle from the seaward side, bombarding the north wall.
However, the defenders patched it on the inner side and lined it with another wall so
that the bombardment proved ineffective. A more closely pressed seaborne assault
also proved abortive, the Genoese troops being repelled by the defenders throwing
down stones and jars filled with stones and sand. Simultaneously, another assault was
made on the landward side, again by ladders, and this again was beaten back, clearly
with considerable loss to the Genoese:

And when they (the ladders) were crowded with men, from above they
threw down a great beam which was lying on the battlements: and they killed
the men and broke the ladder, and they all fell into the ditch. And they hurled
down so many stones from above that they killed any one who might still be
alive. And by means of ropes they let down anchors over the other ladder, and
dragged it upwards by force. And four Genoese were upon it, and they did not
notice that the anchors had hooked on to the ladder, and when they looked at
the ladder and saw that they were being carried up with it, they threw
themselves down and fell into the ditch.132

On the 28 February, a further assault was made, which was similarly beaten off.133

Another problem confronting the Genoese, was the force of Bulgarians based at St.
Hilarion. It seems wholly reasonable to suppose that this force under the command of
Prince John was acting in concert with the Cypriots inside Kyrenia, to whom they
rendered assistance by raiding the supplies coming up from Nicosia to the Genoese
army.134

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131 Makhairas, § 480, p. 463, and 2, pp. 175-6. See too Amadi, pp. 461-2 who describes the weapon as
Shortage of provisions within Kyrenia\textsuperscript{135} and the failure of the assaults prompted both sides to parley, but the talks came to nothing.\textsuperscript{136} Consequently, on 3 March, the Genoese renewed their effort to take Kyrenia, again by a co-ordinated land and sea attack. On the harbour side, a galley lifted up the entrance chain and cut it with a chisel but it was quickly repaired by the garrison. On land, yet another attempt was made at escalade with ladders, which inevitably was repulsed by a barrage of stones and missiles, the Genoese leader, Thomas Taga, being hit by two crossbow bolts. By this time, however, the Genoese had ready four wooden assault towers, which must have been under preparation for some days. The first of these, called the \textit{Sow}, had three storeys. It was no doubt similar to the more fully described \textit{Cat}, also of three storeys or fighting platforms, one above the other. On the first floor was a ram or at least men with picks and other tools to make holes in the wall; the second floor rose to a height level with the castle battlements and from it crossbowmen were able to pin down the castle’s defenders thereby providing covering protection to the men below chipping away at the wall; finally the third floor, which wholly overtopped the castle wall, provided the attacking force with a commanding view of the castle’s interior. A third tower was called the \textit{Falcon} carrying ladders for scaling and the fourth tower had a cage filled with crossbowmen at the end of a beam. Six Bulgarian defenders sortied out of the castle, set fire to the \textit{Falcon} and ‘the cage’ and cast the \textit{Sow} to the ground, killing the men in all three towers. When the Genoese withdrew, at night the defenders collected the nails from the machines and fixed them points upwards in planks which they placed in the fosse and covered with sand, so that when the Genoese attacked again the next day their feet were injured and they fell prey to the bolts and stones showered down from the walls.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} Makhairas, § 485, p. 469, and Hill, 2, p. 404.
\textsuperscript{136} Makhairas, §§ 485-494, pp.469-83; Amadi, pp.463-5; Fl. Bustron, pp. 320-3 and Hill, 2, pp. 404-5.
Next the Genoese lashed together two galleys fastening a yard crosswise between their masts, to the central part of which they fixed an upright beam carrying a shielded platform for crossbowmen, which stood so high it overlooked the castle wall. This assault was countered by the construction of a wooden screen on the castle wall opposite, impeding the crossbowmen’s fire. One of the castle’s three trebuchets then demolished the platform while the other two were employed against the Genoese land forces, one of which finished off the Sow.138

It may be noted in passing that there was nothing particularly novel in these various Genoese attempts at assault – even their contrivances in attacking by sea had clear precedents. In their attack on Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade, the Venetians had bombarded the city using mangonels and other petrarie on board their vessels and erected scaling ladders on their decks. They fixed boarding ramps from their mastheads ‘so that they easily mounted the walls of the city’. The city’s defenders countered this threat by heightening their walls.139 Later, in 1264, the Venetians mounted another seaborne attack, this time on Tyre, then occupied by the Genoese. The Venetians had bound their vessels together and raised over the resulting platform a contraption that enabled them to look down on the sea walls. On that occasion too, the defenders responded by building up their parapet with timbers.140 As it is apparent that Kyrenia’s north curtain was heightened on at least one occasion, we may suggest that once their coast was clear, it was then that its defenders replaced their hastily improvised wooden screen with masonry.

The Genoese gave up the siege and withdrew, probably on 15 March 1374. The Italians continued to hold the capital with a small garrison. Before the end of the month, there was another attempt to retake Nicosia for the Lusignans, led this time by two Genoese noblemen who had defected. The Genoese defenders based themselves in the towers of the Market Gate, which of course included the ‘castle’ they had thrown up on first capturing Nicosia. The Lusignan force was too small, however, to

138 Makhairas, § 498, pp. 485-7; 2, p. 179; Amadi, p. 466; Fl. Bustron, p. 324; Hill, 2, p. 405; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3.
139 Robert of Clari, pp. 71, 85, 92.
140 Templar of Tyre, § 322, pp. 41-3.
make any headway. It was soon overpowered, its Genoese leaders retreating to the 'Tower of Trakhona' where they were captured.  

NEW WORK AND ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER FAMAGUSTA  
1374–1441

Although they had defended Kyrenia successfully, the war with Genoa had, in all other respects, been a disaster for the Lusignans. Indeed, it was probably only the Genoese failure to take Kyrenia that permitted the survival of the Lusignans as an independent dynasty. The Genoese imposed harsh terms in exchange for peace. Among other conditions, King Peter was obliged to require that his uncles leave their posts at Kyrenia and St. Hilarion, and he similarly ‘sent to all the other castles as well, to relieve the men in them.’

The Peace Treaty of 21 October 1374 consolidated arrangements. Among the conditions imposed, Buffavento was to be given to the Hospitallers but it is unlikely that this in fact occurred. Plainly this peace treaty could never have endured and indeed it was soon forgotten as the Lusignans attempted to recover Famagusta. The first attempt began in 1375, at the initiative of one Thibald Belfarage, though with the assent of King Peter. Belfarage raised 800 men at arms in Venice and scored a notable naval victory over two Genoese galleys sent out to intercept them en route to Cyprus. This force of mercenaries appears to have formed the core of the army – a mixture of horse and foot, equipped with crossbows and longbows, which proceeded to Famagusta, perhaps not until 1376. Under the command of Alexis the Cretan, the Turcopilier, this force appears to have achieved very little. A change in command in 1376 made no difference and we assume any attempt at a siege fizzled out.

The next attack was made in September 1378 with the aid of Venetian sea power. On this latter occasion, a joint attack seems to have been contemplated but poor co-

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141 Makhairas, §§ 503-510 and 520, pp. 491-501 and 511; Amadi, pp. 466, 468-9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 325-7 and Hill, 2, pp. 406-9 (and p. 409, fn. 1 for the date of the withdrawal).  
142 Makhairas, §§ 528-9, p. 521.  
143 Hill, 2, p. 414; Opoypion Boyoabento, p. 2.  
ordination brought all to nothing. Realizing that the primary threat lay from a Venetian seaborne assault, the Genoese constructed forty wooden platforms and wooden towers, building them also above the tower of the harbour, and they worked at nailing them and making them ready ... they put fourteen men on every platform, and left one man only (as guard on the landward side:) and (all) the others they posted on the seaward side, on the platforms which they had just newly made, and on the tower.

The Venetians forced their way into the harbour and attempted to scale the sea wall, but this may have been premature, for certainly any Lusignan forces were not organized for an attack from the land. As a result, the Genoese defenders were able to concentrate virtually all their forces on the seaward, in consequence of which they forced the Venetians to withdraw.145

During his reign, Peter II began and largely completed a very considerable fortified, palatial complex in Nicosia. Elsewhere, he founded a new castle – palace at La Cava, at the Nicosia end of a route to Larnaka and a manor at Potamia, about twelve miles south-east of Nicosia.146

When Peter II died in 1382, his lineal successor, his uncle James, was a prisoner in Genoa. This situation allowed the Genoese to impose a further advantageous treaty, which was agreed on 19 February 1383. This recognized a Genoese zone of two leagues around Famagusta within which the Cypriots were banned from building castles, while for their part, the Genoese agreed not to create fortifications outside their zone. The Genoese were to take over Kyrenia in pledge, but it is clear that they never came into its possession.147

In 1385, James was finally able to return from Genoa, whereupon he reconfirmed at least that part of the treaty allocating Famagusta and its hinterland to the Genoese.148 Effectively, he was obliged to recognise the new status quo, by which he was not king of the whole island and that he now had to contend with a land frontier with an

146 See gazetteer.
147 Hill, 2, pp. 433-4; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3.
148 Makhairas, § 613, p. 605.
unpredictable and demanding neighbour. To deal with this new phenomenon, James I is credited with carrying out works on the fortifications at Paphos and Limassol, adding to the new castle-palace complex and city walls in Nicosia and establishing a wholly new fort at Sigouri. In addition, he had work carried out on the ‘Tower of St. Lazarus’, which is probably an allusion to Larnaka, supporting a view therefore that it was James who first established this fortification. Over and above these specific locations, Amadi adds that James was involved with ‘many other buildings and repairs’ and among these unnamed places we may perhaps include strengthening Kantara, as Stephen of Lusignan and after him, modern scholars have suggested. However, it is clear that James was equally keen to enhance the beauty and comfort of his various buildings in addition to his caput in Nicosia. We know that he added to the castle-palace of La Cava and that he made a grant to one ‘Perot’ to develop the house and gardens at the manor of Potamia. This ‘Perot’ was a ‘craftsman’ from Kyrenia and so it may have been he who supervised work on the elaborate royal apartments set against the west wall of Kyrenia Castle that are generally attributed to this period.

The next king, Janus (1398-1432) decided to renew the campaign to recapture Famagusta and to this end he collected 6000 men and hired thirteen Catalan galleys. His first attempt, on 26 March 1402, came to nothing. Arrangements had been made by which Lusignan sympathisers inside Famagusta would open the gates to the King’s men waiting outside but knowledge of the plan leaked out and consequently was forestalled. Janus mounted a siege but in August 1402, reinforcements arrived from Genoa whereupon the royalist forces dispersed and the thirteen galleys were scuttled, bringing the siege to an end.

In 1403, Janus tried again, settling down to a desultory siege with the aid of siege engines. In 1406, Janus burned his engines and gave up. The siege was briefly

\[149\] Amadi, p.495 for a list of James’ works; Lusignan, Description, f. 35; Hill, 2, pp. 445-6; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 206; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 118. See individual gazetteer entries.


\[151\] Makhairas, §§ 630-1, pp. 617-9; Amadi, pp. 496-7; Fl. Bustron, pp. 354-5; Hill, 2, pp. 449-51.
resumed in 1408. On this occasion, both sides used cannons obtained from Venice. The King’s bombards – ‘pezzi grossi d’artiglierie’ knocked down a stretch of the walls towards ‘Chrusoprasini’, but the breach was not entered. The Genoese cannons ‘brought in secret from Venice’ were used against the Lusignan forces - Janus’ general, John Castegna, had his thigh blown away by a ball and ‘the man died of the wound’. Once again Famagusta remained in Genoese hands. Shortly after this, the Genoese retaliated by attacking Limassol castle with a great cannon they hauled over from Famagusta. However, the Genoese force was attacked and overwhelmed by a force led by the Seneschal of Cyprus aided by a Venetian named Carlo Zeno. The royalists inflicted a number of casualties on the Genoese, capturing some and taking the cannon (‘un gran pezzo d’artiglieria’) as well.

This war of 1408 is primarily of interest because this was the first occasion that cannon were recorded as being in use in Cyprus. Clearly they had a considerable impact, though not enough to bring about the capture of Famagusta. Indeed, Peter II’s and Janus’ several, abortive attempts on Famagusta demonstrated emphatically the strength of the town’s defences. Janus had no alternative but to recognize this, making peace in 1409, which was ratified in December 1410 and reconfirmed in December 1414.

In December 1441, King John II (1432-1458) gathered 24 vessels in preparation for a sea and land attack. Three assaults were made but once again, the Italian defence held. It was not till 1464 that the Lusignans recaptured it.

THE MAMLÛK ATTACKS OF 1424-6

From 1404 Janus encouraged a series of Cypriot piratical attacks on Mamlûk territories that culminated in a raid on Syria in 1413. Although Janus agreed to withdraw his support for these attacks in arrangements made with Sultan al-Malik al-Muayyad Shaykh in 1414, Cypriot-based pirates later resumed raids into Egyptian

155 See fn. 153 above, and Hill, 2, pp. 458-60.
waters which climaxed in an attack on the port of Alexandria in 1422. In the same year, Janus seized a vessel sent bearing presents from the new Sultan, al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Barsbay (1422-37) for the Ottoman Murad II, prompting two counter raids on Cyprus. Then, in June 1424, Cypriot pirates appeared off Damietta and captured two Muslim vessels with their cargo and over a hundred men on board, which were subsequently sold to Philip Picquigny, the bailli of Limassol and John Gasel, the commander of Larnaka.157

Barsbay thereupon decided to mount a more considerable expedition against Cyprus. The first of these was launched in August 1424 but it was of limited scale consisting of only five galleys. In September it proceeded to Limassol where it was opposed by forces that withdrew into the castle. The Mamluks quickly moved west to pillage the casal of Kouklia, before returning to Egypt.158

In August 1425 a much bigger force – carried in 40 to 50 ships – landed near Famagusta. Despite the opposition of the King’s brother, various places were sacked, including ‘the lodging of the tower of Aliki’ (Makhairas) ‘la stanza della torre de Salines’ (Amadi) ‘la stanza de la torre de Salines’ (Fl. Bustron).159 This appears to be only our second reference to the fortification in Larnaka commenced, as we saw, by James I, here at a port that James may have hoped could serve in some measure as a substitute for Famagusta. Next, the Mamluks went to Limassol where the Cypriots again withdrew into the castle. With the aid of a canon, the Mamluks breached the defences and killed its garrison. The arrival of a royal army shortly afterwards appears to have then induced the Mamluks to abandon their enterprise to return to Egypt, although not before they damaged the castle.160

157 Makhairas, § 636, pp. 621-3; §§ 645 and 647, p. 629; § 651, p. 631; Ziada, 1, pp. 90-2.
158 Makhairas, §§ 651-2, pp. 631-3; Petite Chronique, pp. 324, 337; Amadi, p. 500; Fl. Bustron, pp. 356-7; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri and Salih B. Yahya, Arab Sources, pp. 96, 103; Ziada, 1, pp. 93-4; Hill, 2, p. 470; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 225.
In 1426, an even bigger force, 180 sail, landed on 1 July and marched to Limassol.\footnote{For the size of the fleet, see Hill, 2, p. 476, fn. 6, which seems more likely to be correct than the 150 given in Makhairas, § 672, p. 653; Amadi, p. 505 or Fl. Bustron, p. 361.}

It appears that the damage sustained by the castle in 1425 had been made good and its fortifications even enhanced. However, the Mamlûks took it by esascalade with little trouble on 3 July and held it for three or four days, slighting it before proceeding on to meet the king’s army.\footnote{Makhairas, §§ 672-674, pp. 653-5; Amadi, p. 504; Fl. Bustron, pp. 361-3; Petite Chronique, pp. 325, 337; Lusignan, Description, f. 155; Chorographia – Grivaud, f. 59a; Chorography – Wallace, § 342, p. 80; Salih B. Yahya and Ibn Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 108, 129; Ziada, 1, pp. 100-1; Hill, 2, p. 477, fn1 and 2.}

Although they failed in their attempts to surprise Kolossi and the ‘casal’ of Episkopi, it has been suggested that some damage was inflicted and indeed there is some evidence for this at Kolossi but any such damage did not in itself cause the immediate erection of the present castle at Kolossi which dates from 1452. Janus gathered his forces in Nicosia and marching \textit{via} Potamia, reached Khirokitia on 5 July, where he and his knights occupied the tower of the Commandery.\footnote{For Episkopi and Kolossi, see below, Part II, An Urban Aristocracy and the gazetteer entry for Kolossi. For the progress of the royal army, Makhairas, §§ 672-675 on pp. 653-5; Amadi, p. 510; Hill, 2, p. 478.} Subsequently, the King was defeated in battle and captured. The Regent took the royal family and treasure to Kyrenia for safety, while the Mamlûks went on to burn the royal lodge at Potamia, \textit{en route} for Nicosia where they similarly burned the ‘king’s most marvellous palace’ and royal records.

The damage inflicted on the royal buildings in Nicosia by the Mamlûks is interesting in that the sources make it clear that what was burned was the court, not the castle as a whole. Makhairas related that Janus:

\begin{quote}
finished the castle, and the houses in which he was to live on account of the burning of the court.
\end{quote}
while Boustronios remarked that

because ever since the royal court had been burned, King Janus, on his return from Syria, took possession of the residence of the knight Sir Richard de la Baume and dwelt there; and it has remained the royal court down to this day.\textsuperscript{164}

From Makhairas' comment, we may infer that Janus completed the castle in any event, and that only the court buildings needed repair because of Mamlûk damage. Boustronios' comment of course does not actually say anything about the castle as such, merely the royal court. Running on from that, it is interesting that, while Boustronios emphasises that Janus and his successors never reoccupied the original royal court buildings, taking over instead the apartments of a knight, there continued to be ample references in his chronicle to the monarch occasionally occupying the castle.\textsuperscript{165}

THE LUSIGNAN CIVIL WAR: 1460-1464

On the death of King John II in 1458, the throne passed to his daughter, Charlotte whose marriage to Louis of Savoy was finalised later that year. Her rule was shortly challenged by her half brother, James the Bastard, who fled to the Egyptian Court where he was recognized as rightful ruler. Aware that James would return and claim the throne by force, Charlotte and her party abandoned the capital and withdrew to the principal castle on the island – Kyrenia. With an Egyptian fleet and army at his back,

\textsuperscript{164} For the defeat at Khirokitia, the capture of the king, and the resort to Kyrenia, Makhairas, §§ 678-687, pp. 657-69; Amadi, pp. 505-9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 363-9. For the burning of 'the lodge of Potamia', Makhairas, § 692, p. 669; Amadi, p. 510. For 'the king's most marvellous palace' in Nicosia, Makhairas, § 694, p. 673, and Amadi, p. 512. Ziada's coverage of the battle and subsequent events is in his 1, pp. 102-4 but Hill is much more comprehensive in his 2, pp. 479 – 85. The quotation on Janus' rebuilding is from Makhairas, § 702, p. 679 and that on the move to the Baume house from Boustronios, § 1, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{165} eg. § 19, p. 79.
James returned to Cyprus, landing on 18 September 1460. Charlotte’s tactical decision is of interest because it says something of the relative strength of the fortifications of Nicosia and Kyrenia. On the one hand, Charlotte may have feared a blockade in her capital but her party would have known that the Egyptian fleet would effectively have the same effect on her at Kyrenia. Her advisers must also have realised that abandoning the capital to her opponent would constitute a very considerable loss of face and symbolically be disadvantageous. In conclusion, one can only consider the move to Kyrenia was largely because it was by far the most defensible castle on the island.

Appreciating that he could deal with only one adversary at a time and that the Genoese had cause to favour Charlotte and Louis’ party, James made it a priority to gain control of Sigouri. No doubt this was to gain a base from which to exert control in the area adjacent to Famagusta, while simultaneously imposing a force that might intimidate the Genoese there from a move towards Nicosia in support of Charlotte. James’ forces appear to have achieved surprise for some of the senior officers were outside the castle at the time. This seems to have been key in inducing its captain, Thomas Mahes, to yield the place up, once the appropriate safeguards were agreed. One of James’ men, Philip of Pezzaro, was then installed as Sigouri’s captain.

About the same time, another of James’ detachments similarly prevailed upon the commander of the fortifications at Paphos, James Mahes, to surrender upon safeguards, although in this instance, the commander was permitted to stay in his post holding it for the new king. It is perhaps noteworthy, however, that James seems to have made no attempt to secure any of the island’s other fortifications at this juncture, concentrating rather on proceeding to occupy the capital. James himself and his forces entered Nicosia unopposed on 26 September but they stayed only long enough to assert control, for by the end of the month, they had begun to establish a siege of Kyrenia. Three main camps were set up: one ‘by Kamouza’ – identified as one of Kyrenia’s town walls’ towers – perhaps the round tower at the south-west corner of

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168 Boustronios, § 68, pp. 102-3; Ibn Tagribardi, Arab Sources, p. 94; Fl. Bustron, p. 401.
the town walls, near the market place; another at ‘Casa Epiphani’, north-east of Kyrenia, and a third created by the emir, Kun the Circassian, in the ‘royal casal’.169

We have a reasonably detailed picture of James’ siege arrangements. From the ‘royal casal’, Kun dragged forward a cannon that had been acquired at Sigouri and positioned it ‘into the barbican’. Another two cannon were set up by two emirs at the camp near Kamouza while another two emirs placed two more cannon ‘on the side of Sperouniou’, most likely the area of the western spur of the main harbour at the seaward end of the town wall. James himself set up a serpentine (‘una serpentina’) on the roof of a Greek church which, we are told, killed 23 men in Kyrenia. He commissioned an Egyptian to make another large cannon and to that end ‘500 olive trees and many other trees were cut down at Casa Epiphani’ most likely to fuel the furnaces necessary for fashioning the gun, though it turned out to be ineffective and hence was broken up.170

It seems apparent that the ordnance thus employed was varied. Those by Sperouniou were small and caused more alarm than real damage, whereas the serpentine was clearly rather more effective. The Epiphani piece that was mismade was probably even larger. All must have been trained reasonably closely to their targets, judging by the reference to Kun’s cannon being in the barbican and indeed it is clear that to be useful, such short ranges were vital. The effective range of a serpentine, for example, has been estimated to be 250 yards. In this, we can reject the observations of Hill that ‘the bigger guns’ would have been effective from the camp at Casa Epiphani itself - ‘a good three miles from the castle of Kyrenia’; indeed it is fairly clear that the cannon were hauled forward for use and were not intended to be operated from the besiegers’ encampments. It seems clear that gunpowder artillery was not the only means of assault, however, for mention is made of the construction of ‘many siege engines’ which could well relate to older devices of bombardment, implying perhaps that even at this stage, new techniques were not seen as having wholly superseded

169 Boutronios, §§ 45-50, pp. 93-4; Fl. Bustron, pp. 395-6; Hill, 3, pp. 561-2;
170 Boutronios, § 50, pp. 94-5; Ibn Tagribardi, Arab Sources, p. 94; Fl. Bustron, p. 396; Enlart, p. 420; Hill, 3, p. 562 who rightly corrects Dawkins’ translation of § 50 in his Boutronios, p. 22 as stating that the cannon was used to destroy the olive trees. For the locations of ‘the side of Sperouniou’, and ‘Kamouza’, Dawkins, Boutronios, p. ix and P. Newman, p. 7.
more easily created and reliable traditional artillery pieces. Scaling ladders were also made, in readiness for close escalade.¹⁷¹

The defences were however, considerable. The castle was ‘fornito a sufficientia’, possessed various artillery pieces of its own and had the support of galleys in the harbour. Charlotte and Louis had the support of a good many lords and so they had a significant force, which they organised, seemingly giving the Sicilian, Sor of Naves, overall charge, while authorising ‘Brother Celli’ and his Hospitaller brethren to keep guard over the castle itself.¹⁷²

No doubt this persuaded the Egyptian commander to agree to a parley with Charlotte’s representatives and eight days after that, the bulk of the Egyptians withdrew from the island, destroying their engines and encampment equipment and abandoning their food which was promptly taken by Kyrenia’s defenders. Charlotte, perhaps accompanied by Louis, took this opportunity to sail off to Rhodes to seek help from Hospitallers as James was obliged to fall back. By 7 November he appears to have been back in Nicosia with his those Egyptians left to him, which we are told numbered 200 Mamlûks and 200 infantry, under ‘Janibek’. He managed his remaining forces well and summoned local troops, these including a 125 cavalry and 100 foot soldiers and archers from Larnaka under its ‘Chevetain’ – George Bustron (the chronicler), and prisoners who had been freed from Sigouri and on 9 November left the capital to return to Kyrenia.¹⁷³ On this occasion, he had far few resources to mount an aggressive siege and it is not at all clear that he was able to maintain even a loose, containing force at Kyrenia over the winter, as Hill thought. Both sides attempted to contrive ambushes, one such episode in April 1461 involving a brief skirmish in ‘the ditch of the barbican’.¹⁷⁴

At some point, Charlotte returned from Rhodes and ‘disembarked at Paphos, making port by the castles.’ James’ commander, John Mistachiel, was easily induced to

¹⁷¹ Boustronios, § 50, p. 95; Fl. Bustron, p. 396; Hill, 3, p. 562, n. 4. For the effective range of a serpentine, Norris, p. 124. For a more general discussion on gunpowder artillery used in Cyprus, see Part II - The Fortifications in War.
¹⁷⁴ Boustronios, §§ 60-70, pp. 100-4; Fl. Bustron, p. 401; Hill, 3, pp. 564-5, 570-1.
restore the castles — 'li castelli' to her; she then appointed her own commander, Peter Palol, as captain, with 'una buona compagnia'. Palol was quickly superseded when Sor of Naves, presumably still in Charlotte’s service, arrived from Kyrenia, and placed his brother Peter of Naves in command. Paphos may not have remained in the Queen’s hands for very long, however, for it appears that James reacted swiftly, appointing one of his supporters in the area — Dimitrios of Coron — as captain of Paphos, whose 'turcopoles and emancipated peasants' besieged the fortifications. Naves with his 'Franks and Cypriots' sallied out and fought with them, but Mistachiel, who seems to have joined Charlotte’s party, changed his loyalty again and induced Naves to go over to James. It appears that Mistachiel was restored to the general command of Paphos, being in this post in October, 1461.

James was also confronted by the Genoese based in Famagusta of course. From November, they launched various raids into Lusignan territory, prompting James' men to counter with their own punitive expeditions. This led ultimately to an attempt to take Famagusta itself. On 22 March 1461, James' assault began. Plainly however, he had few forces. His men located a hole in the wall of the tower on the side of the arsenal and attempted to enlarge it with picks. At the same time, they tried escalade but found their ladders too short, which they tried to remedy by joining them together. Reportedly they also had 'many engines of war', but James' force appears to have been too tiny to have coped with an artillery train and one guesses that this was really an attempt to capture Famagusta by surprise with what slim forces that were available. The attempt was soon abandoned.

In May, James made another attempt on Famagusta, pitching camp 'on the side of St Nicholas', that is, opposite the south side of the walls while the Egyptian forces camped at the Limassol Gate. On 2 June, James captured a vessel bringing victuals to the Genoese garrison, but four days later reinforcements, ordnance and munitions got through to Famagusta on the initiative of Sor of Naves, who had fooled James into believing he had changed sides. Naves sailed on and similarly was able to replenish Charlotte’s garrison at Kyrenia. For the second time, James was compelled to give up
the attempt on Famagusta, and so once again, its garrison was at liberty to forage outside the protection of its walls: it is noted that they raided as far afield as Akrotiri in October. Supplies continued to reach them by sea as well. James returned to Nicosia. He continued to pose an occasional threat to Kyrenia, but it seems that he could not maintain a regular blockade. At best he could have kept small companies of his forces in the area to intimidate Charlotte’s men from venturing out for supplies.\(^{178}\)

Given the detail of the campaigning we have for 1460 and 1461, it is odd that we have nothing for 1462 and 1463. We can assume that James persisted with his pressure on both Famagusta and Kyrenia, as we know that both were very severely affected by want of provisions. We know that in January 1464, such circumstances compelled the defenders of Famagusta to come to terms. These were that if help failed to arrive within fifteen days, it would surrender, but that if help arrived in that time the siege would be lifted and a truce granted for one year. Towards the end of the fifteen days, James foiled an attempt to bring victuals into the port by sea and under the treaty, Famagusta duly capitulated on 20 January. James appointed Nicholas (Conella) Morabit as Captain and gave him strict instructions to let no one enter the castle at night, even if it were the King himself – obviously mindful of the way it had fallen to the Genoese originally. Very shortly after that, Janibek and his Mamlûks, ostensibly still in James’ service, arrived at the castle at night and called for admission. Morabit followed his orders and refused.\(^{179}\)

By this time, Kyrenia was in such straits that its garrison was reduced to eating horses, dogs, cats and mice. Looking to his own interests, its captain, Sor of Naves, responded to James’ overtures and ceded the great fortress, most likely, as Hill estimated, in Autumn 1464, thus ending four years of the castle’s resistance.\(^{180}\)

Yet though the Kingdom was whole once more, it was impossible to recover its former economic health and the rest of James’ reign was crippled by insufficient revenue. After his death in 1473 and that of his baby son and successor, James III in


\(^{179}\) Boustronios, § 88, pp. 112-3 which has the date of surrender as 29 August, 1464, which as Hill, 3, p. 589, fn. 6 comments is ‘unexplained’. Fl. Bustron, pp. 411-6 which includes the full text of the treaty made by the Genoese and James dated 6 January.

1474, his widow, a Venetian noblewoman, Catherine Cornaro ruled until 1489, when she resigned the Kingdom to Venice.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the island's castles fulfilled an important role in Lusignan times. Control of these strongpoints was usually a primary objective in times of warfare as more fully discussed below. This control ultimately effected, even decided, such fundamental issues as the survival of the independent Kingdom. The exigencies of war and of the threat of war naturally influenced the development of the fortifications and we have noted this happening at different times at Famagusta and Kyrenia especially. At the same time, increasing demands for more sophisticated accommodation meant that castle facilities were gradually improved, conspicuously in the capital but at Kyrenia, St. Hilarion and elsewhere as well. As we have seen, all this reached an *apoee* in the fourteenth century, resulting at Kyrenia at least, in a castle of the first rank. Such building work was very much a symbol of the needs and aspirations of the crown, made possible by the prosperity of the country.

The period of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth centuries was, however, the high tide mark, for during the final 150 years of the Lusignan period, the resources of the Kingdom were attenuated by a series of misfortunes. The first of these was disease: the effects of the Black Death were particularly severe, especially of course on the towns. Makhairas recorded that 'half the island died' when the plague first struck in 1348 but it revisited the island on many subsequent occasions. Harvests ruined by attacks of locusts, their first recorded appearance being in 1351 and occasional earthquakes, added to the list of natural disasters. But there was political and military misfortune too. The demands created by Peter I's expeditions in the 1360s, the Genoese invasion and occupation commencing in 1373, attacks from Syria and Egypt, followed by the drain of the Egyptian tribute made matters infinitely worse. The Lusignan Civil War of the early 1460s appears as a *Gotterdammerung* in

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181 In Part II, The Fortifications in War.
this catalogue of disasters born from within. Even when established as undisputed King, James II was forced both to borrow and to tax heavily. Matters were exacerbated by a major famine; in 1472 the usually quiescent peasantry rose in revolt in an uprising which was suppressed with some brutality.182

Changes further afield made matters worse. The drastic reduction of the population of western Europe itself led to a sharp decrease in the demand for eastern products, adversely affecting commercial centres such as Famagusta. Moreover, as noted earlier, about the same time as the first appearance of the plague, it appears that Cypriot mercantile fortunes were further damaged by other factors: the advantageous papal embargo against direct trading with Muslims was effectively rescinded in 1344 at a time when the diminishing volume of east-west trade appears to have been shifting away from the ports on the mainland opposite Cyprus.183 Famagusta was particularly damaged by these developments and as a consequence had been in decline well before its capture by the Genoese.

The combined effects of these factors are reflected in comments we have on urban depopulation. Thus the Lord of Anglure visiting Limassol in 1395 wrote how the town was ‘for the most part uninhabited’. By the end of the fifteenth century, it had shrunk to just a village of about 30 to 40 houses clustered around the cathedral. At Paphos a Catalan visitor in the late 1430s described it as depopulated by reason of its unhealthiness. In Nicosia the settled area had earlier spread out beyond the city walls so that its perimeter was some nine miles but this had shrunk dramatically and did not recover, for in 1507, Peter Mésange found the population too small for the walls with the city then only a quarter inhabited.184


183 Edbury in Caterina Cornaro, p. 33; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 239; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, p. 152; Coureas, Economy, p. 138; Nicolaouu-Konnari and Schabel, Introduction, p. 3.

The sum total of all these difficulties was decline and the chronic insolvency of the royal treasury. Quite simply, this is a major explanation for the lack of attention to fortifications in the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{185}

By the time the Venetians took over full control of the island in 1489, the fortifications were clearly in a state of decay. In the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Venetians plainly exerted themselves considerably, though of course on fortifying communities rather than castles. Castles \textit{per se} had no place within the socio-political complexion of Venetian administration and with the break up of feudalism generally, they became anachronistic - even where warfare was virtually endemic. Accordingly the Venetians abandoned or even dismantled redundant sites, notably the mountain castles, concentrating their attentions on the development of artillery fortifications at Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta.\textsuperscript{186} Impressive though these are, the medievalist must regret that their construction brought about the loss or drastic alteration of the most important earlier castles and town walls of Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{185} cf. A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 207.
\textsuperscript{186} See various gazetteer entries and Hill, 3, p. 850 for Kyrenia; p. 853 \textit{et seq.} for Famagusta, and pp. 862-4 for the mountain castles.
Appendix

The sources for the Ricardian conquest

The most detailed sources that we have and with which we can most conveniently start, are the closely related western chronicles *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte* and the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*. The author of the Anglo Norman rhyming *Estoire* was one Ambroise, who was probably a Norman and a cleric rather than a *jongleur* as was once thought. It is most likely that he was an eye witness of the events he describes, as indeed he claims on several occasions and that consequently his narrative is extremely valuable. He wrote this between 1194 and 1199 so it is very near to Richard I's conquest. He appears to have been in that portion of King Richard's fleet that made landfall in Cyprus on 6 May and quite probably he was intimate with the King's subsequent manoeuvres. He also seems to have been close to a prominent crusader, the Earl of Leicester, or at any rate his sources were. By contrast, the provenance and therefore value of the *Itinerarium* has been a matter of much debate. It is now thought to have been written, most likely between 1217 and 1222 by Richard of the Temple, prior of the Augustinian priory of Holy Trinity in London from 1222 to 1248/50 and that he compiled this Latin narrative (known as IP2) principally from an earlier version that ends with the events of Autumn 1190 (IP1) most likely written c. 1191-2 by an English Templar, chaplain of Tyre, who participated in the Third Crusade; from a Latin translation of Ambroise' *Estoire*, (which may be superior to the version now extant), from Ralph of Diceto, Roger of Howden and other sources that have not been identified. Richard may have added his own experiences and observations as a possible participant on the crusade himself. Certainly IP2's detailed description of what King Richard was wearing when going to confer with the Emperor of Cyprus has led its latest editor to think that Richard of the Temple was most likely present in Cyprus in May 1191. Whether Richard of the Temple's IP2 has the merit of including material deriving from his own first hand experiences or not, it does appear at least that he and Ambroise were independent authors. It is clear, however, that we need to retain some caution in accepting the reliability of the additional detail furnished in the *Itinerarium*, that can not be verified by any other reliable historical or archaeological means. That Ambroise was less dependent on information derived from others on crusade and writing nearer to the
events described, makes him the superior source.\textsuperscript{187} For my present purpose, the \textit{Itinerarium} is crucial as being the only source that refers to what may be fortifications in Nicosia and Famagusta at the time of King Richard’s invasion. Although we can verify the existence of a castle in Nicosia at least from references to it in relation to the rebellion against the Templars in 1192, there is no other source that can be used to adduce the existence, in 1191, of a possible castle in Famagusta. Similarly, the \textit{Itinerarium} refers to another possible castle, most likely in Limassol, which, as we saw, is only mentioned elsewhere in an especially difficult source. The problem of certainty is compounded by what our chroniclers meant by their nomenclature. In narratives compiled in the West at this time, the use of the words \textit{castrum} and \textit{castellum} were generally used imprecisely and could refer to a fort, walled town, even a village or to indicate a place of administrative and judicial significance or the residence of a personage of some status. The authors of chronicles that were compiled in the Latin East, however, appear to have been rather more judicial in their employment of these terms. Although they too could use \textit{castrum} in allusion to an estate, a forthcoming study suggests that they more often employed these two words to indicate a fortification.\textsuperscript{188}

Another western account that draws on first hand experience is provided by Roger of Howden, a royal clerk who was present during King Richard’s occupation of Cyprus though, unlike Ambroise, probably not in the King’s immediate contingent. In what is taken as his initial draft – the \textit{Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi et Ricardi} (once known as the Chronicle of Benedict of Peterborough) – we have references to ‘castles’ at only Buffavento and Kyrenia. However, in Roger’s later, reworked narrative, the \textit{Chronica}, written we may assume, with material gleaned from others that was not available to him when he first wrote, he mentions, in addition, ‘castles’ at Dieudamour (St Hilarion), Candare (Kantara) and Baffes (Paphos). The compilation

\textsuperscript{187} The most recent edition of the \textit{Estoire}, with a translation, is Ailes & Barber. For the \textit{Estoire’s} Authorship and date, Ailes and Barber, 2, pp. 1-3; for a mild note of caution in taking Ambroise’s claim of first hand knowledge at face value, see Helen Nicholson, p. 14. The \textit{Itinerarium} was printed in \textit{Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I}, 1, published in 1864. This was issued in a translation by Helen Nicholson in 1997. Recent analyses of Richard of the Temple’s sources, the possibility that he too was an eye witness of some of the events related in his chronicle, and the relationship of his \textit{Itinerarium} with the \textit{Estoire} are matters discussed by Nicholson, pp. 12-14; Ailes and Barber, 2, p.13, and Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 29-30. Gillingham however, remains unconvinced that Richard of the Temple necessarily went on crusade. See his \textit{Richard I}, p. 127, fn. 11.

\textsuperscript{188} See fn. 40 above.
of Roger’s *Chronica* is not much further removed from its subject matter than the *Gesta Regis*; it is thought to have been begun as early as 1192 or 1193 and certainly the two earliest extant manuscripts were produced between 1199 and 1201 or 1202, Roger dying in 1201. For Cyprus in 1191, the *Gesta* and the *Chronica* therefore have comparable status. This helps to persuade us that we can accept the veracity of these allusions to all five ‘castles’: certainly four are mentioned in several other sources. This leaves one on the list, and therefore the *Chronica’s* reference is especially important. This is Paphos. As will be set out in the Gazetteer, this particular reference has helped fuel much controversy on that site.\(^\text{189}\)

Three other contemporary English chroniclers have information on Richard’s conquest of Cyprus, and though these are not their own experiences, they are quite likely derived directly from those who were on crusade with King Richard. Thus, Ralph, Abbot of Coggeshall claimed he had information from his neighbour Hugh of Nevill who had been with the King. Ralph of Diceto, the Dean of St. Paul’s, who was dead by 1202, received information from his chaplain, William, who was also on the crusade, had access to public archives and had connections with the royal court. William, a canon of Newburgh Priory who had finished writing by 1198, almost certainly by autumn 1197, and who died at some point before 1201, appears to have had access to reliable information: he is careful to record when his information derives from ‘those who were there, or heard from those who were there’. William also drew from the Latin translation of the Continuation of William of Tyre, this being composed in England around 1220 and seemingly merely a summary of IP2 with extracts from Roger of Howden’s work grafted on. Unfortunately however, none of these three gives information on castles in the campaign of 1191 in anything other than the most general sense.\(^\text{190}\) A fourth chronicler with the virtue of being contemporaneous with the events he records is Richard of Devizes, a monk of St. Swithuns, the cathedral abbey of Winchester. His *Chronicon* was composed probably

\(^{189}\) On Roger of Howden, Nicholson, p. 2; Ailes and Barber, 2, p. 14; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 31; Gillingham, Roger of Howden, pp. 141-53; Gillingham, *Richard I*, pp. 144, fn. 16, p. 338; D. Corner, Roger of Howden, pp. 303, 310; D. Corner, *Gesta Regis, passim*. There is a translation of Stubbs’ edition of the passage of the *Gesta Regis* that deals with the Ricardian conquest of Cyprus in Cobham, pp. 6-9.

before 1194, certainly before 1198, and covers the period 1189–92. His account appears to draw on no other written account and is therefore original, but it is not clear how he derived his information for Cyprus, his principal informant of whom we know, accompanying the crusade only as far as Sicily. Richard of Devizes does, however, appear to have spoken to several participants so his work may have value. His account is, however, highly stylised, containing hyperbole and is more moved by knowing his readers would expect chroniclers to ‘work the crude stuff of experience into ... a good story’, than are, in all likelihood, the other early accounts we have. In consequence, his account is both factually unreliable and not inclusive. One or two of his comments on castles in Cyprus may be of passing interest however, in reflecting what could have been expected of castles and castle warfare at that time.¹⁹¹

A number of later English chroniclers also relate events in Cyprus in 1191, these generally following our earlier sources so far as we can see. Of these later works, the Chronicle of the Abbey of Meaux, a fourteenth-century compilation, may, however, be of special value in that the Abbey had been connected with King Richard’s right hand man, Robert of Thornham, who was briefly one of two governors of the island in 1191 after Richard’s departure to Acre. The connection may have been strong: Robert was married to Joan, daughter and heiress of a local magnate, William Fossard. Robert was buried in the abbey, so it is not surprising therefore that it is possible to discern ‘some instances [of] indication of information derived from personal authority’.¹⁹² Another later writer, though not regarded as especially trustworthy, is Peter of Langtoft, who wrote in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century. For affairs in Cyprus in 1191, we can not ascribe any credibility to his narrative, but for my purpose, his account is of interest with regard to the siege of Buffavento, insofar as it correlates with what is said by Meaux and perhaps Devizes.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Richard of Devizes, intro, pp. xvii-xviii; Partner, Serious Entertainments, pp. 143-4, 162, 167-8, 173; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 31; Ailes & Barber, 2, p. 15. The quotation is from Partner, pp. 167-8.
¹⁹² Chronica ... de Melsa, pp. lxxviii; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 55-6.
¹⁹³ Chronicle of Peter of Langtoft, 2, pp. 66-7; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 55, 61-2.
Apart from Anglo-Norman sources, we also have two Eastern, Frankish sources: the *Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier* and the *Continuations of William of Tyre*. Our extant text of *Ernoul* ends in 1231 and though elements of it are based on material written earlier, its account of events in 1191-2 may not have been written until the late 1220s. It is in any case extremely concise in respect of the Ricardian conquest though more detailed with regard to the revolt of 1192. The original version of the *Continuation*, which was probably written by a native of the Latin East in the 1190s, is lost and in its place we have 49 extant manuscript copies all of thirteenth-century date. Indeed some of these take their accounts up until 1277. Which of these copies of particular recensions is the closest to the original, what their inter-relationships are and their connection with Ernoul, are issues of much debate. For our purposes with 1191-2 in Cyprus, the main recensions are those called the Colbert-Fontainbleau or b recension and the Lyon recension. These seem to represent a reworking of the Ernoul narrative written probably not until the 1240s, but they contain additional information although we do not know from where. The b and Lyon Continuations are very similar but b is sometimes more detailed; in both cases, of course, we need to be guarded as to matter not contained in eye-witness accounts. We have the additional problem to allow for that the author(s) of these recensions could have been aware of castles existing in their own day and that they simply assumed that those castles were involved in the events of 1191. Moreover, as with all such sources, they may have been imprecise in their use of terminology and that hence our interpretation of ‘castles’ may in any case be inappropriate. Ultimately, we need to be clear that these chronicles are not as close to the events of 1191 as those of Ambroise and Roger of Howden, and it is interesting to note that because of this, Gillingham deliberately ignores them, as indeed he largely does the *Itinerarium*, in his reconstruction of the Cypriot campaign.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ For the Lyon version of the Continuation, see Lyon Eracles, (Morgan), and the translation given by Edbury, *Third Crusade*. For the Colbert-Fontainbleau or b recension, see Eracles, *Receuil des Historiens des Croisades*, 2, that part which relates to the Ricardian Conquest of Cyprus being translated in Edbury, *Third Crusade*, pp. 176-8. For recent discussions of the various recensions and their relationships and derivations, and similarly their relationship with the *Chronique d’Ernoul*, see especially M.R. Morgan’s *Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre*; Edbury, *The Lyon Eracles*; Edbury, *Third Crusade*; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 27-9. Full references are given in the bibliography. Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 146, fn. 27.
For their part, the Greek sources give us virtually no detail whatever. The contemporary Neophytus the Recluse was a prolific writer but was more concerned to direct belief than record history. On the campaign of 1191, Neophytus is in fact very brief, providing virtually no detail at all. Given his reclusive existence and apparent indifference to worldly matters, it is quite likely that his first hand knowledge of events was limited. He detested both the western crusaders and Isaac equally, so in this, he may at least be said to have been impartial! Nicetas Choniates, writing in Constantinople in the thirteenth century, is no more informative and neither are his followers, Theodore Skoutariotes and Ephraem Aenius.

196 Galatariotou, pp. 211-2; Hill, 1, p. 315; Thubron, pp. 43-4; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 27.
197 O City of Byzantium, pp. 229-30; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 27.
PART II

UNDERSTANDING THE FORTIFICATIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON PURPOSES; THEIR USES AND VALUE IN PEACE AND WAR

RAISON D'ETRE AND FUNCTIONS

The essential question of why castles, as distinct from structures intended to be purely fortifications, were built in the medieval period has rightly been a continuing issue. This is true in respect of castle studies both in the West and in the East. With regard to the West and in particular the castles of England and Wales, useful summaries of current thinking have been provided by Creighton in 2002 and Liddiard in 2005. These reflect the present focus on castles as residences, as administrative centres for their related seigneurial estates, as symbolical expressions of domination and sometimes as the nuclei of complexes of tailored landscapes of gardens, water features, viewpoints and parks. The corollary has been a diminution of their roles as military bases, certainly in a defensive capacity and to some extent in an offensive capacity as well. Although we may argue, as Johnson urged in 2002, that we should have reservations in subscribing wholesale to such modern views, there is little doubt that in the West, most castles were for most of the time neither meant nor used for military purposes. In the West at least, the ambiguity of what in fact was meant by the terms 'castrum' or 'castellum' — certainly until after the end of the thirteenth century, supports such a broader view of their purpose and status. With regard to the Crusader States of mainland Syria in the East, Ronnie Ellenblum has lately furnished a review and analysis of previous thinking. As he noted, there, what seemed like recurring warfare naturally created different conditions from the West and consequently attention on why castles were built or developed, was in the past influenced by that conviction. Nevertheless, here too we see a realization, through a careful dissection of periods showing that there were often times when warfare was not endemic, that castles were created for much the same purpose as in the more settled West — to

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1 see bibliography.
2 M. Johnson, p. 180.
3 Coulson, pp. 2, 16, 33, 42, 53 and 61 and see History fn. 40 above.
promote and exploit nascent settlements – the process of *incastellamento*, as it is now called.\(^4\)

As noted elsewhere, in Cyprus the Lusignans were fortunate in possessing a state with two very significant advantages. First its native population never appeared likely to pose any internal threat – indeed after 1192 there was no revolt until well into the fifteenth century. Second it was an island that for much of the period was also free of external threat. It was of course against this background that the Lusignans were able to maintain what in effect, amounted to a royal monopoly over building fortifications, and why what castles and town walls they did commission, were not necessarily always in reaction to military need. That said, there were occasional periods when there may have been perceptions of external threats and in understanding why our Cypriot fortifications were built, we should first see how far they are connected to these periods.

Reflections on this are included elsewhere in this Part, in Part I – History and in the Gazetteer. The first period in question comes at the beginning of our period when there may possibly have been an apprehension of a Byzantine *reconquista*. As noted in the History and Gazetteer, the building of Saranda Kolones in particular has been set in that context. It is clear however, that a castle could not impede the landing or passage of an invasion force and that had a Byzantine attack materialised, the castle at Paphos could have been by-passed.\(^5\) A similar view can be taken with reference to a second period, this being a hundred years later when there was a possible apprehension of an Islamic or even Crusader initiative. Here again, it is not necessarily the case that the primary works of this period – at Famagusta – are to be explained merely as the simple consequence. Concern of assault may well have stimulated this massive effort, but it can have only been one of several causes. It is especially instructive that a third period of apprehension of foreign attack – from Mamlûk Egypt in the mid 1420s, prompted no programme of fortification of note whatever. We can only speculate as to whether that would have changed had the

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\(^5\) cf this view with those in Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-7; 172-7 and for England and Wales, Creighton, p. 44.
razzias continued and Janus not been defeated and captured and Cyprus made a tributary state.

The assaults of 1424-6 were of course transitory inasmuch as they did not result in occupation, though it is doubtful that Janus had the security of that knowledge at the time. This moves us to the Genoese war of 1373-4 and Genoa’s subsequent possession of Famagusta and its hinterland. In that context, we do know of works carried out – by both sides – to strengthen existing defences. Plainly this reflects the circumstance of enduring hostility between what were then two neighbouring states. The resulting Lusignan works that were carried out have been cited by a number of scholars as a particular example of strategic planning. They have discerned a chain of castles and envisaged that they have in some way been linked together. Notions of castles generally constituting some sort of continuous defensive line were commonly held in the past and have been rightly shown to be illusions. Inasmuch as there has been no repudiation of this argument with special reference to Cyprus, however, it is worth looking at this in more detail.

So far as the Crusader mainland is concerned, earlier scholars, notably Prutz, Rey and Deschamps imagined that a primary purpose of castles was to constitute an interconnecting and mutually supporting line that could somehow defend borders. In 1956, Smail was the first to show this to be a misconception and that Crusader castles in the Holy Land were primarily created as centres of lordship and administration, an interpretation subsequently developed by Prawer in particular. Most recently, Ellenblum has traced the historiography of such opinions, reconfirming in the process Smail’s assessment and thereby reasserting that ‘lines’ of castles buttressing some sort of frontier, simply did not exist.⁶ In the West, we could adduce plenty of examples of eminent historians who similarly once envisaged networks of castles that acted in concert as hubs of a defended border. That they wrote even after Smail’s work reflects how alluring the idea of a castellated border once was. Thus in 1961, Sir F. M. Powicke still saw ‘a strong ring fence of fortresses’ protecting Angevin Normandy from the Capetians. In England itself, Prof. R. Storey saw a line of castles across north Yorkshire, refortified in the later medieval period as an in depth defensive line

⁶ Smail, pp. 204-15; Prawer, pp. 281-6; Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 106-10.
against long distance Scottish raids.\(^7\) So far as Cyprus is concerned, Enlart wrote of ‘a complete system of co-ordinated defence’ \(^8\) which may have launched Perbellini to comment extensively on what he saw as three defensive systems. His 1973 and 1992 articles are arranged on this basic precept. Later still, Kristian Molin referred to James I’s works as a ‘ring of fortifications’.\(^9\)

As Smail first made clear, such views as these are of very limited worth. Generally they are modern attempts to impose a sense of order onto an untidy past. Nowhere were there ‘lines of castles’ in any meaningful sense that were co-ordinated to halt invasions or mere razzias. Similarly in Cyprus we cannot generally pigeon hole its fortifications into groups that were conceived as entities, each group having a particular function common to all its individual units. Attempts to do so are unconvincing. Indeed, Perbellini for example, made nonsense of his own classification when he said of one of his three systems – the so called east/south-east system – that this was ‘a complex set of fortifications which do not form part of one single strategic design’;\(^10\) and ‘albeit accounting for at least three distinct units’.\(^11\)

So, we should be careful not to see the island’s castles in the context of overall strategic planning and in particular, James I’s works as attempting to fortify the new ‘border’. Castles could not serve that purpose.\(^12\) There was no ‘line’ stretching from Kantara in the north \(\text{via}\) Sigouri to Larnaka in the south. Sigouri was built primarily to create a new centre and in that context serve as a balance against Genoese Famagusta. In much the same way, Kantara may have been recommissioned to reassert Lusignan presence rather than as outpost to monitor activity in Famagusta – which given the distance, was hardly practicable anyway. These castles were then one means by which the Lusignans re-established control in parts of the sector contested with the Genoese. As an element in this, they could serve as bases from which Genoese raids could be...
countered as Stephen of Lusignan said with regard to Sigouri but they could be no more than the nuclei for the control of localised areas.  

Indeed it is perhaps worth considering the extent of such areas of control. Scholars writing of castles in the West have suggested that this constituted a radius of some eight to ten miles if the castle’s mounted contingent wanted to return to base before nightfall. It is perhaps noteworthy then that Sigouri was built at a point just under eleven miles from Genoese Famagusta. The garrisons of castles could of course intimidate much larger areas. Thus for example the Spanish Muslim traveller Ibn Jubayr, who visited the Levant in the early 1180s, remarked that Krak des Chevaliers was developed by the Franks to threaten Homs some 25 miles away, while there is documentary evidence that attests that the rebels in Kenilworth in 1266 disrupted the King’s peace and his administration throughout the county of Warwickshire. But as a rule of thumb, the concept of the eight to ten mile day-long reach of a cavalry contingent from its base is a reasonable indication of the area that a castle could control. Sigouri in fact may well have been founded very much as a cavalry station. It is of very simple design that may have been primarily created for this purpose. Undoubtedly it contained a complex of residential quarters and perhaps even the arrangements for local government but in any event, its position near a junction of roads implies rather that Stephen of Lusignan was right and that this castle was sited and built as the main epicentre for a Lusignan presence next to Famagusta.

Having rejected attempts at the wholesale allocation of fortifications to strategic groups, we can go on, however, to discern certain ‘castle strategies’ in Cyprus, but on a considerably lesser scale. As shown above, some of the works of James I have been presented as a response to the Genoese occupation of Famagusta. Although we have shown the ‘strategy’ involved was not to create a defensible border, it is apparent that James’ works had a common purpose of asserting Lusignan control in newly rendered sensitive areas.

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13 see Gazetteer entry on Sigouri.
15 Ibn Jubair, p. 268.
James’ works apart, the only other ‘strategic’ group we may detect are the three mountain castles: at least they have geography, and probably origin in common. For Perbellini, they constituted an identifiable system with Kyrenia, largely because their intervisibility and hence their potential for signalling implied some common cause. We may perhaps see some integrity in this but this is as far as we can go. Indeed, the whole issue of the extent to which ‘strongpoints’ communicated with each other and with nearby settlements, primarily to serve as an early warning system of the approach of hostile forces, is a matter of some interest. It is of course unlikely that castles were built to be look out posts or glorified watch towers but to what extent were they used for this purpose?

Scholars have generally assumed that such ‘networks’ of signalling were extensive, inferring that where there was intervisibility, there was bound to be this type of communication. Such a view has been applied to the Crusader Castles of both the Syrian mainland and to Cyprus. The Byzantines are said to have relied considerably on signalling and we know of instances in Crusader Syria when castles did indeed signal to others as in the 1183 siege of Kerak in Moab. But how far did this really happen? A recent review of the evidence for the mainland has cast doubt on the use of castles in communications, so it is worth examining in detail the position in Cyprus. Here, the only written evidence we appear to have is from Stephen of Lusignan who commented at some length on the measures employed during the Venetian period to keep watch on the coast. He described an extensive network of guard stations capable of signalling by fire in time of need. The only castle that featured in this was Buffavento which could signal alerts to Nicosia and Kyrenia. It is not clear from this how far such an ‘early warning system’ was in operation during the Lusignan period and if it was, whether we may assume that such a wide signalling network included castles. Did, for example, St. Hilarion communicate to the west via far-away Pyrgos on Morfou Bay and thence to the even more distant Akamas and beyond, as has been claimed? Did Buffavento – clearly the northern apex of any such system, also link with Kantara far to the east, as well as Nicosia and Kyrenia? Intervisibility meant

17 Fedden and Thomson, p. 53.
18 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 117.
19 Lusignan, Description, f. 35; Lusignan, Chorograffia, Grivaud, ff. 81a-82; Chorography, Wallace, §§ 560-1, pp. 109-10.
that there was the capability of linking by fire and smoke signals and so forth, though how far they did in practice is another matter. It might be added too that, unlike the Muslims and to a lesser extent, the Crusaders of the mainland, there is no evidence that the Lusignans used carrier pigeons to transmit messages – either between strongpoints or anywhere else in Cyprus. 

A recent study of the contemporary position in southern Rhodes makes for interesting analogy. There, Michael Heslop has put forward an elaborate pattern of intercommunications served by beacons, mirrors and so on, largely based on sight lines. However, his only written evidence is a note of Ludolph of Suchen (Sudheim) who was travelling in the eastern Mediterranean at some point between 1336 and 1341. Ludolph reported that on Rhodes the Hospitallers signalled by fire and smoke signals. If the Franks on Cyprus did the same, it escaped Ludolph’s attention, for he made no mention of such activity when he proceeded there after leaving Rhodes. Heslop’s note of a bonfire pit in Rhodes, above Stelies, reminds us anyway that any intention to create a signalling system did not actually require strongpoints. In short, fortifications might serve as signalling stations but such a function was certainly not a primary purpose or reason for their construction and it is far from clear on Cyprus how far they were actually used as such.

Certainly there can be little doubt that siting a castle was often prompted by a careful consideration of quite how this would best serve the reason for building it. One such factor was the ability to access and dominate routes, as well as areas. In this connection, La Cava and Sigouri are noteworthy inland examples. Locating them next to established roads facilitated the peregrinations of the King and his officers. On the other hand, the island’s castles did not serve as posts from which road tolls could be levied. The Lusignans exercised exclusive control over the right to use public highways but there is nothing to show that castles were sited or used in any way as bases from which to tax traffic. Just as we noted (above) that castles could not necessarily stop an invading army, equally they could not guard roads against the passage of hostile forces. Those based in adjacent castles could, however, have an

21 Fedden and Thomson, p. 53; Edgington, pp. 167-175.
22 Ludolph of Suchen in Cobham, pp. 18 – 20; M. Heslop, fn. 28.
23 cf the siting of castles in England and Wales in this respect - Creighton, pp. 35, 39-40.
intimidating effect, as evinced in the case of St. Hilarion in the Genoese war. Indeed this potential for offence must have been a major reason for the establishment of all three mountain castles in Byzantine times, though how far this remained their raison d'être in our period is doubtful, given the very limited extent to which they were then maintained as military bases.

Of course, most of the important Cypriot castles are on the coast and whether constructed by the king or the military orders, the implication is clear. There can be few better illustrations of the fundamental purpose of these castles than by siting them thus: to facilitate local control and provide bases for economic growth in locations of paramount importance for communication and trade. The connection of castle and local economy is perhaps paradoxically reflected in the adaptation of Saranda Kolones to an agro-industrial centre. In its transformed state, it became a complex of workshops and stores and it seems that the later harbour fort at Paphos was also used to serve as a storage facility. Kolossi was an estate centre throughout its life. It was located amid a number of local Hospitaller estates which came to be used to grow sugar cane. This was then refined in various structures erected around the core of the original buildings. At least one structure of this early ‘castle’ was assigned for storage purposes while the basement of the extant 1450s donjon was clearly constructed to house produce that would have been greatly in excess of what was merely required for the sustenance of the Grand Commander and his staff. At Kouklia, the château was an estate centre first and foremost with almost no veneer of fortification whatever but we can be certain that parts of it were assigned for secure storage purposes. Another, subsidiary use of castles and urban fortifications was the storage and perhaps also the manufacture of weapons. This is reflected both in the considerable amount of artillery ammunition found at Saranda Kolones and in the names of the Arsenal Towers at both Nicosia and Famagusta. Indeed we know that Famagusta possessed a military store and a naval arsenal, the latter articulating with the urban enceinte.25

Castles were of course centres of political authority. In Cyprus, this is reflected in some measure by the status and insofar as we know of it, the power and jurisdictions of those appointed as castellans discussed below. The development of considerable

24 Coureas, Economy, p. 118.
25 Edbury, Templars, p. 191, fn. 7; Creighton, p. 44; Edbury, Franks, p. 74.
castles such as those at Famagusta and Kyrenia should be linked to the need to provide the necessary services and resources to support the discharge of such power and duty. The chambers and halls within the ranges of these quadrangular castles could certainly have served as courts and administrative offices. Kyrenia in particular is famous as the principal state prison and its gaols are still discernible today; it is highly likely that they accommodated at least some who may have been tried within the castle itself. It is also likely that certain castles also served as treasuries – for the storage and display of wealth – just as appears to be the case with castles of the Latin Principality of Achaia in the Morea which, like Cyprus, was a stable area of Crusader rule for much of the thirteenth century.  

Castles were then instruments and images of rule. As was commonly the case elsewhere, conventional depictions of a castle in Nicosia featured on royal seals symbolising authority and power. Although King and country generally lived in harmony, his castles were not there for the benefit of the people. There is no evidence whatever that the island’s castles were made available as refuges for either the urban or rural populations in times of danger. They were generally too small or ill sited to serve this purpose. The damage and destruction wrought by the Genoese and the Mamlûks are chronicled with no suggestion that the people either were encouraged to seek refuge in castles or attempted it in any event. It is in any case, far from clear how much subject populations were thus ‘accommodated’ when need arose in other contemporary states. There is for example, no evidence that castles served as refuges in Frankish Greece, even where there were large enclosures and room. Creating extensive walled areas to provide a haven for large numbers of people may perhaps have been a policy of the Byzantines but it does not appear to have been an aspect of feudal society in Cyprus or Greece.  

In studies of castles in the West, it has been noted that quadrangular castles were particularly suited to serving the needs of the larger households of the rather less peripatetic aristocracy of the later middle ages, while at the same time providing for a somewhat improved quality of comfort and sanitation. Consequently such castles

26 Lock, pp. 175-8, 184.
27 For Lusignan seals, see p. 10 above; for seals in the West, see Creighton, pp. 65-8.
28 Lawrence, pp. 188, 202, 204, 226; Lock, passim.
became common in France and almost the norm in fourteenth and fifteenth-century England for example. What was different about these from earlier, roughly quadrangular forms, was that purely domestic buildings became increasingly articulated into the outer, martial shell. In Cyprus, both Saranda Kolones and Kyrenia were early medieval courtyard castles and we have suggested elsewhere that a reason why both took that shape was in response to the dictates and needs of a Byzantine origin – certainly in the case of Kyrenia and arguably in the case of Saranda Kolones. As it was developed in the later medieval period, Kyrenia’s ranges came to be integrated with the building as a whole. The quadrangular castle at Famagusta, seemingly built from scratch soon after 1300, had its various buildings with their several uses integrated into a defensive shell from the outset. These Cypriot castles were not the homes and headquarters of powerful barons surrounded by their families and households, from which they controlled their fiefs and administered justice; they were rather the bases of senior royal officials who would have had corresponding impedimenta, power and responsibilities. For most of our period, Kyrenia and Famagusta were the two most important and apparently powerful castles on the island and so it is worth noting that their overall form was very likely dictated as much by considerations of administrative and residential needs as military precepts. In the case of Famagusta, this interpretation of what lay behind the castle’s development and design, may perhaps increase our scepticism that it was purely an apprehension of Muslim invasion at the close of the thirteenth century that prompted the Lusignans to fortify their principal port. Sigouri was another quadrangular castle. As noted in the Gazetteer, it may have housed the apparatus of local government, perhaps even a mint. It was certainly created because of the problem of a hostile neighbour but its defences would appear to have been sufficient only to deter raids rather than resist sustained attack.

In this respect it is noteworthy that, as developed towards the end of the fourteenth century, the Lusignans’ main castle-palace in Nicosia was also laid out according to the quadrangular-courtyard form. In this, there can be no clearer indication of what really lay behind the design of our castles as distinct from what in later times were purely forts. As noted in the Gazetteer the capital castle was remarkable in its

30 Gazetteer entry for Paphos.
sumptuousness: it greatly impressed those who entered it. Of course, this was exactly what it was intended to do. Its sophisticated and complex array of buildings, complemented and integrated with other features such as fountains and arboreta, were dazzling and there can be little doubt that the approach to the whole complex was engineered to enhance the impact of all this on the visitor. This certainly seems to be the case also at La Cava, the core of which may also have been intended to be a quadrangular design, or at any rate, part of such a lay-out. La Cava was a retreat, a royal playground, a château de plaisance in which the King could take his ease and entertain his visitors amid the orchards and fountains which were subtly interleaved with its buildings. As noted in the Gazetteer, La Cava had the veneer of strength as a consequence of its site and the substance of its masonry but both these characteristics were primarily for the sake of appearances rather than military potency. Interestingly too, both Nicosia and La Cava were closely associated with religious foundations and here in Cyprus as elsewhere in Europe, this juxtaposition of the manifestations of Crown and patronised Church constituted a deliberate demonstration of both the power and sanctity of the ruling house.31

St. Hilarion is another castle that should be seen in the context of its landscape. As developed by the Lusignans, it is possible to detect that it was configured in such a way as to impress the visitor as he wound his way first into and then upwards through stages of suites and services of increasing sophistication, the route switching to give alternating views of the spectacular landscape. Indeed the sense of an appreciation of its landscape setting is well attested by the provision of the elegant belvedere in the Middle Ward and ultimately the vista built into the Great Hall, the “Gloriette”, of the Upper Ward, each giving quite distinct panoramas.

Ultimately then, there remains the question as to how far we can see the island’s castles as designed fortifications, intended, per se, for use in war. In this section, we have traced the several other functions that our castles served. Analogies have been drawn with England – another island which was generally peaceful in this period – where recent castle studies have greatly revised the traditional view of castles being

31 cf the landscaping of castles set in England and Wales - Creighton, pp. 75-84 and Liddiard, pp. 131-41.
built and used as military tools.\textsuperscript{32} It is clear that in England, castles were created and hence designed, primarily to serve the regular, day-to-day functions that their owners intended. In England the great majority of castles belonged to the nobility rather than the Crown and so first and foremost they were homes above all else. Perhaps as a result, in a good many cases, they were not built with the primary aim of being capable of withstanding determined attack. In this important respect, Cyprus was very different. As we have noted, nearly all of the few castles were under direct royal control and only a minority were ever intended to serve as royal residences. Their various purposes demanded that at the least, they were secure buildings. Yet apart from the very short lived Saranda Kolones, only two in particular constituted serious fortifications, as is evident in the castles and the town walls of Kyrenia and Famagusta. The provision of such features as double banks of fighting levels in towers and curtains is proof of this. We know too that on those few occasions when there was war, Famagusta and especially Kyrenia, stood the test very well, never being taken by assault. How may we account for this – two sites with the attributes of first rate fortifications in the context of the alternative purposes that Cypriot castles were apparently intended to serve?

The stimuli that caused the erection of the works at Famagusta has been discussed elsewhere in this work (above pp. 27-8). As we have suggested, threat of attack was but one consideration, for the fortifications were closely linked with the town’s economic rise and hence importance in the Kingdom’s prosperity and with its importance as a naval base. The development of its fortifications was almost a celebration and furtherance of this growth. There especially, it must be that there was the intent to impress visitors with the strength of the Kingdom through the substance of martial display. Kyrenia’s circumstances were different. Kyrenia is also more problematical in that we have no certain dating for building work beyond what may be loosely inferred from architectural detail and the comment of the Templar of Tyre (see title page). It was of no such importance to the wealth of the Kingdom and generally not visited nearly as much as Famagusta and the south coast towns by those who wrote up their travel diaries. At Kyrenia the Lusignans inherited a considerable castle at the beginning of their régime: one that was convenient to develop. As the

\textsuperscript{32} see fn. 1 above.
nearest harbour to Nicosia it had some importance in communications with the outside world. Its gradual elaboration over a long period of time may reflect a Lusignan tendency (if not a policy) to maintain it as a retreat if necessary and a bulwark as occasion might demand. That Kyrenia in fact amply fulfilled this role, does not of course mean that this was intended but it cannot have escaped the Lusignans’ grasp that its possession determined whether invasions succeeded or failed. We have argued that both the castles at Famagusta and Kyrenia had a number of purposes to serve and though their origins were very different, their quadrangular design perhaps best accommodated those functions. We can conclude by accepting too that such a design was adequate militarily. Those who planned and built these castles were therefore fortunate in being able to provide for a number of quite distinct requirements.

AN URBAN ARISTOCRACY

Reference was made above to what amounted to the royal practice of monopolising the building and possession of fortifications and quite why that may have been implemented and maintained. It remains for us to consider both where the royal family resided and where the nobility resided.

In order to understand this, we need to reflect on what had already been the position in Crusader Palestine and Syria. The general view put forward by most scholars is that there, the King and his greater nobles lived largely in the towns, visiting their rural estates very rarely and were thus an ‘urban aristocracy’. This conviction has been supported by the apparent absence of royal or noble palatial-castle \textit{capita} outside the major centres of population.

How far this was wholly the case is perhaps not so clear. We know that when the Crusaders first established themselves in Palestine, they made a considerable effort to colonise some of their new territories. Frankish settlers were encouraged to settle both in towns and in rural areas inhabited by Eastern Christians – a process stimulated by

\[33 \text{ see History, p. 17.} \]
\[34 \text{ Riley-Smith, \textit{The Feudal Nobility}, p. 47; Prawer, \textit{The Crusaders' Kingdom}, pp. 66-7; Prawer, \textit{Crusader Institutions}, p. 102; Pringle, \textit{The Red Tower}, p. 14; Kennedy, p. 64.} \]
establishing centres of lordship which might be fortified or not. The lesser nobility what we might call the knightly class - appears to have taken a leading part in this process of *incastellamento*. This is attested by the large number of small castles principally simple, two storey towers - that have been traced in rural areas and that date from the first half of the twelfth century. The higher nobility no doubt contributed to this policy of colonization in order to develop their own fiefs, centring their estates and administration in castles, though how far they actually personally resided in them rather than in their town houses in Acre and Jerusalem and elsewhere is hard to gauge. That leading nobles chose to adopt surnames such as Ibelin (Yibna) and Toron (Tibnin) that derived from their fiefs does not mean of course that they lived there regularly. Royal charters suggest that the king and his accompanying barons were quite peripatetic - although the charters appear to show that the king and his aristocracy based themselves in the towns - it may be that estate centres, fortified or otherwise, were occasionally occupied by their noble owners. However, it has been shown that this pattern of settlement declined as early as the second half of that century, in the face of the insecurity that came with the advances made by the Crusaders’ enemies. Even the greater feudatories were disinclined to commission and maintain the more elaborate fortifications needed to withstand a more united and resourceful opposition and like simple knights, they passed their castles on to the Crown and the military orders. So, by the start of the thirteenth century, very few castles remained in the hands of the lay nobility. Whatever the balance had been between their earlier urban and rural existence, they came to live increasingly in the towns. Ludolph of Sudheim (Suchen) saw their deserted residences in Acre when he visited in 1336 or shortly after. He wrote that ‘all the nobles dwelt in very strong castles and palaces along the outer edge of the city.’ Although very few of their structures there remain, their residences are likely to have been at least of two storeys, the grander resembling towers, possibly ranged around a courtyard with a fountain.35

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35 Jeffery, pp. 22-3; Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility*, p. 25; Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, pp. 103-9; Pringle, *Towers*, pp. 335, 337-8; Kennedy, pp. 32, 61, 64, 120; Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement*, pp. 12-13, 32-4, 36, 281-4; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 172-7; Regesta Regni Hierosolymitan, eg (1893), pp. 61-177 and (1904) pp. 16, 20, 37-42 for charters sealed from the 1140s to 1187; Ludolph of Suchen, trans. Stewart, p. 51. Cf too the gravitation of the aristocracy to towns in parts of Europe at this time, eg, in Tuscany, McLean, p. 90.
When the Crusader aristocracy left the Holy Land to settle with the Lusignans in Cyprus, at the end of the twelfth century, their aims and expectations must have been to simulate as far as possible the best of what they had known on the mainland. ‘Old habits die hard’ – as Peter Edbury wrote in his 1994 article on the Templars in Cyprus.\(^{36}\) It would be surprising if we were to find that the Cypriot Crusader nobility behaved in any other way.

Consequently, theirs too appears to have been a cosmopolitan society. Even though living on the island did not include the threats that had faced the Crusaders on the mainland, the Franks of Cyprus preferred the culture and civilization that came with living in established urban conurbations. Historians appear agreed that ‘… in Cyprus, as in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the nobility, as well as the non-noble Frankish burgesses, generally lived in the towns…’.\(^{37}\) Country estates were important for generating the revenue required to support a gracious style of living and of course were necessary for the chase but they were not seen as places to stay for any length of time. Indeed, in the thirteenth century, Nicosia was described as ‘where the knights dwell’.\(^{38}\) In 1336, James of Verona observed that it was “adorned with many gardens, and has many nobles’.\(^{39}\) When Ludolph of Sudheim (Suchen) visited Cyprus that year or very soon after, he too remarked that the Frankish aristocracy, including the knightly class, ‘chiefly live’ in Nicosia.\(^{40}\) In fact we could accumulate ample references to houses in Nicosia of named members of the aristocracy especially after 1300. Similarly there are plentiful allusions to private residences held by members of the nobility in the Kingdom’s second city – Famagusta and as at Nicosia, there is no evidence that they were fortified in any way.\(^{41}\) The same may be said of Limassol.\(^{42}\) Amadi’s allusions to knights of Limassol and Paphos offering their services in 1308 and 1310 to the ousted Henry II also reflects that some of this class resided in these provincial towns.\(^{43}\) Such residences are now lost or almost impossible to distinguish from later development but at the end of the nineteenth century, Enlart was able to

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\(^{36}\) Edbury, Templars, p. 195.

\(^{37}\) Arbel, p. 203. See too J. Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 79; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 92.

\(^{38}\) Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119.

\(^{39}\) James of Verona, p. 177, and in Cobham, p. 17.

\(^{40}\) in trans. Stewart, pp. 42-3, and in Cobham, p. 20.

\(^{41}\) Edbury, Famagusta, pp. 345-6.


\(^{43}\) Amadi, pp. 265, 360.
discern a number in Nicosia. He characterised these as having vaulted lower floors and passages carried on arches: very likely therefore identical in lay-out to the ‘hôtels’ or ‘loges’ the Franks had built earlier on the mainland. Most likely many had chapels and in Nicosia at least their own water supplies drawn from the capital’s extensive system of water pipes and aqueducts.\textsuperscript{44} 

The aristocracy took its lead from the King. It is clear that he resided mainly in Nicosia. Ludolph of Sudheim (Suchen) noticed this in the reign of Hugh IV.\textsuperscript{45} Even James I, who is sometimes said to have preferred Kyrenia,\textsuperscript{46} in reality spent most of his time in his capital. Thus in 1394 Nicolas of Martoni recorded that he resided in ‘Nicosie pro majori parte temporis’. The Lord of Anglure, who visited Cyprus in 1395-6, similarly noted that the King stayed in Nicosia more than anywhere else.\textsuperscript{47} This is not to say that the Lusignan monarchs did not, on occasion, base themselves elsewhere. The palatial works in the middle and especially the upper wards at St. Hilarion suggest that it was envisaged as a royal resort.\textsuperscript{48} In particular, Henry II appears to have favoured Strovolos if he wanted to leave Nicosia while Hugh IV may have stayed sometimes at the Premonstratensian Abbey of Bellapais where he had ‘stantia maravigliosa’ (‘marvellous apartments’) built. Hugh is credited with providing the funds for other building work there too, including possibly the considerable gate tower with its drawbridge and attached enclosure wall with wall walk and loop holes.\textsuperscript{49} In the next century, Janus appears to have resorted to La Cava for leisure time.\textsuperscript{50} Nevertheless, it is clear that the Lusignans were based in their capital for the great majority of the time.

The contention that the nobility of Cyprus was based principally in the towns is supported by the seeming paucity of the evidence that they utilised residences in the country. There are certainly neither remains nor references to any fortified structures that could be ascribed to the nobility. While we can not go so far as to say that there

\textsuperscript{44} Enlart, pp. 402-14; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 40, 42; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 90, 92.
\textsuperscript{45} see fn. 40 above.
\textsuperscript{46} eg Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{47} Nicolas of Martoni, pp. 634 - 5, trans. in Cobham, p. 26; the Lord of Anglure in Cobham, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{48} see Gazetteer entry for St. Hilarion
\textsuperscript{49} For Henry II and Strovolos, see eg, Amadi, p. 253; for Hugh IV and Bellapais, Fl. Bustron, p. 258; Hill, 3, p. 1125 fn. 4; Bellapais Abbey, pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{50} see Gazetteer entry for La Cava.
was a royal prohibition on the establishment of baronial fortifications, it is clear that, as Edbury wrote ‘the Lusignans retained exclusive control of defence’, extending the right to fortify only to the military orders. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the rebels of Aimery’s party could only flee to the remote headland of Kormakiti on the return of Henry II in 1310: they had no fortress of their own to which they could resort. This appears to have remained the case until almost the end of our period. For example, during the reign of Peter I, the two most important fiefs on the island were held by the King’s brother, John, Prince of Antioch (Alaminos), and another by Peter’s nephew, Hugh, Prince of Galilee. Neither had, as Jean Richard wrote, a ‘château veritable, susceptible à l’occasion d’appuyer une rébellion armée ou une prétention, quelconque à une autonomie de son fief.’

This said we should not discount the likelihood that members of the nobility maintained unfortified residences on their estates in addition to their town houses. Certainly we would expect them to have possessed hunting lodges. This may perhaps be reflected in a passage from Philip of Novara when he recounted how, in 1229, the three Ibelin brothers and their knights failed to mount an adequate blockade of St. Hilarion, then in the hands of the Imperialists. ‘Messire Balian estoit à Nicossie... car il estoit yver. Si estoyent les chevaliers en leur terres, ou ils oyseloyent et se desduyoient.’ (‘Lord Balian was at Nicosia... for it was winter and the knights were on their own lands, where they were idling and making sport.’) The sport in question was hunting and hawking and we know that for much of the time involved, the nobility lived in tents and had their victuals brought to them by their servants, but it is surely the case that the Frankish aristocracy possessed residences on their estates, though they may have been neither fortified nor very grand. Occasional references suggest that this was so. Thus, Amadi recorded that in 1308, Philip of Ibelin, the Seneschal of Cyprus, was banished to his estate at Alaminos. Amadi also alluded to Raymond Visconte’s casal of Nisou in 1308 and Balian of Ibelin’s casal of Akaki in 1310 though it is not clear that either nobleman resided in those places.

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53 Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, p. 66.
54 Novara, § 53 (149), Melani, p. 124; trans. in La Monte, p. 106.
56 Amadi, p. 263 and see Gazetteer entry for Alaminos.
Perhaps more indicatively, Amadi recorded that in 1302, Guy of Ibelin, the Count of Jaffa and his family were plainly residing in his casal of Episkopi when they were abducted by pirates.57

Episkopi is in fact an interesting location to consider, for what little we know reflects how careful we must be in adducing the existence, or not, of an occasionally occupied lordly residence. It was clearly a village of considerable wealth and importance judging by the ruins of the churches and chapels that still surround it. By 1302, the Ibelin Counts of Jaffa had held an estate here for some time - at least from 1248 - so it may be that they had a residence there of some sort.58 The same may well be said of the Venetian Cornaro family who acquired an estate here, most probably in Peter I’s reign after the Ibelin-Jaffa family died out in the early 1360s. This must have been of major importance to them for the wealth derived from the cultivation of sugar-cane which they appear to have initiated: the sugar refinery here was thus founded rather later than those at Kolossi and Kouklia. Like the Ibelins before them, however, given that the Cornaros were an increasingly influential family in fifteenth-century Cyprus, it is most likely that they preferred to reside in the capital near the centre of power and saw their estate at Episkopi as a revenue source and little else.

Yet the Cornaros certainly possessed a residence of sorts at Episkopi in the fifteenth century. Various travellers’ notes refer to this, starting with the allusion of Peter Rot in 1453 to ‘Schloss Episcopata’ being a centre of the sugar cane industry,59 continuing with Roberto da Sanseverino in 1458 to ‘uno picholo castello nominato Episcopia’, belonging to the Cornaro family60 in turn followed by a note by Hans-Bernhard von Eptingen of 1460 also referring to a ‘schloss’.61 Plainly though, the buildings were not of any military significance. Indeed in the diary notes of his visit in

57 For Visconte and Nisou, p. 285; for Balian of Ibelin and Akaki, p. 384 and see gazetteer entry, for Guy of Ibelin and Episkopi, p. 238; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 16; Edbury, Franks, pp. 79, 81.
58 Swiny, pp. 156, 160; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 79.
59 in Grivaud, p. 70. For Episkopi and the Cornaro family, Hill, 2, p. 439, n. 5; Swiny, pp. 156-9; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 197-8; Edbury, Franks, p. 97; Warburg, The Antiquaries Journal, 63, p. 301; 81, pp. 307-9, 327-9; Coureas, Economy, pp. 111-2; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, p. 66.
60 in Grivaud, p. 71.
61 in Grivaud, p. 73.
1494, Pietro Casola called them merely a ‘great farm’. The remains, explored by the Department of Antiquities from 1977/8 would appear to bear this out.

In his account of the Mamluk raid of 1426, Stephen of Lusignan reported that the Mamluks attempted to surprise both it – ‘le chasteau’ of Episkopi and Kolossi but that they failed. Elsewhere, Lusignan commented that the Hospitallers had ‘fortifié le chasteau’ here, though when he does not say. Lusignan’s account is of course very late; it is uncorroborated by other sources so far as these matters are concerned and in any case, it is unlikely that such a strong force as that of 1426 would have had any difficulty in taking anything less than a major fortress were they so disposed. In the absence of supporting evidence for a Hospitaller chateau at Episkopi, it seems safe to assume that it was the Cornaro estate centre with its sugar refinery that was the subject of Lusignan’s Mamluk raid and that his account was therefore inaccurate in respect of Episkopi’s owners and the status of its building.

By then, the increasing insecurities that must have stemmed from the inroads of the Genoese and Mamluks no doubt discouraged the aristocracy from living outside the safety of Nicosia in any event. If they do originate from the end of our period rather than later, the towers at Alaminos and Pyla (gazetted separately), both located not far from the southern shore, would appear to be exceptions and should not be taken as being the sole survivors of a greater number of now vanished defensible residences. Neither was, in any case, so salubrious as to reflect a desire for a serious base for a major landholder, defensible or not. Two other ‘towers’ now extant: Kiti and Xylofogou, both also near Larnaka appear more certainly Venetian, so are not gazetted in this study. Enlart made mention of another tower, on the beach at Amathus but only traces were visible in his day. A further site on the top of Mount Olympos,

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62 in Grivaud, p. 146.
64 for the 1426 raid, Lusignan, Description, f 154 and Hill, 2, p. 477. For a Hospitaller fortification at Episkopi, Lusignan, Description, f.18. Lusignan, Chorographia – Grivaud, p. 7a; (Chorography, Wallace, § 9, p. 11 omitted to translate the sentence that includes this reference) also mentions a ‘castellum’ without identifying its builder or owner. Hill, 2, p. 24 takes Lusignan’s accounts of a castle at Episkopi at face value.
65 Except for Xylofogou these towers were covered by Enlart, pp. 375 and 482-6; Jeffery, pp. 13, 187-8, 348 and Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 53. For Xylofogou, see G. der Parthog, p. 236. Vestiges of what may have been Enlart’s tower at Amathus appear on a photograph of 1905, published in L. Bonato et al, p. 15.
Pirgo, shown as a tower on the Attar map of 1542, has also wholly disappeared but was judged to be a Venetian enceinte when investigated in 1910.66

In his pamphlet of 1935, Jeffery asserted the existence of numerous other ‘forts and watch towers’ and ‘smaller block-houses’ created variously to be bases to house those watching out for pirates and as additional measures taken by James I against the Genoese. He mentioned specifically ‘several towers’ on the bay of Larnaka, at Lefkara and on the Akamas peninsula. He explained that a massive export trade of second hand building material carried out in the nineteenth century accounts for the elimination of almost all of these alleged structures but that the foundations of one or two may be traced as at Lefkara and the Akamas. Vaivre too envisaged a number of lost towers of small size built to hold down the countryside and to watch the coasts. With regard to the latter he mentioned the remnants of such a structure near Kormakiti. In fact, it is much more likely that the few remains both had in mind were of something else altogether. One explanation is that they were, essentially, estate buildings. Thus, we know that most villages had a cluster of such edifices belonging to their lord and that in a few cases these approached the dimensions of an unfortified manor house. These were built on stone foundations rising up to about one m above ground, over which mud brick walls and a terraced roof were raised.67

An alternative explanation applies to the site on the Akamas. There, Enlart had also made mention of a fortification which ‘dominates one of the hills’ which he categorised alternatively as a fort and as a tower. He described it as rectangular, of rough construction and still possessed of a ground and first storeys and in signalling communication with Paphos, which appears impossible, and St. Hilarion courtesy of a beacon at Pyrgos, (on the west coast of Morphou Bay), which appears unlikely. This is likely the structure on the Attar map of 1542 where it is labelled Merovigli. We now know, however, that the medieval remains to be seen today on this remote Peninsula, are neither tower nor fort but rather a monastic establishment, as excavations in the early twenty-first century have revealed. These ruins, now called ‘Pyrgos tis Rigainas’, constitute a roughly square enclosure with thin outer walls of

poor composition, attached to the exterior of which are small square chambers on two of its sides. Internally it is possible to identify a series of adjacent chambers of approximately similar size set against one wall, a chapel, and elements of kitchen facilities. The square was entered through a narrow arched doorway suitable for the passage of one person at a time, located adjacent to a single storey barrel vaulted chamber still retaining its roof, set at one corner of the square compound. This small complex bears some resemblance to the nearby arrangement of Ayios Minas, a small establishment that constituted six monks.68

THE FORTIFICATIONS IN WAR

Cyprus experienced remarkably little warfare during the Lusignan period. Although it was where Christian West met Muslim East, especially after the end of the Crusader states on the Syrian mainland in 1291, its island nature largely protected it from Islamic expansionism. The fleets of the Italian city-states were a more potent weapon than those of the Muslim powers and their general domination of the Eastern Mediterranean helped ensure that Cyprus would remain in Christian hands. Through their fleets, the Italian city-states played an increasingly significant part in Lusignan Cyprus' history, culminating in invasion and a subsequent partial occupation which involved occasional campaigning. This was not until 1373 however. Up until then, the only external threats to Cyprus that resulted in warfare were the Crusaders' own invasion of 1191 and the wars of 1228-33 with Frederick II's supporters. There was no warfare at all that led from internal tensions: as we have seen, the native population appears never to have posed any threat to the ruling regime until well into the fifteenth century and of course any possible Frankish aristocratic resistance to the King was handicapped by the their lack of fortifications.69

In Part I, History, we traced the path of what campaigns there were insofar as fortifications were involved and gave some intimation as to their significance in

68 Attar, pp. 46-7, 96; Enlart, pp. 375, 415 and 485. Personal site visit on 12 May 2006. Pyrgos tis Rigainas was excavated over two or three seasons at the beginning of the twenty-first century by John Howells, then of Trinity College, Carmarthen. I have not been able to discover any report on this work. For Ayios Minas, G. der Parthog, pp. 86-7.

69 see above, in Raison d'être and functions, p. 64 and in An Urban Aristocracy, p. 75.
determining both why campaigns were conducted as they were and their outcomes. Here, I wish to attempt an overarching assessment, drawing in comparisons with what was happening simultaneously in wars fought elsewhere.

The aims of those engaged in the early wars of our period were similar: the achievement of direct possession of the island while inflicting as little damage as possible. In the invasion of 1191 and the wars of 1228-33, there were both field actions and sieges which in nearly every instance led ultimately to castles changing hands. Which was the more significant in terms of how the outcome of the wars were determined? Useful comparison may be drawn by analogy. Contemporaneous warfare provides a common answer. So for example, in the Third Crusade on the Syrian mainland of 1191 and the civil wars in England of 1215-17 and 1264-6, we have a common theme. This is that actions in the field were caused by, and in that sense, were incidental to, campaigns that concentrated on acquiring control of key locations. Such field actions had important consequences but our point is that victory in battle was only seen as the sine qua non of achieving war objectives if it caused the enemy such loss that he could not thereafter defend his fortified bases. Before 1373 then, it was therefore mainly the rarity of war and general absence of the threat of war, that led to an omission to develop the island’s fortifications. As we have noted elsewhere, castles and town walls were more than just fortifications and as such, their development must be seen in quite a different light – one in which military matters were merely an ingredient.

In the different circumstances of the later period, we might have expected a change in this respect. In England for example, the raids of the French and their Spanish allies on the south coast in the last decades of the fourteenth century, provoked some considerable refortification. Although this was partly carried out by seigneurial and civic powers, the Crown encouraged and sometimes sponsored such initiatives and indeed invested sizeable sums on strengthening some of its own castles in the vulnerable areas. How far this occurred in Cyprus has been followed in detail in the gazetteer entries. The works of Peter II and James I reflect some limited concern to improve the state of the island’s fortifications, yet clearly just as much attention and expenditure was allocated to improving the Lusignans’ residential facilities. With the exception of works carried out at Kyrenia, Lusignan fortifications created or
developed after 1373-4 were unimpressive: they were few and did not usually resist successfully when attacked. The comparative lack of concern to enhance fortifications during a period of various foreign threats may be partly due to the attenuated resources of the Crown at this time but the overall explanation is not so simple. For one thing, we should note that where there were conspicuous efforts to create new fortifications and in this Sigouri is the principal example, the motive was to establish a base for offence rather than better defend a vulnerable key point. This incidentally reflects that generally in our period, castles and fortifications were built primarily to dominate and serve as bases for expansion and offence: 'self-defence' was a secondary consideration. In Lusignan Cyprus from 1373-4, this became even more the case because the nature of war came to be different. The attacks of the Genoese and the Mamlûks were not only centred on taking key points – as in 1191 and 1228-33 but involved a deliberate policy of pillage and destruction aimed at exploitation and intimidation. Our narrative sources record that this led to skirmishing and ambushes with royalist troops when they could be deployed. In this context, the Lusignans' castles and strong points were no longer the military focal points they had been in previous wars. Although, as we know, Paphos and Limassol especially, featured in these wars, their resistance or surrender came to be of secondary importance. When Janus accepted the risk of battle in 1426, it was not because of fear for his castles but rather because he had to halt the rape of his domain and the indictment of his regime that this constituted. For their part, the Genoese carried out works on the defences of Famagusta. How far these constituted a considerable enhancement of Lusignan work prior to 1373 is hard to say, but the repeated failure of the Lusignans to recapture it suggests that here at least, an ongoing threat of war resulted in a serious programme of maintenance and development. In this, an analogy may be made with the Hospitallers of Rhodes - another regime that derived its wealth and hence power from its maritime activities - which existed in apprehension of attack and so developed its defences accordingly.

It remains to consider the island’s fortifications in the civil war between James and Charlotte. Their respective war aims were similar to those who fought in 1191 and 1228-33: the acquisition of key points and fortifications with as little damage to the island’s economic infrastructure as possible. This explains why the nature of the campaigns followed a similar pattern to that of the earlier wars in the island. Analogy
with another civil war fought at this time, in another island – England – may be helpful. There the antagonists’ aims were also to place their leader on the throne, yet here we find a fundamental difference in how war was directed, for in England, ‘control of the royal castles was no longer the key to the throne’,\(^7\) and the civil wars were pursued primarily by field action. In England, frequently both sides actively sought a decisive engagement and at the same time were disinclined to stay within castles when opposing forces were close by, as at Ludlow in 1459 and Sandal in 1460. Bearing in mind that the English aristocracy actually possessed castles of their own, unlike their Cypriot counterparts, this makes for a curious paradox and hence it may be instructive to enquire as to the causes of this difference.

In England, it appears likely that the protagonists were often evenly matched, both sides possessing a hard core of troops that may have had some professional experience in France or on the Scottish Border. In Cyprus, there was no such pedigree of soldiering and probably no aristocratic military retinues worthy of the name.\(^7\) Consequently there were relatively few troops from within Cyprus that could be engaged in battle. In the civil war of the 1460s as in earlier times, warfare in Cyprus only occurred in fact because one side or another was able to bring in substantial numbers of troops from overseas: this gave advantage and is naturally a reason why field actions were rare: the weaker side avoided battle and sought refuge in Kyrenia. In the contemporaneous English civil war, it was occasionally the practice to harry and so damage the economic base of an enemy’s lands,\(^7\) these being often territorially compact entities. In Cyprus, such substantial landed estates appear to have been uncommon and their destruction in any case not a war aim. There was thus no point in provoking an enemy to take the field to protect a ‘lordship’, as was the case when King Janus felt obliged to confront the Mamluks at the battle of Khirokitia. Nevertheless, although such factors as these may have directed the nature of the two parallel wars of the early 1460s, it is legitimate to question how far the sophistication of the fortifications themselves may have been an influence.

\(^7\) Brown and Colvin, *The History of the King’s Works*, 1, *The Middle Ages*, p. 240.

\(^7\) Edbury, Franks, pp. 73, 84, 93.

\(^7\) Goodman, pp. 214-7.
Apart from on the Scottish Border, English fortifications were not generally formidable in the second half of the fifteenth century and hence may have seemed insecure. As noted above, the same is generally true of Cyprus, for it is clear that in the sparring that occurred between James and Charlotte, all but one of the castles that we know were involved, appear to have changed hands with little or no resistance. But the exception is significant for this was Kyrenia. As was certainly the case in the Genoese War of 1373-4 and quite probably the earlier wars mentioned above, this one fortification was altogether pivotal in deciding the ultimate result. Elsewhere, we have traced Kyrenia’s formidable defences. Clearly, they stood up well to bombardment by gunpowder artillery in 1460. By that time, this had come a considerable way from its introduction in western warfare in the early fourteenth century but it seems apparent that the guns brought to bear against it in 1460 were of mixed value. James’ Mamlûk allies appear to have deployed old fashioned, large, ponderous, slow firing bombards, as was usual for them in this period – their cannon were inferior even to those of the Ottomans whose own ordnance was not as advanced as that of western European states. In the West, bombards were being superseded by smaller, more manoeuvrable and more rapid firing cannon from as early as the 1420s. James himself had at least one, more modern piece of ordnance: the serpentine that he deployed against Kyrenia in 1460. The serpentine was a medium sized cannon held on a wheeled carriage that was the most commonly used piece of artillery in the campaigns of Charles the Rash of Burgundy (1467-77) so in this, James was right up-to-date. He was in any case no doubt well acquainted with state of the art pieces through his various contacts with the Italian city-states, where gunpowder artillery was also at a more advanced stage of development than in Muslim territories. The Venetian overbuilding has obscured the traces of any particular, additional defences that Kyrenia may have been endowed with to combat this evolving weapon of assault but it is doubtful that anything was done beyond the likely creation of gunports, such as we can assume were added at Famagusta. Nevertheless, confidence in the

73 see e.g. Brown and Colvin, pp. 228-241; D.Renn, pp. 169-174.
74 Ayalon, passim; K. de Vries, Gunpowder Weapons at Constantinople, pp. 348-9, 352, 354-362.
76 On gunpowder artillery, see the articles by R.L.C. Jones, C.J. Rogers and M. Keen in (ed.) M. Keen, Medieval Warfare; D. Grummitt, The Defence of Calais and the articles by K. de Vries collected in Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500 which are a mine of information, although certain of his conclusions are questionable. (See my review in The Ricardian, 15, (2005), pp. 152-5).
castle's strength encouraged Charlotte, as it had James before her – in 1374 – to allow her stronger enemy to approach without the apprehension of inevitable defeat. That Kyrenia was neither reduced by bombardment nor taken by assault is testimony to its strength. Charlotte's and James' appreciation of that helps explain why it was central to both their wars.

What emerges from this overview of the island's fortifications in war? In general it is clear that they played a leading role in the conduct of most of the warfare in our period and that their occupation or loss influenced the outcomes of those wars. This was especially the case when war was directed at gaining possession of the land – which our castles and fortifications dominated. Where war was conversely directed at devastating the land, the island's strong points were less important, particularly when their garrisons were too weak to intervene. Both positively and negatively then, the wars in Cyprus demonstrate the link between land and stronghold and hence serve as an almost inevitable reminder of the purpose of castles – both as fortifications as well as in their other functions.

WALLED TOWNS, CAPTAINS AND CASTELLANS

At the beginning of his article on the Town Defences of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, published in 1995, Denys Pringle commented on the scant attention that had been paid to this category of fortifications on the Syrian mainland. As he noted, this has been in part due to the poverty of their remains. Until recently, the same was generally true of Cyprus. Enlart had provided a sound description of the remaining towers at Kyrenia but that was the extent of detailed study. In 2006 however, Nicolas Faucherre provided an attempt to disentangle the medieval elements of Famagusta's wall from the Venetian ramparts. These two analyses apart, there has been no reasonably thorough study. The gazetteer entries in this present work include reviews of the Lusignan and Genoese works at Famagusta, the Lusignan work at Kyrenia and

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77 Pringle, Town Defences, p. 69.
Nicosia where almost nothing remains at all. The purpose of this section is to attempt an overview of quite why they were built, drawing appropriate comparisons.

We have already noted that Cyprus possessed no town walls that were in commission when the Richard of England established Frankish rule in 1191. Similarly we have seen that though Kyrenia may have had town walls by the end of the thirteenth century, it was not until the fourteenth century that the Lusignans created urban defences in Famagusta and in Nicosia. The construction of town walls was obviously a very substantial undertaking and not to be attempted without very good reason. Quite what those reasons were can partly to be detected in what we know of the enceintes themselves and in part from the circumstances of their construction.

Such an analysis reflects that in this, the rationale for urban fortifications in Cyprus was dissimilar to what had happened in Crusader mainland Syria. In Syria, although the Crusaders appear to have built only two urban enceintes de novo, they inherited a further 12 that were already in existence when they arrived. Their works, as summarised by Pringle, reflect that they were simply the consequence of military need.\(^7\)\(^9\) There, the very serious threat of external attack naturally justified such effort and expenditure. In Cyprus, however, circumstances were quite different.

The Lusignans took over a native, largely Greek, population, which was primarily agrarian and posed no real threat to the new regime. At this time, we can safely assume that Frankish urban development was slow at first and in line with this, fortifications were restricted, as we have seen, to a few castles of the Crown and the military orders. Within a decade or so of the conquest of 1191, what fears there may have been of external threats, had dissipated. As a result, thirteenth-century Cyprus was peaceful. To some extent, this was because it remained a relative backwater in East-West trade and while Crusader Syria survived, this was bound to remain the case.

The fall of Acre in 1291 and the effective extinction of Kingdom of Jerusalem changed this. How far it is the case that it placed Cyprus in the front line militarily

\(^{79}\) Pringle, Town Defences - in particular pp. 76 and 78, repeated by D. Nicolle, Crusader Castles in the Holy Land, p. 42.
and perhaps as a consequence a Muslim invasion became a greater possibility has been discussed above (p. 24). But this did not lead immediately to the construction of town walls around the island's premier cities. Instead initial efforts, at Famagusta, seem to have begun as long as 15 years later and by that time it must have been apparent that invasion, from Syria and Egypt at least, was far less likely. Nicosia's walls were constructed even later and although we are not clear as to when Kyrenia's walls were begun, there is nothing to suggest that they are to be connected to the fall of Acre. What then was the prime motivation behind the creation of these three enceintes?

The case has already been made that the principal reason behind the creation of town walls at Famagusta was a response to its emergence as a major entrepôt. It is true that the walls provided for an element of security for the merchants who lived and did business there but as has been shown, the enceinte allowed for a considerable measure of royal control and at the same time symbolically reflected the importance, wealth and dignity of what became the Kingdom's premier port and second city. Famagusta was the epitome of early fourteenth-century Lusignan wealth and power, and it was correspondingly appropriate to exploit and to celebrate it as such, both of which purposes could be facilitated by walls and gates. That it was felt necessary to wall those gates up when there may have been a threat of attack, perhaps suggests that they were not primarily designed for defence in the first place. Although plainly the walls show a Lusignan intention to render the town defensible, in all probability the walls of Famagusta should be seen principally as an expression of confidence and as a contribution and stimulus to its growing prosperity. Inasmuch as it was also now being developed as a naval base, the walls and associated works were also a major investment in the Kingdom's aspirations for offensive, even expansionist activities. In sum, it would be wrong to attribute the building of Famagusta's town walls primarily to an enduring invasion fear following the collapse of Crusader Syria.

The history of the construction of the town walls at Nicosia has been recounted in the Gazetteer below. Here it is enough to emphasise only that apart from the efforts made to strengthen the defences during the war of 1373-4, the pace of building was quite

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80 see above, History, pp. 27-8.
81 Amadi, p. 335; A.H.S.Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 197.
leisurely, which hardly reflects a sense of military need. Indeed, Nicosia’s proliferation of gates, which have been cited as symptomatic of the medieval enceinte’s weakness, in fact demonstrate the enceinte’s main purpose: to provide the means to control and tax passage and to impress. If it was also meant to be an effective means of defence, it did not meet that challenge on either of the occasions (1373 and 1426) when put to the test. The Templar of Tyre’s allusion may imply that the town walls of Kyrenia already existed in the 1290s but we have no historical information as to when they were first built. What remains suggests that the circuit was of some strength. It is also still clear that the walls and towers were visually impressive. There at least, considerations of defensibility and symbolism may have been on a par. We might perhaps also consider briefly the ‘negative’ case of Limassol, where most of our evidence indicates that there was no town wall. In the thirteenth century, this was the island’s major port and the likeliest target of raiding and attack but not even Baibars’ abortive attempt of 1271 prompted any works.\textsuperscript{82} The major explanation must be that in the period of economic boom in the early fourteenth century when town walls were being built elsewhere in Cyprus, Limassol was in decline. Attacks on it by the Genoese and Mamlûks in later periods only served to aggravate that decline; they did not prompt the Crown to build a defensive circuit.

Like most of medieval Europe, Cyprus was of course generally peaceful. Unlike Crusader Syria, warfare, or the likelihood of warfare, was not a permanent fact of life. The apparatus of town walls were commissioned in Cyprus for precisely the same reasons as those elsewhere. An excellent analogy for Famagusta in particular may be drawn with Alanya on the nearby Anatolian coast, where the Seljuk Sultan of Rum, ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Kay Qubadh I, a keen trader, had developed this major port with town walls, a citadel and dockyards, during his reign of 1219-1237. The Sultan’s works at Alanya were a clear statement of the strength of his regime and a reflection of his intention to expand his powers further.\textsuperscript{83} Comparison may also be made with England where its kings regarded themselves as overlords of all fortifications, as most certainly the Lusignans were in Cyprus bar those of the military orders. In England, the Crown encouraged towns to build walls through a variety of mainly indirect financial measures, all of which reflect a recognition of those towns’ buoyant

\textsuperscript{82} Templar of Tyre, § 377, p. 67; Baibars al-Mansouri, Arab Sources, p. 56; Hill, 2, p. 167. 
economies and an aspiration to develop them further. In particular, town gates were used principally to impress and as a means to exact tolls, provide quarters for officials and for judicial purposes including gaols. There they may sometimes also have marked the limits of an urban franchise or borough law, though such a function would seem improbable as a major reason for initial construction. In short, in England as in the rest of western Europe, kings and lords saw increasingly that wealth and hence power was conveniently to be had by encouraging the growth of towns and tapping into their prosperity. Where towns enjoyed significant measures of independence, as in the Low Countries, this naturally led to tension, and there, civic fortifications might be constructed by a town’s burgesses in apprehension of a predatory lord. In Cyprus however, matters were clear and the Lusignan kings had every reason to encourage and enhance the stature and economic infrastructure of their towns: walled, gated circuits were a characteristic of this.

It may be useful to note some ambiguity in quite what were seen as town walls. Although we have a number of references to the island’s town walls as such – the occasion of their building and their role, at least so far as Nicosia is concerned, in military campaigns it is apparent that contemporaries did not always bother to distinguish between what now seem to be town walls and what constituted the outer defences of the castles with which they were associated. The town walls at Kyrenia were described as being elements of the castle, while the outer enceinte of the castle at St. Hilarion was described as its bourg. That a bourg - per se - did not necessarily indicate a walled area, does not assist. A similar blurring of what were identified as castle and town fortifications can sometimes be found in eleventh and twelfth-century England. It leads to the conclusion that urban castles and town defences were more articulated than has been thought. Indeed, this may be less a vagary than a conscious appreciation that a town’s castle and its urban enceinte constituted an overall entity.

This certainly came to be reflected in the jurisdictions of those appointed to govern castle and town, if it was not always the case. Indeed it is worth looking at the officers appointed for local government functions both before and after the creation of urban

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84 H. Turner, passim; O. Creighton & R. Higham, passim but particularly pp. 32, 37, 165, 168-71, 181-2, 249; Coulson, Battlements and Bourgeoisie, passim.
85 see Gazetteer entries for Kyrenia and Khirokitia.
fortifications. Thus in the thirteenth century, unwalled Nicosia, Famagusta and Limassol were governed autonomously by their city councils, albeit under royal viscounts or baillis. Their primary responsibilities were to supervise the *cours des bourgeois* but they were also in charge of collecting urban rents and maintaining public order and defence. Curiously royal castellans had already been made responsible for the defence of other unwalled "towns". 87 From the early fourteenth century when the town walls of Famagusta were taking shape, viscounts and baillis continued there, at Nicosia and Limassol and also at Paphos and Karpasia which were then without fortifications. Throughout this period, castellans were appointed. These were important posts and therefore granted only to those in favour and those who could be trusted. Accordingly, we can assume that appointment was in royal hands and that as John of Ibelin reported was the case in the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the 1260s, delegated authority given to the Seneschal only in respect of appointing officers below the level of castellan and for arranging for the provisioning of castles.88

The respective seniority of bailli and castellan is unclear and it is equally unclear if the viscount or bailli exercised his duties and presided over his court from within the town’s castle where there was one, or not. That said, it would seem likely that money collected would be safeguarded in the castle at least. At any rate, by the early 1370s, at Famagusta, the posts of bailli and castellan appear to have merged, a development repeated at Kyrenia by the early fifteenth century. This arrangement seems to have continued throughout the rest of our period, for in the later fifteenth century, one officer was usually in charge of the defences of both castle and town exercising too the civil duties of the bailli. When a separate officer served as castellan, it is noteworthy, however, that he was subordinated to a captain who was in overall charge of castle and town.89 Two examples from G. Boustronios may serve to illustrate this hierarchy. The first records that one Ferrandetto, who had been castellan of Famagusta in November 1473, asserted how he had to obey the then captain, the Count of Tripoli. The incident Ferrandetto was recalling was the contentious matter of

86 Creighton and Higham, p. 250.
89 Edbury, *Kingdom*, pp. 193-4; Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 70; Otten-Frous in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 115.
a murder in which he was thought to be implicated, so he would naturally stress his obedience to his captain to explain away his actions. Of course, had he not been thus the inferior of the captain, he could not have put this forward as his defence. 90 The second example relates to the arrangements made for the defence of Kyrenia by Charlotte and Louis at the end of September, 1460. They appointed Sor of Naves as captain charging him and his men to ‘patrol the circuit of the walls of Kerynia’, while one Brother Celli, a Hospitaller, was charged ‘to supervise within the citadel’. 91

It appears then that it came to be appreciated that the important walled towns of the Kingdom warranted unified control. The combination of civil and military functions under a single command, mirrored the inseparability of town and castle in contemporary references to their respective fortifications.

It is now quite impossible to compile a comprehensive list of castle captains and castellans and such a list would in any event be of only marginal interest. Boustronios’ chronicle frequently refers to the names and sometimes the official titles of those in command. The succession of changes that he records reflects both the royal sensitivity to the loyalty of those holding these important resources or alternatively the influence of the ascendant faction. At the same time, we see the evidence of the political instability that characterises the last decades of the Lusignan period. We also note the same names recurring, the personages generally being of some consequence and very often holding other senior positions as well, such as Nicholas Morabit, who was also sometime viscount. 92

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90 §§ 157 and 204, pp. 132-4 and 149-50.
91 § 51, p. 96; Hill, 3, p. 563.
92 §§ 88, 102, 158-9, 168, 201, pp. 112, 120, 134-5, 138, 149.
PART III
ARCHITECTURE

The architecture of the Crusader castles and fortifications of Cyprus was first studied in detail by the Frenchmen E.G. Rey in 1871 and C. Enlart in 1899. Their descriptions, especially the careful analyses of the latter, have remained the foundations of all subsequent studies, and though now inevitably superseded in many details they remain invaluable, especially in respect of architectural features since lost or compromised in subsequent restorations. George Jeffery similarly included military buildings in his gazette of 1918. None, however, provided any overarching commentary on the island’s military fortifications with regard to such matters as details of common designs among various sites, of parallels and so perhaps connections with other kingdoms and principalities and from that, evaluating their place in medieval military architecture. Perhaps as a result, in 1957, Robin Fedden felt able to write that ‘the Lusignans added nothing in Cyprus to the art of military fortification… . They left no great concentric castles like Krak…’. ¹

In the half century since then, a number of monographs on individual sites have added substantially to our knowledge and facilitate a reappraisal. A.H.S. Megaw’s booklets for the Department of Antiquities, especially that for Kyrenia in 1964 and more recently the articles on Saranda Kolones by Megaw and J. Rosser and finally those by J.B. de Vaivre, C. Corvisier and N. Faucherre, constitute excellent descriptions and include some historical context. These are all discussed, sometimes disputed, in the Gazetteer below. Yet it has remained the case that there is still no general discussion. Even Megaw’s short but useful contribution on Military Architecture in volume IV of the Wisconsin History of the Crusades in 1977 was really just a compressed Gazetteer. This section attempts to go some of the way to remedy this apparent deficiency. In doing so, we shall consider particular aspects of the island’s military buildings and we shall certainly draw attention to parallels elsewhere, from which inspiration may have been derived. How far we may go as to suggest that some developments coincided with those abroad and so imply that in Cyprus, advances in

¹ See bibliography for Rey, Enlart and Jeffery. Fedden and Thomson, p. 109.
architecture were wholly up-to-date remains to be seen. But in all of this, it will be very important to remember that as H. Kennedy wrote, 'we shall probably understand more about the architecture of Crusader castles by investigating the needs and purposes of the builders and the threats they faced than by searching for outside influences.' In this respect, it will be important to couple this section on Architecture with the sections in Part II of the thesis.²

THE BYZANTINE INHERITANCE

Siting and lay-out

The fortifications encountered by the Crusaders in 1191 were certainly not numerous as Fedden claimed.³ We can be certain of only six (Buffavento, Kantara, Kyrenia, Nicosia, Paphos, St. Hilarion), and less certain of a further two (Famagusta and Limassol). Of the certainties, Nicosia was wholly lost long ago, so nothing may be adduced except that it was inconsiderable and most likely merely the governor’s complex and thus rather a secure site than a fortified one. Buffavento, Kantara and St. Hilarion constitute a trinity in respect of the nature of their sites and likely provenance, while Kyrenia and Paphos may be similarly paired, indeed compared if the site now known as Saranda Kolones was Byzantine in origin.

With regard to their sites, both these groups were typical of Byzantine works elsewhere. So far as the first group is concerned, in Syria for example, the modest castle of Mount Silpius high above the city of Antioch gives a similar impression to Buffavento and Kantara as places of last resort and watch-stations. St. Hilarion is decidedly larger than its fellow mountain castles and may then have been built to shelter a local population during a period of tension. It has been noted that in the mid-Byzantine period, with the decline of Byzantine military power, populations gathered around fortified citadels usually perched on eminences, such as Ankara as rebuilt in the seventh to ninth centuries. Cyprus was effectively demilitarised between 688 and 965, so St. Hilarion and the other two mountain castles are most likely rather later. In any event, such locations naturally conferred advantages, and consequently hill-top

² See bibliography for the works of the various authors mentioned. Kennedy, p. 20.
castles were also very much preferred in Cilician Armenia which began as a collection of independent baronies in the later eleventh century and where shortage of manpower and vulnerability to Muslim invasion made defensibility a major consideration. The similarity of Byzantine and Cilician Armenian hill-top castles is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than at Azgit in Anatolia inasmuch as it was once thought to have all the hallmarks of Byzantine work until proved conclusively to be Armenian. As the Armenians sometimes did in Anatolia and as the Latins sometimes did in Greece in the thirteenth century, in Cyprus the Crusaders took over the three Byzantine hill-top castles and added to them in varying degrees as their need arose. This is evident particularly at St. Hilarion where the Lusignans made extensive additions for residential purposes and rather differently at Kantara where the motive was more military.  

So far as the second group is concerned – Kyrenia and Paphos – both were situated on flat sites on the coast next to artificially sheltered harbours, and both were accordingly important in serving as guard-posts to lines of communication and supply from the sea. At Kyrenia the castle had the natural defences of being surrounded by sea-water on three sides, while Paphos – if we include Saranda Kolones as initially Byzantine – was instead endowed with ditches that were partly rock-cut. In their general layout and extent, they were similar to each other and to Byzantine Korykos on the Anatolian coast. Korykos also utilised the natural defences of its position and where they were inadequate, it was given a rock-cut ditch. All three may have been developed in the Byzantine period at about the same time in the eleventh century. As such they were substantial works, being concentric at Korykos and possibly so, wholly or in part at the Cypriot sites.

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5 Lawrence, pp. 177-80; Edwards, pp. 161-7; Kennedy, pp. 16-17.
Masonry

It is apparent that a variety of masonry types were used in fortifications datable to the mid-Byzantine period. A facing of irregular small stones – little more than a cemented rubble as at St. Hilarion is typical. At Sayhun (Saone), where Byzantine work most likely originated in the period immediately after its capture in 975, the stonework is rather better though the blocks are considerably smaller than those used later at that site by the Crusaders. But we see too the use of larger blocks, ranging from the use of scavenged stones utilised from pre-existing structures as at Qal’at Sim’an dated to 979 to the rather more carefully laid walls of Korykos, most recently attributed to 1081-1143. At Saranda Kolones, the blocks are certainly no larger than those at Korykos nor the workmanship of a better quality. It is also worth noting that in Cyprus, there seems to have been no shortage of stone available that could be cut into ashlar blocks: the Byzantine preference for rubble masonry in their mountain castles may have been simply a consequence of utilising material immediately available and so avoiding the difficulties of hauling cut blockwork up difficult slopes.

Identifying different types of mortar employed can assist in distinguishing between mid-Byzantine and Crusader work. At St. Hilarion and Buffavento, the Byzantine structures are bound with grey stone grit mortar which is recognisably different from the later Lusignan mortar. Still, mortar is vulnerable to erosion and easily lost. For example, there is now little evidence of pointing with mortar between blocks at Qal’at Sim’an and Korykos, and Saranda Kolones is also problematical in this respect.

Interestingly at both Saranda Kolones and at Korykos, use was made of ancient columns found on site or near-by by inserting them through the thickness of the walls as strengthening devices. Byzantine builders had been re-employing such columns in this way for centuries. For example, they can be seen in the wall of the east portico of the palaestra of Byzantine Constantia (Salamis) in Cyprus. Such a technique was not necessarily exclusively that of Byzantine builders, however, for it can be noted in Crusader works, such as their sea castle of Sidon and at Beirut. The Muslims also made use of old columns, as at Shaizar. In Cyprus it can be seen elsewhere, at

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6 Metcalf, *Byzantine Cyprus*, p. 536.
Kyrenia's water-tower, which may be Byzantine or later, and probably at Kolossi which is more certainly Frankish. The use of antique columns as buttressing agents can also be noted in the impressive walls of Byzantine Ankara where there is a combination of types of masonry work: large, irregular blockwork on the lower courses of walls and towers, changing to smaller blocks banded with brickwork at the upper level. Ankara is dated to a period between the seventh and ninth centuries, but the use of alternate bands of brick and stone was a common feature of Byzantine work not utilised by the Franks and so assists in assigning builders. Brickwork can be traced at Buffavento and St. Hilarion and there are fragments at Kantara but these appear to be the only extant examples in Cyprus.7

It is worth stressing that it is not always straightforward to think we can distinguish easily between mid-Byzantine masonry where larger blocks are employed and the masonry favoured by the Crusaders. At its finest, Crusader masonry involves facings of large, regular stonework which are well jointed and there are certainly instances of this in Cyprus, but much Frankish work was not necessarily so well finished in the first place. Consequently modern attempts to distinguish between mid-Byzantine and Crusader masonry work need to be guarded. From this, it is the more understandable that the external walls of a site such as Saranda Kolones may be subject to alternative interpretation as to their origins.

Quite naturally, the works of one period were sometimes adopted and enhanced by a successor. How far did this occur in the fortifications of Cyprus? It is recognised that this occurred at Kyrenia for instance. In particular the solid pentagonal bastions on the Byzantine outer, south wall, which are dated to the tenth century, have been described as having received an outer skin of superior masonry in the Crusader period on the basis of their external appearance. Given the difficulties in establishing hard and fast distinctions between mid-Byzantine large block masonry and Crusader masonry, if we accept this interpretation of Kyrenia's southern Byzantine curtain, how certain can we then be in accepting Rosser's assertion that the enceintes, especially the outer enceinte, at Saranda Kolones are Crusader through and through?

7 Smail, p. 238 and plate vi(a): Fedden and Thomson, p. 50; Salamis, pp. 6-9; Lawrence, pp. 205, 215-6, 218-9, 220-1 and plates 8,9,10, 13,14,16,17,18; Edwards, p. 165; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p.536.
Mural Towers

Byzantine mural towers are noteworthy for their variety of design. Although the rectangular predominates, other types are common, and this is especially true of extant work in Cyprus. At St. Hilarion, the Byzantine walls include semi-circular towers that taper upwards, have loopholes on their upper levels and may have been partly open backed or given timber screens set in arched entries. They connect at wall walk level to the adjacent curtains. Entry points to these towers and through gates are typically via round-headed arches, as indeed is the case at Buffavento and through the inner (Byzantine) curtain at Kyrenia. The Byzantine towers at Buffavento, by contrast, were rectangular while at those at Kyrenia were more diverse. Those of the original enceinte were variously circular and oval, connected to the enceinte by narrow ‘throats’, while one was distinctly horse-shoe shaped. The later addition of the strong outer Byzantine curtain on the south side included solid beak or cut-water towers reminiscent though not identical with the cut-water towers on the outer enceinte of Saranda Kolones.

The mural towers of Saranda Kolones are extremely diverse as they include rounded, rectangular, polygonal and cut-water, prow or wedge shapes. This variety and the particular employment of cut-water towers are discussed in detail below (see Paphos) as an argument for a Byzantine origin for this castle.

Large, boldly projecting, D-shaped towers, or horse-shoe towers had been built by the Byzantines in earlier periods as at Pagnik Öreni on the Euphrates in the fourth century and at Ankara in the seventh to ninth centuries, but they are not common. The horse-shoe tower on the inner southern enceinte at Kyrenia is small and probably no later than the seventh century. Large D-shaped horse-shoe towers were later commonly used by the Armenians in Cilicia however, and it is from them that we should probably see the inspiration for the notable towers of this type in Cyprus, at Kantara and Kyrenia.8

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8 Fedden and Thomson, p. 49; Foss, pp. 17-18, 36 and 145; Lawrence, pp. 174, 208, 221 and 226; Pringle, Africa, pp. 152 and 157; Edwards, pp. 11 and 14; Kennedy, p. 18.
Gates, Gate-towers and Sally Ports

The main entrances to the five extant Byzantine castles (if we include Saranda Kolones) of Cyprus would appear to fall into two possible groups that correspond with their two different types of siting and hence extent. The entrances to the mountain castles were simple affairs, being merely sizeable arched entries in curtain walls. The entrance to the lower ward at Buffavento may have included a rectangular tower subsequently obscured in a Frankish elaboration while that at St. Hilarion may have had the benefit of a barbican, also subsequently modified in the Frankish period. The two castles of Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones are, however, more problematical, inasmuch as the first has been wholly overbuilt by the Franks and the second is an aspect of the contentious issue of who first built that castle. The bent-entrance, rectangular gate-tower on the present inner west wall at Kyrenia may possibly have superseded a similar gate-tower of the Byzantines at this point, but this is mere speculation. Although Byzantine fortifications usually involved gatehouses with entrances that were not bent, occasionally Byzantine enceintes had been endowed with such devices and it is argued below that on the grounds of such a design, the entrance of this type on the outer enceinte at Saranda Kolones could be of Byzantine origin. We know that the Byzantines sometimes used portcullises as in their work at Ankara and indeed there is a trace for one in the inner gatehouse at Saranda Kolones. However, both that gate-house and its counterpart at Kyrenia possessed a chapel above, as was the case with the inner gate-house in twelfth-century Crusader Belvoir, so on the balance of probability, both inner, gate-houses at the two Cyprus castles were Crusader in origin too. Bent-entrance gate-houses constructed by the Franks in the Holy Land became rather more common in the thirteenth century as at Caesarea. The similarity of Byzantine and Frankish practices in this is replicated in the matter of concealed sally ports, for both made considerable use of this device. As noted below, those at Saranda Kolones have been compared with those at Frankish Belvoir and additional comparison could be made with Caesarea too. This has been cited as an argument for a Frankish origin for Saranda Kolones but its sally ports could just as easily have been Byzantine in conception.9

9 Deschamps, Les Entrées des châteaux des croisés, pp. 372; Creswell, p. 166, 174-9, 321; Fedden and Thomson, pp. 46 and 51; Foss, p. 37; Lawrence, pp. 173-4, 207; Pringle, Town Defences, pp. 90-1; Pringle, Secular Buildings, pp. 43-5; Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, p. 50; Mesqui, pp. 14-16; Mesqui with Faucherre, pp. 87-8.
FRANKISH WORK

General

As is the case with regard to Crusader Syria-Palestine and Frankish Greece,\textsuperscript{10} we have no documentary evidence from Cyprus that provides information on such matters as how much money was spent on building programmes, what categories and how many personnel were employed, and how long such works took to complete. As we are also ignorant as to the total income of the Crown, which plainly fluctuated considerably during our period, it is impossible to gauge the extent to which the Lusignans ‘spent what we can assume was a significant proportion of their income on...keeping their castles in a state of readiness’, as Peter Edbury wrote.\textsuperscript{11} What is apparent, however, is that for long periods there was most likely little attention paid to any building works except the successively splendid arrangements of the palace works in Nicosia. This is perhaps negatively reflected in the desultory pace of creating its town walls through the fourteenth century and the emergency works which had to be put in hand in 1373 only when danger threatened. Initiatives such as the first Lusignans’ efforts at Saranda Kolones, whatever they may have been, and later at Famagusta, were exceptional and should not be taken as the rule. That James I seems to have been among the foremost of his dynasty in building ‘castles’ at exactly the time when the revenues of the Crown must have been at their lowest ebb, implies perhaps that the proportion of royal expenditure on its fortifications was not always consistent with its income.

Siting

The Franks kept what they acquired from their predecessors and developed them to varying extents. Whatever circumstance first prompted the foundation of the mountain castles, however, had long since passed and it is likely therefore that the Lusignans had little military use for them except for those very few occasions when there was war within the island. No doubt therefore remote Buffavento and Kantara were largely unoccupied for much of the time. Their possible use as watching points or signal stations and as a gaol in the case of Buffavento would have been of meagre

\textsuperscript{10} Kennedy, p. 9; Lock, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{11} Edbury, Franks, p. 73.
stimulus to warrant much expenditure on maintenance and improvement to the buildings. The apparent late fourteenth-century development of Kantara may well have been a re-commission of a then deserted castle in fact. The absence of references to that castle between 1233 and the reign of King James would suggest as much. By contrast, St. Hilarion was heavily developed. This was not so much because it was situated to dominate the pass that was the shortest route between the capital and Kyrenia, since the bulk of Lusignan work was not in respect of its defences. Instead, it was developed as royal retreat, a kind of Balmoral even, though we have no written evidence to attest to the extent of its use as a Lusignan residence.12

The Byzantine ‘castles’ at Paphos and Kyrenia were also retained and considerably improved. The possible castles at Limassol and Famagusta are more difficult to gauge however, as discussed below. There is no evidence that either was immediately fortified in the Lusignan period; we know only that there was a harbour tower at Famagusta by the time of the wars of 1228-33. All were clearly located in association with ports. Their rationale is discussed in ‘Raison d’être and functions’ (above) but here we may note additionally that Paphos was the first stopping point on the sea route from the West, along the island’s south coast and beyond to the East, Limassol being an intermediate halt on the same route. The gradual reduction in importance of both as ports appears connected with the general neglect of their defences. In contrast, Famagusta’s importance as an entrepôt and naval base grew in the thirteenth century becoming hugely significant from about 1300 (see pp. 26-7 above) whereupon its defences were massively extended. Royal officials – viscounts, baillis – as well as castellans were based at these places, but the fact that they were also based at other locations that were not defended and indeed that there were long periods when it is clear that there was no castle in commission in Paphos and probably in Limassol too, suggests that castles were not always seen as essential for the discharge of local government functions.

As their capital, the Lusignans naturally developed a castle-palace in Nicosia where their Greek predecessors had possessed only a meagre fortification. But though they expended considerable effort there and on some of the other sites just mentioned that

12 Edbury, Franks, p. 75.
had defences in the period before 1191, they founded very few new castles of their own. They were fortunate inasmuch as they did not need fortified bases to control their estates: the indigenous population which supported the island’s economy and hence the Frankish regime was docile and required no strong hand to keep in check; indeed the Lusignans appear to have been sensible enough to appreciate this and to have refrained from over-exploiting this basic resource on which the prosperity of their kingdom depended.13 The only ‘estate castle’ that may warrant such a name in fact is Akaki, and its foundation may be peculiar in that it seems to have been associated with the royal sequestration of that estate from a declared rebel. Kouklia was certainly another royal estate centre, located among the sugar plantations of the south-west, but it hardly merits the ascription of a fortification.

The siting, the assiette of the very few new castles of the Lusignans were of course wholly dictated by their intended purposes or raison d’être. This is mainly covered in the section of that name above and in the gazetteer, but we can summarise here by noting that just as their purposes varied, so did their siting. La Cava was located on its plateau, surrounded by orchards and fountains, near the capital mainly to impress and as another royal playground to supplement St. Hilarion. Like Sigouri, discussed more fully below, Larnaka appears to have been developed as a result of the establishment of a hostile Genoese presence in Famagusta: there seems no evidence to link it with the increasingly important production of salt in that area. The castles and towers of the military orders were primarily estate centres or headquarter buildings so far as their structures in Limassol were concerned. Kolossi only appears to have become a serious fortification as late as the 1450s, centuries after it was founded. Gastria, however, seems to have been an exception. It does not appear to have been associated with any other Templar estates14 in the area and seems to have been well defended from its beginning. Its site was carefully chosen to take advantage of the lie of the land next to an inlet which was essential as the Templars’ private port in Cyprus opposite their base of Tortosa on the mainland.

13 Edbury, Franks, p. 69.
14 Edbury, Templars, p. 191, fn. 7.
Lay-out, design and construction methods

Leaving aside mere towers built at the beginning of the Frankish period and where the lie of the land did not dictate the shape of the perimeter, the royal castles were generally quadrangular in lay-out with their residential quarters and service chambers ranged along the inside of their walls. The Franks inherited this arrangement from their Byzantine predecessors at Kyrenia and arguably Saranda Kolones. Certainly at the former they gradually developed the castle making its internal accommodation and service facilities increasingly integrated into the whole following the pattern in parts of contemporary western Europe that appears to have begun with Frederick II’s castles in Italy and Sicily in the 1230s and 1240s (Trani, Lagopesole, Catania, Maniace, Prato as developed). Famagusta Castle, built in the very early 1300s, is a leading example in Cyprus. Its internal, domestic arrangements are largely united with its defensive outer defences both being built, in the main, in one programme. In his description of Famagusta Castle, Corvisier made particular comparison with Enguerrand III de Coucy’s castle of Coucy le Château (Aisne) in respect of some details of its articulation but other castles in France built at this time might be better examples of quadrangular arrangements with corner towers and internal ranges increasingly integral with their outer, defensive shells, such as Villandraut and Roquetaillade near Mazères, both in Gironde and both very early fourteenth century.

The use of donjons appears to have been restricted to the mountain castles, perhaps following the Byzantine tradition in this respect, but otherwise there appears to be consistency here.

Overbuilding in Venetian and Ottoman times has masked the exteriors of the more important medieval sites impeding an appreciation of how they may have been built but a number of putlog holes on the east side of Kolossi’s donjon suggests that some use was made of scaffolding that was arranged diagonally perhaps to support ramps that rose in zigzags from ground level.

15 Libal, pp. 73-6, 79-80; Jones, p. 179; McLean, pp. 86-7, 108.
16 See e.g. Brown, English Castles, pp. 142-6; Libal, pp. 83-4; Liddiard, pp. 59-64; Corvisier in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 363 and Raison d’être and functions (above).
17 Edwards, p. 31.
Mural Towers and the Armenian influence

The Franks were far more consistent in tower design than their Byzantine precursors. Where they added to the sites they inherited during the very early years of the Lusignan period, these followed the square or rectangular shape that had been dominant in western Europe. Consequently the north-west tower of Byzantine Kyrenia that they adapted and the additional towers they created on the enceinte of the upper ward at St. Hilarion were characteristic of what had been that norm. But already, the dominant design in western Europe was changing with the preference, from about the 1190s, for the cylindrical or D-shaped tower. In the West, this development is most spectacularly discernible in the towers of Richard I’s Château Gaillard and King John’s and Henry III’s Dover, while in the East, for example, it has been noted that enceintes in the Principality of Antioch were endowed with great round towers at the end of the twelfth century. Their superiority has been frequently discussed, but of course the transition was never complete in either East or West. In Syria the hugely impressive walls of Chastel Pèlerin and Caesarea include formidable rectangular towers that date from the thirteenth century while in the West there was a clear tendency to persevere with the rectangular in the castles of northern England right through the later medieval period.18 In Cyprus too there was no wholesale change at this time, for as late as the early fourteenth century at Famagusta Castle and the later fourteenth century at La Cava, tower design remained predicated on the rectangular: peppered with embrasures at the former but not so and consequently most unwarlike at the latter. Some sophistication was attempted with the creation of one or more polygonal towers on the town walls of Famagusta, possibly replicated later that century at Larnaka, although its polygonal “tower” may possibly have been the result of converting a pre-existing church. The more prominent of such towers were endowed with a substantial talus, as in the polygonal torre del Diamente at Famagusta. The use of a talus to strengthen the base of a tower seems to have been largely a Frankish contribution to military architecture.19 In Cyprus it was also subsequently applied to some of the D-shaped towers built a little later.

19 Fedden and Thomson, p. 50; Foss, p. 37.
As noted above, these large D-shaped towers or horseshoe towers in Cyprus most likely date to the fourteenth century and appear to have their inspiration from Cilician Armenia rather than Western towers of the thirteenth century, as Faucherre suggested. The characteristics of Armenian military architecture and their influence on the Crusader buildings and indeed warfare in the Holy Land have been well observed already. Little note has been made, however, of the extent of Armenian influence on Cyprus. The Armenians were the Lusignans’ close neighbours and similarly governed a small Christian Kingdom beset by the increasingly powerful Muslim world. There were many connections between the two states. The two royal families intermarried, from which the Lusignans were able to assume the title of King of Armenia in 1368.

There had long been Armenians resident in Cyprus – Henry II appointed an Armenian corps as palace guards and consequently an ‘Armenian Quarter’ had developed in Nicosia, most likely adjacent to the palace-castle complex just north of the later, Venetian Paphos Gate. Armenians formed a distinct unit of the royal army that fought for Janus at Khirokitia on 7 July 1426. As noted above, from 1360 to 1448, the Lusignans held a foothold in Cilician Armenia. This was Korykos, the second port of that country but the one nearest Cyprus. There, the Lusignans acquired both a land castle and a sea castle at which they maintained a garrison. The sea castle is particularly impressive and relevant to this study. The Armenians had endowed it with a number of towers, some being apsidal-horseshoe in shape, finished off with an ashlar facing. Indeed it is worth noting in passing, that the Lusignans added to Korykos itself, developing at least one of the castle’s towers.

This style and fine workmanship can be seen repeated in Cyprus particularly at Kantara and Kyrenia. The large apsidal-horseshoe tower on Kantara’s main south-east enceinte and the splendid north-east tower at Kyrenia are of a sort that are very common in Cilician Armenia – as at Yilan and Yeni Koy. The complex of the two storey chamber and tower of Kantara’s main north-east enceinte is reminiscent of the chamber-tower of Kiz that is similarly articulated on an angle of 45° with its east face.

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20 Fedden and Thomson, pp. 55-6; Kennedy, p. 18; Edwards, pp. 11, 65-72; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 388.
21 Makhairas, § 433, p. 417; Boustronios, §§ 7 and 9, pp. 70 and 72; Hill, 2, pp. 2; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 92; Leventis, pp. 171, 251.
22 Makhairas, § 681, p. 661.
thrusting out forming a major element of that castle's defences. The solid spur projecting from Kantara's western group of apartments has parallels at Lampron and Vahga, while narrow eschaugettes, though not identical with those at Kantara, appear at Amuda and Anahşu. Indeed similar too to Kantara is the layout of the main curtain facing south-east at Tumlu, while the general plan of the whole of Kantara castle, with most of its chambers built against the enceinte, again not wholly continuous owing to the natural protection offered by the site, can be found at Tamrut.  

The difference in the embrasures in the first and second storeys within Kyrenia's horseshoe tower suggests that it was not constructed in one programme but it may be that in its final form it dates from a similar period to the work at Kantara mentioned here. This may be the reign of James I. As noted in the History, we know that he was responsible for building at a number of sites: he more than most would have appreciated the importance of Kyrenia and of course his reign was chiefly concerned with the presence of a hostile force based in Famagusta. Although Stephen of Lusignan is our earliest source who names Kantara specifically in this context, it may be that we can accept this statement. Of all the Lusignan kings, James was perhaps the most susceptible to ideas developed elsewhere that might have resulted in improvements to fortifications. He was interested in the arts and is said to have given grants to master craftsmen of Kyrenia, at least one of whom was an architect.  

Gates and Gate-towers

As noted above, Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones possess bent-entrance gate-towers. The inner entrance at Kyrenia was certainly enhanced by the Franks whether or not they overbuilt a pre-existing gate-tower of a similar design, while the inner gate-tower at Saranda Kolones is also more likely to be Frankish. Both the large rectangular towers at La Cava constituted bent-entrance towers. The inspiration here appears likely to be from a combination of Byzantine and Cilician Armenian influences. It was just as common, however, for gates to open directly from the front face of towers (Buffavento and the Cava and Limassol gates on the town walls of Famagusta) or in

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25 Makhairas, § 620, p. 611; Lusignan, Description, f. 35.
26 Fedden and Thomson, p. 51; Edwards, p. 15.
gates in curtains immediately next to towers (Famagusta castle and in its south town wall). As noted above, like the Byzantines before them, the Franks sometimes endowed their gates with portcullises. We have noted one in the inner gatehouse at Saranda Kolones and similarly the bent-entance gate-tower of Kyrenia possessed one. They were not common, however: Famagusta castle appears to have been endowed with one only in its first main entrance which was fairly quickly superseded and blocked up.

Archères, Battlements and Machicolation

As on the Syrian mainland, in Cyprus the Franks adopted Byzantine and Armenian practices in the use of archères but employed them more profusely, systematically and with experimentation of design. They were of varying length, some being simple slits while others had stirrup bases – archères à étier – positioned in series of connected arched embrasures or in simple niches in galleries. One, sometimes two levels of such lines of fire, set within the thickness of the walls below wall-walk level, can be traced in Kyrenia castle and in the town walls of Famagusta. Those at Famagusta are especially impressive: it has been estimated that there were as many as 1,500 such firing positions clearly reflecting a huge focus by the Franks on this aspect of defence. The interplay of multi-layered curtain defence interspersed with projecting towers to provide flanking fire reflects best contemporary practice in the West exemplified at outstanding works such as Caernarvon.

Surviving parapets are rare but what we have shows the usual continuation of earlier practices such as can still be seen on the wall of the Byzantine outer ward at St. Hilarion but employed with greater sophistication. Thus the parapet on the north front of Kyrenia – which incidentally replicates a lower parapet below, fossilised in a heightening of that wall – constitutes narrow crenels and big merlons each containing carefully splayed slits. A similar arrangement obtained at later Kolossi and there it may be that there were the additional defences of shutters that could cover the crenels and perhaps even the means of constructing a removable hoarding.

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27 Fedden and Thomson, pp. 50-1; Foss, p. 37; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 319, 321, 326, 333, 339, 342, 345.
The Franks followed Byzantine practice in employing machicolation, but here again, examples in Cyprus are few. Later overbuilding at important sites, particularly Famagusta, permits no opinion as to its general use on curtains; there is none at Kyrenia castle although the west tower – possibly one of a pair defending a gate, on the town wall still possesses the elaborate corbels for such a wall head defence around its entire perimeter.²⁸ Fifteenth-century single box machicolations covering entrances below are extant at Kolossi and Pyla while the corbels for another cover the main entrance at St. Hilarion. The dating for this feature at St. Hilarion is contested and may be Byzantine in origin being embellished in the fifteenth century with the mouldings that are still visible.

Gunpowder Artillery Fortifications

As noted above, cannon are first recorded as used in Cyprus in 1408 during a Lusignan attempt to recapture Famagusta. Subsequent allusions to their use are also tracked above. From this it seems clear that in their later wars in Cyprus the Lusignans mainly used weapons obtained from abroad – purchased or borrowed – principally from Venice. But there is nothing now to show that the Lusignans adapted their fortifications in the fifteenth century. The walls of the capital received negligible attention and although Venetian and Turkish overbuilding at Kyrenia, Larnaka, Paphos and Limassol has obscured much, it is doubtful that any significant work was carried out. After 1426 the Lusignans were vassals to the Mamlûk sultan so there was no threat from that quarter and though there was occasional skirmishing with the Genoese, a lack of resources likely precluded any building work of consequence at these principal sites. In contrast, in the 1450s the Hospitallers at least began work on an enclosing enceinte or mantlet at their commandery at Kolossi. These defences may have been prompted by the aggressive expansionism of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II but the works are of a very small scale and would not have been adequate had such a threat materialised. They are of interest nonetheless. The mantlet included a projecting wing equipped with inverted key-hole gunports in embrasures constructed to accommodate small cannon, arrangements very typical of early gunports elsewhere.

²⁸ Fedden and Thomson, p. 50; Foss, p. 37.
as in England. Kolossi was also endowed with a small, stout, round tower that bears some comparison with similar towers built by the Hospitallers at this time as at Narangia on Kos. Quite possibly this tower at Kolossi was furnished with gunports too but the tower is ruined and any gunports it may have had are lost. The tower was in any case of such a size that it could have accommodated only the smallest artillery pieces. Still, this development was in keeping with what was happening elsewhere. Gun-towers or ‘roundels’ were now being built in the West, as at Threave, Kirkcudbright, Scotland (c. 1447), Querfurt, Germany (1461-79) and in the later fifteenth century, on a much grander scale in Italy (Ostia, Sarzana, Sarzanello, Senigalia, Volterra) presaging the massive Venetian ‘roundels’ on the north-west and south-east corners at Kyrenia.

Elsewhere it is apparent that the Genoese enhanced the fortifications of Famagusta – indeed their need to maintain the town in a state of defence involved heavy expenditure. Their work is in its turn heavily obscured by the later Venetian building campaigns but the several references to iron and bronze bombards of various sizes located on ‘betresca’ (bretèches; brattices ?) mentioned in the Genoese massaria suggest that they ensured that their cannon had adequate platforms from which to operate, in this context betresca presumably being suitably strengthened bastions and platforms. But as the fifteenth century wore on, the diminishing value of Famagusta set against the high cost of its upkeep most likely militated against more substantial or revolutionary works. These were carried out subsequently by the Venetians commencing probably with the horse-shoe outwork in front of the Limassol Gate some time after 1474. In conclusion then, it is clear that little was done to modify the island’s fortifications to the developing threat of gunpowder artillery during the Lusignan period.

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29 Kenyon, pp. 205-40.
30 Spiteri, pp. 182-4.
31 Tabraham, pp. 12, 21-24; Libal, pp. 33, 158-9; Harris, pp. 50-78.
32 Otten-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 118.
34 For further discussion on this and a bibliography, see ‘The Fortifications in War’, above and fns 72, 73 and 74.
Part IV

Gazetteer
AKAKI

Akaki is approximately half-way between Nicosia to the east and Morphou Bay to the west. It is situated on the east side of the *Potamos tou Akakiou* which flows into the Bay past Morphou itself.

It was described merely as a *casal* in 1310 when in the possession of Balian of Ibelin, Prince of Galilee, Lord of Tiberias, Morphou and Akaki. That year, Balian, along with the other rebels, was arrested at Kormakiti upon Henry II’s resumption of power. Akaki may have then been taken into the king’s hands, for later, Makhairas recorded that ‘Akaki was built by King Henry’. The chronicler did not state specifically that what was built was a castle, but we may assume that planting a fortification in the heart of a prominent rebel’s landholding was a clear assertion of royal authority. The scant remains of Akaki appear to accord with such an origin.

It appears that Akaki remained in the royal demesne although we can not tell how far the king’s works there were used as a centre for estate management. It is mentioned as ‘the court of Akaki’ with regard to January 1369, when Peter I spent a number of days there hunting. References to it in 1440, 1452 and 1468, reflect that it was similarly part of the Crown lands in those years. James II came here in 1470 to escape the plague that ‘lasted for two and half years’, returning to the capital only when the plague had passed. We are not told specifically that he used the castle, but we may speculate that he did. These several allusions to Akaki as a royal resort implies that it was once considerably more extensive than its present meagre ruins would suggest.

The extant remains are limited. All we have now is a cylindrical tower, 3.5 m wide internally, with walls 1.1 m thick. It is constructed of large stone blocks, now unfortunately in poor shape. Externally, this shows evidence of slots for the scaffolding that presumably was employed in the tower’s construction. However, these present remains are very ruined, the side that must have accommodated the

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1 Amadi, p. 384; Makhairas, § 597, p. 593; Fl. Bustron, p. 238. For Balian’s titles, Hill, 2, p. 218.
3 Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 147, 154.
entrance being lost to the course protruding above ground level. Elsewhere, the tower is extant to a height of 3.5 m. Within this surviving wall, there is on one side a square hole in the thickness of the wall at ground floor level, with two smaller holes at regular intervals, above it. On the other side of the interior of the surviving wall, the remains of a stair can be detected clinging to the wall, supported on two piers of appropriate height. From this, it seems that the tower must have had at least two floors, perhaps even three. Above this stair, there is a larger opening within the masonry for what must have been a small window.\(^5\)

In overview, this tower is very small. If its arrangements were to accommodate a permanently resident corps, that corps could not have numbered more than two or three. In this respect, this cylindrical tower was on a different scale than its contemporaries elsewhere in Europe, such as on the Welsh Border or Savoy so in fact its size implies that it was not intended as a permanent place of abode. On balance, it seems unlikely that Akaki could have been merely an isolated watch-tower: its foundation circumstances, date, location and history argue against that. Consequently we may speculate that this tower was merely one element of a larger fortification now gone.

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\(^5\) This description derives from site visits on 26 and 27 October 2005 and to a lesser extent from photographs held in the Photographic Dept. of the Cyprus Archaeological Museum.
General view from the west of the tower showing at least two storeys.
Interior of tower. The remains of the stair built against the cylindrical wall is just discernible.
ALAMINOS

Alaminos was a major fief located twenty-one kilometres south-west of Larnaka. During the reign of Henry II, it belonged to Philip of Ibelin, Seneschal of Cyprus. In 1307 he was confined by Amaury to his residence at Alaminos and he was arrested there the following year. Given his loyalty to Henry II we can assume that he was confirmed in possession in 1310.¹ Later that century, the fief was held by John, Prince of Antioch, the brother of Peter I.² We do not know the location of the seigneurial residence, however, for the existing tower appears to date from after this period, perhaps from about the time of King James II’s grant of Alaminos to Giovanni Loredan, some time between 1464 and 1468.³ This is a small and unpretentious structure now on the periphery of Alaminos village. Like other small towers, it appears to have been manned by francomati (freemen) at times in James II’s reign.⁴ Clearly it has benefited from conservation in recent years.

Enlart commented that it was ‘built throughout in a clumsy and irregular masonry of small stones, some of which appear to have been scarcely worked at all.’⁵ It is rectangular (6.75 x 4.7 m) and rises through three storeys to a height of 7.85 m. At ground floor level an entrance has been walled up but whether that entrance was original is impossible to say. There are no other openings at this level so it would seem likely that this was used for storage. The first and second storeys rested on planking laid on beams and it had a flat roof. Entry is invariably said to have been at first-floor level via a doorway (2.6 m above the ground) under a wooden lintel, but the doorway is too low to enter without stooping, so it may have been a hatch or window opening. This opening is at the bottom of a large groove that bisects this face of the tower: previous descriptions have supposed that this recess housed an extraordinarily long drawbridge operated from the roof and that the drawbridge must have connected with another structure for access that is now lost. There is no sign of any pivot holes

¹ Templar of Tyre, §§ 663 and 699 [698], pp. 167, 181 where the date of the arrest is 1309; Amadi, p. 263; Fl. Bustron, pp. 150, 158; Hill, 2, p. 218.
² Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, p. 66.
⁴ Enlart, p. 486.
⁵ op. cit. p. 485.
at the base of the opening however, and given the very simple nature of this small tower, it is very unlikely that such an elaborate drawbridge existed.

There are narrow, groove apertures in the walls on either side of this first-floor opening and in the other sides of this floor. These have been labelled as arrow-slits owing to their internal embrasures, but I have not been able to achieve entry to confirm their existence. Previous descriptions have recorded that the top storey has a round-headed window in one corner, and a fireplace on the adjacent side. There are now rectangular openings covered by wooden shutters similar to the first floor 'doorway'.

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Face with supposed 'entry' at first floor level at bottom of large groove bisecting the face of the tower.
Rear face of tower.
THE CASTLES OF THE PENTADAKTHILOS/BESPARMAK MOUNTAINS

The three mountain castles of Buffavento, Kantara and St. Hilarion constitute something of a trinity and are therefore dealt with together. Our several references to them in the various accounts of the invasion of 1191 show that they were Byzantine in origin and of some consequence as fortifications. However, quite when and why they were first commissioned in the Byzantine period is more difficult. Five different suggestions have been advanced. First, from 965 when the Empire recovered Cyprus from the Arabs; second, in the late eleventh century when the opposite Cilician coast was overrun by the Seljuks; third, in 1091 by Rhapsomates in his rebellion against Alexius I; fourth, after that revolt by the Eumathios Philokales (stratopedarch of Cypris 1091-4) on orders from Alexius I for greater control of the island; fifth, at the beginning of the twelfth century in reaction to the potential threat posed by the establishment of the first crusaders on the mainland.¹

Recent scholars have commented that there is written evidence for the existence of these castles in the late eleventh century but some of these claims are based on doubtful interpretations. Thus a reference in Anna Comnena’s History (ultimately known as The Alexiad), to 1092, when Rhapsomates withdrew with his army to the hills opposite Kyrenia was taken by Nicolaou-Konnari to say that Rhapsomates occupied ‘a fortified position’ there. It is not clear, however, that Anna was so specific, and in any event, a fortified position does not necessarily indicate a castle.² Similarly Galatariotou took Anna Comnena to record that her father had ordered the construction of the three mountain castles to be carried out after the suppression of Rhapsomates’ revolt, but again, this can hardly be inferred from the text.³ We are probably on safer ground in relying on Goudeles who recorded that in 1186, when Constantinople attempted to reassert its control over Cyprus, Isaac took refuge ‘at a

¹ Hill, 2, p. 21; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 204; Lawrence, p. 220; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, pp. 528, 535-7, 540.
² The Alexiad, p. 273; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 50.
³ The Alexiad, p. 274; Galatariotou, p. 48.
castle’ or ‘inside a castle’. Of course, this allusion does not specifically refer to any of the mountain castles, but as we know that Isaac did retreat to at least one of them in 1191, it is highly likely that this is precisely what he did in 1186 as well. This was, however, only five years before the end of the Byzantine period and consequently is of limited help.

In general, their defences are not formidable, their altitude and rocky nature giving ample natural protection, precluding mining and on most sides greatly impeding the use of siege engines. Their locations entirely determined their layouts, which today are still sufficiently extant to be both impressive and exciting. In the words of Robin Fedden:

These castle–eyries, approached by paths that wind their precipitous way upward from anemones, oleanders, and fig–trees to juniper, scrub and rock, are among the most romantic fortifications in existence.  

BUFFAVENTO

Leonton; Leonne; Leon – the Castle of the Lion – Byzantine
Bufferentum; Bufovent – Frankish
[cf. Buffavent castle in the mountains of Savoy]
Buffavento – Italian

Buffavento is the highest and smallest of the three mountain castles. Standing among steep crags at 960 m., its layout was wholly determined by the terrain. It is completely inaccessible from the north, east and west, while the approach from the south is difficult. On this side, the buildings of the castle are at three levels.

LOWER OUTBUILDINGS. The lowest level constitutes a big cistern (2) and a now ruined building thought to have been a stable (1). The water tank is very similar to those at Kantara and St. Hilarion, and like the one at Kantara, its location beyond the perimeter of the castle proper, must have rendered it useless in the event of a closely pressed siege.

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4 Goudeles, p. 150; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 50.
5 Fedden and Thomson, pp. 113-4.
LOWER WARD. The lower ward is entered through a gate passage built within a rectangular tower (3). This tower, originally of two storeys though the upper storey is now lost, appears to be mainly a Frankish structure. It is entered through a typical Frankish pointed arch (2.6 m high x 1.8 m wide) with one pair of drawbar slots for the beam to hold fast the doors. The entry passage is 10.2 m long and has a groined cross vault. The rear of this entry tower terminates in a very large pointed arch which does not appear to have included provision for closing. The south wall of this tower, which runs on beyond its inner end to form the outer wall of this short section of the lower ward, is however, Byzantine. This is evinced by the bands of brick and mortar visible at its eastern end and by the shallow, solid wedged shape buttress in this curtain beyond the tower. Enlart recorded that this curtain once possessed a crenellated parapet but it is not clear if he saw this or assumed it. It screens a modern flight of 17 steps that lead up to a right angle turn, from which further flights of steps proceed northwards up the rock slope. To the left (west) is, first, a small, square, flat roofed building (4), (internally 3.5 x 3.65 m with a pointed barrel vault, gained through a narrow pointed arched entrance (1.8 m high x 0.9 m wide). It has another, identical point of egress on its far (west) side that gave out to a short, exposed terrace. Above this building is a recess (7) and a small barrel-vaulted chamber (8) with draw-bar slots set within its entrance walls. Above that in turn is a much larger pointed barrel-vaulted building (9) (internally 6.05 x 7.95 m). This is entered through a pointed arch doorway (2.25 m high x 1.15 m wide). Internally its two transverse arches divided it into three bays, lit by large pointed arch windows in both the north and south walls. It had a barrel vaulted basement below. As noted, the architectural features of these buildings suggest that they are Frankish.

The structures to the right (east) of this lower ward main stair, are very ruined but seem to have been less substantial in any event. Here, another small chamber (5) similar to the one at (8) on the plan, lies below a larger set of rooms, which are of irregular shape – to take advantage of what space the mountain side allowed. The western chamber (6) is 6.35 m long, separated by a cross wall, 0.7 m wide, from the larger eastern chamber (10) which is 7 m long. At its widest point, this room was 5.9 m across. The scant remains of another structure (11) lie on the next rocky shelf above.
Higher up the main stair, a side stairway branched off to the left (west) to an unvaulted, Byzantine structure (12) which was of two storeys and covered by a wooden roof. It was divided into three large chambers. Entry is into the largest of these (on the south-east) through a large, round headed arch (2.6m high by 1.5 m wide) set in a wall 0.9 m thick. This was a rectangular chamber. It had another similar arch, provided as a window, in its south-east side, above which was a further, smaller, round headed arched window. All these doors and windows are encased in layers of thin bricks alternating with mortar, in typical Byzantine style. Its roof was supported by a large wooden beam, in turn supported by a pillar in the middle of the room. The chamber to the west is semi-circular on its south, this being pierced by a round headed door opening. A second, similar door on this room’s west wall opens onto a terrace. Inside are the remains of a staircase which led up to the upper floor. The third room, with its long external side facing north-west, is now very ruined.

UPPER WARD. From the lower ward, the path snakes its way upwards for another 25 m. to the upper level. The upper ward buildings are all of rectangular design. On the north, set on the cragside below the ward proper, is an outlying, buttressed structure that served as another cistern (18). This upper ward is Byzantine to the west, and Lusignan to the east. The Byzantine buildings range left (west) from the head of the stairway, and constitute a row of four interconnecting, almost square chambers, replete with pipes for collecting rainwater (13 to 16). These rooms diminished in size from east to west. The largest and best preserved – that on the east (13) – is internally 6.5 x 5.7 m and is entered through an arch set in its east wall akin in style to the Byzantine building of the lower ward, this one measuring 1.9 m. high x 1 m. wide. Below are two chambers or cisterns accessed via a trapdoor in the floor. On its south side, where the crags drop steeply immediately below, its wall is 0.75 m thick. The chamber still retains its barrel vault intact. It has matching round headed arched windows set in larger embrasures on its south and north sides, and a doorway in its west side that corresponds exactly with the eastern entry. This western doorway passes through a dividing wall 0.6 m thick and was secured from within the second chamber. A little smaller than its eastern neighbour, this second room (14) is reported by the Department of Antiquities guidebook as having one cellar or cistern beneath which – if so – must have been sealed over as an entry point is not now apparent. Like the two smaller rooms to the west (15 and 16), the second room has now lost its roof.
but all three have similar arches to the first room and internally have putlog holes in their north and south walls, the irregular pattern of which suggest they were used for construction scaffolding. This four room range is clearly a contiguous unit of one period. So too, most likely, is the isolated tower (17) at the western extremity of this upper level. It is now extremely ruined, but possessed single openings in the centre of each of its sides, its entrance of course being on its east side. Internally it is 7.8 x 4 m with walls 1.5 m. thick. It is connected to the main series of rooms by the north facing curtain – a wall 0.8 m. thick, featureless save for a single, crude, low arched opening mid-way along its length. Vestiges of a southern curtain enclosing this ‘corridor’ between the far western tower and the main block, can be traced, but it is impossible to say whether it was ever continuous between the two.

A somewhat different rectangular building (19) is located centrally in the upper ward. This long structure (internally 11.15 x 5.5 m) is perched on a rock about 2 m. high. It now appears to stand independently of other structures of the ward, but originally was probably connected to the range of five Byzantine chambers just mentioned, by the linking crenellated parapet that juts out to skirt the northern cliff edge, and to its neighbouring eastern building (21) by a short wall, described below. There is nothing now to say that this central tower was ever more than one storey high. It is entered at its short south-east end where the wall is at its thickest at 1.5 m. Just inside (right) is an arched recess (0.25 wide x 0.33 m deep). It had two square bays, was groin vaulted, and is pierced on its long south-west side by a Frankish round headed opening in each bay. The opening in the southern bay is certainly a window (1.5 m. high x 0.9 m. wide), while the larger aperture (2.15 m high x 1.3 m wide) in the north bay was seen by Enlart as a doorway. This is, however, unlikely. Its base is 26.5 cm above ground-level and there are no traces of any stair leading up to it. The existence of a corresponding window, 1.25 m wide on the chamber’s north-east face reinforces the view that this bay did not have its own entry point. Either way, it was certainly the superior room. It could be secured against the southern chamber judging by the position of the drawbar slots in the doorway set centrally in the interdividing partition. The Department of Antiquities Guidebook was no doubt right then, to represent this as a Lusignan addition to the castle at this level, but whether we can also agree that it served ‘as a little church’, perhaps remains uncertain. Indeed, a castle chapel, if there was one, has been placed elsewhere – among the row of connecting chambers to the
west, where Faucherre noted traces of paintings and a washbasin. However, such features are not, in fact, *in situ*.

The rectangular structure (21) (internally 11.9 x 5.9 m) located to the east is very close, being merely 2.7 m. away, and on ground only 1 m. lower. The abutting corners of the two towers show signs that a connecting wall may have spanned the gap (20), possibly including a narrow gate, judging by the slot in the east tower’s corner. Such a gate would, as at St. Hilarion and Kantara, have been for little more than the discharge of rubbish. Enlart, who did not distinguish between Byzantine and Lusignan work, noted that this was of a similar nature to the central tower, yet it was shown on the later Guidebook plan as Byzantine. Indeed, the two buildings are of comparable masonry, being similar to the Byzantine, in the use of small, irregular blocks, but different in the use of inferior mortar. The eastern building is very ruined, standing now to a maximum height of 1.7 m. Its walls are 0.8 m. thick. It had two window openings on each of the long sides, one at the east end with an entry probably at the west end close to the central tower.

Although it is clear that the castle’s foundation predates the Lusignan period, the legend that it was built by a noble Cypriot lady seeking refuge from Bouchart’s 117 Templars in 1191-2, serves to reflect a use to which it could be put. Apart from its small part in the wars begun by Richard I and Frederick II, references to it are mainly in relation to its use as a place of incarceration. It was dismantled by the Venetians, but partly restored during the period of British control.

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7 Fl. Bustron, p. 24; Lusignan, *Description*, f.35; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 381.
The two chambered building (19 on plan) at the highest point of the upper ward. The entrance was through its south-east short wall (on the right in this photograph). The window on the south-west side of the north-west chamber is clearly visible.
West of the tower in the previous photograph (19 on plan) and at only a slightly lower level, is the first and largest (13 on plan) of the five chambers (13 to 17) likely to be Byzantine.
Lower Ward. View eastwards from the apex of the apse of the Byzantine building (12 on plan). The two, roughly square buildings in the foreground (9 and 4 on plan) are the principal Frankish buildings on this level. Beyond lies the track that approached the castle from the east.
Lower ward from above. The three chambered Byzantine building (12 on plan) is centre. The larger of the two Frankish chambers (9 on plan) is to its east (left on photograph).
KANTARA

(Candare; Le Candaire - Frankish ; Kandak – Arabic)

This is the easternmost of the three mountain castles. It is at a height of about 670 m., and is in visual contact with Buffavento and Famagusta. It constitutes one main ward, with an enceinte skirting the irregular perimeter of its outcrop, protected on its east side by a subsidiary ward or barbican.

Enlart’s description remains the most detailed, Jeffery’s and Papageorgiou’s Guidebook and most recently, Faucherre’s ‘Notes’, being merely overviews. However, Enlart was unable to visit much of the castle, so his analysis is of limited value with regard to its north and west sectors. As with Buffavento, it did not occur to him that Kantara had its origins in Byzantine times. Most modern commentators have remarked that although Kantara appears Byzantine in many respects, the castle seems to date in the main from the fourteenth century. As they have noted, (see discussion below) it may well be that James I strengthened it as a reaction to the Genoese occupation of Famagusta. Indeed, its various sets of chambers may have been constructed at that time in order to house troops. Although the main enceinte wall was no doubt from the earlier period, as is the case at Buffavento, on its south-east, that was remodelled into a complex defensive arrangement, which also is likely to be work of the later Lusignan period.
The enceinte and its buildings

North, West and South.

Kantara has similar characteristics with Buffavento: barrel and cross-vaulted chambers attached to the curtain, which for its most part constitutes the original Byzantine castle. Indeed fragments of brick can be traced in its northern perimeter (23) where it fronts a cistern (24). All these buildings appear to have had flat roofs, perhaps to facilitate water collection, which was especially important in this particularly dry part of the island. Leaving aside the interesting complex on the east side for the present, three separate series of such vaulted, square or rectangular chambers can be identified. They are all approximately 5 to 6 m. wide, some having holes in the roofs, perhaps to let out smoke. Those chambers no doubt served as accommodation.
The first is a south-east range of four chambers. One of these (9) stands apart, its north-east corner abutting the south-west corner of the large apsidal tower (2) that dominates the entrance. It is similar to that main south-east tower with regard to its arched entry, the light above it and the arrangement for the internal floor: clearly both structures are contemporaneous. The remaining three chambers (10, 11 and 12) are built side by side, but do not interconnect. Their siting has the effect of thrusting out the line of the castle’s wall. The Department of Antiquities’ plan shows an outer wall (31) at the north-east end of this range that connected to the front or south-east end of the large apsidal tower guarding the main entrance. There is, however, no trace whatever of this on the ground. These three barrel vaulted rooms are also entered through pointed arches. They too have slots for an upper floor at the level where the vault springs, and each has a single arrow slit in its external wall. Attached to this range at its west end is a narrow, wedged shaped apartment (13) that served as a privy. Its internal passage slopes down to a pointed arch set low in the curtain.

Second, there is a western complex of five vaulted chambers (15 to 19), which also do not interconnect, but are entered via pointed arches. The northern rooms of this group were clearly designed to serve as cisterns. The southernmost (15) is rectangular like the rest, but has the protection of a solid horseshoe projection to its west, owing to which, exceptionally, it is half cross-vaulted. This chamber was equipped with a narrow, downward sloping corridor, leading to an exit (20) that, as with that in the upper ward at St. Hilarion, can only have been designed for the discharge of rubbish. Above this chamber, the horseshoe projection constitutes an open fighting gallery, with parapet and narrow wall walk that is continuous with that of the castle’s south curtain. Clearly it is of the same design and period as those comparable structures on the castle’s south-east front.

Third, two more roughly square chambers (21 and 22) were attached to the inside of the curtain on its north-west side. Within the craggy enceinte there are the remains of freestanding, now badly ruined buildings, certainly some of which were cisterns.
Standing at the highest point is an oblong structure (25), entered at its narrow south-west end through a doorway 1.1 m. wide. Internally, this tower was 3.1 m. x 9.15 m within walls 1.3 to 1.4 m. thick. It is now severely ruined, only its long south-east wall in part surviving to any height. This wall contained an ornate window; it shows that the chamber was vaulted, and possessed an upper storey. Whether the upper storey was roofed is hard to say. Immediately above the window, there is an archère, so this level may have been a simple open fighting platform. Enlart noted that this tower was of two storeys – one of many reasons to find it hard to see why he should also have likened this to the small square towers of St. Hilarion’s upper enceinte. He speculated that two corbels (only one of which now remains) set at the level where the arch of the window springs, and two small grooves set on either side of the base of the exterior of the tower below the window, constituted evidence that this window was in fact a doorway with a small drawbridge. Enlart continued that this in turn led to some gangway that connected to the buildings attached to the southern section of the curtain. Jeffery and Faucherre repeated this as fact, but it is most unlikely. There would have been no point in endowing this building with such another entrance, and Enlart’s supposed point of egress from this ‘doorway’ is in reality impossible owing to the rocky terrain. It seems more probable that the items that Enlart adduced as evidence for a pont lévis, provided rather for some form of shutter necessary to close up the large window from the winds that are so noticeable at this high, exposed point. Furthermore, a tower with such an arrangement as Enlart envisaged is not paralleled in the other mountain castles. Although the masonry of this chamber-tower is superior to that of its counterpart tower in the centre of the upper ward at Buffavento, that apart, they appear to be of the same basic design and so of the same period.

East

As at Buffavento, a large, triple buttressed roughly square cistern lies outside all the defences (30). Its isolated location must have rendered it useless in time of close siege.
Kantara is at its most intricate and impressive on its east, where the slope of the rock is a little less severe than elsewhere. It is still easy to discern that here at least, the exterior of the buildings were rendered and limewashed to give them a resplendent appearance. As at Buffavento, here was the principal entrance. This was a large – 3 m. wide, pointed arched gateway with well-made voussoirs (7), but at some point subsequent to Duthoit’s sketches of 1865, it was reduced in size to a mere rectangular entry (2.1 m high x 1.25 m wide) by infilling with tightly packed masonry of a very inferior nature. The gateway is in the centre of the curtain, which ran off to the north and south to substantial towers. Save for one embrasure with a loophole towards its northern end, the curtain was defended only by its parapet. The south-east tower (2) is particularly substantial. Unusually, and as noted earlier, it is apsidal to the field, and in this at least, it is indeed comparable with the north-east tower at Kyrenia, as Jeffery noted. Internally, it consists of two cross vaults, with embrasures on each of its long sides with smaller openings above them. A similar small opening lies above the arched entrance. In between these two levels of apertures, are four large slots for beams, so it is likely that there was a floor at this point. There are no particular grounds for stating that the lower chamber may have been a prison as has been suggested.

The complex at the north-east, which is set at an angle of 45° to the line of the curtain, is altogether more elaborate. It consists of three distinct stages, all of two storeys. At ground level, the first structure (26) was entered via a narrow doorway 1.1 m. wide set between well made voussoirs; the upper storey is now too ruined to be clear as to its means of access. This structure was oblong in dimension, the upper level perhaps serving as a hall as Enlart thought, though its narrowness would suggest otherwise. Certainly, at both levels, it provided passage to the outer works. Two square openings, possibly originally with trapdoors, provided for direct access through the floor of the upper room to the room below. The lower storey is 2.8 m. wide and barrel vaulted. It has been described as a fighting gallery owing to its apertures on the exposed northern face, but these are not so much loops as regular rectangular windows with equally crude oblong openings above them, all set in deep embrasures. This oblong building was protected by and led out to a square tower (3). Its lower storey was covered with a cross-vault. Just below the springing of the vault, this has two rectangular openings
similar to those in the adjoining oblong building, indicating a similar date of construction. Its upper storey, which also once possessed a cross-vault, is now roofless. It was protected by its own parapet with loopholes. Third, and finally, and proceeding on again from this square tower, the way led to the ultimate defence at this angle of the main enceinte: an especially elongated horseshoe projection, or eschaugette as Jeffery termed it (8), 1.4 m. wide. Access at both levels was through arched doorways (0.75 m wide) set in the south-east corner of the square tower where its wall is 1.65 m thick. The lower storey of this narrow horseshoe was barrel vaulted, possessed one rectangular opening in its roof, and was equipped with three embrasures closing in loops on both sides with one at its rounded end. Its upper storey was left open, and was crowned with a parapet, again enhanced with loopholes. This structure is purely military – nothing other than a double banked fighting gallery. It is constructed of finely fitting masonry of a very high standard, though how far the restoration of 1914 improved upon the original work is hard to say. Its nose rests on a long, battered plinth (27) leading down to the level of the barbican.

On its south-east side, this barbican, or outer ward consisted of a wing wall that sprang from the apex of the main enceinte’s eastern tower. A similar wing wall sprang from the base of the batter of the north-east horseshoe tower. Both wing walls ended in further eschaugette horseshoe projections (32 and 28), though in these two cases, of a single storey, and very narrow, being effectively mere corridors, that on the south (26) being 1 m. wide and only 1.9 m. high. They had crenellated parapets and were equipped with loopholes – one only in an embrasure at the apex of the southern horseshoe (26), but at least two set in its northern counterpart (28). Most likely they were unroofed and certainly were purely defensive in purpose. These projections thrust out aggressively. They are bound together by an outer wall (4), 1.2 m. thick, that decreases in height to a central entry point (1), 1.9 m. wide, with provision for both a portcullis as well as a door, as indicated by the groove and drawbar slots. The entrance stands between two square edifices (5 and 6) constructed on and in front of the wall. Attached to the inner side of this outer wall on the north side of the entry, is a narrow vaulted chamber (29) attained by means of a flight of five steps. This was entered through a pointed arch (2.2 m high x 1.1 m wide), while inside it, a large round headed arched opening provided access to the square tower protecting the northern flank of the gate (6). Once inside the gate, the visitor is channelled via a
cheminement en chicane that prescribes a dog leg ascent to the gateway of the main enceinte. Perbellini described this whole outer ward arrangement as un rivellino fiancheggiato, which is of course anachronistic but it very adequately reflects the military nature of this eastern outer ward.¹

South end of the east front. The large D-shaped tower (2 on plan) has a lesser outwork beneath it. This is a narrow horse-shoe shaped fighting platform (32 on plan).

Isolated tower (25 on plan) set on the highest point of the interior. The vaulting and windows on the east (right) are discernible.
Complex at the north end of the east curtain. The lie of the land dictated the articulation of the castle. This group of buildings is the most convoluted. A rectangular structure (26 on plan) ran out to the north-east at the north angle of the enceinte. It led to an approximately square tower (3 on plan) which in turn led to a prominent, narrow, horse-shoe fighting gallery (8 on plan) with three archères on either side and one in its nose. All three structures possessed an upper storey, roofed except for that on the horse-shoe eschaugette. Lower down, a lesser horse-shoe defensive outwork (28 on plan) was created at the north end of the outer curtain on this east side, a feature paralleled (32 on plan) below the big D-shaped tower at the south end of this east front (2 on plan). A similar feature is found projecting from the castle's west end. They are redolent of Armenian work in Cilicia.
North end of east, inner enceinte – interior of prominent, narrow horse-shoe, fighting gallery, with three *archères* on either side and one set in its nose. There was provision for another storey above – which was likely unroofed.
East side of castle. Entrance (1 on plan) through the lesser, outer wall with entrance through inner wall behind (7 on plan). The recent substantial reduction in the size of that main entry can be seen.
ST HILARION
(Didymus – Greek; Dieu d’Amour – Frankish)

Before 1191 it was called Didymus (the Twins) from the twin peaks that crown this mountain. The Franks corrupted this to Dieu d’Amour. Its other name of St Hilarion derives from either the obscure saint of that name, or merely one who fled from the Arabs in the Holy Land and who most likely retired to the spot to live as a recluse. Megaw suggested that it subsequently evolved into a monastery and that its buildings were later exploited as the nucleus of the castle but the only evidence to support this appears to be the view that the church was too large to be a mere castle chapel. The castle was built on the uppermost slope of the mountainside at a height of 700 rising to 730 m., certainly located thus to command the road between Nicosia and Kyrenia. It was still effective in war as recently as 1964 when a Turkish contingent took it and thereby dominated the Kyrenia Pass giving them a decided advantage in that sector. Even when the Greeks counter attacked and captured the surrounding hills, they could not capture the castle.

As we will see, the surviving architectural evidence may reflect the distinct functions of providing accommodation for major households and for a body of troops. It is however, too much a speculation to suggest, as Enlart and a number of observers have, that St. Hilarion served as a royal Summer retreat and refuge from outbreaks of the plague. There is no palpable evidence for this even though the remains of some of the domestic facilities reflect the intention to provide for a considerable standard of living.

Clearly the castle is Byzantine in origin and outline. Its fortifications date largely from then with some limited enhancements in the Lusignan period, mainly no doubt from the time of the wars with Frederick II, though in the Prince John Tower, there is evidence of later work on the defences. Modern commentators, particularly Enlart, Jeffery and Megaw, have attempted a dating for the more considerable buildings within the castle on architectural grounds. Their conclusions sometimes differ from each other. Thus for example, where Jeffery believed that both flat terraced roofs on timber and steeped pitched roofs were mere alternatives of a thirteenth-century date,
Megaw assigned construction periods of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries respectively. Nor did they agree on the nature of those pitched roofs. Jeffery found no certain evidence that tiles had been used, whereas Megaw appeared to have taken this for granted. We can at least be sure that some buildings did have pitched roofs, for these are evinced by the remaining acutely pointed gables – as in the middle ward hall and, according to Megaw at least, the upper ward living apartments. Similarly, Megaw held that the barrel and cross-vaults, as in the undercroft of the upper ward apartments, were also indicative of a fourteenth-century build. He considered that the tower-donjon known as the Prince John Tower was also of this later period, and that this apart, there was no evidence of work on the defences from this later century.

How far such evidence for dating is reliable may be worth review. The weight given to the type of roof is especially interesting. No other Lusignan fortification possessed steep pitched roofs, so why should this in itself attest a fourteenth-century date? It has been noted that this style was a reaction to the rain and snow that would be experienced at this altitude, but then if so, why should the builders have not used this style earlier, or indeed, why should such a style not be found at Buffavento, which is considerably higher? Of course it may be that it was only by the fourteenth century that the Lusignans decided to carry out major works at St. Hilarion, which included creating steeply pitched roofs for their buildings, when they all but abandoned neighbouring Buffavento. If this were so, however, we would expect to see such roofs elsewhere, but they are unique to St. Hilarion and do not recur at other Lusignan castles. For example, they are not repeated at Kantara, which it is thought did see building activity in the fourteenth century, and where, we are told, there was a deliberate use of flat roofs to capture rainwater! Gable-ended roofs, however, have been identified in Byzantine buildings on Mount Troodos. Though this is not to suggest that our buildings at St. Hilarion are consequently Byzantine, the point is that such architectural ‘evidence’ appears shaky. Similarly, how far can we say that types of vaulting used always inevitably pinpoint a particular period of construction? If the barrel and cross-vaults and sometimes even ribbed vaults, identified at the mountain castles, may indeed be taken to indicate a medieval, post Byzantine origin, quite when within our period is surely harder to say.
There are three wards ascending the hillside. The Franks did little in the outer or lower ward or the bourg as it is sometimes called. With regard to the defences, previous commentators have agreed that at least the Franks constructed the small barbican (1), no doubt on the grounds that its entry has a Frankish pointed arch (2), (1.7 m. wide x 2.5 m. high) which appears to be original with its wall, not superseding an earlier Byzantine arch, as is the case with the main entrance. However, this barbican arch apart, there is nothing to distinguish the rubble masonry of the barbican from that of the wall of the main enceinte. Apart from its square corner tower (3), the barbican has two small semi-circular, open backed projections (4) in its longer, now ruined, southern wall, these having some affinity with the semi-circular towers on the main enceinte. Therefore, other than the entry arch, with its three pairs of drawbar slots, the barbican may well be Byzantine like the main wall.
Certainly the Franks reduced the size of the main entrance within, as their lower arch shows (5). Above are the surviving corbels for a brattice, variously dated as Byzantine (Megaw) and later fifteenth century (Enlart and Jeffery), the latter on the grounds of the mouldings which can still be seen faintly. Enlart was convinced of his dating on this point, but it is hard to accept that James II would have bothered to add to the defences in this one small respect.

Its entrance apart, the ward is almost wholly Byzantine. This constitutes their original main entrance of a semi-circular arch (5) and thin curtain walls made of irregular, rubble masonry bound by a lime based mortar. The curtain had a wall walk behind a parapet. On its south and east, it followed a contour (7) but on it west, it ran straight uphill (6). The ward was not fully enclosed, as higher up, the gradient of the hillside rendered this unnecessary. The curtain’s seven semi-circular towers occur at roughly regular intervals, mainly of 30 m. They are open-gorged, not being backed by solid masonry, although they may have had timber backs. The tower (8) beside the main entrance has been restored and consequently is now encased in masonry at its rear, with external entries for all three of its storeys – which do not appear to interconnect. The other towers have not been ‘modernised’ however. They too are of three storeys and are entered through a single, wide doorway in an arch. The best preserved is that at the south-west corner (9). It is entered at ground level through a plain doorway, while both its upper floors are only partly open-gorged, having two round headed arches divided by a pier.

The towers taper upwards to embrasured parapets. The upper storeys are equipped with loopholes. In the tower at the south-west corner of the enceinte, the upper floors are reached by ramps, the first floor ramp connecting too with the wall walk. Perhaps these ramps were stairs when the castle was first built. The rooms within vary in size. Lawrence noted typical dimensions confirming Enlart’s findings that they were small, of little height and roofed in timber or with rough vaulting. My measurements confirm this: the restored tower by the main entrance has rooms that, internally, have a maximum width of 3.3 m. and a height merely of 1.85 m. The dimensions of the south-west tower’s rooms are similar (2.9 m by 1.9 m). Within this lower ward there are various buildings either adjoining the inside of the wall or freestanding. These are not especially important buildings: stables and cisterns have been identified; they may
be those of a local community associated with service to the main castle — hence references to the *bourg*. Certainly the large building with its high and wide pointed arched entry in the south-west corner of the ward (10), now also heavily restored, appears to have been Frankish, but the remaining — and lesser structures — are very ruined and hence their dates not easily assigned.

**Middle Ward**

In the middle ward the gatehouse (11), church (12) and adjoining chambers are Byzantine in origin. This middle ward gatehouse shows how Frankish masons took the Byzantine shell and turned it into a cross-vaulted passage, originally closed by a drawbridge, but now ascended by five steps. Another chamber, which had a pointed barrel-vault, is built over the entry passage at a slightly oblique angle. The masonry of both storeys is of fine, square cut blocks. As Megaw observed, the church bears comparison with that at the Antiphonitis monastery near Ayios Amvrosios. It is now judged to date from no earlier than the reign of Alexius I. On its south side, its original round headed Byzantine entrance was partly filled in during the Frankish period, and replaced with a smaller pointed arched doorway.

North of the church and separated from it by a covered passageway is the hall, with cellars below (13). Possibly this may have been the hall of the Byzantine castle, becoming the centrepiece of the ward of the Lusignans. It is thought to have been rebuilt in the fourteenth century, and endowed with a steep wood and tile roof and a wooden floor that divided it from the cellars below. It has been restored in recent years. Servicing the hall, and attached at its east end is a building with three transverse arches now without its timber roof (14). Labelled by Megaw as the buttery, it has a hearth in one corner and two round arched windows. The room beyond (15) has a pointed barrel-vault with another similarly arched window, identified as the kitchen, while beyond again, and at a lower level are two chambers that served as privies and perhaps a steam room. Of a similar date to these structures, at the east end of the covered passageway and adjoining the buttery, is the ‘belvedere’ — a cross-vaulted chamber built of fine masonry designed to provide splendid views from its large openings (16).
West lies another rectangular edifice being a vaulted cellar below a living chamber (17) which had a pitched roof annexed to which was a small kitchen with a simple pointed barrel-vault (18) – all thought by Megaw to be the castellan’s quarters, again dated by him to the fourteenth century. At the north-east corner of the ward is a structure (19) that was perhaps once four storeys (thus Megaw) but certainly three storeys high. Internally, this was supported by five transverse arches, of which traces of four remain. These imply a thirteenth-century date, and so perhaps endorse Megaw’s speculation that this building contained the royal apartments of that time before more luxurious ones were provided in the upper ward. Equally however, these could well have constituted an independent suite for some other household than the king’s, such as his heir’s or that of a visiting personage. Its location, high in the castle, but not at its top, would reflect such a level of status. Judging by the surviving eastern gable end, which is an addition later than the main building period, this block was provided with a steep pitch tiled roof only subsequent to its establishment.

Adjacent, to the west of this tower and also on the northern perimeter of the middle ward is a row of massive chambers that Megaw considered was fourteenth-century work, and which he visualised as barracks (20). This structure is of two storeys and is divided internally by partitions into three identical, interconnecting chambers. It is cross-vaulted and endowed with pointed-arched windows facing north towards the sea, with further pointed arched doorways in the internal two partitions. Adjacent is a structure that Megaw thought to be a kiln in which roof tiles were made. Megaw also labelled the gate (21) marking the exit from this ward, leading on up to the upper ward, as later Frankish work. Similarly ascribed to this period is the massive buttressed water tank (22) – perhaps assigned for the irrigation of the gardens - and the short wing wall with a postern (23) which connects it with the vaulted barrack block at the east.

**Upper Ward**

The upper ward is reached after ascending a zig-zag path, created in 1904, the original means of ascent remaining unclear. This area was enclosed by a Byzantine wall of very rough masonry, 1.4 m. thick, evidence of which is found on the east side where a semi-circular tower (24) similar to those of the lower ward is placed a little north of
the entrance (25). This entrance has a Frankish pointed arch set in it, 1.4 m. wide by 2 m. high with slots for two drawbars. A stone staircase leads from the entrance into the tower and its associated rampart walk. A vestige of another weak Byzantine wall with a semi-circular tower can be found running east-west on the south side of the ward (26). Megaw suggested that an early Frankish improvement, prompted perhaps by the war of 1228-33, included strengthening this with the two square towers at either end. These two towers are very small. The tower to the east (27) survives to parapet height though appears to have been partly restored. It is of one storey and would have had a flat, timber roof at parapet level. Its size allows for one merlon and two embrasures only on each side. The entry is a plain, rectangular opening, 0.9 m. wide by 1.5 m. high. Enlart compared them to the isolated tower at the highest point of Kantara’s enceinte, though quite why is hard to see, for they are clearly different in several respects.

Here were the principal domestic buildings in the castle’s final layout if not before. On the north-east side of the ward lay a kitchen complex (28), now extremely ruined, an even more ruined, large room being attached to the wall at the south-east side (29). A series of cisterns occupied the central part of the ward to the north, while on its west side were the royal apartments. These apartments, variously said to be thirteenth century (Enlart) and fourteenth century (Megaw) - are also now heavily ruined, but, as Enlart was able to show, they constituted an impressive structure. The whole edifice (30) lies on a north-east to south-west axis, is 25 m. long by 6 m. wide internally and was of three storeys. There was an irregularly shaped basement with a semi-circular barrel-vault, now largely blocked up by cave-ins. The ground floor was 7 m. high under a pointed barrel vault with four transverse arches supported on brackets. It appears that this ground floor may have had a loft, no doubt for storage, judging by the regular row of slots at the level where the vault springs from the wall. Lower rows of holes on the east wall may have provided for shelving. The unvaulted upper storey, a Great Hall with two small rooms at the extremities according to Enlart, or alternatively, as Megaw had it, a series of chambers, is impressive. This uppermost floor was reached at its north end from inside the ward by means of a flight of steps 2.33 m wide carried on a flying buttress. At its top, the stair opened onto a wooden balcony that was probably covered and that ran along the length of the façade, into which entry could be gained through four doors under pointed-arches. The western
The wall of the central, main chamber was furnished with three large traceried windows in the centre and two smaller ones at either end, only one of each now surviving. Both have stone seats set within their recesses as at later Kolossi. Another smaller traceried window survives in the attached small room at the south end. Three similar doors to those opening onto the balcony, opened from the lower vaulted room to the courtyard. A small door at courtyard level led down a narrow stair through the basement to an exit – possibly for the discharge of rubbish. It was thought that the whole building was endowed with a steep pitched tiled roof, but there is no evidence for this now. At the north-west tip of the ward is a large if crude closet (31).

Separated from all wards is the isolated tower called Prince John’s Tower (32). This had a pointed barrel-vaulted roof, and was 2.25 m. wide internally. It has three surviving arrowslits on each of its long sides. On the south-west long side, a water pipe descended into a cistern that was set beneath the floor at the southern end of the tower. Entry to the tower was via a pointed arched doorway (1 m. wide by 2 m. high) furnished with a drawbar. The entry is set in a wall that sits obliquely to the body of the building. Clearly, this was dictated by the rocky eminence on which it was built, but in this respect, and indeed in the chamber’s narrowness, it is particularly reminiscent of the first element of the north-east complex of the main enceinte at Kantara. Both seem likely to be of the same period – the fourteenth century – as Megaw put forward for the Prince John Tower. It is worth emphasising, however, that it bears little comparison with the isolated tower at Kantara’s highest point, or those in Buffavento’s upper ward. Unlike those towers, at St. Hilarion it is clear that the builders’ intention was that it should have its own defensibility, independent and distinct from the surrounding castle.

Along with Buffavento and Kantara, St. Hilarion was also ‘dismantled’ by the Venetians.¹

Barbican (1 on plan) with Frankish pointed arched entrance (2 on plan).
Entrance (5 on plan) through main lower ward curtain, showing Byzantine arch over later arch, with corbels above for a box machicolation.
Lower ward/bourg Byzantine curtain (6 on plan) with open backed semi-circular towers.
Frankish arched entrance (25 on plan) in cente of east wall of upper ward.
The eastern, small Frankish tower (27 on plan) on the south curtain of the upper ward immediately above the Byzantine wall of the lower ward that climbs the slope (6 on plan). Beyond (centre) is the isolated 'Prince John's Tower' (32 on plan).
'Prince John’s Tower' (32 on plan) showing its west facing entrance and the angled disposition of the rectangular tower to take advantage of the terrain. The three arrow loops on the south-west face are clearly seen.
FAMAGUSTA
(Greek – Ammochostos)

As the second city of the Kingdom and its major trading centre and port, Famagusta was of particular importance in the Lusignan Kingdom. This is reflected in its extensive fortifications, which for the sake of convenience, we may divide into three areas of interest: harbour defences, castle, and town walls.

Venetian fortified corridor-breakwater from castle to port tower.
Description of the harbour and its defences

It is important to appreciate that Famagusta’s defences were extensive, inasmuch as they constituted not just town walls and castle, but also maritime defences that were built on and indeed exploited the natural features of its coastline. About 500 m out to sea, a succession of reefs and islets ran roughly parallel to the shore and so formed a natural breakwater. At its southern extremity, this connected to the mainland forming an obvious basin. This basin was effectively enclosed at its northern end by means of another breakwater that ran from one of the larger islets, called ‘the Island of the Oxen’, towards the shore adjacent to where the castle was located. Entry to this basin was through a 50 m gap in this northern breakwater close to (approximately 70 m) the circuit of the castle and town walls. At some point early in the Frankish period, this gap acquired a chain, which was in turn associated with structures constructed at either end, the outer one being called the ‘tower of the chain’ (17). Enlart described this as first ‘cylindrical’, but then acknowledged that it came to be pentagonal. It is certainly depicted as pentagonal in Gibellino’s engraving of 1571 but given that we can identify certain imprecisions in that representation of the defences, we cannot really be sure as to the shape of this tower. The chain was fixed to this tower and raised and lowered by a windlass located on the inner side of the gap, at the end of the 70 m breakwater projecting from the shore by the castle. Possibly the terminus of that breakwater included a tower, but whether that was the original Lusignan tour du Port cannot be known. In the Venetian period, if not before, the breakwater was transformed into a fortified corridor terminating at the Venetian torre della Catena (tower of the chain). Severe restrictions on current access make it impossible to establish whether the present structure incorporates any pre-Venetian work; its general shape resembles that shown in Gibellino’s engraving at any rate. Access to this ‘porto interno’ was through a larger, ‘porto esterno’, now called ‘Mandraki’ to the north. This was also protected from the sea by further islets and shoals, but there is no evidence that its mouth was also protected by a chain as Faucherre has speculated.1

1 Enlart, pp. 451, 453; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp. 522-3; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, p. 116. The ‘Island of the Oxen’ is mentioned by Makhairas, § 362, pp. 341-3. The ‘tower of the chain’ is mentioned by Makhairas, § 221, p. 203. See too Makhairas, 2, p. 125. Enlart, (p. 451) noted that a windlass was still in existence in 1860. A chain was discovered in 1903 (Jeffery, p. 159), and placed in Famagusta Museum. The Gibellino engraving is discussed in Appendix II (below). Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 314 and 343.
FAMAGUSTA CASTLE

UPPER STOREY

GROUND LEVEL

Lusignan early 14th Century
Lusignan subsequent 14th Century work
Venetian end of 15th Century
Venetian early 16th Century
Ottoman
The remains of the medieval castle are heavily obscured by subsequent massive
overbuilding and alterations by the Venetians, but enough remains to allow us a
detailed understanding of its layout. It was first studied by Camille Enlart. His
description was imperfect: his proposition that the tower mentioned in wars of 1231-
2 was subsequently incorporated as the north-east corner tower of the early fourteenth
century, was particularly misleading, and was followed by Jeffery, whose plan was
however a considerable improvement on Enlart's, and by Megaw. Both their
descriptions were extremely brief.²

These have now been superseded by Corvisier’s careful study published in 2006 and
the observations that follow are based on this and personal analyses undertaken in
2007 and 2009.³ These show that the castle was a slightly irregular quadrangle, being
56.5 m long on its north side, and 34.5 on its west, reducing to 33 on its east and 54
on its south as a result of the disalignment of the curtain connecting the north-east and
south-east angles. The angles at the south-east (1) and south-west (2) corners of the
quadrangle were covered by almost similar towers, projecting beyond the lines of
their adjacent curtains on both their sides. That on the south-west (2) was covered by
a ribbed cross vault above an intermediate wooden floor supported on large corbels
thus creating an upper storey, while that on the south-east (1) also had a ribbed cross
vault above two levels, though above that there was a further upper storey. Both were
amply endowed with archères. The south-west tower (2) is now preserved within the
Venetian overbuild but has been less affected by later works than its south-east
partner. It is almost square, being 9.25 m x 9.9 m externally and some 6 m square
internally. It was entered at ground-floor level through a pointed arch made of regular
shaped voussoirs, from the adjoining west range rather than from the courtyard.
There are archères set in slightly pointed embrasures all constructed in large masonry:
one on each storey on the north side and east side where those sides protrude beyond
the curtain, while on the south and west sides there were single archères on the upper
storey, but pairs at ground level. One of those on the ground-floor within the west
wall was converted by the Venetians as the entry to their tunnel to their south-west
bastion. The south-east tower (1) had a similar system of archères, certainly at ground

197-8.
level and partly too at its first floor level. Like the south-west tower, it was originally entered from within from its adjoining east aisle rather than from the courtyard. It was substantially altered however, when the Venetians forced an entry doorway, 2.5 m wide, under a round headed arch through the south face. Above this was a large arched window, later partly filled in, while another window was set in the north wall on that storey where it was screened by the east curtain. That window was later wholly filled in.

These two towers, the southern curtain that they bound, and the the short, western curtain, were likely the first elements of the fourteenth century castle to be built. The north-west angle, by contrast, was covered by a larger tower (3) (7.8 m x 9 internally; 11.6 m x 12.5 externally), which was clasped onto the northern curtain, thereby entirely projecting from it, without any projection whatever beyond the castle's west curtain, with which it was consequently flush. It too provided for two levels below a cross-ribbed vault, above which was an upper, third level. It was entered through doors opening into the castle secured by draw-bar as evinced by the slot-holes, under a large pointed arched doorway in its south wall which was 1.8 m thick. Like the southern towers, at its upper level below the vault, this tower had single archères set in the walls of its three projecting sides. There may have initially been a pair on each side at ground level, but only those on the north side remain as on its east and west sides one of each pair of archères appears to have been substituted by an entry passage, similar to that in its south wall. Extant draw-bar slots in the west doorway show that this opened into the tower. Most likely the doors in the east gate of the tower also opened internally. Whether these entrances were an original arrangement as Corvisier believed, or a later adaptation is difficult to say. The doorway in the tower's west wall later served as the route from the castle into the gallery that led to the north-west Venetian bastion; that to the east was blocked by successive Venetian overbuildings. The north-east angle of the castle consisted of an altogether different arrangement – owing to its relationship with the port. This was merely a large, cross ribbed vaulted chamber (4) that was separated by a thin cross wall through which a small doorway allowed for passage from the adjacent five bays of the northern range (5). It was otherwise similar to them: it was not a tower and did not project at all beyond the lines of the northern or eastern curtains. It had single archères at first-floor level in its north and east sides. In its north wall is part of an arch 1.86 m above
the ground that may have first been intended as a doorway but was never built. The Lusignans did create a gateway in this chamber's east wall however. This was 1.73 m wide x 3.31 m high under a pointed arch - later reduced in height by the Venetians to 2.15 m high. (10).

The castle is remarkable for the number of its gates and posterns. On its west, the curtain wall was pierced by a pointed arch gateway, defended by doors and a portcullis (6). This was located at that curtain's northern end, between evenly spaced archères at ground level - one to its north with a further five to its south. None of the other gate passages included a portcullis, suggesting perhaps that this was seen as the castle's primary entrance, at least as first intended. Access to this gate from within the castle may have come to be impeded by the creation of a range of store-rooms against this curtain (7) and it seems likely that this was one reason why the gateway was superseded and blocked up, though the principal reason must have been the subsequent erection of the north-west tower. A wider passage way (8) was cut through the south curtain in the immediate lee of the square south-east tower, while another passage way (9) from within the castle was located under a wide, pointed-arch set in the inner wall of the vaulted chamber at the north-east corner of the castle (4). Through the doorway (10) noted above, a 3 m wide walled gangway (11) open to the sky, led out to and partly formed the fortified jetty, permitting passage to the harbour. The gangway's walls were largely incorporated into the town wall. Gangway and jetty divided the harbour to the south from the seashore to the north. Perhaps most interesting are the arrangements for entry and egress built into the north-west tower (3). As we saw, an arched doorway was provided in its south side - from within the castle, but there were also similar doorways on its west and east sides, providing a means, as Corvisier deduced, for passage to and from the town and the seashore without needing access to and so compromising the security of the castle. In the final scheme of castle and town walls, it appears then that here at its apex, the north-west tower was aimed at controlling a three way communication system.

In fact, this north-west tower is somewhat problematical. Corvisier noted that the tops of the east and west entry arches rise above the lower level of the upper archères within the vault covering the first two levels, from which he inferred that those upper archères were serviced only by a removable floor - presumably put in place merely in
time of emergency. He stressed that the tower was at once a part of the castle and a part of the town wall, that wall running off obliquely from the tower’s north-west corner, the castle’s own northern curtain doubling up as town wall round to where it proceeded from the tower’s south-east corner. These arrangements that he accurately described only make sense however, if we allow for the fact that the castle’s design was modified as it was in the process of construction. Nothing else could allow for what would otherwise have been a duplication of entry points to the castle itself in this quadrant, and the somewhat awkward siting of this tower on the curtain and the interference of its east-west passageway with its upper fighting level. It seems probable then that the main, portcullised entry on the western curtain – a part of an original plan, was rapidly replaced and hence sealed up, by the arrangement contained in the north-west tower, built either at the same time as, or in anticipation of the construction of the northern part of the town sea wall that abutted against it.

Thus, although the castle’s defensive arrangements were no doubt completed in a fairly short period under Amaury’s direction, it seems likely that the irregularities we can now discern were because the design changed and became more elaborate as the works were in progress. This explanation is certainly reflected in the northern curtain, where one or two archères were blocked up by the creation of buttresses for the vaults of the lower storey of a later north range. The construction of that range, along with its eastern outlier that contained the route to the fortified jetty, probably brought about the disalignment of the east curtain noted above. Unlike the curtain walls on the north and west which were probably built earlier, we can not say with any certainty, as Corvisier claimed, that this eastern curtain included archères on two levels, for it appears to have been modified – no doubt rapidly after its first construction, as it was then screened by the creation of a parallel town wall, with its own row of archères and a chemin de ronde, positioned some 5-7 m to the east. Now only one redundant archère, 1.6 m wide, is easily traced on the castle’s east curtain. Similarly, we can not be sure that the south curtain possessed two levels of archères: the Venetian overbuild has obscured all arrangements there except for one archère at ground level that can still be traced at the bottom of a shaft left in their later rampart.

The castle’s domestic arrangements came to be centred on the north range. As we have seen, at ground floor level, this constituted a series of five large, spacious,
unpartitioned cross ribbed vaulted bays (5), accessed by three pointed arched entrances and one rectangular one at the east (sea) end of the range. Each bay was lit by slightly pointed arched windows higher up and above the entrances. Most likely these were assigned as storage areas. At its west end, this long chamber had a large pointed arched opening which was blocked in Ottoman times. As noted above, attached at the east end of this range was a sixth ribbed cross-vaulted chamber (4) which provided the passage to the harbour. Above the whole range was an upper storey, now greatly ruined, but it is possible to discern that this was the main hall (45 m x 7.6 m), and ornate enough to serve the purposes of the royal court as occasion required. The remaining stumps of a series of tri-lobed columns built against the long, internal sides of this range suggest that they would have supported a correspondingly elegant rib-vault. Although we cannot now deduce the window arrangements on the north, outer wall, there was one window (1.6 m wide) per bay on the inner, courtyard side. On this side too there was provision for a latrine while the surviving lower steps of a stairway shows that there was access either to a gallery or the roof above. Corvisier believed that such an upper gallery was continued down the length of the thick inner wall (12) that may have retained an eastern 'range', but so little of that wall remains above ground level that this is mere speculation; his analogy with Coucy for this adds little of substance. Even the existence of an east range is problematical. At its north end, this east 'range' was overlooked by one of the windows of the north hall. This led Corvisier to suppose that east range was either open, or roofed only at a lower level, which would seem to be an unsatisfactory arrangement. The stone stair ascending from north to south set against the internal side of the east curtain (13) would certainly have interfered with any arrangements for chambers aligned against this side. Furthermore, the south-east and north-east gate passages would have opened up directly into such a range. It seems most likely than that there were no buildings at all set against this side of the curtain and that the thick wall was intended principally to channel traffic from either gateway into the central court through the two doorways provided in its length. The arrangements of structures that may have been set against the west curtain are also difficult. Its two levels of archères show there were two fighting levels as in the towers at either end. The need to have access to those two towers would have precluded the creation of a range of chambers at that lower level – most likely this was merely a storage area. A series of chambers could have been superimposed above. Any such upper level of chambers would have been quite
secondary in importance – there are no remains from which to infer vaulting of any kind. Between this possible western upper range and the north range lay the north-west tower – it certainly possessed an upper chamber at the same level. It does not, however, appear to have been connected with either range. The southern curtain is different again: it appears to have been backed by a 3 m wide gangway (14) which the Venetians later filled with earth. It can only have been a fighting gallery with no other function. Its inner wall joined the inner angles of the two southern corner towers.

In sum then, it appears likely that the southern and western portions of the castle were built first – at that time to a regular plan and perhaps without the constraint of either a contemporaneously constructed town wall or one that was envisaged. This work was built on a virgin site and so did not have to adapt its pattern to accommodate earlier buildings. The northern quadrant, the north-west tower and north curtain, followed on. They were built in concert with or in anticipation of the creation of the contiguous town sea wall stretching to the north, and consequently this part of the works involved a first change from the original plan. Third came the internal ranges, most notably the substantial northern range – ultimately of two storeys, each storey vaulted and comprising the main service and residential areas of the royal castle. The decision to create this led to the disalignment of the eastern curtain – built at the same time, which, as we noted was in turn soon after succeeded by a separate outer wall belonging rather to the town’s enceinte. As we have seen, the final result is a rather deformed quadrangular castle that is unlikely to have been wholly the consequence of an initial plan and which therefore hardly displays the ‘remarquable homogénéité de conception’ which Corvisier considered it had.

Given the existence of a royal palace in Famagusta, it seems unlikely that the Lusignans themselves used the castle except in times of crisis as in 1373. We do not know precisely when the palace was built, so it may have been at some point after the castle was created. Even so, it is doubtful if the latter was built with the intention that the royal family and court would be in regular occupation, for as we have seen they spent the vast amount of their time in the capital. Famagusta was of course hugely valuable in the Kingdom’s finances and its royal Captain an accordingly significant

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4 See above in An Urban Aristocracy, p. 78.
figure. His rank and dignity and the importance of his position warranted the high quality of specification we can detect in the castle’s upper northern range. It seems likely then that this was built to reflect and enhance the standing of the king’s man and through that, the image of the power of the kingdom.

Famagusta Castle 1

Ground level of the interior of the south-west tower (2 on plan). The archère on the outermost west side (centre in photograph) was converted to form the entrance to the tunnel to the later Venetian bastion lying beyond
Interior of west curtain – south section: archères on two levels.

Interior of west curtain – north section, including blocked up entrance (6 on plan) with archères on either side.
Large pointed arch entrance (9 on plan) leading from courtyard into north-east chamber (4 on plan). To its west (left) can be seen the end of the substantial wall that constituted the interior of the north end of the aisle (5 on plan) on this side of the curtain.
Courtyard from the west curtain. The lowest courses of the west aisle (7 on plan) wall can be seen in the foreground. On the north (left) is the castle’s main domestic range consisting of a spacious five bayed storage area with four entrances at ground level and five window openings over these (5 on plan). Beyond is the separate, north-east chamber (4 on plan) which led to the fortified passage (10 and 11 on plan) projecting out to the harbour defences. Above this range lay the great hall.
Entrance in north-east chamber (4 on plan) leading into the passage (10 on plan) that proceeds to the harbour. Its reduction in size is very apparent.
Description of the town walls

As with the castle, the town walls have been massively overbuilt in the Venetian period and elements of them were modified by the Ottomans. Identifying earlier work, and beyond that, differentiating that work between the Lusignan and Genoese regimes, has not been easy. It is clear, however, that the Venetian enceinte that we see today generally followed the line of the first walls created by the Lusignans, but there are exceptions to this, certainly at the north-west corner and quite likely on the side facing the sea, where the water washed against the walls until the works of the 1930s. Enlart and Jeffery found only few elements that antedated Venetian times. One
such work was the big, polygonal tower at the north-eastern corner (15) – the Genoese turris Macelli, later the Venetian torre del Diamente, which Enlart ascribed to the Genoese. In the late 1930s however, by means of clearing away miscellaneous debris that had encumbered the fosse and some of the more important works, Mogabgab discerned that the Venetian bastions had generally been built around older towers. He made a particular study of the interior of the Venetian torrione del Priuli/Murato/Moratto (8) which I have used in the following description owing to the present prohibition on visiting this and most of the other towers. Mogabgab noted numerous archères and some medieval gateways in the three landward sides, all blocked up in the subsequent thickening of the walls. Megaw added few substantial observations, following Mogabgab in attributing rather more pre-Venetian work to the Lusignans than to the Genoese as Enlart had done. But it was in Megaw’s time at the Department of Antiquities, that between 1960 and 1974, some of the Venetian terrepleins were cleared away from inside the walls, especially on the side facing the port. This enabled him to see that the Genoese turris Macelli, the later Venetian torre del Diamente (15) and the next tower facing the port, the Genoese turris Morfi, later the Venetian torre della Signoria/del Diavolo (16) – both of two storeys – and their interconnecting curtain preserved much early fourteenth-century work. For Megaw, the Genoese had added little that could be discerned beyond a few circular gunports inserted into earlier work.5

These brief commentaries have now been superseded by Nicolas Faucherre’s detailed contribution to L’Art Gothique. This benefits inasmuch as Faucherre saw the interior of some of the towers, which has not been possible more recently. His work has also benefited from the researches of C. Otten-Froux with regard to the names ascribed to most of the towers by the Genoese and with regard to their armaments and garrison complements as reflected in the accounts for 1443 and 1447. As in the case of the castle, the observations that follow are based on these latest descriptions, elaborated and modified as a result of personal analysis.6

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6 Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 307-350 drawing on private communications from C. Otten-Froux; Otten-Froux, Notes sur quelques monuments, p. 147. The Genoese accounts are contained in the Massaria – the Registers of the Massaria (Trésorerie) in the Archivio di Stato di Genova. A few pages were published by Iorga in the Revue de l’Orient Latin (see bibliography) but all are in the
First however, it is worth noting that there are very few allusions before 1373 to indicate that the Lusignans gave names to all their towers, though what little we do know reflects that the Genoese tended to follow such names as existed. Thus, in May, 1373, Genoese galleys were able to close with ‘the round tower of the Arsenal’ but were repelled by its Lusignan troops led by Sir John de Colie. Assuming this is one and the same as the Genoese turris Darsina, later Venetian torrione dell’Arsenale (2) which was located at the south-east corner of the enceinte, at the seaward end of the south wall, this reference is particularly interesting for it suggests that at that time, this inner part of the harbour could be utilised by vessels other than small, shallow draft types. It was subsequently severely damaged in the Turkish siege. We know too of a Sea Gate though precisely where is not clear. We have reference to the Cava Gate which appears to have been the gate for traffic with Nicosia. This – the Genoese porta della Cava/turris Cave, later the Venetian torre del Carmenì, (11) was located at the north-west angle of the circuit. Finally of course there was the tower de la Chaine (17) already discussed.7

The circuit is very considerable, prescribing a length of 3,000 m. Proceeding clockwise from the castle, the first section of the wall along with the current Sea Gate, is, as Faucherre has put forward, in all probability entirely Venetian, superseding the earlier defences that had run up to 30 m behind. This is certainly suggested by the angles of the Lusignan wall where it was interrupted by the Venetian works, immediately south of the castle and where we can see it resumes 10 m past and so to the south-east of the current (Venetian) Sea Gate. Was the Lusignan Sea Gate located at this point or closer to the castle as Faucherre suggested, or alternatively was it in fact just the gate complex housed in the north-west tower of the castle described above? Otten-Froux assumed the Genoese porta maris was associated with their turris Comerchii (1) which she positioned on the site of the Venetian Sea Gate, but Faucherre’s analysis argues against a Genoese tower at that point. On the other hand,

guarded passages from the inner port to the town must have been necessities. The castle’s north-west tower-gate complex did not contribute to this need. In all likelihood therefore a major Lusignan-Genoese sea gate would have been set in their curtain south of the castle.

The removal of the Venetian terreplein has exposed the internal face of the curtain south of the Venetian Sea gate, revealing the Lusignan wall all along the very long stretch to the Arsenal Tower (2). The first part of this wall has a continuous line of corbels to support a chemin de ronde or gallery above – so at first floor level. Above that, the wall rises through two levels, the first appearing to be of the same build while the upper section with its Venetian embrasures is much later. No doubt the Venetians walled up the archères in this stretch of the wall, as these are not now discernible, raised its level and strengthened the external facing. In the centre of this section, twin flights of stairs converge at a landing high above two pointed arches now just appearing above ground level. Faucherre identified a possible postern at this point, but the twin arches suggest rather a double point of access from the port for the passage of goods into the town. South of this point, the line of the corbels is lost. Here there is a small vaulted chamber, one of several built against the inside of the walls, that Faucherre suggested could be Venetian powder magazines. South of a slight kink in the line of the wall, the row of corbels is again apparent. This is then interrupted by another pair of stairs converging on a landing above a pair of arches below: again quite possibly passage-ways to the inner port beyond. From there, the corbels still carry the inner elements of the first floor wall walk. Along this final section of the southern sea wall, the masonry of the three levels of the wall is all different. The lower level is the masonry of the original Lusignan build, while the level above is of much smaller blocks, and very distinct. Might this have been a Genoese contribution? The upper level is of considerably larger blocks and characteristically Venetian. A pair of ‘powder magazines’ abut the wall, after which may be seen the remains of a wall adjoining the curtain at right angles. On either side of this remnant, the tops of embrasured archères can be detected protruding above the ground – one to the left (north) and two, at different heights to its right (south). These are adjacent to the present large, arched passage-way through the walls that marks the location of the Lusignan-Genoese entry to the Arsenal – a dockyard within the walls for the repair of smaller vessels. The arch appears to have been constructed by the Venetians. In the
crisis of 1570, they filled in the basin of the Arsenal and walled up the arch; it was only re-opened by the British in 1906. Whether the Lusignan-Genoese entry to this dockyard was quite undefended or through an earlier arch that supported the continuation of the *enceinte* is unknown. The dockyard may have had its own defended circuit.  

At the south-east corner of the *enceinte*, the Lusignan round tower of the Arsenal (2) has been wholly superseded by its Venetian successor, itself then repaired and slightly modified by the Ottomans. The use of rusticated, bossed stone, similar to that used in the *torre del Diamente* (15), in the exterior of the Venetian tower, perhaps implies that the earlier tower was demolished rather than absorbed in the later enlargement.

The land wall on the south of the city now shows three irregularly spaced interval towers. Between the Arsenal tower and the first of these, the Genoese *turris Sucii*, later the Venetian *torre del Campo Santo* (3), there seems to have been another tower in the Genoese period, called the *turris Medii* no trace of which remains. This first section of the curtain is clearly Lusignan in origin. Externally two levels of *archères* are easily traced. At either end are similar, well made pointed arches preserved in the wall’s facing, which might suggest that these were gates just large enough for pedestrians or riders, which were later walled up. It is uncertain, however, if these two gates were ever completed. Below the springers, the masonry appears to be uninterrupted, implying that the projected gateways may have been cancelled in the process of the construction of the curtain. Indeed, might these arches have been for passages that were wanted just for the construction of the curtain and that permanent passageways were never contemplated, as Faucherre suggested? This seems unlikely: the *voussoirs* of the arches are too well made, exact and fine for such a temporary purpose. Moreover, if these two arches were merely for construction traffic, one would expect to see such devices appear in other sections of the curtain, which they do not. Otten-Froux has noted a postern associated with the *turris Sucii* in the Genoese period which could very well have been on the site of the western of the two gates.  

Furthermore, it does appear that these possible gates caused some minor

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8 Enlart, p. 453; Jeffery, p. 116; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 522; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, p. 116; History (above), p. 27.
9 Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 322.
interruption in the sequence of the *archères*. Internally it is possible to discern the gallery behind the lower level of *archères* that led out from the *turris Sucii*. This does not, however, seem to be on the site of any Lusignan tower, so the arrangement for accessing the Lusignan gallery and *chemin de ronde* above must have been a later adaptation. The tower and upper part of the curtain were all strengthened in the Venetian period.

Faucherre noted that the *archères* of the Lusignan curtain continued behind this tower. In his description, he confirmed the absence of any Lusignan tower. This is of especial interest for two reasons. First, the absence a tower here would have left this land wall with a very long stretch of curtain not screened by flanking fire. This gives rise to speculation as to just how serious its defensive role was. Second, in his later analysis, Faucherre speculated that there may in fact have been a tower here, and that it must have been detached, or *al barrane*. He formulated a similar view of the next two interval towers on the south land wall and of the first on the long west wall, and that all of these may date back to the early Lusignan programme of works in the early 1300s. The evidence for this is unconvincing. Quite apart from Faucherre’s own, initial dismissal of a Lusignan tower here, his two arguments appear to be thin. One is that he believed the Venetian towers were cut into the rock and so might have been on the site of earlier towers that antedated the Venetian work on the fosse. His principal argument, however, is that he considered that there may be signs of ‘*saignées*’ parallel to the curtains behind some of these towers, implying their separation. In respect of the first point, there is, of course, no reason why these Venetian towers could not have been sunk into the rock without necessarily following the configuration of pre-existing towers or that such Venetian work, *de novo*, could not have preceded, or at least have anticipated, their work on the fosse. With regard to the second point, extremely close scrutiny in fact reveals no trace of *saignées* that may have run behind the towers – certainly not from external inspection.

As Faucherre noted, military treatises from Byzantine times recognised the advantages of such towers and there are indeed examples of *al barrane* towers in Byzantine enceintes. These are rare in works constructed by Westerners, however, and if we exclude detached *donjons*, date from the period after the Lusignans built their town wall at Famagusta. In the Latin Levant, they seem to occur only in the
walls of Rhodes, but not until, it is thought, the period 1421-37. It is then hard to credit that the Lusignans experimented with them at Famagusta for just some of their towers, having never adopted this type before in Cyprus, nor from what we can see, subsequently either.

The rest of this south curtain likely prescribed a similar profile: Faucherre recorded the continuation of the two levels of *archères* within the Lusignan curtain under a Venetian heightening. There are two further interval towers superimposed on this south wall. These towers may be those for which we have names from the Genoese period, but like the *torre del Campo Santo* (3), they are Venetian constructions. These – the Genoese *turris Palmerie* (4) and *turris Judaice* (5), later the Venetian *torrone dei Andruzzi* (4) and *torre della Zudecha* (5), both show reused bossed stonework in their upper external faces, possibly reflecting masonry taken from decommissioned Lusignan structures. The existence of such Lusignan towers is, however, far from certain, and the *archères* in the intervening stretches of curtain not always that apparent. Thus for instance, only one level of *archères* can now be detected in the curtain from the final tower (5) to the south-west angle Limassol Gate (6).

The *Porta Limisso* – the Limassol Gate – covered the vulnerable south-west angle of the *enceinte* (6). With its ravelin and cavalier, it is now a massive and complex series of structures obscuring Lusignan and Genoese work. If the Turin Plan and the *Maina in Morea* wooden model can be adduced as reference points in this instance, the initial tower was indeed octagonal as Faucherre discerned. He calculated this to be 27 m wide and containing a passage-way to deep embrasures on either flank, all behind a fosse cut into the rock. The passage-way was later filled with bossed masonry, likely taken from the initial tower itself, or other nearby Lusignan work, rendered redundant by the massive strengthening by the Venetians. It is unclear now whether this passage extended to include a gateway piercing the front of the tower as one assumes must have been the case; certainly there was a side stair leading to a postern in the adjacent curtain immediately to its left. Above this postern, corbels survive to show that it was covered by a brattice or a box machicolation.

Most interesting was the suggestion made by Mogabgab that the first ravelin – a horse-shoe forework – was a late fifteenth-century Lusignan addition. His evidence
for this appears to be limited to his identification of the Lusignan arms on the face of
the ravelin’s eastern gallery and those of the Kingdom of Jerusalem on the lintel of
west gate. The last Lusignans were beset by severe financial difficulties so hardly
likely to take on expensive building works. It is therefore more likely that the ravelin
dates from the period 1474 to 1489, when the Venetians were in control of the island
on behalf of their ‘adopted daughter’ Queen Catherine Cornaro and before their
formal acquisition of the island in 1489. The Lusignan insignia would still have been
current in that period. The 48 m wide ravelin is a very substantial work. It has two
identical gates for both wheeled and pedestrian traffic set in its opposite flanks, all set
on a scarp behind its own fosse, which in the event it seems was crossed by a bridge
with pont-levis only on its left flank. Its accomplishment would have required very
considerable resources. Only the Venetians possessed these. Under the future Doge,
Mocenigo, they deployed their entire fleet to Cyprus in December 1473 and took
possession of the fortifications in Catherine’s name. Mocenigo was himself based at
Famagusta in early 1474.

Elements of the original Lusignan wall with its towers can be discerned within parts
of the long west facing side of the enceinte. The Venetians wholly rebuilt the wall
between the Limassol Gate and the first tower – the Venetian torrione del Minio or
torre Diocare (7). Faucherre held that the lowest two courses of the extant stonework
of this section were Lusignan survivors, but they are not satisfactorily distinguishable
as such. Internally he was able to note the re-employment of some of redundant
Lusignan stonework to create an access corridor to two casemates within the curtain –
an observation I have not been able to verify. The tower itself appears to be part of the
very early Venetian programme of works. It blocks a Lusignan archère in the curtain,
and as noted above, based on this and the saignées that run parallel with the curtain on
either side, Faucherre considered this to be on the site of a vanished al barrane
Lusignan tower. There are no remains of such a tower, however, nor can his saignées
in any way be said to lead behind the present structure. Interestingly, it is not at all
clear that there was a tower here in the Genoese period for that matter: this is one of
the few towers not mentioned in the Genoese accounts, while the Genoese name turris

10 For the plan and model, see Appendix II. For Mogabgab - RDAC, 1935, p. 21; RDAC, 1936, p. 103,
Rocha – which Otten-Froux indicated might be either this or the neighbouring tower to the north – has more certainly been applied to that second tower – the Venetian *torrione del Priuli/Murato/Moratto* (8) – by Faucherre. From the Limassol Gate, the wide fosse is endowed with the additional safeguard of substantial trench that follows the line of the west curtain, circling both these Venetian bastions. It is therefore most likely to be dated to that period.

Mogabgab was the first to note that this latter tower, bearing the name of *Nicolao de Priolis* and the year 1496, does however, preserve parts of an original Lusignan structure – a thin parapet encased within the Venetian thickening and within – two stairs on fourteenth-century styled corbels serving the original *chemin de ronde*. Sections of the tower’s lower walls have been discerned, indicating that it was polygonal internally and likely externally as well. The Venetian *torrione* incorporated a postern on its right flank: perhaps this repeated a Lusignan arrangement.

About mid-way along this stretch of curtain to the next Venetian tower – the *torre del Pasqualigo* or *torrione Pulacazaro* (10) – there is a short interruption in the trench within the fosse. Here, it is just possible to make out the outline of what appears to have been a rectangular tower (9). This projects from the rock on which the curtain is built. Its only extant feature is a simple embrasure – probably for a small cannon - located in its right (north) side covering the line of the continuation of the trench beyond. Excavation would perhaps elucidate its origin, but on the basis of what little we have, it was clearly pre-Venetian and possibly detached from the *enceinte*, though not necessarily *al barrane*. From this erstwhile tower, the Lusignan curtain, with two levels of *archères*, survives to the next Venetian tower – the *torre del Pasqualigo* or *torrione Pulacazaro* (10), which is another neither mentioned in the Genoese accounts nor showing any evidence of a pre-Venetian structure. As in the case of the *torre Diocare* (7), we cannot be certain then that there was a tower here before the Venetian period. Just outside, within the fosse, the trench circles this tower and carries on again parallel with the curtain, petering out about mid-way to the next tower.

This stretch of curtain, that which leads to the next tower, also preserves a row of *archères* in its facing. So far as the tower itself is concerned, here we are on safer grounds in attesting Lusignan work, for this is the Cava Gate – later the Genoese
porta della Cava or turris Cave, then the Venetian torre del Carmeni or torrione San Luca (11). This constituted the original north-west angle of the enceinte. Faucherre had access to its interior, from which he deduced it to be another octagonal tower. Externally, he found traces of its original Lusignan ditch with the supports for the gate’s bridge across, but only the stone platforms for two possible supports can now be seen, and an early ditch is not apparent. The gate-tower was encased in another early Venetian semi-circular bastion which in turn came to be partly absorbed by the huge Martinengo Bastion which begins at this point of the curtain. From the gate-tower, the original curtain ran north to the Genoese turre Maruffi – possibly the Venetian torrione del Muzzo12 or torre del Cavaler (12), which was removed when the Martinengo Bastion was constructed. As a result, there is nothing now to show what may have been here before the Venetian period, but the Genoese tower, at least, is mentioned in their massaria entries for 1443. The intervening stretch of the Lusignan enceinte, from the Cava Gate to the turre Maruffi (12), can be detected where it is levelled off by the entrance to the later Bastion and where it was later used as a base for the entrance to the cavalier del Carmini. At its upper level, the last portion of this Lusignan curtain retains three very closely arranged archères in their embrasures, all masked externally by the Venetian overbuilding. Faucherre claimed to have located the medieval rock cut fosse, yet the mass of the Bastion appears to obscure any such earlier feature.

The short northern stretch of the enceinte – from the turre Maruffi/Martinengo Bastion to the sea – zigzags to take advantage of the rock. The Lusignan curtain with a single row of archères at ground level is occasionally apparent. There were two towers here: the western tower – the Genoese turris de Guarco/Goarco, perhaps the later the Venetian torrione del Muzzo (13) was mentioned in the massaria for 1443, and again in 1447. Faucherre recorded traces of an early polygonal tower set back 1 m from the outer wall of the Venetian structure and reasonably took the view that it was incorporated into the Venetian tower in much the same way as was the polygonal torrione del Priuli (8) on the west curtain. The other tower on this north side – named by the Genoese as the turris Mastici, becoming the Venetian torre Mastici (14), was also mentioned in 1443 and 1447 but is not now discernible.

12 Thus Faucherre who also has the Genoese turris de Guarco/Goarco on the northern enceinte with the same Venetian name, pp. 337-8.
As noted above, the towers and curtain that run from this point – the north-east corner of the *enceinte* – along the sea front to the castle, have been exposed internally revealing much original Lusignan work. The corner tower – the Genoese *turris Macelli* and Venetian *torre del Diamente* (15) – is a very considerable medieval octagon about 34 m in diameter, standing on a pronounced talus. It was of two storeys, the lower faced with bossed masonry. Each side of its face is complemented with *archères* – two below and four in the upper storey. Internally it was entered through a large pointed arch, but within it was much modified in subsequent periods. Nonetheless it constitutes the most visually impressive remnant of the whole original town wall. It was equipped with a postern on its left flank, which was unblocked and rebuilt in 1937.13 The short stretch of curtain from here to the final tower included another double stair meeting at a landing, and here again there was a postern beneath this - set in one of three arches built into the wall – an arrangement similar to those already noted in the sea wall south of the castle. On its right (south) the top of the embrasure for an *archère* protrudes above the remaining earthworks behind to show that this length of curtain was thus suitably defended at this ground level. The final tower of the *enceinte* – the Genoese *turris Morfi*, then the Venetian *torre della Signoria* or *torre del Diavolo* (16) was another octagonal tower originating from the first Lusignan build, though here only of 14 m diameter. It too was of two storeys being vaulted chambers linked by a stair in the thickness of the wall. On its right (south) flank, the curtain springs off by more than 4 m behind the point where the curtain joins it on its left (north) side, creating a recessed kink that may have provided for a port gate. From there to the castle, the interior of the Lusignan wall is clearly visible, the Venetian wall being built against its front and rising above it. Though most of the internal Venetian earthen embankment was cleared away, a little remains so that the earlier wall is banked up to a depth of about 1 m. It shows that it was certainly of two levels, each with its own series of embrasured *archères* and clearly identical with those of the castle. The lower ones remain mostly hidden by the remaining Venetian earth works but two can be seen inside the first of two blockhouses or ‘powder magazines’ built against the inside of the walls. The upper level possessed a lost *chemin de ronde*, though its corbels remain. Some of the *archères* on

this level were adapted for firearms before being sealed and are then likely Genoese adaptations. The Venetian wall that is clasped onto the front, rises to a third level: the corbels for its wall walk or gallery are distinctive. Whether a floor may have been slotted against the base of this final storey – perhaps suggesting that the Lusignan wall also rose to its ‘couronnement’ at this third level as Faucherre speculated, is open to question.

The second and smaller of the block-houses retains its original large arched entrance. It is not now possible to access the interior of this structure, but it is most likely in here that Faucherre located another postern in the curtain later blocked up by the Venetians. This is one of perhaps four or five points of access through the sea wall north of the castle that Faucherre originally detected (though he has subsequently reconsidered this number) and which constituted a major argument in his postulation that the Lusignan harbour was in fact on this side of the castle, rather than to the south where it has been traditionally placed. Part of this argument rests on his position that by contrast, there was only one sea gate to the south of the castle in the Lusignan period. We have already seen, however, that there were certainly two points of access here – those being underneath two pairs of converging stairways, whether those stairs were later or not, and that if allowance is also made for a now vanished sea gate south of the castle discussed above, we have three in this area, all quite apart from the entry formed by the arsenal dockyard. Faucherre’s other three arguments adduced to support a northern Lusignan port are the defences of the sea wall there – its two fighting levels and the impressive north-east tower, and finally the alignment of the castle so that the northern harbour could be overlooked from its great hall.

These too are unconvincing lines of thought: Faucherre himself located two fighting levels in the southern sea wall, and it is perfectly feasible that the lost Lusignan Arsenal Tower matched its north-east partner in substance. The diagonal positioning of the castle is of little relevance – watch could be achieved of either side by those posted on the towers for that purpose. Indeed it is just as arguable that if the castle was aligned with a northern prospect in mind, it was simply to provide its aristocratic occupants with a splendid view – a motive of design identifiable at both the middle and upper levels of St. Hilarion. The chained restriction on entry to the inner port and lack of evidence to support a parallel for the outer port, are further indications of the
location of the nucleus of the port. Finally, Faucherre's own acknowledgement that the town's street pattern appears to have been least developed in its north-east quadrant, is further indication that business was focussed in the southern port. In his concluding analyses, Faucherre proposed a number of possibilities. Some of these - being his vision of al barrane towers, his argument for a northern port, his interpretation of the purpose of the walled up gates on the southern land wall - have been discussed above. But we are left with the challenge of the overarching question of just how far the Lusignan enceinte urbaine was a serious defensive measure. Faucherre was perhaps ambiguous in this matter. On the one hand, he noted the profusion of archères in the curtains themselves, implying a considerable use of simple frontal defence. In this, he calculated there could have been as many as 1500 archères if vanished sections of the Lusignan enceinte could be assumed to resemble those sections we can still see. On the other hand, he suggested that there would have been sections where the curtain was relatively thinly protected by enfilading fire from projecting mural towers. We are not certain that in every case there were Lusignan towers where there are now Venetian bastions, nor of other possible Lusignan towers that may have existed elsewhere on the enceinte, so it is difficult to be clear as to their spacing. But if they were indeed largely where the Venetian bastions now exist, they would, in fact, have been perfectly capable of allowing archers to sweep nearly all sections of the adjacent curtains, given that bow-shot range was effective up to c. 150 m. The towers were not nearly as closely grouped as, for example, the contemporaneous, first-rate town wall of Conway in Wales, where the towers are generally spaced at about 55 m intervals only, but Famagusta's towers would have been adequate nonetheless. A more significant deficiency, however, may have lain in Famagusta's several gates and posterns. The main gates of Limassol and Cava appear to have merely led from within single towers, further weakened, as Faucherre noted, by being located on the salients of the enceinte. Comparison with the town walls of Acre might also be instructive. Its double wall excited comment by Ludolph of Suchen who visited in 1336 or shortly after, but he had nothing to say of Famagusta's walls.

14 In Vaivre and Pagnieux, pp. 319, 347 and p. 344.
15 In Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 345, 347.
16 Ludolph of Suchen, trans in Stewart, pp. 41-2, 50-1, 57 and in Cobham, pp. 19-20.
We have examined above (Part I - History and Part II – Raison d’être and functions) the new circumstances that prompted the Lusignans to develop the fortifications around the beginning of the fourteenth century, suggesting that major motives were to protect and control the new entrepôt that had developed there, to stimulate further growth and to symbolise the success and affluence of the Lusignan kingdom. There is no real evidence that the fortifications were the direct result of fear of a Mamlûk invasion following the fall of Acre in 1291, for the earliest reference we have to work in progress is from as late as 1308. As we have seen, a description of the enceinte itself, insofar as the Lusignan circuit can be discerned, shows that it certainly was a serious fortification, but that it was not just that. In this respect, the numerous entry-points particularly reflect the enceinte’s rationale – not merely a defensive circuit pure and simple, but fulfilling a more complex role and one in which military considerations could be compromised for other important purposes.

What is apparent is that the defences were augmented during the Genoese occupation. Aspects of what may have been their work that are still visible today have been noted above. The massaria mention numerous ‘betresca’ – presumably a type of brêche or brattice, located on the curtains and their towers. Some were endowed with their own names and appear to have been sturdy enough to take cannon. Faucherre identified the sets of converging stairs on the sea wall with betresca at those points, although the stairs were clearly built at the same time as the Lusignan curtain.
Interior of Lusignan wall running south from Venetian sea gate. The continuous line of corbels to carry a *chemin de ronde* is clearly seen. The uppermost (second storey) level with its embrasures for cannon is likely Venetian, as is the whole of the external facing of this sea wall.
Interior of Lusignan sea wall. This is the more southerly of two pairs of converging stairs that led to the original wall walk, covering twin arches quite likely used for passage to and from the port outside. (The arches are better seen in Famagusta town walls 3 – next). The kink in the wall and beyond the top of the Venetian sea gate can be seen to the north.
Close up detail to show the tops of the arches just above present ground level underneath the second pair of stairs on the interior of the Lusignan sea wall.
Detail of the interior of the southern stretch of the sea wall. The three different building periods are apparent. The original Lusignan work is at ground level and includes an arched embrasure/passage (?) that was blocked during that same period. Above a row of corbels or supports for a platform or chemin de ronde are clearly seen. The smaller masonry above might perhaps suggest a later building period altogether and it is tempting then to question if this is Genoese work. At the level of the second upper storey, the characteristically large blockwork of the Venetians is apparent along with a series of square holes to carry the beams for their parapet platform.
The Venetian Arsenal Tower (2 on plan of town walls).
Detail of the exterior of the Arsenal tower showing occasional use of bossed masonry.
Lusignan south wall between Venetian bastions. The photograph shows one of two blocked arched passages in the wall between the Arsenal Tower and the turris Sucii (Genoese)/torre del Campo Santo (Venetian) (3 on plan). This is the western of the two. The two levels of archères are also discernible.
Interior of the *turris Macelli* (Genoese)/*torre del Diamente* (Venetian) (15 on plan) showing its considerable pointed arched entrance.

Interior of the wall between the *turris Macelli* (Genoese)/*torre del Diamente* (Venetian) (15 on plan) and the *turris Morfi* (Genoese)/*torre del Signoria* (Venetian) (16 on plan) showing another pair of stairs rising over at least one blocked up, arched passage leading to the sea.
Sea wall immediately to the south of the turris Morfi (Genoese)/torre del Signoria or torre del Diavolo (Venetian) (16 on plan). The offset in the line of the curtain can be seen leading from the tower on the left of the photograph. Three levels in the curtain can be seen, the lower two appearing to be of similar stonework. At the lowest level, we can see the tops of the impressive series of embrasure for archères similar to those of the castle. Above is a row of corbels to support a chemin de ronde. The archères above have been blocked or altered, perhaps in the Genoese period. The Venetians thickened the earlier wall by clasping their own sea wall onto its exterior. Internally, the photograph shows their distinctive row of corbels to carry their wall walk behind the upper storey that they built.
The fortifications – to 1308. Historical references and context.

Although nothing remains, there may perhaps have been some modest Byzantine fortification at the start of our period. The Itinerarium refers to Isaac Comnenus retreating to the castrum there in 1191 but he realized that it would not withstand a siege so rapidly moved on to Kantara. As noted above in the History, this reference is difficult, both because of what may, or may not be inferred from the use of this word and because no other source makes such an allusion.\textsuperscript{17} Even more difficult is the reliability Stephen of Lusignan’s attribution of the castle’s foundation of the castle to Guy of Lusignan.\textsuperscript{18} Bishop Wilbrand of Oldenburg saw Famagusta in 1211 and wrote that it was ‘civitas sita juxta mare, portum habens, non multum munita’.\textsuperscript{19} References to the ‘la tour dou port’ – ‘la tour de mer’ taken by the Imperialists in 1231 and then captured by the Ibelins in 1232, show that by that time at least, some element of fortification was in commission. Whether the Lusignans had adapted or perhaps merely adopted a Byzantine structure, or built de novo must depend on our acceptance of the Itinerarium. Whatever this structure was, there is no vestige of it within the later rectangular castle, so we have no certainty as to its exact site.

The Ibelin assault of 1232 is instructive: their forces landed on the rocky islands that formed the further side of the harbour, and from there, they used small boats to cross the shallows to reach the town which they quickly occupied, inducing the surrender of the tower. As Edbury noted, this implies that there were no town walls on the harbour front, a likelihood reinforced by the absence of any reference to such a wall in the boundaries of a grant of Henry I also in 1232. The nature of the Ibelins’ assault in 1232 also led Edbury to consider that they could not bring their vessels directly to the town because of a chain across the harbour mouth. Indeed it may be that a chain was in existence by this date: certainly such a chain was in place from 1296 – the date of the earliest reference that we have. The Ibelins’ route of attack may, however, have

\textsuperscript{17} Stubs, Itinerarium, p. 199; Nicholson, pp. 191-2; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 557. See History, above, pp. 5, 57-8.

\textsuperscript{18} Chorograffia - Grivaud, f. 49a; Chorography - Wallace, § 259, p. 67.
been dictated by other factors: the tactic of surprise and the problem of bringing deep draught ships into a harbour where there was very little depth of water.  

Just as, most likely, there was no sea wall at this time, it seems very unlikely that in this period, there were any town walls on the other three sides either. The lack of any direct allusion to the construction of a wall on these landward sides in Amadi's account of the works undertaken by Amaury in 1310 could mean, as Edbury suggested, that some wall already existed, but this need not have been the case. As was noted by Michel Balard, the absence of any references to town walls or town gates in the registers of the Genoese notary, Lambert of Sambuceto, who was based in the town from at least 1294 to 1307, suggests strongly that there was no wall, certainly on the harbour side, nor in all probability, elsewhere. The same judgement may be drawn from the absence of any allusion to fortifications in the Templar of Tyre's commentary on Famagusta, as it may have been in the 1290s. In sum, it seems reasonable to infer that there was no town wall, or at any rate, a wall worthy of the name, until the time of the regime of Henry II's brother, Amaury.

The fortifications – 1308 – 1489. Historical references and context.

In 1308, on the dissolution of the Temple, its slaves were sent to work on fortifications. In April, in response to a request issued in Henry's name, Clement V granted indulgences to anyone assisting in the work. In 1310, Amaury was engaged in enlarging the castle ('messe cura grande alla fabrica del castello' / 'devoted much care to the making of the castle') and in fortifying the area from the Sea Gate to the Tower of the Arsenal and peasants were commandeered from throughout the island to excavate the town ditch. This work was plainly substantial for in order to finance this,
along with connected work within Famagusta, Amaury raised 400,000 bezants through special taxes. This is, incidentally, our first intimation of the Arsenal itself (see above, p. 174).

In all probability then, construction of Famagusta's castle and town walls was commenced in this period of Amaury's regime of 1306-10 and not before. Regarding the town walls, as noted above, the stretch from the Sea Gate to the Arsenal Tower seems to have been commissioned as a particular piece of work and as Edbury speculated, perhaps the section from the Sea Gate to the Castle remained open at this time. If so, this section must have been completed very quickly afterwards. This in turn would have been extended in front of the castle, rendering its port facing archères redundant. Similarly, the section beyond the castle to the present north–east corner of the walls, was most likely also completed at this stage, judging by the similarity of its archères to those of the castle in particular. Whether these works were the final parts to be built, as Faucherre suggested, must remain speculation.

However, it does seem likely that the whole circuit of the town wall was completed before the end of Amaury's governorship, as indeed Megaw believed, for we are told that on Amaury's assassination in 1310, Famagusta declared for the King, walled up the city gates and demolished its drawbridges, presumably as a precaution against Amaury's faction. There would have been little point in such measures had the circuit then remained incomplete. This also implies, perhaps, that without such emergency adaptations, the town walls as then built were an inadequate defence.

No doubt work on both the castle and the town walls continued after Henry II's restoration, as may be reflected in Stephen of Lusignan's attribution of Famagusta's fortifications to that King, rather than his brother. Indeed, as at Nicosia, work likely continued at a leisurely pace during the reign of Hugh IV (1324-1359) before all was considered complete. This may be reflected in the writings of those who visited: the fortifications provoked no comment from James of Verona, who visited in 1335, nor

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24 Amadi, pp. 326-7; Fl. Bustron, p. 194; Edbury, Famagusta, p. 338; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 309.
26 Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 309.
from Ludoph of Suchem who visited in 1336 or very soon after, as noted above.\textsuperscript{29} It was not until the visit of an unknown Englishman in 1344 - 5 that we have our first description of the fortifications:

firmed it is built and well founded on a firm rock. It has deep wide moats all about cut in the rock, high walls and towers of square cut stones, and built with the greatest art.\textsuperscript{30}

These fourteenth-century works probably included a strengthening of the chain and its terminal towers. As noted above, in 1368, these defences may have deterred an attack by Moroccan galleys.\textsuperscript{31}

In 1373, the King commanded the strengthening of the town walls, especially those of the Arsenal against the apparent threat from Genoa.\textsuperscript{32} Although we do not know what, if anything, was achieved, the defences were strong enough to withstand Genoese attempts to capture the city from the sea in May 1373 and their subsequent efforts until October. As we have seen, that month, they obtained control of the castle by a ruse, and most likely it was they, and not the Cypriots, who created ditches around the castle at this time, capturing the rest of the city as well.\textsuperscript{33} Towards the end of the year, the Genoese ordered a strengthening of the fortifications by heightening the walls in places, and arranging that sea water fill the new ditches to the castle.\textsuperscript{34} Recurring attempts by the Lusignans to reacquire Famagusta must naturally have led the Genoese to continue to strengthen its defences. In particular, we noted the timber hoardings and towers that they created against the Lusignan-Venetian assault of 1378 and it is clear that the Genoese also cleared away the \textit{burgi} of 2000 hearths that had encroached upon the fortifications.\textsuperscript{35} We know too that the Genoese garrison was considerable: it may have been 500 at first, but was reported as around 700 when Nicolas of Martoni visited the town in 1394.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{28} see History, above, fn. 90
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Jacques de Vérone}, pp. 177-8, and in trans. in Cobham, pp. 16-18; Ludolph of Suchem in trans. Stewart, pp. 41-2 and in Cobham, pp. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici}, p. 448; \textit{Western Pilgrims}, p. 61. The quoted passage is from the translation in \textit{Western Pilgrims}. Molin, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{31} For the incident of 1368, Makhairas, §§ 221-2, pp. 203-5.
\textsuperscript{32} See History, above, p. 31, fn 100.
\textsuperscript{33} See History, above, pp. 34-5, and fns. 110 and 111.
\textsuperscript{34} See History, above, p. 37, and fn. 120.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Nicolas de Martoni}, p. 628; Makhairas, 2, p. 169; Hill, 2, p. 412.
Martoni’s descriptions are a very useful commentary on the state of the fortifications at this time. He describes the castle as:

nearly all in the sea, except perhaps a fourth part on the city side, and there are fine ditches there constructed on either side which are filled with the sea water, and remain always full of the said water, making the said castle impregnable. 37

Of the town walls, Martoni wrote:

The said city has finer walls than I have seen in any town,.... They were ...high with broad alleys round them, and many high towers all round. 38 .....in the city on the seaside is an arsenal, large and fine like that of Naples. 39

Continued Lusignan initiatives in the fifteenth century and in due course an apprehension of the threats from Egypt and Turkey presumably obliged the Genoese to maintain Famagusta’s defences in reasonable repair. As noted above, we have reference points in the Genoese financial records – the massaria – the double-entry accounts of the Genoese Treasurers – for payments disbursed for various services – which survive in whole or in part for the years 1391/2, 1407, 1433, 1435, 1437/8, 1442, 1443, 1447, 1448/9, 1456, 1457, 1458 and 1460/1. Unfortunately however, they are generally of limited value in relation to the fortifications. Occasionally, especially for 1447, they note the armaments and number of men allocated to a number of the towers – information now used by Faucherre, but in general they are mainly payments to lists of soldiers and others for work done in one tower or another, the details of which are not usually given. In the main, expenditure was very small. Over and above what Faucherre has already gleaned from Otten-Froux, only the entries for two years appear worthy of comment.

The first is from 1407 from which we know that workmen were employed ‘ad turrim de Limisso’ that year. This is most likely the Famagusta tower/gate of that name, rather than a siege tower used by the Genoese against Limassol castle as has been

37 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 628, and Enlart, p. 448 for the original Latin. This translation is provided in Cobham, p. 22, repeated in Hill, 2, 401 and Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 104.
38 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 628, and Enlart, p. 453 for the original Latin. This translation is provided in Cobham p. 22, repeated in Jeffery, p. 102 and A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 197.
thought. This work was likely associated with Janus’ attack of 1407 or 8. On that occasion, both the Genoese and the Lusignans were equipped with cannon, and so it must be from about this time that we can date the primitive circular gunports that appeared to Megaw to be the only work in the extant remains he could definitely ascribe to the Genoese.

The second entry in the _massaria_ comes from 1442 and is given as an appendix. That year, certain named individuals received payments for their work on the external parts of the gate and fosse of the Limassol ‘porta falsa’ – which was perhaps an outer element of the substantial Limassol Gate or a hidden postern close by. Reimbursements were also allocated for making parts of bombards and their carriages. No doubt this was work prompted by the attack of December 1441. As with the works of 1407, it reflects that the Limassol Gate complex was seen as the key element in the town’s defences.40

The accounts make it clear that Genoese Famagusta was under the control of a Captain who exercised both civil and military powers. One of his senior officers was the _chatelaine_ in charge of a garrison of 20 men stationed in the castle. Judicial functions were, however, exercised quite separately, the Captain’s officer in this being his ‘vicaire’ who presided in the old palais royal - which was where the Captain himself resided.41 It should be added perhaps that the Genoese did not in fact construct a fort called the ‘Gripparia’ in 1441 to defend a secondary entry to the port, as was recently suggested. That proposition was based on a misinterpretation and can conveniently be dismissed.42

40 Jeffery, p. 106 and Otten-Froux, Notes sur quelques Monuments, p. 147. The precise meaning of _porta falsa_ is unclear. It occurs in relation to the city walls of Acre as noted by Philip of Novara, (_une fauce posterme_) in Melani, § 126 (222), p. 222.
41 C. Otten-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 117.
42 D. Nicolle, _Crusader Castles of Cyprus_ ..., p. 10. _Grippariae_ are small cargo vessels and are mentioned in the accounts on several occasions. (_Iorga_, pp. 112, 114, 117, 118) and see too Coureas, Economy, pp. 147, 149, 150, 154. I am grateful to D. Nicolle for his note to me on this and to C. Otten-Froux for clarifying the matter.
Eventually Famagusta was reincorporated into the Lusignan Kingdom in January 1464 when its garrison capitulated under terms to James II. Though he took steps for its security against the type of ruse that had led to its loss in 1373, it is highly improbable that he carried out any work on the fortifications. It was left to the Venetians to elaborate its defences, commencing work as we have suggested, on the Limassol Gate in the 1470s, on the castle in 1492, the 'Sea Gate' in 1495, generally strengthening the towers and curtain and extending the fosse. These initial Venetians' efforts were noted by visitors of the very early sixteenth century, such as the Norman Pierre Mesanges in 1507 and then Jacques le Saige in 1518. Le Saige noted especially that the town was ringed by 'fosses lined with masonry' implying that the ditches cut into the rock noted in 1344-45 had subsequently received the additional strengthening of being revetted – work that may have been carried out at this time. Greater works continued, notably the Limassol Gate in 1544, but the defences were still found wanting judging by the critical report of Ascanio Savorgnano of 1562. Although its details relate to the fortifications as developed under the Venetians and so after our period, it is particularly interesting for its description of the curtains – that they were too low, rising only seven paces and thus in places overlooked and hence dominated by the counterscarp. The report may have been excessively pessimistic as it was plainly aimed at prodding Venice into greater effort, but it might reflect a fundamental attribute of the enceinte inherited from our period. If so, it presents a very different picture from those given by our visitors in the fourteenth century. The Venetians pressed on with their labours, which came to a climax in the creation of the enormous Martinengo Bastion and the erection of a number of cavaliers. They also converted the moat around the castle to a ditch. Centuries later this was filled in by the British administration.43

Appendix I

Excerpt for the year 1442 from the Massaria, in the column DEBET.

Massaria comunis Ianue in Famagusta debet nobis pro Georgio Lolo, et sunt pro expensis factis...

- Item, ea die (20 January 1442), pro dicto Georgio et sunt quos solvit magistro lacop et aliis pro iornatis factis ad portam falsam Limisso ut aparet per unam apodisiam bullatam bis. XI kar. XII et pro Frediano pro uno corio pro faximenti dictam portam, in XXX, bis. XVIII kar. XII 44

- Item ea die pro dicto Georgio et sunt quos solvit Chiriaco de Bardi et Dominico Goastavino pro iornis III factis ad fossum prope portam Limisso in XXX, bis. VI kar. VI

- Item die XXX marci pro Georgio Lolo et sunt quos solvit magistro Bernardo et sociis pro laborare cepos pro bombardis ut aparet per apodisiam unam bis. XII et quos solvit Georgio ferrario pro aptare ferros bombardarum bis. III kar. XII, in summa in XXXII, bis. XV kar. XII 45

- Item, ea die, pro Georgio Lolo et sunt quos solvit monsafer Ermeno pro tachis pro bombardis in XXXII, bis. XVII kar. XII 46

44 Corio: corium, - ii (n) – the outer or top surface or layer of a building, perhaps an earth rampart or a lime surface; ‘in XXX’ refers to the page in the accounts where the corresponding entry is made in the column RECEPIMUS; bis. = besants; kar. = carats.

45 Cepos: caepa, - ae (f) or caepe, -is (f) – in this context perhaps loopholes for the guns or possibly the platforms or carriages on which the guns were mounted. Ferros is most likely the iron used for making the bombards – possibly those parts that bound them to their platforms.

46 Tachis: tachia – fastening, clasp.
Appendix II

Early plans, engravings and models.

- Plan in the ms of Conrad Grunemberg, kept in Gotha, dated about 1480, depicting an idealised isometric projection.47

- A number of plans devised by the Venetians depicting various schemes by which the fortifications could be enhanced.48

- Plans in two unpublished mss – one being in the Correr Museum of Venice and the other in the Archives of the State of Turin, the latter being reproduced by Faucherre. Both appear to be faithful depictions of the Venetian fortifications in their final form in 1570-1.49

- Two models made of painted wood kept in the Naval Historical Museum in Venice. One of these – entitled ‘Forteza di Famagusta, isola de Cipro’ is merely an illustration of another scheme to update the defences and is largely fantastical, but the other, wrongly entitled ‘Maina in Morea’ appears to be a faithful depiction of Famagusta in the 1550s, so preceding the final Venetian works which included the powerful Martinengo Bastion. Noteworthy aspects of this include the fosse before its enlargement with the then counterscarp encircling the ‘torrioni’, an enceinte not then reinforced with embankments of earth piled up against the inside of the walls and the semi-circular shape of the Limassol Gate ravelin. Photographs of both are reproduced by Perbellini, and in Attar while ‘Maina in Morea’ is also reproduced by Faucherre.50

- Stephano Gibellino of Bressa’s engraving of the siege of 1570-1, reproduced by Enlart and Faucherre.51 This is the best depiction of the siege we have and of help in visualising the fortifications at that time. That said, elements of it

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47 As noted by Faucherre, Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 313 and fn. 21.
48 A number have been collected in F. Frigerio, Un plan manuscript inédit du xvi\'e siècle du port de Famagouste, *Actes du II\'e Congres international d'\'etudes chypriotes* (Nicosia, 1986), pp. 297-302 and plates I to XI, noted by Faucherre, p. 313 and fn. 22.
49 Faucherre, fig. 2 on p. 311 and commentary on p. 313 and fn. 24 and 25.
50 Perbellini (1988), pp. 22 and 24 and fns. 34 and 39; Faucherre, fig. 3 on p. 311 and commentary on p. 313 and fn. 26; Attar, p. 104.
51 Enlart, Plan III and in Faucherre, pp. 112 and 113, commentary on p. 313.
are clearly inaccurate: *eg*, the castle is shown as having a central tower and both its ditches and those of the town *enceinte* are shown as filled with water.

- Two other copper engravings of the siege. One was made in 1571 by Balthasaw Jenichen, cartographer and map-dealer of Nuremberg and the other in 1573 by Simon Pinargenti of Venice, reproduced in the European Cartography of Cyprus and in Cyprus Today.\(^{52}\)

For modern attempts at diagramatic reconstructions, see footnote.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{52}\) With commentary in *The European Cartography of Cyprus*, pp. 60-3 and in *Cyprus Today*, 46, No. 2 (April-June 2008), pp. 14-15 where the captions are wrongly assigned.

\(^{53}\) Enlart's Plan IV; in Cobham; Denham, p. 110; Perbellini (1988), p. 20, and (1992), p. 11; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 538, and most usefully, Otten-Froux, *Notes sur quelques monuments*, fig. 16 on p. 147 and Faucherre, fig. 4 on p. 315.
The Templar castle is located 3 km south-west of the village of Gastria (Kalecik – Turkish) on the north side of Famagusta Bay. There is virtually nothing left of it, so even locating it is far from straightforward. Until the recent works of J-B de Vaivre, only Enlart had attempted a detailed description. Enlart’s comments are not wholly
reconcilable with what little is now to be seen on the ground but as Vaivre pointed out, this may be largely because the landscape has changed in the century since Enlart wrote. In addition even more of Gastria’s fragmentary remains have been lost in that time. Enlart’s account therefore retains some value. Without a proper excavation there is very little that can be added to Vaivre’s careful studies of the site. In sum, this constituted a small fort occupying the end of a low, narrowing ridge. The fort appears to have been rectangular – at least on the two sides where it was separated from the ridge by its ditch that was cut into the rock. That ditch is now the castle’s principal extant feature. Part of this ditch appears to have been lost since Enlart’s time as a result of dynamiting and consequently it is not possible now to be clear as to where the castle gate was located: the section of ditch that Enlart noted was 7.9 m wide narrowing to 4.5 m at the corner on its seaward side – the point at which Enlart located his entrance – is now lost. The ditch was, nonetheless, substantial. Its current remains show that it was 7.6 m wide on its long north-east side and 7.2 m wide on the south-east side, having a depth of 2 m on its internal face and 2.6 m on the counterscarp. Within the area encompassed by the ditch, all that can now be discerned are the broken traces of a wall running parallel to the long side of the ditch, a wall joining it at right angles from within the enceinte and a circular cistern located in the centre of the castle.

Enlart considered that the fort at Gastria appeared to be fairly typical of small Templar castles of its period in respect of its ditch and apparent lack of towers at the angles of the rectangular enceinte. Comparison may perhaps be made with the remains of Qal’at ad-Damm roughly midway between Jerusalem and the Jordan. There too its principal surviving feature is a rock cut ditch, entry over which seems to have been adjacent to a corner. Ranging from 4.5 to 6.0 m wide, its ditch is a little less than that at Gastria.

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2 Enlart, p. 475.
3 Pringle, Templar Castles, pp. 153-162.
What should be emphasised, however, as both Vaivre and Enlart allowed, is that Templar Gastria was very likely more than merely a rectangular fort, but rather a more complex arrangement, of which the fort was a part. The fort dominated the landward approach to the peninsula which terminated at the seaward end in a rocky outcrop that is higher than the fort (4). Judging by the cut platforms on its summit, this outcrop was occupied at some point in the past, and it would seem odd if this natural vantage point was not at least an element in the Templar fortifications. The outcrop may have once been separated from the peninsula by a channel (5) cut across its width, but now filled in – there are still signs of this to be seen on its south side.

The fort, isthmus and outcrop all separated the watercourse to the north from the sea. This watercourse was Gastria’s harbour, and explains why the Templars established their base here. It has diminished greatly, not just from Enlart’s time to Vaivre’s report of 1998, but dramatically more so in the nine years since. Current plans to turn it into a marina, replete with hotels and even more apartments than those already creeping towards it from the north, will reintroduce water to this creek, but otherwise will change the landscape out of all recognition.

The castle is first mentioned in 1210 when the disgraced regent of Cyprus, Walter of Montbéliard, sought refuge with the Templars at Gastria. Gastria, though not the castle, is next mentioned with reference to the war of 1228-33, when, in 1229 the old Lord of Beirut landed here. The castle is referred to, however, in 1232, when, after their defeat at the Battle of Agridi, Frederick II’s supporters fled here, only to be refused entrance by the Templar garrison. They were subsequently found hiding in the castle ditch and arrested. In 1279, the castle was dismantled when Hugh III took action against the Templars. It is difficult to judge how completely it was damaged at this time or whether it was ever subsequently repaired: there are no further references to Gastria as a castle, so it is likely that this brought its life to an end. As with most other Templar properties, the site passed to the Hospitallers in 1308. Henry II passed through Gastria en route to exile in Armenia in 1310.

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4 Claverie, L'Ordre du Temple, (2005), 1, p. 325.
5 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, pp. 191 fn. 7 and 192; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125.
6 see History, above, fn. 70; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 369.
7 Amadi, p. 214; Fl. Bustron, p. 116; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 129.
8 Fl. Bustron, p. 170.
9 Amadi, p. 323; Fl. Bustron, p. 192; Enlart, p. 474; Hill, 2, p. 244.
Gastria 1

Fosse (2 on plan) at the north-east angle, looking north-west (as in April 2007).

Gastria 2

Fosse at the north-east angle (2 on plan), looking south-east to the look out point (4 on plan) and the sea beyond (as in April 2007).
KHIROKITIA and YERMASOYIA

Both Khirokitia and Yermasoyia were originally Templar properties which passed to the Hospitallers on the dissolution of the Order of the Temple. How far either was endowed with any fortifications is difficult to say. According to testimonies in the trial of the Templars on Cyprus, they had ‘fortified towers’ in both locations as well as at Limassol.\(^1\) As mere estate centres, with no greater importance to the Order, however, there would have been little cause for the Templars to build substantial military works, or later for the Hospitallers to add anything of consequence.

**Khirokitia** is seven kilometres inland and midway between Limassol and Larnaka. In both of his lists of the Templar properties transferred to the Hospital, Fl. Bustron described Khirokitia as ‘il casal Chierochitia con la stantia sua in foggia di fortezza’ (‘the village of Khirokitia with its rooms in the shape of a fortress’) though elsewhere he calls it merely a *casal*. It was here that the Marshal of the Temple was imprisoned in 1308.\(^2\) It is described as having a tower, when, on the eve of the battle of Khirokitia in July, 1426, Janus ‘lodged in the tower of Khirokitia with the knights’.\(^3\) Stephen of Lusignan added that there was a *bourg* here which had ‘un chasteau assez fort’, which was subsequently knocked down by the Mamlûks after the battle and never rebuilt.\(^4\)

The earliest description of its remains appears to be that of Louis de Mas Latrie in 1846 when he recorded seeing three large chambers of two storeys with windows on each level, next to which was a pointed barrel-vaulted building. By the time of Enlart’s visit in 1896, most of this had disappeared, though he was able to note in addition that the barrel-vaulted building had a filled-in cellar, while some distance away lay the foundations of a rectangular building containing a well reached by a flight of 14 steps. All we now have though, as J-B de Vaivre has just noted, are a few lengths of wall, a cistern and the barrel-vaulted structure, which with a length of 11.4

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\(^{1}\) Gilmour-Bryson, p. 16. See too Luttrell, p. 170 and Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 192.


\(^{4}\) Lusignan, *Description*, f. 35.
m and a width, internally of 5.5 m and externally of 8.45 m, was clearly a considerable building in its own right.  

Yermasoyia lies some six to seven kilometres north-east of Limassol. It was acquired by the Templars by the middle of the thirteenth century. Most likely it was similar to Khirokitia. In his two lists, Bustron says ‘Geromassoia con la fortezza di quello’/ ‘Geromosia con la sua fortezza’. The Commander of the Temple was confined on this *casal* in 1308. It is however, even more obscure than Khirokitia: the buildings were lost long ago; Enlart made no mention of the site, while Jeffery could find no certain trace of it.

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7 Fl. Bustron, pp. 171, 247.  
9 Jeffery, p. 358.
KOLOSSI

We observed above (pp. 17-8) that references in the sources for the Ricardian conquest show there to have been no fortification in Kolossi in 1191. A charter of September, 1210, in which King Hugh I conferred various estates on the Hospitallers, recognised *inter alia* their possession of the estate of Colos—'casale quod dicitur Colos', which had already been given to them by one Garinus of Colos or Kolossi. The scant remains of the first 'castle' are consequently taken as dating from the thirteenth century and it is therefore generally taken to have been a Hospitaller foundation from its inception. Historians have noted, however, that both Fl. Bustron and Stephen of Lusignan reported that the Templars held an estate and a castle here and that these passed into the hands of the Hospitallers in 1310. This immediately presents a difficulty, for it requires that we accept that both orders held considerable estates in this same area and that there were two thirteenth-century castles or towers in close proximity, of which only one happens to survive. Careful consideration of the evidence suggests, however, that there was no Templar base here.¹

Although both orders may indeed have had fortified bases in Limassol, Kolossi was different, being the nucleus of agricultural estates rather than a principal town and port. It is improbable then that both orders were prominent in this same area. Certainly it is clear that Kolossi was of considerable importance to the Hospitallers before they acquired the lands of the Temple — whether these included estates in the Kolossi area or not. This is apparent from the arrangements that they made for the governance of their order after the evacuation of the mainland in 1291. Like the Templars, the Hospitallers established Limassol as their headquarters, but the Hospitallers’ command system was oddly bifurcated: while the grand commander’s jurisdiction appears to have been centred in Limassol itself — and indeed in the general chapter in Limassol in November 1300 it was ruled that as long as the master and

convent was located in Cyprus, general-chapters were to be held in Limassol - his colleague, the commander of Cyprus, supervised elsewhere. This officer is of particular interest as he was initially stationed in Nicosia, but was then subsequently based in Kolossi. The move appears to have been in 1302 as a result of a decision made in a chapter meeting in Limassol in 1301 that Kolossi should take the place of the manoir of Acre - by which it became 'a special centre of supplies'. In such circumstances, it would be very surprising if the Hospitallers had not possessed a building of some consequence here at this time. As for the Templars, the only evidence that we have for an estate and castle at Kolossi are the references of Bustron and Lusignan. Of course they wrote over 250 years after the fall of the Templars, so their accuracy in this cannot necessarily be taken at face value. In sum, it appears most likely that Kolossi Castle and its associated estates were Hospitaller from the outset.2

Kolossi was the centre of an estate which was very profitable, primarily from the sugar cane industry and later from cotton. The first record we have that alludes to the production of sugar is from 1343 but quite likely this had already been in operation for some time before then.3 The vaulted chamber used for refining the sugar and the aqueduct, dated by a heraldic device to the 1360s and 1370s,4 which supplied the necessary water from the river Kouris still exist in a fairly good state of preservation to the south-east of the castle. Kolossi was therefore a potentially attractive target for raids, though the evidence for its actual involvement is difficult. Stephen of Lusignan commented that the Genoese found the castle too strong and that in 1426 the Mamluks similarly did not attempt to take it once they had lost the element of surprise. As noted elsewhere however, there are difficulties with this source, not the least of which is that it is unlikely that the castle was that strong at the time.5

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2 Enlart, p. 494; Jeffery, p. 374; Riley-Smith, pp. 432-3; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 163; Vaivre, Monuments, p. 75.
3 Wartburg, The Antiquaries Journal, 81, pp. 328-9; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, p. 78.
4 Vaivre, Monuments, pp. 115-9, 140; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 419-20.
5 For the difficulties with this element of Lusignan’s accounts, see (above) Part II – An Urban Aristocracy, pp. 80-1. Enlart, p. 494 thought the Commandery ‘ruined by the Genoese invasions of 1373 and 1402’ but as noted by Luttrell, p. 171, there is no evidence for this. For the Genoese and the castle - see Lusignan, Chorograffia – Grivaud, ff. 17a-18; Chorography – Wallace, § 54, p. 24. For the 1426 raid - Lusignan, Description, p. 154b and Hill, 2, p. 477. Vaivre in Monuments, p. 76 and in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 410.
may have been targeted in a further raid of 1434.\textsuperscript{6} Its buildings certainly failed to impress Stephen of Gumpenberg who visited in February 1450. He wrote that ‘das Haus aber ist nicht gut’. It is significant that he did not identify it as a ‘castel’ – the term he used for Paphos and Limassol, but merely as a house, and a poor one at that.\textsuperscript{7} This impression of dilapidation is reinforced in a charter given at Rhodes and dated 22 December 1452 which refers to an old tower (‘turris’) which had been used for storage and as a refuge, but which was cracked and in poor condition having been burnt at some point by the ‘Saracens’.\textsuperscript{8} Perhaps the castle did indeed sustain damage in these raids of the first half of the fifteenth century but it is just as likely that its fabric had simply deteriorated. Either way, it was now that the Hospitallers decided on the construction of the present donjon and its outworks. Quite likely this initiative was stimulated in 1453 when Mehmet II and the Ottoman Turks captured Constantinople and raided Cyprus, though there is no record of Kolossi being involved.\textsuperscript{9} That said, even had the works envisaged in the 1450s been completed, it cannot have been hoped that they could maintain a resistance against such a potential opponent.

The donjon can be attributed to the 1450s on the basis of its architecture; inscriptions giving a date of 1464 noted by Enlart but now lost in the vigorous restoration of 1933; an armorial slab set on the exterior of the east wall but most importantly the charter of 22 December 1452. This nominated Louis of Magnac as Grand Commander of Cyprus for life and set out in detail his obligations and prerogatives. It required him to repair Kolossi at his expense and turn it ‘in formam castri cum quatuor turribus et barbacana’. The towers were to be set at the four corners of the barbican, here indicating the curtain wall – which was to encircle the ‘castle’ – the donjon, within. He was to ensure that the walls were not less than ten “palms” thick and was to

\begin{itemize}
  \item For the 1434 raid – Hill, 3, pp. 515-6. Most recently, J. Richard in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 82 cited the Petite Chronique in respect of this raid, provoked by Hospitallers harbouring pirates preying on Mamluk shipping between Cyprus and the mainlands. The Chronique does not comment on this however.
  \item in Grivaud, p. 67.
  \item The Latin charter is given in full by Vaivre in Monuments, pp. 143-9, with a French translation on pp. 128-32. See too Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 421.
  \item Petite Chronique, pp. 332-3, 338; J. Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 82; Vaivre in Monuments, pp. 133-4.
\end{itemize}
implement future orders with regard to the height of the donjon and towers and the overall timescale for the completion of the works.\textsuperscript{10}

As can now be seen, much of this work was carried out: the castrum itself being the donjon and at least some of the 'barbican' or curtain with one of the corner towers, perhaps two if we may take it that the old tower was re-commissioned and included in the circuit. Clearly the resulting works had nothing to do with the defence of the country but were rather merely for the security of a landowner and the storage of estate produce. This may well be reflected in the term used by Hans-Bernard of Eptingen who saw it when he passed through in 1460: it was probably this building that he called a 'schloss'.\textsuperscript{11} In the sixteenth century, Bustron described it as having four vaulted solar chambers, a noble entrance gained via a drawbridge ('ponte levador'), a cistern and well. Both he and Stephen of Lusignan described it as 'very strong for hand to hand fighting'.\textsuperscript{12} With its absence of provision for anything but small arms, it was certainly not designed with full scale warfare in mind.

\textbf{Earlier commentaries}

The survival of the fifteenth-century tower has prompted a number of descriptions of the castle and the adjacent sugar refinery. Enlart's account is of value, being composed before the British restorations of the twentieth century, but he was also impeded in his appreciation because the site was then encumbered by farm buildings. Megaw directed the excavations of the mid-twentieth century, which inter alia, unearthed the south-west tower and its adjacent walls. He must have realised that these were contemporaneous with the donjon, yet appears to have refrained from assigning construction periods to anything outside the donjon apart from the well-head within its semi-circular tower which he attributed to the first castle. Later Dr Aristidou commented that the first castle included Megaw's well tower, the almost adjoining remains of the stone outer wall on this east side of the tower, 'ruins... on the north-east corner of the forecourt ... [and] the north-west corner circular tower...'.

\textsuperscript{10} Enlart, pp. 495, 497-8; Jeffery, p. 375; Hill, 3, p. 1133; Vaivre, Monuments, pp. 94-5, 122-4, 133; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 415-7, 420-1.

\textsuperscript{11} in Grivaud, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{12} Fl. Bustron, p. 25; Chorographia – Grivaud, f. 17a; Chorography – Wallace, § 54, p. 24 – whence the quotation
However, it is plain that Aristidou’s east wall was in fact built either at the same time as or a little later than the fifteenth-century keep, while the corner circular tower is in fact at the south-west point of the complex and is plainly not at all part of the earlier castle. In short, her account is erroneous. Most recently however, J-B de Vaivre has published a substantial monograph, summarised in *L'Art Gothique*. This is especially useful in facilitating an understanding of the site as it may have appeared originally, before the alterations that were made during the restoration work of the last century.¹³

**Description.¹⁴** Buildings outwith the keep: (i) the early ‘castle’

North-west angle, west wall, south-west angle.

Excavations carried out in 2004-6 on the west side of the keep have revealed a series of walls and chambers which appear to have been principally for agro-industrial purposes and were most likely associated with refining sugar. The profusion of pottery shards and the provision for ovens, perhaps to boil the sugar cane, are apparent. The ashlar facing of one internal wall suggests, however, that part of this range may have been allocated to an alternative use. Whether this complex of buildings was supplementary to, or superseded by, the more elaborate and sophisticated arrangements of the refinery to the east of the castle is difficult to say. What is clear, however, is that these various chambers straddle what may be the outer wall of the first ‘castle’ (1). If this was indeed an original outer wall, it was obviously made redundant in its adaptation within the agro-industrial complex. The wall ranges from 0.8 m to only 0.65 m thick and utilised a few ancient columns in places. It ran from a point almost adjacent to the north-west corner of the later donjon, where it may have constituted a simple right-angle turn with no tower, south to a point where it meets a cylindrical corner tower (2). This tower is clearly of the same construction as the later wall (3) on this side of the compound which lies to the south of the keep and just within the line of the 0.8 m earlier outer west wall: the tower is of similar masonry to and articulated with the later wall. Moreover, with walls of 1.2 m, it is noticeably thicker than the older, outer wall. Externally, this tower is 4.5 m in


¹⁴ The following description has benefited considerably from site visits made in October 2004, October 2005, September 2008 and October 2009 along with discussions with Dr. Marina Solomidou-Leronymidou of the Department of Antiquities who led the excavations of 2004-6.
KOLOSSI

(Ground Plan)

Square base Rock platform with rectangular chamber under Stairs down Oven?

Rounded arch
1m wide x 2m high providing for inward opening door with slot for draw bar

Columns

Oven?

2.4m thick

G-P 4

G-P 3

G-P 5

G-P 2

G-P 1

Entrance with drawbridge

Gun - ports with sighting slits numbered 1 - 5

1.1m thick

Entry with drawbridge

Embrasure for arrow slit

Embrasures

Arch (now lost) 1.2m wide

Screen of 2 pointed arches

1.6m

0.8m

0.65m

Drawbridge

Tower - 4.5m diameter externally
1.2m thick walls
2.1m diameter internally

0 20m

Campaign 1445 - 1454

14th Century tower rebuilt in the 15th century

13th -14th Century

Modern construction (1930 - 1950)

In chambers A & B there are joist holes at 2 levels - the lower is possibly for shelving. In chamber C there is only 1 row of joist holes - where the arching of the vault begins.
diameter, and thus 2.1 m in diameter internally. It is therefore very small and stout—which would be unusual for, say, a thirteenth-century tower. It is not capable of being entered from within at ground floor level, so must have been accessed from above. In sum, it appears that this tower is part of the later, fifteenth-century fortification, and was intended as a small bastion, possibly a gun-tower although its small size would have made the use of artillery difficult. Quite likely, the original castle wall turned a simple right-angle bend here at the south west, again with no angle tower.

South, east and north walls

The walls of the first 'castle' on these sides have yet to be excavated, but it is possible to trace their size and course at certain points (see plan). On the south side, a stretch of wall 65 cm to 80 cm thick, which turns the south-east angle and then, after a break, reappears for a few metres on the east side of the complex (4), is of comparable dimensions to the old outer west wall just described. Again, there is no trace of an angle-tower. As per Megaw, it is likely that the well tower (5) on this east side of the later keep is part of this earlier castle: the masonry of its enveloping semi-circular wall is similar to that of the other earlier walls already described. However, unusually its walls are 1.2 m thick, and its articulation with the rest of the early east wall is unclear. At 9.3 m in diameter it is of considerable size. Within the tower there remains a six step stair to a small platform probably used to access the well. Evidence for the early 'castle' wall on the north side is fragmentary at best. A discontinuous wall (6) lying outside the later fifteenth-century keep, may form the outer boundary of the first fortification, but its relationship with the wall of the north-west angle is unresolved.

The southern courtyard compound

South of the keep, the courtyard is divided into four approximately equal rectangular areas (7). To their west lies a larger chamber (8), its arches indicating a function other than merely storage or manufacture.

It seems likely that some of these courtyard buildings were elements of the earlier 'castle'. The two pointed arches (9) which constitute a screen across the southern
section of the west chamber are especially reminiscent of those at Kouklia, and indicative of a thirteenth or fourteenth-century date. The spandrel between the arches contains two stones with shallow cut in squares inset that may have once been decorated and might help suggest a date of construction. Judging by the holes for beams in the west wall, there was plainly an upper floor here.

Vaivre, on the other hand, envisaged all these works as aspects of the building programme of the 1450s. In particular, he alluded to a fragment of a frame of a fireplace or window located there, which has a braided design which resembles a style in use in Rhodes at the end of the fifteenth century. That could of course be merely an addition to pre-existing structures.\textsuperscript{15}

In sum, the thin walls and the absence of mural towers apart from the thickish wall skirting the well, cast doubt on Kolossi's real claim to status as a fortification prior to the fifteenth-century work. It would seem likely then that for most of our period, Kolossi was merely a rectangular compound used as an estate centre and from the beginning of the fourteenth century, a supply \textit{depôt}. In this, it bears comparison with the royal manor of Kouklia to the east.

**Buildings outwith the keep: (ii) the outworks of the fifteenth-century castle**

The outer wall of the fifteenth-century castle is most obvious on the east side (10). Here, in its northern section, it stands for a length of 23 m, 3.6 m outside the line of the keep. It is 1.1 m thick and built with a finely chiselled and fitted ashlar facing that is of a piece with the main keep-tower itself. In Enlart's time, some of its merlons survived. This wall includes a much restored arch with holes for chains or wires for a drawbridge (11) which is not unlike that of the keep itself, thrown over a narrow ditch (2.7 m wide x 1.2 m deep). Just to the south of this gateway, the wall is pierced by an inverted keyhole gun-port with an embrasure which splays internally, underneath which is a box hole (gun-port 1). To the north of the gateway, this new wall forms a rectangular spur in that it projects north and beyond, by 5 m, the line of the north face of the main keep. It then joins that north face of the keep through two right angles.

\textsuperscript{15} in \textit{Monuments}, p. 110 and fig. 29 on p. 111; Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 417.
The result is a protective north-east projecting mantlet with gun-ports covering its three sides. Minor differences between gun-port 1 and these northern gun-ports (numbers 2-5) may imply an updating of design as work progressed and that this northern, projecting section of the new wall was the last to be built of what we may now see.

Any southern half of this later eastern outer wall is not extant and its relationship with the well tower and earlier wall is complex. It appears to end where it abuts the well tower's thick, apsidal protective wall (14). As already noted, it is likely that the tower was incorporated into the fifteenth-century defensive circuit.

The fifteenth-century arrangements on the north side of the keep are difficult to elucidate. High up, the tower has latrines, implying that when built, there were no adjoining, lean-to buildings on this side lower down. Yet this north face of the keep has a series of five putlog holes 2.5 m above ground-level which could have been for joists to support the roofs for lean-to buildings. Such lean-to buildings would, however, have neutralised the field of fire from gun-port number 5. In contrast, the diagonal pattern of the putlog holes in the keep’s east face is such as to suggest that those were for beams to support ramps used when constructing the building.

As we have seen, on its west side, the earlier courtyard compound appears to have been enclosed by a thin wall (1) on a line just outside the later, fifteenth-century wall (3) which, judging by its external masonry and thickness (1.6 m), was interpolated about the same time as the main keep was built. The south-west tower (2), screening the postern entrance immediately to its north (12), all suggestive of this period, endows this later enclosing wall with a far greater sense of fortification than that implied in its earlier counterpart.

On the south side, this later wall, again 1.6 m thick runs off from the south-west tower for approximately 7.4 m. After that, discernible from a change in the masonry, the wall which now constitutes the south and south-east quadrant of the courtyard was constructed in the restoration of the last century. On the east side, it includes a low

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16 as shown in a poor photograph taken in 1937 before restoration work began. Vaivre, Monuments,
arched doorway (13) replicating the fifteenth-century entry protected by its
drawbridge (11) adjacent to the keep’s east face. There is nothing to say that this
follows the line of a medieval wall of any date.

The fifteenth-century keep

Due to its excellent state of preservation, modern descriptions of the fifteenth-century
keep are perfectly adequate, though the stated orientation of the chambers is
sometimes at odds with their actual alignment. Until Vaivre’s careful works, Enlart’s
record was the most detailed and of additional value as he saw it before certain
restoration work was carried out in 1933. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to include
here a short overview of its principal features.17

The tower has three main storeys and is almost square, being 17 m x 17.35, and 18.6
m high. The walls are 2.4 m thick at ground-floor level.18 The lowest storey
constituted three inter-connecting barrel-vaulted storage chambers of equal
dimensions arranged in a north-south row (A,B,C). Each has a tiny window at both
ends, more for ventilation than light. Below two of these chambers there are cisterns
cut into the rock. Originally, this basement level was accessible internally from the
first-floor via a trapdoor through the basement’s roof; at some point subsequent to
Enlart’s visit, a stair appears to have been added in the south-east corner. Direct
access to this basement from outside was achieved through a doorway immediately
below the main entry at first floor level but it appears likely that this lower entry may
not have been an original part of the fifteenth-century building.

pp. 109, 112-3; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 418-9.
17 Enlart, pp. 495-502; Jeffery, pp. 373-4; Hill, 3, pp. 1132-3; Muller-Weiner, p. 91; Fedden and
Thomson, pp. 111-2; Megaw, Kolossi Castle, passim; Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 206;
18 As most recently surveyed by Vaivre in Monuments, pp. 78-82 and in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 410.
The principal entrance was at first floor level, by means of a ramp or staircase, and then over a drawbridge as recorded by Bustron. At some point, the original drawbridge was superseded by a flying arch, but in 1933 that was taken down and a drawbridge reinstated, its wires using the original pulleys set on either side of the lintel above the doorway. This doorway has a round-headed arch and is 3 m high and 1.5 m wide set in a recess designed to accommodate the closed drawbridge. The first-floor constitutes two vaulted chambers of equal dimensions on a north-south axis (D and E), divided by a wall through which there are two round-headed doorways. Both

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19 As can be seen on the drawing published by Rey in his work of 1871, reproduced in Vaivre, *Monuments*, fig. 18 on p. 98.
chambers are lit by windows, most of which include two stone benches facing each other across their windows' recesses. The western of these chambers has a large fireplace set in the west wall. It has been taken to indicate that this chamber was used as a kitchen, though the design of the fireplace is such as to suggest that its original purpose may not have been merely for such a simple function. Next to it is an alcove which contained latrines. The internal walls of both chambers were most likely decorated with murals, judging by the remnants of a fresco on the south wall of the eastern chamber.

This first-floor storey connected with the top floor, where the external walls are 2 m thick, and beyond it the battlemented roof by means of a spiral stairway in the thickness of the wall in the south-east corner of the tower. Like the first-floor, the upper floor consisted of two vaulted chambers of similar size (F and G) (13.5 m x 6 m), though in this case on an east–west axis, as with the basement. Like its first-floor counterpart, this storey's dividing wall (0.8 m thick) is pierced at both ends by doorways. Both chambers have fireplaces, set back to back in the centre of the dividing wall, that of the north chamber being the more ornate. This north chamber had a latrine set in its north wall: it appears to have projected beyond the exterior of the tower judging by the remains of the corbels visible from the outside. It seems likely therefore that this was the private chamber of the grand commander or his deputy. Access from the stairway lay across the southern chamber which would therefore have functioned as an antechamber or reception area. Both chambers had four windows – all endowed with side seats set within the walls. In both first-floor and upper floors, there are joist holes for beams for wooden floors at the springing of the vaults, attesting the existence of attics or garrets at these levels. These would have been lit by the little windows set high in the end walls.

The battlemented roof terrace has benefited from considerable attention in the 1933 restoration, though certain features appear to have been lost in the process. Enlart noted five or six crenels on each side with arrow slits in the merlons and rings set in their sides as hinges for shutters to close the embrasures. Though he made no mention of them, there is now a series of corbels just below papapot level, which if original indicate a facility for creating a hoarding. In Enlart's day, the crenellated parapet did not extend to the four corners of the tower as is now the case: we have pictorial images
made before 1933 that show the parapet as it was when Enlart visited Kolossi. He thought that these corners may have been equipped with rectangular platforms or turrets, as was certainly so at the south-east corner which housed the stair-head. The remains of broken masonry in the south-west and north-west angles might indeed suggest some erstwhile superstructures at these points. Other features have also been lost, including what Enlart identified as a channel set on the west of the terrace to collect rainwater which was fed into the basement cisterns. On the south side, placed immediately above the first-floor and basement entry, is a five slot box-machicolation, supported on six triple quarter-round corbels, while on the north side of the roof platform, is a simple, two slot box supported on three corbels, apparently constituting a latrine arrangement.

20 The first appear to be lost drawings by Edmond Duthoit in 1862 used by Rey in his 1871 work (reproduced in Vaivre in Monuments, fig. 18 on p. 98) and Enlart's photographs of 1896 (reproduced in Vaivre in Monuments, figs. 19-25 on pp. 100-105). Vaivre in Monuments, p. 77-8; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 416-7. See too the pen and ink drawing from 1926 in Severis, p. 226 and Hill, 2, plate 3. This feature is also apparent on postage stamps of King George V.
General view of the castle from the south-west. The outer compound wall on the west and the western portion of the south wall are part of the programme of works of the early 1450s. The eastern portion of the south wall dates from the restoration work of the 1930s intended to re-enclose the area.
General view of the keep and compound wall of the early 1450s from the south-west. The earlier wall (1 on plan) located outside the fifteenth-century compound wall on the west can be seen in the foreground. Columns, most likely brought to the site to serve as a means of strengthening these earlier walls, may also be noted.
Close up of south (entry) face of fifteenth-century keep showing first floor entry and ornate box machicolation.
Kolossi 4

Aerial view of apsidal tower and well (5 on plan) lying outside the east wall of the modern rectangular compound wall.
Internal view of embrasure with narrow sighting slit and gun-port below in the fifteenth-century wall on the east side of the keep.
External view of gun-port.
Entry with drawbridge (11 on plan) in the fifteenth-century wall on the east side of the keep.
Profile of fifteenth-century wall (10 on plan) on the east side of the keep at its junction with the earlier apsidal tower (5 on plan) containing a well. In the foreground, the base of an early, less substantial wall (4 on plan) can be traced following a line a little to the west. Within that (on the left of the photograph) the present compound wall dates from the restorations of the 1930s.
Looking towards the south-western corner of the compound lying south of the keep. The four chambers (7 on plan) lying east-west can be discerned, beyond which is the large western chamber (8 on plan) with its joist holes in the south wall. The postern gate (12 on plan) lies tucked behind the two-bay screen wall (9 on plan).
Screen formed by two pointed arches (9 on plan) in south-west corner of compound.

Spandrel between the two arches of the screen (9 on plan) showing two stones each with a shallow square inset.
Cylindrical tower (2 on plan) at south-west angle of fifteenth-century compound wall.
View of earlier ‘castle’ wall (1 on plan) as now excavated, lying beyond the west wall (3 on plan) of the fifteenth-century compound.
Excavations underway in October 2005 on the west side of the keep. The continuous wall running north-south (1 on plan) being possibly the outer wall of the first ‘castle’ is clearly seen.
Detail of the junction of the outer, early wall (1 on plan) with the fifteenth-century cylindrical tower (2 on plan) on its north side. They are clearly not articulated and built at different times, the tower being of a piece with the later, thicker wall lying behind (3 on plan).
Kolossi 17

Aerial view of the northern part of the excavated area west of the keep (September 2008).

Kolossi 18

Aerial view of the southern part of the excavated area west of the keep (September 2008).
KOUKLIA
(Chateau de Couvoucle)

This was not a fortification but rather a manorial complex, the purpose and function of which was primarily economic. It was built over part of the remains of ancient PalaiPaphos as a centre for the administration of royal estates in the south-west. In this area, the royal casalia of Kouklia, Emba, Lemba, Anogyra, Phoinikas and Akhelia were especially important for their sugar plantations. The remains of sugar mills and refineries can be found close to the manor building – located immediately adjacent on the site of PalaiPaphos itself and a little further away, to the south beneath the slope of the hill at Kouklia Stavros. Very little of the refinery buildings on the main site survives, but the ‘factory’ structures at Kouklia Stavros are better preserved. Kouklia Stavros has been dated by pottery evidence to the end of the thirteenth century. It was partly remodelled in the fourteenth and continued in working order until about 1600, by which time the sugar production industry had been totally superseded by the growing of cotton. A 95m long stretch of the aqueduct bringing the water necessary to provide power for the mills there, has also survived. Taken together with the remains of the mills and refineries of the Hospitallers at Kolossi and those of the Cornaro family at Episkopi, along with written sources and iconographic information, it has been possible to deduce in detail the complex processes involved in the production of the sugar.1

There are few historical references that can be adduced. The narrative sources all record that it suffered the depredations of the Mamluks during their raid of 1424 and it is possible that it was damaged further in the subsequent raids of the following years, although it is not specified in this respect by the chroniclers.2 Shortly after these traumas, the Crown farmed out this lucrative element of the royal demesne: in 1440 Angelo Michiel of Venice contracted for the exploitation of sugar and cotton

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1 Hill, 3, p. 816; Wartburg in The Antiquaries Journal, 63, pp. 298-314, esp. pp. 299 and 307; 81, pp. 305-335, esp. pp. 305, 7 and 9 and in Palaipaphos, pp. 89-105; Coureas, Economy, pp. 111-2; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, pp. 64-5, 71.
2 for the raid of 1424 - Makhairas, § 652, p. 635; Strambaldi, pp. 268-9; Amadi, p. 500; Fl. Bustron, p. 357. For the raids of 1425 and 1426 that may have affected Kouklia, although it is not specifically mentioned, see for example Makhairas, §. 659, p. 637 for 1425 and § 689, p. 669 for 1426, and in general, Hill, 2, pp. 470-4, 477, 482.
here at Kouklia, while in the 1460s another lease was negotiated with the Martini family. 3 ‘Ein Schloss genannt Casucchia’ as recorded by the Duke of Saxe in 1461, may be Kouklia; in any event he added nothing to this brief reference. 4

Lusignan Kouklia appears to have constituted a quadrangular complex arranged around a central courtyard. Built of well-dressed limestone blocks, its architecture suggests that it was constructed at some point in the thirteenth century. When Enlart visited it at the end of the nineteenth century, he found only the east and south sides worthy of comment, and indeed what remains from the Lusignan period are merely these two ranges and perhaps parts of the gatehouse, all incorporated into later, Turkish buildings. The gatehouse as now constituted is of little defensive merit. It has an upper storey gained internally via a straight stairway from the courtyard through a narrow arch. The long, main passage through the gateway itself has four shallow pointed arches, with a centrally located doorway opening inwards. Much of this is modern however, being part of the extensive restoration works carried out on the whole site in the early twentieth century. Indeed before this restoration there can have been very little of the gateway left at all, for Enlart made no allusion to it whatever. 5

Today the southern range (3) consists of an arcade of seven bays. This is a modern restoration of the original Lusignan work based on the remains of two arches found at the time of the twentieth-century restoration. Given the likelihood that the ground level of the courtyard was lower in Lusignan times, this restored range appears to have been constructed at a somewhat higher level than its original predecessor. Enlart and then Maier volunteered that this may have been damaged and rebuilt after Mamlûk attack(s) of 1425/1426 (Enlart) or 1426 (Maier). Although it is certainly possible that these raids involved Kouklia, as we have noted, we have only certain evidence for 1424 and that raid was very much on a small scale. It is just as likely that this south range fell into ruin over the passage of time, perhaps as a consequence of the decline of the sugar industry. Another pointed arch of the same style at the south-west corner of the courtyard, still visible today, supported a ramp leading to the upper storey of the complex (4). This supporting arch is now sunk mainly below courtyard

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4 in Grivaud, p. 77.
5 Enlart, p. 504; Jeffery, p. 397; Maier in Palaipaphos, p. 56 has ‘parts of the gate tower’ as medieval.
level and consequently at a level lower than the adjacent (restored) arches of the south range: it is to be supposed that its function explains this arrangement, although the probable lower level of the courtyard in Lusignan times would have left this original arch largely above ground.

The principal medieval remains are in the east range. The original medieval masonry is easily identified owing to its weathering, but its ashlar facing is still very fine. At the north end of the lower storey of this range is a room with a pointed barrel vault 4.5 m. wide (1), which Enlart considered had been built subsequently to the main ground floor chamber. This main chamber (2) has been called ‘one of the finest surviving monuments of Frankish profane architecture in the island’. Measuring 27.3 by 6.8 m. and rising to a height of 5.7 m., it is divided into four cross-vaulted bays, the thrust of the vaults being taken by buttresses on the outer east wall. It is lighted by narrow windows on the external face and one at the south end. The corbels, keystones and small roof bosses are the only decorative features in what is otherwise an

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6 Maier in Palaipaphos, p. 56.
unpretentious building. Maier calls it a hall and certainly it is handsomely built enough to serve as such in a royal manor. The vaulted bays would perhaps have been unnecessary had this been merely to serve as an undercroft storage facility, but clearly it could have served in either this capacity or as a hall. Access to this lower storey was via a ramp that descended into a porch with a pointed arch; the ramp has now been superseded by a short flight of steps (5). As noted above, it appears likely that the level of the courtyard was lower in the medieval period, and that consequently this east range was not below ground level to the extent it is today. [see illustrations]

A second ramp leading from the courtyard to the upper storey survives. It terminates on top of the porch to the lower storey. When Enlart saw this upper storey, it was partly collapsed: the roof beams were supported by posts and struts in the centre. Maier also noted that its flat roof was supported by massive beams; he remarked that it comprised one spacious room with rectangular windows, all on the same dimensions as the hall/undercroft below. This upper chamber is, in its present incarnation, very much a twentieth-century rebuild. However, adjacent on its north side but at a slightly lower level - at the point where the ascending ramp doubles back on itself, is another chamber, which is clearly medieval. It is divided internally by a short arcade supported on one central column that runs north/south in the centre of the room, its two arches being similar in style with those in the south range. It may well be that this served a chapel. Interestingly, this chamber with its two arched arcade contains mosaic work, no doubt transplanted from ancient PalaiPaphos.  

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7 In general, this account of Kouklia is based on Enlart, pp. 504-5; Maier in PalaiPaphos, pp. 56-9, and personal observation made in October 2004. Neither Enlart nor Maier makes reference to the apparent change in the level of the courtyard, though see the Blue Guide, p. 107.
South-west corner of courtyard. On the east side, an arch supported a ramp (4 on plan) leading to the upper storey. The westernmost arch of the restored south range can be seen at a higher level.

East range of two storeys, the lower being 1 and 2 on plan. The modern stairs down (5 on plan) supersede an earlier ramp.
Modern flight of steps (5 on plan) replacing earlier ramp, leading to main ground floor chamber of east range (2 on plan).
KYRENA

Introduction. A walled town before the Frankish occupation?

As was more certainly the case with Paphos, a walled town may have existed in early times, at least in the 4th century BC. Like Paphos too, there was a castle here in the Byzantine period which may have had its origins in the mid-seventh century when the Arabs first raided the island. Whether town walls were re-commissioned at the same time is hard to say. The most recent work on the subject implies archaeological evidence for an enceinte dating from the time of the first Arab raid – that of 649, but this is unreliable, not least because elsewhere it is conceded that the inhabitants then promptly abandoned the town and that, in any event, any such wall does ‘not seem to have survived the second Arab raid of 653’. Previous commentators who took the view that there was a Byzantine town wall of any date have adduced inadequate historical evidence. Thus, although it may well be that the ‘Emperor’ Isaac sent his wife and daughter to Kyrenia on Richard I’s invasion of 1191 because he deemed it the strongest place on the island, this can not be taken to reflect anything other than that its castle was the most secure. Similarly the observation made by Wilbrand of Oldenburg in 1211, who certainly must have seen the town and castle much as they were when the Franks arrived twenty years earlier, has been translated as indicating that the town had walls, when strictly speaking, he did not specify this.¹

Historical references

Apart from Wilbrand’s comment, allusions to the fortifications occur principally on those occasions when possession of Kyrenia was pivotal in determining the outcome of wars and are related in the History, above. Such references in the chronicles provide us with next to no detail. The Templar of Tyre related that Kyrenia was fortified and had a walled town. Quite when he wrote this was discussed above (pp.

¹ For the recent suggestion of a town wall in 649-653, see Balandier, pp. 267-270. In general, Lawrence, p. 201, Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 50-1; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 1; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 98; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 14. For Wilbrand of Oldenburg, see History, above, p. 11.
29-30) and from this it is arguable that Kyrenia’s town walls were created before those of Famagusta. Westerners, who commented on other Cypriot castles, tended not to travel to Kyrenia; their routes to and from their homes took them to the south coast rather than the north. Its history in war shows however, that it was a first rate fortification. Indeed, for some of our period, it was most likely the island’s only one. This was certainly the view of Francesco Suriano of Venice in 1484 at the very end of that time.2

Description of the Castle

The description set out in Megaw’s Kyrenia Castle, modified in certain details by his later articles, has remained the fullest to date. Faucherre’s short note of 2006 supplements this in a few aspects. Though much of the Crusader Castle remains, much too has been obscured as a result of the later, massive Venetian overbuilding, making some interpretations of detail uncertain.3

The Byzantine Castle

The Byzantine castle occupied most of a peninsula that juts out into the sea. It thus had the benefits of water defences and communications from the start. It was roughly square in shape, about 80.5 m. (264 feet) square,4 with its entrance probably on the site of the later Frankish one in the west wall. Its curtains were of varying thickness: 0.8 m on its north side; 2.55 m on its south (inner) side. We know from Wilbrand that the castle possessed towers and most likely there were towers at all four corners. Certainly those at the north-west (35) and south-west (13) are discernible. The north-west tower is slightly oval, of two storeys and with walls on average 1.3 m thick. That at the south-west is more circular. Both are hollow and project from the enceinte to which they connect by narrow throats. In this respect they are different from the later Byzantine towers at St. Hilarion. The ruins of towers lying outside the Venetian-Frankish east curtain (38 and 40) have been alternatively assigned as Byzantine and as

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2 In Cobham, p. 49.
4 Thus Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 200. Faucherre, Cerines, in Vaivre and Plagnieux p. 385 has 75m square.
Frankish – part of an east bay outwork that they created. A subsequent phase of Byzantine building appears to include the horse-shoe tower (23) and adjacent wall on the south-east side of the curtain. Beyond the south curtain, connected with it by a short cross wall from the horse-shoe tower, is a much more substantial outer Byzantine wall with solid pentagonal spurs. In separate articles published in the same year, Megaw ascribed this strong defensive wall to the reign of Heraclius (610-641), and the reign of Basil I (867-886). But as it most probably post-dates the inner curtain and horse-shoe tower and as Cyprus was effectively demilitarised between the treaty of 688 and Byzantium’s recovery of the island in 965, it seems more likely that it was built later – in the later tenth century.

A round headed arch set with irregularly shaped *voussoirs* provided for passage through the inner Byzantine south curtain into its south ward formed by the strong outer wall. An identical arch, later reduced by the Venetians and used by them as their access to their tunnel leading to the basement level of their great south-west bastion (17), is set in the short west wall of this outer Byzantine ward. A third doorway, this one being oval in shape, led to a passage that penetrated the southern wall of the outer ward (16). Most likely these last two were both posterns.

Beyond the north-west tower was a chapel (3), later known as St. George of the Donjon, thought to be twelfth century. Megaw ultimately suggested that this north-west tower and chapel were enclosed in an outer wall that ran the length of the castle on its west side, thereby forming an outer west ward. If this were so, then Kyrenia was endowed with double walls on two sides before the Franks ever arrived. However, we have no archaeological evidence for such an outer west wall in this period.

KYRENIA CASTLE

1 Entrance passage
2 Guardroom
3 Byzantine Chapel
4 North West Tower
5 West Ward (north end)
6 West Ward (centre)
7 Gate-House (chapel over)
8 Undercroft with 2 upper storeys
9 To West Range (upper storeys)
10 Early Frankish Undercroft
11 To Gate-House (middle storey)
12 Vaulted Cell with upper storey
13 South West Tower (Byzantine)
14 West Ward, South End (Venetian gun chamber)
15 South West Bastion
16 South Ward & Frankish gateway
17 To South West Bastion (lower level)
18 To South Fighting Gallery
19 Venetian Gallery
20 South East Tower
21 Gate to East Outwork
22 Gun Chamber (site of Frankish tower)
23 Horseshoe Tower
24 Water Tank
25 East Fighting Gallery
26 North Range (foundations)
27 North East Tower
28 North East Staircase
29 Chamber with reconstructed floor
30 North West Staircase
31 Undercroft
32 Postern Gate
33 Site of Frankish Postern
34 Forebuilding
35 Inner North West Tower
36 West Ditch
37 South Ditch
38 Base of Water Tower
39 site of East outwork
40 tower
41 outwork
42 forebuilding

Byzantine Castle
Frankish reconstructions and additions
Venetian reconstructions and additions
The Frankish Castle

Overview

The Franks developed this very considerably. Using fine ashlar masonry, they replaced the Byzantine curtains on the north and east. Remains of the Byzantine wall on the north show that the Frankish wall simply followed the same line. On the east however, this is less certain:- Faucherre suggested that the trace of a curtain wall lying some 12 m. outside the line of the later Frankish-Venetian one, along with the ruins of the tower (40) mentioned above, may possibly be the superseded Byzantine east front. However, it would be odd if on that side the Franks were content to lose space by building within the Byzantine line while on the south, they constructed a curtain beyond the Byzantine perimeter thereby creating a third line with intervening wards on that side. Whether the Franks inherited and strengthened an outer Byzantine wall on the west, or instead were the first to build such an outer west wall, is not certain, as the massive Venetian works have obscured earlier fortifications on this side. At the north-east corner, they developed a two storey horse-shoe tower (27), while at the north-west angle they enhanced the Byzantine tower as more fully discussed below.

A forework was clasped on to the front of the west half of the north curtain (32,33,34), and an outwork (39) created at the south-east angle provided further masonry fortifications. Whether the Franks enhanced the outermost line of defences by developing the “castle harbour” on the west is impossible to say. Either way, Kyrenia constituted by far and away the Franks’ most important fortress, on which they focussed their greatest attention. A little work is early thirteenth century, perhaps of around the time of the wars of 1228-1233 or shortly after, but most is later. Comparing Kyrenia’s north-east tower and its archères set in galleries within the thickness of the curtains with corresponding examples in France, Faucherre suggested that these defensive works date to the second half of the thirteenth century. It would seem just as likely however, that they were even later, either copying earlier French

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7 Faucherre, op. cit., p. 385.
examples, or borrowing, certainly in the case of the north-east tower, from Cilician Armenia. The fall of the mainland Crusader state in 1291 may have stimulated some building campaign, but we should be guarded on this. Under Prince James, it successfully withstood numerous assaults in the Genoese siege of 1374. When he later became King and returned to Cyprus in 1385, James initiated building work at a number of sites and so it is likely he who commissioned some of the domestic structures set against Kyrenia’s west wall that have been identified as fourteenth century work. Though the Venetians drastically reshaped and strengthened the castle, draining its harbour and turning it into a ditch, enough of the medieval fabric remains from which to gauge its impressiveness.10

North – West angle and salient, West wall and entrance

The upper storey of the north-west tower was an early Frankish improvement, but the whole tower was gradually transformed by a series of additions into a substantial rectangular structure projecting slightly obliquely from the line of the curtain. Clearly it commanded the entrance on the west wall and was a conspicuous feature of the medieval castle. North of this developed tower, and therefore covering both it and the Byzantine chapel from the sea, is a salient wall now terminated by the great Venetian north-west circular bastion. The problem as to whether this north wall of the salient obscures earlier Byzantine work corresponds with the uncertainty as to the existence of an enclosing outer Byzantine wall on the west side. What may be said with some certainty, however, is that this salient wall was at least developed by the Franks. Higher up, its eastern portion consists of the smaller facing blocks used by the Franks on the contiguous projecting northern curtain to the east. Each of these sections of wall possesses a similar archère, set in low embrasures reinforced with lintels below their pointed arches. The embrasure of that in the salient is more recessed owing to its thicker wall and is slightly wider (1.48 deep v. 1.15 m wide) than its eastern neighbour (1.26 m v. 0.93 m). Internally, a simple cross wall (west wall of 34) separated the projecting northern curtain from the salient, but the two archères show that these works are contemporaneous. The facing blocks are decidedly larger on the lower portion of the eastern salient and throughout upon its western face. In

10 Jeffery, p. 315; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3; Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 206.
dimension these are almost, though not quite, similar to those used in the Venetian
north-west *roundel*. They are not, however, joined in the same way as the Venetian
work. A surviving three corbelled brattice at parapet level, below which is a very
small embrasure, helps argue that these western portions of the salient are also
Frankish work, being likely of a slightly later date than the initial work on the eastern
part of the salient.

Whatever its origin, the outer west wall would have run from this north-west salient
screening the entire length of the original Byzantine west curtain. We can at least
discern the Frankish entrance (7) built into this inner, Byzantine wall. This proceeds
through a pointed arch, 2.5 m wide with provision for one gate and a portcullis
behind, through a simple bent or L-shaped pointed barrel vaulted entrance - 11.4 m to
the turn and a further 8.1 m thence into the courtyard within. All is constructed in
massive masonry of varying dimensions, up to .68 m in depth, and similar to the
blockwork used in the town walls at their south-west angle. Megaw took this to
indicate a fourteenth-century date, but we can not be certain. Above this entrance was
the chamber for operating the portcullis, while above that again was the castle chapel,
lit by large, pointed arched windows to the front. Only here is there much left of the
uppermost storey of the Frankish west range.

South of the gateway, the Lusignans created a series of chambers against the exterior
of this innermost curtain. These are in two sections. The first is of two storeys
constituting a single chamber at each level (12), its lower level gained from a short
flight of stairs up from the courtyard. The more extensive range further south (8) was
of three storeys however. The lowest level, accessed from the courtyard via doorways
made in the Byzantine curtain is a pointed barrel vaulted undercroft of three bays,
used most likely for storage purposes. Its western, outer walls had shafts that were
most likely for ventilation, rather than being arrow slits as Faucherre thought. At its
southern end, there is a doorway set within a large, pointed arch. Underneath this
level lay the *oubliettes* that had much use in the Lusignan period, the castle being a
principal state prison. Above, the slightly pointed vaulted middle storey, consisting of
four bays, was lit by simple rectangular windows. This was entered through a large
pointed arched doorway in turn gained from an external stone stairway (9) that
ascended from the courtyard. This continued up to the now ruined upper storey,
consisting of three rooms. Through the intervening chamber (12), this series of chambers connected directly with the chapel (7), but additionally, it was furnished with a stone gallery corbelled onto the inner wall, providing an alternative means of passage that by-passed the chapel. The whole range is constructed of the same large blocks as the gatehouse, so appears to be of one build. The doorway and windows on the outer (western) wall, suggest that, from the outset, this was screened by an outer wall. Megaw assigned this range to the thirteenth century on the basis of the corbels that supported the transverse arches of the middle storey – an interpretation that conflicts with his dating of the gatehouse. In any event, it is apparent that the outer west wall must have been built early in the Frankish period, if not before. North of the gateway, against the inside of the Byzantine west wall, there are traces of a large upper chamber of the fourteenth century, supported by elaborate corbels, over an earlier long and lofty undercroft of three bays (10).

The west ward (5 and 6) between the two curtains extended from the north from the salient to the south-west corner of the castle at which point a wide gateway (16) provided access to the segmented gap between the outer Byzantine wall and beyond that again the Frankish curtain on the south, thus providing one route to the latter’s fighting gallery.\(^{11}\)

**South-West angle, South wall, and South-East angle**

No trace has been found of any tower at the south-west or south-east corners of the Frankish curtain. Previous commentators have remarked that it is astonishing to imagine that the Lusignans omitted to create angle towers at such important points, especially here on the side most vulnerable to attack. But Kyrenia would not have been unique in such an apparent deficiency. For example, there were no towers at the angles of the *enceinte* of the greatest Crusader Castle of mainland Greece – Chlemutzi (Castel Tornese/Clairmont), whose lords, the Villehardouins were, like the Lusignans, another powerful French dynasty. In Cyprus itself, reference to Famagusta Castle is instructive: its north-east angle has no tower, perhaps because of the additional defence it had from an outwork leading to the port. Kyrenia’s south-east angle was

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\(^{11}\) Hill, 2, pp. 266-8; 433; Megaw, *Kyrenia Castle*, pp. 2-3, 5-6; Megaw, *Military Architecture*, pp. 200-3; Faucherre in Vaivre and Pagnieux, p. 387.
similarly associated with fortified outworks centred on a harbour. Such archaeological evidence as we have for Kyrenia appears inconclusive and previous commentators are not in agreement. Megaw decided against any tower at the south-west angle, but inferred one at the south-east.\(^\text{12}\) Faucherre recently drew attention to a sizeable doorway located at the south-west (14) and the gateway at the south-east (21) as being indicative of towers at both angles.\(^\text{13}\) This is not, however, altogether convincing. In order to reach the south-west doorway in question, one must first proceed through a small rectangular doorway (13) cut into the west side of the inner Byzantine *enceinte,* where its south-west tower was located. Within this entry, there is a high, narrow, barrel vaulted chamber, from the southern end of which a lower, barrel vaulted tunnel zigzags down into the middle level of the Venetian bastion. Faucherre’s doorway is roughly halfway down this tunnel at a point where it doubles back upon itself (14). This series of tunnels is quite likely be Venetian work, complementing their second tunnel leading to the basement of their bastion running down from the modified Byzantine arch (17) mentioned above. As we will see, the original Venetian work at this south–west angle apparently involved no tower and it seems likely that their work merely followed the lines of what was there before. So far as the south-east angle is concerned, the large pointed arch (21) set in the curtain at the southern end of the east wall is certainly Frankish in origin. It was later reduced in size by the Venetians. Its location is however, considerably to the north of the Frankish south-east angle, making it more likely to be an avenue to the outwork, as suggested by the Johns/Last plan. With regard to the historical evidence, we should note that Silvestor Minio’s description of 1529 talks of three towers only – an old, rebuilt one towards the north above the sea, and two strong towers on the west and east. Hill quite reasonably considered these to represent the Lusignan north–east tower and the new Venetian circular bastions of the north–west and south–east angles. These two ‘roundels’ are undoubtedly early enough in style to have been built by 1529 and certainly the Venetians started work at Kyrenia quite soon after they acquired control of the island – expenditure began as early as 1504. The date of 1544 that is inscribed on the back of the west curtain no doubt indicates when that part of

\(^{13}\) Faucherre, *op. cit.*, p. 387.
the newly converted fortress was at least substantially complete.\textsuperscript{14}

Whether or not they omitted to create towers at the two south angles, in the fourteenth century the Franks did however construct an outer curtain, thus creating a third line of defence on this side. As with the ward created on the west, this new work created a narrow area or \textit{lice} on the south and indeed this appears to have been segmented in turn in that the Lusignans enhanced where necessary the outer angles of the Byzantine pentagonal buttresses so that they abutted the internal face of the new Frankish curtain. This new Frankish wall was equipped with at least one vaulted fighting gallery, discernible at ground level as a series of semi-pointed, arched embrasures, open at that time to the south ward. These are akin to those in the upper storey of the north-east tower.

\textbf{South-east Outwork, East wall, North-east angle, North wall and North wall forebuilding.}

As noted above, north of the south - east angle, a gate (21) in the east curtain led to what may have been a small outwork. It is now difficult to be clear as to its exact extent and origin. Remains of a wall running from the Venetian cross wall blocking the eastern entry to the south ditch (37), to the ruined tower (38) on the shore may be elements of a southern portion of such an outwork or possibly part of an original Byzantine curtain that Faucherre discerned was located 12 m outside the line of the Frankish east curtain. Megaw believed that the outwork’s southern boundary consisted of ‘a stout curtain wall pierced by a postern gate’\textsuperscript{15} that linked the ruined tower to the castle’s main south-east angle. It is not possible though, to verify this arrangement from the remains on the ground and it takes no account of the remnants of the wall running to the south. The tower’s position in relation to the line of the outer Byzantine south curtain suggests that it was probably not an element of their works and is then to be associated with the Lusignan period. This ‘water’ tower is particularly complex (see plan). As at Saranda Kolones, horizontally laid columns from classical times were used to reinforce its walls, but as at the Paphos site, this

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{15} A.H.S. Megaw, \textit{Kyrenia Castle}, p. 13.
\end{footnotesize}
does not determine whether this was Frankish or Byzantine. Clearly it made provision for small vessels to dock, no doubt for the transfer of supplies from larger vessels that could not easily pass the reef into this eastern bay.

**Kyrenia**

**Harbour Water Tower at South East Angle**
From this water tower, the outwork’s circuit probably looped back to connect with a second tower (40) – this being the one described by Megaw as a Frankish tower projecting from the east curtain. The remains of this tower do not permit an understanding of its shape, but at ground level, its mass of mixed masonry shows that it was solid. At 5.3 m wide, it was not inconsiderable. It is located immediately below the point where the line of the main curtain is offset as a result of Venetian overbuilding. Just here, is a Venetian gun port (22) set obliquely and high in the wall that appears to have utilised an earlier Frankish doorway. Quite likely this doorway was associated with the large south-east gateway still visible on the internal side of the main curtain (21). Most probably it connected to the interval tower (40), which suggests that this had an upper storey, and thence to the outwork.

On this east side, the Franks wholly replaced the Byzantine curtain. The new Frankish wall was endowed with one fighting gallery (25), or at least a series of casemates terminating in arrow slits, subsequently filled in with Venetian masonry. Indeed the southern third of this east wall was completely overbuilt by the Venetians. This overbuilding ends in the offset mentioned above, north from which point, the lower third of the rest of this Lusignan curtain has also been overbuilt, most likely also during the Venetian period. This is reflected in the size of the facing blocks, the Venetian masonry being considerably larger than the Frankish blocks, evident above and pierced by a series of surviving arrow slits.

Towards its north end, this east, main curtain contains a blocked up arch, which may have been a postern, especially as just north of it there are the crude remnants of another outlying work (41), this being 1.55 m wide, and so likely a screening wall that ran down to the east bay. Within the curtain, a range of buildings were constructed that ran parallel to the wall, but were not connected with it. The southernmost structures, now collapsed, were of a different period to those to the north. These latter are now the main, surviving domestic chambers of the Frankish castle. As with those on the west, these are of three storeys, with cisterns in the lower storey of one bay, the middle storey being at courtyard level, and separated from the lofty upper storey by wooden flooring, access to which was gained by an external wooden gallery overlooking the courtyard. Similar, albeit smaller chambers, correspondingly ran along the inside of the northern curtain (26 and 31).
The north-east tower (27) is an impressive horseshoe, 12 m. wide, projecting 14 m. from the main enceinte. It has a substantial glacis. The first stage of this plinth is 2 m high above ground level, and is faced with 6 courses of varying shaped blocks, ranging from 0.22 m, though usually nearer 0.33 m deep, to up to 0.5 long. The second stage carries on the glacis for a further 18 courses. The tower is of one build with its two wing walls that run a little way along the connecting curtains. The lower level of the tower connected with the erstwhile fighting galleries of both these curtains and so would seem to have been built at the same time. The tower provided for three fighting levels, being a lower and upper floor both with loopholes, and a third on the roof. The 11 loop-holes of the lower storey are set in simple V shaped embrasures, whereas the five in the upper internal storey open are set in semi-pointed arched recesses (1.85 m wide x 2.5 m high) and thus appear a development beyond the more simple ones in the lower chamber. Most of these archères à étrier were sited so as to alternate from one level to another;16 and they provide the means for an especially aggressive defence. The upper storey and roof levels were attained via stairs from the otherwise separated east range of domestic quarters, this reflecting the connection between the military and domestic elements of the medieval castle.

Like the curtain on the east side, the northern curtain entirely replaced its Byzantine predecessor. Owing to the destruction caused by the building of cells within this wall by the British, it is difficult to be certain now whether the two rows of loopholes visible from the exterior reflected two successive mural galleries below parapet level, or if one succeeded the other as the wall was heightened. It is possible to infer that one of these galleries was vaulted and open backed, being supported on square pillars, providing a fighting platform 6 m. high. This northern curtain was certainly heightened on one occasion, though most likely not two occasions as Megaw held.17 It is worth noting that the parapet superseded in the final heightening was of an identical arrangement to its successor: big merlons endowed with V shaped embrasures narrowing to loopholes and narrow crenels, this implying perhaps only a short lapse of time between the initial building and its raising. Whether both may be confidently

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16 Faucherre, p. 388.
17 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11; Faucherre, p. 387.
attributed to the thirteenth century however, is perhaps not altogether clear. The alternative suggestion that the final heightening may post date the Genoese naval attacks in 1374 is of course speculation but remains a possibility.

Towards its western end, the north Frankish curtain wall prescribed a right-angled turn so as to join the enhanced north-west tower. The resulting projection provided for access to the foreshore. This passage led from within the castle through a small gate (at 34) in the original Byzantine curtain which was retained from here west to the tower (35). The passage then prescribed a right angle turn to a postern gate (32). As Megaw observed, at some point, the Franks elaborated this by creating a much longer forebuilding (42) beyond their own northern curtain, which extended the fortified avenue of approach to this northern entry point. As he noted, this forebuilding appears to have been roughly similar in length to the early Frankish undercroft (31) located opposite – on the inside of the curtain. Its terminal postern is at 33 on the diagram. Although the forebuilding is now lost, it is possible to infer its overall dimensions through a study of the exterior of the main wall. Unlike the eastern half of the north curtain, the western portion had no archères, reflecting that it was screened from the beginning of the Frankish period. Two rectangular doorways (the western one being set in a high, pointed arch) are located in this part of the main curtain, set at the level of the fighting gallery to the east – created out of the superseded first battlemented wall walk. This reflects that the forebuilding possessed an upper story, accessed directly from within the enceinte, built only when the main curtain wall was raised to its later, present height. The eastern doorway is directly underneath two corbels of a brattice and above what Megaw discerned as a portcullis slot, now filled in. This suggests that these defensive arrangements were superseded and augmented by a further, short extension of the forebuilding. At ground level at least, the forebuilding was divided into two sections by a cross wall, now appearing as a mere buttress. The whole forebuilding was probably demolished as part of the Venetians’ ‘improvements’. They were content to seal up the truncated remains with a small

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18 Thus Enlart, p. 425 and fig. 367; Faucherre, p. 387 and fig. 4.
19 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11.
20 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11.
rectangular doorway placed in what became the outer wall (32). However, this still provided for a right angled approach to the entrance in the curtain behind.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Kyrenia Castle 1}

South curtain. In this excavated portion (west section – 16 on plan), the solid Byzantine prow shaped buttresses of their outer wall can be seen almost abutting the Frankish wall with its arcade of large embrasures visible at ground level.

Large Frankish gate-way (21 on plan) opening from inside the east curtain. It led to the south-east outwork and may have connected with the first floor level doorway (22 on plan) that also served the outwork. It was blocked by the Venetians. Their tunnel leading south-east to the lower level of their great south-east bastion can be seen at ground level.
Eastern enceinte. This photograph shows the 'kink' in the line of the wall, being Venetian overbuilding to the south (left) but with the medieval wall still showing its archères in the lower half of the north (right) section. Behind the trees (centre) is the Venetian gunport utilising a Frankish doorway (22 on plan) set at first storey level. This very likely led out to the interval tower – the remains of which appear as a mass of solid masonry (centre foreground – 40 on plan) – and which likely articulated with and as part of the south-east outwork that included the water tower (39 and 38 on plan) to the south.
Water tower (38 on plan). A prominent part of the outwork at the south-east angle, this provided a dock for small vessels approaching *via* the east bay. The use of ancient columns can be seen.
Horseshoe shaped north-east tower (27 on plan). The tower has a considerable glacis. There are two storeys above ground level, each with archères that reflect that those on the upper floor are later. The tower has its own wing walls on either side. The parapet was modified by the Venetians but provided a third fighting platform in the Lusignan period.
North Curtain. The east (left) portion of the curtain shows two levels of *archères* below the parapet level which is endowed with further *archères* in the merlons. The west (right) portion was screened in the Lusignan period by an extensive forebuilding, accessed at its upper level by the doorways now left stranded in the wall. The forebuilding was probably extended on at least one occasion. The remains of a cross wall within the forebuilding can be detected at ground level beneath the west (right) of the two doorways. The forebuilding was demolished by the Venetians.
Frankish rectangular right-angled entrance (7 on plan) through the inner west curtain. The coats of arms above the entrance arch were relocated here in the early twentieth century.
Frankish Town Walls

There is now little to be seen of the walled town or bourg, which was ranged to the west of the castle. The remains of three Frankish towers have been traced and variously described. That at the south-west angle (A) is circular, being 20 m in circumference and faced with massive bonded masonry (0.5 m in depth x 0.8 to 0.95 m in length), its upper courses being en bossage. Internally it constituted one large chamber with a dome, now with an opening in the centre. It was enclosed at the rear from where it was entered through a door, the drawbar slots for which may be seen, covered by a relieving arch. Attached to its east side was a structure that Enlart speculated contained a stair to link the wall walk of the curtain to the roof of the tower. This tower protruded significantly beyond the curtain which ran away east towards the south-west corner of the castle, and north (where it is 1.6 m thick) to the mouth of the harbour. The masonry of the surviving elements of this curtain attached to the tower is similar, making it appear that they are of the same period.
The west arm of the town wall ran north through a second surviving tower (B). Externally it was semi-circular, and tapered outwards at its base. Internally, it consisted of two rectangular chambers one above the other, each with narrow rectangular windows. The chambers' domed roofs have collapsed, but surviving corbels show that the tower once carried machicolations. This particular feature suggests a late fourteenth or fifteenth-century date, but may of course be an elaboration of a tower from earlier in the Frankish period. Previous commentators have associated this tower with a west gate: indeed both Jeffery and Megaw believed it to be one of a pair of towers serving this purpose. A small part of the medieval wall can be noted at the point at its north-west corner near the sea. Here there is still a squared off plinth on which a church now stands (C).

The third surviving tower is the smallest. It is located at the south-west corner of the old harbour at an angle of the wall where its attached fragments of curtain show that it ran off north on one side and east, towards the castle, on the other (D). The tower is circular and possesses two round headed windows that appear to be original. It stands on a plinth standing to a height of 1.8 m from the ground, and consists of ashlar blocks 0.36 m deep of varying length but up to about 0.45. It is then to be distinguished from the larger towers to the west and south-west. 22

Finally, stretches of the town wall survive on the harbour's side where it approaches the castle. This is in two sections. First is a length of 2.8 m, this section being a plinth about 5 m in depth above the ground, and consisting of different blockwork from an adjoining longer section 13.6 m long, running on towards the castle. The latter section had a large building constructed against its harbour side, its narrow end (3.4 m) showing it to have been vaulted and likely to have been a warehouse.

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22 Enlart, pp. 422-3 and figs 365 and 366; Jeffery, p. 316. The depiction on the Attar map of 1542 shows no wall whatever on the harbour side. Attar, p. 90.
Large round tower (A on plan) at south-west angle of the enceinte. The bossed stonework of the upper half is clearly distinguishable from the well faced masonry below, where the blocks used are considerably larger.

D-shaped tower (B on plan) on the town’s west wall, possibly one of a pair protecting an entrance between. The elaborate corbels for machicolation are apparent, suggesting a late fourteenth or fifteenth-century date for this elaboration.
Outer defences – harbours; ditches; reef

Quite clearly, the masonry defences of the Frankish castle and town were complex and sophisticated. The excellent plan of the castle produced by Megaw and included above (with additions), which was based largely on the results of a survey carried out in 1948 by C.N. Johns and J.S. Last, is not however matched by any wholly satisfactory plan of the overall castle – harbours – town complex. Enlart’s plan was naturally based on the remains apparent to him on his visit over a hundred years ago, but as these were greatly altered in the Venetian period, it was difficult for him to be clear as to the features that preceded that time. Thus his plan made no allowance for a possible castle harbour, showing instead a dry ditch on the west side as well as outside the south curtain; it shows nothing of the outworks outwith the east curtain and needs developing in respect of its trace of the town wall and artificial reef. Unfortunately Jeffery did not attempt such a plan in spite of his obvious knowledge and enthusiasm. Enlart’s plan has been simply reproduced ever since, with the exceptions of those produced in 1947 by Newman and in 1992 by Perbellini. The latter is mainly of interest for its plot of the reef but otherwise adds nothing. Newman’s is imperfect but it has the merit of being quite carefully checked against what was then extant and emphasises, most importantly, a castle harbour. The plan of the town walls included above is based on Newman’s sketch. The question of whether there was a castle harbour as distinct from merely a dry ditch on the west side of the castle is of some importance for this would have considerably enhanced the castle’s defensibility. In spite of his plan showing a dry ditch here on the west side of the castle, Enlart observed that there ‘was a broad moat into which seawater flows’. This note appears to have been ignored by Megaw and most other later writers who postulated the existence of merely a dry ditch here, as well as on the south side of the castle. Interestingly too, the depiction on Attar’s map of 1542 shows the sea as coming up to this side of the castle. So if instead we accept Newman’s clear view based on his assessment of the remains, it seems likely that Enlart’s ‘broad moat’ may well have been once a castle harbour, separating castle from town and quite distinct from that of the town harbour.23

23 Attar, p. 90; Enlart, pp. 423-4; Newman, pp. 6-7 with sketch and plan; Muller-Weiner, p. 87; Perbellini (1973), p. 17; (1992), p. 7; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, passim; Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 199-203; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 97.
Access to this harbour would have been through a narrow throat at its head, over which there may have been some arrangement constituting part of the causeway that led up to the castle’s main entrance – as later modified and used by the Venetians as their entry into their fortress. Such a castle harbour must have opened into the mouth of the main, town harbour inside the point where the short mole ran out to the solid structure that held the heavy iron chain in place at this, its east end. That mole appears to have carried its own wall judging by the surviving fragment attached to the solid structure. This chain across the mouth of the main harbour was raised and lowered as required at its west end in a tower that formed the north end of the town wall. Jeffery recorded how, in 1913, he was allowed to convert this chain tower into ‘an office and boatshed for the Customs officers – with the especial object of preserving the ancient landmark.’ 24

If such a castle harbour did indeed exist, rather than just a dry ditch, then the castle benefited from the close protection of water on three of its four sides. To the north, it was further protected by an artificial reef that ran from beyond its north-west tower, parallel to the north curtain, and extending well to the east of the north-east tower. This reef has now been largely overbuilt by a modern pier in a refashioning of the yacht harbour that took place in the later twentieth century, but its extent and scale is discernible from aerial photographs taken before this development. The reef had the dual purpose of creating a barrier against direct approach from the open sea to the north, effectively creating a canal in front of the north curtain and also largely enclosing the bay on the east side of the castle. Entry to this east bay was only through a single, narrow opening, thereby creating another small, separate harbour, simultaneously providing some measure of protection for the castle from sea attack on this eastern flank. The fortified outwork that connected this anchorage with the castle proper facilitated the receipt of matériel in time of need.

Clearly the most exposed side of the castle was that facing south. Quite probably its ditch, which likely ran continuously with a ditch lying outside the southern span of the town wall, was always dry, as previous commentators have remarked. It had no

revetment on its outer side where it faced open country, which encourages this view. However, set against this, it is still possible to discern that the adjacent rocky bay at its eastern end was cut at some point in the past, perhaps to allow for the entry of sea water into this ditch. Any such channel for water was however, sealed off by the Venetians whose cross wall shuts off the south ditch from this eastern bay. The castle does not appear to have been overlooked on this side, as held by Perbellini, though no doubt this was the side that was the target of most assaults.25

Officers in charge; castle and town

We have some references, mainly from later times, to the names and positions of officers in command of the castle.26 From these it is apparent that, like Famagusta, Kyrenia was under the command of a Captain, sometimes known as Chief, who held overall control of the town and castle. This ‘Chief and Castellan of the Castle and the Bourg’ sometimes delegated the Castellan’s duties, but generally jurisdiction over town and castle appears to have remained vested in the one senior officer. As Castellan, It is most likely that his offices and chambers were located in the classical position controlling the main gateway on the west – ‘ante portam castri, videlicet in banco domini castellani’.

Clearly the reference to the bourg of Kyrenia refers to its walled town. Its relationship with the castle, so far as contemporaries were concerned, is perhaps reflected in other phrases used to describe both. Makhairas, for instance, refers variously to an ‘inner castle’, an ‘upper castle’, and a ‘lower castle’. This also appears to be the same perspective we may infer from references to the bourg at St. Hilarion, which there must relate to its sprawling lower ward.27

26 See above – Part II, Walled towns, captains and castellans, pp. 92-3.
27 Makhairas, §§ 425 and 462, pp. 405 and 447; Enlart, p. 428.
LA CAVA

Leondari Vouno [Lion Mountain]
morden – Liotarovounos; Aronas of Athalassa

La Cava was built on the top of a hill plateau shaped roughly like a figure of eight, which rises some 50 to 60 m above the plain. It is an ancient site inasmuch as it is said to have been a centre of rule before the establishment of Ledra – the precursor of Nicosia. The Lusignans occupied and at least partly fortified the site in the aftermath of the disastrous war with Genoa. What they created was first and foremost a *château de plaisance* but it must also have been a symbolical gesture to celebrate the endurance of their rule and its connection with inherited tradition. The site may well have been selected for its defensibility but it is just as likely that it was to promote the castle’s prominence as a symbol of power and lordship.¹ From there it would have been possible to monitor traffic on a one-time road from Nicosia to Larnaka which ran below. If that purpose was a reason for constructing La Cava and given that it appears that the fortification at Larnaka was begun at the same time, it may be possible to denote here the elements of an overall royal strategy. At best, however, such a rationale for La Cava must have been secondary. Its medieval name is supposed to be derived from an especially large, square cistern, cut into the plateau’s north side, one of several that were sunk into the its rocky surface.² Today, it is garrisoned by the National Guard and known as Aronas of Athalassa or Liotarovounos and is not to be confused with its neighbouring sister plateau, simply called Aronas, occupied by Turkish troops across the nearby Attila line.³

The site has attracted scant attention by modern scholars. Enlart appears to have overlooked it. Jeffery gave a reasonable description of the remains, but by his time, La Cava was much ruined, having been exploited as a quarry from about 1870. Later writers made little or no comment. Of these, only Perbellini attempted any detail. He

¹ On which see Creighton, p. 35.
² Jeffery, p. 207; Makhairas, 2, p. 199.
³ I am grateful to Mr Adonis Taliodoros of the Press and Information Office for this information and for securing access for me on two separate occasions as noted below, fn. 13.
identified three elements: the castle associated with which were gardens, water butts, cisterns and a 'noble courtyard'; a ditch; and a protected agricultural area.  

Makhairas recorded that it was Peter II who began work here, while Amadi, Fl. Bustron and Stephen of Lusignan noted that it was built by James I just after 1385. Either way, it is noteworthy that like Sigouri, La Cava's foundation appears to post-date the Genoese occupation of Famagusta and consequently is to be identified with that development.

Certainly James appears to have added to it if he did not initiate it. In his list of James' works, Amadi wrote that James 'fece la gentilissima stantia, zardin et vigna de la Cava' implying clearly that such work was not of a military nature. This image of La Cava being more of a palatial, country retreat than a fortification, is borne out by the words of Luchino dal Campo, the chancellor of Nicolò III d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, who visited King Janus there in 1412. Luchino and his master encountered the king, at play with his courtiers, in

a palace with a garden and you can't see anything more beautiful, with many fountains; and between the fountains there is one that comes out from an orange tree. The water goes so high that it can reach the branches (of the orange tree) and in this garden many beautiful kinds of fruit grow. They went further and they entered in the courtyard of the house and there the king took off some clothes until he wore only a giupone (tunic).  

Similarly, Count Gabriele Capodilista of Padua, who visited in 1458, observed that there was a variety of fruits growing at La Cava, associated with which were some very considerable wells. These orchards must however, have been on the fertile ground below the rocky plateau on which the castle-palace was built.

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4 Jeffery, pp. 206-8; Hill, 2, p. 446; Perbellini (1973), p. 51 and aerial photograph on p. 49; Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 204; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 105. As Jeffery noted (p. 207), the plateau top was very rocky with negligible top soil, so any agricultural area must have been on land at the foot of the plateau. Makhairas, 2, p. 199.

5 Makhairas, § 597, p. 593 and Dawkins' note in Makhairas, 2, p. 199; Amadi, p. 495; Fl. Bustron, p. 352; Lusignan, Description, f. 36; Hill, 2, p. 430; Grivaud, p. 43.

6 Amadi, p. 495.

7 in Grivaud, p. 43.

8 in Cobham, p. 36; see fn. 4 above particularly Makhairas, 2, p. 199.
Stephen of Lusignan tells us that there was a convent of Franciscan sisters in La Cava’s gardens. This may have had its origins in a church that dated back to the early fourteenth century, though in any event, the nunnery certainly antedated the castle-palace. This is an interesting parallel to the comparable arrangement in Nicosia where it appears that the location of the castle-palace complex there was also influenced by a pre-existing Dominican establishment and was deliberately built in association with it. Stephen reported that La Cava was damaged by the Mamlûks after the battle of Khirokitia in 1426 but his narrative of events of those raids may not be wholly reliable as we have seen elsewhere. It played no recorded part in the civil war of the 1460s. Along with other lesser fortifications, it appears to have been demolished by the Venetians. Later, the larger of the two towers was used by the Turks as a powder magazine, and as noted, it was only from the later nineteenth century that it was used as a convenient source of stone.

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LA CAVA

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9 Lusignan, Description, f. 36; Leventis, p. 277. See the discussion on Episkopi in ‘An Urban Aristocracy’, above.
10 Jeffery, p. 208; Leventis, p. 279.
The castle's layout was naturally influenced by its site. As Jeffery recorded, the plateau was difficult to ascend, except at its southern tip. Its present meagre ruins are located in the centre of the plateau, across the narrowest point of the figure eight, these being primarily two massive, rectangular towers linked by a curtain wall some 24.5 m in length and 3.77 m wide. The western tower is slightly the larger, but both towers were built of the finest masonry of a large size. Each possessed comparable entrances from outside, these being set at the re-entrant angles and consequently they faced each other beyond the line of the connecting curtain. Similarly both possessed entrances on their inner sides, these being located somewhat off centre and close to the external entry points, thus creating short routes from beyond this defensive, towered screen to the inner compound. The tower to the west is the better preserved. On its south, it survives to a height of 5.25 m along much of its length of 25.3 m. Its walls are 3.17 m thick except for its internal (north) side where this increases to 4.9 m to accommodate the first, broad treads of a mural stair, which turns a right angle to climb above the entrance from the field. It is still possible to identify the “chase” that Jeffery commented upon, being the slot for the heavy beam that would have slid behind this entrance’s wooden doors. The rebates for these doors appear to have enjoyed some restoration in 1969. The entrance passage itself – being 2.47 m wide – has a floor platform that is now 0.45 m above ground level. Both outside and inside this tower, the medieval masons levelled the natural rock to provide even platforms and on the outside they cut a channel to create a passage. The tower’s internal walls were faced with tightly fitted large blocks over a rubble core. They are of varying dimensions, being up to 0.65 m deep, now surviving to a height of eight courses. Externally there is now but one surviving course of sizeable bossed masonry. Its facing blocks are very large: 0.8 m deep and of varying lengths up to 1.2 m. Above this, lesser facing blocks survive to a further height of 1.65 m after which the rubble core is exposed. Inside one wall of this tower, Jeffery was able to discern the remains of a vaulted hall, but this is now hard to distinguish.

The connected east tower was similarly constructed with thick walls and massive bossed masonry, at least on the face of its lowest courses. Its inner wall is 3.93 m thick: most likely it carried a stair like its twin – but it is now too ruined to confirm
this – the tower survives only to a height of 1.42 m (on its west side). At 3 m wide, its inner entrance was a little wider than that of its western neighbour at 2.6 m.

Within the ‘castle’, are the signs of various lost walls, some of which could relate to the houses whose foundations were observed by Jeffery. One such wall runs roughly parallel to the north wall of the east tower; while set obliquely to the line of the north wall of the west tower and the interconnecting curtain are the remains of a rectangular building, the bottom of which was over a metre below ground level. Whether the *enceinte* of La Cava ever enclosed all these buildings with curtain walls to constitute a quadrangle, as at contemporary Sigouri, is hard to say. Recently, Nicolle took this to be the case but they are not similar, La Cava’s two towers being three times the size of the larger of the two traced at Sigouri. The only visible suggestion of a wall on any other side than our east-west one, is the stump of a wall running only a few metres north from the west tower, as shown on the plan.

In front of the wall, on its south side, there was a deep fosse, partly filled up in Jeffery’s day and wholly filled up today. This arrangement of fosse and wall divided the neck joining the north and south parts of the plateau.

The castle’s location would have enabled communication by beacon with Nicosia, about four miles to the north-west, and beyond to Buffavento in the northern mountains. Clearly then, La Cava was both a self-contained country estate and a handy retreat from which contact could be maintained easily with the outside world. Indisputably, it had a degree of defensibility that was greatly enhanced by its setting on the plateau, but the luxury of entrances to both of the towers, the fact that the towers and curtain do not extend right across the neck of the plateau to sever it completely into two portions and the apparent absence of a perimeter wall around the occupied area – on the northern part of the plateau – suggest that security was not a prime consideration. Although as we have seen, the towers appear to have been vaulted, there is no cause to suppose that there may have been provision to house artillery on now lost upper floors. Probably then, we should see the fortification of La Cava as a grand front designed perhaps to impress visitors before they passed within

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to the centrepiece of the palace proper. As others have observed, militarily this was old fashioned, yet its conspicuous bulk must have created an impact. But as we noted above, what really impressed visitors were not the fortifications, but rather the orchards, gardens and water features, partly fed no doubt, by means of the medieval aqueduct lying to the north-west coming from the direction of the river Pedias that ran through Nicosia.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{La Cava I}

Exterior of west tower from the south

\textsuperscript{12} Cyprus Archaeological Museum, Photographic Dept., noting a restoration of 1969 after which its photographic records were taken. Site visits to La Cava on 31 Oct. 2006 and 21 June 2007, and to the aqueduct on 31 Oct. 2006.
Interior of west tower (west end).

Interior of west tower looking east. The entrance from within the tower north into the castle’s interior is centre left. On the right is the east entrance from outside. There, note the restored (?) masonry with the rebate for the door. This photograph was taken in October 2006 – by June 2007 (see La Cava 4) half of that work had gone.
Main entrance to west tower, showing drawbar slot and remains of rebate for door. This photograph was taken in June 2007 – compare with *La Cava 3* above from October 2006.
Steps in north-east angle of west tower.
West tower and central wall, showing main entrance to the tower on its east side.

The east tower is in the foreground. Its entrance from the south is seen here in its west wall. Passage from the tower to the interior of the complex can be seen through the tower’s north side (right foreground). Beyond, the connecting wall runs away to the better preserved west tower.
West tower and the central wall connecting to the east tower.

Part of aqueduct that may have provided the water supply to La Cava from the Nicosia area.
LARNAKA
(Alike; Haliki; Salines; Salina; La Scala)

After the Genoese capture of Famagusta, Larnaka acquired importance as an alternative port in the south-eastern half of the Lusignans' kingdom, so it appears likely that it was first fortified during the ensuing fifty years. James I 'fece assai case et portal dentro a la torre de San Lazaro' ('made many houses and portals inside the tower of St Lazarus') which is most likely an allusion to a tower here, given Larnaka's connections with that saint.¹ There is a reference to 'the lodging of the tower' in respect of the Mamlûk attack of 1425.² Whether the tower in question may be associated with the Lusignan works within the present fort must remain open to debate. Oddly perhaps, there is no reference to a tower or castle in the narratives of visitors to the island in the Middle Ages, from which we can at least infer that it was indeed built late in our period and that it was not substantial enough to be especially remarkable.

The fortification has attracted almost no attention from modern scholars. Enlart, Jeffery and Megaw did not attempt descriptions and only very recently has Corvisier provided a study.³ His observation that, like Limassol, the fort that we see today was created out of the shell of a church, is interesting and worth considering.

As at Limassol, the remains of Lusignan work are now heavily encased in the artillery fortifications constructed by subsequent régimes, commencing with those of the Venetians.⁴ Like Limassol, it was located on the sea front, though unlike Limassol, it retains its place there now, reflecting still a fundamental reason for its foundation. The principal factor supporting Corvisier's view that the fort was first a church, is the vaulted projection that resembles an apse (2), which is set centrally on the east (sea)

¹ Amadi, p. 495.
³ Corvisier, in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 391-4.
⁴ Lusignan, Description, f. 23.
side. Externally, this was a five sided polygon. Corvisier noted that there are two polygonal towers on the northern part of Famagusta’s enceinte which are clearly not ecclesiastical in origin, but he thought that at Larnaka the positioning of the ‘apse’ in relation to the rest of the fort and its symmetry suggested that it may have first been built as the high altar end of a structure later converted for military use. Such an interpretation requires that the church lay with its length on an east-west axis and indeed Corvisier seemed to think this the case. There is some evidence for this. The foundations of parallel walls (7) may have been the longer north side of such a church: with an inner wall 0.8 m thick and an outer wall 2.0 m thick lying 3.5 m apart and connected by cross-walls 0.8 m thick, we may have an aisle of a Byzantine basilica. At a later date, however, no doubt when the building was established as a fortification, the overall plan was arranged so that its length lay on its north-south axis. On the west (landward) side, there is evidence of two inner walls standing within the current outer wall. Both are now merely of one course showing at ground level.
The outer of these is very thick (3), (2.06 m.) while the inner (4) ranges from 0.8m to 0.85 m wide. Was the inner wall the first perimeter of our fort and the outer a later strengthening either in the Lusignan period or subsequently? This inner wall ran from the current southern outer wall of the fort, northwards, prescribing a slight kink at approximately its mid-way point, for 41.86 m where it turned east on a right-angle (5). This long inner wall is 30.11 m. from the east (sea) wall, and so provides the length of what would have been the shorter north and south walls. These then are what appear to be the basic dimensions of the Lusignan rectangular fort.

This east (sea) side of the fort is the most heavily developed, yet we can trace some of the medieval work still. Internally, the ‘apse’ is half round and some 12 m. in its hemi-cylindrical diameter. Externally it measures 17 m. in diameter and, as noted earlier, it was polygonal to the field, prescribing its arc through five roughly equal sides, as may be seen from the surviving portion that protrudes through the artillery platform above. At that upper level, which is now somewhat higher than its medieval predecessor, we can see that the rubble wall of the apse was well finished with facing blocks. Whether it was left unroofed here, to serve as an open parapet, as Corvisier has suggested, is hard to say. Below, within the vault, each side was pierced by openings that he identified as archères rather than lights. His further identification of these as being stylistically Muslim work of the thirteenth century and comparable with those on one of the curtains at Kyrenia, is especially problematical. While it may perhaps be that Muslim characteristics of military architecture were adopted, that is as far as we can go. It is improbable that Muslim masons were involved and even more unlikely that any such work could be thirteenth century, given the total lack of historical evidence for any fortification in Lamaka as early as then. In this, it is notable that we may make a similar criticism of Corvisier’s dating of the building of the extant harbour fort at Paphos. There we have far more written evidence to infer a later date. It seems likely then that the Lusignan work at Larnaka is considerably later. Hinging onto the apse, at the upper level on the later artillery platform, it is also possible to discern the surviving top of the southern portion of the straight east wall (1), measuring 1.33 m. wide.

This whole eastern aspect of the fort was massively strengthened, mainly under Ottoman rule, to deal with the exigencies of gunpowder artillery warfare. All was
built out to the seaward in the interests of presenting solid, impenetrable bulk. This work included the blocking up of a wide spiral stair (6), which narrows to 1.7 m wide at its top, which emerged onto parapet level – only the upper steps now surviving to reflect a superseded arrangement for defence on this coastal side. The fort’s present walls on the other three sides appear to be post medieval. It is likely that the wall on south followed and contains its medieval precursor, those to the west and north lying beyond the likely line of the original building, as intimated above.6

5 Corvisier, in Vaivre and Plagneux, pp. 393-4.
6 This description is mainly the result of site visits of 27 Oct. 2005, 8 May 2006 and 15 October 2009.
East (seaward) wall showing main Venetian and Ottoman artillery block incorporating and masking the medieval pentagonal work on this side (2 on plan).

Interior of apse (2 on plan) from the Venetian ramp leading to terrace above.
Uppermost level of the medieval pentagonal work, protruding above the surface of the later artillery platform.

South end of the pentagonal work and adjoining wall (1 on plan). The raised walkway and sentinel turret on the south (left on the photograph) is later – Venetian/Ottoman work.
LIMASSOL

(Lemesos [Frankish]; Nimona, Nimocium [Latin]; Nemesos [Byzantine])

In the early part of our period, Limassol was the centre of a diocese and the island’s main port. Even after it was superseded in this respect around 1300, the town continued to prosper in the early decades of the fourteenth century. But from that time, it went into decline being particularly afflicted by earthquakes, as was the case with Paphos. Ludolf of Suchen (Sudheim) in Westphalia, who visited Limassol at some point between 1336 and 1341, wrote that it was ‘now laid waste by constant earthquakes’. Later Francesco Suriano of Venice who visited the town in 1484 wrote that it was ‘entirely destroyed and overthrown by wars and earthquakes’. Dietrich of Schachten similarly wrote of earthquake damage after his visit of 1491. Earthquakes are clearly the major explanation for the loss of most of the town’s medieval buildings. When Enlart visited it in the later nineteenth century, he considered that the castle we see today was the only surviving medieval monument. Although this is not altogether the case, plainly much has been destroyed. Gone now are the buildings of the diocese, of the parochial clergy, of various religious orders and perhaps the dwellings of those who served in the households of the urban nobility. Similarly the buildings of the military orders have vanished, though as we will see, it may be that the castle’s core is the solitary vestige of their works. This surviving and much altered castle was originally set close to a beach, probably much as the fortification at Larnaka still is. Land reclamation on Limassol’s sea-front has given it the appearance of being a little inland. In its day, it was flanked by the river Garyllis, which no doubt formed a protective screen on at least one side, but that too has changed when the river altered course to the west in the sixteenth century.

A study of the fortifications of Limassol is complicated by a number of other factors. First, it is not at all clear what existed on the eve of the Ricardian conquest of 1191.

1 Oliver of Paderborn (ed. Hoogweg), ch. 86, p. 279 and (ed. Peters), ch. 86, p. 136; Hill, 2, p. 87 for the particularly bad earthquake of 1222; Ludolf of Suchen in Cobham, p. 19; Francesco Suriano in Cobham, p. 48; Dietrich of Schachten in Grivaud, p. 133.
2 Enlart, p. 490; Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, pp. 64, 67, 73.
3 Steffan of Gumpenberg in Grivaud, p. 66; G. der Parthog, p. 96, and see map in Richard, p. 71.
Second, we have few historical reference points. Third, on occasion it is not possible to be sure of the structure that these references relate to— for, as will be shown, it is most likely that, like Acre and some Italian cities at this time, there were several fortified structures in the harbour-town during the period. Indeed, this is reflected in the diary notes of Ludolf of Suchen when he recorded that ‘many ... palaces and castles are seen there.’ 4 Historians have overlooked this and have tended to a view that we are looking at merely one fortification with different periods of development. They have identified this with the present ‘Limassol Castle’ and attempted to reconcile the time lines of its architectural features with our scanty literary evidence. A brief summary of these earlier attempts to describe the evolution of the ‘Lusignan’ castle is perhaps helpful background.

Precis of modern accounts

Camille Enlart’s detailed description and interpretation of the present castle’s building sequence appears to have been predicated on this assumption that there was only a single fortification. He identified an initial thirteenth-century phase in which a rectangular keep was constructed—the older, south-west tower of the present castle (1)—and that it then constituted a ground floor and an upper storey, connected by a spiral stairway (2) which continued up to roof level. In his view, this was later modified by turning the two floors into one and endowing the resulting single chamber with a vaulted ceiling supported by a central column and columns set in the sides and corners of the walls. Although he compared this work with that carried out at St Nicholas’ cathedral in Famagusta, which dates from 1311, he considered that this second phase could be much later, most likely being ‘the restoration carried out by James I’, or even fifteenth-century work. Enlart continued that the lower range (3) attached to north-east side of this keep was originally a hall or a chapel added at some point after the keep had been completed and that this range in turn was modified, again probably by James I, into two long parallel buildings, each of two storeys, enclosing a narrow courtyard, bound at its farther, north-east end, by a curtain wall. Enlart went on to comment that the Venetians removed the central column of the keep’s single chamber, added an additional, pointed barrel-vaulted floor above and

4 in Cobham, p. 19.
constructed a wholly new rectangular tower attached to the north-east end of the two storey range.\(^5\)

George Jeffery stressed that the early keep was likely but part of an altogether larger structure and he considered that it had a very close resemblance with the early fourteenth-century citadel at Famagusta. Like Enlart, he knew of a chronicle reference to work by King James I, but he did not follow Enlart in ascribing particular work to that King’s reign: indeed he saw the two storey range as constructed in the sixteenth century, when the whole complex was encased in 3 m thick walls against the exigencies of gunpowder artillery warfare.\(^6\)

Sir George Hill followed Enlart in his description of the castle in the thirteenth century. Like Enlart, Hill knew that in 1228 Frederick II had used a castle in Limassol as a prison, but unlike Enlart, he speculated that we might attribute this thirteenth-century work to that particular time.\(^7\) Perbellini\(^8\) in turn followed Hill, and Kristian Molin too followed in the same mould – that the present castle’s ‘oldest remaining parts … consists of a square two-storey keep … and appears to date from the early crusader period’.\(^9\) Enlart had merely noted Stephen of Lusignan’s assertion that a Limassol castle had been built by Guy of Lusignan in or around 1193, ‘pource que c’estoit le lieu en Cypre plus proche de la Terre-saincte’, but Molin appears to have taken this reference at face value in his argument that the first Lusignan created a simple tower here, as he held Guy also did at Paphos, Famagusta and Nicosia.\(^10\)

In his 1977 summary of the island’s military architecture, Megaw found that the history and development of fortification in Limassol was not as straightforward as these authors believed. His view was that it was not possible to say whether the castle of 1228 was an old Byzantine structure or a new Frankish building. Based on his reading of Enlart, he recognised the existence of a Templar fortification in the town and speculated that our castle of 1228 ‘seems to have passed to the Templars, only to

\(^5\) Enlart, pp. 488-494.
\(^6\) Jeffery, pp. 368-9.
\(^7\) Hill, 2, pp. 15-16.
\(^8\) Perbellini, 1973, pp. 45-6.
\(^9\) Molin, Clermont, p. 192.
\(^10\) Enlart, p. 488; Lusignan, Description, f. 123; Molin, Clermont, p. 192; Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 124, and see History, above, p. 12.
revert to the crown on their suppression’. Megaw believed that this castle was
destroyed in a Genoese attack on the town in 1373, no doubt to accommodate
references we have to the construction of a new castle by both James I and Janus. This
new castle, Megaw wrote, was constructed in the shell of a Templar or Hospitaller
thirteenth-century church; its western bay being converted into a ‘keep’ ‘of three or
more floors’. He believed that its upper parts were destroyed in the Mamlûk attack of
1425, the rest being preserved in the later thick encasing wall built, as he considered,
by the Turks.\footnote{Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 198-9; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 54.}

All these commentaries have now been superseded by the detailed architectural study
undertaken by Christian Corvisier and Nicolas Faucherre, published in 2000, and
subsequently summarised in 2006.\footnote{Corvisier and Faucherre, Une Chapelle Templier; Corvisier, Le Château de Limassol, in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 395-399. See too Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 54-5 with reference to J. Last’s detailed set of plans that Corvisier and Faucherre did not see.} Their investigations uncovered a more complex
building history for the structure currently called Limassol Castle than had hitherto
been appreciated. A brief summary of their work is provided here.
LIMASSOL

FIRST FLOOR

GROUND FLOOR

Phase 1 (13th century)
Phase 2 (End of the 13th century to the beginning of the 14th century?)
Phase 3 (End of the 14th century?)
Phase 4 (15th century?)
Phase 5 (End of the 16th century?)
Phase 6 (Beginning of the 17th century?)
They identified that in origin, it was a church or chapel of the first third of the thirteenth century, externally measuring 38 m long and 14.3 m wide with walls about 2 m thick. It consisted of three sections or bays and terminated at its north-east end with a flattened chevet or apse. They noted that this chapel bears comparison with the chapels within the Hospitaler castles at Margat and Crac des Chevaliers and with the chapel in the Templar castle of Tortosa, which is of the same length, has similar sections or bays, a flattened chevet and no external buttressing. In a second building campaign, dated to the second half of the thirteenth century, a dividing wall was constructed that separated the section or bay at the south-west end of the building. This section was transformed into a two-storey *reduit* or tower (1). Its upper storey, reached by means of a spiral stair (2) at its south-west corner, was equipped with five *archères*—which Corvisier and Faucherre noted bear comparison with those in the Templar castle of Tortosa, the chamber and *archères* generally being also comparable with those in the corner towers of Famagusta castle, built a little after 1300. The remaining two sections of the building (3) may have continued in use as a chapel or church, but equally may have fallen out of use and gradually become ruined.

Corvisier and Faucherre's third phase of building work was mainly the transformation of the tower into one storey by the insertion of columns and the creation of its vault of pointed arches in four quarters as noted by our earlier observers. As we mentioned earlier, Enlart had felt that, on balance, this building programme was late fourteenth-century work: a conclusion endorsed by Corvisier and Faucherre inasmuch as it bears comparison with the royal *donjon* of Vincennes built by Charles V when *dauphin*. Like Megaw, they assumed that the Genoese attack on the town in 1373 involved substantial damage to the castle, including perhaps the collapse of at least a part of the vault supporting the tower's upper storey and that therefore this is the new work carried out by King James I as reported in the Strambaldi variant of Makhairas' chronicle. One difficulty here however, which Corvisier and Faucherre concede, is that this interpretation of the building work rendered the upper-storey *archères* redundant and resulted in a structure that was admittedly more robust but was poorly equipped with defensive devices. If this building phase was a response to Genoese vandalism, it is odd that the modifications resulted in such a passive fortification.

This work on the tower at the south-west end of the complex was followed, perhaps not until the fifteenth century, by converting the disused remaining portion of the
building into a two storey range which was assigned to storage functions, although its roof carried a defensible wall walk gained through the tower's spiral stair. The close similarity of this range's chambers with those on the ground floor at mid-fifteenth-century Kolossi, noted earlier by Enlart, may give some indication of the time of construction. Unlike Enlart however, Corvisier and Faucherre did not consider the creation of prison cells in this range to be an aspect of Lusignan fourteenth-century work, but rather a feature created when the complex was turned into the artillery fortress that it appears as today. They viewed this not as a Venetian initiative, the Venetians having dismantled the castle after 1538, but rather a Turkish work, built very early in their occupation of the island.

Corvisier and Faucherre's work is a formidable piece of architectural analysis and their proffered conclusions provocative. The hypothesis that they present 'à la sagacité des historiens' is that the castle, of which this chapel formed a part, was built by the Templars, that it came into the hands of the Crown on the suppression of the Order in 1308, and that a sizeable royal castle must have existed elsewhere. However, there are difficulties with this interpretation. First, although they acknowledged that the early thirteenth-century three-bayed chapel had affinities with Hospitaller chapels in Syria, as well as with Templar Tortosa, they did not extend such a comparative study to other chapels. Such a study shows what difficult ground this is on which to adduce a provenance. No comparison was drawn, for example, with two small churches in Famagusta which Enlart theorised belonged to the two Orders. Like the present Limassol 'castle' in its first stage, both consist of a single nave with an apse, and like Limassol, the older and larger constitutes three bays. Enlart took this to be Templar, but this was merely his speculation, long since repudiated. The other, which Enlart dated to the fourteenth century and assigned to the Hospitallers – reasonably so in this case to judge by the St. John's Cross on both the lintel over the entrance and that carved on the exterior of its south wall - was 'built on the lines of a tower'. Clearly both are similar to Limassol in such basic characteristics but there are also dissimilarities, for example in the more pronounced apses of the Famagusta buildings and in the larger church's buttresses and its fine

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13 see especially pp. 347 and 370.
14 Enlart, pp. 290-3. See too Otten-Froux, Famagouste, pp. 147; 149-52; Edbury, Famagusta, p. 345; Luttrell, p. 170.
ribbed cross-vaults. Even if we could be certain who built the older chapel in Famagusta, however, this in itself would not tell us positively that they also built the chapel at Limassol. Similarly, no comparison was drawn with the Crusader chapel in Sahyun — which interestingly is of approximately similar dimensions (internally 29.85 x 9 compared to Limassol’s 32.8 x 10.15), having four bays and an apse. Crusader Sahyun’s chapel must of course be twelfth century and so slightly earlier than the core of the present castle at Limassol. However, the point inferred here is that while it seems clear that the inspiration for Latin church architecture in thirteenth-century Cyprus came from Latin Syria, stylistically, it appears difficult to sustain the argument that Limassol’s origins are incontestably of the military orders. Corvisier’s own analogy of Limassol’s tall windows to those in the abbey church at Bellapais is another example of a detail that argues against an exclusive match with Templar architectural characteristics. In general, Pringle’s recent survey of Crusader Castle chapels reinforces this reluctance to accept Corvisier and Faucherre’s hypothesis. In particular, Pringle has shown that Templar and for that matter Hospitaller chapels, frequently varied in style and location within a castle. The absence of absolute consistency in building castle chapels surely detracts significantly from the weight of the argument above adduced for a Templar origin for Limassol.

A possible further difficulty with Corvisier and Faucherre’s interpretation of the physical evidence relates to two features of the range lying to the north-east of what became the main tower. On its north side, immediately adjacent to the present entrance to the castle (4), the surviving half of an attractively moulded pointed arch supported by a decorated capital is preserved in a subsequent wall. The remaining half of a smaller round arch with a different moulding also supported by a decorated capital showing through a later wall is easily seen in the south of the range (5). Both were most likely constructed as parts of a church or chapel so it is pertinent to infer a date for their construction. Corvisier and Faucherre appear to consider them to be early thirteenth century and therefore integral elements of their first building phase but the arch on the north side (4) at least may well be later. If so, this would suggest that the two remaining bays of the original three bay chapel not only continued in use, but were enhanced, thus emphasising the ecclesiastical nature of the overall structure,

15 See the ground plan in Pringle, The Chapels in the Byzantine Castle of Sahyun, p. 107.
16 Pringle, Castle Chapels in the Frankish East, pp. 27-33.
as against a military one. Corvisier and Faucherre's argument for a Templar origin for the castle on historical evidence is similarly impossible to prove or disprove. It is to this that we now turn.

**Historical references and the historical context 1191 - 1489**

We have only slight evidence for any Byzantine fortification in Limassol. There appears to be no direct allusion to any military work there prior to the sources that deal with Richard I's invasion. Similarly, there is no information that any effort which Isaac Comnenus made to improve the port's defences against King Richard had anything to do with a castle; indeed his initiatives in this respect seem to have been limited to simple barricades. As noted in the History, we do have two references to a castle on the occasion of Richard's attack, one of which is of no value taken by itself. Nevertheless, on historical grounds alone, it would be surprising if there had been no castle or fort there, given that Limassol was plainly a conspicuously important port and staging post on the sea lane that hugged the island's southern shore. Even so, any Byzantine fortification was clearly of little significance. It appears likely that King Richard had designated Limassol as his invasion point in his probable plan to capture Cyprus; he would hardly have done this had Limassol been as well fortified as, for example, Kyrenia may have been.

We do not know whether the chapel in Limassol in which Richard of England married Berengaria of Navarre was in a castle. Similarly, it is not possible either to accept or reject Stephen of Lusignan's late sixteenth-century report that Guy 'y bastit un chasteau', in 1193. If this occurred, it must have been a structure quite distinct from the present 'castle' and hence lost. As noted in the History, Wilbrand of Oldenburg visited the port in 1211 and reported that it was 'non multum munita', which does not encourage a view that the Lusignans had indeed achieved much by then.
Our next reference to a fortification is from Philip of Novara in relation to the arrival of the Emperor, Frederick II in Limassol in 1228. Philip recorded that Frederick himself stayed at a manor near the town but that he imprisoned his hostages in ‘la tour de l’Ospitau, quy estoit forte et plus près de sa navie’. This appears to be good evidence that the Hospitallers had created a ‘strong house’ in or very near the port by this time. Certainly they had earlier acquired houses, streets and a garden in Limassol by grant of Hugh I in September, 1210, this making Limassol their main base on the island.

One assumes that Frederick simply commandeered the Tower against the Hospitallers’ wishes, for both they and the Templars sided with the Ibelins in the ensuing wars. Given the likelihood that the Templars obtained most of their lands, including their property in Limassol, just after 1191, no doubt as a consequence of their ceding the island to Guy of Lusignan, it is most probable that a Templar ‘strong house’ had also been created in Limassol by 1228. Although we cannot be certain, it appears likely that Limassol also became the Templars’ main base in Cyprus at this early point in the thirteenth century.

Yet although it would have been wholly natural for the two Orders to have maintained structures of some note, it is reasonably clear that none of these that may have existed in this initial part of our period could have been extensive. Neither the Hospitallers nor the Templars are likely to have maintained a substantial military establishment in Cyprus prior to 1291. Their interests in developing fortifications were focused wholly on the mainland, Cyprus being principally a source of revenue to support that enterprise. In general, it appears that both Orders were on good terms with the Lusignans in this earlier part of the century and it may be that in consequence, the King considered the defences of the town adequately catered for. At any rate, it is noteworthy that there is no allusion to any fortifications in Limassol in a number of commentaries that date from later in the thirteenth century. Thus, it has recently been noted that there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of a castle in a Venetian

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25 Novara, § 34 (130), Melani, p. 96; and following Novara – Florio Bustron, p. 69.
26 Riley-Smith, p. 505; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 191, fn. 7; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 156-7.
27 Riley-Smith, p. 165; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 192; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 158-9.
28 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, pp. 191, fn. 7 and 195.
29 Gilmour-Bryson, pp 15-16; 57.
30 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 192.
memorandum of 1243/4 concerning Limassol. Similarly there are no references to any fortifications in the sources that deal with Louis IX’s expedition of 1248-9 when he used Limassol as his primary base for his crusading activities. He landed here on 27 September 1248 and stayed near the town – in ‘Camenoriaqui’, or ‘Kamevoriak proper Nicocium’ arranging for the storage of his wine and grain ‘in the middle of the fields, close to the shore’. Louis stayed on the island over the winter, ultimately leaving, again from Limassol, on 20 May 1249. Likewise in a description of the island’s principal towns and fortifications later in the century, the Templar of Tyre refers to Limassol but not to any fortification it possessed.

To what extent, if at all, was any Templar ‘house’ in Limassol affected by the dispute that arose with the Crown in 1275? We know that in 1279, Hugh III ordered the confiscation of all Templar estates on the island and the destruction of their fortresses. Most of our sources for this add that accordingly, the Limassol ‘house’ was indeed razed, but it is not necessarily the case that this in fact took place: in Henry II’s instructions to his ambassadors at the papal curia concerning his complaints against the Templars, it was noted that, though the fortresses had indeed been razed, the ‘houses’ had remained untouched.

Just how long the Templars remained in disfavour and their estates sequestrated, has been a matter of debate, but it would appear that they regained their property at some point between the accession of Henry II in 1285 and the withdrawal from Acre in 1291. This is reflected in Templar trial testimonies to Templar gatherings and a Templar house in Limassol in 1291 and 1304, and elsewhere. Templar, and for that matter, Hospitaller relations with the Crown, could not have been helped by the

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31 Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 51.
32 Joinville, pp. 197-200; Templar of Tyre, §§ 261-3, p. 21; Rothelin Continuation, pp. 67, 69, 90; Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, p. 79, fn. 10; Duby, passim.
33 Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119.
35 Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 129-30.
38 Gilmour-Bryson, p. 16; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 132; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 193.
39 Nicosia 1291; Khiroukia; Famagusta. – Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 131-2; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 193.
arrival in Cyprus of many more personnel of the Orders on their flight from Acre in 1291 and it may be that as a result, some tension remained between the Templars and to a lesser extent the Hospitallers, with the King, right up until Amaury's take-over in 1306. Quite probably as a result, Henry II would have attempted to preclude any initiative of the Orders to strengthen their bases in Limassol, while on the other hand, the Templars especially may now have felt the need to possess a defensible structure more than before.

The evacuation from the mainland in 1291 had considerable significance for Limassol, the two Orders' principal bases on the island becoming their international headquarters. In 1291 the Templars located their Convent here and in 1292 the Hospitallers followed suit. Similarly the Teutonic Knights and the Order of St. Thomas the Martyr of Canterbury established their main bases here. Mention has been made of sizeable Templar gatherings in Limassol at this time - if they had not created a fortified building earlier in our period, it would seem likely that one may have been built at this point, for the trial testimonies of the Templars suggest that one was in existence by the time of their suppression at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Set against this, the narrative sources do not suggest that this could - even now - have been primarily military in nature. In writing of the Templars' suppression in Cyprus in 1308, both Amadi and Bustron refer to it variously as casa, mason and monasterio, and as we shall see, it is only Bustron who, in his introductory description of the island - talks of a castellum. For their part, the Hospitallers do not seem to have extended whatever fortification they possessed - rather they built a new hospital for pilgrims in the town in 1296 and we know that in 1304 they were engaged in efforts to enlarge this base.

Other 'evidence' of Templar or Hospitaller military work at this period immediately after 1291 is unreliable. The report of a visitor to Cyprus in the 1480s, that the two

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40 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 193-4; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 135- 8; Gilmour-Bryson, pp. 16-17.
42 Richard, p. 69.
43 For the trial testimonies – Gilmour-Bryson, p. 16; nb too – Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p.192.
44 Amadi, pp. 287-9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 24, 167-70.
45 Riley-Smith, pp. 205, 505.
Orders, along with the Teutonic Knights, all took part in fortifying the town, is – on balance – too suspect to be taken at face value.\textsuperscript{46} The grave slab to a Hospitaller of Margat now housed in the castle quite likely dates from about this time and interestingly it carries a depiction of a castle with three towers with crenellations standing on a small battered plinth. Of course neither its presence in the castle, nor its engraving necessarily imply that our present castle was Hospitaller or then appeared as such.\textsuperscript{47} 

\begin{center}
\textbf{ICIGIST: DI-	extsc{REN}GY:\n\textit{D. MARGAT: AVSEJ PIE}}
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Engraving on the grave slab to a Hospitaller of Margat now housed in the castle.

\textsuperscript{46} Felix Faber, in Cobham, pp. 45-6, more fully discussed below.
\textsuperscript{47} See sketch.
However the relationship of King Henry II and the Templars and Hospitallers may have developed after 1291, and whatever stimuli the Orders had to enlarge their buildings – and for King Henry to restrain them – all was changed by Amaury’s *putsch* in 1306. Still, there is no evidence that the struggle between the King and his brother involved either Order to such an extent that they may have looked to commission the construction of fortifications in Limassol or elsewhere. Although the Templars at least helped Amaury’s party in intimidating the King to stay shut up in his palace in Nicosia early in 1308, that apart, the two Orders appear to have done little more than to have helped in mediation between Henry II and his brothers. Of course, it is more likely that Amaury’s subsequent manoeuvrings that commenced in May, 1308 first to arrest the Templars and confiscate their property moving through to the opening of the formal hearings against them in 1310, prompted the Order to strengthen its bases, especially its headquarters in Limassol, but there is no evidence for this, which is significant given the good coverage for this period provided by Amadi.\(^48\)

Shortly afterwards, the Temple was dissolved and its properties and estates confiscated, most if not all being given to the Hospitallers. Corvisier and Faucherre pointed to a very considerable stock of armour and weapons that was found in Limassol and suggested that this must have been housed in a castle of some consequence.\(^49\) But what happened to this Templar establishment in Limassol? Was it taken into the possession of the Lusignans and later adapted by them, evolving into the building we see today, as Corvisier and Faucherre suggest, or did it instead pass to the Hospitallers and subsequently disappear, the ‘castle’ we see today being instead derived from a different origin, such as the Hospitaller tower of 1228?

The view that a Templar structure became Limassol’s royal castle is derived from the one solitary reference made by Florio Bustron, noted earlier, *via* Camille Enlart.\(^50\)

Corvisier and Faucherre’s argument depends so heavily on this single reference that it is worth analysing it in detail. Enlart took Bustron to say that the castle had been

\(^{48}\) Riley-Smith, p. 215; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, pp. 193-4; Edbury, The Suppression of the Templars, pp. 29-33; Gilmour-Bryson, pp. 16-17; Coureas, *Latin Church*, pp. 135 – 8.


\(^{50}\) Fl. Bustron, p. 24; Enlart, p. 488.
seized by the Crown in 1308; what Bustron says is that ‘A Limiso era un’ castello di Templieri, fatto con grande ingegno, et artificio, cosa fortissima; et dopo distrutti li cavalieri di quella religion, rimase il castello al publico, …’. Bustron held office under the Venetians, so it is probably the case that he used the word ‘publico’ here in the sense of ‘state’, or for our purposes ‘the Crown’. Elsewhere, Bustron provides detailed lists of Templar properties, including ‘castles’, in Cyprus that passed to the Hospitallers. Many of these properties appear to have been estates or manors in the Limassol area, but there is no mention in this list of a Limassol castle. On this basis, Enlart’s interpretation of Bustron does not seem unreasonable. There are however reasons to be careful about accepting this.

First, as a source, Bustron is rather late for our purposes here. Second, as we have noted, he is inconsistent in his own references to what the Templars held in Limassol. Third, his two lists (of 1307 and 1313) of Templar properties taken over by the Hospitallers conflate properties already owned by the Hospitallers, so there is a simple issue of his reliability. Fourth, the absence of a comparable statement in his principal known and extant source, Amadi, makes the dependability of this statement even more debatable. Fifth, we know from a papal grant that by 1319 the Templar ‘domum de Nimocia’ in Limassol had passed to the Hospitallers, and it may be questionable whether the Templars could have held this as well as a castle. It is also worth noting that if the Crown did obtain a Templar Limassol castle at this time, it must have done so either in defiance or with the special permission of the Vatican, as in 1312 and 1313, Pope Clement V ordered that all Templar property apart from that in the Iberian peninsula should be granted to the Hospital. By comparing known Hospitaller estates and property in the thirteenth with their holdings in the fourteenth centuries, it is clear that the Hospital was indeed the principal beneficiary of the suppression of the Temple. Indeed, so far as we know, only one Templar estate – Psimolophou – definitely was assigned elsewhere. Still, could a Templar castle in Limassol have been an exception?

51 op. cit. pp. 170-1, 246-7.
52 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p.191, fn. 7; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125; Claverie, L’Ordre du Temple (2005), pp. 322-3.
53 Grant of Pope John XXII to Maurice de Pagnac, Preceptor General of the Hospital, 1 March 1319, in Richard, Chypre, pp. 115-7.
54 Fl. Bustron, p. 170; Riley-Smith, p. 217; Gilmour-Bryson, pp. 17, 246-7; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 191; Edbury, The Suppression of the Templars, p. 37.
Given the problems with Bustron's statement as recited above, we have to allow for the possibility that there was no Templar castellum as such and that, as Luttrell speculated, Bustron knew of a Templar chapel encased in a later castle built by others, and mistakenly took this to be evidence of a Templar castle.\(^5\) Ultimately, we do not have clear evidence either to contradict or totally accept Florio Bustron's statement. Would the King have now wanted or needed a castle in Limassol? If we assume that the Lusignans had hitherto been content to leave the defensive capacities of Limassol to the military orders, we might speculate as to whether there was now cause to change this policy. In this it is helpful to bear in mind that the Hospitallers captured the island of Rhodes in 1307, taking the city perhaps a little later and in 1309 transferred their headquarters there, thus effectively downgrading the importance of Limassol.\(^6\) The Hospitaller Commandery of Cyprus became centred at Kolossi, so their establishment at Limassol must have lessened quite substantially. In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Hospitallers would have found any additional fortification in Limassol of much value for their own use and accordingly they may have farmed it out or come to some arrangement with the King.

In sum, it is plain that at least one of the 'towers' or 'strong houses' of the two military orders has wholly disappeared. There were certainly other such buildings in Limassol that have also vanished, one being a 'Genoese tower', which must have stood on land granted to them in 1218. In 1293/4 this was attacked by a force of 25 Venetian galleys that 'knocked down the crenellations'. That force then went on to destroy the Genoese loggia in Limassol which appears to have been a separate building.\(^7\) Ludolph of Suchem wrote of the 'palaces and castles' of both the Templars and Hospitallers and 'other nobles and burghers...still seen to this day' on his visit in 1336 or shortly after.\(^8\) But apart from Stephen of Lusignan's uncorroborated statement, we have no evidence of a distinct royal castle in Limassol in the thirteenth century; ultimately Corvisier's and Faucherre's assertion to the contrary is speculation. Their architectural analysis does support the view, however, that the

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\(^6\) Riley-Smith, pp. 215-6, 332.  
\(^7\) Templar of Tyre, § 538, p. 132; Mas Latrie, 2, pp. 39, 51-5; Hill, 2, 208; Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, p. 112.  
\(^8\) Ludolph von Suchem, trans. in Stewart, p. 40 and in Cobham, p. 19.
royal castle of the later medieval period was an adaptation of an earlier building which was perhaps, though not necessarily, of one of the military orders.

Apart from Ludolph of Suchem’s imprecise allusion (above), we have no historical material that attests the existence or ownership for any castle or fortification in Limassol from the time of the suppression of the Templars and the grant of their estates to the Hospital of 1312, until the recurring wars with Genoa much later in the fourteenth century. Thus for instance, an unknown Englishman who visited Cyprus in 1344 was struck by the fortifications of Famagusta, but of Limassol could only write of its wine, bread and charming inhabitants. Indeed, towards the beginning of the century, it appears that the Crown itself acknowledged that the harbour was without defences. Limassol does not appear to have shared the economic boom enjoyed by Famagusta that generated the development of the castle and city walls at that port. However, like Famagusta and the rest of Cyprus, from about the 1340s, Limassol’s prosperity went into marked decline. With the passing of the military orders, it seems that there was simply no stimulus to invest in lordly residences and symbolic or actual fortifications.

Full-scale war with Genoa erupted in 1373. One of the Genoese’ first assaults was concentrated on Limassol, which they pillaged and sacked. They freed a number of prisoners who had been detained in the town and it may be this that has led some scholars to conclude that this attack involved the capture of the castle. It has been further inferred that the Genoese must have then slighted the castle, as it later became one of the sites which were fortified or refortified at the instigation of James I. The Genoese attack of 1373 may not, however, have had any impact on a castle in Limassol; indeed on historical grounds alone, we have no evidence that one was even in commission at the time. Both Makhairas and Florio Bustron report that Limassol was sacked but neither makes any reference to a castle. Given that both chroniclers make a point of doing exactly this with regard to the successful Genoese assault on the fortifications of Paphos – the next episode in the Genoese razzia – it is reasonable

59 Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, p. 446; Western Pilgrims, p. 58.
60 Mas Latrie, pp. 170-1.
to consider that any Limassol fortification in 1373 was inconspicuous at best and played no part in what occurred.6¹

The narrative sources that cover the last quarter of the fourteenth century contain various information on building work at various locations carried out by King James I whose personal reign commenced in 1385 upon his return to Cyprus from detention in Genoa. Although some of this work was purely for domestic purposes, most of it involved the creation of new fortifications or repair of old fortifications as a reaction to the Genoese who had, by this time, established their own territory based on Famagusta. Limassol is not specifically mentioned in the list of these buildings recorded by Amadi, or his follower, Fl. Bustron, but it is mentioned in the Strambaldi variant of Makhairas’ chronicle. This specifies ‘il castello de Limisso, qual fece fabricar re Zac.’6² Taken literally, this comment suggests that King James had Limassol Castle built de novo but it is unlikely that there was any major work. On the one hand, he may have had cause to establish a royal castle here for the loss of Famagusta and the threat posed by the Genoese meant that the Lusignans had need to develop an alternative defended coastal commercial outlet. However, continued economic decay and urban depopulation were serious problems.6³ Limassol itself was particularly affected: it was described by the Lord of Anglure (Marne) as ‘for the most part uninhabited...destroyed by the Genoese’ when he stayed there briefly in 1395.6⁴ We may doubt then whether King James considered that investing in major works at Limassol was an efficient use of his resources, especially bearing in mind that these were seriously attenuated in any event because of the heavy financial indemnities imposed on him by the Genoese. It may well be then that James’ work was of a limited nature. In any event, he would surely have concentrated expenditure purely on fortification work. If this is so, it is not altogether easy to equate this work with the development identified in Corvisier’s and Faucherre’s third building period of the extant castle.6⁵

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6¹ Makhairas, § 377, pp. 357-9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 300-1; Enlart, p. 488.
6² Amadi’s list is on p. 495; Fl. Bustron’s on p. 352; Strambaldi, p. 277.
6³ see above, History, pp. 55-6.
6⁴ in Cobham, p. 28.
Apparently this castle did not impress Makhairas when describing its part in the war with Genoa in 1408: 66

(And the castle was weak, because it was not prepared for war. And as soon as the garrison saw them,) they made a promise to hand over the castle after two months. 67

It was during this war with Genoa that gunpowder artillery was first employed in the island and to assist in their attempt on Limassol, the Genoese had 'un gran pezzo d'artiglieria' 68 transported from Famagusta. In the event, the King's forces acted with celerity and with the aid of a Venetian named Carlo Zeno, the Seneschal of Cyprus led a force to the castle's relief and overwhelmed the Genoese, inflicting a number of casualties on them, capturing the artillery piece and taking eighty prisoners. Howbeit, peace seems to have been quickly restored. 69

The town and castle were prominent targets in the Mamlûk attacks of 1424-6. As we noted above (p. 47), in September 1424, they attacked the town where they were opposed by forces under Philip Provosto and Philip Picquigny. After what seems to have been a brief fight, the Cypriot forces withdrew into the castle from which they mounted a resistance. The Mamlûk force was, however, too small to entertain the possibility of attacking the castle and harried by a small squadron of vessels led by Thomas Provosto, they moved off west to plunder Kouklia. 70

Upon the approach of the much larger Mamlûk force in August 1425, the Cypriots in Limassol led by the balio (Amadi) or castellano (Bustron) - Stephen of Vicenza - again withdrew into the castle. We are told that a number of Muslim slaves who had worked on the castle either defected to the Mamlûks - or were ransomed by them - and that these slaves pointed out a weak spot in a wall where a window had been poorly blocked up with earth and stone. The Mamlûks trained a bombard - 'una

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66 for this date, see History, fn. 151 above. The sources are Makhairas, § 635, p. 621; Amadi p. 498; and Fl. Bustron, p. 355.
67 Makhairas, § 635, p. 621. See above, History, p. 29, fn 95 above and Dawkins, Makhairas, 2, pp. 18 - 22.
69 Makhairas,§ 635, p. 621; Amadi, p. 498; Fl. Bustron, p. 355.
70 Makhairas, § 651-2, pp. 631-3; Amadi, p. 500; Fl. Bustron, pp. 356-7; Petite Chronique, pp. 324, 337; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri and Salih B.Yahya, Arab Sources, pp. 96, 103; Ziada, 1, pp. 93-4; Hill, 2, p. 470; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 225.
bombarda’ (Amadi) – ‘un pezzo d’arteglieria’ (Bustron) against this weak spot, effecting a breach, through which their forces effected an entry, killing Vicenza and his men.\textsuperscript{71} The Mamlûk reprisals of 1424 and 1425 were not campaigns of conquest, but rather raids to pillage and lay waste. It is likely then that the Mamlûks took the opportunity to damage the castle while it was in their hands and indeed the Arab sources record that ‘the upper part of the castle’ was destroyed.\textsuperscript{72} In any event, it must have been abundantly clear to King Janus that the next Mamlûk attack would similarly focus on Limassol and the southern littoral; although Limassol was clearly decayed, we may imagine that wholesale evacuation was not an alternative. It was paramount that the King could be seen to be able to defend his Kingdom, as his efforts against the Mamlûks in 1426 attest. In the circumstances, it may well be that there were hurried attempts to refortify the castle after the Mamlûks had left in 1425. This is reflected in Arab sources that comment that on landing by Limassol on 1 July, 1426, the Mamlûks were surprised to see that the castle had been thoroughly repaired and given a new moat. Such repairs may also be reflected in Makhairas’ comment that the Mamlûks ‘attacked the castle of Lemeso, which had been built by King Janus’.\textsuperscript{73} In 1426, however, the Mamlûks had determined on subjugating the Kingdom: their forces that year were consequently very considerable and no doubt in consequence, the castle fell in no more than a couple of days – on 3 July – ‘con facilita’, apparently by simple escalade. Once again, as seems likely, it appears that they may have damaged the castle during the few days that they retained it. Arab sources comment that it was slighted, although Stephen of Lusignan’s assertion that they completely destroyed it is plainly an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{71} Makhairas, §§ 657, 659, pp. 635-7; Strambaldi variant of Makhairas, p. 270; Amadi, p. 501; Fl. Bustron, p. 358; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri, Salih B.Yahya, al-Maqrizi and Ibn Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 97, 106, 122, 128; Enlart, p. 488; Ziada, 1, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{72} Salih B. Yahya, Arab Sources, p. 106, followed by Hill, 2, p. 473 and Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 199.

\textsuperscript{73} Makhairas, § 672, p. 653; Ziada, 1, p. 100. Hill , 2, p. 477.

\textsuperscript{74} Makhairas, §§ 672-674, pp. 653-5; Amadi, pp. 504-5; Fl. Bustron, pp. 361-2; Petite Chronique, pp. 325, 337; Chronica Byzantina Breviora, in Boustronios, p. 249; Lusignan, Description, f. 155; Chorographia – Grivaud, f. 59 a; Chorography – Wallace, §§ 341-2, p. 200; Salih B.Yahya, Ibn Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 108, 129; Ziada, 1, p. 101; Hill, 2, p. 477 and fns. 1 and 2.
In May, 1452, the castle was captured by a ruse by a Genoese force led by one Damiano Lomellini. This force could not have been large as it was transported by a single vessel only, but the castle itself was poorly guarded and the Lusignan ‘garrison’ was evidently easily persuaded to give it up. The administration in Famagusta took over responsibility for the Genoese establishment in their new acquisition, drawing up “statutes” for its maintenance and its garrisoning by a force of 25 soldiers led by a Captain. Damiano Lomellini himself became the first Captain and appears to have remained in charge until 1455 after which appointments seem to have been made for periods of a year at a time. As was the case with the Captaincy of Famagusta, to which the Captaincy of Limassol was subordinated, this office constituted two roles, being the military responsibility of châtelain and the civil one of consul. The soldiers, on the other hand, served for three months at a time only, reflecting the need to rotate this garrison that needed to be vigilant against a likely Lusignan attempt to retake the castle.

The Genoese records also provide detailed information on the names of members of the garrison, how much they were paid, (and it is notable that their rate was slightly higher than that of the Genoese in the Famagusta garrison), the offices that some performed, such as a sub castellanus, a barber, cook, drummer, firearms specialist, a ‘sarbatanerius’, a page for the Captain, and so on. In addition we know something of the cost of food for the garrison and for the upkeep of the Captain’s two horses. In sum, it is clear that all was a considerable expense for the Republic, but that it considered this worthwhile, providing a bargaining tool to make the King pay his debts. It appears to have remained in Genoese hands at least until 1460-1, perhaps even later, for there is no reference to Limassol Castle in the context of the civil war of 1460-64, possibly implying it was in ‘neutral’ hands at that time. 75

The regulations set out within these ‘statutes’ reflect a natural preoccupation with security and it would be surprising therefore if the Genoese omitted to maintain at least the fabric of the fortifications, though we have no information to that effect. Unlike Famagusta however, they do not seem to have regarded their tenure of Limassol as permanent, so it seems unlikely that they would commit to any notable

75 Otten-Froux, Limassol, passim.
building work. Certainly the fortifications that the Venetians inherited were not
considered to be of any value to them in the sixteenth century.76

The diary notes of visitors provide mixed evidence of the state of the castle. On his
visit in 1449-50, Steffan of Gumpenberg noted that ‘der König hat gar ein schön
Castel da gebauwet, das ligt in einer schönen begend, und hat die eine Seiten das
Meer, darnach ein schön Gebirg mit Weinwachss.’ 77 His description of the castle as
beautiful or pretty is perhaps unhelpful but certainly does not convey any impression
of strength. A similar view may be derived from the words of Pierre Barbatre, who
passed through Limassol in 1480: he noted ‘seullement ung petit chasteau’, which like
the rest of the town, had been ‘destruitte et arrazee par les Infideles’.78 As we saw
above, in 1484, Francesco Suriano of Venice also remarked on the ruinous state of the
town.79

More interesting however are the words of Felix Faber, a Dominican friar from Ulm
who also visited Cyprus in the early 1480s. Although he found the place to be in
ruins, he recorded his belief that the Templar, Hospitaller and Teutonic Orders had
earlier taken ‘possession of it, and fortified it with walls and towers, especially the
port, near which they built a very strong castle, facing the sea on one side.’ Faber’s
testimony is suspect in a number of respects of course – for one thing it was written a
long time after such a concentrated building programme could have been expected to
occur. It ascribes a role to the Teutonic Order which seems hardly credible, and third,
Faber is in error in stating that the Orders’ migration to Cyprus was the consequence
of Saladin’s capture of Jerusalem.80 It is of possible value, however, in confirming the
location of the castle by the sea and in its reference to the existence of a number of
towers. This point is most interesting as it strengthens the view that there were indeed
several towers in Limassol of which our much altered surviving castle was just one.
Whether Faber’s words also convey his belief that Limassol had been a walled town is

76 as above, History, pp. 43-6, 57.
77 in Grivaud, p. 66.
78 in Grivaud, p. 98.
79 in Cobham, p. 48.
80 in Cobham, pp. 45-6 - taken from C.D. Hassler’s 3 vol. edition of 1843-1849. Felix added his
description of Cypriot monuments to the end of his work. This element was omitted in A. Stewart’s
translation for the Library of the Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, 7 to 10, (London, 1893) –
difficult to say. The complete absence of either archaeological or historical evidence for a town wall makes this improbable. Indeed, Pierre Barbatre had specified that there was no urban enceinte. Even so, it has to be accepted that Limassol is much built over: if we accept that there were indeed other towers that have now vanished, there is an argument that town walls may similarly have now gone from sight. Limassol is in fact depicted as having a circular wall with rectangular towers on a copper engraving produced in Paris in 1629. Unfortunately, the engraving is problematical in a number of respects and so is not to be taken wholly at face value.\footnote{The European Cartography of Cyprus, p. 44.}

Subsequent visitors wrote similarly of former grandeur and later decay. In 1491, Dietrich of Schachten (see above) noted that the castle had been strong but was partly destroyed by an earthquake which had wrecked much of the whole town.\footnote{in Grivaud, p. 133.} In 1494, Pietro Casola noted of Limassol that he had not encountered ‘a more arid place’, and that the castle ‘which is guarded by a soldier. . . must have been a fine strong place; nevertheless it is also tumbling down, and nothing is being done to repair it. What little remains standing is a noble sight’.\footnote{in Grivaud, pp. 146-7.} In contrast, Jacques le Saige considered the castle ‘pretty strong’ when he saw it in 1518. His further comment that Limassol had once been a large walled town left in ruin by the English attack of 1191 is of interest merely for his perception of what Limassol may once have been.\footnote{in Cobham, p. 56.} The Venetians appear to have given it little attention. Writing in 1532, Denis Possot observed that the castle was ‘destroyed’ but inhabited by a castellan. We know too from Possot, that it then still retained its fosse which contained no water.\footnote{in Cobham, p. 66.} In 1538 or 1539, a Turkish raiding party landed and though it was staffed only by the castellan and his wife and daughters, the Turks took it only with some difficulty. Once the Turks had left, the Venetian provveditor, Francesco Bragadin, commanded that it be destroyed. According to Bustron, carrying out this work cost so much money that with the same amount of expenditure, or perhaps less, the Venetians could instead have made it impregnable. The Attar map of 1542, however, still depicted a castle with two towers by the shore. Further earthquakes which occurred later in the century, in 1567 and 1568, can hardly have encouraged the Venetians to do anything at Limassol in their final review of the

\footnote{81 The European Cartography of Cyprus, p. 44.}
\footnote{82 in Grivaud, p. 133.}
\footnote{83 in Grivaud, pp. 146-7.}
\footnote{84 in Cobham, p. 56.}
\footnote{85 in Cobham, p. 66.}
island's defences. As put forward by Corvisier and Faucherre, it was then most likely the Turks who created the artillery fort we see in Limassol today.  

In the study presented above, I have dealt first with descriptions of the existing castle and then proceeded to consider the historical context, discussing the references that we have. For the period to 1312, we have a multiplicity of potentially defensible sites and very sketchy historical material, so it is difficult to reconcile the building phases set out in the latest and fullest description, that of Corvisier and Faucherre, with our sources. As we have noted, however, comparison with the architectural characteristics of buildings elsewhere, both on the mainland and within Cyprus itself, may be instructive. From the reign of James I (1382-1398) references become rather more common and it becomes more viable to attempt to align these with the suggested building history of our extant castle. The passing of the military orders and the conflict with Genoa do of course make it much more likely that from James' time, if not before, there was just one, a royal, fortification in Limassol, and that this is the building bequeathed to us today, as modified by the Turks.

**Limassol I**

General view of the developed artillery fort from the south-east.

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86 Attar, pp. 46, 89; Fl. Bustron, p. 24; in Cobham, p. 61; Enlart, p. 489; Hill, 3, p. 863; Corvisier and Faucherre, p. 368.
Latrine brattice at roof level on the post medieval outer casing on the fort’s south-west side.
Partially blocked in pointed arch (4 on plan) within present entrance to the castle.
NICOSIA

( Lefkosia [Greek] )

CASTLE and PALACE

By the mid twelfth century, Nicosia was undoubtedly established as the capital of Byzantine Cyprus. Here Crusaders inherited a Byzantine castle that was clearly very weak, most likely the governor's secured complex rather than a fortification. Rhapsomates made no attempt to defend Nicosia in 1092 and similarly, Isaac Comnenus did not elect to make a stand in the castle mentioned in the *Itinerarium* when confronted by King Richard's invasion in 1191. The Templars withdrew to this Byzantine castle in the 1192 uprising, but concluded that it was indefensible. Lusignan made alternative observations. In the *Chorographia* he commented that after the Templars had left, 'the Cypriots,...destroyed the entire castle which was never rebuilt. We have only the ruins of it. In the castle there is a small chapel dedicated to the Virgin of the Castle, which is in Greek Castegliotissa.' This comment appears to have been taken at face value by Enlart and Jeffery and from them Hill and Megaw. They believed that Lusignan's chapel, dedicated to St. Clair, was never heard of again after his mention of it. In his *Description*, Lusignan remarked rather differently that it was the Templars themselves who destroyed the castle and that this had stood by 'a small market' on which site the chapel called *Castegliotissa* was subsequently built.

Either way, Lusignan's assertions conflict with the information provided by the near contemporary *Continuation* that Guy strengthened the castle, which means that work of some sort was quickly carried out since Guy died in 1194. Its precise location remains uncertain. Grivaud and Schabel took one comment by F.J. Bustron that a 'castello' was by the 'piazza d'abasso' and Lusignan's 'small market' and suggested that the castle was located in the eastern area of the city near the later Venetian Caraffa Bastion and where the river Pedieos had its outflow before it was diverted. It

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2. Stubbs, *Itinerarium*, p. 194; Nicholson, p. 188 and see too above, History, p. 4.
3. See History, above, fn. 11.
is not clear, however, that Bustron was necessarily referring to this first castle at this point. At all events, it was no doubt in a central location, as Bustron remarked elsewhere.\(^8\) As to the Castegliotissa, the name at least did in fact survive, although not necessarily in relation to the site of the old castle chapel. It came to be applied to a vaulted structure used as an arms *depôt* by the Turks. In Mas Latrie's time this consisted of several floors which included a great hall and a basement reached by a stair. Only the hall (26 m x 11.5 m) now remains, south-east of the Venetian Paphos Gate. This has been identified as part of the Lusignan palaces of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries in this area.\(^9\)

This first Lusignan castle was not used as a royal residence. From the beginning of our period, the Lusignans lodged elsewhere in Nicosia. This is confirmed by Wilbrand of Oldenburg who was in Nicosia in 1211/1212. He commented that the town had no fortifications, but observed that a new castle had been recently built, ('...nullam habens munitionem. In qua nunc temporis forte castrum elaboratum.') and that separately there existed a court ('curia') and a palace ('palacinium').\(^10\) Whether this was a rebuilding as Enlart thought, a new castle as Hill thought,\(^11\) or rather simply a continuation of the work carried out in the early 1190s, is unclear. The site remains unidentified.

In 1217, *Castellum Nicossie* featured on the seal of King Hugh I (1204-218). Its details of three round, crenellated towers, the largest being the central one at the base of which is a round arched door, is similar to other such contemporary depictions, such as that given on the grave slab of the 'Hospitaller of Margat' now at Limassol Castle, and must be taken as purely conventional. Another seal of 1217, of the Regent Alice, shows a similar structure though without a central tower.\(^12\) Enlart ascribed Fl. Bustron's allusion to the castle in the centre of the town, mentioned above, to this time rather than at the beginning of our period. But as a source, Bustron is of course

\(^7\) See History, fn. 37.
\(^8\) Fl. Bustron, pp. 26 and 463-4; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 93; Leventis, p. 11.
\(^9\) Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 43; Leventis, p. 177 and photographs on pp. 74, 76, 78 and 80.
\(^12\) Enlart, p. 387; Jeffery, p. 21; Hill, 2, p. 14; Leventis, pp. 9 and 147.
very late and it is not at all clear then that he could have been certain of the history and location of an early castle or indeed successive castles if Wilbrand’s report is taken literally.\textsuperscript{13}

The separation of castle from royal residence noted by Wilbrand appears to have been maintained for a hundred years. We hear nothing of any castle in the sense of a fortification from the reign of Hugh I until the second reign of Henry II. A new palace appears to have been developed during the thirteenth century as allusions to aspects of it from the narrative sources that record the events of 1306-10 reflect that it was well established by this time. Quite probably Henry II himself had it enhanced to reflect his own prestige. His successor, Hugh IV (1324-1359), is said to have improved it in turn.\textsuperscript{14} At some point, the palace came to be connected with a Dominican convent by a covered bridge built over the stream that ran round the palace. This arrangement of palace and convent was a conspicuous feature of Peter II’s building programme, as most likely developed by James I, which superseded this earlier palace. Certain details of the layout of this earlier palace can be gleaned from incidents recorded in the narrative sources, and indeed were catalogued diligently by Enlart. More recently Leventis has also provided a detailed description, though he preferred to think these thirteenth and fourteenth-century works were merely embellishments of the original palace dating back to the Byzantine period. For their part Grivaud and Schabel have attempted a description too, but they appear not to have distinguished between these works and the grander works of Peter II and afterwards.\textsuperscript{15}

Yet until at least the restoration of Henry II in 1310, this complex appears to have been very poorly protected by fortifications – if it was at all. In the squabbling of the years of Amaury’s usurpation from 1306, neither of the rival royal brothers had the asset of a defensible structure in which to base themselves. We are told that the castle gates did not yet exist when, in 1306, Henry II secretly entered the palace by ‘the gate of the bath’ – referring to a gate in the palace building itself. In 1308, Amaury merely

\textsuperscript{13} Fl. Bustron, p. 26; Enlart, p. 387.
\textsuperscript{14} Fl. Bustron, p. 258; Enlart, p. 391.
\textsuperscript{15} Amadi, pp. 249, 252-3, 265, 311, 312, 318, 322, 386, 388; Makhairas § 51, pp. 49-51; Enlart, pp. 77, 391-2, 394; Hill, 2, p. 27; Coureas, \textit{Latin Church}, pp. 211-2; Leventis, pp. 147-161; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95-7.
had to occupy a house opposite the palace’s gates to maintain the King under house arrest. Perhaps not surprisingly, Henry II appears to have decided to remedy this deficiency, for it must have been after his re-establishment on the throne that it was reported that he ‘began the castle wall’. Most likely this new construction was to transform the palace into a citadel, although we should not exclude the possibility that the two were unconnected.  

As noted in the History, in 1368 Peter I commissioned the building of a moated tower called the Margarita Tower constructed quite close to the citadel. This was intended to be of two storeys – a prison below and above, an arrangement to serve as a banqueting hall and chapel. It had thick walls and stairs, either within the thickness of its walls or set against its internal sides. Outside, it was protected by a deep moat. We have more than one description of it, and these differ significantly only in their indications as to whether the structure was completed. Makhairas describes it thus:

he ordered a tower to be built, and in the upper part he built a church, which was called Misericordia, and below the surface of the ground it was a prison, which he called Margarita. And this he finished, and it was very strong, and he wished to put a moat outside it. And he intended to invite a great gathering, as soon as the moat was finished, and all the great lords and barons to assemble for a banquet, and then to shut up his brothers in the tower and a number of his knights of whom he was afraid.  

As it transpired, Peter’s plot miscarried, but work on excavating the moat continued, for we are told that Henry de Giblet’s son, James, was put in irons, and sent ... to dig in the moat at the Margarita, ... with the labourers who were working there.  

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17 Makhairas, § 395, p. 375. See too Grivaud and Schabel, p. 93.  
The excavation of the moat is also mentioned in another source, this being a narrative poem in French written by William of Machaut at some point between 1369 and the poet’s death in 1377. William was almost entirely dependent on the reports of fellow Champenois and other westerners who had been to Cyprus or on Peter’s crusading expeditions, but in this matter he says much the same as Makhairas, Amadi and Fl. Bustron. His account of the rigours of digging out the moat and the suffering of James de Giblet is graphic:


Here he had many slaves
labouring in deep ditches all day long,
digging up earth, bringing it load by load
up on their backs. Here must the young man come,
ordered the king, and dig and carry earth
day after day; no one must interfere,
on pain of strictest penalties, or stop
him bringing loads of earth up on his back;
he must dig there all day and never rest.

These and other equally arbitrary acts merely served to intensify the opposition to King Peter, and indeed we may take it that the Margarita Tower was seen as both a symbol and an instrument of his uncompromising policy. Any ongoing work was most likely brought to an abrupt halt by his assassination in 1369.

In 1376 or 1380, Peter II began a new castle complex, a ‘citadella’, in Nicosia. First, Peter’s father’s Margarita tower and various other buildings including the courts of the Count of Jaffa and of the Patifeli family, were demolished, their material being used in the new works. ‘And wherever there were walls in the town which were of no use, they pulled them down and carried off the stones with carts and wagons and horses.’ Next, Genoese prisoners ‘with irons on their feet... were set to dig the foundations.’ These foundation stones were blessed by Archbishop Berenger and then laid. John de Brie, Turcopilier, and Sir Renier de Scolar were assigned to oversee the work, which was put under the direction of the ‘master workmen Thadok Favla and

20 Guillaume de Machaut, pp. 8-11, 181.
21 Makhairas, § 280, pp. 265-9 for the murder of the King. Enlart, p. 389; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 119, 278.
his brother’. The building work was financed by a ‘voluntary tax’ on the burgesses and other citizens and vigorously pursued. Plainly, this was a much more significant structure than any of its predecessors in Nicosia. It spread out to incorporate a then existing royal court, named the ‘Houses of the Counts’ – the ‘Kountiatika’ – most likely the castle-palace complex developed between the 1240s and 1350s mentioned above and the St. Paraskevi Gate, which may have been modified as a result. The new complex was built ‘as it seems in ten months. And King James did a little and King Janus a little’.23

The allusion to the St. Paraskevi Gate may perhaps locate this complex on the south-west side of the city, close to the later Venetian Paphos Gate, and hence in some proximity to the site on which Enlart located the thirteenth-century complex. Outside the Paphos Gate, a short stretch of wall with a projecting rectangular tower was found, and this possibly is a vestige of Peter II’s work. It has been suggested that possibly the river Pedias was diverted at this time to provide the additional defence of a water channel outside this developed part of the city’s curtain, but if so this could only have happened after the Genoese prisoners had completed their excavations which, as we will see, was not until the 1380s. It is not clear how far the new complex of works had progressed during Peter II’s reign. Some modern writers have claimed that the full suite of royal apartments was completed while others have suggested otherwise. The sources allow for ambiguity but as Leventis suggested, it is likely that the outer enclosure was completed, while the elaborate structures within remained unfinished.24

In any event, it is clear that in fact work continued beyond the initial ten months campaign and that all was completed during the reign of James I. It is difficult to say whether James merely added the finishing touches, or commissioned rather more substantial works, as Stephen of Lusignan would have us believe in his claim that it was James who created the complete complex. Still, the castle-palace-citadel appears to have been completed in his reign. One of James’s first acts was to free the Genoese

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23 Makhairas, §§ 594-7, pp. 591-3, and see too Makhairas, § 87, p. 79; the Strambaldi variant, pp. 250-1 and 35; Amadi, p. 490; Fl. Bustron, p. 349; Hill, 2, 429; Leventis, p. 177. The quotations are from Makhairas, except ‘citadella’, which is the word used by Amadi and Fl. Bustron.

prisoners 'from their fetters and from their labour in the moat'. According to Amadi, Fl. Bustron and Lusignan, James created a church where Peter I’s Margarita Tower had existed and this was called, after the Tower’s chapel, the Misericordia, which James adorned with a ‘bel vergier intomo’. In all likelihood, this was on the south-east side of the new citadel.

Lusignan’s description of the finished works on the main site is of value. He records a ‘vast structure’ of a ‘strong and beautiful citadel’ with water in the moats and two drawbridges. It enclosed the ‘Royal Palace’ or ‘court’, St. Dominic’s friary which, as noted earlier, linked with the royal chambers and which contained the royal ‘sepulchre’ and the residence of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, arranged with two cloisters replete with various fruit trees. This description of the castle-court is comparable with the observations of Nicolas of Martoni, who saw it in 1395 towards the end of James I’s reign. He described a courtyard surrounding a fountain which Nicosia’s citizens accessed freely, many fine apartments, a large arcaded hall incorporating a columnned, ornamented throne area, and a ‘king’s room’ only the door of which seems to have afforded a measure of privacy. In fact Nicolas calls this palace a ‘hospitium’. Clearly he was impressed. Interestingly, his description reflects that what he saw was first and foremost a palace rather than a fortification. On the other hand, he compared this ‘citadella’ with the ‘castrum novum de Neapoli’ created by Charles I of Anjou between 1279 and 1282, which was perfectly defensible. Further details of the palace may be gleaned from the commentary of Luchino dal Campo on his visit with his master, the Duke of Ferrara, in 1412.

The damage perpetrated by the Mamluks in 1426 had a radical effect, though we have conflicting evidence as to what Janus did as a consequence of this damage. Hence, regardless of any repairs he had carried out on the court buildings and its residential facilities, it does appear that the King felt obliged to move out to the premises of a

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25 Grivaud, p. 174; Leventis, p. 177; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95.
26 Makhairas, § 600, p. 595.
knight where his new 'court' was established. This separation of the fortified citadel and the structures housing normal day-to-day royal administration and accommodation is reflected in a number of episodes reported in the narrative sources. The Catalan Pero Tafur – who arrived in the city at some point in the late 1430s – recounted how John II fled from his rebellious subjects 'to a fortress on the edge of the city, called the Citadel, and there they surrounded him,...'. Not long after, in 1450, the German Stephen of Gumpenburg remarked on an impressive 'Königs Castel' with walls and strong gates containing a 'monastery' that was 'oben in der Statt', - 'above/up in the city', but what he saw was merely the shell of the citadel. References from the last decades of the Lusignan period reveal even more clearly that court and castle were then quite separate. In 1456 for example, Charlotte and her new husband, John of Coimbra of Portugal, took up residence in the 'casa de Ugo della Baume, cavalier' and not the citadel. In 1458, John II, Helen Paleologus and Charlotte withdrew to the castle to survive the coup attempted by James the Bastard. Shortly after, on the occasion of her coronation, Queen Charlotte proceeded from the castle to St. Sophia 'to the court where her father had been: and these houses belonged to Sir Richard de la Baume.' Later, towards the end of 1460 when James II had to retire to Nicosia, he quartered his Egyptian allies in the castle and elsewhere, while he and his immediate entourage occupied the royal court.

The great works of Peter II and James I were never reoccupied. The last Lusignans, James II and Catherine Comaro resided in Famagusta after its recapture in 1464. Catherine re-established the royal court in Nicosia in 1476 although whether in the Baume residence or a new location is not altogether clear. The earthquake of 1480 caused some damage in the city, and certainly the castle-convent as described by Felix Faber who visited in the early 1480s shows clearly that the interior of the castle was ruined and uninhabitable, only the convent and outer castle walls being intact. Faber's account is especially illuminating in recording that the 'castle' constituted

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29 Amadi, p. 512; Makhairas, § 694, p. 673 and § 702, p. 679; Boustronios, § 1, p. 67 and § 19, p. 79; Fl. Bustron, p. 373; Enlart, pp. 388, 391; Hill, 2, p. 496, fn. 2.
30 in Cobham, p. 33
31 in Grivaud, p. 65
33 Boustronios, § 58, p. 99; Leventis, pp. 239-43.
34 Fl. Bustron, pp. 373, 453; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 98; Attar, pp. 46, 94; Leventis, pp. 243, 255.
both the former royal residences and the Dominican convent - which possessed two
cloisters with marble pillars and the royal tombhouse - all enclosed in ‘lofty’ and
‘very high and stout’ walls surrounded by the river and accessed by a stone, arched
bridge. By his time, the friars were in exclusive possession of the whole site, and only
they were permitted to build there.\textsuperscript{36} Clearly, the royal court continued to lie
elsewhere. Jacques le Saige visited Nicosia in 1518. He was struck by its decay from
former splendour and in particular observed that it ‘has two very strong castles’.\textsuperscript{37
Presumably he merely formed this impression from the external appearance of the
citadel. The Venetians razed all this as part of their refortification programme,\textsuperscript{38} and
in consequence only fragments have been identified.

It is clear that such works in Nicosia as we have been able to trace above were a
natural consequence of successive kings’ attention to the facilities and – to a lesser
extent – the defences – of their capital. It is perhaps an important point to make: that
this is where the Lusignan kings lived for much of their time. Indeed, there is no
evidence to support the claims made by some modern writers that, apart from the
period 1464-76, the Lusignans necessarily spent considerable periods elsewhere, such
as at St. Hilarion, or that in particular, James I preferred to stay at Kyrenia. Indeed,
James is not untypical in being conspicuously resident in Nicosia: Nicolas of Martoni
noted in 1395 that the king lived in Nicosia for most of the time\textsuperscript{39} and the lord of
Anglure, who also visited in 1395, recorded similarly that:

... in this city the King of Cyprus dwells more than any town or fortress in the
country.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36} Felix Faber in Cobham, pp. 43-4, taken from C. D. Hassler’s 3 vol edition of 1843-49. Felix
added his description of Cypriot monuments at the end of his work. This element was omitted in
the translation by A. Stewart for the Library of the Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, 7 to 10,
\textsuperscript{37} in Cobham, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{38} Hill, 3, p. 811; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{39} Nicolas de Martoni, pp. 634-5 and in Cobham, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{40} in Cobham, p. 29.
CITY WALLS

There is no evidence for the existence of any town walls in Byzantine times or during the earlier Lusignan period.\textsuperscript{41} We noted above that Wilbrand of Oldenburg recorded as much and indeed there is no intimation in any of our sources to infer one before the reign of Henry II or even Hugh IV.

There seem to have been no city walls during the difficult period of Amaury's usurpation (1306-1310), when the contesting factions instead had resort to setting up gates in the streets. Possibly there was some initial Lusignan work after 1310 by Henry II as he developed the 'castle', but if so, this must have been negligible, for during the early years of the next king, Hugh IV (1324-1359), it was reported that 'in the town not much of the fortifying wall was as yet built, and they were building it.'\textsuperscript{42} Peter I is also reported as having commenced the building of the walls.\textsuperscript{43} In all likelihood, this was rather a renewal of an otherwise desultory campaign. In any event, we have an allusion to works in the ditches and on the enceinte in an ordinance given on 16 January 1362.\textsuperscript{44} Some intimation of their state on the eve of the Genoese' first attack on the island may be derived from Makhairas' comment: they were then 'very strong but they were low', so various emergency works were instituted by the Lusignans. The walls were built up with earth and stones, a ditch created and 133 platforms constructed for archers to supplement the towers.\textsuperscript{45} As noted in the History (above), if so many platforms were constructed about 175-210 feet apart as Fl. Bustron recorded, the circuit of the walls would have been almost 5 miles long and consequently a considerable work indeed.\textsuperscript{46} Later, the Genoese in turn strengthened a part of the wall which they used as a base from which to dominate the rest of the city.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{41} A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196; Perbellini (1973), p. 50; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{42} Makhairas, § 41, p. 43, § 76, p. 71, § 76, p. 71. See too Hill, 2, p.257; Megaw,Military Architecture, p. 196; Leventis, p. 167.
\textsuperscript{44} "Bans et ordonnances" in RHC-Lois, 2, no. xxxiii, p. 378 as cited by Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{45} Makhairas, §§ 383-4, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{46} Fl. Bustron, pp. 294-5.
\textsuperscript{47} Makhairas, § 424, p. 405; Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, p. 164; Fl. Bustron, p. 312.
Makhairas records that at this time:

there were two main gates that opened in the walls..., the gate of Saint Paraskevi and the gate of Saint Andrew. 48

In his record of the sparring with the Genoese, he added that there was another gate – the Market or Lower Gate, and he referred also to the Upper Gate, which has been identified as an alternative name for the St. Paraskevi Gate. The Market (Lower) Gate was associated with towers and mention is made of a tower of St. Andrew so it is likely that these three principal gates were all protected by adjacent towers.49 Our other narrative sources also refer to the Market Gate and the tower of St. Andrew and mention a St. Veneranda gate – in fact the Saint Paraskevi Gate by another name and a gate of the tax - which may well be one and the same as the Market (Lower) Gate.50 We also know of a ‘tower of Trakhona’ in this period, and later, in 1426 of ‘the tower of the Arsenal’ used as a prison for a Mamlûk envoy though there appears to be no certainty that either was associated with a gate as Grivaud and Schabel appeared to believe.51 ‘La tour de Sainte Verredi’, no doubt Veneranda, is mentioned in 1468.52

Various attempts have been made to assign locations to these gates and towers, but even if we could be confident that their names remained the same in our period, which as already noted, does not seem to have necessarily been the case, we need to be careful. Such attempts are fraught with difficulty. Thus, in 1457 and 1458 we learn of a possible Gate of the Armenian quarter. If, as has been generally believed, the Armenians were quartered near the royal palace-castle complex which had been built near the Paraskevi Gate, this may have been another gate close by. It has been suggested, however, that the Armenian quarter was on the east side of the city and that these references to a gate of that name are in fact a confusion.53 Grivaud and Schabel recently proposed that the Arsenal tower and the St. Andrew tower controlled

48 Makhairas, § 395, pp. 373-5.
50 Amadi, p. 469; Strambaldi variant of Makhairas, pp. 165, 178, 179, 181, 250; Fl. Bustron, pp. 308, 312, 313; Leventis, pp. 169 and 173.
51 For the tower of Trakhona - Makhairas, § 510, p. 501 and Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, p. 181; Amadi, p. 468; Fl. Bustron, p. 326; Leventis, p. 171. For the tower of the Arsenal – Makhairas, § 677, p. 657; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94.
52 J. Richard, Le Livre des Remembrances de la Secrète, doc. 175 on p. 93 and note 8 on p. 185; Leventis, p. 173 (the gate of ‘Santa Veneranda’).
the passage of the river where it entered the city and where it had its outflow. Leventis too located the St. Andrew tower by an outflow of the river, but there appears to be no evidence for this. It does seem likely, however, that the Market (Lower) and St. Andrew Gates and Towers were on the eastern portion of the enceinte on the basis that this is where the markets were concentrated and the part of the circuit that the Genoese would have first encountered in 1373 and which of course they too fortified. That the St. Paraskevi (Upper/Veneranda) Gate was on the western side appears likely from its alternative name reflecting it was where the river entered the city and from various references to it being used by James in his movements between Nicosia and Kyrenia in late 1373. As we saw, it came to be associated with the great palace-citadel begun by Peter II and continued in use after the establishment of that new complex still serving as the city’s principal gate on the west. The Trakhona tower very likely lay on the north-west of the circuit facing the community of that name.54

James I is credited with enhancing the city’s town walls,55 but in all likelihood they continued to need further development and we have no certain information that anything further was done after his reign in the Lusignan period. Clearly the walls were in poor shape in 1451 when Pope Nicholas V urged John II to complete them and issued an appeal to all Christian powers for money and troops to defend the island. Money raised from the sale of indulgences in western Europe was specifically allocated by the papal authorities for work on Nicosia’s town walls, but little of these funds ever reached Cyprus.56 The apparent ease with which James the Bastard scaled the walls during his adventures in 1457 and 1458 have been taken by one observer at least to imply that the walls were porous and falling down.57 In 1460 they were described as crumbling and useless for defence.58 Indeed until almost the end of the Venetian period, there were regular entreaties that the walls be repaired.59

53 Bustron, pp. 376 and 390. See too Leventis, pp. 171, 251.
54 Enlart, p. 390; Dawkins in Makharas, 2, pp. 164 and 167; Leventis, pp. 145 and 169, 171, 173; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94 and their fn. 49; Keshishian’s plan (p. 69) located the Market Gate on one of the river’s outflows. See History, above, fns. 114, 116-18 and 141 for the sources and Makharas § 623, p. 611; Stambaldi variant, p. 260.
55 Amadi, p. 495; Bustron, pp. 26, 352; Lusignan, Description, f. 32; Enlart, p 389; Perbellini (1973), pp. 50-1; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 104-5.
56 Hill, 3, pp. 523-5; Joachim in Caterina Cornaro, p. 52; Leventis, p. 251.
57 Leventis, pp. 251-3.
59 Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94.
Sixteenth-century commentators produced varying observations of the state of the enceinte. Pierre Mésenge wrote in 1507 that ‘…the surrounding walls are still wholly entire as though newly made; and I think I never saw so fine a wall or in so perfect a state’: a view apparently shared by another Frenchman, Charles de la Rivière, who visited the same year. But as Hill remarked, such comments may have misjudged matters, for certainly in 1529, Minio described the walls as old and weak. They are generally said to have been roughly a circle with round interval towers, a ditch and with no less than eight gates. Establishing the number of gates has importance as this reflects the purpose of the enceinte. We saw above that we appear to have clear references to only three. This, and Lusignan’s reference to three gates in his Chorography, persuaded Leventis to conclude that there was no more than this number. Yet this is hardly credible given the considerable length of the circuit and that when it was first under construction in the decades before 1373, it was more a reflection of royal and civic prosperity when there was no real external threat. It is far more likely that all eight were in existence from the beginning but that two or three were sufficiently prominent to feature in the narratives that we have.

The walls were still standing in 1553 when John Locke remarked that they were ‘not strong’, and 1562 when the Venetian, Ascanio Savorgnan reported on them. By the standards of that later period, they were considered obsolete. Indeed, Ascanio considered matters so bad that he advised that it would be better not to attempt to refortify Nicosia at all. Nevertheless, his elder brother Julius (Giulio) was sent in 1567 to build the new Venetian defences. He and Francesco Barbaro spent eight to ten months constructing a wholly new, three mile long circular enceinte of earthen ramparts and bastions revetted in stone within the circuit of the old walls. These and other older structures were utilised as a quarry and cleared away to create a clear field of fire for defending artillery housed in the new fortification although it was never completed. As a result, nothing now remains of the Lusignan city wall and even its trace and extent is uncertain. It was certainly longer than the Venetian circuit – Minio’s description of 1529 and Savorgnan’s report talk of a little over four miles,

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60 For Mésange - Enlart, p. 389 and Hill, 3, p. 809, and see fn in History, fn. 184, above. For de la Rivière, Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagneux, p. 94 citing Bibliothèque Municipale de Rouen, ms. 1118 (u 100).
and so are in approximate agreement with what we inferred from the descriptions given of the works of 1373.\textsuperscript{61}

APPENDIX

Cartographic evidence

There is little cartographic evidence to draw upon. Three depictions showing Nicosia with its pre-Venetian walls can be mentioned:

- that of Henricus Germanus of 1490 showing 'numerous round towers';\textsuperscript{62}
- a drawing by Leonida Attar of 1542 depicting a four 'miglia' circular enceinte with big, round towers;\textsuperscript{63}
- an anonymous map in circulation in Venice or Rome in 1562 showing the walls as prescribing a wedge shape and having rectangular towers.\textsuperscript{64}


\textsuperscript{62} In \textit{The History and Cartography of Nicosia}, (The Leventis Municipal Museum, Nicosia, 1989), p. 20 referred to in Leventis, p. 251, fn. 266.

\textsuperscript{63} Attar, p. 94; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{64} European Cartography, pp. 42-3.
PAPHOS

The early fortifications of Paphos and historical references to 1222

Paphos has a very long history of settlement and fortification. City walls were first erected in the eighth century B.C. in the Archaic period at its original site. This lay ten miles along the coast to the east, and is now known as Kouklia, or Palaepaphos. New or Nea Paphos – the site of present Paphos – was founded about 320 B.C. and it is assumed that its extensive city walls and breakwaters were begun about then.¹ These defences appear to have received some subsequent maintenance, at least where they constituted a sea wall. Quite possibly the threat posed by the rapid growth of Islam in the mid-seventh century prompted some such maintenance. Be that as it may, in 649 or 653, the inhabitants are reported as having manned these ancient walls in attempting to resist Abu'l-Awar's incursion, though to no avail. Under the terms of a treaty of 688 between Justinian II and Abd al-Malik, it was agreed that Cyprus was to be administered jointly by the Byzantine Empire and the Umayyad Caliphate: thus it effectively became a neutral, buffer zone straddling the border of two spheres of interest. Megaw suggested that possibly Paphos became the headquarters of the Emir who represented the Sultan during this period of truce with Constantinople; certainly Paphos remained effectively an Arab port until its recovery for the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Nicephorus Phocas in 965.²

The relevance to this present study of these events of the seventh century lies in their possible association with the scant remains of a defensive wall with a corner tower, located to block the landward approach to the harbour. Megaw, who drew attention to this defensive line which, in its greatest possible arc, enclosed a much smaller area than the older walls of the third century B.C., ascribed the origin of these either to a Byzantine attempt to withstand the expected Arab attack that came in 649 or 653, or to a defensive work created by the Arabs themselves during what he supposed was

¹ Maier, Old Paphos (Kouklia), p. 9; Maier, Palaipaphos (Kouklia), p. 22; Nea Paphos, pp. 3, 16 and fig. 3; Megaw, Reflections, p. 136 and fig. 1.
² Megaw, Reflections, pp. 143, 145, 147; Megaw, Betwixt Greeks and Saracens, p. 514; Metcalf, Coins from Saranda Kolones, pp. 205, 208, 224; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 284.
their subsequent thirty year occupation. It now appears clear, however, that there is no
evidence to imply that the Arabs did garrison the town expelling its Christian
inhabitants and that in any case, a seventh-century date for this trace of wall remains
far from clear. Indeed, 'a distinctly later date' has recently been preferred by Metcalf.

The treaty of 688 included a ban on the building of fortifications. Admittedly, this
could perhaps imply a recognition of their prior existence, but if they did not and if
this detail of the treaty was observed, then there is an argument that the wall would
not have been built during that long ensuing period of Arab-Byzantine co-operation
and that consequently it is much later. Megaw made two further suggestions as to the
uses to which these walls were put in later times. The first was that these works also
constituted the fortification referred to in the twelfth century, while the second was
that, at its western extremity, the surviving elements may have been utilised by
James I as a substructure for his 'citadella' of 1391 (see below). Both these thoughts
have been dismissed by von Wartburg in an article published in 1996, and it is indeed
the case that there is only slight evidence for the first claim and none at all for the
second.3

The evidence for an twelfth-century use of the defensive wall in question appears to
rest on the third of the four historical references we have that either refer to, or may
imply a fortification in Paphos during the twelfth century. In his Panegyric, St.
Neophytos mentions a church of the Virgin Limeniotissa ('of the Harbour') situated
inside a fortification, and that this church was destroyed by an earthquake which may
be dated to about 1160.4 The remains of this church have been excavated and Megaw
implied that it may go back to the fifth century.5 Its location does indeed place it
within the line of Megaw's wall, so it may be that this wall is indeed that of
Neophytos' fortification, but conclusive proof remains lacking.

That Neophytos' reference alludes to a church within a fortification implies at least
that the latter must have included a curtain wall of some sort, but our other three
allusions in the twelfth century add little except to confirm the existence of a

3 Megaw, Reflections, pp. 144-5, 149-150 and fig. 2; Betwixt Greeks and Saracens, pp. 508, 514-5
and fig. 11; Wartburg, p. 136, fn 52; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, pp. 285-7.
4 Galatariotou, citing Neophytos, Panegyric, pp. 16, 211; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147, and fn. 34;
Nicolaou-Konnari p. 51 and fn. 56.
5 Megaw, Reflections, p. 140.
fortification. The first of these references does not even specifically mention a
fortification at all. This is a record made by a certain Icelandic Abbot or Bishop
Nicholas of Thingeyrar as he travelled through Paphos some time around 1150-3 on
his return from pilgrimage. He noted the existence of a garrison of Voeringjar, or
Varangians, in Paphos. Earlier commentators have assumed that such a force must
have been housed in a castle, but we can not necessarily ascribe such an interpretation
to this reference taken in isolation, for, as with references in the sources to Isaac's
‘garrisoning’ of Limassol against Richard I in 1191, a fortification need not be
involved.6 However, our remaining allusions lead to the conclusion that this view is
not unreasonable. Apart from Neophytus' reference discussed above, elsewhere he
recorded that in 1159, while in Paphos, he was mistaken for an escaped prisoner,
arrested and imprisoned for a day and a night in the ‘phrourion’ of Paphos.7
Phrourion is a classical Greek word taken to indicate a watch post, garrisoned fort, or
citadel. No doubt this was the same structure as the subject of the final reference that
we have for a fortification in Paphos in the twelfth century: this is the allusion by the
Yorkshire clerk, Roger of Howden, in his reworked chronicle, to the ‘castellum’ of
'Baffes' in his list of castles taken by Richard I in 1191.8 Taken together, these four
references provide convincing historical evidence that some sort of fortification
existed in Paphos at the end of the twelfth century. Quite what that may have been,
and by the same token, what may have superseded it, is a matter of considerable
archaeological interest dealt with below. However, before reviewing this, it may be
helpful to continue with the historical evidence for fortification at Paphos to the point
in time when we enter a long period when no references are made at all.

After Roger of Howden's reference to a castellum, and until 1373, after which
references become rather more common, our only references to anything of a possible

6 The Itinerary of Abbot Nikolas (AM 194, 8 vo), Kr. Kalund, ed., Alfroedi islenzk (Copenhagen,
1908), pp. 20.31-23.21, cited by B. Z. Kedar and Chr. Westergard-Nielsen, pp. 197, 203. See
too Galatariotou, p. 49, fn. 40; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147 and fn. 32; Cadei, pp. 131-142, and p.
141, en 7, citing Antiquites russes d'apres les monuments des Islandais II, (Copenhagen, 1852), p.
408. Cadei takes this reference to be 'a garrison room'.
7 Galatariotou, citing Neophytos, Typikon, 76. 19-26; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 51 and fn. 56; Cadei, p.
141, en. 8, citing F.E. Warren, The 'Ritual Ordinance' of Neophitos, Archaeologia: or,
Miscellaneous tracts relating to Antiquity, 47, (1882), p. 12; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147 and fn.
33.
8 Chronica, 3, p. 111, as noted above in History, p. 5. Baffo is an alternative name for New Paphos
(Makhairas, 2, p. 216).
military nature in Paphos come first from the diary of Wilbrand, Count of Oldenburg and Bishop of Utrecht, who visited Cyprus in 1211; second from another German cleric, Oliver of Paderborn, in relation to the earthquake of 1222; and finally a passing note by Ludolf, a priest of the church of Sudheim, or Suchen, in Westphalia of a visit made between 1336 and 1341 that a castle had ‘once’ existed. Let us look at each of these references in turn.

In the History (above pp. 11-12), it was shown that Wilbrand’s comments on Cypriot fortifications are both instructive and difficult. His reference for Paphos – ‘Ab hoc monte uidimus Paphos…,’ that he could see it from where he was on a neighbouring height, - ‘et est civitas parua, in qua hodie monstratur turris illa’: that Paphos was a small town where the same tower was shown …on which Venus was worshipped by her lovers, - is problematical. In the first place, it seems most unlikely that he saw the tower at all: his own testimony implies that he did not visit the town and in spite of what he wrote, he could not in fact have even seen it from where he was at Stavrovouni. Second, Wilbrand’s use of the word ‘turris’ is striking, for it is not a word that he uses in reference to anything else in Cyprus. Its employment here, in relation to a building that hearsay associated with pagan practices of earlier times, suggests that Wilbrand was simply repeating some general tradition about an ancient structure of some kind. In sum then, there is little evidence here to adduce the existence of a fortification at all.

Our next allusion is from the Historia Damiatina, written by Oliver of Paderborn. He had been a teacher in the cathedral school of Cologne but had joined the Fifth Crusade in 1216 and wrote up his chronicle between 1217 and 1222. He wrote:

Anno gratie millesimo ducentesimo vigesimo seundo mense Maio factus est terre motus magnus in Cypro, Lymocio, Nicossia alisque locis eiusdem insule, presertim in Papho in tantum, ut civitas cum castro penitus subverteretur, hominess promiscui sexus, qui in ea reperti sunt tempore commotionis, communiter extincti, portus siccatus, ubi postmodum aque sive sive fontes eruperunt.

11 Oliver of Paderborn (ed. Hoogweg), ch. 86, p. 279.
In the year of grace 1222 in the month of May it happened that there was a great earthquake on Cyprus, in Limassol, Nicosia, and other places of that island, especially in Paphos, to such a degree that the city was completely destroyed along with the fort; human beings of both sexes who were there at the time of the earthquake were completely lost; the harbour was dried up, where afterwards waters or fountains burst forth.\(^{12}\)

As with Wilbrand’s reference to Paphos, Oliver’s comment has been questioned on the basis that he was not an eye witness of this earthquake of May 1222, inasmuch that he was back in Cologne by 16 February. Von Wartburg exploited this in her argument that the 1222 earthquake was merely one of many – we know of others in about 1160, in 1204, 1267/8, 1303 and on subsequent occasions – so in her view, the earthquake of 1222 was not particularly exceptional. She enlarged that, like other writers before and after, Oliver may have merely embellished his narrative of this earthquake with formulae culled from early visitors’ books or pilgrims’ guides that had recorded earlier earthquakes, and that, in conclusion, we should not accept Oliver’s testimony that the 1222 earthquake necessarily wrecked the castle, or that any damage it did suffer went unrepaired.\(^{13}\)

As John Rosser has said however, Oliver’s testimony is not to be dismissed.\(^{14}\) Unlike Wilbrand and his allusion to Paphos, Oliver did not actually claim that he witnessed the earthquake himself. As one who had been on crusade, it is quite likely that he had acquired a number of contacts who may in fact have been able to report first hand information to him of events in the eastern Mediterranean in the months immediately after Oliver’s return to the West. Furthermore, although Oliver’s account of the earthquake is the only one to mention the castle, other annalists recorded the particular effects of the earthquake on Paphos. These include both chroniclers with particular interests in Cyprus or the Latin East and western chroniclers who had no special interest in the island. The first group constitute Philip of Novara, who recorded that ‘en cel an fu le grant crole en Chipre, quy abaty Bafe’\(^{15}\) and the author

\(^{12}\) Oliver of Paderborn (ed. Peters), ch. 86, p. 136.
\(^{13}\) Wartburg, pp. 131-4; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147; Edbury, The Kingdom, pp. 13-14.
\(^{14}\) Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, pp. 45-7.
\(^{15}\) Novara, § 10 (106), Melani, p. 70; copied by Amadi, p. 115.
of the *Annales de Terre Sainte*, who wrote of 'le c[r]osle qui abati Bauffe en Cipre'.

That the earthquake was most likely particularly severe is suggested by its mention in the second group. These include another German, Caesarius of Heisterbach who mentions its effects as far away as Italy. He seems to have heard directly from Oliver that the earthquake had destroyed a church somewhere on the island while the bishop was saying mass and that Paphos was especially affected: ‘tot turres, tot aedificia corruerunt’.

After Oliver’s reference to the castle, there is an absence of references to any fortifications in Paphos continuing throughout the thirteenth century. Such negative evidence has its value, and can best be noted here. In Philip of Novara’s account of the wars between his masters, the Ibelins, and the German Emperor, Frederick II, he makes no mention of any castle in Paphos. As noted in the gazetteer entry for Limassol, Frederick established his headquarters there upon his arrival in 1228, not Paphos as might have been expected as the port nearest the West. In the two wars that followed in the years to 1233, the possession of castles was of considerable importance and Philip provides detailed narratives of some of the sieges involved, but there is not even a passing allusion to Paphos in this struggle.

Similarly in 1248, St Louis made Limassol his base, not Paphos, and when, at this time, the ‘Empress of Constantinople’ landed in Paphos on a mission to seek the French King’s help, she was promptly conveyed to Limassol. If there had been a castle in Paphos that was still intact and in use, it is very difficult indeed to explain quite why it did not feature in these various events. Finally, the Templar of Tyre’s description of Cyprus (see above) which notes the island’s towns and fortifications, correspondingly reflects that at the end of the thirteenth century or the beginning of the fourteenth century, Paphos was not deemed to be fortified.

In the early fourteenth century, in 1312 and 1316, Paphos suffered from piratical Genoese raids, but our chronicle sources make no mention of any fortification then in

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16 *Annales de Terre Sainte*, p. 437b.
17 Caesarius, pp. 251-2; For other references in other western chronicles, see Rosser, *Archaeological and Literary Evidence*, pp. 45-6 and fns. 37 and 39. A further allusion to the earthquake is found in Matthew Paris, 4, p. 346. (Until 1235, Matthew’s *Chronica* is Roger of Wendover’s chronicle with Matthew’s additions).
use. James of Verona visited the island in 1335. He too was troubled by pirates, and visited Paphos but made no mention of any castle there. This impression of the absence of defences is confirmed by the notes made by a Westphalian priest – Ludolf of Suchen – who visited the island some time between 1336 and 1341. He commented that the town was ‘well nigh destroyed by frequent earthquakes’ and like Wilbrand before him, recorded a fortification that had been a place of worship of Venus. Unlike Wilbrand’s testimony however, Ludolf remarks of this castle only that it ‘once stood’. In 1344, an unknown Englishman visited Paphos, and like James of Verona, he too made no mention whatever of any fortifications then in commission.

Accordingly, we have no literary evidence that unequivocally attests the existence of any fortification in use in Paphos from 1222 until there are references made in relation to the war with Genoa in 1373. This dearth of information has made the inferences that can be drawn from archaeological investigation all the more controversial, and consequently inexact, but it is to these that we must now turn.

**Saranda Kolones**

Only a little inland from the shore, at the western end of the area that had been enclosed by the ancient city walls, are the truncated remains of the castle now known as Saranda Kolones – the forty columns – being a reference to the utilisation in its building of the classical columns that had been found on site. Once thought to be an ancient temple dedicated to the cult of Aphrodite, and later a Byzantine castle, the site was investigated in a series of excavations led principally by Megaw, from 1957 to 1983. Megaw and his colleague, John Rosser wrote up their findings and interpretations in a number of articles and reports. For the reasons set out below, they pronounced that this castle should in fact be attributed to the early Lusignan period and beyond that, that it was the Order of St. John – the Hospitallers who had

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18 Joinville, pp. 197-9.
19 Amadi, pp. 393-4; 398; Fl. Bustron, pp. 245-6, 249-50.
20 Jacques de Vérone, p. 176, and in Cobham, p. 16.
22 Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, in Biblioteca..., p. 446 and Western Pilgrims, p. 58.
constructed and occupied it. Although the final report of the excavations has yet to appear, it is clear that their final view will remain as such.23

Megaw’s and Rosser’s excavations identified the remains of a ‘tower of crusader masonry and a connected wall... a walled encampment with a watchtower’ (P on plan), which antedated the larger structure of Saranda Kolones that they wrote was built very soon afterwards. At one corner of this tower, they found a denier of Guy of Lusignan. This coinage is said to have remained in circulation until 1205, as Guy’s brother and successor did not issue any in his own name. No doubt it was then that it was officially withdrawn.24 The presence of the coin could then be helpful in suggesting that the tower was no later than the coin’s withdrawal. However, how certain we may be on this is difficult: for all we know, this coinage may have retained its value in circulation. In any case, the presence of the coin can not, of course, tell us when the tower was first in commission. Megaw’s and Rosser’s view was that this ‘watchtower’ was very shortly superseded by the much more formidable fortress now visible today. Although already described by Rosser and Megaw, this gazetteer would be incomplete without at least some summary of this site, but this will in any case be of help in following subsequent points of debate as to its builders that arise from its structure and design.


SARANDA KOLONES

Sally port 1

Sally port 2

Sally port 3

Sally port 4

Sally port 5

Sally port 6

Sally port 7

Sally port 8

Sally Ports 2 & 5 & Postern (as altered?)

Sally port 2

Postern

Arched chamber leading into tower wall

Sally port 5

Outer gate

Stair to lower gatehouse chamber

Stone pillars supporting bridge
Description of Saranda Kolones

The castle had two wards, one inside the other. The inner ward is 35m x 37m with a projecting, rectangular tower at each corner (J, K, L and N) and in the centre of the east side a D-shaped one containing a right-angle entrance (M). This inner gateway retains traces of portcullis grooves and behind them, provision for double doors, in both its flank and internal walls. There were loopholes set low in the walls of this inner ward. This ward was surrounded by an outer one roughly pentagonal in shape, some 75 m across. The outer ward’s walls are about 3 m thick, and had rounded or polygonal corner towers and rectangular or cut-water/prow or wedge shaped interval towers (A, B, C, D, E, G and H). On the east side lay the entrance – a particularly imposing rectangular tower containing another right-angle arrangement (F). The floor of this gate-tower is set at a slight slope to give the effect of a ramp. (see photograph). This was reached on its south side by a broad, timber bridge supported by two arcades spanning the surrounding ditch – in part rock-cut and elsewhere defined by a masonry counterscarp. A stair leads down from the wall walk, through the thickness of the wall, into a ground-level chamber within this gate-tower.

Accommodation was arranged in two storeys round the four sides of the open inner court. Megaw’s excavations identified stables with a saddlery in the east and south-west ranges (the line of stone troughs running the length of the inside of the eastern inner curtain is very apparent); a forge in the south range; a mill room at the north-east corner and a bakehouse containing an oven in the north range. These services were housed within a continuous ring of vaulting, suitably partitioned. The vaulting was supported by nine massive pillars which were linked by thin walls closing the spaces between them, uniformly around the four sides of the inner court, a space being left for the entrance on the east side. Three of the four corner pillars each contained a pair of latrines, the chutes of which could be flushed into a drainage system routed out of the castle underneath the east ditch. On the south-west corner of

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25 This description derives principally from those given by Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, pp. 42-5 and Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 45 and from personal site visits in October 2004 and October 2005.
this inner courtyard, two arches have been reinstated, and here too it is especially easy to see the springings of the vaults that encircled the quadrangle. From within the vaulted range at this south-west corner, a straight stair runs below the inner curtain into what is now a chamber partly filled with wreckage.

Above this lower level of the inner ward, Megaw identified a mezzanine level at points, in particular a possible small chamber containing a steam bath above the bakehouse. The upper storey appeared to repeat the general scheme of the lower in that it is vaulted, though it rose to a greater height, and had a flat terraced roof. Megaw found a further six latrines immediately above those below, but in the main, the site is so ruined that there is little to say about this level other than that the chapel was in the upper storey of the gatetower. This upper level was reached by two stone stairs on the north and south sides of the court; a further external stair has been inferred leading from the upper floor to the roof terrace. This terrace included an arrangement for collecting rainwater.

Of the outer ward, Megaw identified some accommodation built against the inner face of the outer wall – one row containing three corner fireplaces. He noted that the floors of the outer ward towers were a little below the level of the outer ward, apart from the outer gatetower and the north-west corner tower which had basements. In the latter the lower floor retains embrasures which allow for enfilading cover of the outer curtain. A further embrasure, set at the level of the outer ward, was found in the curtain wall itself near the northern pentagonal tower, suggesting that there may have been ample provision of these devices. Finally, he discerned, from the arrangement in the north curtain on either side of the central tower that the upper storeys of the towers and the interconnecting wall walks were reached by steps in the thickness of the wall.

The profusion of sally ports is a particular feature of Saranda Kolones. Megaw counted as many as eight of these, their actual or planned points of egress in the outer wall being indicated on the diagram. The design of these is varied and some are ingenious, though some are not: they are such a prominent and aggressively minded facet of the castle as to warrant particular attention. Beginning with the west wall, there are two (numbers 1 and 2 on the plan) between the north-west and west central towers (towers A and C on the plan). The southern of these two (number 2) begins its
exit from the castle immediately south of the modern entry ramp, and utilizes the rock, in that it descends into this, in its lower stage. Sally ports 3, and 4 lead out directly from towers (D and E), that at the south-west angle being much the better preserved. They are simpler, leading out from the side of the towers to emerge close to and next to the adjacent curtain. Sally port 5, set in the angle formed between the north wall of the outer gatehouse and its adjacent curtain to the north, is different again. Here, its course can be traced descending directly from the wall of the outer ward to approximately half way down the wall, whereupon it spirals in on itself, ultimately opening externally, about two courses below ditch level, emerging very obliquely and hard against the curtain wall. This port would have been particularly hard to see by an attacking force. A similar arrangement obtains in respect of sally port 7 in that a stair leads down to ground level, then twists outwards within the central, wedge shaped tower of this northern curtain, opening out into the ditch, as usual, just where it meets the curtain. In both this case, and in that of sally port 5, the final openings are sufficiently extant to see that they were kept deliberately so small that it would have been necessary to crouch or crawl to achieve passage. In the case of sally port 7, there are two pairs of slot holes, one pair just below lintel level, for bars to hold in place the small door or hatch, that must have been in place. Numbers 6 and 8 were never finished. Both descend west to east down the side of the north curtain, but their exits remain incomplete: 6 runs down into the flank of the north-east multangular tower, but does not emerge from it, while 8 seems to have been intended as a counterpart to 7 but its exit too was never accomplished. As will be recounted below, the castle remained incomplete in several other important respects.

Megaw and Rosser supported their view that Saranda Kolones was very early Crusader work, and indeed beyond that the work of the Hospitalers, on a number of grounds. These constitute the design of the castle, its historical context, what may be adduced from ceramic and numismatic evidence and their probes into the foundation trenches taken in the early 1980s. We shall review these arguments, and from that, show that at the very least there are both arguments for and against their attribution.
Cut-water tower (C on plan) and postern, as altered, on west outer *enceinte*.

Cut-water tower (C on plan) from the south-west.
Outer, bent-entrance, rectangular gatehouse (F on plan).

Row of stone troughs utilising ancient columns in the stables within the south-east quadrant of the inner *enceinte.*
Saranda Kolones 5

Inner bent-entrance, apsidal gatehouse (M on plan).
Portcullis groove on inner gatehouse (M on plan).
Design and Architectural Affinities of Saranda Kolones

The case for a Crusader origin: comparisons with Belvoir

As with most castles, it is not difficult to identify similarities between Saranda Kolones and other structures. In particular, it bears a striking resemblance in several aspects of design and architecture to the larger Belvoir in eastern Galilee. Belvoir was built by the Hospitalers between 1168 and 1187. It was lost in 1189 after an eighteen month siege. John Rosser first suggested that Saranda Kolones was influenced by a Hospitaller style of construction.\(^{26}\) Shortly afterwards, Thomas Biller’s careful study of Belvoir,\(^{27}\) revealed more detail that aided close comparison and this persuaded Peter Megaw to urge too that Saranda Kolones was also a Hospitaller foundation. In support of this, both he and Rosser have pointed out that Saranda Kolones follows the regular concentric layout of Belvoir; that in both, the inner wards comprise a continuous ring of vaulting, divided by partitions, certainly on the ground floor and probably also on the upper. As they pointed out, both sites have an inner gatetower containing a right angle entrance, each of which has a chapel on the upper floor which contained comparable capitals. Both castles have accommodation set against the outer curtain wall. Both have a number of sally ports issuing into the ditch beyond the outer wall (three in Belvoir; five in Paphos with a further three planned but then abandoned) and both have single posterns leading out from their west outer curtains to bridges over the ditch (the bridge being built at Belvoir and intended at Saranda Kolones).

Biller led Megaw to consider that it was likely that the architect at Paphos was one with direct knowledge of Belvoir and that he may well have known of its efficient defence in 1189, not that this necessarily makes either the architect or the castle at Paphos Hospitaller. Megaw admitted that there are also some dissimilarities between the designs of the two castles, but he gave these negligible attention.\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47; Rosser, The Lusignan Castle, p. 187 and later, Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 41.
\(^{27}\) T. Biller, Die Johanniterburg Belvoir.
\(^{28}\) Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, pp. 48-50; Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 54-5; Rosser, (forthcoming).
Dissimilarities with Belvoir

These dissimilarities are in fact considerable, and should not be dismissed as 'minor' as Rosser did in 1986. First, and as just noted, there is a considerable difference in size. The Paphos castle would then have been capable of accommodating a proportionally smaller establishment. Second, the sites are somewhat different. Belvoir was built at the top of the high western escarpment that drops steeply down to, and overlooks the Jordan valley so on one side at least its position is naturally defensible. Saranda Kolones on the other hand is a few hundred metres only from the shore line on ground that is only very slightly higher: there is not much in the way of utilising a defensible site here. The third matter is the shape of the towers at Saranda Kolones. Those on the outer enceinte are remarkable both in that they are varied, and that they include two that are wedged shaped – the towers at Belvoir by contrast are of a regular, rectangular design. As A. Boas recently noted, on its inner enceinte, the corner towers of Saranda Kolones are rectangular and occupy a fairly large part of the outer bailey, whereas those at Belvoir are more or less square and do not extend more than the thickness of their walls along the curtain walls or into the outer bailey. Fourth, the location and type of the gateways are different in a number of respects. At Saranda Kolones, the gatehouse of the inner ward is situated immediately behind that of the outer ward, both of which are in the centre of their respective curtain walls on the east side. At Belvoir, the gatehouse of the inner ward is located in the centre of the west curtain wall, well away from the principal gateway arrangement through the outer curtain, which is on the other side of the castle. The route into this outer gateway at Belvoir is channelled between the outer curtain wall and a further, parallel wall beyond, so as to form a barbican: this is quite different from what can be seen in the Paphos castle. Moreover, this outer gateway at Belvoir is positioned at a corner of the rectangular enceinte – not in the centre of the east wall as at Saranda Kolones. The single postern gates on their west outer curtains also do not follow a similar arrangement: that at Saranda Kolones runs out from the side of a mural tower, whereas the postern at Belvoir is mid-way through a stretch of the curtain wall. Fifth, the masonry work at Belvoir is, in general terms, of a superior quality: it is faced throughout in well cut and well fitted ashlar, while at Saranda Kolones, the

29 Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47.
30 A. Boas, Archaeology of the Military Orders, pp. 124-5.
excavations have revealed both sections of wall with well laid, large facing blocks, but also courses of masonry similarly well laid but of uneven, unshaped coarse masonry, though this may be merely the consequence of the site remaining incomplete. Unlike Saranda Kolones which is limestone throughout, the main material used at Belvoir is basalt, with limestone imported and used only for groins, doorways and so forth. Sixth, an extremely prominent feature of Belvoir’s design is the considerable batter of the outer enceinte’s walls. This is not replicated at Saranda Kolones, where there is only some slight scarping of the rock on which the towers and walls sit. One consequence of this is that the points of egress from the posterns into the ditch are better concealed at Belvoir (see photograph – Belvoir 1) than was possible at Saranda Kolones.
Belvoir. Note the substantial batter of the outer enceinte providing for concealment of sally ports.
Belvoir. The batter of the curtain and towers is well illustrated here. In this, it has more in common with, for example, Louis IX’s Caesarea (below) than with Saranda Kolones.
Lesser differences relate to the vaulted chambers round the inner enceinte: at Saranda Kolones they were groin-vaulted and supported on pillars rather than barrel vaulted as at Belvoir. The large barrel vaulted chambers arranged around the inside of Belvoir’s outer enceinte are similarly not replicated at the Paphos site where these sets of rooms are much less substantial. Other, minor differences have also been noted, including the locations of the forge and bathhouse (outer ward at Belvoir; inner at Saranda Kolones) and the impressive latrine system at Saranda Kolones which Belvoir lacks.  

**Comparisons with other Crusader works**

Belvoir is not the only castle that has been compared with Saranda Kolones. Cadei pointed to La Fève (Old French)/ Castrum Fabe/Fabbarum (Latin)/ al – Fula (Arabic) in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and to Casale Doc (Da’uk) and Somaleria Templi (El-Sumairiya/As-Sumairiya), both near to Acre. All three were Templar. La Fève was mid-way in size between Belvoir and Saranda Kolones. First mentioned in 1172, it seems to have been at least partly dismantled after the Muslim conquest of 1187. Unfortunately, it is very ruinous and needs proper excavation before comparative conclusions can be drawn, but on the basis of what can be said of it, this analogy is not very helpful. It consisted of a sub-rectangular structure measuring about 80 to 90 m north-south and 110 to 120 m east-west, and it seems likely that as at Belvoir, this enclosure would have had a series of barrel-vaulted chambers constructed against its inner face. It is uncertain if there were any projecting towers, and similarly it is unclear whether there was a donjon. The suggestion has been made that there may have been a number of posterns, but this is not certain either. It may be that there was an outer curtain, but the evidence for this, being a reference to an outer wall seen in 1928, is imprecise, for this could have been either an outer curtain or the counterscarp of the ditch, the trace of which is also not entirely clear. Where extant, the ditch has been measured to be 34 m wide, and the speculation is that it may once have been

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32 Cadei, p. 139.
rectilinear to conform with the general plan of the structure.\textsuperscript{33} There is not much here to substantiate Cadei's opinion.

Though the case for seeing La Fève as of the same genre as has been argued of Belvoir and Saranda Kolones must remain unestablished pending further investigation, at least La Fève was clearly a castle \textit{per se}, for the same can not necessarily be said of Cadei's other two examples. Cadei's view that as-Sumairiya and Da'uk appear to be quadrangular structures; that Da'uk may be contemporaneous with Saranda Kolones; that Sumairiya's \textit{enceinte} has massive square corner buildings, and that both are associated with agricultural 'annexes', do not in themselves establish that these were fortifications. Indeed, it is more likely that they were merely estate centres, and consequently should be discarded as possible parallels for Saranda Kolones.\textsuperscript{34}

Denys Pringle\textsuperscript{35} has recently likened Saranda Kolones and Belvoir with Daron (Dair al-Balah), a royal castle built south-west of Gaza between the 1160s and 1191 and as yet known to us only from documentary sources. Pringle pointed out that by 1191, Daron may well have become a concentric arrangement, and in this respect bears comparison with Belvoir and Saranda Kolones in being another case where we appear to have an instance of an early Crusader castle constituting two lines of defence, replete with towers, and arranged on a roughly quadrangular pattern, one line concentrically within the other. There are difficulties of analogy here too however, for Daron was not planned to be concentric from the outset, as Belvoir appears to have been, while the contention that Saranda Kolones itself was planned as a concentric castle from its inception awaits final proof, depending as it must on knowing who constructed it and in what stages. Furthermore, even if it is accepted that Saranda Kolones was built \textit{de novo} as a concentric castle, and thus acquires an important similarity with Belvoir that distinguishes it from the many sites that came to be concentric by addition, this in itself does not necessarily mean that it was Crusader.

\textsuperscript{33} B.Z. Kedar and D. Pringle, La Fève, pp. 164-179. The relevant part of the article is pp. 166 and 174-7.


The apparent affinity of Saranda Kolones with Belvoir helped persuade some to interpret the architecture at Paphos as designed for a conventual routine, thus facilitating the ascription of the castle, in Megaw’s view, to the Hospitallers, and as we shall see, in Cadei’s view, to the Templars. We should be wary of too much enthusiasm for this convenience, for as Pringle has pointed out, ‘no significant differences are discernible between the twelfth century castles of the military orders and those of secular lords, except perhaps for the prominence given to a chapel in the former.’ 36

It will be seen from the foregoing that recent attempts to identify architectural parallels for Saranda Kolones have concentrated exclusively on a Crusader origin of some sort, the possibility that the castle might have had a Byzantine provenance now being dismissed. On architectural grounds at any rate, this need not be so.

**Architectural affinities with Byzantine fortifications**

We pointed out a number of dissimilarities between Saranda Kolones and Belvoir, and we can now follow the aspects of those dissimilarities to identify analogous features of our Cypriot castle with Byzantine fortifications.

First, with regard to site, there is an immediate comparison to be made within the island itself, at Kyrenia. It is a coastal castle, which like Paphos is in a location that was of some importance in Byzantine times. They were both logical places in which to erect fortifications as being obvious ports for communication with the capital of the Empire. By contrast, there was no such compunction for the Byzantines to commission anything similar in Famagusta because it lay on the east coast, well away from the obvious sea lanes to Constantinople. In this respect, it is hardly surprising then that nothing comparable to Paphos and Kyrenia has been unearthed there. Such an explanation for the creation of a castle in Paphos appears more persuasive than Megaw’s argument that it was built there by the Lusignans, or their agents, the

36 D. Pringle in *Belmont Castle*, p. 215.
military orders, because Paphos was a natural point for the disembarkation of an invasion fleet that Constantinople might send in order to take the island.

Second, with regard to shape and size, we may make further comparison with Kyrenia. In its original form, this was similar in being a rectangular enclosure encompassing an area not especially different from Saranda Kolones. Megaw calculated that Kyrenia's inner Byzantine enceinte amounted to 80.5 m. (264 feet) square[^7] which is not that different from the area enclosed at Saranda Kolones, the statistics for which were given above. It is also worth noting that at Kyrenia, it may be that when the Franks took over the castle, they may have reduced its area a little by building inside the line of the Byzantine east curtain, just as at Saranda Kolones where they may have concentrated their works on a lesser area, being first their 'watchtower' and second the inner enceinte. The comparison of Saranda Kolones with Byzantine Kyrenia may be strengthened by comparing them with early Crusader works elsewhere on the island, for what little we know of these tells us that neither the Lusignans nor the military orders created anything comparable. In respect of the military orders, the recent excavations at Kolossi have emphasised that it does not bear comparison with Saranda Kolones. Looking at the other military order castle thought to date from the very beginning of the crusader period – Gastria – there appears no comparison with Saranda Kolones whatever. It is surely an argument against either a Hospitaller or Templar origin for Saranda Kolones to consider that at Kolossi and Gastria the orders created structures that as fortifications were very considerably inferior.

Both in site, shape and area enclosed, we may make comparison with another Byzantine castle. This is the land castle of Korykos, which is quite close to Cyprus on the southern shore of Anatolia. Like both Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones, it is not merely coastal, but also rectangular except for a stretch where allowance has to be made for its site, and although it is larger than Saranda Kolones and Kyrenia in respect of its enclosed area, the difference in the size of the enclosed area is not significant.[^8]

[^7]: Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 200.
The third dissimilarity with Belvoir noted above is the matter of the variety of towers that feature on the outer enceinte at Saranda Kolones. This is especially interesting. Byzantine fortifications frequently included rectangular towers, circular or drum towers, pentagonal and wedge shaped – or cut-water towers, in the same castles or town walls. ‘[T]he articulation of the curtain wall with rectangular, polygonal prow shapes, and round towers was a regular and principal part of Byzantine fortification’ as Foss wrote.\(^{39}\) For Lawrence, this was ‘accepted … Byzantine tradition’, and alone satisfied him that Saranda Kolones’ ‘master mason was a Greek’.\(^{40}\) There are good examples of such varied forms as at Amasya in northern Turkey – a site with a long and complex building history – but dated by Foss to the Middle Byzantine period, which we may take as the ninth to eleventh centuries. At Amasya, some of the towers have a sharp batter, and some are open at their interior gorges. Another Byzantine fortification that bears some resemblance is Lopadium, built around 1130, being rectangular in shape, and with a variety of differently shaped towers, which are at about 35 to 40 metre intervals. Lopadium however has its differences from Paphos, being bigger and in the frequently found Byzantine tendency to use brick, so its value as a comparison is limited.\(^{41}\) Of course earlier Byzantine works, including most spectacularly the Theodosian walls of Constantinople (fifth century), those of Antioch and the lesser known Byzantine fortifications in North Africa (sixth century) also involved some variety in the design of tower shapes. The twelfth-century towers of the Blachernae area of Constantinople are a particularly diverse group.\(^{42}\) Although the rectangular form tended to be the most common, the other designs were numerous. By contrast, the fortifications created by the Crusaders and those built in western Europe reflect a much greater preference for uniformity in tower design. This is not to say that one can not find any instance where there is some variety in the shapes of towers built by the Latins. Denys Pringle has shown that the remains of the walls and towers of Ascalon are largely those as constructed by Richard I in 1192, and they include one triangular bastion and one apsidal tower. However, the remaining towers at Ascalon are rectangular which was very much the Latins’ then preferred shape. As noted above, about this time mural towers with rounded faces began to supersede the rectangular as the preferred design for the fortifications of the Franks in both the Holy

\(^{39}\) Foss, p. 36.  
\(^{40}\) Lawrence, p. 226.  
\(^{41}\) Foss, pp. 17-18, 145.
Land and in the west. The transition was never complete in either area, but the point is that Latin and western tower design appears to have been far more consistent and in this quite dissimilar to the Byzantine approach.43

The two wedge or cut-water towers on the outer enceinte at Saranda Kolones are particularly important in considering the origin of the castle. Such towers are very rare in western European or Latin fortifications. The bastion at Ascalon is different, both inasmuch as it is solid, and in that it is triangular, and so unlike the Paphos towers that we might describe as hexagonal without their two rear sides. The Crusader tower on Safita’s inner enceinte has an obtuse angle that distinguishes it from the towers at Saranda Kolones where the sides of the front point are at a regular 45 degrees to each other. There are a few examples in the West that do bear comparison – two on the walls of the rectangular castle of Prato in Tuscany (see plan),

42 Pringle, Africa, pp. 152, 157; Lawrence, p. 221.
two on the outer *enceinte* at Gisors in the Vexin (see photograph below - *Gisors*), the gate of Saint-Jean de Provins in the Ile de France, and at Château-Thierry on the river Marne. Alternative dates have been put forward for these cut-water towers, but it seems likely that all are early thirteenth century,\(^4^4\) and therefore likely to draw their inspiration from the East, where they had been in use for centuries. These *tours en

\(^4^4\) Foss (p. 31) dated the Gisors towers as early as the reign of Henry I; for Toussaint (p. 35) they were built by Henry II, but Enlart (*Française*, p. 616) is more likely to have been nearer the mark in ascribing them to Philippe-Auguste. With regard to Prato, Foss (p. 31) appreciated that the castle was created in the late twelfth century, but it is now clear that after it became the "Castello dell’Imperatore", it was enlarged in the early thirteenth century, these works including the cut-water towers. Gotze, pp. 74-5 and fig. 102; McLean, pp. 86 and 108 and plan on p. 87; Fedden and Thomson, p. 49.
éperon a pans coupés as Enlart called them, are quite distinct from other prow shaped towers that can be found in the west – variously described as à bec, en bec, en éperon – that were constructed about the time of the putative date for an very early Crusader Saranda Kolones. Such alternative forms include the tapered donjons at Château Gaillard, La Roche-Guyon, both in the Vexin, Issoudun in Berry and Ortenbourg in Lorraine; the prow fronted Norfolk towers and those of the FitzWilliam gateway at Dover; and the almond shaped – 'tours en amande' – towers of Loches, Le Coudray-Salbart and Parthenay in Poitou, datable to 1202 to 1227.

It is not unlikely that the Lusignan family circle would have known of this latest technique in tower building in the hinterland of their original caput in Poitou. Either way, it is noteworthy that there was no common influence in Lusignan tower design in Cyprus and Poitou: there are no almond-shaped towers in the former and no cut-water shaped towers in the latter.

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45 Enlart, Francaise, pp. 514-5, and see his plate 21 for Château-Thierry.
On the other hand, cut-water towers had been an established feature of Byzantine fortification for centuries. Some time ago, Denys Pringle pointed out that the De Re Strategica had advocated the value of this type of tower: 47 indeed, this treatise – most likely from the sixth century, recommended their use in preference to any other.48 They were quite common in Byzantine citadels and town walls. This was stressed by Foss, for whom this type of tower was ‘a hallmark of Byzantine military architecture’, and indeed he appears to have considered Saranda Kolones to have been Byzantine on this basis alone.49 Outside Cyprus, Byzantine cut-water towers may be traced at Thessalonika in Greece, Amasya, Niksar, Attalia, Alanya, probably Toprak (Toprakkale/Til Hamdoun) and most spectacularly at Ankara – all in Asia Minor; at Resafeh in Syria, at Cerasus on the Pontic coast (Heraclea Pontica/Eregli); at Durazzo (Dyrrachium) in Albania, Zvecan/Sphentzanion in Kosovo; Ribnica in Montenegro; and Mavrokastron/Cetatea Alba. The cut-water towers at these locations date from various periods, commencing with those at Durazzo which are attributed to Anastasius I (491-518), through to those at Ankara which have been dated to the period from 630 to the ninth century, Resafeh also thought to be ninth century, and beyond that time, to the end of the eleventh century at Zvecan, to the twelfth century at Toprak and finally the period immediately after the fall of Constantinople in 1204 at Cerasus. The tall, stout, open-backed, wedge-shaped towers of the citadel and city walls of Thessalonika may be even later.50 At Sayhun (Saone) there are comparable towers which date from the Byzantine occupation of this site, that is from its acquisition by John Tzimisces in 975 to its loss in 1106 to 8. There, cut-water and rectangular towers alternate on the innermost and thickest (up to 3 m.) of the three Byzantine walls at the eastern end of their castle. The cut-water towers are solid to rampart level, unlike those at Ankara which were solid only in their lower parts, and in this feature, are comparable to the three cut-water towers on the Byzantine, outer south wall at Kyrenia. A further cut-water projection at Sayhun can be traced in the middle of the west wall of the Byzantine keep, the corners of which also resemble a cut-water or primitive angular bastion form. Ninth to tenth-century Byzantine towers with cut-water faces were also identified at Butrint in Albania. Although this is now

48 The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise, pp. 2-3, 35, and fig. 1 on p. 136.
49 Foss, pp. 20, 30-1, 36, 216 (fig. 30).
50 Foss, pp. 30-1; A. W. Lawrence, pp. 187, 204-6, (fig. 12 and plate 16); pp. 220, 222-3; Pringle, Africa, p. 157; P. Harrison, pp. 18-19, Epiapirgio, p. 23; Edwards, pp. 244-7; Metcalf, Byzantine
disputed, it does appear that we can accept that in a subsequent building period, thought to be late thirteenth or fourteenth century, a further cut-water tower was added, this being open-backed, of irregular design and partly reusing old blocks. The complex history of the site at that time renders a Byzantine (Despotate of Epirus) origin unconfirmed, but it is most likely.\textsuperscript{51}

The towers at Kyrenia are of considerable importance in considering the origin of those at Paphos. Excavations superintended by Megaw himself and others, identified the Kyrenia cut-water towers as built during the last phase of Byzantine occupation, a dating endorsed by Lawrence.\textsuperscript{52} Although the two cut-water towers at Paphos do not appear to have been built as solid structures, the analogy with Kyrenia might suggest a tenth-century origin for them.

So far as gate-towers are concerned, it may help to distinguish between the two types used at Saranda Kolones – the rectangular tower with its flank, bent-entrance design of the outer enceinte, and the apsidal tower with a flank, bent-entrance design of the inner enceinte. The use of two different designs may imply different building periods. Bent-entrance gatehouses were occasionally employed in Byzantine works, certainly from the ninth century and also in Muslim works of the ‘Abbāsid period, but less so by the first Crusaders. There are twelfth-century Frankish examples at Sayhun (Saone) and Belvoir of course but the Crusaders appear to have adopted such gatehouses rather more in the thirteenth century. This was quite likely the result of what was learnt in the east, for bent-entrance gatehouses are extremely unusual in western European military architecture.\textsuperscript{53} D.J. Cathcart King emphasised as much when he drew attention to the horseshoe gate-tower at Pembroke (see photograph – Pembroke and plans of the Pembroke gate-tower and the inner gate-tower at Saranda Kolones).

\textit{Cyprus}, p. 470.

\textsuperscript{51} Lawrence, pp. 205; 218-9; Smail, p. 238 and plate vi (a); Boase, \textit{Castles and Churches}, p. 49; Pringle, The Chapels in the Byzantine Castle of Sahyun, p. 106; for the trace of Sahyun’s keep and Byzantine walls, see plan in P. Deschamps, \textit{Les Châteaux des Croisés}, 3, album and Pringle, loc. cit; Karaiskaj, pp. 71-2, 122 and plate 48; Hodges, Bowden and Lako, pp. 23-4, 126, 138, 141 and fig. 8.24.

\textsuperscript{52} See Gazetteer entry for Kyrenia, and Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 200; Lawrence, p. 215.

\textsuperscript{53} P. Deschamps, \textit{Les Entrées des châteaux croisés}, p. 372; Creswell, pp. 157, 166, 174-9, 321; Smail, p. 242; Foss, pp. 7, 12; King, \textit{Château-Gaillard}, p. 164; Mesqui, pp. 14-16; Mesqui and Faucher, pp. 87-8.
Like the inner gatehouse at Saranda Kolones, this is a bent-entrance apsidal tower that opens from a doorway set in its flank. A similar gatehouse occurs at Caldicot, and comparisons may be made with the 'open' towers at Tenby. These are places that were either owned by or probably influenced by William the Marshal (d. 1219), who had spent two years in Palestine attached to the Templars. As King noted, it appears reasonable to believe that William was impressed by such towers that he saw there and so built the Pembroke gate-tower to a similar design, at the very end of the twelfth century. Interestingly, there is a difference however, in that these gatehouses of south Wales had no provision for portcullises, unlike the inner gatehouse at Paphos (see photograph). But these western gatehouses are exceptional and the point is of course that the inspiration for them seems to have come from the east. Elsewhere in Cyprus itself, there is the later Frankish rectangular bent-entrance tower of the west, inner wall at Kyrenia, but we cannot exclude the possibility that that follows the configuration of a pre-existing Byzantine arrangement. It is difficult to know whether the different types of gatehouses at Saranda Kolones reflect different building periods or merely the policy of two different master masons who were employed at the same time. The inner gatehouse chapel with its capitals argues that it is probably Frankish in origin but there is less certainty with regard to the outer gatehouse. The problem is exacerbated in that at some point the outer gatehouse suffered especially at the hands of those seeking a convenient source of readily shaped stone. This general ambiguity, however, may be of value in reaching an overall verdict on who built the castle.

Attempts to distinguish Byzantine from Latin or Frankish structures on the basis of masonry alone are of some help, but have their limitations. We can say that, unlike Byzantine work, Crusader work did not utilise brick or banded masonry, and that there was a greater effort to use larger facing blocks. Both however, generally employed the mortared rubble wall, that is - a concreted amalgam, as the core of their walls. The tenth-century Byzantine wall and towers at Sahyun mentioned above

54 King, Château-Gaillard, pp. 164-5; King, Arch. Cambrensis, pp. 40-1; CSG Journal, No. 22, p. 89.
55 The particular robbing of the outer gatehouse’s stonework is a point made by Dr. John Hayes in correspondence, August, 2007.
56 Foss, passim.
are, for example, of such a composition - being constructed of rubble concrete with a facing of small stone blocks. But although Byzantine masonry of this period was not of the standard of - say - the fifth-century Theodosian walls at Constantinople, it could, nonetheless, be of a certain quality and thus reasonably well faced, as in the Blachernae walls of Manuel Comnenus (1143–1180) at Constantinople, and as at Korykos, at which the facing was facilitated by utilising material from the ruins of the much earlier structures on the site. The sections of the walling at Saranda Kolones that we noted appear not to be so well faced may be merely a reflection of its incomplete state. That both Byzantine and Crusader fortifications sometimes contain material from previous buildings nearby, particularly columns from classical structures, is hardly surprising, but it is an obvious example of common practices.

One aspect of the masonry that is worth noting relates to masons’ marks. These are in Greek letters and are found on stones that are scattered all over the site. This could be material the Franks re-employed on a castle they built de novo, or alternatively it could be material fallen from a castle or other building that had been commenced earlier and which was developed by the Franks. Either way, the marks cannot be taken to indicate that Saranda Kolones was Frankish from its outset.

Comparison with the Byzantine land castle at Korykos

We commenced this review of the affinities of Saranda Kolones by a critical examination of comparisons that have been made with Belvoir and elsewhere in Palestine. It is perhaps appropriate then to conclude the review by offering an alternative site for comparison. In this respect, we have already made a number of allusions to both Kyrenia and to Korykos, both in general siting, in size and layout, and in the case of Kyrenia, to its tenth-century cut-water towers. Interestingly, Korykos provides for an even greater comparison with Paphos than Kyrenia. As at the Cypriot castle, there is some variety in tower shapes: they are mainly rectangular towers, but there are two that have cut-water projections on their outer faces. These projections are solid: effectively they are spurs reinforcing rectangular towers, so they

57 Smail, p. 238 and plate vi (a); Pringle, The Chapels in the Byzantine Castle of Sahyun, p. 106.
58 Turnbull, pp. 8, 29-30.
59 Correspondence with Dr. John Hayes, August 2007 and April 2009.
are not identical with those at Saranda Kolones. We may, however, infer some affinity in their respective designs. Korykos is similar to Saranda Kolones inasmuch as it consists of two *enceintes*, the outer being drawn tightly round the inner, no doubt so that the higher inner walls would allow for fire over and beyond the top of the outer circuit. The Korykos land castle is the only fully concentric castle in Cilicia, but it is concentric nonetheless, and here we should acknowledge the long tradition within Roman-Byzantine fortification of multiple lines of defence, already most prominently evident in Constantinople itself. There is then no scope in claiming Saranda Kolones as Crusader merely because it has a concentric arrangement of walling. Furthermore, like Saranda Kolones in places, the towers sit on rock that is slightly scarped to the base of the similarly rock-cut ditch. Its blocks of masonry are larger than at Saranda Kolones, but as we saw at both the builders of the castles used columns from the ruins of pre-existing classical buildings on the sites to help give solidity and cohesion in their construction works. There is perhaps some debate *vis à vis* the dating of this land castle, but it is generally thought to have been instigated by Alexius I (1081-1118) with additions by his successor, John (1118-1143). Quite likely their work constituted a reconstruction of much earlier work that may be dated to the fifth century.\(^\text{60}\) The point is of course that it is Byzantine.

In conclusion to this architectural analysis, it appears reasonable to assert that one cannot ascribe a Crusader provenance to Saranda Kolones on the basis of its structural remains alone. We have argued that on these grounds there is as much to recommend a Byzantine origin as a Latin one, indeed, perhaps more. In such a debate, it is important to remember that there must have been much borrowing by one culture of the techniques of another, presumably mainly the Franks adopting what they found to be worthwhile Roman practices. In consequence, we see that the castles of differing builders in fact shared some techniques in common, one instance being the rectangular design used by the Byzantines in the Balkans, Syria and Asia Minor\(^\text{61}\) and also the Crusaders as at Belvoir. That the latter adopted the Roman inspiration for such a layout does not help us say which culture was the builder in individual cases.

\(^{60}\) Boase, *Cilician Kingdom*, p. 160; Lawrence, pp. 177-9; Edwards, pp. 31, 161-7; Muller-Weiner, pp. 79-80; Foss, pp. 143, 146.

\(^{61}\) Foss, p. 4.
Historical context of Saranda Kolones

As noted above, Rosser initiated the theory that the construction of the castle was influenced by the Hospitallers. He observed that they arrived in Cyprus in 1198, and from this argued that the castle must have been begun in Aimery's reign (1194-1205), on the grounds that it must have taken some time to build it to the extent it had attained when wrecked in the earthquake of 1222.\(^6\)\(^2\) Megaw followed this line of reasoning, taking it that his pre-existing 'watchtower' was superseded by Saranda Kolones as early as 1198. For Megaw, construction on Saranda Kolones continued until 1204. The two dates here relate to an exhortation by Pope Innocent III to the Grand Masters of the Hospital and the Temple to aid in the defence of Cyprus - held by Megaw, Rosser and others \(^6\)\(^3\) to be against the possibility of a Byzantine threat to recapture their lost province, and the Fourth Crusade which effectively eliminated any such threat.

It is worth looking in detail at the Pope's initiative and the possible response of the military orders. Innocent's letters of December 1198 to the Orders and the Latin princes of Antioch and Tripoli did not specify Byzantium as the threat to Cyprus. He may have had it in mind, or at any rate used it as an excuse, as such a danger was mentioned in letters he wrote in December 1199 to the Kings of England and France.\(^6\)\(^4\) However, Innocent's over-riding concern was to retrieve the position in the Holy Land and recapture Jerusalem. Indeed he mentioned this in his letters which consequently should be seen primarily as support for King Aimery of Cyprus who had recently become King of Jerusalem as well. Quite likely Innocent knew that the circumstances for a renewed attempt on Jerusalem were favourable: the Ayyubids were disunited - a position exacerbated with the death of al-'Azîz in November 1198. The view has been made that Innocent's letters to the Orders could not have been motivated by considerations of renewed war with the Muslims because of the truce of July 1198 that was to last for five years and eight months, but there is reason to

\(^6\) Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47.
\(^6\)\(^3\) e.g. see Hill, 2, p. 30, fn. 3; Rosser, (forthcoming). The papal letter of December 1198 is reproduced in Hageneder und Haidacher, 1, doc. 438 on pp. 661-2.
\(^6\)\(^4\) Hageneder und Haidacher, 2, doc. 241 (251) on pp. 459-62; Hill, 2, pp. 62-3; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 8.
believe that Innocent was not concerned with such a truce. This may perhaps be supported by the circumstances of another letter that the Pope wrote, this being in January 1212 – exclusively to the Templars on that occasion – again that they should aid in the defence of Cyprus. This was after the then King of Jerusalem, John of Brienne, had accepted al-`Adil’s offer of another renewal of the truce in 1211, which came into effect in July 1212. It is worth adding that, like the letters of 1198, Innocent’s letter of 1212 did not specify any enemy imagined to be threatening Cyprus. Byzantium could not serve as a pretext after its destruction in 1204 and the concord with the Muslims precluded the use of propaganda of threat from that quarter. All the indications are then that in 1198 Innocent was simply concerned with bolstering the Latin East in a quest to recover the Holy City rather than having an overt fear of any danger to Cyprus posed by the Empire. This verdict is amplified when set against the backgound of the Empire’s decline and visible impotence, as set out in the History (above). In conclusion then, the view that the papal letter of that year was prompted by a genuine fear of Byzantium is quite over-stated.

As to any response of the military orders to the letters of 1198, as noted above, Megaw drew on Hill who commented that the Hospitallers took over some of the island’s fortresses, in response to the letter from Innocent III. If we accept that this happened, it would argue that Saranda Kolones already existed and that the Hospitallers merely added to it. This would account for the similarity of such details as the wall capitals in the chapel that was situated above the inner gatehouse, with capitals from its counterpart at Belvoir, noted above. This does not have to be taken as an indelible Hospitaller fingerprint however: the safer evaluation of this would be merely that it is Crusader and that it is not specific to a particular military order.

However, it is by no means clear that Hill was correct, for there are a number of difficulties with his source. First, this is very late: this was Bosio, the Maltese historian of the Hospitallers, whose first volume was published in 1594. Second,

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65 Ibn al-Athir, pp. 39-50 for Ayyubid disunity in 1198; Edbury, Kingdom of Cyprus, p. 34 for the truce of 1198; Runciman, 3, p. 133 for the negotiations of 1211 and truce of 1212 and pp. 145-6 for Innocent’s ambition for Jerusalem; Courcas, Latin Church, p. 126 for Innocent’s letter of 1212; Rosser, (forthcoming) for the opinion that the truce of 1198 precludes the view that the Pope’s letters of 1198 were motivated by anything other than apprehension of Byzantium.

66 Hill, 2, p. 30.
Bosio provides the tenor of the papal letter, noting interestingly, that there was no record of it in the papal registry. Although there is no reason to suspect that Bosio had not seen a letter, he is confused as to whether the letter went directly to the Master of the Hospital or to King Aimery who then passed it on. Third, and as Hill noted, the letter is dated from the first year of Innocent’s pontificate – 1198, yet Bosio records that it was received by the Master of the Hospital - Goffredo le Rat who did not hold that office until 1206-7. Most important however, is that Bosio does not state directly that the Hospitalers did in fact take over any fortresses. He says only that:

Hauuto, c’hebbe il Re questo breue, presentandolo al Maestro Fra Goffredo le Rat; lo richiedette, ch’accettando la cura, e’l gouerno del’Isola di Cipro, fosse contento di mandar parte de’suoi Cavalieri, e delle sue genti in presidio, & in guardia di quelle Fortezze:

After the King had received this brief, presenting it to the Master Brother Goffredo le Rat, he asked him that, accepting the responsibility and governance of the island of Cyprus, he should be willing to send part of his knights and of his people to defend and protect those Fortresses:

Bosio continued that Goffredo accepted the responsibility though it was a great burden, eventually adding that Hugh I’s accession in Cyprus in 1205 (whereupon the Lusignans lost their title to Jerusalem) obviated the need for Hospitaler help for Cyprus. Thus we are not in fact told that the Order had contributed anything to the defence of the island in the intervening period. Given these problems with this source, and moreover that it seems unlikely that King Aimery would have been inclined to give up his fortresses to another power, it is arguable that Innocent III’s letter had negligible effect. Equally, that King Hugh I was very favourably disposed to the Hospitalers as noted by Hill, cannot be taken necessarily as evidence for a Hospitaler tenure or influence over Saranda Kolones or elsewhere. As we will see, Hugh held the Templars in similar esteem.

Megaw supported his view that Saranda Kolones was the Hospitaler response to the papal initiative with his belief that the Order held estates in the neighbourhood, but

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67 Delaville le Roux, pp. 131-2; Riley-Smith, *Knights of St. John*, p. 155.
68 Bosio, 1, pp. 146-9. The quoted extract is from p. 147.
69 Hill, 2, p. 30.
70 Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, p. 48. Hill, 2, p. 30 indicated these were only granted in 1210, but see next footnote.
Edbury and Coureas have made it clear that it was the Order of the Temple that held property and vineyards in Paphos, and that this 'estate' only came to the Hospitallers after the suppression of the Temple in 1312. Indeed, given that the Hospitallers most probably made their main base in Cyprus elsewhere – in Limassol – from the outset, it seems unlikely that they should expend such considerable effort at Saranda Kolones.

Further comparison with other Cypriot castles in the context of these years may also be of value. If, as per Megaw and Rosser, Saranda Kolones was the Hospitaller response to the papal initiative while the Templar contribution was Gastria on the other side of the island built about the same time, it would seem a little odd that there should be such a massive disparity in design if both had the same inspiration. Further comparison with Kyrenia is also worthwhile. If the Byzantine threat had been so prominent and that consequently the Fourth Crusade brought this to an end, we might expect to find some concentrated effort to strengthen that castle up to 1204 and then a similar discontinuation of effort. Of course this is a little difficult to pursue because Kyrenia was subsequently so very heavily developed but at least it is worth noting that in Megaw's detailed description of Kyrenia, there is no suggestion of any discernment of very early work suddenly halted as postulated for the Paphos site, nor has there ever been any suggestion that Kyrenia was ever downgraded from use as a castle after 1204.

Alternative proposals were put forward by Antonio Cadei. He suggested that Saranda Kolones was commenced at some point between 1192 and 1198, a view that necessarily does not allow for Megaw's earlier Crusader tower, nor his opinion as to the impact of the papal letter. Cadei continued that Saranda Kolones may have been a Templar castle. The argument is summarised below and if too this is hardly conclusive, it is both of innate interest in any event and perhaps helps to demonstrate the difficulties there are in depending on the type of process by which Megaw and Rosser arrived at their judgements. Cadei emphasised the Lusignan obligation to the Templars, which in his view terminated in 1210 when Hugh I assumed his majority and indicted the Regent, Walter or Gautier of Montbéliard, for false accounting. For

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71 P. Edbury, The Templars in Cyprus, p. 191, fn. 7; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125.
72 see gazetteer entry for Limassol, and Coureas, Latin Church, p. 156.
73 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, passim.
Cadei, 1210 was particularly significant, and that it could have been from that point that ‘Templar’ Saranda Kolones was downgraded into an agro-industrial entrepôt.\(^74\)

The Lusignans were indeed very well disposed to the Templars: granting them great estates as Edbury noted, though as Edbury added, this harmony appears to have continued until 1273 and was not seriously undermined by the events of 1210.\(^75\)

Of course, neither the presence of a Templar property around Paphos, nor the good relations of the Lusignans with the Order, has to mean that the castle was either built or occupied by the Templars. Similarly, Cadei’s further evidence adduced to support the case for the Temple, is of interest, but cannot be taken as irresistible argument. This is that on the south-west of the south-east tower of the castle, a workshop was found that had produced ceramics which appear in Palestine and which have been associated with the Templars. Cadei inferred that this might perhaps also attest that Templars remained in control of the site after its change of use from a strictly military function. He also recorded that shards of glass from drinking vessels had been found at Saranda Kolones that are very similar to shards found at Templar ‘Atlit.\(^76\) It is hard to accept however, that any specific category of glass or ceramics can be limited to a particular military order. The artisans who produced such artefacts would have had no cause to reserve their skills for one customer, and unless it may be established that a military order had its own exclusive patterns which they insisted upon, such ‘evidence’ as this may be is unconvincing.

Yet another alternative theory was recently advocated by Kristian Molin. He took Wilbrand’s turris at face value and argued that consequently what fortification existed in Paphos in 1211 was merely a tower visible for many miles around.\(^77\) This he identified as the very early Crusader tower and courtyard wall which Megaw had found. Molin accepted Megaw’s attribution that Saranda Kolones was Crusader, but unlike Megaw, supposed that its construction was later - triggered perhaps by the start of the Fifth Crusade in 1217, and that it was further stimulated by the Muslim raid on Limassol in 1220. However, this argument is flawed, not only because of the

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\(^74\) Cadei, pp. 138-9.
\(^75\) Edbury, The Templars in Cyprus, pp. 191-3.
unreliability of Wilbrand as a source for Paphos in 1211, but also because there is no
evidence to suggest that Paphos was seen or used as a base or depot during the Fifth
Crusade. Indeed the mustering point of the army, which included Hugh I and a
Cypriot contingent, was Acre. Further, the Egyptian raid of 1220 was made against
the Limassol area because that was where the Crusader fleet was moored – not
Paphos.78 In short, we are unable to accredit Molin’s attribution of early thirteenth-
century Crusader work at Paphos to the contexts that he puts forward.

As with our examination of the architectural remains of Saranda Kolones, it can be
seen from the foregoing that the various historical contexts put forward for Saranda
Kolones as a Crusader castle have a number of problems. Furthermore, and in the
same way that the castle’s architectural affinities with Byzantine fortifications have
been neglected, there is a reasonable argument for seeing the castle as a Byzantine
foundation in the context of historical events. In this respect, it is interesting that
various scholars have speculated as to quite what circumstance prompted the
foundations of other Cypriot castles that are irrefutably Byzantine in origin. 79

Comment is made on this in the Introduction, and in the Gazetteer entries for Kyrenia
and for the three mountain castles. Briefly recited, these include the apprehension of
Arab raids in the seventh century, the consolidation of the island after its recovery
from the Arabs in 965, and later – in the late eleventh century – to any one of a
number of reasons – that the opposite Anatolian coast was overrun by the Seljuks; that
the rebellious Rhapsomates created them in 1092; that Alexius I built them after that
rebellion, and that Alexius similarly built them in reaction to a potential threat posed
by the first Crusaders then established on the mainland to the east. If the northern
castles were indeed built as a consequence of any of these reasons, then there is a
good argument that castles were built on Cyprus elsewhere as well. Indeed, Paphos,
and for that matter Limassol, were especially important as being regular calling points
on the sea-route from the west to the east. Vessels would hug the Anatolian coast as
far as Cape Taslik or Cape Chelodonia, cross the 145 miles to Paphos, proceed along
the south coast of Cyprus, driven by the prevailing wind, the meltemi, and then
continue to Tripoli or Beirut. In 1102, the pilgrim Saewulf recorded just such a

78 Oliver of Paderborn, (ed. Peters), ch. 1, p. 51; S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3, p. 166;
Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 125-127.
79 e.g. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 204; Hill, 2, p. 21.
journey, in which his vessel sailed 'ad Paffum civitatem'. Furthermore, our review of the declining power of the Empire in the period leading up to the Ricardian conquest, as set out in the History above, could also be exploited to offer arguments that the Byzantines of those years had some reason to build at a place such as Paphos, even if by then, it was in decline as a port. The attenuation and fragmentation of the imperial navy made it more dependent than ever on its bases and those bases correspondingly more vulnerable. In such circumstances, it could be suggested that the creation of some serious fortification at Paphos would have been an entirely natural reaction.

Numismatic and pottery evidence and the end of Saranda Kolones

Whenever work on the castle per se may have been halted, it is clear that it remained unfinished. Although the inner ward is said to have been completed, it is clear that the outer curtain was not, nor was the ditch. Some of the sally ports were abandoned: in particular those on the north wall were reached by stairs from the wall top that are now quite unprotected and undisguised, suggesting that a screening outer wall was never completed. Similarly the postern on the west remained incomplete without any drawbridge leading from it. Indeed, the route from the castle via this postern appears to have been changed after the castle was decommissioned as a fortification, for it now prescribes three sides of a square in its descent to close to the apex of the adjacent cut-water tower. (see diagram and photographs). This arrangement merely negates the value of the tower and compromises the castle's defensibility, so it cannot be a part of the original design.

Megaw inferred that the castle continued in use as some sort of administrative centre - effectively a manorial headquarters, for he detected that the forge and mill were in use at the time of the earthquake of 1222 which he held brought about an end even to this activity. Indeed the findings of the excavation do bear an interpretation that the castle was downgraded to be a centre of agro/industrial production, although not

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80 Saewulf, p. 61 and Pryor's introduction, pp. 47-8; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp. 511-5; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, pp. 112, 115.
81 Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 516; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, p. 115.
necessarily involving the production of sugar as was once thought. The outside of the inner curtain wall became encumbered by a number of enclosures with thin walls of poor consistency, many of which possessed hearths. Indeed, the arrangements of the central courtyard and multiplicity of stables (see photograph) may just as easily be seen as a lowering of the guard and a change of use from war to economics. The transformation of the large bridge over the ditch outside the main entrance, on the east, to a permanent and immovable structure, with yet another stable between its arches, similarly indicates a fundamental change of purpose.83

Megaw believed that the downgraded castle did not, during this period, have any garrison worth the name. He records the discovery of just one sword and a one helmet which, as he commented, hardly attests the presence of a serious fighting force. The excavations in the inner curtain also revealed large quantities of iron heads for crossbow bolts and about 1,500 stone balls for catapults. The latter items could of course have been manufactured and stored in the castle for use elsewhere. Megaw also believed that the western coins and lead papal seal, dating from about the time of the earthquake, that the excavations discovered, reflected the castle’s additional use as some kind of high-class hostel.84

Some human remains discovered in the earliest seasons of excavation are thought to be those of the earthquake’s victims. Megaw and Rosser were convinced that the castle was never repaired and was merely utilised as a quarry by the townsfolk, and indeed Rosser and Cadei remarked on the robber ramps supposedly made to allow the stonework to be taken away to rebuild the city.85 The long absence of further references to a Paphos castle noted above, in conjunction with the pottery and numismatic evidence available, do indeed indicate that Saranda Kolones was not recommissioned in any way after this 1222 earthquake.
A full report on the pottery evidence for Saranda Kolones has yet to be produced, but it does seem clear that this area of investigation reflects that the castle was largely abandoned after the earthquake of 1222. Dr. John Hayes has commented that there is a wide gap between finds that can be dated to the early thirteenth century and some surface finds and those from a 'house' in the ditch to the south-east which appear to be late thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries. Early thirteenth-century pottery that he identified on site included 'Zenxippus Ware'. This was in use from the 1190s to after 1222 – perhaps as late as the 1240s in fact, but this may indicate only that parts of the castle site were occupied for a little while merely by squatters or those rendered homeless by the earthquake. As to using this area of enquiry to establish quite when the castle was constructed, in 1986, Rosser wrote that the pottery found in 1981-3 dated from the late twelfth or possibly early thirteenth century and that this argued soundly against a Byzantine origin for the castle; that the Byzantine castle must have been elsewhere and that Saranda Kolones was Crusader from inception. However, this ignores the fact that John Hayes has identified Middle Byzantine and Islamic pottery which antedate the main bulk of the finds: evidence which shows activity on the site in the 1160s-1170s, perhaps running into the 1180s. At the very least, this suggests that the site was occupied before the arrival of the Franks and indeed may further indicate some building activity.

A report on the numismatic finds has however, recently appeared, and broadly speaking, its ramifications are consistent with those that may be derived from the pottery evidence. In total, the finds constitute 135 coins, in addition to which is a large hoard of 74 pieces. The hoard is mid seventh century, while the 135 pieces consist of 65 seventh-century Byzantine, being mainly from the reigns of Heraclius and Constans (610-668) but with three or four from the reigns of Justinian II and Tiberius III (685-711); 2 seventh-century Arab-Byzantine; 5 seventh-eighth-century Islamic; 12 eleventh-twelfth-century Byzantine (these include 4 Manuel Comnenus (1143-1180); 5 of these 12 bear the head of the 'Emperor' Isaac, but appear to have been demonetised, so quite likely they were discarded in the Lusignan period); 46 French,

Latin East and Kingdom of Cyprus (at least 5 of these, perhaps twice that number, post date 1222) and finally 5 various foreign coins.\textsuperscript{87}

Given the importance of this numismatic evidence in assigning a date to the site, especially inasmuch as Rosser considers it unquestionably supports his view that Saranda Kolones is wholly Crusader in origin,\textsuperscript{88} it is worth considering certain aspects of this evidence.

First, the considerable quantity of seventh-century coins reflects commensurate activity on the site. Megaw and Rosser thought that this was with regard to a basilica. Even if this were so, it does not obviate activity involving fortification as well. Second, the absence of coins from the eighth to the eleventh centuries is unremarkable. This is true of all of Cyprus and cannot in itself be taken as an indication that the site was unoccupied. Third, at the most, only 40 coins – and of mixed provenance – date from the period 1192-1222. Fewer still date from the period when Saranda Kolones was in commission as a Crusader Castle – that is, before its demotion to an agro-industrial centre. If then, as per Megaw and Rosser, Saranda Kolones was built entirely at that time - as a sophisticated, state-of-the-art, concentric castle - that period has left a paucity of numismatic evidence in relation to the earlier periods.

Other archaeological evidence

Rosser is clear that the probes taken in the early 1980s into the castle’s foundation trenches indicate that construction began around 1200.\textsuperscript{89} Without sight of the full report on this area of enquiry, it is impossible to pass judgement. That said, and if it is accepted that these findings apply to all the foundations, which may not be the case, it is worth asking if Crusader foundations may mask pre-existing ones. More to the point, it is worth bearing in mind a point made earlier with regard to masonry: how precise a science such testing can be? How certain may we be in distinguishing, in

\textsuperscript{87} Metcalf, Coins from Saranda Kolones, pp. 205-9, 216-20, 225. 
\textsuperscript{88} See eg his use of Metcalf, in Archaeological and Literary Evidence, pp. 43-4. 
\textsuperscript{89} As most recently restated in his forthcoming article.
In this instance, between Middle Byzantine masonry and Crusader masonry of the same period?

**Saranda Kolones: conclusion**

In conclusion we may summarise as follows. A final date of 1222 for the end of activity at Saranda Kolones appears to be supported by all the evidence available to us. Prior to that date, the incomplete castle had been assigned primarily to agro-industrial functions that involved the building of new structures that partly superseded and certainly dissipated what would have been the military potential of the castle. However, we cannot be certain quite when that change of use came about. Most important however, is the matter of who commenced the castle. Arguments for a Crusader origin and that it was Hospitaller or even Templar inspired – perhaps indeed Hospitaller or Templar built and occupied, have been reviewed critically above. At the same time, alternative arguments have been put forward that may support the view that Saranda Kolones was Byzantine in origin. Unless further information is forthcoming, taking in the different types of evidence as set out above, it appears reasonable to believe that the castle was indeed commenced before the arrival of the Franks in 1191 and even that a good proportion of what is now extant – particularly the outer enceinte - had been created by that time. The Lusignans quite probably continued with the work, most likely directing their efforts primarily on the inner enceinte. As John Hayes has suggested, it may be that any Byzantine structures in this area were eliminated when the Franks quarried it out to create their undercrofts and central courtyard. A shortage of Latin manpower in these very early years of the Lusignan period would lead them naturally to fortify only a lesser circuit than the outer ring, as indeed they may have done to some extent when they took over Kyrenia, as noted above. A lack of funds with which to build a complex, concentric castle would also reflect such a restricted programme - an alternative argument to John Rosser’s that early Lusignan impecuniosity must mean that only the Hospitallers could have afforded to build the whole complex. If the Lusignans did indeed restrict their work to the inner enceinte, this would account for the comparability of the capitals in its inner gatehouse chapel with those elsewhere, and indeed perhaps justify a possible Latin influence on the overall design of this gatehouse as mentioned above; it would allow for the effective overbuilding of the earlier ‘watchtower’ discovered by
Megaw; and explain why, unlike the outer enceinte, the construction of the inner appears to have been completed.\(^9^0\) We can only speculate as to any Lusignan intention to complete the outer enceinte. Advances in Muslim siege warfare appear to have stimulated the Crusaders' development of concentric castles on the Syrian mainland from the late 1160s: \(^9^1\) whether such considerations lay behind the Lusignans' utilisation of an earlier Byzantine outer enceinte and that they intended to recommission it, is a matter of speculation, though such an intention would have been logical. At any rate, as we have noted, before any such effort was far advanced, work on the castle per se, fizzled out altogether, and instead it was adapted to the exclusive purposes of economic gain. It was not until some point in the following century that changing circumstances prompted the Crusader regime to reconsider the need for fortifications in Paphos.

**Historical references from 1373**

The absence of any reference to fortifications that existed in Paphos for over a century and a half after the earthquake of 1222 noted above is in stark contrast to the written information we have on the development of the walls of Famagusta, discussed elsewhere in this Gazetteer. Unlike Famagusta, Paphos declined economically and was depopulated: - two visitors in 1458 recorded that it was 'ruined and almost without inhabitants', \(^9^2\) and 'ruinata et quasi inhabitata', \(^9^3\) while in the 1480s it was described as 'desolate, no longer a city, but a miserable village...the harbour is abandoned'. \(^9^4\) This decline was probably owing to a combination of its proneness to earthquakes as noted by Ludolf of Suchen and others, and the gradual silting up of the ancient port, a process that may have begun as early as the fourth century, but which appears to have become considerably worse as a result of the earthquakes of 1159 and 1222. \(^9^5\) Unlike Famagusta where the creation of town walls reflected the exploitation

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\(^9^2\) Count Gabriele Capodilista in Cobham, p. 35.

\(^9^3\) Roberto da Sanseverino in Grivaud, p. 71.

\(^9^4\) Felix Faber of Ulm, in Cobham, p. 45.

\(^9^5\) Megaw, Reflections, pp. 149-50; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp. 516-8; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, p. 115; Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 46. For von Suchen, see fn. 21 above. See too Felix Faber in Cobham, p. 45.
of economic opportunity, at Paphos the absence of such opportunity rendered pointless the construction of harbour towers or *cordons sanitaire*. There was little scope at Paphos for their use in levying dues from visiting shipping or storing within them such levied cash or kind. There was not then the stimulus for investment in a castle and town walls that there was in Famagusta.

However, by 1373 when full-scale hostilities with Genoa erupted, there was some fortification in Paphos, for, early in the war, Makhairas reported that the Genoese collected 2000 Bulgarians, Romanian Greeks and Tartars with whom they took the castles of Paphos [ta kastellia tis Paphou]. At that time the castles had low walls, and they set to work and heightened them, and they cut a trench, so that the sea flowed in and surrounded them with water, making the place so strong that, when the Cypriots brought up fighting-towers and soldiers in them, they resisted the attack without anxiety for the result. [96]

The value of Makhairas’ *Recital* is touched on in the History (above), and his detailed record of the part played by fortifications in this and later wars, is invaluable. As noted in the History, Makhairas goes on to describe two abortive attempts by the Lusignan forces to recapture the ‘castles’, one of which no doubt involved the attack with siege towers. [97] Perhaps the second attempt was on 3 July when the Cypriots attacked ‘the tower of Paphos’. On that occasion, the Genoese used their galleys to help ward off the Cypriots, and though the Lusignan force used Greek Fire against these, the fortifications remained in Genoese hands. [98] Subsequently another attempt to retake the fortifications was also foiled, in part because of the use made by the Genoese of their galleys. [99] Our other two chronicle sources for this period are Amadi, who may have drawn from the same material as Makhairas, and Florio Bustron who wrote in the later sixteenth century and drew heavily from Amadi. Both also mention the low walls of Paphos, its capture by the Genoese and of Lusignan attempts to recapture it, in which the chroniclers refer to the forts in the plural – ‘forteze’ (Amadi) and the ‘fortezze’ (Bustron). [100]

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97 Makhairas, 2, pp. 157-8.
These various references to the fortifications, being mainly in the plural, and the evident proximity of the fortifications in question to the sea, must relate to a building complex the remains of which we see today as ‘the harbour forts’, discussed below, and do not lend themselves to an interpretation offered by von Wartburg that this may be evidence for a continuation of the castle of Saranda Kolones. Her view that references to fortifications at Paphos from 1373 can be taken to establish as much is certainly of interest however, and worth reviewing as we track through those, and others, taking us to the end of the Lusignan period and beyond.

Our next reference comes from a list of building works, some of which were fortified, that Amadi attributed to James I (1382-1398). This account recorded that James ‘fece fortificar la citadela et le forterezze di Bapho’. Florio Bustron evidently copied this word for word, so he too wrote that James ‘fece fortificar la citadella e le fortezze de Baffo’ but whether this work was merely the repair of damage perpetrated in 1373 as von Wartburg suggested is impossible to say. She attached some significance to this reference, considering it vital in her argument that it must imply the existence of something other than just ‘the two harbour forts’. This is difficult, partly at least because we can not be certain of Amadi’s source for this, which is not in Makhairas, nor indeed whether we must necessarily infer quite distinct structures in Amadi’s ‘citadel’ and ‘fortresses’. The former could simply have been the prominent feature of the latter arrangement, as may possibly be inferred from what now remains (see below).

Nicolas of Martoni visited Cyprus on his pilgrimage to Jerusalem over the winter of 1394-95. He mentions the ‘castrum quod dicitur Baffa’ and that ‘in quo castro fit magna quantitas zuccare’. It is not impossible that, in writing up his experiences, Nicolas conflated New Paphos with Old Paphos/Kouklia, where sugar was certainly in production, but if he was in fact referring to New Paphos, there is no reason for

102 Amadi, p. 495.
103 Fl. Bustron, p. 352.
104 Wartburg, p. 135.
105 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 637, and in Cobham, p. 28.
106 as suggested by Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 518.
us to infer from this that there was any sugar refining industry in the old castle and we should conclude then that a part of the new forts had been assigned to store sugar.

Most of our subsequent allusions to the later medieval fortifications of Paphos clearly refer to a complex based by the sea represented by two prominent towers. At some point in the first half of the fifteenth century, the ‘Parma Magliabecchi’ portolan was drawn up; this mentions the outer tower with reference to anchoring.\(^{107}\) The towers are clearly mentioned by Stephen of Gumpenberg who visited Paphos in 1449. He noted that ‘da ligen hübscher Castel zwey an dem Meer’ (‘near the sea there are two beautiful castles’).\(^{108}\) Probably the same may be said of a reference we have to the Genoese failing to take ‘des châteaux de Paphos’ in May, 1452.\(^{109}\)

By then, the periods covered by the chronicles of Makhairas and Amadi had come to an end and we are dependent instead on Florio Bustron and his kinsman George Boustronios, who is particularly valuable as an eye witness of the events of the Lusignan civil war and the reign of James II. In that civil war of the early 1460s, Paphos changed hands on more than one occasion. It was probably in late September, 1460 that James the Bastard first obtained control here, then – in early 1461 – losing it but quickly regaining it. In all of Bustron’s references to these events, the fortifications are recorded as in the plural: ‘i castelli’.\(^{110}\) Boustronios however, refers to the castle(s) in both the singular and plural, also mentioning how Charlotte had on one occasion during this time, made ‘port by the castles’.\(^{111}\)

Towards the very end of our period, there is a proliferation of references that survive from the notes or diaries of foreign visitors. Visiting in 1480, Pierre Barbatre noted ‘deux petits chasteaux et la mer’.\(^{112}\) In 1483, Bernhard of Breydenbach referred to ‘gar starcker thurn uff eynem berg in mitten der statt etwann gestanden’ (‘rather strong towers which stood once on a hill in midst of the town’).\(^{113}\) Of course, rather like Ludolf of Suchen, this is a reference to what had been and not what was. A visitor

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\(^{107}\) Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 518.

\(^{108}\) Steffan von Gumpenberg, in Grivaud, p. 63.

\(^{109}\) Otten-Frous, Limassol, p. 412.

\(^{110}\) Fl. Bustron, pp. 401, 409, 410.

\(^{111}\) G. Boustronios, § 68, pp. 102-3; § 85, on pp. 110-1. See too Ibn Tagribardi, Arab Sources, p. 94.

\(^{112}\) in Grivaud, p. 100.

\(^{113}\) Peregrinato in terram sanctam, deutsch, (Mainz, 1486), s.v. Baffa, as cited by Wartburg, p. 135.
of 1484 – the Venetian Francesco Suriano, recorded that Paphos ‘is entirely ruinous, except one or two towers on the harbour.’ In 1491, the visitor Dietrich of Schachten recorded that earlier that year, there was another earthquake causing severe damage to one of the castles by the sea, ‘siendt noch heuttiges tages zwene Thuerm da ann dem Meer’. It must have been repaired quickly as later visitors’ reports give the clear impression that it was then in full commission. Thus yet another German visitor, Hans Schürpf in 1497 also wrote of two castles: ‘ligent vor der statt zwëy starcke schloß’, while in 1518, Jacques le Saige noted that ‘on the seashore there are still two massive towers, and there was once a strong castle’.

The next reference we have is Ludwig Tschudi’s description of 1519. He wrote that ‘da seind vil starcke Thurm auff einem Buhel, in mitte der Statt gelegen, gestanden, da ettlich noch schier gantz’ (‘many strong towers stood on a hill in midst of the town, some of which are near complete’). This reference and a similar description recorded in 1566 by Christoph Furers, were cited by von Wartburg as evidence for the survival of Saranda Kolones. Like Suchen’s and Breydenbach’s allusions, these references to what may well have been Saranda Kolones, should not, however, be taken to indicate that that castle was still in commission. In any event, after 1600, there is certainly no other description of the site of Saranda Kolones as anything but a ruin.

After these observations of 1518 and 1519, later allusions reinforce the impression of the existence of a seaside fortification in which two towers were especially prominent and that there had at one time been another considerable castle a little inland but that that was no more. In 1529, Marino Sanudo reported ‘a li do castelli di Bapho...ha do torre antiche per secuerta del porto.’ The Attar map of 1542 shows just one tower at the entrance to the harbour. The description of a ‘tour, haute et carrée, desarmée’ provided by Oldrich Prefat in 1546 reflects a perception that one tower was the more

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114 in Cobham, p. 49.
115 Dietrich von Schachten in Grivaud, p. 133; Hill, 2, pp. 18, 87; Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 199.
117 in Cobham, p. 61.
118 Wartburg, pp. 135-6; Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 49.
120 Attar, pp. 46, 89.
prominent, but this cannot be adduced as evidence, as Corvisier would have it, that the destruction wrought to the other tower in the 1491 earthquake was never remedied. The testimonies of those who described the harbour fortifications in the intervening period contradict that view. In the later sixteenth-century, Florio Bustron commented that there was hardly anything worth seeing except 'due torri in foggia di castelli'. Writing about the same time, Stephen of Lusignan said much the same: 'there were two very strong castles on the sea whose walls were always washed by the waves; the kings of the Lusignan family had provided them with all things necessary for their defence but since the Venetians have become lords and masters of the island they have completely demolished and levelled them.'

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121 Corvisier, Le Château de Pafos in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 402.
122 Fl. Bustron, p. 15.
123 Lusignan - Description, ff. 16 and 17. [Noted and translated in Enlart, p. 503]. See too f. 211.
PAPHOS FORT

Plan of Lusignan fort

Ground plan with Ottoman additions

Upper level with Ottoman additions

Legend:
- Ancient wall
- Lusignan
- Ottoman

Scale: 0 - 20m
Description of the harbour forts

What we see today appear as two quite separate structures. They are situated immediately outside the western breakwater, while on their seaward facing sides, they are protected by extensive fields of boulders. Both breakwater and boulderfield were made in the twentieth century as part of the improvements to the yacht harbour. Prior to that, the sea washed right up the outer walls, as reflected in a number of photographs dating from the late nineteenth century. An engraving published as early as 1878 also shows the surviving fort as then encompassed by the sea, but this impression disguises the extent to which the the ancient port had silted up, dredging first commencing in 1910. Certainly in the later middle ages the forts were accessible by dry land, judging by the reference to the trench dug in 1373. Both were constructed on the base of the ancient, man-made mole that was created in classical times.

The lower courses of both consist of big reused ashlar stone, most probably from the Hellenic mole. The structure by the seaward end of the breakwater is very badly ruined, while the other is a quadrangular fort which in the main dates from after the end of our period. The ruin is presumably the ‘castle’ noted as damaged by the earthquake of 1491. However, it is still possible to discern within it the ashlar inner wall of a chamber at first floor level. This chamber wall leads obliquely to a narrow window or embrasure, now blocked with stones. (See photograph). This looked over the ancient mole that formed the outer rim of the harbour. The engraving from 1878 strongly suggests that this was connected by a considerable wall to the quadrangular fort at the landward end of the modern mole. Indeed there is still clear evidence of such a connecting wall to be seen today. Half way along the line of this wall is a prominent lump of stonework that may have constituted some intermediate structure. It is also possible that this ‘sea wall’ extended from the quadrangular fort to the land,
for there is modern work there now that appears to contain and utilises older masonry. 
In origin, this ‘complex’ was likely conceived as a whole, the two ‘forts’ being its most prominent parts.

The landward fort is better preserved. The Lusignan work was taken over by the Venetians but quickly abandoned by them in 1503. The Turks in turn took it over and added to it substantially. As a result of their work, it is now extremely difficult to be clear as to what may be Lusignan. Christian Corvisier has, however, made an admirable attempt to disentangle the Lusignan work from the later Ottoman overbuild.

Its nucleus is a tower set inside and against the southern wall of an enclosing curtain that constitutes a trapezoid (38 x 31 x 17 x 16.5 m). This southern wall of the enclosing curtain does not follow a straight line, implying that it is superimposed on an older sea wall that was built on the ancient mole. On the opposite, northern side, the curtain wall is now pierced in its centre by the entrance with its drawbridge operated by two drawbars, the recess groves for which are visible. This entry may not be original however, but rather Ottoman as indeed is suggested by the marble plaque set above the entrance, recording that Ahmet Pasha built the castle in 1592. The Lusignan entry may well have been elsewhere, and Corvisier has suggested it was most likely in the short west wall, perhaps strengthened by a small fore-work, at the point where we can still see earlier masonry in the later Ottoman thickening. The Lusignan curtain was 1.7 m thick and pierced by V shaped archères: Corvisier has suggested that there were as many as five on the long northern side, but the two set in the west wall, though encased and well within the later Ottoman work built onto the outside, are much more clearly apparent. Stylistically these are no later than the fourteenth century.

At its north-east corner – on the eastern curtain, the wall appears to have been thickened and hence projected outwards beyond the line of the rest of this side. The original work at the south-east corner is particularly intriguing however, and there Corvisier has detected ‘une portion de tour carrée de l’enceinte antique’, next to which he has inferred the possibility that there was an opening from which a chain may have been arranged that connected with the outer ‘fort’. Given that both forts were built on the line of the old, artificial mole, a chain would have been unnecessary.
of course, but the proposition that at this point, the Lusignans’ trapezoid incorporated another tower, whether their own or the vestiges of an earlier one that they adapted, is not unimportant. Taken alongside the separate structure midway between the two ‘forts’, noted above, this might help signify the existence of intervening lesser ‘fortifications’ that were a feature of an overall plan. Such ancillary defensive works must have been inconsiderable of course; Corvisier’s findings, the absence of any remarks in the diaries of visitors, and the fragmentary nature of the stump now visible on the breakwater, all attest this.

Like the curtain, the inner Lusignan tower has been the subject of much Ottoman work. Corvisier discerned evidence that suggested a possible original entrance at its north-east by means of a wooden stairway, and noted the four archères covered with lintels still apparent in the north-west angle of the upper floor, indicative of further archères but now lost in the Turkish works. These archères are at a height of 6 m, suggesting that the outer curtain must have been low if it was built at the same time and did not supersede the firing lines of the inner tower. At this upper level, the walls are only 1 to 1.1 m thick, suggesting that, at most, there could have been only one additional storey, the tower then being no higher than as at present. Indeed as may be seen on the plan, the Ottoman works have not greatly affected the tower’s overall dimensions, these being some 8.5 m by 6.8 m and assuming there was no second upper storey, 9 m. high.128

It would seem likely that these ‘two harbour forts’ originated at some point in the fourteenth century, as is generally thought. As noted in the History (p. 29 above) Kristian Molin dated them to the very early part of the century as a response to the Genoese raids that we noted earlier. For his part, Corvisier assigned a similar date, or even the later thirteenth century, on architectural grounds.129 The accounts we have from the 1330s and 1340s make this unlikely. As we have seen, it is from the later fourteenth century that we have a string of references to fortifications at Paphos, and it is more likely that they were first commissioned not long before this time.

128 Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 199; Perbellini, 1973, p. 50; Corvisier, Le Château de Paños in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 400-5.
129 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 116-7; Corvisier, op. cit. p. 405.
Inner walls of first floor level chamber in the ruined fort at the seaward end of the mole.
POTAMIA

As is the case with La Cava, the sources do not altogether agree as to which king founded this establishment, Makhairas having Peter II as the builder, whereas our other sources suggest that we should attribute its foundation to King James. Makhairas has James as commissioning one ‘Perot’ to construct ‘a beautiful garden and a beautiful house at Potamia’ so that king at least enhanced it. Like La Cava, it was damaged by the Mamluks in the wake of their victory at Khirokitia in 1426, but was afterwards brought back into use as a royal residence. In 1470, Gaudenz of Kirchberg visited the ‘schloß genannt Visilopatamo’ — most likely Potamia, although without providing any detail.

Unlike La Cava, however, Potamia had no pretension to be a fortification of any sort. Amadi described it variously as ‘bella et gentil casa real’, and ‘stantia bella et uno delectevole zardin’. It is thus quite clear that its status was that of a manor, or perhaps rather, a château de plaisance, as Mas Latrie described it — a country estate. Indeed this is clear from the surrounding remnants of cisterns, irrigation systems and windmills. Enlart’s gazetteer commented on the building as it then survived. He reports a building ‘of dressed stone’, with walls 80 cm thick, consisting of two square rooms, communicating with each other through a pointed arcade. One was a little smaller than the other, this lesser chamber having a pointed window and a pointed barrel vault whereas the larger was unvaulted. The smaller room was set at a slightly lower level. He recorded evidence that there had been an upper floor. Potamia was ultimately demolished by the Venetians.

1 op. cit. § 597, p. 593.
3 Makhairas, § 620, p. 611.
4 Makhairas, § 692, p. 669; Amadi, p. 510; Lusignan, loc. cit.
5 Grivaud, p. 80, who identifies this as Vassilopotamos.
6 These quotations are from, respectively, pp. 510 and 494. Fl. Bustron, p. 352 says much the same; Enlart, p. 414.
7 In his fn. to his edition of Amadi on p. 510.
8 Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 43-4.
9 Enlart, p. 414 (with plan), and following him, Perbellini (1973), p. 51.
PYLA

Pyla lies a little to the north-east of Larnaka. During the Lusignan period, this ‘lordship of Piles’ was one of the principal fiefs of the kingdom and was held by the Gibelet family. During the reign of James II it was manned by \textit{francomati} (freemen). Pyla’s small rectangular keep is at once reminiscent of the larger mid-fifteenth century castle at Kolossi, and quite probably dates from not long after this time, rather than the Venetian period as Perbellini thought. In 2004 it was sympathetically restored with funds from the EU.

Internally the tower measures 3.32m x 7.2 m. Its walls are constructed of rubble masonry with ashlar blocks at the corners, made of local white limestone. It consists of a basement, a first storey entered via a square doorway on its west - presumably accessed by means of a wooden staircase, and an upper storey with a flat roof. The rooms were unvaulted and had simple timber roofs. The basement was a storage area, having no external apertures, while the two storeys above had arrowslits opening under low curved arches at the end of deep embrasures. A brattice on two corbels defended the first storey doorway, while another brattice at roof level on the opposite side of the tower appears to have served as a latrine, its stone seat being still in place. This latrine brattice is supported on corbels or brackets that Enlart thought to be no earlier than the Renaissance and accordingly he dated the whole building to this period.

Given the fortifications policy of the Venetians, it is unlikely that this tower could be their initiative. Rather, it is probable that it was built in the uncertain times of the last years of the Lusignan period.

\footnote{Enlart, pp. 375, 482-3; Perbellini, 1973, pp. 33, 36; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 53. Site visit 27 Oct. 2005.}
West face with entry at first floor level.
East face with latrine at roof level.
SIGOURI

SIGOURI (Greek); Sivouri/Sivorie; Sigur; Château Franc; Castel Franco (Genoese).

Very little remains of Sigouri today. It appears as an inconspicuous rectangular earthwork rising a mere 3 m above an unremarkable terrain of uncultivated, open grassy flatlands. The site lies 4 km south of Prastio (Dortyol-Turkish) on the east side of a minor, modern road just after it crosses over the dried up bed of the once river Pedieos – a location of no significance whatever today. In the Lusignan period, however, it was at an important junction where roads ran off to Famagusta ten miles to the west, to Kyrenia in the north-west, to Limassol in the south-west, Larnaka in the south and the Karpas peninsula in the north-east. Long before the construction of the castle, there was a ‘lodge’ of the Archbishop of Nicosia here, as recorded in 1196 and 1202. There was a ‘seigneurial residence’ here in 1374, perhaps, though not necessarily, belonging to the Archbishop. ¹

The emergence in 1373-4 of an independent and hostile Genoese colony with a territorial radius of about ten miles around Famagusta, left Sigouri in a new frontier area, perhaps also giving it some commercial and administrative importance to the truncated Lusignan state. Indeed it is possible that the later Lusignans looked to develop Sigouri in some small measure, to compensate for their loss of Famagusta. Thus for example it may be that it was used as the site of a replacement mint for that lost at that city,² and it would in any event have been a natural check point for merchants coming through from the coast. It would then quite likely have attracted a population. Indeed, if Sigouri was not already a settlement of some size by the time of the Genoese invasion, later travellers’ records indicate that it quickly became so.³

³ Grivaud, Excerpta Cypria Nova, pp. 50-1.
It is not surprising then that Sigouri was prominent in the programme of works initiated by King James I just a few years after his return to the island in 1385. As Constable during the reign of his nephew, Peter II, he had become familiar with Sigouri when manoeuvring to ambush a Genoese raiding party in 1374, so presumably he had formed an appreciation of its location. Indeed, according to Lusignan, James established a fortified base here in order to counter raids launched from Famagusta. Accordingly, in 1391, he ‘fece el castello Sivuri’, an attribution endorsed by Fl. Bustron who was present when his Venetian employers began to dismantle the castle. As it has now all but totally vanished, it is especially helpful that Bustron provided a brief description. He observed that it was on level ground, rectangular with four corner towers and had a gateway with a drawbridge (‘ponte levador’). He added that it was surrounded by broad and deep ditches filled with water from the river Pedieos.

King James’ castle impressed those who recorded their visits. A Gascon nobleman, Nompar, Lord of Caumont passed through ‘Château Franc’ in 1418. He remarked that:

\[
en partant de Famagoste, je passay devant ung chasteau en terre playne, qui s'appelle Chasteau franc, à iiij. lièves; lequel le roy de Chypre avoye fet fere, n'avoyt guierres, et me sembloit être bien basti et fort, sillon le lieu playn où il estoit assis.\]

Travelling through in 1518, Jacques le Saige noted ‘a big village’ and ‘a great castle’ five miles from Famagusta called ‘Sinore’.

Bustron’s description accords very well with what Enlart was able to discern at the end of the nineteenth century, corrected in a few details by Vaivre’s very recent description. From this, we know that the castle was rectangular and constructed on an earthen platform that was raised approximately 3 m above ground level. This in turn was surrounded by a ditch 35 m wide which drew in water from the river via a drainage ditch. The rectangular enceinte measures 60 m x 48 m. Its walls were about

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4 Makhairas, § 454 on p. 439.
5 Description, f. 35.
6 Amadi, p. 495.
8 Caumont, ed. la Grange, p. 77. A translation is in Cobham on p. 30.
9 in Cobham, p. 58.
1.4 m thick but are not now visible above ground. Enlart noted that the four square corner towers varied from 4.4 m to 4.5 m x 3.5 to 4.1 m internally, but today, it is only possible to trace fragmentary elements of the southern pair of towers, for which Vaivre supplied corrective measurements of 8.3 x 7.5 for the south-west tower and 4.7 x 4.1 for that at the south-east corner. Gone now, but visible to Enlart, were barrel vaulted basements in the towers, in one of which a conduit made of bottomless jars indicated the presence of a cistern. No trace of the gateway has been found. As Enlart also noted, at the time he was writing, the British administration was busily completing the demolition commenced by the Venetians, so, as with Bustron in the sixteenth century, Enlart’s commentary is particularly valuable.  

Given the paucity of architectural and historical evidence, it is hardly surprising that modern historians have found little to say on Sigouri. As some have observed, it was of a fairly basic design, and indeed, in its basic plan, somewhat reminiscent of the so-called castrum castles of the twelfth century, typified by Coliath in the County of Tripoli. Its wide ditch no doubt added considerably to its defensibility, but it is likely that this may frequently have been dry during the Summer campaigning season. It was not then, an especially formidable fortification by the standards of the time. Interestingly, the castle appears to have had no role in the skirmishes with the Mamlûks in 1425 that occurred around Sigouri.  

Sigouri was a castle nonetheless, and given James I’s financial constraints, its building must have constituted a heavy investment. It had its own captain or commander appointed by the Crown and appears to have been used on occasion as an arms dépôt. Although we can not be certain that it did house a mint, or even the apparatus of local government, it was certainly seen as very important, as demonstrated by the fact that one of the first initiatives of James the Bastard on invading the island in September 1460, was to establish his control here. His

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10 Enlart, pp. 385, 477; Jeffery, pp. 199-200; Vaivre, ...les sites de châteaux disparus..., passim; Vaivre in Vaivre et Plagnieux, pp. 52, 368.
13 For Charlotte’s and James II’s rival commanders and for a bombard that had been taken from here – Boustronios, §§ 44, 50, pp. 92-4.
14 Boustronios, § 44, p. 92.
recapture of Famagusta shortly after must inevitably have caused Sigouri to lose importance. But as we have seen, it was still impressive in the very early Venetian period.

An excavation would no doubt provide information on the location of the gateway, about internal buildings etc. Fragments of yellow and green glazed earthenware of a late fourteenth-century date and of majolica of the early sixteenth century have been found, but all is now obscured by the prolific carpet of flowers that covers the whole enceinte.\footnote{Vaivre in Viaivre and Plagnieux, p. 368. Site visits: 24 Feb. 2007 and 9 April 2007.}
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I have used the latest, scholarly editions of narrative sources where there is more than one. In the case of Philip of Novara’s *Guerra di Federico*..., the Melani edition provides both the original and a translation into Italian, so I have also given references to the latest English translation – by La Monte. Stephen of Lusignan’s *Chorograffia* is referred to in its original and also in the English translation by Pelosi as edited by Wallace.
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