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The Literary Clinic: Deleuze, Criticism, and the Politics of Symptoms

Aidan Tynan
Summary

This thesis presents a reconstruction of Deleuze’s theory of literature as health. What I refer to throughout as the “literary clinic” relates to how Deleuze characterised literary practice in clinical terms as an engagement with both vital and semiotic processes. The fundamental intuition in this regard is that there is a way of conceiving health as a strength or vitality distinct from the organic and socio-linguistic categories which give to experience a liveable form. There is a “formless” or “unliveable” element attending every instantiation of form, and this is what positions the question of the inorganic life of the body alongside issues relating to literary creativity and formal renewal. It is this simultaneous concern with living and semiotic processes that characterises literary criticism as a type of clinic: the pathological exceeds organic constitution just as the author discovers a mode of enunciation beyond the terms of socio-linguistic convention. However, Deleuze’s own writings on these issues are extremely disparate, and his conception of literature as health was never realised in a completed form in his work. The reconstruction presented here follows the literary clinic from its origins in Deleuze’s early philosophical readings and tracks its course through some of the major turning points in his career, most notably his collaboration with Guattari. I argue that despite its incompleteness, the literary clinic constitutes a coherent account of literary theory and practice, one which, furthermore, is responsive to the philosophical and political issues most salient to the Deleuzian corpus. My goal has been not only to provide an analysis of this neglected area of Deleuze studies, but also to open paths towards a properly Deleuzian critical practice.
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Abbreviations:

AO: Anti-Oedipus
ATP: A Thousand Plateaus
B: Bergsonism
C2: Cinema 2
CC: Essays Critical and Clinical
CVL: "Cours Vincennes: Leibniz"
D: Dialogues
DI: Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974
DR: Difference and Repetition
EP: Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza
FB: Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation
FLB: The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque
K: Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature
KCP: Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties
LS: The Logic of Sense
M: Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty
N: Negotiations
NP: Nietzsche and Philosophy

OLM: “One Less Manifesto”
PI: Pure Immanence
PS: Proust and Signs
SM: “From Sacher-Masoch to Masochism”
TRM: Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995
WP: What is Philosophy?
Introduction

From Symptomatology to Schizoanalysis

This thesis centres on Deleuze’s understanding of literature as “an enterprise of health” and of literary criticism’s links to aspects of pathology and clinical practice, especially as these latter come under scrutiny in Deleuze and Guattari’s “schizoanalysis” project (CC 3). The relation between literature and health is argued for most explicitly by Deleuze in his last published book, Essays Critical and Clinical. It is here that he lays out the principal hypothesis of a clinical criticism: certain authors have a weak health, but literature, by gaining a perspective on sickness, is capable of transforming this weakness into a creative power. Literary activity is capable of charting a passage from weakness to strength, and this is a living, vital process as much as an aesthetic or semiotic one, which is why Deleuze titles his preface to Essays Critical and Clinical “Literature and Life”. “Life”, here, is to be distinguished sharply from the personal domain of biographical events and psychological contents, being what Deleuze defines in terms of the inorganic, the socio-political and the world-historical. He proposes that if great authors often suffer sicknesses this is not because they have shut themselves off from life, or choose literature as an escape from life, but because, on the contrary, they have borne witness to and experienced a form of life in excess of their own personhood and biological and psychological integrity. The author may document his or her own sickness but what is thus diagnosed is far less a personal affair than something with impersonal, even inhuman, dimensions.

While Essays Critical and Clinical argues directly for the possibility, even necessity, of a clinical criticism in this sense, it raises many more questions than it answers, and we may even say that it does no more than pose, in the most tantalising of ways, the problem of the relation between literary creativity and health. This is by no means because Deleuze came to the notion late in his life – on the contrary, his early book on Nietzsche emphasises the
latter's idea that both artists and philosophers operate in their separate ways as physicians of civilisation, diagnosing the values of which cultural products and institutions are the symptoms. Philosophers and artists are united by a shared interest in "symptomatology", the practice of arranging symptoms creatively in order to diagnose new diseases. In a work published five years after the Nietzsche book, Deleuze applies this idea directly to the novels and stories of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, whose name was famously introduced into medical terminology when Krafft-Ebbing categorised masochism as a sexual perversion. Deleuze is critical of the ways in which masochism has been classified in terms of an inversion of sadism, and calls the concept of sadomasochism, as it appears mainly in the psychoanalytic literature from Freud to Theodor Reik, a "crude syndrome" (M 40). He seeks instead to account for masochism's symptomatological specificity through an analysis of Masoch's literary techniques, highlighting the importance of the link between the formal features of an author's style and the symptoms of illness. The specificity of an author's style is to be understood in the same way as the proper name of a clinician becomes attached to certain disorders, such as Parkinson's disease, Crohn's disease, and so on. The symptomatologist, in the literary sense, does not simply suffer his or her illness but gains a rigorous perspective on it through the formal innovations of his or her writing, and thus manages to be both doctor and patient at once. This identity of doctor and patient, health and illness, strength and weakness, forms the central intuition of Deleuze's critical and clinical project.

Thus, what can be called the "literary clinic" is, I argue, present from Deleuze's earliest works and persists throughout his career, although, for various reasons which we shall touch upon in a moment, it is often discovered in incomplete forms, half submerged in other concerns. Gregg Lambert describes the literary clinic in terms of three aspects:

First, certain writers have invented concrete semiotic practices that may prove more effective than psychoanalytic discourse in diagnosing the constellation of mute forces that both accompany life and threaten it from within. Second, as a result of this diagnostic and critical function, certain literary works can be understood to produce a kind of 'symptomatology' that may prove to be more effective than political or ideological critique in discerning the signs that correspond to the new
arrangements of 'language, labour, and life' to employ Foucault's abbreviated formula for the grand institutions of instinct and habit. ... Finally, third, certain modern writers can offer us a manner of diagramming the potential forms of resistance, or 'lines of flight', which may be virtual to these new arrangements. (Lambert 2000a: 135)

The origin of literary practice lies not in the "textual" or "literary" domains of constituted forms, but within some "formless" element which both accompanies life and threatens its creations. Thus, diagnosis appears not in terms of subjects and objects of desire, as psychoanalysis has it, but in a series of formal procedures – of which symptomatology is one – in which the relation between those formless "mute forces" and the forms which give them voice can be evaluated. Procedures are the semiotic foundation of these evaluations, and are, for this reason, both literary and non-literary at once. What this leads to is the potential of literature to "diagram" the emergence of new and perhaps healthier social and physiological arrangements or assemblages. The trajectory this thesis attempts to track, then, is one which follows the literary clinic from its origins in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and the methodological principles of immanent criticism, to his subsequent, more directly literary writings, in which the semiotic and formal features of various authors are given special emphasis, and, finally, to the ways in which these elements come together in, or are transformed by, schizoanalysis, which Deleuze and Guattari present as a "universal clinical theory" (AO 311). This trajectory, however, is only loosely chronological, and does not at all attempt to chart a history. While chapter 1 focuses mainly on Deleuze's early work on Nietzsche, and chapter 5 on A Thousand Plateaus, much of my reconstruction of the genesis of the concepts involved moves in a necessarily non-linear manner across different phases of Deleuze's career. My goal is to isolate the literary clinic as a conceptually coherent entity.

It is thus necessary to follow the development of the literary clinic in conjunction with other developments in Deleuze's thought. Following the publication of the study on Masoch, Deleuze suggested that the concept of literary symptomatology had a potentially wide scope and that he wished to write a series of books in that vein on various literary authors, including Beckett, Robbe-Grillet and Pierre Klossowski (DI 133). That these books never appeared does not warrant the conclusion that Deleuze dropped the idea altogether. His
two major philosophical treatises of the late 60s are strewn with passages suggesting that symptoms and illnesses are illustrative of the ways in which living processes and aesthetic processes interact. *Difference and Repetition* suggests that we can consider the symptoms of hysteria and schizophrenia as masks or disguises which, rather than concealing some repressed "uncovered" content (as psychoanalytic approaches generally maintain) are the modes by which the drives are lived or acted out as veritable theatrical performances. *The Logic of Sense*, similarly, develops Deleuze's theory of subjectivity through the concepts of the "wound" and the "crack": the latter offers a means for Deleuze to espouse a theory of alcoholism through an analysis of F. Scott Fitzgerald and Malcolm Lowry, and the former to explore Nietzschean concepts of eternal return through the work of the paralysed surrealist poet Joe Bousquet. The articles published as appendices to the English translation of *The Logic of Sense*, initially published in French in the mid-to-late 60s, discuss Klossowski and Michel Tournier in ways resonant of the study on Masoch.

If we put the development of the literary clinic in the context of Deleuze's career, then, it becomes apparent that one of the main reasons it never emerged as a completed project is because of its many links to other conceptual and practical concerns. Therefore, much of this thesis involves a twofold reconstruction, both excavating the literary clinic from its conceptual interconnectedness in order to isolate it as a distinct entity as well as highlighting this very same interconnectedness in order to show its relations to Deleuze's ongoing philosophical project. One of the most pressing concerns, in this respect, is to explain how the early conception of literature as symptomatology relates to the later schizoanalytical work developed with Guattari. The schizoanalysis project is in many ways a literary one, with Deleuze and Guattari even claiming that the problem of Oedipus and its critique "is in fact literary before being psychoanalytic", and that "there is no longer even any need for applying psychoanalysis to the work of art, since the work itself constitutes a successful psychoanalysis, a sublime 'transference' with exemplary collective virtualities" (AO 145). Why do Deleuze and Guattari here deny the efficacy of psychoanalytic criticism while insisting on the therapeutic effects of the psychoanalytical concept of "transference"? In what sense is this literary transference a "collective" concern, and what do they mean when they say that "literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal, a production
and not an expression”? (AO 144). These are questions which the concepts of the literary clinic are capable of clarifying, and as a result one of the fundamental concerns of this thesis is the explication of the links between the literary clinic and schizoanalysis. My goal, then, will be to show how the literary clinic as a continuing, yet often unresolved and incomplete, presence both persists into Deleuze’s work with Guattari while also being transformed and renewed by the conceptual categories of schizoanalysis.

The literary clinic functions as a distinct part of the schizoanalytic conceptual assemblage, however we need to be careful in how we understand this. Daniel W. Smith has argued that schizoanalysis is essentially a continuation of Deleuze’s early symptomatology project (Smith 2005: 190). But this does not appear to be the case. By the time of the publication of *Anti-Oedipus*, symptomatology, I argue, has ceased to be the central problematic of the literary clinic. Deleuze and Guattari do not attempt to provide a symptomatology of schizophrenia, nor do they argue with its diagnosis as an illness. Instead, they argue that schizophrenia is first of all a life process which, for reasons we shall explore in much detail, turns into a pathology or is turned into one. The way in which life processes are blocked, repressed, and turned back on themselves is a clinical matter, but it is not just that. It is also a question of how to produce, how to create and experiment. With regards to this experimentation, what criteria can we use to avoid pathological breakdowns? The problem, then, is both clinical and critical at once. Thus, the focus of schizoanalysis is far less diagnostic than experimental and therapeutic. Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* maintain that “the problem is first of all practical ... it concerns above all else the practice of the cure” (AO 64). This is where the importance of literature and the role of the literary clinic appear. Literature in some sense involves the capacity to steer the life process away from pathologisation, and is thus implicated in a therapy which is no longer “personological” or individualist, i.e. oedipal, but which is related to the creation of “collective virtualities”, new modes of collective life, new ways of populating the earth. The move from diagnostic to therapeutic concerns has to do with the problem of political engagement as well as the status of the creative process in relation to the life process. But to understand this shift it is necessary first to understand the underlying concerns motivating the notion of the literary clinic. This involves an exploration of Deleuze’s pre-schizoanalytical work.
While Deleuze is drawn to certain illnesses and disorders, he is less interested in the nature of specific conditions than the fact that they are privileged sites for the merging of vital and formal processes. While not being a "formalist" in any traditional sense of that word, form is for him an important philosophical and literary problem: as he writes, the techniques of certain authors such as Joyce, Roussel, and Lewis Carroll embody "an exemplary formalism" (LS 46). Buchanan argues that "Deleuze speaks of permutations in the plane of composition, and while form and plane of composition are not exactly analogous they do serve a similar purpose in that both condition art" (Buchanan 2001: 29). Buchanan argues that more explicitly formalist critical approaches, such as Jameson's, owe much to Deleuze's commitment to the methodology of immanent criticism, in that the latter, in purging the world of its actualised contents, gives us a viewpoint on the genesis of the forms by which our world is given body. The immanence of living and aesthetic, or semiotic, processes constitutes a plane of artistic composition and ethico-political experimentation. In this sense, there is an understanding of the concept of form in which the latter is neither linguistic, social, or organic, but all of these at once. Thus, while Deleuze would never accept the label "formalist", we can nevertheless use his interest in processes of formalisation to take him "from behind", as it were.

The literary clinic, then, can contribute to the conceptualisation of a certain Deleuzian formalism by showing how there is something common to the ways in which life produces illnesses and signs produce meanings. Here we again come across the paradoxical identity of weakness and strength at the basis of the literary clinic. Signs produce meanings by causing us to encounter a threshold or barrier which limits our capacity to know: a love affair, as Deleuze says in his discussion of Proust, is meaningful precisely because the essence of the beloved is blocked from us, and the truth of love is discovered much as a jealous lover interprets the signs of infidelity (PS 9). We become sensitive to signs, in other words,
precisely because they stem from an existential limit-point, a threshold which is, as it were, both the constrainer and producer of meanings. Deleuze here appropriates some psychoanalytical ideas to develop his theories. The symptom is a pathological repetition which is productive of novel disguises or masks, and as such it must be interpreted. Beneath the masks, however, there is no fundamental content which would satisfy us with a final meaning, but simply more masks, more signs to be interpreted. If, according to psychoanalysis, the repressed is always repeated in the symptom, there is, in Deleuze's view, no fundamental repressed content but only ever new substitutions of contents by which the symptom can be endlessly "acted out" in new scenarios. What is repressed, then, relates not to any content but to the principle of creative substitutability, or productive repetition, by which new contents appear, new disguises donned.

This provides Deleuze with a way to think about creativity and the production of the new. But if his is a philosophy of pure creation, as critics such as Peter Hallward (2006) insist, we nevertheless need to take account of an element of struggle and resistance at the heart of creation. The notion of "blockage" is vital. The creative process always involves a struggle against something which thwarts and resists it, and Deleuze often conceives of this along subjective and existential, though never personal or psychological, lines. The idea of a "pathic subjectivity" is thus central to Deleuze's concept of the subject in relation to creative and experimental practices. If signs imply a transcendental threshold, a limit which blocks access to any fundamental content or meaning, this is directly related to how subjectivity is constituted via a struggle or antagonism internal to it. It is precisely this "pathic" element which needs to be accounted for. As subjects, we experience the passage of time as an action of the self upon the self — a self-affection, as Deleuze says — and to this extent the personal "I" is inseparable from an impersonal "other" acting on it and through it, and which is experienced as a kind of blockage embodied ultimately in the relation to one's own finitude and death. Deleuze proposes a novel rereading of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle in this respect. He takes from Freud the idea that death is the source of symptomatic repetitions, but argues that the death drive can be viewed as a positive, productive principle and not simply a destructive or entropic one. The paradox of death, which is also necessarily the paradox of embodied life, is that while it may destroy particular
differences it is nevertheless the very condition of difference in general. Death is related to certain irreducible genetic or productive processes which need to be considered if we are to understand life in the impersonal and inorganic sense.

The literary clinic can function here as a means to conceive of what Deleuze calls the “two dangers” facing subjectivity on either side. If death has two sides or two faces, then embodied experience is faced with a double danger: the petrifaction or rigidity of forms, on the one hand, and, on the other, the bottomless abyss in which all forms dissolve (D 49). Subjectivity, for Deleuze, is always constituted between these two poles. This idea of two dangers or two poles orients much of Deleuze’s thought, and, though the terminology changes, it persists into his collaborative works and beyond, and is essential in order to understand why his political theory is connected to his theories of health and sickness. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of the two poles of legitimacy and illegitimacy, or of the schizophrenic and paranoid uses of desire, it is essentially the idea of the two dangers which is at stake. The legitimate, schizophrenic path is as much a danger here as the illegitimate, paranoid one, in that the abyss of psychotic breakdown is a means by which the legitimate path, and the breakthrough it promises, is policed by social and political forces. These are particularly important notions for the literary clinic in that they suggest what Deleuze believes to be at stake in the relation between literature and health. For Deleuze, all formal and semiotic processes, the creation of meanings, signs and symbols, are based on something irreducibly formless and unformalisable. If forms and meanings enable us to think by providing a ground for our thought, this ground is itself grounded on a kind of “ground-less” or abyss in which all meanings and forms dissolve (M 114). We are thus always in danger of either becoming overly invested in the rigidity of forms, or else dissolving the consistency that binds them together.

The genesis of forms, then, is inseparable from something which threatens processes of formalisation with dissolution. Deleuze reads Melanie Klein’s work on psychosexual development in this way: the processes which generate a subject position within language, which allow us, in other words, to identify with the grammatical position of the “I”, are one with the genesis of impersonal, libidinal forces which the nursing infant experiences directly as the passions and actions of his or her body. What interests Deleuze in the dual genesis of
bodily affect and linguistic propositions is the possibility that the two processes may merge, that the libidinal forces assailing the body, most powerfully present in the “pre-oedipal” phase of infancy, may pass over into the realm of aesthetic agency. There is a point at which bodily passivity and disembodied activity overlap and become identical. The invocation of the concept of the body without organs first occurs here, within the literary clinical problematic of the two dangers (LS 102). Deleuze asks how the passion of a fragmented organism can be made to pass into the inorganic affects of linguistic forms, how embodied suffering can give way to disembodied aesthetic activity. These are not simply theoretical questions for Deleuze, they relate to real experimentations and real dangers facing those who try them. His analysis of the writings of Louis Wolfson, which appears in both The Logic of Sense and in greater depth in Essays Critical and Clinical, confronts these issues. Wolfson was an American schizophrenic author who formulated complex linguistic procedures in which he would take a given phrase of English spoken to him by his mother, which he finds unbearable, and transform it into different languages according to rules and strictures of his own devising. In translating English phrases into new ones made of multiple languages he thus finds a means of escaping what he experiences as the unbearable presence of his “maternal” language.

While Deleuze admires Wolfson’s work, he maintains that it remains a kind of coping device and does not accede to an autonomous poetic. This is because Wolfson fell prey to the dual danger, remaining trapped within an abyssal embodied suffering, in which he felt his maternal language dissolve endlessly within the depths of his fragmented body, while succumbing to the formal sterility of his own linguistic methods. In other words, Wolfson’s work never leaves the level of the pathological. What this means, crucially, is that there are criteria on the basis of which literary experiments can be said to succeed or fail. While symptomatology understands literature in terms of diagnosis alone, we may detect something of a new departure here for the literary clinic, occurring around the time Deleuze first met Guattari, in which the question of therapy and therapeutic effects begin to play a role. The question then becomes whether literature, in giving us a viewpoint on sickness, also discerns paths leading to new modes of health, or, as Buchanan has put it, “a repolarizing of the notion of the symptom itself because now instead of indicating a lack of
Deleuze’s model of health is never an oppositional one, in which good and bad health are opposed as mutually exclusive elements. The model is, rather, immanent: sickness and health are in a relation of inclusive disjunction. Sickness is always a kind of health we are not yet healthy enough to embody, while health is always a kind of morbid regime of normality repressing the emergence of new forms of health. Deleuze takes this notion directly from Nietzsche, and he refers to the latter’s remarks that he possessed the philosophical ability to move “from the perspective of the sick towards healthier concepts and values, and conversely ... from the fullness and self-assuredness of rich life into the décadence instinct” (Nietzsche 2007: 8). This way of “inverting perspectives”, writes Deleuze, involves “no reciprocity between the two points of view, the two evaluations. Thus, movement from health to sickness, from sickness to health, if only as an idea, this very mobility is the sign of superior health” (PI 58). The path towards “great health” is neither a matter of sickness or health but rather a special kind of movement between these categories. This movement is neither conceptual nor physical, but occurs in a space in which the two kinds of movement – the “formal” movement of the concept, on the one hand, and the “real” movement of the body, on the other – are transferred from one to the other. When Deleuze suggests there is a special type of “athleticism” peculiar to artists, it is this movement, bridging the two dangers of the libidinal abyss of the body and the formal rigidity of signs, which is at issue (WP 172-3).

Thus, we can say that the method of the literary clinic is inspired in large part by Nietzschean immanent critique, which lends a certain rigour to the Artaudian inspiration.
that the weakness of thought is its greatest strength. Immanent critique poses the problem of how new values can emerge from existing ones, how the morbidity of our current values can generate criteria for the production of the new. This relates to an important – for Deleuze at least – metaphilosophical problem regarding how we evaluate the activity of thought itself. If philosophy is the creation of concepts, Deleuze denies that true creativity is ever freely chosen, maintaining that any conscious decision to create would be necessarily reliant on pre-existing ideas. Deleuze addresses this problem by relating thought to what does not think, to a kind of unthought inhabiting the libidinal body itself. It is only by encountering this unthought that thought can ever acquire the criteria by which it can evaluate its own process of creation and determine whether it is being truly creative, truly philosophical. Deleuze thus defines criticism, in both its philosophical and aesthetic registers, in terms of an access to an immanent zone in which bodily unthought, or pathos, becomes involved in the formal activity of creation, or logos.

The problem of thinking logos and pathos at once, then, is what unites the literary clinic to Deleuze’s broader philosophical themes concerning judgment and evaluation. Deleuze’s account of judgment is highly complex and goes far beyond the scope of this thesis, but because the concept of evaluation is so important for the literary clinic we will need to consider the problem of judgment to some extent. The operation of judgment, as Deleuze argues in his book on Kant, involves the ways the general and the particular are related to one another (KCP 58-60). How are particular “cases” subsumed under generalities, and how does the appearance of a new case force us to consider its place with regards to the generality to which it may belong, or force us to create a new generality? This problem, Deleuze suggests, is one which structures the relationship between patients and doctors. With regards to his and Guattari’s collaboration in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze suggests that one of their aims was to change the ways in which people think about “cases” in this medical sense:

One thing is rather shocking about books of psychiatry or even psychoanalysis, and this is the pervasive duality between what an alleged mental patient says and what the doctor reports – between the ‘case’ and the commentary on the case, the analysis of the case. It’s logos against pathos: the mental patient is supposed to say
something, and the doctor says what it means in terms of symptoms or sense. ... Now, we didn’t think for a minute of writing a madman’s book, but we did write a book in which you no longer know who is speaking: there is no basis for knowing whether it’s a doctor, a patient, or some present, past, or future madman speaking. ... This is precisely why we used so many writers and poets: you would have to be really clever to decide whether they speak as mental patients or doctors – mental patients and doctors of civilization. (DI 218-9)

A writer, in the literary clinical sense, is defined neither by the *pathos* of the patient nor the *logos* of the doctor, but by both at once, and it is for this reason that he or she is neither a generality nor a particularity, but what Deleuze calls a singularity. The writer in this sense represents a very special kind of case determined by its “problematic” nature. Being neither general nor particular, but both at once, the author, as an “exemplary” case, renders operations of judgment problematic. The significance of authors is neither the fact that they embody simply collective concerns, nor that they are remarkable as individuals alone, but that they demonstrate the forces of impersonality which efface the collective/individual opposition altogether: the singular and the problematic are “neither private nor public, neither collective nor individual” (LS 41). It is for these reasons that the author, in diagnosing his or her own particular illness, also diagnoses the position of civilisation more generally: “the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the world; he follows the illness step by step, but it is the generic illness of man; he assesses the chances of health, but it is the possible birth of the new man” (CC 53). Health in this sense always involves the mobility by which an author shifts viewpoints between his or her own particular case and the condition of humankind in general. This mobility is in itself the practice of health as Deleuze imagines it.

*Deleuzian Literary Criticism*
One of the aims of this thesis is to present the literary clinic as a way of conceiving of a possible Deleuzian literary criticism in a way attuned to the philosophical problems on which his work is fundamentally based. While there has been some excellent work done on the relation between Deleuze literature, no distinctively Deleuzian literary criticism has appeared to the same degree as have Althusserian, Derridean and Foucauldian variants. To some extent this has to do with the role of literature within Deleuze’s philosophical project; he does not isolate literature from his own enterprise to the same degree as he does cinema, for example – one can hardly imagine him writing books titled Literature 1 and Literature 2. The very concept of “literature” or “writing” is itself thrown into doubt by his understanding of philosophical activity as a pure creative practice (Lecercle 2002: 220-1). This uncertainty regarding the distinction between the literary and the philosophical is no doubt one of the reasons why the field of Deleuzian literary criticism, such as it is, is dwarfed by the body of work pursuing Deleuzian approaches to cinema, television and new media, best exemplified by the recent pedagogical volume Deleuze Reframed (Sutton and Martin-Jones 2008). I have deliberately chosen not to consider authors Deleuze himself did not write on, and the reason for this is that I wish to emphasise how the point where Deleuze’s own philosophical agenda ends and the literary texts he is analysing begin is often obscure, but that this is a necessary and fruitful obscurity. If Deleuze is drawn to authors such as Beckett, Masoch, Wolfson, Kafka, and Melville, then we must understand that the reasons for this are connected to Deleuze’s broader theoretical concerns. This is why the literary clinic is presented here not simply as a way to understand Deleuze’s theory of literature, but also as a means to conceive of how literature and his overall project were in a relation of mutual implication and becoming.

It may be useful briefly to reflect on Deleuze’s position within Anglophone literary studies. Claire Colebrook has argued that there has been a tendency to read post-structuralist theory in terms of a Derridean “textualism”, on the one hand, and a Deleuzian “vitalism”, on the other, the former positing an infinite play of signs within an intertextual universe, the latter, a series of relations connecting the literary work to “the real forces of the non-textual, the forces of politics, life and bodies” (Colebrook 2007: 29, 25). The perceived textualism of Derrida has been charged with reinstating the apolitical bias of New Criticism.
and with reproducing the latter’s fetishism for the work as a “closed formalism” detached from material life and non-literary language use. This has led to the emergence of sociologically aware historicist, culturalist and ideology critique based approaches. For Deleuze, however, literature is not by-product of its social or cultural environment – or, rather, it is so only from a “majoritarian” perspective. Literature’s political importance is the perspective its very untimeliness gives us on our own times. Likewise, literature marks a distinct break with habitual modes of language use. The very literariness of literary language is that it appears as a kind of foreign language or non-language from within the native or “maternal” tongue of the author. If more traditional formalisms determine this break in terms of an ascent of everyday speech towards the poetic, then Deleuze does so in the opposite direction, discerning the origins of literary language in illiteracy, silence and bestial noise. The literariness of literary language, then, is precisely not its linguistic or communicative efficacy, but, rather, the very non-communication it renders through its stuttering and stammering, breaths and cries. In other words, there is a zone of immanence, available to criticism, in which the mute illiteracy of the living body is joined to the pure impersonal formalism of the work.

Thus, the opposition of the textual or formal and the vital is, from a Deleuzian point of view, entirely spurious. The relation between life and literature needs to be rethought along the lines suggested by the immanence of the one to the other. Our constituted organic, linguistic and social forms give expression to a life which is at their origin. To the extent that the production and actualisation of these forms is the everyday activity of life, literature thwarts this process, drawing on a distinct power of life to resist any and all formalisation or actualisation of it. It is only by making contact with this mute, formless power of life as a kind of “anti-production”, that literary creativity becomes possible at all. Deleuze, then, relates the literary work back to its origins in life, but this is not in order to endorse the continuity of the life of the text and the non-textual life of organisms, persons and societies. Rather, it is the radical, sometimes violent, disjunction between the two aspects that gives us the immanent principle of the genesis of literary form. For this reason, Deleuze often conceives of authors as having being damaged or injured by a life which is too much for them or for the constituted and consensual forms to which they have access.
The idea that the author is in touch with something essentially at odds with his or her culture and its symbolic and formal resources is one of the main legacies of Freudian criticism. The question as to whether this “something” offers an escape from culture through an appeal to an unchanging biology is one which continues to animate discussions of the literary Freud (Meisel 2007: 21). However for Deleuze the question does not arise: the author’s case is singular and problematic precisely because he or she stands within culture while also standing outside it. This is the only way in which the author could possibly be said diagnose, at once, both his or her own case and also humanity in general, as Deleuze argues. For Deleuze, psychoanalytic criticism makes the central deductive error of believing that it is the “complex” which tells us about Oedipus or Hamlet, without admitting the possibility that Oedipus and Hamlet can tell us about the complex (LS 273). Thus, the literary clinic must be seen in terms of immanent diagnosis: the author’s case is his or her own, but also that of his or her species, language, and society. And it is because the literary clinic is based around this immanent problematic of the case that it can argue that the author maintains such a privileged position with regards to the articulation of new forms of embodied collective life promising a people to come.

Three Core Aspects of the Literary Clinic

This thesis is concerned essentially with three main groups of concepts which converge in and together constitute the literary clinic:

A) Deleuze’s concern with literary style and technique means that we must consider Deleuzian criticism as a type of formalism, as an engagement with authorial practice which is seen to be neither socially nor linguistically determined, but which nevertheless can be evaluated on the basis of certain criteria. The only way literature should be judged is on the basis of criteria internal to literary activity itself. Deleuze searches for these criteria not in any concept of what literature or writing is, but at the intersection of pathological, libidinal
bodily depth and the surface dimension of signs. This is what spurs his interest in psychoanalysis in the early half of his career. Literature can be evaluated only on the basis of this intersection of pathos and logos, of the unthinking body and the thinking brain. Deleuze, in his work on Masoch, Wolfson, Beckett and Kafka, focuses on the specificity of authorial techniques, which he calls procedures. The procedure is meant to suggest how authors work on language at a practical level in order to achieve certain effects. What this generally comes down is separating out the purely formal aspects of signs from the meanings or contents to which they have become associated. Kafka is for Deleuze and Guattari the exemplary figure in this regard: in disengaging the pathological guilt feelings from the signs which expressed them, Kafka was able to discover a way of moving from the domain of the personal and the pathological level which trapped him towards the impersonal and world historical in which he could exist as a pure singularity. This is ultimately what Deleuze and Guattari understand as the healing process of transference.

B) Deleuze takes from Nietzsche the principles of immanent criticism. The values or objects to be critiqued must themselves render up the criteria which would allow for their overcoming. Nietzsche’s view of health here is vital to Deleuze’s approach: the sick body is sick because there is a life within it which is too strong to be lived. We are sick because we are not yet capable of embodying a life too strong for our current organic, linguistic and socio-political forms of existence. What this means is that the very morbidity and decadence of our current values contains the principles by which new and vital values may be produced. The process of formal renewal, the generation of new forms capable of expressing a new health, must begin with the pathological contents it would supplant. This is why at the heart of the literary clinic is Artaud’s contention that the fundamental incapacity or weakness of thought to find a definitive form is also simultaneously the means of expressing thought’s most profound power. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari did not oppose psychoanalysis from a non-psychoanalytic position, from, say, the position of Marxism or Nietzscheanism. Though both Marx and Nietzsche played major roles, Deleuze and Guattari’s approach was always to generate from within psychoanalysis a form of discourse capable of exposing and overcoming the political conservatism of oedipal
psychotherapeutic practice. In other words, schizoanalysis must be understood not in any way in opposition to psychoanalysis, but as psychoanalysis *qua* immanent criticism.

C) Deleuze understands literature as a health, or as a promise of a health to come. The author is a special “case” because he or she is both sick and healthy at the same time: sick because there is a life which is too strong and powerful for our current organic, linguistic and socio-political forms to give body to or express, but healthy in that he or she possesses the ability to articulate and formulate new modes of health beyond the present. In this sense, the author is both a collective and an individual: he or she is an individual instantiation of a more general malaise but also a virtual case of solution to this malaise. The author, then, embodies a “problematic” intersection of the general and the particular, the individual and the collective. The author is both solitary, cut off from society, but also embodies virtually the very principles of new potential forms of society. As we chart the evolution of the literary clinic from its early diagnostic and symptomatological phase to its later therapeutic and schizoanalytic phase then this question of health becomes more important. Ultimately, Deleuze’s concept of the “people to come” will be presented as the culmination of the concept of literature as health. This concept is prefigured in Deleuze’s work on Masoch, when he identifies as an aspect of masochism the promise of a “new man” who would be a harbinger of new forms of collective life. We will see how, with Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari delineate the transference of the pathological elements of individual, oedipal subjectivity onto an impersonal, world historical plane. The role of schizoanalysis here is very important, as we will see, in that the concept of a pure schizophrenic process, distinct from schizophrenic illness, is deemed by Deleuze and Guattari to be the means by which such a transference proceeds.

We will see how, in the convergence of these three interlinked sets of concerns, Deleuze’s most explicitly literary clinical concepts – symptomatology, the procedure, the proper name, the people to come, delirium – emerge and change. We will also of necessity need to discuss concepts which belong to Deleuze’s more general philosophical project: difference and repetition, memory, the death instinct, larval subjectivity, and so on. However, this will only be done in order to trace the outlines of the three groups of concepts adduced above.
Overview of the Thesis

The first chapter argues that the literary clinic has its origin in Deleuze’s early work *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. I argue that the place of literature in Deleuze’s work as a whole is related in important ways to his conceptualisation of philosophical method. Thus, I argue, Deleuze’s interest in literature relates to something which remains constant throughout his career, namely a certain “ethic” of thought which demands that thought engage with its other. Deleuze and Guattari argue in *What is Philosophy?* that philosophical creativity must proceed on the basis that thought enters into contact with some “unthought”, with madness, intoxication and the unthinking body. These elements are what they define in terms of the “pathic” dimension. This is why Deleuze’s approach to literature is necessarily a clinical one: the author discovers a kind of foreign language, illiteracy or non-language within language. The author puts language into contact with its outside, the point at which language can be said to occupy the same zone as silence or formlessness, and at which the differences language creates dissolve into indifference. It is in this sense that Deleuze understands literary technique as a kind of formalism; the author articulates the forms which actualise our experience in order to find new forms capable of expressing new modes of life. This link between literary activity and the pathic dimension makes it necessary to explore certain aspects of how Deleuze understands subjectivity, specifically the roles played by the body, death, and the temporal constitution of experience. I do this through an analysis of Malcolm Lowry and F. Scott Fitzgerald, and the part, as Deleuze sees it, which alcoholism plays in their writing. What will become clear from this is not only the formal specificity by which Deleuze regards literary practice, but the way in which he regards the presence of the formless or abyssal body as both a constant threat to subjective coherence as well as the necessary source of creativity.

The second chapter deals in a more detailed manner with how Deleuze regards the specificity of literary technique. This involves a careful analysis of the symptomatology of Masoch, in which it is possible to discern the origin of the concept of the literary procedure.
Masoch’s symptomatology involved taking an existing set of symptoms, namely the guilt feelings attaching to sexual prohibitions, expressed primarily through the paternal law, and re-ordering them, causing them to express a new sense. For Deleuze, a symptomatology is a highly formal entity, being a set of “disjunctions” distributed on the immaterial plane of sense. We will see how Deleuze develops the central paradox of his theory of embodied subjectivity, namely that the materiality at stake in embodiment is expressed only at the immaterial level of pure form. We will in this way see how his formalism stems from a concern with the body and with the existential problems generated in lived experience. If his approach to the study of literature is based around the distinction of form and content, this is because there is a kind of immateriality expressive of the materiality of embodiment. This paradoxical coming together of materiality and immateriality is what allows for a creative mobility, or what Deleuze defines as a kind of “athleticism”, by which forms and contents can be separated and the processes of formalisation become amenable to experimentation.

We will explore this mobility through notions of the phantasm and affect, and emphasise Deleuze’s debt to psychoanalysis while also acknowledging his distance from it. We will also note how the concept of the people to come is first broached in the study of Masoch via the figure of the “new man” which, as Deleuze notes, appears repeatedly in Masoch’s novels as a symbol of sexual and political liberation. The chapter concludes by looking at Beckett and Wolfson’s procedures, and by arguing that the latter’s procedure was, in Deleuze’s estimation, a creative failure precisely because it signalled an existential failure to negotiate the dual dangers of a purely linguistic formalism, on the one hand, and the abyssal depths of the pathological body on the other. I thus argue that Deleuze bases the criteria by which we can evaluate literature on the possibility of an immanence of pathos and logos, of the unformed materiality of the body and the formal immateriality of signs. What this implies, however, is that the scope of the literary clinic goes beyond the purely diagnostic and symptomatological levels towards a vision of some sort of healing process. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze defines this in terms of the psychotherapeutic notion of transference, but he severs this concept from any personological conceptions of the self, arguing that it is the means for a purely impersonal life to express itself through experimental subjective
modes. Deleuze determines these modes through the themes of difference and repetition, and from this will emerge the concept of desiring production.

Chapter 3 will continue chapter 1's discussion of the death instinct and argue that death, for Deleuze, has a capacity both to save and to fail to save, depending on the mode of repetition embodied in it. The analysis of Deleuze's conception of death is necessary in order to understand to what extent he regards embodiment as the immanent principle both of liberation and of enslavement, of good health as well as sickness. This aspect of immanence is at the heart of Deleuze's methodological conception of the body. The body both blocks and enables, limits and liberates. The concept of blockage will be elaborated on these grounds through a close reading of certain passages from Difference and Repetition, and aspects of Deleuze's relationship to Freud will be explored through Freud's “Dora” case history. The turn to pragmatism signalled by Anti-Oedipus, I argue, must be understood in terms of the therapeutic and prescriptive value given to the concept of production. I argue that the shift from the formalism of symptomatology to the pragmatism of schizoanalysis is not to be conceptualised as a reversal but as the logical development of Deleuze's conception of semiosis. This will be argued through a reading of key passages from both parts of Proust and Signs, and will be pursued through Deleuze and Guattari's book on Kafka. It will be seen how Kafka emerges as an exemplary figure to the extent that he develops the formalist specificity of the procedure alongside the therapeutic capacities of the transference. The importance of Kafka's writing for Deleuze and Guattari is that it constitutes a means to transmute the personal and pathological contents of subjectivity into the terms of a purely impersonal experience at the level of the socio-political and the world historical. The significance of the proper name is explored, in terms of what Deleuze and Guattari call the “order-word”, as the principle by which subjectivity is caused both to be trapped within personal dimensions and to be transformed into an impersonal machine of expression.

Chapter 4 explores the complex links between the literary clinic and schizoanalysis, and argues that some of the key aspects of the literary clinic – the synthesis of formalism and vitalism, pathic subjectivity, the immanent conception of the body – are developed by Deleuze and Guattari's collaboration. Schizoanalysis, I argue, takes the literary clinic beyond
the diagnostic and symptomatological domains, in which Deleuze had originally envisaged it, towards the dimension of therapy and the problematic of the cure. The emphasis on schizophrenia is not merely a descriptive but a prescriptive one: Deleuze and Guattari invest their concepts with an unabashed universal and absolute significance, allowing them to distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate uses of desire in a formal sense, that is, prior to any actualisation of subjective or objective contents. Schizoanalysis is thus presented as a “universal clinical theory”. The emphasis on cure here has nothing to do with curing us of schizophrenia, but rather with curing us of the paralysing neurosis endemic to capitalist society. Psychoanalysis is deemed singularly incapable of curing neurosis because it expresses, in practice if not in theory, the fact that under the conditions of capitalism neurotic illness is increasingly normalised and propagated. If schizophrenia is no less endemic to capitalism, this is because schizophrenic breakdown is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the effect of how the paths beyond neurotic normality are rendered impassable. The curative dimension of schizoanalysis, then, is twofold: to cure us of the paralysing identity of normality and neurosis to which psychotherapeutic practice condemns us, and to enable us to experiment within the pure process of desiring production without collapsing into clinical schizophrenia.

The immanence of this approach is plain: Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between schizophrenia as process and schizophrenia as breakdown, but in both cases it is desiring production which is at issue. Desiring production here occupies the clinical zones of breakdown as well as the experimental zones of breakthrough. Schizoanalysis thus argues that the legitimate uses of the syntheses of desire can be deduced from the clinical entity of schizophrenia, once the latter is seen in its positivity independent from any conception of “normal” subjectivity or the objects proper to it. Conceived independently of subjective and objective contents in this way, desire as pure process can be “mapped” or “diagrammed” according to immanent criteria. This is what connects the formalism of the literary clinic to the pragmatism of schizoanalysis. The “two dangers” of an overly rigid formalism, on the one hand, and the formless abyss, on the other, is translated into the schizoanalytic terminology of the legitimate and illegitimate uses of desire. However, schizoanalysis does not conceive of a material domain of the body and an immaterial domain of signs but,
rather, one universal process of desiring production together with the breakdowns and breakthroughs which attend it. This is why I argue that schizoanalysis signals what Deleuze calls an identity of the critical and the clinical, of the critical domain of formalism and semiosis, and the clinical domain of the pathic body and its blockages. The role of the body without organs is crucial, here, in that it exists simultaneously in pathological and healthy modes. This is because the body without organs is the zone of immanence of breakthrough and breakdown, of logos and pathos, in which blockages are both erected and dissolved. The body without organs in this way develops the methodological role of the body.

I argue that desiring production is the means by which Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise transference. But transference here is inseparable from a type of semiosis in which the subjective “I” becomes capable of expressing purely impersonal and world-historical contents. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call delirium. In delirium, the “I” becomes capable of expressing the sense of the proper names of history. It is thus no longer the name of the clinician which is at issue, but the names of races, tribes, and religions – in a word, the names of peoples. In the final chapter, it is the notion of a people to come which, I argue, constitutes the culmination of the literary clinical conception of literature as health. The writer writes on behalf of collective forces, instantiated in a zone of immanence or body without organs. Deleuze argues that the processes by which collectives actualise themselves is one with the processes of art, in that both share in the same pathos or struggle for self-creation. The point is not that literature can help peoples to become actualised, but that it can articulate or map purely virtual forces of peopling.

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish two different ways of conceptualising groups in this respect: one can regard groups as identical to their actualised and fully constituted forms, but one can also regard them in terms of virtual processes, only some of which may become actualised. The author, to the extent that he or she expresses the forces of a people to come, is engaged with the virtual processes of group formation and with those “collective virtualities” which do not have a recognisable actual form. Literature, then, exists in this zone of immanence of the pathos of a people. This is why Deleuze repeatedly argues that the exemplary author writes of behalf of a people to come. This, ultimately, is the meaning of literature as health. The insights of schizoanalysis, however, are necessary to understand
this, since delirium is the semiotic medium by which the solitary author and the virtual community are united. The health which the author manifests is the ability to move between the two poles governing the legitimacy of the syntheses of desire, which means that the author moves between the two poles of group subjectivity itself. This is the collective and political dimension of health as mobility, and this will be explored through an analysis of Deleuze’s writings on T.E. Lawrence and Melville. I will argue that the author occupies a position between the individual and the group which Deleuze and Guattari define in terms of the “anomalous”. The processes of peopling are described in this way in terms of epidemiology, virus, and contagion, and the thesis will conclude by emphasising how the identity of sickness and health at the heart of the literary clinic are borne out by these schizoanalytic concepts.

This thesis presents a reconstruction of the genesis of the literary clinic as an incomplete concept, or cluster of concepts, within the context of Deleuze’s overall project. We will see how the literary clinic’s connection to other aspects of Deleuze’s work tends to obscure it, but we will also see how these same connections help us render the literary clinic with a certain distinctness and coherence. We will see how the literary clinic, as an obscure and a distinct yet quite coherent conceptual entity, allows us to understand Deleuze’s interest in literature in a way which accounts for aspects of his work which do not immediately appear to have any relevance to literary studies. The intended outcome of this reconstruction, then, is ultimately that it may help open paths towards a properly Deleuzian criticism.

Notes

1. This interconnectedness and incompleteness may very well be the reasons why the copious secondary literature on Deleuze features very little work on the literary clinic or on Deleuze’s interest in the clinical generally. The most sustained Anglophone discussion of the topic is still Daniel W. Smith’s introduction to the English translation of Essays Critical and Clinical: see Smith 1997; see also, Smith 2005 for a slightly different account. Other important contributions include Buchanan 2000 and

Deleuze’s interest in clinical phenomena does not end with literature: the notion of an “aesthetic clinic” was suggested by him in his work on Francis Bacon (FB 38), and, in his second cinema book Antonioni is defined as a “symptomatologist” (C2 8). Unfortunately the scope of this thesis does not allow me to pursue the topic any further than the literary field.

2. While Hallward acknowledges that Deleuzian creation must be tempered by “rules” of caution derived from criteria deduced from within the creative process itself, he apparently fails to see that the origin of creative processes lies in the domain of what Deleuze and Guattari call the unengendered or the uncreated. Hallward’s discussion of the body without organs is illustrative here, in that he sees it purely in terms of a flight from the actual organic body rather than, as Deleuze and Guattari present it, simultaneously a kind of stasis or antiproduction, whose supreme example is the catatonic schizophrenic, which thwarts the functioning of the organism. When Hallward argues that “readers who search through Deleuze’s work for some more primordial concept beneath the creation of difference, some sort of enabling or transcendental condition of creation, will not find it”, he is simply wrong: as I explain at the beginning of chapter one, creation, for Deleuze, is only possible on the
condition of the some “uncreated” or “indifferent” element lying at the heart of every difference and every act of creation (Hallward 2006: 98, 13).


4. For a full discussion of this topic within the American context, see Lambert 2006: 1-12.

5. This is true even of a writer such as Kafka, whose style seems to appropriate everyday “official” language. Deleuze and Guattari describe Kafka’s language in terms of how an asignifying sense emerges from within the significations of everyday meaning. For a discussion, see Bogue 2003: 100-8. As Alan Bourassa writes, the familiar conception of literature as the principal means of understanding and experiencing what it means to be human is called into question by Deleuze’s insistence on the role of the non-literary within literary language use:

Language shatters the easy equivalence of literary and human by opening up a dimension of the non-literary in language (that is, everything that lies outside the scope of the literary but on which the literary depends) and of the non-human (that is, all that lies outside the scope of the human, but nevertheless makes it up. (Bourassa 2002: 61)

6. Deleuze has a contribution to make to the understanding of the “case” and of how to talk about cases. As Lauren Berlant writes: “a case represents a problem-event that has animated some kind of judgment. Any enigma could do—a symptom, a crime, a causal variable, a situation, a stranger, or any irritating obstacle to clarity. What matters is the idiom of the judgment” (Berlant 2007: 663). For a specifically literary approach to the case study, see Tougaw 2006. For a Deleuzian, but also Bergsonian, discussion of issues surrounding law and jurisprudence, see Lefebvre: 2008.
Chapter 1

In this chapter I will show how the literary clinic emerges from Deleuze’s concerns with philosophical method and his understanding of immanent critique. The necessity of securing the immanence of criteria establishes a relation between thought and that which does not think, between the categories of thought and an unthought which we will conceptualise here in terms of the libidinal body. The immanent revaluation of all values can only proceed on the basis of a methodology which suspends all forms of knowledge and cognition. This is how Deleuze, following Nietzsche, understands the pathos of philosophy: the logos of difference and its creation entails, as a necessary condition, something “indifferent” which thwarts creative activity. Deleuze understands literature in a very similar way. Literature discovers within language something which disturbs conventional forms, a form of illiteracy or non-language within language itself. For this reason, Deleuze maintains that the kind of formal renewal literature involves requires that the writer write “for”, on behalf of, an illiterate body which does not think or formalise of its own accord but is the very condition for creativity and formalisation. It is this zone, in which thought, the unthinking body and creative activity participate, which the method of immanent criticism makes available.

The links between literature and the philosophical method of immanence are borne out through their mutual connection to modes of “pathic” subjectivity, those modes of experience in which the subject discovers, at the heart of its own constitution, forms of self-limitation and finitude internal to it. We will look at these issues towards the end of this chapter through a consideration of Deleuze’s analysis of alcoholism and manic-depression in the texts of Malcolm Lowry and F. Scott Fitzgerald. This will show how the literary clinic is predicated on a conception of literary formalist practice as an opposition to given organic, social and linguistic forms and values, and also show how writing is inseparable from a “crack-up” in which the writer flirts with personal disintegration. The cracked “I” means that the subject is split internally. This split is what puts the author within the temporal form of a becoming, which for Deleuze is the condition of aesthetic experimentation.
The chapter will conclude with Deleuze’s highly novel reading of the Freudian death instinct which emphasises how death, while it is the principal form of limitation, is also the principle of change and transformation with which the author, as an anonymous and impersonal force, must identify. In the sense that the author must both embody and somehow evade his or her own death, the practice of writing, viewed through the literary clinical lens, is an opening onto a future health while also being a means to diagnose our present pathologies.

The Case of Thought

For Deleuze, all thinking begins in a kind of pathos. This is because thinking, in Deleuze’s estimation of it, must be distinguished from knowledge or mental activity in general: remembering, sensing, imagining etc. These modes of cognition remain at the purely empirical level of recognisable objects. Thought, however, goes beyond the limits of the recognisable and thus needs to be grasped in a way which distinguishes it from our day to day cognition of the world.¹ In other words, thought goes beyond the given differences which allow us to recognise the objects of our experience, and in turn it leads towards a realm in which differences are not yet distributed in objects. Thought emerges only through this attempt to think the indifferent: “difference is the true logos ... indifference is its pathos” (Di 159).² This is why Deleuze and Guattari, in defining the practice of philosophy as the creation of concepts write that philosophy demands a “nonphilosophical” or “prephilosophical plane”, a “moving desert that concepts come to populate”. Thought does not begin with the creation of concepts, as the latter is only made possible by a series of measures which “institutes” or “lays out” the plane: “these measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess” (WP 40-1). It is only through such a pathos that thinking can properly be called creative, otherwise it would be indistinguishable from mental activity in general.
Thought does not begin by recognising itself in the objects given to consciousness, but by encountering something unrecognisable which presents itself as an impassable obstacle. This is why we must reject the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of a “propitious moment” which locates thought in an encounter with those objects which fall between the categories of the “too large” and the “too small” (DR 29). For Deleuze thought encounters something unintelligible as such which it cannot cognise without suffering a crisis or “catastrophe” (DR 35). This catastrophic moment is foundational for the creation of concepts, but it is also effectively prior to, and thus distinct from, creation. The “desert” which thought institutes is, precisely, uncreated or unengendered, it is always already there, functioning as thought’s unthought. Thinking attains specificity, its distinction from cognition in general, from the fact that it is driven or forced to think this unthought. As Deleuze and Guattari write, this leads to a conception of the one who thinks as someone suffering a loss or crisis of cognition:

there are pathic features: the Idiot, the one which wants to think for himself [...] But also a Madman, a kind of madman, a cataleptic thinker or ‘mummy’ who discovers in thought an inability to think; or a great maniac, someone frenzied, who is in search of that which precedes thought, an Already-there, but at the very heart of thought itself. (WP 70)

At the origin of thought, there is the pathology of the thinker. The compromise of cognition in “aphasia”, “agnosia” and “amnesia”, the general catastrophe of the faculties, testifies to thought’s specific foundation, its quintessential power, which is less a capacity than an incapacity (DR 147). Everything profound in thought takes place at the point where our faculties are forced into compromised states; writing occurs “at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other” (DR xxi).

It was Kant who identified thought’s unique ability with the “power of judgment” (Urteilskraft). Both thought and judgment, for Kant, testify to the same ability or capacity (Fähigkeit). For Deleuze, however, the thinker is less one possessed of a great ability to judge and cognise than one suffering from an inability which is nevertheless inextricable from thought’s greatest power. This is what gives philosophy its kinship with pathological
states, animals and the natural world. It is not human consciousness but, rather, its compromise which ensures that philosophy involves a participation in some absolute process which is irreducible to the categories of human perception and knowledge. This too is what ensures the link between philosophy and literature, for the author is precisely one who encounters, in language, not the certainties of articulated speech but the constant presence and threat of nonsense. One writes “for”, on the behalf of, a power, embodied in the pathos of dying animals and excluded or “minor” peoples, which escapes cognisable difference (CC 2-4). This is why, for Deleuze, literary technique involves experiments with agrammaticality and illiteracy, the discovery, as Proust put it, of a kind of foreign language within language. Literature, then, for Deleuze, is “syntactic creation” only because it is invested in the discovery of something “beyond all syntax”, and in this sense involves not simply the creation of a “new language”, but also a destruction or disarticulation of the given “maternal”, which is to say, native, language (CC 5-6).7

Thought does not begin in a “will to truth” or any sort of conscious intellectual effort which would presuppose the ability to think or to judge. Rather, genuine thought is necessarily “forced” into existence through an encounter with that which remains unthought and unthinkable and which thus constrains the free exercise of the cognitive faculties. The pathos of thought is that there belongs to it, by right, something which is inimical to its exercise. Similarly, one does not experiment with language without having first sensed something inimical to linguistic articulation or formulation. It is thus possible to see at the origin of thought a fundamental and singular “case”, pathological as much as it is philosophical and literary. In order to begin its creative endeavours, thought must acquire a power whose source lies beyond it. But it is only via this beyond, which acts as a constraining limit, that thought discovers the legitimate criteria capable of facilitating it. As Alain Badiou writes, “thought is evaluated according to its capacity to go right to the end, to the limit, of the power that is proper to it and that is forcibly set into motion by the instance of a case-of-thought” (Badiou 2000: 33). We could adduce, here, the “case” of Nietzsche, or the “case” of Artaud. As Deleuze writes, we acquire the criteria for an adequate assessment of literature only if we understand literary technique as a “delirium” which pushes language “to a limit, to an outside or reverse side” (CC 5).
Deleuze suggests that in order to write, “it may perhaps be necessary for the maternal language to be odious” (CC 5). A necessary part of literary technique is a pre-literary disgust for one’s native language and the rules of communication governing it. As Gregg Lambert observes, “the act of writing and the figure of the writer always entertain a relationship with a fundamental stupidity (bêtise)” (Lambert 2000a: 143). It is perhaps the American schizophrenic writer Louis Wolfson who, for Deleuze, embodies this sense of disgust most profoundly, as we shall see in chapter 2, for, in equating the words of his maternal language with poisons and harmful microbes hidden in his food, Wolfson discovered a means to write by way of an anorexic technique: a disgust for eating cultivated a disgust for speaking and vice versa, allowing for the establishment of a zone of immanence encompassing both the gustatory and linguistic functions. We must note that the honing of a sense of disgust is necessary for Deleuze’s philosophical project as a whole. As Deleuze and Guattari write in What is Philosophy?, the philosopher must cultivate a “taste” for “repulsive concepts” (WP 76-7). In his foundational early work, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze identifies the “negative” of thought not as falsity or error, but as stupidity and baseness:

stupidity is a structure of thought as such [...] it expresses the non-sense in thought by right. ... There are imbecile thoughts, imbecile discourses, that are made up entirely of truths; but these truths are base ... The state of mind dominated by reactive forces, by right, expresses stupidity and, more profoundly, that which it is a symptom of: a base way of thinking. (NP 105)

What Deleuze here in his early work wishes to define is what he will later describe, in an Artaudian mode, as thought’s “de jure structure”, the weakness which belongs to thought by right and not because of the contingency of error (DR 147). We might call this, following Lyotard, “libidinal stupidity” (Lyotard 2004: 56). There is a great ambiguity in this concept,
since if stupidity and baseness constitute the mode of thinking to be critiqued, this same mode of thinking is what forces us to go beyond it, it gives us the criteria for overcoming it. We are forced to think anew by something profound within us which does not think but languishes in stupidity. It is only by understanding thought on the basis of a central incapacity, weakness or baseness that we come into contact with something that promises a total disarticulation of the present forms of our knowledge which trap us within conventional ways of thinking. This is how thought’s unique power should be understood.

In terms of Deleuze’s method of philosophical criticism, then, we need to understanding that the object of critique – the stupidity or baseness of thought – has intimate and important links to the overcoming and vanquishing of this object. If Nietzsche, for example, aimed his critique at the nihilism of western culture and Christian morality, defining the latter in terms of a transhistorical sickness of humanity which modernity brings to a point of crisis, then Nietzsche’s solution, in Deleuze’s reading at any rate, is to bring nihilism to completion so that nihilism may defeat itself (NP 172). The “transmutation” of nihilism into a future free of it takes the form of a sickness which, having run its course, gives rise to the possibility of a new health. In order to understand how Deleuze makes this argument, we must turn to analyse some of the conceptual intricacies of his reading of Nietzsche. This will clarify the importance Deleuze attaches to the critical method of immanence; it will also allow us to understand the capacity for formal renewal which Deleuze sees at the heart of the concept of literature as health.

Nihilism emerges when a certain quality or “tonality” of force forges a bond with a certain quality of the will. Thus, there is an important distinction between two different qualities of force, active and reactive, and two different qualities of the will, affirmation and negation (CC 100, NP 54). The true difference is precisely the relation between these two differences (NP 51). The will to power, the will to affirm or negate, is expressed in a quality of force. Active and reactive forces are distinguished at the level of strength and weakness, or, more correctly, dominant and dominated (NP 40). Now, Deleuze asks, if a stronger force always triumphs over a weaker one, as a physical or mechanical law of nature, how is it possible for nihilism – in which weak forces dominate – to triumph, as Nietzsche alleges it has? The answer lies in the imaginative faculties. Nihilism emerges when the will to negate forges a
bond with dominated forces, when negation discovers, as its complimentary component, the desire to be dominated. The negative will projects, via the faculty of the imagination, an "inverted image" amounting to a "mystification or falsification" of the relation between active and reactive, so that reactive forces trump active ones via a "fiction" which serves to "entice active force into a trap" causing it to become reactive (NP 57-8). Under the influence of the imagination, reactive forces are signified, fallaciously, as desirable. Hence, Nietzsche's reading of the origin of Christian morality posits an inversion of values in which weakness and slavishness were revalued, at the expense of strength and nobility, as virtues to be strived towards. Hence, a very real triumph of reactive over active takes place by dint of an imaginary agency. We must, consequently, be able to read every phenomenon in terms of a thing which is taken possession of by a certain quality of force "which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force" (NP 3).

If nihilism is the bond between reactive force and negative will, then, the completion of nihilism, its ultimate overcoming, involves disengaging the negative will from the objects which express it as reaction and replacing them with ones which express it as action. This "conversion" of nihilism then heralds the doubling of affirmation: "Affirmation must divide in two so that it can redouble" (CC 103). There is a double affirmation that affirms both action and reaction. What we are thus left with is not an abstract opposition of active and reactive or of affirmation and negation, as a set of static dualisms, but with a becoming active of the reactive, on the one hand, and, on the other, a superior negation no longer dependent on the objects it negates.9 Now, this double affirmation or double becoming is, as Deleuze says, "a clinical matter, a question of health and healing" since it is the transmutation of the sickness of humanity into the promise of great health (CC 105). We can schematise the process as follows: a force which takes hold of a thing, and signifies it in a certain way, can be disengaged from the thing and replaced with another which then heralds a transformation of that force and a concomitant transformation of the processes of signification through which forces are expressed.
This is a process which recurs, throughout Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the literary clinic, as the central principle by which a pathological state may give rise to processes of creativity indicating new directions for a health to come: we are subjected to given organic, social and linguistic forms but this subjection itself contains the criteria for formal renewal. This is something which we will look at in depth in the next chapter. Here, however, we merely wish to suggest its links to Deleuze’s philosophical method of immanent criticism. We can discern this method also in Deleuze’s understanding of Spinoza. For Deleuze, the project of Spinozist ethics involves the passage from a state of ignorance, in which we experience nothing but passivity and sadness, to a state of greater knowledge, in which we attain ever greater degrees of joyful affections. We experience sadness due to a lack of knowledge of the causes of the various objects that affect us, and thus we remain, from the point of view of our knowledge, in a state of separation from these objects. This state of separation means we have only inadequate ideas of the objects and bodies we come into contact with. But it is precisely the fact that we experience a very real, embodied suffering – what Buchanan has called “an existential paralysis” (Buchanan 2000: 32) – over this lack of knowledge which gives us the criteria for overcoming our ignorance and hence our suffering or subjection. In the passive state, we experience what Deleuze calls “a power of being acted on or suffering action” in contrast to “a power of acting”. However, both suffering and acting here correspond to the same “capacity to be affected” (EP 93). Thus, “passive affections do, it is true, testify to our impotence, and cut us off from that of which we are capable; but it is also true that they involve some degree, however low, of our power of action” (EP 231).

A power of suffering testifies to the persistence within it of a power of action which allows us to overcome our suffering and our subjection through a creative engagement with that suffering. We can regard inadequate ideas in the same sense as the inverted images or fictions which trap us and separate us from our power of acting, since an inadequate idea can be defined, as Simon Duffy explains, as an “imaginary representation ... [which] betrays only a partial degree of understanding” (Duffy 2006: 30). Deleuze, however, does not so much oppose the fictions of the imagination to a demystifying rationality as he conceives of
a profound immanence of reason and imagination, amounting to a kind of demystifying delirium:

Imagination is subject to a law according to which it always initially asserts the presence of its object, is then affected by causes that exclude such a presence, and enters into a kind of 'vacillation,' thinking of its object only as possible, or even contingent. The process of imagining an object thus contains within it the principle of its own dissipation over time. (EP 295)

It is not that we are trapped by images, but that these images tie us to an erroneous objectivity to which we are then subjected. However, Deleuze suggests that the imagination can, with the help of reason, be disengaged from these objects and operate independently of them, the practical result of which would be twofold: freedom from the pernicious influence of the imagination itself, and the autonomous functioning of the imagination independent on its objects.

Immanent Criticism and the Role of Redundancy

Deleuze identifies in Nietzsche a form of immanent criticism, the deduction of a set of immanent criteria heralding a conversion of nihilism into its other. If the case of Nietzsche is so important for Deleuze, it is because it signals the ability to move between the two poles of this conversion, to move from a point of view on sickness from a position of health to a point of view on health from a position of sickness, or as Nietzsche himself put it, "from the perspective of the sick towards healthier concepts and values, and conversely ... from the fullness and self-assuredness of rich life into the décadence instinct" (Nietzsche 2007: 8). This way of "inverting perspectives", writes Deleuze, involves "no reciprocity between the two points of view, the two evaluations. Thus, movement from health to sickness, from sickness to health, if only as an idea, this very mobility is the sign of superior health" (PI 58).
It was, in Deleuze’s view, Nietzsche’s inability any longer to shift perspectives in this way which precipitated the latter’s ultimate decline.\textsuperscript{10}

Immanent criticism is “total”, meaning that it evaluates not by singling out one value and judging all others by it, but by evaluating value itself. This can only be achieved via a “pathos”, the “differential element” which gives us the genesis of values (NP 2). The “object” of critique, then, to the extent that it induces pathos, plays a productive role in this process. As Joe Hughes puts it, “a truly radical critique is not one that leaves the hollowed out remains of the object of critique lying in the past. A radical critique demonstrates the genesis of that which has been criticized” (Hughes 2009: 3). Immanent criticism does not begin by presupposing its object as already constituted, nor does it end by leaving this object behind, but rather attempts to produce in thought a genesis of that object in order to discover a productive principle capable of overcoming it. “Critique”, Deleuze writes, “is a constitution” (OLM 239). It is only through such a genesis or constitution that we can deduce legitimate criteria.\textsuperscript{11} We shall see this quite clearly in chapter 2 with respect to literature and the problem of form and content, and we will see it again in chapter 4 in our discussion of the schizoanalytic critique of psychoanalysis. The pathos involved in criticism is what joins Deleuze’s understanding of literature to his political and social theory; this explains the predominance in both of notions of health and sickness.

The method of immanent criticism, as we have suggested, has important links to literary practices of formal renewal as Deleuze understands it. We have already seen in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche the introduction of a series of evaluative dyads: action and reaction, affirmation and negation. Deleuze’s philosophy is constantly developing such evaluative dyads – virtual and actual, schizophrenic and paranoid, molecular and molar, and so on. These dyads function to replace systems of transcendent judgment, but how does this avoid giving us new forms of transcendent judgment which would imprison us all over again? In other words, do Deleuze’s evaluative methods not seem to contradict his moratorium on judgment, as Badiou, for example, charges? (Badiou 2000: 31-2) The answer is that these conceptual dyads function to perform a movement of substitution or conceptual redundancy: as soon as one dyad is developed, another is proposed which appears to
displace or replace it, as if to cling to a single set of evaluative terms would threaten to fall back into the kind of judgment Deleuze wishes to escape.

John Mullarkey has suggested that this method of substitution is not merely an effort to describe some elusive fact about the world, but involves a necessary prescriptive or normative element in which the provisional nature of all descriptions demands their recurring obsolescence. While Deleuze’s philosophy is no doubt descriptive, it also prescribes to itself a type of conceptual redundancy as a vital aspect of its “metaphilosophical form” (Mullarkey 2006: 46). It is not that one dyad simply replaces another, but that the displacements this effects forces a revaluation of all terms in the series. This means that Deleuze’s philosophy performs metaphilosophically the very movement of difference and repetition it seeks to describe in the world, while being in an important sense autocorrecting or self-diagnostic. It seems that immanent critique could only proceed in this manner, since the doubling and redundancy of evaluative terms effects a revaluation of the entire system. If great health, then, plays an important role, it is not so much that this health could be described as that it can only be prescribed in a way which links the libidinal of “biopsychic” life to the formal nature of language and naming. This, as we shall see in the next chapter, is the principle of what Deleuze describes in literary terms as the procedure.12

We can only give a brief example of this here (see chapters 2 and 3 for a fuller discussion). Deleuze and Guattari begin their book on Kafka by emphasising the predominance of certain formal figures in the latter’s writings: the photo of the parents, and the bent head of the child. The photo and the bent head are joined as the forms of expression and content, respectively, which for Kafka express the sense of a desire which wants to judge and to submit — in other words, the libidinal problem of guilt. Desire is always captured by forms which give it contents. Kafka treats the problem of guilt in formal terms distinct from its embodied actualisation in the family milieu and his literary method is premised on the way this mode of capture is performed through substitutions: a form of expression can give up its contents and take on new ones. The bent head of the guilty child, then, can be substituted for a straightened head: “The head that straightens, the head that bursts through the roof, seems an answer to the bent head” (K 4). Similarly, the new content
demands the emergence of a new form to express its sense, which Deleuze and Guattari call “the musical sound” (K 5). Kafka can be seen as administering to himself, through his writing, a kind of treatment or therapy via the production of new forms which substitute old, pathological contents for new ones. This does not solve the problem of guilt, necessarily, but renders criteria for immanent correction: the bent head calls into being the straightened head, the family photo brings into being the musical sound, etc. etc. Ian Buchanan was perhaps the first to pick up on this point: “the artist empties the procedure (form of expression) of its pathological associations (form of content), which is where technique comes into the equation” (Buchanan 2000: 101-2).

Understood immanently, formal renewal, as literary technique, can be seen to be premised on the expunging of pathological contents, the erroneous objectivity which ties us to certain subjected states. By emptying the form of its contents, new contents can be acquired which forces the form itself to change. This is precisely the process which Deleuze and Guattari discern in Kafka’s writings, in which an initial familial content, expressed in the form of the letters and the diaries, are replaced by increasingly social and political contents which force the form to expand into the domains of the stories and the novels. Putting it simply, the inadequacy of our present forms gives rise to an embodied suffering, but this suffering can itself become the principle of the renewal of forms. This will become clearer later in this chapter in the analysis of alcoholism in Lowry and Fitzgerald, and also in more depth in the next chapter in which the literary procedures of several writers of interest to Deleuze will be considered.

The Methodological Importance of the Body

The genesis of the object of critique, then, is what renders the formal terms of that which might overcome it. Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, in Deleuze’s reading, amounts to the critical repudiation of all the base and disgusting values which Nietzsche saw as
characteristic of the "great sickness" at the root of modern European culture and Christian morality. This sickness Nietzsche ascribed to nihilism. But to overcome its object critique must constitute it in thought; it must actively generate the material which signifies this object in the same way that the sick body produces the symptoms which signify the illness attacking it:

our knowledge of the will to power will remain limited if we do not grasp its manifestation in ressentiment, bad conscience, the ascetic ideal and the nihilism which forces us to know it. The will to power is spirit, but what would we know of spirit without the spirit of revenge which reveals strange powers to us? The will to power is body, but what would we know of the body without the sickness which makes it known to us? Thus nihilism, the will to nothingness, is not only a will to power, a quality of the will to power, but the ratio cognoscendi of the will to power in general. All known and knowable values are, by nature, values which derive from this ratio. ... We ‘think’ the will to power in a form distinct from that in which we know it. ... This is a distant survival of themes from Kant to Schopenhauer: what we in fact know of the will to power is suffering and torture, but the will to power is still the unknown joy, the unknown happiness, the unknown God. (NP 172)

In order to know the object of our critique, we must generate or constitute this object in the same way sickness generates in the body the symptoms which render it knowable. But this critical genesis or constitution reveals to us certain powers of thought which go beyond the categories of knowledge, and it is precisely these "strange powers" which reveal to us the very processes which allow thought to move beyond the object of its critique. This distinction between thought and knowledge is of great methodological importance, especially with regards to the body, for what Deleuze describes as philosophical or critical "reversal" (NP 1). The body, for Deleuze, gives us the principle of immanence because it is what allows us to transform aspects of limitation and constriction into liberation and potentiality. One needs a body in order to think not because "the body thinks, but [because], obstinate and stubborn, it forces us to think, and forces us to think what is concealed from thought, life" (C2 182). Deleuze takes great interest in phenomena of bodily suffering and limitation, and this fact is borne out by the themes and concerns of the literary
clinic, but this needs to be understood in relation to the methodological principles involved in the genesis of thought.

Deleuze defines the body in terms of constraint and blockage, it is the body which limits and blocks and thus is what forces us to think. The body, then, reveals to us a power which belongs by right to thought but which comes into existence only through phenomena of bodily limitation: we are driven to think only via the restrictions which embodiment forces on us. The body, then, is primarily a force of resistance or blockage and not of liberation as such. However, in grasping this blockage in its positivity, Deleuze asserts, the body as a material limitation on thought necessitates the methodologically crucial distinction between knowledge and thought and gives to the latter its de jure power. It is only when the limitations of the body are grasped in their positivity that bodily materiality can be said to be of true philosophical concern. This entails a necessarily paradoxical understanding of embodiment (which we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter). It is precisely literary authors, for Deleuze, who have discerned this more than philosophers. The author submits the body to a “problematic deduction” which “far from restoring knowledge, or the internal certainty that it lacks, to thought,... puts the unthought into thought” (C2 170). Pathological experience tells us that the body is limiting, not enabling. But through the constraints of limitation, we are forced to think, and this involves the affirmation of that in us which does not think. The problematic, then, is that which gives to thought the criteria it needs to make evaluations, these criteria being necessarily unthought. To evaluate is to determine a case as a problem (LS 65). In this sense, Deleuze prefers in every respect the moral deduction of the body to its physical or sensual induction (FLB 97).

The methodological importance of the body puts thought into contact with life via a concept of blockage or limitation common both to life and thought. The role of the organism here is crucial. Life is contrasted with death in the sense that death is the pure form of the organism; death is not the absence of life, but the organ-isation against which life struggles. This means that life can only take on significance for thought, i.e. become problematic, through its various symptomatic manifestations, the degree to which it comes into conflict with the organism. The organism, for Deleuze, does not refer to any substantive content but to the form of organisation unique to life. The organism is unique to life since it is what life
uses to reproduce itself, it is life's hereditary form. As a result, the organism is defined strictly as the formal limitation by which a determinate content can be captured, forced to submit to reproducible forms. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari define the organic as a sort of detour of life: "if everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organised but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life" (ATP 499).

The life which the organism captures is never capable of being given an adequate expression by the organism, there is always a surplus, so to speak, of inorganic life within the organism which organic form will never be able to capture or formalise fully. There is something which is unliveable in terms of the organic constitution of the subject, but which must nevertheless be lived. It is Deleuze's contention that literary authors, more than any others, have been the ones to see this. In his final piece of writing, "Immanence ... a life", Deleuze refers to the character of Roger "Rogue" Riderhood from Dickens's Our Mutual Friend:

A disreputable man, a rogue, held in contempt by everyone, is found as he lies dying. Suddenly, those taking care of him manifest an eagerness, respect, even love, for his slightest sign of life. Everybody bustles about to save him, to the point where, in his deepest coma, this wicked man himself senses something soft and sweet penetrating him. But to the degree that he comes back to life, his saviors turn colder, and he becomes once again mean and crude. Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with death. (PI 28)

Between the life of the person and their organic death, there is "a" life distinct from both. "A" life here should be understood in the singular and anonymous terms by which we understand "a" case. Deleuze argues for a philosophy in which "sequences of random cases ... replace the form of the judgment of existence and attribution which [is] still the basis of dialectical thinking (is, is not)" (DI 158). The literary clinic seeks to grasp the problematic deduction by which great authors determine their own particular and exemplary case with respect to a generality which they also constitute. An author carries out a "deduction" of his or her own case with respect to the general categories of humanity and civilisation: "the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the world; he follows the illness step by step, but it is the generic condition of man; he assesses the chances of health, but it is the possible birth of a new man" (CC 53). The author deduces a "case", which is the case of his
or her own singularity, his or her own anonymous and singular life distinct from both organic death and personal life. What this means is that the author, as a singularity, can be defined neither in terms of the personality or individuality of his or her life, nor in terms of the social or historical generality from which he or she is associated, but strictly in terms of the immanence of the particular and the general, the individual and the collective. The author, then, embodies both individual and collective characteristics, and becomes capable of relaying, through the individuality of his or her style, the impersonal and collective forces of a people. This is ultimately how Deleuze defines literature as health, and this is why the trajectory of health is always one which leads from the personal to the impersonal domain.

This is also why the notion of the "proper name" figures as such an important category in Deleuze's understanding of literature. In medicine, the exemplary physician or, in some cases, patient (e.g., Lou Gehrig's disease) gives his or her name to the discovery of a new syndrome, that is, a new grouping of symptoms, which thenceforth becomes a nosological category subsuming future particular cases. The exemplary or singular case is both generality and particularity in itself. It is of the nature of the problem to be inclusive of both generality and particularity in this way – the problem is "indifferent to the universal and the singular, to the general and to the particular, to the personal and the collective" (LS 41, see also LS 140). As Klossowski discerns with respect to the "fortuitous case" of Nietzsche, when the proper name expresses singularities, it can no longer be identified with the psychological or biographical contents of the person it denotes, but effects "a lived Chaos, a total vacancy of the conscious ego", in other words, a life (Klossowski 2005: 180).

The Nietzschean Origins of the Literary Clinic

This vacancy or loss of the psychological contents of the ego is the effect of the emergence of a life which is inimical to the forms – organic, social and linguistic – by which a person constitutes his or her identity. The writer suffers from a life which in some sense is too
powerful and which forces the discovery of new modes of existence capable of giving it expression. So, while literature most certainly is not the imposition of a form of expression on “the matter of lived experience”, the fact that lived experience involves a “matter” which is both resistant to forms but which also conditions the creation of new forms is what makes literature an exercise in formal renewal (CC 1). What this means, as we shall see in some detail in the next chapter, is that the criteria by which literature is to be judged cannot themselves be literary or formal in nature, but must relate to the genesis of an “unliveable” or formless element emergent at the heart of the consensual and organic forms constituting lived experience. This is what makes the affair of writing the discovery of a “health ...

sufficient to liberate life wherever it is imprisoned by and within organisms and genera” (CC 3). Despite the fact that this last statement comes at the end of his career, in an essay written for the publication of Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze, in the 60s, had planned an entire series of works aimed at “[articulating] the relation between literature and clinical psychology” (DI 133). This relation was discovered by Deleuze in Nietzsche’s project for a “physiology of art”, and, more specifically, in the diagnostic category of “symptomatology” which Nietzsche deployed.15

Symptomatology corresponds to a distinction between two different modalities (discussed above) of the will to power expressed as the differential of forces. In Nietzsche’s view, a force is always either a command, in which case it is an active force, or an obeying, in which case it is a reactive force. All experience results from a becoming of forces. This is why the will is the differential element “added” to force but also distinct from it, it is what puts all forces in becoming. To speak of a person in the singular, Nietzsche insists, is to conceal the fact that, to the extent that we will “we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties”, “the synthetic concept ‘I’” is necessarily undermined by the fact that whenever someone wills, something within that same person necessarily obeys (Nietzsche 1989: 26). But Deleuze, in his reading of Nietzsche, is quick to insist that it makes little sense to speak of this dualism of forces without also talking about the becoming in which they are caught up. Becoming expresses the quality or sense of forces, and these two aspects, i.e. forces and the sense they express in a becoming, should neither be confused nor taken in isolation since they involve one another in a concrete becoming. Thus, the will to power is
firstly “the sensibility of forces”, that is, the sense or quality of phenomena, and secondly “the becoming sensible of forces”, the becoming readable or interpretable of these forces, their embodiment in signs whose readability gives us their sense. Now, an illness is the perfect example of this dual aspect of becoming (NP 63-4). In an illness, a force – as a component of physiology or psychology – is separated from its power of acting: it suffers the action of a stronger force. But in being separated this force becomes readable and interpretable in its own right in the symptom produced. It is thus necessary to speak of a power of separation or limitation which is unique to reactive forces:

Illness ... separates me from what I can do, as reactive force it makes me reactive, it narrows my possibilities and condemns me to a diminished milieu to which I can do no more than adapt myself. But, in another way, it reveals to me a new capacity, it endows me with a new will that I can make my own, going to the limit of a strange power. (NP 66)

Deleuze discerns a great ambivalence here, in Nietzsche’s conception of the philosopher as a physician of culture, since a path towards health is opened only from a position of sickness: “If active force, being separated, becomes reactive, does not, conversely, reactive force, as that which separates, become active? ... Is there not a kind of baseness, meanness, stupidity etc. which becomes active through going to the limit of what it can do?” (NP 67). Becoming indeed points the way towards a health to come, but there can be no becoming without reactive forces, without the necessary separation of forces in the passage of what is to what will be. Deleuze and Guattari thus define philosophy in terms of the need to “diagnose our actual becomings ... The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present”. The present is what we are, the sickness in which we languish, for example, or the inanition which paralyses us. But in another sense, this present passes and thus “is not what we are but, rather, what we become, what we are in the process of becoming”. There is something distinct from the present which is nevertheless “the now of our becoming” and which pertains to “new immanent modes of existence” (WP 112-3). These new ways of living imply a division of time into two streams, since there is a “now” of the chronic present which ties us to the past, but also an infinitive “now” in which the past is never accomplished once and for all but is always in a continual process of coming about, or returning, as the ever new.
This temporal form is the precondition for aesthetic experimentation as Deleuze imagines it. We will see in the remaining sections of this chapter how, in Deleuze’s theory of the subject, the “I” is thus divided by a temporality which splits it. This split is what Deleuze calls the “wound” or “crack”. Since, as Deleuze writes, there is no consciousness or form of culture which is not internal to a general becoming-reactive of humanity, the universal form of time is to separate (NP 64-6). There is a “chronic present” which ties the passage of time to a past which is effectively a mnemonic store of our accomplished or actualised deeds and actions, the things we have gained or lost in our lives. But, in another sense, the past is separated from itself because the past and the present can never be fully reconciled: there is a “now” which is distinct from the present which will be past, and which persists into the future as what remains unaccomplished or non-actualised in every accomplished event. This is what stands apart from the actualised materiality of our lived experience and the physical suffering of the body. Thus, reaction as the general condition of humanity is nevertheless characterised by certain cases in which there can be detected a “becoming active of the reactive”, the discovery, in the depths of illness or stupidity, a form of life irreducible to organic death.

The Crack in Lowry and Fitzgerald

Deleuze warns against “treating authors ... as possible or real patients”. What, then, distinguishes sickness to the extent that it is lived and endured from those exemplary cases in which it becomes the basis for a symptomatology in the “literary-speculative work”? Symptoms, as the effects of reactive forces, are “actualized” in us through the neuroses of our day to day existence. But while “the neurotic can only actualize the terms and the story of his novel” – this “novel” being the drama of his or her life as such – the author, to the contrary, can “extract the non-actualizable part of the pure event from symptoms” and “raise everyday actions and passions (like eating, shitting, loving, speaking, and dying) ... from the physical surface on which symptoms are played out and actualizations decided to
the metaphysical surface on which the pure event stands and is played out”. Thus, literature allows the symptoms and psychopathologies which we, as subjects, actualise in our everyday life to become the direct objects of experimentation. Deleuze charges psychoanalytic criticism with inverting the real causal relationship between the life and the work in this respect: “It is not the complex which provides us with information about Oedipus and Hamlet, but rather Oedipus and Hamlet who provide us with information about the complex” (LS 273). Thus, authors are not simply patients to be “treated” by the critic. Their work, rather, is the result of an experimentation which makes the emergence of the “unliveable” sustainable, and thus authors are both patients and doctors at once.

Authors manage to sustain a life which, ordinarily, is merely destructive and damaging. This is their singularity. As we will see, this is achieved through the formalism distinctive of a given author’s style. What must be borne in mind as we proceed is that Deleuze’s formalist understanding of literary technique is inextricable from a therapeutic orientation which sees writing as the maintenance of a life process irreducible to the terms of present forms. The “two dangers” which make the path of the literary author a dangerous one, then, is that while the health we are given is inadequate, simply abandoning it without the requisite caution ultimately heralds mental and physical decline and even death (D 49). The “crack”, then, as Deleuze describes it, is the line of separation which splits us from ourselves, which splits up the organic and personal unity with which health, in the popularly accepted sense, is identified:

if one asks why health does not suffice, why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits through it, in people ready to destroy themselves – better death than the health which we are given. (LS 182)

For Deleuze, embodied experience takes place between two poles or two dangers: on the one hand, a cannibalistic libidinal depth; on the other, a dissipated, physical surface (LS 277), or, as Christopher Drohan puts it, “at one end of the spectrum we have the threat of absolute meaninglessness and the descent into complete chaos, while at the other we have the threat of an absolutely objective meaning and a completely superficial knowledge of the world” (Drohan 2009: 40). This dilemma is the logical conclusion to the ambivalence which
Deleuze describes in Nietzsche's conception of health and evaluation. Writing as health embodies the paradoxical necessity of living that which is unliveable in terms of present organic, social and linguistic forms, but a total dissolution of these forms is equally unliveable. There is, then, in Deleuze's conceptualisation of literature and the practice of writing an orientation towards a future health, a health to come. Becoming and hence writing involves a resistance to the present (WP 108-9). But this orientation is inextricable from a present “now” which is felt in the neuroses and illnesses of lived experience. The present is always lived as a “chronic”, bodily present which is nevertheless joined to phenomena of passage, change and transmutation.

The crack in the “I” of subjectivity stems from this temporal ambivalence. Deleuze’s concept of the crack is derived from the writings of F. Scott Fitzgerald and Malcolm Lowry. These writers diagnose alcoholism not in the hedonic terms of a search for pleasure but as “an extraordinary hardening of the present” (LS 179). In Fitzgerald’s prose, there is a proliferation of formal “figures” of the past perfect: figures such as “I have drunk”, “I have loved”, “I have been rich”, “I have lost”, etc. The “to have” renders an extreme “hardening” or rigidity of the present moment, while the objects of the participles (the objects loved, the objects lost) appear in a different moment, a moment which, while it is always past, appears only in connection with the present. This process of living simultaneously in two moments is characteristic of the alcoholic’s experience, so that drinking becomes an experiment in temporality. The present moment is always still, rigid and hard, as empty and expansive as a desert or the Grand Canyon (LS 180) while the objects identified as belonging to or participating in the present are a sort of vapour or softness in “flight” across its surface (LS 181).

The alcoholic identifies with the past objects only through that rigidity of the present which brings about their return. This ability to identify with what is lost or destroyed signifies what Deleuze, drawing on the language of Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytic theory, calls a “manic omnipotence”, the construction, out of the remains of a destroyed object, of a hallucinatory reappearance of its wholeness. But, to the extent that the alcoholic brings about an expansion of the hardened present, and the desertification it heralds, he or she also embodies the “depressive” principle of the destruction or loss of these objects: “what
gives alcoholism an exemplary value ... is that alcohol is at once love and the loss of love, money and the loss of money, the native land and its loss. It is at once object, loss of object, and the law governing this loss” (LS 182). The vital point here is that the material problem which constitutes the alcoholic’s case is rendered in purely formal terms as the problem of the (lack of) identity of the passing present. Deleuze detects this in the work of Lowry in the form of the “future perfect”, e.g., “I will have drunk” (LS 185). In Lowry’s Under the Volcano, the problem of the next drink is always paramount to the narrative and the attitudes of the main character: “In the bathroom, the Consul became aware he still had with him half a glass of slightly flat beer; his hand was fairly steady, but numbed holding the glass, he drank cautiously, carefully postponing the problem soon to be raised by its emptiness”. Lowry’s Consul is always concerned with the appearance of the next drink and the disappearance of the present one, a disappearance necessary for the appearance of the next: “he had not only missed the bus, he would have plenty of time for more drinks. If only he were not drunk!” (Lowry 2000: 146, 223).

For the alcoholic, the problem of the last glass, and when to call it, is paramount – when, exactly, under what conditions, does one break off drinking? Evaluation has to do with how systems change or acquire consistency, how they reproduce. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari make an important distinction between the concept of “limit” and the concept of “threshold” in relation to alcoholism:

what does an alcoholic call the last glass? The alcoholic makes a subjective evaluation of how much he or she can tolerate. What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start over again (after a rest, a pause ...). But beyond that limit there lies a threshold that would cause the alcoholic to change assemblage: it would change either the nature of the drinks or the customary place and hours of the drinking. Or worse yet, the alcoholic would enter a suicidal assemblage, or a medical, hospital assemblage, etc. ... What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criterion and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series of ‘glasses’. (ATP 438)

The last glass is for the alcoholic the object which gives the whole series of glasses the consistency which makes it a system, a cycle which is reproducible under certain conditions.
The last, in this sense, is only ever the penultimate, the next-to-last, marking the interior limits of the system, and never the ultimate, marking the threshold or beyond in which the system would have to undergo a change in nature in order to reproduce. The criterion of the last element beyond which an assemblage would have to change is what defines the values governing any particular structure or system: “every group desires according to the value of the last receivable object beyond which it would be obliged to change assemblage” (ATP 439). All desire, whether alcoholic or otherwise, has as its object this paradoxical “last”, whose appearance is the same as its warding off. The last glass, then, is never truly the last. In reaching the interior limit of a system in this way one “wards off” that system’s transformation precisely because one prevents the arrival of the truly last, or ultimate, object. The alcoholic consumes the next glass so that he or she does not have to consume the ultimate glass. This is what constitutes the recurrent, chronic nature of the alcoholic’s drinking.

If alcoholism constitutes a pathological system, Deleuze and Guattari are nevertheless interested in a way to overcome it through elements immanent in the system itself. Is there a way to drink which neither reproduces the alcoholic assemblage nor leads to suicide or hospitalisation? In other words, is there a way to generate criteria for a new health from within the depths of pathology? This is how we should understand Deleuze and Guattari’s fascination with Henry Miller’s attempts to get drunk on pure water. They repeatedly insist on the possibility that drug induced perceptual states can and should be experienced by a sober consciousness, that there is a type of extreme sobriety or non-pathological lucidity which convergences on delirium and intoxication (ATP 166). This assertion that the extreme states experienced through drugs and psychosis are possible through sober thought alone is schizoanalysis’s promise of physiological renewal. But this does not mean that physiology alone is enough, quite the contrary. The importance of literature is that it possesses powers of formal innovation capable of capturing experiences to which the organic body is fundamentally inadequate. It is only through an encounter with the inorganic life in it but also in excess of it that the subject experiences what Deleuze called “the proper limit of sensibility” (DR 237). How does the subject discover its “proper limit”, its true threshold, and survive? The answer is that the proper limit of the body provides the criteria for
immanent evaluations which are rendered by formal processes. It is through this intersection of the corporeal and the literary formalist that we should understand Deleuze's insistence on the importance of death and its relation to subjectivity, which is the topic of the remaining sections of this chapter.

_Larval Subjectivity and Manic-Depression_

The importance of death, both as a danger and as a necessity inherent in life, is fundamental to Deleuze's conception of the literary clinic. The search for a new health, distinct both from the organic health of the body as well as the categories of the individual self derived from sociolinguistic convention, invokes the dangers of self-destruction, madness and suicide. The wounding or cracking of the "I" is for Deleuze the very condition of subjectivity, and for this reason personal and physiological disintegration is always an inherent threat. Deleuze draws on Rimbaud's conception of poetic subjectivity to bring out the sense of personal disintegration with which the author flirts: "I is an other. ... I am a spectator at the flowering of my thought: I watch it, I listen to it. ... A Poet makes himself a visionary through a long, boundless, and systematized disorganization of all the senses. All forms of love, of suffering, of madness" (Rimbaud 1967: 102). Deleuze ties Rimbaud's poetic intuition to Kant's philosophical discovery that all experience is grounded in a subjective self-affection through which the conscious "I" synthesises itself in time. The "I" that actively wills or judges is accompanied by another "I", which arises as a correlate to every subjective act; the "I" exists only as an affection of itself. Hence,

the Self is in time and is constantly changing: it is a passive, or rather receptive, 'self' that experiences changes in time. The I is an act (I think) that actively determines my existence (I am), but can only determine it in time, as the existence of a passive, receptive, and changing self ... The I and the Self are thus separated by the line of time ... If the I determines our existence as a passive self changing in time, time is the
formal relation through which the mind affects itself ... It is not time that is interior
to us ... it is we who are interior to time, and for this reason time always separates us
from what determines us. (CC 29-31)

The line of time, as a purely “formal relation”, which bisects the “I” is the only possible
source of those formalisations which capture and give synthetic unity to experience. This
unity is only possible through representations of self, but Kant’s theory of the subject in an
important sense undermines this unity, as far Deleuze is concerned, since it posits a
necessary splitting of the subject into an “I” which receives formal determination and an “I”
which gives it. Coextensive with the two “I”s there is a kind of agency which makes
determination possible. What this means is that the active and conscious subject identified
with the psychological contents of the “ego” or “person” is predicated on a distinct,
impersonal subject. Deleuze calls this subjectivity “larval”: these subjects are “not yet
qualified or composed, rather patients than agents”, and capable of experiencing states
which “a composed, qualified adult” could not endure (DI 97). The larval subject opens up a
zone in which formalisations and determinations are not yet complete, yet does not simply
abandon us to the formless abyss of indetermination. Rather, the dynamisms of the larval
are what make formalisation possible. The problem of determination is dealt with by
showing that both determination and indetermination are premised on the “determinable”
nature of a “fractured” and “passive” “I” located not in the forms by which a person
identifies him or herself, nor in the psychological contents of the ego, but inhering beneath
these forms and contents as the condition or ground of their possibility (DR 168-70).

Thus, Deleuze is particularly fascinated by subjective experiences in which psychological
contents are compromised, while the forms which delineate personal identity become
divested of these contents. We saw, in our discussion of alcoholism above, for example,
how it was possible to identify with objects which represent us, but we also saw how
alcoholic experience involved identification with the principle of loss, destruction and
bankruptcy of these objects. This kind of subjectivity Deleuze termed “manic-depressive” (LS
220 184-5). The principle source for Deleuze’s conception of manic-depression is Fitzgerald’s
autobiographical essay “The Crack-Up”. In this essay, written only four years before his
death in 1940, Fitzgerald reflects on his early fame and literary success followed by the
subsequent loss and bankruptcy of these, which he refers to as the “crack-up of all values” (Fitzgerald 1965: 51). The crack Fitzgerald describes is of two kinds: the first is “big” and “sudden” while the “second kind happens almost without your knowing it” (Fitzgerald 1965: 39). He suggests that the large events in one’s life – the attainment or loss of wealth and success, for example – occur in two different kinds of temporality at once, taking place both in the form of sudden, life changing instants as well as long, slow manifestations which only seem to be realised long after they happen. “The Crack-Up” recounts three different “blows” or “cracks” in Fitzgerald’s life. The first occurred with his diagnosis of malaria as a young man and the erosion of his dreams of becoming “a big shot in college” (Fitzgerald 1965: 47). The second relates the course of his initial literary success and his subsequent bankruptcy – financial, moral and physical – culminating in a nervous breakdown and a period of convalescence.

Surprisingly, Fitzgerald does not emphasise this second crack, but one which accompanied his recovery: “And then suddenly, I got better. – And cracked like an old plate as soon as I heard the news” (Fitzgerald 1965: 42). Between the two cracks assailing his health, Fitzgerald discovered a third, more damaging one: “In its impact this blow was more violent than the other two but it was the same in kind” (Fitzgerald 1965: 48). Fitzgerald’s ultimate diagnosis of his position was that, during the years of his fame and success as well as those of his decline, he “had become identified with the objects of my horror or compassion. ...

[I]dentification such as this spells the death of accomplishment”. This “merging with the object” was for Fitzgerald fatal, since all such identifications are by their nature insubstantial (Fitzgerald 1965: 52). If “The Crack-Up” is an astonishing text, it is because we can see Fitzgerald attempting, through the medium of literary form alone, to identify himself not simply with the objects of his experience, their acquisition and loss, but also with the very principle of their passing and destruction; this is what gives the piece such importance for Deleuze. Fitzgerald identifies through his prose the pure formal line of self-affection which bisects the “I” and splits it into its active and passive dimensions, in a sense becoming one with this abstract line itself. Subjectivity is thus taken up by forces which emerge from the heart of the personal and lived experience, and yet which lead far beyond the actualisation of the events which strike us. As James Williams writes:
["The Crack-Up"] is about the way any actual life remains in touch not only with its past and future events, but all past and future events and the intensities of significance accompanying them. It is therefore also about the way any life is stretched by this contact, not necessarily in a negative way, but in a manner that connects actual physical events to effects way beyond their immediate actual causes. (Williams 2008:160)

This is an important aspect of manic depressive subjectivity for Deleuze since it highlights the manic omnipotence over objects as well as their depressive loss and destruction. But Deleuze introduces an important difference which distinguishes his theory from psychoanalysis. It is not that identifications are compensations which construct a phantasy defence against the real loss or destruction of objects. Rather, Deleuze sees the possibility of identifying, determining and even "willing" this loss, partaking as such of a power which threatens to destroy us, and directing it towards an experimental use (LS 184-5). This is why Deleuze attaches so much profundity to Fitzgerald’s sentiment that all life is a type of controlled self-destruction or “process of breaking down” (Fitzgerald 1965: 39). Following Fitzgerald’s intuition, Deleuze argues that, since we endure in two different temporalities at once, death necessarily happens twice: both in the depth of the body, in the physical and mental blows we receive, but also at the surface, in the form of a phantasm or “event” which stands as the incorporeal double of, while remaining utterly distinct from, the physical actions and passions which serve as actualisations (LS 178). If the actualisation in depth of every blow involves an action and a passion, then the event is the passage from one to the other. It is neutral with regards to both since it is neither exhausted in the action which actualises it nor remains locked in the depths of the body which suffers it. Between actions completed and passions suffered there is something neutral, something which remains unaccomplished in the physical accomplishment of event. It is this something which is liberated via the crack, which acts both as a constraint and a principle of freedom. As Deleuze and Guattari remark, this is the “proper limit” of the physical or of sensibility: “you reach a degree, a quantum, an intensity beyond which you cannot go” (ATP 198).

It is this impassable limit which constitutes, for Deleuze, the genesis of literary form. By spreading itself over the rift dividing past and future, passions and actions, the phantasm, to
the extent that it insists in neither one, engenders the disjunctive separation of that which passes from moment to moment in chronological time. Thus, it is the phantasm which constitutes the “nonbeing”, or “minimum of being”, inherent in the types of formalisation and symbolisation which make language possible, since these formalisations are rendered via the distribution of disjunctions in singular points (LS 67, 261, 244-5). Disjunctions such as poor/rich are not foundational, but are predicated on a minimum of being, on the impassable limit common to all being, what physicists might call “the limiting case of structure” (Arnheim 1971: 22). As a result, phantasms are neither one nor the other in terms of any given disjunction, but are both at once, simultaneously bringing together and separating. In the poem called “Peter and Paul” which features halfway through Lewis Carroll’s novel *Sylvie and Bruno*, Peter is poor and is lent money by Paul. In a scenario worthy of the recent financial crises, Paul grants a loan to Peter and marks the debt on his balance sheet, but Peter never actually receives the money. Nevertheless, Paul demands repayment. Thus, as the poem continues, the more money Peter is lent the more impoverished he becomes, while the more money Paul lends the richer he becomes. To become richer, then, is also to become poorer. The paradoxical element of debt/payment, or theft/gift, circulates between the two series of Peter and Paul, ensuring their economic and grammatical interaction (Carroll 2007: 105).

*The Death Instinct and the Saving Repetition*

If Deleuze wishes to understand death in terms of the phantasm, it is because of the requirement of attaining the legitimacy of the “proper limit of sensibility”. How is it possible to endure the limit, what is the mode of this endurance? Deleuze’s understanding of death here needs to be seen in terms of his reading of the Freudian death instinct, which we will explore in more detail in chapter 3. All organic life in Freud’s view seeks pleasure and avoids pain, this is the universal “principle” on which the psychoanalytic theory of life is founded. But Freud’s therapeutic practice presented to him cases in which past traumas
were repeated, for example in dreams and symptoms, and in which therapy which would relieve symptoms was apparently thwarted by patients. Freud was led to speculate as to why traumas and symptoms are repeated as if they were desirable. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* he posited that the life drives, or "pleasure principle", governing self-preservation are in fact subject to a more fundamental instinct towards death: "[the instincts of self-preservation] are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself" (Freud 1991: 247).

Deleuze's understanding of this is that, if organic life is the "empirical field" governed by the "law" of the pleasure principle, then the death instinct is "a second-order principle, which accounts for the necessary compliance of the field with the empirical principle. It is this second-order principle that we call transcendent" (M 112). The pleasure principle has a universal extension over life but nevertheless cannot account for its own nature as a principle.

The originality of Deleuze's reading here is not to be missed. For Deleuze, "inorganic existence" is not something we "return to", in the sense Freud means it, as if it were some kind of undifferentiated abyss awaiting our deliquescence, but rather a necessary condition of organic embodiment. In Deleuze and Guattari's estimation "the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself" (ATP 503). The transcendental empirical insistence of this limit is what guarantees "the openness of living systems to the world", as Ansell Pearson puts it (Ansell Pearson 1999: 210). The organism blocks the life process constituting it, and this is why the life "immanent in it" can only be lived as a degradation of the organism. This allows Deleuze to posit, beyond secondary empirical degradation, a distinct "primary power of degradation" (DR 240). If traumas and symptoms are repeated as if they were desirable, this is because they provide means of living that which is otherwise unliveable, means of living the unliveable itself. Hence, we have a positive valuation of traumatic embodiment and the symptom, which we will explore further in chapter 3. But it is important to note Deleuze's transcendental empirical reading of Freud already prefigures the kind of critique the psychoanalytic death instinct will receive in *Anti-Oedipus*. It is illegitimate to trace, from empirical death a transcendent death which is posited,
retroactively, as fundamentally "lacking" in experience. It is precisely in the nature of the drives themselves that they fall outside the remit of organic experience, since they are unliveable, but this does not justify placing a concept of lack at the heart of our experience.

The issue for Deleuze, here, is the order in which we apprehend the two principles of Eros and Thanatos, for Deleuze maintains, with Freud, that the two classes of instincts are always absent from experience, the latter being no more and no less than combinations of both (M 115). The empirical domain is governed by the pleasure principle: we repeat what gives us pleasure, we strive towards that which serves our organic survival. Thus, Eros constitutes the present moments or instants which can be repeated and "bound" together in a recognisable chain of experience (M114). But, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Deleuze suggests that Freud was engaging not in empirical study but in philosophical speculation (M 111). Freud was confronting a particular problem regarding principles: if the pleasure principle governs repetition, this still leaves unaccounted for the repeating agency. If the instant is repeated, what repeats it? Thus, in the domain of the transcendental, the order found in experience is necessarily reversed, since it is not empirical contents which need to be accounted for but the principle governing them. The repetition binding instants grounds our experience, but this grounding is itself grounded by something "absolutely unconditioned" which erases and dissolves all bonds, a 'ground-less' from which the ground itself emerged ... We must conceive of another [repetition] which in its turn repeats what was before the instant. ... To repetition that binds — constituting the present — and repetition that erases — constituting the past — we must add a third, that saves or fails to save, depending on the modes of combination of the other two. (M 114-5).

The combinations of drives, then, account for Deleuze's understanding of masochistic experience in terms of the possibility of a "saving repetition" which literary form offers: "Masochism is above all formal and dramatic; this means that its peculiar pleasure-pain complex is determined by a particular kind of formalism" (M 109). In this sense, the death instinct is what allows symptoms to become the explicit objects of formal experimentation. It is vital to remember here that the experimental question the writer confronts is also a therapeutic one: how can one reach the "proper limit" of sensibility, the limit which gives us
the genesis of literary form, without being destroyed, or as Deleuze puts it: "how can one avoid the line of flight’s becoming identical with a pure and simple movement of self-destruction"? (D 29). It is in dealing with this question that the author discovers a possible soteriological form. It is this theme of a "cure" in the form of a "saving repetition", which crops up in *Difference and Repetition* (DR 19), and again in the discussion of Klossowski and Tournier’s novels in the appendices to *Logic of Sense* (LS 327), and this is what distinguishes Deleuze’s concept of great health from the theories of psychoanalysis, which insist on the irremediable sickness of subjectivity. The wounded subject prescribes difference to the repetition of its self-affections, to its own traumas and symptoms, and, as we shall see in chapter 3, this conception leads necessarily to the productive notion of desire which Deleuze and Guattari prescribe in *Anti-Oedipus*. In order to understand this move from diagnosis to cure, or from symptomatology to schizoanalysis, we need to investigate how the libidinal and the formal interact by looking at specific examples of literary technique. It is to this task we now turn.

Notes:

1. As Levi R. Bryant writes:

Thought does not simply involve mental acts but is that which requires us to go beyond what is familiar. To identify thought with cognition would be purely empirical and therefore nominal insofar as it would vaguely identify thought with any movement of the mind, rather than identifying the distinguishing feature which characterizes thought alone. On the other hand, there are all sorts of different modes of cognition (imagining, wishing, sensing, remembering, fantasizing), such that simply identifying thought with recognition would amount to being unable to know where to locate thought at all. Finally, the notion of thought seems to imply all sorts of upheavals,
perplexities, and questions, while that of recognition seems to imply a passive complacency and continuity which thus sets it at odds with what we refer to as thought. (Bryant 2008: 90)

2. See DR 28-9 for a discussion of indifference as the “monstrous” ground of determination. See also James Williams’s comments on the indeterminate in relation to cruelty and the critical and clinical project (Williams 2003: 58).

3. The notion of catastrophe or “catastrophism” is discussed by Williams (2001) in terms of Deleuze’s understanding of painting.

4. It this aspect of the pathos of the uncreated or the “unengendered” which Peter Hallward (2006) neglects in his characterisation of Deleuze as a philosopher of pure creation.

5. What kind of an entity this capacity or ability may be in terms of the broader philosophical context is a topic which goes far beyond the scope of this thesis. Deleuze’s philosophy of genesis stems from a certain reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgement in which the purposesiveness of thought and the purposesiveness of the natural world are involved in the same impersonal and “supersensible” process of self-production (DI 58-63). For a Deleuzian discussion of these issues, see Toscano 2006. For a discussion of Kant and the question of judgement as self-production, see Fricke 1990: 56. Todd May has suggested that Deleuzian concepts operate less within the field of philosophical judgement than medical “palpation” (May 2005: 20).

6. Deleuze takes this idea from Artaud, and we may even argue that it is the principle Artaudian inspiration at work in Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole (DR 147).

7. On the syntactic nature of Deleuze’s interest in language, see Lecercle 2002: 223-38.

8. Klossowski, referring to Bataille’s Inner Experience, argues that “Nietzsche, out of his own ignorance, will attack the Hegelian dialectic at its roots”. Rather than accept the communicable and consensual nature of desire as expounded in Hegel’s concept of “recognition”, Nietzsche instead remains within “the sovereignty of an incommunicable emotion – the very idea of a ‘consciousness for itself mediated by
another consciousness' remains foreign to Nietzsche” (Klossowski 2005: 9). Deleuze’s “stupidity” is one with Nietzsche’s in this respect. For an analysis of the figure of the “idiot” in the history of philosophy with respect to Deleuze and Artaud, see Beckman 2009: 55-6.

9. Deleuze writes that the negative has no “being” itself but is the effect of affirmation, a necessary aspect of affirmation (DR 64).


11. For a discussion of the role of constitution and genesis, see Hughes 2008: 8.

12. James Williams has picked up on this aspect of redundancy in “the multiplication of disjunctions in series” introduced in Logic of Sense, see Williams 2008: 185-6. For Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of linguistic redundancy with reference to the order word, see ATP 79-81, see also LS 35.

13. The problem of the body in Deleuze and Guattari is, of course, a complex one and must, I argue, be understood in necessarily paradoxical terms. The body is a “problem” in precisely the terms by which Deleuze defines a problem, which is to say that it determines its own problematic nature at the same time as it determines cases of solution to it. Thus, in the case of anorexics, masochists or alcoholics, the limitative aspects of the body are also equally bound up with the processes of overcoming of these limitations, of putting these limitations to new, non-limiting uses. This will become clearer in chapter 2, when the paradox of embodiment is given explicit consideration. It is this distinction between a limiting and non-limiting body which is at the foundation of the concept of the body without organs, whose origins can be traced to the masochistic “supersensual body”. For a discussion of the problem of the body in relation to anorexia and masochism and the body without organs, see Buchanan 1997.

14. See Buchanan 2000: 93-6 for an analysis of becoming in terms of the overcoming of generality and particularity in the works of Melville.

16. Bruce Baugh contrasts Deleuze and Derrida's conception of death in relation to Heidegger's concept of "being towards death". Baugh argues that death for Deleuze has no internal relation to subjectivity, arguing that for Deleuze "all death is extrinsic", stemming from accidental encounters between bodies (Baugh 2000: 79). Baugh's reading, however, is based entirely on Deleuze's work on Spinoza, and this gives us something of a caricatured view of Deleuze's philosophy as somehow "anti-death". As I make explicit in chapter 4, Deleuze is in fact searching for a means to make death, rather than life, the object of a system of evaluation. The concepts of the crack and the wound, which I cover in this and also the third chapter, are means of making death an internal aspect of subjective constitution in such a way that the evaluation of subjective states can also function in terms of the evaluation of death.

17. The single best book on Deleuze and Freud is Faulkner 2006.
Chapter 2

We saw in the last chapter how the literary clinic brings an unformed matter at the heart of lived experience into relation with aesthetic experimentation via the process of living that which is unliveable in terms of given organic, linguistic and social forms. This chapter will explore this issue, which poses the possibility of overcoming the opposition of biophilosophical vitalism and semiotic formalism, by understanding Deleuze's writings on literature via his concept of the "procedure". He introduces this concept in his writings on Louis Wolfson, but we will here extend it to cover his work on Masoch and Beckett. In order to understand the particular formalism of the procedure I argue that Deleuze emphasises the existential and ontological position of bodily materiality in relation to the genesis of language. Embodiment should not be understood simply in terms of the physical body, but relates more profoundly to a paradox, or problem, whereby the body accedes to its materiality only at the point where it forms a pure surface or immaterial plane. It is only via the institution of this plane that the genesis of language can take place. I argue that for Deleuze the materiality of the body is expressed only through the immateriality proper to the formalism of language.

What this means is that bodily materiality should not be identified with any formed contents defined through the subject-object relation, which always implies some type of personological identity, but rather with what Deleuze calls an "ideational" or phantasmatic materiality which he understands in psychoanalytic terms through the role of phantasies or "phantasms" operant in psychosexual development. This will be made clear via an analysis of Deleuze's reading of Freud's text "A Child is Being Beaten". The phantasms which give the subject a personal and sexual position also tend to liberate impersonal forces and "other" selves. We shall also see that the phantasm becomes the condition for Masoch's symptomatology, since it functions as the "art" by which an undifferentiated bodily materiality is expressed in and by the immateriality of signs. Masoch's symptomatology, in Deleuze's reading, functions ultimately to break up the repressive unity of symbolic law and
libidinal object choice constituting the modern phenomenon of the Oedipus complex, freeing up, simultaneously, a purely formal legal and linguistic domain on the one hand and an undifferentiated bodily material on the other. The procedure operates by putting the latter and the former into direct contact, uniting the creative repetitions of forms with the compulsive repetitions of the undifferentiated pathic body.

This is the essence of what Deleuze calls style: a direct immanence of body and language is attained without the totalising or mediating functions of the conscious subject. The abolition of the totalising impetus of the conscious will, then, is central to Deleuze’s understanding of style as aesthetic experimentation, and this will be analysed both in terms of the Nietzschean diagnosis of the “exhaustion” of the will and Deleuze’s reading of Beckett, in which exhaustion serves a fundamentally creative role. The chapter concludes with Deleuze’s writings on Louis Wolfson, as this will elucidate how the procedure can fail both existentially and creatively, and how the distinction between an undifferentiated bodily abyss and the empty formalism of language represent the “two dangers” which can lead in the worst case scenario to schizophrenic breakdown.

*Form and Content in Relation to the Ontological Problem of Existence*

The literary clinic suggests a profound linkage between biophilosophy and literature. In the biophilosophical tradition of hylomorphism which includes Aristotle and Kant equally, life is isolated from the material it animates, since, as Toscano explains, life “cannot organize itself, it can only organize matter” (Toscano 2006: 36). From the hylomorphic point of view, a self-organising life would be unintelligible, since the forms which organise matter would be indistinguishable from matter itself. Life is thus properly speaking “immaterial” and immortal, the pure formal movement of the concept, while matter is mere lifeless receptivity. Deleuze is critical of this position,¹ and it is precisely because of this that the interrelation of matter, form and content is of great concern to him. There are practical,
political reasons for the rejection of hylomorphism: the separation of an immaterial form and a dead matter leads to a particular illusion in which form and content appear to possess a resemblance to one another pre-existing the processes of formation which produce them. Psychoanalysis in particular has tended to fall prey to this illusion, in that, as Deleuze and Guattari contend, “psychoanalysis remains prisoner to a necessarily disguised content and a necessarily symbolic form” to the extent that it is tied to the double bind of the “form-content duality”, in which form and content presuppose one another in a circular fashion (ATP 544, 43).² Breaking with this duality allows us to see, for example, that the laws proscribing certain desires actually produce those desires, and that the contents or objects of proscriptions do not pre-exist the laws which proscribe them but are brought into being as effects of laws. Neurotic symptoms are understood by psychoanalysis as intractable because they involve the necessary presupposition of repressed content by repressing form and vice versa, but schizoanalysis aims to move beyond this intractability of neurotic incurability. As will be seen, Deleuze’s conception of literary technique as the decoupling of forms and contents has important links to his social and political theory in this respect.

Despite his undoubted rejection of hylomorphism, however, as Protevi points out it is not true that Deleuze holds to the inverse view corresponding to a simple hylozoist celebration of “material self-ordering” (Protevi 2001a: 196). This is because the material or libidinal depth of the body entails an ontological problem which cannot be posed in terms of material depth alone. Bodily materiality can only be grasped in terms of a properly immaterial limit. For Deleuze, the material ground of the physical body “can only be discovered by going beyond the organism” towards “a more profound and almost unliveable Power”. The unliveable here is not to be opposed dualistically to the “lived body” but constitutes the latter’s “limit” (FB 32). It is only at this limit that “the body discovers the materiality of which it is composed” (FB 39). Crucially, however, the body discovers its proper limit only through the constitution of a surface on which all materiality is dissipated, and on which is distributed the immateriality constitutive of “sense”. This means that bodily materiality cannot be said to exist prior to its capture by forms which render it in terms of contents, but these forms are only made possible by a surface engendered by the body itself. This paradox of the body means that we cannot accept that Deleuze holds to a simple
inversion of the hylomorphic schema, as some have suggested. There is a crucial immanence of the material and the immaterial which needs to be grasped existentially. The processes of semiotic transformation, which Deleuze wishes to discern as the essence of literary style, take place via the immaterial materiality constitutive of the paradox of the body. Thus, Deleuze’s formalism is grounded not on a semiotic concern primarily, but on an existential concern with embodied experience.

If signs and the body have an important and intimate connection, then, this is because, as Deleuze notes, “signs do not have objects as their direct referents. They are states of bodies (affections) and variations of power” (CC 141). Now, Deleuze defines a sign precisely in the terms of an inadequate idea, as discussed in the previous chapter: “signs or affects are inadequate ideas and passions”, signs emerge from, are the effects of, the random order of (very often) painful encounters between “physical bodies” (CC 143). These effects do not tell us anything about their causes. And yet, Deleuze maintains that the very inadequacy of signs gives us the criteria for the “selection” of ever more adequate levels of understanding of the relations between bodies. What this means is that signs themselves allow for, and can bring about, a liberation from the inadequacies of signification. In what follows, we shall see how, in Deleuze’s reading of Masoch, symptomatology involves the re-ordering of signs in terms of the cruel and violent encounters between bodies. We shall subsequently see how, for Beckett, the wish to be done with words and the order they impose on the body amounts to the discovery of an asignifying power of language, a language of silence and bodies. Finally, in the case of Wolfson, we shall see how the random and painful order of bodies can cause the procedure to fail both existentially and creatively.

That signs are implicated in the confused and painful mixing of bodies testifies to the fact that the formation of language responds to a certain libidinal problem of existence, “the problem of birth, of the difference of the sexes, or the problem of death” (LS 245). Language, and symbolisation generally, provide cases of partial solution to this ontological question posed by the material body. The forms and contents given to the body by language are necessarily partial or incomplete because there is something which is effectively prior to formalisation that cannot be identified simply with formlessness but with something necessarily between “an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless
nonbeing ... [and] a supremely individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form" (LS 121). Just as the body involves an immaterial materiality, language and signs involve a space between the two dangers of complete formlessness and complete formalisation. This is what ties the genesis of the body and the genesis of language together. The ontological problem of existence, then, is posed at the immaterial surface defined in terms of a “minimum of being” (LS 67) belonging both to the surface of the body and the immateriality of language.

This is the particular “agony” that literary works bring out: a work such as “The Crack-Up” has as its subject matter a “happening” which cannot be identified with the things to which these happenings occur (LS 73). To put it another way, Deleuze’s anti-substantialist position entails no ontology of essence, just of sense (DI 15). A thing’s esse, its infinitive being, is not to be confused with its particular material existence, just as the death instinct expressed in the infinitive “to die” must not be confused with the physical death of the person/organism. The point at which the body discovers its materiality is also the point where the infinitive of the event determines a problematic minimum. This convergence is how Deleuze conceives of the “sign” (LS 73). It is crucial, in this respect, to understand that Deleuze’s conception of signs and semiosis is inextricable from existential questions concerning pragmatics, the genesis of bodies and meanings. This makes writing an experiment with reality as much as with language, a political project as much as a literary one.

_Psychoanalysis, the Two Books and the Procedure_

We can relate all this quite profitably to the psychoanalytic understanding of literature which argues that there is something essentially non-literary whose very urgency precipitates the writing process itself. Marthe Robert’s _Origins of the Novel_ , published the same year as _Anti-Oedipus_ , posed the question of a non-literary underbelly of the literary work in the following terms:
let us consider another kind of imagination, the non-literary imagination which ... has all the ingredients of an unformulated novel .... Since Freud ... we are aware of a certain type of elementary story-telling, halfway between literature and psychology, conscious in childhood, unconscious in adult life, but compulsive in many forms of neurosis, whose quasi-universal significance cannot be ignored in view of its remarkable prevalence and the consistency of its content. (Robert 1980: 21)

Literature has its origins in a non-literary domain, in a domain where formalisation and articulation are not yet possible, where all we have are the raw materials of bodily compulsion. This origin is the instinctual body, the drive which blindly repeats in an eternal, chronic present. In a similar fashion, Deleuze conceives of "a more secret book made of flesh and blood" which doubles the book of language, and "in which signs and concepts vanish" (CC 150). In Deleuze's account, the formlessness of materiality is not to be opposed to the formalism of signs and concepts, but inheres as their secret double. Despite their similarities, we must carefully distinguish between the Deleuzian and the psychoanalytic accounts. The tradition of psychoanalytic literary criticism suffers from the reciprocal presupposition of form and content mentioned above. As Perry Meisel writes,

psychical defence and writing are in fact the same, converging as they do in the figure of trope or rhetoric itself, the turning away that is also a figure or structure of language. Freud's revised notion of economy describes rhetoric as a defence and defence as a rhetoric by showing how the very trope of defence produces what it defends against by presuming it, just as repression turns away from the drive in order to spark it into life. (Meisel 2007: 37)

The formalisations of language give articulable stability to the unconscious drive in the same way as the repressive defences of consciousness give it a liveable form. Language use is itself endowed with a neurotic structure: the contents of the unconscious drive are both covered up and repressed by language. But, similarly, the violent return of the repressed, the re-emergence of repressed contents, are only available to us via language, in parapraxes and symptomatic speech, and, for the critic, in the literary work. Literary activity is thereby denied any autonomy, being one with the repressive economy itself, a mere byproduct of the social repression/psychic repression system.
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “secret” attempts to lead beyond this deadlock. Psychoanalysis begins by positing a childhood “hysterical” secret, the discovery of “something” (parental sexuality) meant to stay hidden. But this secrecy is subsequently sustained by a “paranoid form”, which gives the finite contents of the secret an autonomous and infinite life. The form sustains the secret content but only by being distinct from it, attaining a social autonomy which is effectively infinite. From the perspective of the paranoiac everyone and everything both betrays a secret and is guilty a priori of hiding one. The distinction between finite content and infinite form, however, becomes ever more difficult to make, to the extent that the secret should not be opposed to its disclosure: the perception of the secret is part of the secret itself, part of the secret’s social life. For the secret to be sustained, there must be a perception of it, and this perception is no less secret even if it functions to influence behaviours and organise groups:

on the one hand, the secret as content is superseded by a perception of the secret, which is no less secret than the secret. It matters little what the goal is, and whether the aim of the perception is a denunciation, final divulging, or disclosure. From an anecdotal standpoint, the perception of the secret is the opposite of the secret, but from the standpoint of the concept, it is a part of it. What counts is that the perception of the secret must necessarily be secret itself: the spy, the voyeur, the blackmailer, the author of anonymous letters are no less secretive than what they are in a position to disclose, regardless of their ulterior motives. (ATP 286-7)

Thus, the perception of secrecy does not put an end to the secret, but allows it to spread and ramify infinitely. The secret hides its true form, taking other forms as disguises. But these forms, which are needed to sustain the secret, proliferate, and appear to have an autonomy of their own. There is a point, Deleuze and Guattari argue, at which the opposition of disguised finite content and symbolic infinite form breaks down, since the finitude of the secret is only maintained by being “molecularised” by the form while the form itself has nothing left to hide. Thus, the essence of the secret is that it is neither in the content nor the form, but in the processes of formalisation themselves (ATP 286-90).

What Deleuze argues, then, is that every book is necessarily double, being both the manifest contents which its formal structures make clear, but also something which is necessarily
incapable of being formalised and yet which inheres within the former and, as Buchanan says, “implies a strange sort of relation that seems not to entail any direct communication” (Buchanan 2000: 4). The relationship between the two books, the book of language and the secret book, is what makes literature the outcome of a procedure the writer undertakes, the success or failure of which is undeterminable at the outset. The procedure is as much an experimentation with the life of the drives as it is with the social codes which give a liveable form to it. If schizoanalysis is based on the overcoming of the opposition of mechanism and vitalism, as has been well discussed, then the literary clinic is similarly concerned with overcoming the opposition between formalism and vitalism. For psychoanalysis, the existential problem par excellence is how, why, under what conditions the drive is relinquished and the social and linguistic regulations placed on enjoyment accepted by consciousness. If, however, for psychoanalysis the phase of separation from the drive is mediated entirely by given social and linguistic forms, by the system of social and psychic repression (which we will come to discuss in depth in chapter 4), then the literary clinical procedure posits a certain autonomy with respect to the subject’s disengagement from the inorganic life that is “too much” for the organism to bear. There is a special aesthetic athleticism or mobility in the separation from the drive. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

through having seen Life in the living or the Living in the lived, the novelist or painter returns breathless and with bloodshot eyes. They are athletes – not athletes who train their bodies and cultivate the lived ... but bizarre athletes of the “fasting-artist” type, or the “great Swimmer” who does not know how to swim. It is not an organic or muscular athleticism but its inorganic double, “an affective Athleticism” ... What little health they possess is often too fragile, not because of their illnesses or neuroses but because they have seen something in life that is too much for anyone, too much for themselves, and that has put on them the quiet mark of death. But this something is also the source or breath that supports them through the illnesses of the lived. (WP 172-3)

It is precisely because they have borne witness to what is “too much” that artists must seek survival in the “illnesses of the lived”. But this is distinct from the psychoanalytic view, in that illness is less a space determined by repression than a space of experimentation, in
which what is “too much” offers opportunities to go beyond social, organic and linguistic determinism. The principle of aesthetic creation is not divorced from possibilities of political change, as it tends to be in the psychoanalytic account.

The artist says Deleuze “must treat the world as a symptom, and build his work not like a therapeutic, but in every case like a clinic. The artist is not outside the symptoms, but makes a work of art from them” (DI 140). There is thus a space of autonomy opened up between a compulsive or pathic bodily depth and the forms distributed on the immaterial surface; there is, in other words, an immanent space of experimentation in which formal and living processes coincide. This is the space of the procedure. Gregg Lambert has defined the procedure in terms of “a certain kind of repetition”. The compulsive repetition of the body can take hold of a particular phrase, such as the famous formulation “I would prefer not to” uttered by Bartleby in Melville’s short story (which we shall cover in chapter 5), and “cause vibrations and deformations of the normal language” (Lambert 2006: 47). Repetition is hugely important for Deleuze’s conception of literary style as a form “stuttering”. For Deleuze, literary stuttering is an immanent principle of linguistic transformation, in which the repetition of a single phrase or word passes over into language as a whole and makes language itself stutter. Lecercle, referring to Péguy, writes that “the obsessive, incantatory use of repetition turns the poem into a prayer, as a result of which words become ‘disjointed and decomposed members’. ... Through exaggerated repetition, language is taken to its limit” (Lecercle 2002: 243). The type of repetition the procedure initiates, as we shall see in some depth below, causes conventional modes of language to break free of the subject-object and form-content dualities in order to put an undifferentiated pathic body into direct contact with a pure form. It is in this way that the repetitive compulsions of the drive, though giving rise to illness and symptoms, can also open up a means to articulate these symptoms within a space of autonomy.

The literary clinic calls into question the psychoanalytic notion that the relation of bodily depth and symbolic form can only be secured through the intervening role of a subject position, and that depth and form only communicate through the mediating agency of a presupposed totality identified with a personal and sexual “I”. In opposition to a certain psychoanalytical view, Deleuze insists in his piece “Wolfson; or, the Procedure” that
Wolfson’s schizophrenia is less about “symbols” than the libidinal real of the molecular body itself (CC 18). In other words, it was not Wolfson’s refusal to identify himself with a linguistically determined subject position that precipitated his schizophrenic illness. Such a refusal would only be an effect of a more fundamental process in which the formlessness of the body fails to find adequate expression in language, and this failure could only be explained on the basis that there is something in bodily materiality which is irreducibly “too much” for the linguistic resources of “normal” subjectivity to handle. Deleuze wishes to question the terms of psychoanalytic causation here: it is not the libidinal body which fails language, but language which fails the libidinal body. It is precisely from this point of failure or inadequacy, however, that the literary process begins.

The Phantasm

Drawing on the work of Melanie Klein, Deleuze suggests that the constitution of both bodily surfaces and linguistic sense proceeds by way of the phantasm. The phantasm is here understood in terms of what Husserl called the “noematic attribute”, the sense or meaning attributed to physical bodies and states of affairs but which is nevertheless distinct from them. Claire Colebrook has described this as follows: “perceptions are perceptions of x, so the perceptual act ... of seeing, imagining, remembering, anticipating, hallucinating, is accompanied by the perceived ... that which is seen, remembered, imagined and so on” (Colebrook 2006: 116). If bodies constitute a physical domain of experience – an often violent and volatile one in which bodies interpenetrate in random ways – then sense constitutes a metaphysical domain in which experience attains coherency and meaning: it becomes possible to see x as something meaningful. What this means is that the material genesis of the world and the genesis of the formal linguistic terms by which we make sense of the world are bound up in one another. Deleuze draws on psychoanalytic theories of psychosexual development to theorise this. The phantasm is the means by which the infant produces an auto-erotic hallucination of desired objects. Susan Isaacs writes that the
phantasm is the “primary content” of the unconscious, “the psychic representative of the
instinct” (Isaacs 1970: 82-3). Deleuze, however, wishes to distinguish the kind of materiality
involved in the phantasm from the contents of objects represented in the mind. The
phantasm constitutes the immateriality by which the contents of objects are to be
distinguished from the sense expressed by them.

We must be careful not to identify the phantasm with any sort of mental representation.
The phantasm passes between the actual object sought and the libidinal satisfaction it
brings, and is thus to be identified with neither side of this passive-active, or object-subject,
divide. As a result, it subsists in the same temporal infinitive form we previously saw with
respect to the event and entails the same type of agony which Fitzgerald diagnosed in terms
of the physical actualisation of the crack in the body and the sense of it which comes later.
Deleuze writes: “[phantasms] inspire in us an unbearable waiting – the waiting of that which
is going to come about as a result, and also of that which is already in the process of coming
about and never stops coming about” (LS 244). Phantasms, then, are a means to participate
in the paradox of the body that discovers its true materiality at the limit where it is
dissipated on an immaterial surface. As a result, phantasms are the mode of the special type
of athleticism or mobility Deleuze discerns as literary activity. This mobility is neither an
objective or subjective affair in the normal sense; it is strictly neutral with regards to these
categories, and as a result Deleuze defines the experience of the phantasm in terms of the
impersonal or the prepersonal. The exhaustion or dissipation of bodily depth gives rise to a
“liberation” of pre-individual singularities which subsist in a “neutral” state.10

This liberation of the pre-individual occurs through the crack, which doubles the subjective
“I”, and which establishes the narcissistic relation in the ego, the self-affection by which the
“I” doubles itself, as discussed in the previous chapter. Deleuze once again draws on
psychoanalytic theory to describe the nature of the pre-individual. The auto-erotic liberation
of libidinal energy from the actual objects sought provokes a “reflux of libido on to the ego
... forming a neutral displaceable energy” (DR 111). While the phantasm is what gives form
and content to subjective identity, establishing the ego and its objects, this process, for
Deleuze, is inseparable from another movement, occurring simultaneously, which forces the
ego to pass through “a series of other individuals” or impersonal selves “as though time had
abandoned all possible mimetic content” to become a pure, temporal process without content (LS 244, DR 111). When contents are abandoned, libidinal energy is capable of investing the pure form of time, and as a result liberates the experience of death from the “undifferentiated material model” of nonbeing (DR 112). This breaks the “circularity” in the form-content duality of immaterial life and material nonbeing. Deleuze thus maintains that there is a mode of being distinct both from the forms which render contents and the formlessness of materiality. Belonging neither to content nor to form, substantial being or voided non-being, this “phantasmatic materiality” is what conditions the breaking up of formed contents, the freeing of form from its attachment to contents to allow it to take on an autonomous existence in the aesthetic process.

Deleuze refers to a text by Freud in which the latter discusses the recurrence of “beating phantasies” in his patients. Freud’s analysis begins with the symptomatic proposition “a child is being beaten”, and deduces the content of the phantasm by following it through various grammatical transformations. The proposition subsequently passes through several different forms which Freud renders as “I am being beaten by my father”, and “my father is beating the child, he loves only me” (Freud 1979: 170, 177). These grammatical transformations, the reversals of subject and object, signal passages between active and passive roles in the scenario. For Deleuze, this represents the fact that the phantasm “is inseparable from grammatical transformations, but also from the neutral infinitive as the ideational material of these transformations” (LS 246). The mode of being of the phantasm, its minimum of being or its immaterial materiality, means that it lives only through the formal-symbolic transformations that it makes possible and through the various propositions that express it. As Freud notes, then, the “beating phantasies” of his patients share an important link with literary texts, and he even uses the example of the Witches’ prophecy in Macbeth to illustrate the mobility of the phantasm though its various grammatical mutations (Freud 1979: 164, 173).

While Freud treats phantasms as so many disguises for an unconscious content, already formed around the parental figures and the child’s incestuous love affair with them, for Deleuze, on the other hand, the importance of the phantasm is that it testifies to the liberation of singularities through the formal disjunctions (e.g. to beat, to be beaten) that
allow the emergence, via the ego, of impersonal selves through the grammatical doubling of subject and object in the proposition. The phantasm, as ideational material, is expressed, not through any content, but through the very mobility which allows contents to become detached via the formal autonomy of expression. The literary clinic, then, aims not to render symptoms in personological terms, to treat symptoms as so many disguises to be stripped away, but to identify the specific mobility or athleticism that moves through the formal transformations of language in the procedure.

The procedure originates in the non-literary domain, taking from the drives the power of repetition they possess in their compulsive or pathological insistence. The procedure, then, begins as a kind of coping device, a form of incantatory repetition of familiar phrases, words or rhetorical figures disengaged, as it were, from their immediate semiotic environment. But through this very repetition the procedure allows for an expression of something which escapes familiar formal categories. Thus, an important aspect of the procedure is that it allows the personal or sexual forms that tie subjectivity to specific contents to become free of those contents, and this facilitates the emergence of impersonal selves. If the procedure is successful, then, it can move beyond the personal and libidinal into the impersonal and aesthetic domain where it ceases to be a means of coping to become an aesthetic technique, a central aspect of authorial style. Thus, the literary clinic aims to isolate a convergence of strength and weakness in which the weakness or inadequacy of conventional forms come into direct contact with the brute insistence of the body. In other words, literary style transforms the weakness of forms to formalise contents into a principle of creativity. In the remainder of this chapter, we will give a detailed analysis of how the procedure works in various authors, its tendency towards success or failure, beginning with Deleuze's most sustained use of the concept of symptomatology represented in his writings on Masoch.

Symptomatology of Masochism
When Deleuze wrote his symptomatological study of the novels and stories of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch he was trying to account both for the libidinal-material genesis of the body and the formal-symbolic genesis of signs within the field of masochistic experience. As we have seen, for Deleuze the body can be accounted for only via a surface on which formal disjunctions (to beat, to be beaten, etc.) are distributed, since the disjunction is precisely the means through which the body expresses its neutral being or phantasmatic minimum of being. Deleuze is attracted to the clinical practice of symptomatology because it takes for its raw material not the sick body itself but the existing set of known symptoms, constituted on the surfaces of bodies, and re-orders their disjunctive relationships to create something entirely new, a new means of expressing the sense of the body: “there is always a great deal of art involved in grouping symptoms, in the organization of a table where a particular symptom is dissociated from another, juxtaposed to a third, and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness” (LS 273). The “art” common to literature and medicine is the disarticulation of an existing aggregate of signs and a concomitant rearticulation to arrive at a new formal entity. The clinician who produces a new nosological category invents a new disease concept and, as a result, a new means by which bodily materiality can be expressed in signs. Deleuze argues that the writer, in grasping his or her own existential problematic, does something similar, and that medical and literary creativity to a certain extent share the same space.

Deleuze wants us to grasp Masoch’s work as the posing of a general problem related to guilt, conscience and the law, but also a particular case of solution, as much literary as libidinal, to this problem. Masochism does not simply designate a sexual proclivity in certain individuals, but also a collective norm of behaviour in non-sexual areas of life. Freud acknowledged this when he distinguished “erotogenic” from “moral” masochism. Freud’s theory of the death instinct suggests how the component of destructiveness, which is innate to the sexual instincts and directed outwards towards objects, can be turned around upon itself and be libidinally bound within the organism. We saw this in the various reversals of subject and object in Freud’s analysis of beating-phantasies. What this means, as Ricoeur puts it, is that “masochism accompanies the libido through all its developmental phases” (Ricoeur 1970: 298). There is a fundamental masochistic basis to the processes by which, in
Freud’s account, one takes up a subject position through identification with the father and his punitive role. Freud suggests that such an identification is possible only if there is some primary experience of the connection between guilt, punishment and desire. When the child witnesses the father punishing others, there is a sense of sadistic gratification. The child takes on the “beating” role. As a part of “normal” subject formation, however, there needs to be a desexualisation of the idea of punishment, in other words, a desexualisation of the death instinct and a consequent detachment of sexual gratification from the aim of punishment. This is carried out via the establishment of the super-ego, but this does not occur without a resexualisation of the link between desire and punishment in the ego. The child takes on the “beaten” role. Hence, identification with the father and with the punitive, proscriptive role of social regulation he represents – which for Freud is the result of a “normal” passing of the Oedipus complex – entails something which appears to subvert this process: one can identify with the law proscribing pleasure only by unconsciously eroticising its effects, by taking a perverse pleasure in the cruelty it metes out. This unconscious internalisation of masochistic pleasure is the “moral” component.

In the sexual perversion of masochism, as described by Krafft-Ebing and others, the erotogenic aspect becomes conscious and serves the direct ends of sexual aims. But masochism as a “moral” phenomenon cannot be explained by these conscious sexual aims. In this sense masochism arises as a historical, cultural and moral phenomenon as much as a libidinal, erotogenic one. The persistence of the cruelty of the super-ego, in, for example, practices relating to religious ascetism and moral self-denial, was to be explained, for Freud, by the unconscious sense of guilt provoked by the earliest domestic sexual researches of the id, and by the irreducible longing for punishment this brings about. The moral and erotogenic aspects then are ultimately both related to the common ground of the family triangle with the father at its apex. The familial narrative, in which the “beater” becomes the “beaten”, explains both moral and erotogenic aspects of masochism.

For Deleuze, however, the centrality of the father lacks symptomatological support (M 57). For Freud, as for Theodor Reik, the male masochistic phantasy of being beaten by a cruel woman is a disguise for being by beaten by the father, which is itself a disguise for being loved by him. Thus, even if the Oedipal narrative tells us that the transgression to be
punished bears on the mother (the “object” of desire), the issue of the transgression remains essentially with the father, since as Deleuze writes “he is the one who possesses the penis, the one whom the child wishes to castrate and kill; he is the one who punishes, and who must be placated” (M 104). By explaining the link between moral and erotogenic aspects in terms of a preconceived oedipal narrative, psychoanalysis argues that the masochistic pleasure attained by being beaten stems from a desexualisation of the sadistic, destructive instincts which turn around on themselves, thus forming the superego. The resexualisation in the ego of this desexualised energy is what makes masochistic pleasure possible, but Deleuze questions whether this resexualisation is identical or symmetrical (even in a reversed way) with desexualisation, or, in other words, whether the masochistic ego is complementary to the sadistic super-ego. This is why Deleuze questions the sadomasochistic entity: the disjunction between to beat and to be beaten is not an exclusive one. In other words, one is not either the beater or the beaten, but both at once, as Freud’s own theory indicates. This inclusivity of the disjunction prevents the kind of identity or complimentarity which the concept of sadomasochism suggests.

Deleuze, then, questions the psychoanalytic account of masochism for two reasons: firstly, it ignores the symptomatological specificity of masochistic phantasies, and assumes that the beating woman is the father in disguise (M 58), and secondly, it assumes that the libido desexualised in the super-ego is the same energy that is resexualised in the ego, “that the same subject participates in both sadistic and masochistic sexuality” even though “one implies the desexualisation of the other” (M 108). Deleuze instead argues that masochistic resexualisation in the ego must be conceived independently from the desexualisation in the super-ego. The “theatre of this process [of masochistic resexualisation] is fantasy” (M 108). Hence, for Deleuze masochism is primarily neither “material” (i.e. erotogenic, the libidinal experience of pleasure in pain) nor “moral” (the expiation of guilt, the longing for punishment) but “above all formal and dramatic; this means that its peculiar pleasure-pain complex is determined by a particular kind of formalism, and its experience of guilt by a specific story” (M 109). Deleuze states that "symptomatological specificity is primary; the specificity of the causal agent is always secondary and relative" (SM 125-6). Deleuze is here accusing psychoanalysis, in positing a specious etiology via the oedipal narrative, of missing
the specificity of Masoch as an author, of the singularity of his case and the presentation of his symptomatology. Psychoanalysis, in other words, collapses the erotogenic into the moral through the mechanism of Oedipus, and thus fails to account for the formal and dramatic elements of masochistic experience.

In assuming the preconceived oedipal narrative's role as etiology, psychoanalysis presupposes a disguised content, centred on the father, at work in the genesis of masochistic fantasies. The centrality of the father is explained only if we assume that the masochist begins by wishing to usurp the father's role (sadism), then out of a fear of castration wishes instead to placate him and be loved by him. In order to gratify the moral craving for punishment, "to be loved" must be transformed into "being beaten". Finally, to disguise the homosexual object choice, the father must be hidden in the person of the mother. But Deleuze, in his analysis of Masoch's novels, asks where this hidden father resides if not in the person of the masochist himself, the "symbolic" role of the punitive father being transferred to the woman, who no longer represents the oedipal mother:

Who in reality is being beaten? Where is the father hidden? Could it not be in the person who is being beaten? The masochist feels guilty, he asks to be beaten, he expiates, but why and for what crime? Is it not precisely the father-image in him that is thus miniaturized, beaten, ridiculed and humiliated? What the subject atones for is his resemblance to the father and the father's likeness in him: the formula of masochism is the humiliated father. (M 60)

Masoch disengages the formal role of the father to punish and educate, and transfers it to the figure of the woman. The father content, his phallic "potency", is no longer hidden by the mother, but appears on the surface of the masochistic ego, in the simulacrum or hallucinatory image of the masochist's likeness or resemblance to the father. It is precisely through the derisory caricature of the phallus in the ego that the masochist orchestrates a triumph over the super-ego (M 124-6). The role of the super-ego to punish and educate is thus subverted, not because masochistic pleasure is in opposition to it but because it submits all too readily and exaggeratedly to it. As Theodor Reik puts it, "[the masochist] has not adjusted himself to the cultural rhythm, he exaggerated and thereby falsified it. The aim
of education has not been reached. What has been attained is a distortion or caricature of this aim” (Reik 1941: 114).

*The Masochistic Contract*

In Masoch’s novels, the purpose of the “masochistic ‘educator’”, the cruel mistress such as the character of Wanda in *The Venus in Furs*, is to educate the apprentice’s passions (M 19). Because the apprentice must behave towards his educator according to the most exacting obedience, an essential component of masochism is the “love-contract” (M 92). This component, Deleuze maintains, is what all previous symptomatologies of masochism have missed, but is needed for the clinical picture of masochism to be complete. The formal figure of the contract, in which everything which takes place between partners “must be stated, promised, announced and carefully described” in a particular way is the central component of Masoch’s symptomatology in that it subsumes both the moral (feeling of guilt) and material (libidinal combination of pleasure and pain) aspects (M 18, 101). The contract, in transferring the punitive and pedagogical roles of the father to the woman, is used against the father to “demystify” the legal structure which secures the filiation of father and son (M 92-3). If the law needs to be demystified in this way, it is because, as we saw, the paternal law functions by hiding its content. We remarked that, in the oedipal narrative, the object of transgression, even though it bears on the person of the mother, is always the father’s, since it is he who does the beating and hence he who must have been offended against. The role of the mother, in this sense, is to disguise a paternal object which remains necessarily hidden and appears only via a disguise which displaces it. The mother occupies the space of “non-being” complimentary to the being or potency attached to the paternal phallus. Hence, the masochist’s “disavowal” of the mother’s lack of a phallus is how we should understand the importance of masochistic “fetishes” which function as substitutes which disguise this lack.
This desire to suspend the lack or non-being with respect to the object of paternal prohibition is said to give the father the central role, despite the predominance of the mother in the phantasy. Deleuze here acknowledges that both Freud and Masoch are addressing the same problem, which is what Deleuze refers to as the modern "paradox of the conscience". Deleuze explains this as follows: modern conscience has lost all knowledge of what the "Good" might be, and thus we do not know how to "resemble" it in our lives, how to live our lives in its image or likeness. Due to the loss of this mimetic content, the law becomes "valid by virtue of its form alone, the content remaining entirely undetermined" so that "the man who obeys the law ... feels guilty and is guilty in advance, and the more strict his obedience, the greater his guilt" (M 84). Freud explained this paradox on the basis of the instincts and their renunciation. For Freud, the conscience does not precipitate instinctual renunciation, but is born of it, and hence the more we renounce, the stricter and more exacting our conscience in turn becomes: "every renunciation of the drives now becomes a dynamic source of conscience; every fresh renunciation reinforces its severity and intolerance ... Conscience results from the renunciation of the drives ... this renunciation creates conscience, which then demands further renunciation" (Freud 2002b: 65). In renouncing a libidinal aim, the ego takes renunciation itself as a substitute satisfaction, but this gratification only increases the renunciation demanded by the super-ego, and so on ad infinitum. This is precisely the process which renders the neurotic symptom intractable, a reciprocal presupposition of repressing form and repressed content.

Deleuze, however, suggests that Masoch provides a distinct case of solution from the one presented by the neurotic in the oedipal etiology. The formal training the masochist receives from his educator is a means neither to oppose the law of the father nor to submit to it in the hope of placating him, since, as Freud makes clear, both attitudes have the same effect. The masochist discovers a different strategy. As Deleuze writes, the masochist's apparent obedience conceals a criticism and a provocation. ... By observing the very letter of the law, we refrain from questioning its ultimate or primary character; we then behave as if the supreme sovereignty of the law conferred upon it the enjoyment of all those pleasures that it denies us; hence, by the closest adherence to it, and by zealously embracing it, we may hope to partake of its pleasures. (M 83)
Through ritualistic practices detailed in the contract, the masochist “suspends” the efficacy of the law that renders the object of pleasure eternally off-limits, but precisely through this suspension is able to constitute neither a new object nor a new subjective attitude towards it, but “a renunciation both of the object (the mother) and the subject (the father)” (M 85). There is a dual renunciation of both a withheld content and a proscriptive form: “the Oedipal content, which always remains concealed, undergoes a dual transformation – as though the mother-father complementarity had been shattered twice and asymmetrically” (M 90). This dual renunciation, then, constitutes the conditions for what Deleuze sees as the birth of a new subject, which is represented in Masoch’s novels by the enigmatic character of the “Greek” who “stands for ... the hope of a rebirth, the projection of the new man that will result from the masochistic experiment” (M 66).

The hope of rebirth, of a new man and a people to come, makes masochism an experiment in the constitution of a new form of personal and political, libidinal and moral, existence. This is the origin of an idea that Deleuze will elaborate, at a later date, as central to the literary clinic: that the author writes for a people to come, a new way of populating the earth. Writing is oriented towards the future through a resistance to the present. For Deleuze, Masoch’s novels have a crucial cultural and political content: the revolutions of 1848 and the Panslavic movement were bound, in Masoch’s imagination, to the arrival of a new political order under the rule of a “terrible Tsarina” (M 93). The point is not to take Masoch’s Statist political prescriptions literally, but to note that desire is presented as inextricable from the political and world-historical domains, and that the imposition of an oedipal etiology misconceives the content proper to desire. This is an idea that will become central to schizoanalysis, which develops the critique of the oedipal etiology, which we will explore in detail in chapters 4 and 5. Here, we merely wish to stress its origins in Deleuze’s symptomatology of masochism. Through his analysis of Masoch’s writing, Deleuze shows how the experimental character of the drives are one with literary formal experimentation, but that there is an important difference between the two which makes formal and political renewal core features of the literary work. Deleuze links Masoch to Kafka as writers who tie their literary style to a concept of “justice” defined as “an immanent process of desire”
which mixes the formal aspects of law to the ontological and material problems of existence (K 51, CC54). This is something we will explore in greater detail in chapter 3.

Style and the Problem of Unity

Masoch’s symptomatological procedure breaks up a pre-existing entity, the modern paradox of conscience, and poses the problem in a new way, offering a new case of solution which recombines the various elements (guilt, pleasure and pain, punishment, education, the law). Deleuze emphasises the experimental nature of Masoch’s work and the use of the formal elements of the contract and the repetitions of ritualised behaviour. In this sense, Deleuze discerns a process of experimentation which is at once libidinal and material but also symbolic and formal. The outcome of literary experimentation, its success or failure, is radically undetermined at the outset and impossible to foresee (D 36). The criteria of the experiment only come after the onset of experimentation. The posing of the problem and the genesis of a case of solution occur simultaneously in a shared temporality. This is why Deleuze sees Masoch as having an intimate relation to temporality, specifically waiting and suspense, and as having introducing these aspects as formal elements of the novel (CC 54).

The outcome of the masochistic experiment is embodied in a new form of political and libidinal existence which is necessarily “to come” but the conditions for this are only achieved through a suspension of our current forms, hence the preponderance in Masoch’s novels of arrested gestures, delayed gratification, suspended and frozen bodies. The pleasure-pain complex should not be seen as a libidinal solution to the moral problem of guilt, as psychoanalysis maintains, but as the condition for achieving the “temporal form” of experimentation as such (M 70-1).

We can tie these observations to Deleuze’s concept of style. Style for Deleuze must involve a rejection of the “logos” in “which the Intelligence always comes before, by which the whole is already present, the law already known before what it applies to”. Proust’s style, says
Deleuze, is a “pathos” more than it is a logos, since Proust had no notion of the unity of *À la recherche du temps perdu* prior to writing it (P 105-16). This is not to say that Proust’s novel is fragmentary, but that the unity it forms is an outcome of the functioning and communication of elements within it, “a special mode of unity irreducible to any ‘unification’, [a] very special unity that appears afterwards” (P 167). The specific problem of the work of art is the problem of a unity or totality that is not pre-given in an organic or logical whole but which is produced as an “effect” (P 164). As Tom Conley writes, with respect to Proust as well as to Balzac and Leibniz, on the subject of the “total work”: “there results an effect that is neither in the detail nor in the illusion of a self-contained sum. No groundplan precedes the result; no set of concepts or themes serves as a point of reference” (Conley 2000: 264). Deleuze wishes to dispense with the dialectic of part and whole in favour of a concept of the determination of parts in relation to difference (logos) and the undifferentiated (pathos). He is attracted to the concepts and literature of perversion (not only Masoch, but also Klossowski and Gombrowicz) because these involve two elements the combination of which opens up a space of maximum experimentation: an undifferentiated material body, on the on hand, and, on the other, a determination of specific parts. Deleuze suggests a kinship of evolutionary biology with the world of perversions in this respect: the animal body is progressively determined over time through “fits and starts” and “proceeds by way of dilemmas”; before an organic part is determined as a specific limb, for example, it exists, writes Deleuze, as a “hesitation” before the disjunction between left and right – the undifferentiated limb is “suspended” before the disjunction. In this way, a purely formal system of disjunctions can exist alongside an undifferentiated materiality, “differentiation never suppressing the undifferentiated which is divided in it” (LS 321-2).

We have already seen this with regard to Masoch: the masochist brings together a most punitive and binding legal contract with a libidinal materiality allowing him to hesitate before disjunctions such as to beat or be beaten, to feel pleasure or to feel pain, to transgress or to be punished, in order to open up the maximum degree of scope for an experimental process. This process is what Deleuze calls style; style involves making the “objective power of hesitation in the body” (LS 322) pass into the realm of language through
a “stammering” and a “stuttering” that suspends the formal figures of language in order to make them proliferate in different directions. The undifferentiated material being of the body and the pure formal being of language are in this way put into direct contact in the “body-language” of a style (CC 55). Deleuze defines cruelty, so important for masochistic experience, as the coming together of an undifferentiated ground with the pure power of determination. The cruelty involved in masochistic experience is to be defined neither by the libidinal material pleasure-pain complex, nor in the punitive nature of the law and the super-ego, but in the experimental space of immanence the two share in a mutual becoming. He asks us to “recall Artaud’s idea: cruelty is nothing but determination as such, that precise point at which the determined maintains its essential relation with the undetermined” (DR 29). Cruelty denies the role of an intermediary whole or totality which would unify the parts.

One possible source for Deleuze’s concept of style is Nietzsche’s short text *The Case of Wagner*. In this text, Nietzsche presents Wagner, albeit in highly ambiguous terms, as a pre-eminent case of the modern artist. In this sense, “Wagner is a neurosis”, his art is “sick”, for the very reason that his work is symbolic of a state of physiological decline, what Nietzsche terms “exhaustion” and “decadence”, coextensive with the decline of modern European culture at the end of the 19th century (Nietzsche 1967:166). But Nietzsche is far from unilaterally condemning the sickness Wagner represents, in that “sickness itself can be a stimulant to life: one only has to be healthy enough for this stimulant” (Nietzsche 1967: 165). Indeed, it seems that Nietzsche is suggesting that he is healthy enough for Wagner, whereas others, including Wagner himself, are not. This conjunction of health and sickness is related directly to Nietzsche’s concept of Wagner’s “style”:

If anything in Wagner is interesting it is the logic with which a physiological defect makes move upon move and takes step upon step as practice and procedure, as innovation in principles, as a crisis in taste. For the present I merely wish to dwell on the question of style. — What is the sign of every literary decadence? That life no longer dwells in the whole. The word becomes sovereign ... the whole is no longer a whole.
Nietzsche maintains “that Wagner disguised as a principle his incapacity for giving organic form, that he establishes a ‘dramatic style’” precisely through “his incapacity for any style whatever” (Nietzsche 1967: 170-1). In the same way, Deleuze says that Proust’s style, like that of Balzac before him, is “without style”, is a “nonstyle”. Deleuze quotes from Proust’s Contre Sainte-Beuve: “In Balzac there coexist, not digested, not yet transformed, all the elements of a style-to-come that does not exist” (P 165).

Rather than imposing a form, style gives something essentially formless a certain rigorous expression. There is a conjunction, in style, of health and sickness, strength and weakness, in that an incapacity to formalise fully or to totalise becomes the guiding principle of a properly formalist aesthetic. In this sense, the crisis of taste, of which Nietzsche speaks with regards to the “hystericism” and “neuroticism” of the modern artist, belongs to the same moment as the problem of stylistic unity in Balzac and Proust. There is a universal and absolute power of thought which is only realised through specific cases of physiological weakness, just as there is a power to formalise which is the incapacity to take on a definitive form. This is the central Artaudian axiom which inspires Deleuze’s conception of thought and its relation to the body. Deleuze and Guattari refer to Artaud’s letters to Jacques Riviére as “pathetic texts, in the sense that in them thought is truly a pathos (an antilogos and an antimythos)”. For Artaud, “thought operates on the basis of a central breakdown ... it lives solely by its own incapacity to take on form” (ATP 377-8). At one point in the correspondence Riviére, who declined to publish Artaud’s poems in the Nouvelle Revue Française, remarks on “the contrast between the extraordinary precision of your [Artaud’s] self-diagnosis and the vagueness, or at least formlessness, of your creative efforts” then immediately apologises for acting “like those doctors who think they can cure their patients by refusing to believe them” (Artaud 1988: 38-9). As Michaux explains in a text which Deleuze regards as paradigmatic for his idea of literature as health, the creation of a style involves “none of the willed imagination of the professionals. ... only the imagination that comes from the inability to conform” (Michaux 1994: 19).
Deleuze thus links style, and the problem of the stylistic unity of the work, with physiological incapacity and the exhaustion of the faculties. We suggested that Masoch articulates a future existence through the opening of an experimental space of immanence shared by the body and form. If this space is defined as "cruel" in the Artaudian sense, it is because the undifferentiated of the body and the formal differentiations of language combine in a single determination. Now, this may seem at odds with the notion of experimentation, which would seem to open a space of possibility rather than determination. However, for Deleuze, the space of experimentation proper to art cannot be thought of in opposition to determination. Rather, it is the immanence of the absolutely undetermined and the determined, the immanent unity of the pathos of bodily formlessness with the logos of formalisation, which defines the experimental space in which art functions. It is in this sense that the categories of the "possible" are said to be abolished. Deleuze insists that "the world of the pervert is ... a world without the possible. ... The perverse world is a world in which the category of the necessary has completely replaced that of the possible" (LS 359).

Understanding what Deleuze means by possibility is key here. The possible involves the relationship between a subject and its object, between a preferential self and a world in which it can realise its preferences:

When one realizes some of the possible, one does so according to certain goals, plans, and preferences: I put on shoes to go out, and slippers when I stay in. ... But the realization of the possible always proceeds through exclusion, because it presupposes preferences and goals that vary, always replacing the preceding ones. (CC 152-3)

The possible proceeds through exclusive disjunctions: a subject confronts possibilities it may, or may not, choose to realise. But the realisation of one possibility means the exclusion of another (when I go out I cannot stay in, etc.). Thus, for Deleuze, the category of the possible actually narrows and limits, since it relates an already constituted subject to objective possible states which preclude others. As we have seen above, Deleuze is
interested in grasping, simultaneously, the severity of a particular determination together
with the undifferentiated element this determination differentiates. To presuppose
constituted subjects consciously preferring one possibility over another delimits,
illegitimately from Deleuze’s point of view, the scope of experimentation.

Deleuze, then, is interested in procedures which suspend the subject-object relation.
Masochism abolishes the relation between desiring subject and desired object in favour of a
strict necessity determined formally by the stipulations of a contract. It is, however, Beckett
who goes furthest in this direction. In Beckett’s novel *Murphy*, the protagonist’s “mind” is
described as follows: “Nothing ever had been, was or would be in the universe outside it but
was already present as virtual, or actual, or virtual rising into actual, or actual falling into
virtual, in the universe inside it” (Beckett 1973: 63). The parallel presence of virtual and
actual serves, in Murphy’s world, to replace the relation in which a preferring subject is
linked to a preferred object. Beckett’s characters, for Deleuze, “renounce any order of
preference, any organization in relation to a goal” by exhausting the various permutations
or combination of elements within a strictly determined series. For example, Murphy in the
park sits before his lunch of assorted biscuits which he arranges before him:

He took the biscuits carefully out of the packet and laid them face upward on the
grass, in order as he felt of edibility. They were the same as always, a Ginger, an
Osborne, a Digestive, a Petit Beurre and one anonymous. He always ate the first-
named last, because he thought it very likely least palatable. ... On his knees it now
struck him for the first time that these pre-possessions reduced to a paltry six the
number of ways in which he could make his meal ... But were he to overcome his
infatuation with the ginger, then the assortment would spring to life before him,
dancing the radiant measure of its total permutability, edible in a hundred and
twenty ways.

Murphy ultimately cannot partake of the “fullness” of the biscuits “until he had learnt not to
prefer any one to any other” (Beckett 1973: 57). Murphy’s logic of non-preference means
that he is able to formalise what Deleuze calls a “combinatorial” of inclusive disjunctions.
The combinatorial exhausts the possible in a particular manner: by naming. Murphy names
each of his biscuits not so that he may prefer one over any other, but so that the relations
between names replace the relations between objects. This disjunctive language of naming is what Deleuze identifies in Beckett as “language I, a language in which enumeration replaces propositions and combinatorial relations replace syntactic relations: a language of names”. Language I replaces the “objects” or the contents of “possibilia” with words, but these words themselves need to be exhausted by the voices which utter them like “flows that direct and distribute the linguistic corpuscles”. Hence, there is a “language II” which functions to exhaust, not language per se, but the voice itself. Beckett’s characters throughout the novels of his early and middle periods – Watt, Mercier, Molloy – function in this way to exhaust both the objects of language and the subjectivity of speech to arrive at the great silence of The Unnameable (CC 156-7).

Deleuze describes Beckett’s procedure of the combinatorial, in which both the objects posited in language and the subjectivity of the speaker are exhausted and dried up, as stemming from an intolerance with words, with a wish to be done with words and voices. This is why Deleuze describes “language III” as “the language of images and spaces”, which comes to fruition in the late plays and in the works for television, particularly Quad (CC 162). Quad consists of four non-descript human figures silently traversing a square in varying patterns accompanied by music “like the sound of rats”. Deleuze remarks that “it is a question of exhausting space”; the dual exhaustion of objects and subjects in language I and II leads to a language of space and bodies. This is not a return to the objective contents or subjective possibilities which the first two languages dissipated, but signals the emergence of a language of pure space and time devoid of contents. This for Deleuze gives rise to a pure potentiality, proper to the event of language, which only appears after the exhaustion of objective and subjective possibility: “Potentiality is a double possibility. It is the possibility that an event, in itself possible, might be realized in the space under consideration: the possibility that something is realizing itself, and the possibility that some place is realizing it” (CC 162-3). The images of Quad present a space in which the moving figures exhaust every possible permutation of occupying that space, but this is a double exhaustion: the figures’ movement exhausts the possibilities in which the space can be occupied, but, similarly, the space exhausts the figures’ possibilities for occupying it. The “event”, then, is the pure potentiality that is achieved when all possibilities are exhausted, since the event is precisely
that element of something happening which resists its actualisation or final accomplishment. The exhaustion of possibility opens onto pure potentiality. The "pure image", then, is the ultimate destination of Beckett's style (CC 159).13

Schizophrenia and Anorexia in Wolfson's Procedure

The distinction which we have been making throughout this chapter between an undifferentiated depth, on the one hand, and a pure surface or formal immateriality on the other can only be maintained on the basis of the efficacy of experimental procedures. The failure of these procedures not only means aesthetic failure but also risks pathological breakdown. The dual danger facing experimentation is that bodily materiality succumbs to the loss of any possible articulation, while the forms of language become imprisoning and final. Deleuze indicates that Beckett's own method is not free of such dangers: the latter's images are like "the dreams of the exhausted, insomniac, or abulic person" (CC 172).

Beckett draws on the exhaustion and the general poverty of the will that Nietzsche diagnosed as the epidemic of modernity, and in this sense Beckett is no less a diagnostician than Nietzsche. But by what criteria does Deleuze distinguish between the aesthetic success of Beckett's procedure, and the pathology of those for whom the procedure fails? How are the exhaustion and abulia of the schizophrenic, the hysteric or the anorexic person to be distinguished from the aesthetic processes which draw creatively on pathology? This distinction seems crucial for the literary clinic, in that it poses the question of the success or failure of aesthetic production, not on the level of conscious will or authorial intent, nor on social or literary convention, but on the impersonal level of health and sickness which is disclosed only through the loss of conscious will and break up of conventional forms.

In this final section these questions will be addressed as we look at Deleuze's reading of a case which particularly fascinated him and in which he detects a failure (albeit a valuable one) of the literary procedure as we have defined it thus far. In his book Le Schizo et les
Langues, the Jewish-American schizophrenic Louis Wolfson produced a series of linguistic analyses in which, as Deleuze describes in his preface, a given word in Wolfson's mother tongue (American English) is replaced by

a foreign word with a similar meaning that has common sounds or phonemes ...

[A]n ordinary maternal sentence will be analysed in terms of its phonetic elements and movements so that it can be converted into a sentence, in one or more foreign languages, which is similar to it in sound and meaning. (CC 7-8)

The English phrase “don’t trip over the wire”, for example, is transformed via German, French and Hebrew to become “Tu’nicht treb über èth hé Zwirn”. Wolfson’s procedure involves breaking the words of his mother tongue down into their underlying phonetic and semantic forms, so that they can be converted into the phonemes of other languages using grammatically consistent rules of transformation. The procedure thus discovers a principle of escape from language which is enacted entirely within language. This, indeed, is a well known phenomenon in the symptomatology of schizophrenia, and Deleuze goes so far as to insist that the procedure is not only a linguistic and formal aspect of literature but “the very process of psychosis” (CC 9). In the echolalias of schizophrenics individual words and phrases are detached from their linguistic environment and repeated in such a way as to give them a new reality or a new function. The schizophrenic often experiences words not as the facilitators of communication but as material objects with a reality of their own. As one commentator observes, in schizophrenic cognition

words escape the situation to which they are referred and the meaning they take on according to the context in which they are used ... [Words] themselves may get an object-like existence, undistinguishable from “real” objects ... Words are no longer used to share a world, but to create an alternative one ... Words and objects may become interchangeable: paradigmatically, metaphors become flesh-and-blood things; the catachresis (concrete expression) of metaphors flings open the door to delusions. (Stanghellini 2008: 58-9)

The concrete, flesh and blood nature of words are felt, materially and not metaphorically, by the schizophrenic as the source of possible torment and persecution. Wolfson’s method
of dealing with this is to devise a procedure to transform the words bombarding him into a
foreign language, thereby ameliorating their effects. Wolfson speaks, in the third person, of
the therapeutic effects of his method: “If the schizophrenic did not experience a feeling of
joy as a result of his having found, that day, those foreign words to annihilate yet another
word of his mother tongue (for perhaps, in fact, he was incapable of this sentiment), he
certainly felt less miserable than usual, at least for a while” (qtd in Auster 1982: 70).

The Lacanian psychoanalytic explanation here is that Wolfson’s schizophrenia arose from a
failure in the primary mechanism by which the subject normally represses its connection to
the libidinal “jouissance” of the maternal body in order to take up a position in language,
thereby acquiring the ability to articulate his or her desire in the symbolic register via “the
name of the father”. The schizophrenic “forecloses” the paternal function by which
language acquires its consistency as a communicative medium, effectively expelling from
the unconscious the means to anchor desire in articulated speech. In Žižek’s explanation,
Wolfson refused to accept the “paternal prohibition” which secures for the subject a place
in the symbolic order. In Wolfson’s case the object of the prohibition is thus “displaced”
from the real of the drive to the symbolic of language, rendering articulated speech (and the
subject position that goes with it) a fundamental source of pain and suffering: “the tongue
that ignores the paternal prohibition becomes itself the object of a prohibition” (Žižek 1996:
183).

However, the failure of the symbolic is not in itself sufficient as an explanation of Wolfson’s
sickness, since, as we have seen, language and the body are involved in the same genetic
process. Language in Deleuze’s view not only exists as a formed totality distinct from the
material body, but simultaneously results from the gradual effort of the body to produce, by
the material accretion of sounds, the parts which make up language. Wolfson’s failure to
produce a creative syntax must be explained on both of these levels since as Deleuze argues
he “lacks a ‘symbolism’ in two distinct ways”. On the one hand, his linguistic
transformations, for all their ingenuity, seem to accomplish very little in that between the
phrase to be translated and its translation there is no real creative difference, there is
merely a similarity in terms of sound and meaning:

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between the word to be converted and the words of the conversion, and in the conversions themselves, there is nothing but a void, an interval that is lived as pathogenic or pathological. ... The transformations never reach the grandiose level of an event, but remain mired in their accidental and empirical actualizations. (CC 10-11).

Between the translated phrases there is an empty interval or pathological void which is simply lived as an embodied suffering. On the other hand, the linguistic detour the translation takes through the set of languages defined as “not English” is in theory infinite, but also interminable and sterile, what Deleuze calls “a false totality that nothing can define” (CC 12). Wolfson remains trapped in a system that succumbs simultaneously to the two distinct dangers of total formalisation and the loss of all forms, the “beauty” and “density” of Wolfson’s procedure “remain clinical” (LS 95).

The genesis of a creative syntax, of the kind Wolfson lacks, requires the negotiation of language as something which exists both as a pre-formed totality and as something which emerges through the gradual accretion of partial units: “This is the paradox of speech. On one hand, it refers to language as to something withdrawn which preexists in the voice from above; on the other hand, it refers to language as to something which must result, but which shall come to pass only with formed units” (LS 266). Language as a formal totality does not exist apart from the efforts by which the pathic body differentiates itself gradually: sounds are distinguished from the body that emits them, vocalisation is distinguished from the noise of eating. What effects these distinctions? Deleuze answers: the formation of surfaces. The body reaches the limit of a certain physical process, for example eating, and this limit causes the process to change.

Thus, Deleuze understands language and symbol formation through a material genesis of the body which always begins in the domain of depths identified with an undifferentiated abyssal state: “everything starts out in the abyss” (LS 216). Deleuze understands bodily depth, following the psychoanalytic theory of Melanie Klein, as fundamentally cannibalistic, as that which swallows and is swallowed up, both consuming and consumed. There is no distinction, here, between subject and object; the world of the nursing infant is “a universal cesspool” in which elements emitted from the mother’s body are not only “introjected” and
internalised by the infant but also aggressively “slashed to pieces, broken into crumbs and alimentary morsels”. The aggressiveness of the child is “projected” onto these pieces which act “like poisonous, persecuting, explosive, and toxic substances threatening the child’s body from within” (LS 215). This is what Klein called the “paranoid-schizoid” position since from the child’s point of view the breast is split into a “good” (i.e. present, gratifying) and “bad” (i.e. absent, frustrating) object. The bad object is subsequently regarded as a source of persecution anxiety (Klein 1970: 202-5).

The child rises out of this state through a projection onto the idealised good object of a “good whole self” (Klein 1970: 208). During what Klein calls the “manic-depressive” phase, the child identifies with this idealised object, even if this means suffering the aggression directed against it. The bad breast, which was the object of the infant’s frustration and attacks, is now the object of reparation since the child realises that the same object is both good and bad at once (Klein 1968: 306). The whole object becomes a model for the integration of the ego and the symbolic-sexual position it entails. Deleuze, however, submits Klein’s version of bodily depth to a critique. What the distinction between good and bad conceals is a more profound distinction between whole and partial: “Every piece is bad in principle (that is, persecuting and persecutor), only what is wholesome and complete is good”. The duality proper to the depths is not “bad” and “good” but organs-parts and a complete “organism without parts, a body without organs” (LS 216). Organs are associated with alimentary fragments which break apart other organs, revealing more fragments. The body without organs, on the other hand, testifies to the liquid principle of urine, which dissolves all the parts, or binds them together. Now, Deleuze sees this opposition of harmful fragments and an idealised fluid whole as central to the schizophrenic language of Wolfson:

the moment that the pinned-down word loses its sense, it bursts into pieces; it is decomposed into syllables, letters, and above all into consonants which act directly on the body, penetrating and bruising it ... The moment that the maternal language is stripped of its sense, its phonetic elements become singularly wounding. (LS 100)

In opposition to the wounding phonemes, there is a “total and liquid mixture which leaves the body intact” (LS 101) In not only Wolfson’s case but Artaud’s as well, the surfaces separating sounds from bodies are shattered, and language becomes indistinguishable from
bodily materiality. The maternal language loses its "sense", that is, it is stripped down to its bare phonetic forms which thus become detached from any designated semantic content or "state of affairs". What the schizophrenic experiences, Deleuze maintains, is the theft, by articulated language, of a pre-vocal sonorous system of bodily depth. The schizophrenic writings of Wolfson and Artaud decompose the voice to uncover this wholeness expressed in "breath-words" and "howl-words" (LS 222, 101). "To the dirty writing, the disgusting organisms, the organs-letters, the microbes and parasites, there stands opposed the fluid breath or the pure body – but this opposition must be a transition that restores to us this murdered body, these stifled breaths" (CC 16).

Deleuze’s interpretation of Wolfson’s procedure focuses on the means by which the latter formulates an equivalence between the sound of his mother’s voice and the packets of food she gives him to eat, since the foods are seen as filled with the parasites, worms and microbes which, like the dirty letters, compromise the integrity of the fluid body, and which attempt to render this body via the organs that need to be nourished. For Deleuze, then, Wolfson can only be understood on the basis of an anorexic formula by which eating and speaking are deemed equally intolerable. If the maternal words are opposed to foreign languages, the foods are opposed to the atomic structures which break down the nourishing compounds; “to poisonous foods, Wolfson opposes the continuity of a chain of atoms and the totality of a periodic table, which must be absorbed rather than divided into parts, reconstituting a pure body rather than sustaining a sick one” (CC 14).

Deleuze says that Wolfson, unlike Artaud, failed ultimately to formulate a "poetic syntax" capable of supporting the breath words or inarticulate expressions he conjured up through his knowledge of languages, or a "vital cosmology" capable of supporting his body without organs – Wolfson’s procedure “remains unproductive” (CC 186, 20). This cosmology and syntax are to be found in the world historical domains, “among worldwide and cosmic categories”. If Wolfson feels cut off from these categories by certain obstacles, these obstacles are no doubt connected to the parental figures, but these figures are in turn related to something else entirely. If Wolfson’s double failure is represented by mother and father, a poisonous maternal organism and.an illegitimate paternal totality, then mother and father are only symptomatic effects and not the cause:
What [Wolfson] calls 'mother' is an organization of words that has been put in his ears and mouth, an organization of things that has been put into his body. It is not my language that is maternal, it is my mother who is language; it is not my organism that comes from mother, it is my mother who is a collection of organs, the collection of my own organs. ... It is not the father that speaks foreign languages and is familiar with atoms; it is the foreign languages and atomic combinations that are my father. The father is the crowd of my atoms and the set of my glossoalalias. (CC 17-8)

As Deleuze writes, “the schizophrenic problem of suffering, of death, and of life” can be posed only inadequately on the level of mother and father, of Oedipus and the familial etiology it presupposes (LS 97). The “problem of existence” which the schizophrenic experiences to an unrivalled degree is posed in terms of the world, since what makes him sick is the world (CC 18). In the next chapter, we will turn to look at how the literary clinic moves away from symptomatology and diagnosis towards the experimental and therapeutic concerns that will come to dominate schizoanalysis. We will see how the forms of repetition exemplified in the procedure become an aspect of what Deleuze conceives in terms of the psychoanalytic concept of the transference. We will also see how the concept of “production” emerges with respect to these concerns, and how Kafka becomes, for Deleuze and Guattari, an exemplary figure by connecting the formal aspects of the procedure with the therapeutic aspects of an embodied, yet wholly impersonal and world historical, subjectivity.

Notes:

1. Protevi (2001b) provides a brief but penetrating analysis of the hylomorphic tradition from the Deleuzian point of view.

2. See Bogue 1989: 126 for a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Hjemslev as a linguist who broke with the form-content duality.
3. Eliot Albert (2001) pits Deleuze’s Spinozism unambiguously against the hylomorphic tradition which culminates in Kant. However, this ignores the fact that the problem of form cannot be settled, for Deleuze, by a simple retreat to pure materiality, and this is why the intersection of form, content and matter plays a recurring role in Deleuze’s philosophy generally, and in his theories of literature in particular. What Albert ignores, ultimately, is the fact that matter for Deleuze only becomes material upon an encounter with a limit whose essence is, precisely, immaterial.

4. This is why Deleuze understands the body as the source of problems, which are of absolute significance with respect to subjectivity: “the category of problem has a greater biological importance than the negative category of need” (B 120).

5. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the secret is the fundamental thematic of the novella, giving the example of Henry James’ In the Cage. James’ novella features a lower class young woman who enters into a secret affair with an upper class gentleman, Everard, conducted mainly via telegraph messages the protagonist processes at the telegraph office where she works. The woman’s life is dominated by “molar” rigid class and gender structures, but the secret affair opens up a “molecular” line. As Bogue suggests, the affair

   is the line of the secret (a secret that remains a pure form, in that James never reveals its precise nature), a line inducing imperceptible alterations in the heroine’s routines, incipient metamorphoses in class relations between the telegraphist and Everard, microdisturbances in the affectively charged conversations of the protagonists. (Bogue 2003: 159)

Similarly, Michael Taussig gives the example of Thomas Mann’s novella Death in Venice, which explores the homosexual relationship, in Venice during an outbreak of plague, between a young Polish aristocrat and a middle-aged professor who

   becomes aware, albeit in a confused and fitful way, of the hidden presence of death ... Now and again ... he gathers that something terrible is happening behind the scenes. But no sooner does he gather an intimation, than it is dispelled by one or more of the gamut of dissimulating devices with which
humanity is only blessed but seems to delight in using. ... It's as if the secret of the plague – a public secret, be it noted – demands to be revealed; and yet this very same exciting tension has to be turned back, as it were, into itself, through ever-greater expenditures of dissimulating energy. (Taussig 1999: 80)

6. See, for example, Marks 1998: 48-9.

7. This opposition of vitalism and formalism has been noted in the French biophilosophical context by Dominique Lecourt:

   The assertion of . . . ‘vitalism’ as an intellectual requirement which aims to acknowledge the originality of Life, entirely retains its significance today, when the combination of a type of biochemical materialism and a type of mathematical formalism tend to deny this originality of Life, the better to neuronalize thought. (qtd in Wolfe 12-3)

8. Žižek has argued, from a more or less standard Lacanian position, that Wolfson’s writings stemmed from a failure to accept the symbolic codes represented by the paternal prohibition of the mother’s body. This refusal is what causes the schizophrenic regress into the “impossible real” of bodily depth. Since the real denies linguistic articulation, Wolfson’s language remains mired in a pathological inability to speak in his mother tongue, and thus to articulate his desire (Žižek 1996: 183). While Deleuze does not deny the pathology or suffering manifested in Wolfson’s writings, he does deny that Wolfson is made sick by the symbolic.

9. Deleuze’s debt to Husserlian phenomenology is a highly complex issue and cannot be covered here. The single best book on the topic is Hughes 2008. See also Williams 2008: 129.

10. Deleuze is careful here to distinguish neutrality from nonbeing, remarking that “neutral means pre-individual and impersonal, but does not qualify the state of an energy which would come to join a bottomless abyss” (LS 244). Singularities are the determining modes or differences by which individuation takes place, but are distinct from any subjective or personological notions of the individual. As James
Williams writes: “singularities determine a thing as a series of ‘becomings’, that is zones and neighbourhoods where there is change and inflection, such as all the places where a living being is becoming something other than it currently is in an open, tense and unsure manner” (Williams 2008: 91).

11. See Holland (1993: 190) for a discussion of “historical masochism” in relation to Masoch and Baudelaire. Wilhelm Reich argued that German fascism grew out of the masochism of religious ascetism: “[fascism] changes the masochistic character of the old patriarchal religions into a sadistic religion. It takes religion out of the other-world philosophy of suffering and places it in the sadistic murder in this world.” (Reich 1946: 6).

12. Catherine Dale writes in this respect that:

The unlanguage of howls and syncopated rhythms requires utter diligence and determination. Contrary to popular belief there is nothing sloppy about the workings of the depths. Artaud is not interested in a theatre of chance and improvisation, nor in the ‘caprice of the wild and thoughtless inspiration of the actor who, once cut off from the text, plunges in without any idea of what he is doing’ ... In presenting the paradox of language and things, Artaud thwarts the collapse of the mind, but his intensity threatens to collapse even itself, and yet death can never die, and so Artaud’s language of crazed cruelty is always accompanied by mercilessly direct and commanding writing. (Dale 2002: 92)

13. As Tom Conley writes, “images can be understood as things that, when they are exhausted of content, give birth to events” (Conley 1997: 50). In wishing to be done with words and voices, Beckett’s language is propelled towards something language can’t grasp, towards silence and the loss of articulation, and gives us the “ideational materiality” unique to language only by going beyond both words and voices towards the image. Gregg Lambert has argued that Deleuze’s reading of Beckett should be understood in a Heideggerian fashion here, since “it is only when language completes all three steps and arrives at language3 – that it is successful in its
purported mission of showing the thing. ... Only language$^3$ can be understood as a
phenomenon ... that characterizes the ‘being of language’”. The “thing” in this sense
is the being of language as distinct from the contents of objects, it is the
immateriality by which it constitutes the subject-object relation, the minimum of
being or the being of the problem. Language shows this immateriality by
engendering “an event ... that occurs at the limits of language ... when language
confronts silence” (Lambert 2006: 47-8).

14. The best general introduction in English to Wolfson and related authors is Lecercle
1985.
We have thus far understood the literary clinic primarily in terms of diagnosis, with emphasis on the means by which authors formalise a set of symptoms in order to pursue the ordering and re-ordering of signs. The material body is implicated in the literary clinical procedure to the extent that, as we saw with regards to Wolfson, it is bodily depth which threatens to thwart the creative process of formal renewal. However, there is a necessarily therapeutic and curative impetus at work in this theory of literature as diagnosis which implicates bodily materiality in a becoming whose effects have a potentially healing character. As I suggested in chapter 1, there is always the possibility, for Deleuze, for literature to bring about a “saving repetition”. As a result, the literary clinic must be understood in a therapeutic and not simply a diagnostic sense, and this is what constitutes its link to schizoanalysis, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as operating within the practical dimensions of therapy. In Wolfson’s case, as we saw, schizophrenic breakdown corresponds to a double failure: a failure to constitute a viable poetic, or creative formalism, on the one hand, and, on the other, a failure of bodily materiality to become productive in its own right. A purely reiterative formalism and a purely abyssal body were Wolfson’s fate. Masoch’s symptomatology, on the other hand, provided a distinct case of solution to the modern paradox of guilt which involved not just a reordering of signs but a material and libidinal experimentation which connects desire to the world historical and political domains.

In this chapter, we shall see in what sense Deleuze gives a therapeutic and prescriptive value to production by following the development of the literary clinic through the concepts of difference and repetition. We will return to Deleuze’s reading of Freud, broached in chapter 1, and outline how Deleuze’s understanding of the death instinct as a productive repetition paves the way for the critique of psychotherapy central to the arguments of Anti-Oedipus. As we will see, Deleuze understands the symptom in much the same way Freud does, that is, as a form of “blockage” of some unconscious agency, but Deleuze distinguishes
forms of blockage artificially imposed by consciousness from those which he calls "natural".
I will argue that Deleuze, through his reading of Freud’s famous case study of “Dora”, sees
the symptom as a kind of natural blockage and that he derives from this a theory of
“transference” as a healing process quite distinct from the psychotherapeutic understanding
of that term.

The turn to pragmatism to which the theory of production led Deleuze in his collaborations
with Guattari does not compromise the formalism on which the literary clinic is based. In
fact, Deleuze wants us to grasp a pragmatic and productive concept of literary form, which,
as I argue, is what prompted Deleuze to return to the subject of Proust immediately prior to
the publication of Anti-Oedipus. Interpretation is not in opposition to the productive and
pragmatic path taken by schizoanalysis. Rather, Deleuze explains that the production of
signs and the interpretation of them are both part of the same process. This relates to the
importance of madness, since in Deleuze’s reading of Proust it is delirium which pushes
interpretation across the threshold of production. To this end, I argue, through a reading of
Deleuze and Guattari’s work on Kafka, that literature – via the proper name of the author
and the impersonal singularities embodied in it – prescribes production to given values and
the regimes of signs which uphold them.

Repetition, Legitimacy and Method

The literary clinical procedure as a creative practice works via repetition, but there is always
a chance that the procedure will fail and the repetition will remain unproductive. While
failure and success are not to be judged from the point of view of conscious intent, as this
would imply a transcendent judgment rather than an immanent evaluation, their effects are
nevertheless quite real. The prospect of psychological disintegration, manifesting itself in
the worst cases in schizophrenic illness, is, in Deleuze’s conception of writing, an ever
present threat. However, the very reality of this threat offers salvation from it. Failure and
success in this sense need to be evaluated from the point of the view of the paradoxical
unity of difference and repetition which dominates Deleuze’s writing in his two major
treatises of the late 60s. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze makes reference to “the strange
theme of a saving repetition” in the novels of Klossowski and Tournier, in which what we are
saved from, precisely, is repetition itself. “Psychoanalysis”, he writes, “taught us that we are
ill from repetition, but it also taught us that we are healed through repetition” (LS 327).

Deleuze had already introduced this idea in Difference and Repetition where he writes that
“if repetition makes us ill, it also heals us ... All cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetition.
... Repetition constitutes by itself the selective game of our illness and our health, of our loss
and our salvation” (DR 19). He insists that this paradoxical identity of illness and health in
repetition is to be understood in a therapeutic fashion, what in psychoanalysis is known as
transference. While illness and health, loss and salvation may be involved in the same
repetition, there is still the possibility of selecting between them. Thus, he distinguishes
between “two sorts of repetition, one false and the other true, one hopeless and the other
salutary” (LS 328). As James Williams has put it, “curing and health are not entirely about
actual injuries, whether mental or physical, they are how to repeat well” (Williams 2003:
49).¹

Deleuze refers to repetition as “a superior pathos and pathology” (DR 5). Repetition gives to
thought a pathos which allows it to think its own limits. We covered this in some detail in
chapter 1, but we can return to it here with emphasis on the role of repetition and the
distinction Deleuze makes between legitimate and illegitimate types of repetition.

Legitimacy and illegitimacy here must be understood in relation to “the proper limit of
sensibility” (DR 237).² In determining legitimate criteria, thought and the body are
embroiled in a paradox with respect to “the being of the sensible“. Thought is constituted
precisely in its ability to go beyond immediate sense impressions and make all sorts of
inferences not grounded in empirical experience, constructing for itself a veritable delirium.
This is precisely the illegitimate, or transcendent, exercise of pure reason as described by
Kant. But in breaking with empiricism in this way, thought discovers a means by which the
limits which constrain the material field of bodily sensibility, and thus of empirical
observation, are the very principles which give to thought its unique freedom and peculiar
power. In other words, there is a legitimate or “sober” form of delirium (AO 4). Thought and
the body thus merge at this paradoxical point; there is the “paradoxical existence of a
‘something’”, says Deleuze, which unites thought and body, and this “something”
simultaneously cannot be sensed from the point of view of the empirical and can only be
sensed from the point of view of pure thought (DR 236).\(^3\)

In going beyond empirical experience, thought in some sense becomes a kind of delirium or
madness, but, \textit{pace} Kant, this cannot be said to be illegitimate since it is, as it were, a
madness governed by criteria given by the limits of the sensible. In other words, the limits of
the sensible, empirical body lend a formal rigour to a delirious thought which never ceases
to go beyond those limits. These limits continue to act as a constraining and regulating
force, even if thought discovers a freedom through them. As we mentioned in chapter 1,
thought, for Deleuze, fails to attain to its legitimate exercise whenever it consciously or
actively chooses its own opportune moment. This is because thought cannot give to itself its
own premeditated or favourable conditions. From early in his career Deleuze was concerned
with the proper method of philosophy in this sense. In the first half of \textit{Proust and Signs} he
warns against the philosopher who

\begin{quote}
assumes in advance the goodwill of thinking; all his investigation is based on a
‘premeditated decision.’ From this comes the method of philosophy: from a certain
viewpoint, the search for truth would be the most natural and the easiest; the
decision to undertake it and the possession of a method capable of overcoming the
external influences that distract the mind from its vocation and cause it to take the
false for the true would suffice. (PS 94).
\end{quote}

This method, informed by the “good” will to truth, operates by an illusion under whose spell
we see the external world as if it were constructed for the sole purpose of our
philosophising. Once we clear away all the “external” distractions we can philosophise
under conditions congenial to the exercise of thought. Philosophical problems can then be
solved merely by “tracing” the transcendental from the empirical and positing the former as
a mirror of the latter; thought revolves in a “vicious circle” of questions which are
presupposed and answers which come ready made (DR 161). This is the ultimate “dialectical
trick” where we get back our own inverted image from the world, an intellectual fallacy
which, Deleuze says, reaches its high point with Hegelianism (DR 164). Deleuze does not advise that we give more freedom or autonomy to thought, on the contrary, thought can only operate legitimately under conditions that constrain and even weaken it: “thought is ... forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, its own natural ‘powerlessness’ which is indistinguishable from the greatest power” (DR 147). Thought must be forced to think by that which does not think, i.e. the material body understood in terms of its pathological, compulsive and repetitive insistence. From the brute or bare repetition of the material body we attain the criteria for a productive and saving repetition which moves us beyond the limits of organic embodiment and personological death. This other death is what interests Deleuze, and what prompts him to propose a paradoxical and productive concept of the limits defining the contours of the lived body, giving to these limits both a positive and negative, liberating and constraining, character.

Blockage and Production

Deleuze argues for a concept of the symptom as a type of blockage or inhibition which gives rise to the very conditions which might ameliorate it. If the abyssal body serves to bring us back to a repetitive and unchanging depth, in a word, indifference, it also provides us with the positive power to repeat difference. Deleuze asks if the brute repetitions of the material body give us immanent criteria which might attenuate this brutality and give rise to new modes of living: “Do the disguises found in the work of dreams or symptoms – condensation, displacement, dramatisation – rediscover while attenuating a bare, brute repetition?” (DR 16 my emphasis). The question of bare repetition is a subtle and ambiguous one, and it is at the root of Deleuze’s relation to psychoanalysis. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze gives us a highly original interpretation of the psychoanalytic symptom that brings his philosophy into a fertile but also a critical relationship with Freud and the question of psychotherapy. Before we can explore this relationship, however, it is
necessary to introduce the concept of symptom in the terms set out in the introduction to *Difference and Repetition*.

Deleuze describes his theory of the symptom in terms of the concept of “blockage”, which he derives from Leibniz, and the distinction between natural and artificial blockages corresponding to legitimate and illegitimate forms of repetition. Deleuze explains the concept of blockage as follows. According to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, there must be a concept for every individual thing, and, reciprocally, only one thing per concept; on this view, the differences between things exist only if two things differ in their concept. Likewise, two things identical with respect to their concept cannot, logically speaking, be said to be different. This is how Deleuze defines conceptual difference. If the concept of “horse” contains all the predicates that can be attributed to actual, existing horses, then, precisely because the concept is said of one thing and one thing only, it is capable of comprehending a potentially infinite number of individuals belonging to the general category of “horse”. The problem, though, is that existential difference, or difference in itself, cannot be accounted for in purely conceptual terms. There is always something in the “existent” which escapes the comprehension of concepts. In order to give a concept the power to subsume the generality of a class of objects, we must “block” its extension, since an unblocked or complete concept would necessarily only subsume a single individual. Joe Hughes explains this by asking us to imagine we are looking at a single drop of water, in which we recognise the individuality of this particular drop but also the generality of the concept “drop of water” in which it participates. “But you could also say,” says Hughes,

that this particular drop is different from all the others. It is, for example, here and not there, now and not later. And if you were God – and by no means am I implying that you aren’t – you could extend the analysis all the way to infinity. You could understand not only the drop’s relation to all other drops and to the rest of the universe at that moment, but you could see its future and you could follow the drop’s descent in reverse, all the way back up into the clouds. (Hughes 2009: 36)

Understanding an individual thing in this way is not to subsume its particularity under a general category, but means grasping its complete concept coextensive with its very existence as a thing. This would be possible only from the point of view of God or of
madness, and Deleuze says that in Leibniz there is “a kind of conceptual madness” (CVL no pagination). The point Deleuze wishes us to grasp, however, is not that we could somehow attain legitimate complete concepts, but that we may be able to distinguish between different types of blockage and form our concepts accordingly. There may be legitimate and illegitimate ways of blocking the comprehension of a concept, ways which do not follow from the logical movement of consciousness but the real movement of the thing. What Deleuze refers to as “logical blockage” is always related to limitations that he deems completely superficial and illegitimate, in that they originate from a premeditated consciousness which uses concepts not in order to grasp difference in itself but to subsume particulars under generalities. The real differences between things can then be reduced, illogically, to the order of “resemblances” (DR 12). If the particulars of a given class of objects resemble one another, and thus repeat the general characteristics of that class, this is not the kind of productive repetition Deleuze seeks since it merely serves the ends of knowledge and judgment, of a premeditated and “truth seeking” or “knowing” consciousness to which Deleuze is looking for a philosophical alternative.

As we have suggested, Deleuze’s method does not demand we try to form complete concepts but suggests we can discover legitimate forms of blockage, a kind of blockage whose origin lies not in the realm of knowledge and conscious judgments but in what he calls the “real movement” by which novelty and difference are produced. To produce something, to find new modes of living, means to “produce movement”, but to do this we need a concept of repetition distinct from generality (DR 10). To produce real movement, in contrast to the false logical movement or the movement of the concept, is the goal of “true repetition”. This, says Deleuze, involves “a pathological repetition of the passions and a repetition in art and the work of art” (DR 11). In this sense, he wishes in his concept of a productive repetition to unite an ethics or “conduct” of the lived material body with the immateriality of aesthetic signs. I began this thesis with reference to the forced movement of thought, and we must return to it here. The new is never readily accepted and recognised by consciousness (if it were recognisable it would not be genuinely new) but emerges only by forcing its way into our knowledge as a disruptive and violent force. The new emerges precisely by doing violence to our present categories, and by forcing consciousness across
the threshold which distinguishes it from the unthinking, unconscious insistence of materiality. The conscious repetition of thought, in order to encounter the new, must come up against the blind, compulsive repetition of instinct or nature. Repetition “expresses a power peculiar to the existent, a stubbornness of the existent in intuition, which resists every specification by concepts” and which acts upon consciousness as a “constraint” and a “compulsion” (DR 13-4). It is only under the conditions of constraint that a productive thought could operate.

Deleuze seeks to grasp production, then, through legitimate, or natural, blockage. He suggests that the symptom, encountered in psychoanalysis, demonstrates such a legitimate blockage but only if we understand the symptomatic productions as a kind of aesthetic practice, a kind of theatre. The tragic hero, like the neurotic, “repeats precisely because he is separated from an essential, infinite knowledge. This knowledge is in him, it is immersed in him and acts in him, but acts as something hidden, like a blocked representation” (DR 15). The hero or the neurotic repeats something “unknown” not because he or she lacks knowledge, but because he or she can only “enact” or “play” the repetition precisely through not knowing and not forming a representation of it. There is something in the experience of time, which we might call the productive nature of time, that can only be lived in the mode of not knowing. Deleuze thus forms a conception of memory, repression and the symptomatic influence of one on the other which, while heavily influenced by Freud, diverges in important respects from the standard psychoanalytic conception.

Repression and Involuntary Memory

If we ask why we, as beings who are part of nature, do not repeat in the same way nature does, if we have in some sense become alienated from the “real movement” of nature, Deleuze answers it is because of our ability to form memories. To repeat means to “produce movement” (DR 10), but the blind and compulsive repetition of natural objects is tamed by
a memorial consciousness (DR 14). It was, however, Freud who discovered in the pathologies of his patients the insistence of something which resists the work of memory. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, he famously raised the question of why people tend to repeat certain traumas in their lives, for example in symptoms and dreams. If consciousness, via memory, serves to give a recognisable form to objects, allowing consciousness to choose between objects it finds pleasurable and unpleasurable, then repetition of trauma in pathology must, Freud concluded, bear witness to the fact that the psychological principle by which pleasure is sought and unpleasure avoided is not the sole principle guiding psychic life. If the pleasure principle governs the repetitions whereby we repeat pleasurable moments, there nevertheless must be another principle capable of accounting for why certain events, experienced as unpleasurable by consciousness, are repeated. The form of memory by which we voluntarily repeat a remembered past is troubled by the emergence of some unremembered past, of some event whose traumatism has made us forcibly block it out but which we are compelled to repeat nevertheless. The pathological “compulsion to repeat”, for Freud, is “the manifestation of the power of the repressed” which appears in clinical terms as the repetition of symptoms (Freud 1991: 229).

The failure or powerlessness of the mechanism of repression, then, is co-extensive with the power or insistence of the repressed, and it is both this power and this powerlessness acting simultaneously which constitute repetition. By escaping the work of memory, which gives to past events a representation and a recognisable form, something in the experience of the passage of time re-emerges involuntarily. What escapes memory is not related to the contents of any actual memories, but to the *formal* aspect linking the contents of past and present moments. Between two moments, a past moment relating to a remembered event and a present moment in which the event is remembered, there is a paradoxical simultaneity of past and present, and hence, also, of difference and repetition. It is this paradox that emerges to trouble consciousness, since our conscious experience of time requires us to make a simple distinction between present and past. We can explain this in terms of Deleuze’s discussion of the famous scene in *Swann’s Way* in which the narrator, having tasted a madeleine cake dipped in linden tea, is flooded with memories of his youth at Combray. The two moments, one present (the madeleine) and one past (Combray), it is
true, do resemble one another in terms of their contents, since the narrator was given madeleine cake by his aunt at Combray, and this is what sparks the involuntary memory. But Deleuze suggests there is “a strict identity”, an identical quality, more profound than the resemblance of contents, between the two moments; there is “a sensation common to the two sensations or of a sensation common to the two moments” (PS 59). This identity of the past and the present is also, moreover, a difference, a difference internalised by the identity. Deleuze writes that

reminiscence is the analogue of art, and involuntary memory the analogue of a metaphor: it takes ‘two different objects,’ the madeleine with its flavour, Combray with its qualities of colour and temperature; it envelopes the one in the other, and makes their relation into something internal. (PS 60)

Repetition here is “the power of difference”, its very agency and internal, genetic or productive principle (PS 49). The emergence of time in its pure form, that is, as difference and repetition, via involuntary memory has the character of an encounter which does violence to thought. This is because, beyond every conscious recollection, there is, in the experience of time, something that escapes memory’s every attempt to grasp the passage of time. As Christopher Drohan writes, “involuntary memory assaults all our present worlds and understandings with an actual repetition of a feeling or a sensation first discovered in the past” (Drohan 2009: 72). What involuntary memory testifies to is that the being of the past cannot be determined negatively as the “not now”, but has a positive difference in itself which can be felt, and actualised, only by repeating itself in the present. The unity of the past and the present, of difference and repetition, presents us with the necessary and legitimate blockage, the point at which consciousness and its representations reach a transcendentally determined limit.6

Hence, for Deleuze phenomena of repression, and its necessary failure in the return of the repressed (symptoms, dreams, etc.), are to be accounted for in terms of repetition. In other words, repression is to be explained in terms of repetition, and not the other way around. Repression is not a simple forgetting. Rather, there is a primordial repetition which accounts for the ability both to form memories and to lose them. We could here cite Bergson’s distinction between the two types of memory. The first type relates to “the form of memory
images, all the events of our daily life as they occur in time ... By this memory is made possible the intelligent, or rather intellectual, recognition of perception already experienced”. This recollection and recognition of images is to be contrasted to the repetition of “actual movement” which “no longer represents our past to us [but] acts it”. Bergson says of these two types of memory that “the one imagines and the other repeats” (Bergson 1990: 81-2). Deleuze suggests, however, that repetition is not a form of memory per se but the very transcendental condition for remembering and forgetting as such. The compromise of memory, then, is to be explained in terms of repetition, and not the other way around:

I do not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat. I forget because I repeat. I repress, because I can live certain things or certain experiences only in the mode of repetition. I am determined to repress whatever would prevent me from living them thus: in particular, the representation which mediates the lived by relating it to the form of a similar or identical object. (DR 18)

There is in the experience of time something which escapes memorialisation, and whose emergence often thwarts the process of recollection since it makes us symptomatically “act out” instead of remember, but which is nevertheless at the heart of the lived experience of time. Deleuze in an important sense goes beyond Freud in stressing the innateness of pathology by suggesting, as Kerslake puts it, that “there is a pathological orientation built into the structure of temporality” (Kerslake 2008: 32). Thus, says Deleuze, the symptom, to the extent that this is understood in terms of repressed memory, is the mode of living that which cannot be lived in terms of the representations of consciousness. We might say that the symptom is the mode by which the productive aspect of time is lived.

Deleuze points to what he calls the hypothesis of the “inverse relation between repetition and consciousness”, which Freud describes in his paper “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through”, in which, as Deleuze explains, the therapeutic principle is put forward that “the less one remembers, the less one is conscious of remembering one’s past, the more one repeats it” (DR 15). For Freud, in the therapeutic treatment of neurosis the analyst often encounters the effects of the compulsive insistence of a repressed memory, the existence of which the patient does not consciously recognise but which he or she “acts
"out" in the relationship with the therapist: "the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it" (Freud 1958: 150). Freud says the patient may be induced, through a process of "working through", to remember the unconscious event and thus to cease "acting out". But Deleuze challenges the notion, implied here by Freud, that repetition should be understood negatively, as a mere lack of consciousness or failure of memory, and even suggests that Freud himself was not satisfied by the idea that repetition could be explained in terms of simple "amnesia" (DR 16).

Repetition, by Freud’s own account, is related not only to the psychological and empirical pleasure principle, in which pleasurable moments are consciously recalled and repeated, but also, and more fundamentally, to the repetition, indifferent as such to the contents of memory, brought about by the power of the repressed. Deleuze wishes us to grasp the distinction here between the empirical or psychological domain and the transcendental domain, the latter being the condition of the former. In this sense, the unconscious repetition of unpleasant memories is not to be defined negatively, as the result of a lack of consciousness regarding the contents of those memories. The death instinct, for Deleuze, is "transcendently positive, to the point of affirming repetition ... repetition [is] affirmed and prescribed by the death instinct" (DR 16). The question remains as to how we are to grasp the healing properties of repetition which the death instinct "prescribes".

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*Hysteria, Transference and the Wound*

We can begin to broach an answer by looking at Deleuze’s comments on Freud’s theory of hysteria as this is elaborated in the latter’s "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" which documents the case history of the patient Freud famously named "Dora". In Freud’s account, hysterical symptoms emerge when anxiety, attached to some unconscious desire
which has been repressed, is converted into physical symptoms. Freud is thus able to speak of the hysterical symptom in terms of a “symptomatic expression” which renders palpable in a disguised form some “unconscious mental content” (Freud 1977: 73). Symptoms, then, give a disguised and contrary expression to a repressed desire: “A symptom signifies the representation – the realization – of a phantasy with a sexual content” (Freud 1977: 80). The repressed, unconscious thought is given expression through a contrary thought which functions as a substitute for it. Thus, desire over-invests one thought, which Freud calls “reactive”, in order to disinvest a repressed one, this disinvestment being the effect of the repression: “The reactive thought keeps the objectionable one under repression by means of a certain surplus of intensity” (Freud 1977: 89).

In the scene Freud describes, Dora is obsessed with an adulterous affair her father is having with a woman Freud names Frau K. This obsession, Freud argues, is a reaction formed against Dora’s own desire for Frau K’s husband. Dora’s physical symptoms, her periodic loss of voice and coughing fits, are thus physical “conversions” of a surplus of psychical energy, which has been “displaced” by the repression. It is this pathological insistence of a repressed instinctual impulse which led Freud to remark that “the capacity for repeating itself is one of the characteristics of a hysterical symptom” (Freud 1977: 73). The displaced psychical energy is capable of being re-investing not just in terms of various physical symptoms but also through the repetition of scenarios. Freud maintains that this symptomatic repetition is borne out in his own interactions with Dora. If Dora’s concern for her father’s affair is a mask for her love for Herr K, then equally her love for Herr K is a mask for her love for her father. But Freud also asserts that the love for her father is a mask repressing Dora’s “homosexual (gynaecophilic) love for Frau K”, a homosexuality that was initially explored in Dora’s youthful contact with her governess (Freud 1977: 162). Finally, when Dora tells Freud that she is leaving analysis – remarking that she has given him notice “just like a governess” – it was because he, Freud, had taken the place of Herr K (Freud 1977: 160).

Deleuze says, however, that Freud’s great mistake in his analysis was to try to uncover a “bare” instance of repetition beyond the masks instead of understanding the masks themselves in terms of an internal, productive principle: “the disguises and variations, the masks and costumes, do not come ‘over and above’: they are, on the contrary, the internal
genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constituent parts” (DR 17). The repetition of disguises, the position Dora adopts with respect to Herr and Frau K., her parents, the governess and Freud himself, “is the manner in which the drives are necessarily lived” (DR 18). In other words, it is precisely through repetitions of different disguises that desire invests and thus constitutes the social world. Desire does not have a content of itself which a representation could reveal to us, but is the transcendental principle by which different contents are linked together by “blocked” representations. We will recall, from the last chapter, how Deleuze defined libido as “a neutral displaceable energy” the “reflux” of which onto the ego causes the “I” to become expressed in terms of “a series of other individuals” and impersonal selves (DR 111, LS 244). Phantasy, we argued, was the means by which these displacements are effected. There is no original content of the phantasies by which Dora’s desire is invested in her social world, “there is no first term which is repeated”, and Freud’s mistake, Deleuze maintains, was to search for one in the context of a cure. The mask is the “symbolic” or “theatrical” dimension by which repetition internalises the genetic, differential element which makes of it an affirmative principle (DR 17-19). The repetition of symptoms is a type of non-representational theatre in which what is expressed does not exist apart from its expression, and in which “the covered is everywhere the truth of the uncovered” (DR 18).

Deleuze is attracted to Freud’s concept of transference because it places repetition within the domain of therapeutic practice, and even gives to the repetition of symptoms a positive therapeutic value. Freud says that transference is a repetition of some “forgotten past”, meaning a repressed desire. This desire, having been repressed, is compelled to be repeated by taking on different disguises, and hence to take on different objects. Rank and Ferenczi, in a discussion of transference to which Deleuze refers, explain that the “analytic intervention” consists in the “setting free and detachment of the infantile libido from its fixation on its first objects” (qtd in Faulkner 2006: 46). Transference is the mode of repetition by which desire is capable of investing disparate objects, thereby escaping fixation on specific contents. Dora, in her analysis, transferred her repressed desire onto the person of Freud, and thus acted out this desire without, however, consciously “knowing” it.
Thus, the repetition of symptoms, without any knowledge of a recalled, “uncovered”
content, is given a therapeutic value by Freud:

the patient yields to the compulsion to repeat, which now replaces the impulsion to
remember ... the patient repeats instead of remembering, and repeats under the
conditions of resistance ... [The patient] repeats all his symptoms in the course of the
treatment. ... we render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the
right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it into the transference as a
playground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete freedom and in
which it is expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic instincts
that is hidden in the patient's mind ... The transference thus creates an intermediate
region between illness and real life" (Freud 1958: 151-4).

Deleuze describes transference as a “theatrical and dramatic operation by which healing
takes place”. In opposition to Freud’s view, however, transference as Deleuze envisages it
“does not so much serve to identify events, persons and passions as to authenticate the
roles and select the masks” (DR 19).

We can understand this by relating transference to Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return,
since in many ways Deleuze is pursuing a synthesis of Nietzsche and Freud. In Klossowski’s
explanation, the eternal return functions as “an ‘analytic’ cure of the will” (Klossowski 2005:
52). The will is sick because, despite however strong it may become, it remains subject to
the irreversible flow of time and must, as a result, suffer events which are contingent and
“non-willed”. There are some events the will has no control over, and to these it can only
react. The memory of these non-willed events strikes the will with a sense of powerlessness,
and this is what inspires in it its sickness, its belief in the punitive nature of existence and its
desire for revenge, what Nietzsche called resemntiment. According to Deleuze, this union of
memory and revenge is the “formula which defines sickness in general. Nietzsche is not
simply saying that resemntiment is a sickness, but rather that sickness as such is a form of
ressentiment” (NP 114). As we saw in chapter 1, Deleuze does not oppose an active, or
healthy, will to a reactive and sick one, but seeks to detect a becoming active of the
reactive. We are sick because, instead of acting our reactions we form memories of them.
Health, then, can be defined as the ability to act reactions: “the active type expresses a
relation between active and reactive forces such that the latter are themselves acted”. “The man of *ressentiment*,” on the other hand, “is characterised by the invasion of consciousness by mnemonic traces, the ascent of memory into consciousness itself”. This invasion of consciousness by memory is the effect of a failure in what Nietzsche called the “faculty of forgetting”. As Deleuze explains, “psychology’s mistake was to treat forgetting as a negative determination, not to discover its active and positive character. Nietzsche defines the faculty of forgetting as ... ‘an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression’ ... ‘a plastic, regenerative and curative force’” (NP 111-4). Or, as Kerslake writes, “the only action that can overcome the pathology of time is repetition” (Kerslake 2007: 34).

Forgetting is curative because it allows reaction to be acted instead of remembered. The ethical and practical imperative of the eternal return, as Deleuze describes it, is “whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return” (NP 68). The “remedy” the eternal return prescribed for *ressentiment*, then, as Klossowski points out, “is to re-will the non-willed ... thereby rendering it unaccomplished by re-willing it innumerable times. ... In re-willing, the self changes, it becomes other” (Klossowski 2005: 52-3). This re-willing involves reliving the non-willed event in such a way that challenges its irreversible character, and thus expresses it anew, countering its actualisation and extracting from it a virtual field of potentialities left unaccomplished in it. This is what gives the eternal return its peculiar sense of *amor fati*. But this is a fatalism oriented towards the future, since in reliving the past we affirm the pure power of contingency and make of our inability to calculate future events not a weakness but a virtue. To re-will the powerlessness of the will in this way would be to realise the latter’s greatest power.

In emphasising the ethical, but also the lived, embodied character of the eternal return, Deleuze drew inspiration from the poet Joe Bousquet who, having been wounded in the First World War spent much of his life paralysed and confined to bed. Deleuze was particularly fascinated with the sentiment Bousquet expressed with the line “my wound existed before me, I was born to embody it” (LS 169). Ferdinand Alquié wrote how the poet experienced, following his injury, a kind of rebirth effected simultaneously through his wound and the literary expression it provoked: “Bousquet considered his wound as a sort of birth, annulling his birth in the flesh. ... So, mortally wounded, he seemed to us no longer
mortal. He had ceased to be a child of Nature to become one of events" (Alquié 1969: 169-70). For Deleuze, the importance of this is that Bousquet through his writing was able to re-will the event of his wounding so as to liberate what was impersonal and singular in it, to reveal its “eternal truth”, and thus to escape some of its debilitating effects:

[Bousquet] apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as a pure event. ... The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. ... Bousquet goes on to say “Become the man of your misfortunes; learn to embody their perfection and brilliance.” Nothing more can be said, and no more has ever been said: to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn. (LS 170)

The eternal return exhorts us to become the actor of the non-willed events which strike us, and thereby to disengage the truth of the event, its infinite and eternal nature, from its actualisation in bodily depth. “The actor ... actualizes the event, but in a way which is entirely different from the actualization of the event in the depth of things” (LS 171). The wound thus marks the threshold separating the event’s actualisation in the body from its incorporeal or immaterial double by which it becomes possible to extract from the pathology of bodily suffering a purely symbolic element which ameliorates that suffering but is also produced by it. The event relates to a pure expression, distinct from the states of affairs expressed. Paradoxically, it is only by detaching the event from its actualisation in bodies that we can truly embody it (Ansell Pearson 1999: 124). This is why the event has an intimate relation to language, and why the truth of the event is also in some sense the truth of language. In Alquié’s words, Bousquet was able to forge from his injury an “ethic of language”: “instead of deploring the insufficiency of words and taking refuge by a facile movement in some ineffable experience, [Bousquet] prefers language to himself and, with language, the objective tissue of his life” (Alquié 1969: 170-1). In considering the contingency of events, we must turn now to Deleuze’s conception of death, and complete our discussion of his reading of Freud’s concept of the death instinct. Deleuze regards death as having both a personal and destructive as well as an impersonal and creative side. We must complete our account of Deleuze’s reading of the death instinct in order to see how an
impersonal death links up with a productive repetition, and thus to clarify the role of mortality in the literary clinic.

The Productive Death Instinct

As we suggested in chapter 1, Deleuze is critical of Freud's formulation of the death instinct as the tendency to erase differences and return the organism to inorganic indifference and an abyssal non-being. Freud felt that the "compulsion to repeat" could ultimately be separated out from the symptomatic disguises by which the repetitions were performed so that a bare and brute form of objectivity inhabiting the unconscious could be revealed. This objectivity, Freud eventually concluded, was none other than an inbuilt desire for death possessed by all organic life. The instinctual impulses of Eros contribute to an increase in the quantity of energetic excitation within the organism, which the organism at some level experiences as traumatic, and it is only through the discharge of this tension that the organism can be returned to a desired state of equilibrium. Freud supposed from this that the pleasure principle is subordinated by a more dominant, but far less garrulous, principle by which all life is drawn towards a state of total inertia, and thus discerned an irremediable conflict and unresolvable opposition between the drives to preserve life, Eros, and the drives to destroy it, Thanatos. Thus, Freud argued that the pleasure principle, even if it functions as a means of preserving life by steering the organism away from unpleasurable experiences, ultimately serves a tendency linked not to life but to its opposite:

the dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli ... a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our recognition of that fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death instincts. (Freud 1991: 261)
The search for a state of energetic constancy through tension reduction is, as Arnheim puts it, for Freud “not only dominant but indeed the only genuinely primary tendency of the organism. ... There is no inherent drive towards higher development, perfection, novelty” (Arnheim 1971: 45). The opposition of life and death can only be played out via this entropic tendency towards tension reduction. Deleuze however questions Freud’s oppositional model of Eros and Thanatos. As we will recall from chapter 1, Deleuze argues that the pleasure principle is what grounds the empirical field of organic life, but that death is the transcendental principle which gives to this ground a “non-ground”. If this non-ground is “empty” this is not because it is some sort of lack or insufficiency, but because it is the transcendental principle of grounding. The relation between transcendental and empirical is not an opposition but the paradoxical identity of repetition and difference, of a difference which can only become empirical through repeating itself: “Eros and Thanatos are distinguished in that Eros must be repeated, can be lived only through repetition, whereas Thanatos (as transcendental principle) is that which gives repetition to Eros, that which submits Eros to repetition” (DR 18). It is illegitimate, in this sense, to assert that Thanatos be regarded, according to the material model of death, as non-being, since it only appears in conjunction with Eros as the latter’s hidden face. If death is destructive, this is only because destruction is a necessary condition of creation. If Thanatos is the silent partner of Eros, as Deleuze contends, then it is nevertheless unwarranted to deny the former its positive and productive character.

The death instinct must be understood as distinct from organic and personal death. Deleuze distinguishes between two different faces of death, just as he distinguishes between two different kinds of repetition. In order to understand this distinction, we must make a brief detour through Blanchot’s theory of literature. For Blanchot, there are two ways an author can relate to his or her work: either as a means to evade death and attain immortality (as Joyce famously said), or as a means to discover the power to die, to find “in extreme negativity – in death become possibility, project, and time – the measure of the absolutely positive” (Blanchot 1982: 91). It is with this latter attitude that Blanchot links Kafka. For Kafka, writing was a means to die, to make death possible, in that it signified a withdrawal from the “world of men”, of the responsibilities of work and family life. Blanchot
emphasises that for Kafka this withdrawal was requisite for answering the demand the work of writing made on him. But "the fact of being deprived of life does not guarantee the happy possession of death; it does not make death acceptable except in a negative fashion" (Blanchot 1982: 92-3). In other words, then, Kafka was faced with the problem of how to make death positive and affirmative, since this is in no way guaranteed by a simple withdrawal from, or negation of, life. If Kafka's work is successful in this respect then it must be read as the greatest affirmation of life, even if it is also, necessarily, an affirmation of death. This, as we shall see, is ultimately what Deleuze and Guattari argue in their work on Kafka.

It follows then that death is necessarily double, in that the negative death involving the withdrawal from life is not at all the same as the positive death which affirms a life distinct from the psychological and biographical contents of personal identity and intersubjective experience. Blanchot discusses this duality of death in his meditations on suicide. In wanting to die one wishes to affirm the present "instant" in which one's own death is taken as an object of the will: "I want to kill myself in an 'absolute' instant, the only one which will not pass and will not be surpassed" (Blanchot 1982: 103). In willing one's death one attempts to render the instant absolutely present. But this is quite impossible, in that it would require that the present not pass, that all past and future could be banished from the present. Suicide is the attempt to abolish the splitting or crack that, as we saw in chapter 1, constitutes the "I" of subjectivity, the means by which the "I" produces itself as a self-affection internal to time. The fundamental impossibility of suicide derives from the fact that if "I" kill myself it is not the same "I" which dies but necessarily an other: "Do I myself die, or do I not rather die always other from myself, so that we would have to say that properly speaking I do not die" (Blanchot 1982: 98). Blanchot's meditations on death are a key inspiration for Deleuze's conception of life as an impersonal force. If there is an "other" in the "I", this means that there is a life running through us distinct from the life identified with our personality, our biography and our organic cohesion. But this impersonal, inorganic life is nevertheless ineradicable and ever present in our day to day experience, not at all in opposition to it but more its underside or double, and if it is in excess of and threatening to
our organic constitution and personal identity it also in an important sense stirs up a desire to follow its disruptive path.

If suicide is the attempt to render the "instant" absolutely present, to "apotheosise" the instant (Blanchot 1982: 103), then this attempt fails in two distinct ways according to Deleuze. Firstly, the present can be swallowed up by an ever greater present asserting the physical persistence of things, all the way to cosmic eternity. The present is subverted by an augmentation of itself both backwards and forwards in time to the point where it is no longer related to a "good" or measurable instant but to an immeasurable unity of all physical causes. Deleuze names this time Chronos, and says it is related to a "becoming-mad of depth" and "the movement of schizophrenia" connoting the cannibalistic, self-swallowing alimentary drives of the Kleinian unconscious (LS 187-8). But the living present is also subverted in another manner, and in accordance with another time, which Deleuze calls Aion, in which the instant is split across the infinitesimal line dividing past and future. The present for Aion is infinitely thin, always either approaching or receding:

>Aion stretches out in a straight line, limitless in either direction. Always already passed and eternally yet to come, Aion is the eternal truth of time: *pure empty form* of time, which has freed itself of its present corporeal content ... If there is a death wish (*vouloir-mourir*) on the side of Aion, it would be totally different. (LS 189)

It is the transition from the time constituting physical contents to the one concerning effects, from depths to surfaces and from actualisations to their re-willing as pure events, which constitutes for Deleuze the nature of literary creation and which justifies the orientation of literature towards health. Deleuze is in agreement with Freud's position that the organic constitution of subjectivity involves some innate trauma, that bodily depth is irreducibly traumatic. But Deleuze's emphasis on the idea of great health means that this is not an incorrigible situation, and he discovers, in writers such as William S. Burroughs and F. Scott Fitzgerald, "a strafing of the surface in order to transmute the stabbing of bodies" (LS 183). This transmutation is potentially healing, but by no means without risks; the intersections of bodies at the level of depth "succeed or fail in the production of ideal
surfaces” (LS 191, my emphasis). Furthermore, the risk is necessarily double, a “merging of the extremes” of “bottomless depth” and a “generalized debacle of surfaces” (LS 277).

The Delirium of Interpretation

How are we to relate all of this to the formalism of the literary clinic, and how is the concept of production to be squared with that of interpretation? For Deleuze, illness always relates to a blockage of the life process: “neuroses and psychoses are not passages of life, but states into which we fall when the process is interrupted, blocked, or plugged up. Illness is not a process but a stopping of the process” (CC 3). Symptoms are the effects of blockages, since the process by which we go from depth to surface is one especially prone to disturbances. Neurosis and psychosis are for Deleuze “the adventure of depth”. But if it is possible to attain a legitimate concept of blockage, a concept not derived from representational consciousness but one which regards consciousness itself as a blockage, then it also becomes possible to regard blockage not simply in terms of negation or limitation but as a positive, genetic principle. The disturbances of depth disrupt the structuration of language and perception which renders depth “liveable”. These disruptions however “do not simply disorganize the world but, on the contrary, open up a possibility of salvation” (LS 353-4). Thus, the blockage which causes an illness can also be regarded in creative terms, as the production of signs connoting a new health in the form of a new surface. We begin to leave the domain of symptomatology, which operates in terms of the re-ordering of immaterial signs, in which signs are related to other signs in an interpretive manner, and enter the domain of pragmatics, which emphasises the material production of signs.

We would be mistaken to oppose interpretation and pragmatics here, since for Deleuze interpretation and production correspond to the same process understood in distinct ways. In the preface to the second part of Proust and Signs published in 1972, Deleuze explains
why he returned to the subject of Proust after eight years: “The first part of this book deals with the emission and interpretation of signs as presented in In Search of Lost Time. The other part ... deals with a different problem: the production and multiplication of the signs themselves”. Deleuze continues: “interpretation is the converse of a production of signs themselves. The work of art not only interprets and not only emits signs to be interpreted; it produces them, by determinable procedures” (PS ix-xi).

Proust and Signs taken in its entirety examines Proust’s novel in terms of the adventure of thought: the narrator of the Search is the apprentice of signs, the thinker, who becomes sensitive to the different types of signs: the “worldly” signs corresponding to social reality, the signs of love, the signs of sensuality and nature, and the signs of art (PS 24). As Deleuze writes, “the Recherche is a general semiology, a symptomatology of different worlds” (N 142). The narrator’s search for the “meaning” or “truth” of these signs involves interpretation, but what Deleuze argues is that the interpretive process is necessarily tied to a non-resemblance, a fundamental falseness, between the interpreted signs and the desired truth. For example, Deleuze says that jealousy “contains love’s truth” (P 9). Hence, “the jealous man experiences a tiny thrill of joy when he can decipher one of the beloved’s lies, like an interpreter who succeeds in translating a complicated text”. The philosopher is like the jealous man, in that he realises how “the truth is not to be found by affinity, nor by goodwill” but is to be attained only in a betrayal by signs (P 15). There is no identity or resemblance of the sign’s meaning and the object designated. As Christopher Drohan writes, “the material origin (i.e. designation) of the sign of love is existentially blocked, and our attention is instead devoted entirely to its significance” (Drohan 2009: 42 my emphasis). The truth of the sign is this blockage, just as the truth of the interpretive process lies in its failure. This is why the most profound order of signs is the signs of art, since the latter are empty of content, “dematerialized”, composing the transcendental difference by which empirical differences become material and significant (P 41). Thus, the signs of art have a privileged relation to all the other signs, in that they tell us about the relation between a sign and its meaning, about the very process of semiosis.

If interpretation and production are converse sides of one another, then how are we to understand the conversion from one to the other? The literary clinic has an important
explanatory role here. Deleuze argues that madness is the means by which we should understand the conversion to production. He gives the example of Charlus:

anyone who listens to Charlus or who meets his gaze finds himself confronting a secret, a mystery to be penetrated, to be interpreted, which he presents from the start as likely to proceed to the point of madness. And the necessity of interpreting Charlus is based on the fact that this Charlus himself interprets, as if that were his own madness, as if that were already his delirium, a delirium of interpretation. (PS 172)

The signs of art already suggest this delirium, since they bring the interpreter to the point where the secret appears no longer in material objects but in the signs which mask and conceal them. Art leads us to this point of madness where interpretation passes the threshold to production, where the interpretation of signs gives way to their productive proliferation. Interpretation leads us from the immaterial sign to the material object, and culminates with the revelation that the truth of the object is its dematerialisation in signs. Production seems to go in the opposite direction, from materiality to its expression in signs, with the revelation that signified meanings have their truth in an asignifying and meaningless matter. Meaning is thus the self-expression, or autoproduction, of the meaningfulness of materiality. As Deleuze writes, “expression is not itself production, but becomes such on its second level, as attributes in turn express themselves” (EP 14). Production is the self-expression or autoproduction of what is expressed. In order to better understand this, we need briefly to consider some of Deleuze’s remarks on Spinoza since the concept of production is in many ways a Spinozist one.

Deleuze argues that Spinoza's method comprises a “productive deduction” (EP 139). What production means is that, once possessed of a true, that is, adequate, idea of cause, all subsequent ideas will necessarily be true. A true idea follows from a true idea as if one were produced by the other. Now, Spinoza conceived of the universe (“God or nature”) as a self-producing substance. We, as parts of this substance are nevertheless alienated from it through an ignorance of causes, which is due to our constitution as conscious beings. Spinoza believed that the root of human ignorance lay in the conjunction of bodily sensation and the imagination:
When the human mind regards external bodies through ideas of the affections of its own body, then we say that it imagines ... and the mind cannot in any other way ... imagine external bodies as actually existing. And so ... insofar as the mind imagines external bodies, it does not have adequate knowledge of them. (Spinoza 1996: 50)

Spinoza gives the example of the sun, which we “imagine” to be about 200 feet away. We are mistaken in the true distance of the sun not because we lack knowledge, “not because we do not know its true distance”, Spinoza insists, “but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our body is affected by the sun” (Spinoza 1996: 54). Spinoza conceives of ignorance in a quite literally pathological manner, with all the positivity of a disease: without a clear understanding of causes, we suffer passions (passive affections) to the extent that we are no more than mere effects of these causes: we feel the heat of the sun, we estimate the sun to be a disc 200 feet away. Deleuze presses home the kinship he sees between Spinoza and Nietzsche on this point: to the extent that we are embodied, knowing beings, we are separated from what we can do, and thus suffer. If we literally suffer from ignorance, then, for Spinoza, the only thing capable of explaining this suffering is the body. It is because we are embodied that we possess the “power” to suffer (EP 311).

If bodily affections are the positive principles of our ignorance, then if we could somehow attain an adequate knowledge of causes, an idea, that is, of God or nature as self-producing substance, then bodily affection would acquire a productive and therefore demystifying capacity. But how are we to attain knowledge of causes given our subjection to effects? Deleuze answers: through a fiction (EP 137). If we lack knowledge of causes, this is because we only know effects, and in searching for an ultimate cause we go from effect to effect, or from sign to sign, in an infinite regress. But Deleuze says it is possible to “feign a cause” on the basis of an effect (EP 161). We can, for example, “explain [a sphere] by the movement of a semicircle: the cause is certainly fictitious, since nothing in Nature is produced in such a way; it is nonetheless a ‘true perception’” (EP 137). In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari say that delirium gives us such “a true consciousness of a false movement, a true perception of an apparent objective movement” (AO 11). Charlus’s delirium reveals a pathos which is the conversion of an interpretation, organised by the logos of truth, or the search for
causes, into a production of signs which follows no organisation but rather a principle of “transverse communication”, in which effects are connected to other effects (PS 174). The role of madness is to “convert” interpretation to production, that is, madness gives us an adequate idea of our subjection to effects, to signs.

The Proper Name as the Order-Word of Literature

The conversion to production has a prescriptive, imperative motive, as Deleuze makes clear: “you must produce the unconscious. Produce it, or be happy with your symptoms, your ego, and your psychoanalyst” (TRM 81). How are we to understand this in terms of the literary clinic? We saw that the use of proper names to identify diseases is associated with the creation of new formal entities through the ordering and re-ordering of signs. The proper name emits these signs in the same way that it liberates anonymous singularities through the “I” that becomes other via the crack and the wound. But this liberation is not without ambiguity; it is tied to a prescriptive power, a compulsion and a constraint. Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language, and in particular their theory of names, embodies this ambiguity of prescription and liberation. Naming expresses a certain power of language to classify and to order; as Alan Henderson Gardiner has put it, “a proper name is a word in which the identifying, and consequently the distinguishing, power of the word-sound is exhibited in its purest and most compelling form” (Gardiner 1954: 38). Deleuze and Guattari, however, argue that while the proper name is “at the limit and still part of classification” it is also “outside the limits of classification and of another nature” (ATP 541). A name no doubt confers an identity and compels an order, but it is also necessarily immune to this order and free of this identity. This is because a name can designate the thing it names only on the basis of never being able to name its own process of nomination. Language can designate empirical objects only on the condition of an infinite series of designations it cannot itself designate empirically. As Deleuze writes: 123
if we call each proposition of consciousness a 'name', it is caught in an indefinite nominal regress, each name referring to another name which designates the sense of the preceding ... the inability of empirical consciousness here corresponds to the 'nth' power of language and its transcendent repetition to be able to speak infinitely of or about words themselves. (DR 155)

Now, Deleuze and Guattari link this paradox of reference to their social critique of power through the concept of the "order-word" (mot d'ordre), which, as Mogens Laerke glosses it, is "a word which at the same time commands and makes an order pass" (Laerke 1999: 94). The order-word, through the power of speech, makes something happen in the world. A judge, for example, can hand down a verdict and immediately effect a transformation so that the accused becomes a convict. But if words alone bring about this transformation, these words belong no more to the judge than to anyone else because they implicitly presuppose a collective history of juridical statements and acts. The identifying power of naming is dependent on something perfectly collective and anonymous, a collective assemblage of enunciation which has no direct relation to me or my identity but which is nevertheless invoked whenever I speak. The order-word accomplishes something in the world, but this is not because it possesses some special capacity to reach beyond language. On the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari assert that the order-word’s power is the infinite self-referential power of language. If a verdict transforms the body of the accused into the body of the convict, this is nevertheless an incorporeal transformation, a transformation which can only exist via the expressivity of language and the immateriality of signs: “The transformation applies to bodies but is itself incorporeal, internal to enunciation. There are variables of expression that establish a relation between language and its outside, but precisely because they are immanent to language” (ATP 82). The order-word works by a dual process, in that it brings about a transformation but also expresses the transformation it has brought about: “each statement accomplishes an act and the act is accomplished in the statement ... [T]he simultaneity of the statement [expresses] the transformation and the effect the transformation produces” (ATP 79-81).

The order-word is thus the redundancy of the act and the statement. I speak, and make something happen with speech, but this “happening” is the immaterial attribute expressed
in the sense of what I say. If the order-word presupposes the infinite objective self-referentiality of language (the paradox of names), then it also institutes a doubling in which subjectivity is split. We have already considered this split subject in terms of the crack and the wound, but Deleuze and Guattari reformulate this in explicitly linguistic terms in their work on Kafka where, following Lacan, they distinguish between a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement, the subject who speaks and the subject who is denoted as “I”. Deleuze and Guattari discern this duality in particular in Kafka’s letters: the subject of enunciation is the “form of expression”, the formal expressivity by which the letter is written, while the subject of the statement is “the form of content that the letter is speaking about”, the personal contents designated by the “I” (K 30). It is this duality, instituted by his proper name, which allows Kafka, beginning with his letters and diaries, to produce his literary corpus. For Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka is the most personal and also the most impersonal of writers, since, if his work seems to be mainly about his own situation, his own interior life dominated by guilt and feelings of personal inadequacy, this is only a ruse or imposture, a fiction, by which a purely impersonal and expressive life is given free reign within the pages of his work.

In essence, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka was able to effect a “reversal of the duality of the two subjects”, separating the personal contents of the subject of the statement from the formal expressivity of the subject of enunciation so that the personal subject could switch places with the purely expressive subject, “the subject of the statement taking on that real movement that is normally the province of the subject of the enunciation” (K 31). Real movement is here defined as the spontaneous subjective act of utterance, what Lacan associated with desire and the unconscious, which is “transferred”, Deleuze and Guattari insist, onto the “I” of the linguistic statement. As Lecercle writes, “the sensuous force of the embodiment is transferred ... to a non-sensuous, abstract, semiotic pattern” (Lecercle 2002: 52). Kafka let his personal subjectivity become part of the impersonal and collective writing process, the personological contents being in this way subjected to transference by the act of writing. Deleuze and Guattari give, as an example of this, Kafka’s story “The Judgment”, in which the protagonist, Georg, a “young merchant” who works with his father, writes a letter to a friend living in Russia, described as a
"permanent bachelor" (Kafka 2005: 77). Before he is able to send the letter the protagonist is confronted by his father who charges his son with fabricating the Russian correspondent. The Russian friend for Deleuze and Guattari signifies a “potential subject of the statement”, taking on the “real movement” of desire which Kafka, as subject of enunciation, transferred to him (K 31).

If Kafka was able to flee from the duties of work, family and marriage through his writing, this does not mean that we should oppose the work to the life but that we should see Kafka as having overcome this opposition through the introduction of life into literature (K 41). Writing takes on the movement of life, and vice versa, via a series of escapes and captures, deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call in Kafka's case the “K function”. The liberating movement associated with the proper name is, as we have been discussing, always attached to its opposite, to modes of capture and to the threat of the return of personal contents. At the end of “The Judgement” during the confrontation between Georg and his father the latter claims the identity of the Russian friend: “his father [emphasised] the point with stabs of his forefinger. ‘I’ve been representing him here on the spot.’” (Kafka 2005: 86). With the appropriation of the Russian bachelor by the father, and the subsequent return of guilt, the subject of the statement once again becomes aligned with the personal contents of the proper name. The father, recognising the son’s guilt, pronounces his judgment: “‘An innocent child, yes, that you were, truly, but still more truly have you been a devilish human being! – And therefore take note: I sentence you now to death by drowning!’” (Kafka 2005: 87). The return of the personal and familial, the appropriation of the Russian friend, is a veritable death sentence. Georg flees from his father’s room and throws himself into the water, “[swinging] himself over [the railings], like the distinguished gymnast he had once been” (Kafka 2005: 88). The ending of “The Judgment” suggests that if the order-word compels obedience it also induces a line of flight or escape which subverts compliance. Every capture by language and linguistic forms leads to something which always escapes this capture, leading to a continuous variation or “metamorphosis” of forms.

“I is an order-word”, Deleuze and Guattari argue, in the dual sense that it signifies the personal contents of the individual while freeing “the multiplicities pervading him or her, at
the outcome of the most severe operation of depersonalization” (ATP 84, 37). My proper
name is an order-word of untold magnitude; it is the involuntary sign par excellence, basing
itself on a collective system of linguistic presuppositions which tie me to my identity.
Deleuze writes that “all production starts from a sign and presupposes the depth and
darkness of the involuntary” (P 147). My name is ultimately the violent sign that forces me
to produce, to leave my identity behind, precisely because there is something in the name
which no identity can satisfy. If the order-word “carries a little death sentence” it also
portends something else, a call to arms or order to flee (ATP 79). The father’s judgment and
the son’s guilt together produce something that leads beyond the narrow territory of
familial neurosis. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka’s apparently classic case of Oedipal
shame and guilt is something of a comedic exaggeration. He achieves a comic
“amplification” of Oedipus (similar to the derisory image of the father produced by Masoch)
by pushing it to the extreme of a legal proceeding in which both father and son stand
accused on a shared dock (K 9). Psychoanalytic readers of Kafka, such as Marthe Robert, are
mistaken when they interpret the images and figures in Kafka’s texts as ciphers of familial
themes. The mistake, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is one of cause and effect, or means
and ends. Oedipus, for Kafka, functions along the lines of a feigned cause. If the letters seem
to be a reservoir of neurosis, this is because they are “the motor force that, by the blood
they collect, start the whole machine working” (K 35).

It is thus Oedipus which is produced by neurosis, and not the other way around (K 10).
Oedipus is not the real cause of the captures which are effected in its name, but functions,
in Kafka’s hands, as a means to draw ever closer to the real, i.e. social and political, causes
of repression. Behind the images of the family, there are always other “diabolical” forces at
work in the social field which bring about the capture of desire. Desire is, from the very
beginning, invested in this social field and Oedipus is only ever a sort of preliminary
production, a means of accessing far greater productive forces. If this revelation is of
diagnostic importance, in that it shows familial repression to be in fact social and political
repression, it also has a profound therapeutic effect, since via the investment of the social
field desire is able to free itself from oedipal capture: “insofar as the comic expansion of
Oedipus allows one to see these other oppressor triangles through the lens of a microscope,
there appears at the same time the possibility of an escape” (K 12). This escape is what allowed Kafka’s writing machine, through the specificity of its procedure, to leave the genre of the letters, in which guilt still predominated, and start towards the more impersonal and artistic domains of the stories and the novels. We now turn to a consideration of this procedure.

Kafka’s Procedure

Kafka’s writing participates in a therapeutic and creative procedure in which Oedipus functions both as the feigned cause of the writing machine and as the main obstacle to be overcome. Kafka works “by a certain method, both a procedure (procédure) of expression and an operation (procédé) of content” (K 78). The writing machine “must break forms” by liberating personological contents from their expressions, these contents being then taken up by new forms which transform the contents into something else: “When a form is broken, one must reconstruct the content that will necessarily be part of a rupture in the order of things” (K 28). Kafka’s breaking apart of formed contents is here one with a great “respect for forms” (K 85). The procedure, even if it is productive is also a formalism. Ian Buchanan has described the procedure in the following way:

the artist empties the procedure (form of expression) of its pathological associations (form of content), which is where technique comes into the equation. ... The procedure is able to absorb artistic content only to the extent that it can expunge the personal from its form of expression; the more impersonal it can become, the more artistic it can be. (Buchanan 2000: 101-2)

The goal of the procedure is not to isolate content from form, but to put form and content into a mutual imbrication. Deleuze and Guattari begin their work on Kafka by emphasising two elements constituting a repeated motif in Kafka’s works: the bent or beaten head and
the photo or portrait, which are joined as form of content and form of expression respectively:

the connecting of two relatively independent forms, the form of content (bent head) and the form of expression (portrait-photo) ... causes a functional blockage, a neutralization of experimental desire – the untouchable, unkissable, forbidden, enframed photo that can only take pleasure ([jouir] from its own sight, like that desire blocked by the roof of the ceiling, a submissive desire that can only take pleasure from its own submission. And also a desire that imposes submission, propagates it: a desire that judges and condemns. (K 4)

In the opening of The Castle, for example, K. discovers on the wall of the inn where he is lodging a portrait “of a man about fifty. His head was sunk so low upon his breast that his eyes were scarcely visible, and the weight of the high, heavy forehead and the strong hooked nose seemed to have borne the head down” (Kafka 1999: 280). By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari point to a distinct motif, equally frequent in Kafka’s work, joining the straightened head as the form of content to the musical sound as the form of expression: “The head that straightens, that bursts through the roof or the ceiling, seems an answer to the bent head” (K 4). The head, straightening up, calls forth a new form of expression, the musical sound or sonorous material that appears, for example, in the form of the violin played by Gregor’s sister near the end of “The Metamorphosis”: “Gregor, attracted by the playing, ventured to move forward a little until his head was actually inside the living room” (Kafka 2005: 130). The oedipal image of the bent head blocks experimental desire, makes desire submit and propagate submission through a return of personal contents, feelings of shame, guilt and inadequacy. But from this very impasse the criteria for an escape from it are produced: a nascent line of flight is extracted from the bent and submissive head, and a pure expressivity is extracted from the photo. Kafka in a sense never left the Oedipal milieu, but for this reason he never stopped fleeing it. As he wrote in the letter to his father: “I have not lost my family sense, on the contrary it endures, but as a negative sense which spurs my (naturally never ending) inner flight from you” (Kafka 2008: 47).

Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka, through the proliferation of photos and portraits, attains a “blowup” or delirious exaggeration of the father and the impasse he represents,
pointing to the proliferation of photos and portraits throughout The Trial, from the photos in Fraulein Burstner’s room to the obscene images in the judges’ books and the tableaux in Titorelli’s studio (K 61). The oedipal problematic is expanded in this way into a world historical problematic: “the photo of the father, expanded beyond all bounds will be projected onto the geographic, historical, and political map of the world. ... One might saw that in projecting the photo ... Kafka unblocks the impasse that is specific to the photo and invents a way out” (K 10). A way out is found in the animal stories, but these too are subject to their specific failures: Gregor clings to the maternal picture of the woman in furs towards the end of “The Metamorphosis” (Kafka 1999: 118). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “The Metamorphosis” is an example of how Kafka’s “becoming-animal finds itself blocked for a moment” by the reintroduction of an oedipal image on which the animal reterritorialises (K 14). But, Deleuze and Guattari insist that these blockages are necessary for Kafka’s writing to develop. Without blockages, no escapes or lines of flight would be induced. Kafka reaches something of a dead end with the animal stories, as suggested by the re-oedipalisation and death of Gregor, or the death of the hunger artist among the caged circus animals (Kafka 2005: 277). But it was this dead end that spurred the development of the novels (K 54). Every escape is accompanied by a specific re-capture, just as every deterritorialisation is inseparable from a reterritorialisation (AO 347).

Deleuze and Guattari see Kafka’s literary evolution, then, in terms of a sort of discontinuous continuity, what Deleuze elsewhere refers to as a broken line of flight (D 8). The line of flight is inseparable from its impasses, the writing machine from its breakdowns. The result of the procedure is to transmute the blockages of desire into “discontinuous blocks”, which are nevertheless contiguous, marking the new departures and thresholds in the work (K 72, 78). This is the prescriptive value of production: what is produced is not a smooth functioning but a malfunctioning. Deleuze echoes Artaud’s suggestion that “the body, and especially the ailing body, is like an overheated factory” (DI 232). Desire produces, but only in terms of the blockages and impasses which strike it and threaten it with immobility. In the next half of this thesis we will see how this principle joins together the immateriality of signs with the actions and passions of the material body, which, up until now, the literary clinic has treated as somewhat separate domains. The schizoanalytic turn to production brings about not an
end to the critical and the clinical project but a new conception of their relation to one another, what Deleuze described as the identity of criticism with the clinic, in which the critical concern with signs, on the one hand, and the clinical concern with the impasses and blockages of desire on the other could be articulated as a single concern (D 89).

Notes:

1. Williams has remarked on the importance of Deleuze’s readings of Freud, remarking that they are interesting since they carry through an interest in a redefinition of health and cure that can be traced back to Nietzsche and Philosophy and that carries through to Essays Critical and Clinical if not right to Deleuze’s last and very beautiful essay ‘L’Immanence: une vie’. (Williams 2003: 49)

2. Joe Hughes’ excellent book Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation makes the point that Difference and Repetition’s main goal, despite appearances, is to distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of representation (Hughes 2008: 119). This point seems less contentious once we understand that, for Deleuze, a representation is internal to the genetic principles of its production.

3. These are concerns which come originally from Deleuze’s early work on Hume. Lack of space prevents me from going into a discussion of it here, but Deleuze published a succinct summary the same year, interestingly, as Anti-Oedipus (see PI 39). For analysis of Deleuze on Hume, see Bell 2009.

4. Hughes argues that the theory of production found in Anti-Oedipus is already worked out in Difference and Repetition in relation to temporal synthesis.
Production, in this sense, means, ultimately, the “production of the empty form of time” (Hughes 2008: 127).

5. For an excellent discussion of Deleuze on trauma in relation to Bergson, Janet and Freud, see Kerslake 2007: 31-5.

6. On the general theme of the transcendental unconscious, see the special issue of *Pli* (Broadhurst 1992).

7. See Deleuze’s remarks on Freud in relation to Nietzsche (NP 112).

8. Brent Adkins (2009) has argued that Deleuze, in this sense, must be distinguished from the tradition of the “philosophy of death” which has persisted from Socrates to Heidegger.

9. Williams writes that “Deleuze ... [describes] suicide as the attempt to bring together both faces of death, as if there was a right time and way to die” (Williams 2003: 10).

10. Lacan writes:

    Once the structure of language has been recognised in the unconscious, what sort of subject can we conceive for it?

    We can try, with methodological rigour, to set out from the strictly linguistic definition of the I as signifier, in which there is nothing but the ‘shifter’ or indicative, which, in the subject of the statement, designates the subject in the sense that he is now speaking.

    That is to say, it designates the subject of the enunciation, but it does not signify it. (Lacan 1977: 298)
This chapter engages directly with the relation between the literary clinic, as a formalist and vitalist literary criticism, and schizoanalysis, the social and political critique Deleuze devised with Guattari. I argue that the literary clinic plays a vital role in schizoanalysis, and that Deleuze's interest in clinical phenomena did not abate during his collaboration with Guattari. I also argue, however, that the literary clinic changes in a manner which reflects the development of the concerns of schizoanalysis. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to register these changes and to account for the role played by the literary clinic in terms of the goals of the schizoanalytic project with the aim of demonstrating the relevance one has for the other.

Schizoanalysis represents an important departure for the literary clinic in that it signals a shift in emphasis from symptomatology and diagnosis to production. If symptomatology was diagnostic, schizoanalysis is concerned with the modes by which neurosis and psychosis are produced, what I understand as their social and political pathogenesis. For this reason, we can no longer speak of an immaterial semiosis, on the one hand, and a material life process on the other, but one and the same process inextricable from its blockages, displacements, breakdowns and breakthroughs. For this reason, it is necessary to speak of what Deleuze refers to as the strict identity of the critical and the clinical.

It is crucial to remember that Deleuze and Guattari draw on the language of pathology not simply or primarily for descriptive reasons but also for prescriptive ones. Oedipus and schizophrenia function in schizoanalysis as concepts with a degree of universality. Schizoanalysis argues that literary authors, more than psychoanalysis or psychiatry, have been able to grasp desire as a pure process distinct from its subordination to forms of social reproduction, and for this reason Deleuze and Guattari draw heavily on literature. Psychotherapy and psychiatry, they argue, misconceive both neurosis and psychosis by understanding them in terms of a diagnostic picture which mediates desire and relates it to notions of normality based on social consensus. The schizoanalytic theory of desire, on the
other hand, furnishes “immanent criteria” derived from a productive, and not a diagnostic, understanding, with neurotic and psychotic illness conceived as “products” stemming from blockages in the process of production. If literature illuminates this process, it can also find means of overcoming and “transmuting” these blockages.

Schizoanalysis exposes a bias, originating with Freud, in which the theory of desire is skewed by an ideal of normality generated by the exigencies of the therapeutic process. If this process is “interminable”, if the cure does not lead to health but to a normalisation of the illness, this is to be explained not through the supposedly irremediable nature of neurosis but to the “marketability” it discovers in capitalism. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari describe Oedipus as the “market value” of neurosis, the way the latter is bought and sold not just in the therapeutic context but in the social, cultural and political fields generally.

Schizoanalysis’s critique of psychoanalysis needs to be understood in terms of this distinction between theory and practice, with its ultimate goal being to put the theory of desire and the practice of therapy into a relation of immanent criticism.

The Identity of the Critical and the Clinical

In a note devoted to the critical and the clinical in Dialogues Deleuze writes that “criticism and the clinic ought strictly to be identical” (D 89). The identity of the critical and the clinical expresses a more general turn in Deleuze’s philosophy towards a pragmatic, diagrammatic or cartographic theory of language which attempts to articulate a relationship between literature and the socio-political critique of power. Pragmatics does not replace but rather subsumes what Deleuze calls the “generative”, which we have discussed in chapter 2 in terms of the psychosexual genesis of material bodies and immaterial signs, and the “transformational”, which we have discussed in terms of the procedures of Wolfson and Kafka (D 85). Pragmatics seeks to unify these two aspects by understanding the material
genesis of bodies on the same plane as the semiotic rather than relating one to bodily depth and the other to an immaterial surface.

A literary regime of signs is produced from a mapping or diagramming of tendencies already at work within existing regimes. A regime of signs is defined in terms of the formalisation of expression in which signifying statements articulate the contents of desire (ATP 111). But there are always unformed materials within expression which escape formalisation. As a result, every regime of signs has what Deleuze calls “two systems of co-ordinates” or two poles, one indicating a tendency towards increasing organisation and the determination of stable meanings, the other indicating lines of flight which undermine these stable meanings and the power relationships on which they are based. Kafka’s work constituted, as we saw, a new regime of signs distinct from the juridical and familial regimes but only by diagramming the lines of escape that issued from them. The “K function”, to the extent that it evaluates captures while also opening up possible routes of escape, is “a diagram, a map of what is blocked, overcoded, or, on the contrary, mutating, on the road to liberation” (D 87-8).

Kafka, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, prophesised the “diabolical” powers of the 20th century – the coming of German Fascism, Soviet Stalinism, American capitalism, the bureaucratic State – by organising his writing machine around the two poles of capture and flight that orient desire (K 41). These poles do not contain any content themselves but rather indicate positions or coordinates which socio-political contents come to occupy. The diagram is indeed a “nonformal function”, but it tracks the degrees of formalisation transforming unformed materials into formed contents (ATP 512). Guattari argues that a contemporary critique of power is inseparable from a “formalism” evaluating the “semiotic system of capital” (Guattari 1996: 233). The diagram, then, combines at once a formalism (evaluation of degrees of formalisation) with a critique of power, or, in literary clinical terms, a symptomatological or diagnostic evaluation of blockages with a therapeutic production of breakthroughs. The diagram expresses a pragmatic identity of the critical and the clinical by subsuming diagnosis and making it relative to a processual and experimental concept of the therapeutic.
Analysis of the unconscious is in this respect inextricable from the syntheses by which it is
produced. While psychoanalytic methods of interpretation attempt to “trace” the
unconscious, to render some sort of representation of it while presupposing its objective
existence, to map the unconscious is literally to construct it: “the map does not reproduce
an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious” (ATP 12). The
unconscious exists only in terms of its production, that is to say, the means by which it
invests and thus constitutes a social and political space. This does not mean that the
unconscious or desire are to be identified with the social and political objectivity they
constitute. Rather, “the objectivity of desire itself is only its flows” (TRM 81), which is to say
that social and political contents are the products of desire, but these are not to be
confused with the productive principle itself. Desire is identified neither with an object of
desire nor a desiring subject but with an “abstract essence” by which subjects and objects
are produced via the relations or syntheses established between them (AO 292, 329). The
main schizoanalytic objection to psychoanalysis, then, is that it produces a false image or
false objectivity of the unconscious by means of “tracing” it as if it were an object “already
there from the start, lurking in the dark recesses of memory and language” (ATP 12).

Even though desire must be considered a process distinct from its actualisation in the social
and political field, Deleuze and Guattari also insist that desire is, from the very beginning,
social and political in nature. That is to say, desire’s earliest objects are already constituents
of socio-political reality, and not familial or interpersonal fantasies. In his famous case study,
Freud describes the four year old “Little Hans” and the latter’s fear of horses which
developed after he witnessed a draft horse falling down in the street and being whipped.
Deleuze and Guattari describe Hans’s phobia in terms of “a machinic assemblage” in which
he finds himself connected to different animal, sexual and socioeconomic domains (ATP
256). Hans’s phobia “maps” the intensities or affects associated with the horse, namely:
“having a big widdler, hauling heavy loads, having blinkers, biting, falling down, being
whipped, making a row with its feet” (CC 64). In this sense, Hans’s phobic symptoms
combine elements within an assemblage in which parental sexuality is itself only one
element in a becoming that has the possibility to “ameliorate Hans’s problem ... [and] open
a way out that had previously been blocked”. Freud interprets Hans’s horse, its “big
widdler", the row it makes with its feet, as the disguised image of the fantasy of parental coitus. But Deleuze and Guattari see Hans’s desire as an attempt to map out an animal route of escape from the parental home and its impasses. This is why his symptom is for them "a truly political option" and not a representation or a fantasy derived from anxieties surrounding parental sexuality (ATP 258, 14).

The great mistake of the oedipal etiology is to attempt to define the psychosexual beginnings of desire within the family as if the latter were in some sense pre-social. Psychoanalysis attempts to distinguish desire as an undetermined process of infantile experimentation from the investments and disinvestments it will subsequently be determined to make under the sway of social repression. But for Deleuze and Guattari this distinction between the oedipal and the social is utterly false; the contents of the oedipal drama are already social and political through and through, and if the oedipal dilemma seems to resemble other, adult dilemmas this is because the same forces of social repression are at work in each. Thus, the distinction between the familial domain of Oedipus, on the one hand, and the social and political domain on the other is an illegitimate one whose effect is to render a false image of desire that can be applied retroactively: a false objectivity of desire is traced from an existing social and political situation, and thus the productive and constitutive role of desire is missed. The worst ideological outcome of this is to make it appear as if the social and political impasses specific to capitalism are necessarily inscribed in, or predestined by, desire itself. "This placing of the family outside the social field is also its greatest social fortune. For it is the condition under which the entire social field can be applied to the family. ... Everything is pre-formed, arranged in advance" (AO 286-7).

Schizoanalysis thus seeks a more radical distinction between desire as process and desire as social investment by positing a pure productive principle on the one hand and the assemblages of desiring machines on the other.¹ The machines are the products of desire, but the machines themselves are also productive. If we think of desiring production as a non-physical, ideal flow then it is clear that desiring machines function to break or interrupt this flow by giving it physical objectivity. But machines by interrupting the flow also cause it to flow in other directions, and thus each machine involves a break and a flow
simultaneously, constituting as well as dissolving the object it forms: “Every ‘object’ presupposes the continuity of a flow; every flow, the fragmentation of the object” (AO 6). If desire constitutes a socio-political objectivity which it also disrupts, then the flows of desire are strongest at the points where they are most dammed up, where the blockages are greatest. This is why symptoms are not only indices of blockages but also productive, and thus transformative, in their own right, and why schizoanalysis is not only a system of socio-political critique but also a “universal clinical theory” with schizophrenia occupying a privileged heuristic position with respect both to literature and to politics (AO 311).

Schizoanalysis and Literature

When asked in an interview in 1988 about the role of literature in his work, Deleuze reflected on his incomplete critical and clinical project, insisting that his favourite authors, Sacher-Masoch, Proust, and Kafka, were all in their own ways great diagnosticians. But he added to this: “It’s not just a matter of diagnosis. Signs imply ways of living, possibilities of existence, they’re the symptoms of life gushing forth or draining away” (N 143). Eugene Holland is only partly right, then, when he defines Deleuze’s critical and clinical project as the means by which “literature often diagnoses syndromes for which psychiatry then develops an aetiology and a therapy, that is, ascertains the causes and proposes appropriate treatments” (Holland 2000: 251). Considered from the schizoanalytical viewpoint, literature also has a role to play in accounting for the blockages that cause illness and the routes of escape that life invariably produces. We must, however, bear in mind that this processual understanding of the symptom differs in important respects from the symptomatological one. Schizoanalysis grasps illness in terms of its production and reproduction, what medicine terms pathogenesis. The production of desire is, Deleuze and Guattari insist, “inseparable from the stases that interrupt it” and reterritorialise it in the “clinical lands” of neurosis, perversion and psychosis. For this reason, we can say that neurosis and psychosis are “products”, but also that they have a productivity of their own, that they produce in
certain ways consequent on the breakdowns or breakthroughs which attend them (AO 349-50).

It is crucial to note that the symptom has two sides, that it is not just a product but also produces. We saw in the discussion of Kafka in the last chapter how psychoanalysis mistakenly sees Oedipus as an explanation of neurosis rather than its product. Neurosis, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, discovers in Oedipus its pathogenic principle, its manner of propagation. Oedipus for this reason is not just a psychotherapeutic or strictly clinical entity but a wider social and cultural phenomenon. Deleuze and Guattari speak of a specifically oedipal type of literature, and even insist that “Oedipus is in fact literary before being psychoanalytic” (AO 145). Kafka, as an anti-oedipal author, helps us to see how neurosis is not caused by Oedipus but pre-exists the latter as “a desire that is already submissive and searching to communicate its own submission”. Oedipus, in this sense, is the “market value” of neurosis (K 10).

Now, Deleuze and Guattari say something similar with regards to schizophrenia. They distinguish between the schizophrenic as a clinical entity “found in mental institutions” on the one hand, and “schizophrenization as a process” on the other (AO 5, 123). Schizoanalysis bases itself on this distinction, which was first made by David Cooper, R.D. Laing and others associated with existential psychology and the anti-psychiatry movement who wished to differentiate the sick schizophrenic of the asylum from schizophrenia as an essential aspect of human existence, as a “human process”, to use Harry Stack-Sullivan’s term. If Oedipus is the means by which neurosis is extended and propagated, the clinical entity of schizophrenia is the means by which capitalism captures and contains, gives a commodity form to, the process of desiring production. The clinical schizophrenic is produced in the same way as Prell shampoo or Ford cars, with the difference, of course, that the schizophrenic is not saleable or marketable in any way (AO 266). The commodity form of schizophrenia, then, is a means capitalism discovers to pathologise the revolutionary potential of desiring production, and it is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari argue that, while schizophrenia as a process is universal, clinical schizophrenia is specific to capitalism, “our very own 'malady', modern man's sickness” (AO 142). Schizoanalysis thus rejects the importance psychoanalysis attaches to neurosis, and instead echoes Karl Jaspers’
claim that “just as hysteria may have been ‘in the air’ for the mentality of people prior to the eighteenth century, so schizophrenia may somehow be a trait for our days” (Jaspers 1977: 201).

Schizophrenia, then, signifies a pre-personal and pre-social process, “the unity of man and nature within the process of production” and thus, also, the universality of desiring production distinct from its particular embodiment within reproducible social and organic forms: “schizophrenia as a process is the only universal” (AO 52, 148). As soon as desiring production is embodied in reproducible forms – e.g. the organism, the person or conscious subject, the conjugal couple, the nuclear family, the State – it begins to find these forms intolerable, and seeks liberation from them. This is schizoanalysis’s fundamental revolutionary premise. The desiring machines produce forms which become persecutory for the pure principle of desire itself (hence the importance of the role of the body without organs, discussed below). As Gombrowicz put it, “[man] is ... a constant producer of form: he secretes form tirelessly, just as the bee secretes honey. ... But he is also at odds with his own form” (Gombrowicz 1985: 8). There is no embodiment or formalisation of desire which does not prompt lines of flight, trajectories of deterritorialisation which tend to dissolve these forms. But the question for the literary clinic is how these flights should proceed, what the legitimate conditions for them are. This is where the question of therapy and prescriptive criteria seems to come into view. It is not a question of trying to “cure” clinical schizophrenics, since schizophrenia as a disease is itself regarded as artificial. Rather, it is about seeing whether there is a way to deterritorialise without bringing about the complete collapse and dissolution of forms, which we saw with the case of Wolfson, and without making the line of flight itself into a line of death and self-destruction, as we saw with respect to alcoholism and the crack in chapter 1.

Deleuze and Guattari point to the importance of Anglo-American literature in this regard. Authors such as Melville, D.H. Lawrence, and Henry Miller typify what is, for schizoanalysis, the central political and literary formalist problematic. The line of flight is in a certain respect inseparable from the reterritorialisations and the new forms of capture mobilised to counteract it. We saw in our discussion of Kafka how the latter’s literary work proceeds by a broken line, marking breaks or impasses separating the letters from the stories and the
stories from the novels. But we also saw how this discontinuity testifies to the continuity of Kafka’s literary process. There is an identity of the formal discontinuity of the work with the continuity of the process animating it. This creative synergy of breakthrough and breakdown is, for Deleuze and Guattari, typified more than anything else by Anglo-American literature:

From Hardy to Lawrence, from Melville to Miller, the same cry rings out: Go across, get out, break through, make a beeline, don’t get stuck on a point. ... They know how difficult it is to get out of the black hole of subjectivity, of consciousness and memory, of the couple and conjugality. How tempting it is to let yourself get caught. (ATP 187)

The line of flight is constantly in danger of becoming indistinguishable from its opposite, its modes of capture. The line of flight can turn into a kind of fascism or illness. The voyages which took Melville to the South Seas were reterritorialised on the romantic image of the “savage” and a nostalgia for the American homeland (ATP 188-9). This isn’t a strictly literary or aesthetic problem, but a more general one relating to experimentation and freedom. The deterritorialising effects of drugs, for example, are susceptible to reterritorialisation on the pathological body of the addict: “the causal line, creative line, or line of flight immediately turns into a line of death and abolition. The abominable vittificiation of the veins, or the purulence of the nose – the glassy body of the addict” (ATP 285). No deterritorialisation is immune to these dangers, and so the central practical or pragmatic concern is caution in the method of experimentation.

These pragmatic concerns overlap with the question of schizophrenia in a way which is crucial for understanding how schizoanalysis and the literary clinic intersect. With the clinical schizophrenic, the line of flight or schizophrenic process turns into its opposite and becomes a debilitating illness. But in what sense can this be avoided? Does literature provide a resource? “We’re considering a very simple problem,” say Deleuze and Guattari, like Burroughs with drugs: can you harness the power of drugs without them taking over, without turning into a dazed zombie? It’s the same with schizophrenia. We make a distinction between schizophrenia as a process and the way schizophrenics
are produced as clinical cases that need hospitalizing. ... The schizophrenics in hospitals are people who’ve tried something and failed, cracked up. (N 23)

Thus, it is a question of using literature to continue a process begun by the body and the materiality of the desiring machines but which the barriers of the organism, consciousness, and the forms of social reproduction either prevent from going any further or force into a pathological existence. Burroughs’ writing suggests the importance of rendering the physicochemical effects of drugs while bypassing the “algebra of need” that constitutes the physical addiction of the junky. Burroughs writes: “Flush their drug kicks down the drain – They are poisoning and monopolizing the hallucinogen drugs – learn to make it without any chemical corn”. Burroughs councils a “program of total austerity and total resistance” which is nevertheless intended to radicalise the possibilities of drug induced states (Burroughs 1964: 6). This is a kind of intensely sober delirium. In the last chapter I discussed, in the context of Kafka, the idea of the “transference” of “real movement” from desire to language. The question related to how Kafka accomplished something through his writing that he couldn’t otherwise achieve. Now, Deleuze and Guattari bring this idea to bear on the question of literature and schizophrenia: is literature the way in which the schizophrenic process can become possible without pathologisation?

This question relates no doubt to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of how the process of literary creation proceeds, or should proceed. The author does not relate memories, the contents of his or her life, but rather “transmutes” these contents through a process of abstraction that depersonalises and dehumanises them. The individual consciousness then becomes a relay for forces which lie beneath and beyond it. As D. H. Lawrence writes in a wonderful piece on Melville:

In his ‘human’ self, Melville is almost dead. ... His human-emotional self is almost played out. He is abstract, self-analytical and abstracted. And he is more spell-bound by the strange slidings and colliding of Matter than by the things men do. ... The sheer naked slidings of the elements. And the human soul experiencing it all. So often, it is almost over the border: psychiatry. ... [His] bodily knowledge moves naked, a living quick among the stark elements. For with sheer physical vibrational sensitiveness, like a marvellous wireless-station, he registers the effects of the outer
world. And he records also, almost beyond pain or pleasure, the extreme transitions of the isolated, far-driven soul, the soul which is now alone, without any real human contact. (Lawrence 1950: 244-5)

Accordingly, the personal or biographical aspects of the author’s life and the textual or historical specificity of the work are of secondary importance to the impersonal, material process which unites the two in a synthesis of life and literature. As Daniel Smith writes: “In every great work of writing ... one reaches the point at which ‘critique’ and ‘clinique’ become one and the same thing, when life ceases to be personal and the work ceases to be historical or textual” (Smith 2005: 192).

Schizophrenia and the Syntheses of Desire

Schizoanalysis, then, does not attempt to produce a symptomatology or diagnosis of schizophrenia as an illness but rather seeks the legitimate means by which desire as can be defined in terms of the schizophrenic process. Deleuze and Guattari say that the delirium of the schizophrenic is inseparable from the world-historical, social and political fields that it invests, and therefore that there can be no isolatable disease process capable of being diagnosed. They cite a case in which a Martiniquan man describes his psychosis directly in terms of the Algerian War, the revolts of May ’68, and the racial tensions between the Arabs and the French (AO 99). The proper content of symptoms is always social and political, and therefore theories of schizophrenia which attempt to distinguish within the sick person a pathological “mechanism” or disease process, even a psychological one, autonomous from social and political contents are misguided (AO 24). The very possibility of unifying the various symptoms of schizophrenia into a symptomatology is for this reason doubted. As Deleuze writes: “The very nature of the symptoms makes them difficult to systematize, to combine in a coherent and readily localizable entity. They come apart at the seams” (TRM 22). At the same time, Deleuze and Guattari posit the existence of desire as a pure process
or transcendental principle – empty of contents as such but by no means defined through
“lack” – which they abstract from schizophrenia. The psychiatric conception, then, appears,
from the schizoanalytical viewpoint as mistaken in that it sees the process as diseased when
in reality the disease is caused by the termination or frustration of the process.

Deleuze and Guattari’s elaboration of the legitimate uses of the syntheses of desire are,
then, inseparable from a critique of the psychiatric “schizophrenia concept”. Schizophrenia
as a diagnostic concept, they argue, is generally conceived in terms of three major
components: dissociation or disorganisation in speech and thought; autism; and the loss of
reality, or the retreat into a private world of delusions often experienced as persecutory
(TRM 26, AO 24). These three categories describe the hebephrenic, catatonic and paranoid
subdivisions of clinical schizophrenia. Schizoanalysis, however, attempts to understand the
symptoms of schizophrenia on the basis of the positivity of desire, and not on the basis of a
“normality” the schizophrenic is said to lack. The real difficulty with respect to the
understanding of schizophrenia is not how to systematise its symptoms but how to give an
account of them in their positivity (TRM 23).

Thus, the first synthesis of desire, the connective synthesis, is presented as what the clinical
theory of dissociation grasps only negatively in terms of “confused” patterns of speech and
thought. If schizophrenics appear to break the chains of associations on which “normal”
speech and thought depend, then this is because a fundamental feature of the connective
synthesis is that it creates links (forms associations) only by cutting into a continuous flow.6

Hence, a desiring machine is an “object” dependent on a prior, non-objectified flow of
desire. The connective synthesis breaks into this flow in order to determine an object. In this
sense, a desiring machine breaks a flow at one point in order to connect it at another; the
connective synthesis expresses the immediate identity of continuity and discontinuity.
“Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows” (AO 6). If the
schizophrenic splits up associations in language and thought, and creates new associations
in an apparently chaotic and random manner, this is only because connections forming
these associations were already dependent on splitting up a prior continuity.

Deleuze and Guattari define the connective synthesis by way of Beckett’s novel Molloy. In a
famous scene, Molloy distributes through the pockets of his trousers and greatcoat a total
of sixteen pebbles, which he calls "sucking-stones", in an attempt to find a system allowing
him to suck each stone an even number of times. It is Molloy's wish both to distribute the
stones evenly over the four pockets while also sucking each stone one after the other, and
thus he speaks of "two incompatible bodily needs, at loggerheads" (Beckett 1955: 69-74).
The connective synthesis is thus constituted by a certain antagonism constitutive of a
desiring machine as such: to link one element to another, to cause a linear break between
the old and the new, by cutting into a continuity; to cause the new to circulate while
maintaining a pre-existing equilibrium. Molloy wants each stone to be a new one, but he
also wants their equal distribution in his pockets. This is the conflict which leads him to give
up his stone-sucking machine.

The identity of continuity and discontinuity means that every machine is only provisional,
that it exists simply to give rise to new machines. It is for this reason that Deleuze and
Guattari speak of the second synthesis as disjunctive, since the identity of continuity and
discontinuity is also an antagonism in which the desire for unbroken continuity comes into
conflict with the breaks caused by the desiring machines. Deleuze and Guattari use the
concept of the body without organs (henceforth BwO) to understand this disjunctive
relation between the machines themselves and the ideal flow that animates them. The
connective articulation of the machines breaks up the flow and gives a form and an
organisation it. Since this organisation or formalisation cuts off other avenues it represents a
blockage in the flow of desire which the body, on some level, experiences as a suffering
whose only alleviation would be the dissolution of all the organs-machines imposing form
on desire:

What would be required is a pure fluid in a free state, flowing without interruption,
streaming over the surface of a full body. Desiring-machines make us an organism;
but at the very heart of this production, within the very production of this
production, the body suffers from being organized in this way, from not having some
other sort of organization, or no organization at all. "An incomprehensible,
absolutely rigid stasis" in the very midst of process. ... The automata stop dead and
set free the unorganized mass they once served to articulate. The full body without
organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable. (AO 8-9)

The productive functioning of the machines is inextricable from an antiproductive stasis implied in their operation. This stasis is not produced by the machines as such but pre-exists them as a "deserted" plane on which the machines aggregate and disaggregate. The BwO is likened to "the catatonic body ... produced in the water of the hydrotherapy tub", to the rigidified muscles and grinding of teeth observed in the "stereotypical", ceremonial and automatistic behaviours of certain schizophrenics (AO 8; DR 290-1). The BwO is thus understood by schizoanalysis as the site of a "retreat" which brings about the production of the schizophrenic clinical entity (AO 141). It is as if the schizophrenic process prefers the antiproductive stasis to the forms of social and organic reproduction (the organism, the person, the family) in which it is compelled to invest by the forces of social repression. The process then "continues on in the void" of pathological breakdown (AO 148). This is why the schizophrenic entity is always produced "at the end", "at the limit of social production determined by capitalism", and why its genesis as an illness is inextricable from the capitalist mode of production (AO 142). Deleuze and Guattari, however, insist that the BwO appears in two distinct "phases" (ATP 152). They list a number of pathological BwOs: hypochondriac, paranoid, schizophrenic, drugged and masochist. Since the BwO "is nondesire as well as desire", marking both the process as well as its breakdown, it is the site on which blockages are erected and torn down. It is always possible to "botch" the BwO, and for this reason the latter explains both the desire which goes bad as well as the possibilities for a health to come. The BwO "swings between two poles" by which desire both "submits to judgment" and "opens to experimentation" (ATP 159). The question of judgment is something we will return to later in this chapter.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the rigidified plane of the BwO provides a disjunctive surface to which the desiring machines are attached. On this surface the machines both accumulate, articulating one formation of desire, and are also dissolved so that a different formation may appear. This is the means by which the production process is "recorded" or registered (AO 14). What is proposed here is an understanding of the sign as a "detachment" from the unformed flow constituting the BwO. Signs in this respect are pure
quantities or "blocks" of intensity. The connective synthesis already assumed the existence of these blocks: "the partial objects of production presuppose stocks of material or recording bricks within the coexistence and the interaction of all the syntheses ... These bricks or blocks are the essential parts of desiring-machines from the point of view of the recording process". These blocks are the "basic unit" by which composition and decomposition of forms is made possible (AO 43). If blocks constitute signs, however, they are nevertheless not signifying (AO 41). They are composed of insignificant and signifying matter not yet formed into physical contents or empirical objects. The sign here is a pure quantity of affect. Deleuze points in this respect to the "breath-words" and "howl-words" of Artaud, in the latter's translations of Lewis Carroll, in which "every fixed or written word is decomposed into noisy, alimentary, and excremental bits. ... The word becomes the action of a body without parts" (LS 100-2). Deleuze writes that Melville's Bartleby, the scribe or copyist, the "recorder" par excellence, utters his famous phrase "I would prefer not to" "in a soft, flat, and patient voice [so that] it attains to the irremissible, by forming an inarticulate block, a single breath" (CC 68).

This distinction schizoanalysis wishes to make between blocks as asignifying signs which tend to break up forms, and signifiers which formalise contents is an important one, since it is essentially the same distinction as the one Deleuze and Guattari make between an affective, intensive "spatium" and an extensive, physical space (ATP 479). The BwO is not a space, nor any kind of "extensive" physical body, but is the affective medium by which the becomings of intensities are felt (ATP 153). The production of an extensive space is contrasted with the consumption of the intensities which accompany it. This is how Deleuze and Guattari define the third and final synthesis. They draw on the case of Daniel Paul Schreber, the 19th century German jurist whose paranoid psychosis led on several occasions to his confinement. In his Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, Schreber describes, among other aspects of his delirium, the feeling of being turned into a woman for the purposes of copulating with God. Schreber’s experiences of changing into a woman, being persecuted by poisonous singing birds and of the homunculi living on the surface of his body are seen in terms, not of fantasy or hallucination, but of "life and lived experience" (AO 21). This is why schizoanalysis opposes the idea, often elaborated under the influence of Lacan, that
schizophrenic breakdown signifies a withdrawal of the ego into a private fantasy world. Rather, delirium in its positivity is the feeling of being “as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter” (AO 21). Deleuze writes that “schizophrenic delirium can be grasped only at the level of this ‘I feel’ which every moment records the intensive relationship between the organless body and the machine-organs” (TRM 22).

The figures of delirium are not the ciphers of personal dramas but rather the drama, often terrifying, of depersonalisation. The delirium that is simultaneously produced, recorded and consumed is for Deleuze and Guattari a world-historical process. This is why “delirium is not constructed around the name-of-the-father, but on the names of history ... The gradients of intensity which the schizophrenic traverses on the organless body ... are designated by the proper names of races, continents, classes, persons” (TRM 26). The world-historical process is understood through the process of depersonalisation. This is the sense in which Deleuze and Guattari exhort us to read Nietzsche’s remarks that “at root every name in history is I ...

This autumn, as lightly clad as possible, I twice attended my funeral, first as Count Robilant (no, he is my son, insofar as I am Carlo Alberto, my nature below), but I was Antonelli myself” (Nietzsche 1996: 347-8). Desire is synthetic and constructivist; it is the principle of relationality which both assembles the socio-political contents of history while also giving formal integrity to experience. As such, it is intended to overcome the barriers, which Deleuze and Guattari see as being artificially and unnecessarily imposed, segregating the personal and the world-historical domains. Desire is thus said to be analytically prior to the divisions marking subject from object, nature from culture and the individual from the group. But if desire is segregated in this way from its proper, socio-political contents and given the personological forms necessary for social reproduction, we have yet to see in what way Deleuze and Guattari argue this. The next few sections of this chapter will turn to what schizoanalysis defines as its “negative task”, which is to say, the critique of psychotherapy and Oedipus. My aim is to show how the determination of the legitimate criteria of desiring production is inseparable from this critique, and that schizoanalysis is itself psychoanalysis as immanent criticism.
Deleuze and Guattari define the “negative task” of schizoanalysis as “a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage” (AO 342). Curettage denotes the surgical procedure of removing unwanted or diseased tissue. The unconscious has been infected with “neuroticization”, the latter being defined as a social investment of the desire for submission, guilt and the law, what Guattari calls “capitalist Eros” (Guattari 1996: 52). The clinical neurosis of psychoanalysis does not explain neuroticisation, to the contrary, the latter is the mode by which neurotics are produced (AO 397). Psychoanalysis, in this sense, is not blamed with inventing or even discovering neuroticization, but with being the first “to develop and promote it, and to give it a marketable medical form” (AO 399). Schizoanalysis is, in a certain respect, in agreement with psychoanalysis when the latter argues that neurotic disorders predominate in and are an irremediable aspect of modern capitalist society. What schizoanalysis challenges is the efficacy of the psychotherapeutic cure, which Freud himself, in a famous text written near the end of his life, suggested may be an interminable process. Deleuze and Guattari don’t feel any need to attach the slightest importance to psychoanalysis’s claim to cure neurosis, since, for it, curing consists of an infinite maintenance, an infinite resignation, an accession to desire by way of castration – and of the establishment of conditions where the subject is able to spread, to pass the sickness to his offspring ... the only incurable is the neurotic – whence interminable psychoanalysis. (AO 396)

The clinical categories of neurosis, determined via the Oedipus complex, then, are just as artificial as the clinical categories of schizophrenia. Oedipus, far from diagnosing neurotic desire gives the latter a viable mode of propagation and intensification via “the most traditional bourgeois medicine” (AO 72).

The oedipal etiology attempts to clarify a contradiction within desire: why does desire appear to desire against itself, to seek out modes of repression and submission? Freud summed up this contradiction most succinctly in terms of the paradox of conscience, which we discussed in chapter two. Psychoanalysis goes wrong, however, when it relates desire’s
contradictory investments to a family model which is used as a kind of pre-social microcosm: "one acts as if the libido did not directly invest the social contradictions as such, and in order to awaken, needed these contradictions translated according to the family code" (AO 395). But desire does invest these contradictions directly. For Deleuze and Guattari it was Nietzsche, and not Freud, who was the first to give a concrete analysis of these types of investments, which Nietzsche defined in terms of what he called the "ascetic ideal":

an attempt is made here to use energy to stop up the source of the energy; here the gaze is directed greenly and maliciously against physiological flourishing itself, in particular against its expression, beauty, joy; whereas pleasure is felt and sought in deformation, atrophy, in pain, in accident, in the ugly, in the voluntary forfeit, in un-selfing, self-flagellation, self-sacrifice. This is all paradoxical in the highest degree: we stand here before a conflict that wants itself to be conflicted, that enjoys itself in this suffering (Nietzsche 1998: 84).

When Deleuze argues that Nietzsche's diagnosis of the acetic ideal is above all a rereading of the Hegelian dialectic he writes that "the speculative motor of the dialectic is contradiction and its resolution. But its practical motor is alienation and the suppression of alienation". The drama of the Hegelian subject is that it finds itself alienated, but that it then discovers a form of re-alienation, "yet another alienation, a spiritual and refined form of alienation" within "Objective Spirit" (NP 160). Alienation is overcome but also conserved. Schizoanalysis makes the very same point with regards to psychoanalysis: desire is said to be in an untenable state of contradiction within the nuclear family, wishing simultaneously to please the father, to identify with him, but also to transgress his authority and to access the "forbidden" object of desire, i.e. the mother. But the oedipal "cure", Deleuze and Guattari argue, rather than eliminating this contradiction raises it to ever greater and more refined "symbolic" levels, so that the libidinal crisis sparked by the family is itself explained in terms of the symbolic structure of desire as such. The father is then displaced by the "paternal function" or "paternal metaphor" of the signifier, which can equally be assumed by the judge, the boss, the teacher, or any authority figure (AO 72). To move from the "imaginary" content of the parental images to the "symbolic" structure in this way liberates desire from
the family at the cost of alienating it all over again in the pure forms of social authority. Thus, psychotherapy, in its “curative” aspect, moves from Oedipus as libidinal crisis (neurosis) to Oedipus as structure. But Deleuze and Guattari deny that this is in any way a cure; rather, they see it as a mere displacement of repression, an illegitimate repetition of the oedipal impasse in such a way that any real curative effects are rendered impossible:

the psychoanalyst-as-priest, the pious psychoanalyst ... is forever chanting the incurable insufficiency of being: don't you see that Oedipus saves us from Oedipus, it is our agony but also our ecstasy, depending on whether we live it neurotically or live its structure ... The unconscious ... is bound at both ends, leaving it no other choice than to respond Oedipus, to cry Oedipus, in sickness as in health, in its crises as in their outcome, in its resolution as in its problem. (AO 119-121)

This is a self-reinforcing process in that, the more the cure fails to cure, the more it succeeds in curing – hence the “interminability” of psychoanalysis. In this sense, the “speculative motor” of Oedipus is the concept of neurosis, while the “practical motor” is therapy. Medically speaking, we should consider neurosis to be what Ivan Illich, in his devastating critique of modern medicine, called an “iatrogenic” disorder. Illich describes iatrogenesis as “the sick-making powers of diagnosis and therapy ... [the] paradoxical damage caused by cures for sickness”. He continues that, “the more time, toil, and sacrifice spent by a population in producing medicine as a commodity, the larger will be the by-product, namely, the fallacy that society has a supply of health locked away which can be mined and marketed” (Illich 1995: 43, 62). Psychoanalysis, then, is “the new avatar of the ‘ascetic ideal’” in that it holds to a concept of desire that is satisfied, i.e. “cured”, through the invention of a marketable diagnostic category that simply prolongs its affliction (AO 291). If this prolongation becomes a source of pleasure, a kind of “stupefying drug” (AO 391), it is because of the sense that a supply of mental health from which we have been alienated is being de-alienated in the therapeutic process, despite the fact that the commodity form which the transaction between analyst and analysand takes necessarily signifies a re-alienation. Nietzsche can be seen as having predicted the rise of iatrogenic psychotherapy, in this respect, when he writes that “the worst sickness of mankind originated in the way in which they have combated their sicknesses, and what seemed to cure has in the long run
produced something worse than that which it was supposed to overcome” (Nietzsche 1997: 33).

What is the specific link between mental illness and capitalism proposed by schizoanalysis? As Marx himself observed, the fragmentation of society through the capitalist division of labour “is the first to afford the materials for, and to give a start to, industrial pathology” (Marx 1954: 342). Deleuze and Guattari regard the production of neurotics and psychotics as an effect of the reproduction of capitalist social relations since both of these clinical categories are the products of the interruption of the process of desiring production, and this interruption is necessary for capital to reproduce: “social machines make a habit of feeding on the contradictions they give rise to, on the crises they provoke, on the anxieties they engender, and on the infernal operations they regenerate. Capitalism has learned this” (AO 166). Desire is drawn upon by capitalism as a productive force in a way unprecedented by any previous social formation. This is because the productive needs of capitalism require an active severing of the connections linking people to traditional forms of social organisation. As Marx and Engels write: “constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones” (Marx 2000: 248). This revolutionary process instituted by capitalism through its mode of production is what Deleuze and Guattari call decoding and deterritorialisation, these being, essentially, the liberation of desire from its encoded forms of reproduction. If capitalism is constantly liberating this process for its productive needs, it must also, in order to reproduce, find ever new ways of re-enslaving it, since this process is inherently revolutionary, which is to say, essentially hostile to any and all reproducible forms. As Deleuze and Guattari write: “desire is revolutionary in its essence ... no society can tolerate a position of real desire” (AO 126-7).

Capitalism, then, thrives on the contradictions of desire of the type discerned by Freud, even if he misapprehends their true nature. Deleuze and Guattari, in anti-Hegelian fashion, do not believe that the contradictions of capitalism are in any way detrimental to its continuation. Rather, capitalism functions precisely because it is constantly thwarting the revolutionary productive forces marshalled by it. The so-called “free” worker, for example, is brought into being as an effect of what Marx called “primitive accumulation”, in which
people are forcibly cut off from access to the means of production. Marx's specific example is the 17th century enclosure of common lands in England (Marx 1954: 669-70). The crucial point is that labour must be separated from its concrete forms so that a purely potential form of labour — what Marx called labour power in the abstract — can be bought and sold on the open market. Concrete forms of wage labour presuppose a flow of abstract labour power, an undifferentiated potential energy, or what Deleuze and Guattari rephrase as an "abstract subjective essence" (AO 281). This essence is defined as a pure productive capacity, "the activity of production in general" (AO 292). If it is "subjective" it is because it is distinct from the objective conditions which channel it into specific forms of work. It is this distinction from the concrete which gives the activity of production in general its revolutionary capacity. If capitalism liberates this capacity by producing the "free" "naked" proletarian owning nothing but his or her labour power, it also re-alienates it through the commodity form: "Production as the abstract subjective essence is discovered only in the forms of property that objectifies it all over again, that alienates it by reterritorializing it" (AO 281).

Capitalism, then, involves a "double movement" by which production is general is liberated at the same time as it is alienated all over again in terms of the reproduction of existing social relations (AO 281). Deleuze and Guattari charge that this double movement, or what they also refer to as a "false movement", is also constitutive of psychoanalysis. Freud's concept of desire as libido discovered, as did Marx's concept of labour power in the abstract, the idea of an activity of production in general. Freud writes of libido as "a displaceable energy ... neutral in itself" (Freud 1960: 42). Deleuze and Guattari describe libido, similarly, as the "free energy" that fuels desiring-machines (AO 346). But psychoanalysis, as soon as it makes its great discovery of the theory of desire immediately sets about re-alienating desire within the context of the oedipal model. It is at this point that we must take note of Deleuze and Guattari's hostility to psychotherapeutic methods, especially transference. They do not take issue with the concept of transference as such, but rather its illegitimate, oedipal use. They remark that the break between Freud and Jung began with this "practical" issue:
Jung remarked that in the process of transference the psychoanalyst frequently appeared in the guise of a devil, a god, or a sorcerer, and that the roles he assumed in the patient's eyes went far beyond any sort of parental images. ... A child never confines himself to playing house, to playing only at being daddy-and-mommy. He also plays at being a magician, a cowboy, a cop or a robber, a train, a little car. (AO 49-50)

It is as if the transference too is subject to legitimate and illegitimate uses, and that in oedipal psychotherapy it is used to interrupt the process of desiring production and reterritorialise it, via the familial images fabricated in analytic discourse, on the body formed by the analyst and the analysand. Thus, for schizoanalysis, Oedipus marks the very same double movement of de-alienation and re-alienation as capital. In the crucible of the domestic home, the oedipal conflict seems to liberate desire from the person of the child. Desire as libido has the potential to invest in anything: a parent, a sibling, a maidservant, an animal, a toy, and so on. We might remark, as did Freud with respect to Dora, that Oedipus causes a “surplus of intensity” to be produced (Freud 1977: 89). But Oedipus as a practical method seems to appropriate this surplus and redistribute it in a way which re-alienates it within the figures of familial and social authority. It is for this reason that schizoanalysis speaks of an intimate relation between social repression and psychoanalysis.

Repression and Displacement

In order to understand this relation, we must turn now to consider the schizoanalytic theory of repression as this is developed through the critique of Freud. In their reconstruction of the development of psychoanalysis from a radical theory to an institutional practice, Deleuze and Guattari point to a specific turning point in Freud’s theory of the neurotic symptom (AO 127, 364). We will remember from the last chapter that Freud’s diagnosis of Dora’s hysteria was that anxiety stemming from the repression of a forbidden unconscious
desire was converted into physical symptoms, these latter acting as substitute satisfactions for the repressed desire. Freud subsequently reversed this view regarding the origin of anxiety, arguing that “it was anxiety which produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produced anxiety”. Thus, in his revised conception Freud maintains that libidinal impulses are inherently disturbing for consciousness and it is the anxiety thereby provoked which produces repression. The origin of anxiety, then, is not the “repressed” element but “the repressing agency itself” (Freud 1959: 108-9). If the repressing agency, and not the repressed desire, is the origin of anxiety then repression is given a certain autonomy within the psychic sphere, which is to say that repression is seen to be primarily a matter of intrapsychic conflict rather than an antagonism between desire and social authority.

This is the conservative turning point in Freud’s theory, which Wilhelm Reich was the first to recognise. For Reich, Freud abandoned the theory of sexuality to take the side of repressive social forces. However, Deleuze and Guattari draw quite different, and more far reaching, conclusions than Reich, for whom desire remained essentially psychosexual, and not directly social or political, in nature. Schizoanalysis makes the more radical claim that desire is both psychosexual and social at once, directly constituting the social forces of repression at the same time as the “object” on which they come to bear. In other words, there is no difference in nature, only in “regime”, between desire and the social (AO 33). In this sense, Reich remains within the sphere of a certain Freudo-Marxist liberalism, in which the political task would involve finding a social form suitable to expressing adequately a set of presupposed psychosexual contents. Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, argue that the antagonism between desire as a pure principle and the social forms which give it expression is irresolvable as such, and that this is what makes desire a revolutionary force (AO 127). The conservatism of Freud’s theoretical revision, then, is not that he abandons the psychic realm of sexuality to take sides with the social realm of repression, but that he reformulates the antagonism between desire and the social as a struggle taking place within the person. It is as if Freud, having discovered the revolutionary antagonism, sought to resolve it, while prolonging it indefinitely via incurable neurosis, within the terms of an intrapsychic economy.
We made the point, above, that the unconscious cannot be said to pre-exist its production. Similarly, we must make the point here that the "object" of repression cannot be said to pre-exist the repression that bears upon it. In order for repression to work, it must also actively constitute its object. We have already suggested, in our discussion of Masoch in chapter 2, how the object or the contents of the law seem to be produced retroactively as an effect of the law's application. Deleuze and Guattari give this idea special consideration with respect to Oedipus and the incest prohibition, writing that

the law tells us: You will not marry your mother, and you will not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so that's what I wanted! ... One acts as if it were possible to conclude directly from psychic repression the nature of the repressed, and from the prohibition the nature of what is prohibited. ... What really takes place is that the law prohibits something that is perfectly fictitious in the order of desire or of the "instincts," so as to persuade its subjects that they had the intention corresponding to this fiction. (AO 125)

This is what Deleuze and Guattari call "displacement". The only way social repression can repress desiring production is by relating desire to a fallacious objectivity which people feel belongs specifically to them as persons ("so that's what I wanted"). An impersonal force of social repression bears on an impersonal force of desiring production via the intermediary of psychic contents which render desire repressible. Psychic repression, acting through the subject as person, is the "delegated" authority of social repression, giving rise to, or displacing, a "faked image" of a desire conditioned for repression (AO 130). Psychoanalysis, and in particular psychotherapeutic methods of interpretation, function by fabricating such unconscious contents, whereas schizoanalysis asserts that "the unconscious has no material or content" (AO 204). The unconscious, as desiring production, is a pure process, and by giving it contents, by "representing" it as an object, we necessarily impede the process. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari define the repression carried out by Oedipus in terms of three elements: the repressed representative (desiring production), the repressing representation (the parental images), and the displaced represented (the object or contents retroactively given to desire) (AO 181).^8
In making the incest motive the central object of repression, and thus the very essence of desire, oedipal psychoanalysis can conceptualise desire only as impossible, as something eternally and fatally contradicted. Deleuze and Guattari discuss this in terms of the double bind or double impasse of imaginary contents and symbolic form. If the contents of desire are derived from the social forms prohibiting them, then we are led into a deadlocked situation in which we can either accept the terms of the prohibition or else suffer the abyssal dissolution of forms:

Oedipus creates both the differentiations that it orders and the undifferentiated with which it threatens us. ... It forces desire to take as its object the differentiated parental persons, and, brandishing the threats of the undifferentiated, prohibits the correlative ego from satisfying its desires with these persons, in the name of the same requirements of differentiation. But it is this undifferentiated that Oedipus creates as the reverse of the differentiations that it creates. (AO 87)

The fulfilment of incestuous desires is rendered impossible for the precise reason that the parental persons become objects of desire via the very same process which prohibits the satisfaction of that desire. The familial images receive symbolic-formal determination at the cost of rendering them forbidden, but the rejection of the symbolic, in other words, the rejection of the prohibition, leads to the loss of any determinate desire to the abyss of an undifferentiated body, what Lacanians call the “impossible real” (cf. Leader 2003: 48). The acceptance as well as the rejection of the prohibition leads, in effect, to the same renunciation. It is this oedipal double bind which produces neurotics (and not schizophrenics, as Gregory Bateson supposed) in that it compels the continuous regeneration of imaginary and “fantasised” unconscious contents.

Freud described the process of neurotic symptom formation in terms of a “psychic representative”, or “ideational content”, which is invested, and disinvested, by a libidinal impulse or affect. For Freud, it is only the ideational content, and not the affect, which can be conscious or unconscious. Thus, in a neurotic disorder, such as Dora’s hysteria or Hans’s phobia, one content is substituted for another, “displacing” the substituted content into the unconscious (Freud 1991: 151, 156). Repression works via this double movement, drawing desire towards secondary representations but also anchoring it in a primary and
unrepresented or unrepresentable element. The process of “substitution by displacement” is what Freud calls secondary repression, or repression proper (Freud 1991: 525). There is, however, a more fundamental process in which what is repressed is not a representation or an ideational content, but the impulse itself, as Deleuze notes: “Freud shows – beyond repression ‘properly speaking’, which bears upon representations – the necessity of supposing a primary repression which concerns first and foremost pure presentations, or the manner in which the drives are necessarily lived” (DR 18). The substitution of contents would not be possible, Freud maintains, unless there were some original or primary situation in which the distinction between the drive as a pure impulse and the object represented in the mind did not yet exist. Secondary repression works via the withdrawal of investment from one object and the transferral of it to another, but this process would constitute an infinite regress unless there were some original object providing a point of fixation and for which others could act as substitutes.

The repression of the primary union of drive and object, then, is the source of what Freud calls anti-investment (“anticathexis”). To the extent that, in the secondary process, every withdrawal of investment is accompanied by a re-investment, this primary anti-investment is the condition for all subsequent investments of desire. We can understand this in terms of the BwO discussed above. The BwO provides the antiproduction which thwarts the connections formed by the desiring machines, causing them to disaggregate and start up again in ever new forms. It is this antagonism which makes desire a creative force. But Freud goes wrong, in this respect, when he argues that the origin of anti-investment is the protection of consciousness from stimuli (Freud 1991: 155; Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 334). This allows him to make the subsequent argument that anxiety originates with intrapsychic conflict rather than with the social repression of desire. The division of conscious and unconscious, however, could only come about after primary repression, since the latter institutes the distinction between drive and representation, and thus primary repression cannot be explained in terms of the protection of consciousness from anxiety provoked by the drive. This is a central part of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of Oedipus: the effect of repression is illegitimately taken to explain the cause.
Freud's central error, for schizoanalysis, was to have sought an “objective” definition of a desire which, through the repressive representations of consciousness, becomes symptomatically disguised and displaced, presupposed as the correlative content of the symptomatic representations. Within the Lacanian paradigm, this error becomes exacerbated, Deleuze and Guattari argue, in that the essential object of desire is seen to be constitutively lacking. Lack, defined as an object denied to representational consciousness, is thus said to be the essence of desire, and it is against this idea that Deleuze and Guattari inveigh most heavily. If desire has neither contents nor objectivity, this is not because it is a lack or an “empty form” (AO 204), but rather because desiring production is the principle by which objects are produced and contents formed; it is, in Christopher Drohan’s words, the “power that distinguishes and forms our impressions into objects and ideas ... without being represented in them” (Drohan 2009:114). We might notice here that Deleuze’s prior critique of Freud and the death instinct has been translated almost directly into the terms of schizoanalysis. The attempt to determine the nature of a bare or brute repetition misapprehends transcendental-empirical repetition just as the attempt to define desire in terms of lack misapprehends the non-objectifiable process of desiring production. In both cases there is a misconceptualisation of death as “transcendent” and therefore constitutively missing from experience. But death is only transcendent from the point of view of consciousness, or from the point of view of an unconscious defined negatively as a lack of consciousness. But Deleuze and Guattari define death as an immanent process by which antiproducive forces are allied to and become the functional conditions of desiring production. The BwO, as the source of this anti-production, provides an immanent “model of death”. This model is not based on the lack constituting the neurotic’s desire, but rather the rigidified “full” body of the catatonic schizophrenic (AO 362).
The concept of desire as lack gives rise to a false notion of death and its significance for the unconscious. Freud famously posited that the unconscious experiences no negation, that “there is no such thing at all as an unconscious ‘No’”, and that negations expressed by patients in therapeutic discourse are in fact resistances to the unconscious assertion of repressed ideas (Freud 1977: 92). If Freud lends the unconscious an irreducible positivity he nevertheless bases all experience of it on its repressive negation by consciousness. Thus, as Kerslake writes, “the shape of the unconscious is inferred from the effects of repression. [Freud’s] notion of the unconscious is thus ‘relative’ to the process of repression and the criterion of what must be repressed from consciousness” (Kerslake 2008: 18). By positing the unconscious as purely positive Freud doubly negates it: firstly, he posits repression as the means by which the conscious-unconscious divide is instituted, and secondly he maintains that the contents of the unconscious can only be known by inferring retroactively from the effects of repression. Deleuze and Guattari say that death is thereby doubled, death is “[turned] against death” itself (AO 365).

Deleuze and Guattari explain this in terms of the progressive development within psychoanalytic theory in general — with the exception of Reich — of a dualistic account of the death instinct. It is precisely through the qualitative opposition of Eros and Thanatos that Freud “never stopped trying to limit the discovery of a subjective or vital essence of desire as libido” (AO 364). Death, conceived as a qualitative opposition to life, is necessarily absent from lived experience, and therefore can only be understood in terms of this absence. This is what, in Freud’s theory, gives to death a transcendent value. This transcendent and oppositional concept of death, as we observed in the last chapter, is a material or objective non-being understood as the fundamental tendency of all organic life to return to inorganic, undifferentiated stasis. For Freud the unconscious is positive, but can nevertheless be discovered only in terms of what is barred from conscious experience. But if the unconscious, conceived as that which is repressed, is necessarily barred from consciousness, then desire, despite its unconscious positivitv, must itself constitute the very principle of death as non-being. Death is absent from experience, but it is also a form of absence or non-being in itself; hence, the concept of desire as lack. If there is no “no” in the unconscious, if
death is constitutively absent from the living process of desire as Eros, then this warrants the conclusion that desire is understandable only in terms of its own self-abolition.

Deleuze and Guattari understand this betrayal of the notion of a positive or vital unconscious in terms of “Freud’s practice itself” (AO 366). We have thus far discussed a certain ideological complicity of psychoanalysis and capitalism, in that the images or representations fabricated by the iatrogenic maintenance of neurosis function as means to “trap” desire, to relate it to a false objective determination which bears no resemblance to the process of desiring production. But this is not the whole story, in that the trapping of desire serves an economic and not simply an ideological function. This argument hinges on Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Marx, in particular the latter’s theory of the reproduction of capital. As we have already discussed above, the liberation of productive forces in the form of the “abstract subjective essence” is necessary to meet the needs of capitalist production, but in order for the social relations constitutive of capitalist society to be reproduced these same forces need to be repressed. In other words, economic production must be accompanied by destructive forces which both counterbalance production and allow it start over again under the same conditions. We can thus speak of the limits of capital in terms of the interdependent but often antagonistic relations between production and reproduction.

In order to reproduce their labour power, workers need to earn enough to buy back that part of their product necessary for reproduction. In this way, workers produce a surplus beyond what is strictly necessary to reproduce their labour power. The capitalist profits precisely by ensuring that the wages paid out are worth less than the total product. Thus, capitalism produces far more than its workers are capable of buying, and it is this rift between production and consumption which constitutes the central antagonism of capital. As Hardt and Negri neatly summarise:

The wage of the worker ... must be less than the total value produced by the worker.
This surplus value, however, must find an adequate market in order to be realized.
Since each worker must produce more value than he or she consumes, the demand of the worker as consumer can never be an adequate demand for the surplus value.
... Certainly, the capitalist class ... will consume some of the excess value, but it
cannot consume all of it, because if it did there would be no surplus value left to reinvest. Instead of consuming all the surplus value, capitalists must practice abstinence, which is to say, they must accumulate. (Hardt and Negri 2000: 222-3)

One must consume, but only in such a way which facilitates reproduction of the social relations between capitalists and workers. In other words, the basis of economic, and hence social, stability is the simultaneous production of privation and surplus, of “lack amid overabundance” (AO 256). If capital produces a surplus on the one hand, it must, on the other, counteract it by “creating” vacuoles of lack and privation within this very same process. The production of surplus value must be counterbalanced, otherwise the antagonism between production and consumption would cease to be profitable for the capitalist and instead lead to overaccumulation, the hoarding of goods and money. In order for surplus value to “realise” a profit for the capitalist, products must be sold as commodities at a price worth more than the value of the labour necessary to produce them, but this realisation is dependent on the purchasing power of consumers willing and able to buy them. The stockpiling of goods unable find adequate markets means that, as Hardt and Negri, paraphrasing Marx, put it: “even though exploitation has taken place and surplus value has been extracted, that value itself cannot be realised” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 223, my emphasis). As Deleuze and Guattari explain, capitalism can reproduce “only if the surplus value is not merely produced or extorted, but absorbed or realized. ... An unrealized surplus value of flux is as if not produced, and becomes embodied in unemployment and stagnation” (AO 255).

As the processes of production advance in sophistication, such crises of realisation become ever more prevalent. David Harvey explains that the barriers to the realisation of surplus value are not contingent factors, but are internal to the structure of capital itself, and that “all crises are crises of realization” (Harvey 1982: 85). The means capitalism finds to counteract this are multifarious. It can find ways of productively disposing of surplus value via large scale public works and military spending; it can strategically “waste” money on government bureaucracy; it can seek out new markets, particularly in Third World nations. Ultimately, however, it must find means of counterbalancing, even destroying, elements of its own productive forces from the inside, in such a way that production and antiproduction
enter into a relation of reciprocal determination. Deleuze and Guattari argue that this is
done via the specifically capitalist modes of governance and authority. In capitalist society,
power does not come solely from a transcendent source but distributes itself *immanently*
throughout life as a whole:

> The State, its police, and its army form a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at
> the heart of production itself, and conditioning this production. ... The apparatus of
> antiproduction is no longer a transcendent instance that opposes production, limits it,
or checks it; on the contrary, it insinuates itself everywhere in the productive
> machine and becomes firmly wedded to it in order to regulate its productivity and
> realize surplus value. (AO 255-6)

The State is the principle means by which “models of realization” are developed in capitalist
societies (ATP 434). Psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari argue, constitutes one such
model: “psychoanalysis, no less than the bureaucratic or military apparatus, is a mechanism
for the absorption of surplus value” (AO 344). The neurotic on the couch, paying to have his
or her desire analysed and interpreted, provides a new market, a means to dispose of
surplus value via the “commodity” of neurosis. From an economic point of view, the
psychotherapeutic iatrogenesis of neurosis allows for the consumptive expenditure of the
energy of desiring production within the artificially induced territory of a familial and
personological unconscious. That element of desiring production produced at the very limits
of society, where the forces of production come into conflict with the requirements of
reproduction, is thus “absorbed” or consumed within a purely intrapsychic, libidinal domain.
The neurotic, like the schizophrenic, is produced “at the end”, “at the limit of social
production determined by capitalism” (AO 142). The difference, however, is that with the
neurotic this limit, marking the threshold of capitalism, is “displaced” back into his or her
own internal psychological life. This is why the “images” of unconscious representation
serve such a repressive function, despite the fact that the desire denoted by them was
never a real desire. If psychoanalysis fails in this way to grasp the means by which capitalist
society represses desire, it is because it fails to evaluate the immanent model of death on
which the survival of capitalism depends. The psychoanalytical transcendent concept of
death, of death as something relating to a transcendent authority, is an archaism which
ultimately blinds us to how the capitalist State distributes its repression immanently, tying antiproduction directly to production so that they regulate one another without the need for any kind of external authority.

_Psychoanalysis as Immanent Criticism_

In _Anti-Oedipus_, as we have just seen, Freud’s concepts of psychic representation, primary and secondary repression, and displacement are all used _against_ his formation of the unconscious as something derived from the criteria of consciousness and the necessity of repression. Deleuze and Guattari instead substitute the legitimate criteria of desiring production. Thus, they seek a concept of the unconscious which is not relative to consciousness and the socially derived requirements of repression but which, on the contrary, is absolute and thus analytically prior to any and all social formations. Desiring production, then, is a universal and absolute process, while the socio-cultural forms which give it determinate embodiment are necessarily specific and relative. This is why, as I mentioned at the very start of this chapter, the categories of neurosis and psychosis have a degree of universality. While their symptomatic manifestation and pathogenesis may be culturally specific, these pathologies, for schizoanalysis, are the result of the blockage or interruption of the process of desiring production. Both the clinical schizophrenic and the clinical neurotic are specifically capitalist “commodities” because capitalist society actively draws on the deterritorialised flow of desiring production – while also repressing and reterritorialising it – in a manner unprecedented in any prior social formation.

Deleuze and Guattari arrive at their absolute concept of the unconscious via an immanent critique of psychoanalysis. It would not be accurate, in this sense, to say that schizoanalysis is in opposition to psychoanalysis, rather, schizoanalysis is psychoanalysis as immanent criticism. This means that the criteria according to which psychoanalysis is subjected to critique are derived from psychoanalysis itself, specifically, the theory of desire as libido.
The critique proceeds by asking why psychoanalysis, possessing as it did this revolutionary theory was capable of assuming a role that is ultimately conformist, becoming what Deleuze and Guattari call an “official language” and a “state science”, “a sort of racket thirsting after respectability, which will never have done with getting itself recognized and institutionalized” (D 62-4, AO 128). The answer, as we have seen, lies in the marketability of neurosis. If psychoanalysis was able to acquire the kind of respectability Freud craved, it was via the clinical concept of neurosis. But, somewhat paradoxically, for this to happen the category of neurosis had to lose the kind of medical, nosological specificity Freud always insisted it had. This was something Erich Fromm in the 1960s noticed when he spoke of a “crisis” of psychoanalysis:

> When Freud started his therapeutic work he dealt with patients who were 'sick' in the conventional sense of the word; they were suffering from aggravating symptoms like phobias, compulsions, and hysteria, even though they were not psychotic. Then analysis slowly began to extend its method to people who, traditionally, would not have been considered 'sick'. 'Patients' came with complaints about their inability to enjoy life, about unhappy marriages, generalized anxiety, painful feelings of loneliness, difficulties in their capacity at work, etc. (Fromm 1970: 10)

It is, strangely, the very insufficiency of psychoanalysis’s curative effectiveness which explains its success, in that it sustains a near infinite capacity to translate properly socio-political issues into its own understanding of desire as irremediable, internal conflict. It is this “accrued medicalisation of social problems by means of psychoanalysis”, to quote Jacques Donzelot (1977: 33-34), which schizoanalysis challenges when it argues that what we need to be cured of is not neurosis but the cure itself (AO 76). Despite this hostility to the notion of the cure, schizoanalysis can still be considered as being concerned primarily with the practical and therapeutic dimensions regarding the uses, legitimate and illegitimate, to which desire is subject (AO 64). Rather than reject the notion of therapy, then, schizoanalysis submits it to an immanent criticism, a transvaluation of its method based on the very criteria from which it initially sprang, such that therapy is to be identified with desire as an essentially curative and experimental force. Thus, in its critique of
psychoanalysis schizoanalysis reintroduces what the former had, in favour of an infinitely marketable incurability, relinquished, namely, a conception of health.

Schizoanalysis, despite its rejection of diagnostic biases, retains a certain notion of the symptom in that it argues, with psychoanalysis, that there is a necessarily symptomatic actualisation of desire. But whereas psychoanalysis privileges the actualisation, schizoanalysis privileges what we might call, borrowing on Deleuze's terminology in *The Logic of Sense*, the counteractualisation. In the closing chapter of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari say that "there is no deterritorialization of the flows of schizophrenic desire that is not accompanied by global or local reterritorializations", but they also say that the deterritorialisation of desire needs to be "induced" or "discovered through its lines of escape" (AO 346-7). Desire is organised around the poles of capture and escape, and becomes palpable only in terms of these tendencies. What is at issue, then, is a productive and therapeutic notion of the symptom alien both to the psychotherapeutic maintenance of neurosis and psychiatric diagnostic models. The diagram is the means by which the lines of escape drawn by the symptom can be grasped. In this sense, the diagram replaces symptomatology as the principle of the literary clinic, while the proper name as order-word labels the different parts of the diagram as zones of intensity within the affective medium of the body without organs. The function of the proper name is no longer modelled on the diagnostic role of the clinician but denotes the names of history, the names of entire peoples and races.

Delirium is the medium through which the tendencies signalled by the poles of desire can be mapped or diagrammed. This is the role of the author, to the extent that the latter, like the schizophrenic, "hallucinates and raves universal history" in identifying with the most impersonal of forces presaging the migrations and drifts of cultures and races. The memoir of Schreber, as well as the letters of Nietzsche and Rimbaud, suggest to Deleuze and Guattari that "all delirium is racial" (AO 94). Deleuze argues that "health as literature ... consists in inventing a people who are missing. It is a task of the fabulating function to invent a people" (CC 4). The writer "fabulates" via delirium. This is a collective delirium of populations, not simply human, but also animal and molecular, populations. As we shall see, the mode of reproduction by which Deleuze and Guattari trace this human-animal-
molecular peopling is neither sexual nor hereditary but viral and epidemiological. The movement of peoples is a movement of contagion, and the writer fabulates such contagions, inventing peoples on behalf of whom to write.

It is in this direction that the literary clinic, inspired by schizoanalysis, wishes to take psychoanalysis. If, in this sense, Deleuze retains some concept of prescription, cure or therapy it is not as a means to “judge” life on the basis of a pre-existing model of normality. Rather, health is to be invented, imagined and constructed on the basis of an impersonal and collective understanding of the libidinal and the socio-political domains. Nevertheless, this construction still takes place according to criteria distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate. Delirium is precisely that which allows us to discern the falsity of the “false movement” by which capital reproduces (AO 11). But how are we to understand this persistence of prescriptive criteria within a philosophical system so opposed to all systems of judgment? It is certainly a hallmark of both the literary clinic and schizoanalysis that they prioritise the need to “have done with the judgment of God” (to use Artaud’s phrase). What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that Deleuze and Guattari attack transcendent systems of judgment because these systems judge life (AO 213). This is why the organism is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the preeminent form of judgment. The organism is the most fundamental and elementary means by which we become subjects capable of being judged. Judgement is thus only made possible through its application to life and to existence; it does not bear on persons or subjects, as we generally think, but rather we become persons and subjects via the imposition of judgment on the impersonal life flowing though us in the form of the BwO (ATP 159).

This imposition is never final but takes place only via a continuous “combat” or struggle between the forms (the organism, the State, etc.) by which we are condemned and the impersonal life which is constantly moving between these forms and breaking up their organisation. Deleuze argues that “judgment burst in on the world in the form of the false judgment leading to delirium and madness” (CC 129). The threat of madness provokes judgment as a means of subjection. How, then, do we escape judgment, given that its opposite is also its condition of possibility? Deleuze explains that judgment’s “other” is not some “prejudicative” domain but is, rather, immanent to it as a necessary yet antagonistic
presupposition, “a justice that is opposed to all judgment” (CC 127). To have done with transcendent systems of judgment, then, does not at all mean to do away with judgment altogether, but means, rather, to judge death, rather than life, as Deleuze and Guattari argue: “death then is a part of the desiring-machine, a part that must itself be judged” (AO 365). Similarly, Deleuze in his book on Bacon writes that “death is judged from the point of view of life, and not the reverse, as we like to believe” (FB 44). The BwO provides a model and an experience of death, a means by which to make death judgeable. Indeed, it is only by judging death that the concept of health can have any real meaning, in that the judgment on death is not a judgement as such but rather the immanent production of values.

Notes:

1. On the importance of distinguishing between desiring production and desiring machines, see Buchanan 2008: 49-50.

2. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the trajectories of what they call “smooth”, in contrast to “striated”, space can be perceived in the movements of symptoms: “Whereas in the striated forms organize matter, in the smooth materials signal forces and serve as symptoms for them. ... Perception in [smooth space] is based on symptoms and evaluations rather than measures and properties” (ATP 479). The symptom in this sense is the index of movements which constitute events. We must note here a conceptual shift in the significance of the symptom. Deleuze states in his 1961 article on Sacher-Masoch that "symptomatological specificity is primary; the specificity of the causal agent is always secondary and relative" (SM 125-6). In Anti-Oedipus, however, the delirium which characterises the clinical picture of the schizophrenic is regarded as a "secondary phenomenon" which "does not constitute
an autonomous sphere, for it depends on the functioning and the breakdowns of desiring-machines” (AO 23).

3. Oedipal literature is also what Deleuze and Guattari call “major” literature, which they identify with Breton, Goethe and Schiller (AO 146).

4. The question of the relation of schizoanalysis to antipsychiatry is a complex one, and is settled neither by dissociating them completely (see, for example, Rajchman 1977: 45) nor by identifying them as cognates (for example, Turkle 2001: 520). It may very well be the case that Lacanianism came far closer to being the French incarnation of antipsychiatry than schizoanalysis ever did (Postel and Allen 1994: 388). Deleuze and Guattari on many occasions show themselves to be critical of many of the traditional psychological postulates Laing and Cooper adopt, and they charge antipsychiatry with a “maintained familialism” (AO 393, 105). The influence of Guattari, here, is generally seen to be that he brought antipsychiatric ideas to Deleuze’s attention. However the very opposite may be the case. Guattari’s scathing condemnation of Laing’s experimental therapeutic community at Kingsley Hall focuses on the micro­fascism inherent in group formations. The central patient at Kingsley Hall, the schizophrenic Mary Barnes, became the perfect model of oedipalisation due to her integration into the game of institutional power. The situation there was not truly curative, in other words, but neuroticising in the extreme, according to Guattari (Guattari 1996: 52). Writing in January 1972, Guattari warned that Laing’s thought, and anti-psychiatric radicalism in general, was “in frank retreat from the contributions of Marx and Freud” and was in danger of being recuperated due to its “personalist and humanist ideology”. Guattari argued that Laing’s emphasis on the person and the family was in no way opposed to the then trends in psychiatric reform, “family psychotherapy and [sectorised psychiatry]” (Guattari 1996: 38-9). We may thus argue that a naive and theoretically ill informed radicalisation of psychiatry was, as much as psychiatric and psychoanalytic orthodoxy, the main target of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique.

5. Kraepelin was the first to introduce such a concept by unifying hebephrenia, catatonia and paranoia by relating them to some “tangible morbid process occurring
in the brain” (Kraepelin 1987: 23). No such process, however, has ever been
identified by psychiatry.

6. Eugen Bleuler wrote:

   In schizophrenia it is as if the physiological inhibitions and pathways have lost
   their significance. The usual paths are no longer preferred, the thread of
   ideas very easily becomes lost in unfamiliar and incorrect pathways.
   Associations are then guided by random influences. (Bleuler 1987: 68)

7. This idea belongs essentially to Foucault, who argued that:

   to the doctor, Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had set up
   within confinement. He did deliver the patient from the existence of the
   asylum within which his ‘liberators’ had alienated him; but he did not deliver
   him from what was essential in this existence; he regrouped its powers,
   extended them to the maximum by uniting them in the doctor’s hands; he
   created the psychoanalytical situation where, by an inspired short-circuit,
   alienation becomes disalienating because, in the doctor, it becomes subject.
   (Foucault 1989: 278)

8. In his critique of Freud, D.H. Lawrence speaks of a retroactive attribution of the
   incest motive to desire, which, he says, involves

   the motivizing of the great affective sources by means of ideas mentally
   derived. As for example the incest motive, which first and foremost is a
   logical deduction made by the human reason, even if unconsciously made,
   and secondly introduced into the affective, passional sphere, where it now
   proceeds to serve as a principle for action. (Lawrence 1960: 11)

9. Laplanche and Pontalis point out that repression cannot proceed without this double
   movement, writing that

   an idea cannot be repressed without going through two simultaneous
   influences, namely, an action directed towards it from a superior psychical
agency and an attraction exerted upon it by contents which are already unconscious. But this of course fails to account for the initial presence of some formations in the unconscious which cannot have been drawn there by other ones. (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 334)

10. For a discussion of the concept of models of realisation in relation to capitalism and the State, see Surin 2001: 614.
Chapter 5

In this, the final chapter, we will bring together the strands of the argument made over the course of this thesis. This will enable us to suggest what health, in the literary clinical sense we have been exploring, means for Deleuze. In chapter 1, we saw how the author embodies a singular or exemplary “case” with regards to general and particular categories. We will here reread this idea in a more schizoanalytic way, oriented less towards diagnosis than the production of new modes of life, and connect it to the idea, discussed in the last chapter, that literature is a type of delirium. In chapter 2, we saw how Masoch’s experimentation was centred on the creation of the “new man”, a sort of community or people to come. What I argue here is that delirium is the way in which the author imagines such new forms of collective subjectivity. The ability of the author to draw on collective forces, and to use them to imagine new modes of life, is ultimately what Deleuze understands by the therapeutic possibilities of literature.

If, as we have seen, delirium is related to the two poles governing the means by which desire invests the social field, then the health the author manifests is the ability to move between these poles. This notion of two poles of legitimacy and illegitimacy will here be clarified in relation to the problem of collective subjectivity, and we shall see how the movement between these poles is mediated by what Deleuze defines in terms of virtual groups and populations. Delirium is in this way inseparable from the propagation of new forms of collective life, what Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise as modes of “peopling”. We will look at some sections from A Thousand Plateaus in order to see how they relate directly to issues Deleuze discusses in Essays Critical and Clinical, and we will thus argue that the notion of health pertinent to the literary clinic is impossible to understand without the concepts of schizoanalysis.

The author’s case is exemplary because it is both a part of the collective malaise it diagnoses, but also, simultaneously, because it is distinct from this collectivity, being able to gain a certain point of view on it from a position of externality. This is what we have already
suggested is the “singularity” of the author. From the very beginning of this thesis I insisted on the immanence of Deleuze’s critical approach in this respect: new values must be made to issue from a transvaluation of existing ones, new forms of health must arise through existing sicknesses. With regards to Kafka, we saw that the therapeutic element of his work consisted in the ability to extract from his own position of familial guilt purely impersonal tendencies charting trajectories towards new social formations. We will see in this chapter how the author occupies a position which Deleuze and Guattari define as “anomalous”, being both part of a constituted collectivity while also embodying and propagating forces which lead beyond it. The production of such anomalous positions, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is inseparable from modes of viral propagation, contagion and epidemic. But it is precisely through the becomings attached to these pathological forces that new forms of health emerge. We will thus conclude by clarifying the immanent identity of sickness and health which from the very beginning of this thesis I have argued is the central hypothesis of the literary clinic.

The People to Come

From his early work on Masoch, Deleuze associated health with an engagement with issues of group subjectivity and collective life. The literary clinic grasps the author’s position not as a particular and personal case of a wider social and collective generality, but precisely as a problematic intersection of the personal and the collective in which the author can be viewed as a singularity capturing both personal and collective forces at once. If Masoch or Kafka suffered their own conditions at some private or personal level, it was the procedures of their literary activity that allowed a transmutation – what we have been calling a transference – of this private domain into impersonal, world historical and socio-political dimensions. We suggested that Deleuze and Guattari saw Kafka as being able to extract from his own work a set of therapeutic effects which enabled him to escape, at some profound level, the oedipal guilt that pervaded much of his experience. We also suggested
that these therapeutic effects are inseparable from a type of social prognostication: all the
coming social and political forces of Kafka’s future are present in his work as the effects of
the radically impersonal dimensions explored within it, as if Kafka himself became a conduit
for these impersonal forces. Deleuze and Guattari do not grant Kafka any prophetic powers
here. Rather, they discern in his work the exemplary modes by which desire invests the
socio-political field. Literature constitutes a special kind of delirium by which the
investments of desire can be mapped and diagrammed according to criteria governing the
syntheses of desire. We saw in the last chapter that these syntheses are subject to
legitimate and illegitimate uses at a purely formal and universal level, indifferent as such to
psychological and personological contents. Literature, then, as an intensely sober delirium,
has the capacity to map the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the social investments of desire,
and Kafka’s work possesses the experimental breadth to give this process its full
dramatisation.

What this means is that literature, as an enterprise of health, may involve a set of
therapeutic effects at the personal level of the author, but this only becomes possible
through the propagation of new forms of collective life, through the invention of new
modes of collective subjectivity. Deleuze argues that literature enables the author to
become a relay for collective forces in this sense. He says that the greatest artists “invoke a
people, and find they ‘lack a people’” (N 174).¹ What this suggests, at one level, is that art is
not made for any actually existing or already constituted people, but for a people to come
who are not yet recognisable as a group. Great artists are, in this sense, radically untimely,
like a watch that ticks too fast, and their work, as Simon O’Sullivan has remarked, is “not
made for an already existing audience, but ... [calls] forth – or [invokes] – an audience”
(O’Sullivan 2009: 248). There is, however, more to the concept of the people to come than
this element of untimeliness alone. The concept of the people to come is an essentially
literary clinical one and needs to be understood in terms of some of our foregoing
arguments. In chapters 1 and 2, we saw how processes of formalisation and creativity are
based essentially on unformalisable elements, on blockages and elements of “libidinal
stupidity”. We understood this in chapter 2 in terms of psychoanalytic theories of
embodiment and speech. Deleuze consistently argues for the conceptualisation of literary
statements as emerging from the mute inarticulateness of the pathological body. We do not think or formalise on our own behalf, but on behalf of a power which comes from elsewhere and maintains intimate links with the abyssal nature of bodily depth. Deleuze is fond of Karl Philipp Moritz's sentiment that "one writes for dying calves" (C 2). The pathos of something alien and inarticulate is ultimately the source of the power of articulation itself.

The idea of the people to come allows us to give this understanding of the genesis of literary statements its full, socio-political extension. We have already seen, in chapter 3, how individual statements are in reality always collective statements, the individual being a relay for the collective forces of language. Individual uses of language only have efficacy on the basis of collective uses. Deleuze, however, distinguishes between two types of collectivity, or two ways in which groups and communities can be understood. There are, on the one hand, already constituted groups and actual communities. On the other hand, there are groups which are to be defined solely in terms of their internal self-formation, their processes of coming into being rather than any end result of these processes. This latter type of group is what Deleuze and Guattari call, using Sartre's term, a "group-in-fusion" (AO 305). They use this as the basis for their concept of minor literature, drawing on Kafka's statement that "literature is less a concern of literary history than of the people" (Kafka 1948: 149). Kafka argued that writers from "minor" nations are in a privileged position with respect to the experimental possibilities of literature. What is crucial here is that minor, as Deleuze and Guattari understand it, is not the same as what we generally call "minority". Rather, the minor is defined in terms of the pure processes of group formation, these processes being virtual in that they are distinct from any actually existing group or community. This is the kind of collectivity Deleuze wishes us to understand by the notion of the people to come. Within every actual group there are processes or tendencies towards new modes of collective life which are strictly potential. The role of literature is not, Deleuze insists, to enable these tendencies to become actualised (N 174). The actual constitution of a people is not what Deleuze means when he says that "health as literature, as writing, consists in inventing a people who are missing" (CC 4). Rather, the author renders the virtual processes of group formation tangible by diagramming them, and allows us in this way to
conceive of new possibilities for collective life. The relation, then, is one between the author as an actual individual and the people to come as a virtual community (K 84).

The author in this sense is a relay for impersonal, collective and virtual forces relating to the formation of groups. This is the basis for the production of literary statements. But how is this related to the "pathic" dimension of the libidinal body mentioned above? The concept of literature as health seems to hinge on this question. For Deleuze, the processes of group formation constitute a kind of pathos. If the author is connected to this pathos, it is because creative processes and the processes of group formation are of the same type, and can meet in a shared space of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari write that "a people can only be created in abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more with art or philosophy. But books of philosophy and works of art also contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people" (WP 110). Group formation is like the pathos of the dying calf in that it takes place in what Deleuze, in his work on Bacon, calls a "zone of indeterminability" linking humans to a universal suffering shared by humans and non-humans alike. Deleuze says that the violence incarnated in Bacon's "paralytics" and "hysterics", in the tortured "meat" of his various figures, is not a personal suffering but one connected to "all the violence of Ireland, and the violence of Nazism, the violence of war" (FB 28). This pathic dimension of the flesh or meat of the inorganic body taps into the struggles and conflicts of peoples, especially those "minor" peoples who lack a language and a set of shared discourses which would allow them to speak for themselves as an established group. The author is in touch with the illiteracy of such virtual collectivities, and literature in this way causes a type of non-language to merge with language. We have already seen language and non-language merge in this way in our discussion of Beckett, but the concept of the people to come gives this idea an important collective and political dimension.

Thus, the author can become a relay for a populous body which, like the pathos of the flesh of the dying calf or the meat of Bacon's tortured figures, does not think or formalise for itself but nevertheless constitutes the forces of creativity animating the author's work. It is precisely in this sense that Deleuze sees the overcoming of the opposition of the individual and the group, and, indeed, "solitary" authors such as Kafka and Melville are, by dint of their
very solitude, capable of tapping into the collective dimension more than authors who more explicitly claim to speak on behalf of others. As Deleuze writes: "the author can be marginalized or separate from his more or less illiterate community as much as you like; this condition puts him all the more in a position to express potential forces and, in his very solitude, to be a true collective agent" (C2 213). The author can become a relay for forces distinct from his or her individuality. It was Freud who, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, famously defined neurosis in terms of a certain immutable opposition of the individual and the group.\(^4\) The repression of individual desires for the sake of group stability is, on this view, the source of civilisation's misery. For Freud, this is an irremediable condition, at the root of all mental illness. The literary clinic, however, places a high therapeutic value on the possibility of overcoming this opposition of the individual and the collective, with the role of the pathic body being to construct "zones of indeterminability", or bodies without organs, in which individual and group subjectivity become part of a single process of peopling.\(^5\)

Madness and delirium, as we shall see more clearly in a moment, constitute an important means of conceptualising this. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

> It is erroneously maintained that a madman "takes himself for so-and-so..." It is a question of something quite different: identifying races, cultures, and gods with fields of intensity on the body without organs ... Whence the role of names ... proper names that identify races, peoples, and persons with regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities. (AO 95)

The idea of the people to come, then, is the culmination of Deleuze's understanding of literature as delirium. This can be seen quite clearly in his analysis of T.E. Lawrence's novels *The Mint* and *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Lawrence's novels embody a certain type of "madness" related to group subjectivity, which, for Deleuze, is dramatised through the problem of shame. *The Mint*, in which Lawrence documented his time in a Royal Air Force depot, explores the shame of group existence and the daily struggle to "live and survive in an army as an anonymous 'type', objectively determined down to the smallest detail" (CC 122). *Seven Pillars*, on the other hand, tells of Lawrence's experiences as a military leader in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This latter book also deals with shame, specifically with what Deleuze calls "the shame of armies": "it is true that groups of
partisans sometimes have to form an army, or at least be integrated into an army, if they
want to achieve a decisive victory; but at that point they cease to exist as free men and
rebels" (CC 121). The problem of shame, then, is concerned with how one can draw on the
purely virtual forces of group formation without the actualisation of these forces impinging
upon them or cancelling them out. The problem of military organisation, as Lawrence
dramatises it in his military memoirs, is for Deleuze related fundamentally to problems of
group subjectivity and questions of collective belonging: how can one belong to a group
without the shameful feeling of compromising one's own individuality? But similarly, how
can one stand outside the group, as a military leader, for example, without the shame of
regarding others as a homogenous mass? How, in other words, is it possible to be both one
and multiple?

Lawrence makes this dual problem of shame into a kind of "song", a literary lyricism in
which the "madness" of continually traversing the space between group and individual
existence becomes the principle for aesthetic production. In Deleuze's account Lawrence
transforms the pathology of shame into a literary technique capable of emitting aesthetic
"images" and "entities". Lawrence's literary technique in this sense is seen as stemming
from the problem of collectives as simultaneously a literary and a political problem. Deleuze
says Lawrence had no style of his own but "[needed] the mechanism of revolt and preaching
to become a writer"; by himself he "[lacks] a literary technique" but acquires one through
an engagement with the Arab Revolt (CC 119). The position of the author is both
problematic and singular because it lies at this point of intersection of collective and
individual forces. This singularity is also a pathology, it is precisely the pathology of those
authors whom Deleuze and Guattari define in terms of the minor that they cannot integrate
themselves into any actual collective existence, or identify themselves with any established
group. But from this pathology springs the possibility of literary and political health, the
ability, that is, to imagine new forms of group existence and new modes of articulation
proper to them.
We are now in a better position to clarify the argument made in the last chapter that literature is a delirium capable of diagramming the socio-political investments of desire. Deleuze and Guattari define the work of art as “a sublime ‘transference’ with exemplary collective virtualities” (AO 145). What this means is that the author as a relay performs a transference enabling the passage from individual to collective subjectivity. The author’s proper name, through the impersonality it acquires in the work, becomes a virtual mode of existence for peoples and groups. We saw this with our discussion of Kafka in chapter 3. The transfer of personal contents to the impersonal “I” of the linguistic statement allowed Kafka to escape his tormenting personal situation, but in doing so he also became capable of subjectively embodying purely impersonal forces. The “K function”, then, becomes a way of articulating the forces of history, both the anarchic, revolutionary and progressive forces as well as the fascistic, reactionary and regressive ones. In the last chapter, we saw that schizoanalysis regards this way of articulating and evaluating socio-political forces as a form of delirium. Delirium records or diagrams the social investments of desire, these investments being distinguished as either illegitimate or legitimate, or what Deleuze and Guattari also call “paranoiac-fascisizing” on the one hand and “schizorevolutionary” on the other (AO 305). We also saw that literature is a means of articulating and experiencing this delirium in a non-pathological way, in a way which sidesteps the calamity of psychotic breakdown.

The idea that schizophrenic delirium is not solely a pathological process but one with a healing dimension is well known, and was most famously argued by radical psychiatrists such as R.D. Laing and Harry Stack-Sullivan. What is perhaps less well known is that Freud himself considered the symptoms of schizophrenia as a kind of radical self-cure, remarking of Schreber’s delirium that it was an “attempt at cure, which the observer takes to be the illness itself” (Freud 2002c: 65). We have already argued for the distinction between schizophrenia as process and as breakdown in the last chapter. We can here argue that schizophrenia as process implies some of the concepts of group subjectivity discussed above. If literature is a kind of non-pathological delirium, a mode of transference between
personal and impersonal forces, it is because it shares with schizophrenia the sense of
depersonalisation which allows the individual or solitary self to experience in a collective
manner. Schizophrenic delirium is distinguished by the fact that its content is often
concerned with groups and populations. Elias Canetti remarked that “under many different
guises all kinds of crowds appear in the imaginings of schizophrenics.” He cites several
examples: “One woman claimed to have ‘all human beings in her body’; another to hear ‘the
mosquitoes talking’. A man ‘heard 729,000 girls’; another ‘the whispering voices of the
whole of humanity’” (Canetti 2000: 323). While as a pathological experience this is often
terrifying and debilitating, literature, Deleuze and Guattari argue, functions as a means to
render this experience in a non-pathological way. This is ultimately what joins the
schizoanalytic project to the literary clinic.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the social investment of desire corresponds to “the
problem of population” (AO 308). The problem of population is, as we’ve seen, the problem
of how to conceive of group subjectivity. But the concept of delirium adds a new dimension
to this problem, in that it argues that modes of populating can be divided into legitimate
and illegitimate types. When Deleuze argues that “there is no delirium that does not pass
through peoples, races, and tribes” what he means is that delirium evaluates different ways
of understanding the nature of groups (CC 4). Deleuze and Guattari say that delirium has
essentially “racial” aspects: “all delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist”
(AO 94). Schreber’s delirium, for example, is

- filled with a theory of God’s chosen peoples, and with the dangers that face the
currently chosen people, the Germans, who are threatened by the Jews, the
Catholics, and the Slavs. In his intense metamorphoses and passages, Schreber
becomes a pupil of the Jesuits, the burgomaster of a city where the Germans are
fighting against the Slavs, and a girl defending Alsace against the French. At last he
crosses the Aryan gradient or threshold to become a Mongol prince. What does this
becoming-pupil, burgomaster, girl, and Mongol signify? (AO 98).

In the last chapter, we argued that delirium’s proper content is world historical and not
personological or familial. Here, we can go further and say that delirium is a mode of
propagating virtual collectives, or what Deleuze and Guattari call multiplicities, which are
themselves based around the poles of legitimacy. This, ultimately, is the essence of literature as health. As Deleuze writes:

"Literature is delirium, and as such its destiny is played out between the two poles of delirium. Delirium is a disease, the disease par excellence, whenever it erects a race it claims is pure and dominant. But it is the measure of health when it invokes this oppressed bastard race that ceaselessly stirs beneath dominations, resisting everything that crushes and imprisons, a race that is outlined in relief in literature as process." (CC 4)

The people summoned forth by this literary delirium is “not the one that claims to be pure but rather an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race” (WP 109). This “bastard race”, such as the one with which Rimbaud identified in the “Bad Blood” section of A Season in Hell, is what we referred to above in terms of the minor, as the virtual movements of a strictly potential populous body stirring beneath dominant and already constituted groups. Literature as delirium, then, in its invocation of a people to come, swings between these two kinds of groups. What we need to see now is how this idea plays out in Deleuze’s analysis of literary texts.

Melvillian Psychiatry

When Deleuze refers to what he calls “Melvillian psychiatry”, he means to discern in Melville’s works the recurrence of two distinct types of characters: monomaniacs and hypochondriacs, or what he also defines as “demons and angels, torturers and victims” (CC 78-9). This distinction can be traced to Foucault’s description of 18th century notions of madness which distinguished between two separate pairings of mental disorders: melancholia and mania, on the one hand, and hysteria and hypochondria on the other. The melancholia/mania pair would give rise, eventually, to modern psychiatric conceptions of manic-depression, whereas hysteria and hypochondria formed a “parallelism” of the female
and male variants of bodily sensuality which served to give psychiatry its materialist basis. What Foucault is suggesting is that, in distinguishing between these classes of disorder, psychiatry constituted its own version of the dualism of mind and body. The melancholia/mania group concerns the stubborn fixation on a single mental object to the exclusion of all others, and to this extent it is the brain, the imagination and the mind which are the locus of the disorder (Foucault 1989: 145, 122). The hysteria/hypochondria group, on the other hand, concerns the "sympathetic" agency of the body to be moved, physically and morally, by itself and by others, a capacity of the body to be affected and to affect itself via what Foucault calls a "corporeal continuity" subtending it (Foucault 1989: 153-4). What is important for our argument here is that these two classes of mental illness correspond to Deleuze's conception of two different types of delirium, and thus to two different ways of imagining group subjectivity, or rather, two different ways of imagining the relationship between the individual and the group. 6

Deleuze contrasts the characters of Ahab and Bartleby as two different ways in which the socio-linguistic laws and pacts binding people together bear upon individual consciousness in such a way as to create a "delirious" zone of immanence. Ahab falls into the melancholic, monomaniac category. His fixation on Moby-Dick is a betrayal of the Whalers' Law, which states that any healthy whale should be hunted with equal preference. His pursuit raises Moby-Dick above the rest of the whales and himself above the rest of the whalers. Deleuze defines Ahab as a kind of demonic and tyrannical "[Master] of reason" pursuing his own "metaphysical perversion" within the sadean space of a "primary Nature" beyond the laws governing society (CC 82, 79). Bartleby, belonging to the hypochondriac and angelic category, is in contrast to Ahab in that he has no preferences: he is "not particular" and seems to come from nowhere, being hired by the attorney without any references or evidence of any prior life. His famous phrase or formula of "I would prefer not to" itself seems to abolish the preferential nature of language in a way very similar to Beckett's procedures of exhaustion. In abolishing both a preferred object and a preferring subject, Bartleby's formula pushes language towards silence (CC 72). Bartleby, like Ahab, then, also seems to go against the normal function of laws, this time the laws of "copying". But he does this more like a masochist than a sadist, and instead of opposing himself to the laws of
the attorney’s office he chooses an over-zealous obedience which allows him to slip beneath them. Bartleby forces others around him to compromise their own laws against their will while remaining uncompromised himself. It may appear that Bartleby breaks the pact with the attorney by refusing to copy, however Deleuze writes that “the pact consists of the following: Bartleby will sit near his master and copy ... So there is no doubt that once the attorney wants to draw ... Bartleby from behind his screen to correct the copies with others, he [the attorney] breaks the pact” (CC 76).

The hypochondriac/monomaniac distinction can be seen perhaps most clearly in *Billy Budd*. The “Handsome Sailor” is of the hypochondriac type: “almost stupid, [a creature] of innocence and purity, stricken with a constitutive weakness but also with a strange beauty” (CC 80). He is a “foundling” and a “by-blow”, not instructed in the laws of the navy, but his innate beauty suggests “noble descent ... evident in him as a blood horse” (Melville 1986: 300). Billy becomes the object of Captain Claggart who inexplicably fixates on him and accuses him of mutiny. Claggart is described by Melville not only as a “monomaniac”, but also as having a “Natural Depravity: a depravity according to nature”, being “dominated by intellectuality” and the law of reason, even though “in his heart he would seem to riot in complete exemption from that law”:

> These men are madmen of the most dangerous sort, for their lunacy is not continuous, but occasional, evoked by some special object; it is protectively secretive, which is as much as to say it is self-contained, so that when, moreover, most active it is to the average mind not distinguishable from sanity. (Melville 1986: 325-6)

When Claggart’s accusations of Billy are aired, the latter is struck by “his lurking defect”, a speech impediment or stutter that leaves him in “a convulsed tongue-tie” and which ends with a violent and sudden discharge when Billy strikes Claggart dead. The killing of Claggart is, as it were, the paradoxical point where the violence of reason joins the impotence of the body and where the metaphysical impotence of ideas is animated by the vitality of the body. The brain and the body, intelligence and instinct, double one another immanently. It is not that logos and pathos can be said to be opposed; rather, they contain one another. It is for this reason that Claggart and Billy Budd, Ahab and Bartleby, are, for Deleuze, “the
same creature – primary, original, stubborn, seized from both sides, marked merely with a ‘plus’ or a ‘minus’ sign” (CC 80). They are both forms of primary nature which come into conflict with the secondary nature of socio-linguistic convention.

It thus falls to a third set of characters, including Captain Vere in Billy Budd, Ishmael in Moby-Dick and the attorney in Bartleby, to evaluate the movements from one to the other. These characters seem to embody something of the position of the author to the extent that Melville’s style, like Kleist’s, tracks the formal movements between the poles governing the operation of the writing machine itself: “between stationary, fixed processes and mad-paced procedures: style, with its succession of catatonias and accelerations” (CC 80). In chapter 2, we discussed style, in the context of perversion, in terms of the combination of pathos, as undifferentiated bodily materiality in which determinations are dissolved, and logos, as the pure formal fact of determination itself. Style is the means by which a certain constitutive weakness or original incapacity of the pathic body is transferred to language. Style lies at this point of transference which is the principle of Deleuze’s vitalist formalism.

Billy’s stutter is like the moment when catatonia and acceleration meet and become indistinguishable. Melville’s works are, says Deleuze, an attempt to “reconcile” the Ahab types and the Bartleby types with one another, and this is where the concept of the people to come appears for Melville. Any reconciliation of the two types is necessarily a social and political process in that it portends a “community of celibates” (CC 84). Melville’s writing passes through the poles of delirium to the extent that in Ahab and Bartleby, Claggart and Billy Budd, it poses the problem of group subjectivity in two different ways, in terms of two different subversions of the laws of society. But any possible reconciliation is also simultaneously a stylistic problem, in that it requires the immanence of pathic body and formal sign. It is this simultaneously political and stylistic problem which the literary clinic ultimately poses.

The Anomalous

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Health, then, is simultaneously a stylistic as well as a socio-political matter. In chapters 1 and 2, we saw that for Deleuze the creative principle of formal renewal is based on the Artaudian idea that there is an inherent incapacity of thought to take on form. It is precisely this weakness which prevents thought from acquiring any definitive or ultimate form: there is always an antagonism between forms and some formless element, the latter functioning to thwart processes governing the formalisation of contents. We also saw that, from the point of view of Nietzschean immanent criticism, the vital principle of the production of new values is internal to the morbidity of existing ones, just as the production of new modes of health is internal to the pathological process of illness. Life, in this sense, is the constitutive weakness to take on form combined with the immanence of the process by which this weakness becomes the basis for life’s greatest power, which is to say, the power of endless novelty. In terms of Deleuze’s synthesis of vitalism and formalism, then, we can say that life is the power to produce ever new forms of collective statements capable of articulating purely virtual modes of embodiment. Health must be seen in terms of this emission of the statements of a collective body which has yet to be actualised but which never ceases emerging from the actualisations which determine bodies. Literary statements are produced at the site of this antagonism between an already constituted actual group, with its own collective statements and discourses, and the purely potential, virtual collectives emerging within it. The “exemplary” author is allied to this antagonistic point.

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the anomalous understands this through the concerns of group subjectivity discussed above. Every population contains a singular point occupied by an anomalous or “exceptional individual” who “holds a privileged position in the pack, sometimes a position outside the pack, and sometimes slips into and is lost in the anonymity of the collective statements of the pack” (ATP 243). The anomalous individual, like Bartelby and Ahab, signifies the emergence of some new laws or norms. To be anomalous, as Canguilhem argues, is to be “removed, in terms of one’s organization, from the vast majority of beings to which one must be compared” (Canguilhem 1991: 133). In the sense that the anomalous is distinct from the normal it may appear to be identical with the pathological. But the anomalous is not the abnormal, it is not necessarily against the normal but against the normal as it is defined in relation to a statistical mass. Canguilhem writes
that "the anomalous is not the pathological. Pathological implies ... the feeling of life gone wrong. But the pathological is indeed the abnormal". It follows that the anomalous is "more than normal ... but normative, capable of following new norms of life" (Canguilhem 1991: 137, 200).

The anomalous, then, may occupy, from the point of view of the statistical average, the position of the pathological, and yet it is not pathological: it is the very point at which the pathological position is divested of its actual pathological contents, and becomes the principle for the production of new "norms of life". In Kafka's story "Joesphine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk", Josephine's "position" is described as having "never been quite defined"; her singing, a kind of "piping", is "nothing out of the ordinary", indeed, it is hardly distinguishable from that of any other mouse: "we all pipe, but of course no one dreams of making out that our piping is an art" (Kafka 2005: 361). And yet "her art does not go unnoticed", there is something "that irresistibly makes its way into us from Josephine's piping ... like a message from the whole people to each individual" (Kafka 2005: 367).

Josephine as an anomalous individual occupies both poles of group subjectivity. Her singing is a trait common to all mice, and expresses the very ordinariness of group identity. In this sense, she is not beyond the laws of the group. But her singing is also something unique in that it seems to come from outside the group, it portends an outside or beyond of group existence effecting a collective deterritorialisation. Georges Canguilhem writes that a mistake is made regarding the etymology of the word anomaly in that it is often said to be derived from the Greek *nomos* as that which is outside or against the law, *a-nomos*. The correct etymology shows, however, that anomaly relates to the Greek *omalos*, meaning that which is level or even. Thus "etymologically, *an-omalos* [is] that which is uneven, rough, irregular, in the sense given these words when speaking of a terrain" (Canguilhem 1991: 131). Deleuze and Guattari argue that "*an-omalie* ... designates, the unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization" (ATP 244).

The anomalous unifies the group, being what Deleuze and Guattari call a "leader of the pack", but it is also a "Loner" (ATP 243). One can only express what is common to a group by standing outside it. In standing outside the group in this way, the anomalous infuses into the group elements of the outside which may threaten its consistency with unforeseeable
change. This is what gives the anomalous its special relation to novelty and why it is the source of the power of creativity on which artists draw. But how are such alliances with anomalous forces to be made? The question must be posed in relation to the links between art and populations, between art and the political control of populations. Deleuze and Guattari argue that pre-modern, specifically romantic, art formed special links with crowds and populations in relation to a romantic “hero” capable of expressing the nature of collective identity (ATP 339-42). But modern political developments have changed the ways in which it is possible for an artist to engage with populations. Romantic art, in particular the opera of Verdi and Wagner, were appropriated by fascist and Nazi populism. The political establishments of the 20th century have appropriated both the earth and the people to their own ends: “The established powers have occupied the earth, they have built people’s organizations. The mass media, the great people’s organizations of the party or union type, are machines for reproduction” (ATP 345). The maintenance and reproduction of peoples is central to modern, biopolitical forms of control.

It is for this reason that the modern artist, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, is not invested with actual populations, but with virtual collectives which emerge as the effects of biopolitical control. Rather than appealing to the opposition of the “one” and the “crowd” dominant in the romantic paradigm, the modern artist “lets loose molecular populations in the hopes that this will sow the seeds of, or even engender, the people to come, that these populations will pass into a people to come” (ATP 345). Now, these molecular or virtual populations are already part of the modern means of biopolitical control; political authority no longer operates simply through the confinement of crowds in extension, the subjection of the mass to transcendent authority, but works increasingly through the intensive control of peoples at the molecular and micrological level. The modern artistic question then becomes

whether molecular or atomic ‘populations’ of all natures (mass media, monitoring procedures, computers, space weapons) would continue to bombard the existing people in order to train it or control it or annihilate it – or if other molecular populations were possible, could slip into the first and give rise to a people yet to come. (ATP 345)
What this means is that artists work via those same procedures of ambient control (computers, the military, mass media) that characterise the contemporary age; they search out the possibilities of forming alliances with anomalous forces which appear within these systems of control. If political authority functions to reproduce and manage existing populations, then artists must find, within these systems, ways to produce new populations, without reproducing existing ones. If modern forms of political control centre around the maintenance and reproduction of peoples as actual, recognisable groups, then resistance to these forms of control involves the invocation of communities and peoples not reproducible or maintainable as such.

The specifically modern aesthetic question, then, is how to populate without reproducing, how to engender peoples without also creating the modes of political control which attend them. Deleuze and Guattari argue that art must derive from the anomalous points within the biopolitical reproduction of groups new ways of peopling distinct from systems of heredity and reproduction. This is why they "oppose epidemic to filiation, contagion to heredity, peopling by contagion to sexual reproduction .... Bands, human or animal, proliferate by contagion" (ATP 241). The anomaly in this sense is the appearance within the biopolitical reproduction of groups of a new norm of life which is distinct from the norms of any actually existing group, and which, most importantly, cannot function as a means to maintain or reproduce any existing populations. These new norms of life occupy an apparently pathological position, the position of the virus or the contagion, in that they are parasitic on the reproduction of groups. Yet, it also promises the emission of new norms of life in direct conflict with the morbidity of our current modes of embodiment. It is in this way, via the anomaly and the people to come, that new criteria for health can be produced.

*From the Procedure to the Refrain*
How are these new laws or norms of life, distinct from the statistical average, to be produced, emitted and transmitted? This is a question Deleuze and Guattari seem to be addressing with their concept of the refrain. The refrain is a concept designed to account for the genesis of the laws distributing members of a population in space, rendering different populations distinct through variations in the refrains. Their initial example of a refrain is a bird's song, which functions to establish territories and define their limits. The refrain is like a "signature" or a "proper name" indicative of a territory and its inhabitants (ATP 316). As Guattari writes, “in ancient societies, it is through rhythms, chants, dances, masks, marks on the body” that laws of social organisation are enforced (Guattari 1995: 15). All life is organised on the basis of the “productive repetition” of such motifs, which serve to distribute elements in space and define groups:

the refrain may assume other functions, amorous, professional or social, liturgical or cosmic: it always carries a little earth with it; it has a land (sometimes a spiritual land) as its concomitant; it has an essential relation to a Natal, a Native. A musical ‘nome’ is a little tune, a melodic formula that seeks recognition ... The nomos as customary, unwritten law is inseparable from a distribution of space, a distribution in space. By that token, it is an ethos, but the ethos is also the Abode. (ATP 312)

We can compare the refrain to the procedure. The procedure, as we saw in chapter 2, is the means by which an author takes hold of a certain statement or set of statements by submitting them to certain repetitions. As we saw, language functions to formalise contents via the repetition of certain key phrases or words, what Deleuze and Guattari call “order-words”. The procedure, however, serves to reverse this process, to undo the processes of formalisation which constitute our subjection to language and its laws. Masoch’s symptomatic rearranged certain juridical, moral and erotic elements in order to detach from the contents or goals of the punitive law a pure form of the law capable of expressing masochistic experience. Wolfson’s procedure similarly involved detaching the formal structures of his maternal language from the contents and meanings which provoked within him feelings of torment and persecution. If Wolfson, in Deleuze’s estimation, ultimately failed to generate an autonomous poetic out of his system, it was because his access to the world historical and cosmological domains were blocked by the dominance of the parental
figures. If Kafka is so important here it is because his procedure both succeeded at a personal, therapeutic level, but also functioned to engage with world historical and collective forces capable of invoking a people to come.

The refrain shares with the procedure the capacity to disarticulate the contents it formalises. The refrain delimits and marks a territory, it determines the laws governing a territory and the behaviour of its inhabitants. But it does this only by communicating across several different territories at once. There are zones of immanence or indeterminacy in which different refrains occupy one another and substitute themselves for one another in processes of mutual decoding. The fact that a spider can build a web means that "there are sequences of the fly’s own code in the spider’s code; it is as though the spider had a fly in its head, a fly ‘motif’, a fly ‘refrain’" (ATP 314). If the fly territory and the spider territory are distinct, they are nevertheless caught up in a mutual substitution of their elements, what Deleuze and Guattari call a “transcoding”. Thus, if the refrain serves to define a territory and organise elements within it, it also serves to deterritorialise it, causing the elements to pass into other territories by way of transcodings and transversal relationships.

This is the principle of contagious communication which distinguishes the refrain. Certain types of virus, for example, effect an “alliance” between the genetic material of one species and another: "there is a block of becoming that takes hold of the cat and baboon, the alliance between which is effected by a C virus. ... movement occurs not only, or not primarily, by filiative productions but also by transversal communications between heterogeneous populations” (ATP 238-9). The refrain here is a certain genetic sequence, a “block of becoming”, which belongs exclusively to neither species, but to a shared process of deterritorialisation taking place in both at once. It is through such transversals that alliances with anomalous elements from different populations are forged. Kafka’s “A Report to an Academy” tells the story of an ape, Red Peter, who is taught to live as a man. In learning to become a man, however, Red Peter causes his human teacher to become ape: “My ape nature fled out of me, head over heels and away, so that my first teacher was almost himself turned into an ape by it, had soon to give up teaching and was taken away to a mental hospital” (Kafka 2005: 258). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the tuberculoid
coughing which interrupts Red Peter’s speech to the academy functions as a refrain, expressing a pure sonority, a statement common to man and ape (K 13).

The refrain, then, implicates the territories it articulates in a deterritorialisation which disarticulates the contents of the refrain in order to allow for new contents. Red Peter’s tuberculoid refrain is a means for the contents of man and ape to act as substitutes for one another, and in this way to enter into a zone of immanence, to form a body without organs on the transversal line connecting man and ape. The refrain in this sense is no longer a means to identify actual groups and delimit their extension in space, but an empty form, a pure “nomos” distinct from any actual people but capable of transmitting and emitting new norms of peopling. This is the essence of what Deleuze and Guattari mean by their concept of the nomad. Deleuze and Guattari, throughout A Thousand Plateaus, distinguish the concept of nomos from the concept of law. While the law functions to distribute an actual, constituted people, a polis, within a space already parcelled out, the nomos relates instead to a people not distinguishable from the space they occupy and from the nomadism by which they are dispersed:

The nomadic trajectory ... distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating. The nomos came to designate the law, but that was originally because it was distribution, a mode of distribution. It is a very special kind of distribution, one without division into shares, in a space without borders or enclosure. The nomos is the consistency of a fuzzy aggregate: it is in this sense that it stands in opposition to the law or the polis. (ATP 380).

It was Guattari who went furthest in identifying the symptom as a kind of refrain, the repetition of which could betoken the production of therapeutic effects: “In Freudianism the symptom, the lapsus or the joke are conceived as detached objects allowing a mode of subjectivity, which has lost its consistency, to find the path to a ‘coming into existence’. The symptom, through its own repetitiveness functions like an existential refrain” (Guattari 1995: 26). The refrains of Red Peter’s cough, Josephine’s singing, Billy Budd’s stutter, and T.E. Lawrence’s shame are all means by which elements in the socio-linguistic formalisation of experience can become detached from normal processes of subjectification and be used as the basis for the elaboration of the coming into existence of new collective subjectivities.
In this chapter, we have seen how the concept of literature as health culminates with the concepts of group subjectivity and the people to come. We have seen how the Freudian formula for incurable neurosis is the opposition of the individual and the group. The concept of delirium, however, allowed us to argue that the literary clinic’s therapeutic impetus lies in a depathologised schizophrenic process in which this opposition would be overcome, and in which new forms of collective subjectivity would become susceptible to being diagrammed or mapped. If there is a profound link between this form of delirium and the position of the author in society, it is because the latter occupies a problematic space, neither a generality nor a particularity but a singularity encapsulated by elements of both individuality and collectivity. It is for this reason too that this thesis has been organised around the literary clinic’s transition from diagnostics to therapeutics. The author stands outside his or her society in order to diagnose it, but in diagnosing it he or she also articulates the possibilities of new norms of collective life. If the author suffers a sickness, what he or she diagnoses is the sickness of society and the world. From this collective diagnosis, new possibilities for health are articulated in terms of a collective subjectivity in which the opposition of individual and group no longer holds. Thus, the immanent transformation of sickness into health passes through the domains of group subjectivity and collective virtualities.

Notes:

1. The idea of an aesthetic community has been central to philosophical aesthetics at least since Baumgarten and Kant. For an interesting discussion of these issues in relation to Deleuze’s concept of the people to come, see Saison 2008 and Brito 2009.

2. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the principle of minorisation comes as a creative response of peoples whose oppression forces them to identify themselves as part of the oppressor’s culture. For Kafka, as a Prague Jew there was simultaneously “the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in German, the impossibility
of writing otherwise” (K 16). Kafka’s response was to write in the language of the establishment, but in such a way as to turn from its oppressive use. Deleuze and Guattari say that while minorisation is exemplified by authors writing in languages foreign to them, such as Kafka writing in German or Beckett writing in French. This is the revolutionary principle of literature in general to the extent that all writing labours under master discourses and oppressive myths, and all genuine innovation must speak from a position foreign to the point of view of established ideas. There is thus a distinction, immanent to all societies, between major and minor uses of language and the creative process which corresponds to different ways of understanding collectivity, and such a distinction does not necessarily follow any recognised cultural, racial, or ethnic divisions.

3. Deleuze says literature does not actualise or create a people, but tabulates one. He takes the concept of fabulation directly from Bergson, who regards it as an instinctually inbuilt tendency towards mythmaking and storytelling. On the link between fabulation and literature, see Bergson 1935: 166 and Bogue 2010.

4. Leo Bersani has called the antagonism in Freud between the individual and the group a “symptomatic opposition” both in the sense that it is the principal explanation for neurotic symptoms and that, in Freud’s discourse, it is the very presumption which cannot be interrogated without inviting the collapse of the principles on which Freud erected his theory (Bersani 1986: 4).

5. The dialectical opposition of the one and the many, and the possibility of replacing it with the concept of multiplicity, is the overriding concern: “[Multiplicity] was created precisely in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics” (ATP 32).

6. This distinction fits with Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between two classes of delirium which, they say, culminate with 19th century psychiatry and the birth of psychoanalysis. One consisted in an “ideal” realm of signs and signification, and the other, in “passional”, “postsignifying”, and “subjective” aspects, expressed “more as an emotion than an idea, and more as effort or action than imagination” (ATP 119-
20). There is some terminological inconsistency due to the fact that Deleuze and Guattari are distinguishing between paranoia and monomania, whereas in the article on Melville Deleuze's distinction is between monomania and hypochondria. However, despite the terminological inconsistency, the two sets of distinctions seem to follow the same lines in that they both differentiate between a delirium of reason and ideas, on the one hand, and a delirium of affect and the body on the other. The terminological slippage is more than likely due to the fact there is no dualistic opposition between the two groups but rather a sliding between two poles. It is possible, for example, to consider monomania as either paranoiac or passional, depending on which aspects are identified.

7. Luciana Parisi has commented on the importance of forms of non-hereditary and asexual reproduction in terms of the emerging biotech industry:

the reproduction of life – from cells to embryos – without sexual mating has entered the biotech market. A new (but also ancient) mode of sex, bacterial sex (the non-copulatory transmission of genetic material) is now the motor of this commercial engineering of life, which moves beyond species barriers. Bacterial sex is the transmission of information across phyla and lineages. Bacteria (nonnucleated bounded cells) continuously modify their genetic make-up whilst infecting new cells. This sex by contagion has become fundamental to biotech's task of redesigning life. (Parisi 2007: 29)

For a discussion of the biopolitical significance of the “molecularization of life”, see Braun 2007.

8. Michel Serres describes sickness in general in these terms as “noise”:

Sickness, of whatever variety, intercepts a function; it is a noise that mixes up messages in the circuits of the organism, parasiting their ordinary circulation. I doubt that a more general definition can be given. It is as good for cancer as for neurosis, for myocardial infections as for multiple sclerosis. ... Sickness is a parasitic noise. (Serres 2007: 197)
For a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari in relation to cybernetic theories and the virus, and especially in relation to how they "depathologise" modes of viral propagation, see Hansen 2001.
Conclusion

This thesis has presented a reconstruction of Deleuze’s critical and clinical project, arguing that the latter must be grasped as incomplete in terms of Deleuze’s own writing on the subject, but that it appears as a coherent set of concepts when read alongside the rest of his work. As a result, it has been necessary for me to present what I’ve been calling the “literary clinic” in terms of the developments informing the early and middle sections of Deleuze’s career, while at the same time insisting that the methodological principles of immanent critique have remained consistent throughout. If literary criticism and questions of health and illness are inextricably linked, this is because, beginning with his early reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze discerned, at the origin of thought, an engagement with the unthinking body, with what I’ve called, borrowing Lyotard’s term, “libidinal stupidity”. This is how we broached the question of the literary clinic in chapter 1: thought is to be distinguished from general cognition in that it needs to be “forced”, or induced, by coming into contact with its other, with an unthought which inheres within thought as a stubborn refusal to think. This “other” is described by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of “pathic” elements, those aspects of subjective experience which, in going beyond the linguistic, social and organic forms of personhood and consciousness, lead towards madness, intoxication and pathology. In other words, one only begins to think when one reaches the proper limits of subjective constitution. It is precisely these limits which give us the criteria for a purely impersonal thought, which Deleuze exhorted us to grasp as the singularity of “a” life. If the literary clinic involves a kind of casuistics, it is in the sense that the author’s case is “exemplary” in that he or she belongs to neither particular nor general, individual nor collective, categories. In rendering these categories problematic, the author must be understood as a purely singular case.

The paradoxical nature of the methodology of immanence is plain, and Deleuze’s interest in paradox as a properly philosophical mode of thinking is everywhere evident in his work. This is exemplified powerfully in his conception of literature. Deleuze argues that literary
language acquires its distinctive literariness only when it discovers a kind of non-language, a language of silence or illiteracy, within language itself. This is what accounts for what I have been calling, throughout this thesis, Deleuze's formalism. While it may seem counterintuitive to define Deleuze as a formalist, his work makes plain the urgency with which he regarded the problems of form and processes of formalisation. The literary clinic argues that the genesis of literary form takes place as an aspect of embodied experience. As we have seen, particularly in chapter 2, there is no contradiction in seeing Deleuze both as a libidinal materialist and as a formalist, in that the genesis of forms is one with the genesis of the body itself. Our discussion of the concept of symptomatology showed how the materiality of the body is capable of being expressed in the immaterial and formal disjunctions of a table of symptoms. Authors such as Masoch and Beckett, we saw, were capable of expressing new forms of embodied life through a re-ordering of signs. It is this re-ordering that we described in terms of the procedure. If the procedure is a formalist matter, then it is so because of its relations to bodily materiality and the ontological problems of embodied existence.

The body is a limit, but in a necessarily paradoxical — or problematic — sense: it is limiting, in that it thwarts our attempts to go beyond it. But to the extent that it gives us the criteria to think, it is enabling. As I showed in chapter 3, what Deleuze calls “the proper limits of sensibility” signals this central paradox of embodiment. In the sense that the body is both limiting and enabling, it both fails us and saves us at the same time. This plays a crucial role in the literary clinic, since it alerts us to the “two dangers” attending all experimentation. On the one hand, the body is undifferentiated and abyssal, a pure depth in which differentiations dissolve; on the other hand, it is dissipated and immaterial, a pure surface on which differentiations are organised. It is not sufficient to identify Deleuze with a simple materialist hylozoism, since this omits an account of the immaterial and thus obscures the importance he attaches to the conceptualisation of the genesis of forms.

I have argued how the literary clinic proceeded towards an identity of the critical and the clinical. If the critical is related to signs and the genesis of forms, and the clinical to embodied processes and to blockages in these processes, then the identity of the critical and the clinical promises the ability to engage with these two aspects simultaneously. The
literary clinic, in its schizoanalytic phase, proceeds towards this identity through the concept of production. We saw, however, in chapter 3, that production was in many ways worked out in the concepts of difference and repetition and the wound. The capacity to repeat difference entails an experimental subjectivity. We saw from our analysis of both Wolfson and Bousquet that this subjectivity is fraught with dangers and open to failure. Repetition may fail to produce the difference which we require, and may end up condemning us to an abysmal body or a rigidified form. The literary clinic attempts to chart a passage through these two dangers, and in doing so seeks an immanence of pathos and logos. It is this immanence which gives us the criteria for an assessment of an author’s style.

One of the key inspirations for Deleuze, here, is the Artaudian idea of cruelty as a form of aesthetic determination in which the undifferentiated and the differentiated unite. It is this “unity” that constitutes a given author’s style. But this is a unity which takes its power from a fundamental failure or incapacity to totalise. This combination of strength and weakness, health and sickness, has been stressed throughout this thesis as the principal intuition of the literary clinic. The concept of the procedure emphasises this: it is the incapacity of forms to render a definitive formalisation of contents that makes the process of formalisation a source of endless novelty. As the case of Wolfson demonstrated, the creative syntax that the procedure promises is not simply a question of language, it implies an experimental subjectivity in general, in which the fundamental ontological and political problems of existence can be posed. We saw that Kafka emerges as an exemplary figure precisely because he was able to pose these problems on their proper terrain, on the terrain of the world historical and the impersonal, and not the familial. The effectiveness of Kafka’s procedure stemmed from its capacity to effect what Deleuze and Guattari, borrowing from Freud, call “transference”. Despite the critique of psychoanalysis presented in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari never renounced the concept of transference, and only ever condemn its misuse at the hands of oedipal therapies. What our reading of the Dora case study showed was that, for Deleuze, the process of transference expresses the creative and productive side of symptoms as masks or performances. These masks serve to select between the legitimate and illegitimate forms of repetition, the illegitimate being understood in terms of a bare, uncovered content. The proper contents of desire always
have their essence in the masks and disguises which allow the subject to adopt different provisional identities within a social and political context.

The central mistake of oedipal psychoanalysis is to claim to discover, beneath these masks, a bare content that can be articulated in terms of childhood and familial memories and "images". By relating the contents of desire back to familial images, the process of transference is effectively halted. Deleuze and Guattari's method of critique in *Anti-Oedipus* signals a development of the method of immanence, in that they attempt to critique psychoanalysis from a position internal to it. Deleuze and Guattari take the criteria from the psychoanalytic concept of desire itself, and submit all other aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice to these criteria. They do not, despite appearances, write in opposition to psychoanalysis, rather, they wish to transform the latter into an aspect of immanent criticism.

The only sustained schizoanalytical work of literary criticism Deleuze and Guattari wrote was their book on Kafka. They use the concept of transference to define Kafka's literary procedures, in which the pathological contents attaching to familial neuroses and guilt feelings were substituted for contents of ever greater levels of impersonality. Kafka was able to transfer the "real movement" of the body and its passive affections to the domain of linguistic form, liberating the purely impersonal singularities of a subjectivity capable of mapping or diagramming the social investments of desire. The result of this was the "K function", the pure singularity expressed by the authorial proper name once it has crossed a certain threshold of anonymity. As a singularity, Kafka the individual can no longer said to be distinct from the various bureaucratic, socio-political, economic and sexual forces invoked in his writing. Writing in this sense becomes akin to delirium, in which the psychological and organic contents of persons become one with the social and political forces which formalise experience. Writing as delirium maps or diagrams the degree to which these processes of formalisation can be said to be effective. Delirium has by necessity two poles, since formalisation always implies unformed materials which escape along lines of flight. While the diagram cannot in this sense be said to be a "formal function", it is nevertheless involved in tracking the political and semiotic degrees of formalisation to which unformed matters are subject. This is why the literary clinic, which Deleuze appeared to have more or
less abandoned in the mid to late 60s, reappears within the schizoanalytic context. Writing, as delirium, is the means by which transference occurs. The clinical question of schizophrenia emerges here with great political and experimental urgency: how can one produce an effective transference via delirium without succumbing to the pathology of schizophrenia? This is a question which Deleuze and Guattari take directly from literary sources, in that it echoes William S. Burroughs' attempts to render in purely literary terms the effects of drug induced states.

We have seen how the concept of literature as health culminates with Deleuze's notion of the people to come. Through the transference of delirium, the opposition between the one and the many, the individual and the collective, breaks down. This allows the author, as an anonymous singularity, to become a kind of conduit or relay for collective forces. It is not that the author speaks on behalf of an already constituted group or minority. Rather, it is that the virtual forces of peopling or populating are invoked in literary technique. I have shown that for Deleuze the pathos involved in the self-creation of populations is one in which the creative processes of art also participate. This is why Deleuze remarks of T.E. Lawrence that the latter needed the collective forces of the Arab Revolt in order to develop his style. The author "lacks" a technique in the same way the virtual forces of peopling are not actualised in terms of recognisable collectives with distinctive and identifying discourses. It is this fact that renders the forces of peopling fundamentally illiterate; lacking a language or set of shared discourses, a people is involved in the same kind of pathos as the author. We have seen how Deleuze insists upon the importance of this shared space of immanence in which the processes of the self-creation of groups and the processes of art are involved in one and the same form of creativity.

Finally, we saw how the concept of the people to come is indebted to the concepts Deleuze and Guattari elaborate in *A Thousand Plateaus* in terms of the "anomalous" individual, who occupies a space neither fully within the group nor fully outside it. It is this notion of the anomalous which characterises the author's position as a singularity. From this position the author is capable of the emission of what Deleuze and Guattari call "refrains", which, as we observed, functions in much the same way as the procedure. From the position of the anomalous, the author is able to produce from within his or her semiotic environment a
mode of aesthetic propagation which Deleuze and Guattari see in terms of contagion and epidemic. The author is less a father or a child, as the traditional psychoanalytic view of literary production has it, than a virus or parasite effecting transversal communications between disparate elements. The production of literary statements is here to understood as the productivity of symptoms, but in a way which leaves far behind the Freudian view of society as a conflict between individual desires and groups. I finished the last chapter by arguing that the literary clinic culminates in this concept of peopling as contagion, which brings to completion the immanent unity of sickness and health at the heart of Deleuze’s critical and clinical project.

In this thesis, then, I argued that the literary clinic can be viewed as a coherent set of concepts, but that, due to its incomplete character, this coherency must be seen as emerging through several different aspects of Deleuze’s work. These aspects are separated both conceptually, but also in terms of chronology. Firstly, the literary clinic has its origin in the Nietzschean conception of immanent criticism. For Deleuze, literature is health only to the extent that it charts a passage or movement between two points of view: a point of view on health from a position of sickness, and a point of view on sickness from a position of health. If the symptomatological and diagnostic emphasis of the early phase of the literary clinic gives us a point of view on sickness, the later, more schizoanalytically inflected phase of the literary clinic seeks to give us a point of view on health. It is for this reason that this thesis has been organised in terms of the transition from diagnosis to therapy. This transition is effected through what Deleuze called the strict identity of the critical and the clinical. Secondly, I argued how Deleuze’s interest in literary processes shows him to be, in some important sense, a formalist. This formalism is not at odds with his libidinal materialism or pragmatism, but, rather, is fundamental to understanding these. It is only via a formalist reading of Deleuze that we can properly understand the notion of the two dangers of difference and the indifferent, of logos and pathos, and of the passage between them which any properly experimental subjectivity must chart. Thirdly, I have shown how the literary clinic culminates in the concept of the people to come. Literature is health because it breaks down the barriers to enunciation which the opposition of individual and group erect. The breaking down of these barriers, through the delirium of the transference,
allows the individual author, from his or her singular or anomalous position, to become the mode of propagation for collective forces and statements.

My goal has been to show how the literary clinic gives us a coherent and unique account of literature and literary processes. I have also tried to show how my reconstruction of the literary clinic clarifies Deleuze's relation to literature and the importance it has in his overall philosophical project. In this way, I hope to have opened paths towards a properly Deleuzian literary critical practice.


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Laerke, Mogens. “The Voice and the Name: Spinoza in the Badioudian Critique of Deleuze”.


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