Cardiff University | Prifysgol Caerdydd ORCA
Online Research @ Cardiff 
WelshClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Azacis, Helmuts 2005. Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University. Available at: http://business.cardiff.ac.uk/sites/default/files/...

[img]
Preview
PDF - Published Version
Download (225kB) | Preview

Abstract

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy- free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords: Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium
Publisher: Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 30 March 2016
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 04:43
URI: http://orca-mwe.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/43596

Citation Data

Cited 14 times in Google Scholar. View in Google Scholar

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item Edit Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics