The Local Governance of Anti-Social Behaviour

by

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<u>Acknowledgements</u>

Abstract

The aim of this study is to explore the 'empirical particulars' (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking in crime and disorder control, and the ways in which sub national policy actors are able to adapt and exert influence more generally over national level policy decisions as well as resist such wider forces. This research contends that some rethinking is needed away from much existing criminological literature on shifts in crime control policy that has been dominated by the 'grand narrative' accounts of writers such as Garland (2001). These narratives have been concerned largely with the provision of general accounts of overall shifts in policymaking at the national and at times global levels. As a result the local dimension to this process has been with a few notable exceptions neglected or downplayed. Instead the primary focus of much existing criminological literature has been upon the role of national policy elites, presenting policymaking as a top down experience that follows a relatively smooth trajectory. In contrast this study suggests that policymaking is instead a more unpredictable and messier process that can be affected by problems of implementation and resistance. In order to examine the role of the 'local' within policymaking, this research employed the use of a single 'exemplifying case study' of one English city and in turn it examined in depth one particular area of policymaking and implementation, namely the local management of Anti Social Behaviour (henceforth ASB). This sought to bring together documentary analysis and elite interviews in an effort to provide an empirically detailed account of anti social behaviour policy development. This study focused primarily on a series of semi-structured interviews, involving a range of key local policy actors. These were conducted over an extended period of time, which coincided with the rise of the national level ASB agenda. This extended period enabled observations to also be made about the ebb and flow of policy often as it emerged and caused local practitioners to have to develop and adapt policy responses. The resulting empirical findings provide an informed example of the messiness and contingency of public policymaking, whilst also providing a site in which other academic theories can be tested and applied. The intention of this study is to not only make a significant contribution to the field in which it is nested (ASB policy and practice), but also to enhance our understanding of the effects that

broader policy change and the impact that key national policy drivers can have upon the formulation of local level policy responses. In brief the thesis suggests that through the interaction of key policy actors at both the national and local levels, policy formulation and implementation is realised.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Research aims

The focus of this study is the local governance of anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB). The overall aim is to explore the extent and nature of influences over key policy developments in one urban local authority area in England and Wales. In view of this, the key focus of this study has clearly been upon key elements of the policymaking process, as opposed to exploring policy outcomes. It is therefore not the intention of this study to consider in any depth the various aspects of policy implementation, including engaging with recipients of specific ASB measures, such as Anti Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs) (on the latter see, inter alia, Squires, 2008, Burney, 2005) . Instead it has concentrated upon events further up the chain of policymaking.

In terms of a timescale, the study was primarily focused upon the period between 1998 and 2007, which coincided with the rise and consolidation of a national ASB policy agenda. As with crime policy more generally, the main focus of much existing commentary about shifts in crime policy focuses upon national level developments. There has been much less discussion of the sub-national, and local levels of the policy process, and the tensions between the local and the national are rather underplayed within broad sociological accounts of change (see, however, Hughes, 2007, Edwards and Hughes, 2004, 2008). The concept of 'governance' suggests that there has been a movement away from 'government' with policy being increasingly framed and delivered by a range of policy 'networks', incorporating a range of state, community and commercial bodies operating at a number of different levels in the system. The growing complexity of the policy process has been particularly visible in the arena of crime and disorder control during the past two decades or so, which have witnessed a growing emphasis on multi-agency 'partnerships'. This suggests that the Government has developed a more hands-off style of approach in managing its crime control responses, relinquishing control, at least to an extent, to locally based policy actors. An important objective of the current study is to assess how far this appears to be the case in the sphere of ASB policy.

Following the victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 General Election, there was a rapid emergence of a national ASB agenda, beginning with the passing of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA). The origins of this agenda were the growing politicisation of the issue by New Labour during the 1990s. They sought to harness what they perceived as a growing national mood, and attempted to outflank the Conservative Party by appealing to voters on a tough 'law and order' policy platform. Following the election, they began to implement their 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' approach. Within the arena of ASB, this involved a raft of targeted ASB legislative measures, which are outlined in more detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. These were based on a broad definition of ASB and the categories of behaviours that it included. Alongside this was the development of a robust policy framework, designed to empower local level practitioners to take strong action against those who committed such behaviours. Most attention focused on the use of interventions such as 'Anti-Social Behaviour Orders', which would go onto become the 'flagship' element of the Government's ASB agenda. These became a key focus of broader academic commentary and critique on the subject of ASB policy, resulting in a tendency to overlook the more adaptive and preventive initiatives being developed locally, in addition to or even instead of purely enforcement approaches.

A further objective of this study is to provide some more detailed insights into the 'empirical particulars' (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking at the local level. The basis of this was the exploration of how key policy actors at the sub national level initiate, resist and/or adapt national level policies. It is therefore a somewhat contrasting approach to broader sociological accounts of shifts in crime control policy, which sometimes present an overly 'smooth' account of the process of policy translation from the top down. Such accounts can neglect to consider the complex interrelations that take place within the policy process, including those between central policymakers and local implementers. The national, regional and local levels can become sites of power struggles and conflicts, which can occur both across and between the levels involved. In the case of ASB policy, there is evidence to support this disruption of policy translation and implementation at the local level, as variations in approach began to emerge at an early

stage across practitioner sites (Burney 2002, p. 475). Nonetheless there is a seemingly limited amount of empirical research that concentrates upon the more 'messier' and unpredictable elements of the policymaking process. There is too little attention paid to the role played by the 'local' element within policymaking, and its potential ability to influence and shape key policy developments. There are, of course, some exceptions to this. The work of writers such as Crawford (2009), Hughes (2007) and Burney (2009) has all acknowledged, in different ways, the significance of the role of the 'local' in this process both nationally and within a European context. Despite these acknowledgements, this remains an area of study that has been dominated by a focus upon the provision of grand narrative accounts of crime control. There are thus gaps in the existing academic literature that this study into the governance of ASB seeks to address. It is intended that this study will highlight the role of both national level policy talk and decisions, and the production of outcomes locally in relation to ASB.

Designing the research

In undertaking this study, the decision was taken to use an adaptive approach, which sits in between the extremes of both inductive and deductive theories. The main focus of this approach is "generating social theory in conjunction with ongoing empirical research" (Layder 1998, p. viii). The basis of this is that adaptive theory can be used as a means of ordering research data, whilst adapting this order to suit the empirical material that emerges (Layder 1998, p. viii). The main empirical element of this research was a case study of a single English city, in order to provide rich description of a local experience of formulating and delivering ASB policy over time. The case study was driven by a set of specific research questions, which focused on issues relating to the 'why', 'when', 'who' and 'how' of the ASB policy process in this particular city.

An analytical framework was also formulated for this study. The purpose of this was to enable the identification and assessment of the role of not just each linear stage within the policymaking process, but also across the levels involved often simultaneously. In doing so, it was decided to use the work of Pollitt (2001), and his conceptual structure regarding

policy convergence in public administration. Pollitt argues that there are three key 'levels' of policy. These consist of policy talk, decisions and actions, each of which represents an analytically distinct dimension of policy. In Pollitt's study, policy talk is the political rhetoric or broad statements of intent that support any key political developments. The resulting policy decisions are the manifestation of this talk into tangible legislative measures and policy statements. Finally policy action is concerned with policy implementation locally, in essence charging practitioners with the delivery of policy outcomes.

In the application of Pollitt's concepts to this study, the discussion of both policy talk and decisions are focused upon the national level. The talk concerned the rhetoric that accompanied the emergence of a broader ASB agenda. Initially this surrounded the lead up to Labour's success at the 1997 General Election, as the background to these shifts illustrated a broader evolution of the Party. The prominence given to the issue of ASB therefore marked a movement towards a stronger stance being adopted in tackling crime and problems of low-level disorder. It was a stance developed as key Party actors absorbed a range of influences. These included those emanating from the American approach that had been developed in tackling problems of disorder, including the 'zero tolerance' approach adopted in parts of the USA. The key influence upon this had been drawn from Kelling and Wilson's (1982) 'Broken Windows' theory, elements of which would also become a feature of policy talk and decisions in the UK. In this country these would manifest itself in policy changes and modifications to policing practices. The resulting policy decisions formed a key part of Labour policy during three distinct periods of their time in government. The remaining element of policy action is concerned with the delivery of policy outcomes at the local level. In some cases this resulted in the reformulation of national policy directives, as these were interpreted and implemented by practitioners locally.

Research methodology

The overall approach was adaptive in its appreciation of the interplay of existing theory and empirical research and their feedback loops. It was an approach that was adopted, as ASB became a growth area of policy activity in the particular city under consideration developing in real time alongside this particular piece of research. The methods used were primarily qualitative, although where available, secondary sources of quantitative data were utilized (for example, national statistics primarily concerned with the use of particular ASB interventions such as the ASBO). Material of this nature was of particular significance in providing a broader context for the study. It was also used to inform the selection of an appropriate case study city, in conjunction with the use of additional locally based quantitative information.

The case study itself mainly consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews, which were conducted during the fieldwork, which spanned five years. These participants were made up of a cross section of key practitioners in the city selected for case study, in an effort to enhance the understanding of the local policymaking process. The accounts that were provided during these interviews also offered an insight into the establishment and impact of local level working practices. These resulted from local policy actors seeking to provide a local response to key national level shifts and policy decisions in respect to ASB policy. The main aim of these interviews was to gain the informants' perspectives on these key developments locally. The participants were also asked to identify what they believed to have been the main driving forces behind the emergence of this particular policy, and other key external influences. In addition, a significant amount of secondary documentary material was also compiled and analysed during the course of this study. The archive of material also included media reports of ASB locally, which although not in the event forming a central part of the thesis, did provide some helpful background context to local debates surrounding ASB policy. The review of key strategy and policy documents in relation to the case study city were used to chart the development of local level ASB policy at crucial junctures, and a source of crosschecking with the accounts provided in the interviews.

Thesis structure

The next chapter reviews the key themes of the existing literature that informed the theoretical framework for this study. It discusses the grand narrative accounts of crime control policies of writers such as Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) and illustrates the emphasis that these accounts have placed upon national and in some cases global shifts in crime control policies. These accounts also suggest a movement away from previous models of penal welfarism towards increased punitiveness. These accounts tend to underplay the ways in which these broader shifts play themselves out in the form of local level developments, and perhaps overlook the important influence that local actors and, more broadly, local 'geo-histories' (Edwards and Hughes, 2005) can have upon the policymaking process. It is this gap that writers such as Burney (2009), Hughes (2007) and Crawford (2009) have pointed to in their work on ASB policy, which has recognised the role of the local in this process.

To demonstrate growing focus on the complexity of the policy process, the accounts of Rhodes (1981), Cope (2001) and Edwards & Benyon (2001) are used to explore the emergence of a policy network approach. This forms part of a broader discussion of a more recent movement towards governance and its impact upon the ways in which policy is delivered on the ground, a key feature of the later findings chapters of this thesis. The chapter concludes with a series of 'theoretical propositions' derived from the existing literature, which formed a framework with which to interrogate the empirical findings.

Following this, Chapter Three sets out the main elements of the national policy context that emerged around the issue of ASB during the New Labour era. This provides an account of the development of the ASB policy framework at the national level during three distinct periods of Labour government, and applies some of the key elements of Pollitt's distinctions between policy talk and decisions at the national level. These developments are analysed across key milestones in the history of New Labour's time in government.

Chapter Four provides a discussion and justification of the research design and methodology that was adopted by this study. It applies the themes that were identified in the earlier literature review, and the distinctions within the policymaking process, to an emerging research strategy. In considering the design of this study, this chapter also outlines the key research questions. The remainder of the chapter discusses the particular methods adopted within the case study approach. It considers city selection, sampling rationale of interview participants and the interview style adopted. There is also an account of the approach to analysis and the ethical issues raised by the study, and how these were addressed.

The focus of the next two chapters is the presentation of the results of the data analysis. The first of these chapters focuses on a detailed account of the 'who', the 'what' and the 'when'. This includes discussion of the key policy actors in local ASB policymaking, as revealed by the data analysis, the key dimensions of policy change in the case study city, and when these occurred. The second of the findings chapters addresses the complexities of the local policy process via exploring the 'how' and the 'why' questions. In what way did the policy changes come about in the case study city, how far were they resisted and reshaped at the local level, how did relationships between policy actors develop, and with what results in terms of policy outcomes? And in what ways did the identification of such relationships and processes, confirm as well as at times challenge existing theoretical interpretations of the politics of ASB management in the wider criminological literature? Where relevant in these two chapters, the theoretical propositions outlined at the end of Chapter Two are revisited, and considered in light of the empirical findings of the study.

In Chapter Seven, the conclusion of the thesis presents an overview of the key findings of this study, and relates them to the wider issues identified in the existing literature. It reflects on the conceptual framework that was utilised, considering the extent to which and the ways in which the empirical findings suggested that the theoretical propositions needed adapting. The chapter also includes a critical evaluation of the research design and methods. At the same time it also highlights the contribution of a study of this nature

to the existing body of work in the field. The chapter looks towards the emergence of similar studies that recognise the need to apply and test the theories of crime control that focus primarily upon change at the national and global level in terms of the necessary interplay of national, global and *local* processes.

<u>**Chapter Two: Literature Review**</u>

<u>**Introduction**</u>

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main themes of the research literature that has informed this thesis. The key objectives are to place the current study in the context of a wider body of research, to begin to establish the study's particular research questions, and to set out the theoretical framework that guided the research design. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first considers sociological accounts of shifts in crime control in Western societies. Some of these accounts can be considered as 'grand narratives' in so far as they are primarily focused upon globalised shifts in crime control and broader structural and cultural patterns that have shaped policy developments in recent years (see for example; Garland 2001; Crawford 2009; Simon 2007). Because of their broad and general focus, however, these accounts inevitably avoid detailed engagement with empirical evidence about how policy is formed, delivered and interpreted at various levels in the system. Other writers such as Burney (2009), Jones and Newburn (2007) and Hughes (2007) have sought to address this gap and provide more specific, empirically informed accounts of policy change in particular spheres of policy. The current study also aims to contribute to this latter body of work. The second section of the chapter explores the research literature relating to the nature of 'policy' and the policymaking process. An important element of this discussion is the noted movement away from 'government' towards 'governance' over recent decades, with a growth in the number of non-state actors who are engaged in the process of governing.

<u>**Explaining shifts in crime and disorder control**</u>

'Grand narrative' accounts of change in crime control

Garland's 'Culture of Control'

Garland (2001) provides a detailed analysis of key developments in crime control over the last 30 years. He is concerned with both the national and global levels of this process, and the advent of what he describes as the period of 'late modernity'. Garland seeks to identify how and why shifts in the approach to crime control have occurred. He also discusses their apparent divergence away from the traditional approach of 'penal welfarism', which dominated US and UK approaches to criminal justice and crime control during the second half of the twentieth century. A range of shifts has signalled the new era of policymaking with which Garland is concerned. These represent a specific phase of the modernisation process (Zedner 2002, p. 346). They have been impacted upon by a broader series of changes, as institutions have been reassessed and reworked. The purpose of which has been to accommodate the need to maintain order within society. In addition to incapacitating those who have the potential to disrupt it: 'today's reconfigured field of crime control is the result of political choices and administrative decisions – but these choices and decisions are grounded in a new structure of social relations and coloured by a new pattern of cultural sensibilities' (Garland 2001, p. 6).

Garland's account of these more recent changes focuses upon charting emerging trends and patterns within the criminal justice system on both sides of the Atlantic (although he is keen to stress that this is by no means intended as a comprehensive comparative study of developments in both of these countries). In doing so, he puts both crime and crime control policies centre stage in his analysis of these policy trajectories in both the UK and the USA. Garland argues that each country has adopted broadly similar crime control strategies in response to changing social, economic and cultural shifts (although he accepts that there remain important differences between the two countries). It is with this in mind that Garland draws upon examples from both the British and American experiences in his argument. He concludes that a 'reconfigured field of crime control and criminal justice' has emerged (2001, p. 23). The result may eventually be the replication of these identified trends in other late modern societies, despite significant differences in both their cultural and political responses to crime management.

Developments of late modernity

Garland's account attempts to provide a general explanation and overview of policy change, as he assesses the reconfiguration of the crime control field. His initial analysis concentrates upon the key structural and cultural shifts that have occurred, as he seeks to identify potential areas of convergence. These are mainly in relation to the penal, policing and crime preventative policies of these two countries. In addition he also explores some of what he considers to be the broader 'problems' facing government during the latter stages of the twentieth century, including those that are considered to be the more significant catalysts for transformation. For Garland these primarily encompass twelve indices of change (2001, p.20). These include the movement away from the emphasis previously placed upon rehabilitation and penal welfarism, towards the re-emergence of punitive, retributive punishments. It is a shift that has given rise to the idea that prison works on both sides of the Atlantic, which has helped to shape the more sweeping changes that have occurred in relation to the traditional penal model. There has also been a renewed emphasis placed upon risk management in which protection of the public has become of paramount concern. As a result, a more managerial response has been adopted in crime control, including the growth of multi-agency partnerships, and an enhanced focus on the measurement of performance of the agencies involved (2001, p.18). At the same time, and by contrast, crime control has been increasingly characterised by a more emotional and punitive political debate at the national level. There has been a notable politicization of the crime victim, as policymaking becomes more influenced by populist appeal (2001, p.13). This has led to the use of tough political rhetoric, which is designed to illustrate the mood of the public. All of which has culminated in an expansion of the infrastructure of crime and disorder policies, increasing the number of non-state actors who are involved in the process.

These developments have resulted in the former 'penal-welfare' based criminal justice system being somewhat undermined by the raft of changes it has experienced. The culture of uncertainty that this has created, has led to wider questions being raised about its ability to respond effectively to the problem of crime. The system is volatile and

unpredictable, and appears to be premised upon making the most popular choices, which are designed to suit the mood of the time:

> The programmes and ideas that are thus selected are those that fit with field's dominant structures and the specific cultures that they support. They are the ones that mesh with the most powerful institutions, allocate blame in popular ways, and empower groups that currently command authority, esteem and resources. Crime control strategies and criminological ideas are not adopted because they are known to solve problems. The evidence runs out well before their effects can be known with any certainty. They are adopted and they succeed because they characterize problems and identify solutions in ways that fit with the dominant culture and the power structure upon which it rests. (Garland 2001, p. 26)

A number of political, social and cultural changes have occurred on both sides of the Atlantic, with the paradoxical and simultaneous promotion of individual economic freedom alongside an increasingly punitive penal apparatus. The media have also had their part to play in these changes. They have helped to heighten people's awareness of not just other groups within society, but also in highlighting the disparities between social groups as wealth has improved. In both countries, there has been growing division between the 'have' and 'have nots', and both have seen concerns about the emergence of a perceived 'underclass' associated with welfare dependency and criminal behaviour. At the same time, these changes have been used to legitimise the use of increasingly harsh criminal punishments, which all too often have targeted the poorer sections of society. As a result, perceptions of the poor began to centre upon them being seen as both 'deviant' and 'different' and a sector of the population from which the majority needed to be protected. These changes have been used as a means of reinforcing 'the retributive sentiments that increasingly inform penal legislation' (2001, p. 143).

Crime as a 'normal social fact'

These changes resulted in a drastic increase of aggregate crime rates. All of these factors conspired to reduce situational crime prevention and informal social controls, as communities became more fragmented. At the same time as the opportunities for people to be able to commit crime increased. It also appeared that there were specific groups

being targeted, and criminals were increasingly viewed as needing to be punished rather than reformed (Deflem et al. 2010), as the shift away from the rehabilitative ideal continued. Garland suggests that what these various structural changes culminated in was the eventual collapse of the previous model of penal welfarism. This led to the experience of high crime rates as having become gradually normalized, in what Garland suggests was a 'new criminology of everyday life'. However, these rises in crime rates are claims that writers such as Zedner have found difficult to accept, given the decreases in crime rates that have been recorded in recent years in both the United Kingdom and America (2002, p. 350). For Garland though, despite these more recent downturns, crime rates remain persistently higher when compared to those of the 1950s and 1960s. They have also been accompanied by a surge in people's fear of crime, contributing to the perception amongst the general public that crime remains on the increase. These changes in perception have continued to shape the adaptations of the crime control field in response to these issues, giving rise to the emergence of a new kind of criminal justice system:

> Leaving aside for a moment the national experience that distinguished the American experience from that of Britain, one can summarise the impact of these developments as follows: The first set of forces – the coming of late modernity – transformed some of the social and political conditions upon which the modern crime control field relied…The second set of forces – the politics of post welfarism – produced a new set of class and race relations and a dominant political block that defined itself in opposition to old style 'welfarism' and the social and cultural ideas on which it is based. (Garland 2001, p. 75)

Two kinds of crime control response

Garland argues that crime control policy during recent decades has come to be characterised by the contrasting approaches of 'adaptation' and 'denial'. These became the two main categories of response, representing a paradox of policy in terms of the development of nationally led crime control strategies. The concept of denial results from those at the national level disregarding the evidence that supports the idea that crime is not effectively tackled by using punitively based measures. The outcome of which has been the implementation of a range of measures premised upon tougher sentencing and

the introduction of a broader range of police powers. In promoting the use of these measures, those who are leading the development of the relevant crime control strategies are denying the limitations of these systems and processes on the basis of 'sovereign command' (Garland 2001, p. 132). These policies are intended to reassure the voting public that something is being done to tackle issues of crime. In contrast to this, 'adaptation' has also been a key feature of crime control responses in late modern society. These responses have taken a pragmatic and instrumental approach to crime, seeing it as an inevitable feature of contemporary society that must be managed in the most cost-effective way possible, rather than eliminated altogether. Thus, in contrast to the punitive and emotional political responses of 'denial', these approaches acknowledge the limitations of the criminal justice system. At the heart of this strategy is a greater emphasis upon prevention and the delivery of crime control through the development of local partnership working.

Garland identifies six types of adaptation that have emerged in late modern society. These include the rationalisation of justice; the commercialization of justice; defining deviance down; redefining success; concentrating upon consequences; and 'responsibilisation' (redistributing responsibility for crime control amongst a range of state, commercial and community actors) (2001, p. 113). These adaptations have seen a movement towards managerial accountability, a reduction in the scope of offences to be criminalised and a growth in multi-agency working. The result has been a broader shift in approach, with the focus now placed upon managing the consequences of crime rather than trying to deal with its fundamental causes. In shifting the emphasis in this way, it has further contributed to the growth of 'victim policy', and the development of a response aimed at acting in the victim's best interests. In the development of these adaptive responses, what has also emerged has been the gradual decentring by those in government, following the recognition that they no longer have 'a monopoly of crime control'. The result has been to significantly increase the number of policy actors who are involved in the management of crime control responses, as the state tries to renegotiate its role in this process (Garland 1996, p. 5):

> The primary objective is to spread responsibility for crime control
> onto agencies, organizations and individuals that operate outside the
> criminal justice state and to persuade them to act appropriately.
> (Garland 2001, p. 125)

The responsibilisation of other actors in crime control, or the promotion of new sites of governance, should not be viewed necessarily as the state looking to lighten its load in terms of the functions that it performs. Instead, it represents a new form of 'governance-at-a-distance' (1996, p. 6), which has its own set of accompanying processes and supporting apparatus. There has also been an increased emphasis placed upon the role of the community in administering criminal justice policy, and in partnership working, for example in connection with the introduction of community policing. Non-state actors have become actively involved both with each other and the police in aligning their activities in targeting crime control. It was therefore the development of multi agency and partnership working locally, which was a key part of the emergence of a 'responsibilisation strategy'.

The multi agency approach

In its identification of those agencies that are deemed to be competent in addressing crime control, the state has reinforced its decentring approach. As a result they have continued to move away from the idea of them being solely responsible for addressing this issue. In doing so it is developing a new role, in which it is now responsible for both expanding and enhancing the role of these local level agencies in the management of crime control. It has also enabled more preventative strategies to emerge, which can be seen in the growth in local level projects, which are locally administered by inter agency partnerships. For Garland this strand to tackling crime control is one that requires a more innovative approach to be developed by local level agencies, as they seek to reduce the opportunities for crime to occur. A new wave of strategies that are aimed at enhancing situational crime controls have begun to emerge, which increasingly concentrate upon diverting potential offenders away from criminal situations. This leads to a shift in focus toward community safety and away from law enforcement.

However, the increased empowerment of local actors in the crime control process has also enabled groups at this level to become dominant. Owing to the minimal support that their schemes often require, they can at times operate virtually unchecked within the fringes of the criminal justice system. It is a particularly evident trend where policymakers have been left to adopt their own hierarchy in an attempt to both develop partnership working, and to drive forward particular policy agendas. The devolution of powers can also prompt the emergence of new social movements. These can operate as sites of governance in their own right, developing their own concepts around the nature of crime (Stenson 2001). They are also able to act as potential sites for opposition and resistance to the common approach. Garland argues that this is where the hope lies for a return to more progressive and less punitive criminal justice policies. He suggests that this will be achieved through an awakening of communities, who have apparently failed to notice the increased movement away from the more cooperative policies, and the penal welfarism that existed during the latter part of the twentieth century, up until as recently as the 1970s (2001, p. 204).

The opening section of this chapter has highlighted the key themes in Garland's work. These include a broader shift away from penal welfarism, which has resulted in an apparent normalisation of crime and the emergence of various new responses to tackling crime control. There has been greater emphasis placed upon the adoption of a more managerial approach, which has been accompanied by general shifts at both the national and local levels. Such developments have included a greater emphasis being placed upon risk management. There has also been a more general shift in people's perceptions of crime, as this has become more associated with particular social groups. These factors have given rise to the growing politicisation of the victim, which has increasingly been used to legitimise tough law and order policies. The next section of the chapter will begin to shift its focus toward another general account of crime control, this time in relation to the penal field, which has been put forward by Feeley and Simon (1992), who have also posited a general transformation away from traditional approaches of crime control. The result has been a shift in focus away from the importance of the individual, towards a system that divides certain offending sectors of the population into groups based upon

their risk profiles, in an effort to manage crime control more effectively. Their notion of a 'new penology' chimes with some of the ideas of Garland, as they seek to offer an account that sees crime as an everyday hazard to be managed in the most effective way possible. Thus, a growing emphasis has been placed upon the development of a more systems based approach in the management of crime control issues. In some cases this has also led to the redefinition of the roles of supporting agencies, as new mechanisms are developed that are designed to maintain control and therefore reassure and protect the public.

Risk-based crime control: The 'New Penology'

In their account of the emergence of a 'new penology', Feeley and Simon (1992) also focus upon the identification and explanation of broader patterns rather than detailed empirical analysis of particular national or local contexts. Feeley and Simon suggest a growing domination of 'actuarial justice' in criminal justice administration. This is a form of justice that is based upon the statistical calculation of risks, enabling predictions to be made about the future behaviour of particular population groups. The focus is upon developing effective indicators of risk as a basis for the cost effective management of particular groups. Even though a growing preoccupation with 'risk' has been a noted trend in other arenas (Beck 1992) it has taken time to gradually permeate legal discourse in relation to criminal justice. For Feeley and Simon, this shift in penal policy, which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s and saw a more conservative stance being adopted, was just a part of a broader movement towards the development of a 'new penology'. From this a new kind of language, new crime management techniques and penal objectives emerged in response to a shift in focus toward attempts to place offenders (and potential offenders) into clearly defined risk categories. These are factors that have culminated, despite having different origins, in strategic changes being made in the penal field. Feeley and Simon's argument regarding the emergence of a new penology includes three key elements. The first of these is a new discourse of crime control, with terms and concepts borrowed from business management (relating to systems analysis and organisational theory for example) and also an actuarial language of probability and

statistical prediction. The second element is a set of new objectives for systems of crime control, with inward-looking performance related objectives replacing the more ambitious social objectives of previous eras. The final element consists of a whole set of new techniques and methods, encompassing statistical risk prediction, the importation of business management techniques into the penal system, and a range of other activities.

In terms of the emergence of a new penology discourse, to accompany these national shifts, Feeley and Simon suggest that this is no longer focused upon dealing with either individual offenders or the broader issues of criminality. Instead the system has undergone a process of inevitable rationalization. The focus has now become the broader issue of risk management, which considers the criminal justice system as a whole. It is based upon the classification of offending groups into low and high-risk categories, as this new strategy concentrates upon the management of the offending population as a collective. It therefore shifts the emphasis away from imprisonment being the only form of punishment. There has been an emergence of new sanctions, such as those that are more community based. These can also serve as an additional mechanism of control, and as a means of risk managing the population, which is the core aim of this overall approach:

> The new penology is neither about punishing nor about rehabilitating individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is concerned with the rationality not of individual behaviour or even community organization, but of managerial processes. Its goal is not to eliminate crime but to make it tolerable through systematic coordination. (Feeley and Simon 1992, p. 455)

In support of this managerial approach, the system not only recognises that deviance is a given in any society, but it has also lowered the expectations of the criminal justice system to be able to tackle and rehabilitate offenders effectively. For Feeley and Simon this has meant that the correctional arm of the criminal justice system is increasingly being used as a means of applying systems management, rather than punishment or reform. This has led to a change in overall objectives of criminal justice systems, away from ambitious social goals (connected with tackling the root causes of offending for example), and towards narrower and more achievable organisational goals (such as

improving detection rates) that are more amenable to control (1992, p. 456). Those who do reoffend and are returned to the criminal justice system are no longer used as an indicator of penal failure. Instead those in the probationary field use them as examples of where measures of control have worked, and as a way of illustrating the system's effectiveness of identifying and punishing those that fall into this category. For Feeley and Simon, the emphasis is now clearly placed upon the management and quantification of risk groups within society (1992, p. 455), including those who persist in returning to the criminal justice system.

The crime management techniques now being used to delineate and manage these offending sectors of the population are similarly risk based. They concentrate upon the prediction of 'dangerousness', which according to writers such as Zedner (2002), whilst historically linked to individual offenders has since been expanded both in terms of its scope and its definition. In the treatment of these categories, there has for Feeley and Simon been a growth in the application of 'selective incapacitation' (1992, p. 458). At its core is the idea that through the means of detention you can delay an individual's resumption of their criminal activities. It therefore seeks to address crime and disorder issues within communities via the 'distribution of offenders in society' (1992, p. 458), suggesting that by minimising their numbers you can correspondingly lessen their impact. In terms of the techniques that have emerged to accompany the application of this theory, at the one end of the spectrum, for those deemed to be high risk, there is the long-term detention option within prisons that offer maximum security. Whereas parole and probation officers can supervise those classified as being low risk offenders, who it is believed can be better managed locally within communities, under a programme that involves minimal surveillance. In between these two extremes for Feeley and Simon, what has emerged has been a range of intermediary techniques. These include the use of electronic monitoring and the introduction of custodial centres as a more cost effective means of punishment. Examples such as these are not only representative of new forms of control, but they are also techniques that no longer focus upon rehabilitating or reintegrating the offender back into their communities. And correspondingly in shifting the emphasis away from the individual, there has been a further movement, this time

away from a traditional sociological and penal approach to crime that seeks to establish the contributory factors to an individual's criminal behaviour. It was this approach that had originally sought mechanisms of control in both families and the workplace, as a means of preventing behaviour of this nature from occurring. Instead, the new penology focuses its attention upon the relationship between certain sectors of society, with the emergence of an underclass, and the criminal justice system as a whole, whilst models designed to manage public safety and provide reassurance are developed (1992, p. 466). Therefore following on from Garland's observation of a shift away from the traditional penal model during this period of late modernity:

> At one extreme the prison provides maximum security at a high cost for those who pose the greatest risks, and at the other probation provides low-cost surveillance for low-risk offenders. In between stretches a growing range of intermediate supervisory and surveillance techniques. The management concerns of the new penology - in contrast to the transformative concerns of the old - are displayed especially clearly in justifications for various new intermediate sanctions. (Feeley and Simon 1992, p. 459)

Feeley and Simon's study of the new penology highlights similar broad changes in the penal field to that of Garland's *Culture of Control* thesis. There are similarities between the arguments regarding the prevalence of a more managerial stance in tackling issues of crime control and on the increasing emphasis placed upon risk management. These are changes that have occurred as national level shifts mark a departure away from the rehabilitative ideals of the traditional penal model. However, as with Garland's thesis, what this perspective does not do is consider in empirical detail the evidence for and implications of such changes at the local, sub-national level. There is no recognition of the possibility of local resistance to this reconceptualisation of crime control and its delivery. This reflects a more general limitation of these 'grand narratives' approaches to understanding changes in crime control. These often explore global and national shifts at a very broad level of generalisation, at the expense of considering the 'local' element and its role in these broader shifts.

Governing through crime

Another very influential account that shares some characteristics of a 'grand narrative' approach is Simon's (2007) study examining the emergence of new models of governance of crime in the USA in recent decades. Simon offers a broad sociological narrative of shifts in crime control and his thesis of a new punitive culture of 'governing through crime' (and anti-social behaviour) has been widely deployed by 'critical' scholars trying to make sense of developments in the UK (see, for example, Crawford, 2009, Coleman et al, 2009). For Simon, the collapse of the American New Deal from the late 1960s onwards prompted the so called 'War on Crime' that has gathered pace during the last 30 years or so. Simon concentrates upon how policy developments in crime control are intimately connected to more general approaches to governing at the national level. He highlights the ways in which local institutions - including schools, communities and even workplaces - have become increasingly permeated by and governed through the lens of crime control (rather than through the lens of social welfare).

During most of the twentieth century, disadvantaged populations were governed primarily via the state's welfare system, but the emphasis shifted away from this owing to broader shifts in governing strategies. Increasingly, governments look to the criminal justice system as the primary means of dealing with problematic populations. Simon illustrates this movement toward considerations of crime control as a focus of governance more broadly, by considering some of the main changes that have occurred. The growth of gated communities – a particular feature in some parts of the USA – shows how residential planning and organization is increasingly governed by considerations of crime and insecurity. These estates are often subjected to surveillance technologies, with their security managed by private firms.

Changes have been seen in the US education systems, whereby schools are increasingly influenced by the crime control agenda. In many inner city schools, children have become treated as potential suspects as opposed to pupils, as disruptive behaviour is met with a 'zero tolerance' approach to discipline, mirroring the broader American stance on crime control. It is a trend that has also emerged across workplaces, resulting in staff

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being made the subject of pre employment testing, whilst surveillance techniques have become prevalent in working environments as a means of monitoring staff behaviour. For Simon this signifies a return to the workplace as a site of social control.

Simon's influential analysis provides a broad notion of general cultural and political shifts in approaches to crime control and governance that suggests shifts in national level policy have permeated and shaped policy responses regionally and locally. In relation to anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy, Simon suggests that this is increasingly being used as an 'organizing' principle. As a result it has become critical to the exercising of authority measures nationally. In using policy in this manner, in Simon's opinion it has enabled the activities of those at the national level to encompass a wide range of institutions. The same can be said of the local level, where increasingly a variety of organizations have been encouraged to take action in relation to this particular agenda. For Simon ASB policy has also become crucial in ensuring that society is governed by considerations of crime and disorder control. In contrast with elements of Garland's account – which suggests at least in part the state has accepted its diminished role in crime control - Simon's account points to growing state power through its intrusion into a wide range of organizations and across all levels of society, as crime control considerations have become a dominant force. Whilst Simon's arguments are primarily applied to the USA, similar analyses have also been used in relation to the 'criminalisation of social policy' in the UK (Rodger 2008), and more broadly, the 'governing through security' (Loader 2002) in the European Union. All of these analyses, in slightly different ways, argue that issues of crime, disorder and security invade and colonise other areas of social and political life, almost always with negative consequences for society.

The limitations of 'grand narrative' accounts

These 'grand narrative' accounts of crime control have been extremely influential in mapping out the broader social, political and cultural shifts in crime control policies across many Western nations. They have identified some important global shifts, as well as highlighting some dangers of the current policy directions. However, as explanations

of why crime (and disorder) control policy comes to be shaped the way that it is, these approaches do have some limitations. The most notable of these, particularly in relation to the current study, is that they underplay some important variations that have emerged in cultures of control, both between and within nations (Jones and Newburn 2007, Edwards and Hughes, 2005). These broader accounts focus primarily upon global shifts that impact upon the national level of policymaking. In doing so, they can overstate global convergence, whilst lacking any detailed analysis of what can occur in relation to this process both regionally and locally. These accounts present policy formation and delivery as a 'top down' experience, driven by inexorable global forces, as opposed to being an unpredictable and complex process and one that can be influenced by policy actors at different levels of the system. Empirical studies of policy development have shown that policy can be initiated and advanced at the local and regional levels, and filtered back up to those at the national level (Edwards and Stenson 2004). These broad 'grand narrative' studies also underestimate the role that political agency plays in policy development. At the same time it neglects to consider the levels of influence that both contrasting political and legal institutions can have, along with individual national and local political cultures (Jones and Newburn 2007). In overlooking the role of the 'local' in this way, 'grand narrative' writers are also neglecting to test out their own theories in relation to these national level shifts.

Jones and Newburn argue that these broad generalising theories have a tendency, albeit perhaps unintentional, to present a rather deterministic view of the policymaking process. The lack of empirical detail presents an overly 'smooth' picture of policy shifts, and does not take into account that often this is a process that is both contested and unpredictable. It has also led to those who favour a convergence approach, presenting the view that 'the direction of policy is both inevitable and irreversible' in its nature (2007, p. 7). It is a concern that is echoed by Zedner (2002) in her critique of Garland's 'Culture of Control' thesis. She argues that grand narratives such as that produced by Garland, not only offer a description of the events that are occurring in relation to policy developments, but suggest that the direction and nature of change is almost inevitable in its progress. The danger of this is that it will discourage penal theorists from holding to their 'duty to

resist' such developments (Zedner 2002, cited in Jones and Newburn 2007, p. 13).

Young (2002) has also produced a detailed critique of the 'Culture of Control'. It begins by assessing the comparative nature of Garland's study, and its attempts to identify apparent similarities between the British and American approaches to crime control. For Young, in adopting this approach Garland has neglected to also acknowledge the corresponding differences between the two, which are somewhat marked. The main issue for Young is the fact that there is such a fundamentally wide variation in crime rates between these two countries. So much so that this is as significant as some of the other more recognised variables that exist in studies of this nature. These include ethnicity, age, class and gender. In terms of the actual disparity between the two, this can be highlighted by a simple comparison of prison population rates. For example, during the mid point of the nineties the total prison population of Western Europe was no more than 200,000, whilst in the USA it stood at 1.6 million, which is a staggering eight times higher (Zedner 2002, p. 354).

Zedner (2002) also suggests that there is potentially more to consider than just these two countries responses to crime control, with other significant players also having been identified. Indeed, by Garland's own admission countries such as Canada and Norway have also had a role to play, along with other European countries when it came to the development of alternative approaches to crime control (2002, p. 353). However, given Garland's focus upon these two countries, Young also suggests that due consideration should have been given to their differing social and economic conditions. These include the persistent racial segregation that has been apparent in the United States. By Garland's own admission this formed part of the transition into late modernity, with the increased mobilisation of different sectors of the population. The United States have also demonstrated a market society, which has been affected by a culture of violence that has advocated the idea that violence is the right way to resolve disputes, precipitating high rates of gun ownership. According to Young, in looking for so many similarities, Garland has potentially ignored or paid little attention to the significance of the variables involved. Most crucially, for current purposes, the criticism here is that the very broad

level of comparison overlooks the existence of (and possible explanations for) important differences between nations, regions and localities (2002, p. 232).

Whilst Garland acknowledges some of the contributory factors, such as the increase in opportunities for crime and the corresponding decline in informal social controls, he fails to address some of the wider issues. These include society's portrayal of equality whilst the reality for most is unequal living on many levels, resulting for Young in the linkages between inequality and crime being somewhat lacking in Garland's thesis. These are factors that for Young remain underdeveloped, with Garland only having offered an acknowledgment to the work of writers such as Marx and Hobsbawn rather than having incorporated them into the analysis. It would appear that instead, Garland has drawn upon the more situational approaches of Felson, Clarke and others (see for example, Felson 1987; Clarke and Felson 1993). Young argues that in his use of these criminologies Garland has failed to also acknowledge the significance of the rise of other competing theories. Most importantly for Young, this includes the rise in feminism, during the time period with which Garland's study is concerned. In terms of Garland's discussion of crime control responses during late modernity, key to this has been the adaptive response that has emerged in relation to cultural and political changes, with the state's gradual acknowledgment that it is no longer able to control crime. Instead what is required is a wider partnership at the lower levels of the process, involving a range of policy actors. For Young however, these tendencies would appear to be at odds in British society with the crime control policies of New Labour specifically, who although keen to establish partnership working retained a clear belief that the state can have an impact upon high crime rates. Young also casts doubt over Garland's decentring approach, key to which is the suggestion that what is needed is simply a movement away from the 'central to the local'. For Young this does not represent a significant enough move if a substantial challenge to existing crime control methods is to be made, as changes will also need to be made at a structural level.

In contrast to the more general sociological accounts such as that of Garland, some studies aim to offer a more detailed policy history of policy developments in crime and

ASB control. These often highlight the influence that local policy actors can have by resisting, reshaping and at times initiating new policy developments (Jones and Newburn 2007, p. 7). However, it is necessary to consider these local developments with reference to the broader structural patterns and the influences that globalised changes can have upon the policymaking process. The most significant of these is their ability to contribute to the shaping of the political cultures that form a backdrop to more localised responses to crime control. The next section of this chapter will therefore consider some existing academic literature that focuses upon the formulation of local level ASB policy responses within a British context.

Exploring divergence: Complexity and change in policy development

UK perspectives: Governing through ASB

In the last three decades a number of UK criminologists have drawn increasingly on ideas associated with governance studies in political theory (see Johnston and Shearing, 2003, Edwards and Hughes, 2012, Hughes, 2007, Jones, 2012, for overviews of this body of work). All of these works share an interest in examining changing responses to crime and its control as a lens for exploring shifts in the nature of governance more generally. One of the leading exponents of this tendency is associated with the work of Crawford (1997, 2009). Let us examine the work of Crawford as a useful exemplar of attempts to draw critically on the work of Garland and Simon by grounding their grand theses in the empirical specificities of British developments in the new 'governance of incivilities'.

In his article, 'Governing through antisocial behaviour', Crawford (2009) focuses upon the governance of ASB in a purely British context. In doing so, he develops some of Simon's key themes in focusing upon the governance of ASB. These include the suggestion that the concept of ASB is primarily being used as an organizing principle in shaping social policy responses in a range of fields. However, unlike some of the accounts previously discussed, Crawford also highlights the important role of the 'local' in the policymaking process, as he considers the impact of ASB measures upon the individual. At the national level, Crawford suggests that policymakers have become more

risk adverse. As a result they have attempted to use a national ASB agenda and its accompanying measures, as a means of governing the future. The response has been to increasingly treat people on the basis of what they might do in the future, as what they have actually done in the past becomes of secondary concern in terms of the use of regulative measures (2009, p. 819). This sentiment is echoed by other writers such as Zedner, who suggest that increasingly '[p]eople are judged in terms of what they might do. Anticipating and forestalling potential harm constitutes a form of temporal and conceptual 'pre-crime' implied in quests for security' (Zedner 2007 cited in Crawford 2011, p. 504). Other writers have also highlighted the shift toward preventive, anticipatory policy interventions, against the traditional retrospective focus of criminal justice and punishment:

> ASB is identified as the first step in a developmental trajectory (for both individuals and communities), which leads to more serious offending, flagging the need for early intervention: to 'nip it in the bud' in relation to individual criminal careers; and to avert a 'tipping point' in relation to spirals of community decline propelled by a nexus of disorder, fear and crime. Hence, references to Wilson and Kelling's (1982) 'broken windows' thesis litter British policy documentation on urban governance (Innes and Jones 2006).

Crawford uses the Government's introduction of a dedicated ASB agenda, as an example of how those at the national level have increasingly sought to legitimize more state based interventions. In Crawford's opinion, these have largely been designed to match their desire to influence the manner in which practitioners should tackle this issue locally. For Crawford a range of regulatory powers has accompanied these initiatives, as those in government have embarked upon a frantic period of change in respect of this particular element of their crime and disorder agenda. The result has been a blurring of the lines between crime and disorder, with a range of responses having been generated that offer the use of both informal and formal interventions, with the ever-present threat of a criminal sanction used as a means of securing success. All of this has led Crawford to suggest that:

> [R]egulatory ideas are deployed in ways that (either intentionally or inadvertently) can frequently serve to lower the threshold of intervention, formalize previous informal responses, intensify forms of intervention and hasten punishment. (Crawford 2009, p. 812)

In addition to the introduction of more punitively based measures, either as a tool of first or last response, Crawford argues that the Government's ASB agenda sees an attempt by those at the national level to both re-emphasize their role as a risk manager, and to regain the sovereign control that in his thesis Garland suggested the Government had moved away from. As those in power recognized not only the limitations of the late modern criminal justice system, but also the need for the adoption of a more responsibilised, preventative stance, in delivering responses to issues such as ASB. New Labour sought to provide direct reassurance to the voting public of their ability to address people's concerns, about the problems of crime and low-level disorder. However, the reality of this was the introduction of a range of measures that whilst seemingly performing this function, they have achieved little in effecting 'meaningful behavioural change' in the perpetrators of this behaviour (2009, p. 810). The reason for this is that the implementation of this agenda has been accompanied by a national level political discourse that presents an overly simplified picture of what ASB constitutes. The result has been that this has become a policy area that is more concerned with political rhetoric than actual policy implementation, notwithstanding the introduction of increased numbers of rules and regulations. These are mainly concerned with individual behaviour and personal lifestyle choices, as those in government have attempted to micro manage specific elements of the population in an effort to address people's perceptions and fear of crime. Those operating at the national level have used the ASB measures that have been introduced, as a means of circumventing established due process principles. Increasingly order maintenance involves the use of summary justice, as other actors including the police and other accredited personnel have the power to issue punishments (such as 'fixed penalty notices') that do not require the accused to be tried in a court of law. Thus, in increasing numbers of cases traditional criminal justice routes are being bypassed, as punishment is no longer exclusively the domain of the courts. It is in these emerging sites of governance that young people in particular have become the targets of these sanctions. We have seen the emergence of 'novel technologies of control', and the development of accompanying 'intensive and earlier interventions' (2009, p. 810). Those in government have sought to provide practitioners with a toolkit of measures designed to

address issues of problematic behaviour, which has been accompanied by the emergence of a 'regulatory pyramid' (2009, p. 824).

The pyramid structure of punishment exists as a hierarchical model. It is based upon the assumption that the majority of the measures used to tackle ASB initially, will be located at the bottom of this scale, with criminal sanctions positioned nearer the top. In reality this may reflect a wider held belief that the use of measures such as Anti Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs) are a tool of last resort, only to be enacted when all other means of regulation have been exhausted. For Crawford the toolbox is a means of individualizing control, using a form of regulation that appeals both to broader concerns and individual circumstances. However, in practice there is little in the way of rational progression through the scale of seriousness as is suggested by the use of tools from the pyramid. Those who move through it are likely to also be similarly moving through different elements of the criminal justice system. It is this increasingly complex model of punishment that practitioners must navigate as, in their attempts to provide the most appropriate response to issues of ASB, attempts are made to achieve a balance between enforcement and prevention/support. This opens the space for important local – and sub-local - variations in approach to emerge. Thus, national policy – even when characterized by a plethora of new regulations and interventions – does not provide a monolithic straightjacket from which local practitioners cannot break out. The system does provide space for the modification and potential resistance to national level policy by those who are charged with its implementation.

Interestingly from Crawford's perspective, the use of this range of measures, both informal and formal, has been developed in the apparent absence of any evidence-based practice at the national level. It is a gap in government evaluation that has been exacerbated by both the pace and scale of change that has occurred as a result of the rollout of the Government's ASB agenda. For Crawford this belies the undertaking of a more interventionist approach by those in government. It can result in perpetrators of ASB being excluded from their communities, as divisions emerge between the 'law-abiding' majority and the 'disorderly' minority. This leads to the promotion of the use of measures that almost demand individuals to 'self regulate or else…!' (2009, p. 821).

Increasingly, individuals are required to comply with behaviours that in another guise would not necessarily be considered as anti-social, let alone criminal.

In attempting to highlight the role of the 'local' in the policymaking process, Crawford cites the work of Burney (2009). He is primarily concerned with her identification of the emergence of 'divergent cultures of control' both nationally and within local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs), based upon empirical evidence. In an attempt to further explore the different levels of policymaking the work of both Burney (2009) and Hughes (2007) will be considered in the next section. In different ways both of these writers have attempted to incorporate an empirical element into their accounts of the new governance of ASB. Whilst the aim of these studies (unlike the current research) was not to undertake primary empirical research in particular areas, they have identified very clearly the gaps in existing literature in understanding the nature and sources of local variations in policies to deal with ASB.

Local variations in crime and disorder control

In contrast to the writers that focus on identifying and explaining similar developments in crime control policies across a range of jurisdictions, other work has highlighted the importance of divergence in policies, and in particular, the specific features of regional and local policymaking. For example, Tonry (1999; 2001) points to enduring differences in penal policies between countries with contrasting historical and cultural traditions. As he argues: 'The world increasingly may be a global community…but explanations of penal policy remain curiously local' (2001, p. 518). Similarly, Melossi (2001) has noted the striking contrasts over time between penal systems in the US and in Italy, and argued that '(p)unishment is deeply embedded in the national/cultural specificity of the environment which produces it' (2001, p. 407). Whilst these writers focus upon penal policies regarding sentencing and imprisonment, similar arguments can be applied to crime control policy more generally, as well as policy developments in dealing with related areas such as 'disorder' or ASB.

Indeed, the work of writers such as Burney (2009) and Hughes (2007) has offered this type of analysis of ASB policymaking, albeit in the case of Hughes, as part of a wider debate about the politics of crime and control and its various guises. In attempting to fill a gap in what is acknowledged as having been an 'under-researched area' (Gray 2006, p. 393), Burney has concentrated her efforts upon the development of the ASBO framework in Britain under successive New Labour administrations. Her account charts the emergence of ASB as a political concept, and its legitimisation as a result of specific policy developments in Britain. By contrast Hughes focuses upon ASB policy as being one strand of a range of seemingly new problems that are now being governed by a broader institutional infrastructure of community safety. Both accounts suggest that ASB covers a range of categories of behaviour, following the introduction of a broad definition by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA), and is difficult to define in any precise way. Indeed, it has become seen as something that 'means whatever the victim says it means' (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 313), reflecting the emphasis that is now placed upon public perceptions of behaviour. The ASB agenda has in some cases been used as a mechanism to exclude certain groups from their communities. Hughes shows how the particular focus on young people, and concerns about demonization and stigmatization, have been recurrent themes in policy debates surrounding ASB in Britain. Burney sees this as a distinguishing feature of the British approach. The result being that '(w)ithin this context, 'youths hanging about' have become the almost universal symbol of disorder and more and more, menace.' (Burney 2004, p. 473).

Burney, like Crawford, suggests that the raft of ASB interventions demonstrate a renewed desire on the part of government to regulate individual behaviours. However, as acknowledged by Hughes (2007), this is an element of crime control that has a much longer history than politicians at the national level have been willing to acknowledge. According to Burney and Crawford, because of perceived failings of the existing criminal justice system, those in government have sought to adopt an increasingly interventionist stance in terms of regulating behaviour outside of the framework of the criminal law. Those in government have encouraged the use of a more enforcement-based approach in tackling ASB, using national campaigns such as 'Together' and 'Respect' (see Chapter

Three) to prompt coordinated action from local practitioners. These were introduced following the Government's initial disappointment at the lack of response being shown by some authorities to this issue following the 1998 CDA (Burney 2005, p. 133). However, for Burney the emphasis placed upon the use of measures such as ASBOs only served to 'drown out' competing messages regarding the use of a holistic approach in developing long term solutions to problems of disorder. According to Hughes, it was the persistence of regional and local differences in policy interventions regarding ASB that led those in government to try to narrow the opportunities for local level resistance to national policy objectives. Thus, in the work of both Burney and Hughes, the *contested* responses to ASB formed a key theme of the analysis, highlighting the persisting importance of the 'local' in the policymaking process. This kind of research shows that policymaking and implementation rarely follows a smooth trajectory between policy ideas, decisions and actions. Rather, it is a process that in reality is shaped by a range of contradictions, uncertainties and local contingencies (Hughes 2007; Edwards and Hughes, 2005). As Burney notes, '(g)iven the lack of consensus as to what the term 'antisocial behaviour' means in practice, it comes down to local responses to local problems' (Burney 2005, p. 140).

In Burney's exploration of practitioner responses to ASB in both Milton Keynes and Nottingham, she argued that there was little evidence of a homogenous 'one size fits all' approach emerging on the ground (Burney 2005, p. 167). Instead, what could be seen in the contrasting approaches of these two cities was the emergence of variations in approach depending on local factors. In Nottingham, practitioners fully embraced the enforcement aspect of the Government's ASB agenda. In contrast in Milton Keynes, practitioner efforts were instead concentrated upon the use of restorative justice measures as a means of tackling this issue. This is not to say that enforcement measures were rejected out of hand, but rather were combined with a wider raft of informally based and preventive interventions. The empirical evidence contained in this study suggests that practitioners remained able to tailor ASB solutions to fit local needs. This is perhaps not surprising, as Hughes (2007) argues, given the priority that has been placed upon the 'responsibilisation' of local policy actors in the broader crime control framework. The

development of local solutions to a national agenda such as this is also a means by which practitioners can seek to minimise the 'unintended consequences' of attempting to import policy into their localities. Hughes also highlights the importance of unpredictability in the local policymaking process in relation to ASB. Both Hughes and Burney highlight the 'standout' case of Manchester, where the local authority embraced the enforcement aspect of the ASBO both in terms of punitive rhetoric and the numbers of ASBOs issued. This city accounted for a sixth of all ASBOs taken out in England and Wales between 1999 and 2004 (Hughes 2007, p. 121). Burney (2005) suggests that the reason for this was most likely to have been a combination of keen local authority officers and police officers in senior positions within the local force, which could direct the local policy response. In Manchester, the seeds of this approach can be identified as early as 1996, when the Housing Act brought with it new powers for council landlords. In response to these measures, practitioners quickly set about creating a Neighbourhood Nuisance Strategy Team. It made full use of the ability to bring injunctions against unruly tenants, reflecting the willingness of practitioners to fully embrace both policy and legislative developments (Burney 2005, p.123).

Burney also interviewed European practitioners involved in this particular policy field. The aim of this was to highlight the importance of difference in comparing the approaches of Holland and Sweden. Burney conducted interviews with various practitioners and civil servants from both of these countries, the purpose of which was to assess their perceptions and treatment of the issue of ASB (Burney 2005, p. 14). Burney identified that the main difference between the UK and other European countries is the emphasis placed upon individual control, an element of the Government's response that was also highlighted by Crawford (2009). Burney seemingly shares Crawford's views regarding the emphasis that has been placed upon the use of contracts of behaviour, and the increasing need for self-regulation. For Burney, this is exemplified by the use of the ASBO and has contributed to it becoming a unique feature of Britain's approach. It has been accompanied by exclusionary political rhetoric, with the term 'anti-social' being used to single out certain individuals as not being worthy of a place within their communities. Even the process for securing interventions such as an ASBO can

exacerbate this perception. The perpetrators often have to appear at a civil court, which can be a 'dehumanising process,' particularly for young people (Shami Chakrabarti and Jago Russell in Squires 2008a, p. 312). This has meant a shift in attention away from the underlying causes of bad behaviour, as these are rarely identified and treated:

> The people (children and adults) whose behaviour needs controlling are equally part of the syndrome and part of the community. Policies that fail to recognise these connections cannot provide any long-term answers. (Burney 2005, p. 170)

Thus it can be seen that in contrast to the broader sociological analysis of crime control responses, the sphere of ASB control has been the focus of important research that acknowledges the enduring role of the 'local' in the policymaking process. Whilst the more globalised theories of crime control provide an important background to these policy shifts, this does not remove the need for more detailed empirical evidence about how policies come to be the way they are in particular localities. This is not to say that one viewpoint is more important than the other. As Garland states, the different emphases of the 'grand narrative' and 'local study' approaches relate to the 'unavoidable tension between broad generalization and the specification of 'empirical particulars' (2001, p. vii). The position of this study is that both approaches have much to gain from a more detailed empirical consideration of both the idea of 'policy' and more particularly, the processes through which it comes about. The next section of the chapter is therefore concerned with providing a framework for the focus on 'empirical particulars' (Garland 2001, p. vii) in this particular area of policymaking.

<u>Exploring the local policy process</u>

Understanding 'policy'

It has been argued that many criminological studies have tended to take the notion of 'policy' for granted in that empirical research has concentrated on its impacts rather than its origins (Jones and Newburn 2004). At the same time, political scientists, whilst having a more sophisticated notion of policy and policymaking have tended to focus upon areas other than crime control (Jones and Newburn 2004, p.59). By contrast, they have

produced a large body of research on the policymaking process in a range of other policy domains such as health, education, agriculture, economic policy, and environmental regulation. We still know relatively little about how and why crime and disorder control policy changes in the UK. As argued by Tonry (2001), there is relatively little in the way of empirical evidence upon which to base claims about what shapes crime control and penal policy. For Tonry, what is required is 'more, fuller, and nuanced policy histories for individual countries and their component sub-jurisdictions' (2001, p. 531). It is therefore important to be clearer about what we take to mean by 'policy' and how it comes to take the shape that it does.

Public policy is a complex and multi-faceted concept. Any study of policymaking must draw distinctions between the two dimensions of policy – that concerned with the 'process' of policymaking and that with the 'substance' of policy respectively. To begin with the first of these, it is important to recognise that formal 'policy' represents the outcome of a set of processes. Research by political scientists has analysed policymaking by dividing it up into distinct analytical stages, and undertaking detailed examinations of each (Easton 1965). In this view, policy is seen as arising from a distinct set of problem-solving processes: problem definition, formulation of alternative solutions, and considerations of implications of alternatives to experimentation with the preferred choice. Whilst recognising the analytical importance of identifying such stages, a number of authors have pointed out that such an approach runs the risk of implying an overly 'rational' picture of the policymaking process (Hill 1997). Policymaking in practice rarely looks like the textbook discussions of the 'policy cycle'. The content of policies is not determined at the decision-making stage, but is negotiated continuously in the problem definition, legislation, regulation and court decisions, and again in the decisions made by practitioners on the ground. Nevertheless, breaking the policymaking cycle into distinct stages has provided political scientists with a useful analytical tool for empirical exploration of the processes involved (see for example Kingdon 1995). The growth in partnership working has further complicated the policymaking process. The noted shift from 'government' to 'governance' (see below) has transformed the role of central government away from a 'command and control' approach and towards more of an active

negotiator and shaper of networks. Policy cannot, therefore, be viewed in a straightforward or deterministic way, given the complexities of the policy process. Rather, it should be seen as a 'series of intentions' around which negotiation takes place, as each set of actors becomes involved in the process (Barrett and Fudge 1981).

Turning to the second dimension, whilst 'policy' should be viewed as an ongoing set of processes rather than an 'event' in itself, at any point in time it may also be broken down into a number of distinct 'levels'. Studies of policymaking have usually focused upon the more concrete levels, such as written policy statements or legislation. However, others have suggested that this presents an oversimplified view of policy. Bennett (1991), for example, identifies a number of distinct elements of policy including: policy content (statutes, administrative rules and regulations), policy instruments (institutional tools to achieve goals such as regulatory, administrative, judicial tools) and policy style (overall nature of process – consensual, confrontational or incremental). In particular, a key distinction can be drawn between policy symbols and rhetoric on the one hand, and the more concrete forms of policy in terms of actual policy content and instruments on the other. Pollitt (2001) also presents a useful analysis of the different substantive 'levels' of policy, premised upon Brunsson's (1989) classification of distinctions between different elements of policy. Pollitt argues that there are three key elements of policy: policy 'talk', policy 'decisions' and policy 'action'. This provides a very helpful guide to any study wishing to research in detail the 'empirical particulars' (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking in a particular sphere. In developing Brunsson's initial concept, Pollitt provides a conceptual framework that can be used to not only distinguish between these different aspects of the process, but also as a means of highlighting the complexities that are involved:

> Talk, decisions and products are mutually independent instruments
> used by the political organization in winning legitimacy and support
> from the environment. (Brunsson 1989, p. 27)

For Pollitt, policy 'talk' is illustrated by the use of political rhetoric and symbolism. Both of these can be used by those at the national or local level to legitimise policy concepts,

and as a means of securing support for ideas. Policy 'decisions' are the more concrete manifestations of formal policy, and include legislation, written policy statements and national level initiatives. Both 'talk' and 'decisions' should be distinguished from policy 'action' which is concerned with actual policy implementation and the delivery of policy outcomes, particularly by local level practitioners.

Given the complex nature of both the process and substance of policy, it becomes clear that public policymaking is best viewed as a messy and unpredictable process, characterised by uncertainty, variation and unintended consequences. As Barrett and Fudge have argued: 'it is appropriate to consider implementation as a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends' (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 25). The notion of formal policy being resisted or re-worked by practitioners or other policy actors is not a new one. There is a significant literature on the idea of 'implementation gaps' (Dunsire 1978, p. 18), which starts from the position that 'policy does not implement itself' (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 9). More recently, youth justice scholars have noted that 'there is always a space to be exploited between written and implemented policy' (Muncie 2004, p. 175).

Governance and the emergence of policy networks

The shift from 'government' to 'governance' is now a standard feature of discussions of policymaking. In the UK, this work has been most widely associated with Rhodes's (1997) critique of the 'Westminster model'. Rhodes (1997) argued that governing power now operates via central attempts to steer 'self-organizing inter-organizational networks' rather than 'command and control' by state institutions. These changes are linked to developments associated with a raft of governmental reforms such as privatization, contracting-out, multi-agency partnership work (of the kind already discussed) and the creation of semi-autonomous service delivery agencies. These changes have reduced the central state's direct control over the implementation of policy and encouraged the development of policy. Governments seek to steer a growing number of bodies in a particular direction, whilst continuing to promote their own policy interests.

In his exploration of the origins of the concept of policy networks, Jordan (1990) emphasises the significance of the literature of American political scientists. The work of this group led Jordan to suggest that the idea of a policy network first emerged in America during the 1950s and 1960s. The focus of these initial network studies was the interrelations between individuals who operated within interest groups, government and agencies. Since then the policy networks approach has been further developed to take account of the variances in policymaking processes across sectors (Cope 2001). For writers such as Rhodes (1981), policy networks have become a defining feature of the policy process in the UK. Rhodes uses a 'power dependence' model to explain how these networks develop and operate. All of the members of a particular policy network are dependent upon each other for resources of different types. These resources can be financial, but also symbolic, legal, or administrative, and the ability to be able to exchange resources across organisations is pivotal. It requires those involved to engage in a 'bargaining' process for these resources, whilst ensuring that they do not become too dependent upon the other actors in the network (Rhodes 1981, pp. 97-133).

Within the sphere of crime control and related areas, much discussion has focused on the key policy actors of local authorities and the police service, especially since the CDA 1998 (Edwards and Benyon 2001). With regard to Rhodes' power dependence model, it is the local authorities that have acquired the greater level of resources needed to be more influential within policy networks that have emerged since the early 1990s (Rhodes 1981):

> As a consequence they hold the *balance* of organisational power over
> law enforcement agencies in the local policy response to crime and
> disorder. (Edwards and Benyon 2001, p. 162)

The power dependence model as developed by Rhodes, offers a basis upon which policy networks can be analysed as the actors involved in these resource exchanges gradually become more connected. It can also assist in aiding our understanding as to why the development of crime and disorder control policy here in the UK demonstrates differences between localities. In Rhodes' opinion this is explained by the varying

degrees of resource dependency that has emerged, which can impact upon both the inclination and capacity of local government to be able to govern. It can lead to communities being governed in such a way that the expression of a variety of opinions is tolerated. However, those in local government can also choose to lead in a more corporate manner. It is this latter style of leadership that can result in a greater local compliance with national policies and the role of the local practitioner in simply delivering its outcomes, as opposed to attempting to resist or rework this process (Edwards and Benyon 2001).

Policy network analysis can be used to identify the key political actors in the policymaking process, and to assess their ability to influence the groups in which they are involved. It is also a method that can be used to examine the ways in which some groups are able to become more powerful and dominant than others. There are of course other factors that can impinge upon this assessment, including such considerations as to size of the network, and the power dependence relations that exist within it. All of these can lead to both individuals and organisations having greater influence, although not determining policy outcomes within this forum (Rhodes 1997, p. 29).

Rhodes (1981) identified five different types of policy network. At one end of this spectrum there are 'policy communities'. These rely upon a select membership of representatives that originate from organisations that all have access to resources (thus enabling these to be exchanged in the interests of developing public policy, as they are often dominated by either those at the national level or by the interests of the communities that they serve). The communities are characterised both by continuity and the overall maintenance of a balance of power between the parties involved. At the other end of the scale there are 'issue networks'. These tend to develop as a consequence of a specific high profile issue. Rhodes argues that this type of network has 'limited vertical interdependence' (1997, p. 38). It can therefore be prone to inner conflict causing a consequent imbalance between those involved, particularly in terms of available resources. It can lead to an unequal distribution of power and a fairly open approach being taken to the membership of the group. In short:

> [A] policy community represents a relatively closed, consensual and tightly knit network of policy actors. An issue network embraces a relatively open network of actors loosely bound together by their (often competing and conflicting) interests being affected by a particular policy. (Cope 2001, p. 9)

In between these two extremes exists 'professional networks'. These are both stable with restricted membership and are therefore similar to policy communities. These networks are based upon serving the interests of a particular profession, retaining significant vertical interdependence. However, they are often keen to isolate themselves from other networks. There is also the presence of 'intergovernmental networks' within the policymaking process, whose membership comprises of representatives from local authorities. The aim is to be representative of the full range of services that this local agency provides. As a result of their membership, Rhodes suggests that these particular networks can also gain access to a number of other policy networks. The final classification of network offered by Rhodes is the 'producer network', which is dominated by its economic interests. These are often characterised by their fluctuating membership.

Limitations of the policy network approach

It should be acknowledged that the policy networks approach is not without its critics. Some of these have suggested that whilst this is a concept that can aid in our understanding as to how policy is made, it cannot necessarily explain the reason why. The policy network models are also unable to contribute to our understanding of policy change or political processes, developing no further than a metaphor in analysing policy processes (Dowding 1995, p. 136). In terms of the European application of the policy networks approach as a new mode of governance, what it appears to lack is both accountability and legitimacy. Even though it has a potential ability to undermine democratic process, as they can 'expose the policy making process to uncontrollable and particularistic power games' (Besussi 2006, p. 9). All of this culminates in the suggestion that the policy networks model is better at describing the process of policymaking, rather than offering explanations of why certain policy decisions are made. It can also struggle

to account for why certain policy actors are able to dominate this process. The large body of work on networks still struggles to answer key questions: 'How do policy networks form, how do policy networks work and how do policy networks change?' (Cope 2001, pp. 14-17).

Cope (2001, pp. 1- 24) argues that the early literature on policy networks had key limitations. In their explanation of policy networks, early writers tended to neglect any discussion of their origins, assuming that they were already present across contemporary society. In response to this, Cope suggests that rather than undermining the whole approach, this should instead be viewed as an oversight on the part of these early writers. The initial literature also failed to consider the dynamics of policy networks. Instead they emphasised the interdependencies between the actors involved in the individual networks. Even though later accounts of this model have tried to rectify this, writers on the subject do still tend to concentrate their analysis on the 'meso level' of policymaking. In doing so, they fail to fully explore why individual actors make certain decisions, and how available resources are used to ensure that the agenda of their particular network is able to dominate. The resulting lack of discussion about the dynamics of policy networks means that there is little consideration given to how policy can change direction. It is in this way that the approach offers little recognition of or account for policy resistance, and how variations in approach are able to emerge locally.

Despite this Cope (2001, pp.1 – 24) maintains that as an approach, the concept of policy networks is an important analytical tool in assessing the complexities of the policymaking process. It can also enable an examination of the relationship between those different levels of the process. In addition, the more recent accounts on this subject have sought to not only refine the approach but to also ensure that it becomes a more robust theory that can withstand further criticism. For Cope, this has meant that the approach has experienced a shift from the descriptive to the explanatory, making it a useful contributor to the empirical research concerned with policymaking:

> [T]he policy networks approach is a very useful antidote to the belief
> that governance is government; more often government is only part of
> governance, and sometimes governance is 'governing without

Government' (Rhodes 1997, p. 47). The policy networks approach
challenges and indeed rejects the simplistic and misplaced belief that
governments govern. (Cope 2001, p. 19)

For Cope any further contributions made to the existing body of policy network literature
will only assist in strengthening this concept. A key aim of the current study is to
contribute to the discussions regarding the application of policy networks to a local
setting. The empirical element of the study, will attempt to explore some of the key
themes that have been identified in relation to the policy networks approach. These
include whether there is evidence of policy networks emerging locally, and if so what
types are there and how do they influence the policymaking process. These ideas will be
considered in terms of how the issue of ASB is governed locally. In addition, the policy
network approach is helpful in gaining an understanding of how local policy actors have
mobilised resources in response to national level calls for action on this agenda.

<u>Conclusion</u>

This chapter has explored the key bodies of scholarly literature that have informed the
current study. The broader context is the highly influential sociological accounts that
have contributed to our understanding of the changes that have occurred in 'late modern'
crime control. These studies have been undertaken at a broad level of generalization,
looking to identify and explain trends at the national and supra-national level. Whilst
such studies have been hugely important, they inevitably risk over-simplifying the picture
of policy change, both between different countries (and regions/localities within those
countries), and across different elements of crime control policy. The chapter discussed
how the field of ASB policy has already been the focus of studies that have emphasised
the variations of policy response that have occurred in different parts of the country, even
within the constraints of an increasingly directive national agenda. Such studies fit within
a wider range of research literature that emphasises the enduring importance of the role of
the 'local' in policymaking. It is largely based upon empirical studies of this process, an
element that is lacking in the grand narrative accounts discussed in the first part of this
chapter. One of the aims of this research is to follow Tonry's (2001) argument outlined

earlier, and respond to the call for more locally focused empirical studies of the policymaking process. It is indeed these nuances that the work of writers such as Garland (2001) and Feeley and Simon (1992) tend to miss, precisely because of their broader focus. Whilst the insights of such a focus are important, they risk presenting an overly simplified account of a supra-national and national driven policy agenda that has determined the direction of policy on the ground.

The second part of the chapter discussed the literature on policy and policymaking that highlights the various other levels that are involved in this process, and their potential to influence policy outcomes. Policy consists of both a complex set of processes, and a number of different levels of 'substance'. It is also shaped by increasingly complex 'networks' of policy actors, who operate at various levels in the system. It is through the undertaking of a case study designed to explore the 'empirical particulars' (Garland, 2001, p. vii) of policymaking that some of these themes can be addressed. An important aim of the current study is therefore to identify key policy actors in a given locality and explore their influence upon shaping and delivering policy outcomes. It will also seek to examine the relationships between the national and local levels of policymaking, exploring both the extent to which national policy agendas and their resources may be crucial in setting the frameworks and parameters against which local practice is configured and the possibilities for 'bottom-up', local influences on national policy agendas are realised over time.

One of the objectives of this chapter was to draw upon existing literature in order to formulate some 'theoretical propositions' that could then be explored and adapted in the empirical phase of the research (for fuller discussion see Chapter Four). The work reviewed here gives rise to four such propositions in relation to the development of ASB policy in a particular city:

TP1: Following Garland (2001), ASB policies in Southern City reflect the 'reconfigured' characteristics of late modern crime control – largely determined by fundamental social,

economic and cultural forces – and will thus not vary significantly from the national policy trajectories on ASB

TP2: ASB policies in Southern City display a 'schizoid' tension between 'adaptive' elements on the one hand, driven by instrumental, managerial concerns (emphasising such concepts as 'responsibilisation' and partnership), AND more emotive, politicized 'expressive' elements on the other (Garland 2001).

TP3: ASB policies in Southern City reflect a preoccupation with 'risk' that has been observed in criminal justice policy (and social policy more generally) such that it is focused primarily on the cost effective management of unruly populations, rather than upon the punishment or rehabilitation of offenders (Feeley and Simon 1994). Policy development also displays a tendency to colonise other areas of social policy locally such that other policy areas – such as health and education - become configured around and driven by the issues of crime and ASB.

TP4: ASB policy in Southern City is shaped by policy networks of different kinds, including relatively stable and continuous 'policy communities', and 'intergovernmental networks' comprising of participants from national and local government (Rhodes 1981, 1997).

The ways in which these theoretical propositions were used in the study are explained in more detail in the discussion of the research design and methods used in this study as discussed in Chapter Four. Before this, however, it is important to set out the particular context within which this study took place. The following chapter thus presents a detailed overview of the development of ASB policy in Britain during the past decade or so.

Chapter Three: Governing anti-social behaviour - The national policy context

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the emergence of anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy in England and Wales. It focuses upon key milestones that have occurred during the past decade or so, most notably under New Labour administrations. The discussion is informed by the different 'levels' of the policymaking process based upon Pollitt's (2001) distinctions between policy talk, decisions and actions. For the purposes of this analysis, policy 'talk' takes the form of political rhetoric, exhortation, and general statements of intent. More concrete manifestations of policy in the form of legislation, written policies and specific ASB initiatives have constituted actual policy 'decisions' made during New Labour's time in power. Pollitt's (2001) third level in this process, policy 'action', will be discussed in the later findings chapters of the thesis.

The chapter is divided into three main sections, each corresponding to a distinct period in the development of ASB policy. The first examines developments prior to New Labour taking office in 1997, and in particular the emergence of distinct forms of policy 'talk' about ASB and related concepts. The second section examines the first period of ASB policy development under New Labour governments, 1997-2003. The third main section explores the growing complexity of ASB policy that characterised policy developments between 2003 and Tony Blair's resignation as Prime Minister in 2007. A key objective is to situate the local area study that formed the empirical focus of the research within a broader national framework of legislation and policy development. A further important objective is to provide a baseline against which TP1 (see Chapter Two) can be explored. This requires a detailed overview of the national policy trajectory in order to compare it (and assess its relationship to) the playing out of policy developments at the 'local' level of Southern City.

Developments prior to 1997

The emergence of a dedicated ASB agenda at the national level is inextricably bound up with the Labour administrations of 1998-2010. Indeed, the period of primary interest for the current study concerns the development of ASB policy during the years 1998-2007. However, the origins of ASB policies can be found prior to Labour's 1997 General Election victory. These were mainly in the form of legislative measures introduced under the previous Conservative government. Amongst these was the 1996 Housing Act, which incorporated provisions that were designed to enable social landlords to better tackle problems of nuisance behaviour within their housing stock. It was anticipated that this would be achieved through the introduction of 'behavioural regulations', which could be used in tenancy agreements for social housing in particular (Crawford 2009, p. 824). In addition, there was also the earlier 1986 Public Order Act, which for the first time not only recognised the problems that could result from disorderly behaviour, but also sought to introduce measures designed to combat them (Millie 2009, p. 5).

Of course, behaviours associated with notions of incivility and disorder stretch back much further than this. However, in Opposition New Labour identified an opportunity to focus on ASB as part of its broader self-reinvention as a Party that would not be outflanked by the Conservatives on law and order issues. However, it was almost certainly more than crude electoral opportunism that attracted Labour politicians to this area. Indeed, they felt that they were responding to a growing national mood on this subject (Burney 2005, p.16). There were reports that constituency members perceived that ASB was a key concern within their communities, and local Labour MPs noted growing numbers of complaints relating to ASB. Arguments began to emerge that suggested the criminal justice system was ineffective in being able to resolve the low-level disorder problems that were being experienced.

The origins of the ASB policy agenda

The emergence of ASB policy responses must be seen as part of the wider 'get tough' crime control agenda that has formed a central part of the reinvention of the Labour Party during the 1990s. In Opposition, of course, New Labour was restricted exclusively to 'policy talk' in terms of rhetoric and campaign statements. The mid-1990s saw an increasingly punitive discourse deployed by senior Labour figures such as Tony Blair and Jack Straw, as they attempted to outflank the Conservative Party on 'law and order' matters.

Prior to the 1997 General Election, there were several key turning points that affected the positioning of New Labour on the issue of crime and disorder. In 1992, when on a visit to the USA with Gordon Brown, the then Shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair and a number of senior Labour strategists worked closely with senior members of the US Democratic Party who had contributed to refashioning the Party as the 'New Democrats', a key part of which was a tougher approach on crime and punishment issues (Burney 2005, p.17). The electoral success of the US President Bill Clinton demonstrated the political appeal of a tough rhetoric regarding crime and disorder. The work of the US writers Kelling and Wilson (1982), whose 'Broken Windows' thesis had become increasingly influential within US debates about crime and policing, argued that allowing minor disorder in a community to grow unchecked could lead to rising serious crime levels, along with the withdrawal of neighbourly behaviour and social bonds. These ideas had a major effect upon New Labour thinking about crime and disorder policy, both in Opposition and later when in government. In particular, this work became associated with those promoting a 'zero tolerance' policing approach towards crime and disorder[1]. Although in terms of concrete policy decisions and actions, zero tolerance policing appeared to have little impact in the UK, these ideas have loomed large in crime policy 'talk' (Jones and Newburn 2005, p.58). More generally, politicians have drawn upon the Broken Windows

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[1] Of course, there have been a number of criticisms levelled at this thesis in subsequent years. These included the vague and politically constructed nature of the concept of 'disorder', the invalid assumption of causation from the correlation between crime and disorder, and the potentially negative results of using the aggressive policing tactics promoted by these ideas (see Harcourt 2001).

approach in an effort to highlight the importance of so called 'quality of life issues', including ASB. The underpinnings of the approach also chimed with Tony Blair's broadly Christian Socialist and communitarian beliefs (which prioritise the needs of the community and wider society over those of the individual) (Burney 2005, p.18).

The second key turning point for Labour was Tony Blair's succession into the role of Leader of the Opposition in 1994, following the sudden death of their previous leader John Smith. As a result, Tony Blair was now able to exert greater influence over the Party's direction and its stance in relation to key issues. Blair, and his chosen successor to the post of Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw were now better placed to transform the Party's traditional softer stance on crime and disorder, which was seen as having damaged the Party's reputation in the eyes of the voting public (Burney 2005, p.19). In their opinion it had culminated in the Party's defeat at the 1992 General Election by the Conservative Party, despite earlier predictions of a hung parliament. In an effort to try to avoid a repeat of this, Blair and his followers within the Party encouraged the strengthening of their position on the issue of crime and disorder. They therefore highlighted key community policies, which were focused upon tackling prevalent problems, such as ASB, as a key theme within the broader phase of modernisation for the Party. This included what was a newly politicised concept of ASB, which required new responses, as a means of breaking with past traditions (Crawford 2009, p. 815). These developments coincided with the peak in BCS measures of both crime and ASB. At this point the Party published a consultation document, the opening section of which included what has since been described as a 'rallying cry' to the voting public (Burney 2005):

> Every citizen, every family, has the right to a quiet life – a right to go about their lawful business without harassment, interference or criminal behaviour by their neighbours. But across Britain there are thousands of people whose lives are made miserable by the people next door, down the street or on the floor above or below. Their behaviour may not be just unneighbourly, but intolerable and outrageous. (A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal Neighbours, Labour Party 1995, cited in Burney 2005, p. 20)

The consultation document also outlined policy proposals for the introduction of 'Community Safety Orders (CSO)'. These would go on to form the basis of the Anti

Social Behaviour Order (henceforth ASBO), the cornerstone of the Government's broader agenda on this issue. The proposal for the CSO had been developed by Jack Straw during his time as Home Secretary, and had been heavily influenced by housing professionals (the group which had initially identified a gap in the civil powers available to tackle problems of low-level disorder). The early stages of ASB policy saw 'nuisance behaviour' (as it was originally known) primarily as a social housing issue (Scott and Parkey 1998, cited in Flint 2009, p. 417):

> By comparison with residents of other tenures, social renters are more likely to regard anti-social behaviour as a problem in their neighbourhood, and to be the subject of measures such as Anti-social Behaviour Orders. (Flint 2006, cited in Flint 2009, p. 417)

In 1995, the recognition of the imperative to tackle behaviour of this nature, primarily within the housing sector had prompted the establishment of the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group (SLCNG). As a pressure group, Chief Housing Officers, who had been involved in the failed 1995 Coventry City Council v. Finnie case, initially attended meetings of this group. The case had seen injunctions overturned that had initially been granted against the perpetrators of both low-level crime and ASB. As a result, the SLCNG sought to lobby the Government into developing tougher policy proposals. It was anticipated that these would assist them in tackling what at the time, was described as the emerging 'phenomenon of anti-social behaviour' (SLCNG Online 2008). They were therefore not only seeking the development of a more joined up approach in tackling this issue, but perhaps more importantly, they wanted more stringent civil powers to be introduced to tackle low-level disorder (Burney 2005, p. 21). It was the proposals for the CSO that filled this gap. These had been designed as an injunction in the form of a new civil order, aimed at tackling low-level disorder and nuisance behaviour with the responsibilities of local agencies reflected in a press release from the Home Office Minister Alun Michael:

> What we will do is place a new joint responsibility on the police services and local authorities to develop statutory partnerships to prevent crime and enhance community safety by means of Community Safety Orders. We recognise how plagued many neighbourhoods are by continual anti-social behaviour by individuals or groups of individuals. (cited in Gilling 1999, p. 9)

It was suggested that a CSO would be obtained on the basis of civil evidence, with a view to placing exclusions and restraints upon an individual's behaviour or activities. Any breach of an order was to be treated as a criminal offence, punishable by a custodial sentence of up to seven years (Gilling 1999, p. 9). It was therefore these proposals, which had received little amendment during the intervening time that would three years later provide a basis for the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA), and the introduction of the ASBO. This was a civil order that originally became available for use by the police and local authorities in April 1999, who could only make an application for an order after having first consulted with the other (Campbell 2002, p. 2). The scope of those agencies involved who were considered to be 'relevant authorities' in terms of making ASBO applications, was later extended to include the British Transport Police, Registered Social Landlords, County Councils and Housing Action Trusts. This was as a result of the introduction of further legislative provisions (NACRO 2005, p. 2). An ASBO can be imposed upon anyone over the age of 10 who is deemed to have acted in an anti-social manner, in line with the definition contained within the 1998 CDA:

> [T]hat the person has acted, since the commencement date, in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself. (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 1(1)a)

According to the Home Office, most types of ASB fall into one of three categories 'street problems, nuisance neighbours or environmental crime'. In terms of specific behaviours, it can include vandalism, begging, anti-social drinking and the dealing and purchasing of drugs on the street (Home Office Online 2009). In terms of the details of an individual ASBO, these typically contain a range of prohibitions, stipulating what the offender cannot do in an effort to protect ASB victims and the wider community 'from further anti-social acts of the same kind by the defendant' (Campbell 2002, p. 3). For example an ASBO can include explicit clauses such as exclusions from specific areas at certain times, and also more general conditions around not inciting ASB nor encouraging others to do so (Home Office 2006, p. 29). Should a breach of an ASBO be recorded and proven, this can result in criminal proceedings and associated penalties being brought against the

identified perpetrator, which could include the possibility of the imposition of a custodial sentence (Campbell 2002, p. 8).

In an effort to gain support for the introduction and use of the ASBO during this time, leading Labour Party figures also used public speeches as an opportunity to highlight the problems of low-level disorder as experienced by core Labour voters. The claim was that it was 'Labour voters in poor areas who bore the brunt of crime and anti-social behaviour' (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 26). At the same time, BCS statistics suggested that whilst crime victimisation rates were generally falling following the peak that was identified during the mid 1990's, people's perceptions of ASB in local areas continued to increase up until 2002/03 (Jansson 2007, p. 26).

By the time of the 1997 General Election, it was clear that a tougher approach to crime and disorder was going to form a central part of Labour's campaign. As expected, there was great emphasis on crime and disorder proposals in their election manifesto document. Crime was one of the Party's 'five pledges' to the voting public. Labour's approach was encapsulated by the famous sound bite, first used by Tony Blair in the mid-1990s, 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' (Labour Party, *New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better*, April 1997). Other examples of tough 'policy talk' included the assertion that were to be 'no excuses for crime', in that individuals should be held responsible for their actions under New Labour's policy proposals (Crawford 2009, p. 814). Labour's proposals drew heavily on the 'Broken Windows' ideas as previously discussed, giving the appearance of an 'Americanised' approach towards the tackling of low-level disorder problems:

> We will tackle the unacceptable level of anti-social behaviour and crime on our streets. Our 'zero tolerance' approach will ensure that petty criminality among young offenders is seriously addressed. Community safety orders will deal with threatening and disruptive criminal neighbours. (Labour Party 1997)

The proposals put forward by New Labour before they entered government thus provided some key examples of policy 'talk' – in terms of rhetoric or policy proposals – which provided an important basis for later concrete policy decisions.

The core period of New Labour's ASB drive – 1997-2003

The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act

As New Labour took office following their landslide victory at the 1997 General Election (which marked the end of eighteen years spent in Opposition) they began to put some of the policy 'talk' outlined above into the form of more concrete policy 'decisions' in tackling ASB. They sought to maintain the tough stance of their election manifesto in relation to the broader issue of crime and disorder, and placed an early emphasis upon the use of enforcement-based tools in response to ASB. These policy decisions were mainly in the form of legislation, as they entered a period of sustained legislative activity in the tackling of crime and ASB. The focus began to shift away from the traditional associations between issues of nuisance behaviour and social housing provisions, as the scope of agencies involved in ASB management began to grow. This would lead to an increased emphasis on the importance of relations between housing officers, the police and local authority practitioners (Crawford 2009, p. 823). These partnership approaches formed a central part of the first major set of 'policy decisions' in the field of ASB, the 1998 CDA.

The CDA represented a significant departure away from the previously Conservative led crime and disorder agenda. It also emerged as the 1990s saw the development of a broader political culture that was seemingly going in a more punitive direction (Hughes 2007, p. 119). It was in this manner that New Labour could be seen to be responding to the previously cited national mood of the time, whereby in tackling ASB 'enforcement is an easier concept for people to grasp than negotiated solutions' (Burney 2005, p. 122). Therefore, what the CDA represented was the provision of a fast track response to punishment, advocating a tough enforcement-based approach to low-level forms of

disorder, borne out of the Party's pre-election promises to tackle issues such as ASB. In its use of the terminology of 'disorder', the legislation also drew heavily upon American influences, the origins of which could potentially be found in the arguments of senior Labour figures when in Opposition:

> When he announced the Bill, Home Secretary Jack Straw said he wanted new laws to help build safer communities. His aim was to target persistent troublemakers and to allow their law-abiding neighbours freedom from fear and harassment. (The Guardian Online January 2009b)

For Jack Straw, the 1998 Act (over which he was personally very influential), was a 'triumph of community politics over detached metropolitan elites' (quoted in Hughes 2007, p. 77) that was designed to assist local agencies in providing a targeted response to ASB. However, in order to fully achieve their goals of turning policy decisions into action on the ground, national level policymakers also needed to enlist the support of local level practitioners. Prior to 1997, addressing issues of problematic and nuisance behaviour was a field dominated, albeit at times reluctantly, by professionals within the local housing sector, and practitioners from other fields had little or only sporadic involvement. In an effort to try and resolve these divisions, the CDA sought to improve partnership working at the local level. The Act placed a statutory duty upon local government and police forces to cooperate in the development of targeted crime and disorder strategies for their areas. These were to be based upon the results of thorough crime and disorder audits to be undertaken of cities nationwide. For the first time, 'disorder' as explicitly articulated in legislation - alongside the more widely understood concept of 'crime' – was a key focus of public policy action.

Partnership working at the local level

An important strand within this formalisation of partnership working was the creation of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs). These were statutory local partnerships, of which 376 were established across England and Wales by 2006 (Hughes 2007, p. 121). These structures incorporated a range of partners with

responsibility for tackling issues of crime and ASB reduction. These were introduced at a time when those at the national level had begun to realise the significance of the potential role of local authorities in maintaining law and order across their communities. The CDA embraced a model of community safety first set out in the Morgan Report (1991), which had recommended that local authorities be given statutory responsibility as the lead agency in coordinating community safety policies at the local level. This offered local authorities a clear role in responding to the issues of crime and disorder for the first time (Hughes 2007, p. 63). However, its central proposal was rejected by the Conservative led government of the time, as they did not wish to give local authorities a greater role in crime prevention. The impact of this new approach would largely depend upon the responses of the agencies involved, as the local authority in particular sought to maintain a central role in this process. It followed the development of their expertise in this particular aspect of local level governance, in the form of community safety, which had been developed during the intervening time since the report's initial publication:

> This provision indicated national government recognition of the central role of local authorities in reducing crime and restoring order at the district level in England and Wales. It was the culmination of a long campaign, fought by local authorities since the mid 1980s, to stake a claim as a principal actor in the policy response to local crime and disorder. (Edwards and Benyon 2001, p. 151)

The adoption of this style of multi agency approach thus saw local authorities emerging as key collaborators, along with the police, in developing the ASB aspect of the Government's broader crime control agenda (Hughes 2007, p. 105). The police also tried to maintain a leadership role within this context, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, as was evidenced by their interaction with other local level organisations. In terms of local level partnerships, structures such as the newly formed CDRPs would also later become dominated by an emerging duopoly of control between these two groups of practitioners. It was a pattern that would be repeated across a number of localities during the 1990s (Hughes 2007, p. 103), influencing the local approach toward policymaking.

Young people and ASB

The 1998 CDA also established an overarching Youth Justice Board, which had responsibility for overseeing the performance of the youth justice system, providing both advice and feedback to the Home Secretary (Youth Justice Board [no date], p. 4). The 1998 CDA also led to the creation of multi-agency 'youth offending teams' (YOTs), which were designed to replace the previous social services youth justice teams. According to the legislation a YOT was to be established in every area by April 2000 (Williams 1999, p. 1). As a result a total of 157 were established covering all local authorities, having become agencies in April 2000 (HM Inspectorate of Probation [no date], p. 3). Based upon the provisions contained within the 1998 CDA, YOTs were required to not only coordinate the provision of youth justice services within their local authority area, but also to perform the duties assigned to them in their local youth justice plan as developed by local authorities (1998 Crime and Disorder Act Online). In terms of their representation, all YOTs were 'to include a police officer, a probation officer, a social worker, and representatives of education and health services' (Williams 1999, p. 2). These teams were also to become an integral part of the partnership structure created in response to tackling ASB, as they became the focal point for the referral of young people, and were granted powers under the emerging government legislation:

> The Yot also has a role in administering a number of measures to prevent and stop further anti-social behaviour. They have the power to work with families on a voluntary basis, enter into parenting contracts, and apply to the court for Parenting Orders. They can also play a valuable role in supporting an application for a Child Safety Order or ASBO. (Home Office 2005, p. 9)

These teams were also tasked with working alongside young people and their families in an effort to prevent reoffending. For those who had been convicted they also assisted in the supervision of community-based sentences (National Audit Office 2010, p. 3). It was a role that would prove particularly significant as links between this aspect of the Government's crime and disorder agenda, and young people, were established at an early stage:

> Anti-social behaviour is an unpleasant fact of many people's everyday life, regardless of whether they live in leafy, rural villages or deprived inner-city estates. Anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) were designed to combat such behaviour. Before ASBOs, the use of injunctions and evictions went some way to dealing with problem behaviour. But many individuals – and most importantly juveniles, who are commonly considered to be the cause of much anti-social behaviour – slipped through the net. (Campbell 2002, p. 1)

The 1998 CDA also introduced the use of curfews as an additional measure in tackling ASB, as those at the national level suggested that by preventing groups from congregating beyond a certain time, their ability to engage in acts of ASB could be reduced. The local child curfews that were subsequently introduced, which originated from government consultation papers on the subject, saw local authorities being able, following consultation with the police and with the agreement of the Home Secretary, to introduce bans on children of specified ages (under ten) in particular places for a period of up to 90 days. However, following the granting of this power, no applications were actually made by local authorities (Crawford and Lister 2007, p. 4). In an effort to encourage their use, the Government sought to extend these original provisions through the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act, which increased the age for the imposition of a curfew to under sixteen year olds. It also extended the ability of both local authorities and the police to impose curfews upon an area, not just an individual. It was anticipated that local police chiefs would be more willing to enact this provision, owing to their narrower remit when it came to the maintenance of law and order. As opposed to local authorities, which have a greater range of factors to consider when taking action, not least of all public opinion, owing to their levels of democratic accountability (Walsh 2002, p. 71).

Despite these amendments, the use of curfews in tackling ASB never became an accepted part of the Government's broader ASB agenda. Although as a concept, curfews could be seen as having been reintroduced as escort powers, alongside the creation of dispersal orders (Crawford 2009, p. 826). These came as a result of the Government's later 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act, and were designed to regulate places and the people who frequent them (Crawford 2009, p. 820).

The emergence of the ASBO

The ASBO as introduced by the 1998 CDA was to prove to be New Labour's flagship response to problems of low-level disorder. It was also set to become a lasting emblem of their broader ASB policy, as its use was promoted in relation to the tackling of a wide category of behaviours. A civil order if breached it could result in up to five years imprisonment for adults, an element of this provision that was to attract significant criticism from commentators and campaigners alike. Concerns were also expressed about the level of evidence required, with civil rights commentators suggesting that 'ASBOs can be obtained on the basis of gossip and rumours that the defendant cannot interrogate' (Chakrabarti and Russell in Squires 2008a, p. 314). The ASBO was also accused of being exclusionary, and having the potential to demonise young people. Concerns were also raised about the criminalisation of non-criminal, 'anti-social' activities. ASB as defined by the 1998 CDA regarding ASBO applications, was built upon the three pillars of 'harassment, alarm and distress', which were also key themes of the Conservatives' previous Public Order legislation (Millie 2009, p. 5).

The ASBO was designed to sit at the top of the Government's regulatory pyramid, based upon the toolkit of ASB measures that were gradually being introduced. In positioning ASBOs in this manner, it was anticipated that they could also be used as a deterrent to those considering engaging in these types of behaviour. Where an ASBO was used, the Government suggested that it would ensure that individual perpetrators were held accountable, a key pre-election promise of New Labour.

Following the CDA, however, concerns emerged from those in government that there appeared to be little evidence of the adoption of a coordinated approach being delivered by practitioners at the local level. Home Office ASBO usage figures suggested that their use was becoming concentrated in a few areas, most significantly Manchester, where the implementation of these measures had coincided with the development of local practices around tackling problematic council tenants (Burney 2005, p. 123). Manchester City Council's embracing of the Government's enforcement led approach and the emphasis

that they placed upon the use of formal measures such as the ASBO, eventually resulted in them accounting for a sixth of all the ASBOs taken out between 1999 and 2004 (Hughes 2007, p. 121). By December 2007, the Manchester City Council CDRP area had issued a total of 1642 ASBOs (Home Office 2007). Other CDRPs had embraced a less enforcement-oriented approach in addressing issues of ASB. Alternative approaches saw an escalation of response through a series of mechanisms including informal and diversionary measures, such as warning letters and informal contracts. In some areas, therefore, an ASBO was seen as a tool of last resort, to be imposed only when other less punitive interventions had failed (Hughes 2007, p. 122).

Government concern about the lack of decisive local action on ASB prompted the then Home Secretary Jack Straw to write to all local authorities on 15th October 1999, six months after the ASBO became available for use, insisting that they did not necessarily need to exhaust all other options before resorting to the use of this particular intervention (cited in Burney 2005, p. 34). A move that was further supported by a speech given by Straw to the Local Government Association in which he not only urged that action be taken on this issue but that ASBOs "should be used swiftly where circumstances demand it, not just against the very hard cases of unacceptable behaviour" (Cited in Chambers 2010, p. 20). It followed the Government's estimate that 5000 ASBOs a year would be issued proved to be 'wildly optimistic', with only five having been applied at the time of Jack Straw's October letter (Burney 2005, p. 34). The reality being that it would take five years for this initial goal of 5000 ASBOs having been issued to be reached (Chambers 2010, p. 20). This support for a tough approach to ASB was echoed in Labour's Manifesto for the General Election of June 2001. It maintained New Labour's commitment to the tackling of crime and its causes, pledging to increase police numbers in support of this aim.

Key policy decisions post 2001

During the period that followed their success at the 2001 General Election, crime and disorder remained a key element of New Labour's agenda, as they began their second

term in government and sought to encourage local practitioners to utilise the full range of ASB interventions available to them. Continuing their momentum on this issue, upon their return to power the Government passed the 2002 Police Reform Act. The Act enhanced the previous ASB measures that had been introduced, and was intended to make it easier for local authorities to obtain interventions such as ASBOs. It also sought to address practitioner concerns regarding time delays, associated costs and the level of resources required in order to obtain them (Campbell 2002). This took place within a broader commitment to expand police numbers across local communities, which signalled the Government's commitment to ideas relating to 'reassurance policing' here in the UK (Innes 2004). Despite the declining rates of actual crime levels (as recorded by the BCS) since its previous peak of 1995, measures of the public's 'fear of crime' continued to grow (Jansson 2007, p. 17). It was this correlation that has since led academics and practitioners alike to identify a 'reassurance gap'. This gap exists between levels of police activity and the perceived ability of them to do their job, as people's perceptions of crime continued to demonstrate relatively high levels of insecurity (Millie 2004, p. 1).

In an attempt to address these concerns, the Police Reform Act created the role of the Police Community Support Officer (PCSO). This was a new grade of police staff, with more limited training and powers than full police officers, which made them a less expensive resource to employ. PCSOs offered the possibility of expanded visible patrols at a cheaper cost, and it was hoped that communities would be reassured by this greater police presence on the streets. The Government hoped that their presence in communities would restore public confidence in the police as a whole, whilst one of their main functions was also to tackle ASB. It was also intended that they would address quality of life issues more generally, illustrating the Government's community focus through their provision of a direct response to those issues that had been raised through surveys such as the BCS[2].

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[2] However, the introduction of the PCSO was not entirely welcomed by the existing policing community, with Fred Broughton of the Police Federation commenting at the time that 'Modernization cannot be an excuse for policing on the cheap.' (*The Guardian*, 19/01/09)

In addition to offering support in the direct tackling of ASB, the Act also looked to strengthen the ASB interventions already available. These mainly resulted from last minute changes made to the Act by the Home Secretary David Blunkett. These amendments provided 'the means for ASBO lift-off', following the previously minimal activity that had been seen in relation to this particular provision (Burney 2005, p. 138). These changes provided for post conviction ASBOs, which could be attached to criminal convictions passed by the courts, if a court felt that the imposition of an ASBO would prevent a convicted offender from engaging in any further nuisance behaviour. The most critical element of this was that the ASB did not need to be directly linked to the offence with which the individual has been convicted, nor did it require consultation with any other agency in order to secure the Order (Burney 2005, p. 139). It has since been argued that it was the introduction of the post conviction ASBO that prompted a significant subsequent rise in the use of ASBOs, contributing to the fact that 43% of those issued between December 2002 and March 2004 were post conviction (Burney 2005, p. 130). A further provision aimed at improving ASB management resulting from the 2002 Act was the interim ASBO. These were short-term measures, which could be implemented prior to a full hearing, with the aim of curtailing an individual's behaviour immediately if the implementation proved to be successful.

Another key set of policy 'decisions' were contained in the Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003. This was aimed more at local level practitioners and communities, as the Government sought to broaden the scope of partnership working to tackle ASB. The precursor to the Act was the Government's White Paper entitled 'Respect and Responsibility – Taking a stand against anti-social behaviour' (Home Office 2003b). In setting out its proposals for the way in which the Government sought to tackle ASB, the publication of this document not only marked the emergence of a more authoritative tone, but it also set in motion the passing of the subsequent legislation. In doing so, it advocated that communities should 'take a stand against what is unacceptable' (Home Office 2003b, p. 3). The overriding aim of the legislation was the renewed strengthening of both the tools and powers available to practitioners dealing with ASB, with a view to them developing a more flexible approach in tackling this issue. Not only did this

legislation hone the targets of the Government's continuing ASB campaign, but it also sought to ensure that measures such as ASBOs became both quicker and easier to use, a renewed government commitment following a resurgence in earlier criticisms. Both of these had in the past contributed to local authorities favouring the use of faster and less expensive interventions, such as the Acceptable Behaviour Contract (Home Office; Campbell 2002). Practitioners in the London Borough of Islington initially pioneered these in 1999, before their use was rolled out nationally from 2000 onwards.

> The scheme is not designed to replace the ASBO but to complement it. Evidence collected for the purposes of ABCs would also be used for the purpose of ASBOs if necessary. This means that there is no duplication of effort or resources if an ASBO was later applied for, and has the benefit that if an ABC is successful the costs are minimal. Breach of an ABC can also be used as evidence in an ASBO application. (Bullock and Jones 2004, p. 15)

As well as introducing additional measures for use by local level practitioners, such as crackhouse closures, the Act also tried to ensure that the broader responsibility for tackling this issue had been clearly defined. For example in relation to landlords, the Act was used as an opportunity to reaffirm their role in addressing ASB (Home Office 2008, p. 1), with amendments to existing Housing legislation having also been introduced. The 2003 Act also aimed to tackle the dual issues of parental responsibility and young people, with the introduction of tools such as parenting orders and contracts. These were designed to provide training for people to become better parents, as increasingly those in government tried to widen the scope of those required to take an active role in the regulation process (Crawford 2009, p. 822). They similarly broadened the range of those practitioners who are able to issue measures of this nature. Children deemed to have acted in an anti-social manner were to be targeted by youth offending teams who, as a result of the Act, were given the power to apply for an ASBO for children who had not appeared in court (Burney 2005). The Government also encouraged the formulation of a joined up approach locally, as agencies were empowered to act. The result was a clear devolution of powers from those at the national level, marking a potential shift away from government towards governance:

We are determined to help these communities – for more than a year the Government has been working hard to tackle anti-social behaviour and I recognise the tremendous amount of good work already being done across the country. But the Government cannot do everything on its own. We have delivered the powers people on the front-line wanted, they must now be used for the benefit of everyone. (Home Office Press Release 023/2004)

The Government continued its focus on this area of policy by ordering a national one-day count of ASB. It was intended that this would provide a snapshot of this issue at the local level. The count took place on 10th September 2003, and involved an extensive range of local organisations taking a count of the number of reports received from members of the public on a range of topics. These were based upon Home Office categories of behaviour, and for which ASBOs had been imposed. These ranged from noise and verbal abuse to prostitution and arson (Campbell 2002). Following the count, the Home Office published a summary of the information collated on the day. The figures related not just to the number of recorded incidents, but also to their anticipated costs for the agencies concerned:

Between midnight on Tuesday and midnight on Wednesday, 66,107 reports of anti-social behaviour were made to participating agencies. This equates to more than one report every 2 seconds or around 16.5 million reports every year. Anti-social behaviour recorded on the day of the count cost agencies in England and Wales at least £13.5m; this equates to around £3.4bn a year. (Home Office 2003c, p. 2)

The figures quoted by the Home Office understandably became the focus of significant media attention. It was both the scope of the issue based upon reporting levels, and the costs incurred by the agencies involved, which provided politicians with valuable evidence on which to premise the Anti Social Behaviour Act (Hughes 2007, p. 120). Even though there were potential inaccuracies in the data, these statistics, along with the increased levels of political rhetoric undoubtedly provided the Act with a degree of momentum.

A targeted ASB strategy

The 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act was to be accompanied by a dedicated ASB Action Plan. The Plan was to be implemented under the banner of the Government's 2003 national 'Together' campaign. It set out Home Office plans to tackle the issue of ASB in a coordinated manner. In doing so, it also detailed the practical support available to local councils and agencies. It was to be the first nationally run campaign designed by those in government to mobilise both resources and efforts at the local level in support of tackling ASB. The key focus of these initiatives was the empowerment of local communities, supported by political rhetoric that emphasised the need to place communities at the top of the priority list. From this point they would be representative of a collective of potential victims of ASB.

The Government's 'Together' initiative was an overtly enforcement led campaign, and resulted in a further upward trend in the use of ASBOs. The rise in ASBO usage was not only demonstrated in Home Office publicised figures, but also in a report that sought to review the campaign's impact after 12 months. The report suggested that as a result of government encouragement, 85% of CDRPs had increased their usage of ASBOs since the launch of the campaign in October 2003 (Home Office 2004d, p. 39). The increased use of more formal enforcement-based ASB interventions may have also resulted from the promotion of renewed partnership working locally, particularly between agencies and affected areas. However, it should be acknowledged that this increase in enforcement activity was occurring against a backdrop of contrasting rhetoric at the local level. The policy talk at this level seemed to be in stark contrast with the stance that had been adopted by those nationally, as practitioners suggested that ASBOs in particular were viewed as being a tool of last resort. This was a view supported by a report into the use of ASBOs and young people. The evidence for which was based upon interview data gathered from representatives from ten youth offending team areas, where ASBO usage ranged from low to high. It concluded that in addressing problems of ASB there had been significant use made of 'tiered' approaches, as can be seen from the below excerpt:

> [A]gencies expressed a commitment to a 'tiered' approach in which young people might expect to receive a number of interventions before being made the subject of an Asbo … But in either event, in areas where the influence of YOTs was strongest, the use of diversionary measures was more pronounced and there was a consequent reduction in the use of enforcement. (Bateman 2007, p. 20)

The use of ASBOs was also considered by some practitioners to be an indicator of wider failings in the system, as was supported by the detail contained in a report that was conducted by the Policy Exchange into the use of ASBOs. The report included interviews with a number of ASB Coordinators from a range of local areas, many of who suggested that they regarded it 'as a failure to use enforcement powers (particularly the more serious ones) because it signifies that they have been unable to resolve problems earlier on – perhaps through mediation, supportive measures or referrals to other services.' (Chambers 2010, p. 22). As a result, this would see CDRPs increasingly aiming to put in place a range of informally based interventions, designed to divert the individual away from engaging in acts of ASB.

The coordination of policy delivery

In order to further strengthen the rollout of ASB policy set out in national legislation and initiatives, in 2003 the Government established the Home Office Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU). A key aim was to address the uneven use of the measures that had so far been introduced to tackle ASB. The Unit was to be given responsibility for the centralised coordination of the Government's ASB agenda. It was anticipated that by engaging with local practitioners, the Unit would be able to ensure that there was a coordinated approach being undertaken nationally. The Home Secretary David Blunkett, who had taken up this post following the Party's success at the 2001 election, was responsible for determining the Unit's direction. In his approach, Blunkett again drew influences from Kelling and Wilson's (1982) 'Broken Windows' thesis. In the UK, Blunkett was keen to adopt its ideas in emphasising the potential impact of low-level disorder. This became a strong theme within the Government's emerging legislation and

accompanying initiatives, but also in the speeches being delivered by Blunkett and the Prime Minister Tony Blair:

> [T]he Home Secretary in 2003, David Blunkett, portrayed anti-social behaviour in distinctly apocalyptic terms, claiming that 'Britain has never been at a more insecure moment…Anti-social behaviour is actually at the foundation and root of insecurity.' (Hughes 2007, p. 120)

The Government's overtly enforcement led stance on this issue, as reflected in their policy decisions during the core period of their time in government, has since led to the tone of New Labour's message on ASB having been described as being almost evangelical (Burney 2005). The message and the tough stance of the Party overall, was further illustrated by Blair and Blunkett's suggestion that those officials who failed to fully utilise the range of ASB tools 'should be sacked'. This included police officers that were threatened with the same outcome by the Home Secretary, if they failed to make more use of the enforcement powers that had been made available to them (Chambers 2010, p. 5). According to Burney, these two key players began to rely upon 'scaring people into the right kind of behaviour, and punishing them if necessary.' (Burney 2005, pp. 31-32).

The ASBU was also to develop new policies and actions, as set out in the Government's previously published 'Together' Action Plan. As a result, it received funding for the coordination and implementation of ASB policy at the local level. The aim was to reinforce the message from government of their preferred enforcement led stance on this issue. It was also felt that, to achieve the rollout of a coordinated programme of activity, the Unit would also need to oversee the creation of the necessary supporting mechanisms. This placed the focus upon those at the local level, as the Government sought the smooth implementation of this policy.

They utilised both the Unit and a network of Regional Government Offices (henceforth RGOs), as a means of influencing policy implementation at the local level. To increase practitioner levels in support of this, the Unit also provided funding for a network of ASB

coordinators to be appointed in each of the local CDRPs. ASB coordinators were also given a role to play not just in policy implementation, but in developing the necessary tools to tackle ASB. The Unit was also to provide support to practitioners, as a result of targeted work being undertaken by those in government, in the form of the nationally led initiatives. The result was the identification of ten 'Trailblazer' local authorities.

These areas were to receive support from the Unit in managing different elements of ASB related problems, from nuisance neighbours to begging. As part of this, specialist panels of professionals were created with a view to encouraging joined up working across the agencies concerned. However, this approach was not met with support in all of the areas, as practitioners expressed concern at seeing the Government playing politics with the implementation of some of the measures aimed at tackling these issues (BBC Online 2003). Nonetheless, this remained an aspect of the Unit's continuing role in the management of delivering a coordinated approach to tackling ASB. It was an approach that would be furthered in the next stages of New Labour's period of office. Following this core period of legislative and policy activity the Unit would be realigned alongside a dedicated Taskforce, as nationally policymakers began to re-evaluate their approach in tackling ASB.

A moderated approach - New Labour 2003-7

Legislative activity

The Government's ASB agenda was introduced as a means of circumventing the traditional criminal justice system. However, this growth of regulation of people's behaviour outside of the criminal justice system did not stop a simultaneous expansion in criminal law (Crawford 2009, p. 826). As a result, by the latter stages of New Labour's time in government, Opposition parties (and some on the Government benches) were also becoming more critical of their approach. This included Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman Chris Huhne, who likened the plethora of new laws introduced by New Labour under Tony Blair as 'legislative diarrhea' (as quoted in the Mail Online September

2008). This apparent increase in the number of punishable criminal offences is indeed something that has also been commented upon by academics in this field. It has been noted that during their time in government, New Labour created 3200 criminal offences, of which 1000 were a result of Acts of Parliament. It was an approach that was largely underpinned by the Government's drive to increase regulation, offering new and faster routes into the criminal justice system (Crawford 2009, p. 826).

It appeared that New Labour had an almost insatiable desire for introducing criminal justice legislation (Burney 2005, p. 129). It seemed that a new piece of legislation emerged every time a new social problem was identified (Burney 2005). This high level of legislative activity also led some to question both the Party's rationale on the subject, and more broadly its importance in Tony Blair's leadership. Concerns were raised about the Government's granting of 'summary powers' to a range of organisations, specifically local authorities and the police (for example, powers for police officers to issue 'fixed penalty notices', which increased the numbers of convictions that did not require a court appearance) (Chakrabarti and Russell in Squires 2008a, p. 307). The sustained increase in both general policies and legislative activities was to prove an enduring characteristic of New Labour's response to this issue. It continued into the latter stages of their time in power, as a number of Acts were rushed through Parliament during the later stages of 2004-2005, both during the lead up to and following their victory at the 2005 General Election:

> Yet more anti-social behaviour related measures were introduced in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, the Police and Justice Act 2006, the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, the Welfare Reform Act 2007 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. And so it goes on. (Burney 2005, p. 129)

The majority of ASB related provisions contained within these Acts reflected the Government's growing trend towards what some have termed 'conditionality' (Burney 2005, p. 128). This placed the emphasis upon the requirement of good behaviour in return for entitlement. The Government's introduction of alternative kinds of ASB intervention supported this movement. These provisions included the reduction or withdrawal of

housing benefits in response to anti-social conduct, eviction of unruly tenants and the use of ASB injunctions. However, the negative impact of this was that the housing sector in particular was becoming a site of regulatory 'overload', as it provided a focus for the use of a range of ASB measures (Crawford 2009, p. 824). The shaping of these alternative responses could also be seen in other pieces of targeted ASB legislation developed during this later period, including the 2005 Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act. It not only aimed to enforce the rules around disorder issues, but it also widened the scope of the powers available in relation to ASB management (Burney 2005). It was anticipated that the Act would enable local practitioners to tackle poor environmental quality being caused as a result of this behaviour, including graffiti, noise, litter and waste. These measures continued to reflect the enforcement strand of the Government's stance on this issue. It also offered a change in focus towards the provision of sustainable communities, as those in government recognised the impact of this behaviour upon the built environment. These enforcement powers were also extended to the Government's programme entitled 'Cleaner, Safer, Greener'. The aim of this was to enable practitioners to address issues of community safety, including tackling ASB (National Community Safety Network 2007, p. 20).

The Government's 2006 Police and Justice Act focused upon the reform of UK police forces. The Act also led to the creation of the National Policing Improvement Agency, with the provision of powers to enable the Home Secretary to tackle directly 'underperforming' forces. It also enhanced existing ASB management provisions, amending the earlier 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act. It increased the number of bodies able to enter into parenting contracts and those who could apply for parenting orders (National Community Safety Network 2007, p. 21), illustrating the Government's slight change in focus. They now looked increasingly to families and their role in contributing to, and addressing ASB. In addition to the 2005 legislation, this Act saw a renewed broadening in the scope of the Government's ASB agenda. It used this reform of police forces as an opportunity to also strengthen the position of local communities. In doing so, it sought to make the agencies concerned with maintaining order more accountable to the general public. The Government also began to move away from their previously

enforcement-focused approach. The low usage of formal interventions such as the ASBO appeared to force a reassessment of their position on this issue. They also began to recognise the need for earlier interventions that would address the underlying causes of the behaviour, as opposed to retaining a focus upon its consequences. It was a change in approach that would be reflected in Tony Blair's unveiling of his 'Respect' agenda. Incorporated within this was the taking of a more preventative stance, which represented an evolution of New Labour's earlier ASB policies.

Further evolution: The 'Respect' Campaign

The 'Respect' campaign was to be a key element of Labour's General Election campaign in 2005. The accompanying political rhetoric focused upon the notion of the law abiding majority taking control of their local communities, which was an important strand in their social policy (BBC Online 2006). It was also representative of the continuing attempts being made by those at the national level to directly influence the manner in which practitioners tackled ASB. The Government continued to use an interventionist strategy, despite the emergence of an approach that seemingly favoured governing at a distance. As a form of 'community governance' began to develop amongst central policymakers, they continued to offer local policy actors the opportunity to influence policy responses. These included those policies that were being developed in response to tackling issues such as ASB (Edwards and Benyon 2001).

The launch of this second national campaign was to be accompanied by a 'Respect' Action Plan. It was a similar style of delivery to that of the earlier targeted ASB initiative 'Together'. The 'Respect' Taskforce, following the rebranding of the Government's original ASBU, further supported its delivery. The Taskforce assumed responsibility for coordinating both the implementation and the work of the 'Respect' agenda, including the delivery of the Action Plan. Following David Blunkett's resignation in 2004, responsibility for the leadership of the renamed ASBU passed to the former 'Homelessness Tsar', Louise Casey[3]. Not only did Casey become a fervent ASB

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[3] This title reflected the time she had spent as the head of the Government's 'Rough Sleepers Unit'.

campaigner, but she also embodied a new type of national level non civil servant policy advisor. As a result, her views on tackling ASB provided Tony Blair with a new ally following Blunkett's departure.

The tone of the 'Respect' Action Plan was similar to that of the other legislation that had been passed during these later stages of New Labour's time in government. It saw both their policy talk and decisions around this agenda become more wide ranging than had previously been seen in their initial responses to tackling ASB. It was with this in mind that New Labour used 'Respect' as a means of combining condemnation with enforcement in addressing these types of behaviour (Burney 2005, p. 46). The strategy was intended to 'go broader, deeper and further' than before (Home Office 2006c). They therefore introduced renewed legislative powers designed to tackle ASB. However, this did not prevent the Government from using the Action Plan as an opportunity to reiterate the existing wide range of ASB tools available to practitioners. It therefore reserved its tone of condemnation for perceived perpetrators of this behaviour. There was also an apparent recognition of the need to act early in addressing the underlying causes of ASB. In reprimanding perpetrators it proposed to offer support, both to individuals and their families, representing the Government's new focus in tackling this agenda. As a result, they increasingly turned their attention towards parents and families as a means of developing a culture of respect. It was a movement that was echoed in their more recent legislative decisions:

> The emphasis in the 'Respect' agenda was on the 'responsibilisation' of parents – a theme which right up to the present has been of growing importance. Families and upbringing have become the prism through which youthful wrongdoing is viewed, and remedial action is largely aimed at these targets, even where there is no direct link with children's delinquent behaviour. (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 47)

In support of their focus on this sector, the Government also provided local practitioners with additional funding to support youth targeted activities, complimenting the rollout of parenting classes. The basis for this was the promotion of 'pro social' behaviour, in the hope of instilling this sentiment in affected families. Further initiatives included a

network of Family Support Projects, which were designed to work with the more 'challenging' families. At the national level this reflected the adoption of a more holistic approach, whilst also attempting to improve local authorities commissioning of parenting services. These developments should also be seen in conjunction with the renewed focus placed upon the role of education services in this process. In the rollout of a renewed multi agency approach to tackling ASB in its latest guise as 'Respect', this also impacted upon the range of practitioners and agencies involved locally.

However, the use of enforcement persisted as a trend in New Labour's strategy, particularly when tackling those who they described as being the 'non compliant'. It was an element of their approach that was possibly more muted than it had been previously, particularly when considering the overtly enforcement stance encouraged by the 'Together' campaign. For some it was illustrated by the way in which New Labour still sought to improve the behaviour of a perceived anti-social minority, as opposed to fostering a culture whereby through their engagement with 'difference', communities are able to develop their tolerance levels. As a result they are then in a better position to be able to empathise with individuals, causing this to become 'the mark of true mutual respect, of true civility' (Millie 2009, p. 275):

> Everyone can change [but] if people who need help will not take it, we will make them. If we are to achieve the vision of the Britain that we all want, then there is no room for cynicism. We need to take responsibility for ourselves, our children and our families, support those who want to do the same – and challenge those who do not. (Respect Taskforce 2006, p. 1 cited in Millie 2009, p. 268)

The actual delivery of this agenda, marked an evolution of New Labour's initial ASB policies, and was an initiative that was particularly Blair influenced. In seeking to tackle 'disrespect' across society, he and the Party sought to develop a cross departmental agenda. They once again encouraged a joined up approach to tackling this issue, with a continuing emphasis placed upon communities to take an active role in this process. The role of communities had been an enduring feature of the Government's ASB policies. As a result, the implementation of formal interventions such as the ASBO had become somewhat reliant upon active community participation, with those in government seeking

community cooperation in the policing and monitoring of these measures. This approach was premised upon the 'naming and shaming' of perpetrators, in an effort to provide communities with the detail needed to be active participants in this process. This element of the implementation of ASB measures has led to the erosion of 'the principle of anonymity', as practitioners both locally and nationally 'seek to tap into and enlist networks of surveillance and parochial webs of affiliation' (Crawford 2009, p. 822). In their delivery of this later initiative, New Labour had sought to further develop the abilities of communities to participate in this via the earlier Police and Justice Act. The aim was to strengthen communities so that they were better able to support the implementation of 'Respect'.

The origins of this later 'Respect' campaign can clearly be seen in New Labour's early ASB policies. These were concerned with capitalising upon the politicisation of ASB and offering a more coordinated local response. In contrast the later 'Respect' agenda focused upon the encouragement of respect amongst both individuals and their institutions. It was an initiative that was associated in particular with Tony Blair, demonstrated by his continuing deployment of policy talk that emphasised issues of 'self respect', 'responsibilities' and 'rights' (Burney 2005). Blair aimed to maintain influence over the development of this campaign, following the departure of David Blunkett. The former Home Secretary David Blunkett had been a keen ally of Blair, but his replacement Charles Clarke, favoured a return to a softer approach, in tackling both ASB and crime issues generally. It was to be reflected in the promotion of a more preventative stance, which began to permeate the Government's policy decisions whilst also being reflected in the delivery of policy outcomes locally. An overall softer tone in the Party's communications accompanied this shift. The 'ASB agenda' was also moved to form part of the remit of the Department of Children and Family Services. This compounded the shift away from the previously 'shrill tone' of the Government's ASB agenda. In addition New Labour had also made a loud appraisal of the severity of the situation nationwide, as a result of the problem of ASB (Hughes 2007, p.120).

In retrospect, the 'Respect' campaign also marked a significant landmark in the dedicated ASB policies developed and rolled out under Tony Blair's leadership. As 'Respect' became the last significant development in the Government's agenda on this issue that he would oversee. Blair resigned as Prime Minister in June 2007, marking the conclusion of a period of relative consistency both in terms of leadership and the delivery of the Government's ASB agenda. Following Blair's departure, there was seemingly less emphasis placed upon the delivery of this element of the Government's crime and disorder agenda. The new Prime Minister, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, chose instead to concentrate his efforts upon other issues. These included economic problems, immigration and internationally managing the country's role in conflicts that had emerged during Blair's time in power. As the driving force nationally behind tackling this issue from the late 1990s onwards, Blair's resignation marked a significant turning point. It was after all with Blair that the origins of the ASB agenda and the provision of a coordinated response could be traced. Following the change in leadership, there was a broader shift in the political direction concerning ASB policy. The new Prime Minister sought to break away from Blair's approach, abolishing the 'Respect' Taskforce and replacing it with one that was more youth orientated. There was also a growing focus placed upon the positive engagement of young people, in an effort to combat ASB. Overall, the issue of youth ASB received less prominence in the Government's policy programme under Brown, at least initially. It was accompanied by the movement of some of the Party's key personnel, who had previously been vocal both in their support of Blair's approach and the methods advocated. One such person was the Government's former 'Respect Tsar' Louise Casey, who had proven to be an ASB policy entrepreneur. As part of a government reshuffle, Casey was moved from the Home Office to the Cabinet Office. At the same time it was suggested that 'it was becoming clear that the ASBO was being quietly dropped and would no longer be aggressively promoted and publicized by Ministers' (Chambers 2010, p. 21).

Conclusion

The assessment of these key national level policy milestones and shifts has tried to highlight the complexities of the policymaking process, and the contributory factors that are involved. In relation to this element of New Labour's crime and disorder agenda, this included the emergence and positioning of key personalities nationally, whilst locally the role of communities became increasingly prominent. The Party sought to refocus its efforts in their direction, enabling local citizens to influence policy development (Hughes 2009, p. 120). As we have seen, the national trajectory of ASB policy development began with a period during the first part of the 1990s when the Labour Opposition began to reinvent their position on issues such as crime and welfare, and in particular adopted an increasingly strident rhetoric around such notions as 'incivilities' and ASB. During the early stages of their time in government New Labour quickly introduced legislation that attempted to move from this 'policy talk' in Opposition, to a concrete set of policy 'decisions' in the form of primary legislation and other policy instruments. The deployment of tough policy 'rhetoric' by Labour politicians did not end when they entered government. The first period of office continued to be dominated by a highly expressive form of 'ASB politics' by which the Prime Minister and some other leading government politicians continued to deploy strident language to convey an image of decisiveness and action. This was matched by the frenetic period of legislative activity, and attempts to encourage local authorities to use the full range of new ASB 'tools' that the government had provided. However, as the government moved into its second term of office, a more nuanced and moderated approach began to emerge. The emphasis on enforcement and condemnation of ASB remained, but this was now supplemented with a range of other measures aimed at the prevention and management of ASB. Part of this related to a broader trend towards 'conditionality' approaches, which require compliance in return for entitlement to benefits. However, in other ways there was a re-emphasis on the preventive aspects of family support, and other more 'penal-welfare' kinds of intervention.

It is important to explore the transitions between national policy and developments at the local level. One of the criticisms of the 'grand narrative' approaches adopted by writers such as Garland (2001) is that they have a tendency to present an overly smooth account of policy developments at the national level, and underplay local variation and resistance. The first 'theoretical proposition' (TP1) derived from Garland, suggested that we would be unlikely to observe a significant departure from the national policy trajectory at the local level. However, other work on contemporary governance, reviewed in Chapter Two, also suggested that public policy is a complex process, with elements that can be developed, influenced and delivered at different levels. As Chapters Five and Six will demonstrate, whilst it is important to acknowledge the significance of national level shifts in shaping local policy developments, the ways in which, these developments played themselves out at the local level presented some interesting challenges for TP1, and in particular questioned the uni-directional 'top down' assumptions about policymaking that is presented by grand narrative accounts.

Chapter Four: Research design and methods

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to set out the aims and research questions, which guided this study, and provide an account of the research design and methods deployed to address them. It builds on the previous two chapters, which set out some themes within existing academic literature that have informed the study, and provided an account of the broader policy context at the national level. The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section sets out the aims and research questions of the current study; the second considers issues of broader research strategy and design; the third presents a detailed account of the particular methods deployed by the study and considers their strengths and limitations; the fourth section outlines the ways in which the data were analysed, and the final section considers ethical issues raised by the study and how they were addressed.

Research aims and questions

The general aim of this research study is to explore the complexities involved in the crime and disorder policymaking process at the local level. Within this general aim, there are several specific research questions, including the following;

- **What were the key developments in policies relating to anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) in Southern City, and when did these occur?**
- **Who were the key individuals and organisations involved in the development of ASB policy in Southern City?**
- **What was the nature of the relationships between key players in the policy process locally?**
- **How was ASB policy resisted and/or re-shaped at the local level?**

Research Strategy and Design

Epistemological underpinnings

Within the social sciences, it is possible to identify two contrasting broad epistemological approaches underpinning research strategies. Positivist approaches view the social world as something external to the individual and 'measurable' in an objective way via 'scientific' methods such as systematic observation, measurement, experimentation and analysis. By contrast, interpretivist approaches emphasise the meaningful nature of individuals' participation in the social world, and the meanings placed by people upon their actions and those of others. Research methods associated with the physical sciences are seen from this point of view as inappropriate for exploring the complex nature of human social life (Bryman 2008). Each of these broad approaches is associated with a particular methodological approach to empirical research.

As noted above, positivist social research methods are based on the assumption that the social world is amenable to objective measurement, and for this reason have often been closely associated with quantitative approaches. Such approaches seek to test either an individual hypothesis or a collection of theories about a specific subject. This assumes a primarily deductive relationship between the theory and research, or the 'hypothetico-deductive method' (Bottoms 2008, p. 94). On the other hand, those from the interpretivist tradition tend to use qualitative methods to research the social world. This offers a more inductive approach to sociological explanations of particular social phenomenon or activities, and is concerned with the generation of new ideas and theories. As Bottoms notes, '... ethnographic research studies naturally use research methods of a qualitative kind, such as participant and non-participant observation, extended interviews and so on' (2008, p. 81).

For Glaser and Strauss (1967), the pure form of this approach is found in 'grounded theory', which presents empirical research as an evolutionary process, as theoretical concepts and core ideas emerge in an inductive way from the ongoing process of data

collection and analysis. Bryman (2008) notes that interpretivism and positivism lie at opposite ends of a spectrum of research approaches, and in practice are rarely completely separable. For example, inductive theory is often the result of having first engaged in some deductive theorising, and it is difficult – as would be the case in a purely 'inductive' approach – to enter the field completely free of any theoretical or conceptual preconceptions. Furthermore, contrasting methodological approaches are often used deliberately in combination to explore the same social phenomenon via the 'cross-checking' approach known as 'triangulation'. This has been defined as an 'attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint' (Cohen and Manion 2007). This might include, for example, the utilisation of primarily quantitative information as a means of validating the evidence gained through qualitative research methods, or using some secondary statistics or documentary data as a means of contextualising the more focused primary qualitative data that has been gathered.

One helpful approach to thinking about the relationship between theory and methods is the perspective of 'adaptive theory' (Layder 1998). This relies upon having what Layder (1998) refers to as being a 'theoretical scaffold'. This involves the development of a series of theoretical propositions, which can be tested and adapted during the course of collecting empirical data. Accordingly, a number of theoretical propositions (TPs) were developed at the end of Chapter Two, derived from the review of existing literature on the governance of crime control, empirical studies of ASB policy, and research on policy formulation more generally. These TPs were then revisited during the empirical analysis of developments in Southern City, and are discussed and assessed in the conclusions of each empirical chapter. Just to reiterate, these TPs were as follows:

- *TP1: Following Garland (2001), ASB policies in Southern City reflect the 'reconfigured' characteristics of late modern crime control – largely determined by fundamental social, economic and cultural forces – and will thus not vary significantly from the national policy trajectories on ASB*

- *TP2: ASB policies in Southern City display a 'schizoid' tension between 'adaptive' elements on the one hand, driven by instrumental, managerial concerns (emphasising such concepts as 'responsibilisation' and partnership), AND more emotive, politicized 'expressive' elements on the other (Garland 2001).*

- *TP3: ASB policies in Southern City reflect a preoccupation with 'risk' that has been observed in criminal justice policy (and social policy more generally) such that it is focused primarily on the cost effective management of unruly populations, rather than upon punishment or rehabilitation of offenders (Feeley and Simon 1994). Policy development also displays a tendency to colonise other areas of social policy locally such that other policy areas – such as health and education - become configured around and driven by the issues of crime and ASB.*

- *TP4: ASB policy in Southern City is shaped by policy networks of different kinds, including relatively stable and continuous 'policy communities', and 'intergovernmental networks' comprising participants from national and local government (Rhodes 1981, 1997).*

For Bottoms (2008), this kind of approach involves a 'continuing dialogue between theory and empirical observations' (2008, p. 75). The adaptive theoretical approach is therefore less rigid than a purely deductive approach (that sets out the theoretical framework and then straightforwardly 'tests' it), but it is also more focused than the purely inductive approach implied by grounded theory. It also offers suitable flexibility for the project to grow and develop as informed by the empirical research. This is facilitated by the fact that it is an approach to empirical study that is not exclusively based upon either the testing or formulation of a specific hypothesis (Bottoms 2008).

The operationalization of Talk, Decision and Action

One of the main objectives of this study is to provide a detailed account of the 'empirical particulars' (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking, as opposed to testing a specific hypothesis. However, both the literature review (Chapter Two) and the overview of national policy developments (Chapter Three), have suggested a number of more general 'theoretical propositions' that might act as an adaptive guide to empirical enquiry. These include the proposition that there are important differences between the policy dimensions of 'talk', 'decisions' and 'action' in relation to ASB control; that national policy developments can be resisted, re-shaped or re-worked at other levels in the system; and that the policymaking process is characterised by complexity and uncertainty rather than smooth general trajectories of change (as implied in 'grand narrative' approaches).

Pollitt's (2001 p.938) conceptual framework suggests that there are three analytically distinct levels that exist within the public policymaking process that should be considered and separated out for analysis. Policy 'talk', which is identified as being concerned with policy rhetoric and symbolism; policy 'decisions' that exist in the form of concrete manifestations of policy and include specific legislation, national programmes and written policy statements; and finally policy 'action' which focuses upon policy implementation, and the ways in which policy decisions come to fruition 'on the ground' (see also Tregidga 2011).

In the case of this research policy 'talk' is concerned with the rhetoric that surrounded the ASB agenda, particularly at the national level and coinciding with New Labour's time in government. Policy 'decisions' are the legislative framework that emerged nationally on the subject of ASB. This includes the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act and nationally led initiatives such as 'Together' and 'Respect'. It also includes the policy statements and documents that were developed locally largely in response to these legislative changes (see Chapter Three, which discusses these two elements in more depth). Policy 'actions' both nationally and locally include measurable indicators such as the numbers of ASB actions that were issued, including Anti Social

Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs) (see the findings of this research in Chapters Five and Six).

The Case Study Approach

In general, then, the study takes an adaptive theoretical approach. It is not an objective of this study to offer empirical generalisations based upon a specific account of policymaking within one locality. Nor did this study seek to employ only quantitative or qualitative methodologies to the exclusion of the other. Instead the need to use a combination of data types was recognised. The study was primarily qualitative in its reliance upon interview and documentary data, but drew upon some secondary statistical evidence in order to provide a broader context to the research study, and also to guide the selection of the particular case study area.

Yin (1984) has defined the case study research method as empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1984, p. 23). All of these features apply to the current phenomenon under study. As discussed in Chapter Two, the important 'contemporary phenomenon' of crime and disorder policymaking remains under-studied in an empirical sense, and in particular the importance of its contextual situation has not been made evident in many criminological studies. In general, case studies aim to offer a detailed analysis of the features of a particular case or example of a specific area of research. They seek to generate results that offer 'a comprehensive understanding of the group under study' (Becker 1992). Stake (1995) argues that the case study approach is 'concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question' (cited in Bryman 2001, p. 47).

The case study approach was the most appropriate research design given the nature of the aims and research questions of this particular study. As discussed in Chapter Two, limitations of the 'grand narrative' studies (such as that of Garland 2001) included the

tendency to adopt an overly broad level of generalisation (thus focusing attention on major global and national shifts), and a lack of empirical attention to the details of the policy process at the local level. This study was concerned to help address the gap highlighted by Tonry (2001) who called for more empirical studies of the policymaking process, particularly at the local level. Primarily qualitative case study research was clearly the most appropriate research design for such a study, as this would allow a sufficiently detailed examination of the local context of policymaking, and the 'lived experiences' of the key policy actors.

The research aims and questions were not amenable to quantitative measurement of the type suggested by a positivist epistemological approach. It must be recognised that a case study approach cannot be grounds for empirical generalisation in that no single case can be 'representative' in a statistical sense of the spread of local level policies and practices in tackling ASB. As Yin has stated, the aim of case study research is not to make empirical generalisations, but rather to generalise to theory. "The crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalised to a wider universe, but how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings" (Yin 2001, p. 51). In other words, case studies enable engagement in theoretical analysis, which can lead to new hypotheses about specific social settings. The approach can provide a rich and detailed account of the policymaking process in one locality that can be used to test some theoretical propositions about the influences over ASB policy, to shed light on a previously under-explored area, and to give empirically based insights into the nature of the policymaking process. The findings can then be compared with other similar studies, including the work of writers such as Burney (2005) and Hughes (2007). Such an approach offers the possibility of giving some contextualised insights into the nature of the ASB policymaking process at the local level. In short, it can help us understand how and why things come to be the way they are.

Unit of analysis

Given the nature of the responsibility for ASB policy in England and Wales as outlined in Chapter Three, the obvious unit of analysis for case study research was the local authority. It is unitary local authorities that have statutory responsibility as a lead authority under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA), and formed the geographical locus for Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs). The next step was to consider the nature of the case study research design in terms of numbers of cases. Consideration was given to conducting a comparative study of two similarly sized local authority areas, including for example two or more local authority areas that would allow systematic comparison between the policy process in different types of local authority area, or between areas with varying approaches to tackling ASB (for example, including a range of authorities depending on levels of ASBO usage). However, for a number of reasons it was decided that the study should focus upon a single detailed case study. Conceptually, this is justified by the need for depth and detail rather than breadth for comparison. Given finite resources, inclusion of several case studies would inevitably have restricted the level of detail of empirical data collected in each. As the key aim of the current study was to undertake a detailed exploration of policy development at the local level, a narrower but more in-depth empirical examination was deemed more appropriate, which could be achieved through the use of what Bryman (2004, p. 51) calls 'an exemplifying case'. The selection of this type of case study design is based upon its ability to provide answers to specific research questions, whilst also enabling the examination of key social processes.

The next key step was to identify a local authority area to become the subject of the single exemplifying case study. The first stage of this was to assess accessible geographical locations. Given that the problems of ASB, and policy responses to these, have been most discussed in relation to urban areas (although clearly, such issues also affect rural areas), it was decided to focus on a City Council. Candidates for inclusion were considered using Home Office data for levels of ASBO usage by local authority area across England and Wales. Used in combination with Census data, this enabled the calculation of ASBO usage per 100,000 of the population. Whilst accepting the

limitations of case study research with regard to empirical generalisation, it was important to avoid 'outlier' areas for inclusion, in that some local authorities were well above average and others were well below. Whilst recognising the impossibility of finding a 'typical' local authority in this regard, it was sensible to examine an authority that fell into the 'medium use' category. A number of possibilities suggested themselves as candidates for inclusion in the study from this initial analysis of national ASBO statistics. The eventual choice was informed by some further conceptual and practical considerations. An initial examination of documentation relating to particular local authority areas narrowed the choice down to a number of medium use urban local authorities that appeared to be adopting a range of interventions to tackle ASB. Practical issues of ease of access, travel, and so on, were then considered in relation to the final selection. Given that the study was being carried out part-time these considerations were clearly significant, and it is important to be explicit about them. The eventual choice was Southern City[4], a medium use ASBO authority in the Southern part of Britain, near to where I live and work.

Time period

This study attempted to provide a 'history of the present' (Garland 2001) of ASB policy in one city. It was decided to restrict the empirical focus to the period 1998-2007. This period was selected on the basis of the preliminary evaluation of documentary data and research literature in the field. The start of the period coincided with the election of the first New Labour government for whom tackling ASB was such a key focus of their policy agenda. The end point came in 2007, which was marked by the resignation of Tony Blair as Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party. It made sense to have a 'cut-off' point here, because of the close personal association with Blair and the ASB agenda (although of course, policy developments have continued in this arena since his departure).

Research Methods

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[4] This is a pseudonym

Case studies are noted for drawing upon multiple sources of evidence and using a range of specific methods. The methods of data collection for this study comprised of three distinct but related elements: collation of secondary documentary sources, a programme of semi-structured interviews with key policy actors, and a content analysis of local print media reports relating to ASB policy.

Secondary analysis of local documents

Whilst interviews, surveys and ethnographic observation remain the mainstay of much social research, documentary data provides an important focus for social analysis (Scott 1990). As Wharton (2006, p.112) states: 'the significance of the documents may be located in the historical circumstances of production, in their circulation and reception of the item and also the social functions, interpretations, effects and uses that may be associated with them' (Wharton, C. In Jupp, V. 2005). There is now a substantial body of work on documentary analysis in social research, outlining how empirical studies of documents can enhance knowledge and understanding of 'identity, the nature of mind, constructions of self, other and the world and the conceptualization of social action and interaction' (Potter and Wetherell 1995, p. 81). Prior (2003) notes that documentary analysis can be an important and fruitful form of research in its own right, in that written documents not only reflect but work to shape and order knowledge, social groups, hierarchies and political power. Documents can also be a useful supplement to other sources of data, helping to provide an alternative lens against which to test, support or refute theoretical propositions. It was in this way, that documents were used in the current study. A substantial body of over 40 published documents were gathered. These included a range of strategy and policy protocol documents.

Analysis of these documentary sources enabled a degree of triangulation to take place between the different types of evidence used in the case study. In this way, the accuracy and validity of the interview accounts of the participants involved in the fieldwork could also be tested. This reflects the view that triangulation is 'a salient feature of research

methodology' (Denzin 1970, p.20), in that all findings should be checked as far as possible from a range of angles. The purpose of analysing this material was primarily to address the research questions regarding what were the main policy developments, when did they happen, and who was involved? The documentary analysis therefore had several important objectives. The first of these was to provide an initial framework narrative of policy change over the time period upon which the study was focused; the second was to help map out the local ASB control policy 'architecture' in the form of local agencies and organisations, and the third was to inform the sampling of key policy actors at the local level for the interview element of the research. This data was also useful in providing an important basis of comparison with the accounts provided in the interviews. The approach to analysis will be discussed later in this chapter, but in brief the aim was not to undertake a detailed discourse analysis, which would have been focused upon exploring the production of meaning and construction of the social world via text. Rather, the nature of these primarily descriptive policy documents lent itself to a more modest form of qualitative 'content analysis' in order to provide a baseline against which to explore the interview narratives of policy change.

The documents included for analysis were of varying types, but the rationale for selection was broadly that they provided some kind of evidence about policy development relating to ASB locally. Specific documents were tracked down using a combination of Internet and library searches, and from discussions with key policy actors at the local level. The documents fell into three main categories. The first category was published strategy documents, such as the local police force 'policing plans' and the Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy Plans that covered the period of study. These documents included examples of both policy 'talk' and policy 'decision' (Pollitt 2001 – see Chapter Two). The documents included sections that were largely 'aspirational' in nature. For example, in one strategy document, there was the argument that the ASB strategy could be a means of ensuring that Southern City became 'one of the safest cities in the United Kingdom' (Community Safety Partnership Strategy 2002-2005). However, these documents also included details of concrete policy 'decisions' in the form of specific written policies that could be enforced in some way (Tregidga 2011). The second type of documentary

evidence included the formal minutes from meetings of local level agencies. These included relevant meetings of Southern City's local authority at which issues of ASB were discussed, and also of the CRDP that covered the local authority area. The third category of documentary evidence included an extensive collection of 119 local media reports of ASB and related issues. These were drawn from the three key publications that between them cover the main parts of Southern City. Two of these are paid for sister publications, the Southern City Post and Southernshire Daily Press, and the third is a free weekly-distributed paper the Southern City Observer[5]. In the event, the media analysis did not reveal as much as had been hoped about the details of local policy processes, and thus is not included here. However, in a more general way, it provided a useful backdrop of information for the researcher and played an important, if minor, part of the process of familiarisation with the development of ASB policy – and the reporting thereof – in Southern City.

Whilst the local documents were made up of largely qualitative material, they also included some useful statistical evidence to demonstrate the trajectory of particular features of ASB policy in Southern City. For example, they included local level statistics regarding the use of interventions such as ASBOs. It was anticipated that this data would support the identification of any particular patterns or trends to have emerged in the use of specific interventions. A complete list of the local level documents included in the research can be found at Appendix I.

In addition to the local documentation, there were a number of key national level documents that, although not subject to detailed analysis, were important in setting the broader context of the study. For example, these influenced the initial selection of this sphere of policy development as a subject of research, and also helped inform the choice of the local authority area in which to carry out the case study. The most significant of these were the consultation papers *Tackling Youth Crime* (Home Office 1997f) and the White Paper *Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti Social Behaviour* (Home Office March 2003b). These led to the Government's Action Plan and its

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[5] These are pseudonyms

enactment of the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act. The Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003 was accompanied by the national 'Together' campaign. A range of documentation promoting the aims and objectives of 'Together' supported its launch. One of the participants in the fieldwork was able to provide copies of the associated promotional material, which outlined the campaign and the role of practitioners in its delivery. In 2005 it was followed by the launch of the Government's 'Respect' programme (see Chapter Three). As with 'Together', this later national programme was supported by promotional material that also provided a useful source of documentary evidence for the study.

Semi-structured interviews

A key element of the research evidence was the data gathered from a series of semi-structured interviews with key policy actors who could offer an informed view of the recent history (and current operation) of ASB policy in Southern City. Interviews are one of the main tools used by qualitative researchers as a means of better understanding individuals or groups (May 2001). The interview can take a number of forms, varying by the level of structure. The more structured style of interview relies upon a researcher asking each interviewee a relatively tightly defined set of standard questions. These questions are often 'closed', in that there is little or no deviation or room for development of response by the interviewee. At the other end of the scale, the unstructured interview is more of an open-ended conversation, where there is little in the way of pre-defined questions. Rather, the interviewer may guide in a very general way the interviewee to certain areas of interest so as to ensure that nothing is missed. In these kinds of interviews, the interviewee has a considerable degree of freedom to set the course of the interview. Each approach has its advantages and limitations.

The highly structured interview with a series of closed questions scores high in terms of standardisation and the degree of comparability between cases. It also has the practical advantage of being relatively easy to administer (usually according to a pre-set questionnaire), and being much easier to manage in terms of the time that the interview will take. However, the highly structured approach can also be too narrow, imposing the

pre-set ideas of the researcher upon the interviewees' responses, giving little freedom to probe or develop issues in more detail, and restricting the data to rather descriptive and shallow 'factual' details. On the other hand, the unstructured interview in principle allows for an in-depth exploration of particular issues, facilitating the collation of rich and detailed data and allowing the interviewee more space and time to articulate the meanings and interpretations that they have of the particular area of social life under investigation. The interviewer is able to probe and explore answers in more depth, allowing them to go deep 'beneath the surface' of the more superficial accounts that would be elicited by highly structured approaches (Jupp, Davies, Francis 2000, p.61). However, unstructured interviews have their limitations. They risk roaming far away from the central topics of interest to the research, and each interview can be so different from the other that there is little in the way of comparability between cases. In practical terms, highly unstructured interviews require an open-ended approach to timing. Truly unstructured interviews can take several hours, for example. In a study of this kind, which required dealing with busy senior professionals, it was completely impractical (indeed, unethical) to expect interviewees to give up this amount of time. The interviews needed a degree of focus, and a certain level of comparability between cases.

The current study, therefore, utilised a semi-structured interview approach whereby interviews followed a broad 'topic guide' (see Appendix II) which was adapted for use with particular professional groups. This allowed a degree of deviation and development of particular issues, avoided an overly prescriptive approach, but at the same time kept interviews focused on the core issues of the study (and importantly, carried out within the limited time available to senior professionals and practitioners). A key advantage of this style of interview is that it allows the interviewer to retain a degree of control of the process. While semi-structured interviews facilitate the interviewer to be reactive to the answers given, and probe for further details when necessary, they also enable the participant to actively engage in a dialogue with the interviewer (May 2001). The interviewees can speak at length about specific areas of interest, and use language and terminology that they commonly employ. All of this can assist in making participants feel more comfortable in the research setting (Jupp et al. 2000). The main criticism of

semi-structured interviews is that they can lead to a large amount of material being gathered, which can mean that the subsequent analytical process becomes cumbersome: 'Semi structured interviews allow a lot of information to be collected from a few people' (Jupp, Davies, Francis 2000, p. 56).

Sampling

The sampling strategy followed the non-random approach of 'theoretical sampling' (Bryman 2008). This is a type of non-probability sampling that is mainly used in relation to grounded theory, whereby theoretical considerations are used to guide the identification of respondents who are relevant to the area of study but also include a range of viewpoints (Bryman 2008, p.23). Put more simply this is a form of sampling that begins with the interviewer having a clear purpose, which informs participant selection. The sampling rationale for this current study was informed by the general aim of speaking with key policy actors who, by dint of their current or previous position in the policymaking system, would be able to provide informed accounts of their experiences of the development of ASB policies in Southern City. This involved the identification of suitable individuals via the analysis of the documents that had been gathered, as outlined above, and via further research on the Internet (including the websites of the City Council and the police force whose area included Southern City). In addition, a snowballing technique was deployed whereby initial interviewees were asked whether they could recommend other people who could provide an account of developments in Southern City. This is a widely used approach to sampling that relies upon initial interviewees suggesting other suitable participants (Jupp et al. 2000). The full sample characteristics are outlined in Table One. This involved a broad range of local level practitioners from the case study city, representing the key sectors that had involvement in the local ASB agenda. At the same time, it is also acknowledged that in terms of the methods adopted in relation to this study, there was also consideration given to undertaking fieldwork observation of practitioners as opposed to merely interviewing them. However, even though this could have potentially provided a more in-depth and 'lived' account of key elements of the policymaking process, it may not have allowed such a citywide

understanding of the local ASB agenda to be gained, owing to the range of participants that were subsequently involved in the fieldwork.

Initially in keeping with their senior occupational status, a formal approach was made to all interviewees via letter. This outlined the aims and methods of the study, and assurances of confidentiality and anonymity were given (a copy of a sample access letter is included at Appendix III). The use of snowball sampling proved to be a successful strategy in connection with the selection process for the interviews. At the same time, limitations of snowball sampling are that it can raise issues of 'typicality, bias and representativeness' (Tombs 2000, p. 88). There was a risk that participants would suggest like-minded policy actors, who were likely to offer a similar stance on this issue. In order to get beyond the 'official story', further interview candidates were identified who were outside of the core policy process in Southern City, using a number of contacts (including personal contacts within the School of Social Sciences). In addition, a number of interviewees participated in 'follow up' interviews at a later stage of the fieldwork, which allowed further probing and exploration of the policy process locally. The early stages of the fieldwork involved interviews with the core agencies concerned with ASB locally, including the police, the local ASB coordinator, and other local authority personnel with an interest in the area including representatives from housing, social services, education and also the local youth offending team. The later stages of the fieldwork also included interviews with a broader range of policy actors from a range of organisations and agencies with potential influence over ASB policy. These incorporated participants from community groups, the voluntary sector and local politics, both within the local authority and citywide. Practitioners from the Southern City CDRP Executive Board were also interviewed, including representatives from the various local authority based delivery groups that specialise in ASB, and those involved with young people. Interviews were also carried out with senior journalists in the local media concerned with reporting developments relating to crime and ASB.

In total, 30 participants were interviewed, and this provided a rich source of qualitative accounts, from various different standpoints, of the ways in which policy developed

locally, the perceived key influences over these policies, and the nature of the relationships between the main policy actors. The interviews sought critical feedback from participants as to the ways in which policy had been formulated and implemented locally.

Table One: Sample Characteristics

Interview Ref	Candidate/Organisation
001	Southern City Local Authority – Dedicated anti social behaviour team manager
002 A&B	Southernshire Constabulary – Coordinator based in the dedicated anti social behaviour team
003	Southernshire Constabulary – Sector assistant
004	Regional Government Office – Secondee from Legal Services - Regional criminal defence service manager
005	Southernshire Constabulary - Community Safety Inspector, leader of the dedicated anti social behaviour team and the police lead for Southern City on anti social behaviour
005R	Southernshire Constabulary - Community Safety Inspector, leader of the dedicated anti social behaviour team and the police lead for Southern City on anti social behaviour (this was a revisit interview)
006	Southern City Local Authority – Anti social behaviour coordinator based within the dedicated team
007	Local councillor for Southern City and member of the local Southernshire Constabulary Police Authority
008	Chair of Southernshire Local Authority's anti social behaviour delivery group
008R	Former chair of Southernshire Local Authority's anti social behaviour delivery group – Had since become the acting director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services
009	Southern City Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership – Two representatives - the anti social behaviour project manager and the Crime Reduction Manager who was also the team lead
010	Southern City Local Authority – The new dedicated anti social behaviour team manager
010R	Southern City Local Authority – The new dedicated anti social behaviour team manager (this was a revisit interview).
011	Regional Government Office – Anti social behaviour policy lead for the region
012	Chair of Safer Southern City (CDRP) and member of the local strategic partnership
013	Southern City Local Authority - Programme Director for Partnerships and Localities
014	Deputy Editor of Southern City Post
015	Safer Southern City (CDRP) - Assistant Community Safety Officer
016	Process coordinator for Community at Heart – Part of the New Deal for Communities Programme
017	Safer Southern City (CDRP) – Project Manager with the remit for anti social behaviour and hate crime
018	Young Southern City - Manager of Young Southern City's Volunteering Projects
019	Southern City local Labour MP
020	Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager
021	Southern City local Liberal Democrat MP
022	Southern City qualified youth worker
023	Youth worker from Southern City college
024	Southernshire Constabulary – Former Chief Superintendent, responsible for the Basic Command Unit that covered central Southern City
025	Service Director of Safer Southern City (CDRP)
026	Regional Government Office - Advisor from the Drug Prevention Advisory Service

Undertaking elite interviews in practice

The interviews were all with relatively senior professionals and policymakers, and can therefore be considered 'elite interviews', requiring special consideration relating to their specific nature. Elite interviews offer a particular set of advantages to this kind of research. In particular, they potentially facilitate an account of policymaking straight 'from the horse's mouth'. In other words, they offer the chance to gather a kind of data that is unavailable elsewhere, and the opportunity to 'get behind' the documentary accounts (Richards 1996). Such interviews often require a careful negotiation of access, assurance of confidentiality and building up of trust with the respondents, as was outlined above. They also require careful attention to be paid to the busy schedules of the interviewees, and the need to respect the pressures upon their time (Lilleker 2003). The interviews were an ongoing process carried out across the period of 2005 to 2009. They all lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, and were digitally recorded and transcribed with the explicit permission of the interviewees. They all took place at the convenience of the interviewee, usually in their place of work.

The status of the interviewer in this setting was that of an independent academic researcher. This was owing to there being no previous associations with any of the selected interviewees, as there are no links between the research area and my full time occupation. This status provided both advantages and disadvantages in relation to the interviews. The role of 'outsider' in some ways helped, in that respondents did not assume prior knowledge and explained in full the details of their roles and gave what appeared to be full accounts of their involvement in and impressions of policy change. In addition, it did appear that the role of 'interested layperson' in many cases put the interviewee at ease, and to feel able to provide candid accounts of what, to an 'insider', would have sometimes been contested and locally controversial issues. Against this, there were also disadvantages of being an 'outsider', in that somebody with direct experience of working in the field of ASB policy would arguably have brought to the study a greater level of prior insight and understanding of the organisational cultures and micro-politics in the agencies and organisations that formed the focus of this research. In order to

mitigate this limitation, the extensive reading of the academic and policy literature relating to ASB discussed in Chapter Two was helpful, as was the analysis of local policy documents discussed below.

In terms of subject matter, the interviews followed, as far as possible, the model topic guide presented in Appendix II. Earlier interviews with core members of the local agencies concerned with ASB policy enabled an initial mapping out of the key dimensions of ASB policy locally, and the relationships between the main partner agencies. A number of these interviewees were later interviewed again, in order to develop themes touched upon in the initial interviews, and probe further beneath the 'official story' of local policy development. The interviews included the use of both explanatory probes and focused probes, which ask the participant to provide specific examples of their experience. They can also be used when seeking clarification about a particular discussion point. During several of the interviews the basic probe was also used. The purpose of these is to enable the interviewer to repeat specific questions to ensure that the interview remains focused (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, p. 93). All participants were encouraged to be reflective when responding to questions. For those who had been in post for a significant portion of the timescale, they were able to evaluate their role in this process. However, for those who had perhaps moved into their role nearer to the end of this period it could at times prove limiting, and people had to rely on indirect experiences.

Clearly, it was not possible to access representation from all areas of policymaking via retrospective interviews. Given the limitations of time and resources, there were inevitable constraints in the range of viewpoints accessed. However, a substantial amount of detailed information was gathered, from as wide a range of potential policy actors as was possible. As will be covered in the next two chapters, the data was more than sufficient to address the core research questions. For the most part, the response to the research of key policy actors was a positive one, and participants were open and welcoming. During the later parts of the fieldwork, the participants who were approached for a 'follow-up' interview were quick to respond to written requests. Their willingness to

engage in this process was probably assisted by their familiarity both with the interviewer and their area of study.

Validity and reliability

Validity means that research instruments actually measure what they are supposed to measure. In general terms, reliability means that similar results would be found over time. One of the main potential limitations of interviews of the kind described above – that attempt to gain participants' own accounts of policy developments – concern factual recall and lack of objectivity (Seldon 1996), which can impact negatively on both validity and reliability. In other words, interview data would not be valid if, whether intentionally or not, they did provide an accurate account of what actually happened. Such data could not be seen as reliable if a significantly different account was likely to arise should the same questions be asked at another time. Other studies have addressed the same difficulties in assessing interview data (Davies 2001; Jones and Newburn 2007; Tregidga 2011). It is inevitable, when asking respondents to recount their views of developments that took place some years previously, that the recall will not be total. In addition, when discussing an area that is characterised by a high level of political contestation, or when there are relationships of professional competiveness, the accounts of individual respondents will be coloured, perhaps sub-consciously, by their own professional or political interests. Such limitations on validity and reliability cannot be designed out of research such as this. Clearly, these issues needed to be taken into account when assessing and ordering the interview data provided by participants in the policy process, including difficulties with accurate recall years after the events under consideration.

The way to address these problems would be to conduct research that observed the emergence of particular policies 'as they happened'. This was the approach of the leading criminologist, Paul Rock, in his detailed analysis of the development of victim policy in the UK. Rock studied the policymaking process as it unfolded from a vantage point within the Home Office, or in his words, 'in situ' (Rock 2004). It would have been hugely beneficial to the current study to observe policy in the process of being made, for

example by attending key meetings within the City Council and CDRP where key decisions were being taken. However, in practice, this approach was not possible for the current research. It was deliberately designed as a primarily retrospective study of the recent past. Simultaneous observation of policy development would have required a level of access and resources that were not available to a part-time PhD researcher. Nevertheless, unlike the study of Jones and Newburn (2007), the timescale of the current study did provide some limited overlap between the fieldwork and substantive developments in the policy area under consideration. Although the extensive 'insider' access of Rock was not available in this study, some of the interviews did cover, in part, some current developments.

However, the problems identified above were still faced by many of the interviews that were conducted. Their impacts were addressed by a careful crosschecking of accounts given by policy actors placed at different points in the policy process, and against the narratives provided by documentary evidence (following Jones and Newburn 2007). There were no obvious examples within the interviews of any attempts to deliberately mislead or indeed any glaring examples of errors of memory (in terms of what happened and when). The main issue encountered during the interviews was a tendency – perhaps to be expected – on the part of some key actors to present a celebratory account of the successes of policy development in Southern City, which required a degree of critical distance (and again cross-checking with other interview and documentary accounts) in the process of analysis and interpretation of the data.

Data analysis

Secondary analysis of documents

As noted earlier, the aim of the documentary analysis was a relatively modest (but important) one of providing a detailed documentary narrative of what happened and when (and who was involved) with regard to the development of ASB policy in Southern City. It was not the intention, therefore, to undertake 'discourse analysis' of the documentary

sources in order to interrogate in depth the role of textual details in constructing 'meaning' in the realm of ASB policy. Rather, the aim was to undertake a more basic qualitative 'content analysis' that would help provide a documentary overview of the content and timing of formal 'policy decisions', which would inform the approach to sampling interviewees locally, and at the same time would provide the basis for detailed cross-checking with interviewees' accounts.

Two levels of analysis were applied to the secondary documents. First, in relation to the national level policy documents, the analysis was somewhat rudimentary, being focused primarily on identifying very broad themes within them as a means of setting the context for the local study. Second, the local level policy documents were subjected to a more rigorous level of analysis, because they were to form an important source of empirical data in their own right. This followed a form of 'directed content analysis' via which a set of codes are derived from existing bodies of research or theory, and then applied to the documents (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Analysis of the body of literature on ASB, and in particular previous studies of crime policy development in the UK, had helped inform the search for particular key 'themes'. Several key documents were selected, and these were subjected to a systematic analysis, which involved a number of stages. Following a general reading through all the documents, they then underwent a process of manual annotation and highlighting of key themes in terms of what was the actual content of local policy, what happened and when, and which key agencies were involved. This material was then summarised on thematic grids, in order to be cross-referenced with the interview accounts. Key quotations from the documents were highlighted throughout, and referenced in the thematic grids.

Analysing the interview data

The analysis of the interview data can be viewed as taken on a number of stages. Although the most intensive element of the analysis came after the fieldwork, in a broader sense analysis was ongoing throughout. This is because, the secondary analysis of documents informed the choices of interview candidates, and notes and transcripts

from each interview were read and assessed as the study progressed, in order to build up a fuller picture of policy developments and to identify further potential interviewees. However, the most intensive period of analysis came at the end of the fieldwork.

The first stage of this analysis was in the full transcription of all interview data, which I undertook myself. This allowed me to become deeply familiar with the data and to begin to distil themes and sub-themes within them. The second stage was to carefully read through each transcript, several times, highlighting relevant pieces of narrative and annotating the hard copies with notes that indicated potential themes within the data. This involved the application of standard qualitative analysis techniques (Coffey and Atkinson 1996), which meant identifying, extracting, coding and systematically plotting the relevant material against a number of themes and sub themes. These codes were informed by, but not restricted to, themes that had been identified during the literature review. They were also influenced by the key research questions that the fieldwork had set out to explore. Key quotes in the text were highlighted on the hard copy of the transcripts and numbered. The next stage was to construct a set of thematic grids, focused on the core themes (and within them, sub-themes) identified at the previous stage. These themes formed the horizontal axis of the grids (the columns) and each interview case formed the vertical axis (rows). Summary information from the interviews was then manually recorded in the relevant cells of the thematic grids. The result was that a detailed summary overview of the core themes and sub-themes within the data was available for the next stage of the analysis. This stage involved a critical assessment of the thematic grids, noting patterns within and between cases, and allowing a much more systematic comparison of the key elements of narratives of policy development (as provided by the policy actors), than would have been available by individual analysis of transcripts.

Consideration was given to the use of computer software programmes for qualitative analysis, such as Atlas or Nvivo. Such programmes can be useful for storing and managing large quantities of qualitative data, and can be seen as a more efficient method for searching and retrieving coded elements of data (Miles and Huberman 1994). However, it is important to note that such programmes cannot undertake the analysis

themselves, and there is a danger in assuming too much for such technologies (Fielding 1993). For some time, leading qualitative researchers have cautioned against a tendency to see computer aided analysis packages as a substitute for the intellectual work of thematic analysis (Coffey et al. 1996). It is perfectly possible to be systematic in the analysis of qualitative data without resorting to computer technology, and adopting a manual 'thematic grids' approach is one way of doing this (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). Whilst computer software may have speeded up this process, and provided a helpful way of storing and managing the data, a considerable time investment would have been needed in order to train and become familiar with using the programmes. As a part time PhD student, I was extremely limited in the amount of formal research methods training that I could undertake, and was unable to pursue the School of Social Sciences Diploma in Social Research Methods (which includes sessions on using qualitative analysis software). I therefore decided that, given the points made about the limitations of computer software, it would be probably less time-consuming to undertake a systematic manual thematic analysis.

Research Ethics

Ethics are defined as a set of standards by which a group regulates its behaviour, lays down what is and is not morally acceptable in pursuit of its aims. Discussions about research ethics tend to be clearer in discussions about natural sciences (e.g. medical ethics, debates about cloning, euthanasia, animal experiments etc), but social science also has impacts upon a range of actors (participants, sponsors, colleagues, other researchers, other groups in society, and we need to think about this when we are designing, conducting and disseminating research). It is important to remember that ethical matters are not just a 'bolt-on' to be included in methods chapters, but are important issues that need thinking about throughout the research process. The current study was undertaken in accordance with the ethical guidelines laid down by the British Society of Criminology, with the general aim that the research would at no point harm the interests of any of the participants (British Society of Criminology 2006). The key ethical issues raised by this study were informed consent and confidentiality.

Informed consent

This requires the researcher not only to obtain agreement for the research, but also to ensure (as far as possible) that this agreement is fully informed. In accordance with this, all research participants were provided with full information about what the study was about, what its aims were, how the data they provided would be used, and how the findings would be made available. In addition, all were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any point. This information was provided initially, in broad form, in the original access letter, and before any recorded interview began, each participant was given a fuller verbal explanation of the aims and methods of the research, and provided with the opportunity to ask questions. All participants who reached this stage stated that they were satisfied with this and that they understood what had been relayed to them, and none asked to withdraw from the study. I was therefore confident that all participants were fully informed about the purposes, output and audience for the research.

Confidentiality

This is another key element of the ethical approach to research, and this study followed standard practices to disguise the links between the research data and any identifiable individual or organisation. The privacy of all people and organisations that participated in the study was respected. Care was taken, in the writing of the findings chapters, to ensure that individuals were not identified, and are not identifiable. All interview transcripts were listed according to a number (rather than a name), and an identification list for the codes (by professional function and not name), was kept separately. All documentation and transcripts relating to the study were stored securely, and the data will be destroyed after a period following the study, as is now standard ethical practice in the social sciences. As can be seen in the following two chapters, standard social science techniques were used to disguise the identities of interviewees or other participants. Pseudonyms were used for the city that formed the unit of analysis for the case study, and for the local

police force, and care was taken to ensure the removal of all identifiers (such as using 'she' to describe a respondent who is the only woman in a group).

Impartiality

Total objectivity is, of course, impossible to achieve. But in accordance with ethical principles at all times I tried as far as possible to be objective in my analysis and reporting, and be aware of my own tendencies to partiality and bias. Whilst this issue usually applies itself particularly to funded research (when the funder may try to encourage the researcher to lend scientific credibility to a partisan viewpoint) it is still important to be aware of it in unfunded research such as this.

<u>**Conclusion**</u>

One of the aims of this research is to contribute to our knowledge and understanding of the nature of the policymaking process in crime control. Unlike broader sociological treatments of general shifts in crime control policy, the study has a narrower empirical focus. The methods it adopted reflected this, and were appropriate to the particular research aims and questions. This chapter has outlined and justified the use of a single case study to provide contextualized insights into the nature of local policymaking, including a combination of documentary and interview analysis. The subsequent two chapters will now outline the main themes that emerged from the data analysis. Chapter Five will address the 'who' and 'what' questions (who were the key players in local policymaking and what kind of policies were developed locally?), and Chapter Six will focus on the 'how' and 'why' questions (how and why did policy develop the way that it did?).

Chapter Five: The emerging ASB control infrastructure in Southern City

Introduction

In the chapters that follow a detailed account is offered of the historical trajectory of ASB policy and practice in Southern City, drawing on the conceptual insights of the theoretical and empirical literature discussed in chapters 2 and 3. In so doing particular attention will be given to the complex relationship between national, local and regional actors and their governmental resources. It will be argued that the story which unfolds is neither that of a narrative purely 'top-down', national level determinants of policy and practice smoothly unfolding in Southern City nor one suggesting the dominance of local politics, capacities and actors. Rather, the argument which emerges in the following chapters is that national actors and their agendas are vital in providing a crucial set of parameters and policy framework within and against which local actors work and develop their practices and local agendas. In turn such local actors and their networks also have space to challenge, negotiate and at times recast national, top-down 'commands'. In brief local 'geo-historical' contexts matter in the social scientific study of national policy process (Edwards and Hughes, 2005).

The main aim of this specific chapter is to outline the emergence of the key features of anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy in Southern City during the period of the study. Specifically, it seeks to address the following research questions:

- **Who** (in terms of individuals and organisations) were the main policy actors involved in the process of policy change in Southern City?
- **What** were the key developments in Southern City?
- **When** did these developments occur (in relation to developments at the national level)?

The chapter is divided into two main sections, both of which draw upon interviews, documentary data, and official statistics to provide a narrative of policy change in

Southern City and are focused on the questions listed above. The first section aims to identify the key institutions and individuals involved in the policy process that saw the emergence of an ASB control infrastructure in Southern City, thus addressing the first research question. The second section focuses on the second and third research questions, drawing out from the data the key policy changes that occurred locally and when they happened. The concluding section provides a brief overview of the main themes of the chapter and considers the theoretical propositions (TPs) set out in earlier chapters in the light of the empirical evidence discussed here.

Key ASB policy actors in Southern City

Local authority officials

As will become clear from the analysis below, local authority officers in Southern City Council played a key role as local, 'socially situated problem-solvers' (Edwards and Hughes, 2008, Garland, 2001) in developing ASB control policy locally. The local authority is a large organisation, and included a range of departments that, as will be discussed in the following chapter, were not always united in their views and approaches on ASB. For current purposes, however, we aim to simply set out the identities and main institutional responsibilities of some of the key players. Perhaps the first local authority department to consider is the Housing Department. This department was responsible for developing a local housing strategy, for managing the authority's council housing stock, and promoting policies locally on affordable housing. It was in the field of housing that concerns about disorderly or 'nuisance' behaviour by council tenants – and legal responses to such behaviour – first emerged, prior to the passing of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA) (see Burney 2005, Flint 2009). The Housing Department in Southern City was under the direction of a Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services, and played an important role in the development of ASB policy locally. The local authority established an Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU) in July 2004. This consisted of six ASB caseworkers, which were given responsibility for specific geographical remits across the city. Underlying the philosophy of this team was

the key principles of the Government's 'Together' campaign, which promoted partnership working in an effort to solve problems of low level disorder. As a result, this team continued to work closely alongside the police based ASB team, partners from other agencies and also housing officers, in an effort to 'resolve anti-social behaviour swiftly, effectively and with tangible benefits to the community that has suffered' (Southern City Local Authority 'Together' promotional material 2005, p. 6). In cooperating in this manner, practitioners from both of these key agencies were able to support one another in utilising a range of ASB measures, which included not just Anti Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs) but also dispersal orders and crackhouse closures.

In addition to a dedicated ASB team within the city's local authority, there were also a number of other distinct players within this organisation who across the timescale of this research helped to support the tackling of ASB issues in Southern City. These included the youth section of the local authority, coordinated by Children and Young Peoples Services. Their role in tackling ASB grew across the period of interest, with the national agenda regarding this issue having been moved under their remit in more recent times, despite close links having been identified at an early stage between ASB and young people. In Southern City, the Children and Young People's Partnership was established in 2006, and included representatives from Southernshire Constabulary and the Police Authority, Education, local businesses and the community (Southern City Local Authority, Children and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). As with other elements of the local level ASB framework, this collective formed one of five delivery groups that reported to the city's Local Strategic Partnership. The main focus of the Service was to achieve the key deliverables of the 'Every Child Matters' programme (Southern City Partnership Online 2011).

Another key aspect of Southern City's local authority in terms of tackling ASB was the Social Services department. They were often a feature of the city's case conference structure if appropriate. The Social Services were classed as being amongst the city's support agencies, along with the mental health arm of this department. Both of these also had several bolt on organisations that worked alongside them. The Social Services

structure extended to four area offices across Southern City staffed by a total of 16 social work teams. The work of this department was also supported by the local authority's ASB team, which incorporated staff working on the city's Family Support Project. The aim of this was to tackle some of the city's most chaotic families. Two social workers were also located in the Neighbourhood and Housing Services department with the ASB team, whose role was to work with young people at risk of homelessness (Southern City Local Authority, Children and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5).

There was also a significant number of 'Looked After Children' in Southern City, as at 2010 this totalled 655, consisting of a mixture of children under five, children of school age and post 16 year olds (Southern City Local Authority, Children and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). As part of this, the local authority used a 'virtual school' structure in an effort to support this group of children in their educational attainment and to improve their rates of progress academically (Southern City Local Authority, Children and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). This demonstrated the significance of the Education Services, and their potential role in helping to address problems of ASB in Southern City. As with Social Services, Education were also deemed to have been one of the key agencies that needed to be represented in a case conference setting, particularly in those cases that involved young people.

In an effort to prevent both criminal offending, and as a further means of tackling ASB in relation to young people, Southern City's youth offending team also developed its own partnership working and were involved in initiatives such as the Youth Inclusion Programme, the aim of which was the positive engagement of young people in their local communities (see the similar findings of Hughes and Follett, 2006, in the South Midlands). An integral part of the programme was the creation of Youth Inclusion Panels (YIPs), which were initially established in 2000, by the Youth Justice Board. The Board also supported the funding of these Panels via a system of Youth Offending Team prevention grants (Southern City Local Authority Online). These Panels targeted those young people who were identified as being at risk of offending by other key partnership agencies, including ASB teams and local education authorities. Through positive

engagement strategies such as the provision of education and careers guidance to these young people it was anticipated that the workers that supported these panels would be able to change young people's perceptions of crime and ASB (Southern City Local Authority Online). In Southern City the programme also initially established Youth Inclusion and Support Panels (YISPs) in some of the city's priority areas. In contrast to the YIPs, the aim of the YISP was to bring together the relevant support agencies in an effort to provide support to 'at risk' young people. In 2008 the Children and Young People's Services Department of Southern City recommissioned YISPs into locality panels. As part of this process the previous ASB and crime focus of the initial YISPs was removed, as these locality panels performed a somewhat 'generic early intervention role' (Southern City Local Authority Care and Safer Communities Scrutiny Commission minutes 18th November 2008, p. 7).

Southern City Council: Elected members

The local authority officials were all ultimately responsible to elected members of the local City Council. Southern City Council is a unitary authority covering a population of 441,000 people and an area of 110 square kilometres. The recent tradition of political representation in the city has been left of centre, with either the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrats dominating local elections in the past two decades. The city has a tradition of local activism, with environmental issues and sustainable transport having received considerable political attention locally. The city is divided into 35 wards, each electing two councillors for a four-year term. The full council consists of 70 councillors, and has ultimate responsibility for establishing the decision making process and approving the Council's budget and policy framework. The full council elects a leader and seven executive councillors. Together these executives form the cabinet, which is responsible for most day-to-day decisions. For many years, the Labour Party were the dominant power in the local City Council, but during the current study, the Liberal Democrats took minority control of the Council between the 2005 and 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, the Labour, Conservative and Green parties came together to remove the Liberal Democrats from power, and replace them with a minority Labour

administration. In February 2009 the minority Labour administration resigned following a defeat over a contentious local plan for a waste incinerator, and the Liberal Democrats regained control of the Council.

The most relevant committees for the purposes of this research were the ASB select committee of the local authority. The committee was established in 2004, following the identification of ASB as a key priority issue to be addressed by committees of this nature by the council's Overview and Scrutiny Management Committee. As a result, the 'reduction of anti-social behaviour was seen as a matter of keen public interest and high priority for scrutiny, in the context of current local and national activity' (Southern City Local Authority, ASB Select Committee minutes March 2005b). The ASB committee had a number of key aims, but its main outcome was to scrutinize Southern City's overarching ASB strategy. The City Council were also represented on the Police Authority for the provincial police force in which Southern City was the largest urban area, and could thus in theory exert influence over Southernshire Constabulary force policy via this body. The Police Authority consisted of eight elected councillors from the local authority areas covered by the force, and seven appointed 'independent' members. Two of the councillor members were from Southern City Council. It is the responsibility of this independent body to set the strategic direction of the local force, whilst also being able to hold the Chief Constable of Southernshire Constabulary accountable on behalf of local community residents (Southern City Police Authority Online 2011).

Regional Government Office

Nine Regional Government Offices (henceforth RGOs) were established in England in 1994 by the then Conservative Government. Until they were abolished in 2011, they were supposedly the means of delivering a range of UK government policies in the regions of England. It is also important to note that there is a dearth of sustained research on the activities and impacts of RGOs from their inception to abolition (see Hughes, 2007). The RGOs represented 12 central government departments, and had responsibilities in community regeneration, crime and disorder reduction, tackling housing needs,

improving public health, raising standards in education and training, dealing with countryside issues, and reducing unemployment. The structure of the RGO that covered Southern City included a number of geographical area teams and also several specialist teams responsible for dealing with specific themes, including ASB. However, this was only a small team consisting of a theme leader, technical support and an interface with the geographical area teams. The aim of these geographical teams was to act as a conduit between the RGO and community safety partnerships, in addition to a range of ASB coordinators (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB Specialist Team). Despite this relatively small number of resources, this did not prevent this particular RGO from having become a forerunner in the creation of an ASB forum. The aim of this was to bring together practitioners from a range of agencies across the area for which the RGO had responsibility, in an effort to exchange best practice in the tackling of ASB. '[T]he main direction of communication tended to be out to the region through the policy leads in the partnerships. And what we all tended to do was have regional forums' (Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service). These were further supported by RGO attendance at external partnership meetings.

Southernshire Constabulary

The Southernshire Constabulary force area covers 1,855 square miles and has a population of 1.6 million people in 630,000 households. At the time of the study, the force employed about 6000 staff, of whom about 3400 were police officers, and Southern City was the largest urban area within it. The City is policed by the Southern City 'Basic Command Unit' of the force, which corresponds with the local authority boundaries. During the period of the study, this BCU employed over 900 police officers and 170 civilian staff, and was divided into seven 'neighbourhood areas' for the purposes of local policing (Southernshire Constabulary Online, 2011).

Youth groups

The Young Southern City organisation, which is staffed by a small team of development workers, seeks to work with young people from across the city in an effort to positively engage them. In doing so, they promote the use of a range of diversionary activities as a means of diverting young people away from committing crime and acts of ASB. Young Southern City supports a network of 25 local community youth clubs, which in 2009 supported a total of 3098 young people (Young Southern City Online, 2011). However owing to its limited resources, it seeks to target those who are most at risk of becoming disaffected.

Local media

Three main newspapers provide the local media coverage for Southern City, the Southern City Post and Southernshire Daily Press, and the free weekly-distributed Southern City Observer[6]. Between them, these publications covered the core parts of Southern City in addition to extending out to the regions outlying areas. The main local newspapers were an important source of local information about the issue of ASB and the policy responses adopted by local agencies in relation to the problem. Local campaigns were reported extensively, for example the prolific use of crackhouse closure powers in Southern City. These were made available via the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act, and by 2007, 50 of these identified premises had been closed in Southern City (Southernshire Constabulary Local Policing Summary 2006-2007, p. 1). Local media reporting was also instrumental in highlighting problems in certain areas of Southern City to the practitioners, 'just maybe two or three times a year you get something on the front page of the [Southern City] Post and it will be horrible and you sort of think we have got to sort this out' (Interview 025 Southern City Local Authority Service Director).

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[6] These are pseudonyms

Members of Parliament

Four Westminster constituencies, West, East, South and Northwest, cover Southern City, or parts thereof. The trend of representation in these areas began to reflect the national picture, with seats having been held initially by MPs from the Labour Party before seats were then lost to the Liberal Democrats and in some parts of the city, the Conservative Party.

The Western constituency was initially Labour dominated from 1997 until the 2005 Election, when the seat was lost to the Liberal Democrats. More recently in 2010 the seat was retained with an increased majority. The South parliamentary constituency has remained a Labour stronghold, with the same MP having held the seat since 1987. In the East of the city, this has again remained as a Labour seat since the 1992 election, prior to which it had been briefly Conservative. The Northwest part of the city had previously undergone significant boundary changes. There has been mixed representation in this constituency, with representation having moved between Labour, Labour Cooperative (the sister Party of the Labour Party) and most recently the Conservative Party.

Organizational mapping

Southern City Local
Communities
Local Residents
Groups
Local Media

Neighbourhood &
Housing Services
Registered Social
Landlords

Southern City
Youth Sector

ASB Manager
Local Authority
ASB Team

Southern City ASB Policy

Community Safety
Inspector
Police Force
ASB Team

Citywide
Partnership
Local CDRP

Basic Command Unit
Police Authority
Magistrates Courts
Probation Service

ASB Delivery Group
Local Multi Agency
meetings

Local MPs
Regional Government
Office
ASB Network

Dimensions of policy change in Southern City

Policy 'decisions'

Prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998

There was evidence from the interviews that the emergence of ASB as a policy concern in Southern City predated the national policy initiatives of the late 1990s. Whilst these issues may have been framed in a slightly different language than emerged later - focusing on concerns about disorder, noisy or inconsiderate neighbours, and 'nuisance' behaviour (often in social housing) - they show that ASB policies did not appear from nowhere (see Hughes, 2007 pp.110-139 for an overview of the historical emergence of ASB as a social problem, both prior to and after the election of New Labour in 1997). As in a number of other cities, it appeared that a range of practitioners in Southern City had

for some years attempted to tackle problems of nuisance behaviour in a variety of ways (Burney 1999; Cowan 1999). Within the housing sector in particular, there was evidence of formal legal measures such as injunctions, having been deployed by the City Council Housing Department to address problem residents in council housing. For example, under the Housing Act 1996 (S153) social landlords were granted the power to apply for Anti Social Behaviour Injunctions (or ASBIs) against any council tenants who caused a nuisance or harassed other people. These powers were subsequently amended by the Anti Social Behaviour Act of 2003 and the Police and Justice Act 2006. As per the ASBO, injunctions contained 'unacceptable actions which the subject must not commit' (Flint and Pawson 2009, p. 421). If these conditions are breached, it amounts to contempt of court, and as with the breach of an ASBO, this is punishable by imprisonment. In addition, ASBIs can also come with the power of arrest, meaning that any breach can see the offender being arrested and held in custody. However, the key difference between these two measures is the fact that ASBIs cannot be used upon anyone under the age of 18 (Flint and Pawson 2009, p. 421). Other injunctive powers had been made available to local authorities under the 1972 Local Government Act (S222). These were only to be used in 'exceptional cases if the local authority could also obtain an ASBO' (Cowan 1999, p. 360).

> [T]he one that we use mostly against local authority residents tends to be the ASB injunction on the Housing Act to comply with tenancy conditions and then put other conditions attached to that and obviously if there have been assaults we can shove the powers of arrest on there as well … I think there's a few things to consider you see the thing is the City Council have always tackled, I say always tackled that isn't true, but the policy has always been to tackle nuisance tenants and what you have to differentiate between is in those days is what is nuisance and what is anti-social and what is criminal. So until the Anti Social Behaviour Act came into force properly, which gave us a lot more powers and a lot more things that we can do within the Act such as the injunctions coupled with the tenancy conditions to say comply with it opened up a totally different avenue and a policy could be written around that because the thing is you could have a policy but a policy at the end of the day is only as good as the legislation that you are working with that enables you to keep that policy in place. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team)

However, formal action appears to have been a relatively rare event, and unevenly spread across the city. In some localities, there was greater emphasis placed upon the use of

enforcement measures, whilst others saw little activity in relation to ASB. An explanation for this was the variations in the workloads and the approaches of individual housing officers:

> I think the way to view that would be the south of the city … certain other areas, actually for years dealt with ASB either through myself or me pushing other people to do it, and other people having an interest to do it, whereas certain areas in the city up until the time that the ASB team was set up, didn't have ASB so those things are there to be tackled whereas in the south of the city some of them have already been tackled. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team)

A Senior Police Officer, who had worked in Southern City for many years, reported that housing practitioners in particular had issued warnings to residents about ASB, but no further action had been pursued:

> I think many partners weren't tackling it like we were. No one was tackling it, and if you look at Housing files some housing files still brought out to case conference are this thick where warning after warning after warning has been sent, threatening further action but no further action has been taken. So we were giving people warnings and then not backing it up with action so people didn't take any notice of the warnings, and that's happened over a long period of time. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

This had led, in their view, to a general lack of confidence in the local authorities being able to address ASB effectively (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This issue was reflected by the general levels of unhappiness that were reported by a key housing respondent, who suggested that the early days of the service had seen complaints about inconsistencies, lack of feedback from practitioners and a slowness in response (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management). Even though these were issues that the same interviewee suggested had been addressed in a later best manner review that was conducted in relation to Southern City's housing management function, there were still some key lessons to be learnt about the ways in which housing practitioners were equipped to tackle issues of ASB:

> But I think the lesson I learned from that you come into social housing, where you perceive social housing to be a supportive caring

service and then I come along and say tenants are complaining about the failure of the department to deal with issues about breach of tenancy conditions and then saying to those people who came into the service to be in this supportive caring role, and I am saying to them I want you to be policeman effectively for this service, and I want you to start getting miscreant tenants into court and evict them or take action against them. And actually trying to persuade a bunch of what were 65 housing officers that that was a good thing to do despite the training and the direction of the policy and the policy directives I put in place was never really going to work. (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management)

However, whilst the formal powers that were available at the time may not have been fully used in Southern City, the equipping of housing professionals with powers to deal with 'anti-social' residents – under the banner of 'nuisance behaviour' – did provide a baseline of experience for what was to develop later. At the national level, as outlined in Chapter Three, housing professionals had lobbied actively for greater civil powers for tackling ASB to be made available to local agencies which was an important driver for eventual proposals for 'Community Safety Orders', the precursors to ASBOs, in the 1998 legislation. Thus, in some important ways, the precursors to the emergence of a formalised ASB policy structure in Southern City echoed broader developments at the national level, where the issue first emerged in relation to social housing practitioners (and their professional associations). In some senses, this provides support for TP1, which suggested that we would see a similar trajectory of policy development both locally and nationally.

The first Southern City Crime and Disorder Strategy 1999

Despite evidence of some earlier piecemeal action in relation to ASB, which had mainly concerned perceived problem behaviour by social housing tenants, it was clear from both the interviews and secondary sources that the CDA 1998 was the major impetus in the emergence of a more partnership based approach in dealing with ASB, particularly following the creation of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs) as a result of this legislation. 'I think the Crime and Disorder Act was a very good piece of legislation. I think it did force, encourage, inspire agencies to work together in a way that they clearly hadn't been able to do before without the legislation'

(Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander). It also became a key element of the response of local practitioners in tackling the issue of ASB:

> [I]ts been part of a development of a much sort of wider agency responsibility for youth crime and anti-social behaviour, and you are getting linkages now that never really kind of existed before, between different statutory agencies, and also between agencies working in local neighbourhoods and local community organisations. So you know … I think it's had a beneficial effect in that sense, but that goes along with other developments. (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager)

Based upon the account of a respondent from the city's CDRP, even though community safety teams in various guises had existed in the city's local authority for some time, the significant change that was brought about by the CDA was that it gave the partnerships statutory authority, as they were 'given a legislative role and a duty to tackle crime' (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). In Southern City, as elsewhere in other larger urban conurbations across England and Wales (Hughes, 2007: chapter three pp. 54-82) it led to the creation of a formalised partnership structure that represented the local authority, Southernshire Constabulary, the local Health Authority and the Probation Service. Representatives were also drawn from the Home Office Prison Department, local Police Authority and the lead city councillor with responsibility for Community Safety.

Over time this partnership structure gradually evolved to include other voluntary agencies and the previously separate Drugs Action team, which was initially established in the city in March 1999 as links between this particular agenda and crime/ASB were established (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 10). This provides clear evidence of the formation of a local policy network of the type discussed by Rhodes (1997), and supports TP4 which suggested that policy networks of various kinds would emerge and play an important role in the development of ASB policy locally. The characteristics of these networks, and how they impacted on policy in practice, will be considered in the following chapter. The growth of a multi agency approach in tackling this issue that was presented by some of the respondents, who were involved in the fieldwork, was further supported by an analysis of

Southern City policy documents of the time, key to which was the initial crime and disorder strategy that was created by the statutory partners following a period of local consultation, which covered the period 1999 to 2002.

As discussed in Chapter Three, like all local authorities, as a result of the 1998 CDA Southern City Council was now required by law to undertake an annual citywide audit of crime and disorder problems, which formed the basis of this initial strategic plan. It provided all of the agencies involved with clear objectives to be measured by performance-based targets (Home Office Circular 9/99 Guide to Crime and Disorder Partnerships). The achievement of these targets was to be overseen by the city's CDRP, who were also charged with working alongside the courts and local communities to ensure that this strategy was being implemented. In the case of Southern City this initial strategy document also sought to provide an operating framework for those agencies that were involved in directly tackling issues of crime and disorder, including ASB: 'The strategy describes the main findings of the audit, the broad objectives that follow from the audit and the organisational framework for its implementation' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 1).

This led to a structure being formed in which a total of 19 task groups worked on behalf of the city's Community Safety Partnership in implementing the strategy (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 13). Some of these were newly created whilst others had been established for 'several years on particular areas' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p.10) and covered issues such as communities, young people, neighbourhoods and the youth offending team, all of which were designed to feed into the partnership's four identified priority areas. These included drugs, young people, neighbourhoods, crime and also the fear of crime, all of which could be contributory factors to problems of ASB. Even though the strategy acknowledged that young people in the city were more likely to be victims of crime, as opposed to perpetrators as the 'majority are law abiding' (Southern City Community Safety

Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 1). Having identified these as being the key elements of the strategy to be implemented, the framework also outlined four corresponding strategic aims:

- To tackle drugs and alcohol misuse
- To promote a less criminal society
- To promote social justice and urban regeneration
- To reduce crime and fear of crime

(Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 13)

This structure would be overseen by a full-time coordinator from one of the Partnership's statutory agencies, as supported by the previously discussed task groups. In its encouragement of renewed partnership working, the strategy also highlighted on paper at least (see Hughes, 2007 pp.132-137, Crawford, 1997) the need for local communities to actively participate in this process. Their views were to be represented via the task group structure that had been designed to support the partnership, as a result of interaction with the city's non-statutory agencies that could also feed in the views of local business groups:

The agencies involved in the … Partnership have a long record of working with communities to promote regeneration alongside the … Regeneration Partnership, delivering local partnership which promotes community safety and reduce crime and fear of crime. The implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act will build upon these foundations. (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 6)

This first Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy (1999-2002) was also accompanied by the rollout of a dedicated ASBO Strategy for Southern City. The strategy offered guidance for all of the statutory agencies that had been given responsibility for the use of ASBOs as a result of the 1998 CDA. It also provided guidance to the local Magistrates Courts about the proposed usage of these orders, given their role in this process (as also set out in the 1998 CDA). The practitioners in the local authority, in attempting to develop a more targeted ASB approach, sought to work in conjunction with the Courts at an early stage in order to outline the ways in which they were planning to use this newly

developed measure. It was suggested that the provision of this early awareness training for Magistrates had proven to be mutually beneficial, having ensured the continuation of a good working relationship between local agencies and the network of courts across Southern City (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management):

> I think we are only as good as the people who dish out the penalties, we can do all we possibly can, we can haul people back to court we can make life difficult for them but as soon as the judge turns round and says a slap on the wrist go away, we have lost and that doesn't happen very often. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team)

This also provided an opportunity to share with those working in the Courts the agreed approach that was to be taken in tackling ASB by practitioners in Southern City. It was intended that this would be a citywide approach, whereby only in those cases where the behaviour had been deemed to be serious enough that an ASBO would be used as a first response. Aside from this, the use of the ASBO was to be seen as a tool of last resort, only to be used when all other often more informal interventions had failed, 'if the informal route works then why not use that … So we have littered the city with warning letters and ABCs and Manchester have littered the city with ASBOs' (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management). This stance was seemingly adopted at an early stage in the development of a local level approach in Southern City, which appeared to endure throughout the period of interest, even being reflected in local media reporting about ASBO usage in the city: 'A spokesman for [Southern] City Council said: The use of Asbos is very much a last resort … and is only one aspect of a whole range of work that is carried out to address unacceptable behaviour' (Southern City Post May 2008). Interviewees from all key agencies interviewed for the research supported such an approach and confirmed that it was generally agreed between the agencies involved. These views appear to confirm the strong appeal, locally and 'on the ground' of adaptive approaches to problem-solving noted by Garland (2001) as part of the 'preventive turn' in crime control and given empirical support from the research undertaken by Edwards and Hughes (2008) across Wales. As such, they provide preliminary support for TP2 that suggested we would see

clear evidence of 'adaptive' approaches at the local level, with the development of partnership structures that attempted to spread responsibility between agencies for the management of ASB. However, TP2 suggested that we would see tensions between these kinds of policy approaches and the contrasting 'expressive' approaches that are based on a more politicized and emotive response to problems of crime and disorder. As we will see later, the empirical research found little evidence of expressive policies of this sort driving policy at the local level. Indeed, where there was tension between the expressive and the adaptive faces of policy, this was largely between the national (expressive) policy rhetoric, and the local (adaptive) policy responses. These ideas will be developed further in the next chapter.

Southern City Community Safety Partnership Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005

In 2002 the Southern City CDRP published their second strategy document. Having established a structure that reflected a cross-section of the local level agencies in Southern City, it was proposed that the core membership and structure of the Partnership would remain largely unchanged to what had been documented in the earlier 1999 strategy. Representatives consisted of Southernshire constabulary, the local authority, Probation Service and the Health Authority, who as a result of the 1998 CDA had been tasked to 'work together with their partners … and other appropriate agencies to reduce crime and disorder' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1). However, an expansion of their membership to include representatives from the Youth Offending Team, Drugs Action Team and chairs from several forums covering specific issues such as prostitution and domestic abuse, along with a representative member from the voluntary sector was also proposed in this later strategy (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 13). The aim of which was to develop a membership, which would comprise of 'key players within the public, private and voluntary sectors, all of whom have a commitment to and responsibility for community safety' throughout Southern City (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder

Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1). In line with the 1998 CDA, the Partnership sought to develop a rolling three-year strategy, with the aim of guiding the partners in the achievement of their 'shared objectives' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1). In the intervening time as a result of various citywide audits it had become clear there were a number of topics in need of greater attention, this included ASB (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 2).

The second Crime and Disorder Strategy therefore appeared to give formal recognition of the need for a *more targeted* approach to be taken towards tackling problems of crime and disorder and ASB. This had by this stage become a common factor in the approach being taken across the sector, and by the 367 CDRPs that were now in existence (Hughes, 2009). For the city's partners this meant that by having identified that there were various organisational factors that had impacted upon their ability to achieve the targets set by the initial crime and disorder strategy 'that there is potential to achieve much more' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 3). As a result, this later strategy sought to build upon the initial operating framework that had been created in 1999 and introduced a number of new 'organisational structures and disciplines' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p.4). These required additional resources, and improved coordination between the partners in an effort to achieve a common approach, which functioned within a 'newly developed Performance Management Framework' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p.4). It was anticipated that this would enable clear policy actions to be identified and undertaken by the relevant agencies. Such developments would also appear to be part and parcel of the broader need to fit into to a performance management culture, as directed from the Home Office, by which CDRPs across England and Wales showed increasingly convergent types of institutional structures and common targets and goals (see McLaughlin et al, 2001 ref in Hughes 2007).

So as to support the changes made to the existing partnership structure, the Strategy also proposed a refinement of the core group that was to act as an 'executive team', responsible for driving the Partnership forward. One of the main objectives of this smaller core team was to 'focus on putting in place the structures and processes that will ensure the Partnership develops strong competencies and capabilities' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 4), part of which was to direct and prioritise the resources available to the Partnership, whilst having also ensured that the 'partners understand each other's capabilities and are aligned on common objectives' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 4). As a result, a series of measurable targets focused on issues such as ASB were also introduced as part of the Strategy, in an attempt to address inconsistencies of approach between the partners. It was the role of the relevant Partnership Task Groups to oversee the delivery of these targets, as these also acted as their 'priority areas for action' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 7). These also illustrated clear examples of 'enforceable' (or at least monitored) policy 'decisions' and offered the following guidance to practitioners in tackling ASB:

- All anti-social behaviour involving young people, as defined in the Anti Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) protocol, will be addressed using Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABC's) in the first instance.
- To visit and take statements from witnesses within 10 working days from a case conference.
- To issue proceedings to the court within 17 working days of receipt of the relevant information. (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 6)

It is reasonable to argue that the second Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy marked an important turning point in Southern City's policy in tackling ASB as with the emergence of a growing multi agency partnership at the local level, there was also evidence of the mobilisation of key resources within Southern City's statutory agencies, most notably the police and local authority. The first clear evidence of this came with the establishment of a dedicated ASB team in Southernshire constabulary in September 2003.

This would also mark the beginning of what would become a period of 'duopoly' (Hughes, 2007, pp.101-103) between the local police and the local authority in responding to ASB issues, which came to dominate the local 'ASB policy network', to the detriment of some groups (such as youth services). This duopoly also provided the foundations of a 'policy community' as described by Rhodes (1997) in his identification of key types of policy networks. This was a group that was relatively stable and that also had access to resources both within and between these two organisations, which allowed them to ensure that the local ASB agenda could really start to gather pace. It also offers some support to TP4, which suggested that the local formulation and adaptation of ASB policy was shaped by policy networks such as this community and 'intergovernmental networks', which comprise of participants from both national and local government (Rhodes 1981, 1997):

> We decided to set up 2 separate teams for funding and operational arrangements. Now we have two ASB teams mine based in the local authority and … one in the community safety team within the police. They are largely funded by the Safer Stronger Communities Fund, which is delivered through the (CDRP). Two teams do not work co-location based in different parts of the city but work together seamlessly and have a close working relationship, which is fundamental to our success. (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

The creation of this team was preceded by two other important developments within Southernshire Constabulary. Firstly, the creation of an ASB Taskforce, 'established under Neighbourhood Renewal, with all partner agencies striving to improve community links and tackle offenders' (Southernshire Constabulary Annual Report 2002/03, p. 15). The purpose of which was to research existing best practice in achieving the effective reporting and management of incidents of ASB. This initial information gathering exercise lasted for a period of three months (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Second, during the early stages of the project, a police database was established to record incidents of reported ASB across Southern City. This system later formed the basis of the incremental system of response that emerged in Southern City in tackling ASB, which existed alongside weekly case conference meetings that recognised the need to have the 'right agencies around the table' (Interview 005R

Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). The eventual establishment of a dedicated police ASB team resulted from a successful funding application to the CDRP, which drew upon Home Office funds, following the project team's recommendations (Interview 002A Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator). The funds – national and local – that were available to drive ASB policy were widely seen as crucial in encouraging activity during these early stages. As one Senior Police Officer stated: 'Without the money nothing would have happened' (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This provides an interesting perspective for reflection when considering TP1, which concerned the relationship between the national and the local. It suggests that the financial incentives offered by national government on this were absolutely crucial in driving policy forward (amongst other things). The quotation also has important implications for considering the role and dynamics of policy networks and what shapes their effects on policy outcomes (TP4). Here, we see how access to financial resources, unsurprisingly, provided a very powerful driver for some agencies within the ASB policy network. It seems that the police and the local authority, via access to central government funding for this kind of activity, had more resources than some groups (for example, representing youth work). Nevertheless, there were concerns raised about the long-term provision of funds for this and the local authority ASB team, as expressed by a Service Director from within the authority:

> Well I think, I think the dedicated teams and I think this is an issue, and I think that many, many councils will be dealing with this now, in general the anti-social behaviour teams are not mainstreamed, it's not mainstreamed activity. They have been funded with grant funding, and funny money. So in [Southern City] for example, we have got three police coordinators funded through grants, if the grant funding stops, those coordinators won't be there. In the council we have about a quarter of a million pound funding gap for next year, because we rely on grant funding from the Home Office, if that dries up that will have to be picked up by the local taxpayer. So even though it's a number one priority, its never been resourced to the extent that it needs to be and we need to deal with that, particularly in the current finances … Things like for example even though you have got money for the team, there has never been anything in the budget for legal costs. So if you do want to go for an Anti Social Behaviour Order, you need to get someone to pay the legal costs. So I think that it's never been funded properly, so resources wise you know the team is quite lean when you think about the numbers. Three police officers, half a dozen council officers, plus you've then got the housing officers that

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The later strategy document suggested that the CDRP would also continue to maintain their provision of the 'strategic leadership for crime and disorder issues within the city' (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1). This was a level of influence that was no doubt assisted by their financial support for the dedicated police ASB team:

> [D]ue to the ASB legislation, which came to us from government you suddenly had all this pressure on ASBOs and legislative enforcement action, and the ASB team was created in response to that. So [the CDRP] has been involved in setting up that team and the processes, because they work in partnership with the police team, which is funded by us. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager)

The police ASB team consisted of a small group of officers, including civilian staff working as ASB coordinators, who were given responsibility for different geographical sectors of Southern City, working within the force's crime reduction department. As a result of having been the first dedicated ASB team to be established in the city, it was the responsibility of the police lead to not only develop the role of the team in tackling ASB, but to also ensure that the relevant systems and processes were put in place that could support this work. Therefore, a significant element of their work became 'actually working with our partners in other agencies' (Interview 002A Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator) and ensuring that they were forming part of the city's multi agency approach. As a result of these developments the lead police officer described himself as being not only 'the police anti-social behaviour manager, responsible for my team, [but] more importantly responsible for the links that my team has with the other agencies' (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This was a view that was supported by colleagues in the local authority, who suggested that the police 'will be key in helping us to develop the ASB strategy, we work closely with them, with their ASB team' (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager):

> [T]he dominant agencies were the police, I think that would be reasonable to say, I won't say, they were the dominant agency because if you like in the reactive sense because obviously faced with anti-

social behaviour, they were the how can I put it you know were perceived perhaps as the first line of contact, although as it started to evolve we started to get you know better engagement for example with our Housing Services, they came to take a bigger part of the process and the whole. (Interview 012 Chair of CDRP/Southern City Local Councillor)

Police respondents also commented that the formulation of this specialist ASB team had also had a wider impact upon the rest of Southern City's police division, in that ASB became a much higher priority:

> To be quite frank with you, I don't know if you know anything about how calls come into the police. Clearly there's a large number of people who phone the police each year expecting some kind of service, clearly there's a need to prioritise how those calls are dealt with and obviously things that are happening that are life threatening and happening now, crime in progress are all treated as grade one or grade two calls and get a fairly quick prompt police response. Whereas things that are less important or happened some time ago or are reported crime that a delay won't affect get dealt with as a lower level priority. Now anti-social behaviour historically has always been right in that low level category and the police would attend an incident really if they weren't doing anything else. And what we have tried to do is raise the profile, raise the importance, raise the priority. (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

Police respondents also clearly felt that it was the action taken by their organisation that had been the catalyst for a more comprehensive approach being taken to ASB in Southern City. In particular, senior police officers stated explicitly that they had been the lead agency in the development of the local institutional response, although they had worked closely with the local authority once they came on board:

> So we were running with this system and we'd done the project work and implemented it whilst they were still talking about having a City Council ASB team … So I think in terms of that scale our system the police database, the police team, well it has been entirely police led and we have worked closely with the City Council lead in developing the multi agency structure and that's really been in existence now for a year, probably a year fifteen months and is really quite effective. (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).

Despite this strong perception amongst senior police respondents that they had led local developments in ASB policy, it was the case that practitioners within the local authority had already recognised this as an area of priority before the establishment of a specialist

police team. For example, a dedicated post within the existing Housing Services team had been created some time earlier, as they tried to shift the emphasis away from piecemeal-individualised responses from a select few frontline housing officers and towards a more strategic approach. A contributory factor in this was that not all of the housing officers in Southern City had been keen to get involved with the taking of enforcement action, both personally and as a result of competing priorities. Despite senior figures within the council's Neighbourhood and Housing Department having made significant attempts to persuade them to take a role in the delivery of policy action in this manner. At the same time, some senior local authority staff developed plans for the creation of a dedicated team, following the review of their housing management function which suggested that what was needed was a response to ASB that went beyond the remit of housing officers. The decision to create a separate ASB post in Housing Services proved to be a catalyst in the creation of a broader dedicated ASB team within the local authority:

> And at the same time I had one manager in particular on that same estate in [Southern City] saying we can't carry on like this, there are too many big issues in this community around drugs, alcohol, domestic violence, racial harassment, anti-social behaviour to carry on the way we are doing this and in fact what she did was create a specialist post on that team where one person all they did was anti-social behaviour. She selected someone who was an enthusiast who had a real interest in this stuff, who is now actually on this team, the specialist ASB team and that really was the forerunner and a couple of officers did the same within a year or two. They said we need to take this out from the generic work, which this bunch of people do and create a specialist post and that started to work better. We then looked at the models of what was going on in the rest of the country, particularly Manchester, and the best value review confirmed really that that was the way to go. So that's when we set up the team, it took us a little bit longer than I hoped to get that team in place, and they have now been running for heading up for two years now. (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management)

The local authority's dedicated ASB team was thus established in July 2004. Interestingly its launch in the city coincided with that of the Government's national 'Together' campaign, with representatives from the Home Office ASBU having attended Southern City to publicise this. Unlike the city's CDRP, who were primarily responsible for examining the strategic development of policy around the tackling of ASB and funding issues, the City Council's ASB team were much more closely linked with the direct

implementation of local level policy and its formulation. As a result of this, and owing to the high proportion of housing cases, the local authority team took over the enforcement function from the city's CDRP, working in conjunction with the Southernshire Constabulary's dedicated ASB team: 'So the council ASB team is very much focused on interventions to tackle individual perpetrators, individual identified perpetrators' (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager):

> If the case conference has concluded that an ASBO should be sought, the Community Safety Team will instruct the Legal Services division of the City Council. The City Council will make all applications for Orders. Though the application will be made by the City Council, it will in effect be made with the full support of the police. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 10)

In terms of its structure, the local authority team adopted a similar model to that of the police, staffing it with caseworkers given responsibility for different geographical areas of Southern City. The lead for the team, as with the police inspector, was similarly charged with ensuring effective liaison between partner agencies at the local level as part of the policy process, in addition to colleagues at the national level, primarily from the Home Office. The team appeared to embrace elements of national policy, for example, in its explicit advocacy of the need to put 'victims and witnesses at the centre of everything' (Southern City Local Authority 'Together' publicity material). This stance was advocated by the initial manager of the dedicated ASB team in the local authority, who suggested that for them it was entirely about the victims and witnesses to ASB, and ensuring that the ASB which they were experiencing was stopped (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). This has parallels with widely noted shifts in government crime control policies, which had seen the politicization of the crime victim as part of a broader appeal to voters (see Garland 2001, and discussion in Chapter Two). All of this suggests support for TP1, in the sense that at a general level, policy development in the city reflected broader national shifts. In particular, the shift from a primarily enforcement oriented populist discourse around ASB to one that incorporated a range of responses, including enforcement but also emphasising the importance of rehabilitation as well as prosecution. In Southern City it was a sentiment that was further supported in local

documentation, including the local level strategies that had been developed in support of tackling this issue:

> [Southern City] takes a holistic approach to anti-social behaviour. This places the victims of anti-social behaviour at the centre of the solution, recognising the need to strengthen communities, support witnesses and deal with perpetrators through rehabilitation as well as prosecution. (Southern City CDRP Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3)

In terms of the division of the workload between these two operationally focused teams, and the impact upon the delivery of policy actions in Southern City, the case management teams within the local authority and Southernshire Constabulary were each responsible for taking forward any actions that were directly reported to them. Either team was also able to make referrals for formal action, which included those made to other Partnership agencies under the CDRP umbrella. According to a participant - a senior member of the local authority's dedicated ASB team - it was the local authority that was concerned with the most serious forms of ASB (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager), as they concentrated upon the management of those cases where formal prevention measures were required. This was further supported in later strategy documents published by the city's CDRP. 'The City Council's anti-social behaviour team, based within Neighbourhood and Housing Services, tackles the most serious cases of anti-social behaviour where formal action has failed or is not appropriate' (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12). Staff within the Housing Services department of the local authority maintained a local network of contact points across Southern City (Southern City Local Authority, Anti social behaviour. What anti-social behaviour is and how we deal with it, p. 7). Such developments reflected the aspirations of the local authority to retain control over this area of policy, which followed the growth in their expertise relating to community safety and later ASB. This supports the findings of Hughes (2007) which suggested that the issue of ASB has become a new set of problems within the broader remit of community safety governance. At the same time, the dedicated police ASB team retained a wider portfolio including the management of measures such as ASBOs, as they also had to address breaches of these particular interventions:

11.1 The Police upon attending an incident of an alleged breach will have been advised of the existence of an ASBO. The Police will adopt a positive approach at every incident.

11.2 The officer in the case will investigate under normal Police procedures. The investigation may involve interviewing witnesses or the use of surveillance. The standard of evidence must be good and proof is to be "beyond reasonable doubt". The case will be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. The outcome of proceedings will be advised by the police to all appropriate parties. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 11)

The monitoring of formal ASB actions had also become a responsibility for those living in the affected communities. Residents in these areas were encouraged to report upon breaches of ASBOs, as communication with local communities became a crucial element of tackling issues of this nature. At the national level, this had largely resulted from the Government's promotion of their involvement as part of their nationwide 'Together' campaign in tackling ASB. However, this also had an impact locally, and in Southern City the CDRP encouraged the belief that the provision of solutions to tackling problems of ASB was not solely the responsibility of any single agency or organisation. Instead their strategy outlined that 'Residents and tenant, the local authority, victims and witnesses, the police, Social Services, schools, businesses and many other groups and individuals have a role and responsibility to tackle Anti-social Behaviour' (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 11)

Following the creation of dedicated ASB teams in Southern City local agencies implemented a supporting operational structure that was designed to deliver policy action, which was to be jointly managed by the police and local authority. As advised by the CDRP's ASBO Protocol, any decisions taken to obtain an ASBO were to be presented in writing to both the police and an appropriate representative of Southern City's local authority. The initial evidence was to be summarised along with an outline of the action that had been taken up until that point. This would then be presented at the weekly case conference meeting held in the city, and jointly chaired by the ASB managers from Southernshire Constabulary and the local authority. It was at these meetings where decisions regarding formal action were taken (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 6). The overarching aim of this case conference structure was to

provide a consistent citywide approach to incidents of ASB, coordinated by the ASB team representatives:

> The case conference will always include a full consideration of the impact of the use of an ASBO. The use or non-use of an ASBO should be a conscious decision and accompanied by a rationale. The intention will always be to seek consensus on the way forward. Where there is dissent on any given course of action this should be recorded with reasons. Clearly the Magistrates are unlikely to grant an Order where the police and the City Council are not in full agreement that an ASBO should be sought. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 9)

This strategy was intended to replace the former approach – perceived by many respondents as under-resourced, piecemeal and reactive – with a more strategically driven and coordinated approach (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). The establishment of the accompanying systems and processes designed to tackle this issue sought to overcome these previous difficulties. Its design was influenced by the city's local CDRP, as they sought to maintain their role in addressing the enforcement aspect of a national level agenda. The weekly case conference structure was further supported by local multi agency meetings, at which individual cases of ASB were discussed. The aim of which was to 'decide on a course of informal action, consult partner agencies and look for best practice solutions to prevent anti-social behaviour' (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 11). If it was decided that formal action was instead required, representatives at this local meeting were able to refer cases onto the city level case conference for formal action to be agreed upon.

Under this policy, perpetrators of ASB could be subjected to a range of possible interventions organised in a hierarchical model, at the base of which was the use of low-level warning letters. This reflects the 'regulatory pyramid' concept highlighted in the work of Crawford (2009) and discussed earlier in Chapter Two. These letters were primarily produced and sent out by the police to perpetrators of ASB (or their parents in the case of young people). According to one of the police respondents, the database system that was in use by Southernshire Constabulary in support of tackling ASB was

able to generate four types of letter. However, 'we don't necessarily use all four because that can make it quite a drawn out process' (Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator):

> This warning letter will indicate the course of action that is proposed as a consequence of their anti-social behaviour. A copy of the letter will be sent to Legal Services and will be used as further evidence of action taken to abate the behaviour. Indeed it may have this effect, without the need to take court action. The effect of the letter can be monitored whilst evidence is prepared. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 9)

In terms of their success, these low level interventions in the form of warning letters were often sufficient to stop the behaviour at an early stage. Police respondents claimed that these four levels of letter had an 80% success rate in stopping the problematic behaviour. This figure was further supported by the Chief Constable's report of 2009 to Southernshire Police Authority. The aim of this report was to provide an update to members of the overall performance of Southernshire's Command Unit across a range of areas, including the force's approach toward and involvement in tackling ASB:

> [Southern City] is currently one of the top ten trailblazing BCU's in tackling anti-social behaviour … The ASB unit consists of an Inspector and six staff, of which four are funded by [Southern City CDRP]. By providing specialist support to neighbourhood teams the unit scans up to 40,000 ASB incidents a year targeting those incidents where the offender is known. By introducing an incremental system of both formal and informal support and enforcement there has been: 1200 warning letters issued, with 80% success in stopping ASB; Over 65 crack house closures; more than any other BCU outside London (Southernshire Constabulary Police Authority Report of the Chief Constable 2009, p. 2)

According to a Senior Police Officer, this success rate was maintained, as the emphasis remained upon the full utilisation of a preventative, informal agenda by those charged with local level policy delivery. If the warning letter did not succeed they would then look to other informally based measures to tackle the ASB. This included referrals to other local level agencies, such as the youth agencies that could provide support for the perpetrator, or to local agencies working with people with mental health issues, drug or alcohol problems. In tackling ASB in young people, there was also the opportunity to

utilise diversionary activities, particularly by the police. '[W]e try and do as much as we can to stop that behaviour before it gets to the point of them needing an ASBO' (Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator). The next level of intervention available to Southern City's practitioners was more formally based, but was not quite at the level of enforcement. This involved the issuing of Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (henceforth ABCs) to perpetrators of this behaviour (see Chapter Three). As stated in the Draft ASBO Protocol for the city, these were also to be used when tackling ASB caused by young people:

> Acceptable behaviour contracts which are a non-legally binding contract between the perpetrator, his/her family and the partner agencies, are required as the first resort when dealing with young people, i.e. Those under the age of eighteen … Where young people are involved it will invariably be appropriate that diversionary activities and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts should be considered. All agencies should work together to avoid the need for the use of an ASBO for young people. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, pp. 5-7)

Not only were these tools used directly to address the behaviour of individual perpetrators, but according to several interviewees, they were also used as a means of attempting to address some of the underlying issues that may have contributed to the behaviour in the first instance. The option to use more informal measures in this tiered system, particularly in the provision of an initial response to incidents of ASB, enabled practitioners to reduce the use of formal enforcement measures such as ASBOs. This supported the 'holistic problem solving approach' that was advocated by Southern City's CDRP in their later strategy documents (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3). Whilst these 'holistic' approaches were clearly 'managerial' in that they involved a rational strategic approach to problem-solving involving a partnership approach, it is not clear that they can be seen as supporting TP3, which proposed that ASB policy locally would increasingly see the prerogatives of 'risk management' displacing those of rehabilitation and punishment. In its pure form, the 'risk penology' approach suggests that governmental authorities accept that 'the problem' of crime (or here, ASB) cannot be 'solved', and the best that can be done is to manage it as resource-efficiently as possible. Here, however, we see obvious

evidence that local practitioners still held out a clear aim of tackling the problem at source, and that the graded approach – whilst reflecting some features of the 'risk penology' – was still based on the optimistic aim that in some cases at least, the fundamental causes of ASB could be tackled.

For the police based ASB team, 'the aim is to stop anti-social behaviour at the earliest possible stage. A variety of interventions are used, including informal warnings and contracts and referrals to partner agencies' (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12). A Senior Police Officer who was interviewed several times during the fieldwork, clearly perceived the use of these more informal low level interventions as having been successful:

> [O]ur objective is to stop anti-social behaviour, and if we can stop it by getting someone some help or tell them what they are doing is wrong then that is what we will do. So we'll try informal action on a partnership level and most ABCs or all ABCs would be done as a partnership not just by the police … And then when ABCs don't work, if they don't work and again about 60% do work and those that are done by RJ most of them do work and don't get breached … And then if that doesn't work we will be referring them onto case conference and considering what formal action we ought to take. We try all we can to resolve thing at the lowest possible level, and an increased number of our cases are being resolved at that level. So there are a few less ASBOs being taken out now than there were three or four years ago and there are many more lower level interventions taking place. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

However, in order for these informal measures to prove effective in tackling ASB, at the top of this hierarchical model of interventions there needed to be a credible threat of formal enforcement action, usually in the form of an ASBO. Once again, this demonstrates evidence of the regulatory pyramid approach involving increasing severity of punishment for each stage at which compliance is not achieved (see Crawford 2009). Should the use of warning letters and informal contracts such as ABCs fail to be effective in addressing ASB, then the partners must be prepared 'the threat of a formal action being at the top of the tree there, and where warning letters have failed, and informal contracts have failed and the behaviour persists we must be prepared to take a strong line and take the formal action' (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This

was a sentiment that was echoed by the team manager of the ASB team in the city's local authority, who suggested that owing to the way in which interventions such as ASBOs are monitored in the city and their ability to tackle breaches in an effective manner that 'people know that getting an ASBO is a very serious order, need to know that we are watching them and we feed that back to them we continually review and feed back on how people are behaving … We do always inform that if they do breach we do prosecute for that and they will be brought before the court. So it's that clear consistent approach that is essential' (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). These were sentiments that were echoed in Southernshire Constabulary's annual report of 2003/04. This not only highlighted the creation of the force's dedicated ASB team, but it also illustrated the city's strengthening approach toward tackling issues of this nature, "this is not a 'softly softly' approach though. There is always an enforcement angle alongside the intervention. A person cannot be anti-social in [Southern City] and get away with it" (Superintendent of Southernshire Constabulary 2004, p. 16). However, there was still some divergence between the approaches of these practitioners, mainly around the use of formal action in tackling cases of ASB:

> That may be a little bit where I conflict with my local authority colleagues whose role is about preparing for formal action, and they get very excited about taking formal action against somebody. Well I would rather not take someone to case conference and find another way of resolving it to be quite frank, and I think by portraying the national lead I think the Government's got to be particularly careful about the impression it gives of the need for formal action. Yes we have got to be prepared to take formal action if it's absolutely necessary but we have got to have a balanced approach. (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

This quotation provides a fascinating insight into the tensions within the local 'politics' of ASB, as well as tensions between the national and the local. With regard to TP1, which suggested crudely that local policy would largely follow national directives, it provides empirical evidence as to why this might not be so straightforward. When powerful local organisations in the ASB network such as the police are prepared to publicly challenge a perceived national over-emphasis on 'enforcement' to the detriment of other approaches, then TP1 seems immediately less straightforward. Similarly, it

provides evidence in support of the tension between 'adaptive' and 'expressive' approaches within the local policy network (see TP2), with perhaps the local authority (at least in the view of the police) being more inclined to an expressive support for enforcement, when the police (perhaps counter-intuitively) were suggesting that other methods might be more appropriate and more effective. It might be speculated, despite the lack of activism on the part of local elected representatives, that local authority officials still felt more driven towards actions that might have wider electoral appeal, whereas perhaps the police felt more sheltered from 'democratic' influences.

Southern City Anti Social Behaviour Strategy 2005-2008

In 2005 the local CDRP Executive published its ASB strategy for the next three-year period, which extended until 2008. This formed part of the CDRP's broader Crime Disorder and Drugs Strategy for the same period. Its publication followed a consultation period of approximately six months, which involved both public agencies and the City Council's Anti Social Behaviour Select Committee. As has been highlighted in the previous discussions of the city's initial strategy documents, the partners continued to aspire to a safer city where 'communities will be crime-free, peaceful and orderly, where clear standards of behaviour are understood' (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 5). As with previous strategies, this was informed by the results of the 2004 citywide audit, which by this point contained a section concerned with the levels of ASB in the city that was also informed by the national one-day count of ASB that had taken place in September 2003. This suggested that a total of 767 reports of ASB had been made in Southern City, the tackling of which had taken up 40% of total police activity on this particular day (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 7). Based upon a MORI Survey that had been conducted across all of the 'Trailblazer' areas, which included Southern City, it was evidenced that ASB continued to be rated as 'relatively high as a problem' by local residents, which ranked comparatively alongside other much larger cities across the country (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 7). Interestingly, the

'Trailblazer' authorities recorded a higher than national average in the rating of ASB as a problem, despite the application of targeted resources in tackling this issue. This appeared to provide support to those who had argued that in areas where additional funding was received for ASB control, there was a danger that too much time would be spent on bidding for this, and not enough on actually ensuring that the initiatives had been implemented:

> This all comes back to proper evaluation of initiatives … what happened for a period of time certainly during my time, is that you would invest a disproportionate amount of time bidding for money … for funds for initiatives and the (RGO) they would incur costs on being the arbiter of that. You then have to spend a lot of time justifying what you spent it on, but what we never did was spend enough time evaluating. So government are after quick wins, so lets find five million quid to spread around the country on initiative a. It's like saying after a day that's working now lets roll it out, when you know … it's initiative overload … and anti-social behaviour is a good example of that … lets just embed what works to make sure we know that it works first. So whether it's anti-social behaviour, acceptable behaviour whatever, give yourself enough time and of course government doesn't work like that. Ministers need a quick win so that I can go back to the Treasury and get more money for our department.
> (Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander)

The approach taken toward tackling ASB by the city's practitioners by this later stage continued to fit in with wider national policy appeal of 'joined-up', multi-agency approaches which while predating the period of New Labour (see Blagg, 1988, Crawford, 1997, Gilling, 1997) was certainly consolidated in the decade of the Labour administration (Gilling, 2007). More particularly this had been influenced by the Government's 'Together' campaign, and was now based upon a central partnership between the local CDRP, Home Office and the public (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3). In contrast to the previous task group structure that had supported the operational delivery of the local crime and disorder strategy, by this later period an ASB delivery group had been created which had been given 'delegated responsibility' by the local CDRP for tackling ASB in Southern City. This consisted of membership from Southernshire Constabulary and the local authority, and was chaired by the head of the Council's Housing Management section. The same individual also had responsibility for the city's ASB Network Group,

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which included broader representation from not only the statutory and voluntary sectors, but also from local community groups. The purpose of this group was to enable an exchange of best practice, in a similar way to that of the structure of local multi agency meetings that had been set up across the city as part of the development of an operational structure. This was designed to support the delivery of ASB policy actions, of which there had been several since the last strategy, including new legislation in the form of the Police Reform Act 2002 and the Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003, which had culminated in the provision of additional specific powers for practitioners in tackling issues of ASB (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3).

The response of practitioners to ASB issues in the city appeared to continue the theme of previous strategies, with the emphasis placed upon the adoption of a 'problem solving' approach. As noted earlier, this suggests a degree of support for elements of TP2 (which suggested that we would see a tension between adaptive and expressive elements at the local level), and of TP3 (which predicted a growing influence for instrumental 'risk-driven' policies to manage ASB). However, again we should note that the adoption of an instrumental and managerial approach was not sufficient to support the idea that a 'risk penology' had come to characterise local ASB policy, since there remained a clear commitment to more 'traditional' penological goals of punishment on the one hand, and rehabilitation on the other. The local approach was underlined by the need to ensure that all informal measures had been exhausted prior to a case being referred to the city's weekly case conference for formal action, which it is deemed in this later strategy document to be 'proportionate to stop the anti-social behaviour' (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12):

> Since the inception of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, [Southern City] had adopted a problem-solving approach. Whilst this involves taking formal action through the powers available in law, it is underpinned by informal methods. The holistic approach places the victims of anti-social behaviour at the centre of the solution, recognising the need to strengthen communities, support witnesses and deal with perpetrators through rehabilitation as well as prosecution. (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12)

As part of this strategy aimed at combating ASB through the use of informally based measures as a tool of first resort, this later document also encouraged at least at the level of rhetoric (Hughes, 2009) increased involvement from members of affected local communities. As a result of newly introduced legislation, the partnership by this stage could offer an increased range of initiatives to assist in this process, which included an ASB Hotline that was monitored by the local authority ASB team, a product of the Government's 'Together' campaign, and the provision of public training and awareness sessions. As part of this it was also possible for Mediation to be utilised as a means of settling neighbour disputes in particular, before cases were escalated. An element of this renewed emphasis upon community involvement in tackling issues of ASB locally, was the recognised need of the Partnership to increase public confidence in the measures being utilised by practitioners in addressing ASB. It was anticipated that this would be achieved through the introduction of a range of further initiatives, which included the city's YIP and YISP programmes that targeted young people, and a renewed police presence across communities as a result of the creation of Police Community Support Officers, a role introduced following the passing of the Police Reform Act (see Chapter Three). A further key element of this Strategy was the recognition of the need to improve environments, with the creation of a dedicated Graffiti Partnership, the use of CCTV in both the city centre and other identified local centres and the introduction of the Clean and Green project, which encouraged local community groups to address illegal activities, including fly-tipping and dog fouling. All of this suggested a broadening in the scope of methods being used by the city's practitioners in order to tackle issues of ASB locally.

More recent developments

By the end of the fieldwork, it was clear that practitioners in Southern City had begun to sense a decline in the emphasis being placed upon the tackling of ASB by those at the national level. This was associated primarily with the change in Prime Minister, from Tony Blair to the former Chancellor Gordon Brown, which had occurred during the period of the fieldwork. Respondents sensed that ASB was not 'such a hot topic

politically as it used to be' (Interview 021 Southern City Local MP), as increasingly other issues took priority in the Government's political agenda. These included issues of immigration and economic affairs (Interview 021 Southern City Local MP). At the same time, there was a clear decline in the levels of policy talk associated with ASB. Where there were references to ASB, these often came in a context that hinted at the adoption of a softer stance by those at the national level (Millie 2009). The previously 'shrill tone' of the ASB agenda under Blair's leadership, appeared to be on the wane (Hughes 2007, p. 120). This illustrates the significance of 'policy talk' in that it can have real impacts in setting the tone and context for actual policymaking (Pollitt 2001). Whilst there was resistance on many levels to the more punitive approaches suggested in Blair's original rhetoric, the power of the political discourse made it difficult to resist at least elements of this approach. The new Prime Minister also appeared to distance himself from Blair's approach to this issue. The final signifier of change at the national level came with the movement of the Government's ASBU, away from its previous location within the Home Office, to the Department for Children Families and Services. The net result of this was to give impetus to a shift in focus, which had begun with the Government's previous 'Respect' programme.

Central to this shift was a reorientation of aims, away from enforcement and punishment, and more towards prevention and support for parenting and families, and young people in general. This represented both a symbolic and practical reconfiguration of ASB policy away from a punitive focus, which had a clear impact upon partnership working at the local level. This further brings into question the validity of TP3, which suggested that ASB policy would increasingly see risk management becoming the dominant focus at the expense of rehabilitation (or punishment), and that policy in other areas would become 'governed by ASB'. By contrast, these shifts demonstrated a move in the opposite direction, with ASB policy increasingly governed by reference to other areas of social policy. The statutory partners in Southern City recognised the need for representatives from children, youth and families sector to become more engaged in the formulation of local level policy regarding ASB:

Although there is still quite a strong emphasis around tackling ASB head on, there's been a slight softening of that is my take on it with a much greater emphasis around preventative work … there's a much greater emphasis around not just challenging young people but working with young people and families and a much stronger emphasis on parenting. And we have seen that shift in emphasis, which has been accompanied by a shift on funding as well. So more money going into the parenting arena then we had previously had and much greater emphasis on the family intervention programmes and projects around the country … So I think at national level spilling down to local level that's probably the biggest change that I have seen over the last year or two. (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services)

These shifts seemed to reduce the demands placed upon practitioners to deliver the previous enforcement-based elements of policy action, which again had encouraged more local partners to accept their role in the tackling of ASB. This came at a time when practitioners had sought to make full use of government legislation on this issue, as local level policy was also being formulated. However, the use of enforcement action in relation to ASB had not disappeared altogether. In fact, New Labour in its later phase of government had continued to seek to expand the breadth of the powers available to practitioners (see Chapter Three). By contrast though, this approach was accompanied by an explicitly more preventative set of policy options, as the Government seemingly sought a more balanced approach. This was possibly due to the emergence of local resistances to national level policies, and an increasingly more negotiated stance being developed in relation to issues such as ASB, noted elsewhere by commentators across localities (see for example Edwards and Hughes, 2008). 'Before I think it was very much central government saying to local government this is what you are going to do, now it's more central government talking to local government about how we are going to deliver what's needed to be delivered from central policy so we have methods of passing things back up through the same mechanisms' (Interview 013 Southern City Local Authority Programme Director for Partnerships and Localities).

At the level of Southern City, this was manifested in proposals for increased amounts of support work to be undertaken by those at the local level, as national policymakers looked 'to parallel legal actions with much more stuff around support work' (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing

Services). These shifts provide an interesting perspective on TP2, which suggested that we would see ongoing tension between the 'adaptive' approach and more enforcement-oriented kinds of policy associated with expressive approaches. Rather, what emerged was an interesting admixture in which enforcement and other approaches were combined in a complimentary way, at least in theory.

Later local level strategy documents that were produced in Southern City were underpinned by a need to 'provide support for those at risk of anti-social behaviour' and the provision of targeted support services for perpetrators' (Southern City CDRP, Final Draft. Anti social behaviour strategy 2008-11. Promoting positive behaviour, p. 11). The levels of support that were offered by Southern City's practitioners included access to a range of professional, statutory or voluntary organisations, all of which could assist perpetrators with advice and guidance on a range of topics, particularly in relation to the challenges that were being faced by young people (Southern City Local Authority Care and Safer Communities Scrutiny Commission minutes 18th November 2008, p. 4). However, it was recognised that it may be difficult to secure positive engagement with these range of services. In an effort to combat this, practitioners were also able to utilise more formal methods, which included the use of Individual Support Orders and Parenting Orders (see the work of Sadie Parr, 2006; 2009). Both of which 'can be applied to ensure people engage with support' (Southern City Local Authority Care and Safer Communities Scrutiny Commission minutes 18th November 2008, p. 4). Thus, the importance of having addressed the underlying causes of ASB rather than simply punishing the perpetrators (the seeds of which were seen in the 'Respect' Agenda), was increasingly visible, both nationally and locally.

The impact of this more preventative era upon those operating at the local level in Southern City enabled local level practitioners with a similar viewpoint to begin to take more of an active role in this process. This was a shift that was supported by the Chair of the ASB Delivery Group, (which had delegated responsibility from the local CDRP for tackling issues of ASB in Southern City), who suggested that those who favoured a more supportive means of tackling ASB had begun to have more of a voice in this setting, as

the balance was gradually restored between 'stick and carrot approaches' (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services). By the latter stages of the research fieldwork (2008), practitioners had also begun to formulate the next ASB strategy for the city, which covered the following three-year period from 2008 onwards. The ASB team manager from the City Council was responsible for refreshing this document, which at the time of their second interview was out to consultation:

> I hope it builds on the previous ASB strategy … for the city, and the focus as I said is the triple track approach of support, enforcement and early intervention, maybe putting more play on that than there has been the case in the past. Certainly we spoke last time we met around the evolution of this central government agenda being enforcement led. I think the fact that we have sort of broken down these barriers between different responsibilities for different aspects you know of that prevention work locally, we now work I hope because of the national agenda has given us an opportunity to work much more closely with our colleagues in Children and Young Peoples Services, the traditional social services if you like, we sort of share common objectives so I think all of that is certainly considered within the new ASB strategy. (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

In Southern City, it was clear that a 'two man band' style of response had previously emerged in the tackling of ASB, which was initially dominated and led by key senior police officers and local authority officials in the city. Whilst initial policies had emphasised the importance of robust enforcement action (e.g. in the Streetwise project, see Chapter Six), this was later moderated by the renewed emphasis that was placed upon the importance of prevention and the option of the use of less formal interventions. Such developments did not come without criticism locally. Some practitioners reported that this had emanated from some local residents who were attracted to the highly publicised, more overtly enforcement-based stance of practitioners that had been taken in cities such as Manchester. This was reflected in local media reporting, with an article from the Southern City Post about the use of dispersal orders in the city reporting that whilst '[o]pponents complain that the hammer-to-crack-a-nut approach criminalises all teenagers without proof of their intent, while residents in other areas believe the powers don't go far enough' (Allen 2007). This provides an interesting perspective in relation to

TP2, which suggested that the tension between adaptation and expressive (populist) policies would characterise local ASB policymaking. Whilst some such tensions were observable, there was little evidence of a strongly driven 'populist' policy (in terms of promoting tough enforcement action) at the local level (although there were isolated examples of such approaches, perhaps exemplified in the Streetwise Project – see the next Chapter). However, the local media source quoted above demonstrated that populist pressures did not always work to support punitive enforcement action. Whilst this was the case in some areas, in others it appears that popular opinion was critical of such approaches for their potential exclusionary impact on young people. Some local policy actors in Southern City expressed support for the city's refusal to adopt wholesale the enforcement approaches of some high profile local authorities. There was even a hint of pride that the local approach had been subject to public criticism by a leading councillor from Manchester, who at the time was also acting in a national level capacity:

> We got some stick from Bill Pitt about that in his sort of role that he played nationally where he was saying well I don't agree with that, that's not the Government's policy. We said well it may not be the Government's policy but it is our approach in [Southern City] and we are content to stick to it, and that's where this the voice if you like of the people saying you can't just do enforcement, you can't just do enforcement, you have got to have other things otherwise you are potentially driving young people into a particular route. (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services)

This raises questions about TP1, which suggested that we should expect substantively similar ASB policies to develop at the local level, driven by the broader influences at national level. Although national influences were clearly extremely important, there remained very significant room for local resistance and policy formulation, and thus variation.

By the later stages in Southern City, it was apparent that practitioners were continuing to use those systems for tackling ASB that had been created during the early stages in the formulation of a response to this issue. The only difference being that these working practices had now become more embedded than they had been during the earliest interviews undertaken (circa. 2005). It was suggested by a participant with a background

in the police, that the embedding of ASB as a 'theme', had been the effect of New Labour's previous two terms in government. It was their opinion that this had resulted from the continual exchange between nationally led initiatives such as 'Together' and 'Respect' on the one hand, and local policies on the other. However, this respondent added: '[w]hether it was intended to happen that way or whether that was a coincidental output I don't know' (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). In the case of Southern City specifically, it was more than likely that this had had a contributing effect upon the growing establishment of ASB working practices, owing to the previously received national recognition in the form of both 'Trailblazer' and 'Respect' area status. As a result Southern City had been held up as an example of best practice regarding tackling ASB. In order to maintain this, there needed to be full engagement with these national level programmes, and the development of a coordinated local approach. This was especially due to the range of additional pilot projects that practitioners had been charged with undertaking, as a result of this extra level of national scrutiny:

> Like I have said it always has been a cross cutting theme ASB, and I don't see that that's changed in any way if anything the fact that there is no longer a 'Respect' Taskforce within the Home Office, has helped facilitate the embedding of that culture in all those council, central government departments. (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

It was therefore this cycle of practice, which in Southern City had led to national recognition of practitioner efforts in relation to tackling ASB that had seen it becoming a fixed element of the local agenda. There was also a pressure placed upon local agencies to maintain a national reputation, having achieved 'Trailblazer' status, been identified as a 'Respect' zone and been a 'Beacon' authority. All of which had culminated in Southern City's local authority in particular having received a lot of attention from both those at the national level, and also from other areas that sought to learn from their examples of best practice in this field. The institutional framework and related systems that had been put in place during the early years of the new millennium remained largely unchanged during the years that followed. In the words of one police interviewee (who had been involved in the initial creation of these mechanisms), these had proven to be 'very sound

work, and what we set up then is still appropriate and relevant … [It's] the same policy and structure that we set up in 2003' (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).

Policy 'Actions'

In Pollitt's (2001) terms, policy 'action' is defined as actual policy 'outcomes' in the form of concrete examples of policy implementation 'on the ground'. Of course, this still leaves some room for confusion between what might count as a policy action at the local level (potentially ranging from the adoption of a clear local policy as a response to national legislation, to the actual policy 'outcomes' in individual cases). For current purposes, one useful indicator of policy 'action' in the arena of ASB control could be the numbers of ASBOs (or other formal interventions) issued in a local authority area. This is not to argue that this is the only indicator of action. Rather, that for current purposes it provides a useful (and measurable) proxy that can be compared against shifts in policy talk and policy decisions.

As Chapter Three has already outlined, we know that in the years immediately following the CDA, there was evidence of low take up of the ASBO across England and Wales. Home Office statistics showed that only 317 in total had been issued between April 1999 and March 2001 (House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry into Anti Social Behaviour 2004). This perhaps offered an indication as to the growing unpopularity of this measure amongst practitioners locally, which was not just confined to those within agencies concerned with young people, despite acknowledgement that this was a sector of the population that had come to be particular targets of ASB management (Millie 2009, p. 115). As noted above, in Southern City many practitioners expressed a dislike of the Government's enforcement led approach. This group included Social Landlords who have seemingly shown a preference in these cases for the use of non-enforceable measures, such as the ABC, indicating perhaps that 'the appetite for punitive measures is not as great as the plethora of enforcement legislation might suggest' (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 198). As Table Two shows, this impression was certainly borne out by the

figures on ASBO usage that were issued in Southern City during the period of interest of the study. In the first four years of the drive on ASB policy, relatively low numbers of ASBOs were issued. There was a pattern of increasing usage of ASBOs during the middle part of the decade, increasing from 10 in 2002 to a peak of 89 in 2004. There was then a steady decrease in the numbers of ASBOs issued, falling back down to 29 in 2007 (see also Hughes 2007, p. 124 and his noting of similar peaks in ASBO usage).

Table Two: ASBO usage in Southern City

Year	ASBOs issued
2000	12
2001	19
2002	10
2003	31
2004	89
2005	61
2006	34
2007	29

As noted in Chapter Three, the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act was accompanied by a national ASB campaign called 'Together'. Its aim was to encourage communities to develop a more robust response in tackling ASB, but in a broader sense it also aimed to address some of the national variations in approach that had begun to emerge. This regional variation in policy *action* - the actual implementation of the new measures - was recognised by interviewees in Southern City. As we discussed in Chapter Three, local authorities such as Manchester City Council became recognised nationally for their high levels of ASBO usage, often to the exclusion of other more informally based measures: 'They [Manchester] have gone for broke on them, they have served hundreds and hundreds of ASBOs' (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management). This claim was further supported by Home Office statistics, which by the time of this particular interview in 2006 had seen Manchester having issued a total of 1464 ASBOs, making them second only to London (Home Office Online 2006). Such comments were made with a degree of disapproval, and it was interesting that both police and local authority officials in Southern City were so keen to distance themselves from what they saw as an overly punitive approach. In interview, this contrast in practice was regularly raised by research participants: 'we may have just topped a hundred [ASBOs] I don't know, but we've not gone for broke on them, we have been much more select about how we have used them, we have gone much more for informal interventions rather than for legal action' (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management). Even though Home Office statistics suggested that Southern City had in fact issued 256 ASBOs by 2006, significantly higher than the perception of this particular respondent, the rate of use of this intervention in the city was much lower compared to the rates seen in cities such as Manchester.

As we noted above, the police respondents were equally explicit in distancing themselves from an over-reliance on ASBOs and enforcement approaches generally. In contrast to the claims of some influential commentators on police-driven approaches to community safety (see, for example, Coleman et al, 2009, Gilling, 2007), these local police actors, in the field of ASB management at least, were supportive of the preventive turn and adaptive problem solving. In Southern City they claimed very high levels of 'success'

for less formal interventions, such as warning letters and ABCs, based upon the case not having been returned to them within a six month period. The official reporting of the use of these interventions by Southernshire Constabulary indicated that a total of 282 ABCs were issued between April 2004 and March 2006 (Southernshire Constabulary Online). In discussing the use of these measures, local authority officials also claimed that the ABC, in practice, had a 'massive success rate' (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management). Despite these very self-conscious attempts by leading police and local authority officials to present Southern City policy in a certain light, the actual figures for total ASBOs issued only partly supported their impressions. There does seem to have been, contrary to some of the claims made, a quite significant increase in ASBOs during the early years of the new Millennium. These figures remained substantially lower than some of the more enthusiastic local authority supporters of ASBOs nationally, such as Manchester where in 2004 they issued 430 ASBOs (Home Office Online 2009) but at the same time Southern City's rates were higher than many other local authorities' figures, of the same period. This caused them to rank at the bottom of the top 10 of ASBO usage across criminal justice area in 2004, alongside other larger cities, before there was a marked decline in the use of this particular intervention from the following year onwards (Home Office Online 2009). Despite this there was still a stark contrast between the levels of ASBO usage recorded in Southern City and the area at number nine, as they compared favourably with other similarly sized areas.

Whilst the picture of declining use of ASBOs was certainly clear, even at the end of the period considered, the numbers of ASBOs issued annually remained two to three times higher than in the years at the start of the decade. In terms of the policy 'talk' of leading police and local authority officials, and the policy decisions as manifested in local policy statements and documents, there was a clear attempt to distance Southern City from the more extreme models of enforcement associated with local authorities such as Manchester. But in terms of one measure of policy 'actions' – e.g. numbers of ASBOs actually issued – the picture was not quite so clear.

Of those ASBOs that were issued in the city, it was reported by several respondents involved in the fieldwork that the breach rates had been relatively low. For a local authority ASB officer this was explained by the 'selective' approach that had been taken to the use of this particular measure (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team). Practitioners sought to 'look at cases we tend to know we can tackle, deal with, resolve and it's rare that they get breached, we do get breaches there's no doubt about it but we don't get that many' (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team). However, this offered a contrasting picture to that which was occurring nationally during the study. Local media reporting on this issue in 2008 further supported these findings, following the release of Home Office statistics:

> Yobs … are breaching their anti – social behaviour orders more than three times each, government figures reveal.
>
> Records released by the Home Office show the number of orders (Asbos) issued in the region almost halved in 12 months, from 61 in 2005 to 34 the following year.
>
> But despite the small number handed out by officials, offenders broke the conditions of their orders on 109 occasions in 2006, an average of 3.2 times each. (Southern City Post, May 2008)

By 2010 Home Office statistics were suggesting that nationwide the breach rate against the use of ASBOs was around 56% (Home Office Online 2011). In an attempt to counter negative perceptions regarding this figure, Home Office staff used this as an opportunity to suggest that what a high ASBO breach rate in fact suggested was that these orders 'have teeth' as "[a]pproximately 55 per cent of adults that breach an ASBO are given immediate custody" (Southern City Post February 2007). It is possible to apply the same data locally, in order to identify breach rates of ASBOs by criminal justice area. In the case of Southern City this again presented a conflicting picture to that offered by local respondents involved in this study, with a breach rate of 49.3% having been recorded in this area alone by 2010. By this point, Southern City had issued 410 ASBOs, of which 202 had been breached at least once. Out of these 202 breached orders, 155 had been breached on more than one occasion. This suggested that each ASBO issued in Southern City was breached on average 4.6 times (Home Office Online 2011). It is this apparent

decline in the numbers of ASBOs being issued in Southern City, alongside increased breach levels that potentially provides evidence of Garland's (2001) politics of denial, by supporting the idea that crime will not be effectively tackled through the use of punitively based measures alone.

Overall, then, in terms of policy actions there was evidence of a decline in the use of formal measures following the peak in ASBO figures in 2004. In Southern City this saw the rate of ASBOs issued decline from 89 at its peak, to 61 the following year in 2005. The lowest point in these rates came in 2007 when only 29 ASBOs were issued in Southern City, a quarter of what it had been in 2004 (Home Office Online 2009). There had been a similar decline in the use of other comparatively formal measures such as dispersal orders. These are place-based sanctions brought into force by the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act (S30-36), which can be used by the police to 'exclude groups of two or more persons from a designated area, where their behaviour or presence is likely to be perceived by others as anti-social' (Hadfield et al. 2009, p. 469). It was suggested that the previous use in Southern City of this particular measure had proven to be more of a 'temporary stop gap exercise of additional powers' and it was instead recognised that what was actually required was a problem solving plan (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Even though there had been some examples of positive publicity surrounding the use of dispersal powers in the city. These included cited examples of the use of these measures specifically in Southern City, in promotional material published as part of the Government's later 'Respect' campaign:

> When the community was consulted as to whether a dispersal area was necessary in the [an] area of [Southern City], the resounding reply was 'why aren't you using it already?' Since the dispersal was implemented, it has been hugely effective in dispersing groups of problematic individuals in an area where the police often face conflict. (Southernshire Constabulary ASB coordinator)

In terms of the distribution of their use, following several surveys of local CDRPs by the Home Office between 20 January 2004 and 31 March 2006, 1065 areas nationally had in total been designated as dispersal zones. However, within this timeframe there had also been a corresponding 42% decline in their use across the period 2005-06, the only ASB

related intervention to witness such a drop in its usage nationally (Crawford and Lister 2007, p.10). At the same time, in contrast to other measures such as ABCs, ASBIs, demotion orders, crackhouse closures and parenting interventions across the same period saw dramatic increases in their usage (Home Office 2007a). 'The downturn in use also reflects a more general preference among many community safety and ASB practitioners to prioritize preventative approaches over enforcement' (Crawford and Lister 2007, p. 10). This was a pattern that was similarly reflected in Southern City, where the initial take up of the use of this intervention between April 2004 and March 2005 saw 29 group dispersals imposed, a figure that was more than halved the following year with only 13 group dispersals having been issued (Southernshire Constabulary Online).

In terms of the other measures that were in use in Southern City to tackle ASB, the use of ASBIs continued to be favoured over full ASBOs, as these had proven to be both costly and difficult to obtain (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Nationally this was supported by data gathered across local authority landlords. In the area covered by Southern City, this suggested that across the period 2008-2010 a total of 174 ASBIs had been granted (Wall 2010, p. 14). Several respondents reported that the decline of the use of the ASBO since its peak in 2004 was also related to the growing number of options open to practitioners in dealing with this issue. Perhaps particularly in those cases involving young people where there had been a continuing preference against the use of ASBOs wherever possible:

> [W]e'll use the power like we would use lots of powers in local Government, when it's appropriate and proportionate to the situation. So there's been no loss in confidence in the legal actions, we still do loads of legal actions in [Southern City] wherever we need to that's the bedrock if you like. (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services)

This illustrates that by the end of the study, the shift at the national level combined with changes in the approach of local level practitioners, had in fact enabled a potentially larger group of partners to legitimately consider other options in addressing ASB. The overtly enforcement-based approach of the initial New Labour government had begun to decline (Burney, 2005, Hughes, 2007), and practitioners in favour of a softer approach

were given the opportunity to become more involved in local level strategy formulation, and in making an active contribution to the process of shaping this:

> Where there was the people who were on there that would have been there to represent the softer approach if you like, the working with, providing the support and stuff, their voice had been heard but because the enforcement role nationally was in the ascendancy very much, lots of legislation coming through and high expectations on the 'Trailblazers' and all those sort of things, which Louise and her team had launched, that voice wasn't heard quite so strongly. I think with the change in emphasis that voice is coming through a bit stronger, that's what I was beginning to see. Now, I haven't been there for these last eight/nine months but my expectation is that will be, that will have a greater representation in the new ASB strategy that [Southern City] produces, or is about to produce in the next month or two. My expectation is that will have a bigger voice, a bigger say in the strategy. The enforcement will still be there, but that other voice will have grown up had a chance to mature a bit more I suppose if you like. So we will see more stuff around support plans for individuals, the parenting stuff, the working with challenged families and things like that, perhaps in a way that we didn't quite see before. So that was probably the biggest shift in emphasis that I was beginning to see in that 8 months or so last year. (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services)

This enabled Southern City's practitioners to broaden their approach toward the tackling of ASB, incorporating the more widely received methods that now increasingly coincided with the national level agenda on this issue. In Southern City this resulted in the use of alternative interventions, such as restorative justice, which was a method that was increasingly being used by the police as an additional means of settling cases of ASB (in part building on the initiatives noted by Burney (2005) as emanating from Thames Valley and its police force as well building on the longer tradition of restorative justice programmes across the world, McLaughlin et al (2003)). It was an approach that also reflected the newly developed national level desire for whole households to be actively engaged in this process. This was as opposed to just addressing individual behaviour, when tackling incidents of this nature (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). The use of these measures was based upon reparations being made to individual victims, as the role of affected communities and residents remained pivotal having influenced the development of the practitioner response toward tackling ASB. It was also through the use of these measures that practitioners within Southern City once

again received national recognition for their efforts, something that had been a key feature of their early responses to the issue of ASB. On this occasion, Southernshire Constabulary became one of nine pilot areas for the Home Office, running Youth Restorative Disposals (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Practitioners in this area were seen to have adopted a pioneering approach, not only in addressing the behaviour of young people in this manner, but also in signalling in part a departure away from a performance culture orientation for the police (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). The city's local authority had also received further national recognition, as they had been awarded 'Beacon' authority status by the latter stages of the fieldwork:

> [A]lthough a lot of people think of RJ s a pink and fluffy option I don't think of it like that, I think of it as a much harder option where people are actually coming to terms with what they have done and having an opportunity to put things right and 'repair the harm' as we say in restorative justice terms. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

There was also evidence in the local media to support the extension of this recognition to individual practitioners in the city. This was reported in the Southern City Post in 2007, when an ASB coordinator who had worked in close cooperation with a resident to enact an ASBO against a nuisance neighbour had received an award from Prime Minister Tony Blair: [they] have been to Central Hall, Westminster, where Tony Blair presented certificates to a handful of anti-social behaviour co-ordinators from across the country for their work with the public. Mr Blair said: "Across the country, communities are making use of the powers we have given them to curb anti-social behaviour. Anti-social behaviour co-ordinators have played a vital role in this transformation - working with local people to identify problems and solutions" (Southern City Post March 2007).

Key policy developments

National level

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
New Labour begin their second year in government	Between April 1999 and December 2000 241 ASBOs were issued nationally	New Labour win the 2001 General Election

Publication of the Police Reform White Paper | 2002 Police Reform Act | 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act

2003 Together campaign created | 28th October new measures announced by Blair and Blunkett to extend the use and definition of ASBOs | New Labour win the 2005 General Election

2005 Clean Neighbourhoods & Environment Act

Peak in ASBOs issued, 4122 in a calendar year 2204 of which were breached, the highest recorded level | 2006 Police & Justice Act

Respect campaign launched | 10th May Tony Blair resigned as Prime Minister |

Local level

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Crime and Disorder strategy published for the period 1999-2002

ASBO Strategy published

Growth in resident support for a formalised asb approach to be developed by practitioners | Between April 1999 and December 2000 12 ASBOs were issued in Southern City | Crime and Disorder Audit undertaken in Southern City | Crime and Disorder reduction strategy published covering the period 2002-2005

August 2002 Streetwise Project begins in Southern City | Police ASB team created

Southern City becomes a trailblazer authority

Community Safety Partnership and Drugs Action Team merge | February ASBO Protocol published

July Local authority ASB team created

Government's Together campaign officially launched in Southern City | March Tackling anti social in Southern City - A strategy for 2005 to 2008 published | 80% success rate achieved in using warning letters to stop anti social behaviour | Southern City becomes a beacon authority

Southern City identified as a Respect zone |

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that ASB policy had been somewhat uncoordinated in Southern City up until the passing of the 1998 CDA, which led to the creation of CDRPs. Again this reflected wider processes across most local authority areas in the decade of the 1990s (Crawford, 1997, Hughes, 1998). These CDRPs sought to bring the statutory agencies together in a more joined up approach as prior to this there had been isolated pockets of activity in addressing problems of low-level disorder. The new partnership arrangements produced a number of written strategies, in line with legislative requirements. These focused upon outlining the manner in which problems of low-level disorder and crime in areas such as Southern City should be tackled, and included a range of measurable objectives and targets. Overall, it seems that leading local practitioners in Southern City favoured a more holistic 'problem solving' approach to ASB that focused upon the use of informally based diversionary methods as a tool of first response rather

than simply repression and exclusion. This operating framework was outlined in the initial crime and disorder strategy, which was designed to support this style of response. By the time of the second strategy being developed in the city, it was evident that practitioners within Southernshire Constabulary and the local authority were beginning to emerge as policy leaders in the field of tackling ASB, as dedicated teams were established in each and resources were mobilised for the first time in a more targeted manner. The establishment of the necessary systems and processes that were designed to tackle ASB in the city accompanied this formation of operationally focused teams, as a duopoly of control between the police and local authority began to emerge.

There was a gradual ascendancy of a coordinated, adaptive approach, accompanied by routinisation in tackling issues of ASB as these emerging systems and processes became gradually more embedded (despite the high profile 'zero tolerance' initiative of Streetwise which was met with much enthusiasm by the Home Office ASB Unit, discussed in Chapter Six below). This led to the city being highlighted by central government as an example of best practice in tackling issues of ASB, which began with their introduction of the high profile Streetwise Project aimed at tackling persistent aggressive begging in the City Centre. Nonetheless alongside this 'tough' initiative, there was also clear evidence to suggest the use of a pyramid approach in relation to the range of interventions that were being used by practitioners. This culminated in local practitioners working closely alongside Home Office colleagues throughout the period of interest of this study, despite evidence of the approach that was being most routinely adopted locally contrasted with the more enforcement-oriented response that was being encouraged by some politicians at the national level. With regard to ASBOs, even though Southern City reflected national trends, with peaks in the usage of these interventions being recorded in 2004/2005 followed by a sustained period of decline, their numbers never increased to the proportions seen in other more enforcement led areas such as Manchester. Therefore, it appears that practitioners seemingly maintained on balance the problem solving approach to ASB that was advocated in the strategy documents that were produced locally in response to broader national policy shifts.

This chapter has provided some interesting empirical insights in relation to the four 'theoretical propositions' outlined at the end of Chapter Two. With regard to TP1, which suggested that we might expect to see a general similarity of approach in ASB policy in Southern City to that being set out at the national level, there were mixed findings. The findings supported the view that national policy agendas – including both specific legislation and a range of policy 'tools' and resources – were vital in stimulating local policy changes in this area, and also in setting out broad parameters within which ASB policy played out at the city level. However, the empirical findings also brought into question the notion of a straightforward 'top-down' (or 'national-local') view of policy change. There was evidence of substantial resistance to some aspects of the national agenda, and a reworking of different elements – mediated via the relationships between local agencies and actors – to produce a distinctive local policy mix. This would suggest that a conceptualisation of crime (and ASB) policymaking that valorises the broad national picture does risk over-simplifying what is a much more complex empirical reality. Turning to TP2, there was certainly strong evidence of a tension between the 'adaptive' dimensions of ASB policy, and those of a more expressive nature. However, the largely practitioner-led nature of local ASB policy (evidence of interventions by elected politicians was notable by its absence) resulted in a relative lack of local 'populist' pressure, with local practitioners largely engaging with national policy agendas. At the same time, there were clearly tensions between the adaptive approaches favoured locally, and the more expressive and strident tone of national policy rhetoric by politicians such as Tony Blair, and officials such as Louise Casey. This tension was referred to explicitly by a number of interviewees. With regard to TP3, there was some evidence of the emergence of a more risk-oriented and managerial approach to dealing with ASB, and one which involved the active engagement of a range of partners beyond traditional 'criminal justice' agencies. However, there was little evidence of ASB becoming the dominant focus of other agencies (such as health or education), and at the same time there remained an important commitment to finding ways of solving the 'problem' of ASB, in particular via more traditional 'penal-welfare' measures of family support and youth services. So this chapter demonstrated only limited support for TP3, and suggested that the 'risk-orientation' proposed by Feeley and Simon requires

adaptation for the much more complex picture suggested by the empirical research. Finally, TP4 suggested that local ASB policy would be characterised by the emergence of clearly defined 'policy networks' of the types outlined by Rhodes (1997). There was certainly evidence of the emergence of networks of policy actors, and a degree of formalisation of these networks resulted from the statutory requirements of legislation such as the CDA 1998 (which required the establishment of local CDRPs for example), and by the provision of a set of formal tools (and new resources) for practitioners in the field of ASB. Nevertheless, it was not clear that the networks that did emerge fell neatly into the categories put forward by Rhodes. Indeed, rather than a relatively established and broad based 'policy community' around ASB, what seemed to emerge was a looser policy network that was dominated and led in practice by a 'duopoly' consisting of the police and the local authority. The nature of relations between local policy actors is considered in more detail in the following chapter.

Chapter Six: Exploring the Anti-Social Behaviour policy process in Southern City:

Power, negotiation and contestation in multi-agency governance

Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings from the fieldwork and documentary research, which explored the complexities and contingencies of the local policy process. In general then the aim of this chapter is to explore the 'how' and the 'why' as well as the 'what' questions:

- **How** and **why** did ASB policy in Southern City come to take the shape that it did?
- **What** were the key influences on the policy trajectory followed?
- **What** was the nature of the relationships between key local players in the policy process?
- **What** does this tell us more broadly about the nature of policymaking in this field?

As noted in Chapter Two, there is a burgeoning research literature on the day-to-day experiences and realities of multi-agency partnership working in the governance of crime and disorder (Hughes 2007; Gilling 2007; Crawford 2009, Henry, 2009). However the ways in which these processes take shape and are variously constituted with regard to anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy and practice locally has as yet been largely side-stepped in most criminological commentary where the focus has remained 'doggedly' on the broad national tendencies (Squires 2008a & b, Millie, 2009 but see Hughes and Follett 2006; Edwards and Hughes 2008; 2009). Building on the evidence and claims made in the previous chapter, this chapter examines the relational processes lying, sociologically, at the core of policy development and the institutionalisation of new governmental practices.

The following key themes of the Southern City ASB policy process are highlighted both with regard to the timeline for policy change presented in Chapter Four, and in terms of

any features regarding inter-agency relationships which persist across the whole period of the fieldwork:

- Policy zealotry and the 'special relationship' of Southern City and the Home Office ASB Unit;
- The rhetoric of multi-agency partnership cooperation and the persistent reality of a police-local authority 'duopoly';
- The marginalisation of the Regional Government Office and other local partners.
- Reconfiguring the centrally driven agenda and institutionalisation of the modest 'adaptive strategy'.

The concluding section of the chapter will reflect on these issues and in particular what implications the empirical analysis reported here had for the four 'theoretical propositions' outlined at the end of Chapter Two.

Policy zealotry and the 'special relationship' of Southern City and the Home Office ASB Unit

In considering this relationship between these two local level agencies, it is also important to again acknowledge the influence of the direct nature of the links that had been established between these key policy actors and those working at the national level at the Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU). This close working relationship between the Home Office team and members of the Council ASB team was a feature of Southern City's approach that was first highlighted during 2005-2007 and the initial stages of the fieldwork, and was discussed in the previous findings chapter as being a potentially distinguishing feature of Southern City's emergent policy response to ASB when compared to other cities and localities (see Burney 2005; Hughes and Follett 2006). The origins of this 'special relationship' appear to be found with key individual policy actors both nationally and in the local authority who were strong willed, shared common commitments and enthusiasm and were able to drive forward policy delivery both locally and nationally. This was especially marked in the national ASB lead, Louise Casey,

whose fervent enforcement-based stance to the tackling of ASB has since attracted comments from other writers in this field. This led, for example, to Casey having been described as being both 'an outspoken and fervent campaigner' whose role as lead of what was anticipated as being a five year programme involved, according to one academic commentator, 'preaching and supplying advice to local agencies' (Millie 2009, p. 31). This was a style of approach that had been witnessed by some of the practitioners in Southern City, with both Louise Casey's individual approach and the work of the wider ASBU having clearly set the tone for the country on this issue, largely following Blair's policy lead:

> I mean it's some different people, but one of the things that, that there was something about the way that Louise [Casey] worked she is a very charismatic person, very strong leader, very strong views about things and would impress on people that 'that's the way things are going to be, okay?' But at the same time worked very, very closely with local delivery agencies, particularly local councils, where there was a willingness to respond to her approaches. (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services)

In Southern City Casey's enthusiasm and charisma was seemingly supported by the key ASB officer in the local authority team. As one of the latter's colleagues noted:

> And we had a manager … who was a very positive manager, wanted to make a big impact, wanted to get on and do stuff and she pushed, and pushed, and pushed … and moved us on a long way. (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services)

The approach preferred by Casey which during the early stages was largely premised upon practitioners fully embracing the use of enforcement-based action and following Blair's initial policy drive, was not always one that was favoured locally. This supports TP2, with the demonstration of a gap between the two levels of policy developments, as the centre favoured a more punitively based scheme of action, whilst scepticism regarding this approach was expressed locally. Nonetheless she was perceived as being determined to seek the delivery of policy actions, maintaining a personal influence upon

this agenda and emerging policy developments as a result of reporting directly to Tony Blair as the leader of the Government's ASBU:

> Louise Casey's single mantra is action, action, action, I need to see action, when you are taking action on issues I know you have listened to me and are doing something about this and I think she has got this direct from Blair as I know they are pretty close on these things … So I would say nationally Tony Blair's been behind this agenda, they appointed someone in Louise Casey who we had previous experience of working with on homelessness and rough sleeping and she is an absolute dynamo of activity, she is one heck of a pusher she's like no other civil servant that I have ever come across, she is quite unique. I mean the other thing is of course the Home Office doesn't much like research, and Louise's stance has been from the start of this I am not interested in doing research I am interested in action and that is what I want to see. If you want to research it research it, I am interested in action and I think that has borne out of what the constituency MP's were saying to Blair. We have put all this stuff in place but nobody is doing anything about it or very few people, or why is it that in that city, something is happening but in my city nothing is happening that is not acceptable. So the message from Louise Casey has been action, action and I want to see it happening everywhere not just where you choose to do something about it. (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management)

In the case of Southern City, practitioners here seemingly avoided the use of an enforcement-based stance through their continued advocacy of a more 'holistic problem-solving approach to anti-social behaviour' (Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 3). This was a theme that remained consistent in the partner's ASB policy documents across the period, as local practitioners combined the success of the more overtly enforcement stance of projects such as Streetwise (see later discussion in this chapter) with the seemingly softer approach advocated in their broader strategies. This further supports the analysis of the previous chapter and its implications for some of the theoretical propositions. Rather than a relatively straightforward implementation of national policy agendas (as suggested by TP1), and an ongoing tension between adaptive and expressive responses (as suggested by TP2), what was visible in Southern City was a complex admixture of both strategies, including clear elements of national influence but also many examples of local reworking and tailoring. This was visible in the system of early intervention and mechanisms designed to divert perpetrators away from continued engagement in anti-social activities. If these were to fail then enforcement action would be utilised. 'Anti-Social Behaviour Orders will be used where appropriate alongside other

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intervention or diversionary measures or where other approaches have not been effective' (Southernshire Constabulary 2004, p. 1). The seeming lack of wavering from this position, apparently enabled them to adopt an approach that somewhat favoured the use of more informally based actions, at least in the first instance.

According to the manager of Southern City's Youth Offending Team, locally Casey was best understood as having been the main reason behind the emergence of a small group of 'local ASB zealots' (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager), which consisted of individuals who were extremely 'enthusiastic' in their approach towards the tackling of ASB. These were views that were supported by the subsequent local authority ASB Team Manager, who suggested that the launch of the later 'Respect' Taskforce had been accompanied by 'an almost evangelical drive at that time by Louise (Casey) and Tony Blair to deliver this 'Respect' agenda' (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). The influence of these personalities upon the resulting national level ASB agenda was then reflected in their ability to drive and influence local level policy developments in relation to this issue (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager) and enabled certain practitioners to emerge as being more dominant than others locally. As has been discussed, this included the leaders of the two dedicated ASB teams in Southern City, in particular the initial manager of the local authority team. In the opinion of the Youth Offending Team Manager, it was this individual who had demonstrated this as having been a key element of their approach. Even though this same participant acknowledged that when compared to some of the other personalities that they had had experience of, for example in Manchester where they had opted for a heavily enforcement led approach, Southern City's initial local authority ASB Team Manager was in reality a comparative moderate in their approach (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). Other participants involved in the fieldwork, including a former youth worker in Southern City also made reference to the role that key individuals could play in the way in which policy actions were being delivered locally, and also the problems that this can cause. They suggested that 'if you have got big personalities in an area who are adamant that their way is best

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whether that's from a young peoples service point of view or you know or anyone else you won't move' (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker):

> [T]here were certain types of what I would describe as local ASB zealots, who were contributing to the sort of the development of policy, you know. And once, once it came into being in a sense, again there was some fairly sort of Messianic individuals who were sort of leading it locally, that then got then in a sense that got taken up into the national scene then the whatever they call it, the Academy … I mean I think at one point certainly around sort of 2000 at that sort of point in time, 2000 to sort of 2003, 4, 5 it was very much central government pushing the agenda you know, in a very, very sort of high profile way, in the Louise Casey days. Since she fell out of favour let's say, basically its become a bit more low key from the national level … you know the zealotry as I call it, seems to of become much more moderated, and I mean we still have the person that was the lead for who managed the council's ASB team … and I mean she was sort of you know a relative moderate, but certainly I met people from Manchester who were you know were right off the wall, in terms of the zealotry. (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager)

The views of the local Youth Offending Team Manager are borne out in the peaks and troughs recorded by the Home Office who measure the use of interventions such as Anti Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs). Locally as highlighted by Table Two in Chapter Five, there had been a steady increase in the use of ASBOs in Southern City, mainly during the peak years of Casey's personal involvement with the national ASB agenda. These figures were set to fall again as of 2007 when the 'Respect' Taskforce was disbanded and Casey moved into a less high profile role, focusing her attentions instead upon the issue of community policing. Interestingly, during this time Southern City's initial local authority ASB Team Manager had seen their personal profile increasing in connection with the tackling of ASB, as they transcended the boundary between the local and national levels of policymaking as a result of their role as an expert practitioner, playing an active part in the Government's later programme of 'Together' academies (Southern City Local Authority 2005, p. 1). In fulfilling this role, it enabled this particular policy actor to maintain an overview of national level developments, as well as the local. This also offers support to TP4 as it reflects the strength of the initial 'policy community' that developed in the city in response to the tackling of ASB, having evolved from an 'issue based' network, and also the role that intergovernmental networks can play in

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policy development. As a result, this key individual was also able to engage directly with important actors at the national level, a relationship that would under normal circumstances have been governed by a network of Regional Government Offices (henceforth RGOs). It was also an approach that was not particularly favoured by the lead of the police ASB team, who in contrast was content to retain a more localised focus as to the development of an ASB response:

> I am not too bothered actually about what is going on nationally. I will take advantage of national money when I can say I can put it to use for a local purpose, but my concern is [Southern City]. [The Local Authority ASB Manager has] got a slightly wider outlook on things and [is] a bit more tuned into the political agenda I think … but I see my priority is concentrating on how we do it … and [the Local Authority ASB Manager] at a touch of a button would be off to the Home Office or off to do some 'Respect' thing or some 'Together' thing there but I think fine. (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

By 2008 neither of these national and local policy actors was still in their initial posts. As a result, they no longer governed the relationship between the national and local levels of the policymaking process of Southern City. However, this had not seemingly diminished the style of 'personal engagement' that had already been developed whilst they had been involved owing to the fact that this had become an established rapport that by this point extended beyond individual personalities. This had led to the police ASB Team Manager who was visited twice during the fieldwork, having described in the later interview how in Southern City they had always been quite 'lucky' in having benefited from a close working relationship of this nature with policymakers at the national level, which in the opinion of a local authority practitioner, had seeming enabled them to have the 'ear if you like of central government' (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager):

> So there was still that real engagement with people which you don't often find actually I think between national and local government it's not been the case elsewhere in my experience, certainly in quite the same style anyway and that may relate to the way in which a number of Home Secretaries have chosen to work over the years … And when Blair was quite heavily involved in ASB stuff and showed quite a lot of interest, he would actually do the same. When he came to see something he came to see it and listen to people and maybe some of

It was therefore the opinion of both of these participants that they saw no reason as to why this relationship between the levels would not continue, not least given that Home Office colleagues continued to remain in direct contact. This had seen them consulting with local level practitioners on legislative developments, and seeking their opinion as to where, if necessary, improvements could be made to enhance policy implementation and delivery on the ground (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This was further supported by the transition of staff from local to national levels, which helped to contribute to the bilateral relationship that had developed between local and national ASB policy. It also demonstrates how policy can be influenced both upwardly as well as downwards. So in relation to TP1, whilst local policy may have developed largely in line with national policy trajectories, there is not only evidence of local resistance to national trends, but of local influence over the direction of national policy:

> Plus the fact that we have a very, very good relationship with the Home Office, especially Louise Casey's team which is obviously the ASB Unit, in fact they headhunted a couple of our people in the past who are working up there now, so quite a lot of the information they know how to get it from us and we know what they need so it works well … [our ASB Manager] has a very good working relationship with Louise Casey and people at the top in fact she goes out and she does quite a lot of Home Office seminars so she has got their ear anyway, so it's a case of if we need to bend it we can normally suggest what we want and it's up to them then to decide whether or not it's feasible. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team)

The ability of those working on the ground in Southern City to influence ongoing national level policy developments was also reflected in their work in tackling ASB having been cited in a number of national government documents on the subject of ASB. These included promotional material produced by both the 'Together' and 'Respect' campaigns that cite examples of Southern City's use of dispersal orders, in addition to references being made to the use of the Streetwise campaign in tackling aggressive begging (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2007; Home Office 2003; Office of the Deputy

Prime Minister 2002). This was also mentioned in government guidance in relation to drug use, and in documents that were produced in connection with Southern City's application for national statuses such as having become a 'Beacon' authority[7].

'Charisma' and blazing a trail in Southern City

From the perspective of the influence of this relationship between key policy actors upon the development of a local ASB policy agenda, the Head of Southern City's Housing Management was able to recall how Louise Casey had visited the local authority's management team and delivered a presentation on the Government's 'Together' campaign, during which she indicated that there was an opportunity for Southern City to become a 'Trailblazer' authority as part of the Government's broader programme:

> It's interesting how some of these things are down to personalities and are down to personal relationship and contact really. So she [Louise Casey] had some degree of respect for the work we had been doing she had already been to [Southern City] on that stuff and really we continued to develop on that basis. So eventually she came to [Southern City] and talked to our management team and said this is the Government's 'Together' programme I am going to present it to you and she took about 15-20mins to do that, and she said there is the potential for you to become a 'Trailblazer' … we would like you to be a 'Trailblazer' but you have to sign up to this agenda are you willing to do this and we said yes. (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management)

As previously discussed, the Government's 'Together' campaign was a national strategy designed to support the implementation of the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act and its resulting ASB Action Plan. Interestingly, it was officially launched in Southern City in July 2004, at the same time as the local authority's ASB team. It was an event that was attended by Louise Casey as a national level presence in Southern City was maintained. The main aim of the campaign was to 'encourage citizens to take an active role in identifying and stamping out anti-social behaviour' (Southern City Local Authority 2005, p. 1). This was largely as a result of those at the national level having revisited the theme of personal responsibility and accountability. It is worth noting that later research

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[7] can't refer directly as anonymised the city in the research

published in response to the launch of the Government's campaign reflected a more complex picture (including the finding that the public wanted to see the development of a more balanced response in tackling ASB). In turn the research argued the case for policymakers who were able to "balance tough enforcement through ASBOs with strong, high-profile action to prevent problems and offer young people constructive alternatives to hanging around on the streets" (Hough 2005, Online). As part of the Government's ASB Action Plan ten local authorities became 'Trailblazer areas' as announced in October 2003 by the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, and this included Southern City (BBC Online 2003). The aim was for these areas to receive additional support from the ASBU in addressing specific problems associated with ASB. In the case of Southern City they became a 'Trailblazer' authority for begging, and along with four other cities were given responsibility to "audit and profile the people begging on the streets and take action to reduce the number of beggars by at least 60 per cent by March 2005" (Inside Housing Online 2008). In Southern City work was already underway in tackling the issue of persistent and aggressive begging, with the Streetwise project having been launched in August 2002, which was designed to tackle the dual issues of rough sleeping and homelessness in the city and was centred upon the achievement of three key aims, the last of which suggested a movement towards the taking of a tougher stance:

- To promote and educate the public to alternative forms of giving
- To provide advice, treatment and support for those most in need
- To ensure that persistent begging will not be tolerated in [Southern City]

(Southern City Local Authority Neighbourhood and Housing Services Executive 2002, p. 2)

The launch of this project followed the identification of begging as being a key issue for residents in a survey, which suggested that a majority of respondents were 'reluctant' to go into the City Centre owing to an apparent begging problem. The survey prompted further research to be undertaken to ascertain the extent of this issue. The results suggested that at the time there were 'over 200 people … begging in the city centre area and that 95 per cent of these had convictions for Class A drug use.' In addition 40 to 50

of these were either 'persistent or aggressive' in their approach (Home Office no date, p. 18).

In its approach, the Streetwise Project offered a more enforcement-based response to this problem, which was in marked contrast to the stance taken toward more generalised ASB issues across the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs) crime and disorder strategies. However, as with tackling ASB, it was premised upon local partnership working between the city's local authority and police, who were supported by two full time drug workers from the English Churches Housing Group (Home Office no date, p. 18). Streetwise patrols were introduced in the city to directly tackle the beggars, with the begging coordinator from the local authority working alongside police officers 'as this client group are often violent and can carry weapons' (Southern City local authority 2005, p. 3); "the workers go out on patrol two to five times a week at varying times – we don't want to be predictable" (Southern City Local Authority Streetwise Co-coordinator). These staff would go out for between '25–30 hours a week on the streets, beginning at around 4.30pm and make contact with people who beg' (Davies and Waite 2004, p. 44). Their aim was to remove the beggars from the streets, particularly those who used this as a means to support drug habits. Where the offending beggars persistently resisted engagement with practitioners and their planned approach to assist them in addressing their drug problems, they would then be exposed to the enforcement aspect of the project. This began with a caution and could result in a full ASBO application being made. 'This legal action is quick and can prevent displacement to other areas by allowing the inclusion of conditions preventing begging in England and Wales' (Southern City Local Authority Streetwise promotional material 2005, p. 1). One of the key aims of the Project was to send a clear message throughout the city that it would 'not tolerate persistent begging on the streets and people who do this will be arrested', advocating a 'tough love' approach (Homeless Forum Minutes 2004, p. 3). It was a response that was based upon removing these problematic beggars from the streets of Southern City permanently; with the use of a mixture of formally based measures and support where necessary, 'our last resort is going to court and getting an injunction with the threat of jail if they go back out begging' (Southern City Post October 2003). Despite

this, the use of this full range of varying degrees of enforcement-based measures aided practitioners in having achieved significant results in response to tackling this issue. It included 'over 300 arrests' having been made during the six months between the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, with enforcement action having been taken four to five times a week. Reports of practitioners' efforts in tackling this issue were also highlighted in the local media:

> The project aims to help beggars leave [Southern City] streets and, if they are hooked on drugs, to seek treatment for their addiction. They will be offered housing and access to methadone to help them kick their habits. However, if beggars refuse this help they are threatened with a court injunction which will ban them from begging. If that is broken, they face prison. [Southern City], together with Brighton, Leeds and Westminster in London - which also have schemes to tackle begging - have now been chosen to lead by example and will work closely with Home Office officials to help put a stop to the problem. [Southern City's] zero tolerance on begging has proved so successful that the Home Office wants to work with Streetwise officials and encourage other local authorities to take up the fight to rid city-centre streets of beggars. (Southern City Post October 2003)

In tackling this issue practitioners also made use of the various support measures and as a result '(m)any people, who had previously refused drug services, are now in treatment. The project has meant a visible reduction in begging in the city' (Home Office 2003b, p. 48). All of which contributed to practitioners achieving their 60% target as set by the 'Trailblazer' scheme. It was a 'success' that was achieved because 'the campaign took a no tolerance approach to begging, and enforced the message that begging is not acceptable' (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). Even though this zero tolerance stance was initially seen as being highly contentious, according to an account of the project given by a local authority official that was closely involved in its development, it is a model that has since been used in a number of other local authority areas nationally (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). The source of this controversy amongst local policy officers was mainly owing to the perceived repressive nature of this response, although it was set to become a model that was later adopted in several other local areas in their attempts to address this issue (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager) (and see Squires 2005; Burney 2005). This was largely owing to the Project having been highlighted by the

Home Office who worked in conjunction with the city's practitioners, resulting in "[a] number of local authorities have already been down to Streetwise and have taken the scheme's ideas away to try and use in their areas" (Streetwise coordinator Southern City Post October 2003). As a result, Southern City's Streetwise Project went on to become 'the first pilot of a national scheme' (Housing Forum Minutes 2004, p. 2). At the same time it also became the first big project to be tackled under ASB strategy, as the issue of begging was included within the Government's definition of ASB and later recognised in the city's 'Trailblazer' status. Despite the emphasis placed upon the use of enforcement-based actions, these were offered as a last resort after affected individuals were encouraged to address their drug issues with the support of key workers, reflecting the problem solving approach of the Partnership's broader crime and disorder strategy. However, it maintained a more overtly enforcement stance, which would contrast with the later more preventatively based approach that was advocated by practitioners in response to ASB.

Even though ASBOs remained at the pinnacle of the options available to practitioners in tackling this issue, through the adoption of the use of a regulatory pyramid (see Crawford, 2009), the use of these measures was premised on all other routes having been exhausted. Interestingly, the local authority individual who led on the Streetwise campaign locally later became the initial ASB manager responsible for leading the local authority's dedicated team. The early work of this particular policy actor on the city's Streetwise Project had brought them into close contact with key policy actors at the national level, as those in the Government's ASBU and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister assisted in the development of this project (Housing Forum Minutes 2004, p. 2). More generally, 'Trailblazer' authorities such as Southern City as part of this process were required to develop a 'strategic' partnership with the Home Office ASBU. The aim was to assist those at the national level to 'develop and roll out best practice and innovation' as noted in the audit of another 'Trailblazer' area, who had been charged with tackling the issue of abandoned cars (Liverpool Local Authority Crime, Disorder, Anti-Social Behaviour & Drug Misuse Audit 2004). In becoming a 'Trailblazer' authority there were also other notable benefits, which included the provision of additional national

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level funding, and also broader information and peer type support as a direct outcome of national initiatives (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). This was mainly because practitioners in these ten areas were then deemed to be the exponents of best practice in tackling ASB related issues:

> It means that we get that additional support and more focus on the city from the Home Office in terms of achieving targets in this field, and looking at us as an exemplar in that field and to share that practice regionally there are benchmarking groups locally. We have the network group with [the RGO], as an authority we are a member of the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance group and we will share information and attend local regional meetings and 'Respect' will be looking to make sure we are fulfilling our role as a local champion working closely with the local people … and using the tools and powers to effect some tangible change. That is really what 'Respect' means if successful here other 'Respect' areas across the country of which there are now 40 areas, will impact on the development of further legislation and national strategy in tackling ASB. (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

As previously discussed in this chapter, the reality of developing such a close working relationship with those at the national level could already be seen in Southern City, and the benefits that they received from their involvement with those working at the Home Office, which included Louise Casey. In some ways the early recognition that had been received in relation to their work in tackling begging, legitimised the evolution of this initial relationship between Southern City practitioners and those at the national level, which would later be supported by the awarding of further national statuses, such as identification as a 'Respect' area as a result of the Government's later campaign by the same name, and also as a 'Beacon' Authority, for its work in preventing and tackling ASB (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services). Indeed the local authority publicly acknowledged the benefits of the 'special relationship' in its 'Together' promotional material as can be seen from the below extract:

> Working so closely with the ASBU and other 'Trailblazers' means that we have a wealth of resources that we can link into, including invaluable case law experiences. The ASBU had provided us with vast amounts of literature and materials free of charge that have been distributed to staff and key partners via training sessions. Key figures within the ASBU have frequently visited [Southern City] for events

such as the recent Tenant Participation event on anti-social behaviour, where both Louise Casey the Director of the ASBU and Bill Pitt, Home Office Ambassador generously gave up their time to make the event particularly relevant and valuable to our tenants. (Southern City Local Authority 2005, p. 1)

The seemingly continual national level recognition that was received by Southern City during the period of interest, not only enabled the showcasing of their work to a broader audience through mechanisms such as the Beacon Showcase Event that was held in the city in June 2008, but it also inevitably increased the access of selected local policy actors to those within central government. As a result, it also afforded them the opportunity to offer feedback to those at the national level on both the policy and legislative tools that were being developed and used in this arena:

[W]e have been able to feed into that as well working with some people from the Home Office, because we have used that legislation very well, particularly the crackhouse legislation, we are able to consult with the Home Office and they consult with us about what certain changes we may want or need for that legislation, and then that goes through as policy, and that's been quite useful we've managed to change some legislation in that way. (Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator)

This interchange between the developments in Southern City and at the national level provides a slightly different take on TP1. Whilst there was certainly similarity in the policy trajectory nationally and locally, this was not necessarily due to a straightforward adoption of national policies at the city level. Rather, it reflected a complex synergy between the national and the local, in which each influenced the other.

Negative consequences of the 'special relationship' locally

The direct nature of this relationship between key local practitioners and those operating at the national level did also have a negative impact. This was mainly in terms of local level relationships, which had resulted in a degree of fragmentation occurring in the rest of the local CDRP Partnership structure. This was an impression gained from the accounts that were gathered early on in the fieldwork. These accounts suggested that at times this relationship between a select few at the local level, and those leading on policy

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nationally had damaged the relationships between the local authority most notably, and the police as their key partner, and the rest of the Partnership structure, (this included representatives from the Probation Service, Police Authority, the city's Fire and Rescue Services, Crown Prosecution Service, RGO, Prison Service, Health and the voluntary sector). This highlights the significance of the emergence of policy networks at the local level. In Southern City this had seen the gradual evolution of an initial 'issue based' network into a 'policy community' as it became apparent that as is suggested by TP4 that the local ASB policy response was being shaped by policy networks of different kinds, the formation of which was also having an impact upon existing partnership relations. This had come as a result of the membership of this later community fitting with Rhodes' typology of a more select group, who are able to exert influence not only on the basis of the size and scope of their organizations, but also crucially in their ability to both harness and exchange resources, something that had been actively encouraged between the police and local authority in Southern City. However, the negative result of this was that agencies external to Southern City's core partnership structure, including those at the regional level, increasingly found themselves on the periphery of the local decision making process. This included the remaining elements of the local CDRP external to the dedicated ASB teams, which despite a perceived role in maintaining a strategic lead over ASB policy development locally, felt that they needed to regain control over the way in which policy decisions around the ASB agenda in Southern City were being made. In an effort to redress this balance, they were keen to try and open up the direct link between these two levels of local and central governance, as they sought to make this 'less exclusionary' (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). As a result, this became one of the CDRP's key objectives from 2006 onwards as was reported during the interview that was conducted with two representatives from this partnership:

> Although we do want to, not break the link but, you know open up that link, that direct tight link with the 'Respect' Taskforce and ASB [team] and just take into account other partners as at some point their funding is going to stop and we need to know what's going … to pick up the pieces really. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager)

At the same time, Home Office contacts continued to pursue direct relations with local colleagues in Southern City who they had grown confident in working with, which at the time were primarily based within the local authority:

> [T]he 'Respect' Taskforce they tend to go straight … to the ASB team by and large … when the ASB team was being set up … all the focus was on that and it was a very strong team piloting a lot of the new initiatives and [Southern City] got a lot of recognition for it. And as a result there was a lot of direct contact with the Home Office and the team. So Government Office became a little less involved, and to an extent so did we, so but they are always there when it comes to meetings, and they are on the Exec and they are keeping an eye on things. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Manager)

The local authority dedicated ASB team in particular seemingly required little or no assistance in gaining approval from those at the national level regarding their input into the formulation of a local level approach toward tackling ASB. In the case of Southern City, both the dedicated ASB teams seemingly benefited from this close working relationship that had been developed mainly by those working in the local authority ASB team. This was mainly because it was their initial ASB Manager who had formed these earlier links with leading national policy actors such as Casey as a result of the launch of the city's Streetwise project in 2002 as previously discussed.

The rhetoric of multi-agency partnership cooperation and the persistent reality of a police-local authority 'duopoly'

Evidence of cooperative relationships in the duopoly

As discussed in the previous findings chapter, one of the key developments to occur in Southern City, both in terms of partnership working and policy development was the establishment of two dedicated ASB teams. These were located in two of the city's core local agencies, the police and local authority, and were instrumental in the development of a close working relationship between these two core organisations. Initially the two ASB teams, according to the Southern City CDRP officers interviewed during the fieldwork, were created in response 'to the ASB legislation which came to us from

government. You suddenly had all this pressure on ASBOs and legislative enforcement action and the ASB team was created in response to that' (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). As a result, these two ASB teams became responsible for the formulation of the accompanying systems and processes designed to tackle the issue of ASB, as those at the national level continued to advocate a 'denial' response towards tackling ASB (Garland, 2001) that those operating at the local level were encouraged to support. In Southern City, by appearing to cater toward the more enforcement based aspect of the national level agenda, whilst in reality taking a more problem solving approach, local level policy actors reflected the 'schizoid' tension between the 'adaptive' and 'expressive' sides to policymaking, supporting TP2. In Southern City, this resulted crucially in the establishment of a weekly case conference at which cases potentially requiring formal action would be discussed. The responsibility for the chairing of these meetings was shared between the respective leaders of these two teams. This was an approach that also required the team leaders to develop a level of expertise across both their fields of knowledge, as the police ASB team lead often found himself making 'decisions on possession proceeding and housing injunctions, which is totally a housing function … [and] which would be [the local authority ASB team lead's] area of responsibility' (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Both leads would thus find themselves in the position of having to make decisions in cases that came under the remit of the other agency. At times this suggested a blurring of responsibilities: 'So sometimes I find myself as chair of that meeting making a decision about a total council job, nothing to do with the police whatsoever, so that is quite bizarre sometimes' (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).

In common with local trends across England and Wales (Burney 2005; Hughes 2007) the local authority and the police were the key conduits and leading players in the development of a local approach toward tackling ASB in Southern City, thus acting as a de facto duopoly despite the public rhetoric of more plural and de-monopolised partnership working (supporting the thesis of Hughes 2007, p. 73-6). This was a sentiment echoed by other participants interviewed during the fieldwork that cited the significance of the police and local authority role in the development of local level

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strategy. This was a view that was shared – unsurprisingly - by both the city's initial and subsequent ASB managers from the local authority, "who saw themselves and the police as being the leaders in this field, particularly in terms of delivering policy actions" (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). And by the later stages of the fieldwork it was suggested that "we have a renewed focus if you like in the work that we are going to do, to both lead on enforcement, which is my main bag, early intervention and prevention and making sure that there's support that runs right the way through that for both the perpetrators and the victims of anti-social behaviour" (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager).

The dominance of police and local authority officers in shaping ASB strategy locally was not, of course, an unusual feature of partnership work nationally, as other agencies were often seen to be taking a backseat in multi agency settings (Gilling 2007; Hughes 2007; Skinns 2003). This may have been down to the central government pressure that was put on both the police and local authority to respond quickly to national level shifts on this issue, particularly during the initial stages of ASB policy rising to prominence in central government thinking. The Police ASB Team Manager reported that such pressures had been a further contributory factor in the growth of the good working relationship between these two agencies at the local level. Both the scale and the pace of changes being made by those at the national level meant that a broader range of partners were now better equipped to respond to this issue. In particular, as a result, locally in Southern City it was no longer an issue that was seen as being just the province of individual housing officer's workloads, as it had been prior to the creation of these dedicated ASB teams in 2003. The issue of ASB increasingly became seen as being a 'new specialism', (Hughes 2007, p. 103) amidst the wider portfolio of community safety professionals at the local level on a more generalised basis:

> We had to be quite quick to respond as did the council and for the first two years it was a bit of a two man band I suppose, that's the council ASB team based in the Housing office, Housing department, but now more and more of the other departments are becoming involved, and it's becoming accepted. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

Evidence of tension/conflict in the duopoly

Although the overall opinion about these two teams amongst the interviewees was that they had mutually benefited from the formation of a close working relationship, there were at times conflicts between these two large-scale organisations and their working practices and cultures. This was acknowledged not only by observers of it, but also by the practitioners from within the dedicated teams. It seemed that at times the partnership was strained. Interviewees reported that at an early stage of policy development, there was a sense of rivalry between the police and local authority ASB teams. A senior police respondent and leader of Southernshire Constabulary's ASB Team believed that their counterpart within the local authority team would try to 'create the impression' that the systems and processes put in place to tackle ASB were shaped primarily by the local authority. However, they reported as evidence to back up their claims regarding police 'leadership' that the local authority team was not created until July 2004, sometime after that of the police team (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).

So despite the apparent strength of the policy community of which these two key organisations formed a critical part, there were at times conflicts underlying this relationship. These appear to have originally emerged in connection to disagreements about the precise nature of the shared approach to dealing with ASB. In contrast to the often-prevalent assumptions in critical research on ASB and policing (Squires 2005), the Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager argued that the police had at times been less willing than the local authority to utilise formal actions. "Well I would rather not take someone to case conference and find another way of resolving it to be quite frank" (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Interview evidence from the police respondents suggested that local authority officials had, paradoxically, been more focused on enforcement than their police counterparts. It was also evidenced in the zero tolerance approach that was advocated in relation to the tackling of begging, which as previously discussed came under the banner of the city's Streetwise Project, and which caused some early controversy owing to the stance that was taken. This approach was apparently underlined by the adoption of a 'holistic approach' according the local

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authority's promotional material for the project (Southern City Local Authority 2005, p. 3). This suggested that the police were a 'moderating' influence in the development of a more nuanced ASB policy locally, and had been a key driver of the 'graduated approach', which consisted of the use of informally based measures such as warning letters and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (henceforth ABCs), as tools of first response particularly when dealing with young people, before cases were escalated for formal action and referred to case conference for further consideration. The lead for the police ASB team argued that the utilisation of more preventatively based measures, had contributed to a decrease in the number of formal actions being used in the city by 2006 (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This offers further support to TP4 and the notion that influence can also be exerted from within policy communities, particularly from one such as this, which was dominated by two of the key local players in ASB policy.

At the same time, a caseworker from the local authority ASB team cited differences in opinion between the two regarding information-sharing protocols, as also having contributed to these emerging conflicts. Such differences may have arisen in part because the police and local authority were two large organisations, which at times operated in different ways and according to very different cultures and processes of internal decision-making. At times, it also seemed that there were failings in communication between them:

> The key partner is the police without a doubt and that relationship can be a bit strained at times because of the priorities that they have got and culturally we are two quite large organisations and trying to bring two organisations together to work face to face comes with some tensions at times because we work in different ways but you have to work through those things and we have been doing that over the last couple of years. But I would say that the police are far and away our chief partners in this, I nearly said partners in crime, and so working at policy strategy level and at operational level it's absolutely crucial that we line up our resources and [coordinate] the way we do things. (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management).

There were also broader tensions being experienced during the period of interest, as following the introduction of the ASBO nationally, local practitioners who had experienced problems associated with costs, resources and time delays reported difficulties. In Southern City, during the early stages of the fieldwork in 2006, a local authority officer working as an ASBO caseworker described Magistrates at this time as having been 'a little reluctant to give them [ASBOs] out' (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team). This was a perception that may have resulted from the Court's consideration of "the appropriateness and the necessity of a ASBO application", despite having praised the work of the local authority's legal team and "the quality of the applications received" (Southern City Local Authority, ASB Select Committee 2005, p. 4). There were also issues being experienced in the streamlining of the ASBO process, as commented upon by Southernshire Constabulary's ASB Team Manager:

> [I]t wasn't uncommon for us to say right we want an ASBO, it took months to pull a case conference together and by the time you'd presented your evidence to case conference to make a decision, the evidence was out of date and then to go to court with that evidence and by the time you built all these delays in you might as well give up. It's important that the structures are streamlined sufficiently to actually make use of the legislation. (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

The marginalisation of the Regional Government Office and other local partners

Life beyond the duopoly

In formal terms national government aimed to utilise RGOs as a means of supporting the ASB 'crusade' and not least checking that local action was occurring on the ground. A representative from the RGO, which included in its geographical remit, Southern City reported this as follows:

> [I]n fact we have had some [councils] … where I have seen our role as being to go along and say that we do expect you to be aware of and to use where appropriate these interventions. You can't just ignore them,

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not least because as part and parcel of the ASB package. The Home Office does provide £25K a year to each local authority, which is generally used to fund or part fund an ASB coordinator role to help them give that extra resource to this area if you like. So it's very much I think it comes down to how high a priority is anti-social behaviour in your local authority area, what is the public perception of that, so how important is your need as a local authority and the various relevant authorities to respond to that and what is your capacity to respond to it too. (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB specialist team)

The impact of the autonomy of the police and local authority from the CDRP and their 'special relationship' with the Home Office ASBU was that it did not require them to interact with those at the regional level as a means of gaining contact with those at the Centre, which would have been the normal manner in which this dialogue would be conducted (see Hughes 2007, pp. 46-7). In particular, colleagues within the RGO with responsibility for Southern City were prevented from managing this interaction, and from acting as the interface between the two levels, especially when it came to policy development (Interview 011 RGO Regional ASB Policy Lead). This may have been compounded by changes that were also being felt between the RGO and the Home Office, as there appeared to be a distancing between the two:

When I was the domestic violence lead initially the national domestic violence lead was very keen to engage both the coordinators from the partnerships, the domestic violence coordinators, and the domestic violence coordinators from the government offices. And so we would go up and we would have meetings, and we would share practice and we would have an input into developing policy … And then you had this kind of realisation over time that there was this distancing, that was when I started sort of saying to people you know this isn't right … I think there was two things. There was some new ambitious people who had become part of the senior management team, who decided that it was no longer the role of senior officers, that's me and my colleagues, to be going to the Home Office, they should be the people that had that dialogue. So there was that kind of local decision made, but allied to that I think there was also a distancing. (Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service)

In regard to Southern City's practitioner relations with the Home Office, this may have stemmed from the apparent desire of the city's local authority practitioners to act independently of other external influences than that of the Home Office as they continued to develop their direct relationship with those at the national level. A further RGO representative reported that the local authority had continued to maintain a good working

relationship with them, particularly in sharing information about the local authority's performance in this area. Any potential increase in the RGO's involvement in ASB in the future was something that the participant suggested could only assist in strengthening the authority's working relationship with them, whilst ensuring that on a broader level there was a more consistent regional strategic response:

> We have had a close relationship with [the RGO] in sharing out information and being able to report back to them on how we are performing … [the RGO] are very keen to get more involved as a local champion and to provide an intermediary role between local and central government, quite rightly so, and I think that can only improve the relationship that we have with them and that information flow to get a more coherent, strategic regional response to ASB which we haven't necessarily had. Operationally they do attend our local CDRP meetings we have had a well established peer group [Southernshire] user group chaired by [the RGO], which has been fairly effective but given quite different dynamics and different levels of problems between the authorities with [Southern City] probably being the region's capital, certainly the larger authority we have quite markedly different problems here and levels of ASB as compared to some of the smaller rural local authorities within [Southernshire], but it's still useful to share those experiences and have information sharing with them I think. Also ties in with some of our targets for the coming year as a 'Beacon' authority around sharing experience. (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

There were also wider issues reported during the fieldwork in relation to the everyday contact between those operating locally and the national level, and the way in which this negated any involvement from the RGO. Two respondents from the city's CDRP described how they had been involved in coordinating a visit from the Home Secretary and that the Home Office 'came straight to us and [RGO] got very uppity about that, there's protocols and that wasn't appropriate and blah, blah, blah and the woman said I'm sorry I used to work for the 'Respect' Taskforce and that's the way we did it. So I thought that was quite interesting' (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Manager). Whilst noting the 'by-passing' of the RGO in such instances, it should be acknowledged that some of those working in the CDRP did wish to see a return to a more open style of dialogue between the levels involved in the process, with the RGO ideally functioning as a conduit, which would involve all of the relevant local partners:

I don't know to what extent that's true of other places cos I know that the anti-social behaviour manager and Louise Casey knew each other quite well already, and they had both been involved in the rough sleeping initiative years before so there was a history there so to what extent that was driven by personality or to what extent that's the way the 'Respect' Taskforce tends to work anyway I don't know … But I think there are issues, that relationship has created some issues so they are funding the direct council team and they are putting money in there, they are piloting the family support project and they've just given them the money to double in size but they are not funding the police ASB team, which we fund, but the police ASB team needs to provide support to do all the work and all the evidence gathering on the front so their work is being increased but the funding is not going to them it's being bypassed it's not the complete picture. So you know I think there does need to be a widening up of approach and focus because you know really the police are saying can we have another coordinator because there is all this work being funded by the Home Office that we have to support. But I think that within Safer [Southern City] trying to get another coordinator paid for is … we are trying not to pay for the three we are already paying for. I mean that's a whole other issue that is possibly because of this relationship and [the RGO] and us being out of the link you are not really being picked up so I mean that's another task is to widen horizons. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager)

The local RGO did attempt to improve the relations between the local and regional levels of the policymaking process, which led to the establishment of an Anti Social Behaviour Coordinators Network, the aim of which was to coordinate a local level approach. The RGO practitioners who were involved in the creation of this went on to become forerunners in the development of this particular approach of promoting the exchange of best practice in this manner, as this model was later replicated in other areas (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB Specialist Team).

One RGO participant suggested that they had similarly been kept 'out of the loop' not just by local but also national level colleagues, particularly when dealing with the 'Respect' Taskforce. This led the same interviewee to remark that 'they did things quite independently from us a lot of the time' with often no real engagement with those at the regional level (Interview 011 RGO Regional ASB Policy Lead). Even though the ASB Team Manager from the local authority acknowledged that some of the difficulties being experienced by the RGO in relation to 'Respect', might well have been as a result of them not having demonstrated a significant involvement with it:

> I think by their own admission [the RGO] would say that they have not been that involved in the 'Respect' agenda and maybe that has been a shift led by the development and rollout of LAA (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager).

It may well have been this exclusion from both local and national level interactions that had led by the latter stages of the fieldwork to those at the regional level seemingly struggling to find any role in policy development in the case of Southern City. This had also been impacted upon by a reduction in the resources being directed to the regional level by those in government to support this element of their work. This may have been attributable to 'the financial pressures on these departments and the need to downsize and have all these voluntary redundancy schemes, these were biting at our backs all the way through and that was kind of what started the sort of problems for the staff basically because they were basically wanting us to disappear' (Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service). In the long term in the opinion of another RGO representative, it was anticipated that this would potentially result in their inability to continue to deliver all of the Home Office's expectations. This included being able to maintain an overview of the work being done 'on the ground' by local level practitioners in relation to the delivery of ASB policy outcomes (Interview 011 RGO Regional ASB Policy Lead). It was therefore this decline in the levels of regional involvement of ASB policy which also led to a participant with a background in the local authority's housing department commenting that from a practitioner's perspective 'there is a view in local government that the regional offices we don't really know what they are there for and they are constantly scratching to find a role' (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services). This was a view that was shared by others not just at the local level in Southern City, but also across Community Safety Partnerships more generally, particularly in England (see Hughes 2007, p. 46):

> Sitting on the partnership would be the government office [name of region], a whole building of people you frankly don't know why they exist and they cost a fortune. They were the middle people between Ministers saying you need to be doing this oh right yeah, and they would sit around, crazy. (Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander)

Reconfiguring the centrally-driven agenda and institutionalisation of the modest 'adaptive strategy'

The supporting partnership structure

Whilst the RGO was cast in the role of wasteful 'middleman', a reconfiguration of the centrally driven approach was evident from the observations of local actors in the latter stages of the fieldwork. The reconfiguration had seen the maturing of the relationship between policymakers at both levels of the process and some re-balancing of the relationship of the local and national in this policy field, as those in government began to recognise the limitations of attempting to govern from the centre (Garland, 2001), supporting the idea of 'at a distance' governing (see also Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). According to one Education officer:

> You know I think before it was always us and them, and I think now it's how we need to do things and we being all of us. Because I think there is a more tacit understanding now that central government can't run it all from Whitehall, which is when this particular government started they thought they were going to be able to do run everything from Whitehall. And now there's a realism that it's a local presence that is needed and it's not government office, it's actually people who deal with people and you know we as a local authority deal with our local community, whether it's rubbish that hasn't been picked up, or, or anti-social behaviour or a Education issue and actually you need someone who can talk about it and understand it not somebody who's in Whitehall saying I gave 'x' thousand pounds for that to happen and it didn't. (Interview 013 Southern City Local Authority Programme Director for Partnerships and Localities)

Outside of Southern City's core agencies and their relationship with those at the national level, there was also a range of other partners in Southern City, who had by 2008 become more actively involved in the local aspect of the policymaking process, an impression that was gained from the accounts of those participants who were involved in this later stage of the fieldwork. At the same time, this reflected the increased desire of those at the national level to extend the scope of local support in order for the relevant policy outcomes to be delivered by practitioners at this level, which was locally reflected in the scope of the agencies that were now being represented by the CDRP, which by the time

of the publication of the city's 2008 Crime and Disorder Strategy had been expanded to include representatives from the Fire and Rescue Service, Prison Service, Crown Prosecution Service and 'various departments' of Southern City's local authority, in addition to the Voluntary Organisations Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration (VOSCUR) (Southern City CDRP, Final Draft. Anti social behaviour strategy 2008-11. Promoting positive behaviour, p. 3). In terms of the history of Southern City's partnership relations, this would represent the final stage in a series of transitions (see also Hughes and Edwards, 2002). This had begun with:

- Isolated efforts in tackling ASB, mainly dominated by housing officers working in conjunction with the police;
- To zero tolerance and trailblazing on this issue which provided a foundation for the emergence of a 'special' relationship between the local and the national;
- And ending with a potential opening up of the local element of this process, as seemingly a broader range of practitioners began to engage with this agenda.

By 2008 there was also a growing recognition of the need for active engagement across all local partners, in order for the effectiveness of policy action to be both maximised and mutually agreed. In this manner it was also reinforcing the belief of those at the national level of the need for there to be a shared responsibility across all relevant partners for the delivery of an ASB agenda:

> I make it clear to everybody all of the time that the most effective interventions come from fully consulting with all relevant parties … That's the absolute way to go as you then have buy in from everybody, the right intervention is selected, it is supported from all of the agencies there and there is the best possible chance the intervention will then work. (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB Specialist Team)

At the same time, there had also been a reported growth in the number of agencies that had begun to 'buy in' to the ASB agenda, as based upon the accounts of respondents. This was a process that had also been affected by several other contributory factors by these later stages of the fieldwork. The more significant of these had been that by this

time Southern City's style of response to tackling ASB had became somewhat easier to identify, as working practices had become more embedded locally. This was a view that could be supported by the evidence provided by practitioners from both of the city's dedicated ASB teams. These participants in the fieldwork offered accounts of their ASB procedures, as highlighted by a coordinator from Southernshire Constabulary as follows:

> Our main responsibilities, we do low level interventions, diversionary activities working with individuals causing us problems and trying to stop that behaviour, liaising [with] police officers trying to solve problems that they have, they bring information to us and ask us we if we can deal with situations. We look at things like closure of crackhouses, dispersal of groups, ASBOs, ABCS and we are also now taking on work from a higher level within police … we decide whether ABCs are appropriate or whether we are looking at dispersals things like that, or whether we want to take it to a higher level to more formal action. After the local multi agency meetings we then at a higher level have a case conference, which is held weekly… and [we] hear about five or six cases every week. So it's quite a high turnover and at that case conference we will speak about an individual and again all the relevant people so that will be social workers, drugs workers, youth workers whoever is most relevant to that individual, and that works really well for us. It's a system that's been set up and established for quite some time, and it's working really effectively because all the partners are round the table at the right time and nobody's really getting left out. If somebody is not at the meeting they get the minutes sent to them … and it's tackling the problems much more effectively rather than one agency going off and doing one thing and another agency going and doing something completely different. (Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary ASB coordinator)

The establishment of these mechanisms designed to tackle issues of ASB appears to have seen the local level ASB agenda clearly forming part of a wider preventative agenda, leading to improved linkages across the various agencies involved (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). It also suggests the institutionalisation of a local preventive infrastructure which Garland (2001) pointed to, not on the basis of any empirical research conducted by him but in relation to the insights of Crawford's 1997 work, which was later supported by Hughes' 2007 monograph. This was whilst the broader ASB agenda at the national level had undergone a similar process of evolution during this time, which had contributed to the tackling of this issue having become part of everyday working life, particularly for those practitioners from the core agencies (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). This suggested a

perceived mainstreaming of ASB policy locally, particularly as a result of the Government's 'Respect' Agenda:

> So the 'Respect' brand, the little logo isn't being publicised anymore, you know it's probably been removed from the Government website. It's evolved and now that agenda is now being subsumed into everyday working and there's no longer a need for a brand if you like cos it's what you do everyday and that's certainly the expectation and I think that's our experience locally. (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

It was also a response that had become more about collective responsibility at the local level, 'I think it was more about a shared collective approach about what was going on. A more creative innovative look at what could happen to achieve it' (Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander). This occurred as those at the national level continued to encourage a multi agency response to this issue, especially through the use of performance-based strategies. In terms of the police, this meant the introduction of ASB related targets and objectives within local force policing plans. These were designed to reflect the objectives contained within the national policing plan, in which ASB was amongst one of seventeen performance indicators by 2003 (The Guardian Online 2003). It therefore became a feature of Southernshire Constabulary's 2002-03 policing plan for the first time, as the force sought to 'reduce local disorder and anti-social behaviour' mainly through the reduction of fear of crime rates, and the public perception of ASB as measured by the yearly British Crime Survey (Southernshire Constabulary 2002, p. 14). By the time of Southernshire Constabulary's Policing Plan for the following year, the force 'compared favourably with the national average' in its measurement of the 'feeling of public safety'. The plan suggested that this had been achieved through the 'appropriate use of tools such as ASBOs, ABCs, fixed penalty notices, action against badly run licensed premises under the Licensing Act 2003 and other ideas set out in the Government's Anti-Social Behaviour Action Plan' (Southernshire Constabulary 2002, p. 14). However, the setting of targets of this nature in relation to issues such as ASB did not always meet favourably with the local practitioners who were charged with its delivery. A respondent from regional government commented upon the impact of the introduction of more performance based measures from their perspective, '[a]nd then we

were sort of these kind of people in the middle, who had no teeth in terms of performance management … For me and my colleagues one day we were advisors with Drug Prevention Advisory Service then we were performance managers of wider partnerships' (Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service):

> I think it probably was I think you know the service has gone through a time when there was not much inspection of it to a time when then the Treasury got more involved and it was about what value for money are we getting from the police service and we became performance driven, and target driven which is rubbish often. I mean I am not saying that we shouldn't be held to account for performance, it just went far too one way you know and a drive for detection rates I think can skew the activities of the organisation and prevent a service like the police doing the right thing in the right way at all times, and anti-social behaviour is a good example of that. You know if you are not very sophisticated about the way you measure it and record it and kind of encourage organisations effectively to work in partnership it can get lost in the desire to have an x % detection rate and probably a detection of crime targets and all this kind of stuff. (Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander)

Integral to the use of these performance based strategies, was a corresponding national level shift toward 'neighbourhood approaches' in tackling issues of crime and low-level disorder, as increasingly this became the responsibility of all practitioners who were involved locally in the provision of community safety (Audit Commission 2006, p. 3). It was suggested that in order to achieve the targets set for those delivering policy responses '(a)ddressing crime and anti-social behaviour must be linked to other improvements in the environment to enhance the quality of life for people. To be successful, CDRPs need to work with other partners to develop short and long term solutions based on local knowledge of what people really want' (Audit Commission 2006, p. 3). However, as the partner engagement appeared to grow in response to these increasing national level demands, there also emerged renewed differences in approach between Southern City's practitioners. In the same way that they had been apparent between the local authority and police, these conflicts were mainly based upon decisions regarding the appropriate types of action to be used in a case. This was given that some partners favoured full engagement with the national level legislation, which at times would mean the use of formal interventions such as an ASBO or dispersal order, whilst others sought to emphasise the need to address the underlying causes of the behaviour, preferring to

continue working with individuals until all other means of approaching the tackling of this issue had been exhausted (Interview 025 Southern City Local Authority Service Director). This does however pose an interesting conflict with TP3, which suggests that criminal justice policies would become more focused upon the issue of risk management. Whilst this was a shift that had appeared to occur nationally, locally in Southern City policy actors were keen to maintain their position on tackling the underlying cause of ASB, rather than just concentrating upon its impact.

Another potential area of conflict that was highlighted by Southern City's practitioners was in relation to the tackling of ASB and young people. This was an issue raised by the local authority ASB Team Manager during their second interview, when they suggested that working relations had improved with colleagues from Children's Services, as they now sought to meet the needs of both the community and young perpetrators:

> [I]t was never that bad but we are working better now, better communication, we are on board with the same agendas, same strategy there really is a breakdown in some of these silos if you like. (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

The other site of potential conflict was that of individual personalities, and people having their own agendas, which did not necessarily fit with wider objectives (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker). These contrasting approaches were mainly highlighted at the local multi agency meetings (see Chapter Five), a network of which existed across Southern City. This apparent divergence in approach across the broad range of local level partners is perhaps best illustrated by the relationship between the core agencies and practitioners from the youth sector, including the youth offending team, youth workers from both the local authority and the voluntary sector. Initially this had emerged as a result of this particular sector's broadly preventative approach in tackling ASB and a general reluctance for young people to become labelled as being 'criminal' as a result of the use of enforcement-based interventions. This therefore led to the preferred approach of these agencies seeming to be in conflict with the strategy of the city's core partners. It was particularly apparent during the initial stages of formulating a coordinated approach toward tackling this issue, when it was acknowledged by the ASB

Team Manager from Southernshire Constabulary that in relation to the local youth offending team, as an organisation the police had experienced some difficulties in getting to grips with this particular team's stance on the issue of ASB. It appeared that they had their own hierarchy of response to this issue, which at times conflicted with the police's desire to utilise formal interventions such as ASBOs (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This had also been exacerbated by the acknowledged slowness of the youth offending team to engage in wider partnership working at the local level, especially during the early stages of the rise of the local ASB agenda (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). However, by the time of these later interviews in 2009 there was seemingly a more integrated system in place for dealing with both the issue of youth crime and ASB, which had enabled this particular team to become more engaged in this process (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). Also by this stage there was a range of other local partners, including those from organisations that would not have previously considered the tackling of ASB to be a priority. This was a standpoint that had previously been shared by the police in Southern City as illustrated in this passage:

> [W]hen we were wanting to ASBO everybody a couple of years ago they wanted to keep young people out of the criminal justice system and thought it wasn't appropriate to ASBO them. So there were some conflicts and maybe we understand their position a little bit more now, they have their own pecking order of what comes where, supervision order, referral order, ISSP they have their own levels of orders that the court will give and they see ASBOs as a last resort after all those orders whereas we might see it a little bit earlier on in. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)

As those within the police worked toward an understanding with practitioners from Southern City's youth offending team, so the same approach was taken in a broader sense toward the city's youth sector by the statutory partners. This was done in an effort to try and rectify the relations between these two sectors, and also with a view to encouraging the undertaking of a greater multi agency approach locally, which sought to engage with partners from all sectors. However, in the opinion of a former youth worker in the city, this had been a process that was somewhat impeded by the emergence of key policy actors at the local level and their ability to dominate the delivery of this particular agenda.

This was despite the acknowledged efforts of the police to try and increase their work with both young people directly and via youth inclusion panels, as they sought to continue to improve this particular aspect of local level partnership working and to ensure that all other routes were exhausted before formal action was utilised. 'I think [the police] had much more of a positive impact than just the stigma, the labelling and you know well we've got these orders now let's use them' (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker):

> I think it changed over the years and I think work was done a lot to make sure that those conflicts were dealt with and managed and to try and get a multi agency approach to things, but then it goes back, it goes back to individuals again, and individuals will and want to get on and you know work in a, a multi agency approach really. I think like with most issues you can't work in isolation and you have to work together, but if everybody's got their own agenda, and how do those fit in and I think people also forget that it's okay to disagree, as long as you have an open and frank discussion about why you disagree, and go okay we disagree but we can still work together. But you go into some of these, I remember going into some of the meetings and you disagree with someone and you feel like that's it then you are not spoken to for the rest of the meeting. We are going to disagree we are coming from different angles but it's how you know, how do we deal with these disagreements and then work to finding some solution, and if this is how agencies are going to behave what do you want from young people, how do you want that, how do you want barriers to be broken down if you know young people can see the agencies not getting on and you want to break down these barriers with them, well how if we can't break down the barriers ourselves. (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker)

This meant that by these later stages of the research period, there were still issues seemingly being experienced in ensuring the full engagement of all youth focused organisations in the city, including those from the voluntary sector. These can be of significant importance in addressing ASB, as they can be used as a mechanism through which young people can be diverted through their engagement in a range of positive activities, and perhaps more significantly offering them somewhere to go. As acknowledged by the youth offending team manager, this is something that these organisations are able to do without the requirement to formally engage with any other local level partners (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). A representative from the 'Young Southern City' voluntary organisation, which seeks to

positively engage young people in an effort to divert them away from both criminal and ASB activities, was also interviewed during the fieldwork. They highlighted how despite the continued emphasis placed upon the links between young people and the Government's ASB agenda, there was still by this stage no formal referral process in place between themselves and a number of the other local agencies across the city. This had resulted in them as an organisation continuing to operate outside of Southern City's core partnership structure, owing to the lack of any 'meaningful partnership' between these practitioners (Interview 018 Manager of Young Southern City's Volunteering Projects). Instead what existed was a fairly informal arrangement, which was reliant upon personal relationships between themselves and those working in the statutory partnership agencies across the city. Despite this, it had seemingly allowed for young people to be referred by both the local Youth Offending Team and the Probation Service into voluntary organisations such as this, which had its origins in the broader youth club movement. In those few instances where a working relationship had been established with colleagues from Southern City's statutory partners, the interviewee likened this to a procurement/contractor relationship, where as an organisation they are required to provide the core agency with a service. Despite this not being a full partnership of the style that had been seen in other aspects of Southern City's partnership structure, it had enabled this particular participant to attend several Strategy Groups run by the local authority (Interview 018 Manager of Young Southern City's Volunteering Projects).

However, even where there had been participation in groups such as these, the interviewee suggested that the reality of this in terms of their ability to be able to influence policy had been minimal given that it was felt that at these meetings, there was little opportunity given to voice a meaningful opinion on any particular issue, with participants only being given a short time to consider matters. This had led the participant to conclude that this is not a 'very productive way of influencing something' (Interview 018 Manager of Young Southern City's Volunteering Projects). The ability to influence ASB policy specifically had proven to be even more difficult. This was seemingly as a result of this agenda having been based in the local authority's Neighbourhood and Housing Services directorate, which it was felt was too far removed from the youth

services. As a result it presented practitioners from this area with little opportunity to influence key developments around this policy area (Interview 018 Manager of Young Southern City's Volunteering Projects).

In assessing these relationships between core elements of Southern City's partnership structure and the youth sector in particular, the main concern seems to have been based upon the perceptions of those from the statutory partners. This was an issue that had further extended toward youth workers in the city. A respondent from this sector who had gained significant experience as a youth worker during the period of interest, and as with other participants from this sector in Southern City's seemingly 'other' partnership structure, they expressed similar sentiments to that of the other interviewees. This offers evidence in support of TP4, with the existence of an 'other' policy network within the youth sector. This had similar characteristics to that of Rhodes' (1997) identified 'professional network'. These are both stable and have restricted membership, and in their composition are similar to 'policy communities', evidence of which in Southern City has also been identified. These networks are different to communities in that they are based upon serving the interests of a particular profession, retaining significant vertical interdependence. However, they are often keen to isolate themselves from other networks. The experiences of respondents from this network, with regard to the perception of this group had been gained both on an individual and community basis, having sat on local housing panels, Community Safety Partnerships and also worked with young people who had been made subject of interventions such as ASBOs. As a result, one of these respondents suggested that they had seen the demonstration of a heavily enforcement led approach in Southern City, particularly prior to the emergence of the dedicated ASB teams within the police and local authority. At this stage, this had seen the leadership for tackling this issue emerging from practitioners within the local authority's housing department, who during this time had been keen to make full use of tools such as the ASBO:

> The main key players were housing, like as we are talking now housing, housing, housing I can just picture them now they were a huge driving force behind the ASBOs and how the targeting of young people so yeah the main pushers of the ASBOs were the housing

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department. (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker)

Despite the prominence given to Southern City's statutory agencies, and the crucial role of the local authority in particular in developing local level policy, it is evident that there were further levels of partnership working in apparent isolation in Southern City. This potentially formed part of the city's acknowledged four-tier structure of response to ASB, which was put in place to 'consult, form strategy and policy, decide on a course of formal action, and tackle the root causes of ASB' (Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager 2005, p. 5). It was therefore within this broader operating framework that each of these partners had a role, albeit somewhat overshadowed by the continuing duopoly between the police and Southern City's local authority.

The virtual partner? Mobilisations of 'community' in ASB policy and practice

Over the course of this research it became clear that the community also became at least as a rhetorical referent a part of the city's broader partnership structure. Members of local communities appeared to have played an active role in initially highlighting ASB as an issue to their local MPs, which raised the profile of low-level disorder, whilst subsequently they were encouraged to take an active role in the policing of measures that were introduced to tackle this issue. This resulted in them having to also work in partnership with local agencies. This led to them being cited by a fieldwork participant as having been a key part of the 'Holy Trinity' of partnership working in Southern City (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager), as they became a recurrent theme of this case study:

> The Government has been held to account and has had to respond over the public's perceptions of ASB. They have identified it as a key priority for them and I think that is now being reflected in the Government's agenda and central legislation. The 'Respect' agenda has developed in recent years … when we were set up as 'Trailblazer' authorities the Government kicked off its 'Together' campaign, which was about together we are going to tackle ASB that has morphed and developed into 'Respect', which has in a far more detailed way looked at that preventative aspect. It's looking at working with the community and making sure that we feedback to the community so that they understand what is being done locally and that is

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undoubtedly a result of feedback that has been received from local people. (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager)

By the later stages of the fieldwork, a recognised role had been given to the community in the Government's national rolling out of the 'neighbourhood policing' strategy (Home Office, November 2004). In this later initiative, those at the national level sought 'active', participatory community engagement in tackling the issue of ASB and community safety. The result was the introduction of a system of regular Partnership and Communities Together (PACT) meetings across Southern City (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager) in common with many localities across England and Wales (Hughes and Rowe, 2007). These were claimed to be 'local public engagement meetings on crime' (Casey 2008, p. 32). The aim was to bring community representatives together with beat managers and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and also Neighbourhood Policing Teams, who it was proposed would act as the 'face' of community engagement and communications with local residents regarding issues that impacted upon both crime and justice concerns within the local area (Casey 2008, p. 58). These meetings were designed to offer community members the opportunity to not only have direct engagement with key members of their local police force, but also to be able to influence the identification of local level priorities for their areas, which the police were required to respond to.

In response to this newly developed structure, there were some tangible 'mobilisations' of communities that occurred as the council took responsibility for the running of Neighbourhood Partnerships across the city, as once again communities continued to remain a focal point in the formulation of this later response to the tackling of ASB. The Partnerships have a similar motivation to that of the local PACT meetings, in that they seek to bring together local practitioners and the community. However, unlike the PACT forum that focuses upon local interactions between residents and the police, the scope of Neighbourhood Partnerships is much greater. This seeks engagement between local residents and a range of representatives from local statutory agencies, councillors, one of whom chairs the meeting, community groups and the voluntary sector. These have been

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introduced as part of the local authority's long term view of being able to devolve to these Partnerships both a degree of decision making, and the management of small community budgets (Interview 021 Southern City Local MP), with the emphasis of these meetings being upon the shaping of local services. They also seek to identify and address local problems, picking up on key issues that are affecting communities, which may include ASB (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services).

It is anticipated that as a result of this process locally developed solutions to these issues are easier to sustain, having secured a degree of community cooperation in its implementation and subsequent maintenance. This was articulated as it became clear that ASB continued to be a key priority for local residents, both as a result of the data provided by the CDRP's strategic assessment and the views of local residents that were being expressed at the local PACT meetings. "[T]hese are local meetings held around the city where people bring their local issues that they want to be tackled, you know and ASB is a priority" (Interview 017 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). This followed the early identification that 'anti-social behaviour was the number one priority' for people living in this city (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This came as a result of a Quality of Life Survey that was undertaken in Southern City in 2003, which had initially highlighted the need for a targeted local level response to be developed. However, by the later set of interviews that began in 2008, there had been some shifts secured in relation to public perceptions of ASB (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services). These were supported by the publication of an update of the CDRP's Crime and Disorder Strategic Assessment, which suggested a continuing positive trend in 'public confidence regarding ASB' based upon the city's 2010 Quality of Life Audit, despite ASB remaining as the 'most common Neighbourhood Forum priority' (Welshman 2011, p. 4). By 2008, this had evolved into a Neighbourhood Policing strategy and the establishment of forums such as PACT, both of which sought to advance the role of local communities in claiming ambitiously to be capable of addressing this issue through the promotion of a joined up approach at the local level in which residents would become directly engaged with the

partnership agencies. It appears that public perceptions remained an important factor in providing this agenda with a degree of momentum as had been seen in the initial emergence of ASB as a politicised concept:

> Public pressure. 'We want something done; we are not prepared to put up with this' just as a general message, I think that's really been the sort of impetus behind it if I was honest about it. There's one argument that says we do it because the Government tells us to do it I say that the reason why it has developed as it has, has been aided if you like by a public pressure to deal with some of the issues what the Government have been saying is actually reflective of public opinion and public pressure, I think very much a growing reluctance to accept levels of what is perceived to be unacceptable behaviour. (Interview 012 Chair of CDRP/Southern City Local Councillor)

The role of evidence in policymaking

Among some members of the local policy network, criticisms were aired regarding the 'evidence-free' zone surrounding approaches to ASB policy and practice. These were mainly concerned with the lack of evidence-based policy that had been used to support the development of this particular local policy response to the tackling of ASB, and similarly the approach being encouraged by those at the national level. The youth offending team manager in Southern City seemingly echoed a sentiment that had been expressed by the Opposition at the national level, regarding the apparent lack of evaluation as to the effectiveness of ASB initiatives such as 'Together' and 'Respect'. 'Respect promised so much and has delivered so little. The Government hasn't even completed a proper assessment of where it thinks its various interventions are working.' (Ford 2008). This view was echoed in the following assessment of Southern City's Youth Offending team manager:

> But if you take the whole thing right from the centre outwards the amount of resources that are actually going into anti-social behaviour, and yet nobody seems to have demonstrated or tried to demonstrate whether it's effective or not yet, a decade on after the legislation enabled it, which was in 98, it is, it is interesting. (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager)

The same respondent also suggested that 'I don't think they know and I don't think there's been enough work to find out whether it is effective or not' (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). In terms of the response that had been formulated by local practitioners in Southern City in particular, this was an issue that had also been highlighted by the seeming lack of follow up of individual cases. This had apparently left practitioners to presume that if someone had disappeared from their radar, then the behaviour must have been dealt with, regardless as to how this had been achieved. This can be illustrated by the 80% success rate that was quoted to the researcher by the local police, in connection with the use of the warning letter as an informal intervention. The only basis for which was the fact that '80% of those don't come back to our notice again' (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager), regardless as to why. This was an approach that was in stark contrast to that of the youth offending team, who were able to measure their effectiveness in terms of 'preventing offending and reducing reoffending' (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager), and was possibly a contributory factor as to why this particular local agency representative found the ASB response so difficult to interpret. It therefore represented for this participant a notable gap in the system that had been developed in Southern City, but one that they could also contribute to filling, as they were in a position to be able to offer additional information in those cases where they had been involved in the imposition of an intervention. It was anticipated that in doing so, the impact of the range of Southern City's ASB response could be better evaluated. Instead, the same participant suggested that this merely relied upon public perceptions within affected communities, and whether they believed that there had been any significant improvements made as a result of the use of ASB interventions, regardless of them being either formal or informal. Therefore, 'you know presumption is that it must work, I don't know, but nobody seems to be doing the research' (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). In the opinion of this particular participant, this had somewhat stemmed from the emergence of a range of ASB 'zealots' at both the local and national levels within the policymaking process, and also the 'evangelical' nature of the stance taken on the issue of ASB, which ensured that it was given a certain momentum. This had been coupled with national level assurances that something was being done to

tackle this issue, and as local practitioners were encouraged to take action so the reports of ASB began to increase. In considering this alongside both the pace and the scale of the change that was also being enacted at the national level, in terms of new policy initiatives and the introduction of new legislation, in the opinion of this participant it made it hard to interrupt this process:

> It's quite difficult for anybody to put their hand up, is it actually working are you quite sure about this … it's a civil order, but what it has is criminal sanctions right okay for breach, are you actually sort of criminalising stuff that isn't actually criminal behaviour and are you shoving more people, more and more young people, into a kind of you know a sort of a justice system, and are you imposing the quite ridiculous sort of conditions on young people, for very long periods of time you know, and in effect, it I think at a certain point in time the whole ASB apparatus became a kind of alternative youth justice system (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager)

Conclusion

In considering those elements that have contributed to the shaping of ASB policy at the local level, it is possible to identify several key factors. The first of these was the initial impetus and continuing impact of national level shifts upon local level policy. These were seen both in terms of the emergence of key personalities at the national level who sought to drive forward the policy agenda, and the provision of a raft of legislative measures aimed at equipping local practitioners with the tools necessary to be able to tackle the issue of ASB. Both of these were factors in the development of a coordinated local level response in Southern City, which continued throughout the fieldwork stage of this study. Initially, practitioners had to respond relatively quickly as the national level momentum on this issue grew, marking significant changes locally from 2003 onwards. As a result, formal policy often developed only after concrete-working practices had been established, as the demands made for policy action at the national level continued to grow. By the later stages of the fieldwork, ASB responses had become more embedded in the local level agenda, and it was apparent that this had remained a key element of the work of practitioners. Although the fundamental elements of the mechanisms that had been put in place to address this in 2003 had since undergone little change, local

practitioners continued to refine their overall approach. This had enabled the expansion of the scope of the measures being offered, both to fit in more with the preventative stance now being encouraged by those at the national level, and again in response to national level policy shifts.

We now return to the theoretical propositions that were outlined earlier in the thesis, and consider briefly what light the empirical findings discussed in this chapter has shed upon them. TP1 suggested that we might expect ASB policies in Southern City to reflect the 'reconfigured' characteristics of late modern crime control – largely determined by fundamental social, economic and cultural forces – and we would not expect them to vary significantly from the national policy trajectories on ASB. The key theme of the empirical findings of this chapter supports the basic notion of national-local similarity, but the picture of interplay between national-regional-local axes is more complex than a simple triumph of national without compromises on the one hand, or hegemony of the local on the other. Rather, what we saw was a complex intermingling of the local and the national, in which local developments in Southern City (facilitated by the movement of key personnel between national and local government) were clearly important in shaping developments at the national level. The second TP suggested that ASB policies in Southern City would display a 'schizoid' tension between 'adaptive' elements on the one hand, driven by instrumental, managerial concerns (emphasising such concepts as 'responsibilisation' and partnership), AND more emotive, politicized 'expressive' elements on the other (Garland 2001). There was strong support for this admixture in the empirical findings from Southern City, although importantly, the tensions between instrumental and expressive were rarely played out within the local policy community. Rather, the picture was one of a local consensus – at least between the main players – for a managerial and instrumental approach to ASB, but one which found itself occasionally in tension with a more populist drive at the national level. Having said this, there was clear evidence in this chapter of some tensions within the local policy network, not least between the police (who, perhaps surprisingly, were less focused on enforcement and more on prevention) and the local authority. Turning to TP3, this raised the idea that ASB policies in Southern City would reflect a preoccupation with 'risk' that has been observed

in criminal justice policy (and social policy more generally) such that it would become focused primarily on the cost effective management of unruly populations, rather than upon the punishment or rehabilitation of offenders (Feeley and Simon 1994). This TP also suggested that policy development may display a tendency to colonise other areas of social policy locally such that other policy areas – such as health and education - become configured around and driven by the issues of crime and ASB. The evidence from this chapter, supporting that of the previous chapter, was that although there was some manifestation of the 'managerial' approach to ASB that is sometimes seen as part of a risk based approach, local agencies still remained strongly wedded to the notion of tackling the fundamental causes of ASB rather than simply managing an intractable problem. There was little evidence of a colonisation of other local policy areas as suggested in theses about 'governing through crime' (Simon 2007) or 'governing through ASB' (Crawford 2009). Finally, TP4 suggested that ASB policy in Southern City would be shaped by policy networks of different kinds, including relatively stable and continuous 'policy communities', and 'intergovernmental networks' comprising participants from national and local government (Rhodes 1981, 1997). There was certainly evidence of the existence of such networks, although these could not really be described in Rhodes terms as a 'policy community'. Rather, there was the manifestation of a more loosely-based 'issue network', but one which was dominated by a more simple duopoly of the police and local authority, who were able to dominate the local policy network largely by dint of their legal powers and financial resources, but also via their connections with central government.

Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions

Introduction

The main aim of this thesis was to explore the extent and nature of national and local influences over the policymaking process with regard to anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy in a particular geo-historical context ('Southern City' 1998-2007). The study has concentrated specifically upon the activities of those who operated primarily at the local level within this process, and to a lesser extent the regional level. The issue of ASB became one of the most prominent, high profile features of the New Labour government's national crime and disorder agenda, across the selected period of interest of 1998 to 2007.

In assessing the role of the 'local' within this process, the design of this research was also concerned with exploring the complexities of the ASB policy process at the local level. By increasing the need to secure the cooperation of those at the local level in tackling what had become a burgeoning policy area, those at the national level encouraged a growing number of local policy actors to also become involved in both the formulation of policy, and the direct tackling of issues of ASB. Correspondingly this led to a growth in local level policy networks, as these began to emerge in support of what had in some areas become an expanding local level ASB agenda and institutional infrastructure (in accord with Crawford (2008) and Hughes' (2007) emphasis on the UK having one of the most developed and formalised institutional arrangements of a preventive nature across the Western world). It was in choosing to concentrate upon changes to local level working practices, and the assessment of a lived local experience, that this study has sought to refocus attention away from national policy elites toward the role of the 'local'. In doing so, this study has sought to achieve a similar shift in the broader debate surrounding policy evolution, away from a previous concentration upon 'grand narrative' accounts of crime control policies in Garland (2001) and Simon (1992) and others.

In terms of policymaking being a process consisting of individual stages and involving different 'dimensions' of policy, these 'grand' accounts can suggest a rather straightforward translation from policy 'talk' to 'decisions' and ultimately 'actions'. This underplays the uneven, messy and unpredictable nature of the public policy process. Throughout such accounts, the focus also tends to remain upon those acting at the national level, and in some instances upon the global changes to have occurred. These accounts also suggest a growing convergence between western industrial societies, and in particular the United Kingdom and USA, in terms of the nature and direction of their crime control policies and the 'criminalisation of social policy' (Crawford, 1997). Even though it is recognised that these broader structural patterns are an important part of a comprehensive account of policymaking, it is important also to take account of what Garland himself refers to as the 'empirical particulars' (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking as it pans out in specific localities.

A study of this nature thus recognises the significance of the role of local level within the broader policymaking process. This recognition emerges with a view to gaining an enhanced understanding of the shaping and delivery of policy outcomes. The need to shift the debate away from the 'grand narrative' accounts of crime control has become more apparent in an effort to further explore the nuances and complexities of the policymaking process. Indeed it is only by assessing the cumulative impact of national level policy shifts upon local level working practices (and vice versa), and their contribution toward the emergence of key local level policy actors that a fuller and more accurate account of policymaking can be developed. This study has sought to highlight the role of various levels of the policy process, even though it is the sub-national level that has formed the primary focus of the empirical element of this research. The relationship between different levels of the process has primarily been identified and explored via the application of Pollitt's conceptual framework of talk, decisions and action. It is also acknowledged that the factors influencing ASB policy have been little researched in the past. This is both within an academic context and also in the provision of evidence-based policy practice. There have been few detailed local level accounts as to how national level policy decisions have shaped (or not shaped) the work of policy actors at the local

level. The varied local approaches to ASB policy can be evidenced by the variety of local level ASB policy responses that have been formulated and subsequently implemented by practitioners. Writers such as Burney (2005), Crawford (2009) and Hughes (2007), have highlighted similar gaps in existing studies, which they have attempted to fill with their own empirical research. However, even these studies have a broader focus, attempting to capture developments in different areas of England and Wales. In contrast, this study has adopted an in-depth empirical exploration of one local authority area in particular, rather than attempt broader accounts of legislative change and practitioner responses in the UK. The approaches of these writers further underpin the need to also consider the role of the 'local' within accounts of the policymaking process, as well as the need for there to be more empirically based studies. These can offer a critical test of those accounts that seek to identify the emergence of broader structural patterns in relation to policymaking at the national level.

This concluding chapter aims to provide an overview and discussion of the study's key findings, and to assess critically the strengths and limitations of the research in the light of the broader conceptual debates addressed in the wider literature previously under review. The chapter is therefore divided into three main sections. The first explores in more depth the key findings of this study, revisiting some of the significant theoretical issues raised in the earlier chapters of the thesis. The second section of this chapter discusses the application of the ideas of 'governance' to the arena of ASB policymaking, assessing its impact upon broader policy developments. This is primarily concerned with the role of local level policy actors in this process. The third section of the chapter considers the merits of moving the broader debate about shifts in crime control away from 'grand narrative' accounts, and towards more specific, empirically-informed analyses of the policy process. The chapter concludes with a summary of reflections concerning the strengths and limitations of the study, and considers the potential improvements that could have been made, and the lessons for future research.

Summary of the key research findings

The case study was focused upon a particular local authority area that has been referred to throughout this thesis as 'Southern City'. It was designed to explore a set of research questions which sought to identify with the participants key elements of what, had in fact changed in Southern City, what were the main policy influences over the specific local developments, and how these came about. This resulted in the emergence of a number of important findings, a detailed analysis of which is provided in the earlier chapters of this thesis that are concerned with the case study element of this research (see Chapter Five and Chapter Six). In revisiting some of these significant points within this concluding discussion, it is anticipated that these will be contextualised against some of the key themes identified in the initial literature review that provided the theoretical framework for this study.

The key research questions

1) What were the key developments in policies relating to anti-social behaviour in Southern City, and when did these occur?

Although a key aim of the study was to focus on the importance of local level developments in ASB policy, the evidence of this study also underlined the vital importance played by developments at the national level in setting the parameters of what was possible in terms of local policy and practice. Whilst there had been piecemeal and sporadic concern and action in relation to ASB in Southern City prior to the election of a New Labour government, there was no evidence of any significant local political discussion about this issue, or of any major initiatives to deal with it. It was clear that it was national political shifts that played a key role both in raising the local policy 'talk' about ASB, and in terms of the more concrete policy decisions and actions that followed. The national legislation that set out a range of specific statutory measures designed to equip a broader range of local level practitioners to tackle the issue of ASB was a key impetus to local developments. It is clear then that despite the focus on local developments in much of the thesis, the argument presented here does not downplay the

vital importance of national level governmental decisions in this unfolding story. These measures were enacted with a view to moving the debate around responsibility for the tackling of this issue away from the confines of practitioners within the housing sector. At the same time it was recognised that nuisance behaviour in its new guise of ASB, affected a broader scope of people than had previously been acknowledged. This resulted in the introduction of a range of ASB related legislation, which offered practitioners the use of measures such as child curfews, closure orders, dispersal orders and perhaps most significantly Anti Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs). These frameworks of legislation were cited by almost all local level practitioners as having been key to the shifts that were to develop at the local level. These included the establishment of the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (henceforth CDRP), the conducting of a local crime and disorder audit and publication of a reduction strategy (as required by law), and the growing focus on ASB in general. Key institutional developments, which occurred after the shifts at the national level, included the establishment of dedicated ASB units in both the local police force and the local authority. Unsurprisingly, a more coordinated approach to ASB began to emerge at the local level, as the core agencies in particular became the focus for delivering both the enforcement and preventive elements of the Government's national level ASB agenda. The leadership of the local authority and the police within this particular policy area was seemingly cemented by these local shifts that were occurring in formulating a response to this particular issue. This would later see these teams growing in strength, as decisions were made nationally to support them through the provision of renewed funding opportunities.

These developments resulted in the establishment of a structure that was reminiscent of Crawford's (2009, p.824) thesis of the emergence of a 'regulatory pyramid' in the local governance of ASB, as practitioners sought to interpret ASB policy decisions and accompanying initiatives. At the same time, although national impetus was initially important, this also reflected Southern City's move away from a nationally led approach for perhaps the first time, in a series of key developments to have occurred at the local level. This culminated in the introduction of a more balanced approach to the tackling of ASB. Increasingly, local policy actors and practitioners expressed unease with a

primarily enforcement approach, and sought to utilise a wider range of preventative interventions such as Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (henceforth ABCs) and warning letters (despite the 'zealotry' noted in some quarters around the high profile Streetwise initiative).

In applying Pollitt's (2001) distinctions within the policymaking process, it is evident that in the case of Southern City it is this point between policy decisions and action, where the gap between the stages in the policymaking process becomes more pronounced. There is a transition stage between the national and local levels within this process, as practitioners on the ground are tasked with the delivery of agreed policy outcomes, and acting as the point at which policy adaptations could be made. In the case of Southern City, it was achieved via a process of negotiation mainly amongst the representatives from the city's core agencies, despite emerging sites of resistance, particularly from practitioners within the city's youth sector. In their interpretation of the legislative changes that had been made, this became a process that was made easier by the apparent devolution of the Government's ASB agenda to those at the local level. Nonetheless, the gap between decisions and actions continued to widen, enabling the illustration of Dunsire's (1978) implementation gap, where '(T)here is always a space to be exploited between written and implemented policy' (in Muncie 2004a, p. 175). This is a gap that can be filled by the interrelationships between practitioners at the local level. Within the context of ASB policy, they were charged with the delivery of a coordinated response to this particular issue. As could be seen in an emerging policy environment such as the one created in Southern City, this can allow for key policy actors to emerge and influence the manner in which issues such as ASB are prioritised locally.

In Southern City this occurred against a background of growing partnership working at the local level, as this became a core element of the approach that was also being encouraged by those nationally in tackling ASB. Centralised policymakers also focused upon the evolution of a multi agency approach amongst practitioners at the local level, which became ideals fostered by broader policy decisions. This resulted in the passing of legislation that outlined the requirements of partnership working, with the emphasis

having been placed upon core partnership agencies having to work together in a coordinated manner, often for the first time. The effects of which in Southern City as already acknowledged had been a growth in duopoly, as the police and local authority became a focus for these activities.

2) Who were the key individuals and organisations involved in the development of ASB policy in Southern City?

It has been argued that the key local actors in the development of ASB policy in Southern City were the police and policy officers from specific areas of the local authority (particularly housing). These made up the duopoly in relation to which a number of potentially key actors were de facto excluded. As noted previously the latter included elected politicians, the Regional Government Office (henceforth RGOs), and youth services. Local policy was driven and adapted by public servants rather than by elected political leadership or indeed 'the community'. This finding is largely supportive of Garland's (2001) arguments regarding the key role played by adaptive, problem-solving approaches in much contemporary crime control strategies, albeit sotto voce when compared to the noise of the countervailing tendency of the 'politics of denial'. However, we also need to reaffirm the importance of the specific 'special relationship' forged between certain individual actors locally and those in national government and in particular the Home Office.

As a result of the latter, Southern City's practitioners were seemingly able to transcend the gap that normally exists between these two levels, and are mitigated under normal circumstances by regional government representatives, who act as a conduit in their provision of a link between these two elements of the process. The emergence of key personalities who were able to drive forward this particular working relationship centred upon a key policy actor from Southern City's local authority and the civil servant Louise Casey at the national level. Both had carved prominent roles for themselves in the formulation and directing of ASB policy at their respective levels. For Casey, it was supported by the use of strong political rhetoric in relation to key policy developments,

and the encouragement of an enforcement-based stance by practitioners charged with the delivery of the Government's policy actions, in connection with this particular element of their broader crime and disorder agenda. Locally, this particular actor had a key role to play in the formulation of a local level agenda, and the formulation of accompanying strategy. Whether the role of these two individuals is understood as supporting the role of 'charisma' in the various ways in which policy is developed and unfolds, it is clear that particular actors and their dispositions matter in the policy process and how things 'turn out' in specific localities and contexts.

The relationship between these two key policy actors had been fostered on the basis of the previous efforts of Southern City's practitioners in the tackling of persistent and aggressive begging in the city, under the banner of the Streetwise Project. This had brought local practitioners into contact with key policymakers at the national level, as they received both support and recognition for their work in this field. It also provided the opportunity for the relationship between these two seemingly self-styled ASB activists or even 'crusaders' to begin to develop. It was following completion of this particular project at the local level, and perhaps more significantly the movement of Louise Casey into the Government's Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU), as this agenda began to gather momentum nationally that this relationship became of particular importance. As a result, Southern City was offered the opportunity to become a focus for the launch of the Government's newly developed 'Together' campaign, as well as the local authority becoming a 'Trailblazer' authority for the tackling of ASB. It was in this way that the relationship between these two levels of the process was seemingly legitimised, as those local authorities that had gained recognition in this way were tasked to work alongside colleagues at the national level in an effort to replicate best practice in this field nationwide. This would in fact become an enduring feature of Southern City's approach, as national level recognition of the work of practitioners in this particular policy area persisted across the various policy initiatives that were associated with the tackling of ASB across New Labour's time in power. At the same time, this enabled local level practitioners to continue to influence the national element of the policymaking

process, as the close ties were maintained between the two, seemingly throughout the period of interest.

As noted previously, the strength of this relationship did have a corresponding impact upon the relationship between the core agencies within Southern City and the broader reaches of the rest of the city's partnership structure. The direct nature of these links had apparently resulted in other key partner agencies, locally and regionally, being sidelined as the relationship between the ASB specialists in the local authority and those at the national level became rather exclusive in its nature. This had prompted key personnel within the city's CDRP to re-evaluate the local approach to ASB control in an effort to try to involve other local policy actors.

3) What was the nature of the relationships between key players in the policy process locally?

As noted above, the research demonstrated that the two most influential policy actors at the local level consisted of the ASB specialists in the local City Council, and the local police force. In effect, although responses to crime and disorder came under the remit of a wider multi-agency partnership, these two organisations operated what amounted to a duopoly of control. There were particularly close working relationships reported between the leaders of these dedicated ASB teams. Other research on ASB policy has demonstrated that this was not an unusual feature of CDRP practices locally, as local authorities and police forces became the focus for the delivery of policy outcomes and for also driving forward partner relations in a broader sense in other parts of the country (Hughes, 2007). The close working relationship was not always harmonious. It was also a relationship that could become strained, as conflicting organisational cultures at times resulted in clashes. Ironically, as Chapter Six showed, it was elements in the local authority that were at times more keen in promoting an enforcement agenda, with the official agency of law enforcement – the police operating as a moderating influence and promoting a more preventative, diversionary emphasis. It may have been the case that this key relationship was affected by some of the local authority's leading personalities

asserting their style of approach, supported and somewhat strengthened by their relations with key personalities operating at the national level.

This close working relationship that had developed between the local and the national levels of policymaking in the case of Southern City had been guided by strong personalities with considerable enthusiasm for this issue, as already noted above. However, other local level practitioners did not always support their combined approach toward the tackling of ASB. In fact, one participant referred to local developments in ASB policy to have been part of the wider surfacing of a range of 'ASB zealots' associated with this agenda. Even though they did acknowledge that the key policy actors operating at the local level in Southern City were more moderate, particularly in comparison to those in cities where a more heavily enforcement led approach had been embraced. The situation was tempered by the movement of both the national and local level actors within this particular relationship into alternative roles by the latter stages of the fieldwork. Even so, the personal style of engagement that now existed between the two levels of the process became a mantle that was passed to other colleagues at the local level, as these established links were maintained.

The relationship between these two key levels (local and national governmental) was not always a positive one. It contributed to the fragmentation of not only broader local level relations, but it also caused issues with those operating at the regional level as well. The RGO, despite having a formal role in this area, increasingly found itself having been cut out of the loop of this interaction between the national and local levels of the policymaking process. However, it was an experience that was also replicated in the RGOs dealings with the 'Respect' Taskforce in particular, as they demonstrated a similar degree of autonomy in the evolution of the initial concept of ASB. This culminated in the RGO struggling to find a role within wider policy developments. This situation was further exacerbated by a decline in regional resources, particularly by the later stages of the fieldwork, '[i]t got less and less and less, less people, less money … We were just a satellite organisation out there, slowly displaced' (Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service). In the meantime, it had also become apparent that national and local

level interactions were also becoming a more common aspect of the policymaking process overall, as those in national government acknowledged the need for a more collaborative approach to be taken between themselves and those at the local level. This again left little room for regional actors within this process, as nationally policymakers became more accepting of the provision of direct feedback of practitioners about the key elements of policy delivery, and resulting in the growing realisation that not everything could be controlled from Westminster.

These new sites of governance that had emerged in Southern City were strengthened by the renewed emphasis that had been placed upon partnership working at the local level, as these relations continued to grow across the period of interest. It was a process that was eased as an increased number of agencies seemingly 'bought in' to the concept of ASB, and the need for policies to be developed in support of tackling it. This continued to form the cornerstone of a more broadly preventative agenda, which enabled practitioners to distinguish between the key elements of the approach that had been developed locally. Previously some of these partners had been somewhat reluctant to engage with the enforcement aspect, as the initial focus had been upon delivering a response to this element of the Government's broader ASB agenda. As the multi agency approach at the local level continued to grow, so the emphasis shifted onto achieving a collective responsibility for shared targets across partnership agencies at the local level. In broadening the scope of the agencies that were involved in tackling this issue, it also increased the opportunity for conflicts over approach to emerge. In particular, there was evidence of periodic tension between the core agencies dealing with ASB and those operating within the city's youth sector. By the latter stages of the fieldwork, it was apparent that relations between the two had seemingly improved, again as a result of a more integrated system having been put in place in order to deal with youth crime and ASB locally. These improvements came as a result of the attempts that had been made by the police in particular to try and resolve these apparent difficulties between the two, as they renewed their desire for the city to achieve engagement on this issue from all relevant partners, including those working in youth services. However, there were still gaps to be addressed with those working in the city's voluntary organisations that also

had a youth focus. It was suggested that they continued to operate outside of the parameters of traditional partnership working, as they relied instead upon personal relationships in an effort to secure referrals of young people.

Finally this research confirms much existing commentary on the problematic nature and status of 'communities' in the governmental processes associated with ASB management. Whilst appeals to community remain a key rhetorical device deployed by policy actors and politicians, the actual involvement and participation of community groups and 'representatives' in the policy and practice of ASB management is largely 'virtual' and marginal in character.

4) How was ASB policy resisted and/or re-shaped at the local level?

In the case of the formulation of a targeted local level response to the tackling of ASB by those operating within Southern City, the ability to make policy adaptations was perhaps best illustrated by practitioners developing an approach that favoured the use of informal measures over that of more enforcement-oriented interventions such as the ASBO. It was apparent that although there had been a significant amount of time spent developing the mechanisms designed to deliver the Government's enforcement led agenda, the use of a more balanced response was apparent amongst practitioners from an early stage in Southern City whilst co-existing for a limited period with the 'zero-tolerance' initiative of Streetwise. In particular there was the maturing of the local approach toward tackling this issue amongst Southern City's practitioners, as their levels of expertise particularly in the core agencies, developed quite quickly and therefore enabled them to move away from a fully nationally led approach. It appeared that they were quick to take ownership of this issue, and in formulating a response that they believed was best suited to the needs of the surrounding communities. It was in fact this more preventative element of Southern City's approach that would also be later favoured increasingly by those in central government. With a change in Prime Minister came a movement away from the previously 'shrill tone' of New Labour's message in tackling ASB. This resulted in those at the local level being encouraged to consider options other than the use of formally

based measures in addressing this particular issue as other types of responses became accepted. This had seen the emergence and use of additional mechanisms in tackling ASB, which by the later stages of the period of interest included restorative justice initiatives. In terms of the overarching working practices for those operating at the local level in Southern City though these saw little change being made to the original operating framework that had been developed. This for some was testament to the strength of the systems that had been put in place, which had seen ASB becoming a fixed element of the local level policy agenda.

This did not prevent pockets of resistance emerging to the response being developed amongst the core elements of Southern City's practitioners. It was mainly linked to those involved in other sectors external to the city's core partnership structure, predominantly from those working in the city's youth and voluntary sector. These were elements of the city's partnership structure where although there had been improvements made in their relations with actors from the core agencies in particular, as the later emphasis shifted toward the positive engagement of these elements of the process, there were still gaps that were evident in their role in influencing local level policy developments. This led some of the practitioners involved in this field to question whether the decisions that had been made locally as to how national level policy decisions surrounding the ASB agenda should be implemented, were not simply part of a broader momentum of change emanating from the national level. There appeared to be a lack of evidence-based practice to support the introduction and use of formal interventions in particular, as change occurred at a rapid pace with little opportunity offered to evaluate the work that had already been undertaken. It was a particular issue in respect of measuring the success of the use of interventions such as ASBOs and ABCs in securing effective changes in individual patterns of behaviour. The result appeared to be the implementation of a system of tackling ASB that had come to rely upon a large element of presumption. Those at the national level used 'community satisfaction' and the prioritisation of this issue as a barometer of the success of the measures brought in to tackle it, whilst locally practitioners also presumed success in those instances where individual offenders did not reappear on their radar, apparently failing to seek out the reasons for this, which could

have potentially been achieved through the utilisation of the mechanism of citywide partnership working. This suggests that Southern City had perhaps been unsuccessful in securing a movement away from the acknowledged 'two man band' style of response dominated by the city's local authority and police force that had initially been cultivated in tackling the issue of ASB.

Discussing the theoretical propositions of this study

The development of ASB policy in Southern City demonstrates the growing importance of partnership working and in a sense provides a good example of the 'responsibilisation' policies highlighted by Garland (2001). The very existence of a local level multi-agency partnership with statutory responsibilities for crime and disorder control, and involving a range of statutory, community and commercial agencies suggests some support for the move away from the 'Westminster' model of government, and the emergence of a more decentralised polity characterised by shifting policy networks. However, against this, two points should be made. First, the ASB agenda remained in many ways centrally driven. Although national government policy was resisted and re-shaped to a degree, it nevertheless remains clear that it was national laws and initiatives that provided the fundamental impetus for developments at the local level. In doing so, this offers support to TP1, which suggests that local policy developments would largely follow a similar trajectory to that of key national policy milestones, as local policy actors were tasked with responding to issues of ASB management. However, as has been discussed in the earlier empirical findings chapters, in the case of Southern City whilst significant developments could be mapped at both levels, this did not prevent key local policy actors from interacting with their counterparts nationally, and appearing to shape agendas at the national level. This was further supported by evidence from respondents of their ability to ensure that their views and experience of ASB policy were taken into account, a pattern that largely endured throughout the period of interest. It is important, therefore, not to overstate the devolution of policy control and suggest that the central state was anything other than a major player in policy development.

Second, there was very little evidence locally of 'non-state' involvement in policy development. Commercial and voluntary bodies, not to mention actually existing communities, remained somewhat sidelined in local CDRPs. There was evidence in Chapter Six that local voluntary bodies working with young people felt sidelined in the process of ASB policy formation. Even other state elements in the local authority, such as the social services, were rather marginalised in the policy process that was dominated by the ASB specialists in the City Council, and the police. Thus, whilst this research has helped to highlight the complexities that are involved in local policymaking, it must be remembered that key *state* institutions remain powerful players in local ASB policy networks. This offers support to TP4 and the ability of policy networks fitting the typologies of Rhodes' (1997) 'issue based' networks, policy communities and professional networks (which included members of the youth and voluntary sector in particular) to be able to help shape policy developments locally, and in the case of Southern City, even nationally. There was then limits to Garland's claims for both 'de-monopolisation' and 'responsibilisation' beyond state actors in the new preventive sector of late modern society (see Hughes, 2007, p. 73), as the key players locally remained throughout the period of study, members of the police and local authority. Their ability to influence national developments relied heavily upon the 'special' relationship that had been cultivated between these organisations and key members of the national ASB policy movement, and the ways in which these organisations were able to harness their resources and at times support each other by exchanging them. This also included movement vertically, as key local players transitioned into national level roles.

The initial formulation of what Rhodes (1997) would describe as being an issue based policy network came as a result of the development of a local partnership structure, which was premised upon the issue of ASB. This consisted of key members including the community, CDRP, local authority and police. However, over time there developed a somewhat unequal distribution of power within this group as key policy actors began to emerge. This appeared to be consistent with the broader national picture that had developed in relation to local partnership relations, as the duopoly of control between the city's local authority and the police in particular became a consistent trend (Hughes,

2007). In Southern City, this enabled key practitioners from these organisations to dominate the network, and the resulting coordination of a wider local level response to issues of ASB. At times this resulted in conflicts between these two key partnership agencies and other local partners as previously highlighted. These issues arose in relation to their local level positioning, and the style of response and the methods being advocated in the tackling of individual cases of ASB, as conflicts persisted as to the style of adaptive response to be utilised.

These relations may well have also contributed to the evolution of this 'issue-based network' into a structure that increasingly reflected that of a 'policy community'. According to Rhodes' definition, the membership of these communities is often more select, even though the common denominator tends to be the involvement of representatives from organisations that are able to harness the use of extensive resources. These are mainly used to support the development of public policy, which in the case of this study was focused upon local level efforts aimed at influencing ASB policy. This can be further facilitated by the exchange of resources between organisations at the local level within these types of communities. There were again examples of these activities amongst Southern City's core agencies, particularly as the local authority sought to retain key resource levels. This saw staff movement between the city's local authority and police, in addition to the upward transitions that were also being made amongst practitioners between the local and national levels. This enhanced the relationship between these two key levels of the process, as contacts were maintained and policy actors increasingly felt like they had the 'ear' of those in government. Having a once local level actor operating at this national level, who had an understanding of both the dynamics and the geo-political landscape of this particular area, no doubt facilitated this. In addition, practitioners had developed a proven track record in working alongside colleagues at the national level.

Southern City's apparent divergence from an enforcement-oriented national level approach demonstrates not only the apparent 'schizoid' tension that can exist between 'adaptive' elements of policymaking on the one hand, driven by managerial concerns and the presence of more emotive, politicized 'expressive' elements on the other (Garland

2001) as discussed with the formulation of TP2, but also the existence of spaces that facilitate and enable these challenges to be made to the national level of the policymaking process in particular. This supports the suggestion that policymaking is not simply an unchanging, transitional process. It is instead representative of the outcome of a set of processes (Jones and Newburn 2004, p. 60), some of which are open to adaptation. The opportunity for this to occur is increased as more policy actors become involved in the formulation of policy, and as more policy talk and decisions around this agenda began to emerge.

In and amongst this growing scope of actors there emerged a range of key policy actors, both nationally and locally, each of which had a role to play in driving forward the ASB agenda at both levels, with some appearing to have a stronger influence than others. In focusing upon the development of working practices in a single area such as Southern City in this manner, it was at this point during the transition that the distinguishing feature of the practitioner response in this City also became apparent. Those representing the city's core agencies became able to exert more pressure in the formulation of a coordinated local level approach in tackling this issue, whilst also influencing the policymaking activities that were occurring at the national level. Their ability to do so illustrated the ways in which both individual and organisational politics can contribute to the shaping of local level policy delivery, as the mantra in Southern City continued to focus upon a more preventative approach being taken in relation to the tackling of ASB. It can also be a contributory factor in the apparent variations in approach that have emerged in this policy area despite the apparent consistencies in the policy decisions that have been taken by policymakers at the national level, and the legislative framework that has been put in place. In Southern City this saw local policy actors working against the prediction of TP3, which suggested that tackling ASB would become dominated by issues of risk management, as they instead focused upon the underlying causes of this behaviour and the need for this to be tackled. This meant lessening the emphasis placed upon formal actions such as ASBOs, and seeking to utilise more informally based measures such as warning letters. This was in an effort to not only be cost effective in their approach but also to ensure that all other routes were exhausted with the individual

prior to any formal action being applied. These became key elements of the policymaking process that it was anticipated would be best illustrated through the use of a case study approach designed to highlight the role of the 'local' within this progression between the initial stages of policy talk and decision making, to the subsequent delivery of targeted policy objectives, highlighting in this case how local level players were able to shape their responses in the face of an initial barrage of enforcement led approaches.

Concluding remarks and implications for future research

This research suggests that there are two key issues to have emerged in relation to those accounts of policymaking that have focused upon the provision of a grand narrative of developing crime control measures. The first is the inference of this being a straightforward process involving a smooth transition that renders policymaking to be a top down experience for practitioners. Secondly in presenting an account of a top down nature, it presumes compliance from those at the local level. It is suggested that what is required is more detailed empirical analysis of actual policy developments at the local level.

This particular study into the governance of ASB suggests that it is a balanced approach taking into account the interplay and mutual influence of national and local actors and processes that is required in order to enhance the nature of the accounts of policymaking that are being offered academically. In testing national trends in this manner, a movement towards the incorporation of the delivery of policy actions by local practitioners and the ways in which they too can influence this process is advocated. Therefore one of the main aims of this study has been to emphasise the significance of understanding policymaking as a multi-directional process, often of negotiation between different elements of the process.

It is argued that the application of a single case study approach has enabled these key elements of the ASB policymaking process to be identified and contextualised in some depth. In addition, it is anticipated that this is also an account of the transitions that have been made from government towards increased governance. Even though case study

research does not enable generalisations to be made, it is suggested that some of the study's key findings could be applied and tested within the context of other policy fields and localities. For example the suggestion that there are gaps within the policymaking process that can be exploited by practitioners, leading to more individualised interpretations of key policy decisions, whilst some at the local level are able to exert influence over national level policy shifts, are all indicative of policymaking being more than just a top down experience for practitioners. In the same way that partnership relations can add to the complexities that are involved, they can also provide a further dynamic to suggest the movement away from centralised control over key policy developments. This is important, both in terms of assessing national level centred accounts of policymaking, and the suggestion that there needs to be more studies undertaken in a similar vein to this.

A study of this nature can also be used as a means of highlighting future research opportunities. This is both in relation to ASB policy and the policymaking process more generally. It is therefore suggested that the use of a similar methodological approach, which favours the formulation of an adaptive research framework could be applied to other research sites, both nationally and in the provision of comparisons between local areas in England, and between local authorities in the devolved polities of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Having cited a distinguishing feature to Southern City's approach toward policymaking, it would be interesting to explore whether this also occurred in other areas where national level recognition for practitioner efforts were received and led to close local-central government relations. Or was this a case of individual personalities and 'charisma' which can become such a key factor in shaping policy outcomes both locally and indeed nationally. In terms of enhancing our understanding of the complexities involved in the policymaking process, it would also be interesting to present this account from a national level perspective downward. This could be achieved through the application of a similar style of methodological approach, only utilised within a national level context, before being applied to colleagues at the local level. This particular study had to rely upon supporting policy documentation in an effort to explore this (national) element of the process given that the focus remained upon

the gaining a detailed account of the local experience of policymaking. As was also acknowledged in this study, there has been a change of policy talk in this particular policy area in more recent times. This had its origins in a change in Prime Minister and the key personnel who had supported Blair's approach to targeting this issue across local communities, and also the simple fact that tackling ASB had become an embedded part of local level working practices. In recalling the dominance of this issue throughout the period of the research, it would be interesting to contrast this account of policymaking with one set in more recent times. This is especially interesting, as ASB remains an enduring feature of late modern society and its preoccupations with risk, insecurity and tolerance.

This study was restricted necessarily by the imposition of a specific timescale required for data collection, which at times also limited the institutional memory that was available, owing to this being reliant upon the ongoing transition of shared experiences and know-how between old and new members of organisations. Also this research was conducted during a period in which ASB policy was also evolving as a policy area. This meant that a significant amount of ASB literature both locally and nationally became available. However, its initial evolution also at times hindered the production of a study that sought to offer a snapshot of a local experience. It was also a difficulty that was experienced in relation to the local level practitioners who were available to participate in the fieldwork given that some of these identified key local level actors changed roles over the course of the case study, and were therefore no longer in a position to be interviewed as part of this study. In these instances, the accounts of alternative practitioners have had to be relied upon, some of who had direct knowledge of these actors, whilst others had taken their place. There was also a high success rate achieved in the number of interviews that were secured.

Overall, the methodological approach adopted and the resulting accounts that were gained from practitioners who were involved in the administering of ASB policy within a local context, have helped this study meet its key aims, despite the acknowledged limitations of a single case study approach and at times the lack of institutional memory

concerned with the selected period of interest. It is anticipated that this study has successfully highlighted the complexities that are involved in the policymaking process. It has also provided a site in which other academic theories regarding policymaking could be tested and applied, largely in an effort to enhance our understanding of the effects that broader policy change can have upon local level working practices, and of course the consequences of the local developments in turn for the national level of policy and practice.

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Appendix I: Southern City reference documents

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Appendix II: Example Topic Guide

Interview themes

Ask permission to tape. No individual will be named or identified in the final thesis. I'm happy to turn tape off at any point if there is something you'd rather not have on tape.

1. Candidate's role

Could I begin by asking you some general questions about your job here and what it involves?

Explain that the timescale of my research is the period between 1998 and 2007 and therefore will be asking the candidate to think back over this time when answering questions.

- Ask candidate to provide details of role and functions and the duration for which they have been in post and what portion of the 1998-2007 timescale is covered.
- What are your main responsibilities and when was your post first established (contact for predecessor if appropriate)? If post is a recent creation is the candidate aware of any work being undertaken prior to this in respect of ASB?
- How prominent an issue has ASB been during the time that you have worked in this organisation?
- How much emphasis do you think your organisation and your other partners have placed upon tackling ASB in Southern City?
- In terms of ASB policy, what degree of involvement did you have in its formulation given your role within the organisation?
- In your opinion how much influence does the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership have upon the way in which ASB has been tackled in Southern City to date?

- If the candidate has been involved in tackling ASB through both the Community Safety Partnership and the Local Strategic Partnership, have they noticed any differences in the way that this is being done or the influence that either of these Partnerships have upon the way in which ASB policy is implemented locally?
- Are there any differences in the ways in which each of these Partnerships have been interacting with central government?

2. Influences over Anti Social Behaviour Policy

I'm interested in the various local, regional and national influences over the development of ASB policy, so would like to spend a little time on this.

- Given the period of time that I am interested in, how new do you consider all of this to be? Was concern with ASB something that emerged at a national level from central government in the late 1990s, or is this based on a longer history of community concern regarding the management of ASB in Southern City?
- What do you consider to have been the main national influences over the development of ASB policy at the local level between 1998 and 2007? In addition to considering what the key developments have been in regards to legislation specifically? (Probe: Crime and Disorder Act, Anti Social Behaviour Act etc).
- How do the national influences pan down to local authority level? (E.g. meetings with the Home Office, ASB Unit, etc – names of key national people if possible).
- How does central government know what you are doing locally to tackle ASB, do you have to report back to the national level via the local Community Safety Partnership? And if so, how?
- In your opinion, what influence do you think your partners have exercised over the development of ASB policy at the local level and who are the main stakeholders driving forward ASB management locally (e.g. Regional Government Office, partnership agencies)?

- What do you consider to have been the key developments in the evolution of Southern City's ASB strategy and what do you think have been the main issues faced by the Partnership in tackling this issue?

- Do you think that the emphasis placed upon ASB by the Government has been maintained between 1998 and 2007 or have you noticed any significant changes? (Including the transition from to Home Office ASBU to the creation of the 'Respect' Taskforce)

- In what way does the Regional Government Office shape policy – e.g. is it just a forum for the exchange of ideas for professionals/practitioners in the region; does it promote a particular 'regional' approach towards ASB policy; does it act as an intermediary between the national and local levels?

- Would you consider there to be a significant bottom up influence on policy development, feeding up from local community groups?

3. Partnership working at the local level

- Which organizations do you see as being your key local partners in managing ASB? (E.g. police, local authority housing, health authority, others?)

- Did you see many differences in the approaches emerging between the various partners in regard to ASB policy? (E.g. are there different approaches in partners' views about the ways in which (and frequency with which) ASBOs should be used?) How were these differences resolved?

- In your view were there any noticeable differences in what you were asked to achieve by central government and the ASB policy that has been developed and implemented locally? And is there anything to suggest that national policies are being reshaped at the local level to assist in tackling ASB issues that are specific to the local environment e.g. variations in ASBO usage?

- What is your experience of the ASB management tools that have been made available to practitioners, and what is your reaction to some of the criticisms that have been levelled at them, e.g. that ASBOs are exclusionary?

- In your experience has there been any evidence of significant local opposition to ASB policy developments (and if so, who was involved and what did they do to oppose things?)

4. Other

- Is there anybody else at all that you think I should speak to in connection with my study?
- Are there any documents or statistics available that I could see? (other than what I already have access to)

Recipient Address   Return Address

                                                         Date

Dear ……

Re: Researching influences over anti-social behaviour policy in Southern City[8]

I am a doctoral research student at Cardiff University School of Social Sciences. My chosen area of research for my thesis is the governance of anti-social behaviour, and the study is specifically exploring the relationship between local, regional and national influences on the development of anti-social behaviour policies between 1998 and 2007. Part of this research involves a case study of policy developments in Southern City during this period.

The purpose of this letter is to ask if you would be willing to undertake a short interview (of 30-60 minutes) as part of the fieldwork stage of my research, with the aim of enabling me to gain an understanding of the role and impact of your organisation in the development and implementation of anti-social behaviour policy locally. I am also keen to learn more about your relationships with any other key partners in Southern City.

With your consent, the interview will be tape recorded and transcribed. However, neither the city selected for the case study, nor the individuals interviewed as part of this, will be identified in the final research.

I am grateful for your consideration of my request, which is supported by my university supervisors Trevor Jones and Gordon Hughes. Should you have any queries regarding this matter please do not hesitate to contact either myself on [mobile number] or Trevor on [office telephone number], and we will provide you with any further details that you might require.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Victoria Chessell-Edgar

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[8] This is a pseudonym