The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Michael 2007. The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation. Argumentation 21 (1) , pp. 39-61. 10.1007/s10503-007-9022-6

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Abstract

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Psychology
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Uncontrolled Keywords:	argumentation - argument from ignorance - argument strength - burden of proof - decision-theory - fallacies - standard of proof
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0920-427X
Last Modified:	19 Dec 2017 04:07
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/33080

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