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Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint.

Azacis, Helmuts 2007. Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint. Games and Economic Behavior 62 (1) , pp. 140-154. 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.011

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Abstract

I consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment–price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
ISSN: 10902473
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 01:47
URI: http://orca-mwe.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/2727

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