British Scholarship on Greek Colonisation in Context
1780-1990

Summary

This thesis examines British scholarly perceptions of Greek colonisation from the eighteenth century to the present. Beginning with a study of the ancient sources for Greek colonisation and the key themes which preoccupied ancient authors, the thesis proceeds to argue that, modifying recent interpretations of work from this age of empire, British scholarship did not, as a whole, simplistically distort ancient evidence so as to create a version of Greek colonisation which mirrored, in a self-congratulatory way, contemporary British experiences. We should therefore position this scholarship within its appropriate historical context (with special attention to politics, empire, colonisation, and perceptions of antiquity). In addition to enabling us to trace the impact of the great events of the modern era upon classical scholarship, in doing so we can also gain insight into the complexities, hopes, and anxieties which characterised British thinking about such themes as empire, colonisation, political freedom, and the place of Western civilisation in historical perspective.
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## Structure

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Section I: Introduction, Current Debate, and the Ancient View

Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis originates from resurgence in the study of what has traditionally been known as Greek colonisation, and an increasing awareness of a relationship between antiquity and modern European imperialism, colonialism, and colonisation. The revival of interest in Greek colonisation has been a direct result of recent tendency to question the underpinning assumptions of the subject, in particular assumptions derived from what was the formative period of not only classical scholarship, but also modern European imperialism. From the late eighteenth century, but especially from the nineteenth century, classical scholarship emerged as a discipline of both significant prestige and explanatory power. In the eighteenth century antiquity was used to debate the pressing constitutional issues of the day, issues which often crossed the boundaries of domestic, international, and imperial or colonial politics. Come the nineteenth century, Greek history emerged as the most prescient way of framing arguments in favour of the reformist politics of the day, thus supplanting Rome as the dominant point of comparison for Britain in the domestic, if not imperial, sphere.

The first studies of Greek colonisation were made in the later eighteenth century when Britain’s empire, based on naval power, commerce, and colonies of European settlers required a different model to that offered by Rome, and a different field of past experiences to interrogate for useful lessons. From then on, chapters on Greek colonisation became standard practice in all the great histories of Greece, a practice which continued from the eighteenth century, throughout the nineteenth, and up to the present day. Those studies of Greek colonisation written during the late eighteenth century were inevitably influenced by the defining colonial and constitutional concerns of the day, such as the American and French Revolutions – indeed it was their very purpose to relate to and comment upon such events. Accounts of Greek colonisation written during the early to mid nineteenth century, when the American colonies had been lost, coincided with the gradual expansion of Britain’s white settler colonies in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and displacement of indigenous peoples. Into the late nineteenth century, the example of Greek colonisation was actively invoked in debates about a ‘Greater Britain’, or an ‘Imperial Federation’: conceptions
designed to overcome Britain’s perceived geopolitical weakness in the face of vast territorial empires.

At all times after the loss of the American colonies, discussions of Greek colonisation took place within a context of two very different conceptions of what the British Empire was: the white settler colonies on the one hand – free, increasingly self-governing, and representing the extension of Anglo-Saxon freedoms abroad – and the empire of rule on the other – centred on India, despotic, militaristic, yet the basis of Britain’s power in the world. Irrespective of the period in question, studies of Greek colonisation were conducted at a time when British colonisation played an important if changing role in British visions regarding empire and their place in the world, not even diminishing significantly in the period after the Second World War when European solutions offered themselves.

The key question is the extent to which conceptions of Greek colonisation were influenced by this British colonial context – and if so, how? The dominant perspective among recent scholarship is that it most certainly was influenced by contemporary British experiences, and this is one of the key reasons why the subject has come under renewed scrutiny; the term colonisation itself has been brought into question, and earlier scholarship interrogated for contemporary ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ attitudes which distorted antiquity and created mentalities which still pervade and distort our perspectives of ancient Greece to this day. This study aims to examine more closely what British scholars wrote about Greek colonisation from the late eighteenth to late twentieth centuries, taking into account the particular political, imperial, and colonial context at work at the time of writing. It is only by a fuller contextual discussion such as this that we can truly judge the extent of ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ influences on the study of this aspect of Greek antiquity. The contextual discussion is intended to be a study in itself, tracing the way antiquity was a major means of expressing responses to contemporary political, imperial, and colonial debate. Thus while the primary aim of this thesis is to consider the extent contemporary ideas influenced the study of Greek colonisation, it is also the intention to be able to place that understanding within the wider context of British perceptions of antiquity and address the importance of the latter in shaping the British historical imagination – in other words the role of antiquity in forming British visions of the past, present, and future of Western civilisation.
Chapter 2: Current scholarship on Greek colonisation and its earlier historiography

If the ancient sources for Greek colonisation are generally considered problematic, the interpretation of this evidence by British scholars in the modern age has been the subject of equal if not harsher scrutiny. The literary evidence is usually later and often anachronistic in its reading of events, in many cases giving events of the eighth century a very contemporary fifth century flavour.\(^1\) It is perhaps inevitable that much of the modern scholarship has come to be scrutinised in much the same way.

This criticism has not come exclusively from British scholars, as debate about Greek colonisation, and thus its historiography, is international. However international the debate may be, much of it has been conducted in the English language and by scholars connected to British universities, or those of the English speaking world. As a result, a great deal of this discussion has been conducted within the intellectual sphere of Anglo-Saxon approaches to the imperial past, and has thus been influenced by post-colonial thought relating to the former imperial possessions of above all the British Empire.

It is perhaps natural that an increased interest in the historiography of colonisation followed in the wake of important reinterpretations of both the scholarship and the ancient evidence. Such reinterpretations began to be published in earnest in the 1990s, and what follows is a thematic breakdown of some of the main issues raised. What scholars currently think about colonisation and what they think of earlier work is a subject necessarily intertwined. Much in the way of new approaches and new ideas about the nature of Greek colonisation stem from a renewed interest in the subject. This is itself a direct result of a more critical attitude towards traditional scholarship late to feel the impact of approaches long since felt in the field of modern history.

First will be a discussion of two very important elements essential in understanding recent debate about Greek colonisation: terminology and methodology. Then there will follow a review of some of the key themes to emerge from modern debate about Greek colonisation and its historiography: colonisation as an act of state, colonial dependence, and colonists and natives. Current views on Greek colonisation are invariably linked to criticisms of earlier ones. These thematic subheadings are intended to reflect the manner in which current scholarship, in forming new interpretations of Greek colonisation, arguably do so in

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an oppositional way with earlier work serving as a misguided imperial benchmark. Finally, there will be a summarised assessment of current ideas and approaches.

**Terminology**

Several recent works on Greek colonisation and its historiography have included comment on the distorting potential of using the term ‘colony’ to describe what Greeks of the Classical period referred to as *apoikia*. We are told of the Roman origin of the term colony: *colonia*. The literary evidence of Cicero (*De Lege Agraria*, 2.27.73-75, ) and Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights*, 16.13.8-9) suggests that the founding of *colonia* in the late Republican and Imperial period was an act of state for reasons of state and a correspondingly centralised affair. Contemporary practice is thought to have coloured what such authorities had to say of the earlier Republican *colonia*, which in turn has influenced, some might say distorted, our own views, imbuing the early *colonia* with statist qualities. Understood as such, the term provided fitting parallel to European settlements abroad from the early modern period onwards, and thus the term *colonia* fell into common usage as colony (or indeed une colonie, ein coloni, una colonia).\(^2\) In this process of giving us our modern word – used to describe a whole range of European experience overseas, from the settler colonies of America and Australasia to those (less successful) in Africa, and indeed the word colonialism, often a byword for imperialism used without much discrimination – the term *colonia*, and quite casually with it its supposed Greek equivalent *apoikia*, transmogrified into something with very modern connotations it may never have originally possessed. In short, in giving us our modern word, it lost its original meaning – and so did *apoikia* by association, an association imposed by the traditional modern European practice of treating Greek and Roman cultures as a Classical Greco-Roman whole.

Over the centuries, various imperialisms and colonising experiences interacted with the idea of *colonia* and *apoikia*. In the latter case mainly that of Great Britain, with a perceived equivalence between ancient Greek * apoikia* and Britain’s own white settler colonies. One of the objects of this chapter will in due course be to address the issue of how deeply, how, or indeed whether that imperialism impacted upon that nation’s scholarship of the Greek *apoikiai* (or perhaps more accurately of early settlements overseas thought of as

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apoikiai in the Classical period) but current scholarly consensus appears to be that it did. A significant part of that assumption seems to be based on the idea that an association, or a tendency to see an easy equivalence between colonia and apoikia and thus colony and apoikia, is responsible for a traditional British scholarly perspective in which Greek overseas settlement is seen as akin to that of Britain in several important ways. Greek settlement overseas was an act of state, Greeks were often superior to the native, colonial Greeks were culturally dependent on their mother-cities, and Greek were agents of cultural change – civilising the natives. As so much of current scholarly work is grounded in a reaction against traditional interpretations, it is very natural that these perceived similarities form the subheadings of the discussion below, centreing on the key debates, or areas of criticism, in recent scholarship. However, before we turn to those themes, it is necessary to trace in more detail the development of the debate about terminology as it is of central importance to the way Greek colonisation is studied.

Debate appears to centre on whether or not it is appropriate to use the term colonisation to refer to Greek settlements overseas. The main ground of contention concerns its use for settlements established in the Archaic period, as it seems to be much less controversial to suggest that settlements of the Classical period can be seen as colonies in something approaching the modern – or (perceived) Roman – sense; that is as something established by a state for strategic reasons and often exhibiting the exploitation of indigenous peoples. When Osborne calls for the eradication of chapters on Greek colonisa-

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4 Osborne (1998). 268-69. As we shall see, he is in fact willing the eradication of a two hundred year old tradition which has not yet passed; See C.M. Antonaccio, ‘Colonization: Greece on the Move, 900-480’, in H.A. Shapiro, The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 201-224. Ten years later, such chapters remain.

archaeology – perhaps implying that colonisation, more modern distortions notwithstanding, is not necessarily an anachronistic construct if used for the fifth century. Indeed, scholars have been loath to abandon the terms colony, colonisation, colonial and colonialism. Whitley sees colonisation as ‘as good a term as any’, and effort has gone into defining it, and its siblings colonial and colonialism.

Colonialism Van Dommelen defines as the presence of a foreign group with asymmetrical relations between it and indigenous peoples. De Angelis, critical of attempts by scholars of the ancient world to define colonialism in a way which allows the inclusion of Greek colonisation, claims that such exercises do not make the problem go away, and that the correct definition of colonialism is that of Jürgen Osterhammel, which he quotes at length:

Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.

De Angelis goes on to comment that ‘for the early Greek world, there existed very little true colonialism as just defined, general conditions being not at all conducive, and it is only in exceptional circumstances, usually after about 500 BCE, that this definition may sometimes be satisfied.’ The notion that no true colonisation occurred before the fifth century is by now commonplace, but it is worth noting that De Angelis, and also Osterhammel it seems, assume that in order for a settlement to ‘colonial’ it must have been founded by a state and for reasons of state. This is in effect an example of theory being used to discount a historical possibility – that settlements founded more by private initiative than by state interest can see

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the creation of colonial, that is unequal and exploitative, situations between themselves and the native peoples of the areas in which they have settled; in short the very kind of situation in keeping with Van Dommelen’s freer definition. One may also question whether we ought to insist upon one definition of colonialism as being more correct than all others, especially when it is so specific.

De Angelis hopes to move away from colonialism altogether, and describes how a scholar of North America argued that the term ‘colonialism’ should supplant ‘culture contact’ as the former was the primary historical reality. De Angelis, ‘in a similar vein’, argues that ‘we, as scholars of the ancient Greek world, should be using more frequently the term “culture contact” to describe the historical reality we study, for that was the main historical reality in our time-periods. He goes on to argue that the onus should be on scholars who want to use the term ‘colonialism’ to ‘prove its existence, instead of batting the term about because it is fashionable’. There may be problems with both these suggestions and the practices they relate to. A term such as colonialism is laden with connotations, and while using ‘culture contact’ as a neutral term, assuming neither colonial oppression nor peaceful interaction, would be a useful approach, it might be argued that it is unclear whether it would be taken as such. In moving away from ‘looking for colonialism’, as it were, there is a danger that scholars will instead look for peaceful ‘culture contact’. If ‘culture contact’ were misunderstood in such a way, then a possible consequence of using one term or the other – that is ‘colonialism’ or ‘culture contact’ – is that a self-fulfilling prophecy would be enacted, and the use of the one or the other is in danger of being determined more by the historical reality we wish to see rather than that which might be uncovered by a more open and less unilaterally theoretical approach. In the North American case, contemporary scholarship reacting against traditional interpretations might be expected to emphasise the oppressive and indeed exterminationist nature of white settlement, and thus be inclined to use colonialism to drive the point home. Reaction to traditional scholarship regarding the Greek world has different concerns, namely in rejecting the appropriations of the ancient past and retrojections of an imperial present onto that past by traditional scholarship. Therefore current scholarship can be expected to adopt the term culture contact precisely because, if sufficiently misunderstood, it furthers this agenda. Of course, as mentioned previously, De Angelis is not arguing for our acceptance of peaceful contact of equals as the norm. Rather, he advocates ‘culture contact’ as a more neutral term – a ‘first and general level of description’ used before
we move on to ‘distinguish between the possible types of encounter.’ Moreover he clearly appreciates how it is not only earlier but also present scholarship which is affected by contemporary conditions, suggesting that it is ‘only by discussing the nature of previous scholarship that we can combat this problem and avoid letting the present creep into the study of the past’, yet perhaps ‘culture contact’ as a term may yet acquire as much baggage as ‘colonialism’.

There is also a somewhat circular aspect to part of the argument – that we should adopt ‘culture contact’ as it was the most common historical reality (even though it is supposed to be a first level of description) suggests having decided what the historical reality is before deciding upon a theoretical framework to examine it. Moreover it can be seen that the belief in ‘culture contact’ as the most common historical reality stems from an oppositional attitude towards earlier scholarship which saw relations between newcomers and natives as colonial. As Tsetskhladze says, ‘the then interpretation of that ancient colonialism was just as liable to be influenced by the imperial mindset as it may now be by an anti-imperial one.’ The strange fact in this case is that the exigencies of post colonial thought requires that anti-imperial mindset deny imperialism, or in this case colonialism, ever existed – imperialism implies superiority of power even if not of virtue – and that is too much for some. As De Angelis rightly said, we need to adopt a ‘first and general level of description’, but we need to be aware that connotations may unwittingly accompany such terms as ‘culture contact’, or ‘cultural interactions’ as they do the term colonisation – for good or for ill, they stem from a rejection of colonial assumptions, and will tend to approach and interpret evidence accordingly. Therefore perhaps a better way of going about it would be to ask in what sorts of circumstances Greeks who settled overseas found themselves, whether they settled and lived amidst or separately from indigenous peoples, what sort of relations were there between Greek newcomers and the former, and how such relations came into being, developed, and were reinforced. It is only then, and after extensive and equally open minded research of a wide variety of sites that we can suggest a more overarching description of what kind of world the Archaic Mediterranean was – and what kinds of settlements and interactions occurred.

10 Quoted in De Angelis (2009), 51.
Perhaps it would be beneficial to drop the terms ‘colony’, and colonisation, but before we replace them with ‘apoikia’, or ‘settlement’, and ‘founding apoikiai’, or ‘settlement overseas’, we should consider very carefully whether we should take for granted such terms and what they imply. Terms such as apoikia are derived from later literary sources – and so it is not simply a matter of whether it had the same meaning in the eighth century as it did in the fifth; can we truly know how eighth-century Greeks referred to their homes overseas? As a home away from home, apoikia seems neutral enough, but the only possible literary evidence for the eighth century exists in the Homeric epics – and the term apoikia does not appear. Instead Nauthisous ‘raises up’ or ‘transplants’ (anastesas/ἀναστήσας, ἀνιστήμι) people from Hypereia and ‘sits them down’, or ‘places’ them in (eisēn/εἷζελ, ἱδσ) Scheria (Homer, Odyssey, 6.2-11). Of course, this is more reminiscent of one individual making a decision to move people – and in that sense appears ‘statist’, but can be explained by the fact that Homeric epics are about individuals heroes and will explain things in that manner. What is perhaps significant is that the term apoikia does not appear. It seems that the earliest mention of the term apoikia appears in Herodotus (e.g. 6.150). There is a danger that if we persist in thinking of what were the relations between Greek apoikiai and indigenous peoples – regardless of whether we see colonial or more equitable relations – we are still thinking in terms of separate settlements, separate communities, separate and perhaps immutable ethnicities and identities. Therefore, if we think that terms such as ‘colony’ and colonisation ought to be dismissed because they have laden with connotations stemming from modern colonisation and imperialism, then what is the justification in retaining 5th century Greek terminology, itself potentially as laden with such connotations as the modern terminology? There is a case for dispensing of both sets of terminology, and for adopting our own, as devoid of connotations as possible. But which terms should we use?

The adoption of such terms as ‘Greek settlement overseas’, ‘Greek settlers’, and ‘to settle’ may offer a more connotation and baggage free way of approaching and talking about the subject. Nevertheless, perhaps it would be wise to keep the idea of a colonial situation as an interpretive question, or colonialism as an interpretive concept, and feel free to ask of the evidence whether colonial situations arose in the wake of the various instances of Greeks settling in Sicily and southern Italy. We cannot assume there to have been unequal relations between early Greek settlers and native peoples, but equally, in the case of those settlements which were founded, we cannot assume, as De Angelis seems to imply, that simply because they were not founded as a matter of deliberate policy by distant states, that colonial situations never arose. To reiterate it is suggested here that we rid ourselves of anachronistic
terminology be it modern or ancient – being careful of course not to rid ourselves with terms broadly contemporary (such as those used in the Homeric epics) – but keep colonialism and the notion of colonial situations as possible interpretive concepts.

Methodology

Now to turn to the methodology: in 1997 Nicholas Purcell outlined what would become regarded as something of a truism in the study of Greek settlement overseas. Purcell’s criticism was twofold: Greek colonisation is an anachronistic construct made up of on one hand ancient literary evidence amounting to no more than literary tradition, and on the other more recent colonisations. Furthermore, and this is the point with which we are presently concerned, he claimed that to pursue ‘this construct’ is ‘as complete a subordination of archaeology to the slavery of text-based history as one could imagine’. The problem with ‘Greek colonisation’ is not just that it is distorted by traditional scholarship – it runs much deeper, and although it encompasses terminology it goes much further, to the ancient evidence itself. As John-Paul Wilson has shown, not only has literary evidence been privileged over the archaeology, but that literary evidence is itself of a much later period than the events it purports to describe. To complicate matters further, the literary evidence, most of it fifth century or later, was in fact written in an age in which the establishment of settlements overseas for imperialistic reasons was a practice common to several Greek states. Thus the distortions of traditional scholarship written in the age of nineteenth and twentieth century European imperialism is complemented if not intertwined and difficult to disentangle from those of ancient authors writing in the age of fifth and fourth century Greek imperialism. A problem not dissimilar to that already mentioned in relation to Roman coloniae – we must contend with the distortions of both ancient and modern authors writing in imperial eras. It is this literary evidence, fraught with difficulties, which Purcell sees earlier scholarship as having used to guide archaeological research.

This view is echoed in most recent works on the subject. For example Owen agrees with Purcell’s contention that traditional interpretations are the result of privileging the literary over the archaeological. Allowing the former to guide the latter perpetuates the idea

of colonisation as an event, not a process. As Burgers states; the literary tradition records an ‘histoire événementielle’. Ridding ourselves of this tendency to subordinate material to literary would enable us to look at ‘longer-term social processes’ leading up to such events, and a more archaeological approach would also provide a different view on issues of ethnicity and relations between Greek newcomers and native peoples.16 De Angelis credits the ‘independent study of material culture’ (in addition to postcolonial perspectives) with demonstrating how earlier scholarship was infused with notions worthy of but a ‘limited place in the early Greek world’.17 He characterises early works (that is up to the mid nineteenth century) such as those of William Mitford and George Grote (of whom a full discussion will follow later) as being quite naturally based on literary evidence – as the archaeological evidence was lacking. As is well known, when this deficiency was finally addressed with the development of Classical archaeology, the material evidence was usually used to corroborate the literary.18 The various effects of this emphasis on the literary evidence are evidently not lost on scholars. De Angelis mentions Hall’s argument that Hellenocentrism will endure since there are Greek written sources, and material evidence for non-Greeks will never be able to redress this imbalance.19 Similarly, Lomas remarked how native Italic peoples, their cultures being largely non-literate, are at a disadvantage as ‘most of the surviving evidence other than the purely archaeological is filtered through Greek or Roman perspectives, frequently hostile in nature.’20 If recognition of this Hellenocentrism is widespread, there is possibly less consensus regarding how this awareness should direct further study. Responding to Spivey and Stoddart’s contention that the literary evidence should be set aside, and Italian history written using only material evidence, Lomas argued that abandoning the literary evidence altogether is not a realistic option. Better to recognise its limitations and use it in combination with a ‘theoretical approach’ to material evidence, ‘interpreting material culture not just in terms of a diffusion of a dominant culture but in terms of interchange between cultures and in terms of two-way processes.’21 This is probably

17 De Angelis (2009), 49.
21 K. Lomas (1996), 143.
the most sensible course of action. Clearly something has to be done to redress the imbalance caused by there being literary evidence for later Greeks, but not for earlier Greeks and indigenous peoples. This may well require what modern historians may call ‘reading against the grain’ of the literary evidence, and a theoretically informed approach to the material evidence. In seeking to redress the imbalances relating to indigenous peoples, and, again, I would stress early Greeks, we ought not go from one extreme to the other and regard literary sources as useless fabrication even for the period in which they were written, and ignore the history of Greek settlers. In doing so we would be replacing one fixation with another, and in circumstances where colonial type situations are acknowledged, absolve ourselves of studying how such situations arise and are maintained – an important aspect.

We have seen how current scholarship regards the terminology and methodology used when studying Greek settlement overseas as having led to anachronistic readings of the past, contributing to overarching approaches unlikely to produce anything but such readings. Terminology and historical narratives dating from the Classical period have been taken as valid for the Archaic. In turn these terms and narratives, interacting with modern colonial ideas, experiences, and terms, have lead to a two-fold, mutually reinforcing construct, through which the material evidence and Archaic history was interpreted. Consequently, it is believed, we were left with an image of early Greek settlement overseas which is overwhelmingly state-driven, exhibiting unequal relations between advanced Greeks and underdeveloped indigenous peoples: acts of colonisation resulting in truly colonial situations and examples of a Greek colonialism. As with so many revisionist approaches in their early stages, the current one can at times be characterised as inverting such an image, hence offering instead a portrait of individual enterprise, Greeks drawn into indigenous societies on terms either equal or detrimental to themselves, their coming hardly acts of colonisation, and consequently their presence did not in result colonial situations or colonialism – denying their existence is currently de rigeur. This denial is supported by the belief that without state driven colonisation there cannot be colonial situations, and also the current trend to see the period as one of cultural contact rather than of conflict and an innate Greek superiority. One might well ask why cultural contact and conflict are irreconcilable in the same historical environment, and why conflict, even if it results in Greek conquest, need necessarily mean accepting nineteenth century notions of Greek superiority.
State or Individual, Event or Process?

Two of the main shifts which have come in the wake of our criticism of past terminology and past approaches have been in the degree of state involvement we attribute to early Greek settlement overseas, and in the way in which we see relations between those settlers and indigenous peoples. Linked to the two is the issue of what kinds of settlements eighth-century Greek settlers lived in. Indeed the three are in fact very difficult to separate, as the reasons for going overseas, what kind of settlement in which one finds oneself when there, and whether or not one lives with indigenous peoples in one’s midst, or at arm’s length, are evidently part of the same story. As this is a discussion of scholarship, however, a division will be made: here will be discussed recent views regarding state involvement and settlement as an event or process. This will be followed by views concerning colonial dependence, or the relations between Greek settlements overseas and their places of origin, and then finally the rather more politically charged issue of relations with indigenous peoples.²²

In one of the most important recent works on colonisation, Osborne contended that fifth and fourth century settlements abroad, for instance those established by the Athenians, can ‘look quite like Roman colonies’ due to the degree of state involvement. Arguing that in the sixth century one can detect a ‘city community’ sending settlers for military or agrarian reasons, but that in this period one can also detect evidence of attempts by notable individuals to lead ‘unofficial enterprises’ to establish a settlement abroad, he suggests that it is reasonable to ask whether this classical model of overseas settlement can be retrojected into the earlier Archaic period – classical sources thought contemporary practice to have had a long history. Instead of beginning at the end, with the (dubious) benefit of the classical sources, Osborne instead starts at the beginning, using both literary and archaeological evidence.²³ He begins by showing how Homer presents a world of mobility, individual initiative, and an awareness of what it is to settle a new site.²⁴ He proceeds to demonstrate through a discussion of Megara Hyblaia and other southern Italian and Sicilian sites how the archaeology does not clearly distinguish between settlements scholars call colonies and others which they do not, that a ‘precise moment’ of colonisation cannot be distinguished

²² These three themes broadly correspond to the main changes in studies of Greek settlement in the west identified in G. Shepherd, ‘Greek “Colonisation” in Sicily and the West. Some Problems of Evidence and Interpretation Twenty-Five Years On’, in Pallas 79 (2009), 15-25.
²⁴ Osborne (1998), 256.
archaeologically in any fashion other than arbitrary. Instead becoming a Greek settlement should be seen as ‘gradual process’, becoming an *apoikia* as having more to do with ‘the invention of a past than with a historical moment of invention.’ Further evidence against the notion of a colonising event is found in co-existence with the native population; this ‘discourages big bang theories – for increasingly little sign is to be found that those there already felt any bang.’ Osborne’s argument can be seen as a cornerstone of the revisionist position, arguing as it does for mobility and individual initiative in an eighth-century process of Greek settlements overseas. More purely archaeologically oriented scholars may dismiss his use of literary evidence such as that of Homer, but otherwise Osborne’s views hold much that is common with other recent contributions to the field.

As we have seen, Osborne’s views, in seeing Archaic settlers as enterprising individuals, goes hand in hand with seeing settlement itself as a process and not an event. Individuals settling evokes a trickle of settlers, different people from different places and at different times, and so a single event of settlement would be much more difficult to identify. As we have seen in the above discussion of methodology, scholars such as Burgers and Owen indicate that it is text which is more likely to see events in the past, real or not, whereas archaeology is more likely to be able to identify longer term processes. Malkin, however, countered some of Owen’s suggestions by arguing that there has been too sharp a swing against the notion of foundation events (and in fact events more generally). He cites Megara Hyblaia as an early (c.725) example of a planned settlement, and that within a wider context of a large number of new settlements created within a short period of time. He also questions whether the ‘fragmented and processual’ nature of the ‘events leading up to colonization’ makes the end-result any less an event. ‘Aside from destruction’, he argues that ‘archaeology in general has difficulties in identifying any historical events.’ Therefore it seems that whereas there may be a general consensus in that most scholars agree that there are problems with terminology, with literary evidence, and the retrojection of modern (and later ancient) ideas onto the Archaic past, there is still debate about how we should see early Greek settlement as occurring.

It may be that the way forward is to be as flexible as possible. Perhaps a productive starting point would be *not* to think of state-sanctioned action and foundation events, nor individual initiative and longer term processes, as inseparable. Likewise it might be a good

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idea, however archaeological our approach, to be open to the possibility that certain processes are sufficiently short to be perceived as definable events by the individuals who experienced them. For example, hypothetically speaking, an indigenous inhabitant immediately inland of what became Megara Hyblaia may have remembered ‘when the Greeks started settling in the area’, or ‘when the Greeks built their own settlement’. Equally, accepting individual enterprise as a more likely concept than Archaic states making state decisions to establish settlements abroad does not discount the possibility that an individual, perhaps a less god-like but more realistic Homeric-style warlord, could lead a large group of followers overseas and settle a site within a very short space of time. Archaeology may, after all, be able to identify the processes of exchange and interaction between Greeks and indigenous peoples which preceded this event. Individual initiative, events and processes, are by no means irreconcilable.

Colonial Dependence

De Angelis wisely wrote that it is not only earlier but also present scholarship which is affected by contemporary condition, suggesting that it is ‘only by discussing the nature of previous scholarship that we can combat this problem and avoid letting the present creep into the study of the past’. His criticism of earlier scholarship had a direct influence on his own vision of Greek colonisation. The 1930s inspired outlook of Dunbabin, and the very identification of the Greek apoikiai in the West as colonies with all the accompanying baggage the term brings, led to the view that Western Greek settlements were culturally dependent and thus their study ‘secondary and derivative to the study of the polis’ in mainland Greece. Not only culturally dependent, but De Angelis asserts that Dunbabin ‘smoothed over’ the differences that existed in the British Empire, leading to ideas of cultural unity which Greco believed to exist only in the modern imagination. These strands were brought together by De Angelis to create an image of a Greek world in which the

28 De Angelis (1998), 548.
29 F. De Angelis, Megara Hyblaia and Selinous: the development of two Greek city-states in archaic Sicily (Oxford: University of Oxford, Committee for Archaeology, 2003) 204-5. Fascinatingly De Angelis contrasts Dunbabin’s damaging outlook with E.A. Freeman’s view that the development of Greek cities on Sicily constituted a great contribution to the history of mankind, commenting favourably that Freeman had a ‘global vision of the Greek contribution to humanity’, 205.
30 De Angelis (2003), 205.
Western settlements and those of mainland Greece, such as Megara Hyblaia and Megara, developed into *poleis* concurrently,\(^{32}\) with the settlements of the West exhibiting differences the result of the very different and varied contexts in which their development took place.\(^{33}\) This vision can be seen as having gained from a critical study of earlier scholarship with its assumptions of ‘colonies’ culturally dependent on mother cities, aping what existed in the latter, and in which the unifying proclivities of the imperial mind was applied onto the past as well as the present.

For De Angelis, ‘earlier generations of scholars tended to equate the Greek cities founded outside Greece in the 8\(^{\text{th}}\) to 6\(^{\text{th}}\) centuries BC with modern European colonies.’ They fail to recognise, he claims, how great were the differences. Greek cities formed separate, independent, entities, as, he points out, Finley and Graham knew.\(^{34}\) As we shall see, it is not so clear cut that earlier scholarship was guilty of such distortions, but that is a later discussion. There lies within the study of Greek settlement overseas a further distortion which is particular to British scholars, or more correctly, those from the British Empire. T.J. Dunbabin, as De Angelis argued, regarded indigenous peoples to be of little note, and thus it is implied inferior to the Greek settlers; yet that between the colonist and the colonised, to use the older terminology, were not the only hierarchical distinctions made. Dunbabin, an Australian himself, saw Greek colonies as culturally dependent on the mother city, a distortion which as De Angelis rightly states finds resonance in 1930s attitudes concerning the dominions and their relationship with Britain.\(^{35}\) Therefore the hierarchy was seen as one of native – Greek colonist – mainland Greek (in ascending order).

This notion of hierarchy is most clearly demonstrated in Gillian Shepherd’s discussion of nineteenth and earlier twentieth century British views on Greek, and by extension, English colonisation. Shepherd demonstrated how the British, or rather English, considered colonisation to be a phenomenon almost synonymous with themselves and connected with the very vigour of their race. The urge to classify resulting from an age of expansion and the social (mis)application of Darwin’s ideas led to the notion that the Anglo-Saxon peoples occupied the apex of humanity. In terms of historical writing, modern analogy fused with such ideas so that in the ancient world the Greeks and Romans (‘depending upon

\(^{32}\) De Angelis (2003), 204.

\(^{33}\) De Angelis (2003), 206.


the period under discussion’) occupied the same elevated positions as the English did in the modern. Analogies derived from this source also enveloped the study of colonisation. If Owen is concerned about the distorting assumptions of asymmetrical power relations, then Shepherd more so with hierarchy within the ‘colonial’ world, and in this work she focuses on how British (and indeed ‘colonial’) scholars saw not only native peoples, but also ‘colonial’ Greeks as subservient and culturally inferior to or dependent upon those of the mainland – reflecting, it is argued, their own views on the white settler colonies. The use of analogy distorted the ancient reality.36

Shepherd’s points are supported by reference to the writings of Gwynn (1918), Dunbabin (1948) and Woodhead (1962) on the Western Greeks and the analogies they consciously drew between the British Empire and Greek colonisation, leading to misleading notions of native inferiority to colonising Greeks themselves culturally subordinate to those of the mainland. This theme of colonial dependence is further supported analysis of Dinsmoor’s study of Greek architecture (1927,1950) and his apparent surprise at the Western Greek achievement in temple building, something swiftly followed by explaining it away as merely provincial ostentation polluted by barbaric native influences.37 E.A. Freeman, in particular his history of Sicily, is given substantial attention for his apparent application of imperial and racial ideas.38 As I shall argue in due course, although largely correct in recognising that Freeman distorts Sicilian Greek history by applying contemporary ideas, this treatment of Freeman needs more contextualisation: Freeman’s racial and so called imperial ideas are imperfectly understood and he had more to contribute to the study of colonisation than is at first apparent. The notion that British scholars wrote of Greek colonisation as though it were like British colonisation in the sense that colonies were dependent, at times inferior, to their mother cities is overall presented as some kind of coherent, consistent theme. Whether it stands up to scrutiny involving sources other than such late scholars as Dunabin and those mentioned above will soon be addressed. In fact, their views on how ‘statist’ British colonisation was will surprise us.

37 Shepherd (2005), 29-43.
Colonist and Native

The subject of relations between Greek settlers and indigenous peoples has been at the centre of recent works about colonisation.\(^{39}\) This is due in no small part to the influence of postcolonial approaches which seek to unseat the dominance of colonialist writings about the past by demonstrating that they are no more than representations with a vested interest in depicting the colonised ‘other’ as inferior. Postcolonial ideas first made an impact in other, more modern fields of research, but ever since the revived interest in colonisation scholars have not been slow to identify distortions caused by a colonialist mindset in earlier scholarship. De Angelis refers to how T.J. Dunbabin assumed the native people of Sicily to have been of little note, or rather read the evidence in a way which suited his more general outlook – he found ‘little to suggest that the Greeks mixed much with Sikel or Italian peoples, or learnt much from them’.\(^{40}\) Another clearly influenced by such ideas is Dougherty, who claims that Greek stories about sixth century colonisation in Sicily or the Black sea in the seventh century are ‘no less culturally constructed than nineteenth century British tales of empire in India or Africa; they are every bit as much about power, language, and cultural appropriation.’\(^{41}\) This is a very explicit comparison between what she sees as two colonialist sets of writings, and the debt is clearer still in that she regards her work to be about the ‘representation’ rather than the ‘realia’ of colonisation;\(^{42}\) representations because her source material (Greek texts) cannot be anything more than constructs. We see two things in these relatively early works by Dougherty and De Angelis. Firstly ancient Greek sources are thought to be colonialist in perspective and thus in terms of what they say about indigenous peoples amount to no more than representation. Secondly, earlier scholarship, predictably based on such ancient sources, apply a second layer of distortion derived from modern colonial prejudices.

In *The Poetics of Colonization* Dougherty draws attention to the violence she sees as inherent in a colonising venture, violence that can be gleaned above all from a reading of the literary evidence, be it Mimermos’ description of a violent colonisation of Colophon (Strabo 14.1.4), the fact that ancient texts refer to founders such as Syracuse’s Archias as murderers

\(^{39}\) The terminology itself has been a point of debate, with some questioning the use of terms such as native and indigenous, opting instead for ‘local’, e.g. T. Hodos, *Local responses to colonization in the Iron Age Mediterranean* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 15.


\(^{42}\) Dougherty, (1993a), 4.
(Plutarch, *Moralia* 772-773b), that Thucydides sees the Greek settlers as expelling natives from Ortygia (Thuc. 6.3.2), or that colonisation is frequently expressed in gendered terms with the violent act of colonisation mirroring marriage and symbolising the taming or civilising of what is wild and virgin – landscape or woman (Pindar, *Pythian* 9). The problem is, of course, that such literary evidence is later than the earliest cases of Greek settlement overseas. While the poets in question, Archilochos and Mimnermos (dated c.650 and 600 respectively), were indeed contemporary with some acts of colonisation, they certainly were not contemporary with eighth-century settlement. Later scholarship adds a further dimension to such postcolonial inspired interpretations: Dougherty tells us important things about how Greeks of the later Archaic and Classical periods saw colonisation, but it does not, of course, follow that earlier Archaic reality must also have seen similar violence and what Owen, critical of our assumption of it, termed ‘asymmetrical power relations’.

Owen co-edited one of the most recent volumes on the subject of ancient colonisation and its historiography, contributing an article on ‘Analogy, Archaeology and Archaic Greek Colonization’. The discussion centres on the harmful influence of analogies with modern European colonialism, which it is claimed has led scholars to adopt a series of assumptions about ancient Greek colonisation owing more to the modern than the ancient world. Owen summarises traditional views of Greek colonisation as follows: it is an organised act of individual or state for ‘specific ends’ (land or trade), indigenous inhabitants are deprived of their land by foul means enabled by the ‘military and cultural superiority of the Greeks’, natives attempt to imitate Greek culture, and what intermarriage there is involves Greek men and local women – ‘symbolic of this asymmetrical relationship’. It seems that for Owen, the latter is one of the key problems with traditional assumptions, and should be questioned. In keeping with the broader shift against literary evidence, she contends a more archaeological approach would provide a different view on issues of ethnicity and relations between Greek newcomers and native peoples. Her work on Thrace represents such a revisionist approach, acting against the prevailing Greco-centric trends in Bulgarian scholarship which deny the Thracians ‘agency’. By taking a long term archaeological perspective Owen seeks to demonstrate that ideas of asymmetrical power relations with

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45 Owen (2005), 6.  
46 Owen (2005), 18.  
47 Owen (2005), 7-8.
Greeks imparting their culture to others does not apply. Instead the emphasis is on a ‘complex model of social change which results, finally, in the drawing in of Greeks (among others) into social networks of exchange. It was social change within Thracian society itself which led to it becoming outward looking, initiating contacts with other peoples – in stark contrast to the idea ‘that contact with Greeks leads to social change.’ Cultural interactions with Greeks happened before Greek settlement, and their pottery was not seen as exotic but rather for everyday use. When they did come, Greeks fitted in to the existing religious landscape.  

Owen’s use of the term ‘agency’ is telling, as it is a key concept in postcolonial approaches as it is used to demonstrate how those once regarded as inferior, more recently downtrodden, but in both cases passive victims, were in fact nothing of the sort – but had agency. In fact Owen’s work seems to mirror the periphery versus metropolis debate in modern imperial history centring on the issue of whether events on the periphery or the imperial center determined the development of imperialism. The most radical version of the interpretation which emerged following decolonisation is that ‘the fundamental cause of imperialism is to be found on the periphery itself.’ This view is not without its critics, with Cain and Hopkins, authors of a major reappraisal of British Imperialism, suggesting it fails to distinguish symptoms from causes. Such approaches, and that of Owen, have their merits in attempting to redress an imbalance, but it is worth asking whether they are in fact going too far. Owen’s Thracians, here cast into the role of what one may call the ‘new natives’, agents of their own destiny, are in fact those responsible for the Greek involvement – it is ‘complex’ developments within their own society which draws the Greeks in. The danger with these approaches is that we substitute one set of assumptions, comprising of Greek cultural superiority and asymmetrical power relations, with another, where we assume, and our interpretations are guided by the assumption, that asymmetrical power relations were unlikely, that Greeks, wherever they went, were reacting to the initiative of indigenous peoples. This brings to mind John Boardman’s recent criticism that if anything, there exists an anti-Greek prejudice in current archaeology.

In her critique of Boardman’s views, probably inspired as much by his recent criticisms as his now (in)famous statement (of many years ago) that ‘in the west the Greeks

48 Owen (2005), 18-20.  
had nothing to learn, much to teach.” Boardman’s view is an ‘essentialist’ one, with ‘little consideration of acts of agency on the part of non-Greeks, nor of any reciprocity.’ Boardman’s views fitted onto the broader canvas of Hellenisation, itself imbued with similar ideas such as ‘a passive acceptance of Greek material goods and ideologies’ by non-Greeks, and a lack of agency for the latter nor reciprocity between them and the Greeks. The onset of postcolonial approaches, Hodos argues, has resulted in a more nuanced view of the Greeks overseas; especially of the ‘responses of other cultures to the Greeks’ resulting from direct contact. She continues to describe how the ‘ideologies of postcolonial scholarship strive to articulate the active histories of the colonised and to deconstruct the binary models of colonized and colonizers.’ Boardman’s criticisms that we have merely replaced old prejudices with new ones are dismissed as ignoring the ‘fact’ that postcolonial scholarship does not deny the impact of colonising culture, but rather continues to ‘assess their influences’, now taking into account ‘notions of agency, reciprocity and hybrid developments in the process.’

Boardman’s views may be considered old-fashioned, and it may be tempting to read into his comments a disinclination on the part of a more traditional scholar to adapt to current thinking. However his criticisms deserve more than such a dismissal. It is unclear that he ignores the fact that postcolonial scholarship acknowledges colonial impact; rather it seems more a case of attempting to argue that ‘old prejudices’ have been replaced by modern ones, leading to too radical a swing towards indigenous agency in the pendulum of Greek-indigenous relations. After all, postcolonial writing is as embedded in a charged political

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52 Hodos (2006), 1.
53 Hodos, 11-12.
54 Boardman is evidently acutely aware that his interpretations have come under some criticism, and finds it distasteful that a scholar’s work should be dismissed because it does not correspond to the political fashions of the day, and deficiencies explained with reference to his background. His response in one article was in fact to outline his background (mentioning whether or not he had any ‘colonial’ links), and his outlook, concluding with the following: ‘My resentment at being thought prejudiced may be misguided, and I am sure I cannot detect all influences, but I am far more conscious of the effects of assisted serendipity and joy in the subject than of any programme or attitudes induced by education or politics or persons; I hate being misquoted or misrepresented but am well used to it by now; and I can do little about my instinctive intolerance of the intolerant, or desire to ridicule the ridiculous.’ See J. Boardman, ‘Greeks and Syria: Pots and People’, in G.R. Tsatskhladze and A.M. Snodgrass (eds.), *Greek Settlements in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2002), 1-16.
context as is colonial writing. That the impact of colonising (or settling) cultures is still taken into account is scarcely surprising – there would be little validity to what would otherwise be a very incomplete account of indigenous-settler relations (which may or may not take the form of colonial situations). Without doubt a greater consideration of what part the indigenous played in bringing about foreign settlement (and colonial situations, for they are not necessarily the same thing), and how indigenous peoples perceived and acted in response to that situation can only give a more accurate picture, but the point which Boardman raises remains salient: can it not be argued that owing to their ideological and scholarly debt to postcolonial writings born of anti-colonial struggle, modern scholars are predisposed to privilege non-Greek agency, influence, and achievement? Admitting as much would not be to dismiss the value of postcolonial perspectives, but rather add greater depth to them, demonstrating them to be products of certain historical contexts imbued with their own concerns and preoccupations which both contribute to and limit their value as interpretive concepts for viewing the past.

Another recent example of the application of postcolonial ideas to Greek colonisation is Irad Malkin’s ‘Postcolonial Concepts and Ancient Greek Colonization’. One of his main points of contention is quite similar to De Angelis’ ideas about ‘culture contact’: colonialism is not a good way of looking at the archaic Greek past. Malkin’s reasoning is that the colonialism implies a form of ‘binarism’, and as a creation of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheistic past ‘binarism’ is not appropriate for the period shortly before Aristotle, who was among the first to fit Greeks and barbarians into an oppositional model. Instead Malkin argues for a world which was concerned less about ethnic divisions, and instead exhibited fluidity. ‘Binarism’ is inappropriate as there was no central Greek “place”, but instead hundreds of Greek city-states. Accordingly, other peoples were not “others” as ‘their lands possessed a familiar, even expected, environment’. In such a world Archaic Greek identity was ‘neither formed nor reinforced oppositionally’. Rather, it was a world in which an aristocratic, nonethnic, network was easily extendable whether or not one’s ally was a Greek. This lack of exclusivity in terms of ethnicity was mirrored in terms of belief, as polytheism was a ‘world system of diverse sameness’ – in contrast to the European conquest

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57 Malkin (2004), 349-50
58 Malkin (2004), 349.
of the New World – and we should ‘look for a more sophisticated difference within a “sameness,” as the Greeks seem to have done.’\textsuperscript{59}

He argues that Athenian \textit{Klerouchoi} were the closest that Greeks ever came to a colonial situation,\textsuperscript{60} and that ‘Greek colonies never became so predominant as to change the cultures and languages of local populations fundamentally…. instead of domination, especially during the Archaic period, what characterized contact with local populations was cultural negotiation and mediation.’ In this his views, and application of postcolonial ideas from other disciplines, coincide with those of De Angelis: ‘What characterized such early colonial encounters was therefore not conquest and domination but the emergence of a material and cultural Middle Ground.’\textsuperscript{61}

The ‘Middle Ground’ was coined by historian Richard White in his work on relations between Indians and Europeans in the Great Lakes region of North America from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{62} White argued that this specific historical context was not one of sweeping conquests and the destruction of natives but rather the lack of an all powerful authority. This appealed to Malkin, who drawing on other historical parallels from such sources as the Medieval period and the work of Robert Bartlett,\textsuperscript{63} commented that ‘too often we think of colonization in terms of the conquest that it became in later generations. But it is the \textit{inability} to dictate, that is, the lack of hegemonic control over vast territories, that lies at the heart of the colonial experience.’\textsuperscript{64} Instead of seeing things in terms of an all powerful coloniser the emphasis should be on the limits of colonial power, and the ‘Middle Ground’, as a concept, allows a more sophisticated view: ‘each side plays a role dictated by what it perceives as the other’s perception of it, resulting from the mutual misrepresentation of values and practices’. These misunderstandings create a third

\textsuperscript{59} Malkin (2004), 351. See also I. Makin \textit{The Returns of Odysseus: Colonisation and Ethnicity} (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1998), 16-20. Here Malkin discusses the usefulness of analogies between Archaic Greeks and the Spaniards in the New World; his conclusions are that the Greek experience was fundamentally different.

\textsuperscript{60} Malkin (2004), 353.

\textsuperscript{61} Malkin (2004), 356.


\textsuperscript{64} This fear of the effects of colonisation may in fact find reflection in Grote’s view of the Greek colonisation of Sicily.
civilisation, neither native nor foreign, and there is a ‘shift in the conventions of both colonizer and colonized’.  

For Malkin the ‘Middle Ground’ is an useful tool for ‘problematizing the relationships of colonists and indigenous populations’ as it insists on ‘historical contextualization and careful study of social practices and representations’. We may also infer he sees it as providing sufficient ‘agency’ to indigenous peoples, and is part of a move away from approaches in which ‘ancient Greeks are treated as though they were both “white” and “European,” the people who both put together and kept rocking the cradle of Western civilisation’. That cradle is to be replaced by that of the Mediterranean itself, that great network of exchanges, and as such a concept which discourages the idea of Greeks simply imparting to natives and vice versa. This idea of the Mediterranean, no doubt influenced by The Corrupting Sea, finds expression in the interconnectedness of Greek states. Greek colonisation inevitably forms part of this network, but it is not the same as more modern examples of extensive networks of trade and settlement:

Greek colonization illustrates the prior existence of modalities different from modern colonialism. Although often treated in modern scholarship as “Western” in culture and conduct, Greek colonization indicates, on the contrary, the existence of a world diametrically opposed to the hierarchical, centralized, concept of the Christian-territorial kingdom or empire... Nonhierarchical and nonexclusionary, Greek colonization shared in a wide-ranging network that included various native populations and other maritime colonists, such as the Phoenicians and the Etruscans.

All in all a different world to that of the European imagination, and Malkin speaks of the contemporary need to theorize our postcolonial world – casting doubt on essentialism and accepted hierarchies. He also speaks of his doubt that ‘such helpful concepts could have emerged without changes in our own prisms of observation and new questions posed by

65 Malkin (2004), 357.  
66 Malkin (2004), 357.  
67 Malkin (2004), 343.  
68 Malkin (2004), 358.  
70 Malkin (2004), 363-64.
postcolonial theorists. These now allow (and are prodding) historians of antiquity to see ancient colonization in a different light."\footnote{Malkin (2004), 364.}

One wonders, however, whether Malkin appreciates that it was changes in the prism of their observation which led earlier scholars to see the ancient world in the way they did. That aside, if ‘culture contact’ is not a neutral term, then ‘Middle Ground’ is most certainly not. Rather it suggests accommodation, conciliation, or indeed, a ‘middle ground’(!). That ancient societies were not hierarchical and exclusionary on grounds of ethnicity, for example, does not mean that colonial type (i.e. exploitative) relations between newcomers and prior inhabitants could not occur. To discount the possibility of ethnic conflict is also dubious – it can at times be expedient and intertwined with status (e.g. Spartans and Helots). Therefore while the substance of the ‘Middle Ground’, that is the way that cultures can change in interaction with one another, shaping themselves in relation to their misconceived notions of ‘the other’, may be useful, the term itself could potentially lead us to the same trap as ‘culture contact’, and approaches stemming from postcolonial ideas more generally. We might make ourselves intent on not seeing colonialism precisely because it is undesirable.

A Summary

In this discussion I have attempted to give a fair assessment of current scholarship and its views about Greek settlement overseas and its earlier historiography. The intention is to avoid using recent works selectively in order to create a ‘straw man’, or rather ‘straw scholar’ whose views of Greek settlement owes as much to a current mindset as it does to the past, and of whose views of earlier scholarship is simplistic and thus easier to disprove in the subsequent discussion. It is hoped that were one to amalgamate different views outlined above into one hypothetical scholar representing current thought, that that scholar would be justly representative. It is argued that the position of the ‘current scholar’ is as follows:

The terminology used for colonisation has led to misconceptions, and the double layered distortions of Classical and modern writers colouring the past with their own much more ‘colonial’ presents have fused with the suspect terminology to provide further misconception. In addition, the privileging of such evidence such as the Classical and literary has led to the use of other types of evidence – namely archaeological – being misdirected towards confirming distorting ideas. All the above misconceptions have become mutually
supporting, leading to a view of Greek settlement overseas which a) puts too much emphasis on state involvement, not enough on individual enterprise, and b) accepts uncritically later foundation traditions and so posits a close and dependent relationship between ‘colony’ and ‘mother city’ (while colonial ideas have left a residue of notions of ‘colonial inferiority’) and c) sees relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples as mirroring later colonial (Classical Greek and modern European) experiences in which Greeks are superior agents of cultural change whereas indigenous peoples are unsophisticated and passive recipients. Rather, we should be thinking in terms of cultural interaction as being a two-way thing, and we should not automatically think that Greeks were always ascendant – even militarily – and that there were unequal power relations. There is debate as to whether we should be thinking of Greek settlement overseas as part of a wider phenomenon of ‘colonialism’ at all – as that assumes unequal power relations whereas ‘culture contact’ was probably a more widespread experience. In terms of earlier scholarship it is steeped in colonial ideas from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, identifying with Greek colonists, viewing indigenous peoples as inferior to the former and passive recipients of their culture when not being subjugated, all reinforced by racial ideas. In a further hierarchy, Greek colonies are regarded as culturally dependent on mother cities in the same way as the British settler colonies were to their mother country.

What of the weaknesses of this view? Whereas new approaches have undoubtedly been of great value in offering an entirely different way of seeing Greek settlement overseas, it is in some respects too sharp a swing in a different direction. While still taking into account the impact of Greek settlers, there has been a shift against seeing Greek involvement as a violent affair in which unequal power relations can arise. Phrases such as ‘culture contact’ or ‘Middle Ground’ imply more peaceful encounters, and while that is a welcome change from one sided accounts of Greek arrival, conquest, ascendancy, and there is ample awareness of how our own contemporary ideas influence the way we think about this aspect of the past, this awareness is not always reflected in the interpretations themselves. We have gone from looking for unequal relations to looking for peaceful interactions and cultural contact, and seem to privilege such interpretation over other, harsher, possibilities. Terms such as the ‘Middle Ground’ are a further indication of this – the term itself, suggesting mediation, accommodation, and compromise, is laden with connotations. These are very important issues, as they concern the way we approach the subject – it is therefore crucial that we are as open minded as possible about what we might find. Instead of adopting and applying new theoretical approaches, we should be storing them as a new set of ideas to
complement those already in existence, all of which offer different possibilities, different ways of seeing the past.

The aim of this thesis is not, however, to comment on the historical reality of Greek settlement overseas. The focus will be on the extent to which contemporary experiences and ideas influenced the way scholars writing in a British cultural and intellectual context wrote about ‘Greek colonisation’. The method will be first to contextualise the scholarship by explaining the relevant political, imperial, colonial and intellectual climate of a given period with specific reference to the importance of antiquity in shaping the relevant debates. Then there will follow an examination of the way in which the authors in question deal with what is a very specific aspect of Greek history, interrogating their works for evidence of distortions motivated or caused by an imperial or colonial mindset, and doing so against the framework set by the criticisms of recent scholarship: colonisation as an act of state, colonial dependence, and civilising natives. Of course, in order to be able to do so it is critical to be able to gauge to what extent they deviate from the evidence at their disposal. It follows, quite naturally, therefore, that we must first establish the nature of that evidence – which authors discuss colonisation, in what sorts of contexts did they write, what information do they provide, and how does that predominantly literary ancient evidence relate to our three key themes? The next chapter will discuss the ancient literary evidence, addressing its context, the information it provides, and the impression it gives of the nature of Greek settlement overseas in relation to its causes and the three associated themes of state action, colonial dependence, and native interactions.
Chapter 3: Ancient sources and ancient perceptions of Greek settlement overseas

The main responses to the study of ‘Greek colonisation’ have been discussed in the previous chapter. We have seen how they can be characterised as critiquing earlier scholarship for applying distorting imperial perspectives and colonial analogy to create a structure of thought in which Greek settlement overseas is misnamed and misrepresented as colonising and colonial and thus misleading in three main ways: ‘colonies’ are state foundations, ‘colonies’ are seen as in varying states of dependence to a ‘mother city’, and relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples are cast in colonial terms, as those between conquerors and vanquished, innovators and imitators, superiors and inferiors. The aim of this chapter is to aid the main purpose of the thesis, which is to examine in more detail, with reference to a broader range of scholars and a broader chronological perspective, the saliency of such criticisms to British scholarly perspectives of Greek settlement overseas. It will do so by providing the ancient basis (what the ancient literary evidence says in relation to our three interpretive themes) by which we can judge the accounts of modern scholars. The rationale behind this is that in order to determine to what extent contemporary colonial experiences lead scholars to distort antiquity, we need to first determine to what extent they depart from what the evidence at their disposal can reasonably be interpreted to say. For that reason, we evidently must have an understanding of the nature of that evidence.

As a further element of complication, to some, the very idea of ‘Greek colonization’ is meaningful only in terms of literary tradition, and that to pursue ‘this construct’ is ‘as complete a subordination of archaeology to the slavery of text-based history as one could imagine’. Furthermore, it has been said that the privileging of the literary evidence reinforces the distorting lens of European colonialism and imperialism and associated assumptions regarding ‘the ascendancy of a higher over a lower civilisation’. In this view, the traditional idea of a ‘Greek colonisation’, expressed with greatly varying imperialistic virulence from Grote to Freeman through to Dunbabin, is in fact to a degree rooted in fifth and fourth century literary sources. The sources are themselves held to be guilty of

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1 Purcell (1997), 500-502.
2 Owen (2005), 6-7.
‘inappropriate retrojections of classical models into the archaic period’. Thus not only have modern historians imposed their present onto the Archaic past; so did Classical historians. Our much maligned traditional view is ‘a product of the interplay between ancient and modern ideologies of colonization’.6 This raises another issue – even if our modern authors are faithful to the literary evidence at their disposal, this does not necessarily diminish the ‘colonial’ nature of their accounts because they derive their evidence from ancient authors writing in ancient (mainly) fifth century contexts which were themselves ‘colonial’.7 As such it is necessary to consider the value of our ancient sources for the study of, if not Archaic Greek colonisation, then what Boardman cannily titled The Greeks Overseas.8 The chapter will, therefore, be divided into three parts. It will begin by discussing the sources available for the study of Greek settlement overseas with a view to commenting on their utility as sources for the Archaic period. This will be followed by an examination of the causes or reasons given by ancient sources for Greek settlement overseas in its various guises, as the reasons for colonisation – which involves the attribution of motives – can be of direct relevance to the thinking behind modern reconstructions of ancient colonisation and attempts on our part to discern the presence or absence of modern impositions in such accounts. Consider, for instance, how motives such as overpopulation, emigration and colonisation on the part of ‘undesirables’, the desire for land or trade could find resonance equally in modern and ancient accounts of settlement overseas. Disentangling ancient evidence from modern experience can be fraught with difficulty, and hence it is important to be clear as to what image of motives our ancient sources give. The third and final part will look to establish what our ancient sources tell us about the nature of settlement overseas in relation to our three interpretive themes.

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7 Assuming, of course, that we accept the view that fifth century settlements were ‘imperial’ colonies.
The Sources for Greek colonisation

Homer and colonisation

Homer may appear an unconventional source for Greek settlement overseas, but if arguments against using fifth and fourth century accounts as sources for Archaic history rest on the idea that such authorities tell us more about their own times than that they purport to describe, then by same reasoning might not an eighth-century source, even if, or indeed especially if it were concerned with an earlier period, be able to tell us something of the nature of eighth-century Greek society? \(^9\) The dating of the Homeric epics remains, of course, somewhat contentious, and it is noteworthy that colonisation has played a part in such debates. Finley, for instance, contested the idea that the world of Odysseus was that of the eighth or seventh century because, among other things, there was ‘no colonization’. \(^10\) Others have used the presence of colonisation in Homer as evidence for its eighth-century provenance, \(^11\) and so there is clearly some confusion – and it most likely rests with the assumption that something called colonisation happened in the eighth century, and that there is a lack of consistency in terms of understandings of what colonisation is. There have been attempts to address this muddle. Wilson, critical of the desire in scholarship to trace ancient evidence for a traditional model of colonisation back to the start of the archaic period, examined the validity of using Homer as evidence for colonisation. \(^12\) Focusing on three key passages which have drawn the attention of other scholars, he argued that they were variously reflections of Dark Age migrations to Ionia, examples of pre-colonisation, or wandering myths relating to the Dark Age. As such none of these passages were ‘reflective of colonial ideologies’. \(^13\) The problem with his approach, however, is that he examined the passages for evidence of ‘colonial ideology’ relating to the ‘traditional model’ of colonisation largely derived from the interplay between modern and later, fifth century, Greek ideas of colonisation. One simply is not going to find colonisation in an eighth-century source, but in looking for it we are ‘testing’ Homer for the wrong thing and in doing so neglect to consider

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\(^10\) M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (1979), 48. According to Finley, there is in Homer ‘no Ionia, no Dorians to speak of, no writing, no iron weapons, no cavalry in battle scenes, no colonization, no Greek traders, no communities without kings.’


\(^12\) Wilson (2006), 35.

\(^13\) Wilson (2006), 42.
to what extent Homer’s depiction of settlement overseas could reflect an early Archaic reality quite different to the ‘colonial’ model of later invention, and more like the image put forward in more recent reappraisals. In this way Wilson’s analysis is confined by the very distorting ideas his study looks to unseat. Looking for colonisation is not the best way forward – we should be looking at Homer, as an eighth-century source, depicts Greek settlement overseas.

Let us consider the passages Wilson examines. Greco argued that parts of the following passage (Odyssey 6.2-10) give us ‘the clearest and most ancient description of a Greek colonial foundation’:

...αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη βῆ ῥ’ ἐς Φαεκάων ἀνδρῶν δῆμον τε πόλιν τε, οἱ πρίν μὲν ποτ᾽ ἐναιον ἐν εὐρυχόρῳ Ἕπερείη, ἄγχου Κυκλώπων ἀνδρῶν ὑπερηνορεόντων, οἱ σφεας σινέσκοντο, βήπη δὲ φέρτεροι ἤσαν. ἐνθεὶ ἀναστήσας ἄγε Ναυσίθους θεοεἰδῆς, εἴσεν δὲ Σχερῆ, ἐκὼς ἀνδρῶν ὀληρηστῶν, ἀμφί δὲ τεῖχος ἐλασσε πόλει, καὶ ἐδείματο οἶκους, καὶ νησὶς ποίησε θεῶν, καὶ ἐδάσσατ᾽ ἀρούρας.

...but Athene went to the land and the city of the Phaeacian men, who formerly lived in spacious Hypereia, near the stronger and overweening Cyclopes who would plunder them. Thereupon Nausithous the godlike leader raised them and placed them in Scheria – far from the toils of man – drew a wall around the city, and built houses, and made temples of the gods, and divided the lands.15

Dougherty thought it a colonial history of the Phaeacians,16 whereas Wilson agreed with Demand that it was more a case of ‘urban relocation’. Unlike Demand, whose explanation had as its basis mid seventh century expulsions from Ionia, Wilson thought it to refer to Dark Age migrations to Ionia. For Wilson, then, it was more likely to refer to past migrations than a contemporary ‘colonization movement’.17 Considering that the passage sounds very much like the act of setting up a new polis (which scholars argue may or may not have been

15 Note the use of the term ἀναστήσας, from the verb ἀνάστημι – to ‘raise up’, ‘make people rise’, ‘transplant’. Note also the reference to drawing a wall around the city, building houses, making temples to the gods, and dividing out or sharing (ἐδάσσατ, from the verb δαστήμα) the lands.
established by the eighth century) it is somewhat strange to suggest that it more readily resembles an even earlier period: surely the act of delineating a city by its walls, of building temples, but most especially dividing the land must relate to the process of establishing a polis-style community? Furthermore, it seems that the rationale behind dismissing this as an example of colonisation is that it was a case of forced migration. Yet surely asking whether or not this looks like colonisation – understood as a state decision to further its interests, or as the decision of a late archaic community to be rid of part of its population (e.g. Herodotus, Thera, and Cyrene) – is the wrong question entirely. It forces us to look at the eighth century through a later prism, and obscures the questions we should be asking – such as how does Homer depict Greek settlement overseas, and to what extent can this contribute to a still fairly general understanding of the eighth-century environment. In other words, the fact that this passage may not be about colonisation does not mean it is not about the eighth century and the sort of settlement overseas which existed in the early Archaic period.

This problem is also evident with the next passage (Odyssey 9.116-41), usually seen, according to Wilson, as a ‘colonial fantasy island’. It details a fertile island with a fine harbour which a seagoing people would have populated. Wilson disagrees with Dougherty that this represented the opportunities of a new (colonial) world, agreeing instead with Malkin that it has more likely parallels in a ‘pre-colonial’ world, or a world of exploration as opposed to colonisation. As such, Homer is not a source for the late eighth century. Again this argument is based on a false premise – the question asked of the evidence is whether it portrays a ‘colonial’ situation comparable to that presented by late archaic or classical sources. It is clearly ‘pre-colonial’ because it is a source much earlier than late archaic and classical ventures which can more accurately be characterised as ‘colonial’ – but it does not, therefore, necessarily depict a situation predating Greek settlement overseas in the eighth century, a process which recent reinterpretations (e.g. Osborne) suggest to have been fluid, piecemeal, and the result of such private initiatives in any case. The fact that Odysseus does not settle on this island, and that it depicts virgin land unlikely to exist in the eighth century when the west was probably well known, do not mean that this therefore depicts a ninth or early eighth-century situation. Instead, it is quite possible that this is precisely how so-

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called colonisation, or rather settlement overseas, was conceived of by eighth-century Greeks. The important thing is the concept in Odysseus’ mind that this is a place worth settling and that a seagoing people (i.e. the Greeks) would have done so, thus indicating the existence of the idea of overseas settlement. Consider how this could relate to the first passage which details how such a settlement might be organised. Furthermore, the supposedly uninhabited nature of the island fits in well with the idea that this is above all a glimpse of the promise of settlement overseas and not necessarily its reality. This is a point to bear in mind – Homer is not deliberately depicting eighth-century realities. Rather, we are asking whether we can identify certain mentalities or concepts consistent with the eighth-century world put forward by recent reimaginings of Greek settlement overseas.

The final passage Wilson considers is from the Iliad and concerns Tlepolemos, who having killed his father’s much loved uncle, decided to build ships, gather a large band of followers, and ‘set off in exile over the seas’. Eventually, and after much hardship, they came to Rhodes and settled there in three tribes, becoming miraculously wealthy by the will of Zeus. Tlepolemos set off to Troy with nine ships from Rhodes (Iliad 2.650-675). This resembles what we are told of a man named Meges, who had quarrelled with his father and then moved to Doulichion, leading forty ships from that place – clearly implying that he took with him his followers and did not simply settle Doulichion alone (Iliad 2.625-30).21 Dougherty referred to the parallels between these tales and later foundation myths relating to archaic settlement overseas. Compare these foundation stories to that of Syracuse whose founder, Archias, had according to Diodorus Siculus been responsible for the death of a boy in his native Corinth (Diodorus, 8.10). Given the choice between wealth and health by Apollo, he chose wealth, and went on to found a proverbially wealthy city (Strabo, 6.2.4). For Dougherty the murder which caused a ‘colonising’ expedition was symbolic of the violence inherent in the act of colonisation itself; Wilson objects that the Homeric example is not the same as it does not include reference to pollution and the consultation of the Delphic oracle, and thus does not fit into the general schema for foundation myths Dougherty drew. Instead passages such as these are more in keeping with other tales of wandering heroes present in the Homeric epics, and more likely to be based on ‘earlier periods of population movements’22

22 Wilson (2006), 42.
It is of course possible that the accounts of settlement overseas in Homer relate to an earlier period rather than the poet’s own day (which is another way of saying the time in which the epics were crystallised). Yet it is going too far to suggest that this basis in earlier events is ‘more likely’. On the contrary, as far as this uncertain issue is concerned there is no more evidence, and the arguments are no stronger, for Homer’s accounts relating to a more distant past than they are for a time nearer crystallisation. Homer (understood as an eighth-century source), and much later fifth century sources (or sources later still but derived from the latter), both contain accounts of inglorious motivations for settlement overseas. That they do so, but do so differently, may be because they are in fact talking about different times, different places, and different things altogether. Yet the differences evident in these accounts may be alternatively interpreted as adding to their plausibility: such disparate sources would not provide the very same account, and surely the pollution and Delphic consultations Wilson sees as an indication of later agendas makes perfect sense in this context – that is, without such later additions then would not the fifth century (and later) accounts concerning disreputable founders be very similar to our Homeric stories? We may be dealing with similar accounts dressed up differently. The substance remains.

Although there may be something in this apparent convergence between tales set in the early Archaic period on the part of later authorities, and the evidence in Homer, these traditions are on the whole of dubious reality in a specific sense. Even near contemporary sources of the Archaic period, preferring personalisation, are unlikely to have explained overseas settlement in political and economic terms. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that in spite of the centuries of manipulation some indication survives of the sorts of reasons why people left their homes for foreign lands. Thus attempting to pin Homer down as ‘pre-colonial’, or anything so specific, notwithstanding the problems inherent with that example may be missing the point. The dating of Homer remains a contentious issue, and thus it is simply not possible to say with certainty that the epics are exactly contemporary with settlement overseas in the west.\(^{23}\) Wilson, for instance, ‘broadly’ accepts Raaflaub’s dating of Homer; although he was writing in the late eighth century, Raaflaub believes Homer was deliberately setting his poem in the near past, thus to 800 BC.\(^{24}\) This sort of argument is

\(^{23}\) Although I would disagree with Wilson and suggest that the passages cited are possibly near contemporaries to eighth century settlement overseas because of the composite picture they present in terms of the depiction of a polis-style settlement and the varied motivations, some of which mirror those attested to in a different form in later traditions.

\(^{24}\) Wilson, 36. T.B.L. Webster, on the other hand, serves as a demonstration of an older interpretation of Homer as a source. Webster saw the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as the final products of a long tradition of poetry which has
perhaps too chronologically specific for comfort: do we really know enough of eighth-century Greece to make such distinctions, and narrow them down to decades? There have been arguments against Homer as reflecting any historical society, and certainly not a specifically eighth-century one.\textsuperscript{25} This is too pessimistic. More likely is that the Homeric epics reflect the time of their crystallisation, whenever exactly that was,\textsuperscript{26} and that what attempts there were to thrust the story into the past came in the form of both archaic technology and exaggeration. For instance the use of bronze instead of iron, and the vast catalogue of ships, the latter juxtaposed with an unstable aristocratically-led society that makes sense in an eighth-century context. Such deliberate differences would be far easier to conceive of than creating a society different in nature. Exaggeration is a predictable method of dramatisation: had Meges sailed from Doulichion with four rather than forty ships he would make a much more credible early Archaic noble setting out to raid distant shores in some joint venture. The main thing I hope to have demonstrated is that we simply cannot dismiss Homer as a source for the general conditions of the eighth century, in other words the conditions in which century settlement overseas took place, simply because there are no traces of colonisation in the text. Colonisation is something later, and eighth-century settlement overseas need not have looked anything like it.

Homer evidence can be used to add some flesh to the bones of the other limited and very imperfect literary evidence, and also the archaeology. The uncertainty regarding its actual crystallisation does not render it useless since we can still use it as a general indication


\textsuperscript{26} Malkin (1998), 262-68, taking into account the views of Semiticists who place the Greek adoption of the Phoenician alphabet earlier than most Classicists, suggests that the poems may have been written down (and thus crystallised) earlier than the eighth century. One wonders whether the desire to prove the ‘pre-colonisation’ hypothesis is what lies behind this interpretation. It is certainly at odds with West’s belief that it is most unlikely anyone would have attempted to record such a work in writing before the seventh century, and that not before 600 can we assume with confidence that sometime recognisable to us as the \textit{Odyssey} was set down in writing – S. West, ‘The Transmision of the Text’, in A. Heubeck, S. West, J.B. Hainsworth, \textit{A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey. Vol.I, Introduction and books I-VIII} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 34. It also contradicts Raafflaub, who sees an early \textit{Polis} in Homeric social organisation. See K. Raafflaub, ‘Soldiers, Citizens and the Evolution of the Early Greek \textit{Polis}’, in L.G. Mitchell & P.J. Rhodes (eds), \textit{The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece} (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 49-59. See also and also H. Bowden, ‘Hoplites and Homer: Warfare, hero cult, and the ideology of the polis’, in J. Rich, and G. Shipley (eds.), \textit{War and Society in the Greek World} (London: Routledge, 1993): 45-63.
of the kind of society from which the Greeks who settled in the West came. Being epic poetry, with its purpose being to entertain rather than carefully record historical reality, we should not in any case really expect Homer to be an accurate reflection of his own day in a specific sense. Even Herodotus thought Homer narrated things he knew were not true, because certain versions of events were more appealing than others.\(^{27}\) We need to be wary of several levels of distortion when analysing the literary sources – there exists not only the problem of anachronism caused by distance in time to the events described, but also the deliberate 'distortions' of contemporary accounts. If we remain aware of such difficulties, however, there is no reason why we cannot use Homer to inform our understanding of an early Archaic world and the overseas settlement of that era.

If we cannot use Homer in a specific sense, it is nonetheless of value as far as the study of Greek involvement overseas is concerned in conveying general impressions of the Mediterranean. Homer shows it a harsh and violent environment, due not only to nature, with its tempestuous seas manipulated by wrathful gods, but also the societies inhabiting its shores and islands like frogs about a pond (Plato, \textit{Phaedo} 109b).\(^{28}\) We see this in Odysseus’ piratical raiding; on his voyage home he and his followers like pirates raid the lands of the Cicones, killing the men and dividing among themselves the women (\textit{Odyssey} 9.40-45). The Cyclops in fact asks Odysseus whether he and his men sail as traders or as pirates roaming the seas bringing misfortune to others (\textit{Odyssey} 9.250-60), and when Odysseus comes to inventing for himself a past he speaks of himself as once in command of swift ships sailing against foreign shores wining great riches (\textit{Odyssey} 14.230-35). Egyptians similarly fell victims to this pirate of his invented past, yet Odysseus was to wander further still, falling into the company of a cunning Phoenician, accompanying him to Phoenicia and then setting sail to Libya, where the Phoenician secretly hoped to sell him into slavery. Stormy seas intervened to prevent this fate (\textit{Odyssey} 14.260-305).

It seems its very mobility, and the fact that men were ready to cast themselves out onto its dangerous expanses, is part of what made the Mediterranean such an unstable world. We see further echoes of this mobility in the Phaeacians, whose men are as able in seamanship as their women are deft in weaving (\textit{Odyssey} 7.109-10), the Phoenicians who conspired to steal away the infant Eumaeus, and the Phoenician woman who was a slave in

\(^{27}\) T.J. Luce, \textit{The Greek Historians} (1997), 39. In fact, Herodotus mentions that Homer could have invented a particular name (2.20), and that Homer may have been familiar with a story about Paris and Helen in Egypt, only choosing not to use it because it was not suitable for epic poetry (2.116).

his father’s household in the first place (*Odyssey* 15.415-85). The societies of Homer’s Mediterranean may have been frogs around a pond, but they were frogs who roamed it consistently in spite of its many perils, seeking to capitalise on its many opportunities.

**Hesiod**

Another very early source at our disposal is Hesiod. West thought him to have composed in the last third of the eighth century,\(^{29}\) others that he did so in the early seventh century.\(^{30}\) Murray believed he composed around 700 and that he was either a contemporary or within a generation of Homer.\(^{31}\) Hesiod’s *Works and Days* is a potentially highly valuable companion to Homer – if, of course, we are willing to accept that Homer composed his work in the eighth century, and that it was then soon committed into writing and thus crystallised. The *Works and Days* is very much a mundane work compared with Homer’s epics, and reflects the more mundane existence of a man lower down the social scale than Homer’s heroes, and perhaps also Homer’s audience who would have sought to associate themselves with the former. Therefore Hesiod may be used to shed light on those areas cast into the shadows by what Raaflaub perceived to be Homer’s pandering to an aristocratic audience,\(^{32}\) to whom the poet presented a world of the past which reflected the world of the present as they wished it to be. Hesiod’s use is not confined to merely complementing Homer, as he is a useful source in his own right to those concerned with mobility in the eighth-century Mediterranean. To give one example, Hesiod’s father was an unsuccessful sea-trader who had emigrated from Cyme in Asia Minor to become a farmer at Ascra, in Boeotia (*Hesiod, Works and Days* 630-641).\(^{33}\) A further point is that as Hesiod is very much a mundane account, and that it contains mention of travel by sea, then it is possible to draw the conclusion that sea travel was a commonplace thing around 700.

It has been argued that Homer can in some way be used as a source for the general environment in which Archaic settlement overseas occurred. Hesiod can be used rather more

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\(^{29}\) *Hesiod: Theogny; Works and days, translated with an introduction and notes by M. L. West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), vii.


\(^{32}\) Raaflaub (1997), 50.

\(^{33}\) Murray (1993), 18.
specifically, as he provides a specific example (see above) of an Archaic Greek leaving his home.

Archilochos

Datable by a total solar eclipse in 648 BC, Archilochos was born on Paros in the seventh century and he and his family took part in the settlement of Thasos. Archilochos contrasts with Homer and Hesiod in that he does speak of overseas settlement directly – which is to be explained by the fact that he seems to have actively taken part in such a venture, making him a unique source. Several of the remaining fragments of his work relate to the emigration from Paros to Thasos, some of which make Archilochos quite revealing a source for Archaic involvement and settlement across the seas – and not just in the east. For instance we learn of his disappointment on seeing Thasos’ bleakness for the first time (Archilochos 21), indicating that an overseas venture did not always live up to expectations. More interestingly perhaps is that he describes how Thasos, where the misery of all Greece converged (Arch. 102), was not as desirable a place as the area surrounding Siris (Arch. 22); which of course may well refer to southern Italy, or as Campbell more specifically states, the gulf of Taranto. This would serve as striking testament to a mid seventh century Greek being aware of the attractions of that region, perhaps illustrating how widely circulated tales of opportunity could be in the Archaic Greek world. Archilochos also provides insight into the conflict which could occur between newcomers and natives in his references to warfare with the Thracian tribes (Arch. 5), and in his contempt for the ‘Thracian dogs’ (Arch. 93). Yet here some have urged caution, suggesting that the Greek does not justify the term ‘dogs’, which is too enthusiastic and too modern sounding a translation influenced by our modern assumptions about what a seventh century act of colonisation would have been like. Archilochos does speak of settling overseas and of conflict with the indigenous peoples, yet there is nothing to suggest that this venture was a strategic act of a centralised state, and thus an act of colonisation. In this way our three earliest sources, and the only Archaic ones available to us, are quite consistent.

34 A. Sharrock and R. Ash, Fifty Key Classical Authors (London: Routledge, 2002), 19.
36 Campbell (1983), 85; Sharrock and Ash (2002), 22.
37 Owen (2005), 19. Owen refers to a fragment restored from an inscription in the 1930s, and prefers the more recent interpretation of it as Thracian ‘by nature’ (φύσις) rather than Thracian ‘dogs’ (θύζη).
All other sources are later, the main ones available to us being Herodotus, Thucydides, Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Strabo. The first two are fifth century accounts, the final three dating to the early Roman Empire. Yet this is not all, for these sources used others now lost to us in the original, but quoted and referred to by those we have. Fundamentally, our more genuinely ‘Archaic’ sources, Homer and Hesiod, do not speak of Archaic settlement in the West directly. We may suppose the reason for this is because later sources imagined earlier settlement of the west to have been something it was not. Hindsight may have led them to imagine that what were in fact gradual processes, perhaps to the Archaic eye even imperceptible ones, were instead single events or foundations, thus giving us inaccurate and highly reductive accounts. Even so we cannot however dismiss these accounts without careful consideration.

**Herodotus of Halicarnassos**

The father of history was not simply concerned with recording great deeds; he had as his primary concern explaining why Greeks and Persians came to blows. According to Rhodes, this desire to ‘establish and explain what has happened in the past’ is what makes him a historian.38 Herodotus appears to have known the work of Hecataeus of Miletus. Although according to some the latter was not strictly speaking a historian, he is believed to have given an account of his role in the Ionian revolt of 499 BC.39 It is surely not inconceivable that Herodotus learnt of the flight of the Phocaeans in the face of Cyrus, believed to have occurred in the mid sixth century, from Hecataeus (Herodotus, 1.163-169). Thus Herodotus, due to his access to earlier authorities, could inform us of events reaching as far back as the mid sixth century and into the Archaic period. According to Luce, Herodotus himself saw a distinction between history and myth – there are things he believed he ‘knew’, such as Croesus being the first man he knew of who wronged the Greeks (Hdt.1.5-6), implying of course that there were other stories of earlier men who did so, only that Herodotus thought they could not be properly substantiated.40 Rhodes says his line between

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40 Luce (1997), 41.
‘prehistory and history’ was drawn around the mid sixth century – ‘as far back as the oldest men whom he met could have remembered,’ citing Thomas’ assertion that leading Greek families had detailed traditions ‘only for the last three or four generations.’ It is simply worth bearing in mind that there must surely be a difference between the accuracy of fifth century accounts speaking of sixth century events, and those speaking of the early eighth century. Further to this, and a point to remember, having spent his final years in Thurii, Herodotus cannot have been oblivious to the foundation traditions of the Greek West. Whether or not he completed his history in Thurii is unknown. If not, it is open to question whether he would have revised his work, incorporating the additional knowledge living in this new home may have brought.

If, as has been argued, Herodotus represents mid sixth century events accurately, or at least as Greeks of that era would have seen them, then perhaps we can locate the first genuine act of colonisation at this point. Although Herodotus says it was founded by the Phocaeans on the advice of an oracle twenty years prior to the Persian attack, Alalia may in fact have been a real ‘colony’ (Hdt. 1.163-169). The ties between the two cities, Phocaea and Alalia, were certainly strong enough for the Phocaeans to flee to their foundation of twenty years previously, and that these ties were those of a dependent ‘colony’ and mother-city is a distinct possibility: one may question whether any city, fellow countrymen or not, would have voluntarily accepted such an influx of refugees. As for the oracle, it may have a wider significance. On its own, perhaps it was a very real commonplace and a similar practice to reading the omens before a battle. Wherever we encounter oracles as causes of settlement overseas, however, maybe the case in question should be read as one of state organised colonisation. This is because oracles seem such a topos that they are scarcely credible as causes, yet their consistent presence indicates that somewhere lies a grain of truth, and it is possible that this is to be found in an oracle’s possible role as providing religious ratification for a state’s colonisation. Were this the case, it would simply be a matter of confusing either a legitimating act, or less cynically a religious precaution prior to embarking on a potentially perilous colonising venture, for the motives behind that act. These motives could well be strategic and thus the sort of thing Herodotus, who liked to personalise stories and perhaps did not understand or think in terms of high politics, would not have spoken of. Yet not all fifth century sources had the same agenda or approach. High politics and grand strategy are in fact the sorts of reasons Thucydides posits in his work. Although again highly personalised,

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41 Rhodes (1994), 159.
his work uses speeches not simply to tell a tale but to convey arguments of quite some intellectual sophistication. In terms of strategic thinking, this can be seen in his contention that Spartan fear of growing Athenian power was the cause of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. 1.88). It may be worth noting that Thucydides, who appears a different kind of writer, writing arguably dryer history, has no place for oracles, or indeed causation, in his brief interlude on the colonisation of Sicily in book six. To return to Herodotus as a source, there need not be a contradiction in saying that Herodotus reliably informs us about events in the mid-sixth and also the fifth centuries but that his presentation of the reasons for colonisation in these years is misleading. His failings are not those of inappropriate retrojection, but rather of failing to recognise the present. Therefore if we carefully interpret what he says, for instance by suggesting that we should see oracles as betraying acts of calculated colonisation, his utility is not seriously hindered.

If we accept that Homer, Hesiod and Archilochos provide us with evidence of rather more loosely organised overseas involvement down to the mid seventh century, and that real colonisation is in fact detectable in Herodotus’ depiction of the mid sixth century foundation of Alalia, this would leaves us with a hundred years, from around 650 to 550 BC, in which Greek activities overseas could have changed from more loosely organised processes into colonisation. We should bear in mind, however, that this depends on an interpretation of Herodotus that is by no means conclusive. We can only be certain of genuine colonisation from the fifth century onwards.

**Thucydides and his sources**

Thucydides has been considered a more scientific, more objective a historian in the truer sense of the word than Herodotus.\(^\text{43}\) Perhaps it may be more accurate to say that Thucydides is a more sophisticated writer. Nevertheless this tendency of past scholarship may lead to our overlooking the fact that they are both fifth century sources, and may indeed have been writing at much the same time. As it happens, this furthers emphasises that our sources are overwhelmingly fifth century or later.\(^\text{44}\) Thucydides’ account of Sicilian colonisation is different to that of Herodotus, but covers some of the same ground. It is a

\(^{43}\) S. Hornblower, ‘Narratology and Narrative Techniques in Thucydides’, in S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek historiography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994),132. Rhodes (1994), 161, on the other hand, mentions that it is ‘perhaps dangerous that Thucydides is not so obviously different from modern historians.’

\(^{44}\) His account covers the years 431-411 BC (that his account breaks off in 411 and not the end of the war 404, is attributed to his death). T. E. Duff, *The Greek and Roman Historians* (Bristol: Bristol Classical, 2003), 26.
brief and largely systematic account of the origins of the various cities, providing a backdrop for the Athenian invasion (Thucydides 6.1-6). He has much of value to say about the question of ties of ethnicity (see 6.17, and 6.76), and there is a further passage useful for the study of colonisation (7.77) where Nicias encourages the demoralised Athenians by claiming that they, with such a force of hoplites among them, are sufficient a force to constitute a powerful city should they choose to settle down. It has been argued that Thucydides presents the Sicilian expedition itself as a vast colonising expedition 45 and in this way Thucydides may be considered the source in which colonisation proper is presented in its clearest form. As we have already seen in the above discussion of Herodotus, this is due in no small part to the way Thucydides thought – in terms of states, their fears, and their strategies for dominance and survival. This may seem strikingly modern, yet one may well ask whether it is us who have been so influenced by Thucydides that our thinking is strikingly Classical and Athenian.

What Thucydides actually wrote about the settlement of Sicily in the eighth century, that is book six, is worthy of closer examination, as the picture he paints is not quite so clearly one of ‘colonies’ founded as an act of state and the subjugation of natives. First of all, in writing about the first eighth-century settlements, he notes the origins of settlers, but appears to present their founders, rather than the mother cities, as responsible for the enterprise – or alternatively he does not explicitly state that the settlement was the result of a decision on the part of the mother city:

Ἑιιήλσλ δὲ πρῶτοι Χαλκιδῆς ἐξ Εὐβοίας πλεύσαντες μετὰ Θουκλέους οἰκιστόθ Νάξον ὤκισαν...

The first of the Greeks were the Chalcidians who sailed from Euboea with the founder Theocles and settled Naxos... (Thuc. 6.3.1-3).

Συρακούσας δὲ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἑτους Ἀρχίας τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ὤκισε.

The following year Syracuse was settled by Archias of the Heraclids of Corinth (Thuc. 6.3.1-3).

About the same time Lamis led a settlement from Megara and arrived in Sicily, and settled a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas. (Thuc. 6.4.1-3)

In these three cases, the place of origin (Euboea, Corinth, Megara) is named, but the focus appears to be on the founder (οἰκιστής). The settlement is described as having been settled (οἰκίζω) by a certain individual leader. Settlers leave with a founder (οἰκιστής), a settlement is settled (οἰκίζω) by a founder, or a founder leads (ἄγω) a settlement (ἀποικία). Thucydides’ account clearly concentrates on the oikist as the driving force behind these early settlements overseas. There is no mention of the mother city as an active agent in these events.

What is interesting is that Thucydides does ascribe to the mother city a deciding role when it comes to secondary settlements – that is, settlements founded by Sicilian Greek communities themselves, of course, once new settlements overseas (ἀποικία):

καὶ Καμάρινα τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ὕκισθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἕκατὸν μετὰ Συρακουσῶν κτίσιν: οἰκισταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέκωλος.

Camarina was first settled (ὁκίσθη, οἰκίζω) by Syracuse, around one hundred and thirty five years after the creation/settling (κτίσιν, κτίσις) of Syracuse. Daxon and Menecolus became its founders (always οἰκισταὶ, οἰκιστής) (Thuc.6.5.3).

Ἄκραι δὲ καὶ Κασμέναι ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ὕκισθήσαν

Akrai and Casemena were settled (ὁκίσθησαν, οἰκίζω) by Syracuse (Thuc.6.5.2)

καὶ ἔτη οἰκίσαντες πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ διακόσια ὑπὸ Γέλωνος τυράννου Συρακοσίων ἀνέστησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ χώρας. πρὶν δὲ ἀναστήναι, ἔτεσιν ὄστερον ἑκατὸν ἦ αὐτοῦς οἰκίσαι, Πάμπολον πέμψαντες Σελινούντα κτίζοντι καὶ ἐκ Μεγάρων τῆς μητροπόλεως οὕσης αὐτοῖς ἐπελθῶν ξυγκατάκισεν.
They were settled there for two hundred and forty five years until Gelon the tyrant of Syracuse raised them up (ἀνέστησαν) from the city (i.e. drove them out) and the land. Before they were made to emigrate, a hundred years after they settled, they sent Pamillus and founded (κτίζομεν/κτίζω) Selinous, and he had come from the metropolis Megara to join in settling (συγκατοικίζω) [Selinous]. (Thuc. 6.4.1-3)

In each of these passages, there is reference to a Sicilian Greek city as responsible for the settling of another Sicilian settlement. Camarina, Akrai, and Casmenae were settled (ὁκίσθη/ὁκίσθησαν, οἰκίζω) by Syracuse (ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων). Megara Hyblaia sent (πέμψαντες, πέμπο) Pamillus and founded (κτίζομεν/κτίζω) Selinous – Pamillus having come from the metropolis Megara. The exception from this tendency is the settlement of Himera, 'ἀπὸ Ζάγκλης φύλισθη ὑπὸ Εὐκλείδιον καὶ Σίμου καὶ Σάκωνος' (settled from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, Thuc. 6.5.1). In the latter the responsibility for the settlement is ambiguous – it was settled from Zancle under the three named founders – but in the other two examples it is quite clear that the settlements were established by the polity in question. In the case of Megara Hyblaia and Selinous, there is mention of the founder as having come from the metropolis for the purpose joining in the settlement (‘ἐπικατώκισασ, συγκατοικίζω’).

The important thing to note here is that Thucydides, on closer inspection, does not appear to present early eighth-century settlements in Sicily, such as Naxos, Syracuse, Megara, as having been sent out by their mother cities – the emphasis is on the founder, and his place of origin as a secondary concern. The case of Lamis, who led an ‘apoikia’ from Megara (‘Λάμις ἐκ Μεγάρων ἀποικίαν ἄγων’, Thuc. 6.4.1-3) need not have statist connotations provided we translate ‘apoikia’ as a ‘settlement, and not as a ‘colony’. The emphasis on the founder in the settlement of the first site, and subsequently on the community in any secondary settlement, is also in evidence with Thucydidse’s account of the foundation of Gela, usually dated to the early seventh century:

Γέλαν δὲ Ἀντίφημος ἐκ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἐντιμος ἐκ Κρήτης ἐποίκους ἄγαγόντες κοινὴ ἐκτίσαν, ἔτει πέμπτῳ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῷ μετὰ Συρακοσίων οἰκίσαν...ἐτεσι δὲ ἐγγύτατα ὁκτώ καὶ ἐκατόν μετὰ τὴν σφετέραν οἰκίσαν Τέιλῳ Ακράγαντα ὁκίσαν...οἰκίστας δὲ ποιήσαντες Αριστόνου καὶ Πυστίλου... 

46 Nor indeed Cumae in Italy.
Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete led settlers (ἐπνίθνπο, ἐπνηθνο) and settled (ἐκτισαν, κτιζο) Gela jointly, forty five years after Syracuse was settled... One hundred and eight years after their settlement/peopling (οἰκισαν, οἰκιζο) the Gelans settled (ὁκισαν, οικιζο) Acragas... they made (ποησαντες, ποιω) Aristonous and Pystilus founders... (Thuc. 6.4.3-4).

Again the emphasis is on the founders and their origins with the first settlement, and on the community in any subsequent settlement undertaken from that first settlement. Note that with the secondary settlements (e.g. Camarina, Selinous, Acragas) there is a tendency for certain individuals to be made, or become, the founders – in other words it might be possible to infer that Thucydides’ intention was to present these as appointed by the community, or that the decision to settle a site was taken, and that a founder was found to carry it out. Earlier settlements and earlier founders, or perhaps more specifically initial settlements and initial founders, are not presented in this way. In the accounts relating to Theocles, Archias, Lamis, Antiphemus and Entimus, the settlement is presented as having originated from, or entwined with the figure of the founder from the beginning. It may be significant that Thucydides presents the information in this way, and it is possible that this emphasis on individuals in initial settlements overseas (e.g. Naxos c.734, Syracuse c.733, Megara Hyblaia c.728, Gela c.688), and then on communities with regards to secondary settlements (e.g. Camarina c.598, Selinous c.628, Acragas c. 580) is a reflection of what the sources he used said. These may have been silent on the issue of the role of the mother city in the foundation of the first settlements, or alternatively depicted a situation far removed from that of state instigated foundations with which Thucydides was familiar. The exception to this pattern is Theocles and the Chalcidians – here Theocles leads them to Naxos, which they settle, but then on to settle Leontinoi and later Catane – ‘although the Catanians themselves made Euarchus their founder’ (Thuc. 6.3.1-3). The picture Thucydides presents here is of three settlements established in quick succession by Theocles, but one of them deciding to endorse a certain Euarchus as its ‘founder’ – whether this is a symbolic title, or in this context simply means ‘leader’, is unclear. The fact that they are presented as having been settled so rapidly and under the guidance of one leader, this may explain why these secondary foundations are not said to have been founded by a particular community. The one thing which is consistent with the origins ascribed to secondary foundations is the nomination of a founder – but this again is different as the founder is nominated by the new settlement itself, and not by the
originating community. Overall, it may be possible to argue, tentatively, that these differences in the way in which Thucydides depicts initial and secondary settlements may reflect actual differences identified by his sources (which will be discussed below), but perhaps not fully or consciously understood by Thucydides himself.

Thucydides provides information about the relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples. This portrayal is varied, and what violence it contains is consistent with a view of early history in which expulsions, migrations and wandering, and further expulsions and displacements of peoples figure prominently. The violent expulsion of native peoples is attested in the foundation of Syracuse – Archias drove out the Sikels from the island (‘Σικελοῦς ἐξελάσασι πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς νήσου’, Thuc. 6.3.1-3). Similarly, Theocles and the Chalcidians drove out the Sicels in battle, settling Leontinoi (‘Λεοντίνους τε πολέμῳ τοῦ Σικελοῦ ἐξελάσαντες οἰκίζουσι…’ Thuc. 6.3.1-3). This is not the complete picture, however, as Thucydides also presents an example of cooperation between Greeks and natives:

The others were made to raise themselves up (i.e. driven) from Thapsos and Hyblon king of the Sicels gave/surrendered the Megarans land and guided them, and they settled a place called Hyblaia (Thuc. 6.4.1-3).

The Chalcidians who eventually settled Megara Hyblaia did so having been driven out of Leontinoi by their fellow Chalcidian Greeks, and again from Thapsos after Lamis’ death. An indigenous king either gave them land, or surrendered it to them. Positive relations may be inferred by the naming of the settlement after the king. What this demonstrates is that Thucydides presents us with an account of Greek involvement in Sicily which is not exclusively characterised by Greeks expelling and subjugating native peoples. On the contrary, Greeks are equally prone to driving out other Greeks as they are indigenous peoples. This in turn fits into the general flavour of the account which appears to give the impression that Greek involvement in Sicily was merely the latest of a series of migrations and displacements stretching back further than the Trojan War.

Τὸ θέλει δὲ ἀληθικὸν τῶν Τρώων τινὸς διαφυγόντες Ἀχαιῶν πλοίως ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ ὅμοροι τοῖς Σικανοῖς οἰκήσαντες ξύμπαντες...
After the capture of Troy, some fled from the Achaeans, and coming in ships to Sicily, settled (οἰκήσαντες, οἰκῶ) near the Sicanians, and were all called Elymians, their cities Eryx and Segesta. Some Phocians also came to settle with them (προσέξενόκησαν, προσσυνοικέω), brought by the storm from Troy first into Libya and then into Sicily itself (Thuc. 6.2.3-4).

The native Sicanians, although claiming to be autochthonous, had themselves migrated to Sicily having been driven from their homes in Iberia by the Ligurians ("ὑπὸ Ληγύσλ ἀλλαζηάλεο", Thuc. 6.2). They were joined afterwards by Trojans – the most famous forced migrants in history – and it seems by wandering Greeks. The Sicels came from Italy, fleeing from the Opicians, and drove (ἀλέζηεηιαλ, ἄλαζηέιισ) the Sicans to the south and the west, and to Thucydides’ day held the centre and north of Sicily (Thuc. 6.2.5). Then came the Phoenicians, and although they were not migrants in the same sense, settling occupying instead headlands, they still played a part in this story of displacements by abandoning settlements in the face of the Greeks, concentrating instead on their western holdings. This is where the Greeks enter Thucydides’ history of Sicily – and it is evidently as the latest in a long line of migrants in a Mediterranean world characterised by displacement, migration, settlement, and the displacement of others in turn. This is the context in which Thucydides’ depiction of indigenous peoples being driven out by Greeks must be placed. This is not, therefore, the imposition of a ‘quasi-colonial’ fifth century perspective onto the past, but it may nonetheless owe something to more recent Greek experience. The history of the Greeks in the west, as presented in book six seems as replete with expulsions as the earlier, pre-Greek, history.

Thucydides describes with some frequency instances of Sicilian Greek settlers being displaced by other Greek settlements, most notably, but not exclusively, those Greek settlements ruled by tyrants. First we have the example of Megara Hyblaia:
καὶ ἔτη οἰκήσαντες πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ διακόσια ὑπὸ Γέλωνος τυράννου Συρακοσίων ἀνέστησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ χώρας.

They [the settlers of Megara Hyblaia] were settled there for two hundred and forty five years until Gelon the tyrant of Syracuse raised them up (ἀνέστησαν) from the city (i.e. drove them out) and the land. (Thuc. 6.4.1-3)

In this instance it is the tyrant of Syracuse who ‘raises them up’ (ἀνέστησαν, ἀνίστημι). This experience is by no means regarded as unique, as the Camarinians suffer a similar fate having revolted against Syracuse:

The Camarinians were made to rise up/emigrate by the Syracusans (ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων) because they had revolted. Later Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, received the land of the Camarinians as ransom for Syracusan prisoners of war, and he himself became founder, settling/establishing Camarina (κατέφικε, κατοικίζω). Again they were made to rise (ἀνάστατος γενομένη) up by Gelon and it was settled/established (κατέφικε, κατοικίζω) for a third time by Gelon. (Thuc. 6.5.3).

Here, of course, not only do we have the expulsion of the Camarinians by Syracuse, but also the further intervention of a tyrant who resettles the place. These are then in turn ‘made to rise’ – the same terminology is used (ἀνάστατος γενομένη) – by Gelon who settles the place for a third time. The overall impression is one of habitual displacement and settlement. This is further reinforced by the example of Zancle:

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πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τήν πόλιν αὐτὸς ἡμιμείκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίας
Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἄρχαῖον πατρίδος ἀντινόμασεν.

These [the Cumaean and Chalcidian settlers of Zancle] were themselves indeed
driven out (ἐκπίπτουσιν, ἐκπίπτω) by the Samians and other Ionians, who fleeing
the Persians put in to Sicily. Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium threw out
(ἐκβαλὼν, ἐκβάλλω) these Samians, settled (οἰκίας, οἰκίζομαι) the city with a
mixture of men, and named it instead Messene after his original fatherland (Thuc.
6.4.5-6).

We have here the combination of a forced displacement and subsequent migration resulting
in another displacement. These Ionians are again displaced, this time by a tyrant, and their
recently acquired lands repopulated. The crucial point to note is that the theme of expulsion,
migration, and displacement constitutes an underlying consistency between the way
Thucydides saw the events of the Classical period, the Archaic period, and the period
preceding the eighth-century Greek settlement. The later displacements caused by tyrants,
states, and migrants in the classical period, the displacement of Greek settlements by other
Greeks and the expulsions of native peoples by Greeks in the archaic period, and the tales
surrounding Sican, Sicel, Trojan, and Phoenician presences in the pre-Greek period, all
contribute to a general impression of instability and successive population movements. It
would seem that the only settlements which do not explicitly fit into this wider pattern are the
eighth-century Greek settlements themselves, for which motivations are not referred to, and
the focus rests on the founder.

Such is the information Thucydides provides, and the place of eighth-century
settlement within a wider perspective. Now it is necessary to turn to his sources. It is likely
that Thucydides used some earlier source for his work – how much earlier is open to debate.
Dover dismisses the possibility that he could have used Hippys of Rhegion or Hellankios.
More likely is Antiochos of Syracuse. 47 Greco thinks him a late sixth century or early fifth
century author. 48 This would make Antiochos a contemporary of Hecataeus of Miletus,

47 K.J. Dover, in A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K.J. Dover, A historical commentary on Thucydides. Vol.4,
six occasions in his account of Italy and Sicily. See Strabo 6.1.1, 6.1.4, 6.1.6, 6.1.12, 6.1.15, 6.3.2. Diodorus,
although stating that Antiochos’ account ends in 424 (12.71.2), also mentions that Thucydides started his in 432,
describing 22 years of the 27 year war. This would make them near contemporaries.
48 Greco (1992), 170.
regarded as Herodotus’ great predecessor.⁴⁹ Dionysius of Halicarnassos was familiar with Antiochus’ work, in fact directly quoting Antiochus (Dion. Hal 1.12.3). Clearly well-read, Dionysius remarkably refers to Antiochus alongside Hellanikos, Philistus and Thucydides (Dion. Hal. 1.22.3-5). Dover sees the fact that Thucydides’ account shows great familiarity with events associated with Syracuse – not least the fact that the majority of the foundation dates are ‘expressed with reference to Syracuse – as support for the idea that Antiochus (of Syracuse) was his source.⁵⁰ This view is echoed by Van Compernolle. He also suggests that arguments against Thucydides’ use of Antiochus, whom we know as the author of a Sicilian history from other authors such as Strabo, rest on our accepting some other unknown source.⁵¹ Most scholars, in any case, appear to accept that Thucydides at the very least must have known Antiochus’ work.⁵² As Van Compernolle says, since Antiochus’ work does not survive, it is impossible to demonstrate in a direct manner how Thucydides used it, yet that Antiochus was his source is the only satisfactory hypothesis.⁵³ It should be added that when Strabo cites Antiochus, he does so in reference to the Phocaeans (Str. 6.1.1), early Italy (6.1.4), Zancle and the Siceli (6.1.6), Croton (6.1.12), Metapontion (6.1.15), and Taras (6.3.2). May we then presume that he was somewhat of an authority for the Greek colonisation of Italy and Sicily and the preceding indigenous presence? If so, then who better for Thucydides to use as a source for a brief excursus on Sicily than Antiochus – the local authority on the matter? If we accept this hypothesis, and accept that Antiochus was a contemporary of Hecataeus, this further suggests the firmly fifth century or at the latest late sixth century nature of our sources.

*Xenophon and Plato*

Xenophon and Plato are two somewhat unexpected sources. They are almost exactly contemporary fifth or fourth century sources and both students of Socrates. It is interesting that we should come across in works not ostensibly about this issue such sources for colonisation. Xenophon is mainly of use due to a passage in the *Anabasis* (5.6.15-37): seeing

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⁵³ Van Compernolle, (1959), 497.
so many hoplites and other types of troops around him, Xenophon recalls how it seemed to
him that it would be a good idea to found a new city, gaining for Greece more territory and
power. This seems in some ways to echo Nicias’ speech mentioned above (Thuc. 7.77).
Both passages are informative with regards to what would constitute both a city, and a
‘colony’ – an army large enough to be able to defend itself, also implying that a Polis was in
fact its people. Plato, in his Laws, has a fascinating dialogue about the foundation of a new
‘colony’, in which the characters speak of things such as natural resources, the origins of the
colonists, and what type of government there should be (Plato, Laws, 4.704-16).

Diodorus, Dionysius, Strabo, and their sources

Although writing in the later stages of the Republic, Diodorus, Dionysius and Strabo
are believed to have used if not necessarily fifth century sources, then certainly ones
themselves using sources of that era. It is this use of earlier sources such as Ephoros which
according to some makes Diodorus, an otherwise much criticised author, a good source for
the late fifth and early fourth centuries.\(^{54}\) It would appear that Diodorus’ relatively poor
reputation is the result of his moralising tendencies,\(^{55}\) and the belief that he copied his sources
unquestioningly. More recent approaches have sought to rehabilitate Diodorus as a author in
his own right, and more than a copyist unable to offer his own interpretations.\(^{56}\) According to
Pearson Diodorus used Timaios for his account of Sicily and Southern Italy, ‘constantly’
paraphrasing or summarizing his text. Likewise, for the fifth and early fourth centuries he
made use of Ephoros,\(^{57}\) who Clarke regards as his main source.\(^{58}\)

It should be noted that not only does Diodorus mention Timaios and Ephoros, but at
one point he compares them as sources. He considered Timaios as precise and
knowledgeable but prone to lengthy and excessive censures. Ephoros, on the other hand, he
praised for not only the style of his composition but also the arrangement of his work which
dealt with events falling under a single topic. It is this method, Diodorus tells us, that he
embraces, and so his fifth book about islands begins with an account of Sicily, since it is the

\(^{54}\) Rhodes (1994), 167.
\(^{55}\) Rhodes (1994), 167. Diodorus also thought his history to have a moral purpose, R. Drewes, ‘Diodorus and
\(^{56}\) K.S. Sacks, ‘Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity’, in S. Hornblower (ed.) Greek
\(^{58}\) K. Clarke, ‘In Search of the Author of Strabo’s Geography’, in The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 87,
(1997), 98.
largest (Diod. 5.1-2). In other parts of his work he is again seen to compare one historian with another, indicating clearly which version of events he prefers. For instance, Philistus thought the Sicani had moved to Sicily from Iberia, but that Timaios, exposing the ignorance of the former, correctly identifies the Sicani as indigenous (Diod. 5.6). He refers to several historians during the course of his work. The following give examples, but by no means an exhaustive catalogue of his references to other works. Thucydides is spoken of (12.37), as is Herodotus (9.20, 10.24, 11.37), and Antiochos (12.71). Ephoros does indeed seem to be one of his chief sources (see 13.41) as is Timaios – in fact their accounts are compared in 13.54, 13.60, and 13.80 for the numbers they give to various armies. Timaios, who lived from the mid fourth century and well into the third, was forced by Agathocles to leave Sicily for Athens where during his 50 year stay he wrote his history. He is referred to by Diodorus in his own right on several other occasions (13.85, 90, 108, and 109) as well as alongside a certain Polycetios (13.83), and in one place both Dionysius, Dio, and Diodorus himself (10.29). What should be clear is that Diodorus had many sources at his disposal. It is quite puzzling that he should be considered by some as more than an unthinking copyist, when in fact he cites and compares different accounts, on occasion expressing a preference. It would be sensible, therefore, having seen the frequency with which he cites Timaios and Ephoros, to assume that these two constituted his main sources for Sicilian and Italian history.

We see a similar situation with Dionysius, who writing in Rome during the age of Augustus, used Antiochos, Philistus (late fifth and early fourth centuries), and Timaios. The sections of his work which are especially of use are his first and seventh books. The former deals with the very early history of Italy and Sicily and the latter with later, more historical events such as the history of the city of Kyme (in Latin Cumae). The context in which Dionysius was writing was not radically different to Strabo’s. Strabo, originally from Amasia in Pontus, came to Augustan Rome at a time when it was a major intellectual centre, and ‘a meeting point for scholars from the entire Greek world.’ Clarke explains that Strabo

59 See Strabo 6.2.4 for his account of early Sicily and its indigenous peoples, in which he cites Ephoros.
61 See also 9.21, where Diodorus says he himself, Polybius, and three other (to us) more obscure authors (Phlegon, Thallus, and Castor) all give the same date for Cyrus’ accession to the Persian throne.
62 Such as in 5.6.
63 Osborne (2003), 119.
was concerned with ‘periods of geographical transformation’, and that for him the importance of the battle of Actium was its ‘significance for the changing face of the world’.\textsuperscript{66} As we shall see, in Strabo’s notion of geography, it is not the physical environment itself which is the main concern, but those who peopled it and gave a place its identity and significance.\textsuperscript{67} In this way, his value for the study of settlement overseas, and how different places became occupied and defined by different peoples over the ages, should not be very surprising.

As for Strabo’s sources, he clearly used Antiochos of Syracuse in one way or another for his accounts of Sicily and the Greek West. Dueck sees this choice as a reflection of Strabo’s preference for native sources.\textsuperscript{68} Pearson, due to Antiochos’ supposed status as a little-known early historian, believes Strabo used him indirectly, drawing quotations from Timaios (fourth and third century). On what grounds he judges Antiochos a little-known historian is however unclear,\textsuperscript{69} but as we have seen in the above discussion of Thucydides, Strabo, one way or another, learned much from Antiochos. It should also be pointed out that in 6.1.4, Strabo says that Antiochos was speaking in but a simple and antiquated way on a certain matter, not making a distinction between the Lucanians and the Brettians – before going one better himself by explaining the differences. This may imply that he was using Antiochos directly. Whatever the case and however he gained his information, Strabo seems not to have been shy about acknowledging his debt to other, earlier, sources – ‘debts to the tradition were embraced rather than feared as a sign of lack of originality.’\textsuperscript{70} In that case we may question whether ancient authors embellished their accounts with references to authors they had not in reality read, or had not read in much depth – rather like the modern students seeking to make their work look more impressive for their own particular audience. Strabo also refers to the fourth century historian Ephoros, whose account, according to Diodorus, came to an end around 340 BC.\textsuperscript{71} As a matter of fact he refers to Ephoros, a writer influential on his work,\textsuperscript{72} on several occasions. Pearson considers Ephoros a historian as important as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} K. Clarke, \textit{Between Geography and History: Hellenistic Constructions of the Roman World} (Oxford University Press, 1999), 287.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Clarke (1999), 247.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Dueck (2000), 183.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Pearson (1987), 18. We should also remember that Dionysius directly quotes Antiochos (Dion. Hal 1.12.3). He may, of course, have lifted his quotation from another source – Philistus perhaps – yet what evidence Pearson has to dismiss Antiochos as a little-known source is left un-cited.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Clarke (1999), 262.
\item \textsuperscript{72} K. Clarke (1997), 95.
\end{itemize}

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Timaios in providing us with information about the Greek West,\(^{73}\) suggesting that the latter adopted much of what Ephoros wrote with little change. He also suggests that ancient writers expected their readers to be as familiar with Ephoros as they were with Thucydides.\(^{74}\) Polybius certainly was (Polybius, 4.20). Strabo, however, should be judged as having used Ephoros directly; he does after all refer to him consistently throughout books six and seven.\(^{75}\) Furthermore, the lexicographer Harpocration preserved a sentence of Ephoros’ relating to the foundation of Aenos in Thrace,\(^{76}\) the content of which is closely mirrored by Strabo (Str. 7.51).

If this is true, then Strabo must through a combination, though not necessarily a synthesis of Timaios, Ephoros and Antiochos, have had access to fifth and fourth century accounts from which he derived his accounts of founders and their foundations. He also cites Polybius,\(^{77}\) but those parts of Strabo’s work likely to be relevant to the study of the West are more likely to be derived from Antiochos, Ephoros and Timaios.\(^{78}\) Very curiously, although aware of Herodotus (see Str.6.3.6), he does not appear to use him, or rather, cite him, for his accounts of migrations to and colonisation in the West. This is very clear in the case of the Phocaeans’ expulsion and their subsequent migration and attempts at colonisation. He also seems not to compare him to others as he does with Antiochos and Ephoros. Yet this does not mean that he did not read and digest what Herodotus, and indeed Thucydides (Str. 7.7.7) had to say about the West. In the case of Thucydides, why would Strabo mention him if he had Thucydides’ own source – Antiochos? This may lend support to arguments such as Pearson’s: our authors may not see fit to mention their intermediary sources, instead mentioning only the most ancient and by extension, perhaps, the most prestigious. To look at it another way, however indirectly he may or may not have accessed them, Strabo seems to have had at his disposal quite an array of sources. He must have known Herodotus’ work, and through him, it is possible, some of what was recorded by Hecataeus of Miletus. Either

\(^{73}\) Pearson (1987), 34.
\(^{75}\) For references to Ephoros, see Strabo 6.1.7, 6.1.8, 6.1.12, 6.1.15, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.3, 7.2.1, 7.3.9, 7.3.15, 7.7.10, 7.7.7. In all, he is referred to 72 times in the *Geography*, with 9 references in book 6.
\(^{76}\) Pearson (1943), 50.
\(^{77}\) Clarke (1997), 98.
\(^{78}\) And also, it is possible, Pindar (Str. 6.2.3,4). Strabo speaks of Timaios in 6.1.9, 6.2.4 (where he compares his account to something of Pindar’s). Outside of book 6, Timaios is spoken of in 13.1.39, 14.1.22, 14.2.10: 5 times in all.
indirectly through Timaios, or directly, he benefited from Ephoros and Antiochos. To add to these accounts he had Thucydides.

This is further evidence for the very strongly fifth and fourth century nature of his, and therefore our sources. The latter are thus most likely to be well informed about fifth and fourth century events, although through the use of Herodotus and Antiochos of Syracuse, the two earliest sources we know to have been used, we can assume them to be reasonably well informed as far back as the mid sixth century. The familiarity with earlier sources demonstrated by our Augustan sources indicates to me that their usefulness is not severely compromised by their late composition. If they distort the ‘colonising’ process, the distortion they apply is that of the fifth and fourth centuries. This maybe a bad thing as far as Archaic history is concerned, but if follows that accounts supposedly pertaining to the Archaic period, precisely because tainted by a Classical ‘ideology’ of colonisation, must thus be valuable as sources for a fifth and fourth century ‘imperialism’. If, as Wilson argues, classical models of colonisation have much in common with ‘both the Roman colonial experience and the modern imperialist experience’\(^\text{79}\), then surely this should encourage us to explore the parallels, and consider the ‘distorting lens’ of European imperialism as potentially illuminating. We should not fall into the trap of the early archaeologist in seeing that which is oldest as the most valuable, disregarding the later levels found nearer the surface.

Other sources

Migrations, overseas settlements and colonisation are such common themes in ancient works, in one way or another, that there may well be a great many references of use and importance in other, quite unexpected sources. We have already seen this in the cases of Plato and Xenophon. Further examples are Athenaeus, who in his *Deipnosophistae* (12.521-527) discusses the themes of luxury and its paths to arrogance and effeminacy. He has several references to famous Sicilian and Italian-Greek cities like Croton, Sybaris, and Taras. This is not all for he also has place for other cities which became proverbially wealthy, like Miletus, but also Massilia and Siris. To give another example, Cassius Dio relates how after Caesar had taken Massilia, Pompey gave Phocaea, its founding city, its freedom – in order to ‘offset this misfortune’ (41.25.3). This is as clear an indication as any of the extent to which foundation stories and ancient ties of kinship were something akin to common knowledge in

\(^{79}\text{Wilson (2006), 25.}\)
late Republican Rome. Strabo and Dionysius serve as evidence that this interest persisted into the Augustan age, and authors such as Athenaeus and Cassius Dio that it continued into the third century AD.  

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Reasons for settling overseas

We now know something of our sources, their context, and indeed the sources which they themselves use. What will follow is for the most part a literary picture, deliberately so, and excluding other sources such as the archaeology. The reason for this is that the purpose of this chapter is to identify the themes emerging from the evidence at the disposal of earlier scholarship. The focus here will be firstly on personal motivations as revealed by what the literary sources tell us about the oikist, and then secondly on the broader themes relating to the reasons for colonisation which emerge from the literary evidence.

Personal motivations: the oikist

A recurring theme is that of the oikist. Among his various manifestations are figures such as Philoctetes, the Pylians, and Nestor; heroic characters and wandering individuals with their followers in tow. Philoctetes (Str. 6.1.3) seems to have personal reasons for leaving one place to found another, and were it not for the Trojan War as a background, he could be an Archaic oikist. Ogden sees it as significant that Philoctetes, having been lamed by being bitten by a snake then abandoned by Odysseus, was imperfect (Sophocles, Philoctetes, 5-11). Imperfection is a recurring theme within that of the oikist, and it encompasses both Heroic and Archaic figures. Kroton had as its oikist a hunchback called Myscellus from Rhype, Syracuse a Corinthian named Archias. The reasons why they left their homes is not stated in Strabo’s account, which tells us more about their colonising activity and visits to Delphi. We must look to Diodorus for the reasons why, and as we do so, the theme of the imperfect oikist becomes evident: not only was he a hunchback, but Myscellus set out from Rhype to Delphi in order to ask Apollo about the begetting of children, implying that he could not achieve this at home. Whether this was because of his unsightly deformity, or because of sterility, it is not said. He received the oracular response that if he founded Kroton, untouched by plough, he would be granted his wish (Diod. 7.17). We may presume that the following story related by Diodorus was meant to explain Archias’ departure from Corinth: seized with love for a youth, Archias conspired to take him with the aid of his associates, only for the boy to die in the ensuing brawl as his family tried to defend him

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Myscellus is deformed, and perhaps sterile. Archias is practically a murderer. Both have reason to be shunned by their communities.

This leaves us with curious heroes indeed, for it is generally accepted that Greek settlements did celebrate their oikist, and it is fascinating that they are such imperfect figures. In some cases, this imperfection extends to the initial colonists more generally, as we can see in the well known case of the Spartan Partheniai who founded Taras, and the less well known example of the Messenian refugees who having violated Spartan maidens, fled punishment to establish Rhegion (Str. 6.1.6). Whether the citizens of colonies attributed such unsavoury origins always accepted them is open to question, but we should not dismiss the possibility that they did. Erichthonius was a positive figure in Athenian mythology – in spite of his being an imperfect figure, a teras baby with snaky lower limbs. It is probably telling in this regard that according to Herodotus, it is the Cyrenaens themselves who tell the tale of the imperfect Battos going to Delphi about his (defective) speech and told to found a city in Libya (Herodotus 4.154-56). The Theran version is more about the drought in Thera than Battos’ own motives (Hdt. 4.150-51).

Osborne wrote of ‘some common expectation of a better life elsewhere, some common threat to be escaped, or common goal to be acquired’. The imperfection of the oikists we have come across – the hunchback who goes to Delphi about his deformity and is told to found a city (Diod. 7.17), and the man with a lisp who receives much the same response – may well have something to do with this promise of a new and better life. Odgen points out that settlers like Battus and Myskellus may have gone to Dephi in the hope of having a deformity or disability cured, but ended up being given a apoikia. In some cases this appears like divinely ordained compensation. Ogden considers ‘divine compensation for disability with an exceptional gift’ a common motif. These are highly personalised accounts, and the personalisation implicit in the imperfect oikist makes the Archaic and Heroic oikists in effect very similar figures. Of course, they need not be entirely implausible.

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82 Ogden (1997), 31.
84 Osborne (2003), 125.
85 Ogden (1997), 62.
86 Ogden (1997), 54.
If we believe, as Snodgrass does, that early settlements would have been led by aristocrats, then perhaps the personalisation inherent in these stories is not entirely unfounded.\(^87\)

Another clear theme which seems to pervade accounts of various oikists is the manner in which their stories are in some way connected. Their paths cross and interlock. Not only was Archias at Delphi at the same time as Myskellus but when he embarked on his journey to Syracuse he did so with Cheriscrates of the Heracleidae and part of an expedition that was to help settle what became Corcyra, then called Scheria. Thus Archias accompanies yet another expedition setting out at the same time as his. Where Myscellus fits into this story is unclear – we are told that they were both at Delphi together and that Archias became his associate, suggesting that they sailed as far as Kroton together. However, to return to Scheria, Cheriscrates drove out the native inhabitants and colonised it with new settlers. Archias on the other hand proceeded to land at a place called Zephyrium (Locri). There he found some Dorians who had parted from the founders of Megara Hyblaia, and were on their way back home from Sicily. Making common cause with them, Archias took these men with him to found Syracuse (Strabo. 6.2.4), where he first drove out the native Sicels from the island, by which Thucydidès must mean Ortygia (Thuc. 6.3). The link with Megara Hyblaia provides a connection, albeit indirect, to yet another oikist, Theocles the Athenian. According to Strabo the founders of Megara Hyblaia itself set off to Sicily with Theocles and his band of Euboean Chalcidians. On arrival the Euboeans founded Naxos and the Dorians, mostly from Megara, founded Megara Hyblaia (Str. 6.2.2).

These are only a few examples. The early days of Greek settlements overseas, and their oikists, were clearly connected via the web of the ancient traditions, or foundation stories. This intertwining of origins can suggest two things. It may be a reflection of real cooperation, association, and path crossing between different oikists and groups of settlers in the small world of eighth-century Archaic Greece. Alternatively, the oikists may have formed a necessary part of a narrative structure lending simplicity and coherence to the origins of Greek presence in the West. In other words, to make sense of it all, that is the complicated and rather distant nature of their origins, Western Greeks created a series of interlocking stories centred on various oikists. One might be tempted to say that these early Archaic oikists were similar to the Heroic founders who roamed the West in still more

\(^{87}\) Snodgrass recognised that the first settlements are likely to have been led by aristocrats, only he sees them in later (possibly anachronistic) guises such as lawgivers. A. M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece : The Age of Experiment* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1980), 121-22. Others see the world of early Archaic Greece as dominated by small aristocracies who would be partial to the opportunities of the new world: R. Lane-Fox, *The Classical World: An Epic History of Greece and Rome* (Penguin, 2006), 32.
ancient times, but they may have performed quite different functions. Heroic founders added precedent and prestige to various sites which would later become sites of Greek settlement, such as in the case with Metapontion and its initial foundation by the Pylian companions of Nestor (Str. 6.1.15). Archaic oikists on the other hand could have served as direct and personalised points of origin for a community.

As for the thorny issue of reality, it is very much open to interpretation. As has been postulated above, earlier Archaic oikists may have been created as part of explanatory traditions. The often very similar stories, exhibiting the same sort of themes, such as Ogden’s *loimos* schema, suggest, as Ogden himself put it, that only very limited ‘factual’ assertions can be made about the rulers represented in such narratives. The crucial word here is ‘limited’. We may dismiss the substance of what is said about the oikist as invention, but this does need not mean that also entirely dismiss the reality of the individual; or that the initial settlers of Syracuse were led by a man called Archias from Corinth. That Greeks quite clearly perceived certain settlements to have certain mother cities in Greece suggests that at least one part of the colonisation narrative bears some resemblance to reality – the origins of the groups of settlers involved. The early Archaic oikist may be called into question. He may be regarded as no more than a personalisation of the group, or groups involved. It is however harder to explain away the detail our sources provide us of the places of origin of Western Greeks. Writing in the fifth century, Thucydides could refer to the ethnic differences of various Greek colonies, and as in the case of Leontinoi and Chalcis identify both *apoikia* and mother city (Thuc. 6.76).

To conclude, the truth or reality of individual Archaic oikists can in many cases be called into question, but if we meld all we are told of these various individuals, and turn them into one man, we are left with a very richly coloured picture. Because his society shunned him for his crimes, bastard birth, and physical imperfections, even the latter in a harsh age reflections of evil, our man was driven to find a new and better life. Had these not driven him away, he may have in any case some day have been forced to flee from rapacious conquerors overrunning his native land. On the other hand, this new future in a new land across the seas offered opportunities. In a new environment there would be the opportunities presented by shedding one’s previous identity, dubious past, and the disadvantages they brought. In some places he could hope for wealth beyond conception, in others healthy lands in which to rear a healthy family. In short, perhaps this invented man, an amalgamation of all

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88 Ogden (1997), 147.
the oikists we have read, oikists who are by themselves of too dubious reality to be helpful in any specific sense with reference to any specific settlement, can provide us with an echo of the kind of world it was, and the reasons why people left their homes in Greece to venture to the West.

*Reasons for settling overseas: broader themes*

The reasons for overseas settlement, other than the personal motivations of oikists, deserve closer attention, as it is important to establish what the ancient literary evidence reasonably allows in terms of the reasons for colonisation before we can determine any distortions in modern scholarship. Even in recent works some strikingly modern reasons have been given for ancient colonisation. Scholarship has in the past regarded the need for raw materials, overpopulation and the consequent land hunger, as primary reasons for colonisation. Even in recent work one encounters the most sweeping statements to this effect. Take, for example, Niemeyer’s remarks that ‘Phoenician expansion was not a movement to lessen the pressure of overpopulation, as was so often the case with Greek colonisation. And insofar as that was so, Phoenician expansion followed a non-Greek model.’

One assumption leads to another, in this case a whole article on the uniqueness of Phoenician colonisation, using Greek colonisation, or rather a set of assumptions concerning its nature, as the point of comparison. The difficulty with this needs no pointing out.

The foundation of Cyrene may be the example which gave this school of thought its grounding in ancient evidence. Told they must found a city in Libya, they fail to do so. Consequently they suffer drought, and end up sending away two penteconters’ worth of men drawn by lot under the leadership of Battos (Hdt. 4.150-53). Yet the account Herodotus gives us is anything but clear that it was a case of land hunger leading to Therans leaving to found Cyrene. Drought making existing land infertile does not point to a lack of land, and such a random happening as drought hardly needs overpopulation to make it disastrous. Thus the

89 G. R. Tsetskhladze, ‘Revisiting Ancient Greek Colonisation’, in G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek colonisation: an account of Greek colonies and other settlements overseas, Vol. 1 (Leiden; Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2006), xxvii. Oddly enough, Niemeyer’s comments were made in an article in this very same volume (see in the footnote below) edited by Tsetskhladze, in which the latter refers to overpopulation and so forth as notions influenced by modern experiences, which ‘seldom seem relevant to Archaic Greece.’


91 As we have see, the version of events promoted by Cyrene itself is different and centred upon the oikist.
assumption that land hunger was a key reason is supported more by the location of Greek settlements, with good arable land within their territories, than by the evidence actually provided by the literary sources. These should not of course be treated as gospel, but regardless of whether or not those who set out from Greece did so for want of land, it is hardly logical to think that they would not in any case have sought a site that was agriculturally rich. Food is, after all, an essential resource for any settlement, and the mere presence of land capable of providing it proves nothing in terms of the reasons for settling overseas. Rather it is perhaps one of the requirements of a site. This is not to entirely dismiss the notion of land as a factor. Some fifth century Athenian colonies, or cleruchies, appear to have been founded to aid the grain supply to Athens.⁹² These, however, are more well documented examples, and do not necessarily stem from land ‘hunger’ per se. Desiring more land is not necessarily the same needing it. Moreover, it is questionable whether land hunger could have been a reason in the eighth century since there is no clear evidence for overpopulation in those areas of mainland Greece most commonly associated with colonising activity.⁹³ Such archaeological evidence was, of course, not available to nineteenth century scholars.

We can look into further possibilities. Perhaps the definition of land needs revision. Perhaps it was not land in itself that was in short supply, but rather land close enough to be part of a settlement’s territory and thus eligible to be defended by the community as a whole.⁹⁴ If arguments for land shortage leading to overseas settlement are largely based on modern assumptions, does the same apply for trade? Certainly the search for raw materials cannot be discounted as a reason for overseas settlement in the early Archaic period. Phoenician settlements in Spain and Sardinia, and the Greek settlement at Phithekoussai, have been convincingly linked to the trade in metals.⁹⁵ The literary sources are, on the whole, not very vocal on the matter of trade as a reason for overseas settlement. Perhaps there is a good reason for our sources’ silence on the matter of people settling abroad as an extension of their trading activities – it simply isn’t very glorious. In fact, it seems a positively disreputable thing to engage in. When a young Phaeacian sought to taunt Odysseus into taking part in an athletics competition, his tactic was to suggest our (dubious) hero had no talent for sports:

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⁹³ Tsetskhladze (2006), xxviii.
⁹⁴ See Raaflaub (1997) for a discussion of the forming of communities based around the mutual need to defend land.
⁹⁵ Osborne (2003), 113-118.
More likely, I think, you are one who plies here and there in some big ship, a master of trading sailors; anxious over the cargo out, watchful over the cargo home and his greedy gains; nothing about you speaks the athlete (*Odyssey* 8.155-65).

This is enough of an affront to anger Odysseus into taking part. By excelling with the discus he demonstrates his prowess, and by extension how unlike a trader he really is. This seemingly intense contempt for the trader makes it quite unsurprising that there is no mention of any settlement coming into existence through trading initiatives or the initial settlement being encouraged and organised by a trader: far better to have as one’s *oikist* a murderer than a trader. This passage should also serve as a sufficient counter to Finley’s idea that the Homeric epics could not reflect the eighth century because there were no Greek traders.\footnote{Finley (1979), 48.}

The above passage clearly demonstrates an awareness of traders and trading as an activity. It may also show that a Greek *could* be a trader, and even if the only traders we encounter are Phoenician (see *Odyssey* 14.260-305), should we expect epic poetry about Greeks of a distant golden age to show them as traders, of all things? This may be a good example of Homer suppressing an element of present reality (Greeks trading) in an attempt to set his story in an idealised past. Trade and traders are not the only things Homer may have suppressed. As part of an argument for an embryonic *Polis* in the (eighth-century) *Iliad*, Raaflaub claims the poet downplayed the role of commoners in order to pander to aristocratic ideology.\footnote{Raaflaub (1997), 50.}

With reference to the Archaic foundation traditions resembling those two found in the *Iliad*, and mentioned above, perhaps a similar logic applies. Are we really to believe that some quarrel, illegitimacy, or some other similarly personalised cause was behind the foundation of all these settlements attributed such a beginning? Maybe murderers, bastards, and the deformed fitted in with the wider scheme of Greek mythology with its host of very imperfect heroes. These are certainly very common: Apollonius of Rhodes, writing in the third century BC,\footnote{He was in fact probably more Alexandrian than Rhodian. See Sharrock and Ash (2002), 154. Apollonius must have had access to earlier sources for this myth, Euripides’ Medea, perhaps.} has Heracles admonish the Argonauts for considering staying with the women of Lemnos, asking whether they had been exiled for murdering their relatives.
Jason himself ‘enters deeply worrying moral territory’ in his part in murdering Medea’s brother. A rather late source fully aware of and influenced by the Homeric epics, if not also later motifs relating to the reasons for voyages and settlement overseas, these aspects may be more a reflection of these influences than Archaic events. Therefore, if we accept that these are unlikely stories, could it follow that the illegitimate Spartiates, led by Phalanthos, were no more than an invented tradition, invented to mask a shameful aspect of the Spartan past before the days when it became such an example for fascist ideologues – could it be that Taras was initially a small settlement, or community of Spartan traders which grew only gradually into a large and powerful city? Its location, as the ‘only fine port on Italy’s southeast coast’, might support the idea that it was initially a trading settlement. This might explain Taras’ much emphasised (and perhaps compensatory) militarism, reflected in its foundation oracle which depicted the men of Taras as divinely willed to kill and conquer the natives (Str. 6.3.2) – a militarism more palatable to the later, more severe, Sparta?

It is possible that when Strabo describes how even as early as the Trojan War Greeks deprived the indigenous peoples of Italy of so much territory that the area became known as Megalē Hellas (Str. 6.1.2), he was not simply reflecting a Greek tendency to see their past as a series of violent episodes and migrations. Rather, in the conspicuous absence of other less glorious reasons for the diffusion of Greeks and Greekness, such as trade, he was also, or instead, depicting the past as his earlier Greek sources desired it to be. To put it crudely; murder and brutal conquest was more honourable than trade; a tale of war more attractive to an audience than that of a trading venture. Failing that, perhaps the way in which trade may have been partly responsible for the reaching out of Greeks to the wider world was far too prosaic a process, even if recognised, to be given any mention by ancient writers.

Therefore trade may have been an important factor, but our sources are unfortunately largely silent on the matter, and as far as the literary sources are concerned we are obliged to

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100 For the influence of Homeric epic on Apollonius see Sharrock and Ash (2002), 155.
101 G. Brauer, Taras: Its History and Coinage (1986), 5. Brauer in fact states that the site of the initial settlement, at Satyrion, being on a rocky promontory, seems not to have had trade in mind. The modern Saturo bears no resemblance to this description – and seems an ideal shallow bay.
102 Tarentine militarism and brutality is echoed in Athenaeus’s account of an outrage committed against native Iapygians (Deipnosophistae 12. 552). Eckstein speaks of the ‘brutal triumphalism’ of Tarentine dedications at Delphi which commemorated their victories in ‘unrelenting’ wars against indigenous peoples. A. M. Eckstein, Mediterranean anarchy, interstate war, and the rise of Rome (Berkeley, CA : University of California Press, 2006), 148.
read between the lines. But what reasons do the literary sources themselves give for Greek involvement overseas, and its culmination in settlement? The reasons behind several Archaic settlements are hard to define beyond the personal reasons of their oikists, but there are exceptions. As Graham pointed out, if the Archaic oikist ever set out to establish settlements which would further his home city’s ‘imperial or commercial policies’, our sources, however, are silent on the matter.\textsuperscript{103} At no point do the stories surrounding Myscellus and Archias suggest that there would be close and friendly relations between their new settlements and old homes, let alone that the former served to augment the power of the latter. Having said this, Thucydides has the Corinthians say, with reference to the Archaic foundation of Corcyra, that they did not found colonies to be insulted by them, but to retain their leadership and be treated with proper respect (note that there is no mention of a ‘statist’ dimension to the colonisation of Syracuse in book six). The Corinthians claimed that their other colonies were pleased with them, whereas Corcyra had been acting improperly towards her mother city (Thuc. 1.38). As we have already seen, the literary tradition, as found in Strabo (6.2.4), depicts Corcyra as contemporary with Syracuse,\textsuperscript{104} with Cheriscrates of the Heracleidae setting out from Corinth at the same time, and indeed with, Archias.

How can we explain this apparently imperial purpose of such an early apoikia (founded around 733)? Thucydides presents the Athenians as colonisers of Ionia (Thuc. 1.12), a myth allowing Athens to make much of her supposed position as mother city of the Ionians, thus legitimising her rule over a mainly Ionian empire.\textsuperscript{105} This is not to say that ties between Corinth and Corcyra were purely or even largely invented, for Corinthian and Corcyraean arbitration saved Syracuse when the latter was under pressure from Gelon (Hdt. 7.154), indicating that all three cities felt such ties were important. What I would say is that Corinth sought to present the relationship differently, to lend it a character of political subordination that it did not originally have.\textsuperscript{106}

This fifth century tradition, leads us to other, often later settlements, of which we have some further information, and in these cases it is possible to identify several different sets of reasons for Greeks establishing new settlements overseas. First, and perhaps most peculiar, is that some settlements are presented as having been founded on the invitation of an already existing settlement in the West. Metapontion was founded on the invitation of Sybaris, the

\textsuperscript{103} A.J. Graham, \textit{Colonie and Mother City in Ancient Greece} (Manchester University Press, 1999), 30.
\textsuperscript{104} Although Graham regards this synchronisation, which also includes Croton, as suspect. Graham (1999), 219.
\textsuperscript{105} Wilson, 31-32.
\textsuperscript{106} Herodotus indicates a lasting enmity between Syracuse and Corcyra in 3.49.
latter fearing that Taras might seize the land (Str.6.1.15). Zancle sent for Chalcidians to settle Rhegion, (Str. 6.1.6), and then again invited Samians fleeing from the Persians to settle Kale-Acte (Hdt. 6.22-24) – with unforeseen consequences, as we shall see.

The Messeans and Samians, who were fleeing their homes in the face of another people, bring us swiftly to the second reason given for new settlements: forced expulsion leading a people to flee and find a new home. This is a reason which persists from the Archaic through to the Classical period. Ionians came to Siris escaping Lydian domination (Str. 6.1.14), and Phocaeans fleeing Cyrus founded Elea (Str.6.1.1). Messenian refugees, as we have already seen, took part in the foundation of Rhegion (Str. 6.1.6), and Zancle looks to have been refounded by Messenians from the Peloponnese (Str. 6.2.3), where one assumes conditions were not favourable due to the Spartans. The Messenians resurface when refugees from the Messenian revolt are given Naupactos by the Athenians. The latter having taken it from the Ozolian Locrians (Pausanias, 4.24.7; Thuc.1.103). To return to Zancle and the fleeing Samians, having been invited to settle Kale-Acte, the Samians, at the suggestion of Anaxilas of Rhegion, decided to take Zancle instead, in a sordid tale of betrayal (Hdt. 6.22-24). According to Pausanias, however, due to their own experiences the Messenians refused to comply with Anaxilas’ command to enslave the Zancleans (Paus. 4.23.9).107

The third reason is the will of a tyrant. Sicilian tyrants were involved in transplanting people from one place to another in accordance with their strategic or imperial designs. We have already encountered the example of Katane, its inhabitants, along with those of Naxos forced to resettle in Leontinoi (Diod. 11.49), and men loyal to Hieron settled there in their place. Theron, who ruled Himera, having killed so many of his own people, brought in new settlers. The two tyrants behaved quite similarly, expelling or killing their opponents, whether external or internal, and bringing in new people whose loyalty they may have hoped to possess (Diodorus, 11.48-49). As for the reasons for these resettlements, there is clearly the motive of gaining loyal subjects and killing, isolating, or keeping one’s enemies in one place— as at Leontinoi. In fact Leontinoi, which saw the concentration of Hieron’s enemies after their forced expulsion, looks like an instance of the forced concentration or internment of enemies in a particular place for strategic reasons – some sort of ancient concentration camp perhaps.108

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108 For the Sicilian tyrants, see S. Berger, *Revolution and society in Greek Sicily and southern Italy* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992).
A fourth reason for colonisation is similar to the third – that it was part of an imperial plan. This is well illustrated by the nature of the oikist. In fifth century Athenian colonies such as Brea, Thurii, and Amphipolis, as in those of tyrants, the role of the oikist was ‘clearly dictated by the policy of the metropolis’. At these three sites, the oikists Democleides, Lampon and Hagnon seem to be no more than state officials on a temporary assignment, with limitations to their authority, and whose task it was to oversee the establishment of these manifestations of Athenian imperial policy.\textsuperscript{109} Nothing demonstrates this temporary nature better than the example of Hagnon, Brasidas and Amphipolis. Having come under Spartan control, the people of Amphipolis posthumously made the Spartan general Brasidas their oikist, sacrificing to him ‘as to a hero’, and demolishing the buildings of Hagnon and everything that would remind them he had once been their founder. Eager for the Spartan alliance, and at war with Athens, they were unable to honour Hagnon as before (Thuc. 5.11). By the Classical period, the title of oikist was something that could be conferred upon an individual regardless of whether or not he was in fact the founder.\textsuperscript{110} Graham stated that the role of the oikist diminished as new foundations increasingly became imperialistic tools of the founder state. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it changed. The ‘all responsible, even monarchical’ nature of the oikist in earlier foundations may be later invention in itself, or alternatively a side effect of the high degree of personalisation we have seen to accompany early Archaic foundations.\textsuperscript{111} Seen in this way, it is possible that main change lay in the status of the oikist. While not necessarily monarchical in the eighth century, it would be sensible to assume him to be at the head of the new aristocracy of an independent settlement. As the leader of an expedition sent out by a Greek state for imperial purposes, the fifth century oikist would have been at the head of a settlement answerable to the mother city.

Therefore our literary sources show four main reasons for the founding of settlements in the later Archaic and Classical periods. The first is settlement by invitation. Such invitations were often accepted by those fleeing conquest. The second reason is precisely that – people moving in large numbers having been forced to flee by an enemy, sometimes inflicting on others what they themselves suffered. The third and fourth reasons are ostensibly born less out of desperation as out of imperial calculation. The latter should be the

\textsuperscript{109} Graham (1999), 34-38.
\textsuperscript{110} Although, as we have seen, the conferring of the title of founder to an individual who was not, in fact, the founder is attested to by Thucydides in relation to the eighth century foundation of Catane (Thuc. 6.3.1).
\textsuperscript{111} Graham (1999), 39.
only sort of act of settlement afforded the term colonisation. This, of course, assumes that we wish to continue with an understanding of modern colonisation which is common in recent studies of Greek settlement overseas, but, as we shall see, would have been less familiar to eighteenth, nineteenth or twentieth century Britons.
The Ancient Literary Evidence and the Interpretative Themes

*State or Individual, Event or Process?*

Perhaps the most striking thing about the literary evidence is that their portrayal of the events leading up to the foundation of a settlement overseas focuses overwhelmingly on individuals. Our eighth-century sources (assuming that Homer can be used as such), Homer and Hesiod, both posit individual reasons for settling overseas. Hesiod’s father, as we have seen, was an unsuccessful sea-trader who had emigrated from Cyme in Asia Minor to become a farmer at Ascra, in Boeotia (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 630-641). Homer’s Tlepolemos (*Iliad* 2.650-675), and Meges (*Iliad* 2.625-30) both lead their followers to settle overseas because of a family quarrel of some description. In the case of an entire community being forced to migrate, it is Nausithous who makes the Phaeacians uproot and find a better home (*Odyssey* 6.2-10). In the case of Homer this tendency to depict individuals as the primary decision makers in terms of settling overseas could, of course, be ascribed to a natural tendency to personalise in epic poetry, but it is not inconsistent with the aristocratic focus of the epics taken as a whole.

Although the nature of the tales does differ, there is a degree of correlation between the tales transmitted by Homer and the foundation traditions surrounding Archaic founders provided by our fifth century sources (sometimes via later authorities) in that they all emphasise the role of the individual. Thucydides emphasises individual founders in his account of the settlement of Sicily in book six: on the motivations of mother cities he is silent. This must be set alongside his willingness to ascribe to communities as a whole the decision to undertake a secondary foundation, and the decision to provide such secondary foundations with a founder from the city’s own place of origin. By Thucydides’ day, this was thought to be ‘in accordance with the old custom’ (Thuc. 1.24.2), part of the respect his fifth century contemporaries thought a *apoikia* owed its city of origin. He clearly presents Corcyra – an early settlement according to Strabo founded at the same time as Syracuse (Str. 6.2.4) – as an *apoikia* of Corinth, bound by custom to treat the latter with respect. Syracuse, no doubt, was thought to be under similar obligations, yet the silence over the role played by Corinth in its foundation is striking. Is it possible that in his account of the earliest founders, and using an authority such as Antiochus of Syracuse who himself may well have been aware

112 In the Greek: ‘κατὰ δὴ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων ἕκ τῆς μητροπόλεως κατακληθεῖς’, or ‘called down from the metropolis following the old custom’ (Thuc. 1.24.2).
of much earlier traditions, Thucydides provides us with a refracted glimpse of Archaic reality?

Our much later sources, Strabo and Diodorus – heavily reliant on earlier, fifth and fourth century works such as those of Antiochos, Ephoros, and Timaeus – also emphasise the individual in their accounts of settlements overseas. Founders of the Homeric era such as Philoctetes (Str. 6.1.3), as well as those of the Archaic period such as Archias and Myscellus (Diod. 7.17, 8.10), are all depicted as the determining factor in the establishment of a settlement overseas. In other words, the motivations are theirs (albeit in consultation with an oracle), not those of a ‘mother city’. As has been discussed, there may well be an element of personalisation in such accounts – it is simply easier to explain what may have been a prosaic process in terms of an individual and his motivations. On the other hand, and as has also been mentioned previously, if indeed earlier settlements overseas would in any case have been led by aristocrats or men of sufficient authority and means, then these stories may not be as implausible as they may at first seem.113

The most ‘statist’ of our accounts is that of Herodotus and the Theran foundation of Cyrene, but even here the Cyrenaean version of the foundation tradition relates a tale very much focused on the individual; the imperfect founder Battos went to Delphi about a speech impediment and was told to settle in Libya (Hdt. 4.154-56). It is the Theran version which provides us with impersonal, communal reasons for sending out a group to settle overseas (Hdt. 4.150-153), and it is this version, supported by reference to a later Theran inscription, which has come to dominate thinking about Greek settlement overseas whereas the other, more individualistic tales are liable to be dismissed as myth. It is perhaps worth noting that the traditional dating of Cyrene (c.630) corresponds more readily to the period of secondary foundations in Sicily, starting with Selinous (c.628).

In conclusion, the literary evidence, be it apparently contemporary (e.g. Homer), fifth century (e.g. Thucydides), or still later but using earlier sources (e.g. Strabo), paints a portrait of earlier settlement overseas which centres on individual motivations. It is only in relation to later, seventh century settlements that sources such as Thucydides and Herodotus suggest that settlements were founded for communal, or statist, reasons. As such, one would expect earlier scholarship perhaps more credulous of literary evidence to see eighth-century settlements as the result of private enterprise, but secondary foundations in Sicily, settlements

113 See again, Snodgrass (1980), 121-22; and Lane-Fox (2006), 32.
from the later seventh century onwards, and on certain readings of Thucydides’ Corinthian foundations specifically, as the products of state decisions.

Colonial Dependence

There is nothing in Homer to suggest any form of dependence to their original communities on the part of settlers. Indeed their motivations are such – either expulsion (meaning there was no ‘mother-city’) or private quarrel – that any relations, let alone ones based on dependence, were unlikely. The idea that a apoikia would revere its community of origin is probably based to a large extent on understandings of Thucydides and Herodotus. That Megara Hyblaia sent to Megara in order to provide Selinous with a founder (and indeed Corcyra to Corinth for Epidamnus, Thuc. 6.4.1-3, 1.24.2) has been seen as evidence for close relations between overseas settlement and community of origin from the beginning.114 The quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra in the fifth century, and the competing claims of rightful reverence denied to the mother city (Thuc. 1.25), or illegitimate interference in the affairs of the apoikia (Thuc. 1.34) have also served to create a very definite idea of what relations between overseas settlement and originating community were or should have been like not only in the fifth century, but also earlier.

Herodotus’ account of the relationship between Thera and Cyrene differ from both Theran and Cyrenaean perspectives – the former stressing the communal nature of the decision to send settlers to Cyrene, the latter the importance of the founder. As Osborne has said, these differing accounts reflect the respective agendas of Therans and Cyrenaenans some 150 years after the foundation: the Therans were keen to stress that they had no choice but to send out a apoikia and that they had done everything necessary for its success, whereas the Cyrenaenans had been successful, and hence wished to ‘assert their independence, not their dependence’, and the ruling Battiad dynasty of Cyrene had an agenda in stressing the personal role of Battos.115 Thus the varying emphasis on the communal and individual, state and private, ties into later agendas concerning the degree to which the apoikia should be considered bound to its metropolis. In the event, Cyrene accepted a Theran version of events: in the fourth century the latter approached Cyrene asking for land and citizenship in accordance with an agreement sworn at the time the initial settlers set out for Cyrene.116 Of

114 See for instance Graham (1999), 211.
115 Osborne (2003), 12.
course, more recent interpretations may stress how the ‘invention of tradition’ is visible in such accounts and on both sides: there may be advantage to both *apoikia* and *metropolis* in having such a relationship recognised and celebrated – regardless of whether the initial settlement overseas was conducted by an aristocrat and his followers for their own reasons, but that the memory of their origins was something later formalised for the purposes of later generations. For scholars writing in an age more credulous of literary evidence, however, it is quite easy to see how the customary ties of respectful reverence revealed in the failure of Corinth and Corcyra to uphold them could be retrojected onto an earlier period in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

*Colonist and Native*

The literary evidence includes much mention of hostile relations between Greek settlers and indigenous peoples, mainly expressed in terms of the latter being driven from their lands by the Greeks. This is not the entire picture, as there are examples of cooperation, perhaps most notably in the case of Megara Hyblaia as related by Thucydides. Nonetheless it does seem that conflict is depicted as more common in his account: Archias drives out the Sicels from Ortygia (Thuc. 6.3.1-3), Theocles and his Chalcidians drive out the Sicels in battle, settling Leontinoi (Thuc. 6.3.1-3). Strabo provides similar examples – Cheriscrates settled Scheria, or Corcyra, having first thrown out (ἐκβαλόντα, ἐκβάλλω) the native Liburnians (Str. 6.2.4); Phalanthus the founder of Taras consulted the Delphic oracle which told him he was to be given Satyrion so he could gain ‘the rich land of Taras and to become a bane to the Iapygians’ (Str. 6.3.2).117 Although these examples might in themselves indicate some form of ‘colonial ideology’ on the part of the fifth century Greeks who wrote them down (both Thucydides and Strabo used Antiochus of Syracuse), they must be set alongside a host of other instances in which Greeks displace one another.

Add to this examples of indigenous peoples driving one another out of their lands – the Samnites, having thrown out the Chones and Oenotri, even send out their own *apoikia* (ἀποικισάντων, ἀποικίζω) – and what we have is very clearly a vision of Mediterranean life in which violent conflict, displacement, migration, and still more conflict and displacement is seen as a commonplace encompassing Greeks and barbarians alike. Fifth and fourth century Greek authors, and of course much later authorities using earlier accounts, saw their past in

117 Strabo mentions that this is the version provided by Antiochus, and then proceeds to provide that of Ephorus. Hence his account is very much based on fifth and fourth century material (Str. 6.3.2, 3).
much the same way as Homer did his – as a series of violent displacements and migrations. Indeed, considering that they would have been familiar with the displacement of Greeks by barbarians in places such as Ionia, it would be very odd had our Greek authors not seen Greeks as displacing indigenous peoples in Sicily and Italy. Thus if earlier scholars depict Greeks as conquering native peoples, this is not necessarily a ‘colonial’ imposition on their part – and nor is it necessarily a sign of any interplay between modern colonial ideology and a corresponding fifth century and later Greek ‘colonial’ mentality. The perceived harsh realities of the Mediterranean world encompassed Greeks and indigenous peoples alike – indeed, the literary evidence shows that the Greeks often were the ‘indigenous peoples’, displaced both by other Greeks and more powerful barbarian neighbours; this was one of the most frequently cited causes of settlement overseas from Homer to Herodotus.

Conclusions

The overall impression to be derived from a consideration of the literary evidence is as follows. Taken as a synthesis, the accounts of ancient authors appear to emphasise the role of individuals in the establishment of settlements overseas. This could be a reflection of tendency to personalise events on the part of our sources or a glimpse Archaic reality, as early ventures overseas would most likely have been initiated and led by individuals of high status. The relations between an overseas settlement and its community of origin are something earlier sources (e.g. Homer) are silent upon, but which later sources depict as in theory based on amity, reverence, and respect. Relations between Greek settlers and indigenous peoples are by and large shown as characterised by conflict, the latter often forced from their lands by Greeks. This, however, is no different to the relations between Greeks, and fits into a broader vision of a harsh and anarchic Mediterranean world evident with most of our sources, be they Homeric, fifth century, or later still. This literary evidence constituted most of what was available to and used by British scholars until Dunbabin’s pioneering use of archaeology in the 1930s and 1940s. Now that it has been established what it tells us about Greek settlement overseas, and that we have some parameters for assessing the extent to which earlier scholars were faithful to the evidence, or alternatively imposed contemporary colonial ideas, it is now time to turn to the main focus of this thesis.
Section II: The British View 1780-1990

Introduction

How did differing political viewpoints and differing historical contexts influence the way British scholars wrote about Greek colonisation? Recent scholarship has highlighted several important ways in which earlier scholarship is seen to have imposed contemporary ideas upon the ancient past. Among the most important distortions brought to our attention are a tendency to see colonisation as a state driven process, a sense of colonial inferiority to the homeland, and the view that indigenous peoples were inferior to the colonising Greeks. These three strands together form the single idea that Greek colonisation was rather like British colonisation. The intention is to assess the extent to which these claims can be held representative for British scholarship from the late eighteenth century through to those reappraisals of the late twentieth century responsible for the resurgence of interest in the study of Greek settlement overseas.

It will not be disputed here that earlier work was dependent on literary evidence, with the attendant prejudices that brought. As De Angelis said, scholars such as Mitford and Grote quite naturally based their histories on the literary evidence because that is what was available. In fact, prior to the advent of large scale archaeological and epigraphic material nearer the end of the nineteenth century it was quite feasible for a serious scholar to write a history of an entire period and master the relevant source material. The availability of such evidence, of course, is not evidence for its use. The practice of studying ancient history through the ancient texts died hard, and the intrusion of material evidence into the field of classical studies caused unease amongst more traditional scholarship: it took the classical ‘out of a world of eternal value and located it firmly in time’, bypassing ‘the aesthetic and moral communion with the permanent messages of the ancients’ – as Arthur Evans quipped,

1 De Angelis, (1998), 539, identifies the problem, while Osborne (1998), 264-65, promotes the alternative view of individual enterprise.
2 De Angelis (2003), 204-05. His focus is on T.J. Dunbabin, who is also said to have ‘smoothed over’ the differences that existed within the British Empire, De Angelis (2003), 205. See also Shepherd (2005), 29-43.
3 Owen (2005), 6, 18; Hodos (2006), 1, 11-12;
4 De Angelis (2009), 54.
‘Inscriptions, Explorations, Archaeology are incompatible with true Philology’.\(^6\) This is not to say that there was not a dissenting, archaeological, side to this story as some of the first established classical archaeologists saw the discipline as highly specialised and more than a handmaid to ancient texts. They sought to instead examine ancient evidence in its own right with text no more than supporting material.\(^7\) Such debates raise questions about the saliency of recent criticisms of archaeological methodology, yet that is a subject outside the scope of the present chapter and study as a whole. Also omitted from this particular chapter will be discussion of terminology: the common practice seems to have simply called Greek settlements colonies; more pertinent is what characteristics various authors attribute to these ‘colonies’.

There is no perfect way of structuring a discussion of this nature. Certain scholars will always cross the arbitrary chronological divisions we create, and in a work such as this – essentially a history of ideas – changes and continuities will exist side by side, sometimes defying attempts to locate a particular way of thinking in a particular chronological context. Nonetheless the approach will be to provide an assessment of British scholarship and its interpretations of Greek colonisation between 1780 and 1990 by dividing it into three periods corresponding to different phases in British imperial history. The first will be the period between 1780 and 1870, which encompasses the loss of the American colonies and the emergence of an Empire founded on the twin pillars of white settlement colonies and a despotic Empire of rule in India. The second will be the period between 1870 and 1914, the age of High Empire, and encompassing the New Imperialism of the 1870s and the intensification of colonial rivalries which contributed to the Great War. Finally the third period will take us from this defining event, through the interwar period, the Second World War, and up to the long process of decolonisation which lasted well into the second half of the twentieth century. This admittedly arbitrary division is based on broad changes in international politics and imperialism, but great care will be taken to place British scholarship into several different yet interrelated contexts. These will include, of course, changing conceptions of empire and colonisation, but also other contexts without which our understanding of these would be limited: ideas about domestic politics, of race, and of other, non-European peoples.


\(^7\) Stray (1998), 151. The scholar in question was Percy Gardner, first holder of a new chair in classical archaeology at Oxford in 1887. According to Stray Oxford differed to Cambridge in that it saw a more specialised role, and thus a role more separate from ancient history, for classical archaeology.
The contextual discussions will precede those of approaches to Greek colonisation itself. This context is critical in order to understand why the scholars in question wrote about Greek colonisation in the way they did. More recent interpretations of earlier scholarship, although often correct in arguing that contemporary ideas caused late nineteenth and earlier twentieth century scholars to create a distorting picture of Greek settlement overseas, do not always correctly identify the specific ideas which were in fact at play. For example, there is a tendency to evoke the influence of an ‘imperial’ or ‘colonialist’ mindset when in fact the scholars in question were motivated and influenced by other concerns and ideas entirely, or alternatively understood these terms to mean something very different to our current understandings. Thus the underlying agendas at work, and concepts at play, can be quite subtle and require an appropriate understanding of the context in which the scholarly writing took place before they can be correctly identified. Moreover, this enables us to gain a more accurate insight into the precise role played by the study and different understandings of antiquity in contributing to contemporary political debate in addition to the wider intellectual climate. In other words, if we simply refer to earlier scholarship as having an ‘imperial’ mindset, and leave it at that, we risk limiting ourselves to an incomplete and oversimplified understanding of the critical importance of antiquity in forming the British historical imagination. In other words, the precise way in which looking to antiquity informed British conceptions about the present and the future.

Yet it is not simply a matter of missing out on the importance of readings of antiquity to modern political, imperial, and colonial debates, but also of the importance of these contemporary debates in defining those very readings. It was a reciprocal process, as Vlassopoulos writes:

For the educated elite of the eighteenth century, ancient history provided a cognitive model within which they could make sense of contemporary events and personalities and even predict the course of future developments... But this was not a one-sided process. Classical scholarship did not merely provide models and symbols for the construction of imperial discourses; it was also reciprocally shaped by the development of imperial strategies and debates... \(^8\)

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What was true in the eighteenth century continued to be the case throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth, before scholarly work became less openly interactive with contemporary political concerns, and more avowedly ‘academic’. As a result, it is critical to deal at length and in some detail with the relevant contexts so as to be able to understand not only the significance of antiquity as a discipline, way of thinking, and set of references in Western culture, but also the reasons why we have the histories of antiquity that we have, and why we have the accounts of Greek colonisation that we have – indeed why we have accounts of Greek colonisation at all, why some subjects are studied at all, and why they fall in and out of favour.

It is clearly of value to scholars currently working on ancient Greece, and Greek settlement overseas, to be able to identify those aspects of our understanding of the subject which are in fact derived from and owe their importance to the contemporary preoccupations of earlier scholarship, rather than meriting it due to prominence in the ancient evidence. This can lead to new possibilities, approaches, and perhaps more accurate understandings. On the other hand, all study of antiquity, past or present, has to deal with the limitations of the ancient evidence, material and literary – both have a tendency to over or under represent certain groups, tendencies, and so on. All scholarship of antiquity, past or present, is faced with the same imperative of advancing knowledge of the same thing by questioning earlier approaches. George Grote’s famous *A History of Greece* was born out of a desire to unseat the conservative visions of William Mitford, and in doing so did much to advance the study of Greek history. His political radicalism was deeply imprinted on his work, but *A History of Greece* was admired for its scholarship, as well as its politics – the radical edge of which was ignored.9 Earlier scholarship was much less circumspect about its political and philosophical inspirations than is the case today, yet it is unclear that it was fundamentally different in this regard. Antiquity was something one could use to prove a political point about, say, empire – but it was also something one could learn from, and in doing so, by looking for answers to contemporary questions, earlier scholarship advanced our understanding of antiquity: ‘modern discourses on empire did not merely employ the classical past for modern uses, but also initiated new scholarly questions and generated innovative research on ancient history.’10 Much as recent scholarship on Greek settlement overseas has benefited from re-evaluating the subject from the perspective of a different, post-colonial, age, and is as a result better

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10 Vlassopoulos (2010), 52.
placed to understand the complexities of the ancient past, the pressing imperatives of seeking answers for contemporary political, imperial, and colonial problems from the eighteenth century onwards inspired new and more varied interpretations of antiquity.

This following discussion, then, will attempt to understand why British scholarship from the eighteenth century through to the twentieth wrote about Greek colonisation in the way it did. It will not, however, take the precedence of the present in forming interpretations of the ancient past for granted – a subsidiary question is to what extent were earlier understandings of Greek colonisation attributable to contemporary political, imperial, colonial, and other concerns, and to what extent were they attributable to relatively uncontroversial readings of the ancient evidence. It can be unclear at first glance, whether or not a certain view owes anything to a definable contemporary concern; this is the importance of context. Without context, we cannot be sure of identifying those interpretations which are related to contemporary political, imperial, or colonial influences; we cannot be sure whether a certain interpretation can or should be understood in such terms, or whether the scholar in question would have envisaged it in such a way; we cannot, even if we identify what appears to us as an interpretation derived from an ‘imperial’, ‘colonial’, or for instance ‘liberal’ mindset, truly appreciate how that would have related to contemporary understandings of imperialism, colonisation, and liberalism which were often complex and contested. In short, without context, we will not be able to understand why a scholar wrote as he did and what exactly he meant by it.
Chapter 4: The Rise of Britain 1780-1870

A Political, Intellectual, and Colonial Context

The Significance of Ancient History and the Constitutional Obsession

If it is something of a truism to state that Classics were central to European culture by the eighteenth century, it is nonetheless one which deserves reiterating. It is a point which needs to be seen alongside another: that history, and with it historical writing, as a field for critical thinking about human affairs providing ‘validation and justification’, had become central to political thinking. These two points in conjunction meant that ancient history had a special part to play.¹ In an age of ‘unashamedly utilitarian’ Neo-classicism,² the ancient world ‘represented the fundamental historical reference points for much political debate’.³ Its ‘supposed completeness and general applicability’ meant that to study the ancient world had the very practical purpose of escaping from a timeless and almost inevitable cycle of ‘birth, growth, maturation, decline, and death’ which applied to all civilisations.⁴ This cycle was put onto canvas, using the Classical model of course, by Thomas Cole in his sequence of paintings from the 1830s, titled The Course of Empire, and most famously into writing with Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-1788).⁵

In the 1780s political debate frequently meant constitutional debate. This could be as broad as arguments for or against Republic, Constitutional and Absolute Monarchy, arguments which themselves at times had the appearance of mirroring the wars and quarrels of European states, thus giving domestic political debates a very international flavour.

⁵ Gibbon began his history with ‘the age of Trajan and the Antonines, when the Roman monarchy, having attained its full strength and maturity, began to verge towards its decline’. This is outlined in his preface, written on the sixth of February 1776. D. Womersley (ed.), E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (2004), 1. If we combine the schema of rise, maturation, decline, and fall depicted by Thomas Cole with Gibbon’s placement of Trajan and the Antonines in Roman history, Romulus and Remus would have constituted the primordial age of Rome, the mid-Republic its idealised period of rise and conquest, the high empire its phase of maturity, followed by decline and fall in the era of the Christian empire.
Although scholars such as William Mitford (1744-1827) sought to distance modern Britain from ancient Greece, thereby indicating that the Classical model was not a simple matter of validation by association, it has been suggested that Ancient Greece and its multitude of city-states of varying constitutions, sharing a ‘spirit of liberty’ and standing in opposition to a despotic East, could form a point of comparison with Europe itself. This still allows, of course, room for some states to be more praiseworthy than others, all still standing superior to the East, accurately reflecting British perceptions of contemporary Europe.

The concept of liberty was crucial to the relationship between the ancient and modern worlds, regardless of whether one’s perspective was that of an Enlightenment revolutionary or a conservative historian. Rousseau unfavourably compared modern states with ancient republics on grounds of the greater liberty found in the latter. John Gillies (1746-1836) castigated those ancient states which failed to resemble the happy British medium of constitutional monarchy as it was the latter which proffered the greatest liberty. The long and the short of it is that ancient Greece was employed by those on all sides of constitutional debates. Historians of Greece such as William Mitford and John Gillies wrote in highly charged historical contexts encompassing two great revolutionary wars – American and

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8 Indeed, in 1856 E.A. Freeman wrote that ‘what old Greece was to the rest of the contemporary world, Athens emphatically was to Greece itself’. Assuming Athens could represent England, the conclusions are obvious. E.A. Freeman, “Grote’s History of Greece”, North British Review, 25 (1856), 142. See also J.S. Mill’s statement from his second review of Grote’s history (1853): ‘whatever in Greece most merits the gratitude of posterity, Athens possessed in fullest measure. If the Hellenic nation is in history the main source and most conspicuous representative of progress, Athens may claim the same honourable position in regard to Greece itself...’ in M. Robson (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XI, Essays on Philosophy and the Classics (London: University of Toronto Press: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 315.

9 Peter Liddel, Civic Obligations and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens (Oxford University Press, 2007), 4-5. Liddel comments on how Rousseau thought the ‘liberty and equality of ancient republics was reliant on their remaining small in both size and population, and that the virtues of ancient institutions would not endure in a larger organization’; Liddel (2007), 5. These thoughts might prove even more prescient when considered explicitly in terms of the acquisition of empire; the fate of the Roman Republic came, in the modern era, to be an important example of the corrupting influence of empire on democratic institutions. See, for example Tenney Frank’s Roman Imperialism (1914), and A History of Rome (1947 edition).

French – the first of which resulted in Britain’s defeat at the hands of her American colonies, by then a republic, and her old enemy absolutist France. This was a grating political and intellectual disaster. For such scholars, the political agenda behind their historical writing was quite clear, as can be seen from Gillies’ dedication of his work to King George III (1738-1820) with the following words:

The History of Greece exposes the dangerous turbulence of Democracy, and arraigns the despotism of Tyrants. By describing the incurable evils inherent in every form of Republican policy, it enforces the inestimable benefits, resulting to Liberty itself, from the lawful dominion of hereditary Kings, and the steady operation of well-regulated Monarchy.  

Liberty was a common theme, embraced by all, the debate being more about its definition and which form of government was its foremost guarantor. Those not in agreement with one’s constitutional preferences were accused of tyranny or despotism – thus implicitly of association with what both modern European and ancient Greek freedom were defined in opposition to: the East.

John Gillies wrote of the government of ancient Asiatics in a manner both disparaging and laden with ideas with contemporary association:

The government of the Egyptians as well as of the Asiatics, is uniformly represented in scripture as an absolute monarchy. Herodotus and Diodorus mention some laws of the Egyptians which seem to circumscribe the power of their kings. But these laws, if well examined, will confirm the observations in the text. They were established, not in favour of the nation at large, but of the priests and soldiers. The throne of Egypt was supported by the altar, and defended by the sword; and what despotism can be upheld but by the same means?

This image of ‘throne and altar’ monarchies is no doubt derived from a mixture of ancient attitudes, and also more modern ones towards the contemporary Eastern powers such as the Ottoman Empire. Yet it is also possible that it could have been a jibe against the French, the country which would become the European equivalent to the East in comparisons between

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British liberty and the despotism of others. His very use of the word despotism to refer to absolutist states is telling of his political agenda as they would not have regarded themselves as such – eighteenth century French scholars such as Phillipe Macquer (1720-1770) would have seen legitimate absolute monarchy and despotism as two very different things. The appellation of ‘oriental despotism’ was something no European ruler or regime coveted. Indeed, critics of King George III, the object of Gillies’ admiration, portrayed him as ‘an oriental tyrant who just happened to rule in the west.’ Oriental despotism was therefore something of a current and commonly understood political motif to be used by different people for different reasons. Gillies’ distaste for oriental forms of government is evident, and is in fact entirely consistent with ‘Orientalist’ thinking – understood, of course, in Said’s terms as derogatory comparisons between East and West, and not as a genuine interest in Eastern civilisations.

**Empire, Colonisation, and Antiquity in the Eighteenth Century**

The eighteenth century was a time in which constitutional debates were very closely related with international debates and thus the themes of empire and colonisation. This was due in part to a new dimension to imperial and colonial issues from the later eighteenth century onwards. The defeat of French and Spanish imperialisms in the Americas in 1763 – imperialisms primarily concerned with the domination of non-European peoples – led to the predominance of the First British Empire, based on colonies comprised of European settlers. Empire, for the British, could now mean an empire of colonies peopled by European settlers and based on naval power, commerce, and political representation, reinforcing rather than inimical to liberty. This new form of Empire is said to have pushed conventional debates about empire detrimental to liberty to the background, for the time being at least. For now, and until Britain’s nascent Indian Empire became more important following the loss of the

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13 For instance, E.A. Freeman, with an added racial agenda, was to loathe the France of Napoleon III, and thought little better of the Third Republic which he referred to contemptuously as the ‘Welsh Commonwealth’ – Welsh, for Freeman, meaning Gallic, or foreign. See C.J.W Parker, ‘The Failure of Liberal Racialism: The Racial Ideas of E. A. Freeman’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), 831-33.

14 His Annales Romaines (1756) concluded with such remarks as ‘Dans une République il peut arriver, & il n’arrive que trop souvent, qu’un citoyen devienne plus puissant que les lois ; dans un Monarchie, personne ne peut jamais être aussi puissant que le Monarchque, qui est le protecteur des loix.’ Philippe Macquer, *Annales Romaines* (1756), 505.


16 Vlassopoulos (2010), 30, 40.
American colonies, empire meant governing other Europeans. This new imperative of thinking about colonial relations between settler and metropolis, made all the more pressing by the conflict between Britain and her American colonists, inevitably led contemporary Britons to look to antiquity for guidance. James Abercromby, a supporter of British government policy towards the American colonies, thought Britain’s colonies to resemble those of Rome, more than Greece. William Barron, another supporter of British authority, wrote that although early Greek colonies were little more than a means of getting rid of surplus population, there was a marked change during the Classical period, when the realities of interstate politics led to Greek powers making demands of their originally independent colonies. Critics such as John Symonds and William Meredith argued respectively that Barron confused colonies with subject allies, and that the example of Carthage and the revolt of her mercenaries and colonies warned against overzealous taxation.

The need to think about empire as a maritime rather than territorial entity shifted the focus from Rome as a quarry for imperial lessons. As Vlassopoulos has shown, Athens, and even Carthage could provide more illuminating parallels: Montagu could write in 1759 that it was Carthage which bore the ‘nearest resemblance to Britain both in the commerce, opulence, sovereignty of the sea and her method of carrying on her land wars by foreign mercenaries’, and that the position of Carthage in relation to a rapacious Rome seemed ‘greatly analogous to that of Britain with respect to France...’ Others have argued that an eighteenth century attachment to Sparta as opposed to a demagogic Athens has been exaggerated, and in spite of identifying with Sparta over domestic politics, Athenian thalassocracy appealed to conservative conceptions of British foreign policy favouring naval mastery and the Blue Water Doctrine. This resonated with the relatively newfound conception of legitimate empire, which Miles Taylor describes as an Atlantic empire of ‘ships, colonies and commerce’ in which British naval mastery went hand in hand with

17 Vlassopoulos (2010), 42-43.
20 J. Symonds, Remarks upon an essay, intituled the history of the colonisation of the free states of antiquity, applied to the present contest between Great Britain and her American colonies (1778), and W. Meredith, Historical remarks on the taxation of free states (1778), cited in Vlassopoulos (2010), 43-44, 48-50.
overseas settlement by ‘freeborn Englishmen’ and the advance of trade.\textsuperscript{23} This stood in marked contrast, of course, to Spartan (and Roman) campaigns of unsustainable territorial conquest which resembled contemporary French and Spanish imperialisms.\textsuperscript{24} If British scholars and intellectuals in this period increasingly turned to Athens for lessons in maritime empire, they did not do so uncritically; the entire point was that antiquity was to be interrogated for ways in which it could inform the present – the proficiency of ancient states was not to be assumed, their methods not to be emulated without thought. According to Liddel, whereas Temple Stanyan (author of \textit{Grecian History}, 1707/39) thought the Athenian confederacy a mark of greatness, he also thought her reduction of allies to vassal status was her ruin.\textsuperscript{25} Similarly, Montagu looked to Athens for lessons applicable to Britain precisely because he wanted the latter to avoid the fate of the former, brought down by ‘luxury, effeminacy and corruption’.\textsuperscript{26} Mitford’s views centred on the idea that Athens was a tyrannical force imposing democracy on other states, and thought Athens was a \textit{bad} example for empire simply because it failed to create a ‘commonwealth of common interests.’\textsuperscript{27} That William Young took a more positive view of Athens\textsuperscript{28} merely proves that different agendas and approaches could lead to different conclusions. The utility of antiquity in thinking the present was that it was more than a mere source of references, but rather a field for debating the present with reference to evidence drawn from a past historical reality of states exhibiting problems similar though not necessarily the same as, those which confronted modern polities. Those problems were in the eighteenth century perceived to revolve around constitutional debates, and so it was competing constitutional agendas which drove the histories written: as we shall see, John Gillies saw the Greek colonies of Magna Graecia as superior to the mainland because of their more monarchical constitutions.\textsuperscript{29}


\textsuperscript{24} Akça Ataç (2006), 648.

\textsuperscript{25} Liddel (2009), 14.


\textsuperscript{27} Liddel (2009), 16.

\textsuperscript{28} E.g. William Young, whose \textit{The Spirit of Athens} (1777) was, as the title suggests, pro-Athenian. Cited in Liddel (2009), 15.

\textsuperscript{29} Gillies (1786), Vol. 1, 470-71.
The focus on a maritime conception of empire did not mean that the problems of other types of empire, less conducive to liberty, disappeared from the eighteenth century imagination. William Young, a Whig, colonial governor, and plantation owner against the abolition of slavery, commented on the dangers empire posed to democratic states: to such states conquest could be corrupting.\textsuperscript{30} In this Young prefigured what was to be a pervasive nineteenth century concern as the maritime and colonial conception of empire receded in the face of a growing British interest in India, and a form of empire based on ruling non-European peoples. The difficulties of empire for a free state were twofold. Firstly there is the corrupting influence of ruling others despotically, especially if this involved ruling non-European peoples thus compounding the corruption by introducing the additional dangers of intermixing with un-free, servile, political inferiors. Secondly there are dangers inherent in using standing armies to hold empire overseas. This model of thought, especially the suspicion of standing armies, was present in the eighteenth century in the thought of Montesquieu and Hume,\textsuperscript{31} but it was to be rearticulated in the nineteenth as despotic territorial empire became a prevalent aspect of European involvement overseas – Britain in India, France in North Africa. The dangers inherent in using standing armies to hold empire overseas, and that there may be domestic consequences, were in fact very evocatively expressed by Richard Cobden in relation to France, but in a publication about British India: ‘In France the razzias of Algeria were repaid by her own troops, in the massacres of the Boulevards, and the savage combats in the streets of Paris.’ The point was, according to Taylor, that ‘illiberal forces associated with the acquisition of empire could actually pitch the domestic polity into despotism’.\textsuperscript{32} These concerns came to be a crucial part of British thinking about empire, and very importantly they were to crystallise a conceptual wall between on the one hand empire – as the despotic governance of non-Europeans, and on the other colonisation – as the replication of free European communities overseas.

The debates elicited by the maritime empire of ships, colonies, and commerce, and the interrelated international conflicts of the late eighteenth century, were very much centred on constitutional issues. In a way this was very Euro-centric in that it did not obviously concern

\textsuperscript{30} Young (1777), 116. Cited in Liddel (2009), 15.
\textsuperscript{31} Vlassopoulos (2010), 40-41.
the other important development of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century: that is, European involvement in the East. The political debates within and between European states, and especially Britain, were during the early nineteenth century to exert a profound influence over the nature of European involvement in the East. In turn, the East itself, and certain perceptions of it, were to shape the intellectual underpinnings of that political debate.

The Debt to the East in Antiquity

By looking at the way in which British historians explained the rise of Greece in relation to its early interactions with the East we can, assuming the newfound centrality of Greece to eighteenth century political thought, shed light on the role played by the East in the construction of the European self-image. The histories of William Mitford and John Gillies do not conform to the (in)famous argument of Black Athena, as neither hammered home the point of an irreconcilable contrast between East and Europe by a denial of Eastern influences. Rather they acknowledge them, and in doing so a Greek debt to the East comes to represent a far more persuasive affirmation of European superiority than any outright denial could ever have done.

For Mitford, Greece was the first European country to emerge from a savage state precisely because of its connections with the ‘civilised nations of the East,’ and similarly Gillies wrote of a Greek debt to the East in religion, agriculture, and arts. So transformative were Eastern influences that Greeks became superior to all around them (including, we may infer, their benefactors) ‘in arts and arms’ – yet also increasingly loath to see themselves as such passive recipients of gifts from superior civilisations to the East, claiming instead to have been taught by the gods. This could be read as indication of awareness (indeed indicating surprising self-awareness) that Europe’s rise was a recent and still ongoing process, awareness that for all its political failings, the East had long been more sophisticated and indeed the centre world political power. More certain is the implication that the Greeks, having been taught by the East, surpassed it. This is significant, but what is the explanation?

34 W. Mitford, The History of Greece (1829), 8-10.
35 He references Isocrat, Panegyr. Passim.
Greek superiority lay in political freedom, and this political freedom was derived from
the innate superiority of the Greek mind and its language: eastern tongues, Gillies wrote, ‘are
generally extremely deficient in vowels’, thus making them ‘extremely different from the
vocal harmony of the Greek’. The latter ‘abounds’ in vowels and diphthongs, and hence the
Greeks possessed ‘organs of perception more acute, elegant, and discerning. They felt such
faint variations of liquid sounds, as escaped the dullness of Asiatic ears, and invented marks
to express them...’\textsuperscript{37} Therefore the intrinsic superiority of Greece was linked to language,
itself, we may infer, behind a certain way of thinking and thus a propensity for political
freedom. Gillies knew the Phoenicians who had given the Greeks so many gifts, including
the alphabet, had been assimilated and had learned Greek because the ‘inflexible rigour of
despotism, which as in all ages prevailed in Egypt and the East, was unknown to the
conquerors of Troy.’\textsuperscript{38} But why acknowledge Eastern influences at all?

By recognising their debt to the East – a Greek and thus by extension European debt –
two things could be achieved. Firstly it contributed to a framework of progress and cultural
interaction in which civilised peoples impart to rude tribes, implicitly meaning that there is a
ranking. Secondly, it turned an argument against European superiority, i.e. that they had
been civilised by the East, into an argument for it: Greeks had received the \textit{material} elements
of civilisation from East and had progressed whereas their benefactors had not; as Oriental
despotisms, although they possessed a degree of civilisation as befits large centralised
powers, they were by definition stagnant.\textsuperscript{39} The East had developed as far as it could,
whereas the European tribes, once savage, could develop fully, and reach the apogee of
civilisation. All because they had an intrinsic aptitude, possibly linguistic in origin, for
political freedom – and political freedom was a precondition for the highest attainments in
art, architecture, literature, and science. Much of this is in loosely in keeping with Martin
Bernal’s ideas,\textsuperscript{40} yet ironically enough, in overlooking that such authors acknowledged a
material debt to the East, Bernal overlooked the way in which this material debt implied the
absence of a political one. Freedom being the defining contrast between East and West, this
innate Western political aptitude in fact formed the bedrock of the kind of Orientalism we see
with these scholars. Their Orientalism was nevertheless more than simply defining the West
in opposition to the East; instead the ancient East, placed into the context of its role in

\textsuperscript{37} Gillies (1786), Vol. 1, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{38} Gillies (1786), Vol. 1, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{39} M. Curtis, \textit{Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India}
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), 52.
initiating the rise of an ancient Greece which would in time surpass it, represented a means of explaining the still recent ascendancy of modern Europe.

Britain and the East

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be identified as the period in which European states surpassed their Eastern equivalents, economically, technologically, and militarily. As we have seen with our depictions of a stagnant Orient swiftly overtaken by an innately more progressive Greece in antiquity, the idea of such superiority was in place during the last two decades of the eighteenth century – but this in fact merely coincided with, rather than post dated, the actual surpassing of China and India in economic terms. It was not as obvious to eighteenth century Europeans, as it would be for later generations, that their states were substantially more progressive than those of the East.\(^{41}\) This was reflected in the way in which certain eighteenth century Britons could address the issue of non-European peoples.

Pitts has demonstrated how Adam Smith, in emphasising material and contingent factors in the development of human societies, avoided attributing European superiority to superior rationality and cognitive superiority – as in fact became more and more common during the nineteenth century.\(^{42}\) For instance, Smith argued that some societies progressed ‘more or less quickly as a result of many environmental and material factors beyond obvious qualities of climate’ – Greeks developed republican government because of defensible and cultivable land – and his account therefore ‘suggests that those who assume a population must be inferior if it lives “primitively” on good soil have probably misjudged other less obvious factors.’ Positive advances in European societies he explained with recourse to physical explanations and good fortune; in doing so he was able to ‘avoid the self-congratulatory note common in discussions attributing such developments to Europeans’ special understanding of the values of freedom or political equality’.\(^{43}\) These two foundation myths – profligate natives and a European aptitude for political freedom – would come to form the bedrock of nineteenth century colonisation and liberalism respectively.

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\(^{42}\) See Pitts (2005), 25-58.

\(^{43}\) Pitts (2005), 29-30.
Smith’s warnings were not heeded, as Britons derived more and more confidence from their technological and economic superiority. This was, however, superiority aided by the ‘exploitation of colonial resources’, and brought into sharper relief by a stagnation of India which was itself the direct result of British rule. Thus, as Pitts writes, when nineteenth century Britons contrasted a progressive Britain with a stagnant or indeed backward India, ‘they were observing, on both sides of the comparison, phenomena that had not existed before 1790 and that were partly the consequences of colonial rule.’

For relative economic backwardness and traditionalism to merit such censure of course presupposes that attitudes within contemporary Britain were hostile to such traits. This is why attitudes to the east need to be seen in the further context of the political changes occurring within Britain itself during the early nineteenth century: in other words, the rise of liberalism.

**Liberalism and Greek History: 1830-1870**

The histories of Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875), published in eight volumes between 1835 and 1844, and George Grote (1794-1871), published between 1847 and 1856 represented a marked break from those of Mitford and Gillies in that they had an entirely different domestic political agenda which must be seen in the context of a still contentious yet growing liberalism. The association between Greece and Britain functioned on a specific level in terms of a political comparison between Greece and reformist Britain, but this was also positioned in a broader historical sense on a developmental path which applied equally to both societies. Thirlwall’s account of the development of Ionian Greece, in particular that of Miletus in the seventh and sixth centuries BC, is a good illustration of this way of thinking:

It seems probable that the fall of the ancient aristocracies which succeeded the heroic monarchy, and the emulation between a growing commonalty, and an oligarchy which grounded its political claims solely on superior wealth, were conditions, without which the Ionian genius would not have found room to expand itself so freely.

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44 J. Pitts, (2005), 17. Pitts argues that British rule was responsible for increasing deurbanisation, deindustrialisation, and traditionalism – the very things British intellectuals would cite as evidence for Indian inferiority.

45 Thirlwall (1836), Vol. 2, 104-105.
This mirrors Thomas Babington Macaulay’s speech in support of the Reform Bill, delivered before the House of Commons in 1831 in which he ‘situated the Reform Bill crisis of Britain in the 1830s within a broader sweep of British and human history’.\footnote{T. Koditscheck, \textit{Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth Century Visions of a Greater Britain} (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 116.}

All history is full of revolutions, produced by causes similar to those which are now operating in England. A portion of the community which had been of no account expands and becomes strong. It demands a place in the system, suited not to its former weakness, but to its present power. If this is granted, all is well. If this is refused, then comes the struggle between the young energy of one class and the ancient privileges of another.... Such was the struggle between the Plebeians and the Patricians of Rome... Such finally is the struggle which the middle classes of England are waging against an aristocracy of mere locality.\footnote{Cited in Koditscheck (2011), 116-117.}

Both Thirlwall and Macaulay thought in terms of changes in material circumstances creating the necessity of redistributing of political power. The inclusion of the Roman example suggests that this was a explanation of civilisational development which could be applied to all societies past and present. The consequence of rejecting reform was revolution – unpredictable and undesirable.\footnote{Koditscheck (2011), 116-17.} Both men belong to an élite liberal intellectual milieu fearful of the demands of such working class agitation as would culminate in Chartism,\footnote{J.S. Mill referred to some aspects of growing working class association, namely certain Trade Unions, as questionable. See J.S. Mill, ‘Civilization’, \textit{London and Westminster Review}, No I (Jan-Apr 1836).} but in favour of the kind of gradual political reform enfranchising the propertied middle classes embodied by the 1832 Reform Act. For Thirlwall, the material changes and thus political changes in Archaic Greece were connected with maritime commerce, itself ‘coupled with the cultivation of the nobler arts, and the opening of new intellectual fields, in a degree to which history affords no parallel before the beginning of the latest period of European civilisation.’\footnote{Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 2, 118. Thirlwall would no doubt have seen a striking resemblance between political and economic change in contemporary Europe and Thucydides’ depiction of the similar changes in the Greek world. See Thucydides 1.13.} Thus Ionian Greece followed a very similar developmental path as modern Britain – leading in both cases to a desirable outcome in which political liberalisation

\footnote{Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 2, 118. Thirlwall would no doubt have seen a striking resemblance between political and economic change in contemporary Europe and Thucydides’ depiction of the similar changes in the Greek world. See Thucydides 1.13.}
accompanied intellectual enlightenment. British and Ionian ‘genius’ were the products of the same process.

It was George Grote, however, who would do most to transform the role and understanding of Greek history and make it speak to a new reformist Britain – even if his audience absorbed a much more diluted message than the radical one he proposed.\textsuperscript{51} Far more the radical democrat than Thirlwall, Grote’s history was a concerted assault on the hitherto dominant conservative interpretation of Greece, and especially of democratic Athens, which viewed the latter as a demagogic tyranny. The precise nature of Grote’s democratic vision has been outlined in Frank Turner’s subtle and persuasive account. While he defended Athens from ‘unjust and misconceived conservative attacks’, it is little known that Grote ‘did not in fact champion Athenian democracy’. Instead, Turner argues, ‘the democracy that he championed had no precedent, past or present’. Grote’s democracy was what Athens could have been, and what Britain ‘might still achieve’, were it to rid itself of those ‘predemocratic bonds of religion and family sympathy’ which could stir ‘primitive fanaticism’ and undermine the ‘bonds of citizenship and the civic morality of a democratic commonwealth’.\textsuperscript{52} This was not, however, the radical message his audience took from \textit{A History of Greece} either in terms of Athenian democracy or radical democracy – instead, satisfied with the ‘moderate liberalism’ of the 1832 Reform Act, they ‘admired Athens for the resemblance Grote had convinced them the ancient city bore to their own national polity’. For Turner, ‘the great history that Grote had hoped might stir his countrymen to self-criticism and reform instead provided frequent occasion for political narcissism.’ Regardless of intentions unfulfilled, Grote’s history was nonetheless profoundly influential, in Britain and abroad.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} Turner (1981), 233, 225.
\textsuperscript{53} Turner (1981), 234.
A Liberal Conception of Civilisation

The battle of Marathon, as an event in English history, is more important than the battle of Hastings – J.S. Mill  

Grote was very much part of the campaign for the Reform Bill of 1832, and was elected to Parliament after its passage. Grote was, in fact, an admirer of James Mill and a lifelong friend of his son John Stuart Mill who wrote two positive reviews of Grote’s *History of Greece* in 1846 and 1853. They came to disagree on many issues, but Mill’s writings are very instructive if we wish to understand the context in which Thirlwall and Grote wrote, and especially the connection between their political ideas, influenced by a new understanding of ancient Greece, and a broader vision concerning the nature of civilisation itself. Thirlwall’s vision of the rise of Greece as resulting from a ‘growing commonalty’ without which ‘the Ionian genius would not have found room to expand so freely’ is mirrored in Mill’s essay of 1836, titled ‘Civilisation’. For Mill, one of the chief consequences of the advance of civilisation was that power passed from individuals to masses. Power was contingent on property and ‘powers and acquirements of the mind’, and the rise of the middle classes in Britain, France, and Germany, but in Britain most of all, signalled a marked change in the diffusion of property and knowledge, and in the degree of what he termed ‘co-operation’ among individuals. By this Mill meant individuals coming together, ‘sacrificing of some portion of individual will, for a common purpose’, becoming more interdependent, and, we must assume, making decisions collectively. This was particularly significant as ‘there is not a more accurate test of the progress of civilization than the

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56 Clarke (1962), 21.


58 Clarke (1962), 68.

59 Given that Mill’s position as an important philosopher whose *On Liberty* eventually became the Liberal Democrat book of office (preceded by Milton’s *Areopagitica* – information courtesy of Graham Lippiatt, Secretary of the Liberal Democrat History Group), it is likely that his ideas were of some importance and merit consideration.


61 J.S. Mill, ‘Civilisation’ (1836), 11.
progress of the power of co-operation’.

Co-operation, of course, could be easily translated to democratic institutions, and by marrying the advance of civilisation, and even the very nature of advanced civilisation with freer, more representative, more co-operative forms of government, Mill was depicting opposition to such broadening of political power as by definition uncivilised – something which would have implications for his view of non-European peoples, and no doubt provoked the ire of contemporary conservatives. So as to prove the point, he urges the reader to ‘look even at war, the most serious business of a barbarous people; see what figure rude nations, or semi-civilized and enslaved nations, have made against civilized ones, from Marathon downwards. Why? Because discipline is more powerful than numbers, and discipline, that is, perfect co-operation, is an attribute of civilization.’ This is also illustrative of another point – Mill implies that Persians were ‘barbarians’. Gone is a subtler, multi-tier, classification of different stages of development visible in the eighteenth century with Scottish thinkers such as Smith; like his father, John Stuart Mill drew a ‘crude distinction’ between ‘civilized and savage or barbarious peoples’.

A further significance is that while Mill did not necessarily see the progress of civilisation as inevitable, nor believe that greater advancement in civilisation was an unproblematic thing, his ideas do indicate a belief that if civilisation progresses, then we have an idea as to what form it will take. To turn this idea on its head, we know that civilisation is progressing when we see increasing democratisation with first property, then knowledge, becoming more and more widely spread until the power itself is redistributed to reflect this change – as happened in 1832. Mill certainly believed that the nineteenth century was a time of dramatic change – ‘a change has taken place in the human mind’ he wrote in 1831, and he saw his contemporary world as an awakening in which men ‘conscious of their new position’ ‘insisted upon being governed in a new way’. The nineteenth century would as a result ‘be known to posterity as the era of one of the greatest revolutions of which history has preserved the remembrance, in the human mind, and in the whole constitution of

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63 J.S. Mill, ‘Civilisation’ (1836), 4-5.
64 Pitts (2005), 139, 130-31. According to Pitts, John Stuart Mill’s father, James Mill, ‘identified societies simply as barbarous of civilized and thus assimilated all “rude” peoples into a single category of moral and political inferiority.’
65 For Mill one negative side effect of the transfer of power from the individual to the masses was that the influence of the ‘more cultivated over the many’, and the very quality of knowledge, became diluted, thus illustrating the importance of better education. J.S. Mill, ‘Civilisation’ (1836), 15, 18.
66 This idea shares a root with Marx’ later notion that revolutions happen when the distribution of wealth and power is unsustainably inverse to the relationship between the broad mass of individuals and the means of production.
human society.’\textsuperscript{67} Thirlwall’s rise of Ionian Greece, in the seventh and sixth centuries BC, are expressed as resulting from the very same changes as those Mill saw as advancing civilisation in Britain in the 1830s: Mill’s ‘co-operation’, Thirlwall’s ‘growing commonality’ and Grote’s Athenian citizens fulfilling ‘civic obligations’\textsuperscript{68} are in effect different ways of saying a similar thing. Thus it seems that within this broadly liberal intellectual milieu there existed a fairly coherent view of what civilisational progress meant, how it happened, and agreement that Greek antiquity provided meaningful parallels.

**Categorisation, Euro-Centrism, and Progress:**

A certain image of the East was an important component of a new, more far-reaching, Euro-centric understanding of the world which developed in the early nineteenth. Attitudes to the East need to be seen within the context of the political changes occurring within Britain itself at this time: namely, the rise of liberalism. It would matter little that Britain was responsible for any perceived stagnation or traditionalism in Indian society – what mattered now was the way the East represented the antithesis of the sort of society these early liberals wanted to create in Britain, and as such constituted the foreign equivalent of conservative elements within Britain: in resisting the course of civilisation and progress, both belonged in the past. It is useful to place these ideas within the following context:

It was in this period [late 18\textsuperscript{th} to early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries] that Europeans first advanced the claim that their civilisation and culture were superior to all others – not theologially (that was old hat) but intellectually and materially. Whether this claim was true need not detain us. Much more important was the Europeans’ willingness to act as if it were. This was shown in their eagerness to collect and categorize the knowledge they gleaned from other parts of the world. It was revealed in the confidence with which they fitted this knowledge into a structure of thought with themselves at the centre. The intellectual annexation of non-European Eurasia preceded the imposition of a physical dominance. It was expressed in the ambition by the end of our period (earlier if we include the French invasion of Egypt) to ‘remake’ parts of Afro-Asia as the ‘New World’ had been ‘made’. And it ultimately rested on the extraordinary conviction that


\textsuperscript{68} Liddel (2007), 7-8.
Europe alone could progress through history, leaving the rest of the world in a ‘stationary state’ awaiting Europe’s Promethean touch.\textsuperscript{69}

We have already seen how Mill’s idea of advancing civilisation was connected to the rise of the British and European middle classes and the associated democratisation of Western societies. For Europeans more widely, the idea of advancing civilisation was related, informed, proven, by a similar rise in Europe’s position in the world. Indeed the rise of European nation states exhibiting diminishing aristocracies and increasingly enfranchised middle classes was a gratifying vision – despotism was on the retreat both at home and abroad as European nations roundly trounced and dictated to Oriental despots in India and North Africa.\textsuperscript{70} The above passage hits upon several very important concepts related to these changes: firstly the urge to categorise, secondly a Euro-centric structure of thought, and thirdly the idea that only Europe could progress in an otherwise stagnant world.

The author, John Darwin, refers to the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries – the very period under discussion – and it is no accident that the concepts he identifies find direct reflection in the way ancient history was written in this same period. Historical writing about Greece from the 1780s up to Thirlwall and Grote reflects a society attempting to make sense of its place in the world, and especially from Grote onwards, it is consistent with the categorisation, re-structuring of knowledge (in this case history) around Europe, and the emphasis on an intrinsic and exclusive European aptitude for progress, which are identified as characteristic of the age. Furthermore, there is a distinct tendency to interpret wider events through the prism of domestic political concerns: thinkers such as J.S. Mill sought to understand the remarkable events of his time in a wider European and world context and


\textsuperscript{70} An interesting addition to the notion advanced by David Cannadine that the aristocratic rulers of the British Empire cared more for class than race. See D. Cannadine, \textit{Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire} (London: Allen Lane, 2001). That it was the old elites over-represented in the higher reaches of the military who were predominantly \textit{doing} the trouncing of foreign despots, although perhaps not so much the \textit{deciding} who would be trounced, is an irony which may not have been apparent or important to the middle class electorate. As Bernard Porter writes: ‘most of Britain’s colonies arose from the endeavours of her industrial and capitalist middle classes, who however, were far happier exploiting them (in both the best and worst sense of the word) than actually running them. This was where the old upper and upper-middle classes came in. They actually \textit{liked} governing, and they were used to it, so they took over the running of the empire from them. They were the only ones who needed to be ‘strict’ (\textit{imperium}) imperialists, therefore [Porter argues that for the term imperialist to be meaningful, it has to involve an element of domination rather than any vague allusion to a part of the world which happens to be under British rule]. The middle classes could fool themselves – as we shall see later – into thinking they were doing something else.’ B. Porter, \textit{The Absent-Minded Imperialists : Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain} (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 47.
place them in an explanatory framework based on a historically informed concept of
civilisation. Historians such as Connop Thirlwall and George Grote sought to do the same
thing, but this time with an unavoidably greater historical emphasis as they placed the
developments of their own day in a historical framework which traced a corresponding rise of
Europe, and one state in particular, in the ancient world. The concept of civilisation which
emerges with these writers is consistent with the trend identified by John Darwin – i.e.
explaining the past, present and future events in a manner informed by the upward
developmental trajectory of Europe. However, it is crucial to understand that it is implicated
on two other levels. Not only do such histories explain the rise of Europe among lesser
civilisations on a world level, but it also explains the rise of certain European states among
lesser ones within Europe, and, most importantly, the rise of a certain political movement
contrasting to a lesser one within the foremost European state. This was a schema applicable
in both ancient and modern worlds.

Creating a structure of thought with Europe at its centre was a task well underway as
early as Gillies: the framework whereby civilisation was passed from the East and improved
by the once rude but intrinsically more capable Greek was a novel way of doing just this
while at the same time alleging that only Europe could progress. This continued with
Thirlwall, who thought Phoenician interaction with the early Greeks to have constituted ‘the
most powerful of all the external causes that promoted the progress of civilised life, and
introduced new arts and knowledge in the islands and shores of the Aegean.’ Thirlwall was
less enthusiastic about Phoenician religion: ‘their own superstition’, which he thought ‘peculiarly impure and atrocious’ and probably the cause of such vices in early Greek religion.

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71 Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 1, 87-88.
72 Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 1, 88. Thirlwall was less enthusiastic about Phoenician religion: ‘their own superstition’, which he thought ‘peculiarly impure and atrocious’ and probably the cause of such vices in early Greek religion.
depiction of societies at different stages of development, and more a ranking of seemingly innate qualities and aptitudes. Babylon, Assyria, and Egypt ‘attained a certain civilisation in mass, without the acquisition of any high mental qualities or the development of any individual genius.’ With industriousness bought at the price of ‘prostrate obedience to despotic rule’ or ‘imprisonment within the chain of a consecrated institution of caste’, the massed subjects of great kings would toil ‘unaided either by theory or by artifice, in the accomplishment of gigantic results’. These were devoid of ‘the higher sentiment of art’, something which owed ‘its first marked development to Grecian susceptibility and genius’. 73 Greek, or European genius stands in stark contrast to the stagnant, limited, civilisation of the East – classic Orientalism, and nothing particularly new. More than Orientalism, it was part of a structure of thought which, as we have seen with Mill, held civilisational advance to be contingent upon democratisation – the very cause of Greek and Athenian genius. As E.A. Freeman was later to put it in his review of Grote’s history: ‘... in truth, the pre-eminence of Athens in literature, philosophy, and art, was simply the natural result of her pre-eminence in freedom and good government.’ 74 What was new, and is indeed absent with Mill’s Civilization, was that Grote seems to have believed the distinctions between Greece and other civilisations to have had some form of racial basis.

This is evident in his views of racial mixing under Alexander: ‘such compulsory mixing of the different races promises nothing favourable to the happiness of any of them...’. 75 Furthermore, whereas Thirlwall wrote loosely about Egyptian ‘national character’, 76 Grote sought to classify along racial lines the civilisations of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Phoenicia and Carthage. 77 Though still Asiatic, ‘people of the Semitic race’ (e.g. Phoenicia) excelled other types (Assyria and Egypt) because of their ‘degree of individual impulse and energy’, ‘industrial aptitude and constancy of purpose’, and ‘strenuous ferocity of character’. 78 Civilisational attributes seem to have been seen as racial qualities, reflecting a growing trend to use race to explain behaviour and a developed hierarchy of civilisations: 79 the Semitic people were as distinguished from the Egyptians, enslaved as they were by ‘childish caprices

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73 Grote (1854), Vol. 3, 405-6.
79 As opposed to a Porter’s ‘timeline’ where all could progress. See B. Porter (2004), 78.
and antipathies, and by endless frivolities of ceremonial detail’, as from ‘the flexible, many-sided, and self-organising Greek.’

The Greeks, having learned a little from Egypt, more from Phoenicia, are destined to occupy the highest tier of Grote’s hierarchy of civilisation:

not only capable of opening both for himself and for the human race the highest walks of intellect, and the full creative agency of art, but also gentler by far in his private sympathies and dealings than his contemporaries on the Euphrates, the Jordan, or the Nile – for we are not of course to compare him with the exigencies of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In an age where Europeans increasingly sought to explain the disparities in technology and power that existed between them and other peoples across the globe, and at the same time as Charles Darwin was developing his ideas following a voyage to the far flung corners of European settlement, Grote’s attempts to classify are a reflection of a widespread trend. In his classification according to what appear to be innate capacities, Grote is entirely consistent with a tendency from James Mill onwards to rely ‘on the capacity or incapacity of individuals to explain all social difference’. Was this derived from racial theory?

**Race and Racial Anglo-Saxonism**

Was the conception of civilisation and its highest stage seen with Mill, Thirlwall, and Grote based exclusively upon a people’s position on what was essentially a timeline – rather than an immutable hierarchy – of civilisations, or did other nineteenth century ideas about race have an impact? The ‘liberalisation’ of Greek history and conceptions of civilisation is very important, yet omits some important detail. There were new ways of explaining an European, or British aptitude for freedom, an important one being race. Of course, ideas of racial hierarchy were nothing new: they clearly existed in John Gillies’ day. The 1780s and beyond were times of slavery – even if Britain at this time sought some self-congratulation

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81 Grote (1854), Vol. 3, 407. The image of the Greek as gentler, more humane than other civilisations was to become a feature of British Hellenism. See Gilbert Murray’s essay on ‘Hellenism’.
82 Pitts (2005), 132.
83 According to B. Porter, Britons saw others as being behind Britain rather than different. The clock of this timeline did not, however inevitably tick forward – Porter points out that it was common to note that civilisations could decline as well as progress. B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 78.
from its increasing opposition to it, thus reaffirming its ‘unique commitment to liberty’ after the less than creditable War of Independence. The prominent position of slavery in the United States offered some moral consolation, and while the association of anti-slavery with the French Republic, Jacobinism, and the rights of man once posed problems for more conservatively minded Britons, the reinstitution of slavery by the French Empire in 1802 meant that opposition to slavery could now sit comfortably alongside existing international political enmities. In 1807 Britain abolished the slave trade, although not slavery itself, within its Empire. The act of 1833 which went that step further was supported by reformist liberal opinion, including George Grote. What is significant is that at a time when Britain was acting against slavery, racial ideas were becoming more important, not less.

An important intellectual and cultural development in the early nineteenth century was a growing interest in the Anglo-Saxons as a race. This was most keenly felt in the reception of medieval history. Inspired by such works as those of Walter Scott, ‘medievalists were tapping contemporary interests in the history of European peoples to make Britain’s “superior” history of free institutions the inherent trait of a superior Saxon race’. These ideas were connected to the rise of phrenology, or the study of skull shapes, concerned with proving such things as the existence of a distinctly Anglo-Saxon skull, and that skull-shape determined behaviour. It could have a distinctly domestic application by indicating a person’s honesty or diligence – and as such would become a part of the all-encompassing ideologies of racial determinism and racial degeneration within European nations and cities. More importantly as far as we are concerned, what could be applied to an individual could be applied to nations. Just as ‘Britain’s free institutions followed from the splendid mentality of their Anglo-Saxon creators’, the undeveloped nature of Indians, Africans, and American Indians could be explained by their brains – ‘Their temperaments were unsuited. And these temperaments could be measured from skull shapes.’ By connecting skull shape to ‘racial temperament’ one could ‘rank’ various peoples and even predict their actions.

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84 Colley (1996), 374-79.
89 Desmond and Moore, 34-37.
1840s it had become an assumption among racial theorists that Caucasian European races were inherently more civilised. Although drawing on eighteenth century ideas about ‘beauty, art, and human difference,’ they drew different conclusions to their predecessors, conclusions rooted to a greater extent in unalterable human racial difference. The social Darwinism of the period after 1859 ‘merely intensified’ this sort of racial thinking and ‘aided the categorization of ethnic differences’ – easing more detailed classification which could apply as much to Celts, Jews, and the working classes as to ‘non-Caucasian ethnic groups’. Thus although this way of thinking may have become more and more prominent after 1870, when it would become an important facet of thinking about the future role of the colonies of settlement, its roots lay in the earlier in the century. It is nonetheless unclear how racial ideas – especially the more extreme biological explanations of phrenologists – impacted upon the thoughts of liberal scholars of Grote’s generation. J.S. Mill, for one, had no time for claims of biological differences and inequalities – his ‘commitment to an ameliorative colonial rule’ in British India was ‘premised on assumptions of human equality and biological uniformity’ – assumptions which were beginning to be challenged by the 1860s.

A Mid-Century Transformation

According to Taylor there occurred a ‘hardening of racial attitudes in the mid-Victorian period’, and henceforth ‘radical and liberal opinion drew a much sharper distinction between a white liberal empire composed of self-governing settlement colonies and a non-European territorial empire, precariously dependent on the rule of imperial authority’. During early nineteenth century leading ‘liberal’ intellectuals could be among the most forthright supporters of British imperial rule in India – on the understanding that it could be a vehicle for modernising the country and save it from its stagnation and backwardness by imposing what were seen as universal values. Such intellectuals included James Mill,

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90 D. Challis (2010), 96.
91 Challis (2010), 115.
92 B. Porter (2004), 82.
93 Pitts (2005), 241.
95 The term is not entirely appropriate in writing of figures such as James Mill, but their ideas would inform the later liberal tradition.
Thomas Babington Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill – all men who would work for the East India Company. 96

The Indian Mutiny of 1857, along with the reception of evolutionary theory after 1859, caused an important change in the way Britons thought about empire and the governance of non-European peoples. Earlier in the century James Mill and Macaulay envisaged a despotic but benign Britain as transforming India to a position of adequate civilisation in a matter of decades. 97 The Indian Mutiny severely dented the confidence that a British civilising mission could succeed – that non-Europeans could be civilised. The advent of evolutionary theory, mixed with such new pessimisms, brought about new ideas relating to race: it was ‘treated as neither immutable not incidental, but as a longue durée historical phenomenon’ – in other words, other races could progress, but it would be a far longer process than was thought to be the case earlier in the century. Now, races differed ‘not in their essential humanity, but in the speed and success with which they had passed through a universal transformation from savagery to civilization’. Indeed, as far as other races were concerned, progress was so gradual that individuals would not be able to experience it. 98

Bernard Porter’s argument that Victorians could be seen as more ‘culturalist’ than ‘racist’ – the former implying the ‘arrogant but fundamentally liberal and optimistic belief in the advancement of everyone’ – that ‘all peoples (or nearly all) could, like Britain herself, “progress”, 99 may well have applied before the mid-century crises – but after the 1860s in a very technical fashion only. Not only did the Mutiny and evolutionary theory change the way attitudes towards non-Europeans were formed, but they also contributed to a shift in British imperial policy. At the very time some of the universalising and assimilationist efforts of liberal imperialism were bearing fruit in the form of an educated Anglophone Indian elite, the colonial rulers changed their minds about the best way to govern India. 100 From now on there would be contempt for such ‘Babuses’ with mere ‘trappings of an English education’, and a move towards emphasising and indeed even cultivating the Indian traditionalism with which the British were far more comfortable, as it would mean effectively indefinite colonial rule. 101

96 See Koditschek (2011).
100 Koditschek (2011), 236, 311.
101 Koditschek (2011), 232, 230. Henry Maine, the British jurist, historian, and anthropologist, and author of Ancient Law (1861) argued that Indian traditions should be strengthened by the British as they ‘fitted the Indian character at its current evolutionary stage’.
This is the transformation in British imperial policy which Karuna Mantena characterised as a shift from a ‘universalist’ to a ‘culturalist’ approach.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Empire and Colonisation into the Nineteenth Century}

The loss of the American colonies in 1783 did not mean that Britain was a power in decline: this happened during a period of continuing expansion and exploration, and it was France, not Britain, which was ruined by its victorious participation in the American Revolutionary War. Between 1794 and 1816 Britain’s trade more than doubled as it sought new markets elsewhere\textsuperscript{103} and continued to explore and expand. By 1770 James Cook had discovered the eastern coast of Australia and circumnavigated New Zealand, both of which were claimed for the British crown. The penal colony of New South Wales was subsequently founded in 1788, and Britain still held her Canadian provinces which from 1763 formally included the French speaking territories taken from France after the fall of Quebec in 1759. These were divided into upper and lower Canada in 1791, mirroring English and French divisions. Added to this were the lucrative plantation possessions of the Caribbean and quasi-private interests in India.

One of the most noticeable things is that eighteenth century Britons perceived separate empires: on one hand that, as already encountered above, which encompassed ‘ships, colonies and commerce’ where British naval mastery went hand in hand with overseas settlement by ‘freeborn Englishmen’ and the advance of trade,\textsuperscript{104} and on the other hand, although admittedly more an early nineteenth century phenomenon, the parasitic empire of conquest in India and West Indies which was corrupting and pregnant with dangers for liberty at home.\textsuperscript{105} Implicit is the idea that colonisation is a far nobler thing than governing others – James Mill at one point argued for a British colonisation of India in order to reproduce a British system of ‘checks and balances’: a far better alternative than colonial adventurism and arbitrary rule which aided unsavoury ‘vested interests’ at home.\textsuperscript{106} An added dimension to

\textsuperscript{102} K. Mantena, \textit{Alibis of Empire: Henry Main and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism} (Princeton University Press, 2010).
\textsuperscript{104} M.Taylor, ‘Imperium and Libertas? Rethinking the Radical Critique of Imperialism during the Nineteenth Century’, \textit{The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History} (1991) 19: 1, 1-23. The colonies, in this case, would have to refer to America prior to Independence.
more liberal thinking about colonies, informed by the loss of those in America, was the belief they should become independent as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{107}

John Stuart Mill, although he worked for the East India Company for 35 years, was most enthusiastic about Greek colonisation and the lessons it could teach Britain in its relations with the settler colonies.\textsuperscript{108} His conception of the British Empire was of ‘different types of possessions’ to be ‘governed in different ways depending on the stage of civilization they had reached and on the political arrangements they had inherited’.\textsuperscript{109} Even though a timeline of advancement consistent with his idea of civilisation rather than a strict hierarchy, it was obvious which possessions were able to govern themselves (the white settler colonies) and which could not (India). Mill believed in an enlightened despotism fundamentally separated from the home government of the colonising power: for the good of both Britain and India, Mill ‘insisted that the administration of India be vested in a disinterested elite and kept entirely separate from the government of Britain’ lest settlers and officials in India take advantage ‘of liberal institutions and public opinion at home in order to pursue their acquisitive interests in India’.\textsuperscript{110} In a view that is contradicted by Pitts, who more persuasively holds Mill to have been a more enthusiastic liberal imperialist,\textsuperscript{111} Taylor argued that neither Mill nor those with similar ideas were ‘supporting imperialism’ – ‘rather they were offering imperfect solutions to the political problems posed by distant dominion over non-European peoples.’\textsuperscript{112} Empire is regrettable yet irreversible (another power would

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\textsuperscript{107} See B. Porter, \textit{Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge} (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008), 7-9, for the views of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. The latter, of course, a great influence on George Grote, J.S. Mill and many other prominent nineteenth century liberal thinkers.


\textsuperscript{109} Pitts (2005), 160.

\textsuperscript{110} M. Taylor (1991), 13. Mill’s views can be seen as part of wider liberal disquiet about the problem of India. His differed from those of Richard Cobden, free-trader and critic of empire, in that Cobden was very pessimistic, believing that India could only be ruled despotsically and that that would harm British democracy. As we have seen, Mill thought separation was the answer, and can he can be seen as closer in this to John Bright, Cobden’s colleague. Bright accepted possession of India as a fact and stated that Britain did not know how to leave it, so deciding that all that could be done was to decide how to govern it. The answer being as the
simply step in), flawed, prone to corruption, and best kept at arm’s length. Colonisation, and
the resulting extension of free-institutions, is none of those things. It also became more
popular from 1850 onwards as individuals such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Gladstone
saw and publicised the merits of colonisation – it would ‘reproduce the likeness of England...
thereby contributing to the general happiness of mankind’. An important part of such pro-
colonisation sentiment was the belief that the colonies would one day, as did America,
separate from the mother country. Regardless, there was a ‘gradual acceptance that the settler
communities could be a valuable adjunct to British wealth and power, and a “healthy”
extension of British society.’

Accordingly, it has been suggested that the Victorian middle classes ‘did not call the
British Empire an empire, because they did not think of it as one’. Instead, glossing over
an India in any case considered an entirely separate aberration, they much preferred the
settlement colonies; the colonies were entirely consistent with the peaceful spread of free
British trade and free British institutions, proffering the benefits of empire without the
drawbacks. With colonisation, one could simply replicate what one had at home, and
regardless of whether one maintained political control one had prosperous, self-organising,
allies, bound by ties of filial affection, and upon whom one could count upon in conflict with
any third power. Colonisation was a means of circumventing empire, transcending its
transience as something doomed to fail because of the necessity of ruling over the
uncooperative and the unchangeable: as we have already seen, ‘in some circles, the second
half of the nineteenth century was marked by a growing lack of faith in the ability of non-
European nations to become moulded and perfected in a Western pattern’. As we shall see

University Press, 2009), 146.
114 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 94.
116 See B. Porter (2004), 94-95 for the anti-imperial ideas of British free-traders such as Richard Cobden. Such
ideas – that free trade would render empires and arms irrelevant in an interdependent world – were also related
to internationalism, and for Porter part of the explanation as to why mid-Victorian British liberalism never was
as closely connected to nationalism as its European counterparts. See Cobden’s speech of 15 Jan 1846 at
Manchester, quoted in B. Porter (2008), 14-15. Consider also in this context the internationalism of what I
would call ‘Liberal Hellenists’ such as J.B. Bury and Gilbert Murray.
117 Duncan Bell, ‘From Ancient to Modern in Victorian Imperial Thought,’ The Historical Journal Vol. 49, no. 3
in due course, with the discussion of the political, intellectual, and colonial context to the age of High Empire (1870-1914), the importance of colonisation in circumventing empire was soon to apply in a more European context. Not simply because European conquests were seen as transient and a tinderbox of ethnic conflict with lesser races, but also because Britons as well as Germans came to see settlement in *their* colonies – as opposed to in America – as a means of allowing for emigration whilst still contributing to the geopolitical and demographic strength of the home countries\(^\text{119}\): so that Englishmen and Germans could emigrate and *remain* English and German. This is a fundamental difference in the natures and perceptions of empire and colonisation. Colonisation was a far more liberal, democratic, racial, and middle class phenomenon. Empire, on the other hand, was conservative, autocratic, and from the mid-century involved the acceptance of, and governance through, native institutions and customs. It was also the preserve of a class-obsessed aristocracy. There is, clearly, one aspect of colonisation which we have overlooked. Critics of empire tended to focus on the negative impact upon the imperialist in having to rule others despotically, not on the other way around. Colonisation, praised as eschewing such vices, also exhibits a similar bias, and we can identify it by what is omitted: mention of what happens to the natives where the Englishman chooses to settle and bring with him his free-institutions. The silence on how to govern such peoples is chilling.

Porter suggests that admiration for Britain’s settlement colonies involved ‘closing one’s eyes to some inconvenient facts’, one of which was the ‘violence done to their aboriginal populations’. Readers of nineteenth century textbooks could even be ‘unaware that continents like north America and Australia had any original populations at all’, he writes, citing one example in which the author referred to ‘rich land unused by man’\(^\text{120}\). Needless to say, the reality was very different. New South Wales would stop receiving penal settlers in 1840, and New Zealand, formerly part of the penal colony, was founded as a separate entity in the same year. This was a period in which the granting of autonomy and a strengthening of the colonial state was seen across the colonies: in British North America in the 1840s, and Australia and New Zealand in the 1850s. Henceforth, it was the colonial state – i.e. that directly responsible to and comprised of colonists (as opposed to officials in faraway London ) and acting in the interests of white settlers – which decided how land was

\(^\text{119}\) Consider how Richard Cobden, the ‘arch anti-imperialist of the day’, was not against retaining the colonies, and believed that the ‘English race should spread itself over the earth’ to the benefit of the mother-country and the emigrants. Porter (2004), 107.

\(^\text{120}\) Porter (2004), 71.
bought and sold and at what price.\textsuperscript{121} In New Zealand, self-government, but not control over relations with the Maori, was granted in 1852;\textsuperscript{122} the British state had only grudgingly annexed in 1840,\textsuperscript{123} and it appears that the impetus behind colonial expansion came from settlers rather than the Colonial Office. In response to ‘growing racial friction’ by the late 1850s, London did grant the settler government more of a responsibility in relations with the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{124} The Maori had resisted intensely in 1845-6,\textsuperscript{125} and the government’s decision led to an escalation in settler activity and further conflict involving up to 10,000 imperial troops throughout the 1860s, most intense between 1863-4, and only subsiding in 1870. These wars are thought to have ‘marginalised’ the Maori and cemented New Zealand’s future as a ‘settler state’.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, from the 1840s onwards the white population increased dramatically, whereas that of the Maoris fell and the land itself changed in accordance with the needs of Western civilisation: ‘this demographic invasion had been accompanied by a drastic transformation of the pre-colonial environment into a land of European grasses, trees, flowers and animals.’\textsuperscript{127} Thirlwall (1835-44) and Grote (1847-56) were writing their works at a time when colonists themselves were the driving force behind settlement and the dispossession of indigenous peoples. In this British colonists were doing what the French had been doing in Algeria since the 1830s, one difference being that in the French experience empire and colonisation went hand in hand rather than being two conflicting visions. Perhaps it is telling that liberal criticism of British misrule was more vocal in response to governor Eyre in Jamaica, whose brutality attracted the condemnation of such liberal intellectuals as Mill and Darwin – Jamaica, with its history as a slave-run plantation with white settlers, was probably never considered a true colony of settlement. Having seen a political, intellectual, and colonial context for British scholarship on Greece up to 1870, it is now time to consider what individual scholars made of Greek colonisation.

\textsuperscript{122} Darwin (2009), 170-71.
\textsuperscript{123} Darwin (2009), 51.
\textsuperscript{124} Darwin (2009), 170-71.
\textsuperscript{125} Hart (2008), 178.
\textsuperscript{126} Darwin (2009), 170-71; Hart (2008), 178.
\textsuperscript{127} Darwin (2009), 169.
Colonisation as an Act of State

William Mitford, writing in the 1780s, certainly did not depict Greek colonisation as a statist movement resembling European experiences more than Archaic reality. He wrote that ‘few of the Grecian colonies were founded with any view to extend the dominion of the mother country,’ and so clearly he did not see colonisation as strategic acts of states. Furthermore, it would confound those who criticise the supposed statist or imperialistic distortion of earlier scholarship, instead advocating a greater for private individuals, to learn that Mitford thought the leaders of early colonising expeditions were often ‘no more than pirates, not unlike the buccaneers of modern times.’  Of course, rather than proving that Mitford was innocent of anachronism, this could instead suggest that our understanding of how Britons in the eighteenth century and beyond saw colonisation is flawed. That Mitford wrote of early colonisation in a manner not entirely dissimilar to more recent interpretations may not be a result of scholarly detachment but rather of a historical context in which colonisation was neither an uncomplicatedly state or private affair. Having said that, Mitford’s account does not differ radically from the picture allowed by the literary evidence, which as we have seen could quite reasonably be interpreted as depicting a high degree of individual responsibility and at times piratical tendencies.

It is more difficult to gauge how John Gillies saw this issue. He clearly thought that the Mediterranean from the eleventh century onwards was a very unstable place where piracy was endemic and even a well regarded profession.  This piracy, in a world of ‘intestine sedition, foreign invasion, or the restless spirit of adventure and rapine’, was responsible for the early Greek colonisation of Sicily, Sardinia and Cyprus. Therefore his views are consistent with Mitford’s in that he saw colonisation as something which could arise out of piratical ventures, yet elsewhere, writing of later events around the time of the first Messenian War in the eighth century BC, he described how peace caused a rise in the population of the Peloponnese, which in turn meant that the Peloponnesians ‘continued to diffuse their numerous colonies over the islands of Sicily and Corcyra, as well as over the

128 Mitford (1829), Vol. 1, 351.
129 Gillies (1786), Vol. 1, 15-16.
130 Gillies (1786), Vol. 1, 90-91.
southern division of Italy, afterwards known by the name of Magna Graecia. Population increase, therefore, is the explanation for Greek colonisation, although on the execution of colonising ventures he is silent.

Connop Thirlwall, writing half a century later, thought it important to discuss the Greek colonies in order to have an ‘adequate conception of the magnitude of the Grecian world’, and he saw these ‘migrations’ as undertaken with the ‘approbation and encouragement of the states from which they issued’. Thirlwall lends more explicit weight to the explanation for colonisation given by Gillies: colonisation occurred when it was in the interests of the mother country, for instance ‘as when the object was to relieve it of superfluous hands, or of discontented and turbulent spirits.’ Thirlwall’s view is quite statist in that he sees colonisation as organised by the state and in the state’s interests, yet he did not think colonisation was undertaken for strategic reasons. As we have seen previously, he wrote that ‘it was seldom that the parent state looked forward to any more remote advantage from the colony, or that the colony expected or desired any from the parent state.’ It is difficult to determine whether one scholar is more statist than another. Perhaps the important thing is that broadly speaking, none seem to have thought colonisation to have been strategic in intent – any benefits for the state were of the immediate kind. Furthermore, Thirlwall’s interpretation is no more than an exaggeration of the importance of the Theran and Cyrenaean example provided by Herodotus.

Colonial Dependence

The failure of eighteenth century works to conform to current ideas about earlier scholarship is striking, and this is evident in the lack of any coherent idea of colonial dependence. For William Mitford, only Corinth in earlier times and Athens somewhat later had more long lasting ambitions regarding colonies. Colonies were not culturally or in any other way dependent, subordinate, or inferior to the cities of mainland Greece: ‘the colonies advanced nearly equally in improvements of art, science, and civilisation, and sometimes went even before the mother country’. John Gillies, although critical of insolent Corcyra’s

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131 John Gillies, The History of Ancient Greece, its Colonies and Conquests; from the Earliest Accounts till the Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East (1829), Vol. 1, 177.
132 A rise in population is also claimed to have led to the colonising ventures of the Asiatic Greeks. Gillies (1829), Vol.1, 293.
134 Mitford (1829), Vol. 1, 350.
betrayal of its mother-city Corinth – as befits a scholar writing shortly after the American Revolutionary War – was nevertheless for the most part an admirer of the Greek colonies, and often a damning critic of the cities of mainland Greece. 135

The mainland Greeks experienced ‘fierce and frequent wars’ which ‘exhausted their population’ while ‘the exclusive spirit of republican jealousy, which sternly refused strangers any participation in their government, or any protection in their government, or any protection from their laws, naturally repressed their vigour, and stunted their growth.’ 136 The colonies of Magna Graecia, on the other hand, excelled:

The kings, or nobility of Magna Graecia, secure in their own pre-eminence, felt nothing of the republican jealousies which prevailed in the mother-country. They received with pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter they might come. The barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were associated; their children received a Grecian education; and the states of Italy and Sicily thus increasing by degrees, could soon boast, the former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuse, Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, and several other cities, which rivalled or surpassed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populousness of Thebes, Argos, or Sparta. 137

Ruled, we may presume, by constitutional monarchies, the colonies of Magna Graecia were more capable than republics of being inclusive towards non-Greek elements. They could thus assimilate, adding to their strength and prosperity.

This highlights two things. Firstly Gillies’ account of the colonies is heavily influenced by the constitutional theme which runs throughout his history. Secondly it could be said that his work is consciously or unconsciously a reflection of contemporary developments in the nature of the British Empire. In other words, not only a commentary on the merit of monarchy over republic, Gillies’ work is also evidence of early imperial discourse in what became in 1801 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Within the British Isles alone there were several different ethnic groups to unite – and Gillies was himself a Scotsman. The loss of the American colonies, seen as truly ‘English’, was mirrored

by stronger links with Scotland. In this way the Second British Empire was indeed *British*\textsuperscript{138}.

The expression of this ‘officially constructed patriotism’, or Britishness, ‘stressed attachment to the monarchy, the importance of empire, the value of naval achievement, and the desirability of strong, stable government by a virtuous, able and authentically British élite.’\textsuperscript{139} Perhaps Gillies himself should be seen as a manifestation of this ‘authentically British’, that is not solely English, élite. His work is a defence of the lynchpin of this new order which emerged from the American war – the British monarchy. As we have seen Gillies’ monarchical Greek states unite disparate peoples, and this can be seen to mirror that of Great Britain. This aspect of eighteenth century self-image finds echoes in recent interpretations of British history. According to Phillip Jenkins, writing of the early modern period, ‘though individual kings might make disastrous and intolerant decisions, the institution of monarchy offered the potential to satisfy an astonishingly broad range of cultural aspirations, and permitted very diverse ethnic and linguistic groups to see a given dynasty as the epitome of their nation, no less than the national state.’\textsuperscript{140} Gillies’ history of Greece can be seen as a defence of this idea of monarchy as a way of ‘forging the nation’ out of disparate groups, and stands at the inception of a new British patriotism.\textsuperscript{141} Perhaps Gillies, above all, should be seen as a scholar writing as an imperial nation was invented – and this had a direct bearing on the way he wrote about Greek colonisation.

Moving from John Gillies in the late eighteenth century to Connop Thirlwall in the 1830s, we still see little sign of a coherent idea of colonial dependence: ‘there was in most cases nothing to suggest the feeling of dependence on the one side, or a claim of authority on the other’, wrote Thirlwall. He did use a filial metaphor – sons left Greece with the blessings of their fathers – but even here he described how these sons were ‘completely emancipated’ from their fathers’ control. This was a relationship based on affection rather than formal political control; the founder would be honoured after death, and ‘when the colony in its turn became a parent, it usually sought a leader from the original mother-country.’\textsuperscript{142} This is essentially a relationship between equals. If there is any suggestion of colonial dependence,

\begin{itemize}
  \item Colley (1996), 153.
  \item Colley (1996), 154.
  \item Colley (1996), 207.
  \item Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 2, 110-11.
\end{itemize}

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then it lies with the filial metaphor, and even that indicates a very short-lived stage of dependence as colonies could become more powerful than their mother cities.\textsuperscript{143}

The theme of colonial dependence, or perhaps more accurately of \textit{inferiority}, does appear with Grote, an author who as we have seen was somewhat more in tune with latest intellectual developments than Thirlwall. For Grote the Greek colonies were inferior because of two interrelated factors. Firstly, the Greeks of Sicily are not to be considered as purely Greek but as modified by native language, customs, and character, and secondly their politics are not on a par with the mainland, or more specifically, Athens:

we are not dealing with pure Hellenism; and that the native element, though not unfavourable to activity or increase of wealth, prevented the Grecian colonists from partaking fully in that improved organisation which we so distinctly trace in Athens from Solon downwards.

Colonial Greece represented a political and cultural debasement of Hellenism, or for the Atheno-centric Grote, Athenian Hellenism. Here we see that the political message which pervades Grote’s history, as well as contemporary ideas about the nature of civilisation, impact the way he wrote about colonisation. The way native influences are not seen to prevent the creation of wealth reflects contemporary ideas about the distinctions between material civilisation and civilisation proper. Genuine European civilisation in large part, of course, means political freedom – Grote’s primary concern.

The consequences of Greek colonisation speak not only to nineteenth century concerns about the true nature of civilisation and arguments for political freedom, but also the implications of engaging in colonising activity where this means interaction with native peoples. Grote tells us how the poetry of Greek Sicily was coarser because of the way native ideas had entered the Greek mind, and how ‘Doric’ Greeks had in common with semi Hellenised Sikels of neighbouring villages their ‘coarser vein of humour’. Native influences combined with the lesser Dorian aptitude for political freedom to create a situation in which Greek-Sicilian despots ruled by using native peoples as cheap mercenary manpower thus making popular government ‘all but impossible’.\textsuperscript{144} This may place Grote within an intellectual canon critical of the corrupting influences of empire on the political freedom of the imperial power, and serves as a reminder that colonial and imperial affairs were

\textsuperscript{143} Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 2, 110-11.

\textsuperscript{144} Grote (1854), Vol. 3, 498-500.
connected to the more domestic political concerns which were at the heart of his history. This issue, of course, is connected to the wider question of native peoples and their influence, something to which we shall now turn.

**Civilising the Natives**

According to John Gillies, wherever ‘the spirit of enterprise’ induced the Greek colonists to settle, ‘they perceived, it is said, on the slightest comparison, the superiority of their own religion, language, institutions, and manners; and the dignity of their character and sentiments eminently distinguished them from the general mass of nations whose territories they invaded; and whom they justly denominated Barbarians.’\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^5\) Even so, the nature of the western colonies, monarchical like contemporary Britain meant that ‘they received with pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter they might come’ and ‘barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were associated.’\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^6\) In this case, Gillies’ barbarians were, under a benign monarchy, eminently improvable.

Thirlwall’s perspective differs in that whereas he too saw Greek settlers everywhere ‘establishing themselves as conquerors’, assimilation under a just monarchy was replaced by a more violent view of colonisation. Greeks settled on land already inhabited, and so dispossessed its inhabitants. Those ‘suffered to remain’ did so as slaves, or at best inferiors. Colonisation was more violent for Thirlwall than it was for Gillies, and Thirlwall’s account differs again in that he saw the types of government established in the colonies as very different to Gillies’ restrained monarchy:

> The very spirit in which they [the colonies] were founded, was highly unfavourable to the permanence of an aristocratical ascendancy, and the only thing restraining complete democracy was the property qualification required for political rights.\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^7\)

A generation can make all the difference: if for the eighteenth century Whig colonial Greece was an admirably restrained monarchy, for the nineteenth century liberal it was a suitably

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\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^6\) Gillies (1786), Vol. 1, 470-71.

\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^7\) Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 2, 112.
‘liberal’ place. Interestingly, in Thirlwall’s colonial Greece political equality between fellow citizens stood in stark contrast to the relations between the Greek and the indigenous slave: the colonies were on the one hand more exploitative of indigenous peoples and on the other more liberal than monarchical.

Grote saw interactions between Greeks and natives very differently. Gillies and Thirlwall demonstrate to us a shift in emphasis from a defence of constitutional monarchy to a circumspect promotion of liberalism in which the expansion of Greece finds equivalence in the expansion of liberal Britain overseas. Grote’s account is much more clearly a product of its time in that much more of the contemporary intellectual context can be seen at work in his history. To begin with he echoes contemporary colonisation rather strongly. Grote’s Greeks, on their arrival in Sicily, expelled and subjugated natives:148

These natives seem to have been of rude pastoral habits, dispersed either among petty hill-villages, or in caverns hewn out of the rock, like the primitive inhabitants of the Balearic islands and Sardinia; so that Sicily, like New Zealand in our century, was now for the first time approached by organised industry and tillage.

Greek colonisation, like modern European colonisation, unleashed the dormant potential of the land wasted by its primitive inhabitants. This idea has been identified in other examples of colonial era writing, and called the ‘myth of the Profligate Native’, meaning that ‘whoever was on the spot was wasting its resources, and that therefore they might be legitimately be expelled, or submitted to European tutelage.’149 Grote described how the Greek colonies brought urban life and became very prosperous, not comparable to the English colonies in America, but ‘nevertheless very great’.

Grote mentions New Zealand, and considering the timing of his history, written in the 1840s and 1850s, it is likely that his image of the transformative nature of colonisation is drawn directly from contemporary British experiences there. As has been stated previously,

149 R. Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World (2000), 232-33. In a similar vein, Drayton points out how this logic applied to conservation as well as exploitation – when the natives did attempt to exploit natural resources they did so irresponsibly, thus threatening the resource in question with extinction. See Drayton, 234-39. Note how Thirlwall credited the early Phoenician influence in Greece with introducing the exploitation of untouched natural resource by stimulating the Greeks to do so – hence the myth of the profligate native was applied to the Greeks, with the Phoenicians taking the role of the civiliser. Thirlwall (1855), Vol 1, 88.
in New Zealand at this time white settlers were gaining ground in the face of Maori resistance, and the land, for so long neglected by the Profligate Native, changed accordingly – into ‘a land of European grasses, trees, flowers and animals’. In broader perspective, at this very time, in Algeria, French soldiers and settlers were engaged in a similar process: in 1843 the notorious Lieutenant-Colonel de Montagnac wrote of killing all Arab men older than fifteen and deporting the remainder, ‘en un mot, anéantir tout ce qui ne rampera pas à nos pieds comme des chiens’. French scholarship on North Africa would for a long time lament its economic and infrastructural decline following the collapse of Roman rule and the coming of Islam.

Grote was very much a man of his age, yet to describe this age as one in which Classical scholarship simply served as justification for colonisation and empire would be deeply misleading. Grote saw Greeks and natives interacting, indeed he saw ‘a fusion of two races in the same community, though doubtless in relation of superior and subject, and not in that of equals.’ He, rather like Gillies and later Thirlwall, imagined the Greeks, on their arrival in Sicily, expelling natives from the town and surrounding lands, but as they extended their territory, subjugating, and not expelling, the native tribes. These then fell under Greek influence, what he called ‘the ascendancy of a higher over a lower civilisation’, of Greeks possessing ‘superior intellect, imagination, and organisation’ over natives inferior in all these regards, who were eventually Hellenised. This belief in assimilation is not what it seems.

It has already been discussed how Grote thought colonial Greece to have represented a debasement of a Hellenism which found its purest expression in Athens. We have also seen that Grote believed that one of the causes of this debasement was the corrupting influence of native peoples. Writing of the days after Alexander, he stated that the Greeks who had gone to the East were unlike those who had not: in ‘communicating their language to Orientals’ they themselves became ‘substantially orientalised’. In their ‘feelings, sentiments, and habits of action’ they ‘ceased to be hellenic’. Equally, the ‘hellenized Asiatic’ was ‘not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations’.

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150 Darwin (2009), 169.
152 D. Mattingly, ‘From one colonialism to another: imperialism and the Maghreb’, in J. Webster and N. J. Cooper (eds), Roman imperialism: Post-colonial Perspectives (Leicester: School of Archaeological Studies, University of Leicester, 1996).
distinguished ‘fundamentally’ from the real Greeks – and that is how he would have been seen by ‘Sophokles, by Thucydides, by Sokrates.’\footnote{Grote (1854), Vol. 3, 500. See Lawrence James, \textit{The Rise and Fall of The British Empire} (1995).} In somewhat of a parody of more recent views which see cultural influences working both ways, Grote thought they did, and that this was a bad thing. An European people endowed with political freedom, in attempting to assimilate native peoples or Eastern civilisations will achieve only superficial change and corrupt itself in the process.

Grote’s cautionary tale does not end there. Not only was this assimilation incomplete and by the very act of contact detrimental to the Greeks, leaving them incapable of political freedom and thus true Hellenic civilisation, but they eventually sowed the seeds of their own destruction:

It was the destiny of most of the Grecian colonial establishments [in Magna Graecia as a whole, one assumes] to perish by the growth and aggression of those inland powers upon whose coast they were planted; powers which gradually acquired, from the vicinity of the Greeks, a military and political organisation, and a power of concentrated action, such as they had not originally possessed.\footnote{Grote (1854), Vol. 3, 500. See Lawrence James, \textit{The Rise and Fall of The British Empire} (1995).}

This is in some ways reminiscent of recent appraisals of the British Empire which claim it gave those over whom it ruled the wherewithal to free themselves,\footnote{Grote (1854), Vol. 3, 500. See Lawrence James, \textit{The Rise and Fall of The British Empire} (1995).} yet this is no nostalgic comment about the Greek colonial achievement. The underlying message is that contact with less civilised peoples brings about a change for the worse: the political liberalism of the civilised colonising power is subverted while surrounding natives, having corrupted it, learns from it the material elements of civilisation with which it can one day strike back against an impure, debilitated, compromised, and decaying colonial civilisation. Grote evidently did believe that colonial situations bring about a ‘shift in the conventions of both colonizer and colonized’.\footnote{See Malkin (2004), 357, for the idea of the colonial ‘Middle Ground’. See also C. Gosden, \textit{The Archaeology of Colonialism: Cultural Contact from 5000BC to the Present} (Cambridge University Press, 2004).}

It is instructive to consider how approaches to these aspects changed over time and according to political perspective. For Grote admiration of Athenian Hellenism and its political freedom went hand in hand with contempt for lesser peoples and their tendencies
towards servility and despotism. Assimilated, or Hellenised Sikels, were but minions of politically deviant Greeks. There is a clear difference between the attitudes of Gillies and those of Grote. Whereas Gillies saw a monarchical colonial Greece welcoming and assimilating all,\textsuperscript{159} Grote displays little but hostility towards a despotic colonial Greece, impure and corrupted by the Hellenised Sikels whose assimilation, we may presume, was superficial, adopting the trappings of civilisation – wealth and grandeur – but not its substance – political freedom. Both scholars showed consistency in method, Gillies extolling restrained monarchy while Grote lamented the frustration of liberal Hellenism – and in this Grote predates the pessimism of the period after 1857. Both wrote in defence of a version of political freedom defined in opposition to Eastern and other lesser peoples, be they civilisations or ‘rude’ tribes. The difference is that Grote’s own position within his historical context equipped him with a concept of civilisation which was highly contingent upon democratic (as opposed to oligarchic) political freedom. It is also possible that he allowed a more prominent place for racial ideas. These two elements in conjunction may have resulted in a much more suspicious approach towards empire and its effects upon the imperial power. Note the use of the term ‘empire’ here instead of colonisation. The reason for this is that Grote’s colonial Greece appears a curious mix of a colonial situation – i.e. corresponding to New Zealand or Australia with settlement colonies in apparently ‘virgin’ lands, and an imperial one – i.e. corresponding to India with a large subject native population. Grote was of a political background one would have expected to be favourable towards British colonisation and the spread of free English institutions, yet critical of the Indian empire. Why, therefore, the seemingly paradoxical mixture of these two models of overseas involvement in the Greek colonising experience? The answer surely lies in the way the contemporary world interacted with the historical world of colonial Greece in Grote’s mind. Most likely is that Grote did not impose either a white settlement or Indian ‘model’ onto the ancient Italy and Sicily. Rather, certain elements of the debate pertaining to both influenced what he wrote about a situation he saw as mirroring in some elements a colonial setting (see the reference to New Zealand), and in others an imperial one (for instance the corrupting influence of ‘native’ troops in preventing democracy and sustaining despotism). In general terms, however, we can conclude that there is a marked difference between the views of indigenous influences exhibited by Gillies and Grote. Gillies and his easy assimilationism based on eighteenth century ideas about the unifying influences of constitutional monarchy

\textsuperscript{159}Jenkins (2002), 1-11.
could easily accommodate the ‘imperial’ situation Grote saw in Sicily. Grote and his liberal ideas about empire and the corruption it could bring,\textsuperscript{160} could not, and the fact that the Greek settlements were commonly understood as colonies did not lead him to a simplistic tribute to the Greek colonial achievement.

**Conclusions**

It may be useful to think of the different ideas encountered in this discussion in terms of overarching frameworks of ‘civilisation’, frameworks which are frequently but not always connected. The two most prominent are as follows: the first framework is a longstanding belief, traceable from the earliest work in the 1780s through to those of the mid nineteenth century and beyond, that that western, especially British (or rather English) peoples are freer than those of the east – a belief consistently held regardless of the particular political tendencies of the individual authors. Western monarchy, let alone parliamentary democracy, was different from eastern despotism. This idea stands alongside its opposite – by implication Eastern civilisation, although capable of great wealth and power, lacks the freedom so crucial to innovation in thought, art and more besides. It is stagnant and incapable of attaining the highest level of civilisation. It is worth noting that it is not only those of the East who are incapable of political freedom – other savage peoples can be seen as equally incapable, depending on the author and contemporary historical context. The second framework is that of the nature of cultural interactions. This is a framework which in its simplest form changes little in scholarship about Greece from the late eighteenth to the mid nineteenth century – peoples are ‘rude’ until they come into contact with and are taught by civilised ones, and having learnt from the latter, the recipients, if European, eventually surpass them. In its more complex form, encompassing both peaceful interactions and colonial rule, the capacities of various peoples for such improvement were thought to vary greatly, and in later work the idea of consequences for both coloniser and colonised, civiliser and those who are civilised, becomes very important indeed.

These frameworks are parallel, and interlock where appropriate. For instance it seems that the Greeks, being of European origin, are more capable of learning from other (eastern)

\textsuperscript{160} The nineteenth century critique of Indian-style empire long predates the basis of the recent idea of a ‘Middle Ground’; that colonial relations bring about ‘a shift in the conventions of both colonizer and colonized.’ The difference is of course that the nineteenth century view was that such changes were negative. See Malkin (2004), 357.
civilisations than others, and it is this very European origin, and a predisposition towards freedom, which enables them to overtake eventually their eastern instructors. Thus the framework of western freedom becomes interwoven with that of cultural interaction, and in doing so it brings to mind other ideas such as those of race; there is some notion that westerners are quicker to learn, in some sense innately freer, and this must in some way be related to some idea, however inexplicit, of language, of race, of ethnicity, of blood. In looking at this third framework in particular, we can see there existed changes between Gillies and Grote as to the capacity for improvement attributed to native peoples. John Gillies believed in the capacity of a civilised Western monarchy to civilise primitive peoples – those primitive Europeans of ancient Sicily, at least. Grote, writing in the mid nineteenth century, while believing that material civilisation could be taught, thought this was merely superficial, and that an aptitude for political freedom could not so easily be passed from one people to another. On the contrary, despotism and servility is more easily transmitted from the colonised to the coloniser by a process of intermingling, and, possibly, also, the coloniser corrupts itself by the very act of exercising arbitrary rule. In this, and even if this work predated the pessimism of the 1860s, Grote represented the shape of things to come.

In broader terms we can conclude that historical writing about Greece, while at the same time intended as commentary on contemporary British politics, was embedded in the wider European attempt to understand a world in which they were the rising power by placing themselves at its centre. All histories of Greece begin with an account of the influences of Eastern civilisation upon still primitive Greeks whose aptitude for political freedom enables them to surpass all such contributors. On a different level, the history of Greece was an expression of the need for scholars of different nationalities to explain their particular place in this rise with reference to an ancient world comprised of different states whose characteristics were seen to mirror those of modern equivalents. Focusing closer still, authors who saw themselves as part of particular political affiliations sought to inform, understand, explain and further their agendas with reference to an ancient world which was also seen to offer points of comparison and inspiration to the political battles both between and within modern sates. These three layers of interpretation were mutually dependent, and as we have seen with liberal thinkers, domestic politics was a crucial factor in the formation of the idea of civilisation itself. There are consistencies, however, as authors from across the political spectrum would have appreciated the superiority of Europe in the world and of their own country in Europe. Furthermore individuals from all backgrounds would have conceived the superiority of European civilisation to have been the result of its liberty. The
differences lay in the particular interpretations of Western freedom. A tendency to praise the monarchies of the ancient world in the eighteenth century – as these only could preserve the liberty of the propertied and noble in the face of dangerous mobs – gave way to a democratic understanding of freedom from the early nineteenth century onwards. The latter, assuming the freedom of democratisation to be the root of civilisational advance and its indicators – art, literature, culture, and humanity – became, as we shall see, a dominant conception in British scholarship about Greece for over a hundred years. The influence of this idea – or perhaps ideal – also extended beyond the frontiers of this most Liberal of scholarly disciplines and came to influence British conceptions of other civilisations – ancient and modern – more widely.

Neither Greece nor the Classical world more generally were intended as models for uncomplicated parallels and emulation, however. The study of Greek civilisation was thought to offer lessons about the present and the future, and very conscious of what befell all ancient powers, be they Athens or Rome, this was as much about avoiding the mistakes and fates of such cities as emulating their virtues. Any notion of ‘Whig’ progress proves to be pointedly inadequate as an explanation of the message they contain. The idea that there is such a thing as progress is entirely different to believing it is inevitable. Historical writing about Greece reflected both the hopes and the anxieties of contemporary Britain and Europe – if the rise of Greece amidst the stagnant civilisations of the East was noted, so was its fall and the degradation of that political and intellectual freedom which was the very source of its greatness. These histories display an intellectual culture concerned with explaining and debating the present in light of the past, and we can appreciate how interconnected were their ideas about international and domestic politics, of political freedom, Eastern influences, colonisation, empire, and the nature, rise and fall of civilisation. Perhaps the most influential history of all, George Grote’s *A History of Greece* best of all illustrates this complexity. An admiration for Athenian Hellenism goes hand in hand with fears of civilisational degeneration resulting from the double-edged sword of ruling lesser, unfree, peoples.
Chapter 5: High Empire 1870-1914

Introduction

If in the eighteenth century Greek monarchies were valued whereas democracies and eastern despotisms were reviled, come the nineteenth classical Athens was adopted by liberal Britain, its genius contrasted with other, illiberal, Greek states, and the despotisms of the east. By the last third of the nineteenth century, political liberalism had become a prevalent part of the political culture as opposed to a contentious proposition supported by controversial readings of ancient history privileging the role of Athens. Even conservative politics, including Disraeli’s New Imperialism, were conducted within a broadly liberal political system of parliamentary democracy with a limited, but increasing, franchise. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that much scholarship on Greece continued to be written from a liberal perspective. This perspective, however, was not necessarily the one envisioned by Grote. Grote did not hold Athens as a model, whereas later liberals such as E.A. Freeman most certainly did.\(^1\) Equally, Grote was not as critical of radical democratic Athens as would be later scholars of a more conservative bent, such as G.B. Grundy and Evelyn Abbott.\(^2\) Gladstone, that symbol of late Victorian British liberalism, in fact started out as a conservative, and his higher regard for a Homeric Greece, characterised by leaders ruling with the assent of the people, constituted a ‘critique of the presuppositions of radical Victorian political thought’ such as that represented by Grote, whose Homeric kings, on the contrary, brooked no dissent – as illustrated by the example of Theristes, beaten for speaking out (Iliad 2.210-280). Gladstone’s liberalism was to be a much more conservative one than Grote’s, and should be seen within the context of the increasingly complex British political landscape of the late nineteenth century in which Athens was neither an outright pariah nor an uncomplicated model.\(^3\)

Nevertheless, most of the scholars covered in the following discussion betray an explicitly liberal perspective towards Greece, the individuals concerned often implicated in Liberal politics – but it is important to bear in mind that such an affiliation was a broad one, encompassing such radical figures such as Freeman as well as far more gradually reformist ones like Gladstone. As with this discussion as a whole, there will be an attempt to avoid

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1 Turner (1981), 244-45.
explaining work written in this period in purely constitutional terms, as has been the trend in many other approaches to scholarship on Greece. Grote’s *A History of Greece*, published between 1847 and 1856 and read for many years thereafter, is a work which stood at the cusp of the late Victorian era, and can be seen as a portent of some of the key concerns which would come to define it, even if later audience developed their own, very different understandings. These concerns encompassed a range of interconnected ideas which exceeded the conventional confines of purely domestic political debate while still relating to it, and included debate about empire and ideas about other races and civilisations. The following discussion will continue in this vein, demonstrating how scholarship about Greece offers an insight into the connected nature of these debates, and in particular how perceptions of Greek colonisation offer an unique window to the way Britons saw the past, present, and future of empire, civilisation, progress and political freedom.

*A Political, Intellectual, and Colonial Context 1870-1914*

Traditionally the period 1815-1870 has been seen as one of ‘informal empire’ giving way to a tendency towards annexation from around 1870 as Britain faced competition from new powers; the growth of Britain’s ‘formal empire’ was a product of its ‘relative decline as a great power’. More recent work suggests that far from being an aloof idyll preceding rivalry and decline, the mid Victorian period was one in which Britain had only just begun to penetrate new markets, and was yet to ‘lubricate’ world trade with its financial and commercial services. This only began in force during the late Victorian period. Consequently, instead of being the ‘rearguard actions’ of a declining power, British annexations from 1870 onwards should be seen as ‘overflows’ of ‘expansionist tendencies’. In this context, it is Britain’s rivals who were reacting to the expansion of a ‘dynamic and

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5 I.e. where possible acting in concert with local elites and only when this is not possible resorting to annexation.


7 Cain and Hopkins (2002), 401.
ambitious power". That said, the reality of British power need not necessarily be reflected in public perceptions which may nonetheless have seen their contemporary world as one in which Britain’s global supremacy, naval mastery, technological and industrial lead, were all being challenged – a perceived decline which implicated the ancient world, for so long a fruitful quarry for those concerned with the rise and fall of empires.

Colonies of Settlement, Empire of Rule

One of the most noticeable features of the British Empire in this period was the marked difference between more or less democratically governed colonies of white settlement in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,9 and the vast territories populated by other races subject to despotic rule, most notably in India. This was a contradiction which drew attention at the time, and conflicting views about these two ‘types’ of empire, each speaking to different ancient parallels, would come to define British imperial thinking in this era.

Disraeli’s ‘Imperialism’ of the 1870s, conferring upon the Queen the title ‘Empress of India’, was part of a wider European trend to link imperial expansion with a greater prominence for an imperial figurehead.10 For some, such as Disraeli’s great rival Gladstone, this was the pursuit of imperial expansion for its own sake: a ‘creed of aggrandisement’11 which involved making acquisitions for no purpose but to increase the vastness of the empire.12 Thus Disraeli’s ‘Imperialism’ (variously described as the ‘New Imperialism’), intimately linked with the Indian Empire and the new imperial monarchy, and inevitably speaking to the ancient precedent of Rome, was very much a Conservative conception of Britain and Empire. In his famous Crystal Palace speech in 1872 Disraeli claimed the working classes were natural Conservative allies ‘proud of belonging to a great country and wish[ing] to maintain its greatness…’13 Gladstone would later write that Disraeli was appealing ‘under the prostituted name of patriotism, to exaggerated fears, to imaginary

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8 Cain and Hopkins (2002), 402.
9 South Africa, French Canada, and Ireland were much more problematic.
12 Ibid, p. 239.
interests’. Drawing parallels between Disraeli and triumphal Roman generals, Gladstone railed against territorial aggrandisement while commending the colonies, which were ‘a noble feature in the work and mission of this nation, as it was of old in the mission of Greece.’ The ‘sentiment of empire’, ‘innate in every Briton’, was at times prone to excess: as happened in the case of the American colonies, ‘the grandest monument ever erected by a people of modern times, and second only to the Greek colonisation in the whole history of the world’, but lost due to ‘obstinacy and pride.’ It is important to grasp, nonetheless, that even in promoting his Imperialism Disraeli had to show at least some sensitivity towards the liberal British scepticism, even fear, of empire: he stressed that the imperial title was to be used in India only – not in England. Equally, Liberals such as Gladstone could no more think of being rid of the Indian Empire in its entirety than could Disraeli of making Victoria an Imperial monarch over Britain itself. Having conquered India, Britain was obliged to remain, and in this esteem for Greek and English colonisation as spreading free institutions, and toleration of Roman and British Imperialism as being somewhat regrettable yet nonetheless better than the barbarism they replaced, Gladstone was consistent with earlier liberal thought as expressed by Cobden and Mill. Yet even these subtler distinctions – that is admitting there was more to it than a simple dichotomy of Conservatives privileging India and Rome, and Liberals the Dominions and Greek colonisation – do not do full justice to the complexity of imperial thought after 1870.

How to Avoid the Fate of Empires

The day of small nations has passed away; the day of Empires has come – Joseph Chamberlain

There were those who thought that the Empire was transient and that the best way to secure Britain’s future as a great power was closer links with the colonies of white settlement

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18 P. Vasunia (2005), 54.
19 Attributed to a speech in Birmingham, 13 May 1904.
the idea of Greater Britain. For its advocates, ancient history, if anything, proved that empires were ‘self-dissolving’, and that Britain should break away from ancient models, both Roman and Greek: ‘empires modelled on their templates were doomed to eventual failure, whether by internal decay or the peaceful independence of the colonies’. Instead, Britain should follow its own path, and look to the modern world for ‘intellectual, political and moral inspiration’. The path was towards an Anglo-Saxon political community, the inspiration a belief in the progress of the Anglo-Saxon race, better inured in political freedom than any other, and destined to succeed where all mere empires had failed.

Chamberlain’s words are easily misunderstood, his use of the term ‘empires’ misleading. To understand it properly, his vision has to be seen in the context of the theories of Mahan and Mackinder. Alfred Mahan, an American Naval Officer, had in 1890 published *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, which emphasised the crucial role played by maritime power in determining world affairs. This view evidently reassured a Britain faced with increasing competition from states such as Germany and America whose demographic strength was all the greater for being relatively homogenous and concentrated in comparison to her own far flung and ethnically heterogeneous empire. Less assuring was British geographer Harold Mackinder’s paper ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, delivered in 1904, and which claimed that the ‘Columbian epoch’ of ‘overseas exploration and conquest by European powers’, was coming to an end, to be replaced by a dominance of large territorial (and demographic) units capable of sustaining a corresponding industrial base. The consequences for the United States, Russia, and potentially an expansionist Germany were clear, as were the consequences for Britain, as a relatively small European state whose power was dispersed across the globe. Thus the idea of Greater Britain was part of an attempt to evade this prophecy by creating an ethnically homogenous entity, variously envisaged as an oceanic state, federation, or looser community, rather than empire per se, which could compensate for Britain’s own demographic, territorial, and industrial shortfall. This was something which simply could not be done with the non Anglo-Saxon empire: ancient history showed what happened when one based one’s power on tribute and troops from subject races while neglecting the true basis of one’s power – invariably an ethnically homogenous and egalitarian citizen body. Even in seeking to transcend ancient models, Britons inevitably

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21 Bell, (2006), 735, 747.
ended up thinking of alternatives informed by the ancient past.\textsuperscript{23} ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.’\textsuperscript{24}

Not all political Liberals were as enthusiastic about Greater Britain as they were disdainful of the despotic Indian Empire, and not all made a conscious effort to abandon the ancient world as a source of prescient lessons. E.A. Freeman thought the Greek colonies demonstrated the folly of attempting to bind colonies to the metropolis. Relations between Corinth and her independent colony of Syracuse formed ‘a touching and beautiful tale of abiding friendship between two independent commonwealths’, those between Corinth and the dependent colony of Korcyra ended up with the colony winning its independence at the cost of ‘bitter and abiding hatred between colony and metropolis.’\textsuperscript{25} The example of Corinth and Korcyra reflected Britain’s mistake in America, that of Corinth and Syracuse the way things were and should remain between Britain and what became the Dominions.

For that matter, not all those in favour of Greater Britain were equally against the Indian Empire and its Roman exemplar. It must be remembered that for all its unsavoury political implications, which for liberal imperialists were in any case misunderstood and the price of spreading civilisation, the Indian Empire was, for the time being at least, a crucial part of Britain’s great power status and military power.\textsuperscript{26} The Indian empire was in the long term transient, not useless. James Bryce, a political Liberal and president of the Oxford branch of the Imperial Federation League (and so for the Anglo-Saxon political community) did not think British rule in India was a problem: it had always been ruled by despots, its diversity in race, religion and language made despotic governance necessary, and in any case its inhabitants cared little for self-rule. In its necessarily despotic nature British rule resembled Roman rule in the provinces. The point was that Britain, unlike Rome, was democratic at home.\textsuperscript{27} Before 1857, British liberal intellectuals had been very forthright in defending a civilising and progressive government in India which had as its aim the spread of

\textsuperscript{23} Bell indentified the irony inherent in attempts to avoid the fate of ancient empires by endorsing the example of the United States – itself modelled on an ancient republic. Bell (2007), 229-30.
\textsuperscript{24} K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).
\textsuperscript{25} E.A. Freeman, The History of Sicily from the Earliest Times (1891), Vol. 2, 35-36.
\textsuperscript{27} R. F. Betts, ‘The Allusion to Rome in British Imperialist Thought of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, Victorian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Dec., 1971), 155-56. Note also that Rome was the prime example of the difficulty in maintaining ‘libertas’ at home while also engaging in empire.
universal Western values. After 1857, and into the 1860s, this ‘universalist’ perspective had given way to a ‘culturalist’ one foreseeing a far more gradual – that is, effectively static – progression on the part of non-Europeans. Empire effectively meant the indefinite guardianship of subject peoples – more likely to end in overthrow than in the granting of democratic freedoms to fully prepared natives. By the end of the nineteenth century a leading Liberal statesman saw no contradiction in support for both a Greater Britain and such an empire of rule. Is Bryce representative? A detailed examination of British imperial thought is outside the scope of this study, but other figures also indicate an increasing liberal acceptance of empire by the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. One such example is Benjamin Jowett, liberal theologian and eminent scholar of Greek famous for his translation of Plato’s dialogues who became highly influential in the admissions to the Indian Civil Service. His students included three successive Indian Viceroyys, and he insisted on over half the marks in the Indian Civil Service exams to be in Latin and Greek so as to attract Classics graduates. This suggests that the notion that classical antiquity could provide relevant lessons for the present was still very much alive. Perhaps the point is that liberal statesmen, scholars, and thinkers, although they preferred the settlement colonies, were increasingly prepared to accept the facts of international politics.

That the role envisaged for the colonies came to be more important than ever at a time when liberal opinion was increasingly reconciled to the Indian empire as a problematic, transient, but nonetheless morally justifiable geopolitical necessity, is perfectly logical. We have already seen how the idea of Greater Britain was situated in the geopolitical foreboding of the time, influenced by such ideas as those of Mackinder. Britain’s dependence on India for its demographic and territorial clout could be seen as a major weakness. According to conceptions of the rise and fall of empires informed by the study of the ancient world, ideas of race, and more recent events such as the Indian Mutiny, any empire, by virtue of being based on despotic rule over other peoples, especially very different ones incapable of political freedom, are doomed to fall, eventually. Closer integration with the colonies offered a

30 Bernard Porter, like Koditschek and Mantena, situates the disillusionment with the ‘civilising mission’, or the transformative capacity of empire, to the mid nineteenth century, coinciding with the Indian Mutiny of 1857: ‘in some circles, the second half of the nineteenth century was marked by a growing lack of faith in the ability of non-European nations to become moulded and perfected in a Western pattern’. It gave rise to three other options – indirect rule, benevolent despotism [as was the practice in India and Egypt], or withdrawal. Porter (2008), 25-27.
unique way not of avoiding these problems – for they were unavoidable – but of making them irrelevant by ensuring that Britain’s future power would rest on far firmer, more permanent, foundations. Comprised of self-governing Anglo-Saxon settlers, together, the colonies would not constitute an empire, but as John Seeley put it, a ‘vast English nation’. Indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century colonisation could more than ever be seen as a means of achieving the double purpose of making emigration contribute not detract from Britain demographically and thereby creating that Oceanic nation – a Britannic nation – which could compete with the great white territorial empires. The Weltpolitik of a geopolitically surrounded Germany meant that it too was eager for colonies, for very much the same reason – Germans could emigrate and remain German, contributing to a Greater Germany, rather than adding to the strength of the United States.

Such concerns were not limited to Britain, but also extended to the colonies themselves. In his piece for the periodical Nineteenth Century titled ‘Greater or Lesser Britain’, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Julius Vogel, wrote that a confederation would save Britain from the fate of Holland, instead enabling her to retain ‘in her own dominions her subjects and their wealth, and not to drive them abroad’. Under a confederation, ‘the enterprise of her people’ would be ‘devoted to enlarging the power of their country, instead of their diminishing it by becoming subjects of other nations.’ In the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth the increasing popularity of a British imperial identity went hand in hand with growing national consciousness among the settler colonies. This may seem contradictory, but the development of colonial ‘national identity’ entailed rejecting ‘subservience’ to the British government while at the same time ‘affirming equality’ with Britain: a Britannic nationalism. This had several advantages, one of which was that it would

31 Darwin (2009), 178.
32 An early manifestation of this idea is James Anthony Froude, who bemoaned the fact that ‘without colonies the natural growth of our population must overflow into foreign countries...if we allow them passively to become parts of another community, we are losing elements of strength which might be of more worth to us than the gold mines of Ballarat [in Australia]’. He also cited the example of the Irish in the United States who had been carelessly been allowed to emigrate there thus creating ‘an element dangerously hostile to us across the Atlantic’. J.A. Froude, ‘The Colonies Once More’, Fraser’s Magazine, Vol. 82 (Sept. 1870), 269-87, in P. Cain, ‘Empire and Imperialism: The Debate of the 1870s’, Key Issues No. 20 (1999), 54.
enable the colonies to expand whilst remaining under British protection, and the other being that affirming a ‘Britannic’ identity could provide social cohesion in these growing states.35

Colonisation, or emigration to the colonies, was itself seen as an answer to Britain’s social problems. Late Victorian fears about demographic growth36 and the pending enfranchisement of an urban underclass – frequently referred to in the language of hygiene and degeneracy – fed the fears of social conflict and even revolution.37 As we have seen, emigration, primarily destined for the United States, increased the strength of a rival while doing nothing to alleviate anxiety about Britain’s position in the world.38 Emigration to the colonies, on the other hand, could at the same time increase Britain’s military and economic strength and relieve it of social pressures.39 This solution could appeal to a broad range of opinion about the future of Britain’s relations with the colonies – from those who favoured eventual separation to those who wanted a globe-spanning Anglo-Saxon federal state. Although there were concerns among colonial governments about uncontrolled immigration,40 both British commentators and the colonies themselves saw the potential promise of emigration: a Britain devoid of social conflict and urban degeneration could be remade in the colonies,41 and emigration would form part of the growth necessary to form dynamic states out of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.42 British perceptions of the colonies, and the colonies’ own perceptions of their place in the British system, were generally positive. There is little sense of any disquiet over the consequences of colonisation for indigenous peoples.43

35 Darwin (2009), 147. From 1907 the settler colonies were called ‘dominions’: see Darwin (2009), 11.
37 Bell (2007), 48, 52, 54.
38 Bell (2007), 54.
39 This was not a new development of the late nineteenth century – as early as the 1830s J.S. Mill wrote in favour of colonisation as a means of answering the ‘social question’. See D. Bell, ‘John Stuart Mill on Colonies’, Political Theory, Vol. 38, No.1, (2010), 13.
40 Bell (2007), 54-55.
42 Darwin (2009), 148, 153, 172-73. English speaking Canada saw the settlement of the West as a means of outnumbering the French. New Zealand Premier Julius Vogel advocated railway building and subsidised immigration in order to kick-start growth and create a country which would replicate Britain – only without the industrialism.
43 According to Bell, J.S. Mill (who belonged to the same generation as Grote, coming to an end around 1870), came to be more critical of colonisation nearer the end of his life: the colonies were guilty of protectionism, and, he finally recognised, ‘barbarism in their treatment of indigenous peoples’. Bell (2010), 20.
The Scholars

Before proceeding to discuss British scholarship on Greek colonisation (1870-1914) we will consider where the scholars in question should be positioned in terms of the political, intellectual, and colonial context outlined above. These scholars include Evelyn Abbott (1843-1901), who published a *History of Greece* in 1888, J.B. Bury, (1861-1927) whose *A History of Greece*, first published in 1900, became a standard textbook of remarkable longevity, and also scholars who touch upon Greek colonisation from different directions: Sir Edward Bunbury (1811-1895) and his *History of Ancient Geography*, and E.A. Freeman (1823-1892) who wrote *The History of Sicily*.

E.A. Freeman

E.A. Freeman has been subject to some of the most vocal criticism of earlier scholarship. Shepherd writes how Freeman made overt use of the ‘ideals of high empire and the notions of race, hierarchy and fidelity combined with modern analogy’,44 thus distorting Greek colonisation. The latter proposition is no doubt true, and Freeman’s ideas of racial hierarchies are indeed evocative of the era of high empire, but Freeman was if anything part of an intellectual discourse *critical* of empire, and his ideas were anything but an endorsement of Britain’s status as a great heterogeneous world empire in which whites ruled over lesser races. Freeman was not a young man in the 1890s, and his ideas were grounded in an earlier tradition of liberal scholarship about civilisation, the east, and the place of ancient Greece as well as being strongly influenced by the international politics of the 1870s.

Freeman shared with Grote the idea of an oppositional relationship between east and west, and that only the latter could progress and attain the highest levels of civilisation. On the very first page of the preface to his history of Sicily Freeman quoted Grote’s remarks that the conflict between the Phoenicians and Greeks on Sicily, like those between Saracens and Normans, would determine whether Sicily be part of Europe or Africa, which he himself repeated more forcefully as a conflict between Ayran and Semite prefiguring the Crusades.45 In a review of Grote’s *History of Greece*, Freeman praised his bringing to light the political

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genius of the Greeks. Freeman’s politics were of a similarly radical Liberal bent to Grote’s and their work both informed and was informed by this political outlook. Freeman, however, was most famous for his history of the Norman Conquests, and this interest in medieval history resulted in a firmer belief in the Anglo-Saxon race and its unique ability for political freedom derived from the ‘free forests of Germany’. For Freeman medieval history was in no way isolated from that of the ancient world – he believed in the ‘Unity of History’, and his scholarship had as a consistent focus the study of those ‘Aryan’ political institutions best representing freedom.

There were other differences. As far as we can infer from his writings on Greek colonisation and Hellenistic imperialism, Grote’s liberalism drove him to pessimism as far as assimilating lesser races was concerned. Freeman, for all his strident remarks about the ‘foul and bloody rites’ of the Phoenician gods in his history of Sicily, wrote that if the Hamilkar and Hannibal of the fifth century B.C. were ‘still essentially barbarians’, those of the third century were ‘essentially Europeans’ equal to the greatest names in Greek and Italian history. He was tempted to think that the Phoenicians, ‘political peers of the European nations’, had ‘drunk in something of the spirit of the West, and had almost parted company with the barbaric kingdoms of Asia.’ Freeman’s conception of race, for him a product of modern scientific and historical inquiry, was with the notable exception of black Africans linguistic rather than biological. In his preface to Freeman’s The Historical Geography of Europe, J.B. Bury wrote that were Freeman alive to edit his work anew, he would probably have modified his language: although Aryanism was one of the pillars of Freeman’s ‘construction of history’, what he really meant by the term Aryan was ‘of Aryan speech – speech was his criterion’, and therefore the ‘inference from Aryan speech to Aryan stock is invalid.’ After all, Bury thought it to be ‘certain that all the European peoples who spoke or speak tongues of this [Indo-European] family are not of common race, and many of them probably have very little ‘Aryan’ blood.’ Freeman was influenced by the ideas of Max

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47 See Parker (1981), 827.
49 E.A. Freeman, ‘Carthage’ in The Contemporary Review, Vol. ??, (Sept. 1890), 359. This article is one of several works belonging to J.B. Bury which found their way into the library of the British School at Rome following his death, in Rome, in 1927.
50 Freeman (Sept. 1890), 358-59.
51 Parker (1981), 836.
52 Whom Freeman once described as young scholar destined to do ‘great things for the Unity of History’: Freeman, (1891), Vol. 1, xvii.
Müller (1823-1900), and this emphasis on the philological as opposed to physiological basis of the Aryan race enabled him to ‘reconcile his Teutonism with his broader classicism and his concept of Christendom.’ 54 Although in theory open to other races, none of this means he was generous towards the unassimilated. The other great influence on his work was, as stated above, contemporary politics. His views on this were inextricably linked to his views on history, especially a belief in Aryan Anglo-Saxon political freedom eclipsing that of Europe but defined in opposition to the east.

In the 1870s the Ottoman Empire still ruled over Christian peoples in the Balkans, and Revolts against Ottoman rule in Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875 resulted in brutal reprisals from the Ottomans, became known in Britain as the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876. 55 Propping up the Ottoman Empire against Russia was a cornerstone of British imperial strategy, especially since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made the Eastern Mediterranean the best route to an India threatened by that same power. 56 This was known as the Eastern Question, and at the very time it erupted into violence, Disraeli was busily increasing the symbolic importance of the Indian Empire, in 1876 proclaiming Queen Victoria Empress of India. Gladstone was as critical of the Ottoman Empire and the Bulgarian atrocities as he was of Disraeli’s New Imperialism, and in the same year he published the pamphlet The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, 57 the start of a campaign which would see some of Britain’s foremost intellectuals vent their fury at Disraeli’s policy. 58 Among this

54 See Parker (1981), esp. 834-35. Müller, a scholar of Sanskrit, saw both South Asians and Europeans as heirs to a common linguistic and religious heritage, and the sacred text Rig Veda as the oldest example of Aryan speech and thought. In contemporary terms this would have meant elevating then subject India to a position of common heritage with its British masters. Although the term IndoEuropean was created as early as 1813, Müller was highly influential, and according to Ballantyne ‘cemented the centrality of ‘Aryan’ within the lexicon of European ethnology and imperial culture.’ See T. Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (2002), 41-44. For the conflict between Teutonism and Classicism, see Horsman (1981), 75 and J. Samson, Race and Empire (Harlow; New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005), 43.


58 Gladstone seems to have found Oriental despotism so odious that it coloured his views on Virgil: ‘This relationship between Virgil and Augustus, so close to the kind stereotypically attributed to oriental courts with their despots and sycophants, was contrary to the ideals of parliamentary democracy or liberal empire, and unacceptable to the reformist Gladstone on political grounds...’ from P. Vasunia, ‘Virgil and the British Empire, 1760-1880’, in Proceedings of the British Academy, 155, ‘The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought’ (2009), 110-11.
élite spanning science, history, the law, and politics and including Charles Darwin, Lord Acton, James Bryce, and many more, was E.A. Freeman.59

Freeman had as a boy been sympathetic to Greek independence60, and the idea of European, Christian, peoples governed by an Asiatic, Islamic, empire was for him an anathema.61 In Freeman’s world view, the East was essentially the same, and as such it had constituted an eternal opposite to the West. In the same way as one could glimpse incipient modern European civilisation in the beginnings of Greece, once could also see the ancient empire of Nebuchadnezzar ‘reproduced in every essential feature at the court of any modern oriental despot’.62 That some of the earliest homes of Christianity and European civilisation were under the control of such an oriental despotism, and especially one which adhered to the faith that was ‘the most direct enemy and rival of Christianity’, was simply intolerable. More intolerable still was that Disraeli – who was in any case of suspect racial provenance – was allowing this outrage to go unchecked because of an inherently flawed imperial interest. Gladstone was an outspoken critic of Disraeli’s imperial expansion, and Freeman belonged to a more extreme version of this Liberal vision of the Empire, caring very little for the larger part of it. Garrisons and forts in the midst of barbarian peoples (such as in India) would not result in the permanent extension of Europe: the real instances of colonisation were those of Europeans in places such as Canada, Australia and most importantly, the United States, where the constitution of Greece was born again.63 Tellingly, the latter was, of course, not even part of the British Empire. Indeed, he once referred to George Washington as the ‘true Expander of England’.64 Unlike other liberal Anglo-Saxonists critical of the longevity and utility of empire on the Indian model, Freeman’s understanding of Greek colonial history reflects an opposition to the idea of an Imperial Federation. In 1885 he delivered two lectures, ‘Greater Greece and greater Britain’ and ‘George Washington, the expander of England’, criticising such plans.65 This could be read as a belief that attempting to formalise relations between Britain and her colonies with the intention of creating a state to transcend

64 Vasunia (2005), 53.
doomed heterogeneous empires was a contradictory ambition – the lesson of history, especially Greek and American colonial history, was that regardless of ties of kith and kin, political control over colonies was contrary to the Greek and Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberty – and it could only end in enmity and secession on hostile terms. We should not read this as a belief that racial ideas do not matter because empires are doomed whoever they govern – instead there is an implication that governing Anglo-Saxons (and Greeks) despotically is perhaps even more untenable because of their superior and intrinsic capacity for freedom and self-governance.

It is clearly misleading to portray Freeman as an archetypal scholar of high empire unless we understand that this period was in fact defined by debate and disagreement about what form, if any, empire should take. Freeman’s ideals were of a racial Anglo-Saxonism inextricably linked with political freedom and independent colonies of settlement echoing those of ancient Greece – a world away from the Indian Empire of Imperial Viceroyos and Delhi Durbars, but also strikingly different to other visions (i.e. colonial unity) from within his own intellectual and political milieu. That milieu, as we have seen, was in any case capable of great diversity of opinion not only in terms of what to do with the colonies but also in terms of varying attitudes towards the Indian empire of rule. It is ill advised, especially when writing about approaches to colonisation and empire, to assume there to have been a single coherent way of seeing those things in the age of High Empire. It would be equally misleading to depict Freeman as an extreme figure marrying crude racial ideas with strange political ideas. His racial ideas were more complex than they appear at first glance, and his mix of political liberalism and Anglo-Saxon racialism although perplexing to modern audiences were perfectly coherent and indeed widespread at the time. Recent notions of a political left and right, of liberal and conservative, and where racial ideas belong in such a framework, are evidently misleading in looking at this period. In spite of Queen Victoria’s opposition to the appointment of a man with republican sympathies, with Gladstone’s help

66 J. Bryce, ‘Edward Augustus Freeman’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 7, No. 27 (Jul., 1892), 502. The First Viscount Bryce (1838-1922) was variously a historian, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, Liberal politician, and Ambassador to the United States. He condemned the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks, and produced the Bryce report on German atrocities in Belgium. His account of Freeman’s life and work, is further testament to Freeman’s far from marginal position in late nineteenth century Britain.
he became the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 1884.68 This position, an association with Gladstone, and the fact that he was father in law to Sir Arthur Evans indicate that Freeman was not a marginal figure. Rather than demonstrating the ‘ideals of high empire’69 he should be positioned within a canon of liberal thought critical of empire, for Anglo-Saxon freedom, yet who did not allow his Teutonism to override his Classicism, or most importantly, his Hellenism. Freeman’s view of Greece and the basis of its genius was entirely consistent with liberal thought before and after: ‘in truth, the pre-eminence of Athens in literature, philosophy, and art, was simply the natural result of her pre-eminence in freedom and good government.’70

Bunbury and Abbott

Freeman’s work is striking for its very immediate connection to contemporary politics and its highly explicit overarching framework – conflict between the free Aryan, the servile easterner, and the Semite. Freeman’s ideas, although their expression in racial terms make them sound different, were in fact but a continuation of a wider liberal, British, trend to define civilisational progress in terms of the supremacy of the free liberal Englishman over reactionary tendencies at home, the free Anglo-Saxon over a varyingly despotic Europe, and a broadly speaking progressive Europe over a despotic and stagnant Asia. This mirrored the supremacy of democracy in Athens, Athens in Greece, and Greece in the ancient world. The works of Sir Edward Bunbury and Evelyn Abbott, two very different scholars, are on the other hand much more visibly a continuation of trends already apparent from the earliest liberal histories of Thirlwall and Grote. Bunbury wrote at the same time of Greek colonies such as Cyrene and Hesperides as constituting an ‘oasis of civilisation in the midst of surrounding barbarism’71 and the ‘influence of the Asiatic civilisation upon their then ruder [Greek] neighbours’.72 The allusion to then ruder neighbours carries an implication with a long history: the Greeks were once barbarous, but were subsequently improved by the Phoenicians, and surpassed their oriental tutors. Abbott, very much a conservative scholar,

68 Stephensen (2007), 133.
70 Freeman (1856), 142.
72 Bunbury (1883), Vol 1, 115.
and in this ‘typical of the growing conservatism of late-century university intellectuals’, similarly echoes earlier work in his depiction of once rude Greece, itself guilty of barbaric religious practices at this early age, expelling the Phoenicians and their ‘inhuman rites’ yet receiving from them metalworking and letters. There is a pattern of stating some reservations regarding Phoenician civilisation while at the same time recognising their technological superiority to the Greeks – in aid of course of a wider schema in which Greeks overtake them. In a manner not dissimilar to Grote, Abbott concludes that it is not known how the Greeks resisted ‘amalgamation’ with the Phoenicians, who ‘in material civilisation were far their superiors’, but that evidence suggests ‘before the dawn of Western history, the Phoenicians were expelled from the peninsula of Greece and the northern islands of the Aegean, by the nation to whom we owe the gift of Hellenic civilisation, poetry and thought.’ In resisting ‘amalgamation’ the Greeks spared themselves from corrupting influences which would have stunted the development of their civilisation. The overall thrust of their histories is the same privileging of Greece in the ancient world in a way that reflected Europe in the modern. This is the case for both liberal and conservative scholars.

J.B. Bury

The republics of Greece had performed an imperishable work; they had shown mankind many things, and, above all, the most precious thing in the world, fearless freedom of thought – J.B. Bury

By the very end of the nineteenth century we can see that the place given to Greece in history is even more unambiguously central than it was with Grote, Freeman, Bunbury and Abbott. J. B. Bury’s A History of Greece, first published in 1900, became a very widely used

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74 Abbott (1888), Part I, 54.
75 E. Abbott, History of Greece (1888), Part I, 51-52. This is the very same Abbott as the scholars responsible for the famous, and still widely used, Abbot and Mansfield primer of Greek grammar. Abbott was clearly and admirer of German scholarship, and in his Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens (1891) he mentions his debt to the German histories of Greece by Duncker, Busolt, and Holm. He was in fact responsible for translating the English edition of Max Duncker’s five volume The History of Antiquity (1877) which charted the history of ancient civilisations including those of the East with a view to understanding and establishing ‘the value and extent of those early phases of civilisation to which the entire development of the human race goes back’, and concludes with the first clashes between East and West which were the Persian Wars. See M. Duckner, The History of Antiquity (1877), vi, ix.
76 Abbott (1888), Part I, 55.
77 The very last line of A History of Greece.
A single volume Greek history for students, scholars, and a wider educated audience. Bury was an eminent Classical and Byzantine scholar, and had as his (only) student the equally eminent Crusade and Byzantine historian Steven Runciman. His view of history did not however rely on students for their survival and transmission, as a second edition of his history of Greece was published in 1913, a third in 1951, and a fourth with the aid of Russell Meiggs in 1975. Subsequent reprints included further revisions, and modifications of Bury’s views about eastern influences – reflecting both advances in scholarship and the sensibilities of that era. Bury wrote at the high point of British liberalism, and although he was a much less publicly involved than such scholars as Grote, Freeman, and Bunbury, he nevertheless made notable intellectual contributions which spoke to this liberal era.

*History of Freedom of Thought* (1914) stands out, a work as forthright in its defence of freedom of expression as it is critical of religion, tyranny, and intolerance. Chapters went under such telling titles as ‘Reason Free (Greece and Rome)’ and ‘Reason in Prison (The Middle Ages)’, at once an indication of Bury’s interest in ideas of progress, and of the esteem in which he held the Athenian Hellenism. His description of the ‘debt which civilization owes to the Greeks’ lends further meaning to his ideas about eastern influences expressed in *A History of Greece*. In that work, he wrote that in giving the Greeks the alphabet the Phoenicians ‘rendered to Hellas and thereby to Europe’ one ‘inestimable service’. It may have been a Phoenician gift, but in moulding the alphabet to the needs of the Greek language, the Greeks ‘showed their genius’. In this way, and consistent with a century of scholarship, Bury turns a Phoenician invention into a demonstration of Greek genius. Apart from its eighteenth century provenance this assertion seems to have had some grounding in the literary evidence – Plato, after all, remarked that ‘whatever Greeks acquire

78 Other headings included ‘Prospect of Deliverance (‘The Renaissance and the Reformation’, ‘The Growth of Rationalism (The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries)’, and ‘The Progress of Rationalism (Nineteenth Century)’.

79 Bury’s interest in ideas of progress is well illustrated in *The Idea of Progress* (1920). In relation to the importance of Athens, Bury wrote: ‘In this chapter “the Greeks” does not mean all the Greeks, but only those who count most in the history of civilization, especially the Ionians and Athenians.’ J.B. Bury, *A History of Freedom of Thought* (1914), 23. For the debt of civilisation to the Greeks, see Bury (1914), 21-22.

80 Note how both Grote and Bury use the very same word, ‘inestimable’, to describe the Phoenician gift of the alphabet.

81 J.B. Bury, *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great* (London: 1900), 77. Bury’s account of Greek ‘genius’ appears a bizarre parody of the rather similar arguments made today whenever one scholar or another reads ‘against the grain’ in order to give natives the ‘agency’ they deserve in colonial interactions. The difference is that the natives in this case are the sublime Greeks.
from foreigners is finally turned by them into something nobler’ (*Epinomis* 987e). Where Bury departs from earlier works is in his omission of any mention of ‘rude’ Greeks receiving civilisation from the Phoenicians. Instead he concentrates on the matter of art:

The Phoenicians exerted little or insignificant influence upon Greek art; on the contrary, it was probably from Aegean art that they learned much of what they know. They had no artistic genius; they were imitators, not creators.

Art would not have been considered as an aspect of material civilisation – i.e. that which the east could teach. More importantly here is that if we combine these views of Bury’s on eastern influences with his views on Greece in *A History of Freedom of Thought* we see the rationale behind such dismissals. Greek art could not be derived from the east because the east was not free. Bury thought that ‘our deepest gratitude is due to them [the Greeks] as the originators of liberty of thought and discussion.’ This is crucial because ‘this freedom of spirit was not only the condition of their speculations in philosophy, their progress in science, their experiments in political institutions; it was also a condition of their literary and artistic excellence. Their literature, for instance, could not have been what it is if they had been debarred from free criticism of life.’ Here glimpse of an idea that became a pervasive part of the self-identification of free societies from Bury’s day to the Cold War: that open societies are not only better places in which to live, but they are also more likely to innovative, prosperous, and successful. In this way Bury built on earlier ideas of the essential difference between a free and innovative west and a despotic and stagnant east evident with Grote. Perhaps his Greeks spoke to the idealism, rather than the anxiety, of pre-war liberal Britain. Would it be going too far to say that Bury’s Athens offered a direct parallel to Britain at its height?

But apart from what they actually accomplished, even if they had not achieved the wonderful things they did in most of the realms of human activity, their

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82 I came across this remark courtesy of Chad Lazdins. Fittingly it is the Athenian who makes it, having first commented on the ideal nature of the Greek climate as being not too hot nor too cold, and thus most favourable to human excellence (*Plato, Epinomis* 987d). It would be interesting to consider whether the perceptions of imperial Britons were in themselves based on a trusting or receptive reading of what Athenians, not shy of conquest, said about themselves.

83 E.g. Gillies, Mitford, Thirlwall, and even Grote, Abbott and Bunbury.

84 Bury (1900), 78.
assertion of the principle of liberty would place them in the highest rank among the benefactors of the race; for it was one of the greatest steps in human progress.\textsuperscript{85}

This is possible, indeed, considering the tendency of previous scholarship, most notably George Grote, to see equivalence between democratic Athens and liberal England, even likely.

As one should now come to expect from liberal scholarship, Bury is no simple eulogist of Britain and of Greece, and nor are his views on empire either as simple as denunciation or uncritical praise. Bury’s views about the nature of civilisation are as suffused in critical reflection as any of his predecessors. It may seem strange, in view of his image of Greek and Athenian superiority vis-à-vis the Phoenicians, that he also credits the Greeks with the creation of the very idea of prejudiced cultural supremacism towards others denigrated as ‘barbarians’: an idea ‘quite new’ and ‘destined to control the future’. He thought that it was in the fourth century BC that the term ‘barbarian’ acquired its ‘depreciatory meaning’: what was once a neutral term ‘equivalent to non-Greek’ came to ‘imply moral and intellectual inferiority’. This ‘prejudice’ had its roots in the fifth century and was diffused by the Athenians. It was present in Euripides’ \textit{Medea}, \textit{Andromache}, and \textit{Iphigenia in Aulis}, and Bury quotes from the latter: “It accords with the fitness of things that barbarians should be subject to Greeks, for Greeks are freemen and barbarians are slaves by nature”. This notion of barbarian inferiority which began after the Persian Wars, ‘probably at Athens, was propagated from this “School of Hellas,” and became in the fourth century a dogma accepted throughout the Greek world, firmly held by men like Aristotle and Isocrates.’ This belief in ‘their privileged position’ was ‘as strong as the belief of the white races in their superiority to the coloured races to-day’: others were permitted to learn from their example, but to be ‘kept in their place’.\textsuperscript{86} Was Bury making a direct yet not unambiguously flattering parallel with contemporary Europe?

Their eminent intellectual and artistic attainments, all they did for our own civilization, may prompt us to be indulgent to this self-exaltation; but the idea

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\textsuperscript{85} J.B. Bury, \textit{A History of Freedom of Thought} (1914), 21-22.
\textsuperscript{86} J.B. Bury (ed.), \textit{The Hellenistic Age and the History of Civilisation} (1923), 24-25.
degenerated into an intolerant bigotry which a modern writer has considered a leading cause of their political decline. 87

Bury then continues to describe quite positively how ‘there was born, however, in the generation after Alexander’s death, another idea, sharply contrasted with this exclusiveness – the idea of mankind as one great community, the ideal of a state embracing the whole oecumene.’ This was the philosophy of Zeno, whom Bury credited with introducing the idea of a cosmopolitanism ‘transcending patriotism’ and ‘embracing all rational beings’ ‘without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian’ – of an ‘ideal state’ where ‘all human beings were citizens’. This idea was born, says Bury, at an ‘opportune’ moment, as it corresponded with what he saw as the revolutionary feature of Alexander’s empire: that is the ‘breaking down’ of ‘racial antagonisms and overcoming or softening the distinction between Greek and barbarian’. Even if Aristotle taught him to ‘treat the Greeks as a leader, but the barbarians as a despot’ in a way reminiscent of the British system of democracy at home, despotism abroad, Alexander ‘recognized non-Greeks as part of the human family with equal claims on a common ruler’. 88

If we recall, for George Grote the Hellenistic Empires and those Greeks who ventured to the East represented little but the corruption of the Athenian ideal: they achieved a superficial Hellenization and the price was that they ‘ceased to be hellenic’ – or ‘real’ Greeks like those of fifth century Athens. 89 Bury’s view of the Hellenistic world is radically different. To begin with, unlike Grote, and in spite of the downfall of Athenian democracy, Bury appears to have seen the Hellenistic world as one of progress: it was a tolerant society where ‘thought was perfectly free’ and the power of the gods much diminished. Philosophic and scientific advances once ridiculed (that the earth moved and was round) were now accepted rather than scorned. 90 Bury expressed admiration for Alexander’s desire to rule Greeks and barbarians on a basis of equality in A History of Greece, in 1900, and he argues in the closing paragraphs of that book that had Aristotle had his way, and implemented his ‘ideal’ city (which was an egalitarian community of citizens with non-Greek slaves tilling their fields), then Greece would not ‘have done what they did for European civilisation’. 91

88 Bury (1923), 26-27.
90 Bury (1923), 5.
this we can recognise a glimpse of things to come – the idea that a certain loss of purity is the price of being part of a greater thing.

This is entirely at odds with Grote. Grote drew parallels between Aristotle’s advice to Alexander (i.e. to treat the Greeks as a leader, barbarians as a despot), and Edmund Burke’s suggested policy for the British government in America and India respectively.\textsuperscript{92} Grote, influenced by James Mill,\textsuperscript{93} was evidently of the liberal school of thought regarding India – if it had to be done, there needed to be a strict separation between the two spheres so as to avoid the contamination of the democracy at home by the despotism abroad.\textsuperscript{94} Alexander’s actions, to him, were as though the British government had decided to unite the empire as one, governing all its subjects on a basis of equality – and since ‘no Greek [or British] thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity upon which the march of every Grecian [or British] community was based’\textsuperscript{95} – this would have meant degrading the status of the white empire to the despotism appropriate to the rest. This was the defining trait of liberal reservations about empire: that despotism abroad would soon mean despotism at home. The corrupting influence of exercising despotic rule over lesser races, along with the exaggerated importance of military institutions, would one day threaten liberal democracy at home.

Why, therefore, did Bury, no less a believer in the magnificence of Athenian democratic ideal, think differently? That Bury thought differently in 1900 indicates that it was not the Great War which made him shun Grote’s segregationist view of empire, or give him his internationalism and distaste for chauvinism – but the war may well have confirmed these ideas. Come 1923, Bury was much more explicit:

... has there been any more salient feature in the advancing movement of human society than the linking up of all parts of the oecumene and the propagation of Western civilization, of which the foundations were laid in Greece, to all the margins of the world? In that movement Alexander took the first step. And in modern times the confederate idea of the solidarity and fellowship of the human race has become an active and driving force. It has expressed itself as Internationalism which breaks down barriers and disowns country. It has

\textsuperscript{93} Vasunia (2007), 93.
\textsuperscript{94} It had to be despotism, as natives were incapable of political freedom.
expressed itself in the League of Nations. It is the intellectual basis of humanitarianism. It was Zeno who first taught men to think in terms of the oecumene.  

What this says about Bury’s views regarding empire and the spreading of civilisation to other peoples is ambiguous, and will be discussed shortly. Perhaps the most important thing to note here is Bury’s open avowal of internationalism and disavowal of nation, and considering how this argument is developed in his text – as stemming from Athenian and wider Greek conceit and chauvinism – it is tempting to think that Bury’s Greece is a direct reflection of modern Britain and Europe where the forces of a belligerent and chauvinistic nationalism on the part of all nations led to a catastrophe.

In this internationalism, Bury looks to the next generation of liberal scholars, and as we shall see, an internationalism informed by what could be called a ‘liberal Hellenism’ became the creed of such individuals as Gilbert Murray. But what of Bury and empire – should we see the criticism of chauvinism as connecting indirectly to the conflicts within Europe? Or should we take it more directly, and assume instead, or additionally, to refer to European – indeed British – prejudice towards the ‘coloured races’? The way that Bury describes Alexander’s conquests in a positive light, and refers to the challenges faced by Rome in ruling Oriental nations and ‘wild backward sections of mankind’, suggests that he did not have much objection towards empire per se – but only against the kind of empire which was founded on prejudice and slavery. In this he is consistent with earlier, and rather hopeful, liberal thought about what the imperial rule in the east and elsewhere should be. He does mention the British Empire in connection to Roman imperialism, mainly, it seems, to discredit the claims of both to have been in any way ‘defensive’, and also to advise some caution to what has already been hinted earlier in this chapter – that Classical antiquity offered the pleasing vision for middle class Britons of (often eastern) despots being dictated to by free citizens. He could appreciate how ‘in modern times, since the rise of democracies’, ‘it has been exhilarating and edifying to see proud monarchs trembling at the word of a plain Roman’, but suggested that ‘the government of the Republic was an oligarchy as grasping and greedy as any of the majesties whom its consuls and ambassadors humiliated.’ Was Bury representative? He presents us with a plausible view of what the assumptions and

96 Bury (1923), 29-30.
97 Bury (1923), 13-14.
98 Bury (1923), 12-13.
outlook of liberal scholars, both at the turn of the century and after the calamity of 1914-18, would be like. Bury admired Athens and Greece, and thought them the pinnacle of ancient civilisation as much as did Grote, yet he was more willing to see the good in other societies, in other periods, and to recognise the flaws in those liberal idols. As a historian of Byzantium, his horizons were as broad as those of E.A. Freeman in that both sought to appreciate the unity of history rather than focus on one brilliant moment in the history of western civilisation – not that they doubted it. Unlike Freeman, he seems to have been critical of chauvinism – nationalist and racist – yet reconciled to ‘good’ empire as a form of internationalism and a civilising force. He appears also to embody a classic liberal conception of progress as tied to increasing liberalism, secularisation, and democratisation, yet Bury also very much belongs to the twentieth century, and seems consistent with what would be the British self-image for years to come: as a benign, moderating force in the world, the head of a vast multi-ethnic empire, guarantor of European peace.

Having defined the context, it is now time to turn to the way these scholars wrote about Greek colonisation. Scholarship from the age of high empire might be expected to reflect contemporary views about colonisation in writings about the ancient world in the most immediate way – seeing Greek colonisation as mirroring the links between Britain and its white settler colonies. It is far from clear, however, that views of British colonisation in this era matchup to what more recent scholarship supposes them to have been, and as we have seen, there was in fact in this very period debate as to what form that relationship, whatever it was, should in future take. Recent work on the historiography of colonisation seems to overlook how even on a general level ‘most of the energy behind British expansion was private, not public.’

99 This means that although colonies were under nominally under British control, much of the energy for colonisation came from the colonies themselves and private initiative in Britain. Therefore, it will be argued that if there is any ‘statist’ bias in scholarship from this period, then it might have little to do with modern British colonisation, and all to do with the retrojections of ancient writers. This discussion will follow the format used with scholarship from 1780-1870 in examining the views of various scholars on the three themes of colonial dependence, colonisation as an act of state, and native peoples.

99 Darwin (2009), 144.
Colonisation as an Act of State 1870-1914

In order to understand the way these scholars wrote about this specific aspect of Greek colonisation it is important to appreciate firstly the esteem in which Greece was held by liberal Britons and the interest it held as a model of a western civilisation’s rise, secondly that scholars were faithful to what were (significantly) incomplete ancient accounts, and thirdly the nature of British colonisation itself in this period. It will be demonstrated that Greek colonisation was seen as symptomatic of the dynamic energies released by a rising civilisation, mirroring modern Britain. The literary evidence, depicting a strange and fragmented mixture of state involvement in certain cases (namely Herodotus on Cyrene), discontented individuals (the bulk of the evidence), and overseas adventure, at once offered parallels with British colonisation itself. This, far from an uniform state-organised phenomenon, instead a similarly variable blend of fortune-seeking, discontent, and state backing, was so complex a thing that it demanded the vaguest of explanations: a colonising ‘spirit’. The incomplete nature of the literary evidence further invited scholars to ‘fill in the blanks’ with elements of the colonising movement they knew best – that of their own country.

Edward Bunbury began his discussion of Greek colonisation with a direct comparison with British expansion. He wrote of a ‘remarkable movement of the Hellenic mind’, an ‘early development’ of ‘national energies’ the results of which were displayed ‘in almost every direction during the period in question’:

Nowhere is this more strikingly shown than in the rapid extension of their colonies around the shores of the Mediterranean and the Euxine, until they had laid the foundations of a colonial empire, which bore much the same relation to the narrow and limited area of the parent country, as does the British Empire at the present day to the British Islands.\(^{100}\)

\(^{100}\) Bunbury (1883), Vol 1, 91.
This was an exciting period in Greek history, and Bunbury’s depiction of it finds resonance in the other works from this period. Evelyn Abbott wrote of Greek colonisation as stimulated by commerce as the Hellenes outdid the Phoenicians who had in earlier times introduced it. Populations rose, noble power ‘counterbalanced that of the monarchs’, trade and commerce created a wealthy class which demanded a share in government – ‘Money, not birth, now made the man.’ The prospect of a better life and better status attracted the impoverished, discontented, and ‘ruined aristocrats’ alike. Meanwhile the suppression of piracy and improvements in shipbuilding ‘allowed the mariners to become acquainted with distant shores, and productive regions, whose wealth was but imperfectly known to the ignorant and barbarous natives. Such were the general causes from which the new impulse to colonisation arose…’.

For J.B. Bury, Greek colonisation was something more than commercial gain:

The cause of Greek colonisation is not to be found in mere trade interests. These indeed were in most cases a motive, and in some of the settlements of the Black Sea they were perhaps a leading motive. But the great difference between Greek and Phoenician colonisation is that, while the Phoenicians aimed solely at promoting their commerce, and only a few of their settlements, notably Carthage, became more than mere trading-stations or factories, Greek colonisation satisfied other needs than desire of commercial profit. It was the expression of the adventurous spirit which has been poetically reflected in the legends of the “Sailing of the Argo” and the “Home-coming of Odysseus” – the same spirit, not to be expressed in any commercial formula, which prompted English colonisation.

In all three of these images of colonisation, there is a sense that the period in question represented a release of national energies, or a colonising spirit which could not be reduced to mere economics. Instead, its ardour was derived of national vitality outgrowing the constraints of the home country, an urge to escape deprivation both in material terms and in rights, and an impulse to take up new opportunities, to explore, to adventure. The image, without doubt, owes something to the authors’ conceptions of Europe’s, but more especially Britain’s own history – yet, as such, and taking into account how ‘most of the energy behind

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British expansion was private, not public’,\textsuperscript{103} this image was necessarily not of a colonial world formed by calculations of state, but a rather more ethereal notion of colonising spirit. This is perhaps best captured by the idea of private initiative as the driving force, though quite naturally supported by the state.

The causes and the impulses behind the expansion of Greece mirror those earlier conceptions of Thirlwall (and Ionian Greece), and of Grote, which are themselves a mirror image of the rise of England depicted by Mill. When Abbott wrote that ‘Money, not birth, now made the man’, he was deviating little from the idea of the rise of Greece formed half a century earlier.\textsuperscript{104} Let us recall Thirlwall’s ‘ancient aristocracies’ giving way to a ‘growing commonality’ – an oligarchy grounding its political claims solely on its wealth – enabling ‘the Ionian genius’, and which was tied to a maritime commerce which not only provided economic enhancement, but also stimulated ‘the nobler arts’ and ‘new intellectual fields’ in ‘a degree to which history affords no parallel before the beginning of the latest period of European civilisation.’\textsuperscript{105} Colonisation was a symptom of a civilisation’s rise – by definition, according to Mill, an increasing democratisation – as middle classes demanded political rights commensurate with their means. Colonisation opened new worlds, literally and metaphorically broadening horizons, further stimulating this change, and in doing so became a cause as well as a symptom of European ascendancy – intellectually, politically, and economically. Colonisation offered the disenfranchised – economically as well as politically – the opportunity of creating a new and better version of their home countries where they could attain the means and thus the status to enjoy those free institutions and political rights they did not qualify for at home. Coupled to this spirit which valued freedom so highly was a taste for adventure and discovery. The rise of modern Europe and especially England was the rise of Greece. This was the view, be it in 1830 or 1900. In 1900 J.B. Bury could look back on a long process further advanced, when the English speaking race had already ‘shown an unexampled energy and capacity for colonisation.’\textsuperscript{106}

If, then, the portrayal of Greek and English colonisation alike is very much more enterprising than strategic, what did Bunbury mean by referring to a ‘colonial empire’?

\textsuperscript{103} Darwin (2009), 144.
\textsuperscript{104} That Abbott’s account of the rise of Greece mirrors that of Thirlwall in the 1830s illustrates how Abbott’s conservatism was very much that of a milieu broadly liberal in their youth, but increasingly conservative nearer the end of the nineteenth century. Another way of putting it is that British conservatism had by then come to adopt certain liberal principles. See Turner (1981), 253.
\textsuperscript{105} Thirlwall (1855), Vol. 2, 118.
\textsuperscript{106} Shepherd (2005), 23, cites the 1877 Encyclopaedia Britannica’s entry for ‘colony’. 
Although he wrote of Corinthian colonies as ‘mere dependencies’, Corinth was seen as an exception, and Milesian colonies are simply said to have maintained contacts with their parent cities. The implication therein is that although the state had some hand in the establishment of colonies – in facilitating their departure, perhaps – they were not intended to remain subject.\textsuperscript{107} It is important to consider that British colonisation, as the debates from the 1870s about varying degrees of unity or separation between Britain and her colonies show, offered a wide range of possible concepts which could influence ideas about ancient colonisation. Abbott drew a distinction between earlier colonisation – ‘isolated band of pirates’ and ‘colonisation in the later sense – i.e. settlements intended to form cities, and generally confirmed by divine sanction’ from the eighth century.\textsuperscript{108} This may appear somewhat statist, yet he quite explicitly stated that Greek colonies ‘were not, like those of Rome,\textsuperscript{109} established to extend and secure Hellenic dominion, however great the part which they played in diffusing Hellenic civilisation.’ More than trading posts they became independent cities with histories of their own, often surpassing their mother cities. He appears to draw an implied distinction between Greek colonising experiences and those of colonists who looked forward to returning home with their wealth. In other words he is not simply applying a nineteenth century framework of colonisation onto the ancient world but seems to make distinctions using knowledge of the ancient literary evidence and what he knew of some colonisers contemporary to himself.\textsuperscript{110}

Attempts to determine whether accounts of ancient colonisation were modelled on more recent experiences are made difficult by the relative obscurity of what the scholars in question thought about modern colonisation. Take E.A. Freeman’s definition of ‘colonisation ‘as opposed to ‘migration’.\textsuperscript{111} To put it simply, migrating peoples leave their own lands to flourish in new ones. Colonisation constitutes ‘a higher stage’: ‘a band of men goes forth from an established city or kingdom to seek homes in another land; but the city or kingdom

\textsuperscript{107} Bunbury (1883), Vol 1, 107-109.
\textsuperscript{108} Abbott (1888), Part I, 335.
\textsuperscript{109} If this is a simplification of Roman colonisation it is one which remained highly uncontroversial for much of the twentieth century.
\textsuperscript{110} Abbott (1888), Part I, 355. ‘For the Greek colonist did not look forward to returning home with wealth which he had amassed, and closing his life in the haunts of his childhood. When he left his native city he ceased to be a member of it, his fortunes being henceforth bound up with the fate of the colony of which he had become a member. For this reason the prosperity of the mother cities was not in proportion to the prosperity of the colonies which emanated from them.’
\textsuperscript{111} Note that in making a distinction between migration and colonisation Freeman prefigured what came a century later: see Demand (1990).
from which they set forth is neither destroyed nor weakened by their going forth’.  He compared the English settlement of Britain to Greek settlement in Sicily: the former was a migration, the latter a colonisation resembling later English settlement in America. In instances of real colonisation ‘the settler is almost sure to belong to a more advanced race than those among whom he settles’.  Freeman does not mention whether or not those established cities of kingdoms made the decision to colonise or whether they sought to gain any future advantage from their colonies.  J.B. Bury was more explicit – ‘the colony was a private enterprise’, although the ‘bond of kinship’ with the mother-city was ‘carefully fostered’.

These scholars appear to be in general agreement that Greek colonisation, even if it was not a solely private affair, was certainly not a strategic act of state.  How do we then explain the image of colonisation which emerges from these works?  The somewhat vague, even romantic idea of national energies and a burgeoning civilisation expanding and founding colonies does not appear to be tied with the state action and strategic foresight.  It may be that the basis of this image lies in an interplay between the literary evidence – which mainly concerns individuals – and contemporary rationalisations (or imaginations) substituting what that evidence cannot tell us.  No scholar attempts to claim for Greek colonies a strategic significance – in most cases that would be going against the grain of the literary evidence, and instead colonies are afforded a civilisational significance (i.e. they spread Greek civilisation) independent of their mother-city.  There is also the suggestion that people leave for individual reasons – as is supported by the literary evidence (for instance Battos’ lameness, Archias’ crime) – yet this is explained, or rationalised in contemporary terms as the search for economic opportunities and political rights overseas when they are lacking at home.  Furthermore, the lack of evidence of state design in archaic Greek colonisation invites scholars to imagine it to have been a movement not unlike British colonisation – which in spite of the high degree of state involvement at varying stages (for instance the actions of colonial governments in Canada and Australia to encourage immigration, and the foundation of penal colonies by the British government), is overwhelmingly depicted as the result of the ‘spirit’ of the English people.  This may be an idea with particular cultural origins – it is not

112 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 222-23.
113 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 319.
114 Bury (1924), 87.
115 With the exception of that of Corinth.
expressed in statist terms, it is in some ways disassociated with ‘empire’, and it reflects a typically English capacity for ‘self-organisation’.

The suggestion that plausible invention, or conjecture, comes into play when the literary evidence is largely silent is most evident with the causes of colonisation. For Abbott colonisation could prove the salvation of the ‘ruined aristocrat’. Bury thought trade and political repression at home to have been reasons behind colonisation: ‘political discontent was an immediate cause of Greek colonisation and conversely it may be said that colonisation was a palladium of aristocracy’; without the safety valve of colonisation Greek aristocracies might not have lasted as long as they did. Abbott’s notion of colonisation as another chance for failed aristocrats may have had some contemporary colouring – yet the British settler colonies were, surely, more commonly seen as a worthy expansion of England with new lands tilled by industrious Anglo-Saxons. The image of discontented aristocrats in fact has surer grounding in the literary evidence. Bury’s idea of trade and repression on the face of it bears little similarity to a liberal view of British history in which colonisation was seen as a desirable alternative to a restive British underclass, yet perhaps what this shows is that the idea of colonisation as a safety valve could be applied to other societies deemed aristocratic. Thus the application of modern ideas onto the past was never rigid. Parallels and analogies are meant to elucidate not constrain, and so it was with the scholars concerned. They were equally at home with drawing distinctions between the ancient past and present (e.g. the lower degree of colonial dependence in Greek colonisation) as they were with drawing parallels – in this case between Greek and English colonisation on a more general level: both represented a similar spirit of expansion symptomatic of two civilisations on an upward historical trajectory.

**Colonial Dependence**

The question to be addressed here is whether scholars from this period depicted Greek colonies as culturally and politically dependent upon their mother cities, and if so, whether they went further than the ancient texts justify. Although Sir Edward Bunbury wrote of a Corinthian ‘colonial empire’, its colonies founded by Corinth as ‘mere dependencies’ which would for a long time enjoy friendly relations with their mother city (with the exception of

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117 Bury (1900), 86-87.
Corcyra),\textsuperscript{118} it is important to remember that Corinth had long been seen as an exceptional case. On Milesian colonisation he seems less convinced of colonial dependence, instead stating how the colonies maintained permanent relations with the parent city,\textsuperscript{119} and his more general impressions of Greek colonisation convey far less an impression of dependence: although never cut off from the rest of the Hellenic world, ‘it cannot be assumed that the colonies in all cases maintained much continuous intercourse with the parent cities’\textsuperscript{120} Evelyn Abbot went a step further, as for him Greek colonies were more than trading posts; they became independent cities with histories of their own, often surpassing their mother cities.\textsuperscript{121} There is little to suggest that either author modelled Greek colonisation on contemporary colonial experiences – in terms of colonial dependence, at least. The ancient sources implied in most cases cultural ties and political independence, and that is what these two scholars accepted. Such a reading of the ancient sources was at the heart of E.A. Freeman’s clear cut distinction between ancient Greek and modern colonisation. Freeman thought relations between Corinth and Corcyra exceptional, \textit{precisely because} they were similar to what one found in the modern world: ‘relations so rare in Greece though so familiar in modern times, in which the colony was a separate city with the usual attributes of a separate city, while the metropolis still claimed some authority inconsistent with the perfect independence of the colony.’\textsuperscript{122} The latter may represent the colonies of other colonial powers, or somewhat of an echo of Freeman’s fears for Britain’s colonies were Britain to deviate from the ‘natural’ course of gradually loosening political control so as to ensure lasting friendship.

As we have seen, the colonies of Corinth and (its colony) Syracuse presented the dangers inherent in the alternative tightening of political ties between colony and metropolis, an idea which as we have seen was very much part of a contemporary imperial debate (the idea of Greater Britain) in which Freeman was a notable participant. Both Corcyra and Camarina ended up revolting against their mother cities, and as the French and Spanish supported the revolt of the English colonies, the Greek cities of Sicily supported the revolt of Camarina. Significantly, what the Corinthians and Syracusans did was a ‘departure from

\textsuperscript{118} Bunbury (1883), Vol 1, 107-109.
\textsuperscript{119} Bunbury (1883), Vol 1, 102.
\textsuperscript{120} Bunbury (1879), Vol.1, 97.
\textsuperscript{121} Abbott (1888), Part I, 355.
\textsuperscript{122} Freeman (1891), Vol. 2., 35-36.
common Hellenic practice’, and as such supplies ‘one of the most instructive lessons in all political history.’ Whereas relations between Corinth and her independent colony of Syracuse ‘form a touching and beautiful tale of abiding friendship between two independent commonwealths’, those between Corinth and the dependent colony of Corcyra ended up with the colony winning its independence at the cost of ‘bitter and abiding hatred between colony and metropolis.’ For the relations between Corinth and Syracuse we should read instead the ideal projected course of relations between Britain and Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. For relations between Corinth and Corcyra, we should read Britain and the American colonies. The significant point to remember is that Corinthian and Syracusan colonisation, due to the high degree of colonial dependence, was at the same time a ‘departure from common Hellenic practice’ and analogous to modern colonisation. Therefore, it follows, Freeman could not have modelled Greek colonisation (other than that of Corinth and Syracuse) on that of his own day as he saw them as opposite policies, the Greek in fact being the superior.

Of course Freeman, as an individual who campaigned against imperial federation and the political union of Britain and her colonies – and who indeed persuaded Gladstone against such ideas – had a political axe to grind. In writings produced as part of that debate he in fact employed the example of the cordial relations between Greek mother cities and their independent offspring in support of his argument. In this way, his views on modern events were shaped by his reading of ancient history, and vice versa perhaps. Freeman clearly used modern parallels, but more to the point, what of it? In this particular instance it seems less a case of retrojecting modern ideas onto the past as applying ancient political lessons to the modern world. In any case, as Malkin wrote, history must speak to the present. Whatever Freeman’s agenda, he appears to have been making valid points out of a sensible reading of the ancient texts. The inclusion of modern parallels is not enough to justify charges of anachronism and a failure to carefully consider what is actually said.

123 This is a point of confusion – presumably the freedom enjoyed by Syracuse became practice from then on, thus allowing Freeman to say that political control on the part of the mother city was rare in Greek history.


125 This is a point of confusion – presumably the freedom enjoyed by Syracuse became practice from then on, thus allowing Freeman to say that political control on the part of the mother city was rare in Greek history.


128 I. Malkin, Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2008.11.08.
Each scholar, Bunbury, Abbot, and Freeman, would most likely be in agreement with Bury’s treatment of relations between colony and mother city: Greeks retained their customs and language wherever they went. Colonies may have been private enterprises, but nonetheless there existed a ‘carefully fostered’ bond of kinship between them and their mother cities. If the settlers left because of political discontent, future relations with their homelands were characterised by reconciliation.\textsuperscript{129} Certain aspects of this description – the maintenance of customs and the unhappy causes of colonisation – could equally apply to modern British colonisation, but then again they might also apply to virtually any significant movement of peoples. To conclude, there is scant evidence of these scholars departing from the ancient literary evidence in order to make antiquity ‘fit’ the present, to present Greek colonies as unduly dependent on their mother cities. What we have is in large part a faithful representation of the literary evidence elucidated with reference to contemporary British colonisation.

\textit{E.A. Freeman and Colonial Inferiority}

Slight evidence for ideas of colonial dependence need not mean no notion of colonial inferiority. In order to explore this idea, the discussion will now focus on Freeman, partly because his \textit{History of Sicily} by its very nature has much more to say about Greek colonies, and partly because Freeman in particular has been subject to criticism on this particular count. First of all let us consider Freeman as a historian. He did not simply accept what the literary evidence told him, and it is far from clear that his interpretations, his decisions as to what to believe and not to believe, were simplistically directed by his contemporary preoccupations about race and colonies. In fact some of this ideas relating to foundation traditions, and how they relate to retrospective claims of colonial dependence, prefigure by a hundred years some recent examples. For example, he believed that the origins of the settlers who colonised Sicilian Naxos were to be found in Euboean Chalcis, yet chose to disbelieve the version of the story in which the founder, Theocles, is an Athenian. In his eyes this was ‘one of a crowd of stories devised to claim for Athens in early times a position in Greece like that which she won only long after,’ especially at a time when she became interested in having a so-called ‘past’ in Sicily.\textsuperscript{130} Compare this with what John-Paul Wilson wrote in a work published in 2006: Thucydides presents the Athenians as colonisers of Ionia (Thuc.

\textsuperscript{129} Bury (1900), 87-88.

\textsuperscript{130} Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 315.
1.12), a myth allowing Athens to make much of her supposed position as mother city of the Ionians, thus legitimising her rule over a mainly Ionian empire. Ideas which may have originated with Freeman are still useful today, in works dealing critically with foundation traditions and the later claims of colonial dependence on the part of mainland Greek states. To put it crudely, Freeman was not a bad historian.

To turn to the issue at hand, that of colonial inferiority, Shepherd argued that Freeman’s work replicated contemporary hierarchies, not only between colonists and natives, but also between the mother-country and the colonies: ‘however successful it may be, a colony will never match up to its mother-city and must be to some degree subservient’. It will be argued here that although Freeman did indeed consider the colonial achievement to have been a lesser one, there is evidence to suggest that this may have been less to do with a set, preconceived idea that colonies are and always will be lesser polities, and more to do with the course of specific colonial histories, ancient Greek and modern English, and how they relate to a very old theme: political freedom.

The colonial achievement was a lesser one in that mainland Greece enjoyed fuller and more lasting freedom and prosperity. Sybaris, for instance, surpassed Athens and Argos ‘in the more tangible results of wide commerce and wide dominion’, whereas the latter two had greater ‘traditional and religious honour’, but ‘if for a while the cities of colonial Hellas outstripped those of the motherland, it was only for a while. Neither their political freedom nor their material prosperity was so lasting’ – Greece, after all, had remained Greek to his day.

According to Shepherd, Freeman saw two tiers of Greeks: those in Greece, and the colonials. In support of the argument that a colony, in Freeman’s mind, could never compare to its mother-city, he is quoted as having written that ‘each owed to its special mother city the reverence of a child’. This, in fact followed by ‘but neither the submission of a subject nor even the lighter allegiance of a vassal’, obscures the fact that Freeman, as we have already seen, did not see Greek colonies as politically dependent. This does not alter the fact that he did nonetheless see the Greek colonies as inferior, but the vital question is why he thought so. Perhaps the central theme of Freeman’s work is the idea of political freedom – his racial ideas

132 Shepherd (2005), 28.
134 Freeman (1891), Vol. 2, 3-4.
135 Shepherd (2005), 28.
are formed by this chief concern – and it is in this defining aspect that he saw colonial Greece lacking. If the colonies ‘for a while’ surpassed mainland Greece, ‘neither their political freedom nor their material prosperity was so lasting’. Why did he think this? The answer appears to be because, quite simply, ‘tyranny was more abiding in Sicily’, with tyrants ruling there when ‘the tyrant was in old Greece all but unknown’:

This is one of the many marks of difference between Greece and her colonies. Brilliant as are some periods of the life of Hellas transplanted to other shores, more brilliant at some times than the lie of Hellas on its own ancient soil, the freedom of the colonial cities, like their greatness, had not the same abiding root as the freedom of the cities of old Greece.

Tyrannical government was part of the turbulent nature of Sicilian history, in which governments and populations changed constantly – ‘the tyrants of Sicily became proverbial.’ It is their lack of lasting political freedom, exemplified, as ever, as with Grote, by Athens, which makes colonial Greece inferior in Freeman’s eyes. What of, then, Freeman’s assertion that

...at Syracuse, in the city itself and in its history, we see the highest point to which the Greek colony could rise. The greatness of Syracuse is essentially of the colonial kind. It was a greatness which could for a while outstrip the cities of old Greece in prosperity and splendour, but which was still a greatness essentially inferior in kind and less lasting in duration.

Does this, as Shepherd argues, serve to explain away the successes of colonial Greece? Surely the point is that for Freeman, as with other scholars writing from a similar perspective (e.g. Grote, Bury), the definition of success, and of greatness, was political freedom – not vast temples, but highly refined ones. The definition of refined is perhaps more dependent on the level of freedom shown by the creator rather than the product itself. As it was, for

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137 Freeman (1891), Vol. 2, 3-4.
138 Freeman (1891), Vol. 2, 55. See also Vol. 1, 330: Athens ‘gave the world the picture of a lawful and well-ordered democracy, while Syracuse was tossed to and fro between mobs, tyrants, and foreign deliverers.’
139 Freeman, (1891), Vol. 1, 328; Shepherd (2005), 28.
Freeman, colonial Greece – where tyranny was rife – simply did not achieve the level of political freedom thought to have been demonstrated by Athens.

What of Freeman’s idea that there was such a thing as a greatness of a colonial kind? His reasons for believing colonial Greece to have been second-rate were determined by the specific nature of its history – steeped in tyranny. This would suggest, therefore, that the distorting influence at work is not that of a modern idea of colonial inferiority, but rather a liberal conception of civilisation in which progress towards political freedom was paramount. There remains the need to account for his explicitly stating that ‘North America’ had become the greatest home of the English ‘folk’ – but ‘only in the sense in which for a whole Sicily contained the greatest power of Hellas’.

At first glance this appears to show that he did have some general idea of colonial inferiority spanning the ancient and modern worlds. Questioning whether his views on America were, in fact, less to do with a preconceived hierarchy, and more to do with what he saw in the America of his day, offers a different conclusion. His travels there alerted him to the dangers of its vast Negro – and Irish – population: the former, according to his conception of race, entirely incapable of civilisation let alone Anglo-Saxon freedoms, the other a troublesome white race which threatened the great Anglo-Saxon democracy. Negroes, for Freeman, could not be assimilated – not even Rome faced such a challenge as the United States as the peoples it assimilated did not exhibit ‘eternal physical and intellectual differences’. Rather than this being a case of a schema of colonial inferiority being applied to both past and present, it seems more a case of reading them through the prism of a certain conception of political freedom (in which races were judged by their perceived capacity for it). The theory of colonial inferiority was made to fit the facts, albeit facts interpreted according to the prevailing liberal idea of civilisation as the arduous march towards political freedom.

140 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 7-8.
141 In his Some Impressions of the United States (Longmans, 1883), pages 136-158 cover the issue of foreign elements, and are revealing of Freeman’s thinking. Germans and Scandinavian immigrants were men ‘of our own race’ whereas ‘one may be allowed to think that an Aryan land might do better still without any Negro vote, that a Teutonic might do better still without any Irish vote.’ He then, rather notoriously, stated that ‘very many approved when I suggested that the best remedy or whatever was amiss would be if every Irish man should kill a negro and be hanged for it’, adding that dissent came in the form of concern about obtaining domestic servants, and from Rhode Island, where the lack of a capital punishment meant that the Irish would have to be kept ‘at public expense’. Nonetheless, he still felt able to claim that he had no ‘ill-feeling’ towards the Irish: ‘In their own island I have every sympathy with them’. Lest this be interpreted as a joke – which it was not – he went on to say that he supported Home Rule for he would be inconsistent were he to ‘refuse to the Irishman what I have sought to win for the Greek, the Bulgarian, and the Dalmatian’ – i.e. independence. That the punishment for ‘English misrule’ in Ireland be dealt out in America, was not entirely unreasonable, only a little pointless. See also Parker (1981), 843.
How did scholarship from this era differ from that which preceded it in its approach to colonial dependence and inferiority? Clearly these accounts bear little relation to the Tory admiration for a monarchical colonial Greece seen with Gillies in the 1780s. Having said that, they appear less critical than was Grote. Freeman, although he believed in the superior freedoms of democratic Athens vis-à-vis colonial Greece, did not seem to attribute the tendency of the latter towards despotism to their intermingling with native peoples – as Grote very clearly did. Perhaps part of the explanation for this difference lies in entirely different ideas about the influence of native peoples. Grote saw Greek colonisation as some kind of a fusion between Colonial and Indian versions of empire – although responsible for the better cultivation of the land in a manner reminiscent of New Zealand, its political freedom and hence development was stunted by inassimilable natives and their corrupting influences, resembling certain contemporary views of the empire of rule. Freeman, on the other hand (as his previously discussed views on the Carthaginians attest), was far more open to the possibility of changing and assimilating others, certain racial parameters having been met: as he saw racial affinity between the Greeks and indigenous inhabitants of Sicily (they were all Aryan), this was no significant problem: Sikels ‘could be made into artificial Greeks’.

The perceptions of individual scholars cannot be reduced to a line on a graph, certain ideas becoming more prominent with time. What each scholar wrote has to be seen in the very specific historical contexts in which they wrote, contexts which influenced but did not override a judicious reading of the ancient evidence.

Civilising the Natives 1870-1914

In Egypt the existence of a long-established native civilization precluded the settlement of Greek colonies; but here also the Greeks had succeeded in establishing commercial relations – E.H. Bunbury

Scholars writing in the age of high Empire saw Greek colonies as distinct from those of England due to their political independence, yet saw the colonising movement itself as reflecting an English spirit of colonisation. How then did they perceive relations between Greeks and native peoples? How did the contemporary perspective of writing in the age of

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143 Bunbury (1879), Vol. 1, 96-97.
high Empire colour these accounts? It will be argued that the ancient world was seen to mirror the modern in terms of the different types of societies, or civilisations, they contained, and that this had specific consequences for the way scholars saw colonisation. Colonisation, in the British and Greek sense, was more often than not carried out in lands either uninhabited or inhabited by ‘savages’. It was not practicable among what were deemed to constitute civilisations. Scholars were not shy to depict colonisation as a violent process, often as the imposition of a higher over a lesser culture, contributing to this coherent structure of thought regarding the nature of civilisation. However, far from representing late Victorian Britain’s certainty concerning the progress and its ascendancy over lesser races, accounts of colonial Greece also betray perceptions of civilisation in which the highest type, meaning the most free, would not necessarily always prevail. Certain other, non-Greek cultures, though forgoing the most priceless gift of civilisation – political freedom – could assimilate civilisation’s more material and even organisational traits, and use them to overcome its highest embodiment: Greece. It will also be shown that as is consistent with these histories, the retrojection of contemporary colonial experiences occur due to the relative silence of the ancient texts.

If the ancient world was used to construct the modern European self-image, then that self-image and the concepts related to it were projected back onto the ancient. In certain key ways nineteenth century scholars understood the ancient world in very similar terms to the modern. An important aspect was the concept of civilisation, constructed using ideas about the ancient world as well as supposed European ascendancy in the modern; it was thought to be applicable to both. In the above passage Bunbury, while quite clearly demonstrating this tendency, does so with a direct implication for views of colonisation. The Greeks did not colonise Egypt in the real sense, as there was already an established civilisation in place, yet, Bunbury continued, after the ‘jealousy of all intercourse with foreigners’ had given way to Psammetichus’ more open policy, Naucratis became an important ‘emporium of Greek commerce’ with ‘traders of that nation’ settling there in such numbers that it could be considered a Greek colony.  

This is, of course, appears a tale strikingly similar to the European experience in India and China, suggesting equivalence between the Oriental civilisations of Bunbury’s day and those of the ancient world. There is also the implication that where Greeks do settle and establish colonies, then they do so where there is no

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144 Bunbury (1879), Vol. 1., 97.
established civilisation. As so often with these works, this invites a parallel between Greek colonisation and the British colonisation of such places as Australia and New Zealand where they perceived the indigenous peoples to have been savages lacking in civilisation.

Furthermore, this serves to create a coherent structure of thought whereby each aspect of Britain’s contemporary imperial and colonial experiences can find an ancient equivalent from which lessons can be drawn. What this passage demonstrates is that it was never as simple as a straightforward banding of Greek and English colonisation and Roman and British imperialism; in addition to the example of Alexander’s imperialism, there is the possibility of making ancient history correspond to the modern in a way which even made chronological sense. Greek colonisation could relate to both English colonisation in so-called uninhabited lands, and earlier English and European maritime and commercial involvement in the midst of ancient oriental civilisations – in the modern world Britain’s commercial interests eventually ended up in a colossal Indian empire, in the ancient east Greek traders gave way to Alexander’s conquests and centuries of Hellenistic rule. In other words, modern British intellectuals saw in antiquity a model of societal development which recurs – as it had in the modern world.

For Bunbury, in writing about colonisation in the first place, therefore, certain assumptions were implicit: it necessarily meant writing about the incursions of a higher culture amidst one which did not qualify as a civilisation. This has clear implications in terms of relations with such indigenous peoples. We saw that George Grote was highly sceptical about the possibility of successfully incorporating native peoples into a colonial civilisation – the attempt would end in disaster for the coloniser as his own civilisation would be held back by such backward elements incapable of political freedom – critical in liberal conceptions of the higher forms of civilisation. We have seen that E.A. Freeman, in spite of his greater concern for racial ideas (largely, but significantly not solely, linguistic) was more open to the possibility of assimilation: Sikels could become Greeks as both were of Aryan stock. Certain peoples, however, could never be assimilated to civilised standards: heathen destroyers, ‘slaughtering and burning’ as they went, were in the end less destructive than ‘the missionary of the highest civilization when he settles among a people by whom that civilization cannot be received’. This comments on both the unchangeable nature of certain

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145 In addition to this, consider E.A. Freeman’s contention that it is only established polities – that is those in a more advanced state of civilisation – who are capable of colonisation as opposed to migration. Freeman (1891), 222.
uncivilised peoples, and the consequences for such peoples when an advanced civilisation colonises in their midst.

Freeman saw both American Indians and native Britons (both of whom would have been considered barbarian peoples) as having died out in certain areas following the coming of the English – but the British population survived in Cornwall and other parts of the British isles, and as with the Hellenised Sikels of Sicily, the descendants of the ancient Britons of Cornwall and the English of Kent could see English history as a ‘common possession’ – but no native American had written a history of America in English.146 The idea that certain peoples, on the grounds of an Aryan racial provenance, are capable of being successfully assimilated whereas others – non-Aryans – are not, is very much a reflection of the late-Victorian historical context in which Freeman was writing. It is also striking that Freeman is quite candid as to the consequences for savage races when a civilised race colonises – they die out. This is not the act of denial implicit in descriptions of settling in ‘uninhabited’ lands, and Freeman’s openness may well reflect his highly uncharitable views regarding peoples deemed lower than the Aryan and even the Semitic race.

How did the natives of western Greece fit into Freeman’s hierarchy of civilisation? We have seen that he held the Sikels to be Aryan – ‘an undeveloped Latin’.147 As such they were of a lower level of civilisation to the Greeks, yet assimilable. Indeed, contact and strife with barbarian peoples was the defining feature of western Greece. Elsewhere, Freeman wrote, Greek colonies found barbarian neighbours either so much stronger or so much weaker – ‘over native tribes of inferior civilization and slight material power the Greek colony could easily establish its supremacy’.148 The distinction is made between material power and civilization, and one may infer that in those situations where the Greeks were weaker than barbarians it was because of their lack of material power rather than inferior civilisation. This would, however, be misleading. Civilisation itself could be subdivided into that which was material and that which was not:

Indeed we never doubted that many of the Eastern nations were, in material prosperity, even in material civilization, far ahead of the men of early Hellas.

Only we doubted, and we still doubt, whether all the wealth and splendour, even

146 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 320. Freeman also notes that in modern colonisation of a ‘lower type’ – i.e. Spanish colonisation of the Americas, there are indeed natives of Spanish speech – a situation similar to that of the Hellenised Sikels.
147 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 20.
148 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 17.
all the art, of a lord of slaves can be put alongside of the higher powers of the mind of man, the powers which were wielded when a free assembly bowed willingly to the magic speech of Periklès or Hermokratès.\textsuperscript{149}

As we have seen with previous treatments of Greek civilisation, this distinction between material civilisation (frequently conceived as civilisation in mass) and the more values-based aspects of civilisation (expressed as political and intellectual freedom) allowed scholars to maintain a privileged place for Greeks even when they were on the losing side of history.

Another, more empathetic way of looking at this way of thinking is that it is possible to write a history of a civilisation which embodied all one’s own society most valued without it descending into a meaningless and uninstructive eulogy. By drawing a distinction between firstly the more intangible qualities of high civilisation (namely political freedom and an open society), then the slightly more tangible aspects of a more sophisticated civilisation (political and military organisation), and finally the most tangible qualities of material wealth and the raw power of mass, it is possible to explain why those who attain the highest levels of civilisation do not always win, and that progress is not inevitable.

Freeman’s \textit{History of Sicily} is far from being a tale of Greeks arriving, conquering, and effortlessly dominating other peoples. The barbarians the Greeks encountered in Italy and Sicily were far more ‘on their own level’ than those Greeks encountered in Gaul, Libya, and even the great kingdoms of Asia.\textsuperscript{150} In Italy and Sicily the Greeks were confronted by ‘barbarian commonwealths [native Italians and Phoenicians respectively] whose physical strength, greater than that of the Greeks, was guided by a political and military skill approaching to that of the Greeks themselves.’\textsuperscript{151} Freeman identified what he thought a ‘deeply instructive’ ‘doctrine’ in the very different relations between Greeks in Italy and those in Sicily. Whereas those who settled in Sicily were able to overcome and hellenise an ‘Aryan’ population caught in an undeveloped stage but then had to fight advanced Asiatic colonisers, those who made their homes in southern Italy had to contend with an Aryan people who had progressed too far along their own path to be either conquered or assimilated. Italian peoples were open to a degree of Greek influence, yet received it as ‘something foreign’, and could not be Hellenised. The ‘ruder branches’ of the Italian peoples, such as the Lucanians, in fact sought to act ‘as destroying enemies’, to ‘root out’, to annihilate Greek

\textsuperscript{149} Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 232.
\textsuperscript{150} Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 18-19.
\textsuperscript{151} Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 18-19.
presences – in much the same way as did the Carthaginians. The lot of Italian Greeks was to live in a perpetual if intermittent state of conflict, some being destroyed and enslaved, others prospering.\footnote{Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 19-21.} Freeman nevertheless did like to believe that however ‘utterly unthought of’ it may have been to people at the time, there was still a distinction to be drawn between ‘kindred’ Italians and ‘alien barbarian’ Carthaginians.\footnote{Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 21-23.}

Freeman’s depiction of relations between Greeks and natives is at once an affirmation of the colonial stereotype we have in our minds when thinking of earlier scholarship and evidence for a more complex reading of antiquity than we have hitherto allowed. Freeman did indeed believe in a hierarchical conception of civilisation, with those lower down the ladder subject to conquest and assimilation by their betters, or alternatively receiving civilisation from the more advanced. An antagonistic opposition between east and west also pervades his history. This is however far too limited, oversimplified, picture, which even if correct in a general sense, overlooks details which are significant and without which we cannot understand the full meaning and significance of the work. Freeman’s framework of civilisation is guided by his (and most other scholars’) overriding concern – political freedom. If races are ranked, Aryans deemed superior to Semites, Greeks to barbarians, they are judged according to their aptitude for freedom. The framework is more complex than this, however. The highest civilisations may be the freest, yet Freeman allows for peoples ostensibly less free some of the useful corollaries of advancing civilisation in terms of superior political and military organisation (things which J.S. Mill appears to have regarded as associated with and necessarily dependent upon democratisation). Thus civilisations that are less free can be militarily as adept as Greeks and even bring about their demise. Furthermore, given sufficient wealth, numbers, and power – general mass – even the basest, crudest, most autocratic civilisations can overwhelm Greeks. To provide further complication, even though advances in organisational and political (as opposed to material) civilisation are western, European, or Aryan in origin, Asiatics can, if they live in proximity to Europeans, assume some of these characteristics and prove formidable foes to Greeks.

In short Freeman’s colonising Greeks offer could find themselves in various circumstances, conquering natives or being conquered by them, even if the assumption that it was only Greek culture which would be spread remained. In his candid words about the possible consequences for the colonised, he is similar in his outlook to Abbott, whose portrayal of the relations between Greek colonists and native peoples is an altogether
unpleasant one. His Greeks were not clear-cut benevolent benefactors of civilisation. Greek colonisation meant ‘severe conflicts’ with native peoples whose ‘hostility was natural’:

The natives resented the occupation of their territory; they became aware that the products of their country would pass into other hands, with little, or at any rate very little remuneration to themselves. They must expect either to be driven off the ground or reduced to the position of slaves where they had been the masters. Nor was the conduct of the new-comers such as to inspire confidence. Any kind of treachery was considered lawful in dealing with the natives.¹⁵⁴

This view owes something to British colonisation in the Americas and Antipodes. The seizure of land, the treachery employed in doing so, is familiar, yet Abbott uses ancient evidence: the Locrians cheating Sicels (Polybius, 12.6).¹⁵⁵ He assumes that Greeks did conquer, yet openly admits the morally ambiguous nature of the way they did, making his portrayal a curious one. Considering the way he highlights the intermarriage between Thracians and Greeks – and the fact that Themistocles and Thucydides were thought to be products of such unions – this is still more so the case.¹⁵⁶ These elements sit uncomfortably alongside his descriptions of such things as the great influence of the Greek colonists in spreading the alphabet and setting up centres of civilisation, of their religious tolerance yet the retention of a Greek identity and an ‘independence of feeling’ which prevented their ‘becoming degraded by barbarous practices’, social or religious.¹⁵⁷ This is not an account of Greek colonisation distorted by self-congratulatory ideas about British colonisation, although it is surely in some senses informed by its concerns. Most likely it is an honest attempt to engage with the literary evidence, with contemporary ideas slipping in to text where that evidence is unclear, and perhaps also dictating the type of questions Abbott wanted to ask – that he saw fit to mention the fact that the colonies had remained uncorrupted is in itself significant and very different to Grote’s earlier castigation of colonial impurity.

A similar sense of seeming inconsistency – notions of Greek superiority mixed with acknowledgements of intermingling with native peoples – is also visible with J.B. Bury. Following Freeman, who thought the true Sicily to be Greek, its greatness of a colonial

¹⁵⁵ Abbott (1888) Part I, 357.
¹⁵⁶ Abbott (1888) Part I, 357.
kind, Bury wrote that ‘Sicilian, like Italian history, really opens with the coming of the Greeks’. He also saw an oppositional relationship between native peoples and Greeks. So much so, in fact, that ‘...colonisation tended to promote a feeling of unity among the Greek peoples’. There was a sense of kinship between Greeks of the kind which occurs in colonial contexts: ‘by the wide diffusion of their race on the fringe of barbarous lands, it brought home to them more fully the contrast between Greek and barbarian, and, by consequence, the community of the Greeks...’ This might easily have been said at the time of the sense of community felt by the white man in Africa – yet, still, Bury thought that ‘perhaps Sicel natives joined in founding the western Megara’ – Megara Hyblaia. Ideas derived from colonisation and empire colour, but to not appear to unduly distort, his image of Greek colonisation. This is to say that contemporary notions lend themselves to an attempt to better understand the past in a way relevant and comprehensible in the present – but do not seem to override the framework of the ancient evidence.

All in all, views on the interactions between Greeks and natives conform to familiar patterns of Greek superiority, yet it is important not to oversimplify this. Although nineteenth and twentieth century concepts are in evidence, they rarely appear to conflict with the ancient evidence. Crucially, distinctions between various civilisations, and different forms of civilisation, allowed Freeman, specifically, to recognise Greek superiority even in defeat. These distinctions laid the conceptual foundations for the foreboding of the interwar years, when the highest level of material civilisation was used to further inherently primitive political aims.

Conclusions

In broad terms, there exists a good deal of continuity between scholarship from this period and that of the period which preceded it. This continuity is most apparent in the great frameworks identified in scholarship up to 1870. The overarching narrative of the west learning from the east, before surpassing it due to an innately superior capacity for political freedom, remains. The possibility of making the rise of Greece, as a civilisation, in the eighth

158 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 5-6.
159 Bury (1924), 98.
160 Bury (1924), 88.
161 Bury (1924), 100.
century BC equate to the rise of the modern west to an ascendant position by the eighteenth
century AD, also remains. The difference was that scholars writing in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century wrote at the zenith of European power; their rise was thus
a more distant thing. Conceiving their civilisation to have been at a point of maturation –
inevitably to be followed by a decline and fall – the need to learn lessons from antiquity was
all the more urgent. This historical conception of the world and the course of empire,
compounded by the very real geopolitical fears of a maritime empire surrounded by territorial
giants near the turn of the century, meant that making the most of colonisation, as a means of
replicating the home country, was an altogether more pressing component of contemporary
imperial debate for those of a more Liberal outlook. In a more assuredly liberal age, this –
the fate of empires – overtook constitutional debate as the primary reason for using and
learning from antiquity. In this broadly liberal age, histories of Greece had lost the
controversial edge they once had, which is not to say that a laudatory history of Greece and
Athens did not remain an important aspect of the liberal British self-image, as did a more
critical one to the conservative. In this age when colonisation was such an important part of
imperial debate, and when liberal Britain, modern mirror of Athens, was at its height, it is
astonishing how little scholars made the history of Greek colonisation look like that of
Britain. This is a testament to the fact that Freeman and colonial inferiority apart, scholars
did not unduly distort the evidence they had – but rather used contemporary experiences to
attempt to bring to life the mysterious and poorly documented past. This is why Greek
colonisation is portrayed as a specific thing in the manner suggested by the ancient texts
(individual founder, act of settlement, reverence to the mother city), but as those are largely
silent on its causes, Greek colonisation it is also portrayed, quite vaguely, as the product of a
certain kind of spirit – the spirit which drove the English speaking peoples to shape the
modern world.

Apart from that of east and west, and those themes which streamed from this
historical idea, the other framework highlighted in scholarship before 1870 is that of cultural
interactions. There again appears to be continuity, with some candid admissions regarding
the fate of colonised peoples – a fate which does not seem discordant with that most
commonly described in the literary evidence. Yet, as with Grote, who bemoaned the
corruption of the colonial Greek civilisation, certain forms of disquiet are discernible. First
we have Freeman’s distinctions between various forms of civilisation, laden with the
implication that the highest type of civilisation – that which is free – may not prevail in the
face of those who though politically less civilised, are in material power and even material
civilisation preponderant. Such was the fate of colonial Greece as depicted by Grote. Barbarians learned from the Greeks not only the more material elements of civilisation but also some of its organisational benefits, things which they used to extinguish colonial Greece. Freeman’s account bears similarities, no doubt derived from Grote’s history, and the implications, though perhaps clearer with Freeman, are also broadly similar: progress towards political freedom, and the apogee of civilisation, is far from inevitable. Moreover, even ‘liberal’ civilisations can sow the seeds of their own demise.

Another inkling of disquiet is to be seen in Bury’s balance sheet of Hellenism. Though he never doubted the brilliance of classical Athens, he nonetheless felt obliged to criticise Hellenic contempt for the barbarian – an ‘intolerant bigotry’ and leading cause of their political decline. He much preferred Alexander’s diffusion of Hellenic culture among the peoples of the east. This quite possibly reflects Bury’s internationalism, and perhaps also a hint of the idea that the narrow nationalism of the polis and its attendant sin, internecine conflict, was to be the cause of a downfall: that of free Greece and modern Europe. It would be fair to conclude that scholarship from this period contained a subliminal sense of foreboding about what the future held. This is ironic considering Britain’s ascendant position in the world, yet it is also true that those circumstances made such apprehension all the more appropriate. It is also ironic that this fear for the future was most apparent at the very time this liberal conception of civilisation had found its clearest expression:

...we doubted, and we still doubt, whether all the wealth and splendour, even all the art, of a lord of slaves can be put alongside of the higher powers of the mind of man, the powers which were wielded when a free assembly bowed willingly to the magic speech of Periklês or Hermokratês.162

To conclude, scholarship from this period, a period in which colonisation was a more integral part of imperial debate than ever before, scholars did not model ancient colonisation on the modern. It would also be misleading to assume antiquity to have been used to further the self-congratulation of a complacent great power: on the contrary, we can detect fears and foreboding which were to become realities come the age of world war.

162 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 232.
Chapter 6: World War to Cold War 1914-1990

Introduction

This chapter will look to provide a context for British scholarship concerned with Greek colonisation, from the Great War to the Cold War, before proceeding to discuss that scholarship in accordance with the three themes – colonial dependence, colonisation as an act of state, and civilising the natives – which have constituted the framework of previous discussions. As before, there will be an emphasis on contemporary political and imperial debate. Where possible the discussion will centre on the involvement of prominent classical scholars in such issues, but will also consider the use of antiquity by other political and intellectual figures. There will be a division into five thematic sub-sections each important in order to understand scholarly perceptions of ancient Greece in general and Greek colonisation specifically during this period. The discussion will encompass the following: foreboding about the future of civilisation on the part of liberal intellectuals and classical scholars; opposition to liberal understandings of civilisation; liberal intellectuals and their attitudes towards the British Empire; the changing status of the settler colonies; and finally the diminishing importance of ancient Greece as a means of thinking about empire and colonisation at a time of a growing importance as a metaphor for European political fragmentation and arguments for and against the creation of larger political units.

It will be argued that for liberal classical scholars the interwar years and indeed beyond represented a period in which civilisation – understood in very liberal terms, and profoundly informed by liberal readings of antiquity – was under immediate threat. The accusations of barbarism levelled towards the extreme left and right were much more than mere insults, and were in fact a manifestation of the sincerely held belief that such political creeds represented a regression and a renunciation of the Greco-Roman heritage of Western civilisation. It will also be put that similar responses of the left and the extreme right to the problems of liberal civilisation reveal a liberal myopia, and unwillingness to think about economic inequality, which constituted the Achilles heel of liberalism. This was reflected by an unprecedented challenge to liberal conceptions of antiquity which privileged Athens and classical Greece, and the rapid disappearance of political Liberalism as a force in its own right due to the rise of the Labour party and a shift to more conservative positions on the part of many, but not all, liberals. Furthermore, liberal opposition to the open class based politics of the left in domestic terms was mirrored in international terms by a thorough acceptance of
the British Empire as the guarantor of the liberal order. Liberal intellectuals opposed colonial nationalism, left wing anti-imperialism, and any attempt to curtail the sovereignty of the Western powers primarily because they saw such objectives as a threat to the geopolitical strength of the British Empire and thus the security of liberal civilisation. Such debates occurred at a time when the white dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were increasingly asserting their status as individual nations with a voice in the government of the Empire and in international affairs. Though this development did not much worry liberal intellectuals, similar aspirations on the part of other, lesser nations, did. Come the 1940s and beyond, when imperialism and colonisation were less projects under way than enterprises on the wane, such subjects also became less important to classical scholars. Of greater relevance were debates surrounding political integration, be it in terms of international organisations to preserve peace, such as the League of Nations, or more closely European solutions to the imperative of preventing war. In this context, classical Greece, understood as having succumbed due to political fragmentation and internecine conflict, became an informative metaphor.

It will be demonstrated that in spite of the continuing relevance of antiquity to contemporary political, imperial, and colonial debates, and in spite of the prominent positions held by classical scholars and classically trained intellectuals in public life, this wider context would leave but a marginal imprint upon the way in which British scholarship wrote about colonisation in this period. Whereas political fragmentation or integration became a significant intellectual theme after the Great War, a theme to which Greece of the poleis was seen to speak presciently, colonisation and colonial issues diminished in importance. If works of ancient history intended for general audiences were full of references to linking the fall of the poleis to European predicaments, and public intellectuals used the example of Greece as forewarning, colonisation was simply not discussed with any seriousness. The great debates of the late Victorian era concerning a Greater Britain, an Imperial Federation, were long gone. Not only were the very clear imperial and colonial debates which permeated British discussions of Greek colonisation absent come this period, but so is the clear influence of domestic politics and political liberalism. Studies of Greek colonisation really do appear not to make any political point at all. This is not to deny the persistence of certain ideas, for notions of Greek superiority and of unequal relations with native peoples remain – the difference is that these can no longer be seen to correspond to contemporary political and colonial debates, and are rather more of an echo of longstanding mentalities. It is important to note that not all scholars were so disinterested, and that the way scholars approached Greek
colonisation could still be influenced by their background and contemporary concerns, as the example of T.J. Dunbabin demonstrates. All in all, however, the influence of contemporary colonial debates is not felt on scholarship – both a reflection of decline in the importance of colonial politics in an age of sovereign dominions, and the changing nature of academic practice.

A Political, Intellectual, Imperial and Colonial Context

Liberal Civilisation in Danger


In 1923, J.B. Bury wrote glowingly of Alexander’s heterogeneous empire, contrasting it to Aristotle’s narrow vision of a small, self-sufficient polis where barbarians were to be no more than slaves. Alexander’s work was to be continued in modern times: 'the confederate idea of the solidarity and fellowship of the human race has become an active and driving force. It has expressed itself as Internationalism which breaks down barriers and disowns country. It has expressed itself in the League of Nations. It is the intellectual basis of humanitarianism’

Bury’s disavowal of nationalism, and his internationalist inclinations, were a feature of his thought before the war, but the war gave them this more immediate relevance. Other scholars had been more optimistic than Bury, and less critical of the Greek poleis, in their pre-war writings, but then turned to similar internationalist sentiments. In 1907 the distinguished Australian born scholar of Greek, Gilbert Murray, wrote how ‘the direction in which Western civilization has moved is on the whole a good one’.

This civilisation, and progress, had its seeds in Greece, and in Greek literature – itself an ‘embodiment of the progressive spirit, an expression of the struggle of the human soul towards freedom and ennoblement’.

Hellenism, for Murray, represented civilisation, ‘the opposite of savagery’, yet also something which always had savagery very near it. The darker side of Greek society – for instance slavery and the subjection of women – were the ‘remnants of that primaeval slime from which Hellenism was trying to make mankind

1 Bury (1923), 29-30.
2 It should be noted how many of the scholars in question were in one way or another ‘outsiders’ either from the wider Anglophone world (Murray, Childe, Finley), or non-traditional backgrounds within Britain (Zimmern).
4 Murray (1907), 9.
In other words, the bad things about Greek civilisation were not Greek at all. Considering the strength of the association between Greece and liberal English civilisation, come the Great War that fragility of that Hellenic civilisation, struggling in the midst of barbarism, may well have gained resonance as Britain descended into the abyss of a conflict often portrayed as a war for civilisation itself.

Murray, after the narrow victory, became actively committed to internationalism and a founding member of the League of Nations Union, a body which concerned itself with promoting international cooperation. Come the 1930s, however, liberal civilisation was once again under threat. H.A.L Fisher, historian, education minister, and friend of Murray, serves as a good illustration of the foreboding that the proponents of liberal civilisation felt in these years. Murray would have concurred with the opening lines of Fisher’s *A History of Europe*, a work which would become the standard history textbook for a generation of post-war schoolchildren: ‘We Europeans are the children of Hellas. Our civilization, which has its roots in the brilliant city life of the eastern Aegean, has never lost traces of its origin, and stamps us with a character by which we are distinguished from the other great civilizations of the human family...’

That civilisation, Fisher continued, was preponderant. To Asia modern knowledge owed little, to Africa (excluding Egypt) nothing. Europe was almost solely responsible for the gifts of modern science. Its science, along with its big ideas – ‘nationality and responsible government, of freedom and progress, of democracy and democratic education’ – had exerted a profound influence on the rest of the world. The ‘material fabric of modern civilized life’ was the result of the ‘intellectual daring and tenacity of the European peoples’.

Yet crucially, this was not all there was to say. Fisher’s history is no complacent boast:

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5 Murray (1907), 16. As for certain other aspects of this darker side, he claims that the position of Greek women was ‘far removed’ from the ‘seclusion of the East’ [more a comparison between modern Britain and the contemporary East than of Greece and the ancient East].

6 See for instance Great War service medals.


9 H.A.L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (1936), 1. Whatever its borrowings from the east, and vice versa, Fisher wrote, ‘the broad fact remains. There is an European civilization. We know an European when we meet him...’ Gilbert Murray referred to Fisher’s history as an expression of a ‘certain philosophy or weltanshauung or faith’ which he equated with ‘the spirit of liberalism’ – see Morefield (2005), 66.

10 Fisher (1936), 2.
Yet this astounding supremacy in the field of scientific discovery has not always existed and may not always continue. Judged by the length of years during which human life has existed on this planet, the intellectual ascendancy of the white European races is a very recent phenomenon. Europe has not always been the tutor, nor Asia always the pupil. There was a time when these relations were reversed, and the men of Europe (the land of the setting sun) were deeply influenced by the far older and more sumptuous civilizations of Babylon and Egypt.\(^{11}\)

‘...and may not always continue’: in spite of the prevalence of theories of progress, variously construed, this suggests the persistence of more cyclical conceptions of history in which progress is much less of a certainty. It had been evident since the eighteenth century that Europe’s rise was recent, and this consciousness, informed by antiquity, could all too easily result in the belief that this ascendancy, like those of many other civilisations, may be followed by maturation, decline, and a fall. The notion that European (and liberal British) civilisation may not always be ascendant in the longue durée was a historical perspective of some pedigree – British statesmen had long feared what the future held, even when Britain was at its strongest, and as we have seen with dreams of a Greater Britain sought strategies to evade the fate of ancient empires. The difference is that for Fisher, like many other 1930s intellectuals, the potential causes of this downfall were not hypothetical, some obscure future menace, but rather very real, and very immediate indeed.

The war had changed everything. It had undermined belief in the liberal system: ‘there passed also by insensible degrees out of the average thinking of average men that strong belief in civil liberty and peaceful persuasion which had been a distinct feature of the nineteenth century.’ Once it seemed as though parliamentary institutions would be the blueprint from which the future would be formed – even Russia had had to adopt the façade of liberal civilisation, and people assumed that political progress meant ‘extending the franchise, educating the voters, and improving the machinery of parliamentary government’ – a ‘Liberal faith which Conservatives were compelled in varying degrees of readiness to accept’.\(^{12}\) These certainties of the nineteenth century did not endure. The assured political superiority of an aloof liberal Britain over its continental rivals, a steady progress in which advancements in material civilisation went hand in hand with increasing democratisation, and

\(^{11}\) Fisher (1936), 2.
\(^{12}\) Fisher (1936), 1184.
a complacent supremacy over a stagnant East with a past but no future – were all evaporating. Such foreboding about the future of their civilisation caused liberal intellectuals to enunciate more clearly than ever its precise nature. As they did so, they also betrayed more plainly than ever before the influence of antiquity on their conceptions of the present, and also explained more fully, more explicitly, the debt they believed the modern west to owe to classical civilisation. As P.A. Brunt would write of Cicero’s declamations of Republican liberty: ‘they were articulated so clearly and their practical implications brought out so explicitly, precisely because they were under challenge; men seldom feel the need to state justify their beliefs when those beliefs are universally shared.’

Fisher’s lost liberal vision mirrors Murray’s Hellenic civilisation. For Fisher, the mark of the ‘civilized polity’ was that ‘every citizen should be able to think as he liked, to speak as he liked, and to vote as he liked... Some dangers there might be in the practice of liberty, but they were nothing to the risk of allowing discontents to fester under a system of repression.’ Murray, for his part, conceived ‘Hellenism’ as depending ‘not upon force but upon free speech and persuasion’ flowing from a very liberal understanding of what caused and constituted civilised life:

... the unsacerdotal and unsuperstituous background, the consequent absence of dogmatism and censorship, the freedom of thought and speech, the consciousness that our enemies have something to say for themselves and ought to be understood...

Indeed, in ‘Hellenism’, a lecture delivered to the Royal Institution in 1941, but written years previously, he delivered a poignant account of the values of Greek civilisation – values Britain shared and fought for.

This centred on Greeks acknowledging no divine, absolute, or arbitrary rulers; transient *tropaion* standing in marked contras to Assyrian reliefs and their atrocities, and the ‘horrible triumphs’ of Rome; freedom from ‘the paralysing grasp of the supernatural’; and liberty from ‘authoritative orthodoxy and censorship’. These qualities, along with a culture of

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14 Fisher (1936), 1184.
debate and a ‘readiness to hear and understand the other side’, made the Greeks free to proclaim *eleutheria* and *parresia*: ‘the Greeks really did let people say what they believed without censorship or punishment’. In this, Greece resembled Britain, and contrasted with certain other European states. The Greeks, of course, had their failures – political and social. With added poignancy, like the nations of modern Europe, the Greeks knew that nothing but order and concord could save them, ‘but found the goal too hard to reach’: ‘They failed to abolish war and war ruined them.’ 18 As we shall see, this aspect of Greek history – the conflicting demands of sovereignty and unity, war and peace – became an increasingly important historical *topos* in the interwar and post-war years.

The question of how representative a single author can be is a valid one, and the answer very difficult to determine. On the other hand, through his association with several major public intellectuals such as Alfred Zimmern, Arnold J. Toynbee, H.A.L. Fisher, and Bertrand Russell – not to mention his frequent contributions as a liberal voice in *The Times*, and leading position in the League of Nations Union – it is not unreasonable to judge Murray an important and respected voice within a broadly liberal canon. For this reason we should take note of ‘Hellenism’ and how in his concluding remarks in particular we are given a rare glimpse of an early twentieth century liberal scholar explicitly stating what he thought of the relationship between ancient Greece and Britain, and what he thought that civilisation stood for. More than that, he explicitly stated how he ‘could not help feeling, in detail after detail, how closely the spirit of ancient Hellenism represents the cause for which this country now stands as champion before the world’:

We stand for freedom, for man’s right to use his supreme gifts of thought, speech, and creative art, as the spirit moves him, not because we are blind to the dangers involved in freedom, but because we have confidence in the general patriotism and social conscience of our community, and know that the human spirit withers if it is not free. We stand for law, law untouched by threats and supreme over the arbitrary will or ambition of any ruler or political party, subservient only to the continual and never completed search for true justice. We want to live and to let all mankind live in such a way as to be able to seek truth, to enjoy and create beauty, and to foster that goodwill between man and man which casts out fear, and is to a great extent the main secret both of political stability and of personal

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happiness. Above all, we have seen the moral dangers of Hubris and fanaticism and will not for the sake of any national pride or cherished dogma of our own allow the altar of pity to be overturned in our market-place.

Freedom of thought and expression, law and freedom from arbitrary rule, a creative energy and concern for excellence, a spirit of humanity which caused Demonax to tell the Athenians they must remove the altar of pity should they insist on staging gladiatorial games (Lucian, *Demonax*). These central themes, connecting ancient Greece with a liberal Britain, were those continuously identified over the course of the past century.

George Grote contrasted the energy, flexibility, and self-organisation of the Greek, capable of the ‘highest walks of intellect, and the full creative agency of art’ to the ‘submission to regal and priestly sway’ and whims of kings which characterised the ancient civilisations of the East. As for his humanity, the Greek was ‘gentler by far in his private sympathies and dealings than his contemporaries on the Euphrates, the Jordan, or the Nile’.19 Similarly E.A. Freeman held ‘the pre-eminence of Athens in literature, philosophy, and art’ to be ‘simply the natural result of her pre-eminence in freedom and good government’,20 and as did Grote he too believed that it was the Greek who demonstrated ‘the higher powers of the mind of man’ – powers ‘wielded when a free assembly bowed willingly to the magic speech of Periklês or Hermokratês’.21 The distinction was again made between the West, best embodied by Greece and Athens, and an East which knew ‘no government but the will of arbitrary rulers’, checked by nothing but religion.22 J.B. Bury applauded the Greeks as the ‘originators of liberty of thought and discussion’, their literature and philosophy made what they were by openness to the ‘free criticism of life’.23 Greece is again distinguished from the East by virtue of the ‘absence of sacerdotalism’: priests ‘never became powerful castes, tyrannizing over the community in their own interests and able to silence voices raised against religious beliefs’.24

By the 1930s and 1940s it had become clear and clearly expressed what were the values and ideals which made Greece what it was, and how they now made Britain and the liberal civilisation of the West what it was. Freedom of thought and expression, enabled by

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21 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 232.
23 Bury (1914), 22.
24 Bury (1914), 24.
freedom from arbitrary punishment and religious power, resulted in an essentially humane culture alone capable of attaining the highest reaches of art, intellect, and thus civilisation. Only now, this civilisation was at risk, its ideals openly rejected:

I think most people would agree that in so far as nations like Russia and Germany in various ways turned their backs on the normal Greco-Roman tradition of western Europe and reverted to the supposed worships of their proto-historic ancestors, all were in their degrees slipping away from civilisation.

These states abided by principles which were the direct opposites of those upon which ancient Greek and modern liberal civilisations were founded. The ‘will’ of party leader took precedence over the rule of law, those to who ‘might become centres of thought in a nation’ were killed, all information censored to further a ‘propagandist myth’, and the lesson of the Great War: that men can ‘impose their by violence upon others’, or ‘as Dr. Goebbels phrased it, the important thing is not who is right but who wins’. Arbitrary rule, censorship and suppression, and the triumph of will and power over reason as an ideal not a nightmare. These things were not ‘bright, new, creative ideas’, but a regression to the ‘slough’ from which western civilisation – ‘based on its Greco-Roman predecessor’ – was thought to have saved Europe forever. The Great War nearly brought about a ‘real collapse of civilization’ – so much so that it was possible to ‘glimpse down into the gulf beyond the precipice’. No doubt what lay there looked very much like the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, and Fascist Italy.

Fisher’s analysis of the nature of that threat, and what Europe stood to lose, mirrored Murray’s in most of its essential features. Like Murray, Fisher feared a future where a (political) religion reigned, when dogma and censorship prevailed, when freedom of thought and speech were eroded, and when opponents were eliminated by force rather than won over by persuasion. He feared, in short, the totalitarian regimes which so absurdly yet tragically inverted the liberal idea of progress that the final chapter of A History of Europe bore the title ‘New Dictatorships and Old Democracies’.

This chapter was concluded by a question – ‘Can liberty survive?’, and an outline of the problem. New ‘scientific technique and apparatus for propaganda’ had come into politics, and antiquity had ‘never beheld despotisms’ as ‘penetrating and all-pervasive as

those which with the help of modern mechanism it has been so easy to set up in Russia, in Italy, and in Germany.’ These regimes had (ab)used the material elements of civilisation, and of progress, while forgoing its political and social advances. They used modern technology to further despotism, arbitrary rule, and primeval hatreds which history was supposed to have shown not only to be a feature of the past, but also to belong to it. Civilisation had been subverted to such an extent that the despotisms of the present were even worse than those of antiquity. Fisher also feared the impending consequences of such regimes, and the ill-use of modern technology, to Europe as a whole: aviation meant that war was more destructive than it had ever been, destructive enough, in fact, to make the quarrels which had been a feature of past centuries, should they erupt once more, fatal to European civilisation – the most ‘splendid possession of man.’ 26 This interpretation of the present led to an epilogue in which the search for some basis of European unity and a permanent peace, the struggle to harness the material benefits of civilisation to advance it politically rather than destroy it, and the imperative of remaining economically competitive amidst the rise of the East, were seen as the defining concerns of the day. 27

To sum up, when in 1941 Alfred Zimmern wrote that Britain held the ‘frontier between civilization and barbarism’, this was no thoughtless jibe. The frontier was that ‘between lands living under the rule of law and lands where brute force was supreme’. 28 The charge of barbarism meant something very specific – Nazi Germany was barbaric because it was rescinding on the values, lessons, and heritage of a precisely defined liberal civilisation consciously descended from Greece and Rome. Were it not for the British Commonwealth, Zimmern wrote, ‘Hitler would have established his “New Order,” inaugurating a fresh Dark Age for Europe and perhaps for the world as a whole.’ 29 Britain was committed to the rule of law, freedom of expression, religious and political moderation, and international peace. The Third Reich was arbitrary, closed, fanatical, and militaristic. Murray, Fisher, and Zimmern were remarkably consistent over what liberal civilisation stood for and the threats it faced. Less obvious is precisely why Europe was beset with these threats in the first place.

26 Fisher (1936), 1217.
28 Alfred Zimmern, From the British Empire to the British Commonwealth (1941), 7.
29 Zimmern (1941), 7.
The Problem with Liberal Civilization

These were of course the concerns outlined by a select group of liberal scholars who happen to be, for the most part, silent with regards to what part liberal civilisation and its failings had in bringing about those very problems they identify. Others from both within and without this liberal tradition would be more forthright. E.H. Carr would rail against the cant of the liberal democracies, and their scholars-cum-international envoys such as Murray and Alfred Zimmern, who preached peace, yet failed to see how the division of the world by the western powers into nations who were haves, and have-nots, undermined any prospect of achieving one that endured. Equally, liberalism, hitherto known for its progressive stance in domestic politics would come to be seen as both remarkably blind and ideologically impotent in the face of the social inequities which plagued interwar Britain and Europe more widely. Identified at the time as the ‘ghost of liberalism walking’, and revealed in recent academic studies as relying on obfuscation and an increasingly bizarre paternalism to avoid the prospect of confronting such unpleasant realities as class inequalities in Britain and national inequalities within the Empire, Gilbert Murray can be identified as emblematic of this problem with liberalism. Revanchist powers, colonial nationalism, fascism, communism, and even domestic socialism, represented both the bêtes noires and the guilty conscience of liberal civilisation – born of its greatest failings, poised to destroy its greatest achievements. We must bear in mind, however, that neither Murray nor Zimmern were simply relics of the Victorian era – ‘orthodox’ liberals in the sense of believing that societies were like markets:

30 Murray and Zimmern did believe that liberal capitalism, along with the “massed and organized selfishness” of states, played a part in causing the war. Their solutions, however, were superficial, and reveal an unwillingness or ideological incapacity to deal with the underlying problems with that system, which would have required overcoming ‘a liberal fear of state power’. Morefield (2005), 103, 136.
31 Consider, for instance, ‘new’ liberals such as J.A. Hobson, prominent critic of imperialism, and known to Murray.
32 Although, as Morefield states, Murray and Zimmern were critical of the behaviour of western states and their role in bringing about war, for complex reasons relating to their liberalism (fear of any coercive international authority which could turn into a super-state, an unwillingness to consider an equalisation of international power and extension of self-governance due to a firm belief in the role of the western powers as defenders of liberal civilisation and a deep-seated scepticism concerning the capacity of the colonial other for liberal democratic government) could not countenance anything but a superficial change. Morefield (2005), 93.
35 Morefield (2005), 80-95.
36 Morefield (2005), 111.
they would right themselves eventually and ought not to be interfered with regardless of the social cost. Rather, they were liberals with a social conscience who attempted to reconcile their liberalism – with its emphasis on the freedom of the individual – with what they saw as a need for more welfare provision and solidarity, something usually associated with the state. In this they shared something of that ‘powerful tension’ between ‘competing individualistic and collectivist instincts’ that also troubled the ostensibly socialist H.G. Wells.\textsuperscript{37} Zimmer, in fact, went so far as to contest the Caernarfon parliamentary seat – then held by David Lloyd George – on behalf of the Labour party. That we are not dealing with an ossified Victorian liberalism in these two scholars makes the fact that their ideas were nonetheless highly contested all the more significant.

In 1956 Murray wrote how ‘we older men who were grown up or growing up before 1914 know what a civilised society really is’, whereas the younger generation had known its ‘remains’ after ‘fifty years of strain’.\textsuperscript{38} His friend Bertrand Russell related how it had been ‘a difficult time for those who grew up amid Victorian solidities’, when ‘outbreaks of barbarism’ were ‘making nineteenth century optimism look shallow.’\textsuperscript{39} Victorian certainties were certainly being called to question, and outside the works of liberalism’s staunchest defenders, this is reflected in the more diverse range of perceptions of antiquity which developed in the period following the Great War.

Among these certainties to be questioned was the canonical status of democratic Athens as the embodiment of all that was best about western civilisation in antiquity. In What Happened In History (first published in 1942), Gordon Childe, archaeologist and socialist, painted a much less idealised picture of Athens than that which had long characterised liberal scholarship – even allowing for J.B. Bury’s reservations. Childe saw no need to resort to Murray’s solution of labelling all that was bad about Greece as either remnants of a darker age, or not authentically Greek. Fifth-century Athens was the first well-documented example of a popular government, but this was not to be exaggerated. Women ‘had no place in public life’, and were in fact ‘almost as completely secluded as women in Mahommedan countries today’ – in law they were ‘in a worse position than their Assyrian and Babylonian sisters.’ In a democracy that was ‘not only politically conceded but also

\textsuperscript{37} R. Toye, ‘H.G. Wells and the New Liberalism’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2008), 159, 184. Toye argues that Wells, conventionally seen as a socialist who stood as a Labour candidate, also saw himself as a Liberal, and believed the two parties should work together: ‘It is not, of course, argued here that Wells was not a socialist. He certainly thought that he was, just as he sincerely believed he was a Liberal.’


economically established’, the Athenian citizen ‘secured leisure for politics and culture largely at the expense of their wives, of aliens who had no share in government, and of slaves who had no rights whatsoever’ – and even this was supplemented by ‘exceptional sources’ of wealth in the silver of Laurion and the tribute of Empire: thus the so-called Athenian ‘people’ was ‘in a sense only an exceptionally large and diversified ruling class’. Less romantic scholars than Murray (for whom Hellenism had an almost ‘spiritual’ quality) had long identified these foundational facets of Athenian democracy. In the eighteenth century the slave-owning Whig, William Young, found in a slave-owning Athenian democracy a neat parallel for his own situation and political beliefs. At the turn of the twentieth century, Roman historian Warde-Fowler, while acknowledging that by nineteenth century terms Athens was ‘not really a democracy, but a slave-holding aristocracy’, would nonetheless attempt to exculpate her – it was ‘hard to grudge’ Athens her slaves, essential as they were to the “good life” of ‘the free minority which has left us such an invaluable legacy to modern civilisation’.

Childe, his history replete with such terms as ‘class struggle’ and ‘bourgeoisie’, saw no such saving grace, and his work can be seen as one small manifestation of a broader and deeper questioning of liberal certainties – and their intellectual foundations – by newer creeds.

That left and right tended to identify similar problems with liberal civilisation – albeit offering differing solutions – is well illustrated by Oswald Mosley’s migration from the Labour Party to the leadership of British fascism. While hardly representative of 1930s political thought, his criticism of the liberal order – the values of a ‘senescent civilisation’ – is cutting, and in substance echoes Childe’s socialist critique of a ‘democratic’ Athens in which a minority enjoyed a political freedom founded on the servitude of the majority:

41 Zimmern, rather bizarrely, similarly referred to Hellenism as a “political religion”. This is very curious considering the traditional liberal aversion to an intrusive religion, political or otherwise. Morefield (2005), 78.
42 Young, (1777),116, cited in Liddel (2009), 15.
43 W. Warde-Fowler, The City-State of the Greeks and Romans (1893), 177-79. With not inconsiderable special pleading, at the same time perhaps reflecting contemporary hierarchies within the British Empire, he adds that the slaves of the democracy were comparatively better off, and that most were in any case not Greeks but ‘foreign and semi-civilised’.
44 See Childe (1967), 266.
45 Which is not, of course, to say that their respective solutions were similar – Childe wrote that classical civilisation was economically and scientifically ‘dead’ by AD 250 – and that attempts to rescue it by ‘reviving a régime of Oriental centralization, often miscalled State Socialism’, was in vain. A better name for the Roman imperial system from that period, Childe thought, was ‘Naziental-Sozialismus’ – as this ‘employed almost identical methods for the same purpose of maintaining an antiquated social system’: see Childe (1967), 285-86. In this, of course, we can identify the socialist critique of fascism as a totalitarianism which was revolutionary in
Real freedom means good wages, short hours, security in employment, good houses, opportunity for leisure and recreation with family and friends. Modern Science enables us to build such a civilisation. It is not built, because Democracy prefers talk to action. We have to choose between the freedom of a few professional politicians to talk and the freedom of the people to live. In choosing the latter, Fascism makes freedom possible and releases the people from the economic slavery riveted upon them by the Democracy of talk.\footnote{Oswald Mosley, 100 Questions Asked and Answered (London: Action Press, 1936), 9-10.}

The claim that fascism seeks to use modern science to create a new ‘civilisation’ is an illustration of the claim to modernity apparent with most European fascist movements, reveals more precisely why Fisher insisted (see above) that fascism uses the material advances of civilisation to take it back to barbarism, and demonstrates the prevalence of the idea of ‘civilisation’ in 1930s political thought. Most important, however, and echoing in some respects Ronald Syme’s account of the fall of the Roman Republic,\footnote{R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), 513. ‘...there is something more important than political liberty; and political rights are a means not an end in themselves. That end is security of life and property: it could not be guaranteed by the constitution of Republican Rome. Worn and broken by civil war and disorder, the Roman People was ready to surrender the ruinous privilege of freedom, and submit to strict government...’. See also A. Momigliano, Review of Syme’s The Roman Revolution, JRS, Vol. 30. Part 1 (1940), 75-80. Momigliano is critical of this perspective.\footnote{Morefield (2005), 80, 81.}} is the charge that political freedom is meaningless without economic security: this struck to the heart of the liberal beliefs embodied by Murray, and in two ways. Firstly it questioned the fundamental precepts of liberalism: hard won political liberty. Secondly, it identified liberalism’s most dangerous flaw – an aversion to addressing social inequalities, partly out of distaste for class politics (and a self-interest that dared not speak its name), and partly out of historic liberal aversion to state-power which would be the necessary corollary of government-led social reform.\footnote{In 1939 an American reviewer, considering several books addressing the rise of fascism, devastatingly dismissed Murray’s Liberality and Civilization in two sentences: name only – its real agenda was to preserve a corrupt system by eliding class-conflict with recourse to nationalism, racialism, and more primitive instincts. For Constantine, Christianity, and triumph of the totalitarian state, see page 288.}
*Liberality and Civilization* is a good example of the ghost of liberalism walking. It offers only beautiful sentiments hitched to no program of reality. Fascism will not be stopped by preaching the virtues of democracy, as Lerner has fully demonstrated.

The latter, Max Lerner, had, in the reviewer’s estimation offered a solution – the goals of liberalism were ‘permanently valid’, but ‘new methods, new economics, and new political tactics ‘ were ‘required to win them’ – liberals must fuse economic planning with a commitment to democracy.49

Mercifully for liberals, such a path was open, even if it was not actually taken until 1945.50 Britain was not simply faced with the stark alternatives of fascism and communism – but was instead fortunate enough to have a labour movement sufficiently reconciled to the establishment and, as Murray himself observed, not particularly indebted to Marx.51 Indeed, the middle road of Social Democracy was one Murray identified, writing to *The Times* of possible cooperation between the Liberal and Labour parties – the former would act as a moderating influence upon the latter.52 In the event, Britain turned out to be one of those 1930s liberal democracies identified by Gregory Luebbert as having succeeded in repelling both fascism and social democracy by undercutting the latter with concessions and its absorption into the mainstream political establishment.53 This nonetheless serves to

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50 This proved not to be to Murray’s taste, and he voted Conservative, for the first time in his life, at the 1950 general election – seeing his liberalism as better represented by the Conservative rather than Labour Party. See M. Ceadel (2008), 237.

51 Morefield (2005), 87.

52 ‘Liberals and Labour: Professor Gilbert Murray on Possible Cooperation’ *The Times* (27 October 1925), 16. Morefield (2005), 87, however, contends that both Murray and Zimmern, even though they did not see the Labour party as being comparably Marxist to continental equivalents, still saw it as a threat to their liberal way of life. Indeed, he wrote to *The Times* (16 February 1944) that electoral reform, and proportional representation, was essential so that neither Conservatives nor Labour could impose their own reactionary or socialist revolution without the genuine consent of the electorate. This last piece also brings out strongly Murray’s commitment to a consensual politics over the ‘might is right’ which he believed characterised fascism and communism, but also to a much lesser extent, a British electoral system in which the largest minority of the electorate could impose its will upon the population.

53 Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Origins of Political Regimes in Interwar Europe* (OUP, 1991). Luebbert’s thesis was that countries like Britain and France with cohesive middle classes succeeded in marginalising their respective labour movements through concessions and in doing so preserved the liberal order. Countries with strong, unified labour movements united to create social democracies, whereas in those countries which succumbed to fascism did so due to an alliance of middle classes and the peasantry.
demonstrate how liberal intellectuals such as Murray and Zimmern – but perhaps even more so their continental counterparts – were increasingly being challenged over the failure of their cherished liberal civilisation to ensure domestic stability. They would respond in turn by accusing their political opponents of subverting the hard won gains of liberalism, and in doing so of moving away from civilisation itself. Their brand of liberalism – well-intentioned, ostensibly reformist, yet incapable of countenancing state-induced social reform, preferring instead to speak vaguely of voluntary associations in a manner reminiscent of today’s liberal-conservative politics\textsuperscript{54} – led them to rely more and more on seeking to avoid the uncomfortable realities of class-inequality by focusing instead on the obfuscating language of family, community, and the harmony of traditional social roles.\textsuperscript{55} In this way one could evade the need for anything more but unbinding and symbolic reform, and this way of thinking was transferred onto their understanding of international politics, and informed their thinking on the form the League of Nations should take, and the place of the British Empire within it.

The Place of the British Empire

\textit{If European civilization as a whole is a child of the Greco-Roman tradition, it is roughly true that at home England is Greek, in the Empire she is Roman} – Gilbert Murray

The liberal myopia concerning the realities of power and social inequality extended beyond the realms of domestic politics and into the international sphere. As Jeanne Morefield has demonstrated in her study of Gilbert Murray, Alfred Zimmern, and their involvement in international relations after the Great War, liberal intellectuals took a strongly paternalistic attitude towards colonial peoples in a manner which resembled their thinking about domestic politics. Using the language of family and community they tacitly accepted the fact that the post-war international order they envisaged would in fact remain hierarchical and dominated by western imperial powers retaining control over the colonial peoples under

\textsuperscript{54} According to Morefield, Zimmern believed ‘rigid notions of human equality were not necessary in a society in which classes understood their relationship to one another through tradition’. Instead of advocating a bigger state to improve the welfare of the general population, Zimmern, in his book \textit{Quo Vadimus?} (London: OUP, 1934), 31-32, wrote of diffusing “responsibility as widely as possible among the citizen body, amongst local authorities, occupational groups, voluntary associations, and private individuals”. Morefield comments that Zimmern was ‘stunningly silent on the specifics of how this kind of informal, voluntary form of moral economy was to be re-established in the absence of the state.’ See Morefield (2005), 91-92.

\textsuperscript{55} Morefield (2005), 85-95.
their exploitative rule, or benevolent tutelage – depending on one’s point of view. This was not particularly new. What was new was that these men occupied influential positions at a time when Britain had a key part to play in formulating a new international order as negotiations took place over what form a future League of Nations should take.\(^\text{56}\) This was an opportunity to put liberal ideas into practice, and the type of League of Nations these men argued for – and got – is illustrative of the extent to which British liberalism had become not only reconciled to the British Empire, prone to see it as an essential guarantor of Western Civilisation, but also the extent to which liberalism had become acquiescent in the relations between different peoples upon which imperial power rested, and the manner in which such an understanding informed their geopolitical vision.

There had been some discomfiture earlier in the nineteenth century, with Grote, with Freeman, over the nature, purpose, and consequences of Empire. This it seems had diminished with Bury, who although he appeared critical of the ‘belief of the white races in their superiority to the coloured’, was reconciled to the idea of a benign empire, like Alexander’s, extending civilisation to all ethnicities.\(^\text{57}\) Indeed, the opposite vision – the Aristotle presented in *A History of Greece* – has the likeness of a Little Englander.\(^\text{58}\) Any unease that may have been present in the thoughts of those three liberal scholars was, it would seem, entirely absent in Murray’s comments about the British Empire. There occurred after the Great War a shift in the way Empire was presented. Rather than promoting its militaristic glory, the emphasis came to rest on presenting it as caring and conservative – and this was reflected, argues Porter, in a desire to move on from a crude militarism to the idea of the Commonwealth. The family metaphor was employed to make the Commonwealth seem a benevolent institution ‘anticipating’ internationalism. Its justification pointed to the hard facts of international affairs: in a world dominated by empires – good and bad – colonial nations would fall prey to more rapacious conquerors were they to break free from the ‘kindly British Empire’. It is in this context of the softening idea of Commonwealth that Murray’s ideas should be positioned – an idea which, ironically enough, coincided with one of the most brutal periods of imperial rule: the age of Amritsar and the Black and Tans.\(^\text{59}\) It is not that Murray believed empire, *per-se*, to be an inherently good thing – his admiration lay with a humane Greece rather than a militaristic Rome. Rather, Murray’s thinking about

\(^{56}\) Morefield (2005), 153-54.  
\(^{57}\) J.B. Bury (1923), 25-26, 29-30.  
\(^{59}\) Porter (2004), 274-80.
empire is emblematic of a twentieth century liberal acceptance of empire as a geopolitical necessity on the one hand, and a civilising influence for lesser races on the other. The former was more usually an implicit understanding, or presented in terms of the stabilising influence of the Empire rather than as being in Britain’s interests. When Murray, therefore, engaged with the subject of the British Empire, he did so in a manner which acknowledged the drawbacks inherent in imperial rule, but which depicted it as of advantage to the ruled. Implied by his opposition to colonial nationalism is that empire was also necessity for its rulers.  

He acknowledged the problematic nature of empire in this way: ‘the rule of one race over another is always a fearful problem. When the ruling nation is a democracy the difficulties are greater.’ He also articulates the often quoted but rarely attributed truism about British imperial thought: ‘if European civilization as a whole is a child of the Greco-Roman tradition, it is roughly true that at home England is Greek, in the Empire she is Roman’. This division of Britain and her settler colonies on the one hand, and the empire of rule on the other, into Greek and Roman models, could draw on considerable precedent, and served an useful purpose. In so doing, the British Empire could be portrayed as upholding ‘Greek’ freedoms in Britain and the colonies, while extending the benefits of a beneficial Roman imperium to the multitudes of ruled peoples. The latter achievement was hardly as noble as the first, but it had merits of its own, long presented in British historiography as the preservation of peace and the spread of law and civilisation.

This is not all, however, for the justification does not rest on a simple division of services rendered. Rather, the very nature of the British Empire as a Greco-Roman hybrid offered further possibilities which neither Greece nor Rome could have presented by themselves: ‘if under a democracy the difficulties [of empire] are greater, the hopes of a successful issue are greater too’. The British Empire was no ordinary empire but, ‘the only empire known to history which has deliberately pursued the policy of training her dependencies to become independent’. Parts of the ‘Roman’ Empire would one day become ‘Greek,’ and in which case, under Britain, empire need not even be a necessary evil. This, of course, presupposes that there are those who enjoy democratic freedoms while ruling and teaching others, while at the same time there are those who are ruled, taught, and exist under what was in effect a despotic government. This might be temporary, but as certain studies of

60 Morefield (2005), 111-12.
British imperial thought have shown, this could all too easily be very much ‘temporary’ in a somewhat indefinite sense, and of course any decision concerning the fitness of a given people for self-government rested at the whim of the imperial power.62

The aftermath of the Great War, the ensuing peace negotiations, and debates over a future League of Nations – both of which involved the presence of representatives from a host of new, small, nations, alongside the more established powers – serve as a good illustration of the British outlook and the British self-image. Men like Murray and Fisher who became involved in such international negotiations discovered to their dismay that this necessarily involved dealing with foreigners.63 Writing to South African leader Jan Smuts about the League of Nations Assembly, Murray lamented the presence of ‘a rather large proportion of small dark Latin nations’. Similarly, Fisher, writing to Murray, mentioned how the ‘Latin races love grandiloquent platitude’.64 For the Spanish diplomat, Salvador de Madariaga, the problem such liberals now faced was this: international gatherings such as those of the League of Nations were no longer characterised by deference to wise and disinterested British advice, but were rather:

... a tumultuous agora of nations obtaining an equality of status far ahead of any claims to natural or cultural equality. Was it for this that the lofty, disinterested British civic monks had striven so loyally for years?65

Here the Spanish diplomat strikes to the heart of the matter – various and variously oppressed nations, each with their respective axes to grind, were claiming an equality of status before they merited it. It was, of course, only benevolent and supposedly and disinterested Britons such as Murray, Zimmern, and Fisher – ‘civic monks’ – who could make a judgement as to who was ready for that equality of status. This also points to a certain problem, a potential divergence between liberal rhetoric and reality: it may be that men such as Murray would have been more than willing to treat on equal terms with formerly colonial peoples who had made the grade, but the trouble is that it seems such a judgement rested solely with the disinterested British. A people, needless to say, who looked far more disinterested to

63 See Salvador de Madariaga’s pithy depiction.
65 de Madariaga (1960), 197.
themselves that to others, and who were able to claim to be disinterested precisely because the existing system was their system.  

What, then, happened when the day came, and colonial peoples demanded their self-government, instead of it being proffered upon them by a Britain which had judged them to be ready? To understand the response of liberals of Murray’s generation to this problem, we can turn to Arnold J. Toynbee, a man who knew him well. In a passage which deserves to be quoted at length, Toynbee effectively captures not only Murray’s outlook, but a wider liberal predicament:

Murray never wavered in his devotion to the cause of the weak and the oppressed, whether these were men or women, Boers or Bantu, human beings birds, or beasts. But he did begin to jib – and this more and more decidedly towards the end of his life – at the spectacle of certain under-dogs, who would once have been a liberal’s protégés, now championing their own cause, sometimes rather aggressively, and turning against top-dog and all his work and values, sometimes without showing much discrimination. Of course, Murray’s own Irish ancestors had reacted like this. They had not been willing to leave their destiny to be decided by English liberals. But this ancestral reaction did not always win Murray’s sympathy when he encountered it in contemporary Asians and Africans. His growing anxiety to see modern liberalism save itself from meeting Hellenic liberalism’s fate led him, in his latest years, to take a line on more than one controversial issue that distressed some liberals, gratified some conservatives, and perhaps surprised both. The explanation of this is to be found in his increasing concern to see the spark of civilization saved from extinction.

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66 Writing of J.S. Mill’s criticism of French glorifications of empire, Jennifer Pitts identified what was to be a key component of the British self-image for decades to come: Mill ‘only rarely and glancingly acknowledged the extent to which Britain’s unassailable international position made possible the tone of high-minded disinterestedness that more often characterized British debates’. J. Pitts (2006), 256.

67 Classical scholar, protégé and later son in law of Gilbert Murray, analyst and propagandist for the Foreign Office during the Great War, and perhaps most famous for A Study of History, the great work which sought to explain the rise and fall of civilisations. See McNeill (1989), 72-78 for Toynbee’s role during the Great War.

There are some key things to note here. First is the benevolent attitude towards downtrodden groups on the part of liberals who wished to see themselves as reformers – reforming, that is, *on behalf* of the disadvantaged. Second is the liberal-British self-image as disinterested arbiter in the affairs of others. Third is the distaste at the presumption, at times grotesque, of underprivileged groups (most notably Asians and Africans) insistent on ‘championing their own cause’. Fourth, and perhaps most important, is the dismay at the manner, and the consequences, of such action. At the manner because of its anti-western spirit, and rejection of western civilisation and its (presumably liberal) values. At the consequences because of what a post-colonial future would mean: formerly colonial nations who had shown themselves as yet incapable of appreciating western liberal secular democratic freedoms taking their place as equals at the United Nations, their demographic and material resources no longer at the disposal of Great Britain, and thus civilisation, but instead threatening to further the interests of the Soviet Union, and thus a barbarism ever present in spite of the defeat of the Third Reich.69

In this way, the aspirations of colonial peoples were an ideological threat to liberal civilisation because they either renounced it in fact by active opposition to its ideals, or renounced it in effect by forgoing further tutelage in something they understood imperfectly, if at all. In turn, by threatening to undermine the integrity of the British Empire, their aspirations would also threaten the geopolitical basis of liberal civilisation in the world at a time when the threat of barbarism, Nazi and then Soviet, loomed large. These were very much the sentiments behind Murray’s article in *The Sunday Times* of the 16th of December 1956, titled ‘The Shadow of Barbarism’, written during the Premiership of Eden, and after it had become apparent that British involvement in the Suez crisis had become a diplomatic catastrophe, and the victorious Franco-British force obliged to withdraw. Murray wrote that the practice of one nation one vote at the United Nations was absurd – more so with the ‘recent universal clamour for equality and the “anti-West” enthusiasm of nearly all Asia and Africa.’ New additions to the General Assembly in the 1950s included nations which ‘had not reached the standard of government that we call “civilisation” – and yet they were in a majority. The Franco-British attack was a ‘daring attempt to stop the “anti-West” conspiracy of Nasser’s usurpation’, thwarted by an ‘anti-white’ or ‘anti-colonial’ majority at the UN. This strange, unthinkable situation, caused him to reflect on the spirit of this new age, and it was not to his liking: it was no longer ‘permitted to say that some nations are less advanced

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69 See Morefield (2005), 111-112: ‘For Murray and Zimmern, colonial agitation for increased autonomy, democracy, and even statehood, posed an inherent threat not just to Britain but to the entire western order.’
than others’, and he seems to have longed for the ‘age which still dared to say that unequal things were unequal’. To proceed in the same ‘equalitarian’ direction as was ‘now fashionable’ risked making not only the British Empire but “Western” or “Christian” civilisation in its entirety ‘of less and less account’. Of increasingly more account were the enemies of civilisation, preaching communism, led by Russia. The ‘great danger’, he warned, was that ‘we may all look on and see the civilised world rebarbarised’. 70 This nightmare situation explains the desires of Murray, Zimmern, and indeed the British government to keep the League of Nations they had such a hand in designing in the 1930s as a toothless organisation unable to bind the western colonial powers to the wishes of lesser nations. 71 Perhaps the most important thing to grasp here is not that Murray had become reactionary, or conservative, near the end of his life – or as Ceadel argued, that his liberalism did not last as long as his mental powers. 72 Rather, Murray remained committed, and consistently committed to that understanding of liberalism – informed by Greece – with which we have become familiar during the course of this discussion. For Murray, liberalism had become something which needed conserving; conservative politics simply better represented his liberalism. Much has been made in certain works over this ‘exclusionary potential of liberalism’ – that liberalism necessarily excluded certain group who, in the liberal eye, did not adhere to liberal principles. Perhaps such a condemnation could only have been written in an age which privileges inclusion above what were once considered essential and universal moral and political values.

Britain’s Colonies and the Turn to Europe

True to the standard practice adopted in this thesis, the above has provided a discussion of the relationship between antiquity and liberal thought concerning domestic and imperial politics and how these in turn help inform a historical imagination mapping out the past, present, and future of liberal civilisation. What has not yet been discussed is colonies and colonisation, understood purely in terms of the white Dominions, of course, and their place in this particular vision. The answer, in short, is that they played a very marginal role in British intellectual responses broaching the great questions of the day with reference to

71 Morefield (2005), 111-12. Murray was not alone in his concern for the future of western civilisation. Arnold Toynbee, in an essay titled ‘The Dwarfing of Europe’ warned Europeans not to expect that non-western peoples would merely duplicate western liberal norms.
72 Ceadel (2008), 237.
antiquity. This does not, of course, necessarily apply to the views of the political leadership, more and more detached from intellectual debates and increasingly professionalised academic purists. British and Dominion leaders still saw the imperial connection as critical to their respective national interests (the Dominions were formally sovereign since the Statute of Westminster of 1931) from the 1930s through to the post-war era, but the continuing cooperation and assent of independent Dominions could not make up for the loss of the most important part of the imperial edifice with the independence of India in 1947. This, along with Suez marked the collapse of British world power. The semblance of Empire remained in African and the Far East, individual states breaking away in what was a protracted process continuing well into the 1960s. Britain’s hopes that the Commonwealth would serve as some vehicle for British power proved ill-founded, and a reorientation of British foreign policy towards Europe saw Britain turning its back on what was to all intents and purposes a symbolic collection of wildly differing states. If colonisation could no longer inspire or provoke intellectual responses as it was no longer one of the big questions facing civilisation, this turn to Europe, in forcing new thinking about the respective needs for security and sovereignty, most certainly did.

**Freedom or Security?**

**Modern Europe and the Decline of the Polis**

The demise of the Empire and Britain’s inability to turn the post-war Commonwealth into anything resembling an adjunct to British power and influence, posed the question of how exactly Britain was to exert influence and maintain its security in a world dominated by two vast continental states. Alliance with one of them was quite clearly going to be a major pillar of British policy for the foreseeable future, but American behaviour over Suez also demonstrated, quite clearly, that the British role in such an alliance would always be a junior one. The importance of the United States for the economic well being and strategic security of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, along with the differing concerns of such widely dispersed and long independent nations meant that there could be no return to nineteenth century dreams of a Greater Britain transcending the mother-country’s geopolitical weakness in the face of large territorial states. There lay open, however, other possibilities, namely European integration. This, of course, meant a political union of some form or another.

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between the fragmented states of Europe – whose very fragmentation had been a primary cause of half a century's internecine conflict. Such integration would pose serious and tortuous questions of the sort which had long tormented liberal intellectuals. In domestic politics it had been the dilemma as to where the correct balance lay between individual liberty and commitments to a wider community. In international terms it had been about the extent to which state sovereignty could be compromised in order to fulfil commitments to the community of nations and prevent conflict. At the time the League of Nations was being constructed, Britain, its Empire intact, its power thought preeminent, saw little benefit in curtailing its sovereignty and thus altering an agreeable status-quo. Times had now changed, and shorn of its Empire Britain was obliged to reflect on where it should now stand in relation to this enduring dilemma.

The problem of sovereignty and the instability, leading to internecine conflict, which disunity could entail, was an important intellectual motif after the Great War. War, its implications, and how to avoid it appears to have been a defining concern of liberal intellectuals from the end of the Great War, to the Second World War, and indeed beyond. More often than not it was associated with the debate about political fragmentation and its ill-effects. The classical parallel was obvious. As Murray wrote:

Strangely like the nations of modern Europe, the Greek communities knew that nothing but *Cosmos* and *Homonoia* [order and concord] could save them but found the goal too hard to reach. They failed to abolish war and war ruined them.74

Writings from the period after 1914 display a constant engagement with the dilemmas posed by inter-state relations and classical Greek parallels. The sovereignty – or freedom – of individual European nation states could be compared to that of the Greek *poleis*. That freedom entailed an inherent disunity which in modern as in ancient times left open the path to war – and eventually to the demise of the exhausted civilisation concerned. This, in turn, of course, evoked the dilemma between posed by any possible solutions – ought Greece, like contemporary Europe was pondering, have restricted freedom of individual states – or sovereignty – in order to attain some greater security? Examining a selection of works written by professional scholars but for general audiences reveals how ancient Greece

provided a prescient point of reference for British discussions of this problem. We shall begin with two scholars of an older generation – Gilbert Murray (1866-1957) and William George de Burgh (1866-1943), before proceeding to consider the writings of a later generation with Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), H.D.F. Kitto (1897-1982), V. Gordon Childe (1892-1957), and finally Moses Finley (1912-1986).

Gilbert Murray perceived the troubles of the interwar period in relation to that of the conflict in classical Greece, with the demise of Greek freedom in the face of Macedon most resonant in 1941, when Demosthenes could most profitably be compared with Churchill and his opposition to appeasement:

The *Philippics* of Demosthenes, delivered in vain to a sluggish and wishfully-thinking Assembly, remind one constantly of Mr Churchill’s ‘Arms and the League’ speeches which so long failed to stir the Baldwin and Chamberlain Governments.

Philip takes on the mantle of Hitler, intimidating, shying just short of open war, whereas the individual Greek state resembles those of modern Europe – congratulating itself on ‘being safe while Philip destroys its neighbour’, never seeing ‘that they must unite for the common security, that their only chance of security is by union’. When Demosthenes finally stirs Athens into action, it is too late: ‘there was no American arsenal then to redress the balance in support of democracy’.75 The theme of unity and security is very much in evidence here, but Murray appears more concerned with relating the plight of Athens with that of Britain in a specific sense, rather than in making any broader historical or political point.

De Burgh, on the other hand, offers a much broader perspective. Educated at Oxford, professor of philosophy at the University of Reading (but previously a lecturer in Greek and Latin), his most famous book was *The Legacy of the Ancient World*, first published in 1923. He was the same generation as Gilbert Murray (indeed, born in the same year), and like Murray would seek to explain the significance of antiquity, albeit differently, to the modern world.

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Whereas Murray’s thinking focused on a ‘Hellenism’ equated with political liberalism, De Burgh’s main contention in *The Legacy of the Ancient World* was that the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans each ‘bequeathed to after-ages one of the essentials in the idea of a complete civilization’ – the Greeks demonstrated the value of liberty, the Romans discipline, the Hebrews a religious vision. Thus ‘freedom, law, and the kingdom of God’ formed the ‘threefold legacy of antiquity to the modern world’. The characterisation of the debt to Greece as resting in a liberty allowing the intellect to ‘flourish’, like the notion that *polis* was of ‘incalculable’ significance for the future of civilisation, is both conventional and a constant from Grote to Bury and, it seems, beyond. The basis of this understanding of the significance of the *polis* is also very much in keeping with a classic liberal conception of the place of Greece in the history of civilisation:

In distinction from Oriental kingdoms, the city-states of Greece achieved the union of civilized life and political liberty. In the East, freedom of government is found, but only among rude tribes living in small communities. Advance in culture is possible only through the formation of large aggregates of such communities under despotic rule, and is therefore purchased at the cost of liberty… Throughout antiquity, a large state meant despotism. Till the Greeks appeared, progress in civilization meant the creation of a large state. They were the first to solve the problem of uniting culture and freedom in a small community, and solved it through the city-state. They willed to resemble one another and achieved a unique result, realizing in the free public life of the *Polis* a history that contrasts dramatically with the monotonous tale of despotism, caste-privilege, and servitude recounted in the records of the East.

In this explanation the Greek *polis* is a unique progression in the course of civilisation. It fuses the freedom previously associated with tribal societies with the sort of settled and sophisticated civilisation hitherto obtainable only under despotism and a large state. This concept of Greece as the origin of a higher type of civilisation is in keeping with a century of British (liberal) thought. Yet the *polis* suffered from a fatal weakness, for although it had transcended the impasse between freedom and civilisation, it could not bridge that between

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77 De Burgh (1953), 8, 100.
78 De Burgh (1953), 100.
freedom and the unity necessary for security. Internal disunity among citizens and external disunity among *poleis* – and the failure to resolve such conflict by combining in ‘political union even in the face of a common foe’ – ‘worked for the eventual dissolution of Greek independence’. This ‘excess of liberty [domestic and among states] issued in bondage to and alien power’, and in a comment very similar to Murray’s outlook, De Burgh remarks how the Greeks ‘were not slow to diagnose their own disorder’, but were ‘powerless to cure it’: Greek history was ‘full of tragedy’.

The very freedom behind Greek artistic genius ‘proved the ruin of their political independence’ by fostering an ‘aversion from federal solidarity’, thus making them ‘easy prey’ to Macedon and then Rome. Nonetheless, the ‘Greek spirit had its revenge’: Alexander spread its culture in the East, that culture permeating Rome, and thus ‘moulded the thought and culture of the modern world’. Rome itself was confronted with that problem ‘which beset ancient civilization throughout its history, of uniting civic liberty with the expansion of empire’, and ended up as a ‘world-despotism’ realising, like Britain in India and Egypt, ‘the ideal of paternal government’. Were paternal government the ‘last word in civilization’, then the fall of the empire was ‘the most melancholy event in the annals of mankind’, but such a government – a bureaucratic despotism – can ‘evolve no living response’ from its people: ‘the spirit of man craves not comfort, but liberty, not economic stability or equitable administration, but the right, at the cost of infinite toil and tribulation, to work out its own salvation’. Rome could offer no ‘causes’. Such was De Burgh’s assessment of the course of ancient history, and understood as such it offers little scope for optimism (in parts it sounds positively cyclical). This was not necessarily, however, how he conceived the present: if ‘throughout all antiquity a large state meant despotism’, this was because the ‘devices employed by modern nations in order to reconcile an extended territory with the maintenance of political freedom, the printing-press, steam transit, communication by electricity, and, above all, representative government, were unknown to the ancients’. This might signal that De Burgh, for his part, had some confidence in the capacity of the

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80 De Burgh (1953), 107.
81 De Burgh (1953), 4-5.
82 De Burgh (1953), 267.
83 De Burgh (1953), 312.
84 De Burgh (1953), 316.
85 De Burgh (1953), 316-17.
86 De Burgh (1953), 198. De Burgh’s explanation as to how technology made representative democracy possible mirrors J.S. Mill’s thoughts in *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861).
modern world to reconcile liberty and a sufficiently large state. His explanation as to the reasons why this was possible – technology and representative government – bears some similarities with late Victorian hopes for a Greater Britain melding Britain’s colonies of settlement to the metropolis and thus transcending the frailty and transience of empires of rule. De Burgh was, of course, a man of this very generation. How, then, would a later generation broach this subject?

As a promising classical scholar at Oxford Arnold J. Toynbee became a protégé of Gilbert Murray, and eventually his son in law. He travelled extensively in Greece, and come the Great War he served as a propagandist and later analyst for the Foreign Office (compiling the Bryce reports on Turkish atrocities in Armenia and then German ones in Belgium). In the 1930s he started writing *A Study of History* – perhaps one of the most ambitious historical works ever written, and its theme of exploring the rise and fall of civilisations very much topical in interwar Britain with its concerns for the future of civilisation. As with other civilisations, he sought to position ‘Hellenic Civilization’ – by which he meant the civilisations of Greece and Rome as one – within a wider schema of civilisations, and as with those other civilisations, identify a pattern. It is significant that he identified the chief problem with Hellenic civilisation as resting in its failure to create some sort of political order above that of the ‘parochial’ sovereignty of the city-state – but even more significant, perhaps, that he identified this failure as being a common to most civilisations:

… the challenge that worsted the Hellenic civilization is one which has been the common bane of most of the civilizations whose breakdowns and disintegrations are on record, and at the same time one which is nowhere more easy to identify than it is in the Hellenic case in point. The challenge under which the Hellenic civilization broke down was manifestly the problem of creating some kind of political world order that would transcend the institution of Parochial Sovereignty. And this problem, which defeated the generation that stumbled in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 BC, never disappeared from the Hellenic society’s agenda so long as such a thing as Hellenism survived in any recognizable form.88

87 McNeill (1989), 74-75. In 1917 Toynbee was assigned to the Political Intelligence Department, where Alfred Zimmern also worked.

Toynbee saw in the third century ‘constitutional experiments’ of the Seleucid Empire, Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies, and the ‘Roman Commonwealth’ attempts to ‘transcend the traditional sovereignty of the individual city-state’ by creating from city-states either persuaded or coerced ‘political communities on a supra-city-state scale’. In achieving conquests to the East, and thus increasing the ‘material scale’ of the Hellenic world, these larger political units in fact aggravated the problem, merely continuing to wage the internecine warfare of the city states on a larger scale. Larger territorial units in a multi-polar world were not, therefore, a sufficient answer – wars would simply be bigger – and a ‘Pax Oecumenica’ such as that imposed by Augustus represented a sort of rally on the part of a disintegrating civilisation, temporarily giving it life.

In spite of reservations, and the belief that a civilisation’s path could only be traced at a voyage’s end, Toynbee did attempt to plot the position of Western civilisation – suggesting, revealingly, that as it was yet to achieved a ‘Pax Oecumenica’ then it was possible to rule out it being at certain stages of the pattern. His contemporaries, after all, were ‘acutely aware’ that they had not achieved such a peace – and were no longer content to see society ‘partitioned among a number of parochial sovereign states that are apt to assert their sovereignty by going to war with one another.’ In his day, the Pax Oecumenica was seen as a ‘crying need’ lest another catastrophe happen. In an age of Total War, resolving ‘parochialism’ and establishing some form of world order was of the highest import to western civilisation as it then stood.

Toynbee’s A Study of History was written in a context in which Britons feared for the future of their civilisation. Its attempt to discern a pattern in the life of civilisations must owe something to the desire to identify where, along such a pattern the civilisation of the West then lay. What is very striking indeed is the emphasis put on the need to overcome political parochialism, and the very clear equivalence drawn between that problem in antiquity – with a ‘Hellenic’ civilisation encompassing both Greece and Rome – and the

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89 Toynbee (1940), Vol. 6, 288. See also 289-90 for the view that this was a period of ‘catastrophic warfare’, sapping the ‘stamina’ of Hellenic civilisation and ending only when Augustus ended the ‘Roman Anarchy’.
90 Toynbee (1940), Vol. 6, 289-90.
91 Toynbee (1940), Vol. 4, 143.
92 Toynbee (1940), Vol. 4, 170. See page 158 of the same volume for the idea that democracy and industrialism, put into the ‘old machine’ of the ‘Parochial State’ created political and economic nationalism: ‘it is in this gross derivative form, in which the ethereal spirit of Democracy has emerged from its passage through an alien medium, that Democracy has put its ‘drive’ into War instead of working against it.’
93 For a wide ranging discussion of interwar pessimism, see R. Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilization (Penguin, 2009).
predicament of Britain and Western Civilisation in the present. In this way we can identify three important things: firstly, a very ambiguous attitude towards progress and the prevalence of the idea of a rise and fall; secondly, an enduring desire to draw lessons from classical (but not only classical, and not only European) antiquity; and thirdly, the significance of political fragmentation as a key factor in development and fall of civilisations. This latter concern would prove to be a defining concern of British scholarship of antiquity, and it was almost certainly inspired by the predicament of Europe. Toynbee’s ‘The Dwarfing of Europe’ is as clear an indication as any of the significance of this idea.94

Kitto’s *polis* was characterised by responsible government, public affairs with an ‘immediacy’ incomprehensible to us, and as a form of political organisation which allowed the Greeks to develop their ‘genius’ and become a ‘race of brilliant individuals and opportunists’. The alternative posed by an ‘intellectually barren’ East – ‘irresponsible government’, absorption into ‘the dull mass of a large empire’ – was unacceptable; ‘arbitrary government offended the Greek in his very soul’.95 In this way the *polis* performs a similar function to that it did with de Burgh – bridging the equally inadequate offerings of uncivilised tribal freedom and the despotism associated with Oriental civilisation. The central point of Kitto’s understanding of the *polis*, however, rests on understanding its nature in its own right, on its own terms, and by appreciating its ‘immediacy’ and centrality to Greek life. It is only by doing so that we can understand why ‘in spite of the promptings of commonsense the Greek could not being himself to sacrifice the polis, with its vivid and comprehensive life, to a wider but less interesting unity’ – in other words, why the Greeks could not countenance the larger political unit so necessary for their own preservation.

*The Greeks* is a very entertaining work, and Kitto’s explanation of why the Greeks chose not to unite to save the *polis* is by way of a rather clever analogy. He invites the reader to imagine a conversation between an ancient Greek and member of the Athenæum:

The [Athenæum] member regrets the lack of political sense shown by the Greeks.

The Greek replies, ‘How many clubs are there in London?’ The member, at a guess, says about five hundred. The Greek then says, ‘Now, if all these

94 A. J. Toynbee, ‘The Dwarfing of Europe’, in *Civilization on Trial* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 97-125. Toynbee expressed fears about the incomplete nature of Westernisation in many parts of the world, the dwarfing of Europe by polities ‘she herself has called into existence’ (Brazil, Mexico, China, Pakistan, India), and discussed the importance of an European Union amenable to the United States – he concludes, however, by commenting on the anachronism of even an European state in a global economic system.

combined, what splendid premises they could build. They could have a club-house as big as Hyde Park.’ ‘But,’ says the member, ‘that would no longer be a club.’ ‘Precisely,’ says the Greek, ‘and a polis as big as yours is no longer a polis.’

Thus any attempt to ‘save’ the polis by uniting in a larger body would necessarily mean the end of the polis. Kitto’s ideas can be interpreted as a rejoinder to modern attempts to ‘solve’ the problem of the polis (and perhaps seeking to use such an understanding to solve their own difficulties) suggesting that such attempts were made, inspired no doubt by the position of post-war Britain and other European states. They are echoed by Moses Finley, who wrote of such ‘solutions’ that they ‘all have one thing in common: they all propose to rescue the polis by destroying it, by replacing it, in its root-sense of a community which is at the same time a self-governing state, by something else.’

Such scepticism about proscribing solutions to the predicament of ancient states does not extend to disinclination to making comparisons between those predicaments and the quandaries faced in the modern age. Kitto, reflecting on the Greek reasoning for rejecting an unity which could perhaps have saved them, was drawn to think of modern Europe:

After all, modern Europe, in spite of its common culture, common interests, and ease of communication, finds it difficult to accept the idea of limiting national sovereignty, though this would increase the security of life without notably adding to its dullness; the Greek had possibly more to gain by watering down the polis – but how much more to lose. It was not commonsense that made Achilles great, but certain other qualities.

The reference is most likely to the European Coal and Steel Community, proposed in 1950, and established with the Treaty of Paris a year later – the year The Greeks was first published. Britain was not a signatory. One of the most interesting things about this passage is the assertion that the Greek poleis had more to lose from such a union than did modern European

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97 Kitto (1963), 79.
states – and this is probably because the political life of the *polis* was that much more direct – immediate – than that of modern representative democracies.98

One way of reading the above is that compared to the Greek *polis*, the representative democracy is already ‘watered down’: a little more might do no harm. Yet perhaps Kitto does see equivalence between the European – or British – nation-state and the *polis*. It certainly wouldn’t be the only instance in which he presents a conflict between an embattled, exceptionalistic, way of doing things. His critiques of socialism – Kitto makes a scarcely veiled allusions to the Labour party’s dream of a ‘perfectly planned and perfectly efficient national economy’ which fell afoul of the Englishman’s ‘strange addiction to personal freedom’99 – and of other forms of egalitarian political utopianism,100 can be seen as illustrative of Kitto’s resistance to overconfident new certainties, and nostalgia for better things which he realised were no longer possible. Perhaps Kitto is a good illustration of how the ideal of ancient Greece, like a good proportion of the Liberal vote, had in the face of social democracy migrated to the Conservative party, or at least to more conservative positions – as is illustrated by the decision of Gilbert Murray, arch-liberal though he was, to vote Conservative for the first time in the 1950 general election.101

His contempt for what might be called ‘utopian’ solutions and the politics they sometimes require is clear. So as to cast out any doubt as to his position on this, consider his assertion that while it may seem odd to us that the Athenian thought his life ‘something less than the life of a real man’ were the walk to his political centre longer than a day, so too would it be for a Russian to know that ‘we prefer our notions of personal liberty to the triumphs, real or prospective, of their system.’ That was the very choice faced by the Greeks

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98 As we have seen, De Burgh believed that representative democracy, along with technology, was what enabled modern states to ‘reconcile an extended territory with the maintenance of political freedom’. De Burgh (1953), 198.

99 Kitto (1963), 120. First published in 1951, thus perhaps still in the process of being written in 1950, this is likely to be an allusion to the February 1950 general election in which the Labour party returned a majority narrow enough to warrant calling another election in October the following year, which it lost. The 1950 election campaign had been fought on a programme of further nationalisation, and the manifesto make frequent reference to the aim of instilling greater ‘efficiency’ in industry, agriculture, and the economy at large. See the 1950 Labour Party Election Manifesto, *Let Us Win Through Together: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation* (1950). Available online at [http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1951/](http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1951/).

100 Kitto enthused that had ‘reformers, revolutionaries, planners, politicians and life-arrangers in general’ been immersed in Homer from a young age, then ‘they might realize that on the happy day when there is a refrigerator in every home, and two in none, when we all have the opportunity of working for the common good (whatever that is), when Common Man (whoever he is) is triumphant, though not improved – that men will still come and go like the generations of leaves in the forest; that he will still be weak, and the gods strong and incalculable; that the quality of a man matters more than his achievement; that violence and recklessness will still lead to disaster, and that this will fall on the innocent as well as on the guilty...’. Kitto (1963), 64.

– to accept a lower quality of life by ‘diluting’ and losing the polis, or to perish. More telling is this:

If – in the spirit of Cyrus at Croesus’ pyre – we reflect that we too are an imperilled political society clinging desperately to a certain conception of life, our judgement on the Greeks may become a little less complacent. Pericles’ policy – that is to say, the policy which prevailed with the Athenian Assembly – was to try to make the best of both worlds, to enjoy to the full both polis and Empire. We shall perhaps be able to condemn him with better heart when we ourselves have succeeded in reconciling love of liberty with survival.

Suggesting a very real fear over the threat posed to ‘a certain conception of life’, this passage carries within it definite traces of that fear for the future of liberal civilisation which vexed liberal intellectuals such as Zimmern, Fisher, and Murray. Kitto’s idea of what the Greeks stood for corresponds in most of its essential features with what has been identified throughout this thesis as a liberal vision of Greece.102 Whether his liberalism was Liberal or Conservative, in the party-political sense, is unclear, but it is fairly clear that it, speaking through his Greeks, was not socialist. In this way Kitto’s work can be seen as illustrating how Greek studies had undergone a shifting of positions. From being the intellectual underpinning of a liberalism at the forefront of reformist politics – and in direct political and intellectual opposition to Conservative politics – to being an uneasy Liberal bystander, or Conservative bedfellow, in the struggle to moderate or reverse the excesses of a potentially or actually illiberal and variously utopian politics at home and abroad. For all its pithy dismissals of various types of left-wing politics, Kitto’s work carries with it a somewhat fatalistic air – differing from the disbelieving immediacy which characterised 1930s liberal responses to the threat to their civilisation. The ‘larger unit was not acceptable - a point of some interest to Western Europe today’,103 he wrote of the Athenian Empire, yet elsewhere he writes how the polis was proving itself a failure, ‘no longer providing a tolerable way of life’:

102 This is not to say that he saw an actual equivalence between Athens and Britain as did Gilbert Murray. Drawing a parallel between the Athenian and a very liberal British conception of politics, he remarked that in their upholding of a ‘common good’ over ‘party advantage’, the Athenians were ‘in this respect, if in no other, something like the British race’ [my italics]. Kitto (1963), 101.
103 Kitto (1963), 164.
As today, in somewhat similar circumstances, Western Europe is trying to feel its way towards some larger political unit, so in the fourth century there were some who were turning away either from the polis itself or from the democratic principle.\textsuperscript{104}

One gets a definite sense of an order, be it liberal as opposed to socialist politics, or the nation-state as opposed to a more united Europe, inexorably passing away, as did the polis, and Athens, ‘clearly the most civilized society that has yet existed’.\textsuperscript{105} Like that of the polis, this passing is not to be celebrated, even if it is inevitable: ‘Occidental man, beginning with the Greeks, has never been able to leave things alone. He must enquire, find out, improve, progress; and Progress broke the Polis.’\textsuperscript{106}

The appropriate counterpoint to Kitto is Vere Gordon Childe, the famous archaeologist of prehistory (who in fact had a classical background, holding a degree in Latin, Greek, and philosophy from Sydney University, and later winning a scholarship to study classical archaeology at Oxford).\textsuperscript{107} In keeping with liberal scholarship, his socialism also inspired a perception of Oriental states as stagnant, their lack of innovation the result of the ‘conservatism, mysticism and waste of a ruling class of priests and their bureaucracy of scribes in the Mesopotamian cities’.\textsuperscript{108} His critical approach to Rome bears similarities to certain liberal elements, portraying it as a rapacious aristocracy under the Republic (Roman governors exploiting conquered territories like Oriental monarchs, accountable only to like-minded capitalists),\textsuperscript{109} the worst excesses of Senatorial government curbed under Augustus (who provided a ‘reasonably efficient and honest administration’, and above all peace), only for the increase in wealth that ensued to prove to be the result of the ‘superficial expansion of civilization and the suspension of attritional warfare’. Come the later days of the empire (from circa 250AD), Rome would be an Oriental despotism. His depiction does not quite, however, match Kitto’s scathing summary and turn of phrase.\textsuperscript{110} Like Kitto, he attributes the

\textsuperscript{104} Kitto (1963), 158.
\textsuperscript{105} Kitto (1963), 96.
\textsuperscript{106} Kitto (1963), 161.
\textsuperscript{109} Childe (1964), 270.
\textsuperscript{110} Kitto’s summary of the history of Rome, compared unfavourably with Athens for its lack of statesmanship, was as follows: ‘To compare the Romans with the Athenians in this respect is quite absurd. The Romans had many gifts, but statesmanship was not one of them. No major reform was every carried through in Rome without civil war: the achievement of the Republic was to fill Rome with a pauperized rabble, to ruin Italy and provoke slave-revolts, and to govern the empire – or at least its richer parts – with an open personal rapacity
failure to adapt to social and economic change to be a critical factor in the demise of ancient political systems: ‘it [the polis] could not provide an ideology compatible with an economic system based inexorably on international trade on at least a Mediterranean scale.’\textsuperscript{111} His interpretation, however, differs in being a socialist critique – there were ‘contradictions in the political and economic structure of the world of the Greek poleis’ which had ‘fatal’ outcomes. The prevalence of slavery caused unemployment and proletarianism, peasants lost their land by serving or losing in war, and the lack of any outlet save as mercenaries, while at the same time piracy was rife, thus providing more slaves, further ‘aggravated’ the problem. These economic contradictions were complemented by the ‘parochialism of the City-States that split Greece into tiny units, each clinging to local autonomy with suicidal fanaticism’.\textsuperscript{112}

Childe, as did De Burgh and also Kitto,\textsuperscript{113} did recognise the polis as having negotiated that impasse between primitive freedoms and despotic Oriental civilisation. The polis ‘provided a conscious motive for self-sacrificing moral action such as a barbarian tribe did not need and an Oriental State could not evoke’, inspiring ‘its citizens to deliberate valour, triumphant art, and noble generosity.’ Yet the ideal, encapsulated in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, was but a ‘local patriotism’, and as such it could not address prevailing economic conditions, caused Greece to have ‘squandered’ its manpower, ‘dissipated its wealth’, enslaved Greeks, diminished the labour of free men, and eventually ‘forfeited the autonomy of the poleis themselves’.\textsuperscript{114} Considering this was a work first published in 1942, it is hard not to discern a scathing condemnation of the capitalist nation-states of Europe in this appraisal of the polis. The decline of the Roman Empire is dealt a similar treatment. Its economy died ‘having failed to stimulate proletarian and peasant demand by advertising and to make it effective by a redistribution of purchasing power’, its middle-classes ‘doomed to proletarianism’, restricting their families, as ‘only the great landlords escaped, and that by a reversion to Neolithic self-sufficiency’.\textsuperscript{115} The only response to this ‘bankruptcy’ was the revival of a ‘régime of Oriental centralization, often miscalled State Socialism’ – but more accurately described as a ‘Nazional-Sozialismus’, for the latter ‘employed almost identical

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{111} Childe (1964), 239.
\textsuperscript{112} Childe (1964), 238.
\textsuperscript{113} Kitto (1963), 10-11. Kitto wrote that the Greeks were distinguished, and saw themselves as distinguished, from the ‘barbaroi’ living under Oriental despotism as well as those to the North ‘living in tribal conditions from which the Greeks themselves had not long escaped’. What distinguished them was the city-state.
\textsuperscript{114} Childe (1964), 238-39.
\textsuperscript{115} Childe (1964), 285.
\end{footnotesize}
methods for the same purpose of maintaining its antiquated social system’. The failings of the liberal capitalist order of the nation-states, and the purported fascist solutions, were writ large on Childe’s impression of antiquity.

Another significant scholar of the post-war period was Moses Finley, who famously left the United States in 1954, having lost his job, and finding himself unable to find another, during McCarthy’s ‘Red Scare’. With the help of the classical scholar Anthony Andrewes (author of The Greeks, 1967), he moved to Britain, where he lectured at Cambridge. Although his works were clearly influenced by Marxism, his left-wing politics did not, it seems, manifest itself in the virulent condemnation of certain states as we have seen to have been the case with the older Childe. This most apparent in his treatment of the polis in The Ancient Greeks, a popular book first published in 1963. We have already encountered his sympathetic, or rather empathetic, account of its decline, questioning modern accusations that it was a ‘stupid failure to unite in a national state’, and suggesting that the ‘solutions’ offered up for its salvation in effect meant destroying the polis. Rather than condemning the polis, as Childe seems to have done, as dying a deserved death, Finley instead chose to see the polis as an unique and unrepeatable episode which in its ‘fleeting moment’ captured and recorded ‘as man has not often done in his history, the greatness of which the human mind and spirit are capable’.

Indeed, his treatment of classical Athens is overwhelmingly sympathetic. His response to Greek laconophiles such as Plato was that ‘he and those who thought like him conveniently forgot that in Sparta they would never even have begun to think, let along been permitted to teach freely as they did’. In spite of his experience of political persecution for leftwing beliefs – or rather perhaps precisely because of it – Finley wrote admiringly of Athens as an open society and the opposite of Sparta. The latter was ‘the model of the closed society, admired by those who reject an open society with its factional politics, its acceptance of the demos as a political force, its frequent “lack of discipline”, its recognition of the dignity and claims of the individual’.

In contrast, and citing J.S. Mill, Finley mentions how remarkably tolerant the Athenians were of sedition in their midst. Moreover, in spite of its critics, ancient and modern, Finley held the ‘overall record and achievement’ of the

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116 Childe (1964), 285-86.
118 E.g. The Ancient Economy (1973) with its emphasis on the relative primitivism and exploitation inherent in ancient economies is thought to have been influenced by Marxist approaches.
119 Finley (1971), 92-93.
120 Finley (1971), 82.
121 Finley (1971), 87.
democracy and its Assembly as ‘credible to the end’, having shown itself capable of keeping to a ‘consistent line [of policy] for long periods’. This sympathetic treatment of Athens, and reluctance to condemn the Greeks of the *polis* for political stupidity, did not mean that Finley was inclined to see the demise of the *polis* as anything other than inevitable. Phillip and Alexander demonstrated that ‘the political difficulties which were rooted in the fragmentation of Hellas were susceptible only to an imposed solution’, be it from a leading Greek state such as Athens or an outsider force such as Macedon. At no point did the Greeks, ‘even the proponents of pan-Hellenic peace and coalition’ suggest the ‘political integration of the city-states into larger units’. Equally, and perhaps the clearest indication of a politically-informed approach in *The Ancient Greeks* is his contention that no Greek ever suggested, ‘even hypothetically’, how it might be possible to ‘overcome the poverty of natural resources and the low level of technology, except by moving out against Persia’. The connection between an inability to think creatively about economic affairs and a resort to violence, internal or external, to resolve domestic economic problems was a defining feature of the Greek: ‘whenever in Greek history economic difficulties became critical, and that meant agrarian crisis, they were solved either by revolutionary means or by looking abroad, whether by emigration to new lands, as in the long colonization period, or by one or another form of pressure on other Greeks.’

This corresponded to his view of the ancient economy as essentially primitive and exploitative, with the city a parasitic imposition upon the countryside – as more fully expounded in *The Ancient Economy* (1973). It may also be seen as revealing in terms of the influence of political inclinations on Finley’s scholarship. Although usually seen as a Marxist émigré, Finley was not in fact a Marxist, but rather thought himself more ‘Marxisant’ – *The Ancient Economy* emphasised the importance of status over ‘class’, of status as the determining force in ancient economies, and the primitive and hence pre-capitalist nature of the ancient economy – but his concern with unsustainable economic conditions leading to revolution or expansion must owe something to Marxist influences. That is perhaps the point: Finley represents an age in which political ideas had

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122 Finley (1971), 81, 79.
123 Finley (1971), 88.
come to inform flexibly rather than dominate scholarship. For Finley, scholarship was not, it seems, the continuation of politics by other means.

Colonisation had by the end of the Second World War ceased to be an important debate to which scholars wanted to contribute. This in turn would for the most part lead to a diminished influence of contemporary ideas, in deliberate terms at least, in scholarly discussions of colonisation; this went hand in hand with a tendency to avoid making obvious political statements in scholarly works. The most important contemporary theme which scholars wished to engage with was now that of the relationship between political freedom, political fragmentation, and security. As we have seen, this was a theme present in many discussions of the *polis*, and it was also a defining concern for those classically educated intellectuals prominent in public life. Responses to this theme, as we have seen, varied greatly, but there was irrespective of the specific viewpoint a common view that the *polis*, be it a repressive system or an inspiration, was ultimately unsustainable – and that for a variety of reasons relating directly to the author’s particular viewpoint.

*British Scholarship and Greek Colonisation 1914-1990*

From the preceding discussion it will be clear to us that the political, imperial and colonial, and intellectual climates of the era following the Great War were substantially different to those which preceded it. What had become by 1914 a dominant liberal conception of politics had faced and continued to face dangerous intellectual challenges. A liberal reconciliation with empire as a bulwark against the barbarism of colonial peoples and extremist ideologies, and a softening of the empire’s image at the time of some of its most brutal repressions, sets a markedly different context to that of the overt suspicion yet at times pragmatic and tacit acceptance of empire which characterised late nineteenth century liberalism. Liberal responses to its demise varied, yet few of those considered in this study appeared to welcome the passing of an unjust system – instead they lamented the onset of barbarism or congratulated the culmination of a benign process of education.

The effective independence of Britain’s settler colonies, and reorientation of the Anglo-Saxon world under an American Aegis, meant that any future programme aimed at transcending Britain’s growing geopolitical insignificance could not do so by recourse to schemes relating to colonisation and colonial integration. Colonisation was now a nineteenth century anachronism of little significance in intellectual life. Its results – that is the colonies
of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – were now of more relevance as friendly and like-minded states contributing to a shared world of Anglophone politics, military alliances, and intellectual life, than as parts of any colonial programme centring on Britain. Furthermore, intellectual life, as expressed through classical scholars and classically educated intellectuals, appears less concerned with colonial issues, instead betraying deep misgivings about the prospects of a Europe of nation-states divided like the Greece of the poleis, and the fate of such a Europe in a world rapidly reorienting itself back towards the East. This is significant, because the changing context influenced what was – and was not – written, how it was written, and that this has a direct relevance to scholarly work about Greek colonisation. As colonisation was no longer a significant part of any major political debates, or of any major geopolitical solutions centring on Britain as a mother country to settler colonies, studies of colonisation lost their political edge. This is not to deny the persistence of certain ideas stemming from the legacy of British colonisation, but it does indicate the lack of a purposeful project of using scholarship and antiquity to further contemporary political agendas pertaining to colonies and colonisation.

The following discussion will consider works relating specifically to Greek colonisation written from 1914 to the point, somewhere in the 1990s, when a revival in Greek colonisation studies began, ostensibly out of a critical reappraisal of a discipline still labouring under ‘colonial’ ways of thinking. It should be noted that this can be considered a study of ‘British’ scholarship about Greek colonisation a somewhat loose sense – several of the key figures of the preceding and following discussion (e.g. Murray, Childe, Finley, and Dunbabin) were not born in Britain, even though they would to varying degrees become leading figures of British-based scholarship. On this point, it is perhaps more appropriate in this era to speak of Anglophone scholarship written in a British cultural context. The approach will be the same as with scholarship from previous eras: we will consider scholarly interpretations of Greek colonisation in accordance to the three key themes of colonisation as an act of state, colonial dependence, and relations between newcomers and natives. The discussion will make use of a variety of sources – from monographs and articles focusing specifically on colonisation to the presentation of colonisation in more popular works.
Colonisation as an Act of State

There appears to be a certain consensus that Greek colonisation was indeed an act of state. H.D.F. Kitto wrote of how ‘the mother-city organized the swarm’. Moses Finley contrasted the ‘new’ colonising movement of the eighth century to that of earlier ages – if the latter were ‘haphazard and chaney, a flight rather than an orderly emigration’, that of the eighth century and later ‘was certainly not’. He reasoned that ‘Archias’ expedition to Syracuse would not have been possible unless Corinth had attained sufficient size, wealth and political organization to arrange it’ – and indeed had Corinth not provided the ‘element of compulsion’. Similarly, Alfred Zimmern wrote of colonisation as ‘a deliberate effort of state-craft’ encouraged by the ‘healing influence of Delphi’, whereas T.J. Dunbabin saw in the increasing segregation of Greek and native in the colonial (as opposed to pre-colonial) period further ‘proof that colonization was not a series of accidents but a deliberate policy.’ Few would differ from Aubrey Gwynn’s statement in 1918, that colonisation ‘was essentially a state-enterprise, organised for the public good’ and led by a responsible oikist. At first glance this picture appears conclusive – the dominant scholarly perception of Greek colonisation was that of a state organised affair. The pressing questions, however, are how we are to account for this and to what extent this perception as due to the influence of a recent colonial past. It will be demonstrated that in spite of an overwhelming consensus regarding the state oriented nature of Greek colonisation, the scholars concerned formed their views on the basis of the ancient (mainly literary) evidence available and were aided in their conclusions by their specific views concerning the causes of colonisation. The influence of recent colonial experiences appear slight – to the extent that it is simply not possible to claim any broad ‘colonialist’ influence on approaches to this specific aspect of Greek history.

In order for these scholars to have stated so explicitly that Greek colonisation was an act of state, it follows that they must have thought of alternative conceptions, and that there may have been something significant in the very decision to favour so decisively a state oriented model. As it happens, Gwynn, Zimmern, and Dunbabin explicitly discuss the alternative explanation which has gained ground in recent years: that of private initiative, and

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126 Kitto (1963), 82-83.
127 Finley (1971), 37.
128 A. Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth (1931), 252. Note, however, that The Greek Commonwealth was first published in 1911.
129 T.J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks (1948), 46.
its associated notions of a gradual process and lack of uniformity. Furthermore, Gwynn and Zimmern do so with specific reference to modern colonisation – only their reasoning is not exactly what one might expect. Zimmern wrote of the ‘profound and characteristic differences between ancient Greek and most modern forms of colonization, between ancient Marseilles, for instance, and the modern Greek quarter of New York.’ That difference lay in their origins, for ‘a Greek colonizing expedition was not a private venture of individuals or groups of individuals, but embodied a carefully organized scheme of State-promoted emigration.’ Rather having been founded ‘by a few pioneers and then gradually built up by band after band of subsequent stragglers’, a Greek colony was ‘planted once and for all, in its proper form and numbers, by a swarm going out, like bees, with a Queen or Head-colonist of their own.’ Therefore, in Zimmern’s estimation, ancient Greek colonisation was an act of state, and in this – indeed precisely because of this – it differed from more recent colonising experiences. Gwynn’s view mirrors Zimmern’s in both respects:

To-day European expansion is a gradual process. Men go out, sometimes alone, sometimes in small groups, to make a private settlement in a new country; and in proportion to the steadiness with which this stream of emigration can be supplied from the mother-country is the success of each state in its work of colonisation… But Greek colonisation was conducted on different lines. The need of expansion was a gradual growth, the discovery of a new home was also, probably, a gradual process; but the actual foundation of a colony was a single enterprise conducted by a single leader and shared in by a definite number of settlers… What is certain is that a Greek colony was never a motley gathering of adventurers, grouping themselves together under no definite leadership. It was essentially a state-enterprise, organised for the public good and placed under the leadership of a competent ὀίκιστής.  

Again we see the central idea that Greek colonisation was not like modern colonisation. The latter was gradual and largely the result of the efforts of private enterprise. Greek colonisation was characterised by a single definable act of foundation conducted at the behest of a state and under leadership ratified by that state. The not inconsiderable irony is that current scholarship advocates (not incorrectly, in my view) a way of seeing Greek

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131 Zimmern (1931), 252-53.
132 Gwynn (1918), 99-100.
colonisation which interwar scholarship would have considered guilty of applying recent colonial experience onto the ancient past.

Interestingly, both Gwynn and Zimmern – and also Dunbabin – allowed for a situation more like that of the modern colonising experience – or that conceived by more recent scholarship – in their discussion of pre-colonial involvement in the West. Zimmern wrote of the ‘adventurous forerunners’ to the state organised colonising expeditions:

… pioneers, part pirates, part dealers with the ‘shy traffickers’ of the hinterland, sometimes an organized soldiery, sometimes explorers or wandering scholars just going out ‘to have a look’, are at once the creators and the creatures of a new era of city economy. The natives who watched them labouring shoreward from the blue distance and brought their treasures down to the beach for exchange at the recognized meeting-place, often dimly wondered what drove them so far abroad from their homes and gods.

Such bands, ‘early trading visitors came without wives or families or gods or institutions’ were ‘as different from the later colonizing swarm as the Hudson Bay trappers from the ordinary Canadian, or the early Vikings from the Normans. They are, in fact, not immigrants but migrants’. Gwynn saw the ‘commercial enterprise’ of such groups and individuals as having ‘had its share in the origins of Greek colonisation’ – ‘individual traders’ playing a part in ‘the work of discovering new sites and of acting as guides to the emigrant community.’ Dunbabin thought pre-colonial trading contacts meant that Greeks had visited many sites before the foundation of a colony, and the foundation of Zancle, an early colony founded by pirates from Cumae (Thucydides, 6.4.5) demonstrated ‘the line between piracy and trade was then, of course, not firmly drawn’ in the eighth century. To conform to the idea that Greek colonies proper were the deeds of states, he makes Thucydides’ statement that colonists from Chalcis and Euboea followed and shared distribution of land to mean that Zancle was later ‘formed into a regular colony’. The pre-colonial world presented distinctions to the colonial era in other ways too – in terms of relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples,

133 Zimmern (1931), 255-56.
134 Gwynn (1918), 92.
135 Dunbabin (1948) 11, 13-14.
there occurred a ‘change from the freer intercourse of the pre-colonial period… at or very soon after the colonization, certainly within the eighth century.’\textsuperscript{136}

It would seem that the crucial factor in determining this difference between current scholarly views regarding the private rather than statist nature of early Greek colonisation lies not in the distorting influence of colonial precedent on the part of earlier scholarship, but rather in a different approach to the later, fifth century, literary evidence. Earlier scholarship, with the exception of Dunbabin, purposefully and deliberately rejected the application of recent colonial experiences (which they understood to be characterised as private and piecemeal) to the Greek because of the ancient evidence, which spoke of deliberate communal decisions and single acts of foundations under a single designated leader. The difference between more recent and earlier views on this particular subject is therefore largely due to scepticism about that ancient evidence and its authority over events hundreds of years prior.

\textit{The Relevance of Causes}

It should also be noted that for earlier scholarship there was another reason to suppose Greek colonisation to have been a state organised affair. Notwithstanding the (much later) ancient evidence, part of the rationale for believing colonisation to have been an act of state, rather than a gradual process brought about by private initiative which they themselves identified in the ‘pre-colonial’ period, was that the latter was seen as incompatible with what they saw as the chief \textit{cause} of colonisation: overpopulation and the resulting desire for land – not trade.

To be clear, there were exceptions to this view – in Dunbabin’s analysis there appears to be a correlation between trade, state planning, and a foundation as an event on the one hand, and on the other, land, a more ambiguous view of state involvement, and the view of foundation as a process. His depiction of Chalcidian colonisation,\textsuperscript{137} but much more clearly

\textsuperscript{136} Already cited as the ‘proof that colonization was not a series of accidents but a deliberate policy.’ Dunbabin (1948), 46-47.

\textsuperscript{137} Naxos (as the first Chalkidian colony in Sicily), was intended as a base rather than an end in itself, and had to be considered in conjunction with Catania and Leontinoi: Leontinoi had as its first objective the ‘rich Laistrygonian plain’, whereas Canania strengthened the position of the other two colonies and provided a better port than that at Leontinoi. Dunbabin does not explicitly state this, but the last group, as well as the other two Chalkidian colonies – Zancle which ‘lived by and for its harbour’, and Rhegion which complemented it – appear to have been founded with trading interests to the fore of other considerations. Dunbabin (1948), 12, 7, 9, 10.
that of Corinth,\textsuperscript{138} centres on state action in aid of trade. Corinth in fact occupies a special (if somewhat farfetched) place in Dunbabin’s account of the foundations of Greek colonies in general, and there is a clear emphasis on state action acting in concert with commercial motives. Both Chalcidian and Corinthian colonies of Sicily appear, in general terms, to be founded for reasons of trade – a point of view no doubt influenced by his pioneering use of archaeological evidence, in this case heavily reliant on pottery. This stands in stark contrast to the southern Italian colonies, which he sees as having been founded primarily for land.\textsuperscript{139} This is not the only way in which these colonies are seen to differ, for while the foundation of Sicilian colonies appears as a ‘marked event’ involving ‘a single body of colonists’, southern Italian colonies had mixed foundation traditions and mixed populations. Whereas it appeared that ‘colonization in Sicily was planned and directed by a few Greek states’, many ‘colonial ventures’ in southern Italy ‘just grew’.\textsuperscript{140} Dunbabin appears to be unique in identifying some form of relationship between trade and state involvement in Greek colonisation: most scholars did not. That Dunbabin did so may be the result of a misapplication of colonial ideas, the very tendency criticised by Graham.\textsuperscript{141}

Gwynn thought the first Greek colonies to have been ‘primarily communities of an agricultural people, only later centres of industrial or commercial activity.’\textsuperscript{142} Zimmern drawing on Plato’s remarks on colonisation,\textsuperscript{143} focused its function as relieving population pressures. The eighth and seventh centuries saw ‘overpopulation in its acutest form’, and colonists were mostly dispossessed cultivators crying for redistribution of land: ‘a Greek

\textsuperscript{138} Dunbabin is far more explicit with regards to the motivations behind Corinthian colonisation, and ascribes to it commercial motives of the most strategic kind. The colonists of Syracuse may have craved land, and the community at large may have benefited from the easing of population pressures, but whatever their desires, and whatever the motives of Archias, the Bacchiad rulers ‘directed the colony’ for commercial reasons – their interest in trade ‘testified by ancient authorities as well as by the wide distribution of Protocorinthian vases’. Thus Syracuse was an ‘official venture of the Corinthian state, as is shown by the subsequent interest which Corinth took in it as in all her colonies’. In fact, the success of the ‘colonial venture and of wider trading in the west’ one of the factors which transformed Corinth to the leading state in Greece: ‘… the colonies made Corinth what she was.’ Dunbabin even goes further than this, as Corinth had the most to benefit from the colonisation of southern Italy and the consequent expansion in trade with the west, it thus followed that Corinth ‘encouraged and directed the surplus population of Akhaia and Locris to colonies in south Italy’ in order to reap the rewards of further trade. Dunbabin (1948), 15, 38.

\textsuperscript{139} Dunbabin (1948), 23.
\textsuperscript{140} Dunbabin (1948), 23.
\textsuperscript{141} A.J. Graham, \textit{Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece} (Manchester University Press, 1999), 5. First published in 1964.
\textsuperscript{142} Gwynn (1918), 122.
\textsuperscript{143} ‘Last of all, if there be an excess of citizens and we are at our writs’ end, there is still the old device of sending out a colony’ (Plato, \textit{Laws} 740).
colony was not primarily a trading centre…’. Kitto, was certain that colonies were not founded for reasons of trade, but rather for land – colonisation was a safety-valve. R.M. Cook held that ‘the primary cause of Greek colonisation is usually and sensibly held to have been overpopulation’, and ‘when one considers the Greek colonies of the eighth and seventh centuries, it is plain that those in the West were intended as economically independent states, as self-sufficient as any Greek city was likely to be: in other words, the purpose of this colonisation was simply to rid the motherland of surplus inhabitants.’ Finley, very much an advocate of the view that certain economic conditions, namely ‘agrarian difficulties’ were at the heart of the colonising impulse, was perhaps bound to see Greek colonisation as primarily concerned with land.

Colonisation, according to Finley, was a ‘safety-valve’ which ‘took off surplus (and disaffected) sections of the population to new regions.’ Indeed, Finley’s conviction that land was the chief cause of colonisation, and the way in which this conviction tied in a certain conception of the state of the early Greek economy, is also something reflected by an earlier scholar such as Gwynn. While Finley commented on the small scale of trade in the eighth-century Greek world, Gwynn drew attention to the agrarian nature of Greek society at this time to support the conclusion that Greek colonisation was, really, all about land: ‘the earlier Greeks were, in the main, not traders but peasants, and the first Greek colonies did not owe their existence to reasons of commerce.’ This emphasis on the primitivism of early Greek conditions functions, for both Gwynn and Finley, to dim any enthusiasm for commercial explanations of early Greek colonisation. Indeed, Gwynn was ‘tempted to ask whether they [early Greeks] were anything more than half-wild, healthy men, with an eye for beauty and an almost endless capacity for improving their minds’. Certainly, he thought, ‘they were not the men to organise a great national venture on a purely commercial basis, and for purely commercial ends’. If for more recent scholarship this ‘primitive’ depiction of early colonisers would seem to lend weight to more ‘private’ visions of colonisation, it certainly

144 Zimmern (1931), 252-53.
145 Kitto (1963), 81.
147 Which, as we shall discuss, Finley considered a ‘mis-named’ movement.
148 Finley (1963), 36-38. In The Ancient Economy (1973), Finley referred to Greek colonisation as ‘a hiving-off of surplus citizens to foreign lands, sometimes by conquest, and not always with the consent of those sent away.’ He also regarded it, and colonisation in general, as ‘an evasion, not a solution, of the needs of the poor.’ See pages 171-72.
149 Gwynn (1918), 92.
150 Gwynn (1918), 93.
did not for scholars such as Gwynn, Zimmern, Kitto, or Finley – on the contrary there seems to be a direct link in their thinking between colonisation as a quest for land and colonisation as a state organised affair. As Finley saw it, colonisation was the compulsory movement of peoples for social and economic reasons organised by ancient Greek states, and Archias’ expedition to Syracuse simply would not have been possible without the wealth and political organisation of Corinth.\(^{151}\) Thus the reasoning was as follows: Greek colonisation was a response to overpopulation which afflicted early Greek communities. Therefore those very communities took action and organised colonising expeditions which could be compulsory. In this way the connection between land as a cause and state action as the means becomes enshrined.

A.J. Graham concurred with Gwynn’s conviction that ‘in the main the great Greek colonizing movement was caused by overpopulation and desire for land.’ Interestingly he believed this to be ‘a necessary correction of earlier ideas of colonization for trade, which arose largely from misapplying the analogy of modern colonization’. Graham also lamented that in spite of Gwynn’s efforts scholars ‘continued to attribute commercial aims to early colonisation’ – for instance the idea that Corinth had clearly commercial aims in her colonisation of Sicily in the eighth century. For Graham, as for Finley and Gwynn, Greek colonies were to be self-sufficient *poleis* in possession of enough land to sustain themselves.\(^{152}\) There were nonetheless differences. Although Graham considered land to be the chief motivating factor behind colonial expeditions, he did not so readily accept that also ought to mean that colonial expeditions were acts of states. In what is a nuanced work throughout, he argued that ‘oversimplifications, such as that all early colonies were private, or that colonial enterprises were generally official, should be avoided’. There was literary evidence to support both positions, for although ‘the interest of ancient writers in individuals’ meant that they stressed ‘the private nature of colonial undertakings’, it seemed to him reasonable ‘to infer from two examples in Herodotus that both state and private enterprises existed throughout the historical colonizing period’, but he despairs of drawing a ‘firm line in the early period between colonies founded on individual initiative and approved by the state and those established by a decision of the community’.\(^{153}\)

\(^{151}\) Finley (1963), 37.

\(^{152}\) Graham (1999), 5.

\(^{153}\) Graham (1999), 7-8. The examples from Herodotus Graham refers to are the foundation of Cyrene – ‘clearly described’ as ‘a state act’ – and Doreius’ ‘abortive colonial expedition’, which was ‘equally clearly a private enterprise’.
To conclude, there was a general consensus among the scholars considered here that colonisation was an act of state. This belief was based on the later literary evidence, but also supported by reference to what was considered the chief cause of colonisation. Most scholars appeared to have drawn a connection between overpopulation and land as a cause and an act of state as the consequence. Dunbabin constituted an exception – for him it seems to have been precisely the commercial aims of colonisation which betrayed the hand of a state. Whether his emphasis on archaeological evidence with an emphasis on using pottery to infer commercial connections is behind this is not entirely clear. As to whether colonial influences were in any way responsible for this consensus on the role of the state in colonisation, there is no clear evidence. On the contrary, modern colonisation was seen as a private, piecemeal affair, and scholars such as Gwynn, aware of the distorting potential of modern analogies, it would seem, explicitly stated that Greek colonisation differed from that of the modern age precisely because it was an act of state. The one possible argument which could be made is that in spite of the contemporary colonial experience being of a primarily private nature – something which to deny would mean flying in the face of evidence – scholars were nonetheless in some way prone to understanding historical events as the result of state actions, and were liable to do so in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and especially when there was some supporting evidence such as the later fifth century accounts of early colonisation. This, however, is purely conjecture.

Colonial Dependence

The theme of colonial dependence is one which has drawn considerable attention in recent studies of earlier approaches to Greek colonisation. Contributions by De Angelis and Shepherd have demonstrated in some detail how the work of T.J. Dunbabin, in particular, shows a marked tendency to equate the relationships between ancient Greek metropoleis and their colonies with those between Britain and her white settler colonies. De Angelis drew attention to Dunbabin’s depiction of the western Greeks as politically, economically, and artistically conservative. Their economic role was akin to that of the Dominions – producers of raw materials but importers of finished goods, and as a further parallel, the Greek colonies only came of age after Himera – as did Britain’s colonies during the Great

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War.\textsuperscript{155} Shepherd argued that the way in which the cultural dependence of colony to mother city that Dunbabin presented in his work served, in the absence of political dependence, to maintain cherished hierarchies with mainland Greece (and thus Britain) at the top.\textsuperscript{156} It will be argued that their treatment of Dunbabin’s work in relation to the extent to which he portrays Greek colonies as dependent on their mother cities is largely well founded. The main adjustment which ought to be made to this portrayal of Dunbabin and this aspect of his work is a deeper consideration of how his views were influenced by contemporary thinking on the part of residents of the Dominions towards their relations with Britain and the imperial question more generally. Discussion of earlier scholarship relating to this theme has not been confined to Dunbabin, for the works of other scholars such as Aubrey Gwynn and A.G. Woodhead have also come under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{157} The following discussion will focus on the works of Gwynn, Dunbabin, and Graham, and focus specifically on the extent to which they conceived Greek colonies to have been dependent on their mother cities, and further question the depth of recent colonial influences in the ideas they contain. It will be shown that Dunbabin is in fact somewhat of an exceptional figure in the degree to which he applies a conscious contemporary colonial model onto ancient colonisation, and that whatever misconceptions plague the works of others they are more the result of their approach to later literary evidence than to colonial retrojections.

However much the scholars under consideration here would stress the differences between modern and ancient colonisation, they would continue to use the term ‘colony’. It is significant, therefore, that in 1975 Moses Finley set out the case against calling Greek settlements overseas ‘colonies’:

\begin{quote}
The so-called Greek and Phoenician colonies of the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C., extending from the coasts of the Black Sea to Marseilles and Carthage, were more peaceful enterprises in some instances, less in others, but what is essential is that they were all, from the start, independent city-states, not colonies (apart from a small number of unimportant exceptions).\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{156} Shepherd (2005), 35.
\textsuperscript{157} See Shepherd (2005), 29, 42.
This was a view he would repeat elsewhere, and the crucial distinction, for Finley, between a Greek settlement overseas and true colony was that the former was an independent political entity, and not, like the latter, a dependency. Indeed, Finley remarked that it had been ‘well said that it was precisely because the colonies were independent from the start, both politically and economically, that on the whole they maintained close friendly relations with their respective mother-cities for many years – based on tradition and cult, free from the irritations and conflicts often aroused elsewhere by commercial disputes and rivalries.’159

The crucial point to take away from this comment is that Finley quite clearly believed in close and friendly relations between colony and mother city while at the same time directly rejecting the application of ‘colonial’ terminology. That the scholar who first made a big issue of the impropriety of such terminology and analogies could think so as is as clear an indication as we are likely to get that perceptions of friendly relations between colony and mother city were not primarily reliant on any false colonial analogy. This is not, it must be stressed, to deny the influence of colonial ideas on notions of colonial cultural dependence and inferiority as put forward by Dunbabin.

How, then, did other scholars conceive of the relationship between colony and mother city? Was the dominant perception one of some loose notion of sentimental ties, or was there a tendency to see the sort of cultural dependence envisaged by Dunbabin? If so, what was the influence of recent colonial experience? There is certainly no obvious trace of either political or cultural dependence in Zimmern’s brief treatment of Greek colonisation: ‘once planted, the colony became, of course, a full-fledged city, leading a new and independent life, associating much or little, according as it felt inclined, with its metropolis’.160 This, one might, add, come from a scholar far from averse to making imperial analogies, stating that Athens could no more ‘step back’ from her empire than most Englishmen felt they could leave India.161

Gwynn, discussed fairly briefly by Shepherd,162 wrote that ‘each colony felt itself bound by the strongest possible ties to foster its relations with the mother-state’. Custom dictated that metropoleis be honoured, and ‘the universal respect accorded to this custom’ was ‘only made more striking by the single flagrant exception of Corcyra’s relations with her mother-state’.163 There is no clear indication of colonial dependence, as such, in his account. Rather, the emphasis is on respect according to custom, which could be supported by

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159 Finley (1963), 40.
160 Zimmern (1931), 253.
161 Zimmern (1931), 194.
163 Gwynn (1918), 101, 104.
inferences derived from Thucydides and the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra. Of course, it is possible that contemporary colonisation influenced his account – Shepherd refers to Gwynn’s admiration for their tenacity in maintaining their traditions – in contrast to the ‘more Anglo-Saxon colonies, where progress has often been achieved at the cost of respect for tradition, and of much else that is beautiful’. Of course, the inference here is that Greek colonisation was not like the modern British experience – but there is the added complexity that in stating the difference Gwynn was simultaneously revealing a contemporary attitude towards the course of British colonisation. The relationship between the colony and mother city represented, for him, a tension between a ‘natural desire’ on the part of colonists to ‘reproduce, as far as possible, in their new homes the familiar institutions of the mother-city,’ and the ‘reaction of a society where the exploitation of the resources of a new country counted for more than the traditions of the past and of family descent.’ One can with ease say that this is an expression of a modern dilemma, pure and simple, but it might also be said that it is not an unreasonable remark to make of any group which had transplanted itself to a different cultural and economic context. More to the point, it is unclear as to whether such ‘colonial’ influences in his thought were at all incompatible with what his chief source of evidence – literary texts – told him in any case. Not that this discounts the possibility that it was certain ideas about contemporary colonisation which led him to more readily accept fifth century accounts for earlier events in the first place.

A closer examination of his reasoning can also shed light on precisely why he saw colony-mother city relations in this light. At the heart of his thinking is that ‘each colony acquired from the first a distinctly individual character’, and that this was because, in his estimation, because most early colonies were drawn from once city only, and the result of a single act of foundation. In fact, the very distinctive identities of Greek colonies were ‘decisive’ evidence in showing that the Greek settlements were not the result of haphazard emigration, and the closeness of colonies to their mother-cities was something which could not be ‘reconciled with the theory that the early settlements grew out of motley gatherings’. Apart from demonstrating how interconnected were Gwynn’s ideas about colony-mother city relationships, and the concept of colonisation as a single, state organised act of state, this further highlights the primary importance of fifth century literary evidence for Gwynn’s views on earlier colonisation.

165 Gwynn (1918), 111.
166 Gwynn (1918), 104, 101.
Critically, his main reason for believing in the strength of the colonial ties was ‘religious sentiment’: ‘any act of hostility or contempt [on the part of the colony towards the mother city] was looked on as an act of impiety.’ His evidence was Herodotus and Thucydides. Thus religious reverence, attested by fifth century sources, justified the perception that colonies and mother cities were bound by strong ties of custom. This in turn was something which could only have come about had colonies been comprised of settlers from a single state, and as an act of state. Such a view lead to the conclusion the colonisation was a single event, and not a piecemeal emigration. This is a fairly complex argument, all based on the later literary evidence, in this case concerned with fifth century debates concerning the relations then considered appropriate between colony and mother city. To add a further dimension, Gwynn believed those colonies founded in an earlier era when religion was of greater account (and also when colonies were politically independent) maintained friendlier relations with their mother cities than those founded later for imperial purposes. This tied in with the composition of the colonists – homogenous in early colonies, mixed in imperial ones – which in turn corresponded to the motivations of earlier and later colonies:

The days were past when the states of Greece sent out colonists from the sheer necessity of finding some outlet for a growing populace. It had rather now become a difficulty to find men in sufficient numbers to enable them to develop their resources; and, like Australia and Rhodesia in similar circumstances to-day, Corinth and Sparta took refuge in a vigorous campaign of advertisement.

The early colony was caused by overpopulation, had as its aim land, was accordingly settled by one state in a single act of foundation, and was due to political independence and religious reverence able to maintain friendly relations with the mother city. The imperial colony of the fifth century was founded in order to make use of land, was consequently in need of settlers irrespective of origin, was politically dependent, and due to this and the lack of religious reverence typical with a mixed population failed to maintain as firm a friendship with its mother city as did the colonies of old. Gwynn’s conception of Greek colonisation was built upon an awareness that the sources available at the time meant that little was known of early

167 Gwynn (1918), 118. Citing Hdt. 7.51, 8.22, cf. Thuc. 5.106
168 Gwynn (1918), 118-19.
169 Gwynn (1918), 101. The reference to Corinth and Sparta relate to the second foundation of Epidamnus in 435 and the foundation of Heraclea in Trachis respectively.
colonisation. His response was to construct elaborate models based on the readings of those fifth century texts available to him. He did not retroject the evidence for fifth century colonisation onto the archaic past, but he did accept, as perhaps he had little choice but to, the writings of fifth century sources about earlier events as more credible than would now be the case. The influence of colonial ideas on his work in relation to the theme of colonial dependence are far from clear, and cannot be proved to have been behind his tendency to identify strong ties of custom between colony and mother city. If anything, as far as this theme is concerned Gwynn appears more interested in exploring the differences between ancient and modern colonisation than he is in using contemporary ideas to form his interpretations.\textsuperscript{170}

The most important work to consider the relationship between colony and mother city was Graham’s. One part of his thesis was that the ‘changing role of the oikist reflects the increasing dependence of the colony, or the increasing interference of the mother city.’ Early colonies were independent, and their oikists ‘all-responsible, even monarchical’; the dependent colonies of archaic tyrants were ‘closely attached to the ruler of the metropolis’; while in the imperial colonies of the fifth century the oikist was ‘no longer even a participant in the new community’.\textsuperscript{171} For Graham, therefore, political dependence increases from the eighth century to the fifth, but political dependence, as we have seen, was not a controversial topic among scholars of this period – it was taken for granted that most early colonies were state acts (Dunbabin and Corinth apart) from the outset politically independent of their mother cities, in stark contrast to modern European colonies which were politically dependent yet the result of private initiative.

Nonetheless, Graham was sceptical about our ability to pronounce with any confidence on early colonisation due to the nature of the evidence. He though the evidence ‘so predominantly from the fifth century or later that it is impossible to give a satisfactory and convincing general picture of the state of relations between Greek colonies and mother cities in, say, the seventh century’.\textsuperscript{172} As a consequence, he decided against taking a purely

\textsuperscript{170} This position deviates slightly from that of Shepherd: Gwynn ‘used analogy with modern colonization as much to point out the differences as the similarities with ancient colonization.’ See Shepherd (2005), 29.

\textsuperscript{171} Graham (1999), 39.

\textsuperscript{172} Graham (1999), 3-4. Among the difficulties he identified was, for instance, that the fragmentary evidence could frequently refer to one moment in a colony’s history only; this was something very problematic as relations between any two cities not necessarily unchanging. Indeed, modern colonial history, he argued, demonstrated that there could easily be differences between the ‘arrangements and aspirations of the original founders and colonists and the subsequent relations of the two communities’: the act of foundation was ‘one thing, the subsequent relations another.’
chronological approach, and against simply looking at relations between colonies and mother
cities from the eighth century to the fourth, for ‘this principle of arrangement would involve a
great deal of repetition and continual discussion of the question whether later evidence or
later analogies are applicable to the earlier periods.’ His solution was to separate the act of
foundation, where ideas and practices ‘varied much less than the subsequent relations
between colonies and mother cities.’ 173 The dilemma of whether, in the absence of evidence,
one could assume fifth century relations were present in the eights or sevenths, would
nevertheless be a critical one in Graham’s work, and his reasoning for, in the end, deciding
that there were indeed relations between colonies and mother cities from the beginning,174
requires closer scrutiny.

Graham shows how interest in the colony-mother city relationship was evident among
classical authors, but considers the important question to be ‘whether the interest in colonies
and active relations between colonies and mother cities found in the fifth century arose at that
time, or existed in the previous two centuries, only hidden by the lack of source material
capable of revealing it.’ He refers to arguments that relationships between colonies and
mother cities ‘became politically effective in the sixth century’, and were part of a trend
towards acquiring overseas empires. Early colonies, in this view, were entirely
independent.175 Graham refers to the idea of independence (by which we should assume not
political independence – which surely he accepted – but rather a connection) in the early
period as an assumption, and proceeds to search for evidence of the importance of the
relationship from the beginning. The justification upon which he appears to base most of his
case is that of a concern for origins and competing claims for the status of metropolis within
mixed foundations – as expressed in fifth century sources. If ‘distinctions of origin remained
important in mixed colonies and that an attempt was sometimes made to monopolize the
position of mother city’, then this, in his view, made ‘it is reasonable to proceed to the further
conclusion that the relations between colonies and mother cities were considered important
from the beginning of the great colonizing movement.’ Such an argument, he thought,
allowed ‘some confidence in accepting statements about earlier times in fifth century
sources’, and slightly weakened the ‘argument from silence implicit in the view that the idea

174 Graham (1999), 211. In his conclusion Graham cites the seventh century foundation decree of Cyrene, and
the foundation of Selinous which involved Megara Hyblaia summoning an oikist from Megara – neither, clearly,
are solid evidence for eighth century perceptions.
prêt du Vie siècle’, La Nouvelle Clio vi 1954, 413-60.
of the relationship between colony and metropolis was especially effective in the fifth century’. The problem of course, is that those very quarrels over attempts to monopolise the status of mother city were expressed by later, fifth century sources, when such concerns were paramount and a part of inter-state conflicts. The blunt conclusion is that Graham preferred to trust in the literary evidence which suggested that colonies and mother cities did maintain an active relationship, and distrust arguments from silence – that since there was no evidence for the relationship in the eighth century, it did not exist. This decision on his part was most likely a consequence of earlier approaches more credulous of the claims of literary evidence and prone to subordinate archaeological evidence: nothing more, nothing less. There are no apparent colonial distortions in his work, in spite of such chapter headings as ‘Corinth and the Colonial Empire’. In Colony and Mother City, first published in 1964, his argument was that there existed relationships based on common origin and common cult among colonies and mother cities, and there is little to suggest any notion of colonial dependence, political or cultural.

To compare the works of Gwynn (1918) and Graham (1964) with that of Dunbabin is to become almost immediately aware of a different approach. Gwynn sought to avoid imposing modern colonial analogies, and Graham scarcely mentions modern colonisation at all. Dunbabin’s approach is altogether different in drawing an open equivalence between colonials, ancient and modern. Nowhere is this clearer than in the preface to The Western Greeks (1948). Here is a portrayal of ‘colonial life’ as something different and ‘larger’. It’s ‘material circumstances’ were easier, and thus ‘life less intense’; this was ‘no place for fruitful political ideas’. As for the people, ‘colonials were a pleasure-loving people, sportsmen and athletes, and fond of good cheer’. This depiction in itself could for a certain audience have easily have been mistaken for one of modern ‘colonial’ life. Nonetheless the parallel is made explicit:

I have drawn much on the parallel to the relations between colonies and mother country provided in Australia and New Zealand. Here political independence is combined with almost complete cultural dependence, on which the colonials pride themselves. Difference in manner of life is due to difference of material circumstances, and is not enough to destroy the essential unity. This unity is the

176 Graham (1999), 12-22.
177 This chapter in any case deals with later instances of colonisation, and Corinth had long been seen as having exerted control over her colonies prior to the conflict with Corcyra.
pride of most colonials; so probably in antiquity. The economic life of the ancient colonies also is illuminated by modern examples. They were, like Australia until a few years ago, producers of raw materials, with a few staples on which they grew rich, and importers of manufactured goods. They brought most of their luxuries and objects of art from the mother country. In the period under study here, Corinth occupied the place of supplier of the rich western market and, we may believe, as chief port of consignment for corn and other exports, which Great Britain has held with the Dominions. When Corinth’s economic supremacy was challenged, her cultural supremacy also weakened. The first stages in the emergence of a specifically colonial spirit are here studied. But it is long before any of the arts produced work which had not Corinthian models.

This is a very telling passage, worth quoting and analysing at length. Much of this has already been examined, and various points made about Dunbabin’s very clear – and decidedly inappropriate – application of modern colonial ideas onto ancient Greek experiences. Dunbabin, as an Australian of a generation which maintained attachments to the ‘mother country’, and who went to an Oxford known for its discussions about the British Empire, came from a milieu perhaps more likely than most to identify colonial connections spanning ancient and modern times. Yet there is more to be drawn from the above passage. Firstly, in extending to even the exact economic relations between colonies and the mother country in the modern world, the colonial parallel is a very close one. Furthermore, the apparent ‘colonial’ pride in being culturally dependent on the mother country is striking, as is, perhaps, the connection made between the decline in economic superiority and cultural supremacy in antiquity.

More importantly, Dunbabin’s attitudes are best understood as one manifestation of what has been referred to as a ‘Britannic nationalism’, or in other words the assertion of a national identity stressing British origins on the part of Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This could take the form of stressing how colonials were in fact the foremost bearers of British culture, or alternatively,

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178 De Angelis (1998) and Shepherd (2005)
180 De Angelis (1998), 545.
181 See Darwin (2009), 147.
as seems the case with Dunbabin, an affirmation of a cultural dependence could be seen as an important part of that British identity. In fact, Dunbabin’s words appear to conform exactly to John Darwin’s statement that ‘to most Australians, the stability of their own society and its cultural cohesion still seemed to derive mainly from its British origins and continuing “British” character’. Ironically enough, it could be said that it was precisely because of a context of diminishing British power, and consequent fears of isolation on the part of a white Australia which had always defined itself in opposition to a ‘native substratum’ and its Asiatic neighbours, that stressing the British connection became paramount. Australian immigration policy seems to lend credence to both the sense of isolation, geopolitical and racial, as well as this attachment to the British connection: the post-war Australian government saw immigration as crucial to the future security of the country, and under the slogan ‘populate or perish’ sought to encourage immigration from the British mainland while maintaining the ‘White Australia’ policy which effectively excluded all non-European immigration. Rather than a confident articulation of secure colonial ties, perhaps it would be more appropriate to see the somewhat exaggerated nature of Dunbabin’s attachment to colonial connections, Greek and British, as reflecting the growing geopolitical and racial anxieties which characterised Australian responses to the decline in British power and influence. That is, a Britain no longer able to play the role of military protector or cultural symbol for an isolated colony in the midst of increasingly independent Asiatic peoples. In this way, maintaining the idea of cultural dependence was less about keeping Britain at the top of the hierarchy – although that was an important part of it – and more about using the British connection to maintain hierarchies closer to home, with both natives and neighbouring Asians.

There will be no attempt here to go into any detail about the influence of Dunbabin’s colonial mindset on his work in relation to the theme of colonial dependence on the part of

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182 De Angelis (1998), 541. Note that although Dunbabin’s book was published in 1948, it was based on a thesis submitted in 1937 – whether the thesis was as stridently ‘colonial’ in its outlook is an interesting question. Dunbabin (1948), ix.

183 See Darwin (2009), 575-76. See also J.R. Roach, ‘Australia’s Immigration Problem’, Far Eastern Survey Vol. 21., No. 10. (June 1952), 102-108 for Arthur Calwell’s speech to the Australian parliament explaining the need to increase the population for reasons of defence, and for the White Australia policy (existent in some guise since the turn of the century) as having effectively ‘effectively barred Asians and Negroes’. This is one of several articles about Australia and immigration written in this period for journals with a Far Eastern or Pacific focus: it was evidently a pressing concern.

184 It is perhaps noteworthy, in this context, that Dunbabin’s book, published in 1948, followed soon after Indian independence. That event, along with the Suez fiasco, the two critical nails in the imperial coffin.

185 Shepherd (2005), 35.
Western Greeks – this has already been done in some depth. The key point made is that Dunbabin believed colonial Greeks to have been heavily reliant on the material culture of the mainland, a view derived in part from his preconceptions about colonial cultural dependence, and in part from the tendency of earlier archaeological methods in which painted pottery was considered a ‘faithful’ indicator ‘in the reconstruction of cultural and economic history’. In conclusion, we have seen how of the three scholars considered in this discussion of colonial dependence – Gwynn writing in 1918, Dunbabin in 1948, and Graham in 1964 – it is in fact only Dunbabin who quite clearly allowed contemporary colonial ideas to influence his interpretation of the relations between colonies and their mother cities. It is most likely his very status as a ‘colonial’, along with the particular political and imperial context of concern to an Australian of his day, which is behind this marked difference. Gwynn and Graham made mention of modern colonisation, and Gwynn more frequently than Graham. This did was not a primary cause of their assuming a relationship between colony and mother city – and even then that relationship was not conceived in the same ways as did Dunbabin with his obvious portrayal of colonial cultural dependence. Gwynn wrote more of reverence, Graham of contact and religious ties. Both owed their views, more than anything, to a manner of reading ancient literary evidence entirely common and conventional in their day. Dunbabin is an exception in the degree to which he was influenced by contemporary colonial ideas, and this is a consequence of his background and the misconceptions his archaeological evidence was prone to in such a pioneering stage.

Civilising the Natives

This discussion of the relationships perceived between Greeks and indigenous peoples encompasses works of scholarship published at times corresponding to very different stages of British imperial history. Gwynn (1918) wrote at the Empire’s very height, Dunbabin (1948) at a time when the Empire had lost India but still ruled over a myriad of other African

186 De Angelis (1998), 546.
187 This is not to say that Dunbabin was an absolute exception: Shepherd has shown how Dinsmoor assumed colonial architecture to be artistically inferior to that of the mainland, and both De Angelis and Shepherd that Dunbabin’s archaeological method and its tendency to ‘demonstrate Greek superiority through material evidence’ owed much to others at Oxford, such as Blakeway. See Shepherd (2005), 40, 30; De Angelis (1998), 541.
countries,\textsuperscript{188} and Finley (1963) at a time when decolonisation was well underway. In spite of allowances for specific instances, such as the cooperation between the founders of Megara Hyblaia and the native king Hyblon, all three, nevertheless, believed Greeks to have expelled and subjugated native Sikels. That this is true for Finley, decidedly more unlikely than his earlier counterparts to have seen colonisation on such terms as a ‘good thing’, is noteworthy. It is a clear indication that the belief in ‘asymmetrical power relations’\textsuperscript{189} was not necessarily the result of a colonialist mindset on the part of the author, even if it were in part derived from the pervasive nature and longevity of such models long after the empire and mindset which produced them had ceased to be of account.\textsuperscript{190} It is also, of course, possible that the idea of violent colonisation was much a product of the later literary evidence and colonial retrojections from classical antiquity as of more modern ones. In this discussion it will be argued that notions of Greek cultural and military superiority, of violent conquest, and of the degree of intermingling envisioned with native peoples each vary according to the scholar in question, but that the main theme to remain unchanged is the second – that of violent conquest.

According to Gwynn, writing in 1918, one difference of ‘the most profound significance’ between modern and ancient colonisation was that the Greeks, although religious, lacked the missionary zeal of modern Europeans. He dismissed Ernst Curtius’ idea that ‘the priests of Delphi organised the movement of colonisation with the intention of creating a wide sphere of Hellenic influence in the Mediterranean world’ as this was ‘as contrary to the psychology of the Greek religion’ as it was ‘destitute of historical evidence’. The Greek ‘had the spirit of a trader and adventurer, but he was never an apostle’. This lack of a religious motivation would be very noticeable in the relations of Greek settlers ‘with the native tribes whom they displaced’. Presumably what Gwynn meant was that there was no notion that the Greek should attempt to convert or improve the native: ‘no Greek’ of the eighth or seventh century ‘left his home with the thought that he was the bearer of a higher

\textsuperscript{188} Although, as I mentioned previously, \textit{The Western Greeks} is a later version of a 1937 thesis. Dunbabin’s ideas about Greek-Sikel relations need not be in any way strictly related to the conditions of the late 1940s, but may rather relate more to more general ideas. Dunbabin (1948), ix.

\textsuperscript{189} Owen (2005), 6. Owen argues that the ‘assumption that asymmetrical power relationships, drawn along ethnic lines, existed in all “colonized areas”… still pervades much of the literature [on colonisation]’.

\textsuperscript{190} Shepherd (2005), 42. Commenting on Boardman’s assertion that the Greeks in the West had ‘nothing to learn, much to teach’, she remarks that ‘the model established in the late nineteenth century was still active in the second half of the twentieth, notwithstanding the fact that the basis for it – the British Empire – had all but disappeared.’
faith as well as of a higher culture.’ Two important points are made here: firstly, Greek colonisation involves the brutal displacement of native peoples; secondly, Greek colonisation, because of its lack of missionary zeal, was not prone to the same tendency to cause cultural frictions with the dispossessed natives, and that in spite of the Greeks possessing a ‘higher culture’. This shows how Gwynn was interested in using modern parallels to explore the differences between ancient and modern colonisation, but in doing so the questions he asked of the Greek experience were necessarily defined by the modern colonial inspirations of his approach.

Nevertheless, that Greeks would usually conquer and subjugate indigenous peoples is not an assumption Gwynn made carelessly, but instead fits into longstanding ideas about the various ‘types’ of societies one could expect to find in the world (ancient and modern). He certainly did believe the Greeks would have generally overcome and subjugated native peoples, but this did not always happen: of all Greek settlements overseas, it was in Naucratis alone that the Greek settler ‘came into contact with a civilisation more advanced than his own’. Under such circumstances, it was ‘natural that he should be unable to establish himself with full security on Egyptian soil.’ Compare Gwynn’s words with those of Edward Bunbury from 1879, which we have already encountered:

In Egypt the existence of a long-established native civilization precluded the settlement of Greek colonies; but here also the Greeks had succeeded in establishing commercial relations.

As we have seen, Bunbury’s account of the Greek presence in Naucratis resembled that of early European involvement with the sophisticated Oriental states of the East. In this way, Gwynn’s conception of the ancient Mediterranean, and therefore the relations which Greeks would have with its various inhabitants, mirrored the same hierarchical model Europeans saw in the modern world. The specifics could vary, but one generally had savages, tribal societies, sophisticated yet stagnant Oriental civilisations, and nascent western peoples who found colonisation and displacement far easier in the more primitive and unsophisticated contexts than they did with Oriental civilisations. If the Greeks at this early stage of their

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191 Gwynn (1918), 97-98.
192 See Gwynn (1918), 109 for the explanation of why the lack of a religious mission was significant.
193 Gwynn (1918), 106.
194 Bunbury (1879), Vol. 1, 96-97.
history\textsuperscript{195} found the Egyptians too hard to deal with, and instead resorted to trade, it was a different story in the west, for ‘as a rule, these settlers came into contact with native tribes of much ruder civilisation than their own… none were equal of the Greeks’\textsuperscript{196}

This is not to say that Gwynn believed colonisation to have been easy. Greek fortunes varied greatly. The ‘arrival of a Greek colony’ was frequently ‘a signal for war’, and settlements most likely survived ‘by force of arms’, but ‘sometimes owing to the friendly attitude of some native tribe’. As testament to this general environment of insecurity many colonies were established on commanding sites: ‘powerful tribes’ posed a real danger to Greek colonies, and those of southern Italy were eventually overrun by the ‘tribes of the interior’.\textsuperscript{197} This does not constitute an uncritical assumption of asymmetrical power relations; the impression is of a very hostile environment. Of course, the view is that Greeks would overcome most of the time – as bearers of a ‘higher culture’ – and it may be that the hostile environment Gwynn draws serves to put the Greek tendency (as he saw it) to subjugate the natives and force them into a condition of serfdom into appropriate perspective. The imposition of serfdom is something for which there was ‘occasionally’ evidence, for example the servile class at Syracuse to whom Herodotus referred as the Κυλλύριοι (Herodotus 7.150), and who may have been subjugated Sikels.\textsuperscript{198} The lack of much direct evidence did not mean that no conclusions could be drawn, for ‘Greek colonisation rested primarily on conquest, and it is very natural to suppose that relations between land-lord and tiller of the soil may often have coincided with the relations of master and serf’ – Aristotle, after all, would have approved of such a relationship as being ‘to the advantage of the serf’.\textsuperscript{199} Gwynn is obviously open to the charge that he makes assumptions with regards to conquest as being the basis of Greek colonisation. It is of course quite plausible that his knowledge of modern European colonisation made such an assumption more likely – but it is worth bearing in mind that such an assumption is compatible with the way in classical authors saw their past as involving violent subjugation, be it from experience, ideology, or reasons of narrative: see for instance, Thucydides’ description of how native peoples were expelled at the foundation of Syracuse. Of course there was ancient evidence of an alternative nature, such as the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[195] The parallel between on the one hand the tentative dealings of the early Greeks with Oriental civilisations, giving way to more forthright action in the classical period, and eventual conquest under Alexander – and on the other that of modern European history, may not have been lost on these scholars.
\item[196] Gwynn (1918), 107.
\item[197] Gwynn (1918), 107-108.
\item[198] Gwynn (1918), 108.
\item[199] Gwynn (1918), 109. Zimmern in fact cites Aristotle’s remarks that a model polis should have its lands worked by tame slaves or serfs of alien origin (Aristotle, Politics, 1330a 26), Zimmern (1931), 254.
\end{footnotes}
cooperation between Megara Hyblaia and its Sikel neighbours, but perhaps the most apt summing up of this problem is that the modern colonial mindset was more prone to accepting the view most common among classical authors that the foundation of a colony was a violent affair and an evil day for native peoples.

During this examination of Gwynn’s portrayal of Greek-native relations it has been argued that he tended to see colonisation as a brutal affair taking place within a hostile wider environment; that he tended to attribute Greek colonial success (however hard fought) against native peoples to the position of the latter on a civilisational hierarchy applicable to antiquity and the modern world in equal measure; and that he was inclined to see natives as more often than not relegated to positions of serfdom by conquering Greeks, this based on the assumption that colonisation necessarily meant conquest, and that assumption sustained by a contemporary British tendency to read colonialism into antiquity and the use of later literary evidence. Before closing this discussion it is necessary to look at one further aspect: that is intermarriage and mixing between Greeks and natives. It has already been said that he saw Greek-native relations as predominantly characterised by hostility and the subjugation of the latter, but inequality does not necessarily preclude intermingling – and it did not for Gwynn.

In spite of his view that colonisation was based on conquest, he was quite prepared to think of Greeks coming into contact, for instance commercial, with the Sikels of the interior. Such commercial contacts ‘must often have led the Greeks to enter into the closest relations of daily life with the neighbouring tribes’, he wrote, suggesting that it was ‘important to remember how many advantages in favour of easy intercourse with the natives were granted to the Greek settler, though they are now for the most part denied to modern colonists...’.

Such close relations between Greeks and natives is not something which would be familiar to anyone whose main source for western Greek history had been Dunbabin and his claims of Greek purity. The more significant aspect however is the reason why Greeks were better able to mix with natives whereas modern colonists for the most part could not. Gwynn’s explanation draws on Lord Cromer’s *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (1909), and Cromer’s claim that Rome enjoyed certain advantages in carrying out its work of assimilating its various peoples – ‘there was neither religious question nor colour-question in the ancient world’. The lack of a religious question mean that there would be no ‘embarrassing’ situations as could arise due to the actions of missionaries; Greek-native relations would not be strained by cultural conflict. The lack of a ‘colour-question’ meant that Greeks could
enter into ever closer relations with indigenous peoples, even extending to intermarriage.\textsuperscript{200} The latter was not, he stressed, a controversial issue for the Greeks, for to ‘understand how freely Greeks could intermarry with the natives not separated from them by any distinction of colour, we have only to remember that Cimon was the son of a Thracian woman...’\textsuperscript{201} There are several important points revealed to us from this. Firstly, Gwynn did not see all aspects of Greek colonisation as unchangeably and invariably based on conquest and subjugation, but instead regarded Greeks as more capable of entering into productive relations with native peoples than moderns because of the lack of religious and racial divides. Secondly, Gwynn conceived Greek superiority over natives they \textit{met} to have been cultural, not racial; ‘the Greeks met races which, though socially and intellectually their inferiors, were still, in feature and colour, of the same general type.’ Perhaps it should be emphasised that this related to the natives \textit{whom they met} because Gwynn points out that ‘even the Libyan tribes, of which we have been speaking were, it is well to remind ourselves, not negroes, but Berbers.’ It is not explicitly said, and not clear, whether the Greeks, had they encountered ‘negroes’, would have been considered by Gwynn their intellectual and social superiors for racial reasons. Subsequently Gwynn refers to the way in which ‘fusion with native peoples was much facilitated by the absence of prejudice arising from differences either of colour or of religion’. This could mean that Gwynn simply thought that mutual prejudice, rather than racial inferiority, was the cause of frictions in modern times: in truth there is not enough evidence to form a conclusion on this count. The third and final point is that Gwynn again states the differences between ancient and modern colonisation, but in using modern colonisation as an interpretive tool certain modern colonial attitudes seep into his understanding of antiquity – such as the idea that the success or possibility of cultural contact depends on race.

All in all, Gwynn’s portrayal of Greek colonisation is a both a nuanced attempt to understand the Greek experience and an example of the distorting potential of modern colonial ideas. Greek colonisation is described as based on conquest and the subjugation of native peoples – the classical ancient evidence fusing with colonial ideas. This subjugation is possible because the Sikels and other natives, frequently defined as ‘tribes’, are on a lower rung of a civilisation hierarchy than both oriental civilisations and the Greeks themselves (something quite puzzling considering other comments about the undeveloped social,
political and economic organisation of the early colonists), but this is not to say that Gwynn presented the Greeks as untroubled, for they had to maintain their positions by military means in what was a very hostile environment. Because of a lack of racial difference – and in stark contrast to modern colonising experiences – relations between Greek and native after colonisation were not exclusively hostile; intermarriage ‘broke down’ barriers and ‘the life of Greek settlers must gradually have become merged in the life of the surrounding nations.’ Nonetheless, Greeks, as the bearers of a higher culture – this certainly evidence of a Hellenophilia typical of Britain in his day – remained ‘jealous of national tradition’.

There are points of similarity and of difference between the accounts that Gwynn and Dunbabin provide concerning Greek interactions with indigenous peoples. Dunbabin, like Gwynn, thought it worth mentioning how the natives of Sicily and southern Italy were of ‘similar stock to the Greeks, speaking in the most general terms.’ Another similarity is the forthright assumption of Greek civilisational superiority: the Greeks, according to Dunbabin ‘were no doubt more conscious of the differences than of the likeness to themselves in these barbarous peoples, and took little note of their capability for civilization.’ Other similarities include the tendency to see Greek colonisation as violent – if first contacts were peaceful, come ‘the era of official colonization’, the Greeks ‘preferred the sword to peaceful penetration’: at least half of all Greek colonies were built on sites formerly occupied by native towns, ‘and it is likely that most were’. Greeks ‘drove out Sikels or Italians by force’ in ‘every case of which we hear’, he wrote. Where he does differ from Gwynn is in his fairly positive rejection of mixing between Greeks and natives – there is no mention of intermarriage in Dunbabin’s account: ‘Archaic colonial culture was purely Greek’, and any Sikels ‘among the colonials’ were ‘completely hellenized’ and without any material trace of their origins.

One of the main differences in Dunbabin’s account is the way in which he does not rely solely on the various scraps of information provided by the literary evidence, for he used

202 Gwynn (1918), 93, 97-98. Gwynn seems unable to decide whether Greek colonists are ‘than half-wild, healthy mean, with an eye for beauty and an almost endless capacity for improving their minds’ or the bearers of a ‘higher culture’ Perhaps the answer lies in some idea that the Greeks had the capacity for rapid improvement within them, and soon fell into a position of cultural and political superiority to their indigenous neighbours.

203 Permitting for intermarriage between (male) Greek colonists and native women has been criticised as another example of assuming asymmetrical power relations between Greek and native. See Owen (2005), 6.

204 Gwynn (1918), 109-110.

205 Dunbabin (1948), 42.

206 Dunbabin (1948), 47.
archaeological evidence extensively in order to support his arguments concerning Greeks and natives. For example, there were ‘no Sikel remains of colonization date’ in the vicinity of Syracuse, and no Sikel remains either in terms of votive deposits or the Greek cemeteries of Syracuse.\(^{207}\) Although the literary evidence related the tale of Sikels assisting the foundation of Megara Hyblaia, Dunbabin believed it ‘likely that they [the Megarans] soon rid themselves of their Sikel benefactors, for the Sikel Hybla disappears from history’. The apparent disappearance of the native settlement could not be accounted for by cohabitation between Greeks and Sikels: ‘there is no indication that Greeks and Sikels lived side by side at Megara... Megara has been thoroughly excavated and neither the town nor the cemetery has yielded a single Siculan vase or bronze. Any admixture of Sikel blood was so slight as not to affect the purely Greek culture.’\(^{208}\) More broadly, Dunbabin argued that ‘the strongest argument that Sikles and other native peoples’ were prevented from taking part in colonial life, ‘except perhaps as slaves’, lay in the colonial cemeteries. Of the thousands of archaic graves excavated in a dozen Sicilian and Italian sites, ‘not more than one or two of them contain objects which can be regarded as Sikel or Italian...Archaic colonial culture was purely Greek’.\(^{209}\) The assumption that Dunbabin made, of course, was that people could be identified by their pots, and it is unfortunate that such archaeological assumptions as were common in his day coincided with Dunbabin’s unmistakable colonial agenda – be it in stressing the purity of colonial Greece vis-à-vis the natives, as in this case, or in affirming the dependence of the colonials to the mother country, as we have seen previously.\(^{210}\)

That Dunbabin was so strongly against the idea of interactions between Greeks and natives is an important difference between his work, published in 1948, and Gwynn’s, published in 1918. It is not impossible that the very fact that archaeological evidence was available to him, in conjunction with the then prevalent tendency to equate peoples with certain types of material evidence, bear the main responsibility for this difference. This may well be part of the explanation, but it is likely that Dunbabin’s own background, set in the context of contemporary Australian concerns to stress the British connection so as to strengthen a sense of racial exclusivity in relation to indigenous peoples and neighbouring

\(^{207}\) Dunbabin (1948), 43.
\(^{208}\) Dunbabin (1948), 44.
\(^{209}\) Dunbabin (1948), 46.
\(^{210}\) See Shepherd (2005), 31-34; De Angelis (1998), 542-45. Both comment on how Dunbabin dismissed linguistic evidence for mixing between Greeks and natives. De Angelis in particular draws attention to how Dunbabin exaggerated how well excavated various sites were (thus lending his dismissal of native presences a misleading certainty). Shepherd refers to how Dunbabin insisted that examples of metalwork common in native Sicilian and Italian sites were in fact Greek and thus evidence for the purity of colonial populations.
aliens, is as if not more important in determining this direction in his work. To argue as Finley did, that Greek ‘migrants were prepared to fight, subjugate or expel natives’, is no evidence of colonial distortion; it is a conventional interpretation of the literary evidence. Even Gwynn’s version, replete with references to modern colonisation and Greek cultural superiority, remains in good part a varied and nuanced appraisal of Greek-indigenous relations based on the literary evidence – for its time. Dunbabin’s account, on the other hand, appears pre-determined at every turn to dismiss any native influence and stress Greek purity that it may well warrant De Angelis’ charge that it constitutes ‘imperialist archaeology’.

Conclusions

In spite of the very clear influence of antiquity on contemporary political and imperial debate, and the prominent positions of classical scholars and classically trained intellectuals in public life, it will be striking how little of the contextual discussion which preceded this analysis of Anglophone scholarship on Greek colonisation has any impact on the way the latter was written. With the exception of Dunbabin’s very clear application of colonial ideas, and those from the very particular perspective of a ‘colonial’, and relating to contemporary ambitions and concerns on the part of post-war Australia, there is little trace of the great debates of the period 1914-1990 on the way this scholarship was written. There are traces, the enduring presence of mentalities and ideas, but none of it is explicit enough to connect with the changing context in which they were written. Scholarship from the period after the Second World War seems more and more reluctant to make open political points, however much they may bear the imprint of enduring mentalities. A work such as Graham’s, published in the 1960s, demonstrates an almost complete lack of contemporary allusions, and no discernible attempt to consciously apply any colonial ideas. What arguments there are in favour of colonisation as an act of state, for the idea of close relations between colonies and mother cities, and for hostile relationships between Greeks and natives are more the result of conventional readings of the ancient texts than any colonial agenda. This must, again, be qualified by stating that there were exceptions to this tendency, and certain individual scholars were more prone than others to apply colonial ideas in relation to certain themes.

211 Finley (1963), 37.
Section III: Conclusions
Chapter 7: Conclusions

This thesis aimed to address the way and extent to which contemporary ideas influenced the way British scholars wrote about Greek colonisation. It aimed to do so by examining a series of texts from the late eighteenth to later twentieth centuries in relation to the contemporary political, intellectual, imperial and colonial context; the three interpretive themes derived from the apparent distortions identified by recent scholarship; and what image of Greek colonisation the ancient evidence could reasonably be interpreted to allow. The contextual discussion also aimed to explore the significance of antiquity in shaping the British historical imagination from the eighteenth century to the later twentieth, with specific reference to issues relating to imperialism and colonisation. We shall begin with some wider conclusions relating to the important themes identified and important historical points made before moving on the final conclusions on British scholarship and Greek colonisation 1780-1990.

Wider conclusions

Throughout this study there has been an attempt to set scholarship on Greek colonisation in the relevant colonial context, yet themes and ideas other than colonisation, colonialism, and imperialism were of critical importance in the studies of antiquity we have considered. Conceptions of political freedom are the single most important set of ideas at work in scholarship on Greece. If we refer to things which are in fact more to do with political freedom as ‘colonial’, then we miss out on much complexity, miss out on understanding why, and may even misunderstand what is being said. Another theme of crucial importance is the role of conceptions of societal development, civilisation, or civilisational advance. Eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century British scholarship had a concept of the course of civilisation and civilisational development – most societies could move from a savage state, to a tribal one, to civilisation of the basic, Oriental, type. They, would, however, remain fixed at that level without political freedom. The Greek achievement in antiquity, the achievement of the polis, was to transcend the stagnation and despotism of Oriental civilisation on the one hand, and the lack of civilisation on the part of free but undeveloped tribal societies on the other. Unfortunately the polis was too small, too exclusive a community to be viable and secure on an interstate level – the problem of
combining civilisation, political freedom, and geopolitical power would not be solved until the rise of British representative government in the modern era. This is a broad schema, and naturally different scholars coming from different political perspectives would draw different conclusions, but the overarching idea still applies.

For this reason, the study of the history of classical scholarship needs to pay greater attention to firstly, changing concepts of political freedom in relation to the Greek poleis. Secondly, the way this interacted with a more general conception of what constituted ‘civilisation’, and thirdly, the relationship between classical scholarship and anthropology, set within a context of colonisation, colonialism, and imperialism and their role in shaping ideas of societal development and thus civilisation. These three areas are closely interconnected, as they are all, essentially, concerned with ideas and debates about the changing nature of political order. These ideas impacted significantly on British intellectuals in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they attempted to grapple with the question of political development and political conflict within and between states.

It has been mentioned on several occasions how important antiquity was to the British historical imagination. As the most common form of historical knowledge for educated classes for much of the modern era, antiquity formed a critical basis by which politicians, intellectuals, and an educated public could think about contemporary issues. Accepting, as has been argued, that British scholars perceived a schema of civilisational development, antiquity could thus present lessons for self-consciously developing polities – it provided examples of past civilisations’ journey through various stages of development. It was therefore a discipline like no other, which could be interrogated for lessons and used to further arguments of unequalled relevance and validity. It was by way of antiquity that one could find answers to contemporary political, imperial, colonial and civilisational predicaments – and forecast the future outcomes of current actions and tendencies. In this way, intellectuals educated in ancient history had truly historically informed ways of thinking about and responding to the world around them.

Apart from these broader points, among the most important themes to emerge from this discussion has been the significance of British liberalism to scholarship about Greece, and the wider significance of Greece to a historically constituted liberal vision of civilisation. This has been ever present from the 1830s with Mill and Grote, through the nineteenth century with Freeman, and into the twentieth with Bury, Zimmern, and Murray. With this comes another important point: a number of excellent studies have recently explored what has been identified as the ‘exclusionary potential’ of liberalism and the tortuous relationship
between liberalism and empire.\textsuperscript{1} What has not been fully appreciated \textsuperscript{2} is the importance of Greek antiquity in providing the historical and conceptual basis for liberal justifications of ostensibly illiberal politics and actions towards non-European peoples.

For John Stuart Mill an idea of civilisation rooted in antiquity – in which progress was defined as increasing democratisation, and any deviant cultures such as those found in the East uncompromisingly dismissed as ‘barbarian’ – served as the intellectual foundation for justifications for British imperial rule. This is not to say that a liberal conception of civilisation, defined by political freedom, would necessarily be used to justify imperial rule – the example of George Grote demonstrates that if anything, colonial situations are to be avoided because of the corrupting nature of such encounters, be that due to the unassimilable nature of certain peoples and the debasement caused by cultural interaction (as is clearly his view of the Hellenistic era) or the corruption and degradation inherent in despotic rule.

With E.A. Freeman, we have a different picture again, yet one which holds certain elements in common. The primacy of a liberal conception of civilisation defined by political liberty caused Freeman to distort Sicilian Greek history, dismissing it as having a greatness of a ‘colonial kind’ – the Sicily of the tyrants could not compare to Athens. It would also cause him to adopt what was at times an extreme East-West dichotomy and contributed to his racial ideas centring on an Anglo-Saxon and Germanic ideal. This did not, however, make him an imperialist – for the British Empire of rule he appears to have cared little. More important is the way in which Freeman exhibits a civilisational vision which both affirms the superiority of politically free polities, yet which also betrays foreboding about their future. In Freeman’s view of antiquity, political freedom remains the thing which makes the higher reaches of civilisation possible, yet the material and organisational arts of civilisation can be mastered by peoples who have no use for it, and are more than capable of extinguishing a higher civilisation. Both Grote and Freeman express fears about the future of a liberal civilisation in contexts in which it comes into contact with the uncivilised or non-European – political freedom cannot be understood by all, and must be guarded jealously.

For Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern, the world after the Great War represented one threat after another to a liberal conception of civilisation most certainly from their point of view rooted in Greek (and to a lesser extent Roman) antiquity. Fascism and Communism


\textsuperscript{2} Although see Morefield (2005), 72-95.
were obvious and uncomplicated dangers – more instructive is their attitudes towards the British Empire and non-European peoples. Their defence of the British world order centred on a belief that it stood guard over a liberal civilisation. Colonial nationalisms threatened that order and thus had to be contained. Moreover, their attitudes towards colonial peoples reveal a distinct element of continuity between their ideas and those of Grote and Freeman: Murray in particular saw peoples who were not yet ready, who did not yet understand liberal civilisation as not only making their claims for adulthood too early, but doing so in a manner of open hostility to the West. In undermining the British Empire, guarantor of liberal civilisation, and in rejecting their tutelage in the ways of liberal civilisation (instead espousing more radical creeds), these peoples were a threat to that very civilisation. Thus could Murray, at the time of Suez, in the death throes of the British Empire, write ‘The Shadow of Barbarism’, and state that civilisation was in danger from those who did not fully understand it.

Murray’s fears were in a different way echoed by his son-in-law, Arnold J. Toynbee: as a disunited Europe stood to become dwarfed by far larger units in Asia and the Americas, Europeans took much pride in their Westernisation of the world. Quantitatively, he had no doubt that Western culture had indeed spread far and wider – ‘but what about quality?’ The example of Russia alone showed that ‘a social heritage will not readily bear transplantation.’

Grote might have said that those non-Western nations ‘attained a certain civilisation in mass, without the acquisition of any high mental qualities or the development of any individual genius.’ Freeman would have agreed, and lamented that the civilisational superiority proffered by political freedom was no defence against ‘ruder’ foes, equipped with the material and organisational elements of civilisation, who came ‘as destroying enemies’. The young John Stuart Mill of 1830, and the elderly Gilbert Murray of 1957, though separated by more than a century would have warned of the resurgence of ‘barbarism’. The problem of how to deal with those who do not accept liberal values, so clearly for the beholder the goal of progressing civilisation, is something which troubled liberal intellectuals from the 1830s through to the demise of British power in the world in 1947-56. All too often it caused conclusions to be drawn about the relative capacities and incapacities of different peoples, and that, frequently, on the part of intellectuals opposed to biological racism.

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5 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 19-21.
6 See Pitts (2005), 241.
antiquity, in providing the intellectual and historical basis for a liberal conception of civilisation, was a significant yet all too often underestimated foundation of this way of seeing the world.

**Final conclusions**

In chapter 2, current scholarship on Greek colonisation was examined, key themes relating to apparent distortions on the part of earlier work drawn out, and those themes formed the basis of much of this discussion. A hypothetical ‘current scholar’ was created, whose views represented a synthesis of recent views concerning the distortions identified in earlier scholarship and the study of Greek settlement overseas in general. The aim of this thesis has not been to comment on the latter, but rather on the former.

According to our ‘current scholar’, the misconceptions apparent in earlier scholarship, guilty of anachronism and the retrojection of ideas derived from the modern European colonial experience, led to the following view of Greek settlement overseas. Firstly too much emphasis was put on state involvement, not enough on private initiative. Secondly, later foundation traditions were accepted uncritically and lead to a view of close and dependent relations between colony and mother city. Furthermore the imposition of colonial ideas contributed to the perception that Greek colonies were inferior to their mother cities – colonial inferiority. Thirdly, relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples were seen as mirroring later colonial (Classical Greek and modern European) experiences in which Greeks are superior agents of cultural change whereas indigenous peoples are unsophisticated and passive recipients.

Because there has not been a systematic study of a broad range of scholars, across a wide chronological span, and according to a defined set of criteria (that is our three themes), recent scholarship has not been able to present a representative impression of the way British scholarship wrote about Greek colonisation. We have seen how in the late eighteenth century, in the nineteenth century, and up until the period after the Great War, the dominant scholarly perception was that Greek colonisation was primarily the result of private initiative. Those scholars who suggested otherwise did so on a not entirely unreasonable understanding of Herodotus on Cyrene or perhaps in the belief references to individuals must have been mythical. Come the period after the Great War, the shift to a state oriented explanation was caused by ideas concerning the primitive and agrarian nature of early Greek society, the
primacy of land as a motivation, and following from that, the view that colonisation was a deliberate act of state by communities plagued with overpopulation.

It has been very rare indeed for any scholar throughout this period to suggest any political dependence on the part of Greek colonies – certain exceptions, understandable in view of the literary evidence, noted. By far the most common view has been of political independence coupled with ties of friendship, reverence, or sentiment – again hardly controversial considering the literary evidence. Of course, the criticism made by recent scholarship includes the suggestion of an uncritical attitude towards the literary evidence and foundation traditions. In this they may have a point – but it is a point much more easily made in an age in which archaeology, a whole range of evidence unavailable to our earlier scholars, has progressed so far. Criticisms of later, twentieth century, scholars in term of colonial dependence – for instance Dunbabin – are entirely justified and correct. As for colonial inferiority, the unexpected views of eighteenth century scholars have been missed. As for Freeman, recent scholarship has been correct to identify distortions and notions of colonial inferiority, but has not fully appreciated the exact reasoning behind the distortion.

The relationship between Greeks and natives is one theme where there has been a consistent application of contemporary ideas. Yet much of what was said in terms of violent conflict and the subjugation of natives was in good part consistent with the ancient evidence. Furthermore, accounts of Greek-native relations are influenced by much more than ‘colonial’ ideas – to examine them through this prism can in itself be distorting, and oversimplifies the history of classical scholarship. Moreover, earlier scholars, even if they applied contemporary ideas, could by very nuanced in their approaches, and did not tend to try to make antiquity fit the present.

It is hoped that the thesis has shown that British scholarship did not, as a whole, simplistically distort ancient evidence so as to create a version of Greek colonisation which mirrored, in a self-congratulatory way, contemporary British experiences. Thus our ‘current scholar’ has been proven correct in some cases, wanting in others – largely because of a lack of systematic and comprehensive treatment, and because most recent contributors were quite understandably most interested in their more direct predecessors – or those, often later, scholars who had a defining impact on their field of study. This thesis has looked to provide that systematic study, providing a much more comprehensive account which can be of use to those working on Greek settlement overseas and wish to understand its significance and prior approaches to it in classical scholarship. It is important to emphasise that recent scholarship has been right to question the underlying assumptions behind the state of work on Greek
colonisation as it stood. This has led to new perspectives and a better understanding. It is also right to interrogate earlier work for ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ ideas – and indeed examine more recent works for ideas based on the continuing use of assumptions born in a previous historical context. This does not mean, of course, that those ideas are necessarily to be dismissed – merely that they are identified and understood in context. One of the key problems it is hoped this study has outlined is that we need to go beyond the approach of ‘looking for colonialism’ in earlier works – the fact that we are looking at, say, accounts of Greek colonisation does not mean that it is only contemporary colonial ideas that we might find. We need, instead, to look at the subject from a broader perspective, and be aware of a broader spectrum of influences and ideas. Furthermore, we need to do so with reference to a deeper understanding of the contemporary context, without which we risk misunderstanding or oversimplifying the view in question.

This leads to a second point. This thesis was intended to contribute to the specific debate about the nature of earlier scholarship on Greek colonisation while also placing it in a wider context thereby making other points more relevant to the realms of the history of classical scholarship and debates in modern intellectual history. The result has been to show the critical importance of ideas concerning political freedom to the study of Greek antiquity in the modern age, identify the significance of antiquity in British conceptions of societal development, and uncover the relevance of Greek antiquity in forming a liberal conception of civilisation which proved to have an enduring influence on the troubled encounters between British liberalism and non-European peoples.
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