The State of the Nation:

Television News and the Politics of Migration

Thesis submitted for the award of PhD

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This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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Abstract

The State of the Nation investigates discourses of British nationhood by analysing the coverage of migration on UK public service television news bulletins. These bulletins embody discourses of the national on a structural level through their public service remit and their position in the programme schedule. They also evoke the nation in and through their content—in particular in the context of the coverage of migration. The central line of enquiry of this thesis is focussed on the potentially problematic consequences of the interrelation of discourses of migration with discourses of the nation. That this is a question of how they interrelate rather than whether rests on three theoretical assumptions: discourses of nation represent a form of identification; identification is the outcome of encounter with and potentially exclusion of the Other; migration is a discourse of encounter. Two further assumptions relate to the current historical moment and the news coverage under analysis: discourses of the nation have increasingly come under pressure; and yet, public discourses do not fully recognise or even acknowledge this, instead insist on the nation’s continued unchanged relevance. The key question is: Under what contingencies is migration positioned as an excluded Other in relation to these imagined community discourses? The thesis relates these issues to wider questions about the possibility for a cosmopolitan ethic. It theorises that certain logics of narrow nationality are a key determinants, but have to be understood as variable rather than as constant. The first two chapters of section 1 develop these key theoretical assumptions as well as some methodological concerns. The third chapter provides some topical context and background for the main data set: material collected during six months of media monitoring in 2006 on three news bulletins with a public service remit. The data is analysed in section 2 across three case studies. The first considers so-called illegal migration in relation to questions of space, attempting to trace the boundaries of the nation. The second moves from the boundary to the inside of the nation and looks at the changing nature of citizenship. The third case study focuses on the conditions under which journalists and migrants encounter each other.
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Introduction: The State of the Nation—UK Television News and the Politics of Migration

How can geographical knowledges be reconstituted to meet the needs of democratic global governance inspired by a cosmopolitan ethic of, for example, justice, fairness and reason

(Harvey 2005, p. 220)

This thesis explores the question posed by Harvey in the quotation above in relation to the politics of migration and the state of the British nation discourse. These issues are investigated through an analysis of the coverage of migration on British television news programmes. The analytic approach is premised on the understanding that a) television news constructs and projects what are potentially national imagined communities (Anderson 1983) and thus evokes current discourses about the nation; and b) that the discourses in relation to migration are particularly strong indicators of the discourse about the nation. Cohen (2000, p. 576) highlights the interrelation between the two discourses by arguing that when these discourses manifest themselves in government policy they fulfil “a national function (who is included and who is excluded here takes a literal form)” because of “the perceived need [by the nation-state] to continue and develop its affective role as a rallying point for the symbolic identity needs of its population.” It is important to note that the concern of this thesis, the reason for undertaking this research encapsulated in Harvey’s quote cited above is focussed on both aspects. So despite discourses of migration being considered indicators of discourses of nation, this should not be understood as a convenient appropriation of migration in the service of the nation with little or no concern for the potentially problematic consequences of how these discourses interrelate—potential consequences that arise if no appropriate answer to Harvey’s question can be found and that Cohen also points towards when he warns that:

The people of Britain do not need the simplicity and uniformity of an over-assertive identity and they should beware of politicians wrapping themselves either in the flag of St George or the Union Jack. (ibid, p. 581)

In fact, the central line of enquiry in this thesis is focussed on determining how such a—not necessarily intentional—appropriation of migration to serve the nation occurs.

That this is indeed a question of how rather than whether rests on three theoretical assumptions. Briefly these assumptions can be summarised thus: discourses of nation represent a form of identification; identification is the outcome of encounter with and potentially exclusion of the Other; migration is a discourse of encounter. These assumptions will be discussed in more detail at various points later on but are already implied to some extent by Cohen’s (ibid, p. 576)
suggestion quoted above that migration policies fulfil a national function and serve as a “rallying point for the symbolic identity needs of its [the nation-state’s] population” and made even more explicitly by him later on in his article (ibid, p. 581): “We know who we are by agreeing who we are not. Others judge us as we judge others. The Other cannot be separated from the Self.” A further two assumptions—again, to be discussed fully later but have already been hinted at—of more specificity to the current historical moment, link these three to the focus of analysis, the coverage of migration: the first is that discourses of the nation, which had been in the ascendency since the late 18th century as actual forms of group identification and state organisation, have increasingly come under pressure in recent decades—hence Harvey’s question/demand quoted at the outset for new geographical knowledge that takes this situation into consideration and allows for a cosmopolitan ethic; the second is that public discourses such as those in television news content do not fully recognise or even acknowledge this pressure, instead attempt to maintain a national imagined community (Anderson 1983) by insisting on its continued more or less unchanged relevance and at times appropriate migration in the process. Not only does this fail to meet Harvey’s demand but this ha negative consequences for the treatment of migrants, as the television news media is a key site for the development of the public’s understanding of these issues, a point highlighted by Threadgold in relation to asylum, one specific form of migration:

The iconic (images do not lie) and reality (s/he was really there on location) functions of television help images, figures of speech, narrative and histories to stick together, to become performative (Butler 1993) of what asylum is and thus to generate effects. (2006, p. 230)

In Threadgold’s reading these effects tend to be negative, as asylum seekers become “linked to foreign terrorist threats, and are constructed as objects of fear and agents of threat and danger, a risk to the social body” (ibid, p. 227). However, they do not necessarily have to be. Television has the potential to generate a whole set of different effects, a point Chouliaraki emphasises:

Media representations are, in this sense, conditions of possibility for public action and it is these conditions that we need to analyse so as to understand just how media texts may contribute to promoting an ethics of care and responsibility, or indifference and apathy towards distant others. (2008, p. 832)

Besides highlighting the centrality of media representations in general—though Chouliaraki specifically discusses this in relation to television in this article—and their potential for changing perception, the quotation hints at two further, related aspects explored in this thesis. Both relate to Chouliaraki’s concern with “distant others”. Firstly, Chouliaraki, though using lower case, draws on a similar understanding of the concept of the Other as Cohen (2000, p. 581) does in
the quotation cited above. Yet, by highlighting the possibility of care and responsibility towards the Other she explicitly suggests that there are situations in which the Other does not necessarily have to be excluded or rejected. As she writes elsewhere—though it equally applies to her 2008 work—care and responsibility towards the Other are the expression of a different process of identification in response to media representations that results in a different sense of identity of different imagined communities: “it is possible for the media to cultivate an ideal identity for the spectator as a citizen of the world—literally cosmo-politan” (2006, p. 3). The difference between the two authors is that Cohen considers the Other in the context of a (certain kind of) national and Chouliaraki in the context of (the possibility of) a cosmopolitan identity. As becomes clear from Chouliaraki’s continued use of the term Other, the Other remains Other, i.e., the Other does not necessarily become the same as the self rather the Other is no longer called upon to establish the self as separate and becomes part of a shared cosmopolitan imagined community. However, rather than separate kinds of identity, I propose that they represent points on a scale or spectrum. The measure on this scale is related to the second aspect Chouliaraki’s (2008, p. 832) phrase “distant others” raises.

The phrase signals a spatial dimension to the concept of Other. Chouliaraki is concerned with distant Others and their suffering. In bringing in distance the term relates the concept of Other explicitly to geographical knowledge. Chouliaraki use of the term is twofold: a) it refers to physically distant Others and b) processes of mediation that establish a mediated presence of the physically distant other yet may or may not evoke an ideal identity in the spectator. I also want to employ the term beyond the physical. Similar to Chouliaraki’s use of the term distant, geographic knowledge as posited by Harvey (2005) relates to the discursive construction of space and spatial relation, the production of space in Lefebvre’s terms (1991 [1974]), which might generate perceptions of distance that do not necessarily overlap with physical distance. In other words perceptions of space, place and territory that define spatial relationships can result in the positioning of someone or a groups of people as Other in relation to the self on the scale proposed above. Thus the concern of this thesis is to analyse media texts to develop an understanding of the conditions under which media texts emphasise or de-emphasise symbolic distance. My theory is that discourses of the national plays a key part in this, but has to be understood as a variable rather than a constant, as Wiley argues:

we need not assume that we are always already “in” nationally organized space, that the nationality of a particular social space is necessarily its most salient characteristic, or that nationally defined spaces today are national in the same way as they were in the past. Instead, we
can turn these assumptions into questions about the changing role played by logics of nationality... (2004, p. 93)

To explore the theory, to analyse the application of logics of nationality in the coverage of migration the following questions will be pursued in this thesis:

What discourses of migration are evoked in journalistic content of British public service broadcasting television?

How do these discourses of migration interrelate with discourses of imagined community?

What kinds of imagined communities emerge in the context of migration?

Under what contingencies is migration positioned as an excluded Other in relation to these imagined community discourses?

Under what contingencies does a British national imagined community emerge?

What kind(s) of British national imagined communities emerge?

And coming back to Harvey what kinds of geographical knowledges are constituted in the process?

And finally, what are the challenges for overcoming discursive formations that pre-
determine the activation of processes of exclusionary othering?

Overall these questions—but in particular the final question—mark a clear move beyond previous research. There has of course been substantial research looking into discourses of migration in British news media (cf. Buchanan et al. 2003; Cookson and Jempson 2005; Finney 2003; ICAR 2004; MediaWise 2005; Smart et al. 2007). These studies argue that the representation of migration tends towards the exclusionary and consider this to be problematic. This kind of research focusses on the coverage of migration either in a specific spatial context, e.g., migration to Britain, and/or in relation to a specific form of migration, e.g., asylum. Emphasis has often been placed on the use of labels and other explicit aspects of the coverage that the research suggests have negative connotations. On this basis coverage is categorised along a negative-positive divide and recommendations to affect change are made accordingly, e.g., avoiding the use of certain labels. However, though some media outlets have taken on board these recommendations—some even quite willingly—the discourses around migration in these
contexts appear to have changed very little (Gross et al. 2007, p. 8). Again, I would postulate that this has to do with the logics of nationality. To challenge this logic requires more than changing labels. Though using some of the same analytical tools and approaches and with a similar aim in mind, the research presented here thus represents a departure from this kind of research by looking at migration in one location—British public service broadcasting at specific moments in time—but at the coverage of migration in a variety of spatial contexts and at a variety of forms of migration. The aim of comparing and contrasting the coverage is not to place it into negative-positive categories, rather to consider what logics apply in what contexts and whether the national logics is as influential as proposed in resulting in exclusionary othering. In the process I intend to identify possibilities and limitations of a covering migration suggested by Chouliaraki in relation to distant suffering.

The thesis will pursue a discourse analytical strategy. Representations of migration in the content of television news programming will be analysed and will form the basis of inferences about the state of the nation. Discourse analysis is the strategy, migration and the nation its topic and television news the location, the point of engagement with these discourses as data. While the methodological approach will be elaborated on later, here it only serves to indicate the direction of travel and to introduce an overview of the content of the thesis. The main data consists of six months of media monitoring between 24 April and 24 October 2006 of three terrestrial late evening news programmes with a public service remit, BBC 1 News at Ten, ITV 1 News and the evening news programme Channel 4 News. The media monitoring was originally conducted for a research project into the representation of refugees and asylum seekers funded by Oxfam (Gross et al. 2007)\(^1\). Part of the research project also involved interviews with journalists. While these interviews are not part of the analytical, content-orientated focus, they will be brought in and discussed in some detail to provide context. For the same reason and to highlight the continued relevance of the arguments under investigation additional content from more recent programming will be drawn upon in the six chapters that form the main body of this thesis. In the first two of these chapters the key theoretical assumptions or reference points will be developed. These include identification as discourse and encounter, mediation, the nation and its news media, the discourse of nation under pressure, the nation and migration. Some

\(^1\) The author of this thesis was the lead researcher on this project. The use of the data has been cleared by Terry Threadgold, the project’s primary investigator. The contribution of colleagues, Sadie Clifford and in particular Kerry Moore, in collecting the data is gratefully acknowledged. Some of the findings and sections from the report that represent the author’s own work have been incorporated into the thesis after discussion with the PI. Other findings from the report are referenced in the standard way.
methodological concerns will also be considered, e.g., news as text and discourse inscribed with habitus. While the first chapter will be framed in mainly theoretical terms, the second chapter is focussed through an analysis of the prime ministerial debates of the UK general election 2010. This chapter will also discuss the discourses around the particular nature of the British nation state. The following, third chapter will provide some context for the 2006 core data set in terms of the news environment at the time. While drawing on other migration stories since 2006 allows for an exploration of the issues over time, this contextualisation will facilitate a better understanding of the way migration discourses related to and collocated with other issues at the time. The subsequent three chapters build on the theoretical as well as contextual discussion by considering different aspects of the coverage. The first of these three case studies focuses on the coverage of so-called illegal migration to consider questions of geographical knowledge, of space, territory and distance explicitly, attempting to trace the boundaries of the nation. It is this case study which explores Harvey’s demand most closely. It establishes some of geographical knowledges explicitly represented through the coverage. The second case study still addresses some issues of geographical knowledge explicitly but also goes beyond by moving from the boundary to the inside of the nation. Through an analysis of the coverage of EU migration it looks at the relationship between the state and its populace and at debates over changing notions of citizenship. While the first two case studies directly deal with the nation and questions of geographical knowledge, its outline and content respectively, the case study concluding this section considers the conditions under which journalists and migrants encounter each other—representing instances of identification in moments face-to-face encounters of individuals rather mediated encounters. An analysis of migrant voices in the coverage of television news represents the investigative starting point. From there the analysis moves beyond content to bring in the aspect of television news production in the form of the interviews with journalists mentioned above. This chapter offers an insight into the difficulty for journalists of moving beyond discourses of migration connected to the nation, i.e., migration in which the logics of nationality come to the fore. Though questions of geographical knowledge are addressed explicitly to varying degrees across the three case studies, they are all linked to the issue raised by Harvey. As has already been highlighted here and will be further developed later, migration is an intrinsically spatial and hence geographic phenomenon. An analysis of the coverage of migration across all the dimensions outlined above will allow drawing conclusions about the contingencies of specific mediated articulations of the nation, the specific logics of nationality and the extent to which they allow for Harvey’s demand and cosmopolitan identification. As indicated above, how I
conceive of processes of identification and its mediation through television will be the subject of the following chapter.
Section 1: From Identification and Mediation to Discourses of Migration and the British Nation

1.1. Identification, Mediation and the Position of PSB Journalism

As developed in the preceding chapter, in my research I am primarily interested in the role a certain kind of news media plays in processes of identity formation and the conditionality of inclusive or exclusive/exclusionary subject positions with a view to explore under which conditions a cosmopolitan identifications might be possible. Allowing for the possibility of various identity outcomes as well as the terms ‘formation’ and ‘processes’ highlight that I start from an understanding of identity as a concept that is continually constructed rather than permanently fixed. As Derrida (1998, p. 28) suggests: “No, an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures.” Additionally, I conceive of this process of identification as fulfilling a particular function. Identification fulfils the function of attribution. But, as Butler suggests, attribution only becomes relevant if it is questioned:

Only in the face of such a query or attribution from an other—“Was it you”—do any of us start to narrate ourselves, or find that, for urgent reasons, we must become self-narrating beings. (2005, p. 11)

When the narration begins identity starts to take shape—in relation to the query from an other. Both of these aspects, the function and the construction of identity, become not only visible but also relevant in a situation of encounter of a self with an other. In fact, I would argue that as human beings we live in a permanent state of encountering. Identity is the forever provisional outcome of the relationship established in the encounter. However, apart from certain aspects of case study 3 (chapter 2.3) the encounters explored do not include actual face-to-face encounters. Rather these encounters are mediated through the medium of television, through content produced in the context of public service broadcasting (PSB), specifically in relation to journalistic content. This definition of mediation by Silverstone is particularly appropriate here, because it also highlights the consequence mediation has for social relations and hence identifications:

Mediation...describes the fundamentally, but unevenly, dialectical process in which institutionalized media of communication (the press, broadcast radio and television, and increasingly the World Wide Web) are involved in the general circulation of symbols in social life...As such, mediation has significant consequences for the way in which the world appears in and to everyday life, and as such this mediated appearance in turn provides a framework for the definition and conduct of our relationships to the other, and especially the distant other—the other who only appears to us within the media. (2002, p. 762)
Having so far merely given brief definitions of two of the key concepts that contribute to the theoretical framework of this thesis, the remaining chapter serves to develop these further to provide a foundation in the pursuit of the argument that television news coverage of migration represents a moment of encounter with an other inscribed with the habitus of a British nation. Some of the elements of this foundation and emerging argument will be picked up on and developed in more detail and with more specificity to the issues of concern in the second chapter as well as the case study chapters of the second section of this thesis.

**From the Other to the National—Processes of Identification**

As the Other is highlighted in the definitions of both identification and mediation, it serves as a good starting point from which to explore processes of identification that lead to the evoking of a nationally imagined imagined community (Anderson, 1983). As the above quote from Butler suggests, the notion of Otherness is central to the process of identification. Butler’s (2005, pp. 22-30) discussion of the complex relationship between a self and an other and how a self and an other become recognisable in relation to Hegel’s conceptualisation of self, other and the process of recognition develops this further (ibid, p. 27, original emphasis): “The Hegelian other is always found outside; at least, it is first found outside and only later recognized to be constitutive of the subject.” First finding the other outside presupposes an awareness of an inside. However, this awareness is only raised through an encounter. In other words, in the first instance a self becomes aware of an outside and hence of its limits, of itself as an entity by encountering an other. In the second step the encounter establishes identifications beyond the awareness of existence, subject positions in relation to each other, i.e., not only that one is but also as what or as who self and other recognise each other in this encounter. ‘An other’ does not necessarily have to be understood as the excluded Other mentioned in the quotation by (Cohen 2000, p. 581) cited in the preceding chapter. In Hegel’s myth (1977 [1807]), because the recognition of the self as self generates a sense of loss and of threat, the encounter is a struggle between self and other that initially establishes a master and a slave subject position. One could argue that this is Cohen’s Other—an Other if not explicitly dominated than at least excluded in order to confirm a particular kind of (superior) identification of the self as not-the-other. However, I would argue that the same dynamic of encounter does not have to be understood as a struggle and can establish Self/Other identifications along the lines Chouliaraki calls for. Coming back to Butler, her argument suggests the potential for different outcomes of encounter. She emphasises that how other and self recognise each other is defined by external conditions specific to the encounter. At the same time, drawing on Foucault, Butler (2005, p. 30) also hints at that these conditions limit the number potential outcomes: “There is a language that frames the encounter,
and embedded in that language is a set of norms concerning what will and will not constitute recognizability.” I will come back to the conditions of encounter and the set of norms later on in this chapter and relate to three key dimensions: the situational, the relational, and the historical.

By drawing on Foucault Butler introduces the element of power in the process of identification. It is this aspect that I will develop to suggest that, though Derrida (1998, p. 28) suggests identification is an indeterminable process, meaning can become—at least temporarily—fixed through discourse. Foucault (2002 [1972], p. 54) describes discourse as “practices which systematically form the object of which it speaks”. I would argue that to take on a recognizable form an object has to become manifest in either a metaphorical or an actual sense, its meaning has to become fixed. So what Foucault suggests here is that discursive practice is the underlying mechanism that generates recognisable forms through the fixing of meaning. This is a temporary fix that relates to the symbolic or imaginary order (to use Lacan’s 1977 term), and is experienced as real though it is in fact illusionary.

This fixing mechanism, however, is not a neutral machine that is available to everyone in the same way and to the same extent. Lacan’s symbolic order works on the level of imposition. Also some have more power than others. In Discipline and Punish (1995 [1977]) Foucault provides an interesting analysis of the inner workings of discourse, the driving forces that generate and sustain discourse. Discipline and Punish is of particular relevance here, because in the book Foucault also raises issues directly related to questions of identity. Through a study of the history, a genealogy to use the Foucauldian term, of penalty, of penal action by the state, Foucault illustrates the relationship between discourse, the human subject and the human body—the relationship between discourse and identity. Drawing mainly on Discipline and Punish, I want to highlight two points in the following section: firstly, the generating forces that sustain discourse; and secondly, the relationship between discourse and body.

According to Foucault power and knowledge, what he also calls power/knowledge, are the two interdependent forces that generate and sustain discourse. Though discourse establishes dominant as well as dominated subject positions, the actual control over discourse does not rest entirely with those more privileged by it. Foucault describes power as more diffuse in nature:

[This] power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions—an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. (ibid, pp. 26-27)
This diffusion of power into a network of multi-directional power relations already makes it difficult to trace much less to challenge those in power. However, if they themselves are not in control of power, how do they maintain their dominant position? Foucault’s answer is through knowledge. Knowledge hides the often precarious artificiality of the relative positioning of subjects and makes the process appear natural. In essence knowledge is the claim to know the truth. Joining up with power this claim becomes truth itself.

Establishing penal categories of illegality is the example Foucault uses to illustrate the process involved in establishing knowledge. Those in dominant positions, in this case judges sitting in court assist as far as they can in the constitution of delinquency, that is to say, in the differentiation of illegalities, in the supervision, colonization and use of certain of these illegalities by the illegality of the dominant class (ibid, p. 282)

They decide, that is, claim to have the knowledge of what is legal and what is illegal behaviour. However, it is important to remember the diffusion of power that coincides with the establishment of knowledge. These processes interact and influence the dominated as well as the dominant. Discourse may appear natural to all that are positioned within it. The judges’ actions may have strategic consequences in terms of advancing the interests of some sections of society over that of others. Foucault even suggests that the strategies may change, as they become less effectual (ibid, p. 285). Still, the judges can be as convinced of the naturalness of these categories as the delinquents who accept to be judged by them. I will be addressing the question this raises regarding the tension between structure and agency later in this chapter by drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. At this point it leads me to the analytical approach suggested by Foucault to examine discourse.

As I have mentioned above, the diffusion of power makes it difficult to trace and challenge discourse, as the source of power cannot be pinpointed. Even without this source as a focal point, however, an analysis of discourse is possible. According to Foucault such an approach needs to be systematic in the sense that the approach needs to take an entire system into account:

One would be concerned with the ‘body politic’, as a set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge. (ibid, p. 28)

Here, Foucault widens and at the same time focuses the analytical approach. The ‘body politic’ with all its various aspects becomes the aim of analysis; the human body its focus:
the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. (ibid, p. 25)

The body, its shape and actions represents the consequence of discourse. It is important to note that Foucault emphasises two aspects of the body here, shape and action. The emphasis suggests discourse not only forming the physical body, but also the apparently intangible inner workings of the body, the processes of thought, instinct or emotion that generate action. By observing how penality has shifted its focus from the body to the soul in the 18th century (ibid, p. 16), Foucault illustrates the sway discourse has over an individual’s existence. Through this example he also repudiates Enlightenment thinking about an essential soul at the core of human existence. In his conclusion he turns this soul from the essential core into the constructed result and relay of discourse (ibid, p. 30): “The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.”

It is in the specific context of the history of penality that Foucault draws these conclusions. Penality, however, in its overt attempt to discipline and punish the body is merely an example. The conclusions about the nature of discourse are also applicable in other, less overt contexts. In fact for Foucault discourse, its power and the very notion of an individual are inextricably linked (1980, p. 98): “[It] is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals.” Despite the fact that Foucault seems to suggest here that individuality is ultimately an illusion, it is experienced as, made real through the disciplined body shaped through and shaping discourse and its practices.

There are parallels between the disciplined body and what Bourdieu (1992, pp. 69-70, original emphasis) calls hexis: “Bodily hexis is political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking.” Again, similar to Foucault, the shape of the body are influenced by structures, which are not entirely under the any one person’s or institutions control—what Bourdieu, in this instance, calls political mythology, similar to what Foucault calls discourse. The reason I mention Bourdieu is that he has conceptualised the process by which these structures are converted into hexis. There are several aspects to this process: among them symbolic capital, symbolic violence, fields of practice. These I will address later in the chapter in terms of the historical, situational and relational dimensions of identity. Here I will turn my attention to habitus. Not only does habitus serve as the focal point of this process, it also represents an attempt to resolve the tension between structure and agency alluded to above.
In *The Logic of Practice* (1992) Bourdieu develops a theory of action that, he maintains, transcends the dichotomy between agency and structure. In his view human action is neither entirely based on reason, nor on habit, nor on an automatic enactment of static structures. Instead Bourdieu (ibid, p. 50) suggests a principle of practice in which action depends on the interplay between “external constraints which leave a variable margin for choice, and dispositions which are the product of economic and social processes”. These dispositions represent what Bourdieu calls habitus:

systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations (ibid, p. 53)

Despite the fact that habitus is originally shaped by outside forces, economic and social processes across generations, at the moment of generating action they are part of the internal, or rather turned internal, world of the actor (ibid, p. 56, original emphasis): “The habitus—embodied history, internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history—is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product.” In the above quotation Bourdieu already acknowledged a ‘margin of choice’ in relation to external constraints. The same applies to habitus, but it is a narrow margin. Habitus (ibid) “tends to exclude ‘extravagances’ (‘not for the likes of us’), that is, all the behaviours that would be negatively sanctioned because they are incompatible with the objective conditions.”

One final step is necessary to develop fully the relevance of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to my own understanding of identity as encounter: the tension between stability and variance at its centre. Habitus not only embodies history, it also “produces more history” (ibid, p. 54). In Bourdieu’s words it has an “infinite capacity for generating products” (ibid, p. 55) without resulting in “the creation of unpredictable novelty”. So while it provides a certain degree of “constancy over time” (ibid, p. 54), the margin of choice and the continuous production of history, which prescribes the legible outcome of practice in similar but slightly different terms each time, allows for variance and, over time, for change. Habitus may represent durable dispositions, but they are not static. Thus the habitus-external-constraints equation contains two variables, both changing over time, that in turn shape a third variable, hexis. In each situation, in each encounter between the internal and the external, the equation attempts to generate the appropriate practices and representations enacted by and at the same time shaping hexis. The possible outcome of this equation is infinite but not random. It represents the identity of the actors; an identity that is better described as a spectrum of possible identities. Identity is permanently constituted through and becomes temporarily fixed in the moment of encounter.
So far I have developed my understanding of identity in relation to the Other as well as Foucauldian discourse and Bourdieuan habitus. The latter two concepts, however, have been criticised as limited. Alexander and Mast (2006, p. 8), for instance, argue that discourse based on power/knowledge as well as habitus may have been adequate for societies of the past, “where social structure and culture were relatively fused” rather than for “the autonomizing, reflexive, deeply ambivalent psychological processes of today”. It is a criticism that I can only share to some extent. While current societies may be more fractured, the processes that shape identity at a particular moment can still be conceptualised by drawing on habitus and discourse. To account for the complexities, however, it is important to take a closer look at the relational, historical, and situational dimensions that define this moment. Butler’s (1999) critique of Bourdieu’s distinction between the internal and external, between the subjective habitus and the objective field is useful here. The implications of her critique relate a) to the fundamental question of the possibility of changing the field and b) to the potential of an actual speech act to affect change.

While I will look at the three dimensions separately here, it is important to remember that they are in fact not separate but interdependent. Also, in my model the relational dimension takes somewhat of a lead role in part due to the functional nature of identification and the role of the Other in instigating a process of identification introduced at the outset of this chapter and expanded on above. According to Butler (2005), identity arises out of the need to attribute action; the need itself only arises out of this attribution being requested by someone else. The narration of self in response to the request is orientated, related towards the request. The origin of identification that leads to a temporarily fixed identity is thus essentially relational.

It is not only this starting point, however, that is defined by relational aspects. The whole narration that follows is defined by the relation between the identity proposer/sender, the person narrating the self in Butler’s terms, and the addressee, the person querying attribution and now ‘listening’ to the narration. Social actors, as Alexander and Mast suggest,

embedded in collective representations and working through symbolic and material means, implicitly orient towards others as if they are actors on a stage seeking identification with their experiences and understandings from their audiences. (2006, p. 2)

This orientation is not as simple, however, as the theatre metaphor would suggest. When an identity is put forward, is performed in Butler’s (1990) terms, it depends on the uptake of the addressee whether the identity works (Blommaert 2005b, p. 68), or as Butler puts it:
Even if morality supplies a set of norms that produce a subject in his or her intelligibility, it also remains a set of norms and rules that a subject must negotiate in a living and reflective way. (2005, p. 10)

This situation raises two main questions: Does the identity proposer/sender have the capabilities to be understood? Does the addressee have the capabilities and the willingness to understand? Related to identity this means: If one cannot make his or her identity understood, he or she cannot perform it (Blommaert 2005b, p. 207). Actions may be misinterpreted. Thus identity is created through a communicative event. It is the result of an interaction between message and uptake. This result is strongly influenced by issues of power: the relative position of power between the entities interacting and projecting their respective identities in the process (Blommaert 2005b, p. 166).—This dimension of the identification process is of particular relevance to case study 3 (chapter 2.3), which addresses issues of voice in journalistic content as well as the actual encounter between journalist and migrant.—Drawing on Bourdieu, Thompson (1991, p. 8) provides an interesting summary of this aspect: “Those who speak must ensure that they are entitled to speak in the circumstances, and those who listen must reckon that those who speak are worthy of attention.” In Bourdieu’s terms an assessment of the situation depends on the level of symbolic power the speaker has in the social field and its subfields:

The position of a given agent in the social space can thus be defined by the position he occupies in the different fields, that is, in the distribution of powers that are active in each of them. (Bourdieu 1991, p. 230)

Entities do not so much assume an identity in a particular situation: Depending on their relative position of power, their symbolic resources, they may be denied their preferred position and may be positioned in another identity. Those in a more powerful position could attempt to reject aspects of, even an entire identity and redefine it—again, a point of particular relevance to the final case study presented in this thesis (chapter 2.3).

Besides the overt power relations between the interacting parties, comprehension, the other relational aspect, is implicitly connected to relations of power. For an identity to function in a particular situation, it has to remain intelligible. What can be understood or comprehended depends on the availability of the appropriate frameworks, to decode a projected identity. This is influenced by the extent to which shared orders of indexicality (Blommaert 2005b, p. 77) exist and are available. This availability does in fact depend on power: in the terms of Foucauldian power/knowledge, it is the power to define the truth, the power to define what is allowed to be said, and the power to draw on or decide which orders of indexicality are applicable in a particular situation. This is highly relevant in the context of migration. I will expand on it below.
as well as in case study three (chapter 2.3). Comprehension can be limited, even fail due to the various parties applying different, incompatible frameworks to a situation—frameworks less defined by the relations of power inherent in a situation, but based on the relation of power each party is situated in within other contexts. This can especially be the case in interaction where the participating entities have a rather distant relation, i.e., little ‘common’ ground in terms of meaning making. Geographic combined with cultural distance is one aspect that can play a role here (ibid, p. 72): “Whenever discourses travel across the globe, what is carried with them is their shape, but their value, meaning, or function do not often travel along.” Thus the further a discourse travels from its source the more difficult it becomes to maintain it (ibid, p. 122).

Discourse formations, frames of reference and orders of indexicality may shift as a discourse reaches different locations. Independently of the positions of power the interacting agents have in a particular encounter, certain frameworks may have been proscribed or suppressed by others and may even have been forgotten. Later on I will return to this issue in the context of immigration coverage. At this point this aspect of geographic and cultural shifts affecting shifts in identity hints at another facet that defines the performance of an identity: the situational context.

Bourdieu’s concept of the social field (1991) again helps explain this dimension. The social field is made up of several overlapping fields. Each field has its own set of rules, frameworks and issues at stake (ibid, p. 230): “One can thus construct a simplified model of the social field as a whole, a model which allows one to plot each agent’s position in all possible spaces of the game”. However, this definition of situations as fields remains limited. Fields may be more appropriate for a type of situation, rather than specific situations. A field of practice needs to be wide enough to be useful as an explanation beyond the specific instance. It also needs to be established to be defined as such. This already hints at the historical element, which I will develop below. Still, by applying the concept of fields of practice in this context, I want to highlight the fact that an agent needs to adopt or rather is being positioned in a variety of identities as he or she moves through various fields of practice and encounters various situations. Moreover, these identities are not necessarily distinct and mutually exclusive. Across the different situations these categories can overlap, their sets of characteristics can be complementary but also contradictory (Haber 1994, p. 121). If an agent does not have sufficient symbolic capital for a particular encounter, if he/she cannot adapt or is not adapted to the situation, the agent cannot be recognised and action will become difficult as Thompson suggests (1991, p. 17): “an individual may not know how to act and may literally be lost for words”.

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The knowledge about how to act, even if it appears to be instinctive, is acquired. Acquiring is a process that happens over time, which leads me to the historical dimension. Identity is historical in two ways, in a particular and general sense. In the particular sense it is historical, because the habitus an individual or entity is assigned in a specific situation is influenced by the history that has led up to this situation. In the general sense it is historical because, as I explained above, to be understood, identities need to conform to certain existing orders of indexicality, fields and categories. Categories of identity are, for instance, gender, ethnic identity, or national identity. Returning to Foucault (Foucault 1995 [1977]) and the example of penalty, it is clear that discourses have a history. Penalty and the identities the actors in that field (e.g., judges, defendants and so forth) are assigned have changed over time. As the discourse around the field changes so does the social field as well as the categorisation and hierarchisation within it. The field has a past, during which it came into existence, developed, and changed. Thus the history of the specific situation, which is also the history of the entities interacting in this situation, and the history of the field of practice come together at a point in the present and generate identity (Thompson 1991, p. 17). However, if those individuals, groups or entities that come together do not share a history, do not share the same orders of indexicality, the issue of whose history, whose field of practice ultimately defines the outcome of the situation, throws the underlying power dynamic into relief.

The historical context as well as the nexus of the personal and the social also accounts for change and development. Identity categories are not incontrovertible, as Butler suggests in her previously mentioned critique of Bourdieu (1999) as well as when she summarises Foucault’s concept of ‘regimes of truth’:

> Although the regime of truth decides in advance what form recognition can take, it does not fully constrain the form. Indeed, decide may be too strong a word, since the regime of truth offers a framework for the scene of recognition, delineating who will qualify as a subject of recognition and offering available norms for the act of recognition….it means only that it is in relation to this framework that recognition takes place or the norms that govern recognition are challenged and transformed. (2005, p. 22)

Butler (1990) suggests that even gender is the result of performance regulated by regimes of truth rather than any biological essence. Identity types are thus open to change. They can even become obsolete or be transformed to such an extent that they become ‘new’ types of identity—though there may be (overpowering) resistance to such change. Changes may occur only very slowly and as a strategic project can be difficult to achieve, though Butler (1999, p. 123, original emphasis) identifies the “exprobriability of the dominant, ‘authorized’ discourse” as a potential strategy.
So far I have conceptualised the process of identification as the result of encounter. I have done so mainly by drawing on the relation between self and Other, Foucault’s concept of discourse and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Butler’s critique of the latter. By developing identification along a historical, a situational and a relational dimension, I highlighted the complex processes that occur when the individuality of an agent is constituted. Before moving on I will summarise my position here: The discourse of identity, as Butler (2005) has suggested, itself fulfils the function to identify, to attribute action to an agent. It makes it possible to delineate between entities as well as ascribe agency to action in general. As such identity gives meaning to and legitimises behaviour, actions, practices as well as relations of power and social order. Ultimately, it becomes physically embodied:

Every social order systematically takes advantage of the disposition of the body and language to function as depositories of deferred thoughts...Symbolic power works partly through the control of other people’s bodies and belief that is given by the collectively recognized capacity to act in various ways on deep-rooted linguistic and muscular patterns of behaviour (Bourdieu 1992, p. 69)

Specific expressions of identity are manifestations of this discourse particular to a specific context. In the manifest expression identity depends on relational as well as situational and historical contexts. Depending on these parameters, identification occurs and identities are performed. The question of agency and the process of identification find their answer and culmination in a moment of encounter. The aspect of power is central to all discourse. It also underpins the parameters of identity formation and can make the performance of an identity less a question of choice than a question of negotiation, struggle and even denial.

Considering the topic of this thesis, I will now develop these general observations about identification to the particular encounter between apparently settled groups living within a set of state borders, often called nations, and migratory groups. After addressing the issue whether nations are in fact a thing of the past, I will examine the discursive nature of the nation in more detail by drawing again on discourse and habitus as well as cultural memory and emotions as two symbolic resources these can draw on.

Claims that national identities are a thing of the past and that the current period could be defined as post-national—a discussion I will return to later on in this chapter as well as expand on in the next—are commonplace. These claims are, however, based on too narrow a definition of national identity. It is built solely on equating national identity with the concept of nationalism, of a state containing one nation, a homogenous people who share essential characteristics and are different from other nations. Even in this sense of nation the argument for a post-national period is difficult to sustain. Appadurai’s (1996, p. 39) assessment seems more appropriate—of
nation states as “embattled”, of destabilised communities and networks being “shot through with the woof of human motion” (1996, pp. 33-34) due to the increase in global movements, i.e., migrations. He does not conclude, however, that this spells the end of the nation state, rather that nationhood still appears to be an aim to be realised for many:

It is possible to say that in many societies the nation and the state have become one another’s project. That is, while nations (or more properly groups with ideas about nationhood) seek to capture or co-opt states and state power, states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood (ibid, p. 39)

In these societies individuals at certain points perform their personal identity as an expression of a collective, national identity—again I will pick up on this point in the following chapter and connect it to an argument about nationalism and cosmopolitanism between Beck (2005b) and Calhoun (2008). However, a collective identity does not always have to be defined as national. For Bourdieu (1991, pp. 229-251) class is one collective identity fundamental to habitus but not necessarily always national in character. The relevance of class can rather be found in its serving as a collective reference point within one system of fields that make up a social field. Regionalism on the other hand is a reference point that positions entire social fields in relation to each other within the social world:

The region and its frontiers (fines) are merely the dead trace of the act of authority which consists in circumscribing the country, the territory (which is also called fines), in imposing the legitimate, known and recognized definition (another sense of finis) of frontiers and territory—in short, the source of legitimate di-vision of the social world. (ibid, p. 222)

For Bourdieu the idea of region, which he equates with ethnicity as well as race, and as becomes clear from the quote above with a territorial state and potentially a nation, is a “performat ive discourse” (ibid, p. 223). Its viability depends on various factors: the authority of the institution which pronounces it; the extent to which this pronunciation chimes with the “objectivity of the group to which it is addressed” (ibid); and whether it is accepted by others outside the group. Conviction and acceptance can be achieved through acts of demonstration. Successful demonstration leads to institutionalisation and objectification. The social world is a space of “permanent struggle to define reality” (ibid, p. 224), “to make and unmake groups” (ibid, p. 221). This also suggests that the precise definition of a group identity may be heavily contested from the inside. Not all people within the boundaries may share it. As Morley suggests in relation to Anderson’s conceptualisation of nations as imagined communities (1983):

Anderson’s notion of the comunicative [sic] community is open to doubt. The boundedness of a given national imagery is one thing; homogeneity within those boundaries is quite another. In the terms already indicated here, we should better look to a process of continual reconstruction than to an accomplished fact. (Morley 2000, p. 165)
Various collective identity discourses may be vying for dominance in this field and yet one identity may emerge as dominant. This point is particularly relevant to the British context, because of the tension between the discourse of a British nation and discourses of Welsh, Scottish, English and Irish nations, a point that I will discuss in the next chapter. For now, it is important to note that a group’s performance of community is based on an assumed shared cultural memory:

> Cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity. The objective manifestations of cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a positive (“We are this”) or in a negative (“That’s our opposite”) sense. (Assmann 1995, p. 130)

Through claiming a shared cultural memory entire groups of people may be referred to or refer to themselves as one entity with a collective identity ascribed to them. An individual may be part of several, even overlapping groups at the same time. Again, depending on a group’s function as well as on the situational, historical and relational aspects of the context, a certain collective identity may be dominant at a particular moment. This is no contradiction to the claim that cultural memory plays a key role in collective identity formation. Various discourses may all claim legitimacy by referring to a shared cultural memory. Cultural memory allows for variance:

> Cultural memory exists in two modes: first in the mode of potentiality of the archive whose accumulated texts, images, and rules of conduct act as a total horizon, and second in the mode of actuality, whereby each contemporary context puts the objectivised meaning into its own perspective, giving it its own relevance. (ibid)

Again depending on relational, situational and historical context an identity discourse based on a shared culture may be expressed differently. Besides being contested some people may not even share in any of the identity discourses in circulation. Either because they do not have to or want to be included or because they are not allowed to and are excluded. Various parameters of an inclusion/exclusion mechanism may determine whether an individual may perform as part of a collective identity (Cederman 2001). This mechanism differs depending on how the nation is conceived. Giesen and Eder have developed an interesting model based on the relationship between the organization, in this case the state understood as a nation, and the individual:

the individualist paradigm which focuses on legal guarantees for the rational pursuit of individual interests, the political paradigm which puts forward the ideal of participation of all in public debates, and the collective identity paradigm which links citizenship to a common culture or tradition. (2001, p. 4, original emphasis)

So, for instance, in the first and second paradigm exclusion can take the form of administrative exclusion, for instance by not granting citizenship. In the third paradigm it can take the form of cultural exclusion, a perception that a certain way of life, following certain traditions does not
conform to the dominant collective identity discourse. While the prior exclusion mechanism can at times be overcome, the latter form of exclusion shows aspects of the more narrow formulation of a nation as a people sharing essential characteristics. The difference today is that it is often framed in terms of behaviour that could be changed rather than essence that is fixed, an aspect that will be discussed in relation to Britain as a multicultural nation state in the next chapter. The parameters of these inclusion/exclusion processes are often unacknowledged and implicit, even, as Ahmed argues, emotional:

the nation becomes the object of love precisely by associating the proximity with other with loss, injury and theft…Emotions provide a script, certainly: you become the ‘you’ if you accept the invitation to align yourself with the nation, and against those others who threaten to take the nation away. (2004b, p. 12)

To Ahmed, however, emotions are neither the result of bodily sensation nor of cognition. They do not come from the inside as the psychoanalytical ‘inside out’ model would suggest. She acknowledges that her ideas about emotion are closer to the anthropological and sociological ‘outside in’ model: emotions not as “psychological state, but a social and cultural practice” (ibid, p. 9). Still, she only accepts this model to an extent. Rather, for her emotions are the result of contact between objects. They are not dependent on the nature of the object but on the nature of the contact:

So emotions are not simply something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others. (ibid, p. 10)

Ahmed does not only reiterate the importance of encounter, the moment of contact for the process of identification, her emphasis on its emotional dimension raises another important issue: the difficulty to overcome established identity positions. As discussed before in relation to Bourdieu, though habitus is potentially open to change, how such change occurs is unclear. In any case it may not occur easily, neither on its own over time nor through intentional strategy (Butler 1999). Bringing in emotion adds another layer of complexity, of entrenching identity positions. Even if emotions are the result of social and cultural practice, i.e., discursive, they are indicative of the strength, a potential dominance and possibly an almost inescapable hold of an identity discourses in certain moments of encounter. This could explain that claims to membership in a group based on the individualist or political paradigm may be rejected if a stronger collective identity paradigm is also in play (Giesen and Eder 2001), as the latter is more likely to generate an emotional attachment—a point relevant in all case studies but of particular relevance in relation to the analysis of EU migration (Chapter 2.2).
I will now move from habitus being inscribed in the hexis of human beings to it being inscribed in the kinds of texts represented by television news, thus move to the relationship between identification and mediation introduced at the outset by quoting Silverstone (2002). As suggested above identity, in this case national identity is continually constructed rather than permanently fixed (cf. Derrida 1998; Giesen 1998; Hall 1992). Because this construction involves questions of power related to the level of influence individuals or groups have on the process, identity is not merely a neutral construct but a discourse (Foucault 1995 [1977]). As I have discussed here, a Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse also implies that no one is ultimately in charge (ibid p. 27): the discursive formation positions and at the same time is perpetuated, challenged, reinforced and possibly even shifted by all those within its reach. However, even without ultimate control some wield more influence and power than others. The mass media is among those with some degree of influence.

**Mediation, Journalism and the Nation**

In the article above definition of mediation is taken from, Silverstone (2002, p. 761) develops an argument about how the processes of mediation evoke various perceptions of otherness and how these have repercussions for “our common humanity” and an “ethics of responsibility and care” towards the other in everyday life. Sharing the concern of Chouliaraki, who of course acknowledges Silverstone’s contribution to her own thinking, Silverstone points to mediated distance as an area of particular concern:

> Mediated distance...continually swings between incorporation (that is denial of both difference and distance) or annihilation (that is denial of both a common humanity and closeness). In both cases the other appears on our screens, and therefore, on the face of it, is seen and seen to be present. Yet in both cases the possibility of approaching that otherness with any degree of comprehension and sensibility is, with obvious individual exceptions, fundamentally compromised. (ibid, p. 770)

What Silverstone takes as given is the two points, the two subjects between which distance opens up. I will draw on some of his other work in relation to the medium of television later on in this section to develop processes of mediation involved in establishing these points. However, I will start out with briefly looking at the role of mass media in this process in general.

In *Nationalism and Social Communication* Deutsch (1966 [1953], p. 181) identified mass communication as one of the key areas that advance a process of forming a collective, national unit. Deutsch’s analysis of the relationship between mass communication and national identity formation has been developed by many scholars since then (cf. Schlesinger 2000 for a summary of this development). I have already mentioned Anderson’s conceptualisation of nations as
imagined communities. His concept captures the main aspects of this relationship rather appropriately:

It [the nation] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion...In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even those) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. (2006 [1983], p. 6, original emphasis)

In modern nation states forms of mass media provide the means of connecting individuals into a more or less coherent whole across large distances. Anderson’s interest is historic. His concern is with the initial emergence of the modern nation state in the 18th and 19th century. Thus he focuses on the printed word. My concern is with the maintenance of already existing imagined communities in the contemporary world, because as Schlesinger (1991, p. 165) points out “we should better look to a process of continual reconstruction than to an accomplished fact.” Indeed among many other scholars, drawing on Scannell (1989) Morley makes a strong case for television a being key to this maintenance function.

National broadcasting can...create a sense of unity—and of corresponding boundaries around the nation; it can link the peripheral to the centre; turn previously exclusive social events into mass experiences; and, above all, it penetrates the domestic sphere, linking the national public into the private lives of its citizens, through the creation of both sacred and quotidian moments of national communion. (2000, p. 107)

Morley’s use of the term ‘communion’ picks up on a key aspect of Anderson’s concept of the imagined community and thus highlights the structural function of the medium. The term implies the idea of a community established through individual, yet similar and hence shared experience rather than direct encounter. Similar to the consumption of the Eucharist during Catholic Mass, certain in the knowledge that others are watching, too, the ritual of consuming national broadcasting allows an individual to imagine being part of a community without necessarily knowing all of its other members. Morley’s quote highlights the effects of national broadcasting in structural terms. The content of broadcasting almost appears to take on a secondary role—or at least as Scannell suggests national broadcasting is more than the sum of the content of its programmes,

but a set of relationships, a communicative ethos, that registers the quality and manner of social intercourse between institutions and audiences and, beyond that, the expressive idioms of public and private life. (1989, p. 153)

It is the experience of the broadcast that matters, too. However, it is the content that provides the ‘sacred and quotidian moments’ Morley writes of and which are the focus of this research.
Silverstone’s (1994) threefold relationship between the individual and television not only captures the process of mediation but also acknowledges the importance of the latter element, content, as well as the former, the act of watching or listening. In *Television and Everyday Life* he defines this relationship thus:

Television as object: the screen providing the focus of our daily rituals and the frame for the limited transcendence—the suspension of disbelief—which marks our excursions from the profane routines of the daily grind into the sacred routines of schedules and programmes.

Television as medium: extending our reach and our security in a world of information, locking us into a network of time-space relations, both local and global, domestic and national, which threaten to overwhelm us but also to provide the basis for our claims for citizenship or membership of community and neighbourhood. Television as entertainer and informer: providing in its genres and its narrative stimulation and disturbance, peace and reassurance, and offering within their own order an expression and a reinforcement of the containing temporalities of the everyday. (1994, p. 19)

In the third aspect, Silverstone brings content back into the equation and it is with content where my focus lies: the information provided by a particular genre of television, television news. This information is important in its own right, because it defines the characteristics of the community; but it is important to stress that only if all three aspects come together can it have the effect of evoking an imagined (potentially national) community.

To go into more detail about how a text relates to a theoretical spectator and how it can be analysed, I want to bring in Fairclough (1995, p. 58). He proposes that a text as three main functions—ideational, interpersonal, and textual—that relate to discursive constructions of relations, identities and representations Fairclough also calls systems of knowledge (ibid, p.55). Fairclough is positioned within traditions of semiosis and the linguistic turn in the humanities—the concept that verbal as well as non-verbal languages represent sign systems (cf. de Saussure 1983 [1916]). De Saussure’s theory of semiosis suggests that a sign consists of two elements a signifier and a signified. The signifier is a word or symbol that represents the signified, e.g., a thing, idea or action; the relationship between the two elements is arbitrary. The consequence of this arbitrary relationship is highlighted by Hall:

There is no simple relationship of reflection, imitation or one-to-one correspondence between language and the real world. The world is not accurately reflected in the mirror of language. Language does not work like a mirror. Meaning is produced within language, in and through various representational systems which, for convenience, we call ‘languages’. Meaning is produced by the practice, the ‘work’, of representation. It is constructed through signify — i.e. meaning-producing –practices. (1997, p. 29)

These meaning-producing practices are discursive, i.e., suffused with issues of power as developed previously in relation to Foucault and Fairclough’s use of the term ‘systems of knowledge’ for the concept of representation. However, how individual members of the
audience as well as myself interpret content is an aspect that is neither fully addressed by Silverstone’s nor by Fairclough’s structural formulations here. However, it is especially the latter that falls under Scannell’s (1989, pp. 157-158) critique of the “ideological effects” thesis and a “politics of representation” he ascribes to Stuart Hall and Roland Barthes but could also apply to Fairclough, as he operates in the same tradition. Scannell considers this approach as “one-dimensional” and as one that “systematically misunderstands and misrecognizes its object”, because it does not consider history and starts from an analytical position that predetermines the outcome. By drawing on Allan (1998) as well as Gerbner et al. (1994) I will respond to Scannell here. Allan engages with Scannell’s as well as other authors’ criticism when discussing hegemonic discourse in television news in relation to Hall’s Encoding/Decoding model (1980):

From this vantage point, the communicative strategies utilized in televisual news to construct a sense of the very taken-for-grantedness of hegemony may be shown to be structuring ‘in dominance’ what is, at least in principle, a polysemic text. (Allan 1998, p. 116)

Allan’s argument about structural impact rather than the specific effect of an individual piece of content bears parallels to the cultivation model that focuses “on the consequences of exposure to its recurrent patterns of stories, images, and messages” (Gerbner et al. 1994, p. 37). While taking into account viewing habits as well as a wide set of parameters that influence how individuals may interpret the “facts” of a specific programme, the model suggests that the “repetitive lessons we learn from television…are likely to become the basis for a broader world view” (p. 30). Cultivation methods move from forms of content analysis to survey audience research. In the case of this thesis, I limit myself to content to suggest a “taken-for-grantedness” (Allan 1998, p. 116) without denying the polysemy of the text, the potential of different interpretations and a spectrum of broader world views.

So far I have addressed the process of mediation and the relationship between the individual and broadcasting: the encounter with broadcasting turns the individual into a member of an imagined group. This group, however, is not necessarily a nation. After all, Silverstone’s ‘membership of community and neighbourhood’ comes without the attribute national attached. Generally, different elements of broadcasting might evoke different imagined communities and thus not necessarily a national identity. For instance, Mikos (2009, p. 112) referring to drama and documentary serials emphasises their importance in shaping not group belonging at all but personal identity: “Local and national identities have no more than secondary importance.” In a similar vein, Rosie et al. (2006, p. 330) caution against an automatic interpretation of a deictic expression such as ‘we’ as an evocation of the national. And Schlesinger (1991, p. 165) warns against an expectation of homogeneity in terms of the community contained within its imagined
boundaries, hence his own emphasis on continual reconstruction. Also, Chan and McIntyre (2002, p. xx) raise a series of questions in relation to the relevance of the national in mass communication in the context of globalization, that includes the fundamental question of whether the “nation state is losing its relevancy [sic]”. As previously cited, Wiley proposes an interesting research strategy that addresses these concerns:

we need not assume that we are always already “in” nationally organized space, that the nationality of a particular social space is necessarily its most salient characteristic, or that nationally defined spaces today are national in the same way as they were in the past. Instead, we can turn these assumptions into questions about the changing role played by logics of nationality—questions that have been made more complicated and more pressing by the acceleration of globalization. (2004, p. 93)

Hence, even though the national may only have limited or no importance and may only be “a component of the ideological background” (Mikos 2009, p. 113) in relation to specific content, it remains important to investigate if, when and how logics of nationality continue to apply. Two structural relationships specific to the data analysed here mean that such a logic is never too far from the foreground: one, the relationship between the nation manifest in the state and broadcasting in the form of public service broadcasting (PSB) in the UK and two, the particular role of news within such broadcasting.

The connection between the nation manifest in the state and broadcasting is frequently closer than between the state and other forms of media such as printed media. Though the argument to justify this connection was and is often made in terms of the technological and the limited resource, the scarcity of the broadcasting signal, Uricchio (2009, p. 62) points out that this notion of “scarcity was constructed and deployed in the service of the period’s larger hegemonic goals”. In fact Uricchio suggests that this connection can entail some form of control of the state over broadcasting, precisely because of its potential to reach and thus potential to project a community, to support “the formation of an ideologically coherent national public” (ibid). Price, too, (1995, p. 49) calls attention to this characteristic by defining broadcasting as an ‘instrument of imagination’ and argues that “Control over at least some of the instruments of imagination becomes an attribute of [state] sovereignty.” This does not necessarily require close state control of content, but a structural set-up of the sector with some form of state involvement that results in an inherent affirmation of the national. It would lead too far here to go into detail of the history of broadcasting and particularly of television in the UK. Instead I will briefly reflect on how the concept of PSB as it has developed and continues to exist in this country can be defined as national broadcasting in Morley’s terms.
Scannell and Cardiff (1991, p. 6) in their analysis of the early developments that shaped the broadcasting sector in the UK highlight how “the definition of broadcasting as a public utility to be developed as a national service in the public interest came from the state”. The state intended to maintain indirect control through a licensing process: In accordance with the license broadcasters had certain responsibilities to fulfil and were “answerable for the conduct of the service to that state department” (ibid) that issued the license. As the only broadcaster in the UK the BBC was synonymous with PSB until the 1950s. Today there are five main terrestrial television channels with a PSB remit: BBC1, BBC2, ITV1, Channel 4, and Five. The concept of indirect control has survived to this day in the form of Ofcom and the BBC Trust, institutions that are meant to keep the state and more specifically the government at arm’s length from the day-to-day running of public service broadcasting while ensuring that these broadcasters offer a public service—in the case of Ofcom this control also applies to broadcasters without PSB remit. This distinction between state and government is important because, for one, it helps define what might actually constitute public service broadcasting and, additionally, its highlights its national characteristic.

The precise boundaries of what is and what is not public service in terms of content are difficult to define. Sure, PSB has the task of providing programming that ‘educates, informs and entertains’. Though the definition and relative weighting of the three elements and their specific meaning has changed over time, this triad of content goes all the way back to John Reith, the first general manager and later first director general of the BBC, and can still be traced to this day (Crisell 2002, p. 28). In the Communications Act 2003, for instance, which established the current regulatory set up of the whole PSB sector in the UK, this understanding is still clearly evident. Under subsection 6 in part 3, chapter 4 of the Act a series of points—a) through j) (pp. 235-236)—serve as contemporary guidelines in this matter. Point a) explicitly refers to the “dissemination of information and for the provision of education and entertainment”. It is not necessary to provide a closer definition of PSB content here beyond that news as one form of content is specifically mentioned under c), an aspect I will come back to. More important is the intended effect that this service is supposed to deliver. Again in reference to the early years of British broadcasting Scannell and Cardiff define this effect when they describe how the audience was imagined by the early broadcasters:

The ‘listener-in’ was recognized as carrying a range of social and cultural needs and interests, as having domestic and social responsibilities both in the home and the local community; and beyond that as having a role to play—a more public role as citizen—in the larger community of public affairs and national life. (1991, p. 15)
Focussing on the latter aspect, I argue that the one aim of public service programming is to integrate the individual into wider society, into the public. As such public service broadcasting does not merely broadcast to the public it becomes a site where the public is evoked as an imagined community. Morley cites Hall (1993, p. 32) to move from mere evocation to actual constitution and puts it more explicitly in national terms:

In extension of this argument Stuart Hall argues that the BBC did not in any way simply reflect the make-up of a pre-existing nation, but rather was “an instrument, an apparatus, a 'machine' through which the nation was constituted. It produced the nation which it addressed: it constituted its audience by the ways in which it represented them.” (Morley 2000, p. 108)

Hall postulates a link that makes the nation not just the project but the product of public service broadcasting in its early phase. Hall also moves from structural set-up of PSB to its content: the nation was constituted through being addressed by and represented in content. This echoes the point raised above in relation to the interdependence of the act of watching or listening to a broadcast and its content. Now the issue is the interdependence of organisational structure and content. Schlesinger discusses this question in reference to Gellner's conceptualisation of media in the context of nation state formation. Using the example of a hypothetical National Broadcasting Corporation Schlesinger wonders at what point a media culture can still be considered national without taking content into consideration:

Say we increase the imports to 90 per cent ..., and the privatizing economy measures of the national government constrain the National Nightly News to become essentially a relay station for the international news agencies. Could the position be sustained that only media mattered but the message did not? Presumably not. (1991, p. 162)

Criteria set out in the Communications Act 2003 in relation to PSB content reflect Schlesinger’s assessment. To represent and address the British public, the British nation in its content is still a key concern, to quote the above cited subsection of the act:

6) A manner of fulfilling the purposes of public service television broadcasting in the United Kingdom is compatible with this subsection if it ensures i)...that [its programmes] reflect the lives and concerns of different communities and cultural interests and traditions within the United Kingdom, and locally in different parts of the United Kingdom; (pp. 235-236)

With its emphasis on diversity this formulation of public may have changed from that of the early phase of PSB, but as Seaton (2010, p. 303) argues in reference to the BBC: “metabolizing the nation has to be continually reinvented.” As times change every new incarnation maintains an ultimate affirmation of the United Kingdom as a coherent unit. In its current form, I would argue, it reflects the multinational and multicultural contemporary British nation discourse described in the following chapter. It also signals my shifting from PSB content in general to the particular content under investigation here. I have already mentioned that journalistic content in
terms of news and current affairs is specifically mentioned in the 2003 act. It is not the only form of content that is cited; among others “drama, comedy and music” (point b) receive mentions as well. However, in difference to these other forms of content news and current affair are explicitly tasked with a particular purpose that is specific to the argument here. Under c) the act states:

that those services (taken together) provide, to the extent that is appropriate for facilitating civic understanding and fair and well-informed debate on news and current affairs, a comprehensive and authoritative coverage of news and current affairs in, and in the different parts of, the United Kingdom and from around the world (p.235)

‘Civic understanding’ specifically evokes the audience not just as members of the British nation but as citizens of the British nation state, the United Kingdom.—Granted, the sentence acknowledges that the United Kingdom is made up of ‘different parts’ and that it is located within ‘the world’; but as the only specifically named unit it provides the focal point that establishes the alternative spaces on the local/regional and the global level.—Moreover, ‘civic understanding’ and ‘well informed debate’ can be read as a reminders of the specific role news and current affairs are considered to play in maintaining the effective function of news in a modern Western state. Habermas’ (1989 [1962]) account of the transformation of state and government through the development of a public sphere from the early onwards accords the emerging political press some importance. Referring to the 1st issue of the Craftsman in 1726, he writes:

the press was for the first time established as a genuinely critical organ of a public engaged in critical political debate: as the fourth estate.

Thus raised to the status of an institution, the ongoing commentary on and criticism of the Crown’s actions and the Parliament’s decision transformed a public authority now being called before the forum of the public. (ibid, p. 60)

Of course, Habermas also suggests that over time the press sector—in the wider sense of political coverage on any medium whether press or broadcast—has changed in various aspects, in particular through capitalist commodification of the sector that have compromised and distorted its fourth estate function. In this context public service broadcasting is identified as an attempt at the continuing provision of this function by Habermas (ibid pp. 187-188) as well as others, such as Curran, whose third-way model of the media sector in a democratic societies centres on public service media:

The core [public service] media sector is where people come together to engage in a reciprocal debate about the management of society….It gives prominence to public affairs. (2002, p. 245)
Neither suggests that existing PSB news and current affairs programming necessarily rises to this
demand; nor is the wider debate about whether the news media in general and PSB news in
particular manages to do so relevant here (cf. Hargreaves and Thomas 2002, pp. 16-23 for a
summary of this debate). However, as the definition of PSB and the special role identified for
news and current affairs within it in the Communications Act 2003 indicates, to rise to this
challenge remains its aspiration.

One question remains: How to define ‘news and current affairs’ for the purpose of this thesis?
News and current affairs are representations of phenomena interpreted by professionals in
relation to developing sets of journalistic standards and practices for the distribution to
audiences—as Lewis (1991, p. 123) puts it “news is…a structure of highly coded messages,
shaped by a complex series of codes that derive from economic and ideological conditions of its
production”. The classification of these standards and practices, ‘the conditions of production’ as
journalistic is meant to distinguish them from other sets in relation to which phenomena are
transformed into representations, for instance, artistic sets. Not that these are mutually exclusive,
but they differ in how they structure engagement with phenomena as well as how to prioritise
certain aspects of form and function of their representation. To give an example, the concept of
impartiality embodied as ‘special impartiality requirements’ in the part 3, chapter 4, subsection
320 of the Communications Act 2003 guide the engagement with, the journalistic practice of
PSB journalists when they encounter certain phenomena, according to the act “(a) matters of
political or industrial controversy; and (b) matters relating to current public policy” (p. 284). That
journalists approach these matters in the first place is part of professional practice as it has
developed, related to the function of news and current affairs within PSB as well as the threefold
relationship developed by Silverstone between viewer and television, cited above.

Silverstone’s (1994, p. 19) analysis of the link between viewer and the content of television
broadcasts suggests that television has the ability to provide “in its genres and its narrative
stimulation and disturbance, an expression and a reinforcement of the containing temporalities
of the everyday” in general. Above, in the light of Silverstone’s argument I developed how PSB
and in particular ‘news and current affairs’ programming could be defined as national
broadcasting in Morley’s (2000, p. 107) terms, hence they establish an everyday that not
necessarily at all times but at a fundamental level could be defined as national. Debating the
question as to how much of the programming content would in fact have to be national,
Schlesinger (1991, p. 162) singles out “the National Nightly News” indicating the status of this
type of programme as a kind of last bastion of what defines a broadcaster as national and gives it
prominence within the wider field of news and current affairs. In Schlesinger this status is only implied in the way he sets up his hypothetical example. Scannell on the other hand, explicitly argues for its prominence:

News is part of the fabric of days for us. In the course of the day it is constantly, routinely updated…News marks the structure of days, bringing it to an eventful climax with the main news nightly…What is the news about? It is about in the world. It is about the world….News for us is world-disclosing. In its busyness and concern it reveals the ways of the world, the worldliness of the world. (1996, p. 161, original emphasis),

Scannell’s assessment captures the nightly television news as object, medium, and content. More so than rolling news or forms of on-demand news, the nightly news bulletin as object provides a climax, a self-contained, definitive—at least for one day—summary of the world and the viewers place within it. Moreover, because of its regular frequency, what Scannell discusses as dailiness—though it is more than its daily occurrence but also its fixed place in the schedule that this encapsulates—it evokes an imagined community even more forcefully, as each viewer could imagine him- or herself watching the news simultaneously with other members of the community. To Ellis this makes scheduling

the locus of power in television, the mechanism whereby demographic speculations are turned into a viewing experience. And it is more than that as well, for any schedule contains the distillation of the past history of the channel, of national broadcasting as a whole, and of the particular habits of national life. (2000, p. 134)

However, Ellis (ibid, p. 72) also proposes that we now live an “era of availability”. Many more television channels than in the past as well as new media forms such as the Web have made more information available; information is no longer scarce. As a consequence, Ellis notes the power of individual programmes and their place in the schedule is diminishing as the “audience has fragmented, and television programmes can no longer claim, as they could in the era of scarcity, that they were definitive”. In light of these developments Blondheim and Liebes (2009) have raised the question whether the connection between television news and the nation has come to an end, echoing the questions raised by Chan and McIntyre (2002, p. xx) in relations to mass communication in general. At least in reference to the situation in the United States Blondheim and Liebes answer it in the affirmative. They connect their argument not only to the challenge new sources of information pose to the position of the nightly news but to the debate about the continued relevance of the nation these bulletins stand for:

Globalization from without, and fragmentation from within, shattered the nation as the ultimate unit of social organization….National networks, and particularly their news operations, were pushed to the margins of a new media ecology focused on the parallel poles of the ecumenical and the microparticular (2009, p. 190)
Focussing on television news bulletins, Blondheim and Liebes also argue that the ability of television to work as a medium of integration is diminishing, as “the new TV—particularly “on-demand”—is constructing the viewer as a private consumer while undermining television’s public role”. Ellis, on the other hand, while accepting that television to an extent “promotes consumerism” suggests a continued importance of television as a medium of integrative force:

This is television’s new role in the era of multiplying consumer choice and escalating social difference and antagonism….It now plays its part as one of the social institutions which try to reconcile the divisions that come with differences. … It also provides the experience of witness, giving modern citizens a sense of complicity with all kinds of events in their contemporary world. (2000, p. 72)

So in difference to Blondheim and Liebes, Ellis proposes that television as a medium still has a public role, the role of mediating this new era, this age of uncertainty as he calls it and reassure the viewer of his or her place within it. Research by Hargreaves and Thomas (2002, p. 44) into the state of television news in Britain at the beginning of the 21st century provides evidence for Ellis hypotheses—at least on a numerical level. While survey evidence suggests that “television news is now the only news medium available, used, trusted and valued across the whole of British society”, the relevance of the main news bulletins is in decline. Audience numbers for these bulletins had gone down by 10 percent between 1994 and the publication of their report (ibid, p. 11). Interestingly, since then the decline has been somewhat halted. According to figures cited by Stewart Purvis (2010), Ofcom Partner for Content and Standards, in a speech at the BBC, viewing numbers for the flagship news bulletins on PSB have stabilised since 2004—with the BBC 1 News at Ten the most popular. Not only have the flagship news bulletins maintained their audiences, but Purvis also claimed that “these programmes remain the main source of news for most of the population”. Though the nightly news may be challenged from other types of news media, this continuing relevance of these flagship news bulletins means that they remain an important field for research—and not just in terms of their position in the schedule or as rituals in the viewers everyday lives, but also in terms of the content with which they try to explain this age of uncertainty.

Conclusion
In the preceding chapter I have developed a theoretical framework within which I will explore journalistic content in the following chapters. This approach is focussed on content and yet I do not deny the importance of the fields of production and reception: The content of news, the news as text is the outcome of a complex process of production, in which a journalist or a team of journalists is working within a newsroom environment as well as the overall structure of the media industry and its position within society. The latter two aspects I have addressed; the
former will be highlighted further in the following chapter as well as in case study of chapter 2.3. Additionally, I fully acknowledge that a text’s reception by an individual member of the audience can be an equally complex process not only involving diverse interpretations but also uses of news content (Gerbner et al. 1994; cf. Hall 1980; Katz and Lazarsfeld 2006 [1955]; Madianou 2009; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Morley 1980, to name a few of these approaches). The limitations of my approach I have just pointed explicitly towards have of course been implicit in the way I have set developed my theoretical framework in the chapter. It has been my intention over the course of this chapter to set a number of contexts, in which to position the data at the centre of my analysis. News programmes do not occur in isolation. Just like any other discursive practice they are situated within various levels of context, “from the infinitely small to the infinitely big” (Blommaert 2005b, p. 40). However, not all of these contexts are equally relevant, and researchers make conscious and unconscious, at times problematic decisions about which contexts they take into account in their discourse analysis (ibid, p. 50). In the preceding chapter I have positioned this study within two diachronic contexts: a theoretical context—identification as the outcome of discursively structured encounter with an/the Other and the mediation of this encounter through television news; the latter aspect also provides the second, a historical context and institutional context—the relationship between journalism and society, specifically PSB in the UK and the position of the nightly news bulletin. In the following chapter I will add to the historical context by discussing the question whether national is actually an appropriate attribute for the UK. These contexts not only position the data, they are necessary to follow my interpretation and critique of journalistic content. Thus they also position me, that is my own ideological position. In part this can also be taken as my response to Scannell’s critique (1989) of an ideological effects approach.
1.2. Journalism, the Nation and Migration

In 2010 for the first time in a UK general election, the candidates for Prime Minster from the three major parties, Gordon Brown for Labour, David Cameron for the Conservatives and Nick Clegg for the Liberal-Democrats, faced each other in a series of television debates in front of a carefully selected audience supposed to represent the British electorate. After opening statements by each of the candidates—again—carefully selected members of the audience posed—again—carefully selected questions to the panel. The reasons for putting such emphasis on the aspect of selection, I will return to later on in this chapter. At this point, I will continue by quoting one of these questions. Through a close analysis of it as well as the candidates’ responses to it, I intend to highlight some of the key themes and concepts not developed so far that I have drawn on in developing the title of this thesis: The State of the Nation—Television News and the Politics of Migration.

Incidentally, the question of concern here is the very first question from the very first debate which was broadcast live on ITV 1 on 15 April 2010. One of the regular presenters of ITV 1 News, Alastair Stewart, moderated the event. To begin the candidate-audience interaction, Stewart called on one Gerard Oliver. Oliver, according to the moderator a retired toxicologist from Cheshire, asked the candidates: “Good evening. What key elements for a fair, workable immigration policy need to be put in place to actually make it work effectively?”

The obvious point of connection between Oliver’s question and the topic of this thesis can of course be found in the fact that both are about migration. However, this is merely a starting point and the relevance runs much deeper than surface-level. Oliver did more than mention migration. The way he phrased his question indicates a set of assumptions that begins to discursively position the phenomenon of the movement of people across space—begins, because it is only in the responses from the candidates that the discursive framework of this phenomenon is revealed more fully. To start with Oliver’s question, it is the term ‘immigration’ that begins to define the phenomenon by defining and thus producing the space, to use Lefebvre’s term (1991 [1974]), through which people move not as an open space, as the term ‘migration’ would suggest, but as bounded spaces, as territories. When migrants cross these boundaries they become inmigrants. These bounded spaces are defined further, as ‘immigration’ denotes a specific direction of movement: from a space that is defined as outside to a bounded space that is defined as inside. Combining the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘policy’ introduces another definitional degree. Now, the inside space is defined not only as bounded but also as controlled. It is turned into an administrative unit within which policy is to be enforced. The
aspect of enforcement, of the legitimate application of force within it, allows defining this territory as a state in Weberian terms:

a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory...The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. (Weber 1948 [1918], p. 78, original emphasis)

To reiterate: Oliver defines the phenomenon of migration as a movement from a generic outside space to a specific bounded and controlled inside space, a state territory. Considering the addressees of the question, candidates for the office of Prime Minster, suggests that Oliver assigns responsibility for policy implementation to the British Prime Minister and his government. This allows to draw the conclusion that Oliver’s question produces a specific space, the British state. It would be premature to make further inferences about the nature of the British state—if for instance, it could be characterised as national. As Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 83) point out, a territorial state is not necessarily a nation state. There is little in Oliver’s question that goes beyond the level of a territorial definition. Further definition of the state will have to wait until the analysis of the candidates’ responses later on in this chapter. The next analytical step, however, turns towards the overt content of Oliver’s query.

By posing the question, Oliver suggests that the current immigration policy does not work effectively. His expectation that the future Prime Minister do something about it, also suggests that Oliver considers this state of affairs to be problematic. In other words, he offers a set of definitions: migration as immigration and space as divided into a generic outside space in difference to a specific inside state territory; he also offers a diagnosis of a situation, immigration policy as problematic; and asks the candidates for a solution, a remedy to the situation. However, it is important to note here that he casts the situation and not the phenomenon as problematic. This is an important distinction that I will come back to at various points of the thesis. Oliver defines migration as immigration, but does not offer a value judgement on immigration itself. The problem he diagnoses is not with immigration, but with immigration policy, i.e., the way government handles immigration. His suggestions that there should be a “fair, workable immigration policy” that will “work effectively” do not in themselves allow drawing a conclusion on his opinion about immigration. Fair to whom or to what? Effective in achieving what outcome? If Oliver had given an indication as to how he believes these questions could or should be answered, how fairness and effectiveness could be judged, the situation would be different. However, he does not supply any such points of reference. Once Oliver had posed the question, the terms and targets of fairness and effectiveness were open to the interpretation of the three candidates.
The format of the debate allowed for each candidate to give a response to an audience question first, before they could engage with the other candidates directly. It is worth quoting these initial responses at length here, as they not only indicate the candidates’ lines of interpretation of Oliver’s question but also develop the definitional layers of space and state.

Gordon Brown, who went first said:

You know, I’ve heard the concerns around the country. I’ve been listening to people. I know people feel there are pressures because of immigration. That’s why we want to control and manage immigration. And I when I became Prime Minister, I did a number of things. First, I introduced a points system so no unskilled worker from outside the European Union can come to Britain now. I also said that jobs had to be advertised in Jobcentres where there were skills that there were shortages of that we needed people in this country. I then said we’re going to look at all the range of occupations where people come from abroad. I talked to a chef the other day who was training. I said in future, when we do it, there’ll be no chefs allowed in from outside the European Union. Then I talked to some care assistants — no care assistants come in from outside the European Union. We are a tolerant, we are a diverse country, but the controls on migration that I’m introducing and I will see go further are the right controls, the right policy for Britain.

David Cameron, second to respond, said:

Gerard, what I would say is that immigration is simply too high at the moment. It has been these last ten years, and it does need to come down. I think the pressures that we’ve put on housing and health and education have been too great. If you look at the — what’s happening with immigration, the difference between the amount of people going to live overseas and those coming here, it’s been often as high as 200,000. That’s equivalent to two million across a decade. It’s too much. I want us to bring immigration down so it is in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands. How would we do that? I think we need to have not just a points system, but also a limit on migration when people are coming from outside the European Union for economic reasons. I also think when new countries join the European Union, that actually we should have transitional controls so they can’t all come here at once. It’s been too high these last few years, and I would dearly love to get it down to the levels it was in the past so it is no longer an issue in our politics as it wasn’t in the past.

And finally Nick Clegg concluded the opening round by saying:

Gerard, you talked about a fair, workable immigration system. That’s exactly what I want. What’s happened over the last several years is almost precisely the reverse. You have had lots and lots of tough talking about immigration from both Conservative and Labour governments, and complete chaos in the actual administration of the system. It was a Conservative government that removed the exit controls so we knew who was leaving as well as who was coming in. It’s what the Labour government followed up on as well. What I think we need to do is, firstly, make sure we restore those exit controls, so we have borders so we know exactly who is coming in but also when they are supposed to leave. The second thing I would do is this. At the moment under the immigration system, if you want to come and work in this country, you have to show two things: firstly, that you’ve got a sponsor who is sponsoring your arrival in this country, and secondly, that there is a job for you to do. I want to add a third element: that you also only go to a place, to a region, where you are needed. So that we only send immigrants to those places where they can be coped [sic].
In their responses all three candidates accept Oliver’s definition of immigration and the definition of space this entails. Though Cameron and Clegg acknowledge that migration can also occur in the opposite direction, i.e., from the inside to the outside, this does not question the underlying division of space into bounded territories. Clegg’s reference on exit controls also implies a specific emphasis on boundaries in the context of state formation that will be picked up later. Moreover, Brown and Clegg explicitly evoke the inside space that is only implied in the question by first calling it “the country” and later in Brown’s case “Britain”. All three also accept the responsibility Oliver ascribed to them and suggest that they have the power to do something about the problem—though it is worth pointing out that both Brown and Cameron reference another administrative, quasi-state space, the European Union (EU). In terms of spatial definition the EU indicates that the outside space can be differentiated into three spatial categories: EU space, “new countries joining the EU” and outside-EU space. It can also be read as an implied acknowledgement of the limits of their power, aspects I will come back to later. Spatially then, the three candidates share a similar understanding of space and migration with Oliver. However, they differ from Oliver in another important aspect: their definition of what actually constitutes the problem.

All three—though Brown and Cameron more so than Clegg—shift the focus of Oliver’s diagnosis from immigration policy to immigration itself. Also, all three decide to interpret the measurement of fairness and effectiveness, left open by Oliver, in a single direction. The pressure Brown and Cameron mention towards the beginning of their respective responses is in their view directly caused by immigration not by immigration policy. They do return to the policy aspect, but only after asserting immigration as the actual problem. Clegg’s response, on the other hand, remains focussed on policy. In fact, he even challenges Brown’s and Cameron’s shift in focus. Their responses could be taken as exactly the kinds of “tough talking on immigration” Clegg has in mind. However, though Clegg avoids joining in their tough talk, he, too, interprets Oliver’s question along the same lines as his colleagues: fairness and effectiveness of policy are to be measured by their impact on an Us evoked by the use We by all three. Brown merits a closer look in this respect.

For one, by being the first to respond Brown sets the parameters against which the other two can be measured. As Clegg’s response indicates, Brown’s co-debaters could have challenged him immediately had they wanted to do so—even within the constricted format of the debate. Also, in his response Brown moves beyond an unspecified We and explicitly relates it to Britain as well as a specific set of people. Finally, the relationship between these two elements—Britain and
these people—as presented by Brown, hints at a further characteristic of the state space introduced by Oliver. These people are defined in difference to another set of people. On the one hand, *these* people are the people that Brown listened to and who feel the pressure caused by immigration. On the other hand, there are *those* people who “come from abroad”. One set is present and established on the inside; the other kind is coming in from abroad, the outside. Yet again, the outside space is not defined with any more specificity. The inside, however, is and not just in name.

As already mentioned, Brown evokes the space as Britain and he evokes an established set of people that are located within it. In the final sentence of his statement he moves beyond locating these people within space to redefining the space through them. When Brown says “We are a tolerant, we are a diverse country…”, not only does he position himself as part of these people through the use of the first person plural, he also equates these people with this space he calls a country. These people do more than live *in* this space; these people *are* this space; these people *are* the state prescribed by this space. In Brown’s words these people *are* Britain. The twofold definition of Britain as a state as well as a people suggests that Brown conceives of it as a particular kind of state, a nation state. A number of definitions of nation exist, but I want to draw on one by Renan:

> No, it is no more the land than the race that makes a nation. Man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which we call the people. Nothing of a material nature suffices for it. A nation is a spiritual principle, the result of profound historical complications, a spiritual family, not a group determined by the configuration of the soil. (2001 [1882], p. 174)

Renan emphasises the importance of a people in the make-up of a nation without resorting to notions of an essentialised, biologically determined race. Also, when it comes to what constitutes a people, Renan emphasises the historicity of this unit, which allows for change in the make-up of a people over time. These are important points, as debates of nationhood beyond the racial definition often centre on a national culture as the element that brings a people together and how such a culture may have come about. While scholars in the primordialist (cf. Smith 1989) tradition accept that national cultures are ultimately constructed, they argue that nations are founded on pre-existing cultures, which are often described as ethnic cultures. Modernist scholars, on the other hand, (cf. Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990) argue that even if there are pre-existing elements within a national culture, its composition is not the result of a continuous, gradual development but the outcome of a comparatively abrupt introduction in the interests of a particular class (cf. Pecora 2001, for a discussion of the different approaches). Either way, culture can be seen in Renan’s term as the outcome of “profound historical complications”.

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Returning to Brown, he, too, explicitly rejects a racially constituted ‘We the people’ when he describes it as tolerant and diverse. Initially, these characteristics might suggest a rejection of a unifying culture and a national definition of Britishness and instead an avowal of multiple cultures. However, Brown’s avowal conforms to a particular contemporary formation of nationalism, what Fortier calls with specific reference to Britain a multiculturalist nationalism:

that is, the reworking of the nation as inherently multicultural. Multiculturalism is generally considered in relation to specific national settings, but the predominant theory is that diversity is a disruptive, extraneous element causing a crisis of the nation, conceived as founded on monoculturalism. But in multiculturalist nationalism, there is a shift away from linear narratives of nations moving from monoculture to multiculture (2005, pp. 560-561)

It is important to note that multiculturalist nationalism does not necessarily result in the inclusion of everyone, as Brown’s response clearly highlights. Though he evokes Britain as a multicultural nation, he also establishes limits to its diversity and tolerance straight away through his setting up of two kinds of people. Neither Cameron nor Clegg challenge Brown’s claim, which is not to say that they repeat it verbatim. Cameron’s use of the term ‘people’, for instance, is more generic in that it refers to a number of persons. But in phrases such as “we should have transitional controls so they can’t all come here at once” and “So that we only send immigrants to those places where they can be coped” made by Cameron and Clegg respectively, they evoke a similar categorisation of a resident populace, potentially a nation on the one side and immigrants on the other.

More has to be and will be said later in this section about British multiculturalism as well as other challenges to conceiving of Britain as a nation state. However, at this point the focus is on the specific content of the candidates’ responses to Oliver’s question. Drawing on Renan allows reading Brown’s evocation of We as an evocation of a nation. Drawing on Fortier allows defining diversity and tolerance as national characteristics. However, it is important to remember Weber’s definition of state before concluding that Brown conceives of Britain as a nation state. As mentioned above, Brown accepts Oliver’s definition of space and by accepting responsibility to regulate immigration into this space he claims the right to legitimate violence within this territory. It is the overlap of these two elements under the auspices of a nation, territory and state sovereignty that define the modern nation state, a status Brown claims for Britain.

Above I have introduced the concept of the nation state by citing Lefebvre in relation to space and state territoriality, Weber in relation to state, and Renan, Hobsbawm, Gellner and Smith in relation to nation. I have also begun to relate their respective concepts to the specifics of the British state, the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Both
aspects the conceptual and the specific were closely connected to the opening question/response-set of the first prime ministerial election debate. All three candidates develop their arguments about immigration and immigration policy on the basis of this shared understanding of space and people as defined by the national. They not only add the specificity of the national in response to Oliver’s question, they also recast immigration as the problem. The political elites in the UK as represented by the prime ministerial candidates from the three major parties see themselves as part of a British nation that is faced with this problem. In fact, I would suggest that they recast immigration not merely as a problem for the nation but as a challenge to its coherence. Staying close to the actual content of the debate, this contemporary textual evidence allowed sketching some of the corner-stones on which the central theory of this thesis rests: the discursive position of migration can be taken as an indicator of how those who do the positioning—do the discoursing—see themselves. To develop this argument further and bring in the role journalism assumes in this process I need to move beyond the particulars of the debate and look at British nationalism in more detail.

To be British—National identity in a Multinational and Multicultural State

Colley (1992, p. 5) calls Great Britain and British nationalism “an invention forged above all by war”. For her it was war with France that shaped this nation from the late 17th century to the mid 19th century. Before that time, though already under the control of the same ruler the Irish, English, Scots and Welsh had not developed into a British nation. During that time a sense of Britishness arose less out of an accommodation with each other than out of continuous confrontation with the outside, initially with France and Catholic Europe, later with “the colonial people they conquered” (ibid, p. 5). Putting confrontation and conflict at the centre of British national identity formation, Colley concludes that the peoples inhabiting the British Isles “came to define themselves as a single people not because of any political or cultural consensus at home, but rather in reaction to the Other beyond their shores.” (ibid, p. 6) Of course, it would be remiss to deny that others have reached different conclusions about the formation of British nationalism. Nairn (1981, p. 41), for instance, in his influential collection of essays that make up The Break-up of Britain defines nationalism in general as “the joint product of external pressures and the internal balance of class forces”. In relation to the development of British nationalism, he suggests that it “suffered far less from external pressures and threats than any other” (ibid, p. 42). Though placing the emphasis on the internal dimension in his analysis, Nairn still considers the external dimension important and cites warfare of particular relevance in the formation of British nationalism, “each episode of which farther strengthened its inward conservatism, its conviction of an inherited internal unity” (ibid). Both Nairn and Colley with their arguments
about the past, the origin and development of British nationalism intend to illuminate the present. Nairn identifies an overall backwardness and uneven development within Britain as the reason behind the “territorial disintegration” and “threat of secession” (ibid, p. 14), the break-up of Britain. Colley explains “a revival of internal divisions” (1992, p. 7) and a subsequent, though gradual unravelling of Britishness with the fact that former points of external conflict have disappeared or at least diminished well below the level of large scale warfare on British territory. While I believe an internal dimension to be important—whether necessarily in Nairn’s terms of class struggle is another matter—, it is Colley’s argument about the external dimension that I want to pursue here further.

First of all, however, it has to be noted that 30 years after Nairn and nearly 20 years after Colley made their arguments a British state still exists as does a sense of Britishness. Survey data provides evidence for the latter, though it also shows an increasing importance of other, disaggregated British national identities, i.e., English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish, and a complex set of attitudes towards Britishness (Bechhofer and McCrone 2007, 2008). To Kumar this indicates that:

one may still think of oneself as British, but with a decreasing sense of its salience in one’s life and a diminishing commitment to the political entity of Britain. It is almost as if, for significant sections of the population, Britishness is becoming a residual legacy of the glory days of British power and prestige. (2010, p. 475)

The resurgence of these other nationalities that for a time were, though never entirely subsumed into but nested (Miller 2001) within a British nation, highlights not only that contemporary Britain needs to be understood as multinational state, but also that the idea of the multicultural nation state already needs further attention. As mentioned above multicultural nationalism attempts to accommodate one dimension of multiplicity specific to the British context that challenges the notion of a British nation. However, the acceptance of diversity under the auspices of multiculturalism does not mean that minority and majority communities are on an equal footing in the national We, as “minorities’ ethnicity is understood as Otherness, foreignness, from ‘mainstream’ British culture” (Fortier 2005, p. 371). This limitation echoes New Labour’s move away from an unqualified support for multiculturalism to an increasing emphasis on social cohesion, based on “belonging given by loyalty and adherence to central hegemonic, so called British, values” (Yuval-Davis et al. 2005, p. 528). A similar line has been pursued by the Conservative Liberal-Democrat coalition government since the 2010 election, as evidenced Prime Minister David Cameron’s claim in a speech in February 2011 that state multiculturalism had failed. So while in this model diversity is accepted, “in order to be
welcomed in the national fold, [members of ethnic minorities] must deracinate themselves” (Fortier 2005, p. 571) and conform to these British values. As Yuval-Davis et al. (2005, p. 521) point out multicultural policies are “aimed almost exclusively towards communities of immigrants from ex-New Commonwealth and Pakistan countries” established before the 1981 Nationality Act further restricted “privileged rights of settlement of non-patrial ex-colonial settlers”. Diversity and tolerance are not aims pursued for their own sake nor is multicultural nationalism, but rather they are the outcome of ‘historical complications’; they are a consequence of Britain’s imperial past.

In targeting the level of what are defined as ethnic communities, it sets Britain up as a nation comprised of a number of specific immigrant ethnic minority communities and a settled majority community. The latter is supposed to embody the British values the minority groups ultimately have to accept to become more or less fully recognised. The exact nature of these values, however, is unclear and attempts by New Labour and in particular Gordon Brown to establish a coherent and normative set of British characteristics remain contested (Bechhofer and McCrone 2007, p. 251).

Partly, this difficulty stems from the multiculturalism already having unsettled a no-longer dominant mono-culture; at least equally important, though, is another dynamic already mentioned above: the challenge to this mono-culture from within. Whereas in the context of multiculturalism the majority culture is considered as one coherent unit, outside this context it is considered to be comprised of at least four parts: England, Scotland, Wales and (Northern) Ireland. While the political debate over challenges to the social cohesion of the British nation tends to focus on multiculturalism (again see David Cameron’s speech on the failure of multiculturalism from February 2011), it is the resurgence of these nations that may actually challenge the very cohesion of the UK as a unitary state unit, because, as Miller points out:

> the component nationalities have most of the properties of independent nations, including a territorial homeland, their claims must be treated quite differently from the claims of ethnic groups; the Scots in Britain have a claim to self-determination which Muslims, say, in Britain do not (2001, p. 307)

Considering the twofold dynamics of multiculturalism and multinationalism, it appears difficult to sustain a contemporary and mutually re-enforcing British identity/British nation state pairing. In light of the challenge of multinationalism but also relevant in relation to multiculturalism, Aughey (2010, p. 350) suggests foregrounding a sense of allegiance to the British state as a multinational democracy over a sense of allegiance demanding a “common identity (a sort of British nationalism) and identities demanding exclusive allegiance (varieties of sub-British
nationalism”). However, considering the political discourse as evidenced in the responses from the prime ministerial debate, a common identity with ‘a sort of British nationalism’ seems to remain the goal for political elites. Clearly, this evidence is selective and narrow, but especially in Gordon Brown’s response it highlights an underlying understanding of Britain as a nation state. To (re)forge the nation, to come back to Colley’s argument, a new outside threat has to be defined. Immigration appears to be a convenient proposition to serve in this role, as Cohen (2000, p. 576) argues in this previously cited passage: “Migration policy remains a national function (who is included and who is excluded here takes a literal form).” Cohen’s argument rests on a specific understanding of identity and how it is constructed, which is worth bringing in at this point:

A method for analysing an identity cannot start from the crease and move the boundary or migrate from the core to the periphery, as there is no kernel and no core. Instead, the fuzzy edges of an identity are where the action is and where the answers lie. We know who we are by agreeing who we are not. Others judge us as we judge others. The Other cannot be separated from the Self. (ibid, p. 581)

Cohen echoes some of the points about identity I have already elaborated on in the previous chapter. Here I only want to pick up on the aspect of boundary and relate it to the special predicament of the contemporary nation state.

**Migration and Territoriality in the Era of Globalisation**

Barth (1998 [1969], p. 15) based on his analysis of how communities come to understand themselves as ethnic groups has called for a focus on “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses”. His emphasis is on social boundaries, though he acknowledges that “they may have territorial counterparts”. In fact, a claim to territory, a “territorial homeland”, as Miller describes it in the quotation above, with territorial boundaries is a key aspect of the discourse that might turn a mere ethnic group into a nation. In the case of a nation state the boundary is turned into a fixed, administrative border, the territorial homeland into a territory, which allows for nations to assert power within it. Taylor (2003, p. 101) refers to this spatial assertion of the nation as territoriality: “a form of behaviour that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome.” For Taylor (ibid, p. 102) modern states have four main functions: “states wage war, they manage the economy, they give national identity, and they provide social services”, all of which the state tries to achieve through “strategies of territoriality”. Taylor’s argument is similar to Giddens’ (1987, p. 120) concept of the modern state as “a bordered power-container”, but with an even stronger focus on territory and boundary, as Taylor returns to boundary as the strategy of territoriality (2003, p. 101): “By controlling access to a territory through boundary restrictions, the content of a territory can be
manipulated and its character designed.” However, and this is where territoriality turns into a predicament, absolute sovereign control over what is perceived to be national territory and thus over what is going on within its boundaries is an illusion. To mistake this illusion for fact means to fall into what Agnew (1994) calls a territorial trap. Together with Corbridge, Agnew (1995, p. 100) argues that “Social, economic and political life cannot be contained within the territorial boundaries of states through the methodological assumption of ‘timeless space’.” Far from eternally fixed in time and space “the territorial state and its power” is “dependent on the interaction between global and local (including state-territorial) processes of political economic structuration” (ibid, p. 91), which produces a) changing territorial formations but more importantly b) entirely non-territorial-based power structures over time. So while this interaction between the global and the local may have been conducive to the territorial nation state in the past there is no guarantee that it will remain so. In fact Hurrelmann et al. (2007) speak of a golden age of the territorial nation state between the late 19th century and the 1970s. Since then aspects of power of the territorial nation state have been transferred to private actors and international institutions, with the consequence “that the array of functions and guarantees it could provide to its citizens is indeed unravelling” (ibid p. 19). At the same time as power is escaping from the nation state container, the container in terms of territory itself appears to remain intact. Appears intact because a closer look reveals that as Lefebvre points out the apparent physical inviolability of territory hides its increasing hollowness:

The modern state is confronted with open spaces, or rather, spaces that have burst open on all sides:...The nation itself no longer has any borders—not for capital or technology, for workers and the workforce, for expertise, or for commodities. Flows traverse borders with the impetuosity of rivers. (2003 [1978], p. 92)

The transfer of power described above has an impact on the territorial manifestation of the state. This phenomenon of deterritorialisation, of course, has been defined as an integral part of the process of contemporary globalisation (cf. Appadurai 1996, pp. 33-34, quoted in previous chapter; Bauman 2007, p. 2). And yet, as Calhoun (2007, p. 171) asserts “Globalization has not put an end to nationalism...Nationalism still matters, still troubles many of us, but still organizes something considerable in who we are.” In fact as Calhoun acknowledges nationalism often reasserts itself in reaction to the process of globalisation. Calhoun (2008) positions himself in opposition to the likes of Ulrich Beck, whom he accuses of having a naïve belief in the power of cosmopolitanism. And indeed, in face of the same dynamics of globalisation Beck calls for a cosmopolitan realism, because
the points at which domestic state power struggles, inter-state power struggles and non-state power struggles dovetail with one another can no longer be located within the frame of reference of either ‘national’ or ‘international’ arenas. (2005b, p. 115)

Beck attempts to distance himself from a cosmopolitanism that is uncritical/unrealistic. To Calhoun (2008, p. 443), however, this cosmopolitan perspective remains based on “class position and privileged citizenship” and ignores the necessity of other forms of belonging—often national—as a basis of democracy and of “actual social action” for most. Both Calhoun (ibid p. 441) and Beck (2005b, p. 32) are concerned about social inequality—whether previously existing or as a consequence of globalisation. Both see group solidarity as necessary to challenge inequality. However, they disagree on how to achieve it. Calhoun (2008, p. 444) sees the solution in nationalism, but one that is beyond “reactionary versions of nationalism which have often been antidemocratic as well as anticosmopolitan”. For Beck cosmopolitan realism provides a better answer.

I discuss cosmopolitanism in greater detail in chapter 2.1, here it is important to pick up on the debate begun in the previous chapter about the state of the nation state and to highlight two aspects here: one, that this debate highlights that globalisation does not have an inevitable outcome; two, in its current incarnation it represents a challenge to the territorial nation state. The debate also reflects a third point: reactions to the processes of globalisation differ. I want to borrow Beck’s terminology here, which identifies the potential for “cosmopolitanization” or “to ‘re-ethnicize’ and renationalize both society and politics” (2005b, p. 32). Rather than absolutes, Calhoun’s and Beck’s arguments represent points on a spectrum on which these reactions can be placed. Neither Calhoun nor Beck is representative of its polar ends—these would rather be represented by the types of uncritical positions about cosmopolitanism and nationalism from which both scholars try to distance themselves. Additionally I propose that an analysis of the reaction to migration can serve as an indicator to identify positions on the spectrum.

Returning to Cohen’s suggestion of migration policy as a national function, I also want to draw on Bauman’s (2007, p. 14, original emphasis) argument about a shift in what the territorial nation state can provide its citizens in response to the challenges of globalisation and in the hope to maintain its legitimation: “The spectre of social degradation against which the social state swore to insure its citizens is being replaced in the political formula of the ‘personal safety state’…” Bauman lists a number of threats—from paedophiles to terrorist as well as migration—against whom this personal safety state appears to defend its citizens. And yet in his view migration has a special role to play. Parallel to Barth’s focus on the boundary in relation to ethnic group
formation, Cohen’s similar focus in relation to national identity formation and finally Colley’s analysis of British identity formation in relation to an external threat, Bauman suggests that:

The latent function of the barriers at the border, ostensibly erected against ‘false asylum seekers’ and ‘merely economic’ migrants, is to fortify the shaky, erratic and unpredictable existence of the insiders. (2007, p. 85)

This strategy only works while the border is still intact not just as a physical, geographical line around a territory but also as an actual barrier. In this context it is worth remembering Clegg’s emphasis on border controls in his response to Oliver’s question. It is also worth pointing to an immediate limitation of this strategy acknowledged by Brown as well as Cameron in their responses. By virtue of being part of the EU the barrier has already become fairly easy to cross for most EU citizens—an aspect I will analyse and discuss in chapter 2.2. Though Brown’s and Cameron’s rhetoric starts to unravel from the inside, ultimately all three politicians still follow an argumentative line that traces the strategies and dynamics outlined by Barth, Bauman, Cohen and Colley. In their one-sided emphasis on fairness and effectiveness of immigration policy to the benefit of the UK none of the three responses addresses global inequalities, thus are positioned well beyond Calhoun’s reformulation, towards the reactionary nationalism end of the spectrum.

**Debating the Nation—The Role of Journalists and Audience in the Election Debates**

So how does journalism fit into all this? After all, the starting point of the above analysis was an overtly direct exchange between a member of the public and three politicians. However, a closer look at the processes that led to this exchange highlights the pivotal role journalistic activity played in it. As highlighted at the very beginning the interaction between members of the public and the three politicians underwent several stages of a selection process. The composition of the audience and selection of questions were negotiated and codified before the debate. The result of the negotiations was a 76-point document called *Prime Ministerial Debates—Programme Format* (All Parties, 2010) that addressed the following issues: audience selection (points 1 to 13); audience role (14-40); structure of the programme (41-57); role of the moderator (58-64); themes (65.1-65.3); set (66-68); audience cutaways (69-76). Rather than going through all the points I will highlight a few that are indicative of the journalistic involvement in the debate.

First of all, though well-established journalists served as moderators in all three debates—Alastair Stewart in the first debate on ITV 1 (15/04/2010), Adam Boulton in the second debate on Sky News (22/04/2010) and David Dimbleby in the final debate on BBC 1 (29/04/2010)—
their role during the broadcast was restricted to ensuring that the candidates stuck to the rules and to calling on members of the audience to pose their questions.

The latter aspect was the result of a carefully calibrated pre-production process of selection, which I already hinted at at the very beginning of this section. The first step of which was audience composition. Recruiting conducted by the polling company ICM Research had to follow a strict weighting in terms of voting preference. Broadcasters were only allowed to recruit a small number of additional audience members. The overall objective in terms of the role of the audience, as set out in rule 14, was

to ensure maximum debate between the party leaders—the distinctive characteristic of these programmes—while allowing the audience’s voices to be heard directly posing questions.

As I discuss in more detail in chapter 2.3, it is important to look at the conditions under which voices can be heard directly in the media. Being included in the audience did not automatically confer a right or even the opportunity to be heard. Being heard was dependent on a screening process conducted by an editorial panel—staffed by the respective broadcaster for each debate—and ruled by a number of aspects addressed in points on audience role, structure of the programme and themes of the Programme Format. Whilst editorial independence was explicitly assured (rule 33), the selection process was closely determined by these rules. The first section of each debate was to focus on a particular main theme: domestic affairs in the first, international affairs in the second, economic affairs in the third. For the second, un-themed section rule 30 stated that “a maximum of two questions will be selected on a single subject”. For both sections the editorial panel had various elements to consider, for which rule 32 provides an interesting insight:

the panel will use its editorial judgement to select questions and will take into account factors such as the prominence of certain issues in the campaign, the distinctiveness of the different parties’ policies on election issues, voters’ interest and issues relevant to the role of the Prime Minister.

Among these considerations, voter interest is the only one that indicates the public’s point of view as an unqualified starting point of question selection. ‘Prominence of certain issues’, ‘parties’ policies on election issues’ and prime ministerial issues, on the other hand, represent selection criteria that start with party programmes and political institutions, thus the relevance and selectability of a question depends on the extent it reflects these and not vice versa. The topic of migration was selected by each panel. As mentioned above, the first question of the first debate related to migration. In the two subsequent debates it featured in the un-themed sections,
both of which I want to briefly look at here to highlight how the topic was developed across all three debates.

In the second debate migration was raised in a question by Bethlehem Negessi, who asked:

> I'm an immigrant, and I have been in the UK for 13 years. I recognise that immigration is becoming a problem in the country. What new measures would you introduce in order to make the system more fair?

In the third debate Radley Russell raised the issue in the context of a wider point about the relationship between elected officials and their constituents. He asked:

> Are the politicians aware that they have become removed from the concerns of the real people, especially on immigration, and why don’t you remember that you are there to serve us, not ignore us?

Both questions raise some interesting points about the way they are worded as well as how they came to be selected. Though second in actual sequence, it is Russell’s question, I will address first. To explain its inclusion, I suggest, one has to consider a particular event during the campaign in the week preceding the final debate. During that week Gordon Brown called Gillian Duffy, a woman he had met in a regular-voter-on-the-street encounter, a bigot because of her views on immigration. That he did not do so to her face but as he was being driven away after their conversation added to the media outrage that followed. The issue dominated the election news for several days. Russell’s question reflects both elements of the coverage: politicians out of touch with the electorate in general and on the issue of migration in particular. Compared to the first debate the question is more overtly critical of migration, but this is couched in a concern about politicians’ common touch. The criticism is directed at the politicians rather than immigrants. The dichotomy between ‘us real people’ vs. ‘you ignorant politicians’ is much stronger and the focus of the question rather than the secondary ‘us real people’ vs. immigrants dichotomy. However, in their initial responses to the question, all three candidates focussed very much on the migration issue itself. Rather than addressing the question whether they were in fact out of touch, they tried to realign themselves with the ‘us real people’ of the second dichotomy by emphasising it over the first.

While Russell’s question as well as the candidate’s responses provides further evidence for the evocations of the nation in the context of migration, it is Negessi’s question that allows for a closer analysis of the role of journalism in this process. In difference to Russell’s, there is no timely event that would explain its inclusion in the debate. This is the more surprising Negessi’s question asked in the second debate appears to be essentially a repeat of Oliver’s question from
the first debate. Only this time, the questioner already frames migration as a problem rather than the candidates initiating this problem focus—as was the case in the first debate. The reason for repeating the question can be interpreted in several ways: not all viewers watch all three debates hence a certain overlap is justified; migration is an issue that voters are concerned about; migration is an issue that features in the parties’ election manifestos; the candidates need a second chance to clarify their positions about migration; migration is an issue the editorial panel judged to be important. There are probably several reasons more. Still, it is striking that the two questions so closely resemble each other and yet also differ from each other at the same time.

What is also striking is who the election panel selected to deliver it. Choosing a self-identified immigrant in the role of the one-who-puts-his-finger-on-the-problem avoids suspicions of anti-immigrant bias. I do not suggest that there is anti-immigrant bias. But considering the question selection process and the fact that audience members have to stick to the agreed question, I do suggest that all information contained in the question can be considered important and that strategic decisions were made by the panel as to who would ask a specific question and how that person would ask it. The fact that Negessi identifies himself as an immigrant adds nothing to the question itself, i.e., the candidates should be able to respond to it in exactly the same way without this additional piece of information—in fact parts of their initial responses closely resemble those from the first debate—so why let him add it?

The reason I raise this question, is not to suggest that these issues might not be of genuine concern to the audience and this particular audience member, but to emphasise that a) the audience present at the debate was a highly constructed representation of the British public and b) the questions individual audience members asked had undergone a journalistic process of selection. Though they may have been authors and originators in Goffman’s terms (1981 see chapter 2.3 for a more detailed discussion) of their submitted questions, at the point of delivery during the debate, the members of the audience had been reduced to mere animators, a role embodied in rule 38: “The audience members will be restricted to asking the selected questions.” Despite the audience’s presence in the room the way the debates were set-up “allowed for little meaningful audience participation” (Wring 2011, p. 3). However, their presence was essential for another reason. The entire audience as well as the those who were allowed to ask a questions were meant to be if not representative in quantitative terms then at least illustrative in qualitative terms of the British public—as judged by the editorial panel that is. Through this process of journalistic filtering they turn into parts within a script fit for the dramaturgy of a prime ministerial debate in which everybody has their role play. The audience’s role is to be the British public, the British nation. It is cast in this role by the journalists—the panel behind the scenes
represented on stage by the moderator. The latter acts out his own role: a conduit between the nation and its leaders; apparently not in charge of either but making sure that both keep to the rules. However, considering the influence journalists had over the selection process, I would argue that not only were they in control of the audience on the night, they constructed this representation of the British nation. In this context Negessi, who voiced the question on immigration in the second debate, becomes a representative for the multicultural British nation.

**Conclusion**

The prime ministerial debates represent an example of the type of programming that falls into news and current affairs category explicated in relation to the 2003 Communications Act in chapter 1.1. They stand for an attempt by the public service broadcasters BBC and ITV as well the non-PSB Sky at “facilitating civic understanding and fair and well-informed debate”. These debates are an expression of the genre ‘news and current affairs’. This genre argument rests not on the form of the debates but on their function and on their mode of production, i.e., a journalistic mode of production and their textuality and contextuality, e.g., the rules of the debate, the Communications Act. Focussing on the debates also provided me with the opportunity to develop some key points about the UK as a nation state, the nation and territoriality and how this interrelates with the phenomenon of migration. However, the detailed development of the argument for the remainder of the thesis rests on data collected from a specific form of ‘news and current affairs’: the nightly main evening news bulletin.

Over the two preceding chapters I have positioned this study within two diachronic contexts: a theoretical context—identification as the outcome of discursively structured encounter with an/the Other and the mediation of this encounter through television news; the latter aspect also provides the second, a historical context and institutional context—the relationship between journalism and society, specifically PSB in the UK and the position of the nightly news bulletin in chapter 1.1 and in this chapter the UK as a multicultural nation state. In the next chapter I want to set another, a synchronic context, the topical context of the time the main body of the data was collected.
1.3. Context chapter: The ‘Home Office in Chaos’ Narrative

The current chapter develops pertinent aspects of the topical context. In the same way that news programmes do not occur in isolation but are for instance part of a channel or a public or private institution, news items are embedded within a programme’s broadcast on a particular day. News bulletins are made up of a series of topical segments, made up of single or several individual pieces. Though these segments are presented as separate, they do not exist in isolation from each other. They are interconnected. Sometimes the interconnection is explicit, i.e., a wider topic, such as sport is covered by a number of pieces; the anchor joins them by way of his or her introduction. Sometimes the connection is more implicit, i.e., segments cover similar topics; the anchor, however, does not necessarily establish explicit connections. But regardless of topic, all pieces are connected by the fact that they appear in the same programme. In the case of bigger events or developments they sometimes become part of the news agenda for days or weeks and may over time turn into news narratives that the programmes return to on a regular basis.

Bringing in this context is a wider application of the concept of collocation, taking it beyond the “way words co-occur” (Fairclough 1989, p. 113) as “configurations of discourse” (Fairclough 1995, p. 102) to the way themes and topics co-occur and inter-relate. I have described this as a more synchronic context in the preceding chapter, to highlight that it represents the immediate context of the specific instance of the moment the core data was selected while acknowledging that this content has its own history, its own synchronic contexts. Also included in the appendix is an analysis of the running orders collected during the entire monitoring period to provide of a summary of the news agenda at the time, i.e. the topics that dominated or were given some degree of prominence across the news programmes. Not all of these stories, topics and narratives are equally relevant to the issue of migration. However, their presence positioned migration on the news agenda as well as in the news mix or composition. In the appendix provide a brief sketch, and it is no more than that, of the contemporary news spectrum of the core data. In this summary I have also indicated the points of connections of some of the items to migration, establishing a level of hierarchisation in terms of relevance between items with and without a migration dimension. Here, the main body of this thesis, I want to take a further step in this direction and analyse one of the narratives in this list in some detail. The problems at the Home Office, the ‘Home Office in Chaos’ narrative, contained a number of different migration aspects, topics and stories that make it of particular relevance to this thesis. At the centre of this

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2 For Channel 4 News and ITV 1 News the first 3 month were collected. For the BBC 1 News at Ten the running orders were collected for the entire 6-months period.
narrative was the perception that the Home Office was not ‘fit for purpose’ to use the terminology of John Reid, one of the two Home Secretaries during the monitoring period, i.e. not capable of doing what it was supposed to do. This narrative was so pervasive that I found it inevitable to return to it time and again throughout the case study section, in particular case studies of chapters 2.1 and 2.2.

**Background: Foreign Prisoners’ Deportation Row/Illegal Immigrants’ Numbers Game**

According to Home Office policy at the time, foreign nationals who spend time in a British prison for criminal offences were supposed to be considered for deportation upon their release. In the events referred to as the foreign prisoners’ deportation row the Home Office failed to consider such people for deportation in slightly over 1000 cases. The origins of this row date back beyond the scope of the sampling period. It was kicked off by a question raised by Conservative MP Richard Bacon in a committee hearing in 2005. The footage of the session incorporated into news pieces from the monitoring period suggests that the question, or part of the question, specifically related to so-called failed asylum seekers who happened to have committed a crime and were sent to prison (BBC 1 *News at Ten* 25 April 2006; Channel 4 *News* 25 April 2006). At the time the civil servant before the committee did not have the answers at hand. It took the Home Office until 25 April 2006 to compile the data and release it. In the following weeks the story remained one of the top stories on the monitored news bulletins.

The perceived failure of then-Home Secretary Charles Clarke to deal with the foreign prisoners deportation row eventually led to his departure from the cabinet in the wake of Labour’s losses at the English local elections on 4 May. During this wider reshuffle of the cabinet on 5 May John Reid became the new Home Secretary. On the basis of Reid’s media reputation as ‘The Enforcer’ journalists interpreted the appointment as a sign that he was to sort out the perceived mess at the Home Office. Without the foreign prisoners’ deportation row fully resolved, however, the next alleged mess started to make headlines: illegal immigration.

Illegal immigration is in itself a recurring theme. As defined by the media coverage various groups of people come in under this heading. They include failed asylum seekers, visa overstayers and others who according to the journalists have no legal right to stay in the UK. During the sampling period the theme rose to particular prominence for a while, due to comments made by the Home Office’s head of enforcement and removals, Dave Roberts, to the Home Affairs Committee on 16 May. When quizzed by MPs about the number of illegal immigrants in Britain he started his response by saying, “I don’t have the faintest idea.” Though he immediately
qualified this statement somewhat by stating that he was aware of the research in this area and gave an estimate, the political damage had been done. The next day, 17 May, Tony Blair came under pressure during Prime Minister’s Question Time, defending his government’s performance on illegal immigration.

In terms of coverage it is interesting to note that initially Roberts’ comments generated only limited coverage in the monitored news programmes. It was Blair’s performance during Prime Minister’s Question Time that put illegal immigration towards the top of the agenda for most of the bulletins. Later the topic acquired a life of its own with several spin off stories generating coverage over the following days. Later in the week (18/5/2006), for instance, Channel 4 News broke a story on illegal immigrants working in a Home Office building as cleaners.

The two storylines, the foreign prisoners’ deportation row and the illegal immigration controversy culminated in an appearance by the new Home Secretary John Reid before the Home Affairs Committee. Specifically referring to the immigration service, but seemingly implicating the wider situation at the Home Office, John Reid called his department “not fit for purpose”. He described the data coming out of the department as unreliable and management as well as communication structures as inadequate. His comments were seen by many journalists as an honest assessment of the Home Office and confirmed the ‘Home Office in Chaos’ narrative.

**Putting Pressure on the System**

So far I have provided a brief overview of the timeline and events related to the chaos narrative. In this section I explore the way migration issues became a symptom of this narrative in more detail by looking at the news coverage of the foreign prisoners’ deportation row and the controversy over illegal immigration around three key dates: 25 April, 16 May and 17 May taken together, as well as 23 May 2006. The first date represents the very beginning of the foreign prisoners’ deportation row. On the first day of the second set of dates Dave Roberts, as mentioned above, had to admit that he did not have the “faintest idea” about the number of illegal immigrants in the UK. The following day Tony Blair had to defend his government’s policy over illegal immigration. The final date relates to Home Secretary John Reid declaring his department “not fit for purpose”. A particular focus is put on issues relating to asylum feature within the coverage, as within the coverage the migrant-category of asylum seeker appears to provide connective tissue between the two otherwise distinct categories of illegal immigrant and the foreign prisoner. It is interesting to note that at times asylum becomes the focus of the coverage of these issues; at other times it is merely cited, mentioned in passing. In these
instances asylum is often serving as a self-evident indicator of the problems the Home Office is facing.

**Channel 4 News**

Channel 4 News’ coverage strongly framed the controversies around foreign prisoners and illegal immigration in the ‘Home Office in Chaos’ narrative. In the coverage on 25 April this framework was especially apparent in the trailers, introductions, and headline recaps as well as in an interview with then-Home Secretary Charles Clarke. The programme put the emphasis on the systemic failure at the Home Office, on a “blunder” (Channel 4 News anchor Jon Snow) and on the question whether the Home Secretary should resign. Though Charles Clarke had been replaced by John Reid before the onset of the illegal immigration controversy the narrative remained similar on 16 and 17 May, as terminology such as “the Home Office’s spate of failures” (Jon Snow) and the question, whether the government can “regain control over the Home Office and sort out the mess” (Jon Snow) indicate. On 23 May, the day John Reid declared that the immigration department was “not fit for purpose”; the programme framed its coverage in a way that appeared to confirm the chaos narrative. Reid’s suggestion to overhaul the immigration department was taken up by the programme and expanded to a reform of the entire Home Office.

The opening of the programme on 17 May offers a good example of how immigration was considered part of the chaos-narrative: over footage of the PMQ-debate between David Cameron and Tony Blair in the House of Commons, Channel 4 News anchor Jon Snow describes the main story of the day with the words: “Tories claim Labour is in paralysis over foreign prisoners, illegal immigrants and human rights.” (emphasis added) While the verbal level addresses migration in general, the visual level features a brief mention of asylum. The trailer is immediately followed by the title sequence, which as its first image reveals stock footage of a form titled ‘Home Office—National Asylum Support Service—Application form’. The form is followed by a close-up of folders on a shelf, which in turn gives way to the final piece of footage in this opening sequence: a computer screen displaying a deportation letter. Overall the title sequence only lasts approximately 14 seconds. The form is merely visible for a couple of seconds. It is clearly a very minor mention that could have been easily missed by an inattentive viewer. Yet, it was deemed a fitting image to be included to connote the ‘Home Office in Chaos’ story.

On 25 April, the day the foreign prisoners’ deportation row broke, a piece by Home Affairs correspondent Simon Israel contained an interesting example of a verbal and visual mention of
asylum seekers: using a PowerPoint style graphic the correspondent lists the types of crimes committed by the 1023 convicted foreign nationals released without being considered for deportation: 5 killers, 9 rapists, 39 sex offenders, 204 guilty of violent crimes. The final item on the list shows the statistic that 391 of the total were asylum seekers. This number has the same margins and font size as the crimes listed before, thus visually equating asylum seeking with crimes. In the verbal commentary, however, the final item is somewhat set off from the rest. Israel says: “And a breakdown of immigration history reveals that a third of the total were asylum seekers.” Grammatically this bullet point is not part of the same sentence as the list of crimes. Still, the correspondent gives no further explanation as to why he has highlighted this group. It may have been the biggest group or it could be explained in light of the knowledge that an initial question directed at the Home Office contained a reference to failed asylum seekers. This reference was part of the coverage on other news bulletins on this day. However, this is not made explicit here, and the mention simply serves to collocate asylum, a specific form of migration, with chaos and dysfunction at the Home Office.

So far the examples have shown rather minor mentions of asylum. A number of times asylum featured more substantially, for instance when asylum was cited by journalists as well as sources they quote or cite as an example of failure or success at the Home Office. An interview on May 17 with Tony McNulty, the then Immigration Minister, is an example of a source bringing asylum into the discussion: in the segment about the numbers of illegal immigrants in the UK, McNulty defends the Home Office’s position by citing the “unholy mess” Labour inherited from the Conservatives in terms of asylum. He says that this had to be Labour’s first priority and that still more needed to be done there. This suggests that to McNulty a) asylum was/is a problem; b) a problem of great urgency/that needs priority; c) the focus on dealing with this problem is partially responsible for negligence in other areas. In this argument asylum has thus become not only linked with party politics, but has also turned into an example of, possibly one of the very reasons for the troubles of the Home Office.

BBC 1 News at Ten

In a similar way to Channel 4 News, BBC 1 News at 10 framed the events around foreign prisoners and illegal immigrants in the wider context of a chaotic Home Office and a crisis for the Blair government: from day one the situation is called a “crisis”, a “damning indictment of the whole system”, a sign of “incompetence” and “deep failings” that puts the Home Secretary under “intense pressure”. By 23 May this has led to a “tidal wave of bad headlines” and the need for a “full and fundamental overhaul of the Home Office”. In this context asylum featured in
similar terms as developed above: asylum was often mentioned without further explanation or as a reference. In these cases there was still a focus on deporting etc. and on the subsequent troubles at the Home Office. The coverage, however, also displayed some differences, especially in the usage of archival images as well as footage of political debate and parliamentary work. Though News at Ten also relied heavily on the use of archival footage, it did not feature explicitly asylum-related material, such as the National Asylum Support System—Application form mentioned above. It was more common for asylum to become part of the coverage through the selection of footage from committee meetings and political debate.

A package by Nick Robinson from 25 April on the foreign prisoners’ deportation row contained footage of the same committee meeting featured on Channel 4 News. This was the autumn 2005 meeting during which Conservative MP Richard Bacon raised the questions that kicked off the whole series of events. In the footage shown on the BBC, Bacon specifically refers to failed asylum seekers in his questions. In his commentary Robinson does not give any further detail. Failed asylum seekers and foreign criminals are linked with no real explanation. The only other mention of asylum seekers in that day’s programme occurred in a preceding package by Margaret Gilmore. She cites critics who accuse the Home Office of focussing too much on “meeting government targets like cutting asylum and reducing the prison population” (emphasis added). So the impression that remains at the end of the programme appears to be a not fully explained association between foreign prisoners, asylum targets, failed asylum seekers and the failures of the Home Office.

ITV 1 News at 10.30

On ITV 1 News the foreign prisoners’ deportation row as well as the illegal immigration controversy were also seen within the framework of a ‘Home Office in Chaos’. The foreign prisoners’ situation is a “failure on a grand scale” (ITV 1 News 25 April 2006). In a trailer on 17 May presenter Mark Austin cites an unnamed minister who describes the situation in relation to illegal immigrants with the words: “We are not in control of our borders.” On May 23 political editor Tom Bradby calls the Home Office a “shambles” and the graveyard of many a New Labour career. Two particular instances of implicating asylum in this coverage are highlighted here: one a rather minor mention of asylum as part of a look at tomorrow’s front pages; the other, a substantial mention by way of a package that focused on the number of failed asylum seekers as an explicit example of illegal immigration.
Similar to other television news programmes, e.g., *Newsnight*, ITV 1 *News* normally takes a look at tomorrow’s front pages at the end of its 10.30 programme. Usually, three to five headlines from a variety of papers are cited by the presenter. Among the headlines cited on 16 May, were two, one each from *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Daily Mail*, both relating to immigration. Mark Austin summarised them as follows (emphasis added):

The Telegraph says the UK Immigration Service is in chaos. Senior officials told MPs they had not the faintest idea how many people were here illegally. And the Daily Mail leads on the same story: it claims the Home Office has abandoned hope of finding hundreds and thousands of failed asylum seekers.

As is normal for this ‘tomorrow’s papers’ segment, the quotations were not explained any further. It is also interesting to note that on this day the illegal immigration story was not covered in any other part of the programme. The associations suggested between the Immigration Service, the Home Office, people in the UK illegally, and failed asylum seekers, again, produce a set of negative collocations about asylum and immigration.

The following day, with David Cameron confronting Tony Blair in the House of Commons over the numbers of illegal immigrants, the programme did cover the issue extensively as its main story. It featured two packages as well as an interview with Tony McNulty, then the Immigration Minister. The first package by political editor Tom Bradby focused on the political debate and tried to show the extent of illegal immigration: Bradby uses figures for failed asylum seekers as an example. According to these numbers, almost 300 000 failed asylum seekers were not deported and could be living in the UK at the time. In the introduction to the package as well as at the beginning of the package itself, the journalists suggest that a) Britain is a soft option for illegal immigrants and b) that people come here purely for economic and social security reasons, i.e., to scrounge off the system. Towards the end the package features footage of Tony Blair in a House of Commons debate. In this footage Blair is shown defending his government’s position by citing that the numbers of asylum seekers are down and removals are three times the level of 1997. By using the example of failed asylum seekers and this particular footage, the package reinforces a similar line of association to the one already mentioned above: asylum seekers as a problem and increasing pressure on the government to deal with it.

**Conclusion**

The ‘Home Office in Chaos’ is a strong if rather disjointed narrative prevalent in news coverage during the monitoring period. Migration in general and asylum and refugee issues in particular were frequently given as examples of, sometimes even reasons for this situation. In this context migration was regularly defined as a problem, a problem that has led to more problems in other
areas, such as the fight against crime and terrorism. However, this was the context for migration to the UK for which I would argue a very strong national logic (Wiley 2004) applied. In the next chapter, I will investigate the limits of this logic when migration is covered in other contexts.
Section 2: From Geographic Knowledge to the Value of Voice

2.1. Britain On and Off the Map—Illegal Immigration in the Geographic Imaginary

If nation states are “imagined communities”, as Anderson (1983) suggests, then they must also be geographically imagined. The more states could mobilize this geographical imaginary (by insisting upon ideologies of collective belonging on the land or to territory, for example) the more they could ground their legitimacy and power.

(Harvey 2005, p. 221)

This case study follows Harvey’s suggestion in re-assessing the imagined community (Anderson 1983) along geographical lines, as it is presented in the coverage of so-called illegal immigration. This approach is based on an understanding of geography and spatiality, of space itself as discursively constructed (cf. Harvey 1990; Lefebvre 1991 [1974]; Soja 1989) and of news media playing an important part in this construction (cf. Harvey 1990; Jansson and Falkheimer 2006; Meyrowitz 1985). Though I have already developed some of its elements in the first chapter, I will return and expand on the construction, or production of space to use Lefebvre’s expression (1991 [1974]) below and develop it in more detail. First, though, I want to introduce some key aspects and the structure of this case study.

It is important to note that the geographically imagined imagined community proposed by Harvey is far from stable and coherent. Harvey (2005, p. 231) describes it as having a “shifting, kaleidoscopic character”, but with a “dominant and hegemonic” core that becomes established over time. In fact I would argue that, television news is involved in what Beck (2005b, p. 47) calls a “transnational meta-power politics of plural boundary demarcations”. These plural boundary demarcations are the result of increasing problems of legitimation as states move from a nation state based on exclusivity of space to the cosmopolitan-state model based on the sharing of space and the removal of boundaries (ibid, p. 32). Symbolic as well as political boundaries are constantly erased, shifted and redrawn—at times in more inclusive terms at other times, however, in more exclusive terms along national or ethnic lines.

[With] cosmopolitanization, there is a greater temptation, and greater opportunity, to ‘re-ethnicize’ and renationalize both society and politics. It is precisely because barriers and boundaries begin to come unstuck that the perceptual block in people’s minds becomes firmly re-established. (ibid)
The back-and-forth of temptation is of course played in various spheres—and not only in spatial terms. In the next case study, for instance, I will move on from spatiality and address a similar issue in the context of state-populace relations and questions of citizenship. However, as I will explain below, the media plays an important role in shaping spatial perceptions. Indeed, I would agree with Jansson and Falkheimer (2006) that communication studies should take a spatial turn or at least increase its awareness of spatiality, because “Geographies of communication produce battles over images and discursive framings of spatial realities” (ibid, p. 17).

It is exactly this battle over framings of spatial realities that is the focus of this case study. Based on a spatial analysis of boundary positions and distance within the coverage, I will illustrate how news programmes construct shifting boundaries and thus plural identity positions along a spectrum between cosmopolitanism and renationalisation. The imagined community proposed by individual news pieces shifts and varies, at times even appears contradictory. Before proceeding with a detailed analysis of three pieces from the BBC news programme *News at Ten*, I will conceptualise the issue of spatiality in relation to states and media as well as the particular relevance of boundary formation and distance in this context.

**Space and Boundary**

Migration and the state are defined through spatiality. In what is often considered its ideal form, for a nation to manifest itself as a nation state it needs to establish, to produce itself in space. It needs to claim and gain exclusive authority over an expanse of space, a bounded space that it can proclaim as its sovereign territory. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established “the modern sovereign state as power container, formally all powerful within its territory” (Taylor 2003, p. 103), this link between state and territory has become taken-for-granted, natural in appearance. It rests on the assumption “that state, society, and economy are contained by congruent, more or less perfectly overlapping geographical borders” (Brenner et al. 2003, p. 2). However, despite its appearance it should be neither taken for granted nor considered natural. This link represents what Agnew (1994) calls a territorial trap, as it fails to consider that space is constantly produced rather than a given constant.

This production of space (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]) as national territory has substantial ramifications for migrants, people on the move through space. Migrants or nomads, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) term, can be turned into immigrants or emigrants merely through the re-definition of space as territory or rather territories—striated (ibid) bounded spaces rather than smooth (ibid) open space that an emigrant/immigrant crosses out and into, territories of
origin as well as belonging, on the one hand, and of transit and destination, of less belonging, on the other. In the abstract sense, the actions of migrants and immigrants may be exactly the same. They may simply put one foot in front of the other, but the definitions of their actions as migratory or im-migratory are dependent on the definitions of the space around them. In turn, the migrants’ movement has consequences for space to maintain its definition as smooth or striated, as Ek explains drawing on Deleuze and Guattari:

The relationship between striated and smooth space is not only dialectical, but antagonistic as well. The sum of the Nomads, conceptualised as a ‘War machine’, challenges ontologically the order and structure of striated space through their mobility. (Ek 2006, p. 52)

In other words, there is a discursive struggle between migrants being redefined by space and migrants redefining space. Migration of course is not the only aspect posing a challenge to the link between state territory and state sovereignty. Ruggie (1993) highlights increasing influences of international and transnational institutions, such as the EU, over state territory—as became clear in the acknowledgment of the EU in responses of the prime ministerial candidates. It is worth repeating Lefebvre’s more general assessment about the spatial condition of the modern state:

The modern state is confronted with open spaces, or rather, spaces that have burst open on all sides:…The nation itself no longer has any borders—not for capital or technology, for workers and the workforce, for expertise, or for commodities. Flows traverse borders with the impetuosity of rivers. (2003 [1978], p. 92)

However, state territory may come under increasing pressure but it has not been dissolved. The flows may be crossing with a level of impetuosity, but states still hold on and try to maintain and re-enforce their territory wherever and whenever they can. This is particularly the case at the boundary, and in relation to migration, points that I will come back to shortly and which I already hinted at in the first chapter. Suffice to say that the relatively weak positions of power most migrants occupy vis-à-vis the state, mean that they are defined by state territory rather than vice versa. Because of this antagonistic dynamic, migrants can become indicators of how space is defined. Their encounter with the obstacles put in place by and defining the striated spaces of national territories throws the spaces’ definitions into relief. The actual encounter, for instance with border check-points, represents a key point at which these definitions becomes visible, but it can be observed elsewhere as well, as the production of space not only entails the structuring of a physical space as national territory, i.e., its infrastructure within, its physical borders around it. According to Lefebvre the state also produces itself in and through space along two further dimensions:
The production of a social space as such, an (artificial) edifice of hierarchically ordered institutions, of laws and conventions upheld by “values” that are communicated through the national language. (2003 [1978], p. 84, original emphasis)

And more importantly for this thesis and this case study in particular

comprising a social (but not immediately political) consensus, the state occupies a mental space that includes the representations of the state that people construct—confused or clear, directly experienced (vécus) or conceptually elaborated (élaborés). This mental space must not be confused with physical or social space; nor can it be fully separated from the latter. For it is here that we may discern the space of representations and the representation of space. (ibid, p. 85, original emphasis)

It is mental space as it manifests itself in representations of space that I am interested in here, what Harvey, following Anderson, calls the “geographically imagined” imagined community (Harvey 2005, p. 221). This geographic imaginary, the mental space depends on geographic knowledge. It is again the state that Harvey identifies as playing a key role in the constitution of this body of knowledge:

Nation state formation has always gone hand in hand…with the production of certain kinds of geographical knowledge oriented to achieving cohesion and legitimacy of political powers grounded in territorial-based solidarities. (ibid, p. 221)

One specific instrument Harvey suggests shapes and controls geographic knowledge and which I will draw on it in the analysis section of this case study is the medium of cartography.

Cartography is, plainly, a major structural pillar of all forms of geographical knowledge…Locating, positioning, individuating, identifying and bounding are operations that play a key role in the formation of personal and political subjectivities. (ibid, p. 242)

Subjectivities is the key term here. Even if maps allow one to conduct an objective task, e.g. assist in navigating from point A to point B, they are always, as Harley points out, manifestations of “manipulated forms of knowledge” and

in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of representation maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon particular sets of social relations. (1988, pp. 277-278)

As a consequence a map can be in a sense accurate and manipulated at the same time. Rather than being a true or a propaganda, a scientific or an artistic representation, Harley suggests that all maps operate on a rhetorical level:

All maps state an argument about the world, and they are propositional in nature. All maps employ the common devices of rhetoric such as invocations of authority….Maps constantly appeal to their potential readership through the use of colour decoration, typography, dedications or written justifications of their method (1992, p. 242)
I will return to specific points of cartographic representation in the analysis section. Here I just want to raise one further point to take me back to the issue of mental space. The importance of cartographic knowledge in shaping mental space is also signalled by the fact that the state often exerts substantial control over it (Harley 1988, p. 284). However, as with other forms of geographic knowledge the state is not the sole distributor. To distribute the knowledge and hence establish and maintain the mental space of the territory, the state finds support in other institutions. A link already suggested by relating the geographic imaginary to Anderson’s concept of the imagined community, Harvey explicitly considers the media to play a significant role (Harvey 1990, 2005, pp. 230-233) in this process. Interestingly, despite its overarching aim of establishing a coherent territory, the geographical imaginary presented in the media is far from coherent, as has been pointed out previously:

It has a shifting, kaleidoscopic character which, when coupled with information and image overload plays havoc with the idea of some easily synthesizable or synthetic knowledge system. Yet, a dominant and hegemonic, even if somewhat blurry and contradictory structure to geographical thinking, does tend to crystallize out of the chaos of representations, if only for a while in a particular place. (ibid p. 231)

What becomes clear is that the projecting of a variety of spaces or spatial relations does not necessarily run counter to the attempt to establish and maintain bounded territory. Rather it highlights the “continual production and transformation of state space…through a range of representational and discursive strategies” (Brenner et al. 2003, p. 11). So in difference to the physical space, mental space is far more flexible without necessarily compromising its function as part of the apparatus of territorial control.

To trace the range of representational and discursive strategies as they manifest themselves in television news I will now turn to two specific areas of enquiry: boundaries and distance. So far, apart from the aside on cartography, I have focussed on the production of space in a rather abstract sense. I have drawn on the ideas of Lefebvre and Harvey to highlight the formation of state space, the significance of and flexible characteristic of mental space and the role of the media in shaping mental spaces. Boundaries and distance are aspects that define space as places and territories. They will allow me to explore the continual and flexible production of space as it manifests itself in the news coverage of migration in a variety of ways.

Boundaries are a key element that transforms space into national territory (cf. Dahlman 2009). In his description of the nation state as a container, Taylor points out the increased importance of the boundary or border in the post-Westphalian state:
This completely changed the nature of territory, especially the integrity of its borders. From being parcels of land transferable between states as the outcome of wars, all territory, including borderlands, became inviolate. (2003, p. 106)

By enclosing, bounding, delimiting space, it turns into territory. However, the importance of the boundary does not stop with the original act of enclosure when the line was drawn. Rather than stopping there, the boundary continues to play an important role in the production of the space and the people it encloses as a coherent unit. As previously mentioned, Barth (1998) calls attention to the importance of boundaries in the process of group identity formation. He suggested, anthropologists should shift their emphasis and analyse “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (ibid p. 15, original emphasis). It is the boundaries that are more clearly and homogeneously defined and thus define a community, which may be far more heterogeneous in its internal composition (ibid; see also Morley 2000, p. 165). In her research Madianou (2005, p. 136) has highlighted the relevance of Barth’s concept to investigating the role news media can play in the “drawing of boundaries” between, in her case ethnically defined, groups. Boundaries are the prime location for tracing a collective, national identity, because, as Giesen suggests:

They mark the difference between inside and outside, strange and familiar, relatives and non-relatives, friends and enemies, culture and nature, enlightenment and barbarism. Precisely because these borders are contingent social constructions, because they could be drawn differently, they require social reinforcement and symbolic manifestation (1998, p. 13)

Of course it is the social reinforcement and symbolic manifestation of boundaries on and through television news that I am interested in.

Most migrants are outsiders; they are part of the Other through which collective, national identities are constructed (Cottle 2000; Giesen 1998; Harvey 2005). When these outsiders cross administrative boundaries, they also cross the symbolic boundaries erected by the modern nation state (Giesen 1998, p. 21). In an age of increased global migration, more and more people cross these boundaries and challenge them in the process (Appadurai 1996, pp. 33-34; Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Ek 2006, p. 52). In fact, making a similar argument as Ruggie (1993) and Lefebvre (2003 [1978]) cited above, Bauman (2007, p. 80) has argued that these borders become increasingly fragile and are bound to fail as the nation state continues to lose power in what he calls the era of liquid modernity (2000). This loss of real power, however, Bauman suggests, has led to an increase in a show of power by the nation state towards migrants:

The latent function of the barriers at the border, ostensibly erected against ‘false asylum seekers’ and ‘merely economic’ migrants, is to fortify the shaky, erratic and unpredictable existence of the insiders. But liquid modern life is bound to stay erratic and capricious whatever the treatment
given and whatever plight is visited on ‘undesirable aliens’—and so the relief tends to be short-lived, and the hopes attached to ‘tough and decisive measures’ are dashed as soon as they are raised (Bauman 2007, p. 85).

Extending Bauman’s quote already cited in the first chapter brings in the idea of migration policy not just fulfilling a function on structural level in Cohen’s terms, but its repeated presence in day-to-day politics. Similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) argument cited above, others have remarked on the challenge migration poses to the nation state in the context of globalisation (cf. Bhabha 2004 [1994]) and that the focus on immigration can be a more or less intentional tactic by the state to divert from its failings in other areas (Huysmans 2001, p. 203). However, Beck (2005b) in refining his concept of a second modernity has challenged the notion that national boundaries are necessarily bound to fail completely. Their instability may instead lead to “a greater temptation, and greater opportunity, to ‘re-ethnicize’ and renationalize both society and politics” (ibid p. 32).

What is emerging are “context-specific (variable, plural) boundary constructions’ out of a ‘transnational meta-power politics of plural boundary demarcations’” (ibid, p. 47). Meta-power politics involves “playing for power while simultaneously changing the nation state rules of power” (Beck 2005a, p. 150) and hints at a key aspect of Beck’s understanding of cosmopolitanism. These politics represent a struggle between a cosmopolitisation and renationalisation of the nation state (ibid, p. 50) played out over and through boundaries with the aim to attribute, claim or avoid responsibility. Of course cosmopolitanism is a contested concept that can be conceptualised and thus applied in different ways (cf. Cheah 2006 for a summary of these debates; Yegenoglu 2005). I will return to a specific critique of Beck’s position put forward by Calhoun (2008) that I have already pointed out in the introductory section. First, however, I want to turn back to the media, in particular television news to consider more closely its potential for an analysis in spatial terms. Focussing on aspects raised by Chouliaraki (2006), this will, again, involve the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism. After combining Chouliaraki’s news-media-based with Beck’s global-relations-orientated approach, I will address Calhoun’s critique.

**From Space to the Distant Spectator**

As already mentioned at the beginning of this case study Jansson and Fallkheimer (2006) not only suggest the need for a spatial turn in communication studies, they also emphasise that such a turn needs to be sensitive towards ideological and political issues, as “Geographies of communication produce battles over images and discursive framings of spatial realities” (ibid, p. 17). While such a battle could be said to rage along Beck’s renationalisation-cosmopolitanism
spectrum, Beck’s formulation does not necessarily provide a clear entry route to the analysis of the geography of television news. The utilisation of maps on the news is one entry point, already suggested. Another, which can be derived directly from Beck’s argument as well as the general points made so far about space and migration, is the representation of boundaries. Boundaries mark the differences between territories and thus define them. Migrants’ encounter and crossing of them delineates boundaries more clearly. However, these representations need to be put into relation with a centre. Seemingly stable, it anchors and establishes relations between the spatialities. This anchor enables me to find an answer to the following question: does the boundary run between the centre and the migrants or are the centre and the migrants positioned on the same side of the boundary? The answer provides a further clue as to the relationship between the centre and the migrant. But what and where is the centre? As to the what, this centre, I would suggest, is provided by the imagined community that is addressed by the news. In other words the question posed above turns into a question of shared belonging based on space: do they, centre and migrant that is, share the mental space of the imagined community or not? As to the where, I would like to draw on the concept of the spectator, in particular as developed by Chouliaraki (2006). This will also allow me to expand the relationship between boundary and space by the dimension of distance.

In her analysis of the ramifications of transnational flows of news images of suffering for the position of Western spectatorship, Chouliaraki (2006) draws on Hannerz’s (1996) concept of cultural resonance and Warner’s (1993) ideas regarding the imaginary reference to the public to suggest that there is the potential for a cosmopolitan, beyond the nation level of identification (Chouliaraki 2006, pp. 9-13). Cosmopolitanism, here, is “a generalized sensibility that acts on suffering without controlling the outcomes or experiencing the effects of such action” (ibid, p. 13) that can lead to re-positioning the spectator not as a citizen of a national community but as “a citizen of the world—literally cosmo-politan” (ibid, p. 2). A similar point is made by Cottle (2006) in his analysis of mediatised rituals. He argues that these do not necessarily “manufacture consent” but “can contribute to the formation of plural solidarities or ‘publics’” (ibid, p. 411). However, as Chouliaraki discusses throughout her study, the conditions of and the level of identification through mediation as well as the outcome in terms of action towards those who suffer are complex and should not be taken as a foregone conclusion. In fact, rather than with any degree of identification distant suffering can be confronted with complete indifference (Chouliaraki 2006, p. 12). Despite their immediacy and potential for the spectator to become a witness of distant events, such images can lead to a feeling of “powerlessness and separation” (Ellis 2000, p. 11). Citing Ellis’ notion of powerlessness as a point of departure Chouliaraki
(2006, p. 2) later argues, “only a certain type of fragility of the sufferer is powerful enough to present her to spectators as a cause for concern” (ibid, p. 193) that may be perceived as “a call for effective action”. In other forms watching may merely remain on the voyeuristic level rather than the level of concern. But the worst is not merely an indifferent, psychologically paralysed or voyeuristic viewer, but a viewer who experiences the distant suffering as re-enforcing his or her own position as part of a Western We that “inhabits the transnational zone of safety and construes human life in the zone of suffering as the West’s ‘other’” (ibid, p. 10). Developing a similar argument, Szorenyi (2009) uses Ravenscroft’s (2004) term to define this position as white spectatorship. A white spectatorship position enables the spectator not only to be reassured of his or her own safety but also to overlook the history of colonialism that may be responsible—and thus by implication the responsibility rests on the spectator as well—for the suffering in the distance (Szorenyi 2009, pp. 94-97).

Both, in Chouliaraki’s as well as in Szorenyi’s analysis, distance is not necessarily measured in physical term. Drawing on the work of Osuri and Bannerjee (2004) on white diasporas, Szorenyi redefines element of distance in distant suffering not in physical but in symbolic terms:

“Distance” thus seems often to work as a way of obliquely referring not simply to mileage, but to the structure of the world instituted and maintained by colonialism and its accompanying racial discourses. (2009, p. 97)

While the point Szorenyi makes is an important one—it highlights spatiality beyond the physical realm and relates it to relations of power—she discusses symbolic distance in the context of more or less mono-modal still images and thus does not address the complexities of the multimodal medium of television and the particularities of television news. A return to Chouliaraki’s argument highlights these complexities—she suggests that they generate “the paradox of distance as a politics of space-time” (2006, p. 43)—and allows me to propose multiple, at times inverse distance scales. Chouliaraki (ibid, pp. 40-43) discusses arguments but forward by Tomlinson (1999), Boltanski (1999), Silverstone (2003), and Butler (2004) in relation to distance and proximity, immediacy and hyperimmediacy in relation to a) narrative techniques specific to news coverage, b) text-audience relations and c) in terms of the relationship between those represented in a text and those watching a text. She concludes the level in distance in terms of a) may not necessarily result in the same level of distance in terms of c). The distance levels of a) and c) work independently from each other on different, that is multiple scales. In terms of b), the text-audience relation, Chouliaraki focuses on the text rather than the audience to propose reasons for this discontinuity.
The narrative techniques that would suggest proximity to suffering do not necessarily equate to an equal proximity between spectators and those who suffer. In fact, telling the story of suffering from too close a distance may result in a greater distance between sufferer and spectator, an inverse relation—however, one that does not mean that the scales are interdependent, only that “neither proximity nor distance in themselves, have to do with the closing of moral distance” (ibid, p. 42). Chouliaraki concludes by proposing Silverstone’s (2003) concept of proper distance in the “pursuit of the cosmopolitan disposition” (Chouliaraki 2006, p. 43), a distance that takes into account both temporality and spatiality, in terms of historicity and proximity:

The humanness of sufferers demands that we neither zoom too close up to assume that they are like ‘us’ nor zoom too far out, reducing them to dots on the map. The demand for historicity requires that each instance of suffering is placed in a meaningful (though not tiresomely exhaustive) context of explanation and understanding that addresses the question of why this suffering is important and what there is to do about it. (ibid, p. 43)

Of course the proper distance does not resolve the paradox of distance—and Chouliaraki does not suggest that it does. Rather, the paradox remains at the centre of proper distance. It is the right balance between the multiple scales of distance, as I would describe them, that result in the proper distance, which in turn result in a ‘position of reflexive identification’, a position that combines empathy with the sufferer with an understanding of the suffering and from which one can actively engage with, rather than passively observe, suffering.

The cosmopolitan spectator now emerges as a figure who navigates between the singularity of suffering—which is necessary for feeling with the sufferer, but without indulging in unnecessary emotion—and the historicity of the event—which is necessary for evaluating the suffering, but without adopting a heartless impartiality. (2006, p. 181)

The balance, however, cannot be arrived at by formula. As already indicated above, Chouliaraki suggests that certain conditions are more conducive, conditions which are often but not exclusively occurring in a type or class of news that she calls ecstatic news (ibid, pp. 213-214 and chapter 7); but there is no set of variables that operate on defined scales. It is not a question of fine-tuning. It is, I would suggest, a question of the shifting interplay between the multiple, independent scales of multimodal distance—geographical, physical, historical, temporal, verbal, visual, filmic as well as moral and participatory—that generate distances in space and time between the spectator and the spectated in any given television news piece.

Chouliaraki draws on various methodological and theoretical approaches (ibid, chapter 4) to find points of analysis within the news texts. Let me point out here that this focus on the text has drawn criticism from scholars such as Ong (2009), who believe that a study of the media along such ethical-moral lines needs to engage in audience research (ibid, pp. 451-452). However, I
would argue that Chouliaraki’s text-based approach addresses Ong’s concerns through the application of phronesis (2006, pp. 5-8) and the conceptualisation of the audience as a “reflexive spectator” (ibid, pp. 178-181). Those aspects relating to the mediation of space and time (ibid, pp. 85-88) are of particular relevance here, and I will refer back to them in the analysis section below. However, rather than proper distance and ethical norms, my main focus will be more modest, looking for the extent to which news coverage reflect “a range of representational and discursive strategies” (Brenner et al. 2003, p. 11) and these in turn reflect a “transnational meta-power politics of plural boundary demarcations” (Beck 2005b, p. 47). Analysing distance in its various dimensions, I intend to map the mental space (Lefebvre 2003 [1978]), the “shifting, kaleidoscopic character” of the geographically imagined community” (Harvey 2005, p. 231) in order to see whether or under which conditions it positions the migrant within or outside of this community. These findings I will in turn relate to Beck’s argument about the struggle between renationalisation and cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005b).

So far I have accepted the definitions of cosmopolitanism proposed by Beck and Chouliaraki, respectively, without qualification, though I have alluded to the contested nature of this concept. Before turning to the analysis, it is necessary to respond to some aspects of this critique as far as it is relevant to the discussion here. Tracing the development of cosmopolitanism from its first modern formulation by Kant, Cheah identifies four strands, four modalities that still dominate current debates:

(1) a world federation as the legal and political institutional basis for cosmopolitanism as a form of right; (2) the historical basis of cosmopolitanism in world trade; (3) the idea of a global public sphere; and (4) the importance of cosmopolitan culture in instilling a sense of belonging to humanity. (2006, p. 487)

Chouliaraki’s cosmopolitanism draws on aspects of 1) as well as 3) and focuses on 4). Beck, I would argue, builds on all four strands to develop an analytical stance he calls “cosmopolitan realism” (2005b, p. 115), from which to assess the transformation of global relations in response to globalisation. Out of this transformation, Beck proposes (2005a, p. 156), may potentially rise the “cosmopolitan state”. However, this would involve a radical paradigm shift, namely “the separation of nation and state” (ibid). Beck (ibid) acknowledges that to “those thinking in national terms” this may sound “like a completely unrealistic utopia”. In fact, as has been pointed out before, Beck’s ideas have been criticised by, among others, Calhoun (2008) for dismissing the nation state dimension too easily. Calhoun argues that Beck overemphasises the significance of interpersonal connections established as a by-product of increasing globalisation. Calhoun calls this form of cosmopolitanism an “ethics of globalisation” (ibid, p. 429), because
the connections are supposed to develop into an “attitude that treats these as a source of moral responsibility for everyone” (ibid, p. 429). But for Calhoun (ibid, pp. 429-433) ethics are not enough, as it can lead to underestimating the necessity for action through established and institutional politics: since cosmopolitan institutions are few and far between, it is national structures that remain dominant. Also, Calhoun finds the apparently inherent virtuousness of such an ethics problematic, especially when it is put as the positive opposite of a negative that is defined as “belonging to a specific group”:

the solidarity of these groups is a basis for action to redress many ills and sometimes even to mitigate inequality; communities, nations, and religions motivate many in ways that abstract membership of the human race does not. (ibid, p. 434)

Setting up such a value-laden dichotomy is a point of criticism that might apply to Chouliaraki as well. Ong (2009, p. 450) summarises the possible identities one could assume in response to news according to Chouliaraki as either one of “cosmopolitanism (moral) or communitarianism (less moral)”, implying exactly that. However, neither Chouliaraki nor Beck denies the relevance of the national or call for an obliteration of group belonging. In the case of Chouliaraki the dichotomy is context-specific. It applies in relation to suffering only—possibly in the wider sense of global injustice and taking responsibility for and acting upon it. And for Beck a de-coupling of nation and state is neither an accomplished fact nor does it actually imply a complete dissolution of nation or groups, but their separation from territory. In fact he argues that the loss of territorial autonomy can translate into a gain in terms of sovereignty:

The practical sovereignty of (collective and individual) actors expands as their autonomy, in formal terms, declines. In other word, during the course of political globalization, a transformation takes place from autonomy based on national exclusion to sovereignty based on transnational inclusion. (2005b, p. 91)

Thus, when Beck sets up the cosmopolitanism-renationalisation dichotomy, he is not arguing against nation per se but against a retrenchment along ethnic/nationalist lines, a kind of renationalisation that Calhoun would call “reactionary versions of nationalism which have often been antidemocratic” (2008, p. 444) and is himself critical of. As previously suggested Beck’s and Calhoun’s argument leads me to propose a spectrum of nationalism/cosmopolitanism. Drawing on Chouliaraki’s arguments about distance as well as Lefebvre’s about space allows for the mapping of news coverage onto this spectrum.

The three pieces I will analyse in the next section of this chapter were broadcast on the BBC 1 News at Ten. All cover illegal immigration and were broadcast in the spring/summer of 2006, on 17 May, 15 September, and 18 September respectively. They were collected as part of the Oxfam
research project (Gross et al. 2007) discussed previously. The sample for this project included all news items mentioning asylum or refugee issues in a UK context from the main evening news programmes on Channel 4, ITV 1 and BBC 1. Analysis of this wider sample showed a strong discursive connection between different categories of migration, issues related to refugees/asylum seekers and illegal immigration. This discourse entailed a focus on domestic power politics (see below and Context chapter for more details). What also became apparent was that this focus contrasted in various aspects with coverage of illegal immigration in non-UK contexts.

Analysis: Illegal Immigration and the Location of Boundary
The three pieces analysed here are illustrative of some of the aspects developed above. Despite featuring on the same news programme over a relatively short time span, their individual representations of illegal immigration differ quite substantially. Alongside a short description of the stories, I will summarise these representations and suggest a number of parameters that may have had an influence on the portrayal of illegal immigration in these contexts. In a second analytical step I will trace the positioning of the imagined community, a potentially British Us in relation to a migrant Them across the three pieces. Any changes to these positions also entail a shift in the boundary between them.

The first story, from 17 May, represents illegal immigration in a highly politicised context. It is part of two connected, ongoing narratives that dominated the news at the time for several weeks and which are alluded to at several points in the piece: the troubles at the Home Office and the future of Prime Minister Tony Blair (see chapter 1.3). To reiterate briefly: a number of administrative scandals relating to the field of immigration and crime had led to the replacement of Charles Clarke as Home Secretary with John Reid during a cabinet reshuffle 12 days earlier. This narrative in itself was set in the context of the approaching but as yet unscheduled departure of Tony Blair as Prime Minister. Journalists expected the departure to be imminent and interpreted each new problem Blair’s government faced as the final nail in the coffin—in fact it would be another year before Blair stepped down and Gordon Brown assumed the premiership. It was in this atmosphere that Dave Roberts, the Immigration Service’s head of removals, acknowledged during a parliamentary committee hearing on 16 May that he did not have the “faintest idea” about the numbers of illegal immigrants in the UK. The next day in a House of Commons debate David Cameron, then the Conservative leader of the opposition, challenged the Prime Minister on the issue, combined it with several others, among them further issues relating to the Home Office in general and immigration in particular, and concluded by
saying: “This is a government in paralysis!” This is a comment through which he raised the stakes of the debate from being about illegal immigration, beyond the issues at the Home Office, to one being about Tony Blair’s future as Prime Minister.

When the debate featured as the top story on the news, the coverage echoed the three levels suggested by Cameron. It dealt with illegal immigration, i.e. the issue at hand, and also the troubles at the Home Office more generally. The overall focus, I would argue, however, was on Tony Blair. The coverage consisted of several pieces: an opening trailer before the title sequence, followed by a package presented by Nick Robinson, the political editor of BBC News, then a short presentation-style segment by Mark Easton, the home affairs editor, a short return to Nick Robinson live from Westminster, and finally a headline recap at the end of the programme. The trailer and the recap as well as the introductions to the other pieces were presented by Huw Edwards, one of the presenters/anchors of BBC 1 News at Ten. The Easton segment exclusively deals with issue of illegal immigration and the difficulty to know the accurate number of illegal immigrants. This piece, however, is framed on either side by segments that focus on the political dimension and mention illegal immigration almost in an incidental manner, incidental to the ongoing troubles at the Home Office and to the back-and-forth, the political points-scoring in the House of Commons between the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.

This focus can be seen, for instance in the transition between the segment by Mark Easton to the second Nick Robinson piece. After mentioning the introduction of electronic borders and identity cards in the coming years, Mark Easton concludes by saying: “We may be getting closer to assessing how many illegal immigrants there are in Britain, but knowing that my simply pose some uncomfortable new questions. Huw.”

What exactly these “uncomfortable new questions” are is not quite clear. They possibly relate to the pressures illegal immigrants may put on public services, a concern Easton mentioned previously in the segment. Huw Edwards then segues to Nick Robinson:

Mark, thank you very much indeed. Now let’s pick up on some of those points and talk to Nick Robinson at Westminster. Nick, first of all what do you make of the exchanges today and where does it leave Tony Blair?

The question, with which Edwards turns to Nick Robinson, suggests that Edwards is less interested in picking up on some of the Easton’s points. Instead he refocuses the coverage on the politics of power and asks Robinson for an overall assessment of the situation. Robinson responds:
Well, it leaves Tony Blair with a problem. He is saying to the country: ‘Look!’ Privately in effect he’s saying, ‘I know that we didn’t recognize the scale of this problem early enough, but we are now faced with real difficulties.

Yes, Robinson does pick up on the issue of illegal immigration here. He even continues to talk about various difficulties Blair faces to deal with it. But, I would argue, he only employs illegal immigration as an example in the context of Blair’s—perceived—slipping hold on his premiership. Returning to this underlying concern, Robinson concludes his assessment by saying: “At the nub of it, Huw, it is step by grinding step to make the difference, and some people are accusing Tony Blair of taking those steps too late.”

The “too late” comment is somewhat ambiguous: Too late for what and for whom exactly? Is Robinson suggesting that it is too late for Tony Blair as he may be about to lose power? Or is it too late for Britain—the country soon to be overwhelmed by illegal immigrants because of Blair’s failings? Considering all the content that has come before Robinson’s statement in the programme, I would suggest it is the former kind of lateness he implies. The ambiguity remains unresolved, however, and leads me to consider more closely the explicit elements of the representation of illegal immigration in this story.

So far I have developed the dominant theme which frames illegal immigration in the coverage—party politics: illegal immigration may be the reason why the story is carried on this particular evening, but it is almost incidental to the top-level issue of Blair’s hold on his premiership. What is it that makes immigration, in this case illegal immigration, to the UK such a good example? Its quality comes from the value it generally signifies, derived from the discursive network, the logic of association it is positioned within. Some of these connections are made within the news programme by the journalists and their sources. Immigration is associated with illegality, crime, pressure on public services, loss of tax revenue, a black labour market, the asylum system, and loss of control of ‘our’ borders. The latter signals a wider administrative and political incompetence, even impotence as human rights legislation is deemed to tie the hands of civil servants and politicians to deal with the issue properly by means of deportations (see chapter 2.3 for more details on the issue of human rights). Visual elements reinforce the verbal discourse. The images selected to illustrate and thus signify illegal immigration in the bulletin are dominated by archival footage of men running along train tracks, climbing over fences and out of containers. Some of the footage is blurry, possibly even from CCTV. They only reflect one aspect of illegal immigration and have no specific relevance to the issue of the day, yet they appear to serve as an iconic image of illegal immigration as such. In their study of the use of archive footage in television news programmes Machin and Jaworski (2006, p. 346) highlight the
potential consequences of certain images and archival footage being repeated over and over: “The world in these images comes to resemble the limited world of the image banks, which is an ideologically prestructured world”. For the specific context of the coverage of asylum, Threadgold develops a similar argument but takes it a step further towards the lived experience of viewers as well as asylum seekers:

The iconic (images do not lie) and reality (s/he was really there on location) functions of television help images, figures of speech, narrative and histories to stick together, to become performative (Butler 1993) of what asylum is and thus to generate effects. (2006, p. 230)

Relying on archival footage and the lines of association mentioned above, the verbal and the visual level establish a fairly abstract, negative notion of illegal immigration: illegal immigration is a threat to the safety of the British public; a threat exacerbated by the inability of the government to deal with it.

Now, I have just mentioned ‘the British public’ without yet tracing its existence within the coverage. It is indeed present beyond the generic ramifications of a national news programme. Before developing this point further, I will analyse the representation of illegal immigration in the other two pieces, next a piece by BBC correspondent Richard Bilton on illegal immigration from Africa to the Canary Islands, a group of islands off the coast of Africa that is part of Spain. The package featured on the News at Ten on 15 September 2006. Again, the piece was the top story and consisted of several segments: an opening trailer before the title sequence, followed by a package and, at the end of the programme, a headline recap. Fiona Bruce, another of BBC 1 News at Ten’s main anchors, presented the trailer, a comparatively lengthy introduction to the package, and the headline recap.

The tone of the coverage and the representation of illegal immigration can be demonstrated by taking a closer look at the trailer segment. The sequence starts with a shot of Bruce in the studio starting her commentary: “The frontline in the battle to stem the illegal flow of immigrants into Europe: the Canary Islands”. The camera then cuts away to the scene of a harbour at night. Low quality images show people apparently too weak to walk being carried off a ship, while Bruce continues: “Coming from Africa and now Asia, many die trying to reach the Canaries.” The picture then fades to a shot of young, black men sitting in a tent. Bruce: “But still they come. 24,000 have arrived so far this year.” Finally, the segment returns to the studio. The anchor concludes the trailer by saying: “The authorities there criticise Europe for standing by while the islands are overwhelmed. We have a special report.” As befits a trailer, it contains key elements of and sets the interpretive frame for the later package—the main piece of the coverage. The
main theme indicated here is illegal immigration into a space called Europe. This main theme is split into two sub-themes: a) the danger to the illegal immigrants who decide to take this route by boat from the African mainland, b) the failure of Europe to help the Canaries. It is important to note here that Bruce exclusively uses the term Europe, whereas correspondent Richard Bilton also uses the term European Union. This represents a difference in usage I will come back to later on, when analysing geographical terms and the representation of geographical spaces. What I will discuss first, though, is the tension arising out of the two sub-themes. On the one hand the emphasis on the level of danger the migrants experience on this journey could be construed as an almost sympathetic representation of them. This, however, is balanced—I would argue outweighed—by the rhetoric around the threat these illegal immigrants pose to the Canary Islands and Europe. According to Bruce the threat is existential, as Europe appears to be at war with the immigrants. After all, in her terms the Canary Islands have become “the frontline in the battle” which could “overwhelm” these European islands. The tension between the two themes is maintained throughout the coverage on the verbal as well as the visual level. In his package Bilton apparently witnesses a rescue of a boatload of illegal immigrants. “The coastguard bring the young and the ill to shore”, he says over the same images of the harbour-at-night-time footage shown in the trailer. On the other hand, he also uses terms such as frontline. And footage of young, black men, who are being processed by Red Cross workers under the watchful eyes of security personnel—images reminiscent of prisoner of war camps—underscore the state of war theme. The level of sympathy towards the migrants is thus outweighed but not obliterated by a representation of illegal immigration as an uncontrollable flow of mostly young, male, African or Asian people who would do anything to get into Europe/the European Union. Again, the threat-level illegal immigration poses appears to be high, but the degree of sympathy present in the coverage already hints at some differences to the previous piece. The British public and its boundaries are positioned somewhat differently here. To make these changes in representation and positioning clearer, I will now consider the final piece, and then develop the shifting positions across all three pieces.

The third piece, broadcast on 18 September 2006, covers illegal immigration from North Korea into Thailand. The coverage consists of a comparatively lengthy introduction presented by Huw Edwards and a package by Jonathan Head, the BBC Southeast Asia correspondent. It is positioned as the penultimate story within the main part of the news programme. Head tells the story of seven women, who left North Korea to immigrate “illegally”, as Head mentions, into Thailand. The package picks up the day before they plan to cross the Mekong River from Laos into Thailand and concludes the following day with the women reporting themselves to the Thai
The representation of illegal immigration focuses on quite different aspects than in the previous two pieces: reasons why the woman left North Korea are cited but not fully explained. In fact their leaving is described as an “escape” and the fact that they have to illegally immigrate is described as a “must”. I will pick up on this particular aspect below in the context of defining spaces as unsafe and safe as well as the demonization of certain countries. Here it is important to note that it frames their migration in far more understanding terms, which is also reflected in other aspects of the piece: the women are shown living an everyday life in hiding; at several points in the coverage the women’s Christian faith is highlighted: they are shown praying; the people helping them on their journey are described as a “network of Christian activists”. One woman even gets to tell her own, personal story in an interview sequence, where she is shown crying over the young son she left behind in North Korea. These illegal immigrants are not an anonymous, threatening mass of people. They are portrayed as individuals with feelings, fears and hopes. A notion reinforced by the concluding remarks of the correspondent. Over pictures of the women praying, he says: “And then all they can do is wait and hope that the new life, that they’ve struggled so hard for, is not too far away. Jonathan Head. BBC News. Northeastern Thailand.” Those words suggest a high level of sympathy for the women and their migration experience. Absent are any notions that these illegal immigrants could pose a threat to their new host nation Thailand or to the British public. Again the boundaries drawn here are positioned rather differently from the previous two pieces.

Having mentioned the British public several times already, I will now turn my attention to locating this British collective, imagined community. I will do so by tracing the boundaries the three pieces draw. The British public, a British collective community is (re)constituted by an emphasis on borders and boundaries, an inside and an outside as well as the relationship suggested between the migrant Other and the British Self in the coverage. Building on the analysis of the representation of illegal immigration, I will highlight two elements in particular: the links the journalists establish between themselves and their audience, and the representations of borders, distances and geographical spaces.

One of the simplest and yet subtle ways for a journalist to connote a national frame of reference is through deictic expressions (Billig 1995, pp. 106-108). Among them, personal pronouns are a particularly prominent tool and an easy way to establish a link with an audience. In the first two examples Mark Easton and Richard Bilton do exactly that. Talking about the introduction of an electronic border around the UK, Easton says: “So, for the first time we will be able to identify the over-stayers.” Who exactly is this “we”, since Easton is unlikely to be the one who will do
the counting himself? This we encompasses more than the border official who will do the job, for Easton cannot count himself as part of such an exclusive we. In this case, I would argue, the we refers to the wider British society, or at least to that segment of British society that is watching the news that evening. A high level of perceived crisis leads to strong deictic references to the nation (Mihelj et al. 2009). By virtue of being British they all have the right to point at the over-stayers, the non-British Others who pass illegally among them.

Besides establishing a clear link between the journalist, the government and the British public, Easton’s segment on illegal immigration into Britain features a particularly interesting representation of borders as well as geographic space. Easton talks about the planned introduction of an electronic border, while a map of the United Kingdom is shown behind him on a screen. The coastline of Northern Ireland and its border with the Republic of Ireland, which itself is absent from the map, the coastline of England, Scotland and Wales, as well as the borders in-between them are flashing, while Easton says: “From 2008 there’ll be an electronic border around Britain.” Through his comment Easton places the emphasis on the external borders, i.e. the coastline and the border to the Republic of Ireland, and defines the boundary of the inside space, Britain. It is important to remember that this map is not a ‘false map’. This cartographic representation of the UK is accurate. But, I would argue, it contains a strong rhetoric (Harley 1992, p. 242), especially in what it does not show, its silences:

The notion of ‘silences’ on maps is central to any argument about the influence of their hidden political messages. It is asserted here that maps—just as much as examples of literature or the spoken word—exert a social influence through their omissions as much as by the features they depict and emphasise. (Harley 1988, p. 290)

The main silence of this map is the fact that no other geographic elements are shown on it, e.g. the Republic of Ireland or northern France. This, I would suggest, strengthens a sense of British insularity, even singularity. It is this space, and this space only the illegal immigrants want to enter. To do so they have to cross the border. It is this act that turns them from migrants into immigrants. As mentioned above, to become an im-migrant one has to cross a boundary from one space into another. However, there is no other space on this map, only the flashing border and the UK. In fact it is important to note that the dominant images in terms of footage described above, focus on this very point in the migrant experience. Climbing over fences and out of containers, immigrants are metaphorically captured and remain frozen in this act of crossing the border. Without representing any other space, they are seemingly coming from nowhere and everywhere. Their journey is thus reduced to crossing the boundary. This entry from the outside to the inside is made without permission and thus deemed illegal and
threatening. This is not a neutral crossing but represents a violation of this clearly demarcated boundary.

I also want to raise another cartographic point: the relationship between the journalist and the map. Easton is standing in the studio in front of the map, which is displayed on a screen behind him that shows a sequence of various images, among them the map, titles and other graphics. Most of the time the journalist is facing the camera, but at times he makes a half-turn towards the screen and gestures with his arm. The screen changes sync up perfectly with his gestures and his commentary. Though this happens without his doing anything visible, he appears to be in control of the process, in control of the map and by extension in control of the space it represents. In relation to images of military leaders, Harley suggests that they are frequently shown in front of maps to confirm or reassure their viewers about the writ of power over territory in the map. Map motifs continue to be accepted as geopolitical signs in contemporary society. (1988, p. 296)

Of course, Easton is not a military leader, but the interaction between him and the map through mere placement and level of control suggests certain similarities. Also, the use of the term we discussed above suggests that he sees himself as a somewhat privileged stand-in for the British public on whose behalf he “will be able to identify the overstayers”. His control of the map provides a level of assurance that he as well as we will be up to the task of controlling British space.

Tracing a British boundary in the second piece is more complex, as it is projected more subtly. To begin with, the link the journalist, Richard Bilton, establishes with the audience is less emphatically connoting Britain. He opens his package with the words:

Well, for most of us these islands are all about holidays, but increasingly in the dock areas they are seeing a different kind of arrival. The Canary Islands have become a frontline for illegal immigrants getting into the European Union.

Yes, the expression “for most us” establishes a fairly straightforward link with the audience and an oppositional position between an Us, who come to the Canary Islands on holiday, and an illegal immigrant Them, who come here for rather different reasons. However, the Britishness of this audience is far less marked than in Easton’s we. It is there in the generic ramifications of the piece: Bilton is after all a correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation (cf. Hannerz 2004 for a discussion of the role of the foreign correspondent), and the package is on a national news programme; but Britain is not explicitly referenced within the narrative of the piece itself.
In further difference to the coverage of illegal immigration to the UK, the piece actually establishes a relational geographic space. During Bruce’s introduction a map (physical representation only, without political borders) quickly zooms in on the Canary Islands on a screen behind her. The zoom starts with a frame showing mainland Europe (with the southern part of the UK just visible for a split second) and northern Africa. It finishes centred on the Canary Islands, with a section of the West African coast barely, but still showing. The boundary between an Us and a Them appears to be, is represented as a weaker one. Not only does the map establish a relational geographical space, it also highlights the proximity of the Canaries to mainland Africa in comparison to mainland Europe. The zoom could be interpreted both as emphasising the Canaries’ distance from Europe and their belonging to Europe. Other visual elements, however, the representation of the illegal immigrants, as well as the verbal level frame the Canaries as unquestionably European and re-establish a boundary between these European islands and migrants from Africa and Asia. I have addressed some of these other, visual and verbal elements above. One aspect, the usage of the terms Europe and European Union, I will expand on here briefly. In her introductions Bruce uses the less precise but culturally more emotive and evocative term Europe (Guibernau 2001, p. 2). Bilton for most of the time uses the term European Union, referencing a more administrative rather than culturally defined space. Still, he uses the term to differentiate and separate it from the spaces the migrants come from, Africa and Asia. These terms imply not administrative but cultural definitions of space. To him, too, the Canary Islands are “Europe’s southern border” as he describes them in the piece. In difference to the easily traceable lines of the piece on illegal immigration to the UK, the boundary has become a more diffuse border area. The islands, the sea around them, the nearby African coast, all are part of this area. To draw a precise borderline around Europe seems to be more problematic than to draw a line around the UK. This reflects the debates over the European border in terms of its eastward position discussed in chapter 2.2 (cf. also Eder 2006; Paasi 2001). The difficulty to define a precise European borderline also applies to the south, as the physical location of the Canaries as well as Morocco’s albeit rejected application for membership indicates (Rumelili 2004). Neither a geographic nor a cultural definition can fix this boundary precisely.

But where is Britain located in all this? So far this fuzzy boundary, this borderland space seems to run between Europe and the migrants. Also, compared to the first piece the boundary established is weaker and less clearly demarcated. The illegal immigrants are represented in a way that makes them appear less threatening—relatively speaking; the verbal and visual construction of spaces and boundaries is also less absolute and more relational. I would argue that this has to
do with a weaker identification of Britain with the EU (cf. Ash 2001 for an analysis of Britain and the issue of European identity; Grundy and Jamieson 2005 for a recent study on attitudes towards the EU in the UK; also see chapter 2.2 for more details). The UK is in the EU, but the union is still kept at arm’s length. These migrants may be illegal, they may cross “Europe’s southern border”, but they pose less of an immediate threat. The UK unlike most other EU as well as 3 non-EU countries has not signed the Schengen agreement. These migrants will have to cross another border check-point before they can get into the UK. So this is not a violation of the closest boundary around the British Us, but of a more distant borderland region. Still, ultimately, Britain and the borderland of the Canary Islands are part of the same space. They are enclosed by the same symbolic boundaries of Europe. The illegal immigrant is represented as the Other that crosses the boundaries against whom the boundaries need to be defended.

The final piece, the story of the North Korean women, does feature borders and boundaries but none that need to be defended. Nor does the journalist establish a direct link with the audience beyond the generic aspects mentioned previously. In stark contrast to the previous pieces, crossing boundaries illegally and thus questioning the boundaries’ validity seems to be the right thing to do, as the very different representation of the illegal immigrants in this piece suggests.

The emphasis on the struggle of their journey in Jonathan Head’s package is foreshadowed in the introduction by Huw Edwards. Again, a map features prominently in this piece. Here it is a map of eastern Asia in the introductory segment. This time the different countries are demarcated. The emphasis is not on the boundaries between countries, though, but on the space they occupy. Each country the women had to travel through has been filled in with a different colour. The adjoining countries are shown in standard physical map-style. A dotted line retraces the journey of the seven women, as Edwards mentions their “escape” and the threat of deportation they still face while moving through these spaces. In difference to the other two pieces the migrants come from a specific place and travel across specific space. The space itself is divided into unsafe areas (North Korea, China, Laos) and at least potentially safe areas (a safe house in Laos, Thailand). The journey is not reduced to crossing boundaries or entering borderlands. It is part of the journey but not its essence. The border between Thailand and Laos, the Mekong River, is in fact reduced to a physical and administrative boundary. The illegal crossing appears to be perfectly justified to get from an unsafe to a safe place.

This safe/unsafe dichotomy is presented here as self-evident and suggests a level of demonisation of space. Harvey argues how certain countries are being “demonized” for political purposes, for instance, to sustain “a belief in the US as the bearer of a global ethic” (2005, p.
220). I am not suggesting that North Korea is in fact a good place to live. What I am suggesting, however, is that the rogue state status North Korea has acquired in the mental geography of the public can be used as an apparently self-explanatory argument, one without explicit justification, for a particular case. Rather than assuming that most if not all migrants from there are economic migrants, an assumption which seems to be the underlying principle in the other two pieces analysed here, the assumption appears to be that all migrants from North Korea are victims of oppression. True, the correspondent implies oppression by mentioning that “a grim fate” would await the women were they to be caught and returned to North Korea. Also, introducing a sequence in which one woman tells of the child she had to leave behind, Head mentions that “exhaustion from working on a state farm and in a labour camp drove her to cross” the border into China. But these are allusions to oppression. It remains unclear to what extent these women were singled out or whether these experiences are part of everyday life in North Korea. Again, let me reiterate that I am neither suggesting that all is well in North Korea nor that these women have not suffered, merely that the definition of North Korea as a demonised space allows for a different framing of the women’s migration experience.

However, it is another spatial aspect that plays an important role here—distance. For without the various dimensions of distance, one could argue that the suggestion by the correspondent Richard Bilton in the piece on illegal migration into the EU that some of the migrants to the Canary Islands are from Asia should have sufficed to frame their migration in moral rather than economic terms as well. After all, the Asia Bilton refers to includes states such as Afghanistan, countries that could also be described as demonised. Of course, the issues such as the securitisation of migration (Wæver 1996) in particular in relation to the perception that these Asian migrants could pose a terrorist threat, play a part in the fact that the migrants are as demonised as the places they come from. Taking distance into account across all three news pieces, however, allows relating such issues back to the question of space.

The piece on illegal immigration to the UK contains three main spaces: the studio, Westminster, and the boundary locations, which the footage suggests are overrun by illegal immigrants. The transitions between the first and the second space are smoothed out by the standard journalistic practices of handing from one location to the other. Phrases such as Huw Edwards’ “First tonight, let’s join Nick Robinson” help to establish a link and a coherent space between the journalist in the studio and the journalist on location. Within the package, Robinson’s presence in Westminster locates the various pieces of footage of parliamentary debate, committee meetings and politician statements. It may not be clear where and when—in fact temporal
dimension is rather disjointed—each of the several statements from politicians that make up part of the piece were given or where the committee meeting that Robinson references took place, but the information provided connects it back to the wider space of British politics that is represented by Westminster and Nick Robinson’s presence in Westminster. The footage fragments of ‘illegal immigrants’ on the other hand do not connect to this space. They do not even connect to each other. They lack specificity in terms of location. They show British territorial boundaries as such. British boundaries that is, as developed above, which are apparently being violated constantly by illegal immigrants. Geographically speaking, measured in miles, the migrants are very close. They are right on the boundary line. In fact as the package suggests on a verbal level they are right among Us. However, the incoherence of the space they occupy makes it difficult to actually locate them. As suggested above the migrant space becomes a diffuse everywhere and nowhere. Considering the multimodal narrative techniques employed in the piece, it seems that they also emphasise this diffusion. The footage is shot either from some distance, in the instance of the men running along a fenced-in railway line, or from above, in the case of migrants climbing out of a container. Individuals cannot be identified. Furthermore, the footage has no natural soundtrack, i.e. sounds that are part of the footage itself. All you hear is Robinson’s commentary. Lacking a distinct aural anchor further heightens the diffusion that places migrants nearby and far away at the same time. Finally, I would like to point out that neither Edwards nor Robinson nor Easton appears to share the same space as the migrants. The migrants may potentially be everywhere, but they are not sharing the specific spaces the journalists occupy.

In the piece on illegal immigration to the EU, on the other hand, migrants and journalist are positioned differently to each other. The piece contains two dominant spaces: the studio with its implied location in the UK and the borderlands of the Canary Islands. Again, the transition between the two is smoothed out by standard aspects of news broadcasts. This time it is not only on a verbal level, but also on a visual level by the pan/zoom movement from a map showing the European peninsula including the UK onto the Canary Islands. As discussed above, this cartographic image shows relational space but also emphasises the geographic distance inherent in this relation. The spatial-temporal dimension on the Canary Islands itself is somewhat disjointed but there are five main strands. The correspondent Richard Bilton standing in a dockland area at night framing the package with a piece-to-camera. In between are three reportage sequences and one separate statement by an official spokesman of the Canary government that is positioned between the first two sequences: a rescue mission of a boatload of illegal immigrants from Asia, beginning at sea and ending with their arrival in port; and the
processing of what appears to be a different group of illegal immigrants from Africa, beginning with them sitting in a tent and ending with them departing in a bus—the start of a journey that, as Bilton suggests, will eventually take them to the Spanish mainland and thus into the mainland of the EU. Together these two sequences represent the illegal migrant experience in the borderland Canary Islands. The first sequence is entirely shot from long-distance, between several hundred metres and probably no less than 50 metres, with a long-shot to medium-long shot framing. In the second sequence the camera is much closer, no more than approximately 5 metres away. Most of the shots are full-body shots, but it also contains a close-up of a male African migrant’s face. The original soundtrack is slightly audible underneath Bilton’s commentary in both sequences. The third reportage sequence contains no migrants. Bilton is interviewing two Spanish fishermen in the harbour to get their opinion on the situation. Though it is unclear in what temporal relation the events represented in these five sequences have occurred, they contain enough verbal and visual information to establish a coherent news narrative in space and time. The moving in of the camera in the first two sequences, mirrors the shrinking of distance between the migrants and the EU. From the outer reaches of the borderland, the sea, they have come in close, the Canary Islands. Again, I would like to point out the position of the journalists relative to the migrants. The anchor, Fiona Bruce, is in the studio in the UK, clearly at a distance from the migrant, the distance in fact retraced by the pan/zoom movement across the map. The correspondent on the other hand is located in the same space as the migrant. Taking the correspondent as a stand-in for the British public this location shortens the symbolic distance between migrants and the audience somewhat. However, he does not share the same specific space with the migrant. He is clearly on the Canaries, but by sharing I mean encountering, being in the same exact location at the same time. The verbal level suggests that Bilton has indeed encountered migrants. Bruce mentions that the correspondent “witnessed the operation there”. And Bilton himself says, “I’ve seen over the last few days, to get in some people are prepared to take enormous risk”. These comments suggest co-presence. However, seeing and witnessing can be done from a distance—watching the news programme is in itself seeing and witnessing from a distance, a point mentioned above. A certain level of distance between Bilton and the migrants is maintained here. In those sequences that also contain images of migrants, the correspondent is not actually in the frame. Nor is his commentary recorded live at the time of when the images were recorded but it was added later on. He may have been present there, but even if he was, he did not seem to interact with the migrants and remained at a distance, behind the camera. Now, journalists are often neither seen nor heard in the spaces that are represented in a particular piece. However, I would argue that this is of particular relevance.
here, because this piece contains an internal contrast in which two dichotomous categories of people are treated differently. Not only is Bilton in the frame at the beginning; more importantly he is in the frame when talking to the Spanish fishermen, a sequence that is similar in terms of style to the reportage sequences containing the migrants. The fishermen are presented as locals, those who belong not only to the borderlands represented by the Canary Islands but to the heartland of the EU. Bilton is shown sharing space with the locals, but though in the same location he is positioned at a distance from the migrants.

In the third piece, on the migration of the North Korean women, the distance between journalist and migrants is further reduced. The piece presents only two main spaces: the studio and the space of migration. The latter could be subdivided. But its separate parts, North Korea, China, Laos, the safe house, the shores of the river, Thailand, the police station, are all presented as contiguous and as constituting a coherent space of the journey the women undertake in their migration. The transition between the two spaces is again achieved through a map, which at the same time emphasises the geographic distance between the UK and the location of the events about to be shown in the Far East of Asia. It is in this specific, coherent place of that the news is set. Involving the crossing from Laos into Thailand, the final part of the women’s journey represents the focus of the piece. It is told through a time-sequential narrative starting with the women waiting at the safe-house, leaving to cross the river, and finishing on the women entering the police station in Thailand to hand themselves in. The reportage elements of this journey are interrupted by interview sequences mentioned above as well as a sequence during which the women are shown praying in the background as Head walks past them talking to the camera. In terms of their placement these elements fit into the sequential progression of time within the narrative. As described above the narrative is very personal. The camera is close and the framing tight, the original soundtrack is at time, though not all the time, clearly audible. Though the journalist is not present throughout the journey he is present at this final stage. But not only is he seeing and witnessing, Head is interacting with the women, sharing the space, appearing in the same frame.

The representation of these boundaries suggests two possible locations for a British Us. One, they are at home—watching the news from a safe place and a safe distance. Despite crossing several borders in the process of their journey, the women never violate a boundary—symbolic or physical—that brings them closer to the British Us. The audience can witness (Ellis 2000) the women’s experience without necessarily being required or being put in a position to act. The story provides the audience with a “powerless knowledge” (ibid, p. 1) of events far way and a
connection to other members of the audience through their shared complicity (ibid, pp. 72-75). It is an explanation similar to the idea of a ‘spectatorship of suffering’, which can ultimately lead to ‘denial and fatigue’ (Chouliaraki 2006, p. 150). However, this spectatorship of suffering can also generate a degree of identification with those who suffer. As the level of othering is reduced, the sufferer, in this case the North Korean women may remain outsiders, but they are “now closer to the spectator’s own experiential world and within reach” (ibid, p. 125). The audience is still at home watching, but the boundary drawn around it includes the women in a cosmopolitan embrace.

**Conclusion**

I want to conclude by returning to Harvey to highlight the importance of the questions I have raised at the outset of this thesis:

   How can geographical knowledges be reconstituted to meet the needs of democratic global governance inspired by a cosmopolitan ethic of, for example, justice, fairness and reason? (2005, p. 220)

Though I cannot answer this question fully, what I hope to have demonstrated in this case study is that geographical knowledges are context-specific and can point towards a cosmopolitan ethic, as was the case in the piece on the migratory experience of the women from North Korea. It is a mere pointer towards such an ethic for three main reasons. For one, as suggested at the end of the previous section, it is not possible to make a judgement as to whether this geographic knowledge generates fatigue or action or whether it is just a reassertion of existing knowledge about certain regions and places (Szorenyi 2009, p. 98). Also, as the analyses of the other two pieces indicate, only certain conditions allow for the production of this type of knowledge. In those two contexts a more or less explicit re-assertion of the national in opposition to the migrants is evident. In their different positioning and definitions of space and drawing of boundaries, the coverage analysed above provides an illuminating example of Beck’s (2005b, p. 47) “transnational meta-power politics of plural boundary demarcations”. Finally, the third reason can be found in journalists’ approach to the topic of migration, an aspect not addressed so far that will be part of the final case study.
2.2. Nation State or Market Economy? — The ‘Liberal Paradox’ of EU Migration

Britain opened its doors to new countries like Poland. At the time the government expected up to fifteen thousand workers to come here. In the event nearly six hundred thousand could have arrived. It has been largely a success story, but there are concerns it could happen again. (BBC Journalist Gavin Hewitt on BBC 1 News at Ten, 26 September 2006)

On 1 January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania became members of the European Union. Due to the experiences of the previous, 2004-accession round and its high levels of migration not anticipated by the UK Home Office, substantial political debate on how to restrict potential migration from the two new EU-states was echoed by media discourses in Britain in the preceding months. However, the core of the coverage contained a paradox, as a closer look at the above quotation illustrates: what is it exactly that BBC journalist Gavin Hewitt proposes “could happen again”? a) Another underestimate? b) Another success story? Looking at Hewitt’s entire item does not provide a clear answer, but overall suggests that it is a) — another underestimate and further substantial migration. However, this answer only leads to another question: why the concern over a) if the previous underestimate led to “largely a success story”?

The paradox proposed by Hewitt’s comment is indicative of the coverage during that period: on the one hand, shock about the numbers and calls for restrictions; on the other, an analytical focus that represented EU migration from the 2004 accession countries in mainly economic terms, suggesting an overall positive impact on the UK. These contradictory aspects of the coverage bear a distinct resemblance to what Hollifield (2004) calls the liberal paradox of migration, a paradox faced by countries that have turned their focus towards the pursuit of a liberal/neo-liberal market economy but remain tied to notions of belonging that stem from modern-nation-state discourses. It arises because the imperatives of the market and the imperatives of the nation state pull in opposite directions, as Hollifield argues: “the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure.” (ibid, p. 887)

Similar to the case study analysing the coverage of so-called illegal immigration (chapter 2.1), the coverage of EU migration contains a discursive struggle between openness and closure. In the prior instance the struggle was mapped onto a spectrum between re-ethnicisation and cosmopolitanism. Now a different though connected spectrum applies. Again, one end, the end
tending towards closure follows the logic of re-ethnicisation, the logic of the nation state as a closed unit. The other, however, does not tend towards cosmopolitanism but, as suggested by Hollifield’s conceptualisation of the liberal paradox of migration, towards the forces of the open, neo-liberal market. Parallel to the exploration of the shifting boundaries of the imagined community in the context of the coverage of illegal immigration, an analysis of the coverage of EU migration allows me to draw conclusions about how this community is defined. This aspect is not necessarily the focus of the coverage, but it is part of the discursive structure within which EU migration is positioned. Borders and boundaries while still important play less of a role in the analytical line I aim to pursue here, so I will only briefly address the boundary issue in relation to Turkey and EU enlargement. Rather, the focus will rest on the relationship between the state and its populace. The dynamic generated by the liberal paradox, affects not only migration but also those who are considered to be part of the established, British imagined community. In the process of its continuing back-and-forth, the relationship between the state and the populace, the notion of what it means to be a citizen undergoes a gradual transformation, first in political then as a result of the political in legal terms, from one primarily defined by a closed nation—even if one that is defined, as suggested in the first chapter, as a multicultural and multinational one—to one increasingly defined by the open market.

However, as is to be expected of a dynamic generated by a paradox that can be characterised as a back-and-forth, the transformation is uneven. The political dimension is heavily contested. In the specific context of EU migration two strands of the political debate play a particularly important role, one domestic, the other on a foreign politics/international relations level. On the foreign level, it is Britain’s ambivalent attitude towards the EU that influences the debate. Specific to EU enlargement this attitude not only seems ambivalent but, on the face of it, almost contradictory. It is defined by a re-assertion of British sovereignty, on the one hand, and by the UK government’s comparative willingness to expand the EU, which could be considered a challenge to its sovereignty, on the other. But in fact this apparent contradiction is resolved, as EU enlargement is turned into the very instrument for re-asserting sovereignty within an open market agenda. The second strand formed a key part of the domestic political agenda at the time and relates directly to the politics of migration discussed previously: the alleged inability of the Home Office to deal with not just EU migration but migration in general, as detailed in chapters 1.3 and 2.1. The international relations strand is based on a logic of openness; the domestic strand on a logic of closure. When the two connect, as they did in the course of 2006, the dynamics of the liberal paradox are thrown into relief on television news: on the one hand, an
interpretation of EU migration in mainly economic, often positive terms; on the other, a renegotiation of this legal migration movement as a threat to national stability.

In this chapter, I will develop these points in greater detail by focussing on an analysis of coverage of already existing EU migration and of the two new member states over the six-month monitoring period in 2006, the year before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. To compare and contrast what was a boom period for the British economy with the more difficult economic climate of recent years, I also draw on additional material from January 2009. This later coverage pertains to so-called wildcat strikes that occurred throughout the UK in reaction to the awarding of construction contracts for work to be carried out in the UK to non-British companies from other EU countries. Before analysing the coverage, I will set the political and theoretical context in which the analysis is positioned. In terms of the political context, I will address Britain’s ambivalent attitude to the EU, the strand of foreign politics mentioned above, in particular in relation to the connection between the processes of integration and enlargement. Details on the other political strand, the strand of domestic politics can be found in chapters 1.3 and 2.1. The section on the political context concludes with a review of the literature on British media coverage of the EU. This will be followed by a section on the liberal paradox and its impact on citizenship to provide the necessary theoretical context for the analysis.

The UK and European Integration
A very brief overview of EU history is necessary to understand the complexity of contemporary European boundary formation. The origins of the European Union go back more than 50 years. The first formal step was taken with the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community. It consisted of France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux states Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Seven years later, on 1 January 1958 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community. The motivation for the ECSC and later the EEC was mainly twofold. It was meant to serve as a check on the resurgence of Germany, the instigator of the two preceding World Wars (Gilbert and Large 1991, p. 393). In the age of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union the ECSC and EEC were also considered as political bulwarks of the Western, US-orientated Bloc against the advances of the Eastern Bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union: “Europe was seen as consisting of two halves—the Atlantic Europe or the Europe of the US, and Eastern Europe or the Europe of the Soviet Union” (Paasi 2001, p. 11).
The early treaties affected a comparatively limited number of issues related to economic and industrial topics. Over the years this has changed substantially. The ECSC has not only changed its name, first to EEC later to European Community (EC) then to European Union (EU). It has grown in size from the six original members to 27 today and has also gradually taken on ever more responsibilities (cf. Börzel 2005 for a summary of what is called the task expansion of the EU over time).

These processes of enlargement and integration are the outcome of an unresolved debate. The core of the debate rests on two main approaches to European integration, the intergovernmental approach and the neo-functional approach, which can be summarised thus (Risse 2005, p. 300): “liberal intergovernmentalism predicts that constitutional powers will remain with the member states, while neofunctionalism would expect an ever-increasing role for supranational institutions.” The intergovernmental approach is at the heart of the founding principle of the EU. An organisation that rests on treaties between governments is by its very nature intergovernmental. By signing these treaties, though, these governments have given up part of their sovereignty to the EU (Giesen and Eder 2001, p. 1). The debates in EU member states about the EU often centre on the question to what degree sovereignty should be surrendered to central EU institutions. The spectrum reaches from the EU as a European super-state, with all power resting centrally with the Union, to the EU as a strictly intergovernmental organisation, i.e., as little central power as possible. This constant debate has lead to an uneven situation where some areas are more integrated than others (Börzel 2005, p. 231).

Since the UK joined what was then the EEC in 1973, it has mostly pursued an intergovernmental approach and has taken an ambivalent, to the point of overtly critical stance to the European project. So-called Euroscepticism has been and is an attitude held by a substantial number of politicians (cf. Aspinwall 2000; Gifford 2006; Usherwood 2002), members of the public (cf. Bruter 2004, pp. 27-28; European Commission 2007, p. 23) and is also reflected by parts of the British media (see detailed literature review section below). Ash (2001: i) ascribes this attitude to the idea of a British “exceptionalism told by the ‘Island Story’ school of historians”. This view is echoed by Gifford (2006, p. 857), who contends that Euroscepticism is in fact the outcome of a reassertion of British exceptionalism in the face of a post-imperial crisis of legitimation (ibid, p. 851). This in turn ties in with Ichijo’s (2005, 2008) description of Britain’s relationship with Europe as a “balancing act” defined by contemporary, if outdated discourses of sovereignty, in which the concept of sovereignty is closely related to that of identity (Ichijo 2008,
pp. 2-5). In this model, Britain just like other states is involved in a sovereignty trade-off with the EU. Unlike the situation in other states, Ichijo states,

Sovereignty in Britain in the twenty-first century is something that penetrates even the view of the people on the street. In fact, sovereignty is often depicted and described as the very essence of British national identity. (ibid, p. 3)

As a consequence, on the one hand, successive British governments decided to remain outside the Eurozone, the area comprised of those EU countries that share the Euro, the common European currency, as well as the previously mentioned Schengen area, in which some EU countries and other European countries operate a policy of open internal and closed external borders. On the other hand, when 10 European states, most of them successor states of former Eastern Bloc states, joined the EU on 1 May 2004, Britain was one of only 3 existing EU member states that immediately granted people from the new member states the right of free movement as well as the right to come to Britain to live and to work here. This reflected an overall positive attitude towards EU enlargement by the UK government as well as opposition parties at the time (Ichijo 2008, p. 58). The apparently contradictory approach—pro-enlargement but contra-Euro as well as other aspects of integration—can partly be explained by the fact that not all aspects of EU integration are considered to have an impact on sovereignty. Levels of Euroscepticism can thus be explained by whether a particular issue trade-off is considered to be beneficial for or indeed threatening to Britain as a self-contained unit, to British sovereignty. In fact enlargement in itself did “not touch on the sovereignty issue” (ibid, p. 60). Moreover, as I will explain below, enlargement became part of a strategy of British sovereignty maintenance.

Besides legal and economic integration, enlargement is the third major process involved in the EU project. Successive strategies of enlargement have been adapted to the geo-political changes on the continent. Until the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s early 1990s and on up until the middle of that decade, the main strategy was towards enlargement among the western and southern parts of the continent, parts not under Soviet influence. Together with Denmark and Ireland, Britain was part of the first enlargement phase, during which industrialised, democratic states in Western Europe became members of the EEC. During the second phase in the 1980s the former dictatorships of Spain, Portugal and Greece joined, to encourage democratic developments in those countries (McCormick 2002: 71-72). Finally, in the mid-1990s Austria, Sweden and Finland became part of the EU, bringing the era of enlargement under the auspices of the Cold War geopolitical order to an end.
With the Soviet Union’s loss of influence over its former satellite states and its dissolution into a number of successor states the EU’s scope for enlargement widened.

A new strategy was adopted to take account of the changed circumstances in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which revised the procedures to gain membership. 12 new member states have since joined the EU, 10 in 2004, 8 of which had been part of the Soviet sphere of influence, and 2 in 2007, with several more candidates at various stages of the application process. On the face of it, the recent enlargement represents a continuation of the founding idea mentioned above, of establishing an internal space of peace and prosperity on the continent, of “creating a ‘Europe whole and free’”, which was a strategy that “was widespread and was closely associated with EU enlargement” (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, p. 520). It is also a continuation of an external policy dimension. The EU may no longer be primarily directed against the Soviet Union or Russia, its main successor state, but the enlargement process represents the EU’s attempt to assert its political influence over the continent and as a global actor (cf. Diez 2005; Hill 1993 for summaries of the debate).

If this were the case, enlargement could indeed become an issue that touches upon sovereignty. However, the speed and scope of this process is a highly contentious issue between the member states, and “the proclaimed commonality of policy is often more declamatory than real” (Maull 2005, p. 791). Reflecting the difference in approach to the EU explained above, member states pursue their own strategic goals in their policies towards the EU that also map onto their domestic priorities (Larsen 1999). In relation to enlargement for instance, some member states want to slow down enlargement until the EU becomes more stable internally through further centralisation, while other member states favour enlargement in the hope that it requires the EU to remain a loser, inter-governmental association. Some suggest that the latter is the reason why the UK government, for instance, has been favourably inclined towards further enlargement in general and Turkish membership in particular (Koenig et al. 2006; Negrine et al. 2008) at least for some time.

The candidature of Turkey is a hugely controversial issue. Starting from the fundamental question as to whether the country can actually be considered a European state, as “Historically Turkey has been the ‘other’ for Europe” (Keyder 2006, p. 72). The debate over Turkish membership highlights the fact that there is no agreement among member states as to the political (cf. Christiansen et al. 2000) and cultural boundaries (cf. Eder 2006) of Europe. But the issue of boundaries and boundary formation is not limited to the ultimate line of division between European and non-European space. Faced with changing political circumstances the
EU has had to continuously redefine its fuzzy boundaries (Christiansen et al. 2000). This redefinition is part of what Eder (ibid, pp. 261-262) describes as a “series of transformations and cycles of narrative legitimacy” through which the EU places itself in a wider narrative cycle about Europe. In the context of enlargement, the EU has to deal with four levels of political transformations in relation to boundary formation that are reflected on a narrative level—what I call narratives about the ultimate, the final, the interim, and the internal boundary levels.

The ultimate is the boundary between what is considered to be Europe and what is not. It is a boundary defined by absolute exclusion of those beyond it. It is discursively constructed and ultimately temporary, but has currently considerable discursive strength and is relatively fixed; even if, as the debate of Turkish membership shows, the exact position of the fault line is difficult to pinpoint: Turkey may be within this boundary hence it is a candidate; whereas Morocco is seen to be definitely outside, as the rejection of its membership application on grounds of the country not being European indicates (Eder 2006, p. 263; Rumelili 2004, pp. 42-44). In difference to the ultimate, the final boundary is less fixed. It represents the greatest possible extent of the EU within the European space defined by the ultimate boundary. It is the finishing line of the European project at any one time. Its finality is only temporary, however, as the potential for enlargement changes with shifts in economic and political conditions. Pre-1989 hardly anyone anticipated the sudden demise of the Eastern Bloc and the potential for some of these Bloc states to become part of the EU. Then, the Iron Curtain represented the ‘final’ boundary of the integration project. Today the final boundary has been pushed eastward towards Russia’s western border. Russia itself, despite parts of it being considered European, remains outside the current final boundaries (cf. Flenley 2008; Morozov 2003).

While the ultimate and final boundaries are relatively abstract concepts, the interim boundaries are rather specific. They represent the actual borderline and the boundary space around the EU. Shifting with each enlargement stage, they need to be redefined and re-established comparatively frequently not only administratively but also symbolically and thus require the most maintenance in conjunction with the fourth, the internal boundary level. As a state becomes a member of the EU, it switches sides along the interim boundary line from the outside to the inside space. In the process its former border with the EU becomes an internal EU border. This sudden political transformation of the border has to be supported by a more gradual narrative transformation of the boundary, which, as Eder (2006) suggests can be rather difficult: “the test of Europe might turn out not to be so much on the construction of its outer boundaries and the making of its
outer borders, as current debates propose, but much more on some inner boundaries” (ibid, p. 269).

Administratively the maintenance of all four boundary dimensions is conducted through treaties, associations of varying closeness and in some cases candidature and the promise of eventual membership (Lavenex 2004, p. 683). With the current halt on further membership, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has become a key tool in the process of boundary maintenance. The ENP in particular is designed to shape the non-EU boundary space around the interim and final boundary lines to the advantage of the EU without necessarily having to use the bargaining chip of membership:

The optimism that this policy framework can achieve these goals is evident in the policy’s proclaimed ambition that the neighbouring countries will constitute a benevolent and stable ‘ring of friends’. (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, p. 520)

Part of the ENP and its policy and administrative process is also a normative categorisation of the geographic space, which again implies levels of symbolic proximity to and distance from the EU and translates into different policies towards these areas (cf. Rumelili 2004 for an analysis of the policies towards the Central Eastern European Countries). In order to gain closer partnership, states need to undergo a process of so-called Europeanisation along lines set out by the EU. The ENP functions as an inclusion/exclusion mechanism, as for some countries the eventual trade off for undergoing this process was/is EU membership. Aspects involved in this process include market and judicial reforms, addressing human rights issue, cooperation on controlling borders and migration, and combating crime (cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 for a summary of this process in the 2004 accession states). Because of its focus on certain specific aspects in these areas, the shifting of boundaries on the administrative level is theoretically a process of ticking the boxes. However, the ticking of boxes may be influenced at times by politics and by the difficulty to shift the boundaries on the symbolic levels. As Eder’s (2006) quotation cited above suggests: the administrative process of Europeanisation could at any one time be ahead of the narrative symbolic transition.

Boundaries and the process of othering they highlight, play an important role in identity formation and maintenance. However, in the context of the EU enlargement these boundaries have repeatedly shifted and thus spaces that had previously been considered part of the Other became part of the Self. This may have been space considered less other than some, i.e. some sense of shared Europeanness may have existed, but this repeated redefinition nonetheless poses a constant challenge to settling an identity within the EU. The difficulty of defining and
maintaining a European identity has been widely debated (cf. Bruter 2005 for a summary of this debate), but is not central to the issues discussed here. It is only relevant insofar as it ties in with debates over EU citizenship, which I will discuss further below, and to the extent it relates to the ambivalent attitude of Britain towards the EU.

Coming back to Ichijo’s (2005, 2008) argument about UK-EU relations, I would suggest that enlargement as a strategy to maintain sovereignty was contingent on it appearing to be separate from a sovereignty trade-off. When enlargement became connected to the issue of migration from the 2004 accession states the contingency began to unravel. Before I explain this in more detail in relation to the liberal paradox (Hollifield 2004), I will show how discourses in the British media reflect the political and public discourses about the EC/EU and Europe described so far.

The UK Media and European Integration

A number of studies into the representation of Europe and the EU in the British media have found discourses that reflect the UK-EC/EU relations described above. Dalton and Duval (1986) analysed coverage of the EC in the Sun and the Guardian newspapers as part of their research into British attitudes towards European integration in the 1970s. They found interesting parallels between public opinion and media discourses and concluded:

the long-term baseline for British opinions of the EC is predominantly negative. Except for accession and the 1975 referendum, the British have generally been critical of European integration. Thus, we cannot assume that a reservoir of diffuse support exists in Britain to sustain the Community through the next steps in the integration process. (ibid, p. 134)

While Dalton and Duval’s prediction has not come true in the sense that integration has continued and the UK remains an EU member, a critical and often negative attitude towards the EU in large sections of the British media has been confirmed by in a number of studies since. These studies have not just addressed issues of representation in print (Anderson and Weymouth 1999; Hardt-Mautner 1995; Koenig et al. 2006; Mihelj et al. 2008; Musolf 2000, 2004; Negrine et al. 2008; Richardson and Franklin 2004) and broadcast media (Gavin 2000, 2007; Independent Panel 2005; Kevin 2003; Peter and de Vreese 2004; Peter et al. 2004; Peter et al. 2003), which are of particular relevance here, but also journalistic practice (Gavin 2001, 2007; Independent Panel 2005; Morgan 1995) as well as media audiences (Bruter 2003; 2004; Carey and Burton 2004) and media strategies employed by British politicians (Independent Panel 2005; Morgan 1991, 1998; Richardson and Franklin 2004) in relation to the EU.

Research into the content of national print media has focussed on newspapers and has often assigned the various outlets an either Eurosceptic/anti-European or Europhile attitude (cf.
Hardt-Mautner (1995) with the former group dominating the market (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, p. 61). According to these studies coverage is structured by a limited number of key themes. Similar to what Ash (2001) called the historical discourse of exceptionalism, Hardt-Mautner (1995, p. 181) focussing on the anti-European tabloid *Sun* identified “Britain’s isolation from the rest of the EC” as the “most salient topoi”:

The physical correlative is the geographical separation of the British Isles from mainland Europe, and this is then extended to refer to other, non-material forms of separation and distance such as economic and political isolation. (ibid)

These topoi are then expressed in the coverage by emphasising 1) a sense of distance and isolation, 2) the EC as a threat to national identity, 3) prejudices against other countries (ibid, p. 198). Based on wider sample Anderson and Weymouth also found three main themes in the coverage of the Eurosceptic press that show an extensive overlap with Hardt-Mautner’s:

- economic (with socio-political undertones),
- political (mainly sovereignty and defense issues),
- historico-cultural, including at its most extreme, a palpable dislike of foreigners, and of Germany in particular. (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, p. 63)

It is interesting to note that these themes structure the coverage of the pro-European press, too (ibid, p. 98). This segment of the press, however, develops these themes in more positive, albeit at times critical directions (ibid, p. 184), e.g., both the pro- and the anti-European press focus on history and culture, but rather than implying German “expansionist ambitions” (ibid, p. 63) in the guise of the EU as the latter does, the pro-European press sees “Europe as a legitimate economic, political and social space” (ibid, p. 98). But even though, these issues are debated from two angles, the dominance of the Eurosceptic press is overwhelming. Approaching the issue from an explicitly acknowledged pro-European stance Anderson and Weymouth conclude that the “majority of the reading public is indeed insulted by the quality of the press performance with regard to European issues” (ibid, p. 185). They suggest that alternative sources of information may provide a better, more balanced view. They identify public service broadcasting (PSB) as one of those sources, but express concerns about its declining influence in the UK (ibid, pp. 185-186).

The potential of PSB to offset the negativity of the press is shared by Gavin (2007) in his analysis of the roles press and television play in British politics, but he also shares Anderson and Weymouth’s concerns about PSB: “The broadcasters may cease, in respect to Europe, to act as a counterbalance to a press which is vocal, raucous, opinionated, highly partial and occasionally dishonest” (ibid, pp. 41-42). Based on his analysis of economic news within BBC and ITN news programmes between 1997 and 2001, Gavin contends, that it could come to this situation, if
current downward trends in terms of quantity and quality of broadcasting news on PSB channels including the BBC continue. That PSB and print media in Britain already share similar approaches becomes clear when looking at an earlier study (Gavin 2000) based on parts of the same data set. The three main types of television news stories show parallels to the themes identified by Hardt-Mautner (1995) and Anderson and Weymouth (1999) in the press: 1) “stories about benefit and loss for British individuals, social groups or organisations” (Gavin 2000, p. 364); 2) “gain or loss for British national interests” (ibid, p. 365); 3) “news about other countries within Europe” (ibid, p. 365). Again, these stories could have been developed in an apparently neutral, negative or positive direction towards Europe, but Gavin (ibid, p. 366) concludes that overall the coverage emphasised negative aspects and symbolically constructed a Britain that is somewhat positioned as separate from Europe (ibid, p. 362).

Besides Gavin’s analyses of economic news, there have been several other studies looking at the British broadcast media and its coverage of Europe (Independent Panel 2005; Kevin 2003; Peter and de Vreese 2004; Peter et al. 2004; Peter et al. 2003). Apart from the Independent Panel (2005) report, which looked specifically at the coverage of Europe in BBC news programmes in 2004, the studies involved cross-national comparisons and the data stems from the years 1999 and 2000. Approaching the issue from a quantitative perspective, these studies analyse aspects of frequency and prominence of EU-related topics channel-wide (Kevin 2003) as well as news-programme-specific (Peter and de Vreese 2004; Peter et al. 2004; Peter et al. 2003) and are often concerned with questions regarding the development of a European public sphere, aspects which are not the focus of this case study. What is of relevance though, is that all these studies consider UK television news to be negatively inclined towards the EU. However, in their analysis of EU news that are not focussed on a particular EU-related event such as EU parliamentary elections, Peter et al. (2003, p. 322) found that British television news may actually not be the most sceptical or negative when compared to other countries.

With a specific focus on BBC news programmes, the question of a negative or positive slant, in short of bias, has been addressed more recently by an Independent Panel (2005) report. Looking at production practices as well as news content relating to the EU, the panel investigated whether the BBC “is systematically Europhile” (ibid, p. 2)—rather than Eurosceptic, which is what the other studies seem to suggest. It concluded that the BBC was not deliberately Europhile; in fact the panel suggested the corporation tried to be impartial, but failed at times and thus needed to improve its coverage. In fact the report found that “partiality seems to flow both ways at different times and with different intensities” (ibid, p. 4). As an example of partiality flowing in
an anti-European direction the report cited the issue of enlargement, which according to the panel “focused too much on fears of mass migration” (ibid, p. 4). Another interesting aspect is the “Westminster prism” the panel found existed in the coverage in (ibid, pp. 6-7). This reliance on domestic viewpoints, e.g. MP rather than MEP sources and interpretative frames based on national party politics are also considered important factors that influence the coverage of EU by other research (cf. Peter and de Vreese 2004, pp. 6-8). The domestic frame will also play an important part in the argument put forward here. Building on the ‘Home Office in Chaos’ narrative (see chapters 1.3 and 2.1) the link between migration and domestic politics will be developed further in the contexts of EU migration and enlargement.

In fact, the issue of recent enlargement mentioned in passing by the Independent Panel Report has so far not been addressed sufficiently in relation to British television news. Some related studies, however, provide some background in which to position this case study. Schuck and de Vreese (2006) have studied media effects of the news coverage of the 2004 enlargement in Germany, using newspapers to analyse media content. They suggest a connection between public support and the balance between risk and opportunity frames in the news. They found the coverage to be balanced but note that “public opinion about EU integration could shift in one or the other direction if either of the two frames received more emphasis within news coverage” (ibid, p. 22). While I do not intend to make claims about public opinion, the risk and opportunity dichotomy provides an interesting point of reference for the discourses constructed in the television coverage analysed for this case study. Another reference point is offered by research on a related topic: the debate over the status of Turkey as a potential EU member state (Koenig et al. 2006; Negrine et al. 2008). Again, these studies focus on newspaper coverage, this time in a number of countries including the UK. Both found more support for Turkish accession in the British media than in other countries. Both traced this support back to the UK’s attitude towards the EU. Acknowledging the similarity of their argument with Koenig et al, Negrine et al. conclude:

For the British press, that Turkey was a Muslim country, large and poor, was no more than a statement of fact and, in itself, not a cause for rejecting Turkey….As we have seen, the French and British positions varied because of their perspectives on both Turkey and the EU but also because of their perspectives on what the objectives underpinning Turkey’s membership signified, namely, either a union that had to be similar in order for it to be strong and united in order to counterbalance US global power or a federal, neoliberal and loose union of states in which cultural differences were not significant (see also Koenig et al., 2006: 158-60). (Negrine et al. 2008, p. 64)

This difference is also linked to differences in debates or concerns of collective identities in the respective countries. Negrine et al. (ibid, p. 48) cite Trenz (2004), who argues that EU-level
debates regardless of topic tend to be linked to “debates over the collective identity” (ibid, p. 309) in the member states. For Negrine et al. (2008) the support for Turkey, for a widening, opening-up of the EU also implied an assertion of Britain, in order to “differentiate between continental European history and British history” (ibid, p. 63).

In the context of this case-study three aspects need to be highlighted, of what has been addressed so far. a) Media discourses reflect the broad spectrum of political discourses of the UK-EU relationship, the international relations strand of the dynamic proposed at the beginning of this case study. b) These discourses are not uniformly and overtly Eurosceptic. Rather, in relation to the EU and the process of enlargement in particular, they suggest parallels not only to Ash’s argument about Britain’s relationship with the EU, but points at a discursive struggle between openness and closure: a tactical support for openness employed as part of a strategy of self-assertion. c) Self-assertion, of course, does not necessarily entail closure. However, as the analysis of the data will show self-assertion turns towards closure as the tactical support for openness comes under pressure. Less the result of the international relations between the UK and the EU, the pressure is primarily the outcome of a spill-over effect of the tactic of enlargement: EU migration from the 2004-accession countries to the UK. In the next section, I will address how this issue formed part of the domestic politics strand and became caught up in the dynamic of the liberal paradox of migration (Hollifield 2004).

**The UK and EU Migration—a Liberal Paradox**

The concept of EU integration as a sovereignty trade-off helps in explaining the ambivalence of UK-EU relations as well as the issues of integration and enlargement in general. However, it does not fully account for the contradictory attitudes towards EU migration in particular: on the one hand, the initial openness towards EU migration in 2004 on a policy level; on the other, the call for restrictions in 2006. Of course the change could be solely put down to the passage of time, to the experience gathered since 2004. As I will show below in the analysis of the news coverage at the time, this explanation does not suffice. Instead I would suggest that news coverage and policy changes display the characteristics of the liberal paradox of migration (Hollifield 2004).

As I have written above, in the introduction to this case study, this paradox represents a dynamic generated out of two opposing approaches to migration that are inherent in nation states that operate on the basis of a liberal market economy, such as the UK: “the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure” (Hollifield 2004,
The paradox cannot be resolved, but a temporary suspension or equilibrium can be achieved depending on contextual factors. In Britain, in 2006 the core of the paradox was heavily contested, as the issue of migration became a key part of domestic politics that were also played out on the news. My analysis will show that supporting openness, parts of the coverage focussed on an economic analysis of the situation, which emphasised an overall benefit and a relatively small negative impact on social services from EU migration. This was contrasted with an emphasis on the sheer number of EU migrants that were believed to have come to the UK. This tied in with wider concerns about migration and a perceived inability by the British state to control migration, which led to demands for caution and closure. By 2009 the terms of the debate over the paradox as it relates to EU migration had changed. With the UK in an economic downturn, the liberal or rather neo-liberal economic logic seemed to be in retreat. Also, the argument for closure was no longer primarily about the loss of control over migration but whether the nation state should safeguard the employment prospects of what it considers to be its own people.

I have intentionally used the rather clumsy expression ‘its own people’ rather than citizens, to highlight that citizenship and what constitutes ‘its own people’ is actually the contested subject at the core of this debate. It may not necessarily be talked about explicitly in the coverage, but through it groups of people are discursively positioned into various categories of citizenship. In analysing this classification I follow Bauder’s (2008) conceptualisation of citizenship status as social capital that is used to establish a hierarchical “ordering principle” (ibid, p. 320) of participants in the labour market. Status is assigned through the evaluation of formal and informal characteristics. Bauder’s simple formal/informal distinction is helpful, because it can draw on elements of different citizenship definitions without being constrained by their classifications. It reaches beyond and at the same time draws on such elements as the civil, the political and the social (Marshall [1950] 1994) to define citizenship models such as civic and ethnic models (e.g. Bloemraad et al. 2008), as well as paradigmatic approaches based on the individualist, the political or the collective identity paradigms (Giesen and Eder 2001). Formal citizenship rests on legal status “that is strategically created, endorsed, and valorized by the collective membership of a national community or the political elites that claim to represent them” (Bauder 2008, p. 323). As Bauder also argues, formal citizenship does not necessarily in itself suffice to have high levels of capital (ibid, p. 326). Building on arguments put forward by Yuval-Davis (2007) and discussed in the first chapter, Bauder suggests that these informal, often less tangible aspects are “related to practices of identity and belonging” (Bauder 2008, p. 326) and denies formal citizens access to the nation-state community, because access to this
community is regulated by informal citizenship characteristics. Depending on their background migrants have varying levels of citizenship capital that accord or deny them access and rights not only to the labour market but also to the wider system of the industrialised, liberal democratic state (ibid, p. 325).

Bauder agrees with Yuval-Davis that notions of race play an important part in this process of exclusion, and that “[i]n fact, racial markers often signify cultural non-belonging” (ibid). Because racial markers are so significant in general but less applicable to EU migration, Bauder along with others scholars (cf. Eder and Giesen 2001; Garapich 2008) posits that processes of EU integration are establishing or even have established “new collective identities of unity and difference” (Bauder 2008, p. 329) within Europe beyond the level of the nation state. Followed to its logical conclusion this would suggest that EU migrants besides their formal citizenship status as EU citizen, which confers formal citizenship rights throughout the EU, can also attain high levels of informal citizenship capital because of their perceived cultural and racial proximity. This is also borne out by Ford’s analysis of policy and public attitudes in Britain towards different migrant groups based on their point of origin:

There is a long-established preference for white over non-white immigration, reflected both in the reactions of the British public to migrant settlement and in the behaviour of elite policy-makers since 1948. (2011, p. 1022)

This could mean that they are outside the constraints posed by the liberal paradox. In my opinion, this assessment is only partially correct. I would agree that EU migrants tend to have higher levels of citizenship capital when compared with migrants that are classified into other categories, for instance, refugees and asylum-seekers or so-called illegal immigrants. On the other hand I would argue that EU migrants are a) not a homogenous category, some individuals and groups are higher up, others are lower down the scale and b) as a consequence, the liberal paradox applies to them as well and they face challenges to their citizenship capital, both in regards to its formal and informal aspects. Again, Ford’s (ibid, p. 1023) research appears to support these points: “Eastern Europeans have been the cause of more controversy, suggesting that migrants from this region are more negatively regarded.” Their inclusion in the its-own-people category is at best contingent and temporary.

On the formal level, despite its legal codification, EU citizenship has not become valorised fully in practice (cf. Favell and Hansen 2002; Hansen 2009; Liebert 2007). I would argue that this failure to translate formal EU citizenship into formal citizenship capital reflects a general trend in
the development of citizenship rights in the context of the modern nation state in a neo-liberal context. In relation to this Ong observes:

We used to think of different dimensions of citizenship—rights, entitlements, a state, territoriality, etc.—as more or less tied together. Increasingly, some of these components are becoming disarticulated from each other, and articulated with diverse universalizing norms defined by markets, neoliberal values, or human rights. (2006, p. 500)

In its overlapping and at times contradictory position in relation to national citizenship regimes, EU citizenship has become disarticulated in practice. It is less concerned with equality and human rights (Liebert 2007) but is mostly restricted to the economic, market dimension. In fact, Favell and Hansen (2002, p. 598) describe it as “little more than a fancy PR packaging of minimal cross-national economic rights for workers in the EU” to facilitate the market at the heart of the integration process (ibid, p. 597). However, this PR packaging and the centrality of the market has consequences not only for migrant but also for the non-migrant citizens, because it also challenges “the privileged status of nationals and older migrants” (ibid). Ong (2006, p. 500) echoes this concern when she argues: “unregulated markets and migrant flows threaten protections associated with liberal traditions.” In difference to the meaning of the term liberal in the economic, free-market sense used by Hollifield—what Ong calls neo-liberal—liberal here is used in the American sense of the word, i.e., systems of social security embodied in the idea of the welfare state. The result of this process is a shift in the idea of citizenship that is based on the supply-and-demand dynamics of the market. Consequently, what Ong (2006) calls flexible citizenship, others have termed this new type market citizenship (Fudge 2005; Harvey 2001b; Schild 1998). Either term implies fundamental changes in the relationship between the state and its citizens. A process that has already started in the UK:

in Tony Blair’s New Britannica, citizens are generally governed ‘through freedom’, or an inducement for formally free subjects to make calculative choices on their own behalf. Government is no longer interested in taking care of every citizen, but wants him/her to act as a free subject who self-actualizes and relies on autonomous action to confront globalized insecurities. (Ong 2006, p. 501)

As Ong points out, not only does this concept put the market at the centre of state-citizens relations, it also posits the individual as a “homo economicus[,] as an instrumentalist figure forged in the effervescent conditions of market competition.” (ibid, p. 501, original emphasis) However, while this is a process that primarily targets formal aspects of citizenship through legislative and policy change, such as changes in unemployment benefits towards a work-for-benefits regime, it may have had and is having a spill-over effect onto the informal realm as well. Also, the state in pursuing the neo-liberal agenda has to accept a loss of control, a “letting go” of their need to control governance over the flow of capital, goods, services and persons” (Favell and Hansen
2002, p. 598). However, these processes have not entirely supplanted previous ideas of citizenship based on notions of cultural belonging, nor have they supplanted previous ideas about the role of the nation state. The result: an uneven as well as back-and-forth dynamic of change that can be mapped onto the liberal paradox.

On the basis of an analysis of the television news coverage of EU migration, I will argue in the following section that the opposing forces, the discursive struggle might become visible, in instances when the state decides to let go of control as well as in instances when the state tries to re-seize control in “forms of restriction centred on preserving citizenship and welfare rights for recognised members only” (ibid, p. 582). This discursive struggle will become visible for certain when claims are made on the basis of the old citizenship regime, but the state is no longer in a position to validate these claims, to (re-)seize control. In the first instance when the liberal paradox comes into view it appears to apply to migration only; in the second, its wider ramifications to the non-migrant populace become apparent.

**Analysis: Economic Migrants and Economic Citizens**

In this section I will go through five analytical steps to illustrate how television news coverage of EU migration reflects the dynamics of the liberal paradox: the positioning of the EU in relation to the UK; the economic focus in the analysis of EU migration; the shift from an economic to a political focus; the hierarchical categorisation implicit in the use of labels; and finally, the repositioning of Britishness based on a market citizenship model. In steps 1 to 4, I will draw on the data from 2006 to show the dynamics of the liberal paradox in relation to EU migration. Twenty-six items pertaining to migration from within the EU including the 2007 accession countries were collected over the six month period from 24 April 2006 to 24 October 2006: 14 on the BBC 1 News at Ten, 6 on Channel 4 News, 6 on ITV 1 News. Overall, the coverage mainly focussed on its impact on Britain. Two discursive strands dominated. One, an economic approach to the analysis of migration emphasised the economic impact on the UK and the economic incentives to migrate to the UK. The other strand related migration to the context of politics. The latter context moved to the foreground during the monitoring period as numbers that purported to reveal the level of migration from the 2004 EU accession states were released. The figures appeared to be much higher than those estimated by the government in 2004. Also part of the political context was the debate over how to deal with the 2007 accession states and the consequences for the UK government’s EU strategy. While present in this debate, the question over whether Romania and Bulgaria were actually ready to join the EU in terms of accession criteria was present but became secondary to the issue over how many migrants more
could or would come to Britain. While the focus in steps 1 to 4 is on the liberal paradox in relation to EU migration, step 5 serves as a point of comparison under changed economic circumstances and draws on three additional news items from 30 January 2009. The analysis of the coverage of the so-called wildcat strikes originating at the Lindsey Oil Refinery in Lincolnshire highlights how the liberal paradox affects not only migrants but the resident population as well. The difficult economic conditions allowed the state less room for manoeuvre to satisfy demands for closure and exposed the fact that British citizenship had moved towards a market citizenship model.

In the following sections I will draw on examples from the various news items to illustrate my argument. The evidence cited in these examples may at time appear contradictory, but such is the nature of a paradox and thus the nature of the coverage.

The Positioning of the EU in Relation to the UK

First of all, it is important to note that despite the repeated mention of the EU and Europe, the coverage cannot be described as either overtly anti- or pro-EU or even to focus on these issues. In fact, the coverage mostly ignored the EU as a centralised institution, apart from some comparisons to the migration policies of other pre-2004 EU countries. Take for instance a piece on BBC News at Ten (1 May 2006) in which Europe editor Mark Mardell compares the “open borders” regime of the UK and other EU countries with the “closed borders” regime of such countries as Germany, Italy and France. Reporting from the Italian-Slovenian border, he does mention potential negative effects on local wages from increased migration, but places more emphasises on its potential positive aspects for the economy. Most importantly, because it shows the absence of the EU as an institution in the coverage, he highlights the fact that the restriction on Slovenians to come and work in Italy “hurts [Slovenians’] national pride”. It is not the EU that is presented as responsible for this hurt. Responsibility is placed on countries, such as Italy that pursue a “closed border” policy. In difference to the findings of previous studies on the media coverage of the EU in Britain, the coverage did not reflect a debate over the EU’s meddling in British affairs, but focussed on the direct relationships between the UK and EU accession countries.

Similarly, even though, the processes of EU enlargement and integration provided a background to these relationships, they were not presented as interference from the centralised EU structure. At the same time, however, this approach to covering the issue demonstrated, echoed and at times explicitly mentioned the UK government’s attitude to the EU: expanding the EU in terms
of space to decentralise and weaken it in terms of policy scope, coupled with a free-market attitude to the economy. While I could again cite Mark Mardell’s piece on BBC 1 (1 May 2006) mentioned above for echoing this attitude, Jonathan Rugman on Channel 4 News (26 September 2006) provides a more explicit example. It comes in the context of a report on the decision by the EU to grant Romania and Bulgaria membership in the EU as of 1 January 2007. The programme’s diplomatic correspondent mentions “Britain’s hopes for a looser, wider trading bloc including Muslim Turkey”.

The fact that Britain was also pursuing this strategy through its domestic migration policy became particularly apparent on the day restrictions for the 2007 accession countries were announced on 24 October 2006. Journalists on all three news programmes alleged a disagreement within government and emphasised Britain’s pro-enlargement stance and the connection of this stance to migration. The BBC’s political editor Nick Robinson (24 October 2006) summarised the reasons behind the restrictions as

The Foreign Office is saying, we should be proud of being champions of EU expansion. We should be wary of sending a signal to Romania and Bulgaria that they are not really wanted. And besides the Foreign Office has argued these controls probably won’t work. The Home Office has argued back and they’ve won the day. That there is a greater risk, a risk to the British public, saying we are not serious about controlling immigration.

ITV’s political editor Tom Bradby (24 October 2006) implies a similar argument when he confronts Home Secretary John Reid in an interview segment by stating: “Your government has spent years trying to get these countries into the European Union, now they’re in, you’re slamming the door in their face.”

And finally, Channel 4 News presenter Jon Snow (Channel 4 News 24 October 2006) quizzes Europe Minister Geoff Hoon, who denies any disagreement, along the same lines. Snow asks the minister: “So anybody who suggests there was any sort of cabinet sub-committee rift on this matter, between the Home Office and the Foreign Office would be on another planet?”

I will come back to the other aspects of the coverage on this particular day later on. What I want to stress again here, is the fact that the EU itself was not the target of criticism or positioned as a meddler in British affairs. Nor was the British pro- or anti-European debate the focus. The alleged rift between the Home Office and the Foreign Office could have been, but was not mapped onto this debate. Rather, at various points the coverage reflected, mentioned and analysed the UK’s ambivalent attitude towards the new EU member states as set out in the introductory section to this chapter.
The Economic Focus of the Coverage in Relation to EU Migration

Until the debate over numbers started to dominate the coverage, the economic strand took centre stage, especially on the BBC. The economic impact of migration was exhaustively analysed. Deemed to be positive overall, the impact was assessed in terms of its consequences for such issues as a growing housing shortage, potential wage undercutting, a rise in unemployment, keeping mortgages down, and use of social services. In several pieces on BBC 1 News at Ten the programme’s economic editor, Evan Davis, (BBC1 News: 9 May 2006; 20 June 2006; 16 August 2006; 22 August 2006) drew a subtle picture, providing several possible explanations and various factors that may have had an influence on these issues rather than a definitive answer. For instance, highlighting the complexity of the issue and resisting any urge to cut through and simplify it, Davis concludes a piece on the impact of recent EU migration on wages and unemployment in the UK by saying:

It will take years to know where Matthew [a Polish migrant to Swindon interviewed in the piece] and his friends end up. And it will take years to know how migration really affects Swindon. Sorry for the indecisiveness, but like the Irish who helped built Swindon’s railway, migrants both take jobs and create them.

Even when the political strand and the economic strand combined for good in late August, looking at the dynamics of migration through the lens of economics remained the dominant explanatory framework. On 22 August, the day the Home Office released figures showing the extent of EU migration from the 2004 accession countries, Channel 4 News business correspondent Faisal Islam (22 August 2006) reported from Cambridge on the role these migrants play in the local economy. After talking to businesspeople as well as migrants, he draws the conclusion that “the labour market is absorbing this huge influx of new labour as it is particularly concentrated in areas with large numbers of relevant vacancies.” Adding a further layer of complexity to Islam’s positive assessment, his piece was followed by an additional package in the programme that widened the view to patterns of unemployment across Britain. Economic correspondent Liam Harrigan acknowledges that recent migration avoided areas of high unemployment, but highlights that it may have a negative impact for some—maybe in the future: “But immigration does push wages down, especially for the unskilled. So it will remain divisive. Not least because in five years time, EU rules will allow even more immigration.”

On the same day a similar contrasting strategy was followed by Libby Wiener on ITV 1 in a package from Southampton. Initially, she focussed on the positive impact. In an interview segment with coffee-shop owner Bunny Taylor EU migrants were favourably compared with British people in terms of their work attitude. Wiener introduces the interview sequence by
saying: “Employers such as Bunny Taylor, who runs a cafe, say that even with no or limited English the Poles make good workers.” Then Taylor says: “I can’t get her to sit down. With the English people I employed, I couldn’t get them to stand up and work.” Wiener then asks her: “What about the wages, though. Are you employing here for less than an English employee?” To which Taylor responds: “No, exactly the same.” Of course, these were not Wiener’s words but Taylor’s, but the item did not make any suggestion that the coffee-shop owner was not telling the truth. Instead the correspondent tried to balance the businesswoman’s assessment with some quotes from British people on the street in Southampton in a later sequence. After Wiener says, “This Polish food-shop opened in 2004 and business is booming. Hardly surprising when you consider that one in ten of the residents of Southampton are from Poland”, the package cuts to footage of a house with an English flag on display. Over this footage Wiener says: “But not everyone here is happy with the situation.” The footage cuts to a vox pop, i.e., a men/women-on-the-street sequence. An unidentified woman says: “No. It’s absolutely disgusting. You know my partner can’t even get a job, because we’ve got the Polish.” This is directly followed by an unidentified man saying: “I presume when I go to find a job there will be none left. It’s all cheap labour isn’t it?” After this sequence the package cuts to footage of what appears to be a kind of high street. Wiener says: “There is certainly pressure on local services. So will ministers think again when it comes to Bulgaria and Romania joining next year?” Her question is answered by a cut to a statement by Immigration Minister Tony McNulty, who says: “If we need to put restrictions and limitations in place if/when we make the decision we will make sure we will make the right decision for the UK economy.”

It is interesting to note here that the English flag and the way that it is incorporated into the item, brings in a whole set of cultural connotations. This imagery does set up a dichotomy between, in this case, English people and EU migrants beyond the competition of the job market, a point to which I will return later. However, the overall context as well as the quotations remains mainly focussed on the economy, and it is this economic focus that I want to highlight here. Though the impact of migration was often presented as difficult to pin down exactly, migration itself became simply a question of supply and demand. Not only did it reduce migration to its economic dimension it also suggested a close association between the UK as a state and the UK as a market economy. Take, for instance, Tony McNulty’s comment cited above: At this stage in the political debate the immigration minister talked about the UK government’s intention to “make the right decision for the UK economy”. Also, throughout the coverage journalists use the term economy as a synonym for the UK. This is not to say that the
UK exclusively became to signify a market economy, only that an understanding of the UK in those terms provided a strong interpretative frame in this context.

The Shift from an Economic to a Political Focus

While the economic analysis of migration did not unequivocally suggest that migration was entirely a good thing, it did emphasise the positive contribution migrants were making to the British economy. As a result, when politicians eventually moved to bring in restrictions, some journalists explicitly challenged their motives, i.e., raising the question why restrictions were necessary now, if migration has had such a positive impact so far and was governed by supply and demand. On 24 October 2006 especially, when the government announced restrictions for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, journalists highlighted the incongruity in relation to the encouraging economic data of recent EU migration. The examples cited above, already pointed in this direction. Again, a look at ITV’s Tom Bradby (24 October 2006) raises an interesting point. He concludes his piece, a live segment from Westminster, by saying:

The fact is almost all those people ended up in jobs and are contributing to our economy. There is something slightly uncomfortable about the reason we’ve closed the door on the Romanians and Bulgarians. I can’t believe I’m alone in feeling that and I think one has to keep the debate down to the facts. But Mr Reid says, look, let’s be careful, let’s be cautious.

Bradby’s summary not only illustrates the point about the economic strand, it also raises another, the political dimension of migration. What is it that Mr Reid was careful and cautious about? It is the potential number of migrants that could head to the UK, when Romania and Bulgaria join the EU. This potential number was an extrapolation, an estimate based on the number of migrants that appeared to have arrived after the 2004 accession round. In 2004 the Home Office estimated that on average less than 15,000 of such migrants would come to Britain per year. In the event, numbers in 2006 seemed to suggest that more than 500,000 had come to the UK over the two year period. Now, as iterated above, journalists agreed that this may have put some pressure on local services, kept wages low for some etc., but that the migrants made an overall positive contribution to the UK economy. However, in their role as society’s watchdogs, that is from a default position “of critical scrutiny over the powerful” (McNair 2009, p. 239), journalists challenged the Labour government on its apparent failure to predict the level of migration from the 2004 accession states. Consequently the sheer numbers and the failure by the government to predict them moved to the centre of attention.

The numbers floated around as early as the middle of May, when the BBC’s home affairs editor, Mark Easton, mentioned them in the context of the progress of Romania and Bulgaria towards
EU accession (16 May 2006). It was in late August, though, that the data gained wider attention and became the focus of the coverage. First, on 20 August 2006, the Conservative party’s call for tougher restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians on the basis of these numbers was covered on the BBC 1 and Channel 4 news bulletins. Then, two days later, when the Home Office officially released numbers on migration from the 2004 accession, all three programmes covered the issue. I have already quoted excerpts from the coverage in the preceding section in terms of the economic strand that continued to be part of the coverage. With an additional excerpt from Evan Davis on BBC 1 News (22 August 2008) and an excerpt from a studio debate on Channel 4 News (22 August 2008), I will move beyond the overt aspects of the careful weighing of economic pros and cons and highlight the implicit hierarchisation of social groups that it entailed.

As mentioned above, throughout the coverage of the day there was concern for the negative impact migration may have or have had on some sectors of British society, and Davis’ piece was no exception: after looking at the role the migrants play in filling gaps in the job market, he continues with a sequence looking at the impact on the low-wage sector. Introducing a statement by Frank Field, Labour MP for Birkenhead, Evans says: “Labour MPs are getting nervous. Generally they are well-disposed towards immigration, but is it now primarily about the rich finding a cheap gardener?” Field provides an answer:

For those in the labour market wanting to employ people at home, we’ve got a new servant class and that group in the country has never been that well off since the 1920s. It’s actually if you are lower down and you haven’t got all that disposable income to employ staff where life is a lot more difficult.

Similar to Libby Wiener’s piece on ITV1 News, this was followed by a short vox-pop sequence of two men-in-the-street. Davis introduces the sequence thus: “And in Leeds today signs of some dissatisfaction.” The first man says in response: “They work for peanuts. We, well, eventually we end up with peanuts. We get nothing.” This is followed by another men saying: “It’s about time we stood up for us, us British people.”

Overtly, the entire sequence expressed a concern about the economic status of people such as these two men only. However, implicit in this concern is a hierarchical dichotomisation between the British and the EU migrants, which I will address further below. Before I develop this point, however, I want turn to the coverage of potential future migration from the 2007 accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria. It plays an important role in shifting the coverage from the economic towards the political end of the liberal paradox. All three programmes made potential
future migration part of their coverage on the 22 August 2006. Channel 4 News and ITV 1 News raised the issue straight away, in the opening segments.

In the opening trailer on Channel 4 News, over footage from an immigration checkpoint presumably at an airport, that has the image of an immigration stamp superimposed and a meter apparently tracking migrant numbers that doesn’t stop running but moves out of the frame around 542,000, presenter Krishnan Guru Murthy says: “Hundreds of thousands more immigrants than ministers expected and more waiting to arrive. Should we stem the flow or be grateful they’re here?” This is followed by the opening sequence, i.e., the programme’s signature tune and some footage form a passport control point, people working at a construction site as well as footage of people picking fruits. At the end of the sequence the programme cuts to the studio where Guru-Murthy proceeds to trail the main headlines:

Good evening. Rarely has Britain’s population changed so much in so short a time. In just two years more than 600,000 Poles, Czechs and other Eastern Europeans have come here and there are thousands waiting, if Bulgaria and Romania get EU entry next year. Tonight: Are there too many? Are they to blame for Britain’s rising unemployment? Or are many of Britain’s unemployed just too old, too lacking in skills or even too lazy to meet the needs of the labour market? Also tonight…”

In the programme that followed, the questions Guru-Murthy raises were picked up and debated to some extent. What was not discussed or further explained, but simply asserted as fact here and throughout was that “there are thousands waiting” in Bulgaria and Romania.

The issue was handled similarly on ITV 1 News. In the opening sequence, presenter Mark Austin says “As hundreds of thousands are prepared to follow, ministers tell ITV, there needs to be a rethink”. It becomes clear in the coverage that the hundreds of thousands could potentially come from Romania and Bulgaria. If and why they would come is not addressed.

On the BBC the aspect is developed differently. In the opening sequence potential migration was only mentioned in so far as presenter Fiona Bruce cites critics that “say the open-door policy isn’t working and there should be tighter immigration controls”. It was only after Evan Davis’s package that the issue of future migration came up and was addressed in more detail. Bruce introduces this segment by saying:

The debate over Eastern European migrant workers coming to the UK was sparked two years ago when 8 new countries joined the European Union. Britain was one of only a handful of member states to allow them in to work without restrictions. Now the government is under pressure to come up with a new strategy if as expected Romania and Bulgaria join the EU next year. Rory Gethin Jones is here.
As Jones then explains the pressure on the government stemmed from projections that up to 175,000 people from Romania and Bulgaria would come to Britain, if no restrictions were put in place. Jones highlights that these estimates were contested, but he does not explain in what way they were contested or by whom. The focus of the piece is on the pressure the government has been under because of the estimates in relation to Romania and Bulgaria, in case they turn out to be accurate.

In effect, all three programmes took migration from Romania and Bulgaria as a given. Nor did the coverage of the issue on BBC 1 News and Channel 4 News two days earlier question this assumption. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section there was more coverage of Romania and Bulgaria later in the monitoring period that addressed some of the issues and took a closer look at the situation in those countries. But apart from one item on BBC 1 News from 16 May 2006, none occurred in the months preceding the events of 20 and 22 August. In the process, the programmes ignored the main argument they had been proposing previously as to why migration happens in the first place, i.e., because of the supply-and-demand dimension of the labour market. In other words, if there was no demand, migration should cease on its own. If there is a demand migration, should be welcomed in economic terms. Also, most of the evidence cited in the programmes also suggests that the concern for British people who have to compete in the unskilled labour market with EU migrants as well as pressures on public services may be something to keep an eye on but would not justify restrictions on migration in themselves. Because of this blind spot in the coverage, I would argue that the issue went beyond a question of the economics of migration. A closer look at the headline recapitulations of what was the top story for all three programmes on that day illustrates that the focus of the of the coverage had moved away from economics and migration towards politics and migration.

BBC 1 News presenter Fiona Bruce says to footage of people working on fields:

Tonight’s main news: New figures show that more than half a million Eastern European workers have arrived in the UK in the past two years. The government predicted a fraction of that but says they are a valuable resource for the economy.

To footage of people arriving by bus, ITV 1 News presenter Mark Austin summarises the day’s top story thus:

Hello again, a final look at tonight’s headlines: The Home Office has admitted to ITV News it will have to rethink its immigration policy following the influx of migrant workers from Eastern Europe.
And Krishnan Guru-Murthy on Channel 4 News in a first headline recapitulation in the middle of the programme says: “New figures show, almost half a million workers from Eastern Europe have arrived in the UK over the last two years—far higher than the government’s estimate.” At the end of the programme the presenters says: “Our main headline tonight: new figures suggest around six hundred thousand people from former communist countries have arrived in the UK in the last two years.”

In these headlines, when the news became reduced to their journalistic essence, only BBC 1 News still mentioned the economy at all. All but one mentioned that the government either got the numbers wrong or would change immigration policy in response to the numbers. All mentioned the sheer number of migrants. In fact, in the final headline on Channel 4 News it became the sole aspect worth mentioning. But does this merely represent a statement of fact? I would argue that it suggests something else. First of all, the numbers can be challenged. In the case of EU migrants from Poland, the biggest single contributing country, statistics suggest that several hundred thousand Polish citizens had already moved to the UK prior to the 2004 accession to live and work (Home Office 2003), some legally others illegally. When Poland became an EU member some of those registered their presence under the UK’s workers registration scheme, in fact, constituted 30 percent of the schemes number (Garapich 2008, pp. 749-750). This suggests that the migratory movement while still substantial and beyond the original estimates, was more gradual than presented in the coverage. Also, the shift in focus moved the coverage closer in kind to the coverage of so-called illegal migration to the UK (see chapters 1.3 and 2.1). Issues such as the sheer volume defined as too much for the UK to handle as well as a loss of control over borders became an issue in this context. The failure to predict migration, not necessarily migration itself, and the prospect of more migration in the future were implicitly presented as negative events. While the prior could be ascribed to be mostly negative for the politicians, showing them up as clueless fools, the aspect of future migration of Romanians and Bulgarians implies that migration itself is negative. Furthermore, the coverage on the restrictions (Channel 4 News 26 September 2006; BBC 1 News 26 September 2006; Channel 4 News 24 October 2006; BBC 1 News 24 October 2006; ITV 1 News 24 October 2006) also highlighted potential problems implementing them, alleging a huge number of Romanians and Bulgarians would break the rules and come to work in the UK illegally, thus connecting their particular, potential migration even more closely to illegal migration.
Hierarchical Categorisation through the Use of Labels

Positioning Romanians and Bulgarians as a potential migrant-in-waiting, in fact as potential illegal-migrants-in-waiting, is an example of the differentiation of individuals and groups into hierarchical, often oppositional and yet at times overlapping categories. As some of the examples cited above show, various labels were employed in the coverage that differentiated Britons from migrants and foreigners, Britons from Poles, Czechs or Romanians, Europeans from Eastern Europeans, present Europeans from former communists and future Europeans, and one kind of EU citizen from another kind of EU citizen—with the latter kind potentially even turning into an illegal immigrant.

In keeping with the economic focus of the coverage, the term worker is often added to differentiate British workers from migrant or foreign workers. The explicit sharing of a category, i.e., that includes Britons and non-Britons, only occurs once, in the above cited package on the impact of EU migration on Cambridge by Faisal Islam on 22 August 2006 on Channel 4 News. Islam says: “Our labour is being traded within Europe within a market of 450 million people, a bit like fruit and veg.” Most of the time, non-British people are differentiated from British people despite the formal sharing of EU citizenship by all. Their differences are emphasised by mentioning their countries of origin. In fact the term EU citizen is rarely used. The more ambiguous term European gets used more frequently, at times carrying a political, EU, and at times a geographic meaning. Often the migrants are identified in terms of particular countries of origin, placing an emphasis on their not-being-from-here, their foreignness. The “Polish plumber” in itself appears to have become a by-word for the whole migration phenomenon, for example, as used by Evan Davis (BBC 1 News 16 August 2006). In this piece on rising unemployment in the UK Davis says: “It’s [the town of Bridgnorth] not dominated by Polish plumbers, but it has seen that pattern of rising unemployment and employment.”

While I would argue that the emphasis of origin already suggests a certain level of distancing it was in the regional descriptors where this became more obvious. A second look at the headline recapitulisations from 22 August 2006 provides a good example. On the BBC they are “Eastern European workers”, on ITV “migrant workers from Eastern Europe”, and on Channel 4 “workers from Eastern Europe” as well as “people from former communist countries”. The phrases emphasise difference over similarity, as Kuus (2004, p. 484) observed in her examination of discourses of EU and NATO enlargement: “the persistent connotation of the East, that is inherent in the concept of Eastern Europe, still subtly frames East-Central Europe as not fully European.” In all these examples these people, who are officially citizens of the EU, become
qualified Europeans. Qualified by their origin in the East, in former communist countries, they become Europeans of reduced status. They cannot claim rights; they have to accept what they are given. For instance, they may have the right to work in the UK but, as becomes increasingly clear, they do not have the right to take away so-called British jobs from British workers. Though this issue became a bigger concern in 2009, the implied hierarchy was already present in the debates of 2006 and shows parallels to Ford’s (2011) suggestion of a hierarchy of public attitudes towards Western and Eastern Europeans. Not only in the vox-pop statements and journalists’ and politicians’ expressed concern for some sections of the labour market, but also in more explicit terms. Already implied in the opening segment on Channel 4 News on 22 August 2006 quoted above, the issue is raised again in a studio debate later on in the programme. Guru-Murthy asks his guests: “Are all these migrants taking jobs from British workers?” To which one discussant, Sir Digby Jones, former head of the Confederation of British Industry, replies: “They haven’t taken British jobs, because British people have said I don’t want to do that sort of work, although it’s essential.” This is more than a concern for wage deflation; this is a question over whether something has been taken away from British workers that rightfully belongs to them. Interestingly, in the case of the studio debate, Guru-Murthy and Jones use a terminology very similar to the one for which Brown came under pressure in 2009, i.e., the expressions British jobs and British workers. Again, the right to work in the UK is not to be confused with the right to take a British job from a British worker.

The remarkable thing about this process of differentiation is the fact that these categories are contingent upon context and their content is unstable yet they are used as shorthand for a claim to certain rights, to a position on the hierarchy, for a claim to belong, to hold the right kind of citizenship based on formal and informal criteria. As such the debate serves as an illustration of Bauder’s (2008) argument about citizenship and migrant labour outlined above. In 2006, journalists and politicians already moved people between the categories but maintained implicitly that to be British in the UK meant to be at the top of the hierarchy, i.e., that the informal dimension of citizenship, aspects of culture and belonging overrule any other claim to this spot. At these points in the coverage, the equation of the UK as a state with the UK as a market economy became somewhat suspended and partially supplanted by the UK as a nation. In terms of the liberal paradox, the balance had shifted from openness towards migration based on liberal market attitudes towards the desire for closure to protect the nation. However, the turn towards closure was still set in the context of a buoyant economy and focused solely on the migrant population. Turning next to the events of 2009, with the economy in decline, I will show how
the market dimension of the liberal paradox had already had an impact beyond migration and had changed the terms of what it meant/means to be British.

**British Workers as a Market Citizens**

In 2006, the defensive reaction against ‘Easter Europeans from former communist countries’, this shift in balance traced above did not resolve the paradox itself; but it did obscure for the time being that the re-assertion of British citizenship over EU citizenship was only a political gesture. In fact, it was a fairly easy gesture, because rights did not have to be taken away, but in the case of the 2007 accession states could simply not be granted in the first place—all within the legal framework of the EU. As shown above, some of the coverage challenged the gesture, but it did not challenge the underlying hierarchical notion, nor did it highlight that British citizenship itself had already undergone changes under the liberal, market-driven society of New Labour, that the liberal paradox had also affected what it means to hold the status of British citizen.

Indeed, even the debate in 2006, already carried some of the hallmarks of so-called flexible citizenship (Ong 2006) or market citizenship (Fudge 2005; Harvey 2001b; Schild 1998), but with the UK economy still buoyant these implications were less apparent. The claim to top spot in the hierarchy still appeared natural. In 2009, with the UK economy showing signs of recession, the situation had changed. The liberal market justification of supply and demand employed by journalists and politician in support of migration was gone. However, the legislative and policy framework towards EU migration and the EU labour market still remained intact. The weakening economy combined with the labour market policy based on free movement began to expose the extent to which British citizenship itself had become defined in market terms. Pardos-Prado (2011) highlights the importance of the economic context in relation to attitudes towards migration. It is important to note here that besides the argument that “economic vulnerability and competition for scarce material resources increase resentment against immigrants” (ibid, p. 1000), Pardos-Prado also suggests that the influence of left-right ideological frames depend on economic context, too:

> when the individual and contextual levels of socioeconomic vulnerability are higher, people tend to articulate their (generally negative) attitude towards immigrants without further ideological mediation (ibid, p. 1010)

This point is important in this context as it helps explain the reaction of unions to events at the Lindsey Oil Refinery in North Lincolnshire in late 2008 early 2009. In response to an Italian company bringing its own Italian and Portuguese workforce to fulfil a construction contract, already employed workers at the refinery went on strike in January 2009. A statement that Prime
Minister Gordon Brown had made at the 2007 Labour party conference about trying to create “British jobs for British workers” became a rallying call for a series of strikes. After a few days workers at other refineries and power plants in various other parts of Britain went on strike as well to show their support. The particular dispute continued for several weeks and was eventually resolved by hiring a proportion of local workers. Similar events, however, have occurred since then, for instance at the liquid gas terminal in Milford Haven in May 2009.

In early 2009, as indicated above, the workers staked their claim to the contract based on Brown’s statement. But, as it turned out, to be British in Brown’s terms meant something rather different from what the workers seemed to think. The workers appeared to conceive of Britishness in terms of being local. By virtue of being local they believed to be entitled to more rights than people from abroad, in this case from Portugal and Italy. However, this local-abroad distinction was challenged by their shared, formal status as EU citizens. Union leaders repeatedly and strenuously denied any ethnic or racist connotation in this context—illustrating Pardos-Prado’s analysis of the diminishing relevance of left-right frames outlined above. Still, since in those formal terms the hiring practice appeared to be legal, the striking workers did build their claim on the informal aspects of citizenship, on aspects of belonging. Rather than an ethnic or racist belonging, their claim then appears to have been derived from a vague notion of cultural belonging. Based on this notion, they maintained that they belonged to Britain and Britain belonged to them, thus these jobs were British and meant to be theirs. This understanding was quite different from the notion of Britishness implied by Gordon Brown, as will become apparent by looking at the news coverage of these events.

The situation at the Lindsay Oil Refinery had developed for over a week—newspapers started to report on it on 21 January—but it did not become part of the main headlines on the three news programmes until 30 January 2009, when strikes in support of the workers at the plant in Lincolnshire occurred across the country. On this day, all three programmes contrasted the strikers’ demands with what Gordon Brown had said. They also pointed out that the employment of the workers from Italy and Portugal appeared to be legal. Channel 4 News even addressed the issue on the level of the EU labour market and elaborated on the details of how many British people were working in other EU countries based on their rights as EU citizens. The programme also put the situation at the oil refinery in the context of a global economy and open markets versus protectionism. Likewise, the global context was discussed on BBC 1 News. Overall the coverage reflected, though, it did not explicitly endorse the workers’ demands in so far as it appeared to accept their notion of Britishness. Similar to the workers, any ethnic
The connotation of Britishness was challenged, as was Brown’s usage of the phrase, because of its close proximity to the terminology of the far-right, racist political spectrum. Still, the underlying dichotomy of local-abroad, British-foreign remained largely intact. Similar to the coverage in 2006, the foreign status of the workers from Italy and Portugal was emphasised over their shared status as EU citizens. For example none of the programmes referenced the EU or Europe in their opening sequences. On Channel 4 News they were “foreign workers”; on ITV 1 News “foreign labour” and on BBC 1 News they were described as “foreign workers brought into a British refinery”. The example from the BBC, in particular, with its definition of the refinery as British suggests a dichotomy between being British and being foreign. However, the hierarchy that such a dichotomy implied in 2006 was less apparent in 2009. While accepting that these categories existed, the coverage highlighted the fact that British citizenship and being British did not automatically guarantee the top spot in the hierarchy as it had come under challenge from the legal framework within the EU—a fact also acknowledged in some of the comments made in the prime ministerial debates of 2010—as well as the global economy. I will illustrate this point by looking at an interview segment on Channel 4 News between presenter Krishnan Guru-Murthy and Pat McFadden, Minister for Employment Relations.

After some initial back-and-forth about the government planning to check that everything had been done according to EU rules, Guru-Murthy confronts McFadden: “Let’s assume all the rules are being abided by and that nothing illegal has happened. There is nothing you can say tonight, is there, to alleviate the concerns of those people on strike today.” To this McFadden responds:

Oh, I think we can tell people that we are doing everything we can in what is a very difficult economic time to support the country to support business and to support people through a difficult economic time. I don’t think there is nothing we can say at all. What we can’t say is that we’re going to have a protectionist response to the world downturn. The Prime Minister was very clear about that in what he said at Davos this morning...

At this point McFadden is not specific about what this support is actually going to look like. He brings in the dimension of the global economic downturn. All he can say with certainty is that protectionism is not the answer to this downturn and thus neither to the situation in Lincolnshire. When the minister tries to further the global dimension by alluding to a speech the Prime Minister had given that day at the World Economic Summit in Davos, in which he warned against protectionism, Guru-Murthy interrupts by saying:

But the prime minister has it both ways. I mean you have it both ways. Because you say we can’t have protection but then you use this phrase more than once, British jobs for British workers, and that raises expectations that you’re unable to deliver.
In response McFadden tries to clarify what Brown had actually meant when he used the phrase: “That is about the capacity of our workforce to have the skills for the jobs and industries of the future and that’s precisely what we’re doing.” Guru-Murthy challenges that explanation by asserting that the EU framework could mean that the workforce could also contain people from other parts of the EU living in Britain: “But it doesn’t only apply to British workers, does it? If Poles, or Italians, or Portuguese people come and live here, they can presumably apply for all those things as well.” A point McFadden has to concede: under those circumstances British training and education would not just be for British people. He responds: “Well, if someone was settled here permanently and wanted to have an apprenticeship of course that’s the case.” Taking this concession from the minister, Guru-Murthy applies it to the original statement: “So it was always a meaningless phrase...” This point McFadden is unwilling to concede and repeats his earlier argument about skills: “No I don’t accept that. What I think this was about, was about equipping the workforce for the future and that is what the government is doing.” But Guru-Murthy remains unconvinced and ups the ante by suggesting that the phrase was not in fact meaningless but worse: “Why didn’t you say EU jobs for EU citizens? That would have been accurate wouldn’t it? That would have been what you meant instead of this jingoistic ‘British jobs for British workers’.” In the final response from McFadden that follows this charge of jingoism, the minister denies it and elaborates again what Brown had meant:

I don’t accept that it’s jingoistic at all. I think that it’s quite right to invest in your workforce to try to make sure through your further education system, through your apprenticeship system and through other tools at the government’s disposal that people in the United Kingdom have the chance to compete and be equipped for the jobs of the future.

To end the pre-recorded segment the programme cuts back to Guru-Murthy, who finishes the segment off by saying: “Pat McFadden the employment relations minister.”

I have cited this segment at such length, because it reveals the discrepancy between what the government appeared to understand by Britishness and what the workers as well as the journalists apparently understood by it. For the workers Brown’s phrase meant a right to those jobs. To Guru-Murthy the usage of the phrase by Brown suggested jingoism—this charge is interesting in itself since the presenter used a similar terminology in the studio debate from 2006 cited above—but as other parts of the coverage suggest, e.g., the trailer segment, he accepts the workers’ dichotomy between British and foreign. However, the language used by McFadden to explain what Brown had meant is the language of market citizenship. For workers and journalists to invoke Britishness meant to invoke a claim to rights. For the government to invoke Britishness, meant to invoke a claim to opportunity in a competitive marketplace.
Conclusion
The events of 2009 provide an interesting point of comparison to the situation in 2006. The changing economic climate highlights several key aspects. One, the liberal paradox towards migration applies to politicians and to journalists. With the justification of supply and demand for migration, a valid argument in 2006, gone in 2009, the coverage puts less emphasis on the notion of the UK as a market economy. Two, in terms of risk and opportunity frames (cf. Schuck and de Vreese 2006), the coverage shifts from one that at least considers opportunity in the sense of positive economic benefits to one focussing on risk. Three, the retreat is not as simple for either politicians or journalists because the emphasis on economics has had actual ramifications for the status of Britons as well. Their citizenship status, too, has become defined in market terms. As the market dynamics continue, it appears that to be British carries less of extra value than politicians and journalists previously suggested. The top spot in the hierarchy is no longer secure. Three, because of the dynamics of the liberal paradox, the changing economic climate demands a political shift to re-establish that extra value or at least to make some gestures towards it.
2.3. Can the Migrant Speak?

One often-highlighted aspect in research regarding the representation of migration in the news is the dearth of migrant voices within the coverage (Buchanan et al. 2003; Cookson and Jempson 2005; Finney 2003; Gross et al. 2007; ICAR 2004; MediaWise 2005; Smart et al. 2007). Migrants are talked about, but rarely speak for themselves. But does the inclusion of migrant voices change their representation as Other (Lynn and Lea 2003)? What actually happens when they are allowed to speak on those rare occasions? Who is allowed to speak? What do they say? Does it actually destabilise the discursive framework around migration? These questions are important because as Couldry argues voice cannot be reduced to process but has to be understood in terms of value as well:

Defending voice as a value simply means defending the potential of voices anywhere to matter.

If, through an unequal distribution of narrative resources, the materials from which some people must build their account of themselves are not theirs to adapt or control, then this represents a deep denial of voice, a deep form of oppression. (2010, p. 9, original emphasis)

Though some of the above questions undoubtedly look at the process of voicing, the aim of considering these questions is to assess value. Research on voice and narrative within immigration (cf. Johnston 2005) and asylum (cf. Blommaert 2001) systems have highlighted that issues of power and orders of indexicality (cf. Blommaert 2005b) often make it difficult for migrants to make themselves understood, even if they are allowed to speak. The relevance of this case study to the overall argument of the thesis rests in its return to a point of actual encounter. It is the journalist’s encounter with the migrant—either face-to-face or in the metaphorical sense with migration as a topic. By analysing coverage of migration on British television news, this case study investigates whether similar issues to those found in the encounter between immigration officials and migrants apply to the encounter between journalists and migrants and in this particular context refugees and asylum seekers. Does the Other necessarily become less Other in the process of speaking on television news? If this were the case it would indicate that the Other’s voice has value on his or her own terms. Additionally, it marks a return to the question over the state of the nation. The way migrant voices are treated suggests the degree journalists are able to escape a metaphorical territorial trap (Agnew 1994, see case study 1), i.e., remain bound to orders of indexicalities in their working practices and approaches that are inextricable linked to and perpetuate the nation despite their context-specific contingency.

Before I engage with the data, I will develop my argument in more detail in two sections. In the first section I will discuss the voice and position of the migrant in a discursive network of power
relations. The second section will look at the position of the journalist, a position that can be characterised through its tension of powerful and powerless positioning conditions. In this section I will also move beyond the content of news and draw on interviews with a number of journalists conducted as part of the previously mentioned research project.

**Position of the Migrant**

I want to address two aspects here: first, the migrant’s position as subaltern; secondly, by drawing on ideas about power, discourse and orders of indexicality, I want to discuss the consequences that follow from this position for migrant voices. Underlying this analysis is the understanding of the migrant as bearing characteristics not only of an Other but also of a subaltern. The subaltern position entails limits, even the total negation of agency, voice and thus social mobility (Spivak 1988, 2005b). However, this descriptor does not apply to migrants per se. As has been mentioned previously, migration is a wide field and is classified into various categories by administrative systems. Public perception of migration also differs depending on the origin of migrants (Ford 2011). Though some categories may overlap and the underlying dynamics for these migrations may even be quite similar (Castles and Miller 2003, p. 152), these systems process each category according to certain sets of parameters, policies and regulations. These sets are hierarchical (Bauman 2007; Cohen 2006). There are some forms of migration that are considered acceptable and at times are even encouraged by a destination country, a status that is reflected in the administrative processes related to these types of movement. For other migrant groups, those that migration scholar Robin Cohen (2006, p. 151) calls *helots* and Zygmunt Bauman (2007, p. 47) the *ineffable*, these parameters are structured in more restrictive ways and can even form a deterrent to their migration.

In this chapter I will focus on this, the lower reaches of the hierarchy. In particular, I will analyse the news coverage of asylum seekers. As the debates around the issue in British politics and the UK media show (Gross et al. 2007; Lynn and Lea 2003), their migration, their seeking of asylum in the UK is often not considered acceptable and is certainly not encouraged by the British state (Somerville 2007, p. 65) nor is public opinion positively inclined towards this group (Crawley 2009). Their mobility, physical and social, their voice and agency are severely limited by the systems put in place. Still, news coverage does feature some quotations by asylum seekers. I will argue, however, that quotation, even direct quotation, cannot always be equated with active agency and value expressed through voice. Too many restrictive conditions apply for a quotation to be elevated to this status. The various influences and relations of power, which structure the migrant voice as it appears on a broadcast, need to be considered. They include the various
stages of the production process of a particular news item: from the journalist being assigned a story, to the interview situation during which the migrant voice is captured, a quotation being selected from the raw material of the interview and the inclusion of the finished product on the news programme. The conditions of this production process, however, are already in place before a particular news story has been assigned and have to be taken into account when analysing migrant voices in the context of television news.

Above I suggested that the voices of the kind of migrants I focus on here, the voices of asylum-seekers in the UK, can be described as subaltern. To develop my claim, I referenced Spivak’s essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988). Spivak is not the first to use the concept of the subaltern. Gramsci provided an earlier formulation of the concept (cf. Mignolo 2005, p. 381; Thompson 2003, p. 380). Indeed his conceptualisation of the subaltern developed in Prison Notebooks (1992, 1996) in the context of the industrial revolution provides a pertinent aspect of subalternity applicable here. It is the possibility of being positioned somehow below, beyond or outside, in Gramsci’s case Marxist, categorisations of society.

Gramsci’s ‘subaltern’ included not only the working class of the industrial revolution, but all those for whom the ‘progress’ made by the industrial revolution created the conditions that left them out of the game. (Mignolo 2005, p. 383)

However, Spivak’s focus on questions of voice and agency raise issues that go beyond Gramsci and advance the argument presented here. In the 1988 version, the first published version of ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ Spivak answers the question set up in the title quite emphatically (ibid, p. 308): “The subaltern cannot speak.” However, to say that the subaltern cannot speak is not the same as to say the subaltern is mute, cannot articulate words or cannot talk. In the context of Spivak’s essay the main target of her answer are Western intellectuals who presume to understand the subaltern position and believe they can speak for the subaltern. Spivak suggests that many but not all of these intellectuals, her specific targets here are Foucault and Deleuze while she praises Derrida, are complicit in an international division of labour that perpetuates the injustices of the colonial in the post-colonial era. “Western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit with Western international interests.” (ibid, p. 271) I share Spivak’s concerns about the Western intellectuals’ ability to speak for the subaltern, and it is important to point out here that I am not attempting to do so. Rather than speaking for the subaltern, I intend to analyse the conditions, the mechanics to use Spivak’s term (ibid, p. 294), which influence migrant voices in the context of television news. To analyse these mechanics, I will, however, as I have done previously, draw on Foucault, one of the theorists Spivak criticises. Again, it is Foucault’s conceptualisation of discursive power developed in Discipline and Punish
(1995 [1977]), which I have discussed in chapter 1.1 and which I will return to below, when discussing the position of the journalist in the following section.

In response to her critics that the emphatic answer in ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ implies an even more complete silencing of the subaltern, Spivak has since revised her stance and framed it in less absolute terms in later versions of this essay (1993, 1999) (cf. Hiddleston 2007 for an analysis of the difference in emphases in the most recent version of the essay). Still, the thrust of Spivak’s argument about the subaltern remains: the subaltern’s spoken words and other attempts to signify something on the subaltern’s own terms do not carry the power of meaning that is necessary for it to be recognised and turned into agency, which would be necessary to change the subaltern’s condition. “Subalternity is where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognisable basis of action.” (Spivak 2005a, p. 476)

The focus in Spivak’s work on the subaltern is on women in colonial and post-colonial India. How then, does it apply to migrants? Returning to Gramsci’s original concept of subaltern, allows for a wider application. The condition of subalternity is not defined by gender or geography. It is a condition defined by being positioned at the bottom, or even outside, of a dominant hierarchical structure. This definition by Mignolo in regards to the multitudes of people he calls damnés captures some the subaltern position in a contemporary context:

the damnés refers to the changing sector of the global population (e.g., like immigration today, as well as the white population disenfranchised by neo-liberal economy) in subaltern relations of power; those people whose lives are devalued in and by hegemonic Euro-centered discourses (from the right and from the left). (2005, p. 395, original emphasis)

Mignolo goes on to say that not all subaltern are necessarily damnés. All damnés, however, are subaltern, defined by their hierarchical, devalued position imposed on them by dominant discourses. As Mignolo points out, migrants are damnés—or rather can be. Since, as I highlighted above, the subaltern position does not apply to all (categories of) migrants. It applies most forcefully to those migrants whom Cohen (2006) describes as helots. These migrants, and Cohen includes asylum seekers in this category (ibid, p. 151), are more vulnerable to actions such as detention and deportation than the more privileged denizens (ibid, p. 152). Ultimately, Cohen suggests, helots are considered “disposable units of labour power to whom the advantages of citizenship, the franchise and social welfare are denied” (ibid, p. 152).

So far in this section, I have tried to relate the situation of asylum seekers in the UK to the condition of subalternity. To establish this connection, I have moved from subalternity as a condition of total exclusion to the contemporary context of globalisation under neo-liberal
parameters and continued on to the specific consequences of condition and context within the regulatory regime of a state-run immigration system—from the subaltern, via the damné, to the helot. This route emphasises the lack of agency implied in the subaltern position. This position manifests itself in law, policy and regulation. The subaltern is shaped and excluded by the dominant discourses of the political but has no influence over it. The status of the subaltern has to be borne in mind when comparing my findings with those of Lewis et al. (2005) or Cottle (2000). Their focus is on citizens and more general aspects of news access, respectively. They also address issues of hierarchy and come to the conclusion, in Cottle’s case, that “the organization of news is not geared up to the needs of the socially powerless” (2000, p. 434) and, in the case of Lewis et al., that citizens on the news “are, on the whole, shown as passive observers of the world” (2005, p. 48) yet with some opportunity to be heard (ibid, p. 89). However, as citizens, even from socially more powerless sections of society they are in a relatively elevated position compared to an asylum seeker or refugee. They are part of society rather than beyond it. An analysis of the mechanics of this exclusion needs to consider this dimension. For the specific analysis here, however, an additional route has to be traced. It takes as its starting point the prerequisite for agency and again ends in the situation of the asylum seeker as helot.

As I have discussed above in reference to Spivak (1988, 2005), this prerequisite is a measure of symbolic self-determination. The inability to act, to establish agency is determined by the inability to become recognisable within the dominant discourses. The subaltern lacks or is denied this ability (Spivak 2005a, p. 476). This lack of recognition is echoed in Bauman’s use of the term ineffable (2007, p. 45, original emphasis) for asylum seekers and refugees: “In the habitual terms in which human identities are narrated, they are ineffable.” Bauman’s ineffable is the connection point between the subaltern and the helot. Like the damné in the political sphere so the ineffable in the symbolic sphere, the asylum seeker whose identity cannot be comprehended, becomes defined in the terms of the dominant discourses manifest in the state-run immigration system.

Bauman’s ineffable represents more than a rhetorical convenience for my argument. The term points to a central aspect of the mechanism under analysis: the limitations imposed on the ineffable to become effable by orders of indexicality. I am using the latter term as developed by Blommaert (2005b). In this sense (ibid, pp. 70-78) these orders have a number of key characteristics. They generate meaning out of the connection between sign and context; this connection is not random but specific to social groups; in fact because they are also hierarchical they structure and define groups:
we have to conceive of indexicalities as organised ‘regimes’ which invoke matters of ownership and control and allow and enable judgments, inclusion and exclusion, positive or negative sanctioning, and so forth. (ibid, p. 74)

Their specificity to social groups as well as their hierarchical nature presents a formidable challenge to the migrant voice in the attempt to become effable, i.e., comprehensible according to the orders of indexicality in place. As Blommaert points out (ibid, p. 69), moving across spaces, i.e. migrating, also means potentially moving away from a familiar and acceptable set of orders of indexicality into spaces where these may no longer be valid or at least become devalued.

Consequently, voice in the era of globalisation becomes a matter of capacity to accomplish functions of linguistic resources translocally, across different physical and social spaces. Voice, in other words, is the capacity for semiotic mobility…” (ibid, original emphasis)

Research by Blommaert (2001, 2005b) as well as research by Maryns (2005) has shown how asylum seekers are denied semiotic mobility within the context of the Belgium asylum system. Blommaert argues that the system is based on the unchallenged assumption that asylum seekers have “complete control over the medium and communicative skills” (2001, p. 417) necessary to negotiate the process. However, this is rarely the case, as their voices and narratives of self reference different or less valued sets of orders than those by which their asylum application is judged. Arguing from a similar position, Baynham and de Fina (2005, p. 7) suggest that in the context of migration “Narratives can be misunderstood, discounted and silenced by the discursive routines of institutional procedures.”

Maryns’ (2005) conversation analysis of interviews conducted by immigration officials with asylum applicants, a chapter in the book edited by Baynham and de Fina, illustrates this point well and points towards the dynamics that I will focus on in the context of television news. Basing their interpretation of what the applicant says in what is considered to be standard English (a valued order of indexicality), the immigration officials appear to misinterpret the responses given in an African variety of English (a less valued order) (ibid, p. 183). The applicant, a young girl from Sierra Leone is allowed to speak, but her voice is not heard:

In short, instead of being negotiated in interaction, meanings are unilaterally imposed by the asylum authorities and become subject to institutional entextualizations that are far beyond the asylum seeker’s control. (ibid, p. 179)

The lack of control hints at an asymmetrical distribution of power that works against the applicant. This type of power distributions has also been observed in other interview situations in which migrants, even of the higher-valued denizen order, are involved, such as job interviews (Hawthorne 1992) or green card applications in the USA (Johnston 2008). In each of these
situations migrants have severely limited influence over the interpretation of their voices. Maryns
ascribes this process of entextualisations not to an overt wilfulness on part of the immigration
officials but to the conditions and context of their work environment (ibid, pp. 188-193). She
cites Goodwin’s (1994) concept of professional vision to explain the interpretative frame officials
bring to the interview. Journalists, too, develop a professional vision, I would argue. In fact, with
its asymmetrical distribution of power coupled with an interpretative framework of professional
vision, the interview situation described by Maryns shows remarkable similarities to the interview
as part of the news production process. In the following section I will trace these parallels by
focussing on the position of the journalist within this process.

Position of the Journalist

Even if a particular journalist is presented as the author of a specific piece on television news,
news content is the result of a production process often involving several people whose
collaboration is determined by a set of conditions that establish the context of the journalistic
work environment. Conceptualising journalists as being positioned within this system of
production also implies a relative position of power, which I will address first but only briefly in
this section. In the second part I will discuss the potential ramifications this has for the
encounter between the asylum seeker and journalist in the context of television news.

A number of ethnographic studies of newsrooms in the United States (Epstein 1973; Gans 1979;
Tuchman 1978) and the UK (Schlesinger 1978) have shown how the work environment of news
production is shaped by its connection to the society within which it is located, to institutional,
organisational and individual forces (Van Dijk 1993, pp. 14-15). From topic selection or
assignment, considerations about a story focus or angle, accessing data and contacting sources,
selecting the accumulated material for eventual inclusion, sequencing of the material, to writing
and recording a commentary—even if journalists appear to be comparatively free in their actions
on a day-to-day basis, these forces put certain constraints on them during each step of the
production of a specific piece of news content. In fact this appearance of freedom is countered
by journalists’ perception of themselves. A cross-national survey conducted by Hanitzsch et al.

revealed a hierarchical structure in which organizational, professional, and procedural influences
that originate from the journalists’ immediate environment were perceived as more powerful
limits to the journalists’ work than political and economic influences. (2010 cited in Hanitzsch
and Mellado 2011, p. 407)

This suggests that the appearance of free agency undercut by structural constraints results in only
a relative position of power for journalists. This ties in with Foucault’s (1995 [1977])
understanding of power outlined previously, power that works as a network of relations, which is constantly shifting and context-dependent:

In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions—an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. (ibid, pp. 26-27)

This quotation highlights two important aspects: a) in a direct encounter during the news production process the strategic position journalists occupy may be comparatively more powerful vis-à-vis the subaltern migrant; b) journalists come to the encounter with their own set of constraints. Not only a), but both aspects ultimately shape the voice of the migrant on television news. I want to illustrate this point by looking at three stages in the production process: deciding on questions for an interview; the journalistic interview itself; and the use of the material generated in an interview.

Deciding on questions for an interview as well as using the material touch on general issues of journalistic production. The interpretative frames journalists use to find a topic or assess an event, phenomenon or occurrence and turn it into an article or piece on the news. When journalists approach a topic, they do not start from scratch. Besides their general knowledge and understanding of the world, they may have some specific ideas about a particular topic, which influences the way a topic is developed into a story and the story into a news piece (Clayman 1995, p. 124). In fact research has shown that journalists tend to focus on and frame material in such a way that it confirms or is adaptable to their “basic narratives” (Nylund 2003, p. 531) rather than re-orientate their approach substantially. These basic narratives closely relate to what Entman (1993) drawing on framing theory developed by Goffman (1974) describes as news frames:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (Entman 1993, p. 52, original emphasis)

Frames play a role in the production, on which I focus here, as well as the consumption of the text (ibid, pp. 52-53). Established frames help journalists in making sense of what they find. However, it also shapes what they can find in the first place. If an event or situation does not fit a frame, it could result in it being ignored or fitted to the frame. As Kitzinger (2000, p. 75) points out, frames are somewhat flexible and “can show different paths and perspectives”. An interesting example of this process is described by Ettema and Peer (1996) in their analysis of the coverage of two Chicago neighbourhoods. Their research illustrates how fixed perceptions about
urban problems and a specific language-set associated with these problems coupled with journalists’ professional vision of themselves, shaped the coverage of a deprived area of Chicago. This situation did allow for a range of topics and stories, some that the researchers coded as negative and some that were coded as positive. However, even the positive stories contained and thus reinforced the problem frame of urban pathology (ibid, p. 844). Alternative topics that would move beyond the urban pathology of the area that did not fit this interpretive frame hardly ever found their way into the news. These topics were either not considered newsworthy and/or the topics appeared to pose problems to notions of journalistic professionalism (ibid, p. 845). Other research has shown how differences in priorities and frames between journalists and their sources have lead to similar consequences in the fields such as demographic developments (Teitelbaum 2004), the sciences (Rowe 2005), as well as crime and immigration (Armstrong 2000). News frames and the discursive framework they establish around certain topics become established over time. Influenced by major events, slow development or targeted intervention—as was the declared aim of Ettema and Peer’s research—they can shift. As a consequence, the voices of the asylum seekers I analyse here have to be understood in the context of the prevalent frames around asylum in the UK at the time—something I will come back to later on. For the moment I want to focus on the journalistic interview as a means of producing journalistic output.

There are two main types of journalistic interviews in a news context. One is the interview as a genre (Clayman and Heritage 2002; Cohen 1987; Jucker 1986; O’Connell and Kowal 2006), i.e. where substantial parts or an entire conversation are broadcast. The focus in research on the news interview is mainly on the power relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee (Clayman 2001; Dickerson 2001) as well as questions of neutrality (Clayman 1988) and stance taking (Haddington 2004) by the interviewer. The other is the interview conducted to get raw material to be edited for other genres such as packages. In the latter case actual footage of the interview tends to be heavily edited and may be reduced to a bare minimum of a few words (Ekström 2001, p. 568). It may even not be used at all, with journalists incorporating the information they gleaned from it in their own voice in the body of a piece. Both types of interviews raise questions regarding access and the relationship to sources (Davis 2003, 2007; Fowler 1991). Research of the interview as raw material additionally discusses issues of quotability and selection (Clayman 1995) as well as de- and recontextualisation of quotations (Ekström 2001; Fairclough 1995; Nylund 2003).
Research into the interview genre mainly focuses on the use of elite sources, e.g. politicians, experts etc. It shows that even for elite sources the balance of power tends to swing against their favour. Ekström (2001, p. 582) describes the interview as “a decidedly asymmetrical form of conversation”. This does not mean that these elite sources cannot try and at times succeed to subvert the balance of power through denial of access, evasion, spin or persuasion (Clayman 2001; Davis 2003, 2007). Overall, however, the journalist appears to be in charge of the situation (Clayman 2001). This balance of power shifts even further once an interview is over and it is to be used as raw material for other forms of news.

The focus here is on direct quotations. Clayman (1995) identifies three considerations that influence the quotability of an interview excerpt: narrative relevance (ibid, p. 124), conspicuousness (ibid, p. 126), and extractability (ibid, pp. 126-127). Narrative relevance is closely related to the issue of news frames discussed above: “Insofar as journalists orient to such narrative frameworks, they tend to gravitate toward quotations and sound bites that relevantly fit into the developing narrative.” (ibid, p. 124) Again, unless there is a particularly conspicuous quotation, the strength of which would change the story line, the journalist’s decision is influenced by these frames. But the power of the journalist does not end with selecting a quotation. For after extraction or decontextualization comes reinsertion or recontextualization of the quotation (Ekström 2001; Fairclough 1995; Nylund 2003). It is here, where the journalist can wield particular influence:

they have the ability to edit material, suppressing direct questions and replacing them with text they produce ex post facto or juxtaposing interviewees’ answers with material culled from other interview situations. Thus, journalists have the ability to change the meaning of interviewees’ utterances. (Ekström 2001, p. 570)

Particularly interesting about Nylund’s (2003) research in this context is the fact that he was able to test Ekström’s (2001) claims by comparing the original, complete interview with the material included in the final broadcast. This is not to say that all journalists always use the full extent of their power, intentionally or unintentionally. Not every direct quotation represents a total change from its original meaning. Also, different countries have different journalistic cultures (Hanitzsch 2006, 2007; O’Connell and Kowal 2006). While recontextualising is likely to be a part of most, the extent to which it is acceptable to change the meaning of an utterance in these ways, may differ. What Ekström’s as well as Nylund’s research on direct quotation in television news highlights, however, is the potential power of journalist to shape the voice of their sources. It does not matter whether this power is wielded intentional and unintentional, in fact Nylund emphasises that
Because of institutional and organizational restraints as well as conditions..., news reporters are forced to standardize and to develop a small number of basic narratives. When these narratives are applied to news work, the result may be only little more than an amplification of a reporter’s gut-feelings combined with cultural beliefs, stereotypes and myths. (2003, p. 531)

Because institutional constraints, cultural beliefs and feelings rather than reasoned intentionality are the influences that produce the particular position and shape of a voice, journalists can “still subscribe to the conventions of objectivity and neutrality” (ibid, p. 531). Not only can one draw conclusions about these basic narratives by looking at the transformation of raw material into journalistic content, as Nylund did, but analysing the narrative frames in journalistic content, as done for example by Ettema and Peer (1996), can also provide an indication. Based on their findings from the content analysis, Ettema and Peer, also conducted five interviews with journalists involved in the coverage:

The juxtaposition of the findings from the content analysis with the journalists’ reaction to them create an unusual dialogue on the limits to, and the opportunities for, renewal in contemporary journalistic practice. (1996, p. 838)

I will pursue a similar strategy to Ettema and Peer here. A close analysis of instances of voice in the coverage will be placed in the wider context of the representation of refugees and asylum seekers on British television news at the time (Gross et al. 2007). Additionally, I will move beyond a focus on content and juxtapose it with data collected in interviews with a number of journalists.

**Analysis: Instances of Voice—Moments of Encounter**

**The Discursive Framework: Refugee and Asylum Issues in the UK/EU Context**

This section’s analysis of the voices of asylum seekers and refugee in a UK and EU context builds on research conducted into the representation of refugees and asylum seekers on British television news (Gross et al. 2007). I will briefly summarise the relevant aspects of this research project, before engaging in the data. In terms of voice the research focussed on a quantitative analysis, i.e. the number of times certain types of sources were drawn upon or quoted, directly and indirectly. This quantitative analysis drew on data collected during the first 100 days of a six months monitoring period from April to October 2006. During these 100 days (24 April to 31 July), the research team closely watched three evening news programmes (BBC 1 News at 10 p.m., Channel 4 News at 7 p.m., ITV 1 News at 10.30) as well as one hour of programming between 10 and 11 p.m. on the 24-hour news channel Sky News. All news items that featured
the terms asylum or refugee in a UK or EU-level\textsuperscript{3} context were coded for a range of variables, from the use of images, main and additional themes, to the use of main and additional sources.

Themes and sources are especially relevant to this analysis. From the findings relating to themes the team was able to trace the discursive framework, in which asylum was positioned at the time. Three key points emerged:

1) Asylum and refugee issues are “rarely the main focus of reporting or news… Asylum is, however, regularly mentioned in news stories focussing on other topics.” (ibid, p. 6, original emphasis). In fact of the 65 news items that mentioned the terms ‘asylum’ or ‘refugee’ only 14 focussed on issues directly related to them\textsuperscript{4}.

2) When asylum and refugee issues are mentioned but not the main focus of an item, recurring connections between them and a number of dominant themes, such as terrorism or political crisis, frame these issues “as a largely negative phenomenon” (ibid, p. 10).

3) Even though coverage in terms of intensity, use of certain images or negative labels had changed from that observed in previous research (Buchanan et al. 2003) the negative discursive framework has remained remarkably stable (Gross et al. 2007, p. 9).

These aspects form the background against which the voice of asylum seekers and refugees feature on television news and have to be analysed. They represent the discursive framework and are part of the orders of indexicality within which journalists produce the coverage and audience members view it. The interviews with journalists summarised above confirmed the findings of the content analysis. As did focus group research in which some of the data was used (Durante 2006). This is not to say that alternative stories are impossible to produce (Kitzinger 2000, pp. 76-77) or that audience members are incapable of making alternative interpretations (Entman 1993, p. 56) of the coverage, but to suggest a certain level of dominance of this framework

\textsuperscript{3} EU-level refers to items that deal with asylum and refugee issues on the level of the EU in difference to items that deal with asylum and refugee issues in other EU countries.

\textsuperscript{4} These numbers are based on the monitoring of BBC 1 News at Ten, Channel 4 News, ITV 1 News, and the Sky News channel.
despite “innumerable points of confrontation” and “focuses of instability” (Foucault 1995 [1977], p. 27).

The voices of asylum seekers and refugees are rarely part of television news. People labelled refugees and asylum seekers—labels that were not always applied correctly (Gross et al. 2007)—are very rarely used as sources in news items. In the 53 items[^5] that mentioned the terms asylum or refugee only 8 (6 on Channel 4 News, 2 on ITV 1 News and none on BBC 1 News) feature an asylum seeker or refugee as an additional source. They are never the main source. The coverage is dominated by elite sources, i.e. politicians, officials and experts (Gross et al. 2007, p. 69). Source and voice, however, is not the same thing. For the purpose of this analysis I am interested in the occurrence of direct or indirect quotation, by the latter I mean explicit paraphrases rather than citing someone as a source of information. This reduces the number even further down to 7 (5 on Channel 4 News, 2 on ITV 1 News). Before I summarise and then analyse these instances, I want to turn to the interviews with journalists mentioned previously.

**Interviews with Journalists**

As pointed out above, journalistic content and news coverage is the result of a complex production process. Interviews with journalists provide the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the structures, pressures, decisions, expectations, attitudes and logistics that influence this process.[^6] A brief note about methodology: As indicated above, the analysis based on interview material moves beyond the methodological concerns outlined in chapters 1.1 and 1.2. While a full discussion of the concerns associated with qualitative interviewing would lead too far here, I would like to address some of the major concerns about this research method. Incidentally, the concerns about power raised in relation to journalistic interviews also apply to

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[^5]: The data analysed in this section only draws on the 52 news items collected from the three terrestrial evening news programmes as well as 1 additional item that featured in the local news window and which was not included in the quantitative analysis of the research project. The 13 news items from the non-PSB news channel Sky News are excluded.

[^6]: The interviews were conducted as part of the Oxfam funded research project mentioned previously. In all, 8 journalists were interviewed: 4 from the BBC and 4 from ITN. Of the latter, 2 are part of the team that produces ITV 1 News, the other 2 work for the Channel 4 News team. Due to time constraints on part of the journalists, the interviews varied in length from 40 minutes to 2 hours. Based on the preliminary findings from the content study, Kerry Moore, a colleague of mine in the team involved in the original study, and I devised a set of questions that formed the basis of semi-structured interviews. The questions were developed in order to encourage our participants to discuss some of the key areas of newsroom practice, attitudes and journalistic values relevant to our research. However, the open and flexible approach ensured that participants were able to interpret, respond to and challenge the questions in their own way, to talk more freely about their experiences as journalists reporting asylum and refugee issues, and, potentially, to talk about any areas that the research team had not anticipated. To get the most out of the limited time available, the prepared set of questions was adapted depending on the particular journalist’s area of expertise and role in the newsroom. Researchers worked in pairs in all but one of the interviews. In each interview one researcher took the lead on questioning, while the other picked up interesting avenues for further questioning as the interview progressed. All of the interviews were conducted in the journalists’ own working environments—the newsrooms of the broadcasters in central London. I was present at all of the interviews.
research and many other forms of interviews (cf. Tracy and Robles 2009 for a classification of interviews). While the open form of research interviews should limit the influence of power (King and Horrocks 2010, p. 2), the decisions interviewers make prior and during the interview in terms of what areas to pursue clearly shape and limit the scope of the interview. Also, as Holstein and Gubrium (1995, p. 4) argue interviewing is not a straightforward transfer of information between interviewer and interviewee: “Meaning is not merely elicited by apt questioning nor simply transported through respondent replies; it is actively and communicatively assembled in the interview encounter.” Finally, the context and the situation of the interview itself also have an influence on the information generated by it. As Briggs (1986, p. 124) suggests: “By failing to consider the effects of the interview situation on responses, we circumvent the vital process of examining our own contribution to the generation of the data.”

Additionally, though the responses journalists provided started to repeat themselves, the number of interviews does not allow drawing the conclusion that a saturation point had been reached (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Still, similar to the research by Ettema and Peer (1996) juxtaposing the emerging picture from the interviews with the content of coverage provides interesting insights and indications of the professional vision of journalists. These methodological considerations are important to bear in mind when approaching this section.

Though the set of questions was slightly adapted depending on the specific role of the interviewee, all interviews covered the following 5 partially overlapping core areas: attitudes, news values, narratives, language, and sources. In the following section I will briefly summarise some of the findings relevant to this case study and also highlight some links to points raised in other chapters of this thesis.

First of all it is important to consider the news value of the topic migration. News values influence a journalist’s decision to cover a particular story. They help explain how out of all the things that occur on any given day, some “events” become ‘news’” (Galtung and Ruge 1965, p. 65). It is interesting to note that some journalists denied that news values can be assessed in such an abstract sense. One said: “I have a gut instinct. I call the editor. She has a gut instinct. We agree.” Regardless of this, all the journalists maintained that their decisions to cover asylum and refugee issues were the same as they were for any other topic. Besides “gut feeling” other generic aspects mentioned were: an exclusive aspect, a new aspect, human drama, as well as an assumed audience’s interest, empathy or concern.

Each of the journalists placed their own emphasis on one or two of these aspects. So while some would look for human drama, others would shy away from it, preferring perhaps an approach
based on statistics and numbers. What emerged as an issue particular to the topic was the aspect of timeliness, what Galtung and Ruge (ibid, p. 66) call frequency and for which they argue that “the more similar the frequency of the event is to the frequency of the news medium, the more probable that it will be recorded as news by that news medium”. Though one journalist claimed to be able to find or create a timely peg whenever needed, thus aligning the topic with the programme’s frequency, most of the other journalists described the asylum system as an ongoing process without timely events that would fit the profile of the news programme. One said:

With asylum and immigration these things are ongoing, you know. The immigration story is not now. So the question is when do we go on the national news with it and talk about these things? That is the question.

Because this question is actually rather difficult to answer, the attitudes journalists hold towards the topic become highly important. The attitudes and beliefs as well as the assumptions journalists make about the attitudes and beliefs of their audiences inevitably shape coverage, as they influence the professional vision which makes some stories and events visible as potential news stories even if they do not fit the timeliness criterion or other generic news values. Key to journalists’ overall attitude transpired to be the shared belief in two connected assumptions: that there are deserving and undeserving asylum seekers and that the system was not adequate in terms of dealing with alleged abuses and for helping those with a justified claim. In relation to the latter some highlighted a strong moral obligation of the UK to help, in general, though, they expressed a suspicion that many asylum seekers were in truth economic migrants without a moral right to claim asylum. One journalist said:

Asylum clearly is about society respecting its obligation as citizens of the world and looking after people in torment and so on. However, there genuinely was and is quite a lot of abuse of that asylum system.

Moreover some suggested that the asylum system had been abused by criminal gangs and terrorist groups. One suggested: “Some of them [terrorists] have used the asylum system to get into the country. It’s the easiest cover for them.” This also helps explain some of the language and terminology used in the coverage. The use of explicit terms such as illegal asylum seeker was less problematic than suggested by the findings of previous studies. So in terms of language, the question became more focussed on when and why journalists mention a person’s immigration status at all, because in doing so they establish links with other terms and their associated discourses. None of the journalists were aware of any specific guidelines their respective organisations have in terms of somebody’s immigration status. The general rule was to give as much information about a person as possible. On the other hand, they suggested as a guiding
principle that the information should be relevant: they generally agreed that they would only mention immigration status, if they thought it was relevant to the story. Journalists had no hard and fast rule of relevance, though. Instead they explained that they make decisions on a case by case basis. Some journalists tried to define relevance by giving a series of examples. Coincidently, most examples related to crime. One said:

> We’d mention it, if it was relevant and not, if we didn’t feel it was. It’s difficult to answer: Someone’s committed a crime and they are an illegal immigrant. It’s relevant. You know. In the current political climate, you feel, it’s—unless it is, you know, unless they committed a parking offence then it’s clearly not relevant, you know what I mean.

One journalist suggested that editors would expect a mention of someone’s immigration status not in relation to crime but in stories about terrorism. That journalist said:

> Their status would be irrelevant to me, if I was interviewing him about banking or about sentencing or paedophiles or, you know criminal justice or crime. It would be totally irrelevant to me. If they are in court on a terrorist charge or something like that, then it becomes more relevant that they may be an illegal immigrant or come in illegally, because they’re exploiting the system and that becomes relevant.

What also becomes apparent from the above quotation is the connection several journalists made between asylum and legal as well as illegal immigration. When asylum was thus framed as a category of immigration in general, journalists also raised issues related to multiculturalism and social cohesion, echoing some of the debates outlined in chapter 1.2.

Another important aspect of shaping the overall approach to asylum and refugee stories also shows an interesting parallel to a point discussed, again, in chapter 1.2. It relates to the question raised by Radley Russell in the prime ministerial debates about politicians allegedly having “become removed from the concerns of the real people.” Some journalists expressed a concern about their own connection to “real people”, i.e., that their experience of living in cosmopolitan London was divorced from the experiences of immigration the main part of their audiences had. While the journalists perceived their audiences to be neither anti-asylum nor anti-immigration, they did see their audience as being critical towards unfounded asylum claims, as believing that the government fails to control immigration, as feeling somewhat under threat, and as having a sense that politicians and the media had underplayed the issue. One journalist said:

> The public is not confident, in crude terms, that those who should be here are here and those that shouldn’t, aren’t. And until and unless they are confident you almost can’t have a wider debate. Because they are just like: get it sorted! You know—It’s vital to the issue of fairness, the notion that those who play by the rules benefit and those who don’t, don’t. And central to the issue of immigration and asylum is the undermining of the notion of fairness.

And:
People feel there is a conspiracy. There is a widespread sense among the audience of a conspiracy of the liberal ruling class to lie to them about this issue [immigration], because they don’t live in these places. It isn’t your school, your doctors, your street that is affected by immigration.

These differences in perspective, as well as a fear of being called racist, some suggested, may have led to an inadvertent, subconscious bias in their coverage in the past that was positively inclined towards immigration. However, at the present time, while none wanted to pander to their audience, BBC journalists especially felt that they needed to reflect its concerns more. Some journalists at the BBC suggested that parts of the press, in particular the tabloid press, had been more aware of these concerns in their coverage of immigration. One said:

Some of the newspapers, I think, have been way ahead of us, albeit on their terms. And I don’t always approve of the tone and the way they have done it. But they have been much closer to understanding the things that were getting to their readers than perhaps we have been. We have been a bit too coy about engaging with these issues. And I think we were wholly wrong to do that.

From the examples provided to the interviewers, often it was clear that journalists were thinking about EU migration quite specifically rather than refugee and asylum related issues when they conveyed these ideas. From the content discussed in chapter 2.2, this attempt at catching up still appeared to be tempered by an additional, strong economic interpretative frame. It should also be noted, however, that some journalists expressed misgivings that the current situation could lead to overcompensation. One journalist suggested that the main attitude had already become downright anti-immigration and expressed a committed reluctance to buy into it. That journalist said: “I am working on the basis that immigration is not bad. But I am working against an entire ethos that says it is. And that ethos appears in all shapes.” This alleged ethos was not necessarily accepted by other journalists. The ‘Home Office in Chaos’ narrative (see chapters 1.3 and 2.1) serves as a good example of an alternative explanation and justification.

The concept of immigration in general and asylum in particular as a symptom of a ‘Home Office in Chaos’ was also specifically addressed in the interviews. This specific line of questioning pursued the general suggestion made by journalists that the system was inadequate in relation to the picture emerging from the coverage at the time. Such a dominant aspect of the content analysed in chapter 2.1 in relation to illegal immigration to the UK, it also offers an interesting insight into how it shaped the content that is the focus here, in fact one of the items analysed here was framed as part of the foreign prisoners deportation row—one contemporary strand in the narrative. As mentioned previously, at the time immigration was within the remit of the Home Office. In fact, as explained above, many of the stories during the monitoring period related to the perception that the Home Office was unable to deal with immigration in general
(see chapter 1.3). Overall the interviewees accepted that this narrative exists and that certain events are viewed through this prism. Some journalists acknowledged that this may have led to immigration and asylum being covered on a more abstract level in the context of the political debate (as suggested by the findings of chapter 2.1). Most journalists developed similar arguments as to why immigration and asylum appear to be such good examples for the situation at the Home Office, even if employed as a shorthand for the narrative: in these areas the Home Office is not able to maintain its own standards; it does not follow its own processes; it does not have processes in place to achieve its stated aims; also, the Home Office regularly gets its facts wrong; and to some journalists the Home Office appears not to be ready for the challenges of mass migration in a globalised world. Again, this ties in with the basic assumptions about a distinction between deserving and undeserving asylum seekers and a system that is not-fit-for-purpose. Most journalists emphasised that this was not a value judgement on their part as to whether asylum or immigration are good or bad phenomena. They simply wanted to stress that these areas are not managed properly, hence represented a perfect example of the failures of a failing, chaotic department. One said:

There was similarly a management crisis in terms of just an inability to manage the number of people claiming asylum to the government’s own test. Forget whether you thought there should be more or less—that wasn’t the point. They set the policy. They couldn’t do it. So in those terms, I think, so long as crisis is used narrowly, you can justify it. If it is used broadly, it’s pejorative, it’s subjective and it creates an impression that it shouldn’t.

This journalist’s comments indicate a clear awareness of and the intention to avoid the potential stigmatising effect of connecting migration to crises. Where this line between broad and narrow usage between reporting on the facts and creating guilt by association was to be drawn exactly, however, was left and is of course open to debate. So despite the caveats and concerns journalists mentioned what emerges from the interviews is a potential for asylum and refugee topics as well as migration in a wider sense to be processed by what Altheide (1997; 2002) calls the problem machine that the mass media in general and television news in particular often turns into and which entails “the construction and routine use of a problem frame and expansion of fear in public discourse” (1997, p. 665).

An important role in Altheide’s media-problem model is assigned to “claims-makers” (ibid, p. 665), the people or institutions who offer themselves to the media for comment and play into the media logic of fear to promote their position. This brings me back to the issue of sourcing and who can say what, under what kind of conditions, which is particularly relevant in relation to the discussion of this case study. Accessibility and reliability were the key factors cited by the journalists, influencing the selection of sources. For asylum and refugee as well as immigration
stories the starting point for most stories as suggested by the content was the Home Office. The politics and policy focus that framed these issues at the time ensured that elite sources were most often used. So after the initial Home Office response, it was often MPs who would be contacted next. After whom journalists turned to interest groups. In terms of using refugees, asylum seekers or migrants as sources, most journalists acknowledged a general willingness but cited several difficulties: access, communication problems, as well as fears—an issue for asylum seekers and refugees as well as illegal immigrants—to be identified and suffer repercussions. Most journalists only thought of asylum seekers and refugees as sources for human interest-based stories and did not mention the possibility of using them to comment on policy. The interest group mentioned most often by journalists was MigrationWatch UK. MigrationWatch (2011) describes itself as an “independent, voluntary, non political body which is concerned about the present scale of immigration into the UK” and considers migration as a problem, which the organisation defines thus:

governments have lost control over our borders during the past fifteen years. This has resulted in immigration on a scale that is placing huge strain on our public services, housing, environment, society and quality of life. (ibid, p. What is the problem?)

It appears to be fair to conclude from this that MigrationWatch UK could be described as an organisation that has an overtly critical attitude towards migration. Framing migration explicitly as a problem, the organisations fits in well with Altheide’s description of claims-makers. In terms of accessibility and reliability this organisation had established itself quite strongly in previous years in the context of domestic migration issues. According to some journalists, it was the organisation’s predictions on migration from the 2004 EU accession states, which appeared to have proved correct, that boosted its standing. Journalists also mentioned the reliability of the MigrationWatch spokesman, off-screen as well as on, and his ability to appear on camera in central London at short notice as factors. Some journalists, though, acknowledged being wary of the organisation’s political agenda. One did not use them at all because of it. Most journalists said they used it on a regular basis, either for access to or a different explanation of data, or to provide a statement. One said:

I have gone to MigrationWatch, despite the fact that they’re considered by some persona non grata, because some of their research has been worthwhile as long as you approach them with caution. They are a lobbying group a pressure group. They got a view. But...most of the people I deal with have a non-objective view of the world.

In terms of interest groups on the other end of the spectrum, most journalists were able to come up with a few suggestions, such as the Refugee Council, but emphasised that there was no regular point of call. While these groups should not be equated with the inclusion of the voice of
an asylum seeker or refugee, in fact these organisations’ position as speaking for them could potentially be quite problematic, too—as will become clear from the analysis below—, yet their inclusion would at least suggest openness towards a supportive position. Several journalists, however, thought that these organisations had sometimes little understanding of the journalists’ requirements in terms of time pressures and general production processes. One journalist also suggested that journalists used to overemphasise these interest groups’ liberal agenda, because it used to be their own. Now that the agenda and many journalists’ position had shifted (see above), it was important to give voice to the other side of the debate. One said:

This [a pro-asylum or immigration view] was the conventional wisdom: The view of the charities was also the view of mainstream politics. It’s also in the last year or two that mainstream politics has reacted to the public’s view. So now there is the gap.

Again, what comes across here besides the difficult position pro-asylum organisations occupy as a potential source is an assumed understanding of public opinion and an implied concern about having been out of touch. Considering this as well as the overall picture emerging from the responses, highlights the complexity of the discursive network that defines the refugee and asylum related issues and as a consequence affects the inclusion of individual refugees and asylum seekers in the coverage. In the following section I will briefly describe the 7 news items featuring the voice of people labelled or identified as asylum seekers or refugees in a UK context.

Instances of Voice

Case 1: Channel 4 News, 4 May 2006

Anchor report combined with correspondent report on the so-called Foreign Criminals Deportation Row: The row centred on the failure of the Home Office (see chapter 1.3) to consider foreigners who had been convicted of crime in the UK and spent time in prison for deportation. This controversy eventually led to the replacement of the Home Secretary. The correspondent report is positioned earlier in the programme. Anchor Jon Snow and Home Affairs Correspondent Simon Israel talk about the case of a terror suspect who could have been but was not deported years ago, after having spent time in prison for criminal offences. The anchor report, presented by co-anchor Lindsay Taylor follows immediately afterwards. The report focuses on the case of Ernesto Leal. This 41-year-old man came to the UK from Chile 30 years ago as a refugee. He had recently served a prison sentence and was now threatened with deportation. Footage of Leal showing him talking to camera is included in the report. His voice can only be heard very faintly in the background overlaid by commentary from Taylor. The anchor is not summarising what Leal is saying but talks about Leal’s current situation.
Case 2: Channel 4 News, 9 May 2006:

Package on the case of the so-called radical Islamic cleric Abu Qatada: The report by Home Affairs correspondent Simon Israel centres on a court case regarding deportation of terrorism suspects to Jordan, involving the radical Islamic cleric Abu Qatada. As part of recapping the background to the story, Israel mentions that Abu Qatada arrived in Britain in the mid-90s and was given refugee status. Footage of Abu Qatada talking to the camera is shown. His voice can be heard faintly in the background but is overlaid by commentary from Israel. The correspondent briefly mentions the content of the footage, but moves on to talk about the current situation.

Case 3: Channel 4 News, 13 May 2006:

Package on concerns over the Human Rights Act: The report by correspondent Lucy Manning discusses recent political controversies about human rights legislation which revolved around the suggestion that the legislation and its interpretation by judges favoured the rights of criminals over the right of the public to be protected. One example cited is the case of a group of men from Afghanistan who hijacked a plane to come to Britain, claimed asylum and were eventually allowed to stay. Their voice enters the piece via a written statement that they released. The letter, written in first person plural, is represented as part of a graphic sequence that also shows mug-shots of the men and is read out by a journalist.

Case 4: ITV 1 News, local news window for Wales, 15 May 2006:

Package on the case of two asylum-seekers who face deportation: The report by chief reporter Andy Collinson tells the story of two mothers, Samah Majeed from Iraq and Aisha Siringul, a Kurd from Turkey. The two women face deportation while their children are allowed to stay. Samah Majeed is shown explaining her situation in two separate segments within the piece. Her voice is dubbed in the process.

Case 5: ITV 1 News, 22 May 2006:

Package on the migration into Europe from Africa combined with a live correspondent report on the new immigration minister in the Home Office: The package by Europe Correspondent Juliet Bremner focuses on the migration of men, children and women, who are at various points labelled illegal immigrants, refugees and migrants, from Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa. The anchor of the programme, Mark Austin, makes a number of explicit connections to the UK, e.g. suggesting that some of these people may “end up” in the UK. This
connection is strengthened by the segue into the following segment of the coverage of migration in which Political Editor Tom Bradby talks about the appointment of a new Immigration Minister in the Home Office to sort out the “shambles” (Austin). Voices of two migrants feature in the package about migration to Italy. One of them is not identified by name and gives a short statement in English about where he came from, Eritrea, and for how long he had been travelling. The other is part of short sequence in which he shows the reporter around a makeshift camp. He is identified by first name only and gives a statement about how life may actually be better back home.

**Case 6: Channel 4 News, 10 July 2006:**

Live studio interview with a member of the exiled Chechen government, part of a series of segments on the death of the Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev: Anchor Jon Snow conducts a 6 minute interview with Akhmed Zakayev, the foreign secretary of the exiled Chechen government. Zakayev is described as “having been granted asylum in Britain”. The interview focuses on the death of Basayev and what it means for the cause of the Chechen rebels. The talk is conducted through an interpreter with Zakayev speaking in Russian and Snow in English. Zakayev’s responses are translated live and instantaneously, i.e. the interpreter’s voice is heard above Zakayev’s voice after a short delay.

**Case 7: Channel 4 News, 24 July 2006**

Package on the migration into Europe from Africa: The piece by correspondent Juliet Linley focuses on the challenges Malta faces with the number of people arriving from Africa by boat. The people are labelled illegal immigrant or migrants. Linley also mentions that “most fail to win asylum status”, suggesting that most of them are asylum seekers. Three asylum seekers are quoted directly in the piece. One is identified by full name and briefly talks about his passage to Malta. Two more are quoted directly without identification. They complain about the conditions in which they have to live on Malta.

**A Conceptual Framework: Silenced, Packaged and Translated Voices**

As becomes clear from these brief descriptions, voices of asylum seekers and refugees can occur in a variety of ways within the news. They are used as illustrative footage without regard to content (cases 1 and 2). In these instances as well as in case 3 their voices undergo a comparatively radical process of de- and recontextualisation. Case 3, in fact, represents a transitional point: Attention is given to the content of the collective voice of the Afghan men, i.e., in form of the letter, but the content is appropriated to make a wider point about the Human
Rights Act rather than a specific point about the situation of the men. This process also occurs in cases 5 and 7, when the migrants’ voices are used to help to personalise and back up more general points the journalists are trying to make. However, the context shift is less substantial. Case 4 represents a particularly interesting example. The item focuses on the individual experience of the two women; hence the process of de- and recontextualisation is rather subtle and hardly seems to go beyond the minimum ramifications of the package genre. However, dubbing their voices raises the question what happens in the process of accessing a higher order of indexicality, i.e., a higher standard of spoken English, while at the same time completely obliterating their voices. This touches on issues of translation and interpretation, which also needs to be looked at in case 6. Still, the latter case represents the rare instance in which a refugee can assume the role of expert.

Without wanting to claim that these represent the totality of potential occurrences, I want to suggest a conceptual framework through which I intend to analyse these particular cases—the totality of occurrences during the six months of media monitoring. The framework consists of three points of orientation, three analytical notions of voice: the silenced voice, the packaged voice, and the translated voice. I use the term notion here, because they are contingent rather than fixed concepts and cannot be defined in the abstract. Neither are they mutually exclusive. It is possible that an item may display characteristics of more than one. Their function is similar to the points of a compass. They suggest direction or tendency first and a fixed location second—if at all and then only by triangulation. By adopting this framework, I want to highlight certain conditions, contingencies and potential consequences of these occurrences of voice, without losing sight of the specific context of television news and the wider, theoretical context of subalternity. Above, I have already started to orientate the pieces in relation to these points. In the following I will analyse the orientations in more detail through a close application of the concepts developed at the beginning of this chapter.

**The Silenced Voice**

The silenced voice positions the speaking migrant as mere footage. His or her voice is a voice devoid of content and meaning. It may find an expression in sound, as happens in the case of Abu Qatada (case 2: Channel 4 News, 9 May 2006) but this embodiment is incidental: the cleric does not speak in English and what he says is almost inaudible. In these cases (case 2; case 1: Channel 4 News, 4 May 2006) and instances like these, the position of the journalist is very strong. The journalist can completely disregard what an asylum seeker or refugee is saying, and can appropriate the footage to fit the needs of a particular news piece. More often than not the
image of the speaking migrant serves the purpose of illustration. The footage is an iconic sign of
the particular person in question, Ernesto Leal in case 1 and Abu Qatada in case 2, respectively.

This is a common technique in news journalism. When a particular person or group of people is
spoken about, the commentary is accompanied by footage or still images of that person or that
group (Boyd et al. 2008, pp. 272-274). Of course this material is not restricted to showing
someone talking to camera. It could show the person in a sheer infinite variety of situations,
from talking with a colleague, walking down a corridor or perusing files, to taking part in a
political demonstration or attacking another person. In fact there are instances of footage within
the material collected that contains footage of asylum seekers and refugees in a variety of
activities but without their talking to a journalist (e.g. cases 5: ITV 1 News 22 May 2006, and 7:
Channel 4 News 24 July 2006). All usage of footage raises issues regarding professional conduct
and ethics (Machin and Jaworski 2006), e.g., using archival footage of illegal entry to the UK as
iconic images of illegal immigration to the UK (see chapter 2.1 for more details). However, the
case of using footage of someone talking to camera without their talk, their voice being heard
raises the additional and very specific issue of silencing. By actively silencing a voice, journalists
take away part of the primary information contained in the footage.

Interviews and the delivery of speeches or statements are to an extent speech acts. The
utterances in themselves may not perform an action in terms of the speech act described by
Austin (1962), but they are acts defined by speaking. Depending on the context their visual
component may be more or less important and a deliberate part of the delivery, e.g., the setting
of the inaugural speech of an US president on the steps of the Capitol is an integral and
deliberate part of the act. But even at the level of a comparatively extremely staged speech or
rather speaking act, the primary component is the speech itself. In the cases of Ernesto Leal and
Abu Qatada the visual aspects appear to be far less deliberate and important to the overall
meaning of what they say. Leal is shown sitting on a chair in a cluttered office with the right knee
against his chest. Abu Qatada is shown sitting in a room (the commentary suggest it is a prison
cell) in front of a bare, white wall. By using only the visual component of their speaking acts, the
acts lose their defining component—speech and are redefined as solely visual images.

Redefining footage in this way is not restricted to the group of people I am interested here.
Within the material of this case study, for instance, footage of the Labour politician Jack Straw
giving a speech as Home Secretary in 2000 is part of the package on the Human Rights Act (case
3: Channel 4 News 13 May 2006). What he says is inaudible, as correspondent Lucy Manning
provides a commentary alongside it. In this particular instance, however, Straw’s voice does not
remain silent. The sequence is followed by more footage of the Home Secretary, again from the year 2000. This time he gives a statement to camera. His voice turns from one that is silenced into one that is packaged. But even without this change in the status of his voice, being silenced does not have the same ramifications for Jack Straw and many other people who have their voices treated in this way by journalists, as it has for an asylum seeker or refugee. Often the former group has other opportunities to be heard, whereas such opportunities for the latter are rare. The silencing of their voices in this manner thus emphasises their condition of subalternity.

**The Packaged Voice**

The packaged voice represents a shift from a voice emptied of its content to one whose content matters—at least to some extent. In difference to the silenced voice, the packaged voice positions the migrant in his or her own words as an integral part of the structure of an individual piece. The key characteristic of the packaged voice, however, is the tension between content and meaning, the content of the migrant’s utterance and its meaning within the news. As developed in the section on the position of the journalist, media professionals have the ability to define meaning or rather to direct interpretation through the selection of particular fragments and their con-/re-/en-textualisation, their packaging as part of the item. Of the cases broadcast during the monitoring period 5 and 7 are obvious examples of packaged voice, as are cases 3 and 4. The latter two cases also raise further issues about authenticity of voice. These issues come under the heading of the translated voice, which I will address in the following section. Here I will pay closer attention to the range of aspects the migrants speak about and how their voices are embedded within a piece of news.

First I will turn to the issue of embedding, analysing aspects such as the journalist’s commentary, in particular those parts immediately pre-ceeding and following a quotation and the position of the quotation within the discursive structure of the pieces. It is precisely the selection and interweaving of voices into an ordered and hierarchical “web of voices” (Fairclough 1995, p. 81) that establishes the discursive structure of an individual piece. To provide a detailed example of such a web, I will analyse case 3, Lucy Manning’s Channel 4 News package from 13 May 2006 on the Human Rights Act. As described above, incorporated into its fabric is the collective voice of nine Afghan men represented through a statement released by them apparently in reaction to debates over the Human Rights Act. Before their voice is heard, however, which is towards the end of the piece, it has been framed as the utterance of criminals and in effect marginalised. In this case the process is set in motion within in the first second of the coverage. Research has highlighted (Lewis et al. 2006) the important role a news presenter or anchor plays for the
discursive development of a whole item during the introduction phase of a topic. It is there that
discursive frames are established against which and within which the remainder of the coverage
occurs. In this case, this phase consists of two sequences, a trailer at the beginning of the
programme and the actual introduction to the package.

The image shows a split screen, one half showing the mug-shot of a man the other that of a
plane in front of an airport hangar. The man in the mug-shot, who is not identified at this point,
is convicted sex offender Anthony Rice. In addition to being a sex offender, Rice committed
murder while being released on probation. The plane presumably is the plane the 9 Afghan men
hijacked in 2000. In his commentary Channel 4 News presenter Krishnan Guru-Murthy starts by
evoking a number of clashing voices: “Amid rows over Afghan hijackers and criminals freed to
commit murder”—but only identifies one more specifically—“the government says it needs to
clarify the balance between public safety and human rights”. He concludes in his own voice, i.e.,
his own professional voice as the presenter of a news programme, by raising the question that
will presumably be answered within the coverage of the issues: “But can it be done without
tearing up the European Convention?” Later, when the programme returns to the topic, Guru-
Murthy names, or rather specifies a few more voices in the introduction to the package. For it is
not the government in general but the specific comments made by the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Falconer, in a radio interview on that day that Guru-Murthy seems to be referring to and appears
to provide the reason to cover the topic on this evening’s programme. Guru-Murthy presents the
introduction seated, while a screen behind him shows an image consisting of several statues of
Lady Justice. He says:

Public safety comes first the Lord Chancellor insisted today as he admitted the government was
considering changes to the Human Rights Act. Lord Falconer said, there was real concern about
how the act was working in practice and new legislation might be needed to make sure public
safety wasn’t endangered.

He then brings in a new voice, likely to be another one of those involved in the row mentioned
in the trailer and finishes by introducing the reporter who covered the topic: “Human rights
campaigners said current worries weren’t the fault of the act itself—as Lucy Manning reports.”

So far the audience has been introduced to three voices: the Lord Chancellor’s, human rights
campaigners’, both of which are channelled through the third voice, the voice of the presenter. It
may be obvious that the Lord Chancellor and the human rights campaigners represent so-called
institutional voices (Tunstall 1971), i.e., they are spokespeople for institutions, the government
and human rights campaigns respectively. Their utterances are the expression of the positions of
these institutions in this debate. It is worth remembering, though, that there are parallels to the
voices of the presenter. As I have mentioned above, despite the fact that specific journalists are put forward as the authors of particular pieces, the production process is defined by collaboration and shaped by institutional, organisational as well as individual influences. Especially, in the case of the presenter institutional elements come to the fore. It is, for instance, not unlikely that the introduction was not written or at least not written exclusively by Guru-Murthy, but by another or several other members of the production team and underwent an editorial approval process to ensure it works with the following piece. For this reason I would also argue that the images of the hijacked plane and of Anthony Rice as well as of Lady Justice are part of the institutional voice of the news programme embodied in the presenter (Goffman 1981, p. 226).

It is this voice which is dominant at this point and establishes a discursive frame, assigning particular roles to the participants in the debate over balancing the Human Rights Act. On the one side is the government and on the other are human rights campaigners. At stake is the safety of the public. This is actually presented as something these two sides agree on. Their disagreement appears to be over how this can be achieved. Whereas the government finds fault with the Human Rights Act and wants to change it, the human rights campaigners seem to suggest that it is not the act that is the problem. The way these explicit points of agreement and disagreement are presented also implies the further point of agreement over public safety: there is a problem, public safety should come first and is indeed at risk. The risk comes from such cases as cited by Guru-Murthy at the very beginning: “Afghan hijackers and criminals freed to commit murder”. Through the labelling as hijackers as well as the close association with murderers, the Afghan men have certainly developed the potential to be cast as criminals, if not one of the villains in the emerging discursive structure. Their role at this point, however, is not particularly central. They are merely examples of villainy, turned into an iconic sign of the potential risk to public safety that sparks of the debate around the balance of justice, which is the focus of the coverage. A focus visually highlighted by the image of blind Lady Justice. Their voice has been set up as marginal to the discursive structure of the package.

While the initial phase of the coverage is important, it does not mean following developments could not change these positionings. However, the piece by Lucy Manning echoes and further solidifies this discursive structure. It starts out with a summary of the Anthony Rice case as well as the case of the Afghan men. Both summaries use similar visual elements, a mug shot of Rice, shots of the hijacked airplane. Manning says:
Convicted sex attacker Antony Rice was freed to kill Naomi Bryant. The enquiry finding too much attention was paid to his human rights. And a judge decided the government should let 9 Afghan hijackers stay in the country as refugees, because under human rights law the men couldn’t be sent home as their lives would be at risk—both cases tipping the government into doing something about the Human Rights Act.

Again the journalist, in this case Manning, becomes the filter for other, paraphrased voices—the voice of the enquiry and the voice of the judge. By interpreting the government’s action as a reaction to these two cases, she also establishes a certain level of equivalence between the two. The decision to free Anthony Rice and the judge’s decision in the case of the Afghan men are presented as equally flawed. For flaws in the Rice case she can cite an official enquiry. Her claims for the Afghan men are less clear. She does not engage in the judge’s argument, nor does she cite another source of criticism to back up her claim. Her only evidence seems to lie in the reaction of the government, i.e. the reaction of the government proves that the judge’s decision is wrong. Since Manning does not question the government’s line of argument at this point this suggests that she may be sharing it. However, again this is a question that can only be answered by looking at the further development of the discursive structure.

The next two voices brought into the web are David Cameron, then the leader of the opposition Conservative Party, in paraphrases and Lord Falconer in paraphrases as well as in his own voice. The Lord Chancellor’s voice is heard in an excerpt from a BBC 4 radio interview. While the excerpt is played the screen shows a graphic: a photo with the caption “Lord Falconer speaking on BBC Radio 4” is positioned in the centre of the frame on a background containing an image of a statue on the left and an photograph showing the crest on the wall at the Royal Courts of Justice. The framing of the statue and the quality of the image is such that it is impossible to ascertain whether it is Lady Justice again. However, considering the context and the previous use of the statue as a symbolic sign for justice within the programme, this is highly likely. This imagery of justice not only continues the focus of the coverage but also parallels the comparatively abstract contribution of Lord Falconer. Neither Cameron nor Falconer picks up on the specific examples that may pose a threat to public safety. Both of their voices, however, add to the argument that the Human Rights Act may be compromising public safety and suggest possible remedies, ripping it up in Cameron’s case and amending it in Lord Falconer’s opinion.

In difference to these comparatively abstract points about legislation and public safety, the voice immediately following the interview excerpt again points more explicitly to the criminals that are a danger to the public. It is the voice of Dennis MacShane, a Member of Parliament for the Labour Party, here identified as “Dennis MacShane MP, Former Europe Minister”. He is shown standing in front of the Houses of Parliament delivering the following statement:
I remember when the act went through. It wasn’t envisaged that the civil rights lawyers funded by taxpayers with judges would act against the will of parliament. There isn’t a single MP across the road who doesn’t have his constituents’ safety and right to be protected from some of these people at the heart of their thinking. And it is really the judges and the civil rights—rights lawyers who got this so desperately wrong.

Two aspects I want to highlight here: a) the deictic expression “from some of these people”, b) the positioning of civil rights lawyers and judges as part of the problem. “These people” may be meant as a general reminder of the criminals who threaten public safety under the alleged protection of the Human Rights Act. In the context of this coverage the general reminder finds two specific targets. “These people” are Anthony Rice and the Afghan men. Again, however, they are restricted to the part of bit-players. According to MacShane, they pose the immediate risk, but it is the civil rights lawyers and judges who are responsible for creating the risk in the first place. This leads me to return to the start of the Manning segment. It is this line of argument that could explain her interpretation of the government’s reaction. Following MacShane, the reaction is a common-sense one to the judge’s “desperately wrong” ruling in the case of the Afghan men.

Already foreshadowed by MacShane’s comments about how the act has strayed from its intended path, the piece now turns to the origins of the Human Rights Act. A short sequence shows Jack Straw in October 2000, then the Home Secretary, presenting the act and giving his assessment of the Act in a statement. He says: “It is an important day for the rights of the citizens of this country against the state.” Within the discursive structure Straw’s comments represent a turning point. They are a reminder of the promise of the act. A promise that not everyone feels has been compromised since. It is from here that voices in favour of the act are woven into the web. It is only somewhat of a turning point, however, because the discursive structure is not abandoned or reversed. The look back has merely provided a point of entry to bring in pro-Human Rights Act voices. These voices are positioned within the existing discursive structure with little scope to challenge it.

Straight after Straw’s statement the piece returns to the present (2006), to Downing Street, the official residence of the British Prime Minister, in front of which Lucy Manning is shown standing as she delivers a piece-to-camera:

Well, Downing Street is obviously taking note of the public’s outrage over recent court decisions that appear to protect the rights of criminals above those of the public and they are no doubt also looking at the tabloid campaign to get the Human Rights Act abolished. But while the government hasn’t shirked away from criticising the decisions of judges, is the threat to introduce legislation a step too far?
Structurally, this short segment leads up directly to a statement by Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty, a pro-human-rights organisation, who provides an implicit answer to the question posed by Manning. Before Chakrabarti can give her answer, however, the segment solidifies the discursive structure of the piece by introducing two more, anti-human-rights voices: the tabloid media and the public. Again, their voices do not appear directly but are merely referenced by Manning to provide evidence. Assessed on the basis of the piece itself, however, the evidence is rather weak. So far positions or groups supposedly holding these positions cited by Manning have at least been ascribed to specific people or have been represented by an example, e.g., Dennis MacShane as an example of the politicians in the House of Commons. In this instance, however, the alleged media campaign to abolish the Human Rights Act is summarily ascribed to the tabloid media in general. Manning provides no further specifics or examples. Nor does she question the reasons why the tabloids may be running such a campaign. In fact, combined with her claim about “the public’s outrage” the tabloids’ position seems to be merely reflecting the will or rather the emotional condition of the people. A condition, however, for which Manning provides no obvious evidence. It remains unclear how Manning has assessed public opinion to arrive at the conclusion that the public is outraged. It is not uncommon for journalists to cite the public in their coverage. In fact using an assumed public opinion without evidence is a standard technique in television news (Lewis et al. 2005, p. 21). This can become rather problematic, because journalists regularly assume public opinion incorrectly. In their research on the representation of citizens in US and UK television news, Lewis et al. (2005, p. 22) found that “conventional journalistic wisdom may fly in the face of polling data”. This is not to say that Manning does get it wrong here, only that she provides no evidence that she got it right. Regardless of the accuracy of these claims they suggest an outraged populace by the incorrect application of the Human Rights Act and a tabloid media keen on getting rid of it altogether.

This anti-human-rights position is given further credence by the government’s criticism of the judges’ decision. Again, Manning does not question the appropriateness of this criticism. Suggesting that the government’s possible introduction of further legislation could be a step too far, Manning seems to imply that all previous steps have been within the acceptable limits. Moreover, Manning uses a question to raise the criticism thus further distancing herself from its content. Now with an outraged British public, the government, the opposition, and the House of Commons against her, the stage is set for Shami Chakrabarti, director of Liberty, to provide a response from the pro-human-rights side and give an answer to Manning’s question. She says:
I completely understand why politicians of all colours don’t like human rights. They are there to provide a check on politicians. Human rights belong to the people. It’s up to us not to be conned by politicians on the run. It’s up to us to decide—Do we want them to be more accountable to us or not? We shouldn’t give in to the lies and spin about the act. The act gives us rights against them, including victims’ rights against gross failures in public protection.

Chakrabarti’s implicit answer seems to be “Yes, new legislation is a step too far.”, i.e., the Human Rights Act in its current form is a good thing and should not be changed. She attempts to reposition the Us vs. Them-dichotomy to suggest that the Human Rights Act actually benefits the public. Her argument, however, is rather generic, i.e., abstract rather than specific. She does suggest that human rights protect victims’ rights, but where and how as well as in which instances exactly—theses questions remain unanswered. Her answer does not explain or even refer to the specifics of the case of Anthony Rice or the case of the Afghan men. Hence it remains questionable how effective her attempt to introduce a new Us vs. Them-dichotomy is.

Through her use of personal pronouns she appears to try to replace Us, the public vs. Them, the criminals who threaten the public with Us, the people vs. Them, the politicians and other people in powerful positions who try to con the people. This new dichotomy runs counter to the discursive development of the piece, and this change in direction is not supported by Manning. Chakrabarti’s inclusion merely suggests an attempt to establish a level of journalistic balance (also cf. Davis 2007 chapter 3 for a discussion of ‘journalistic balance'; cf. Lewis 1991, p. 124). By quoting the Liberty director, Manning can claim that pro-Human Rights Act voices have their say, too, and journalistic balance has been achieved. But they only have their say technically speaking. Manning does not develop Chakrabarti’s argument; instead she counters the campaigner’s statement by taking a more detailed look at the case of the Afghan men. It is worth reiterating here that so far the Afghan men have been cited as an example of abuses of the Human Rights Act, first by Guru-Murthy then by Manning. Thus Manning’s return to the case seems to contradict directly Chakrabarti’s claims, unless, of course, Manning intends to challenge the discursive web she has so far been developing in her piece. Straight after Chakrabarti’s statement, the piece cuts to a graphic that includes the mug-shots of the nine Afghan men. As the camera zooms in on the faces of the men, Manning says:

And now the Afghan hijackers have joined the debate about the human rights legislation, which helped them, in a statement arguing that it was right they were allowed to stay. The nine hijackers said:

In this lead-up to the statement that is to follow, the discursive web remains firmly in place. The mug shots as well as the labelling of the Afghan men as hijackers appear to echo the criminal association from earlier on. Seen through the prism of the dichotomy of Us the outraged people vs. Them the criminals, the fact that the human rights legislation has “helped them” does not
support Chakrabarti’s claim that it protects “victims’ rights against gross failures in public protection”—to the contrary. Now comes the point where the Afghan men are given space for their collective voice for the first and only time. It is possible that the statement which was released through the solicitor of the Afghan men was not written by them alone, but this is not the issue here. What is of concern is whether their voice carries enough agency to actually challenge the discursive web established in and through the piece overall. Before they have said anything they have been put on the defensive. They stand accused of not only being a threat to public safety but of being an example of the failure of the Human Rights Act.

From the mug-shots the graphic then switches to one with a plane in the background and the text of a statement released by the Afghan men in the foreground, which besides being on screen is also read out by an unidentified male voice, presumably belonging to a member of the Channel 4 News staff:

We do realise, for the other people on that plane, the hijack was terrifying and we regret causing such fear in the hearts of others. But we did it because we were desperate, and we did not believe we could all get away safely in any other way” [Manning interrupts to say:] “They added.” [The male voice then continues:] We face being accused of sponging and living off the state, when it is the last thing we wish or need to do.

Their statement does not engage explicitly with the Human Rights Act. Rather its content suggests an attempt to personalise their experience in order to excuse their actions. In the context of the discursive structure of the piece, however, it does not challenge their association with criminality. No further context is provided that could elaborate on their claims that they acted under duress and out of desperation. The second part of their statement seems almost irrelevant in the context of this piece. The question of whether they are sponging is not one that has an immediate relevance to the issues of public safety and human rights—the focus of this piece. Yes, their collective voice is given space, but it is a voice without agency. This becomes even clearer when looking at the concluding segment of the piece.

Immediately after the statement Manning finishes off by saying: “Downing Street knows it will be judged in the polls if criminals keep benefiting from the Human Rights Act. This is Number 10 stepping up the pressure on the judiciary.” Her commentary is accompanied by a panning shot of Downing Street starting on a sign that reads “Judges Parking”. Manning does not engage in the content of the statement of the Afghan men at all. Through her commentary Manning simply dismisses and re-contextualises it as the empty pleading of the guilty. She appears to suggest that the Afghan men are criminals, despite the fact that their criminal convictions were overturned on appeal. The proximity of their statement, their overall positioning within the
discursive web of voices—all these aspects suggest that it is the Afghan men who must be some of those “criminals who keep benefiting from the Human Rights Act”. This is how they were defined at the beginning of the piece and this is how they are defined at the end of it in spite of the inclusion of their voice. Their voice has not made a difference.\(^7\)

Manning’s piece highlights the processes of re-and entextualisation of subaltern voices: Voice is given space to provide content, but its meaning is beyond its control. It is shaped by context and the voice’s position within the discursive web of voices. Not all inclusions of packaged, subaltern voices undergo this process to such an extreme extent. For a start, the pieces on illegal immigration, cases 5 and 7 do focus on migration. Still, the migrant voices within those pieces remain packaged—by the particular framing of illegal immigration prevalent at the time. Both cases, 5 (ITV 1 News 22 May 2006) on illegal immigration via the Italian island of Lampedusa and 7 (Channel 4 News 24 July 2006) on the situation in Malta, are examples of illegal immigration as a crisis. It is a crisis of control over the “floods of Africans” (Channel 4 News 24 July 2006), a “human tide of desperate refugees from Africa” that “is apparently unstoppable” (ITV 1 News 5 May 2006). This framing a) again, directs the interpretation of what they say and b) limits the scope of what they can talk about. In the case study on the formation of boundary and distance (chapter 2.1) I have developed the crisis narrative and the framing of illegal immigration in more detail. Suffice to say here that from the outset they are illegal immigrants first; anything else that may define them as part of another group or as an individual person comes second. Even if they talk about their personal experiences, it is always their experience as migrants that they are heard talking about and how they are described by the journalists.

\(^7\) It is interesting to note that the package is followed by a studio interview conducted by Guru-Murthy with Lord Lester, a Liberal Democrat peer and human rights lawyer. In the interview Lord Lester supports the Human Rights Act. He takes issue with the connections made by politicians between public safety and the act and explains in some detail points about the motivation behind the tabloid campaign as well as the case of Afghan men. In his defence of the Human Rights Act on principle Lord Lester echoes Chakrabarti’s stance on the issue. When pressed on the issue of the hijack by Guru-Murthy, for instance, Lord Lester says:

Now that's a very difficult thing when they [Afghan hijackers] have taken the law into their own hands and it's very hard to justify to public opinion. I agree with that. But what is wrong is not the Human Rights Act—as I say—it's explaining to everyone why it is in all out interest that all our rights and freedoms are protected by a law that gives us a direct remedy instead of having to go to Europe.

What becomes clear is that Lord Lester defends principles of law, not the actions of the Afghan men. His voice challenges the position of the Human Rights Act within the discursive web proposed by Manning’s piece, not that of the Afghan men.
In the piece on ITV 1 News migrant voices feature twice. In a sequence that shows illegal immigrants being brought to shore by the Italian coastguard at night, a group of men is shown sitting on the ground apparently waiting to be processed by officials. The correspondent, Juliet Bremner, is shown crouched down next to one migrant (To note the contrast to the position of the journalist in relation to the migrants discussed in chapter 2.1., her sharing of space with the migrants is in line with an overall sympathetic tone of the package—its “human tide” framing notwithstanding). In her commentary Bremner says: “By the time they’re picked up, all papers and passports have been destroyed to prevent them being identified and sent straight back. There is no doubt some have been travelling for months.” The unidentified male then says: “I came from Eritrea. My [inaudible] three months, since about three months.”

Later on in the piece a man identified as 28-year-old Ali, who according to Bremner “escaped the war in Darfur”, shows the journalist round a makeshift camp on the Italian mainland. He says: “Here is our bathroom. Where we taking—we use to take shower here. This is our bathroom.” Bremner then says: “He and his friends wish they’d never come.” Ali adds: “We hope that here we change our lives but I think here and there the same—maybe therefore it’s better than here. I think so.”

In the piece on Channel 4 News three migrant voices are inserted, first in a sequence on the Safi detention centre in which the Maltese government holds illegal immigrants. Over various shots showing men walking around behind a fence the correspondent, Juliet Linley, says: “Their dream was to reach Italy but either their smugglers conned them into believing the Maltese shoreline was the Italian coast or they were shipwrecked and washed ashore.”

The piece then cuts to a man, identified by a title insert as ‘Warsame Ali Garari, Somali migrant’. He says: “I am from Somalia and I came here by boat as everyone here staying in the centre. It was horrible for me and most of the time even I don’t like, I don’t like even to talk about.” This is followed by a sequence of images of men watching a music video on television in a room. Linley says:

Over the past few years more than 5,000 migrants have arrived here, largely from Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Most fail to win asylum status but about half of them are granted humanitarian protection meaning they can live in makeshift centres like this converted school, seek low paid work but can’t leave the island.

This is followed by a short vox pop sequence comprising two unidentified male migrants. Male 1 says: “I don’t want to stay here, because there is no, there is no [inaudible] in this country, I wanna, I wanna go, I wanna, I wanna freedoms. I want freedoms.” Male 2 says: “Here is a, we
don’t have water, shower. Maybe two weeks I am not showered because I don’t have water shower.”

I have already mentioned the overall illegal immigration as crisis frame within which the migrant voices in the two pieces operate. Here I want to argue that nothing any of these men are shown saying challenges this frame. Their incorporation in the piece may give the crisis a few faces. It may even raise some sympathy with their plight. Ultimately, however, they exemplify the crisis and do not, or rather cannot challenge it. The voice segments Linley and Bremner chose to integrate in their packages have the migrants talk about the length or difficulty of their journey, the difficulty of their current living conditions, and highlight the fact that by coming to Europe their hopes have not been realised. Similar to the case of the Afghan men discussed above, they only talk about their own and their fellow migrants personal experience. I have already noted that the excerpts of the Afghan men’s statement included by Manning refer only to their personal situation. The excerpt has them plead for understanding based on their desperation, on their individual and specific case, but does not directly comment on the Human Rights Act. None of these voices in these pieces are shown providing a reasoned explanation—alluding to desperation does not count as reasoned—as to why they may have had to come to Europe illegally, nor are they shown voicing an opinion on the legal framework that makes their migration illegal in the first place. Part of this process of packaging the voice is due to journalistic practice. Media frames (Entman 1993) and templates (Kitzinger 2000) shape the approach journalists take to a particular piece, the people they talk to and the questions they ask of particular people, the answers they receive as well as the visual footage they shoot. Unless some unforeseen occurrence has unsettled their original approach substantially, it will influence how they select and combine segments of the audiovisual material they collected to a finished piece. Journalistic practice, however, is only part of the process.

As some of the quotations in the pieces on Lampedusa and Malta highlight, the migrants’ varying level of competency in English also has an influence on the situation; and competency is not just a question of being able to put a grammatically correct sentence together. Considering this aspect in terms of Blommaert’s (2005a) orders of indexicality, suggests that a truly competent utterance let alone one that could subvert a well-established framework would have to take much more into account than basic questions of grammar and lexical choice. As Maryns (2005) has shown in her analysis of interviews with asylum seekers, voices are assessed, even given meaning and reinterpreted according to the demands of the dominant orders of indexicality. So it is journalistic practice and language competency contingent upon orders of indexicality that shape
the meaning of the packaged voice. Of the examples provided so far in this section, the statement by the Afghan men shows the highest level of competency. Yet, the influence of journalistic practice has resulted in the highest level of entextualisation. Also the statement raises questions about the originality of voice. The statement was released by the organisation defending the Afghan men in court. Though released in their name and written in the first person plural, it may not be a direct expression of their voices. In fact it may have been entirely composed by their lawyer. It is difficult to ascertain what exactly happened in this case. Did they accept the loss of their personal voices at the price of gaining access to the appropriate order of indexicality? In the following section I will explore these issues further in relation to the idea of the translated voice.

**The Translated Voice**

Translation from one language into another is a communication process that includes an overt, intermediate stage of transformation. On its way from an originator to an intended final receiver a message is translated by an intermediate receiver, the translator (Sakai 2006, p. 74). Often this transformation is necessary to render the message intelligible, e.g., because it was issued in a language the receiver does not understand. In theory translation thus may offer a migrant, whose English language competency is low, access to a higher order of indexicality via his or her native language and the assistance of a translator. The process of translation, however, does more than merely change language in its form. Meaning may shift alongside it as well:

> we cannot ignore the implication that *every translator or interpreter inevitably intervenes when translating or interpreting*. As there are no fully equivalent codes—which is not just a matter of ideolectal peculiarities—claims to equivalence in translation become void in the absence of a thorough awareness of inevitable difference. (Verschueren 2007, p. 76, original emphasis)

The consequence of this intervention is one of degree. The level of change may be affected wilfully or unintentionally, but regardless of intentions it will occur. It can be subtle, even negligible; it can be substantial to the extent that an original meaning can be distorted or altered entirely. If the form and meaning are always changed in the process of translation—even just a little—to what extent is it still a migrant’s voice when it is heard in translation? The access to a higher order of indexicality comes at the price of surrendering one’s voice to the meaning changing process of translation. The result of which is twofold: in its translated form, the voice becomes distanced from its original source through the changes in form and meaning. At the same time the translated voice comes to define its original source as it turns into a representation of the migrant who uttered the words in the first place. Considering that migrants and in particular refugees or asylum seekers often speak from a subaltern position, the potential for
misinterpretations and misappropriations inherent in acts of translation could ultimately lead to a complete silencing of the original voice. How can the balance between empowering and silencing be assessed? As all translations are representations and all representations are constructions, they can never be judged on accuracy, instead they may be judged on what Liu calls representational justice.

The simple litmus tests for representational justice in the field of translation studies should be whether translation helps people in the cosmopolitan centre understand what peoples in the global peripheries truly think, feel, aspire to, and dream; whether it helps reduce the inequality and asymmetry of cultural relations; (2007, p. 64, original emphasis)

Applying Liu’s argument to the translated voice of the migrant on television news, suggests that surrendering your voice to translation may be a price worth paying, if the translation achieves representational justice. Applying the litmus test, however, is not as simple as Liu seems to suggest. It may be rather difficult to assess a specific translation on its success, especially since Liu warns against a normative approach: none of the two main translation approaches, emphasising sameness on the one hand or difference on the other, with their respective techniques always indicates or guarantees representational justice (ibid, pp. 62-64). In the context of television news, there is, however, one aspect which can be analysed and without which representational justice cannot be achieved for certain: authenticity.

Authenticity of voice is not an objective quality, but based on evaluations (Van Leeuwen 2001, p. 392). Montgomery (2001, p. 404) notes that contemporary reporting on radio and television relies more and more on establishing an appearance of truth through the deployment of seemingly authentic voices—seemingly authentic, because upon closer inspection, the truth-claim, the claim to authenticity can always be called into question. Consequently, to appear authentic, to not be called into question, a voice has to conform to established standards of authenticity. Building on Goffman’s (1981) concept of fresh talk, Montgomery provides three overlapping criteria for an assessment of authenticity:

First there is talk that is deemed authentic because it does not sound contrived, simulated or performed but rather sounds natural, ‘fresh’, spontaneous. Second there is talk that is deemed authentic because it seems truly to capture or present the experience of the speaker. Third, there is authentic talk that seems truly to project the core self of the speaker—talk that is true to the self of the speaker in an existential fashion. (2001, pp. 403-404)

All three criteria ultimately relate back to an assessment of the speaker: can this person sound like that? Can this person have the relevant experiences or the necessary knowledge? Does what the person says reflect his or her true self? If someone is not generally well-known beyond a particular news item, the answers to these questions are based on a mixture of trust towards the
journalist, the limited information provided within the news coverage and on additional information that seems relevant to a particular case. The process of translation further complicates the assessment of authenticity. The physical change of the speaking voice, the aural appearance of the translator’s voice on the scene, opens up a separation between talk and speaker. According to Goffman a speaker can be defined as any combination of author, animator and principal:

One meaning, perhaps the dominant, is that of animator, that is, the sounding box from which utterances come. A second is author, the agent who puts together, composes, or scripts the lines that are uttered. A third is that of principal, the party whose position, stand, and belief the words attest. (1981, p. 226)

Goffman develops this concept in the context of the construction of fresh talk on the radio, that is, talk that appears fresh and natural but is actually a highly constructed artifice. Even if for any one utterance all three aspects of speaker may not be comprised by the same person, the artifice might be maintained through a number of strategies. Montgomery (2001, p. 400) drawing on Goffman suggests, that utterances tend to appear the “most authentic” when a speaker actually comprises all three aspects and highlights the relevance of the issue of (the appearance of) authenticity for broadcasting. In the context of this case study this issue becomes important in the context of translation. In the process of translation, the translator, at a minimum, becomes the animator or re-animator. The extent to which, if any, he or she takes on the other parts is obscured by the act itself and thus the appearance of authenticity receives a crack in its facade. This crack may not bring the whole edifice down, but it can, because it highlights its constructedness. The appearance of authenticity is thus potentially destabilised. This can create a knock-on effect that calls into question the utterance’s sufficient fulfilment of the criteria of authenticity. As a consequence, the voice is deemed inauthentic.

However, as the terms may, potentially and can suggest, this failure to be authenticated may or may not occur. The crack can remain a mere crack and not gain destructive momentum. After all, translation is regularly used on television news in a variety of situations. Non-English speaking politicians, eye-witnesses and victims of or participants in events, such as demonstrations, accidents and catastrophes, appear on the news frequently. Their authenticity is cracked by translation but apparently remains sufficiently stable still. I would argue that this is contingent upon two determinants: a) the overall staging of the news programme, with its set of rules and conventions (Luginbuehl 2004) and by transference the specific staging of the translation within a news item and b) whether what the translated voice says appears to conform to criteria 2 and 3 as suggested by Montgomery (2001).
In the following section I will develop this argument by comparing cases 4 (ITV 1 News, local news window for Wales, 15 May 2006) and 6 (Channel 4 News 10 July 2006). As outlined above, case 4 is a package about two women, Samah Majeed and Aisha Siringlu, who face deportation while their children would be allowed to stay in the UK. While footage of both woman forms part of the package, only Samah Majeed is interviewed for the story. Case 6 is a studio interview conducted by Jon Snow with Akhmed Zakayev, the foreign secretary of the exiled Chechen government, occasioned by the death of the Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev. In both instances the voices of the migrants, Majeed and Zakayev respectively, are translated.

It is interesting to note that case 4 was also part of an audience, focus-group-based study conducted by the Institute for Public Policy (Durante 2006). While I have no audience data for any of the other pieces, it is worth taking these results into account as a reference point. In one of the activities participants were shown 3 news items about asylum and refugee issues. These items were provided by the research team at Cardiff University that looked into the representation of these issues on British television news and which I was part of (Gross et al. 2007). My colleagues and I choose this particular item because in difference to the other material collected, it appeared to display what could be described as an overtly positive attitude towards the asylum seekers: the piece focuses on their specific, personal stories; at least one of them is allowed to speak at some length; as are some of the children as well as a neighbour and the women’s lawyer; no one with an anti or even critical stance towards asylum is quoted or cited at all. Later, in personal conversation with a member of the research team at IPPR (Durante 2006) it turned out that this piece received very negative reactions from most of the focus group participants: the piece completely failed to create any sympathy or even understanding for the women’s situation, who were deemed to be in it entirely due to their own fault. In Hall’s (1980) terminology this could be described as an example of an oppositional reading. As I can only surmise about the attitude of individual audience members as well as the dynamics of the different groups that led to this reading, I want to return to the text itself in order to make sense of this reaction. There are elements within it that may have facilitated such a reading. For one, it may have been the very one-sidedness of the item, which does not conform to the standards of journalistic balance and objectivity (cf. Davis 2007 chapter 3). However, one-sidedness in itself may not pose a problem. This is, after all, a human interest story, a type of story were different standards apply and which are often comparatively one-sided with all the advantages and disadvantages such an approach can bring (cf. Macdonald 1998 for a discussion of the issue). But this particular one-sidedness ran counter to the prevalent media framing of (Gross et al. 2007; ICAR 2004) and subsequent public attitudes towards (Lido et al. 2006) these issues at the time,
which may have created problems. Negative public attitudes towards single mothers (Kiernan et al. 1998), at least Majeed is identified as one, may have played a role, too. Also, there is the aspect of the women’s level of language competency: despite having lived in Wales for years, the women need a translator, which suggests that they do not speak any English or at least not enough English to express themselves in this situation. Language competency has been identified as playing an important role in shaping the attitudes of locals towards migrants (Threadgold et al. 2008, p. 14). Additionally, even if migrants have acquired a good level of competency their foreign accent may still engender a negative response (ibid, p. 52). So without wanting to challenge Liu’s warning against taking a normative approach on this issue, it should be pointed out that the translator’s foreign accent may contribute to shaping the reactions of the focus group participants. However, while all these factors may have played a part, the key to understanding the oppositional reading, I would argue, lies in the representation of the translated voice. Because of its staging, its content is called into question and it fails to pass as authentic.

As mentioned above, there are two segments in the piece during which Majeed is shown explaining her situation. In the first instance her face is shown in a close-up. Apparently in sync with the image a voice can be heard. The voice speaks English with a foreign-sounding accent. At this point the voice seems to be Majeed’s. However, after approximately three seconds an insert appears that reveals that it is not her voice after all. The caption reads: “Wales Tonight: SAMAH MAJEED, Speaking through Translator” It turns out that the voice that can be heard is not Majeed’s, but the translator’s. Her voice track has been completely erased and has been replaced by that of a translator; the appearance is similar to that of a dubbed movie. In the second segment the translation is done similarly, only this time Majeed is shown sitting in a living room. A woman who appears to be the translator is also shown in the frame. I have deliberately avoided any suggestions that they sit there together, because beyond being present in the same room, there is no apparent level of togetherness, no interaction suggested through body position or body language. Majeed is positioned in the left half of the frame. Her body is turned towards the camera at an angle. She is looking to the left of the camera, where the journalist is likely to be positioned. The translator is positioned slightly further back, in the right half of the frame. Her body is also turned towards the camera, and her eyes are also directed to the left of the camera. She holds a few sheets of paper and gives no indication that she is actually listening to Majeed. Still, she manages to translate, to animate Majeed’s voice without any hesitation in almost perfect sync with Majeed’s lip movements.
This is a rather different staging of translation when compared to that of the interview with Akhmed Zakayev on Channel 4 News. Following a package on the death of the Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev, Jon Snow introduces his interview guest by saying:

With me now is the Chechen foreign minister in the exiled government Akhmed Zakayev. He’s been granted asylum by Britain. He’ll speak in Russian. We’ll translate it for you. [Snow then turns to his guest] Mr Zakayev, do you accept Basayev is dead?

The camera then cuts to the foreign minister. For a moment he is quiet, as he seems to be listening to the translation into Russian. This translation is not broadcast. Then he begins to give an answer in Russian, which is audible. After slightly more than one second, a man’s voice hesitatingly starts to provide a translation in British-sounding variety of English. The translator’s as well as Zakayev’s voices can be heard at the same time. This pattern of translation is repeated throughout the interview. It is a pattern typical for live interview on television news: the translation is immediately acknowledged or apparent, as the voice of the translated can be heard in the original by itself at the beginning of each answer and throughout the translation, albeit then at a slightly lower volume. The typical pattern for translated voices in the package format tends to be slightly different. Often the translation sounds smoother, delivered with less hesitation, because the production process does not require the instantaneous translation delivery necessary in live interview situations, but provides the time to translate and do the voice over later on (the interview segment with the woman from North Korea discussed in chapter 2.1 for instance is staged in this way). Both formats share the characteristic that the original voice is at least somewhat audible at some point. In Goffman’s (1981) terms two animators are present. The staging of the translation process suggests that the translator is merely the re-animator of an original voice. Because of this set-up, the interpretive intervention that the translator necessarily has to make (Van Leeuwen 2001) tends to be smoothed over. Even in its translated form, the role of author and principal can still be ascribed to the original voice.

The staging of the translation of Majeed’s voice is rather different. Her voice is never audible. Moreover, suggested by the presence of the translator, the second segment is staged as if it were a live interview within the package, i.e., no longer live but comparatively unedited footage of the actual interview between the journalist and Majeed assisted by the translator. But it fails to conform to the conventions of a translated live interview. There is no delay between Majeed and the translator, no hesitation in the latter’s phrasing. In fact, as pointed out above, the translator gives no indication that she is listening to Majeed. Despite the foreign-accented voice, the translation simply appears too smooth to be real, real within the parameters of translation on television news. The crack in the appearance of authenticity characteristic for all translated voices
is given the chance to spread from Majeed’s position as original animator to her positions as author and principal of the translated voice. These questions regarding authorship and status as principal can only be answered by looking at the content of her utterances.

In the first segment Majeed/the translator says:

“It’s true the coalition, the British are protecting Iraq and they are helping the Iraqi. But the terrorists do not believe that and because my daughters are British, they are threatening us if we return that they might kidnap them.”

In the second segment Majeed/the translator says: “I would like them [my children] to have a chance at decent life in this country, because it’s their right to live here and as they are in my custody I want to do them the best.”

It is noticeable that Majeed develops a very reasoned and complex argument at a high order of indexicality in these two short utterances: she addresses the political situation in Iraq as well as the role of the British state within it and relates these aspects to her and her children’s personal situation. In the second segment, she develops her children’s position in more detail. Her statements are comparatively free of emotive language. She does say things such as “threatening” and “decent life”, but other voices in the item, e.g., correspondent Andy Collinson, use far more emotive terms such as “Cardiff girls” for the children and “mother” for Majeed. She herself does not do so. Instead, by using the term custody at the end of her statement, she highlights a bond between herself and her children that is legally rather than emotionally defined. All this sounds very much like an appropriate argument to make in a petition to an immigration officer or tribunal. When a case such as Majeed’s is decided on legal frameworks and policy directives, custody rather than motherhood may be the deciding factor. However, within the context of a human interest story on television news, it may further challenge the appearance of authenticity of Majeed’s voice.

The challenge posed rests on the question whether the utterances can be deemed “truly to capture or present the experience of the speaker” and to be “true to the self of the speaker” (Montgomery 2001, p. 396). Again, these are questions about the appearance of authenticity. Since Majeed is not a well-known person beyond this news piece, the answers depend on an evaluation of the information provided within the piece. This information is somewhat limited: how long she has been in Wales; that she did not change her immigration status when she married a British-passport holder, who is the father of her children; that she has separated from her husband since; that an immigration appeal has already failed and she may face deportation; and suggested by the fact that her voice has been translated that she appears not to speak
English particularly well. It is difficult to make an assessment of her voice’s authenticity based on this information. There are two further aspects, though, that allow for additional information from outside the text to be taken into account. It is debateable to what extent news is a form of story-telling (Lewis 1991). What is clear, however, whether within a narrative structure akin to story-telling or not, news “position[s] news actors symbolically to serve wider cultural myths” (Cottle 2000, p. 439). Beyond the level of a specific, individual human being, Majeed is also defined within the piece in symbolic terms as a) a mother and b) as an asylum seeker. The authenticity of her voice may thus also be judged against the repertoires available to these groups. As the case of Kate McCann suggests, as a mother Majeed fails the test on account of her not showing or expressing emotion. McCann is the mother of Madeleine McCann, a 4-year old girl from Britain who disappeared from her family’s holiday bungalow in Portugal in 2007. The media coverage on the disappearance repeatedly commented on Kate McCann’s lack of showing emotion. Some stories focussed on McCann explicitly stating that the press was turning against her because she did not look and behave like a typical mother (cf. ‘Kate McCann is right. Just because she's slim and pretty doesn’t mean she’s a killer…’ by Bel Mooney, Daily Mail 18 October 2007, 53; ‘Too serene for sympathy? ’ by Margarette Driscoll, The Sunday Times 21 October 2007, 14). Journalist Dominic Lawson (‘This tidal wave of emotional tyranny’, The Independent 11 September 2007, 30) compared McCann’s case to media reaction to the calm comportment of Lynn Chamberlain, whose child, Azaria disappeared in the Australian outback in 1980, suggesting a line of similar cases and a media demanding of mother’s to be emotional. As an asylum seeker, on the other hand, Majeed becomes “locked into a cyclic, stereotypical ‘logic’” (Lynn and Lea 2003: 428) regarding refugee and asylum issue in the British media. Part of this logic pertains also to what kind of voice can be expected from an asylum seeker. Considering other research (cf. Buchanan et al. 2003; Gross et al. 2007) as well as the examples provided in the section on packaged voice, when their voice is heard at all it usually expresses personal experience, possibly delivered in low-level English. With its measured and well reasoned argument delivered at a high order of indexicality, Majeed’s translated voice does not conform to any of those aspects. The Chechen foreign minister is likely to escape this logic: the translation is staged in a manner that does not highlight its interventionist character. He is also featured as a spokesperson for or expert on Chechnya. In those roles he acquires a different, elevated status of authority. His voice is not defined by subalternity. Research into the lead up to the 2003 Iraq war (Rampton and Stauber 2003) suggests that such a transition is not uncommon for people like Zakayev, who either have or are presented as political exiles. In the context of his expertise and standing his migration status is only incidental, and he does not comment on it. The authenticity
of his voice is unlikely to be called into question. In Majeed’s case on the other hand, with its authenticity already in doubt due to the staging of the act of translation itself, the additional factors may lead to the conclusion that Majeed may in fact not be its author or principal either. Within the context of television news the utterances appear to neither “truly capture” nor are “true to” (Montgomery 2001, p. 396) Majeed’s self. The claim to authenticity of her translated voice becomes difficult to maintain—especially when also considering the additional issues that may shape an audiences attitude towards her, e.g., her status as an asylum seeker and her lack of English language skills as well as the accented English of her translator. Measuring the outcome in terms of representational justice (Liu 2007, p. 64), suggests that the translated voice has not improved Majeed’s position. Instead access to a higher order of indexicality through the act of translation made her voice less audible and ultimately seems to have silenced her.

**Conclusion**

In analysing the instances of migrant voices, in this case the voice of asylum seekers and refugees, this chapter tried to assess the value these voices attain, because as Couldry (2010, p. 9) argues voice cannot be reduced to process but has to be understood in terms of value as well: “Defending voice as a value simply means defending the potential of voices anywhere to matter.” From assessing value I developed an understanding of the extent to which journalists are bound to orders of indexicalities in their working practices and approaches to this migration topic that perpetuate the national. In terms of the former, assessing the instances of voice in the coverage that could be classified as silenced as well as packaged suggests that the processes of journalistic production limit their value. Instead of gaining value on their own terms, they are appropriated to add value to the journalistic product on the journalists’ terms—potentially with the best intentions of showing the plight of migrants in make-shift camps after crossing the Mediterranean, for instance. The particular instances of translated voice, on the other hand, gave these particular migrants access to a higher order of indexicality, which on the face of it added value to their utterances. As indicated above Zakayev has to be considered as a special case, because despite his legal status as a refugee he did not speak from a position of subalternity. However, in Majeed’s case the problem of subalternity persisted, despite the package containing elements of an alternative discourse.

Relating this package back to the professional vision and the narrative frames that became evident in the interviews with journalists, I would argue that this package represents a partial attempt to move beyond these. A partial attempt, because the categorisation of asylum seekers and refugees into deserving and undeserving is part of the narrative, i.e., Majeed and Siringlu are
positioned as deserving. However, they are framed as deserving because of their current living situation and a hypothetical danger if they were to go back rather than because of trauma or persecution they might have experienced in the past. The moral obligation the journalist, Andy Collinson, evokes is about their presence in the UK rather than their reasons for coming to the UK, for becoming migrants. Also, Collinson only frames the British state as an administrative unit rather than a nation. Phrases such as “the youngsters have British passports like their father” and “their mother [Majeed] did not change her Iraqi status when she married” emphasise a citizenship based on the individual, legal paradigm rather than the collective identity paradigm (Giesen and Eder 2001, see chapter 1.1). Of course it has to be remembered that this package was part of the local news window within a national news programme. And yet, in this particular case the local is also the national. Wales not Britain is the potential national frame of reference. The Welsh-national is here literally nested (Miller 2001) in the British-national frame. However, Collinson, though he mentions Wales as an identifier of location as well as a place of refuge, more strongly evokes the local to establish a sense of belonging: one of Siringlu’s neighbours is quoted at length; Majeed’s children, for instance, are “Cardiff girls”. Siringlu and Majeed are framed not as an external Other but as part of the (local) Self. Additionally, as mentioned above, Majeed is given access to a higher order of indexicality through a translator. And yet, the discourse of subalternity appears to reappear and dominate.

As Spivak (2005a, p. 476) argues “Subalternity is where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognisable basis of action.” To become recognisable Majeed accessed a higher order of indexicality not only in the sense that she is using fluent English, but also in the legalistic argument she adopted. However, she remained tied to her subaltern position because her accessing this order was rejected by the audience (Durante 2006)—as I have argued because it was deemed that she did not speak in her voice and thus was deemed inauthentic. She still had no access to a “recognisable basis of action”. Majeed’s case highlights the difficulties of overcoming positions of subalternity and attaining a voice that carries value—that matters. She cannot make herself understood on her own terms; yet her attempt to make herself understood on recognisable terms fails because she is limited by being understood as a subaltern along the terms developed in other coverage. Threadgold’s previously mentioned warning about the consequences of coverage is worth repeating here:

The iconic (images do not lie) and reality (s/he was really there on location) functions of television help images, figures of speech, narrative and histories to stick together, to become performative (Butler 1993) of what asylum is and thus to generate effects. (2006, p. 230)
Though the piece on Majeed does not rely on the standard images of asylum that Threadgold refers to here, these images appear to have come to define how Majeed can express herself. In this instance a strategy to change habitus, a possibility suggested by Butler (1999), falters in the face of the power of this habitus’ “embodied history” (Bourdieu 1992, p. 56). This embodied history shaped by the repetition of dominant patterns in the news coverage allows for the utterances of the migrants crossing the Mediterranean to be considered authentic but not Majeed’s. Her subaltern subject position and her position as Other are reaffirmed, even without an evocation of those patterns and the national in the package itself.
Conclusion: Migration and the State of the National Logic on British Television News

How can geographical knowledges be reconstituted to meet the needs of democratic global governance inspired by a cosmopolitan ethic of, for example, justice, fairness and reason

(Harvey 2005, p. 220)

This thesis explored the question posed by Harvey in the quotation above in relation to the politics of migration and the state of the British nation discourse. These issues were investigated through an analysis of the coverage of migration on British television news programmes. The analytic approach was premised on the understanding that a) television news constructs and projects what are potentially national imagined communities (Anderson 1983) and thus evokes current discourses about the nation; and b) that the discourses in relation to migration are particularly strong indicators of the discourse about the nation. My theory has been that discourses of the national play a key part in this, but have to be understood as a variable rather than a constant, as logics of nationality (Wiley, 2004). To explore this theory, to analyse the application of logics of nationality in the coverage of migration, I have posed these questions at the outset:

What discourses of migration are evoked in journalistic content of British public service broadcasting television?

How do these discourses of migration interrelate with discourses of imagined community?

What kinds of imagined communities emerge in the context of migration?

Under what contingencies is migration positioned as an excluded Other in relation to these imagined community discourses?

Under what contingencies does a British national imagined community emerge?

What kind(s) of British national imagined communities emerge?

And coming back to Harvey what kinds of geographical knowledges are constituted in the process?

And finally, what are the challenges for overcoming discursive formations that pre-determine the activation of processes of exclusionary othering?
As mentioned in the introduction, the central line of enquiry has been focused on determining how a—not necessarily intentional but potentially problematic—appropriation of migration to serve the nation occurs. At the outset I indicated that this is indeed a question of how rather than whether. My argument has rested on three theoretical assumptions, which I summarised thus: discourses of nation represent a form of identification; identification is the outcome of encounter with and potentially exclusion of the Other; migration is a discourse of encounter. A further two assumptions of more specificity to the current historical moment have linked these three to the focus of analysis, the coverage of migration. The first is that discourses of the nation, which had been in the ascendency since the late 18th century as actual forms of group identification and state organisation, have increasingly come under pressure in recent decades; the second is that public discourses do not fully recognise or acknowledge this pressure, instead attempt to insist on and maintain the nation and at times appropriate migration in the process.

In chapters 1.1 and 1.2 I explained the first three assumptions in more details and concluded with establishing the key points of the fourth. I started out by developing identification as encounter. In the main, I drew on Butler’s (2005) functional understanding of identity in the service of attributing action, which also included a consideration of the role of the Other in the process of identification and Foucault’s (1995 [1977]) conceptualisation of discursive power as well as Bourdieu’s (1992) concepts of habitus and hexis as inscribing identity in the body in the moment of encounter. Considering these processes of identification to a national identification, I emphasised the importance of boundaries (Barth 1998 [1969]) in this process and introduced different concepts of populace-state relations ranging from the purely administrative to relations based on a sense of shared culture (Eder and Giesen 2001). In the context of identity formation, I also highlighted Ahmed’s (2004b) analysis of emotions as discursive formations, an aspect I will come back to below. Starting from the concept of the mass media projecting an imagined community (Anderson 1983), I discussed how process of identification relate to processes of mediation (Silverstone, 2002). I related that to the specific the history of public service broadcasting in the UK and how the nation remains an acknowledged project of PSB in general and of PSB news and current affairs output in particular (Communications Act 2003). Finally, I turned to a consideration of the nightly news bulletin, the specific kind of journalism from which I had drawn most of the data for the case studies. I highlighted its special importance for the imagined community due to its climactic position in the daily television schedule (Scannell 1996) and debated questions over its continued relevance (Blondheim and Liebes 2009; Hargreaves and Thomas 2002). While schedule stresses the structural function of the nightly news as part of television as ritual (Silverstone 1994), my analytical focus has been on the actual content. The
structural position gives the nightly news importance but it is content that over time defines power/knowledge (Foucault 1995 [1977]) around migration and cultivates understanding (Gerbner et al. 1994) in the (national) audience. The nightly news hence becomes an important site of encounter where the nation is evoked.

These considerations of chapter 1.1., I developed in more detail in relation to space and territory (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]) and the consequence the understanding of space as territory has for migration in chapter 1.2. Territory requires boundaries. Boundaries turn migrants into im-/e-migrants, i.e., boundary crossers and hence potential challengers of territory (Bauman 2000). This also makes the boundary one of the key locations for encounter and hence identity formation. Additionally, I emphasised how national territoriality has turned into a territorial trap (Agnew 1994) as recent and current dynamics of globalisation have undermined the authority of the nation state (Appadurai 1996), i.e., there is a discrepancy between perception of control and actual control over territory. Part of the context of globalisation is also the debate over the continued relevance of the national as a basis for global solidarity (Calhoun 2008) and new, cosmopolitan forms of solidarity (Beck 2005b), which I also raised there. Taking another focussing step, I mapped and related these points onto the situation in Britain by analysing the prime ministerial debates of the 2010 general election. I debated how discourses of a multicultural (Yuval-Davis 2007) and multinational (Miller 2001) Britain, discourses of the UK as a particular kind of nation state (Colley 1992) and a national logic (Wiley 2004), remain relevant, in particular in discursively positioning migration. The prime ministerial debates also provided me with the opportunity to examine the relationship between journalism and the nation in more detail. While chapters 1.1 and 1.2 set the theoretical and historical contexts, the final chapter in this section established the topical context of the time of data collection of the three case studies that followed. Across these case studies I explored the following questions:

What discourses of migration are evoked in journalistic content of British public service broadcasting television?

How do these discourses of migration interrelate with discourses of imagined community?

What kinds of imagined communities emerge in the context of migration?

Under what contingencies is migration positioned as an excluded Other in relation to theses imagined community discourses?
Under what contingencies does a British national imagined community emerge?

What kind(s) of British national imagined communities emerge?

And coming back to Harvey what kinds of geographical knowledges are constituted in the process?

And finally, what are the challenges for overcoming discursive formations that pre-determine the activation of processes of exclusionary othering?

The first case study developed these questions argument in the context of the coverage of illegal migrations in relation to the production of space (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]) and explicitly related them to geographical knowledge (Harvey 2001a). Rather than producing the same kinds of knowledge, different contexts of illegal migrations established different sets of geographical knowledge. Depending on the context discourses of space as bounded national territory were more or less prominent and even absent. The findings were considered in light of a debate of a national or cosmopolitan response to contemporary challenges of globalisation (Beck 2005b; Calhoun 2008) as well as the position and engagement of the spectator (Chouliaraki 2006). The discussion of the latter issues was limited. Chouliaraki’s wider concerns about ethics and the possibility of action were turned into a mere consideration of how the coverage establishes discourses of relative distance.

Though the second case study also addressed issues of geographical knowledge, i.e., the continuing realignment of European boundaries (Eder 2006), it was centred on tracing the liberal paradox of migration (Hollifield 2004) in the context of EU migration. The paradox served as a good explanatory framework from which to understand the tensions within the coverage of 2006: the emphasis on the positive economic dimension combined with a level of unease about the number of migrants who had come and who might come—the tension between a global neoliberal economic openness and a concern for national closure. Its explanatory relevance continued in 2009, when changed economic circumstances shifted the emphasis towards closure. The comparison between 2006 and 2009 not only showed the dynamic of the liberal paradox at work in relation to migration, it also highlighted the changing relationship between the state and its populace in the context of neoliberal globalisation. While journalists and politicians expressed their concerns about the British people in terms of the collective identity paradigm (Eder and Giesen 2001), the dynamic had actually changed the relationship towards a form of market citizenship (Fudge 2005; Harvey 2001b; Schild 1998).
The third case study represented a shift from tracing the national in the content to looking at the encounter between journalists and migrants. However, despite introducing some data from interviews with journalists to show parallels (Ettema and Peer 1996), the focus remained on content, specifically on an analysis of how voices of asylum seekers and refugees are included in coverage. Having a voice is often suggested as a strategy to move beyond discourses of migrants at Other. However, for this strategy to work, to make a difference, voice must carry value (Couldry 2010). Discussing the subaltern position (Bauman 2007; Mignolo 2005; Spivak 1988) from which some migrants and most refugees and asylum seekers speak, I indicated the challenge they face in developing a value-laden voice in general. Additionally, research on journalistic interview and working practices (Clayman 1995; Ekström 2001) as well as non-journalistic interviews with migrants (Blommaert 2001; Maryns 2005), I drew on, suggests relations of power that—intentionally or not—shape these voices. The findings also indicated that even access to higher orders of indexicality (Blommaert 2005b) do not necessarily offer an escape route from the subaltern position, as the narrative myths of the news (Bird and Dardenne 1988) of migration influence producers as well as the audience of news and the ways they understand the phenomenon. So far in this chapter, I have summarised the key points of the theoretical framework and the key findings from each case study. I want to conclude this thesis by relating the latter more closely to each other, consider the state of Britain as a nation state in the context of Harvey’s demand and finish off with a further reflection on the consequence of these discourses and the difficulty in overcoming them. In the latter step I want to highlight that I have moved beyond a mere explication of the complexity of the discursive interrelation of migration and the nation as well as beyond the conclusions of other investigations into the coverage of migration in British news media (cf. Buchanan et al. 2003; Cookson and Jempson 2005; Finney 2003; ICAR 2004; MediaWise 2005; Smart et al. 2007).

Six years have gone by since the core data that forms the basis of this thesis was broadcast. The economic climate has made a turn for the worse. The government has changed. And yet, as coverage of the wildcat strikes in 2009 and the prime ministerial debates in 2010 and the rhetoric of the current government suggest, the discourses around migration may have shifted by degree but they have not shifted substantially. Migrants are still put into categories; some of them defined in legal others in cultural terms. Depending on their category, they are embraced, not considered a migrant (myself, a migrant from Germany move unrecognised most of the time), welcomed, and accepted, or endured, despised, suspected, and feared. The categories themselves do not change, only who falls into which of them changes. Take EU migrants from the 2004 and 2007 accession states, for instance. They slipped down the hierarchy as the tensions generated by
the liberal paradox of migration (Hollifield 2004) became visible under changed economic circumstances. Initially welcomed, they became suspect when “too many” followed the invitation yet were still endured in the positive economic climate of 2006 but ended up being feared in the difficult economic conditions of 2009. This case is an example of change over time. Changing categories can also happen across space and distance. At the same time as undifferentiated illegal migration to Britain was presented as a threat, illegal migration from North Korea to Thailand was presented as a justified necessity. The former migrants, close in real terms, were kept at a distance; the great distance to the latter was compressed by the medium of television and the narrative technique of television news to bring them close to the audience.

I will come back to how the audience may react to this proximity below. For now I want to argue that both cases change over time and change across space suggest a reference point defined in cultural and spatial terms respectively. This reference point produces space (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]) and turns it into a territory filled with people who can claim territorial rights of belonging based on a collective identity paradigm (Eder and Giesen 2001). The reference point implied in the coverage can thus be defined as a nation state. Discourses of nation and national identity become visible at the moment or point of encounter with migrants. At the same time, as a consequence in fact, it implies a discursive position of non-belonging for migrants—even those that are welcomed or embraced. In case of the former their being welcomed remains as contingent as for the other categories on the spatial and temporal contexts of their encounter with the nation. The latter do not become part of the nation as the context may not evoke the nation and thus the national logic (Wiley 2004) does not apply. Instead this kind of encounter has the potential for new forms of identity based on a cosmopolitan logic along the lines suggested by Beck (2005b) or a different kind of national logic that is more open as suggested by Calhoun (2008).

However, even if the coverage discursively positions migrants in an embrace, members of the audience may reject the embrace and reassert the national, as appears to have been the case for the package on the two women in Wales. The embrace from a distance, i.e., of the North Korean women, is more likely to be acceptable\(^8\), whereas the close encounter inside the UK is not. Despite their positive representation the women in Wales remain connected to domestic, national politics and apparently remained Other for members of the audience (Durante 2006). In the same way EU migrants started to slip categories and discursively as well as eventually legally

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\(^8\) I have used the package of the North Korean women as a teaching aid several times and the responses from students have been overwhelmingly sympathetic—though their responses may of course not be representative of audiences in general.
turned into illegal migrants (in waiting) when they became linked to domestic discourses—
exemplified in the ‘Home Office in Chaos’ narrative so important a frame of reference for illegal
migration to the UK. EU migration became problematic when it highlighted EU integration as a
sovereignty trade-off (Ichijo 2008), which could also be defined as a national trade-off issue, i.e.,
an issue that activates the national logic. However, the EU case study also highlights that the
national logic may be an illogic and in the form evident here does not lead to new forms of
solidarity in Calhoun’s sense. The collective identity paradigm no longer reflects the actual
conditions of market citizenship. It is worth remembering the hedging of David Cameron and

Brown: “I introduced a points system so no unskilled worker from outside the European Union
can come to Britain now.”

Cameron: “I think we need to have not just a points system, but also a limit on migration when
people are coming from outside the European Union for economic reasons.”

Both immediately undercut their tough rhetoric on migration by hinting at but not fully
acknowledging the influence of EU. And yet, they pressed on attempting to make the appearance
that the national logic still applies and appropriated migration in the process of confirming the
national. Nor do the candidates or the coverage address the complexity of the UK as a
multicultural and multinational state beyond evocations such as Brown’s that Britain is “diverse”
and “tolerant”. When the national becomes an issue in the coverage of migration, the details of
this kind of Britain fades, the outline, the boundary moves to the forefront and appears to
enclose a rather homogenous territory. It is Colley’s understanding of British identity as defined
in relation to “the Other beyond their shores” (1992, p. 6) all over again. This kind of national
logic, however, leads right to the territorial trap. It fails to face up to its own limitations and
responsibilities in the contemporary context. Again, I would argue, following Harvey (2005, p.
220), whom I have quoted at the outset of this thesis and chapter as well as used as the overall
frame as to why the analysis of presented in this thesis matters, the issue becomes a question of
geographical knowledge and a cosmopolitan ethic.

The question remains difficult to respond to. Especially, when considering Ahmed’s remarks
about the emotional dimension of the national collective, a dimension that is defined through
othering (2004b, p. 12): “the nation becomes the object of love precisely by associating the
proximity with other with loss, injury and theft”. Emotions are difficult to overcome with
knowledge. However, Ahmed (2004a, p. 38) argues elsewhere that a global emotionality is
possible—at least under certain conditions and mostly amongst those on the move. Still, new
forms of emotional attachments could form over time. Clearly, as the package on the migration
of the women from North Korea exemplifies such an attachment might most easily be formed in the context of distant suffering. — The package on the two women in Wales highlights that suffering itself may not suffice. It has to be at a distant for the time being. — However, this leaves the question to be answered, whether “the spectacles of suffering, most common on our home screens, go beyond wishful thinking and lead to forms of public action towards these distant others?”, as Chouliaraki queries (2008, p. 831). An emotional solidarity may fall short if it does not lead to action. Chouliaraki’s question is not rhetorical. She (ibid, p. 846) suggests that each individual member of the audience has in fact the “conditional freedom” to act, as television texts offer “multiple ethical positions” for them from which to act. This freedom is conditional in so far as it is constrained by being “linked to a political economy of global broadcasting that ultimately reproduces an exclusively Western sensibility towards ‘our’ own suffering at the expense of sufferings of the distant ‘other’.” Transferring, that is downscaling Chouliaraki’s concerns from the global to the national level, similar issues remain. It appears that the closer the Other gets the more difficult it becomes to escape the national logic as national trap in the coverage.

So how can television news create multiple ethical positions for the condition—whether one of explicit suffering or not—of the proximate Other? In particular, can it do so without reproducing the immigrant as Other and without falling into the territorial trap of a narrow national logic? Based on the argument in this thesis, I would argue that a recommendations, such as the preference of certain labels or images, along the lines suggested by previous research (cf. Buchanan et al. 2003; Cookson and Jenmpson 2005; Finney 2003; ICAR 2004; MediaWise 2005; Smart et al. 2007) while undoubtedly laudable and an important aspect does not suffice. The demand for a cosmopolitian ethic that might avoid such positioning requires a more radical change that needs to consider the logics of narrow nationality in relation to migration in the processes of production and consumption into account. As I have shown at various points throughout this thesis these logics do not apply in all instances of the coverage of migration. This indicates the possibility for change. Also, I have used the qualifier narrow in relation to national here, because to argue with Calhoun (2008, p. 434), the national as such might not be the problem as “the solidarity of these groups is a basis for action to redress many ills and sometimes even to mitigate inequality”. So the issue is not that television news continues to project an imagined community in the encounter with migrants, but how it imagines that community—emphasising boundaries, positioning the migration in the context of crisis and as a problem. To return to the beginning of this thesis and the prime ministerial debates, the issue is not Gerard Oliver’s question—“What key elements for a fair, workable immigration policy need
to be put in place to actually make it work effectively?”—nor that journalists want to ask it. The issue is how the response, the moment of encounter it represents takes shape.
Appendix

Context:

Here the main stories that occurred during the monitoring period will be listed and the major stories explained. Based on an analysis of the running orders 10 topics played a substantial part in setting the background for the overall news coverage during the monitoring period: problems at the Home Office; the future of Tony Blair as Prime Minister; the situation in the Middle East; the Iraq war; the war in Afghanistan; the fight against terrorism; social cohesion in the UK; the crash of a television presenter in a race-car; the football World Cup in Germany; and climate change. As is apparent the stories came from a wide spectrum of topic areas, from political, crime, sports, celebrity, and scientific news. For a better understanding a brief description of the 10 main stories and a list of another 15 stories, which were of somewhat lesser but still strong prominence, will be given below.

- First, a few general observations: some of the stories completely dominated the news for a period of time, e.g., the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon or the football World Cup in Germany; others, though not as dominant, were covered consistently and extensively, e.g., the debate over social cohesion in the UK or the war in Afghanistan. Also, the lines between the stories cannot always be clearly drawn. Several of the stories at times connected with each other, e.g., the problems at the Home Office at times coincided with the debate over the future of Tony Blair as Prime Minister; the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were at times connected to the fight against terrorism. On some occasions, stories from the second tier also tied in with the ten main stories. It is also interesting to note that some of these stories had a migration dimension, e.g., problems at the Home Office (see chapters 1.3 and 2.1) or the fight against terrorism.

- Problems at the Home Office: this topic combined several events, which at times dominated news coverage. It started with the row over the failure of the Home Office to consider non-British, so-called ‘foreign prisoners’ for deportation upon their release. This culminated in the replacement of Charles Clarke by John Reid as Home Secretary. The Home Office remained in the headlines over the numbers of illegal immigrants and EU migrants in the UK as well as John Reid’s declaration that parts of the ministry were “not fit for purpose”. Updates on reform efforts as well as problems with prison
overcrowding kept the issues in the news throughout. At times the problems at the Home Office coincided with discussions over the future of Tony Blair.

- Tony Blair’s future as Prime Minister: Blair came under serious attack right at the beginning of the monitoring period. Combining the foreign prisoners’ deportation row, an extramarital affair of Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, and problems for Health Secretary Patricia Hewitt to a so-called ‘Black Wednesday’, some of the news coverage suggested that the Blair government was unravelling. A cabinet reshuffle following the local elections did not quieten the discussion. The media continued to speculate about the possible date for Tony Blair to step down, as well as whether Chancellor Gordon Brown would easily succeed him or had to face a leadership contest. In the later phase the coverage was most intense around the Labour Party conference.

- The crisis in the Middle East: this topic had three main aspects: a) the conflict between Fatah and Hamas to form a government for the Palestine territories; b) the relationship between Israel and the Palestine Authority, and c) the conflict between the Hezbollah and Israel that, eventually, led to war. Aspects a) and b) were covered throughout the period, but with less emphasis. After Israel started to attack Lebanon in response to the kidnapping of several Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah, the conflict dominated the news for several weeks. From the middle of July until early August all the news programmes presented at least some of their coverage from Israel or Lebanon rather than from their studios in the UK.

- The fight against terrorism: domestic and international events kept this topic consistently in the headlines. An anti-terror raid in the Forest Gate area of London as well as the prevention of an alleged terrorist plot to bring down several transatlantic flights, each dominated the news for several days. A number of events relating to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005 also featured prominently: the release of videos of the suicide bombers; the release of reports into the 7/7 bombing; the first anniversary of the bombings; and the report into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by police two weeks after the bombing. An ongoing trial against alleged terrorists in London was also covered consistently as was a dispute between the Home Office and the judiciary over control orders against terror suspects. On an international level, anti-terror raids and trials abroad as well as the fight against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan received substantial coverage.
• The war in Iraq: a growing insurgency in Iraq, fighting between Iraqi factions as well as between Iraqis and coalition forces were covered on an almost daily basis. The issues were reported in terms of events in Iraq, e.g., almost daily bomb explosions; the trial of Saddam Hussein; changes in military strategy; and the political pressure the situation exerted on US President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair. Especially when British soldiers were injured or died in fighting, Iraq became the top story of the day.

• The war in Afghanistan: similar to the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan was consistently covered and regularly received top story status, especially when British soldiers were injured or died there.

• The social cohesion of Britain: the question over the social fabric, the state of multiculturalism and cohesion of the UK became a consistent talking point during the monitoring period. This was sometimes led by politicians raising the issue; at times it was covered through in-depth pieces not tied to an obvious current event. A newspaper column by Jack Straw, Labour MP and Leader of the House of Commons was one of the key events that sparked off substantial coverage. In the column he had expressed misgivings about Muslim women wearing veils in his constituency surgery. For more self-generated coverage the BBC 1 News at Ten's series ‘Changing Face of Britain’ is a good example. Topics in this series included: segregated schools, the Hindu community, the impact of immigration, and the state of mental health in Britain. However, it has to be noted that most of the time migration was not explicitly mentioned in this context.

• Climate change: this topic was consistently covered on a global as well as a national level. Climate change played a role in terms of the water shortages in the southwest of England especially during the July ’06 heat-wave. Both BBC 1 News at Ten and ITV 1 News ran series of in-depth pieces on the global dimension of climate change. The documentary on climate change An Inconvenient Truth by former US Vice-President Al Gore, which was released during the monitoring period, was also reported on extensively.

• The football World Cup in Germany: even weeks before official kick-off in early June, the football World Cup received substantial coverage. The injury of footballer Wayne Rooney, the search for a new England manager to replace Sven-Göran Erikson once the competition would end and the general preparations for the event were reported on consistently. During the competition coverage at times dominated news. After the
Portuguese team knocked the English team out of the competition in the quarter-finals, coverage was scaled back to some extent, but the topic remained prominent.

- *Top Gear* presenter crash: the car crash of Richard Hammond, one of the presenters of the BBC programme *Top Gear*, while filming a segment for the show in late September, received substantial and sustained coverage over several days and at various points later on.

Other key stories of less but still substantial prominence during the monitoring period:

- *illegal migration* to the EU from Africa (see chapters 2.1 and 2.3);
- EU migration and expansion (see chapter 2.2);
- questions over the relationship between Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and the owner of the London Millennium Dome;
- Tony Blair’s new policy towards nuclear power;
- the so-called Cash for Honours inquiry;
- animal rights campaigns and animal rights extremism;
- David Cameron’s reform of the Conservative Party;
- the split-up of Sir Paul McCartney and Heather Mills-McCartney;
- the extradition of 3 British NatWest bankers to the USA to face charges in connection with the collapse of the Enron company;
- the fatal shooting at an Amish school in Pennsylvania;
- the row over Madonna’s adoption of a boy from Malawi;
- Iran’s alleged attempts to develop nuclear weapons;
- North Korea’s alleged nuclear missile tests;
- Pope Benedict XVI’s travels in Poland, Spain and Germany and the ensuing controversy over some of his comments regarding Islam;
knife crime in Britain.
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