Beyond Contiguity: The Role of Temporal Distributions and Predictability in Human Causal Learning

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Abstract

Most contemporary theories of causal learning identify three primary cues to causality; temporal order, contingency and contiguity. It is well-established in the literature that a lack of temporal contiguity – a delay between cause and effect – can have an adverse effect on causal induction. However research has tended to focus almost exclusively on the extent of delay while ignoring the potential influence of delay variability. This thesis aimed to address this oversight.

Since humans tend to experience causal relations repeatedly over time, we accordingly experience multiple cause-effect intervals. If intervals are constant, it becomes possible to predict when the effect will occur following the cause. Fixed delays thus confer temporal predictability, which may contribute to successful causal inference by creating an impression of a stable underlying mechanism. Five experiments confirmed the facilitatory effect of predictability in instrumental causal learning. Two experiments involving a different aspect of causal judgment found no effects of interval variability, but two further experiments demonstrated that predictability facilitates elemental causal induction from observation. These results directly conflict with findings from studies of animal conditioning, where preference for variable-interval reinforcement is routinely exhibited, and a simple associative account struggles to explain this disparity. However both a temporal coding associative account, and higher-level cognitive perspectives such as Bayesian structural inference, are compatible with these findings. Overall, this thesis indicates that causal learning involves processes above and beyond simple associations.
Preface

This thesis was completed at the School of Psychology, Cardiff University, under the supervision of Dr. Marc Buehner, 2007-2011.

Parts of the empirical work in Chapter 3, specifically experiments 1, 2B and 3, were published in the article: Greville, W. J., & Buehner, M. J. (2010) Temporal Predictability Facilitates Causal Learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139*(4), 756–771. Other work undertaken during this period of study, but not presented in this thesis, is currently being revised for publication in *Memory & Cognition*.

An overview of this research was presented at the following conferences:

BPS Cognitive Section Annual Conference, September 2009: University of Hertfordshire, UK;
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Finally I would like to thank my family and especially my sister, Katharine, and my parents, David and Maureen, for their enduring love and support.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of three dearly missed people that sadly departed during the past three years:

To my grandpa, Norman Gordon, a kind and caring man of true integrity, who proudly served his country and who loved and was loved by his family.

To my friend, Quirine Charlton-Robbins, whose bravery in the face of adversity was incredible and whose cheer and generosity is missed by all those who knew her.

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Chapter 1 – Current Perspectives on Causal Learning

1.1 Causality and Causal Learning – A brief introduction

The study of causality has a long and rich history in both philosophy and psychology. In essence, causality is understood as the relationship between one event or entity, the cause, and another event or entity, the effect, such that the second is recognized to be a consequence of the first. In other words, causes produce or generate effects. Causal learning, in the simplest sense, is how we come to learn that one thing causes another.

An expanded and more precise definition of causality acknowledges that causes may be either deterministic, where the effect necessarily follows from the cause, or probabilistic, where the cause alters the likelihood of the effect. Furthermore, causes may be generative, producing or increasing the probability of occurrence of an outcome, or preventative, inhibiting an outcome that would otherwise have occurred. Causality then may be seen as the underlying laws that govern systematic relations between events.

Multiple relationships between multiple entities or events may exist within a given system. For example, a fire may produce smoke and heat, both of which are common effects, while the fire itself may have resulted from natural causes (such as a bolt of lightning) or from deliberate human action, both of which may be regarded as common causes (or parents). Such an interconnected series of events is known as a causal network (Pearl, 2000). Causal learning may thus be more broadly defined as the process by which we construct and represent causal relations and networks, and how we use this information in thinking, reasoning, judgment and decision-making. The research presented within this thesis however focuses on the former, more fundamental question of causal learning – how do humans learn that one thing causes another?

1.2 The central problem for causal learning

The ability to learn enables us to adapt to our environment and, ultimately, to survive. If learning has evolved as an adaptive mechanism, it is natural that the content of learning should reflect relations that actually exist in the universe (Shanks, 1995). Causal learning endows us with the capacity to create representations that mirror the causal structure of our surrounding environment. Creating such representations allows us to
understand how and why events occur, to predict the occurrence of future events, and to intervene on the world and control our environment, directing our behaviour to evoke desired consequences and achieve goals. Causal learning is thus a core cognitive capacity and a crucial adaptive mechanism. The central question for learning theorists interested in causality is how such knowledge is acquired.

Seeking an answer to this question has been a preoccupation of scholars throughout the ages. Yet, this may, to the uninitiated, seem somewhat surprising. When asked “how do you learn that one thing causes another?” an immediate answer may spring to mind such as “I see it happen and so I know how it works” (Schloßmann, 1999). One might then be puzzled as to why this question has provided such a dilemma when the answer seems so intuitively obvious. For example, when one kicks a ball, the causal connection between so doing and the subsequent motion of the ball seems immediately apparent. Indeed, it has been argued that such events involving physical collision of objects or “launching” (Michotte, 1946/1963) may indeed give rise to direct causal perception (for an overview see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).

Consider however some alternative examples. When one practices a skill such as learning a musical instrument, there is typically a causal understanding that continued practice will lead to improved performance. However we cannot directly see the physiological changes to the neurons in the brain and muscle fibres in the body that practice confers to improve the co-ordination and dexterity of the individual. Nor can the cellular changes be observed when, for instance, a pathogen invades our body and causes illness, or a drug is taken to treat that illness and eliminate the pathogen from our system. How then, have we come to learn causal relations such as that microscopic pathogens cause illness and that certain drugs will eradicate these unwanted visitors, or that one can develop a skill through practice?

Such unobservable causal relations need not always involve biological processes. Hanging a wet cloth outside on a sunny day, for instance, will cause the cloth to dry, and we may well be able to observe the cloth becoming drier, if we have nothing better to do. What we cannot see however, is the mechanism involved, the transfer of energy, the water molecules becoming more excited and eventually changing state from liquid to vapour as they evaporate from the cloth. Moreover, we cannot directly perceive the laws of physics
governing the behaviour of molecules, such as in the evaporation of water, which ultimately underpin this process. Such causal laws or relations are not entities in themselves and are therefore imperceptible; we cannot see (nor hear, touch, smell or taste) a causal law. If such laws are unobservable, then how can we ever become aware of them?

Although philosophical concerns regarding causality extend as far back as the days of Aristotle, it was the Scottish empiricist David Hume (1711-1776) that first formalized and addressed the “riddle of induction” that is exemplified by such scenarios as described above. Hume reasoned that since our sensory modalities are not attuned to the detection of causality per se, the existence of causal relations can only be inferred from the observable evidence that is accessible to us (Hume, 1739/1888). Causal learning is therefore often referred to also as causal inference or induction. It follows then that representations of causal relations must be constructed on the basis of the sensory input we receive from the world around us. Hume proposed that there are crucial ‘cues to causality’ that underpin such representations, and identified the most important determinants as 1) temporal order – causes must precede their effects; 2) contingency – effects must repeatedly and reliably follow their causes; and 3) contiguity – causes and effects must be closely connected in space and time.

These statistical and temporal relations between events form the bedrock of nearly all theories of causal learning. The primary goal of this thesis is to address the possibility of an additional cue, namely temporal predictability, contributing to the process of causal inference. At this point then, it seems appropriate to provide a brief overview of the thesis, and outline how this question shall be approached.

1.3 Plan of the thesis

The remainder of this chapter will firstly explore in more detail each of the cues to causality as suggested by Hume, and the role each is considered to play in causal learning. Following this, I shall briefly introduce three broad theories of causal learning, each of which has its own particular interpretation of how humans and other agents use such cues to learn about causal relations. This background is necessary for the eventual evaluation of the empirical results that will be presented further on. Chapter 2 then fully introduces this concept of temporal predictability and outlines how such a feature might be a factor in
causal learning. It is then considered how each of the theories of causal learning introduced in Chapter 1 might accommodate any effects of this potential cue of temporal predictability that may be subsequently identified. Chapters 3 and 4 then provide a series of experiments designed to assess the empirical contribution of temporal predictability, in both instrumental and observational learning tasks. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a full discussion of these results and considers their implications, as well as suggesting a new abstract model to account for these results, before concluding the thesis by looking towards future research that might be pursued along this same vein.

1.4 Hume’s Cues to Causality

1.4.1 Temporal Order

Hume’s first cue of temporal order is perhaps the most fundamental, and its importance is almost unanimously accepted across researchers; causes must occur prior to the effects they produce. There are however a few notable clauses in this dictum. Firstly, events may not always be observed in their causal order (see Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). For instance, during a medical diagnosis, a physician may detect a symptom before identifying the disease that is causing it. Such situations are in fact crucial for distinguishing between the predictions of different theories of causal learning, as shall be discussed in more detail further on in this thesis. Secondly, research has shown that new information can influence the perception of events in the past, in what is known as postdictive perception (Choi & Scholl, 2006). Nevertheless, in most contemporary accounts of causal learning, temporal order is taken as a given necessity for causal inference.

1.4.2 Contingency

The vast majority of the literature on causal learning has focused on the second cue of contingency, and how this information may be used to infer causality. Contingency is the extent to which the effect is dependent (contingent) upon the cause, or in other words, the degree of covariation between cause and effect. This encompasses both the extent to which the effect follows the cause, and also the extent to which the effect occurs without the cause, known as the base rate. Contingency then is the degree of statistical dependency between the presence and absence of candidate causes and their putative effects.
While of course both causes and effects may take the form of stimuli whose properties are on a continuum (such as the brightness of a light or the loudness of a tone), most models of causal learning simplify the problem by defining cause and effect as either present or absent. Researchers generally agree that the statistical information we receive with regard to the presence or absence of candidate causes and effects is computed in some way to assess the covariation between them, which can then form the basis for a causal judgment. At the root of most covariation models is the 2×2 contingency matrix, as shown in Figure 1.1, which describes in the most simple format the possible combinations in which cause and effect can be either present or absent. Exactly how this information is computed is still the subject of rigorous debate (Buehner, Cheng, & Clifford, 2003; Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 2005; Lober & Shanks, 2000; Luhmann & Ahn, 2005; White, 2005) and numerous models with varying degrees of complexity have been proposed to account for this computation.

One of the best known and widely used models is the $\Delta P$ statistic (Jenkins & Ward, 1965). In fact such is the popularity of this measure that it is often treated as an objective measure of contingency and “contingency” is sometimes used as a synonym for $\Delta P$. The value of $\Delta P$ is given by the difference between the probability of the effect in the presence of the cause, $P(e|c)$, and the probability of the effect in the absence of the cause, $P(e|\neg c)$. In terms of the cells of the contingency matrix, this is calculated as:

$$\Delta P = P(e|c) - P(e|\neg c) = \frac{A}{A+B} - \frac{C}{C+D}$$

There are of course different ways in which the cells of the table may be combined, including among others the $\Delta D$ rule, calculated as $(A+B) - (C+D)$. For an overview of a number of such rules, see Hammond and Paynter (1983). More recently developed models, for instance Cheng’s (1997) Power PC theory, have extended covariation-based models to account for some of the particular phenomena of causal inference that $\Delta P$ alone cannot represent. While the discourse continues over how covariation information is and should be utilized in making causal inferences, all researchers would likely agree with the general principle that the greater the contingency between cause and effect, the stronger the perception of causality.
1.4.3 Contiguity

The second of Hume’s tenets, contiguity, refers to the proximity of the cause and effect both in space and in time – spatial and temporal contiguity. In a classic illustration of the importance of contiguity, Michotte (1946/1963) used simple visual stimuli to demonstrate the “launching” effect. A prototypical procedure began with two squares (X and Y) separated from each other by a small distance. X then began to move in a straight line towards Y. On reaching Y (so that their outer surfaces appear to make contact), X stopped moving and Y immediately began to move along the same trajectory. Such a sequence created the strong impression that X collided with Y and caused Y to move. Reports from Michotte’s participants revealed that if Y began to move only after a delay (lack of temporal contiguity), or before it was reached by X (lack of spatial contiguity), the causal impression of X having launched Y was destroyed.

However, as alluded to earlier, a distinction may be drawn between causal perception, which involves a direct interaction and visible physical contact between the participants in the causal relation, and causal induction, when the physical interaction between participants is undetectable and the relation must instead be inferred (Cavazza, Lugrin, & Buehner, 2007; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002). While spatial contiguity remains of utmost importance for perceptual causality (as in the above example of launching), in the case of causal induction (such as in the earlier example of inferring the causes of disease), the necessity of spatial contiguity tends to be downplayed. After all, many events can often be triggered remotely, such as flipping a switch at one end.
of a room to cause a light to come on at the other end. Most contemporary research on causal inference instead then focuses on temporal rather than spatial contiguity.

Relatively speaking, there has been far less empirical attention devoted to contiguity compared to contingency (although the disparity is gradually being redressed in recent years). As a result, contiguity is less well understood and its role in causal learning more uncertain. According to Hume, contiguity between cause and effect is essential to the process of causal induction. This supposition was affirmed in a systematic investigation by Shanks, Pearson and Dickinson (1989). Their task involved judging how effective pressing the space-bar on a keyboard was in causing a triangle to flash on a computer screen. Participants were given a fixed amount of time to engage on the task and could gather evidence through repeatedly pressing the space-bar and observing whether or not the outcome occurred. The apparatus was set up to deliver the outcome with a 0.75 probability when the space-bar was pressed. On each trial, if an outcome was scheduled, it would occur after a specific amount of time following the space-bar. This interval varied between conditions from 0 up to 16s. It was found that as the delay increased, participants' causal judgments decreased in systematic fashion. In fact, conditions involving delays of more than 2s were no longer distinguished as causally effective and were judged just as ineffective as non-contingent control conditions.

Shanks et al.'s (1989) results provided evidence that delays have a deleterious effect on impressions of causality, corroborating the assertions of Hume that contiguity is indeed necessary for causal learning. Yet this idea seems at odds with everyday cognition. Humans and other animals often demonstrate the ability to correctly link causes and effects that are separated in time and learn causal relations involving delays of considerable length; over days, weeks, even months at a time – an often cited example is the temporal gap between intercourse and birth (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). And yet, Shanks et al. show a failure to detect causal relations involving gaps of more than a few seconds. Clearly there must be something that enables us to bridge such temporal gaps and infer delayed causal relations.

Einhorn & Hogarth (1986) proposed a knowledge mediation hypothesis. They argue that rather than being essential, the function of contiguity is as a cue to direct attention to the contingencies between events. According to this view, people can overcome the requirement for events to be contiguous if there is some other reason why an attentional
link should form between these events; for example, if they have knowledge of some existing mechanism that may connect one to the other. Some knowledge of human biology might therefore enable the connection between intercourse and birth. According to this view, if there is an expectation for a delayed mechanism, a temporal delay no longer becomes an obstacle to causal inference. Thus prior knowledge can mediate the impact of temporal delays.

Adopting this perspective, Buehner and May (2002) demonstrated the detrimental effect of delay could be mitigated by invoking high-level knowledge in participants. In judgment tasks where a cover story was used to make a delay between cause and effect seem plausible (the effect was an explosion and the candidate cause was the launching of a grenade), causal ratings were significantly less adversely affected by delays compared to situations where the cover story made delay seem implausible (where the effect was a lightbulb illuminating and the candidate cause was pressing a switch). Further work by Buehner and May (2004) showed that the effect of delay could be abolished completely by providing explicit information regarding the expected timeframe of the causal relation. Participants again evaluated the effectiveness of pressing a switch on the illumination of a lightbulb; however one group of participants were told that the bulb was an ordinary bulb that should light up right away, while another group of participants was instructed that the bulb was an energy-saving bulb that lights up after a delay. For this latter group there was no decline in ratings with delay; delayed and immediate causal relations were judged as equally effective. Indeed in some circumstances, delays even may serve to facilitate causal attribution where an immediate consequence is incompatible with an expected mechanism (Buehner & McGregor, 2006).

Additionally, Buehner and May (2003) also found that mediation of delay could also be induced through prior experience; they found strong order effects such that where conditions with immediate causal relations preceded conditions with delayed relations, causal ratings were markedly lower compared to when delayed causal relation conditions were presented first. Reed (1992) and Young, Rogers and Beckmann (2005) show that filling an interval with a stimulus such as an auditory tone (known as “signalling”) can likewise negate the impact of delays. Greville, Cassar, Johansen, and Buehner (2010) have meanwhile shown that delays of reinforcement no longer impair instrumental learning.
when the task environment highlights the underlying contingency structure. Such work provides insight as to how causal inference can take place over longer time periods. Nevertheless, most researchers agree that in the absence of such mitigating information as described above, delays tend to have a deleterious effect on causal learning, and temporal contiguity thus remains an important cue to causality. Barring a few exceptions, all other things being equal, contiguous causes and effects elicit a stronger causal impression than causes and effects separated by a delay.

1.5 Theories of Causal Learning

Despite a fairly general consensus over the importance of Hume's cues to causality, there is considerable disagreement with regard to the processes that underlie causal inference. Moreover, no model of learning thus developed has thus provided a full account of causal learning that encompasses its various idiosyncrasies. Dissatisfaction with existing accounts has led to the development of a veritable smorgasbord of learning rules and models over the years, some with the intention of addressing specific facets of learning that previous efforts could not account for, and some providing a more general framework. Each is motivated from a particular theoretical stance, and each has had its successes and shortcomings debated, some more favourably so than others. One long-standing measure, $\Delta P$, has already been briefly described. Others include the probabilistic contrast model (Cheng & Novick, 1990); Power PC (Cheng, 1997); the pCI rule (White, 2003); BUCKLE (Luhmann & Ahn, 2007); knowledge-based causal induction (Waldmann, 1996); causal support (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005); and theory-based causal induction (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009). While these examples specifically address human causal learning, models of animal conditioning have also been applied (with varying degrees of success) to account for causal inference, including the Rescorla-Wagner model (1972); the SOP model (Wagner, 1981); the Pearce-Hall (1980) and Pearce (1987) models; scalar expectancy theory (Gibbon, 1977); and rate estimation theory (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000b). Neither of these lists are exhaustive and it is of course unfeasible to accommodate a detailed explanation of all existing models of causal learning within this thesis. Indeed, a full account of a single more complex framework such as theory-based causal induction could easily stand alone as a doctoral thesis in itself (see, e.g., Griffiths, 2005). Instead it seems
more appropriate to categorise these models based on their common ground, and consider the general principles underlying each particular theoretical position. It is also worthwhile to point out at this juncture that the work contained in this thesis examines only generative causes. Accordingly the following review of existing models of causal learning will focus on the generative form.

1.5.1 Conditioning and Associative Learning Theory

Learning in animals is measured by changes in behaviour. Indeed, it has been argued that learning is, by definition, a change in behaviour and that such changes are the only way by which learning can be measured (Baum, 1994). Stimuli that elicit a change in the behaviour of an organism may be categorized as either reinforcers, which increase the frequency of a behaviour, or punishments, which decrease the frequency of a behaviour. The common conception of reinforcement or punishment is the delivery of a stimulus that has a particular motivational significance or adaptive value to the organism; either an appetitive (pleasant) stimulus, such as food, or an aversive (unpleasant) stimulus, such as shock, which are known as primary reinforcers (or punishments). Appetitive stimuli are also often referred to as rewards, and the terms reward and reinforcer are sometimes used interchangeably. However strictly speaking this is not entirely accurate. While appetitive stimuli (rewards) generally serve as reinforcers and aversive stimuli as punishments, this is not always the case; for instance in the case of a satiated animal, food will often fail to increase the frequency of a behaviour and thus cannot be classed as a reinforcer. To clarify then, reinforcement and punishment refer to the effects on behaviour, whereas appetitive and aversive refer to the nature of the stimuli. Reinforcements and punishments are directly responsible for the emergence and maintenance of new behaviour.

The experimental analysis of animal learning and behaviour began with the pioneering work of Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) and Edward Thorndike (1874-1949) who respectively developed the protocols of classical (Pavlovian) and instrumental conditioning (see Pavlov, 1927; Thorndike, 1898). In a typical classical conditioning preparation, subjects are presented with a neutral stimulus to which they normally would not respond such as a tone or light, referred to as the conditioned stimulus (CS), which is then routinely paired with another stimulus that has some adaptive value (i.e. a primary reinforcer, such as food) and that normally would elicit a response (such as salivation), referred to as the
unconditioned stimulus (US). As conditioning progresses, a new pattern of behaviour is seen to emerge such that the animal responds to the CS before the US is presented or even if the CS is presented in isolation. This is known as the conditioned response (CR) and tends to be similar in nature (though not always identical) to the unconditioned response (UR) that would normally be elicited by the US. Pavlov's dogs, for instance, after repeatedly hearing a bell ring prior to being fed, developed a salivatory response to the sound of the bell. The presentation of the CS and subsequent delivery of the US in classical conditioning are arranged by the experimenter and thus not dependent on the animal's behaviour. In an instrumental conditioning protocol meanwhile, a response is required from the animal before the satisfying outcome is obtained. In a typical experiment, Thorndike placed a cat inside a puzzle box, from which it could escape by triggering the appropriate mechanism. Thorndike noted that the time taken for the cat to escape decreased over successive trials, and thus concluded that the animal learned to perform the correct response to evoke the desired consequence of escape. The consequence thus reinforces the response.

Conditioning is thus an example of associative learning. The animal associates the CS with the US in classical conditioning, and the response with the reinforcer in instrumental conditioning. Through associative learning, stimuli that would not themselves directly evoke an unconditioned response may acquire a motivational function and thus serve as secondary reinforcers. Virtually any stimulus has the potential to provide secondary reinforcement, with money an obvious example in human society. Money in fact serves as a generalized secondary reinforcer through association with many primary reinforcers (since it can be exchanged for food, water, shelter, and even sex) which is why it can exert such powerful effects on behaviour. Associative learning is one of the most fundamental forms of learning and is ubiquitous in the behaviour of organisms, from humans to slime mould (Latty & Beekman, 2009). The parallels between associative learning and causal learning should be immediately apparent, and causal learning is indeed susceptible to many of the same influences as associative learning (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987), as shall now be further discussed.

1.5.1.1 The Rescorla-Wagner Model

Probably the most influential model of learning ever developed is the associative model of Rescorla and Wagner (1972) which at time of writing has been cited in over 3500
scholarly articles. The Rescorla-Wagner model (RWM) has enjoyed such tremendous success due to its simplicity, elegance, and moreover due to its ability to account for various phenomena of conditioning such as blocking (Kamin, 1969). The model was developed specifically as an account of Pavlovian conditioning, and specifies the change in associative strength between CS and US on a given conditioning trial according to the following equation:

\[ \Delta V = \alpha \beta (\lambda - \Sigma V) \]

where \( \Delta V \) is the change in associative strength, \( \alpha \) is the salience of the CS, \( \beta \) is the learning rate parameter for the US, \( \lambda \) is the current magnitude of the US, and \( \Sigma V \) is the current level of association between the CS and US (summed over previous trials) for each CS present on the current trial. More simply, we may term \( \lambda \) as the actual outcome and \( \Sigma V \) the expected outcome. The RWM is thus a trial-based error-correction model where the animal learns through surprise, in other words through the discrepancy between what is expected to happen and what actually happens.

A trial on which the US follows the CS serves to increase associative strength between them, with successive CS-US pairing resulting in (increasingly smaller) increments in associative strength until the maximum level of association is reached, and learning has reached asymptote. If the US is absent on a given trial, then \( \lambda \) is 0 and there will be no increment in associative strength. Indeed if some conditioning has already taken place, \( \Sigma V \) will be positive and \( \Delta V \) will hence be negative, producing a decrement in associative strength. Nonreinforcement thus weakens an existing association. Associative learning then, as specified by the RWM, is sensitive to the statistical relation or contingency between CS and US just as the contingency between cause and effect shapes causal inference.

One of the most notable successes of the RWM was its ability to account for cue competition. This phenomenon was first observed by Kamin (1969) who demonstrated a “blocking” effect in aversive conditioning with rats. In what is now the standard blocking paradigm, the subject initially received \( CS_1 \rightarrow US \) in an initial training phase before undergoing subsequent training with a compound stimulus \( CS_1 CS_2 \rightarrow US \) (in Kamin’s experiments, the US was a shock, \( CS_1 \) a light, and \( CS_2 \) a tone). At test, subjects exhibited a reduced CR to \( CS_2 \) compared to control animals that did not experience the initial training
with CS₁ alone. Learning the CS₁ → US association thus appeared to block learning about CS₂, providing clear evidence of competition for associative strength between cues. Blocking is easily explained by the RWM. Since by the end of phase 1, the US is perfectly predicted by CS₁, there is no discrepancy between the expectation and outcome. In phase 2 then where CS₂ is presented, $\lambda$ is equal to $\Sigma V$ and hence $\Delta V$ is 0. CS₂ thus fails to acquire associative strength. Despite a clear predictive relationship between CS₂ and the US in the second training phase, CS₂ is redundant as a predictor because CS₁ has already been established as a perfect predictor of the US. The blocking effect thus further emphasized the sensitivity of conditioning to the statistical relationship between events.

1.5.1.2 The Role of Time from an Associative Perspective

In addition to the statistical relations between cues and outcomes, conditioning is also highly sensitive to the temporal arrangement of events. Indeed, prior to the development of models such as the RWM, contiguity was held to be the dominant principle of learning in traditional associative theories (Gormezano & Kehoe, 1981), with the “Law of Contiguity” stating that if two events occur simultaneously, then the reoccurrence of one event will automatically evoke a memory of the other. In other words, contiguity was considered to be both necessary and sufficient for the formation of an association. Though this assertion has since been toned down in light of new evidence (as shall be discussed further on), contiguity remains a central determinant for conditioning.

The importance of contiguity has been made evident through the comparison of different conditioning protocols. In what is known as delay conditioning, the CS will first be presented and the US then delivered either while the CS is still present (so CS and US overlap) or else immediately following CS termination. The delay between CS and US onset is referred to as the interstimulus interval (ISI). Meanwhile, there is an interval separating CS termination and US onset, this is known as trace conditioning, as conditioning is assumed to rely on a trace memory or representation of the CS, since it is no longer present. The terminology can sometimes be confusing – in trace conditioning there is a delay separating CS and US, while in delay conditioning the US paradoxically follows the CS without delay. The “delay” in the term instead refers to that between CS and US onset, and serves to distinguish from simultaneous conditioning where CS and US onset is concurrent. It is well-established that (generally) trace conditioning is less effective than
delay conditioning, and that long-delay conditioning is less effective than short-delay conditioning, with the CR taking longer to develop (Solomon & Groccia-Ellison, 1996; Wolfe, 1921) and being diminished either in magnitude (Smith, 1968) or in rate (Sizemore & Lattal, 1978; Williams, 1976). Indeed with longer trace intervals, conditioning can fail to occur altogether (Gormezano, 1972; Logue, 1979), though this is highly dependent on the nature of the stimuli entering in the relationship, as the following paragraph shall explain. The influences of temporal contiguity can be incorporated into models of conditioning such as the RWM by adjusting the value of parameters such as $\alpha$ and $\beta$.

Yet, just as with causal learning, there are exceptions to this contiguity principle. The blocking effect, in addition to showing the sensitivity of conditioning to the statistical relationship between events, demonstrated that contiguity alone was not sufficient for conditioning to occur. Although a cue and an outcome may occur contiguously, an association between the two will not be learned if the cue is redundant as a predictor. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that a lack of contiguity is not necessarily a barrier to associative learning. In studies by John Garcia and colleagues involving conditioned taste aversion (now commonly dubbed the Garcia effect), rats were given a gustatory stimulus (such as flavoured water) followed by the inducement of nausea (through administration of x-rays, or substances such as lithium chloride or apomorphine hydrochloride), and subsequently demonstrated avoidance reactions to the gustatory stimulus. Importantly, this conditioned taste aversion was readily established even when the onset of nausea is delayed by more than an hour after the gustatory stimulus (Garcia, Ervin, & Koelling, 1966). In an extension of this work, Schafe, Sollars and Bernstein (1995) have shown that rats fail to acquire conditioned taste aversions when the CS-US interval is very brief. Such results indicate that not only is contiguity not always essential for conditioning, but it can actually prevent conditioning in certain circumstances. These findings have been explained by postulating an innate bias such that certain cues and consequences are more readily associable, with these hard-wired preferences presumed to have arisen through natural selection. Garcia and Koelling (1966) indeed demonstrated that particular outcomes tend to become associated with particular stimuli, even when other stimuli are presented concurrently and thus have equal predictive value. While rats in their experiments associated internal malaise with gustatory stimuli, they associated external pain (e.g.
electric shock) with contextual cues such as tones or lights rather than a substance they consumed (demonstrated in their subsequent behaviour).

Broadly speaking then, the core factors of contingency and contiguity appear to exert remarkably similar influences on both the acquisition of associations in classical and instrumental conditioning and on human judgment of causal efficacy. These parallels have led to speculation that causal inference and conditioning are governed by the same underlying processes, and many researchers have attempted to reduce causal inference to associative learning (Allan, 1993; Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Dickinson, 2001; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1993). In an associative account of causal learning, the cause is mapped to the cue (CS) and the effect to the outcome (US). The strength of a causal impression is then a direct reflection of the acquired associative strength between cues and outcomes, which is continually updated over successive learning opportunities or trials. The demonstration of blocking in human contingency judgment gave further credence to this idea (Shanks, 1985), although a modified RWM (Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) is required to encompass backwards blocking (in which phase 1 and phase 2 are switched so subjects are first trained with the compound stimulus).

**1.5.1.3 Difficulties for an Associative Account of Causality Judgment**

Associative learning theory recognises that the extent of delay that can be tolerated for an association to be learned between stimuli depends on the nature (e.g. the physical attributes) of those stimuli (Shanks, 1993). However, while a bias in the associability of stimuli is plausible with regard to a few evolutionarily significant relations, such as that between taste and nausea, one may often encounter delayed mechanisms that do not have any such connection to physiological processes. In human society in particular, day-to-day life leads us to interact with many artificially developed mechanisms that are not found in the natural environment and thus for which innate knowledge could not possibly have been fostered through natural selection. How then can temporal gaps be bridged in these cases? Associative accounts of causality judgment suggest that stimuli may have differential associative weights that have been transferred from previous learning sessions, which indeed may account for order effects pertaining to contiguity (Buehner & May, 2003). However associationism cannot account for different interpretations of identical evidence.
achieved through abstract concepts, such as implicit manipulation of timeframe assumption (Buehner & May, 2002). Thus, it is appropriate to consider other theories which acknowledge other means whereby the connection between a candidate cause and a temporally distant effect may be bridged.

1.5.2 Causal Mechanism and Power Theories

A significant aspect of traditional associative theories is that they inherited Hume’s empiricism; they are data-driven or “bottom-up” in the sense that only the observable properties of stimuli such as contiguity are considered to contribute to learning. However, a number of findings have proven problematic for this empiricist approach applied to causal inference. People appear to have pre-existing conceptions both about the types of stimuli that are able to elicit certain outcomes and the timeframes involved in such processes, and can use this knowledge to guide causal inference (Buehner & May, 2002, 2004; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Purely bottom-up accounts do not allow the scope for influences such as higher-level knowledge on learning and therefore struggle to explain such effects where there is no plausible prior associability bias. Alternatives to the empiricist approach therefore embrace instead the philosophical position of Immanuel Kant (1781/1965), who proposed that people have intuitive ideas about causality that provide a framework for learning new relations. That is, causal relations need not be derived solely from empirical observation; inference may also be facilitated or constrained by top-down information.

Causal mechanism or power theories of causal learning stem from the Kantian rather than the Humean perspective. The central underlying principle of this view is that successful causal inference hinges upon belief in or knowledge of a causal mechanism – a specific process connecting causes to their effects and thus creating an intuition of necessity between the two (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995; White, 1989). According to this view, causes are not just passively followed by effects, but rather actively generate their effects by exerting their causal power. This may be seen as the transmission of force, energy or some other property from one element to another (Peter A. White, 2009). This position is motivated by the same cautionary mantra that is drummed into any aspiring scientist or statistician; that correlation or covariation does not necessarily imply causation. The key contribution then of mechanistic knowledge is in making the mental leap from an observed covariation to the inference of a causal relation. It is therefore considered that
people do not infer causality unless they know of a plausible mechanism by which these events could be linked. Such a perspective has however been criticised as being hamstring by circularity: If top-down assumptions about mechanism govern causal inference, where do such assumptions come from in the first place?

1.5.2.1 The Power PC Theory

Cheng (1997) attempted to synthesize the ideas of Hume and Kant, and refine the causal power account, by proposing that empirically observable data (in the form of contingency information) serves as the initial input for causal learning, while prior knowledge then guides inferences drawn from this data. The prior causal knowledge assumed here is general rather than specific. That is, mechanistic knowledge that is initially acquired from empirical observations can then subsequently then be generalized to novel learning situations (see Liljeholm & Cheng, 2007), hence overcoming the problem of circularity.

According to Cheng (1997), observed deviations in human causal judgments from measures such as $\Delta P$ are due to fundamental assumptions that people make about the nature of causality that go beyond mere covariation, such the assumption of causal power. Such deviations in judgement include sensitivity to changes in the base rate of the effect, $P(e|\neg c)$, when $\Delta P$ is constant. To address these shortcomings of $\Delta P$, Cheng advanced the power theory of the probabilistic contrast model, usually shortened to PowerPC. This approach focuses on the generative (or inhibitory) power of the cause, that is, its capacity to produce (or prevent) the effect independently of all other potential causes. Causal power is computed as:

$$\Delta P / 1 - P(e|\neg c)$$

for generative causes

$$-\Delta P / P(e|\neg c)$$

for preventative causes

Causal power is thus further distinguished from covariation models by making different predictions from identical contingency data depending on whether the cause is assumed to be generative or preventive, providing greater flexibility. One well-documented phenomena of causal induction that covariation models cannot account for but that is predicted by Power PC is the problem of ceiling effects. For example suppose one wished to test whether a new type of medication produced nausea as a side effect. If every participant experienced nausea after taking the medication, $P(e|c) = 1$ and the scientist might conclude
that the medication was a very strong cause of nausea. But suppose every participant was feeling nauseous to begin with; the results would then be uninterpretable; the participant might well have developed nausea after taking the medication but since they were already feeling nauseous this cannot be evaluated. $\Delta P$ in this case would be zero; $P(e|c) - P(e|\neg c) = 1 - 1 = 0$, therefore predicting that the medication would be judged as noncausal. In contrast the Power PC model, taking the generative form of the equation, would not return a value in such a case, as the equation attempts to divide by zero. Power PC thus correctly predicts that humans in such a situation would refrain from making a causal judgment rather than concluding that the medication does not cause nausea.

In similar fashion, consider again the above clinical trials scenario but instead assume that the medication was supposed to prevent (or relieve) nausea. Since none of the participants experienced relief, one can, in this case, rationally conclude that the medication was ineffective as a preventive cause of nausea. The predictions of causal power and $\Delta P$ here then are equivalent for the preventive case but differ in the generative case when $P(e|c) = P(e|\neg c) = 1$. Meanwhile, if the base rate was zero and once again $P(e|c) = P(e|\neg c)$, causal power predicts that humans will be unable to make a causal inference in the preventive case (as there is no opportunity for the cause to exert its effect) but will accord with $\Delta P$ in the generative case.

Predictions of the PowerPC model thus more closely mirror human judgments than $\Delta P$ and have proven resilient to challenges from other researchers (see Buehner et al., 2003). However, although PowerPC emphasizes the distinction between causation and covariation, causal power is still computed using covariation information – indeed, the $\Delta P$ statistic itself forms part of the Power PC model. The causal power perspective therefore makes the assumption that an observed configuration of causes and effects can be unambiguously interpreted to populate the cells of the contingency table. However, this is not necessarily a given. Furthermore, the model does not explicitly represent temporal information.

1.5.2.2 The Role of Time from Covariation Perspectives

From the causal power view and related perspectives, time is not bestowed with a particularly privileged role in causal learning. Temporal information is instead used to determine how events experienced in the input are assigned to the cells of the $2 \times 2$
contingency matrix. Provided that this information can be discerned from the available evidence, contiguity is not required to compute contingency. If there is temporal separation between cause and effect, the assumptions regarding mechanism and the expectation of timeframe determines how these events are interpreted. If a delay is anticipated, then the effect will be attributed to the cause, and constituting a single case of cell A (c→e, or e|c), as shown in Figure 1.2, strengthening the causal impression. If instead a contiguous mechanism is expected, a delayed pairing will be interpreted as one case of cell B (c→¬e or ¬e|c) and one case of cell C (¬c→e or e|¬c), weakening the causal impression. This is known as the attribution shift hypothesis (Buehner, 2005). Contiguity is thus only a necessity if a contiguous mechanism is expected; meanwhile longer delays can be tolerated if a slower mechanism is hypothesized. Longer intervals however also increase the likelihood of intervening events occurring between action and outcome, which compete for explanatory strength and place greater demands on processing and memory resources. Delays thus introduce added uncertainty as to whether a given effect was generated by the cause in question or whether it was produced by some other mechanism. This can mean that causal learning with delays may sometimes be problematic even when the anticipated mechanism means delays are plausible.

\[ \text{Figure 1.2: The effect of attribution shift in parsing an event stream with a specific timeframe assumed: } c \rightarrow e \text{ intervals that are longer than the temporal window simultaneously decrease impressions of } P(e|c) \text{ and } P(\neg e|\neg c) \text{ while increasing impressions of } P(e|\neg c) \text{ and } P(\neg e|c). \]

The causal power and mechanism theories thus reflect the view that learners adopt a more active approach to inferring causality. Rather than just passively processing information, we seek to impose structure on data, using heuristics and prior knowledge to constrain causal inference. Such mechanistic beliefs are key to avoiding learning spurious
relations. We do not, for example, learn that the crowing of a rooster causes the sun to rise, despite the fact that former event reliably signals the latter, since we know of no plausible mechanism by which the rooster crowing could influence the rising of the sun. A key strength of such approaches to causal learning is thus the flexibility to allow for top-down influences such as prior knowledge to assist in the comprehension of empirical sensory data. From this perspective then, causal learning is more than the mere sum of its parts.

1.5.3 Causal Models and Structure Theories

A third perspective on causal learning embraces a framework developed in statistics and computer science – probabilistic graphical models (Glymour, 2001; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Schienes, 1993). As the name suggests, this framework utilizes graphs to model probabilistic relations in a simple yet effective manner, in which variables such as causes and effects are denoted by nodes, and causal connections are indicated by arrows linking these nodes. These models are also commonly referred to as causal Bayesian networks (often shortened to Bayes nets), since their application utilises principles of Bayesian probabilistic inference. Named after its original proponent Reverend Thomas Bayes (1702–1761), Bayesian inference is a form of logical reasoning whereby the probability of a hypothesis is assessed by specifying some prior probability which is then updated in the light of new, relevant data.

Figure 1.3 shows a graphical model expressing the causal relation “X causes Y”. This is a prototypical example of a directed acyclic graph (DAG); directed in the sense that X and Y are connected by a directed arrow from X to Y, rather than by an undirected link; and acyclic as there is no corresponding arrow directed from Y to X, and so a path cannot be traced from one node back to itself. DAGs are the most popular means of expressing causal relations in a graphical model, and the intuitive simplicity of these models makes them an effective tool for representing complex causal networks.

Figure 1.3: Directed acyclic graph representing causal influence of X on Y.
The fact that the causal arrow extends from X to Y with no symmetrical link from Y to X reflects causal directionality, such that X causes Y but Y does not cause X. A crucial component to causal understanding is that causes produce their effects and not vice versa, such that an alteration to X will consequently produce an alteration in Y, but that an alteration made directly to Y itself will not produce an alteration in X. The representation of directionality is one of a number of key advantages afforded by Bayes nets.

1.5.3.1 Causal Model Theory

Waldmann and Holyoak (1992, 1997) argued that principles such as directionality cannot be captured by mere associations, and pinpointed this failure to specify causal direction as a major shortcoming of associative theories of causal learning. Waldmann and Holyoak instead advocated a causal model theory, according to which humans have a strong tendency to learn directed links from causes to effects, rather than vice versa, in line with how information is represented in a causal graphical model. Importantly, this remains the case even when an effect is observed temporally prior to the cause – for example, when one sees smoke before one sees the fire that produces it. In such a case, the smoke is still correctly identified as an effect of a temporally precedent cause, the fire, even if the fire is seen only subsequently, or remains unseen. In other words, humans construct causal models that correspond to the veridical temporal order rather than the perceived temporal order.

Inferring the presence of fire from the observation of smoke is an example of diagnostic inference. Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) drew special attention to the idea that people appear able to reason both predictively, from causes to effects, or diagnostically, from effects to causes. In a typical conditioning preparation, the order of stimulus presentation mirrors the temporal order of a predictive causal model. Cues (input) correspond to causes, and effects to outcomes (output). According to an associative account of causal learning, the strength of a perceived causal relation is assumed to be a reflection of the associative strength between cues and outcomes (Van Hamme, Kao, & Wasserman, 1993). However as Waldmann and Holyoak illustrate, in diagnostic inference the input-output sequence is reversed with respect to the true causal model. In an associative account of causal learning, effects would be assigned to the input layer and causes would be assigned to the output layer, based on the order of observation in a diagnostic causal model.
Meanwhile according to causal-model theory, the causal order is preserved and people should reason from effects to causes.

This distinction between associative and causal model theory has important implications regarding stimulus competition. As Kamin’s (1969) blocking effect demonstrated, cues compete for associative strength in conditioning, and the success of the RWM is in part due to its ability to elegantly explain blocking. Associative theory makes the same predictions of cue competition regardless of whether cues represent causes or effects. Causal model theory meanwhile argues in favour of competition between causes rather than cues. To illustrate, consider a common-effect model, where two causes jointly influence the same effect – as an example, where both rain and a water sprinkler are potential causes of the ground being wet. Suppose one knows that it is raining, one would then predict the ground to be wet. Subsequently finding out that the sprinkler had been turned on would not affect this prediction; the ground would still be wet. The sprinkler then is redundant as a predictor if we already know that it is raining and if rain has been established as a reliable predictor. Cues thus compete for explanatory strength as causes in predictive inference. Instead then, consider a common-cause model, where both the ground being wet and people using umbrellas may be attributed to the common cause of rain. Noticing that the ground is wet might lead us to infer that it has been raining. Here however, noticing a second effect, that people are carrying umbrellas, would not weaken our impression of the first link between the rain and the ground being wet. Thus there is no competition between effects. In contrast, according to an associative model, here the effects would constitute cues, and the presence of the first cue should block learning about the second. Using the blocking paradigm, Waldmann and Holyoak (1992, 1997) demonstrated that human subjects indeed made judgments consistent with causal model theory rather than associative theory (see also (Booth & Buehner, 2007; Waldmann, 1996, 2000).

The above examples depend on prior knowledge of the causal models in questions. Causal model theory then argues in favour of an integrative process utilizing both empirical data and existing knowledge, rather than a purely associative mechanism. In this regard, causal model theory is remarkably similar to the causal power approach advocated by Cheng (1997), described in the previous section. The defining characteristic of model-based theories is instead their basis on the Bayes nets framework. Causal model theory initially
focused on how people use causal models in reasoning and how different assumptions about causal structure may lead to different predictions from identical data sets. Waldmann and colleagues did not however attempt to specify how causal models may be used to provide a computational account of how empirical data such as contingency and contiguity combines in causal inference.

1.5.3.2 Bayesian Structure Learning

This challenge was taken up by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001, 2003; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005) who pointed out the inadequacy of existing normative models such as $\Delta P$ and causal power to account for various aspects of causal induction (including effects of sample size and non-monotonic effects of base rate on judgments). They instead proposed a Bayesian “causal support” model to address these shortcomings. At the heart of this framework is the notion that causal induction involves two kinds of learning, identifying causal structure and assessing causal strength. In other words, deciding whether there exists a causal relationship (structure), and if so, the extent of any such relationship (strength).

Structure learning is the task of identifying the causal model and its functional form, as may be represented by a causal graphical model. Prior knowledge of how the world works is used to generate a “hypothesis space” of plausible causal models that could account for observed sequences of events (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2003). The simplest case of causal induction is learning the relationship between a single candidate cause and a single effect, where values of cause and effect are constrained such that both may be either present or absent on a given occasion (and the relationship may thus be represented in the contingency matrix). Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) termed this as elemental causal induction, a moniker that shall be adopted here henceforth. Structure learning in elemental causal induction then is essentially a binary decision between two hypotheses, as shown in Figure 1.4: $h_0$, in which there is no causal relation between cause $c$ and effect $e$, and $e$ instead occurs solely due to the influence of random background processes $b$; and $h_1$, where $c$ has the generative power to produce $e$ (and $b$ still also produces $e$).

The strength of a causal relation may be denoted in a causal graphical model by the use of parameters, such as $w_0$ and $w_1$ in Figure 1.4, where $b$ produces $e$ with probability $w_0$ and $c$ produces $e$ with probability $w_1$. Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) argue that both causal power and $\Delta P$ are estimates of the parameter $w_1$ and so are measures of causal
strength. The graph $h_1$ (that a relationship exists between $c$ and $e$) is therefore assumed in both models. The different predictions of the two models result from different parameterization of the graph. Causal power (for generative causes) corresponds to a noisy-OR parameterization, where parameters have independent opportunities to produce the effect. $\Delta P$ meanwhile corresponds to a linear parameterization, where the parameters interact (see Pearl, 1988, for further details).

![Directed acyclic graphs](image)

*Figure 1.4: Directed acyclic graphs representing the two basic hypotheses that are compared in elemental causal induction.*

1.5.3.3 Causal Support

Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) argue that the primary goal of causal inference is the more fundamental task of recovering causal structure, as it must be determined whether a causal relationship exists before the strength of any such relationship can be assessed. In Bayesian structure learning, plausible causal structures within a hypothesis space are evaluated in terms of the probability of obtaining the current data set given that structure, $P(D|h_i)$. This value can be calculated by integrating over parameter values (see Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005, and Cooper & Herkowitz, 1992, for computational details). In elemental causal induction, there are only two causal models in the hypothesis space, $h_0$ and $h_1$. Structural inference in elemental causal induction is then made by assessing the likelihood of obtaining the observed data under each of these two hypotheses, formalized as a decision using Bayes' rule:

$$
\text{support} = \log \frac{P(D|h_1)}{P(D|h_0)}
$$
Causal support is thus a measure of the extent to which $h_1$ provides a better account of the given data than $h_0$. According to Griffiths and Tenenbaum, causal support may be likened to a significance test of a hypothesis for which causal power is the effect size measure.

Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) went on to present five experiments demonstrating the superiority of causal support over $\Delta P$ and causal power in terms of providing a better fit with human judgments of causality across a number of different learning situations. However, causal support is at its heart a probability based model, and Griffiths and Tenenbaum acknowledge that it does not specifically address the dynamics of elemental causal learning in continuous time. Although causal support does a tremendous job of accounting for how human causal judgments are obtained from contingency information, such information is not always clearly defined. Assigning combinations of events to the cells of the contingency matrix is a non-trivial task, particularly when delays are involved, but causal support does not provide a computational account of the effects of contiguity.

1.5.3.4 A Bayesian Perspective on Contiguity

In an updated computational framework entitled theory-based causal induction, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2009) advocate two central concepts. Firstly, that people approach the problem of causal induction with prior knowledge, in the form of abstract causal theories, that enable the generation of hypothetical causal models for a given situation. The principle of Bayesian statistical inference is then used to select the best model. Secondly, the framework emphasizes the importance of coincidences, such as in patterns of spatial and temporal contiguity. Griffiths and Tenenbaum (see also Griffiths, 2005) argue that humans are attuned to the detection of such coincidences. Since coincidences are by definition those events that are improbable, or in other words unlikely to happen due to chance, then coincidences provide support for a causal relationship. Indeed, noticing conspicuous coincidences has often led to causal discovery throughout the history of science.

Patterns of coincidence in time and space provide very strong evidence for a causal relationship. We will all have experienced, from time to time, the illusion of causality that strong contiguity will confer. For example, if we drop a glass on the floor and suddenly all the lights go out, we briefly experience the impression of the former having caused the latter, although of course we know that there is no mechanism by which this could have
occurred and so dismiss this coincidence as spurious. Experimental evidence of illusory correlations produced by strong contiguity in the absence of supporting statistical information has been provided in the literature (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Fiedler, 2000; Mendelson & Shultz, 1976). Of course, such apparent “coincidences” are often not merely coincidental but in fact are the product of a genuine underlying mechanistic causal connection.

Bayesian accounts are somewhat obscure with regard to the precise means by which contiguity contributes to causal inference. Krynski (2006) attempted to outline how the short delay advantage may be explained from a Bayesian perspective, by considering that the temporal delays between cause and effect may be modelled as a probability density function, characterized as a gamma distribution. The height of the distribution on the y-axis for a given point on the x-axis corresponds to the likelihood of observing that particular delay. Since short delays are inherently less variable than long delays, the peak of the distribution is narrower and higher for short delays. Krynski then goes on to argue that a rational approach to causal inference is to integrate over all possible delays, meaning that the likelihood ratio is higher when the temporal intervals are shorter, thus providing more evidential support for a causal relation. This account of the short delay advantage bears striking functional similarities to an associative account, although obviously the two are conceptually very different.

However, the Bayesian structural account does not necessarily predict a uniform advantage for contiguity. Rather the timing of events may place constraints on the plausible causal models in the hypothesis space. Certain temporal patterns are more characteristic of certain causal models than others. In elemental causal induction, the temporal distribution of events may either constitute evidence in favour of a causal mechanism or may indicate that background processes are a more likely candidate for the observed temporal pattern. Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2009) chose a very specific example to demonstrate the effect of patterns of temporal coincidence, based on earlier work examining how people use temporal information to infer hidden causes (Griffiths, Baraff, & Tenenbaum, 2004). The experiment presented a fictitious scenario via a computer simulation involving a set of cans arranged on a table, each containing an explosive compound called Nitro X. Participants were informed that because of the instability of this compound, spontaneous combustion
might produce an explosion of a can at any given moment, and further, that any exploding can would propagate unseen shock waves which may in turn cause neighbouring cans to explode in a chain reaction. The task required participants to decide whether a particular temporal pattern of explosions was due to spontaneous combustion, explosion of a nearby can producing a chain reaction, or some other unseen cause. Results indicated that when a suitable time lag separated one can’s explosion from another, a causal chain was correctly inferred. When several cans exploded simultaneously however, a hidden alternative cause was assumed (such as a jolt to the table), thus demonstrating how temporal coincidences influence model selection. Griffiths and Tenenbaum provided a fairly complex computational account of these particular effects, but did not provide a more general-level computational model for the effects of temporal distributions in causal induction. Nevertheless, the Bayesian structure approach offers considerable advances in accounting for and modelling the effects of contingency and contiguity in human causal learning.

1.5 Chapter Summary

Causal learning is a core cognitive capacity that enables us to understand, predict and control our environment. Causal relations themselves are not directly perceptible by our sensory systems, and thus they must be inferred from patterns of evidence in the information that reaches us. Cues such as contingency and contiguity between putative causes and effects tend to foster impressions of causality between those events.

Some theories of causal learning adopt the empirical view, that only observable data may contribute to the induction of causal relations. An associative perspective purports that causal learning is nothing more than the acquisition of associations between cues and outcomes. Associations are continuously updated over successive learning instances, with contingency and contiguity being determinants of the direction and size of changes in associative strength. Problems for associative accounts of causal judgment include apparent influences of prior knowledge in mitigating a lack of contiguity between stimuli, since such theories cannot accommodate these top-down representations.

Causal mechanism and power views argue that human causal induction goes beyond mere associations. Proponents of these perspectives argue that humans postulate specific causal mechanism by which causes generate or prevent effects. This both constrains causal
reasoning, such that spurious correlations where there is no plausible mechanism can be ignored, and also enabling inference from statistical relations to be guided by top-down knowledge. Such cognitive accounts provide the flexibility to account for phenomena such as systematic variations in judgment of noncontingent relations (Cheng, 1997), effects of prior experience (Buehner & May, 2003), and knowledge-mediation (Buehner & May, 2002, 2004; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).

Causal-model and structure-based theories meanwhile are inspired by the Bayes nets graphical framework to model causal relations. Like the power view, structural accounts endorse the idea that inference from empirical data is guided by top-down influences in the form of abstract causal knowledge. Where these accounts differ is with regard to structure versus strength. The Bayesian approach argues that causal power is an attempt to estimate the strength of a $c \rightarrow e$ cause-effect relation, before having evaluated the evidential support for the existence of this relation, and is thus to some extent putting the cart before the horse. The Bayesian approach instead is concerned with identifying the likelihoods of plausible causal models given the obtained data, ahead of attempting to estimate the parameters of this model to evaluate causal strength. According to the Bayesian approach, regularities and coincidences such as contingency and contiguity constitute evidence in favor of a causal relation since such occurrences are unlikely to happen due to chance.

The order in which these theories have been presented in this chapter largely reflects their chronological development. Associative theory is the most longstanding while the Bayesian computational (structural) account the most recent. As such, the associative view has been the most subject to criticism, while more recent accounts have the benefit of hindsight. The question of how people infer causal relations, despite great strides forward in understanding of learning processes, remains both unresolved and actively debated. Associative theorists have attempted to undermine each significant challenge to associationism, including Power PC (Lober & Shanks, 2000), causal model theory (Shanks & Lopez, 1996), and knowledge mediation (Allan, Tangen, Wood, & Shah, 2003), which in turn has drawn ripostes from the original proponents of these accounts. Discussions range from specific boundary cases and technical details, to the more fundamental question of whether causal learning is an insightful reasoning process or simply the product of
associations. Suffice it to say then that no model has yet offered a full and undisputed account of human causal judgment. Any empirical study of the phenomena of causal induction would thus do well to remain mindful of all perspectives, their relative merits and predictions, and consider how well the various accounts correspond to actual human judgment within the domain of interest. This thesis shall adopt this consideration and the experiments which follow will consider both the predictions of associative and cognitive perspectives and how well the obtained results accord with each perspective.

This introductory chapter has hopefully provided sufficient background on the already recognised cues to causality and how each of these cues is considered to contribute to causal learning from three distinct schools of thought on the subject. The following chapter shall now introduce the concept of temporal predictability, which is the phenomena of central interest to this thesis. This concept will be considered from a theoretical point of view, in relation to the three broad perspectives identified in this chapter, before an empirical investigation of this concept in the two subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 – The Potential Role of Temporal Predictability in Causal Learning

2.1 Introducing Temporal Predictability

Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2009) point to the discovery of Halley’s comet as a striking example of causal induction through the use of knowledge and theories. Sir Edmund Halley (1656-1742) noted that comets observed in 1531, 1607, and 1682 had all taken remarkably similar paths across the sky. Halley’s friend and colleague Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) had already outlined in the *Principia Mathematica* that comets tend to follow orbits corresponding to conic sections. Using the principles of Newtonian physics, Halley inferred that the three comets previously observed were in fact one and the same comet following a regular solar orbit. As Griffiths and Tenenbaum suggest, Halley’s prior knowledge of such physical theories was doubtless crucial to this successful calculation. Perhaps the most potent clue to this discovery however was that the three comets had been observed approximately 76 years apart from one another in each case. In other words, there was a consistent temporal interval between the appearance of all three comets, that varied (in relative terms) minimally. Such periodicity is congruent with a celestial body following a regular orbit, and hence provided a strong indication that the three comets were in fact one and the same. It was this periodicity that allowed Halley to predict that the comet would return again in 1758 and indeed this prediction proved to be accurate, with Halley’s comet visiting the Earth every 76 years since. This facility of consistent timing, to enable predictions regarding the occurrence of future of events and specifically when those events will occur, makes “temporal predictability” an apt term to describe such a feature.

As a more commonplace example, consider the following anecdote:

Dave, Jon and Tom are discussing their morning drives to work. Dave and Jon suffer a similar problem in which they encounter sets of traffic lights that sometimes take a very long time to change, even when no cars are coming through on the opposite side. Tom suggests that they try flashing their headlamps at the traffic lights to induce them to change, as he has heard a rumour that they are programmed to respond to the flashing lights of emergency service vehicles. Both take his advice. Dave notices that every time he flashes his headlamps, the traffic lights do in fact change after a consistent delay of around
10 seconds. Jon tries it at the set of lights on his route; sometimes the lights change very quickly, sometimes they take much longer, with little discernible pattern. Jon concludes the lights are operating on a fixed program and his headlamps are not influencing them. Dave instead decides that his actions are effective and continues to flash his headlamps when held up at the traffic lights.

The above story is an example of how event timing influences the way in which we learn about causal relations. Here, contingency information is unhelpful; the traffic lights will change eventually, the concern is instead with when they will change. In this example, it is not the absolute delay between candidate cause and effect on each instance that eventually determines the conclusions drawn by Dave and Jon. Rather, their decisions are based on the variation in the timing of events across the set of instances over which they try out Tom’s suggestion. What eventually convinces Dave of the efficacy of his actions is the consistency of the temporal interval across multiple events.

The pairing of a particular candidate cause and effect tends to be experienced repeatedly rather than as unique, one-off occurrences. Causal relations are, after all, manifestations of invariant physical laws governing events in the environment (Sloman, 2005). Likewise when testing a hypothesized causal mechanism, we will normally make multiple attempts, as in the example above. Obviously over multiple cause-effect instances, we will experience multiple cause-effect intervals. These intervals may remain constant, or may vary from one instance to the next. The variation of the interval separating cause and effect is a consideration that has been overlooked with alarming frequency in the literature.

When there is a degree of constancy in the duration of intervals, then one may be able to predict, just as Halley did in the earlier example, when a particular event will occur. The degree of accuracy possible with such predictions will likely be a function of how consistent the interval is over time. If the temporal interval is fixed and always takes the same value, the relationship may be said to be maximally predictable. Conversely, if inter-event intervals vary from case to case, then predicting future events becomes a much more difficult, if not impossible, task. The greater the variability of the intervals, the more unpredictable the relationship. Under the former scenario, one may develop particular expectations regarding the timing of events, whereas for the latter there is uncertainty as to when an outcome may occur. However, what influence this distinction may have, if any, in
the detection or appraisal of causal relations, is yet to be fully explored. To begin with then, this chapter shall review the scant existing evidence relevant to temporal predictability, before considering how such a feature might be accommodated within models of learning.

2.2. The Temporal Predictability Hypothesis

The ability to predict the occurrence of future events is of course one of the central advantages afforded by causal understanding. Causal impressions may thus be considered as a direct reflection of the extent to which the cause is a predictor of the effect. This importance of predictability for causal learning was emphasized by Young, Rogers and Beckmann (2005). Young et al. noted that the dominant approach in the literature was to conceive of and define predictability in terms of statistical regularity, that is, whether the effect will follow the cause (e.g. Siegler & Liebert, 1974). They instead sought to expand this perspective to encompass temporal regularity, positing that causal impressions are based on not just whether an effect will occur but also when it will occur. In line with this perspective they proposed a “predictability hypothesis” to account for the dual influences of contingency and contiguity on causal learning, arguing that while contingency conveys predictability in a statistical sense, contiguity conveys temporal predictability.

Young et al.’s (2005) contention was that delays make it more difficult to predict when an outcome will occur, due to the inaccuracy in remembering the duration of a delay. The longer the delay, the greater the inaccuracy (Gibbon, 1977). This temporal uncertainty creates weaker causal impressions. Young et al. elaborated further by adding the caveat that longer delays might sometimes be preferable if such a delay is expected (and thus predictable) due to instruction, prior knowledge or experience. Causality then may be attributed to temporally separated events provided that “earlier events are good predictors of whether and when later events will occur” (p321). However, Young et al. stopped short of pointing out what seems a logical extension of this argument; that in order for a delayed mechanism to be predictable, it must be temporally consistent.

Young et al. (2005) did not directly contrast fixed and variable delays in their experiments. Instead they investigated the effects of filling the delay interval with an auditory stimulus, they suggested would enhance the temporal predictability of the outcome. Using variations of Michotte’s (1946/1963) launching effect, participants were
shown computer simulations of one ball colliding into another, and were then asked to provide a rating of the extent to which they believed the first ball was the cause of the second ball moving. In trials where launching lacked temporal contiguity, causal ratings were markedly decreased, in line with Michotte's original findings. However, the introduction of the auditory stimulus bridging the temporal gap between impact and launch was found to reduce the delay-induced decrease in causal judgments relative to where no such stimulus was provided. Young et al. interpreted this finding as evidence in favour of the predictability hypothesis; however these results are also readily explicable from an associative perspective, in terms of the auditory stimulus signalling the outcome (Reed, 1992, 1999). Young et al. therefore did not address the potential impact of variation of delays from case to case, and so did not conceive of temporal predictability in the same sense as described in the anecdotes with which this chapter opened. Instead, they considered temporal predictability to be provided by contiguity, since shorter delays are inherently less variable, and attributed the detrimental effects of delays to a lack of predictability.

The goal of this chapter is to broaden the conception of the role of temporal information beyond mere contiguity, and to reconstruct the temporal predictability hypothesis to encompass the impact of delay variability. Rather than just being a consequence of contiguity, temporal predictability can be conceived as the consistency of intervals over multiple cause-effect pairings. If the temporal interval between cause and effect is held constant across repeated instances, then the timing of the event becomes highly predictable, even if the actual interval between cause and effect is long. Holding the temporal interval constant therefore constitutes another means by which predictability may be enhanced, in addition to providing instructions, appealing to prior knowledge, or presenting an external cue such as an auditory signal. According to this ‘updated’ version of the temporal predictability hypothesis, a consistent timeframe linking cause and effect means that the cause is a good predictor of when the effect will occur. While as Young et al. (2005) suggest, a short delay is more temporally predictable than a long delay, a fixed long delay is more predictable than a variable long delay. Consistent delays thus constitute temporal predictability, which should enhance impressions of causality. Fixed intervals should therefore be more conducive to causal inference than variable intervals.
2.3 Previous Empirical Research on Predictability

To date, the contrast between fixed and variable intervals in human causal learning has received remarkably little empirical attention. One exception is a landmark early study on detecting response-outcome contingencies by Wasserman, Chatlosh & Neunaber (1983). They studied causal learning in a free-operant paradigm, where a response made during any given trial could increase or decrease the likelihood of a light to illuminate at the end of that trial. Their third experiment contrasted predictable conditions employing trial lengths fixed at a constant value of 3s, against unpredictable conditions where trial lengths could take a value of 1, 3 or 5s. Although fixed and variable conditions did not differ significantly, there was a general trend indicating that the variable conditions received uniformly, if marginally, lower ratings than their fixed counterparts. The implication of this research is therefore unclear, and a closer systematic examination of predictability is warranted. Indeed, Wasserman et al. (p. 428) stated:

“Our failure to find significant effects attributable to these factors in no way means that manipulation of the same variables over a broader range of values would also fail to yield reliable results; indeed, we still believe that such work would disclose discernible differences. Our research can thus be seen as a guide to others in their search for potent influences on the perception of response-outcome relations.”

In a related study, Vallée-Tourangeau, Murphy & Baker (2005) investigated the effect of outcome density on causal ratings. They implemented conditions where the timeline was segmented into 1s ‘timebins’. If a participant responded, a reinforcement was presented at the end of the timebin. Action-outcome interval was thus variable depending on the point at which the participant responded. This was then contrasted with situations where the action-outcome interval was instead held at a constant interval regardless of when participants responded. Vallée-Tourangeau et al. found the same apparent trend of fixed-interval conditions attracting slightly higher ratings, but again this difference was not found to be statistically significant.

With a dearth of conclusive previous experimental work, there is a lack of clear understanding and characterization of the role of predictability in causal learning. The initial goal of the empirical work of this thesis is to address this omission in the literature. Chapter 3 shall present a series of studies intended to determine whether predictability does
in fact exert an influence on judgments, and the nature of that influence. Before progressing with these studies however, it is worth casting a broader glance at findings from the learning literature that might have some bearing upon this issue of predictability. The non-significant trends in the studies described above suggests that, if anything, causal relations with fixed temporal intervals may be seen as more robust than temporally variable relations. However, there is a wealth of evidence from studies of reinforcement learning with animals which suggests that the reverse may be true.

2.4 Animal Preference for Variable Reinforcement

Inspired by the earlier work of Pavlov and Thorndike, the research of B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) focused on extending and refining the experimental analysis of behaviour (e.g. Skinner, 1938). Thorndike’s earlier experiments were in the form of discrete trials, in the sense that the animal performed a single response (pressing the escape mechanism) to a given stimulus (being in the puzzle box), with a reduction in the time taken to perform the response the measure of learning. Skinner instead developed an apparatus where the animal could make multiple responses to given stimuli – the operant conditioning chamber, popularly referred to as a Skinner box. A typical chamber includes a food dispenser and a lever or mechanism of some kind that can be operated by the animal. Under appropriate circumstances, pressing the lever can release a food pellet from the dispenser into the animal’s food trough. The animal is able to freely explore the chamber and may press the lever at any point; hence this was referred to by Skinner as the instrumental free-operant procedure (FOP). This procedure has become so widely adopted that the term operant conditioning is often used synonymously with instrumental conditioning (though strictly speaking instrumental conditioning is a broader term also including discrete trials procedures such as those of Thorndike). Indeed the earlier described paradigms of Shanks et al. (1989) and Wasserman et al. (1983) are variants of this basic procedure.

A longstanding method for the exploration of how relations between responses and outcomes govern behaviour is the use of reinforcement schedules (Skinner, 1969). In operant conditioning, not every response is followed by a reinforcer; instead, certain conditions must be satisfied before reinforcement delivery. Such schedules of reinforcement specify the input that is required for a reward to be delivered. The two most
common schedules used in behaviour analysis are *ratio* schedules, where a certain number of responses are required before a reward is received, and *interval* schedules, where reinforcement is provided following the first response after a given period of time has elapsed. For example, in a fixed-ratio (FR) 30 schedule, the reward is dispensed after every 30 responses, and in a fixed-interval (FI) 30 schedule, the reward is dispensed following the first response after a 30 second period has elapsed (from the dispensation of the previous reward). These schedules can also be variable as well as fixed; for instance, on a variable-interval (VI) 30 schedule, the amount of time after which a reward can be received varies about an average of 30s, with the specific interval for any one trial falling within a predefined range with 30s as the midpoint, for example 0-60s, 15-45s, or 20-40s.

Higher response rates on a particular schedule are generally taken as an indicator of preference; in other words, that the animal has identified that there is a greater potential for reward on that schedule. Naturally, a schedule providing a faster rate of reinforcement, or requiring less input to receive a reward, will be preferred to a slower or more demanding schedule. For instance, a FR10 schedule will be preferred over a FR100 schedule since the latter requires ten times as much work for a given reinforcement. But certain types of schedules are preferred over others even when the rate of reinforcement is the same. It is a fairly well-established finding in the behaviour analysis literature that animals tend to respond more frequently during variable-interval schedules compared to fixed-interval schedules (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1995; Davison, 1969; Herrnstein, 1964; Killeen, 1968). It has been argued that such findings are artefacts of the task; if one assumes that the animal can learn the temporal intervals in a fixed preparation (cf. Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000a), then it can restrict its responding to the point when it expects reinforcement to be delivered. If instead intervals are variable then such a strategy will be ineffective; the best chance for receipt of reward is to continue responding frequently throughout the schedule.

However, it has also been demonstrated that animals prefer variable over fixed response-to-reinforcer delays when choosing between alternatives. For instance, Cicerone (1976) employed a free-operant procedure in which pigeons were presented with two, concurrently available, response keys. Variable-length delay intervals were superimposed on the reinforcers scheduled with one response key while delay intervals of constant length were superimposed on the reinforcers assigned to the other. The results showed that
pigeons preferred variable over constant delays of reinforcement, responding more frequently on the variable-delay key, and furthermore that this preference for variability increased as the range of the interval lengths increased. Many other studies have also found that organisms prefer aperiodic over periodic reinforcement delays (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1997; Mazur, 1984, 1986) thus indicating that this goes beyond task demands and reflects an inherent property of variable reinforcement delay that makes it preferable.

While it is clear that performance on schedules of reinforcement and causal inference in humans are not equivalent tasks, the preference for variable reinforcement shown in non-human animals may be indicative of a general facilitatory effect of variability in learning preparations. As Reed (1993) points out, while a relationship linking a response to an outcome is not necessarily a reinforcement schedule, it is nevertheless possible that “human perception of the causal efficacy of responses may be influenced by such schedules of outcome presentation in some systematic manner” (p.328). A consistent preference for variability may well be something that generalizes across learning domains.

Drawing inspiration from such studies of animal reinforcement to make forecasts regarding temporal predictability is of course the same approach taken by many proponents of associative accounts of causal learning, who have illuminated numerous ways in which human causality judgments mirror simple conditioned behaviour. At this point then, it seems appropriate to revisit the associative account, along with the other theoretical perspectives on learning that were outlined in Chapter 1, and attempt to discern how predictability might be accommodated in these theories. This will enable the results obtained from these experiments to provide a contribution to the advancement of causal learning theory as well as their empirical significance in their own right.

### 2.5 Theoretical Perspectives on Predictability

#### 2.5.1 An Associative Analysis of Temporal Predictability

The dominant theory of animal behavioural processes is associative learning theory (Mackintosh, 1983; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). According to an associative account of causal learning, causal relations are represented by the strength of an association between putative causes and effects which is determined by the increment (or decrement) of
associative strength over repeated learning trials. Effects are considered to be reinforcers to the conditioned stimulus or response which is considered as the cause.

The impact of contiguity on causal learning is addressed by the supposition that the greater the temporal separation between stimuli, the less associative strength that is acquired as a consequence of their pairing (Shanks, 1987). In classical conditioning, this could be due to the representation of the CS held in memory decaying over time (Wagner, 1981). Meanwhile in operant conditioning, the value of the reinforcer becomes diminished as the delay until its receipt is increased, so a delayed reinforcer contributes less associative strength compared to an immediate one.

It is important to note at this juncture that many distinct models of associative learning have been proposed over several decades of research in this area. Although these models may often be grouped together under the same umbrella term, there is no unanimous agreement between different models on the role of time in learning. In the final chapter of this thesis, I shall examine a number of specific associative accounts individually and in more detail, to assess their compatibility with the results presented herein. Generally speaking however, when associative learning is applied as an account of causal learning in humans, the essential principles of traditional associative theories such as the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model (RWM), as described in Chapter 1, are applied. For the purpose of outlining an associative account of temporal predictability then, these principles shall for the moment be assumed.

Models of associative learning such as the RWM may be capable of representing temporal information through the learning rate parameters such as $\alpha$ and $\beta$, which refer to the salience of the CS and US. For instance, if it is assumed that the representation of the CS held in memory decays over time, then the value of the $\alpha$ parameter will decline, resulting in smaller increments in associative strength when delays are greater. Associative accounts of the effect of contiguity, as exemplified by the RWM, thus assume a monotonic influence of time in learning such that longer delays result in weaker associations. The overall extent of contiguity may thus serve as a potent determinant of the strength of acquired associations. One might therefore be tempted to assume that whether contiguity is fixed or variable should not matter, and the mean delay alone should determine the contribution of contiguity. However, trial-based models such as the RWM update
associative strength on a trial-by-trial basis, so each reinforcement makes an individual
correction to the strength of an association. Any anticipated effect of predictability would
therefore depend on the rate at which associative strength changes with delay.

It is generally considered that the greater the extent to which the a stimulus appears
to reinforce behaviour, the stronger the acquired association. In other words, the amount of
conditioned responding that is exhibited, or the rate or magnitude of instrumental
responding (such as pressing a lever), is taken as an indication of the degree of association
between the CS and US (in classical conditioning) or response and reinforcer (instrumental
conditioning). Studies of delayed reinforcement in animals reveal that response rates
decline as a negatively-accelerated function of reinforcer delay (Chung, 1965; Williams,
1976). Taking response rate as a measure of associative strength then suggests that changes
in associative strength as a result of reinforcement diminish with delay of reinforcement
according to the same negatively accelerated function. If causal inference can be reduced to
associative learning, then it may be anticipated that delayed effects lose their capacity to
increase the cause-effect association in an analogous manner.

To then explain animal preference for variable-interval reinforcement, compare a
hypothetical set of fixed delays with a set of variable delays that have an equivalent mean
delay. Further assume that the fixed delay forms a central midpoint about which the
durations of the variable delays are evenly distributed. As an example, if the fixed delay
was 2s, then for every cause-effect pairing with a delay of 1s in the variable set, there
would be a corresponding pairing with a delay of 3s. Obviously an early outcome will
contribute more associative strength, and a late outcome less, relative to an outcome with a
delay intermediate between the two. Due to the negatively-accelerated form of the function,
associative strength is lost rapidly as contiguity first begins to decline, and less rapidly as
delays become progressively greater. The difference in associative strength between the
early (1s) and the intermediate (2s) outcome is greater than the difference in associative
strength between the intermediate (2s) and the late (3s) outcome. In other words, the loss in
associative strength by increasing delays from 1s to 2s is greater than the subsequent loss
by increasing delays from 2s to 3s. The combined associative strength of one early and one
late effect would thus be greater than that of two effects with a fixed intermediate delay,
despite the mean cause-effect delay being identical. In Figure 2.1, where $\Delta V$ is the change
in associative strength, this could be expressed as: $\Delta V_x + \Delta V_z > 2\Delta V_y$. Consequently, it would be expected that a series of effects with delays evenly distributed about a central mean would accrue greater overall associative strength than where every effect follows the cause after a fixed delay of a duration equal to that central point.

There has been some debate over the precise mathematical form of the function best describing the decline in response rates with delay. For instance, Chung (1965) reported in a signalled delayed reinforcement task that pigeons' response frequencies declined exponentially as a function of the delay interval. Other work (Herrnstein, 1970; Mazur, 1984) suggests that hyperbolic functions more accurately describe such trends. However, for the above inequality to hold, the precise shape of the function is unimportant; any negatively accelerated function would result in the same imbalance in accrued associative strength. Under the assumption that causal learning is a direct reflection of associative strength, it would then be anticipated that temporally-variable conditions would give a stronger overall impression of causality than predictable conditions, and thus attract higher causal ratings.

Figure 2.1: Potential differences in accrued associative strength between fixed-interval and variable-interval conditions according to a hyperbola-like discounting function of delayed events.
However, this prediction might be considered as somewhat counter-intuitive. One might be more inclined to expect predictability to provide confirmatory evidence for a causal relationship, as was the case in the anecdotes at the opening of this chapter. Consistency of the temporal interval separating candidate cause and effect could be taken as symbolic of a genuine relationship between them, in much the same way as statistical co-occurrence. If causes are hypothesized to bring about their effects by means of a particular mechanism or sequence of events, it seems reasonable to suggest that (provided the mechanism remains unaltered) there should be a degree of regularity in the timeframe over which these events unfold. Let us therefore turn now to consider other theories of causal learning which may generate predictions in accordance with this intuition.

2.5.2 The Attribution Shift Hypothesis

From a covariation perspective of causal learning, a potential explanation for the effect of predictability is the attribution shift (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987). This has was earlier outlined as an account for the detrimental effect of delay. Under this assumption, a delayed action-outcome pairing is perceived not as a cause-effect pairing, $c \rightarrow e$, but instead as one instance of an action with no outcome, $c \rightarrow \neg e$ and an outcome following no action, $\neg c \rightarrow e$, as illustrated earlier in Figure 1.3. In terms of the $2 \times 2$ contingency matrix (Figure 1.2), this may be described as one instance of Cell B and one instance of cell C rather than a single instance of Cell A.

However, this process is highly dependent on the size of the “temporal window” that is adopted for event parsing. If a reasoner assumes a more relaxed timeframe over which events may unfold, this enables temporally distal effects to be correctly attributed to the candidate cause rather than disregarded as spurious. Previous work (Buehner, 2005) has suggested that prior knowledge about existing causal mechanisms can lead to the adjustment of this temporal window in this manner. In similar fashion, if the reasoner repeatedly encounters evidence that is contradictory to their initial timeframe expectations, they may revise their assumptions and adopt a new, more lenient temporal window. Thus if the cause and effect are temporally separated, but this interval is constant, this may be recognized over repeated instances and avoid the delayed effects being subjected to attribution shift. Temporal predictability, therefore, may enable a learner to bridge temporal gaps in causal induction through repeated exposure to the same temporal interval. In
contrast, a variable interval might preclude recognition of the statistical regularity between cause and effect, which in turn would mean that actual cause-effect pairings will be parsed as instances of Cells B and C. The attribution shift hypothesis is therefore capable of forecasting an advantage for predictability through the reduction of erroneous attribution of delayed effects to random background processes. If the temporal assumptions are relaxed and the window is expanded to encompass the \( c \rightarrow e \) pairings, then with a fixed temporal interval, all the pairings will be counted.

2.5.3 Bayesian Models

One final perspective takes a broader and more integrative viewpoint on the causal learning process. The Bayesian structural approach (Glymour, 2001; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005, 2009; Spirtes et al., 1993; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992, 1997) is inspired by concepts from statistics and computer science, specifically, the use of causal graphical models or Bayes nets to represent causal relations. Again, as with associative learning, the Bayesian perspective is a general category of learning theories that encompasses a number of individual models, which differ in their specificities but share common principles.

Bayesian accounts of causal judgment combine both bottom-up empirical processes, by which statistical inference from observable evidence forms the basis of causal induction, with top-down modulation in the form of pre-existing causal theories. These abstract theories serve to allow the generation of a hypothesis space of plausible causal structures constrained by prior knowledge, experience and expectations. Under this framework, the goal of causal induction is to first adjudge the best fitting causal model from the set of possible structures, by evaluating the evidence in favour of a given structure. Once structural inference has taken place, one may assess the strength of a causal relation through parameter estimation. In elemental causal induction, structural inference is a binary decision between two causal structures; either a causal relation exists \((h_1)\), or it does not \((h_0)\). Among the leading accounts of causal learning in the Bayesian tradition is the causal support model proposed by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) which proposes that judgments of causality are best described by a log ratio of the evidence for \(h_1\) compared to \(h_0\), which reflects the degree of confidence that the causal relation \(c \rightarrow e\) exists between a candidate cause and an effect. Models such as \(\Delta P\) and causal power meanwhile are
considered to be estimates of the parameter $w_1$ which specifies the strength of the $c \rightarrow e$ connection. Bayesian perspectives thus emphasizes causal structure over causal strength.

Learning to impose structure on the world of sensation crucially depends on our ability to identify patterns and consistencies in the environment which we can piece together to produce a coherent picture. On a representational level, a Bayesian perspective emphasizes that such regularities or coincidences, whether statistical or temporal, are evidence in favour of a stable causal mechanism. Both contingency and contiguity then increase the evidence supporting $h_1$ over $h_0$. If it is assumed that a causal relation manifests as a result of a specific mechanism, that this same mechanism is appealed to in each case, and the processes involved in the mechanism unfold in a consistent manner, then it seems reasonable to anticipate that this mechanism should have a consistent timeframe of action. Constancy of temporal intervals is thus a further regularity in the environment that an organism may be able to detect and use to construct an accurate representation of causality. Meanwhile, spontaneous outcomes, generated by background processes rather than the hypothesized mechanism, are assumed to occur according to a stochastic Poisson process, where there is no reason to expect temporal consistency from one case to the next. Although the likelihood of a spontaneous outcome increases with the time since the last such outcome, since the probability of an outcome at each precise point is infinitesimal, the likelihood of spontaneous outcomes repeatedly occurring following the same interval would be a startling coincidence. Variability may thus be seen as indicative of a stochastic process that $b \rightarrow e$ represents, while predictability is emblematic of the mechanistic process $c \rightarrow e$. From the Bayesian structure perspective then, temporal predictability would serve to facilitate causal learning because temporal regularity between putative cause and effect is much more likely if there exists a causal relation than if no such relation exists (and the repeated regularity occurs by chance).

In computational terms, a Bayesian perspective is capable of predicting a facilitatory effect of temporal predictability through likelihood distributions. Such distributions reflect the likelihood of obtaining given data under a specific assumed hypothesis. Recall from Chapter 1 the argument presented by Krynski (2006), mirroring that of Young et al (2005), that the short-delay advantage manifests because short delays are inherently less variable. According to Krynski, this results in a narrow likelihood
distribution with a high peak; in other words, the experience of shorter delays provides strong confirmatory evidence for the existence of the hypothesized causal relation. In contrast, longer delays (if the variance of such delays is proportional to the mean delay), result in a wider likelihood distribution. By necessity, a wider distribution will also have a lower peak, hence longer delays provide weaker confirmatory evidence for a causal relation. If however the delay is fixed (or at least relatively consistent), then this would result in a narrowing of the distribution, more closely converging on this fixed delay, with the result that the peak of the distribution is elevated. In other words, making delays less variable should have a comparable influence to shortening the delay. Thus, the added certainty provided by fixed delays would serve to increase the likelihood of the data under the hypothesized mechanism, \( P(D|h_1) \), and thus should enhance judgments of causality.

2.6 Chapter Summary

Temporal predictability refers to the constancy of a temporal interval between cause and effect such that the time of occurrence of future effects of can be anticipated. Predictability may be contrasted with interval variability where predicting the onset of an effect becomes more difficult. Previous experiments (Wasserman et al., 1983; Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2005) have suggested that there may be the potential for differences in the precise temporal arrangement of events in a learning preparation, such as with predictability compared to variability, to elicit different responses or judgments of causality. What is currently absent from the literature however is a systematic series of studies specifically centred on elucidating the precise contribution of such temporal arrangements to causal inference. The following chapter then attempts to definitively address the potential role of temporal predictability in human causal learning. It will be assessed whether case-by-case fluctuations in temporal delay can impact the causal impression, or whether overall degree of stimulus contiguity across a learning preparation is the sole contribution of temporal information.

Three broad theories of causal learning have been reviewed in attempt to discern the predictions that they may generate regarding a potential role for temporal predictability. From a traditional associative perspective, as exemplified by the RWM, the contiguous pairings of cause and effect that are possible under a variable timeframe overcompensate
for the smaller contribution of pairings with longer delays. Variability should therefore confer an overall boost to impressions of causality compared to predictability (under the assumption that delays are symmetrical about the mean). The predictions of this associative account may appear counterintuitive, but are well-founded on a wealth of research from reinforcement learning in animals. In contrast, cognitive perspectives allow for top-down influences on learning, through which predictability could be taken as evidence of a consistent underlying mechanism and thus facilitate causal inference. At a process level, a covariation-based model may account for a predictability effect by postulating a relaxation of the temporal window adopted for parsing the flow of input. A Bayesian account of causal reasoning meanwhile appeals to the idea of delays being modelled as probability distributions. According to this view, temporal predictability is highly unlikely to occur under the causal model $h_0$, where the effect in question is not a consequence of the candidate cause, and regularity instead constitutes evidence in favour of a causal model $h_1$ where the candidates are connected by a causal link.

The primary motivation underlying the experiments is to definitively address what has surprisingly remained something of an oversight in the assessment of cause and effect relations. However, since the outlined theoretical accounts make contrasting predictions, it is evident that a manipulation of temporal predictability has the potential to provide evidence that favours one account over another. Thus, results concerning predictability may also confer some important theoretical insights and reinvigorate the debate between associative and cognitive accounts of causal learning.
Chapter 3 – The Role of Temporal Predictability in Instrumental Causal Learning

3.1 Overview and Introduction

This chapter comprises five experiments intended to investigate the role of temporal predictability in human causal learning. The results constitute evidence in favour of a facilitatory effect of temporal predictability. Discussion within this chapter focuses largely on specific aspects of individual studies, as well as general methodological concerns. Consideration of the wider theoretical implications of the results contained herein shall be withheld until the General Discussion in Chapter 6, where they shall be discussed in light of the theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 2, together with the results of the second empirical section, Chapter 4.

It is evident that temporal predictability (or variability) has the potential to be added as a fourth cue to causality (in addition to temporal order, contiguity, and contingency). A number of perspectives on causal learning have been reviewed, all of which at least allow for the possibility that temporal predictability may play a role in guiding causal impressions. Given that existing empirical data is sparse and ambiguous, and that different theoretical perspectives allow contrasting predictions, this chapter is dedicated to an experimental analysis of the role of temporal predictability on causal inference.

The primary aim of this chapter is to determine whether predictability can influence judgments by contrasting fixed and predictable temporal intervals with variable and unpredictable temporal intervals. The results should inform as to whether predictability enhances causal judgments, in line with a cognitive perspective and the temporal predictability hypothesis, or whether instead variability is preferred, in line with a reductionist approach and a simple associative account. It is also possible that no distinction may be made between predictable and variable causal relations, with contingency and mean overall contiguity remaining the defining principles. If predictability can indeed be identified as a cue to causality, the secondary aim of this chapter is to understand how predictability might interact with the established cues of contingency and contiguity, revealing whether they contribute independent or interactive influences.

For this initial foray into the investigation of temporal predictability in causal learning, it was necessary to use a paradigm where the temporal interval between cause and
effect could be tightly controlled, and in which candidate causes and effects were clearly identifiable as such. Additionally it was considered prudent to avoid any unnecessary complications or distractions by using a very simple and straightforward paradigm, such that temporal distributions of events would be the most salient feature of the problem at hand. The experiments conducted by Shanks, Pearson and Dickinson (1989) proved highly effective in elucidating the role of temporal contiguity in human causal judgment. As a computer-based adaptation of previous free-operant instrumental paradigms such as Wasserman et al.’s (1983) earlier studies, this method allowed for the precise timing of intervals to be specified and a wealth of behavioural data to be easily recorded. The paradigm was used again with success by Reed (1992) and Buehner and May (2003). It was therefore decided to base the initial experiments on a similar paradigm.

3.2 Experiment 1

This first experiment was modelled closely on Shanks et al.’s (1989) original study. In each condition, participants were presented with a triangle on the screen and a button labelled “PRESS” just beneath it. Participants were instructed that their task was to investigate the extent to which their action (clicking on the button) could cause something to happen on a computer screen (the triangle lighting up).

Participants engaged on a free-operant procedure (FOP) meaning that they were free to choose whether and when to respond throughout the duration of the condition. Previous studies have found scheduling of response-outcome contingencies on a FOP to be a highly sensitive and unbiased method of investigating causal learning (Wasserman et al., 1983). However in many such studies, the learning experience is segmented into pre-defined ‘response bins’ or learning trials (for example of 1-second duration). If a response is made during this time bin, then it is reinforced at the end of the period. However, it is of course possible that the participant may respond again during the time between a reinforced response and the consequent outcome. This, and any further responses, would then go unreinforced. Consequently, such a procedure fails when participants respond at a faster rate than that corresponding to the pre-defined bin-size as only the first response within each bin will have the potential to produce an outcome. This was pointed out by Buehner and May (2003) who demonstrated that action-outcome delays in a standard FOP change
\(P(e|c)\) and \(P(e|\neg c)\), so that the actual contingency experienced by the participant is lower on delayed than on immediate conditions. Furthermore, and of crucial importance for scrutinizing the influence of temporal predictability, using this underlying trial structure means that full control over the cause-effect interval cannot be maintained; while trial length can be held constant, a participant may respond at any point during this trial hence the interval between action and outcome may still vary. Wasserman et al.'s third experiment should therefore more accurately be considered as a comparison of low-variability against high-variability, rather than predictability against variability.

To avoid such problems, the experiments in this chapter did not employ pre-defined learning trials or time-bins; instead, every response had the potential to generate an effect, regardless of when it was made. The same response-outcome contingency as used by Shanks et al. (1989) was employed again here: every press of the button had a 75% chance of producing the outcome. If an outcome was scheduled, the effect occurred following the programmed delay. The experimental program enabled the delay to be precisely specified for every pairing of cause and effect, meaning it was possible to manipulate temporal variability and delay across conditions while keeping constant the objective contingencies. Of course, this trial-free instrumental procedure is not free from its own burdens, and one may note that without defined trials there is inherent ambiguity with respect to matching individual responses to individual outcomes. For instance, a participant could perform several responses in quick succession and then observe a corresponding burst of effects after the relevant delay. It would be difficult to match individual responses to specific effects, and this would be amplified when the cause-effect interval is variable. Importantly, however, by allowing each response to produce the effect (without limitations imposed by trial structures) the overall objective contingency will remain unaffected by variations in delay and variability of delay, which is essential to permit these factors to be assessed independently. Whether the subjective impression of contingency (and indeed therefore in this case also causality) remains unaltered by these manipulations is of course a different question altogether, and in fact at the heart of the research reported here.

The experiment employed two mean delays, two and four seconds, and three different types of temporal predictability. The first was a fixed, pre-determined delay that remained constant throughout a given condition, and thus constituted maximal
predictability. However, most natural causal relations rarely involve precise and perfectly predictable cause-effect delays. Epidemiologists, for instance have long postulated that disease outbreak follows infection after an incubation period described by a log-normal distribution (Evans, 1993) centred around a mean expected wait time. Consequently, the second level of temporal predictability sampled cause-effect intervals from a normally-distributed probability density function, centred around a midpoint corresponding to one of the fixed intervals (see Method below for more detail). Finally, as a maximally uncertain control, a uniform random distribution was employed, where the delay could take any value within a pre-defined range, with an equal probability of taking any particular value. Importantly, these manipulations are distinct from Experiment 3 of Wasserman et al. (1983); rather than restricting intervals to a small set of fixed values, I instead allowed intervals to vary freely across a continuum.

Most real-world causal relations are assessed against a background of alternative causes. For instance, whilst an illness may be the cause of a headache, a headache could also potentially arise as a result of stress, tiredness, or dehydration. Identifying the crucial relation from other spurious connections is a fundamental part of the induction process. In order to preserve ecological validity in this respect, I also introduced three different levels of background effects to the paradigm. This was done by scheduling the effect to occur a pre-defined number of times, independently of the participant’s action, at random points in time during the condition.

3.2.1 Method

3.2.1.1 Participants

31 undergraduate students with a median and modal age of 19 years were recruited via an online participation panel hosted at Cardiff University. They received either £4 payment or partial course credit for participation.

3.2.1.2 Design

The experiment manipulated three factors – temporal distribution, background effects, and delay. Temporal distribution had the levels fixed, normal, and random; background effects had the levels zero, low, and high; delay had the levels 2 and 4 seconds. Factorial combination of these levels resulted in a $3 \times 3 \times 2$ within-subjects design, producing 18 different conditions each of 90s duration.
The probability of an outcome following an action, \( P(e|c) \), was .75 throughout all conditions. Note that this probability was not defined relative to a particular unit of time; instead, each button press had a 75% chance of causing the triangle to flash. If an event was generated, the effect then occurred after the appropriate temporal interval had elapsed.

The three types of temporal distribution provided a manipulation of predictability by controlling the variation of the temporal intervals in each condition. The interval for any given action-outcome pairing was determined according to the particular combination of delay and temporal distribution. In the fixed conditions, the temporal interval was always the same, held at a constant value within the condition (i.e. 2 or 4 seconds). These values then served as “midpoints” for the comparable normal and random conditions. For the random conditions, the temporal interval for any given cause-effect pair was given by generating a random value within the specified range. So for example in the ‘Random2’ condition, the interval could take any value between 0 and 4 seconds, with any value equally as likely to occur as another. For the normal conditions, the delay was specified according to a normal probability distribution with a range of 4 seconds, centred around the midpoint. So for example in the ‘Normal4’ condition, interval lengths were drawn from a normal distribution centred around 4 seconds, with minima and maxima of 2 and 6 seconds. Accordingly values closer towards the midpoint of 4 seconds were more likely than values towards the extreme boundaries of 2 and 6 seconds. Thus, the delay variance for normal conditions should be smaller with respect to the random conditions.

In addition, three levels of non-contingent ‘background’ effects were employed, where the outcome occurred independently of the response. As a baseline, I first applied a zero rate of background effects – the effect did not occur in the absence of the cause and \( P(e|\neg c) = 0. \) In addition I created a medium rate, equivalent to 1 effect every 10 seconds, and a high rate equivalent to 1 every 5 seconds. With a total condition time of 90s, this gave 9 and 18 background effects in total for the medium and high levels respectively, which were distributed randomly throughout the condition.
Two questions were used as dependent measures to gauge participants’ impressions of causal strength. One was based on a covariational understanding of causality couched within a counterfactual question:

“Imagine you had pressed the button 100 times in this condition. How many of these 100 presses would have caused the triangle to light up?”

The other was slightly more ambiguous and was aimed to appeal to the degree of perceived control beyond pure covariation:

“Overall, to what extent do you feel pressing the button controlled the triangle lighting up in this condition?”

Participants provided a rating between 0 and 100 for both questions.

3.2.1.3 Apparatus, Materials and Procedure

The experiment was programmed in Python 2.4 and conducted on Apple Macintosh computers situated in individual testing booths. Participants used the mouse to click on the “PRESS” button, and used the keyboard to type in their responses at the end of each condition. After being welcomed by the experimenter and giving consent to participate, participants read on-screen instructions which outlined the nature of the task.
In each condition, a triangle was presented in the centre of the screen, along with a button that participants were able to press, by clicking on it with the mouse. If a response triggered an outcome, the triangle lit up for 250ms. Participants engaged in 18 different free-operant procedures as described above, presented in a random order, with each condition lasting 90 seconds. At the end of each, the screen cleared and participants were asked to respond to the two questions described previously. Participants then typed in their answers into the appropriate text box and clicked on the SUBMIT button to proceed to the next condition. In total the experiment lasted around 35 minutes.

3.2.2 Results

3.2.2.1 Causal Judgments

Two different questions were posed at the end of each condition, intending to try and capture fully all aspects of the participants’ causal impressions. The ‘contingency’ question is a well-established measure that has been used in many previous studies (Shanks et al., 1989; Wasserman et al., 1983). The ‘control’ question meanwhile was rather more ambiguous, which may propel participants to take temporal information into account in providing their rating, and thus may provide a more useful measure for capturing any influence of predictability. Accordingly it seems appropriate to focus initially on this latter measure. Figure 3 shows mean ratings provided by participants for the ‘control’ question, for all 18 conditions. For clarity, error bars are omitted; standard deviations can however be found in Table 3.1. As expected, ratings were considerably higher in the shorter-delay compared to the longer-delay conditions. Also in accordance with previous findings, ratings declined as the rate of background effects increased. The effect of temporal predictability, which is the factor of principal interest, is less immediately apparent. It can however be seen that the fixed conditions consistently received higher causal ratings than their normal and randomly distributed counterparts, while there appeared to be little difference between the two distributed conditions.

A 3×2×3 within-subjects repeated-measures ANOVA corroborated these impressions, finding significant main effects of temporal distribution, $F(2,60) = 3.373$, $MSE = 611.2, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .101$; delay, $F(1,30) = 20.91$, $MSE = 729.9, p < .0005, \eta^2_p = .411$; and background effects $F(2,60) = 27.49$, $MSE = 792.5, p < .0005, \eta^2_p = .478$. Since it was hypothesized that fixed interval conditions would draw higher ratings than their
variable counterparts, Helmert contrasts, which compare each level of a categorical variable to the mean of the subsequent levels, were performed to compare the fixed conditions with the normal and random conditions combined. These planned comparisons confirmed that fixed interval conditions \( (M = 52.70, SE = 1.933) \) received significantly higher ratings than variable interval conditions \( (M = 46.95, SE = 1.269) \), \( F(1,30) = 4.984, MSE = 1235, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .142 \), while in turn there was no significant difference between normal and random conditions, \( F(1,30) = 0.050, MSE = 798.4, p = .825 \). None of the possible interactions were significant.

![Figure 3.2: Mean Control Ratings for all conditions in Experiment 1 as a function of background effects. Filled and unfilled symbols refer to mean delays of 2s and 4s respectively. Delay variability is noted by different symbol and line styles. Error bars are omitted for clarity.](image)

Participants’ ratings for the ‘contingency’ question followed the a similar pattern as for the ‘control’ question, with significant main effects for temporal distribution, \( F(2,60) = 3.851, MSE = 557.5, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .114 \), delay, \( F(1,30) = 20.84, MSE = 679.6, p < .0005, \eta_p^2 = .410 \), and background effects \( F(2,60) = 12.57, MSE = 556.6, p < .0005, \eta_p^2 = .295 \). Of all the possible interactions, only that between delay and background effects was
marginally significant, $F(1,30) = 3.077$, $MSE = 523.6$, $p = 0.053$, $\eta^2_p = .093$. Further analysis of this interaction by examining simple main effects revealed a significant contrast in the differences between zero and high levels of background effects at short and long delays, $F(1,30) = 5.007$, $MSE = 598.0$, $p < 0.05$, $\eta^2_p = .143$, and a marginally significant contrast in the differences between zero and medium levels of background effects at short and long delays, $F(1,30) = 4.062$, $MSE = 845.7$, $p = 0.053$, $\eta^2_p = .119$. Using Figure 3.3 as a reference, this would seem to indicate that broadly speaking, the influence of background effects on contingency ratings was rather more muted at longer delays compared to short delays. Aside from this interaction, participants apparently made little distinction between the two dependent measures, with both eliciting similar responses. Indeed inspection of the raw data revealed that they were treated as identical by considerable proportion of participants, with scores matched in over a third of the total cases. It was therefore decided to employ only a single dependent measure in subsequent experiments.

![Figure 3.3](image-url)

*Figure 3.3:* Mean Contingency Ratings for all conditions in Experiment 1 as a function of background effects. Filled and unfilled symbols refer to mean delays of 2s and 4s respectively. Delay variability is noted by different symbol and line styles. Error bars are omitted for clarity.
3.2.2.2 Instrumental Behaviour and Outcome Patterns

Table 3.1 shows the behavioural data from the first experiment, for each of the 18 conditions. This includes response rate (i.e. mean presses per minute) within each condition, and the corresponding rate of effects (outcome density). The experienced $P(e|c)$ is also shown, calculated as the proportion of responses that generated an effect (ignoring background effects), for each participant in each condition. The mean interval between cause and effect was likewise computed, and is shown with the standard deviation, as an indication of temporal interval variance, in parentheses. In addition the mean ratings provided for the contingency and control questions are also reported, again with standard deviations in parentheses.

While the number of responses produced is fairly consistent across conditions, it appears that conditions without background effects produced the highest response rates in general, while the ‘Random4’ conditions (random distribution, 4 second delay) received lower response rates. If for some reason different conditions are producing different response rates in participants, then the effect of this manipulation may not be directly upon causal rating but instead mediated through changes in response (and subsequent outcome) density. It was thus necessary to verify whether the independent variables influenced ratings indirectly by exerting an effect on behaviour. In addition, some fluctuations in the actual delay and $P(e|c)$ from the programmed values are also expected; while these were assumed to eventually cancel out throughout the course of each condition (and certainly across participants) it is possible that differences between conditions could remain and be driving any observed differences in causal ratings.

To address these concerns, $3 \times 2 \times 3$ within-subjects repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out on the data derived from participants’ instrumental behaviour. Due to a small number of participants responding at a very high rate, the distribution of data for response and outcome rate is positively skewed; hence response rates were normalized by taking the square root. No significant effects of temporal distribution, $F(2, 60) = 0.456$, $MSE = 1.536, p = .636$, delay, $F(1,30) = 0.003, MSE = 1.813$, or background effects, $F(2,60) = 2.326, MSE = 1.633$, were found on response rate. There was however a significant distribution $\times$ delay interaction, $F(1,30) = 3.578, MSE = 1.193, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .123$, specifically that for normal conditions, response rate was higher with shorter delays.
while for random conditions this pattern was reversed. However since this interaction did not involve a systematic difference in overall response rates between fixed and variable conditions, it is not problematic for the principal findings. Meanwhile, mean delay naturally differed between different delay conditions, but was not significantly affected by either temporal distribution or background effects (both $ps > .3$). Actual $P(e|c)$ was also unaffected by all three independent variables (all $ps > .1$). Participants’ causal judgments were therefore not impacted by uncontrolled differences in instrumental behaviour or deviations from programmed values.

Table 3.1: Behavioural Data for Experiment 1. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
3.2.3 Discussion

The results of this experiment replicate well-established findings that a) in the absence of delay expectations, cause-effect delays are detrimental to learning and b) adding non-contingent background effects, thus reducing contingency by inflating the proportion of $e|\neg c$ (cell C in Figure 1.2) likewise reduces causal ratings. This instils confidence in the reliability of the paradigm. Of central interest, however, was the influence of temporal predictability. The analyses confirmed that conditions with fixed temporal intervals received the highest causal ratings, suggesting that enhancing predictability by holding the cause-effect interval constant facilitated attribution, in line with predictions derived from top-down theories of causal learning.

These effects of predictability do not appear to be obscured by non-contingent background effects, as evidenced from a lack of an interaction between predictability and level of background effects. This is perhaps surprising since if a non-contingent outcome occurs between the cause and its generated effect, then a different (shorter) interval between response and outcome will be experienced objectively, which should disrupt the impression of predictability. However, since the free-operant procedure allows for responses at any time, subjects are able to make several responses in succession, from which a consistent delay may well become evident. Noncontingent effects that subsequently intervene between the cause and a generated effect should then be correctly attributed to background processes. One might then ask, if participants were able to connect causes with their effects, why judgments were adversely affected by increasing background effects. To address this question, it should be remembered that causal judgments tend not to be solely based on $P(e|c)$, but instead on normative measures of contingency that take the base rate into account. The fact that the outcome occurs independently of the response will thus reduce the contingency, even if contingent outcomes are correctly attributed to the candidate cause (by inflating the value of cell C). The marginally significant interaction between delay and background effects meanwhile is a finding that has not previously been reported with any real emphasis in the literature. Specifically, this indicated that causal ratings were less affected by the level at background effects when delays were long compared to when delays were short, and only when contingency ratings were solicited. This is potentially interesting and further research might wish to further explore whether
this is a systematic effect or merely an anomaly. This result is however not in any way problematic for the findings regarding predictability, and is largely irrelevant to the central focus of interest, so will not be considered in more detail here.

While the fixed conditions clearly attracted the highest ratings, no distinction was obtained between the normal (intermediate variability) and random (high variability) conditions. Arguably, normally-distributed delays could have been expected to elicit higher ratings than their uniformly-distributed random counterparts, due to the smaller variability of delay in the former compared to the latter (as reported in Table 3.1). One possible suggestion for this failure to find a significant difference is that the large number of experimental conditions made it more difficult to distinguish one from another and thus contributed to noise within the data. A more substantial explanation is that the normal and random conditions were much more similar to each other than either was to the fixed conditions. While the fixed conditions had no variability of delay, for the two distributed conditions, there was a maximum range of four seconds within which the effect could occur following a reinforced response, the only difference between these two being the likelihood of the effect occurring at a particular point within this range. Rather than increasing or decreasing the temporal range within which an effect could occur, I varied the probability distribution according to which any given temporal interval was determined. Although the variance of the delay was greater for random than normal conditions (Table 3.1), the maximum range of interval variability was the same for each. It therefore seems an appropriate next step to investigate the effect of modifying temporal predictability by varying the size of the interval range. Will an increase in interval variability, and concomitant unpredictability, lead to a corresponding decline in causal evaluations? Experiments 2A and 2B sought to address this question.

3.3 Experiment 2A

Experiment 1 has demonstrated that maximally predictable conditions where the temporal interval between cause and effect is fixed and constant elicit stronger judgments of causality, relative to less predictable, variable conditions with the same average delay. What has to be demonstrated clearly however is whether an increase in the variability of the temporal intervals in a causal relationship produces a corresponding decrease in the
evaluation of causal strength. As I already pointed out, the contrast of two differently shaped distributions, where delays were distributed either normally or uniformly, but still centred around the same mean, may not have produced sufficient differences in experience to produce different impressions of causality. Experiment 2A thus sought to implement differences in the degree of predictability by varying the range over which intervals could vary, rather than the type of distribution from which they are drawn. If, as the results of Experiment 1 suggest, predictability enhances causal judgments, then conditions with fixed intervals should once again receive the highest ratings. Furthermore, if impressions of causality decline as predictability is lost, then judgments should decline as the range of temporal intervals increases.

A number of improvements were made to the paradigm. Firstly, only a single question was deployed as a dependent measure of perceived causal effectiveness. Experiment 1 found no systematic differences between the two measures used in that study, so the focus on one question is economical both in terms of participant time and analysis. Secondly, since Experiment 1 showed that the addition of random non-contingent outcomes (while producing the expected main effect) had no interaction with either delay or predictability, the independent factor of background effects was removed, thus reducing the number of experimental conditions to six. Thirdly, I increased the time participants could learn about each causal relation from 90 to 120s, comparable to earlier studies (Shanks et al., 1989). Experiment 1 employed a shorter exposure time merely to prevent participant fatigue when working through such a large number of conditions. Having streamlined the number of conditions in this study, it seemed reasonable then to increase exposure time.

3.3.1 Method

3.3.1.1 Participants
42 undergraduate students from Cardiff University were recruited via an online participation panel. Participants included both males and females, with a median and modal age of 19 years. Course credit was awarded for participation. Due to an experimenter error, one participant did not receive the correct materials and was dropped from the sample. One further participant failed to comply with the instructions and was removed from the analysis. 40 participants thus contributed data to the sample.
3.3.1.2 Design

Two independent variables were manipulated – mean programmed delay and range of temporal interval values. In similar fashion to the “random” conditions in Experiment 1, the value of a temporal interval on any given cause-effect pairing could take any value within the defined range, with uniform probability across the range. Interval range was thus a manipulation of the level of temporal predictability – the wider the range of temporal interval values, the greater the variation in the value that a temporal interval could take on any one particular cause-effect instance, and thus the greater the variability of temporal intervals throughout the experimental condition.

Delay had two levels, 3s and 6s. Range had three values: 0s, which meant that there was no variation in the temporal intervals and the delay was fixed throughout the condition; 3s, which meant the temporal interval on a given cause-effect instance could take any value within a range of 3s about the mean delay, or in other words 1.5s either side of this central midpoint; and 6s, which meant temporal intervals could take any value within 3s either side of the programmed mean delay. These were combined factorially to produce 6 different conditions, each of which was experienced by every participant, producing a 2×3 within-subjects design. As an example, in the 3s-range 3s-delay condition, cause-effect intervals could take on any value between 1.5 and 4.5s. The six conditions are represented diagrammatically in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Diagram illustrating the combination of the levels Delay and Range to produce the six experimental conditions in Experiment 2A.
3.3.1.3 Apparatus, materials & procedure

The experiment was run on an Apple “Mac Mini” running Windows XP and Python 2.4.1, with a 17” LCD display. The basic perceptual experience for participants was virtually identical to that from Experiment 1, except that condition time was extended to 120s, and that I opted to use only a single dependent measure: “On a scale of 0-100, how effective was pressing the button at causing the triangle to light up?” The experiment took approximately 15 minutes to complete.

3.3.2 Results & Discussion

3.3.2.1 Causal Ratings

The mean causal ratings for Experiment 2A are shown in Figure 3.5. There is a clear separation between delays of 3s and 6s, with the more contiguous conditions receiving higher causal ratings. There also appears to be a general trend for predictability. While there appears to have been no discernible influence of interval range for short-delay conditions, with a longer mean delay causal ratings appear to decline in linear fashion as temporal interval range is increased and predictability is reduced. This is suggestive of an interaction between delay and predictability such that where inter-event delays are longer, predictability becomes more important.

A 2×3 within-subjects ANOVA obtained the expected significant main effect of delay $F(1,39) = 19.57$, $p < .0005$, $MSE = 386.9$, $\eta^2_p = .334$. However, contrary to my predictions, there was no significant effect of interval range, $F(2,78) = 1.759$, $p = .179$, $MSE = 426.6$, $\eta^2_p = .043$. Surprisingly given the trend in ratings in Figure 3.5, the interaction between delay and range was also not significant, $F(2,78) = 1.548$, $p = .219$, $MSE = 472.6$. The linear component of the main effect of predictability was however marginally significant, $F(1,39) = 4.005$, $p = .052$, $MSE = 374.7$, $\eta^2_p = .093$. 
Figure 3.5: Mean Causal Ratings from Experiment 2A as a function of temporal interval range. Different symbol and line styles represent different delays. Error bars show standard errors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>delay</th>
<th>range of temporal intervals</th>
<th>0s</th>
<th>3s</th>
<th>6s</th>
<th>0s</th>
<th>3s</th>
<th>6s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3s</td>
<td>0s</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>32.775</td>
<td>27.025</td>
<td>28.89744</td>
<td>27.575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6s</td>
<td>0s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6s</td>
<td>0s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Behavioural Data for Experiment 2A. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
3.3.2.2 Behavioural Data

Table 3.2 summarizes the behavioural data for Experiment 2A. Once again to verify that behavioural variance is not a confounding influence on causal ratings, the effect of the independent variables on response rates was analyzed using a $2 \times 3$ within subjects ANOVA. There was a marginally significant effect of delay on response rate, $F(1,39) = 3.887, p = .056, \text{MSE} = 876.1, \eta^2_p = .091$, driven by slightly higher rates of responding in the short-delay conditions. There was no significant effect of temporal interval range, $F(2,78) = 1.066, p = .349, \text{MSE} = 690.8$, and no significant delay $\times$ range interaction, $F(2,78) = .186, p = .831, \text{MSE} = 831.9$. Response rates were therefore largely unaffected by these manipulations. In any case, the correlation between response rate and causal rating was found to be non-significant, $r = -.098, n = 240, p = .129$. Variance in causal ratings is therefore not attributable to fluctuations in responding. $P(e|c)$ was again constant across conditions, with none of the expected small fluctuations resulting in this value differing significantly from the programmed 0.75 level (all $p$s > .1). Likewise mean temporal interval did not differ significantly between conditions matched for delay (all $p$s > .05).

3.2.3 Discussion

The anticipated facilitatory effect of temporal predictability failed to convincingly materialize in the current study. One possibility why the manipulation of interval range failed to produce reliable effects on causal judgments could be that the cause-effect contingency was too easily detectable. In contrast to Experiment 1, all background effects were removed from this task. Therefore participants did not experience effects occurring independently of their actions. All they needed to do was withhold their responding for an extended period of time to quickly realize that the effect did not occur without them pressing the button, and conclude that therefore they were in full control over the occurrence of the outcome. Not only then did they not experience any non-contingent conditions situations where they lacked control, but the same response-outcome contingency was present for all situations. Previous studies (Shanks et al., 1989; Wasserman et al., 1983) examined a range of contingencies including non-contingent conditions. Experiencing different degrees of causal control could be key to participants distinguishing between conditions and making more extensive use of temporal cues in their
causal decision. In the short-delay conditions, participants may easily have been able to detect that they have full control over the outcome occurrence and then further detect the similar pattern of response-outcome covariation across conditions. They thus would have had less need to take account of temporal cues and instead base their decision solely on contingency information (meanwhile the lack of contiguity in longer-delay conditions means that this information remains difficult to discern). This issue could potentially be addressed by re-introducing a set level of background effects for all conditions to demonstrate that the effect may happen independently of the participant’s own action. Alternatively, the task could include non-contingent conditions in which responding is ineffective and outcomes occur according to some predefined schedule, so participants experience both situations where they have control, and no control.

To summarize the principal findings from this study, short-delay conditions tended to attract higher causal ratings compared to the less contiguous conditions, and did not appear to differ from one another when predictability was varied. In contrast, in the long-delay conditions, judgments appeared to decline as predictability was decreased, with the long-delay low-predictability condition receiving by far the lowest mean causal rating. Thus despite the fact that the main effect of temporal interval variability was not statistically significant in this case, there does seem to be a general trend that accords with the findings in Experiment 1. The suggestion is that refining the paradigm to be more sensitive may provide more informative results and help to elicit the precise effect of temporal predictability.

3.3 Experiment 2B

The previous experiment implemented variations in the degree of predictability by modifying the range over which intervals could vary, rather than the type of distribution from which they were drawn. It was anticipated that increasing interval range, thus entailing decreasing temporal predictability, would produce concomitant declines in causal judgments. Although an inspection of Figure 3.5 suggests this may have been the case for longer delays, the effect on shorter delays was minimal and increasing interval range was not a statistically significant effect. This casts some doubt on the apparent facilitatory effect of predictability obtained in the first experiment. Further investigation is thus required.
Previous studies in the literature included either non-contingent conditions where $P(e|c) = P(e|\neg c)$ (Shanks et al., 1989; Wasserman et al., 1983) or non-contingent conditions where outcomes were predetermined and responding was ineffective (Reed, 1993; Shanks & Dickinson, 1991). Both manipulations guarantee that participants will experience situations where the outcome occurs independently of their actions, creating an element of uncertainty as to whether an outcome that occurs is due to their action or to alternate causes. Experiment 2A lacked conditions such as these and therefore may have made the task trivial. Participants may all too easily have been able to recognize that they were the only active causal agent, and thus work out the response-outcome contingency without having to make use of other available cues such as temporal information – particularly since $P(e|c)$ was constant across conditions. If instead an element of uncertainty is created as to the causal status of the participant’s action, then other potential cues may be more useful, and so more effectively demonstrate the role of predictability.

It was decided that one of these approaches to adding element of uncertainty must be adopted in order to ensure that the task is not trivial. Having already examined the influence of background effects in the first experiment, I instead introduced non-contingent conditions using a yoking technique. Specifically, outcome sequences that were generated from the performance of participants during the previous experiment were played back to participants in the current experiment. In these conditions, the action of pressing the button had no causal efficacy itself and the effects that occurred were therefore non-contingent upon the current participant’s behaviour. Reed (1993) previously used a yoking technique in which participants own performance on previous conditions was played back to them in subsequent non-contingent conditions. Here, yoking to outcome patterns from the previous experiment, rather than to participants’ own behaviour in the current experiment, was preferred for two reasons. Firstly, yoking to one’s own behaviour places considerable restriction on the ordering of conditions, since a yoked condition cannot be presented until a participant has worked through the corresponding master condition. Secondly, it is very possible that participants might notice that the same outcome stream they previously generated is being played back to them, particularly if they are responding in a structured way (such as using response bursts or specific patterns of responding), and this would therefore make the task trivial.
3.3.1 Method

3.3.1.1 Participants

60 undergraduate students from Cardiff University, with a median and modal age of 20 years, were recruited via an online participation panel. Either £4 payment or partial course credit was awarded for participation.

3.3.1.2 Design

The experiment adopted a $3 \times 2 \times 2$ fully within-subjects design. The factors delay and range remained from Experiment 2A with the same levels, and a third factor, condition, was introduced, with levels master and yoked. The six master conditions were identical to the six conditions presented in Experiment 2A, by combining all levels of delay and range in the same manner. In these conditions, a response from the participant generated an outcome according to the same probability of 0.75 as for the previous experiment, with the response-outcome interval likewise determined in the same manner. The six yoked conditions meanwhile served as noncontingent control conditions, in which responding was ineffective in influencing the outcome pattern. The presentation of outcomes in these conditions was instead yoked to the outcome sequence generated from the performance of participants during Experiment 2A. Each new participant in the current experiment was paired randomly (with replacement) with a participant in the previous experiment. The outcome patterns generated by the previous participant during the six conditions in Experiment 2A (which were identical to the master conditions here) were then simply played back in the corresponding yoked conditions. To ensure that the outcome sequence during the yoked conditions was comparable with that during the master conditions, only those participants whose outcome rates were in the second and third quartiles were made available for the yoking procedure; participants with extremely low or high outcome rates were not included.

Factorial combination of range, delay and condition in a $3 \times 2 \times 2$ within-subjects design produced twelve different conditions. The first condition presented was always a master condition, and counterbalancing across participants determined which of the six conditions was selected as the first. The remaining conditions were then presented in random order.
3.3.1.3 Apparatus, Materials & Procedure

The experiment took place in a large computer lab. Participants were tested in small groups, seated in a quiet area of the lab to work on the task. Each participant used a PC running Windows XP and Python version 2.4.1, with a 19” LCD widescreen display. The paradigm was a straightforward adaptation from the previous study, with the visual appearance in terms of size and shape of stimuli and the speed of stimulus presentation consistent with Experiment 1. The basic experience for participants was thus virtually identical to that from Experiment 1, except that condition time was extended to 120s, and that I opted to use only a single dependent measure: “On a scale of 0-100, how effective was pressing the button at causing the triangle to light up?” As in the previous experiment, participants used the mouse to click on the button and the keyboard to type in responses. The experiment took approximately 15 minutes to complete.

3.3.2 Results

3.3.2.1 Causal Ratings

Figure 3.6 shows mean causal ratings for Experiment 2B. Firstly, there is a very clear distinction between ratings for the master and the yoked conditions, with the master conditions receiving significantly higher ratings as expected, $F(1,59) = 114.2$, $MSE = 1270$, $p < .0005$, $\eta^2_p = .659$. This indicates that participants had little difficulty in correctly distinguishing the contingent and non-contingent causal relations within the experimental set. The yoked conditions themselves all appear to have elicited very similar, low causal ratings, as expected, since there is no connection between response and outcome. The fact that ratings are above zero is likely attributable to the occasional random coincidence of participants responses with the pre-programmed outcomes, or a reluctance to endorse ratings at the extreme end of the scale.

Of primary interest, however, are the master conditions, where delay and delay variability actually affected the timing of outcome following responses. Accordingly, subsequent analysis of ratings shall focus on these conditions alone. As can be seen in Figure 3.6, judgments of causal effectiveness declined as a function of increasing interval range (and thus temporal uncertainty), with an ANOVA confirming a significant linear relationship, $F(1,59) = 10.97$, $MSE = 651$, $p < .005$, $\eta^2 = .157$. The effect of delay is also immediately apparent, with short-delay conditions receiving uniformly higher ratings than
the long-delay, $F(1,59) = 14.07$, $MSE = 590.4$, $p < .0005$, $\eta_p^2 = .193$, in line with Experiment 1 and prior research. There was no significant interaction between range and delay, $F(2,118) = 0.186$, $MSE = 444.2$, $p = .830$. Planned comparisons found that conditions with fixed intervals ($M = 57.06$, $SE = 2.860$) received significantly higher ratings than both the maximally-variable conditions ($M = 46.15$, $SE = 2.683$), $t(119) = 3.553$, $p < .01$, and the intermediate-variability conditions ($M = 49.22$, $SE = 2.530$), $t(119) = 2.524$, $p < .05$, which in turn did not differ significantly from each other, $t(119) = 1.053$, $p = .294$.

Figure 3.6: Mean Causal Ratings from Experiment 2B as a function of interval range. Filled and unfilled symbols refer to master and yoked conditions respectively. Mean delays are noted by different symbol and line styles.

3.3.2.2 Instrumental Behaviour and Outcome Patterns

Table 3.3 shows the behavioural data for the six master conditions in Experiment 2B. $3 \times 2$ within-subjects ANOVAs found that actual $P(e|c)$ remained unaffected significantly by either range or delay (both $ps > .5$) and mean experienced delay was also unaffected by range, $F(2,118) = 0.319$, $MSE = 7.021$, $p = .727$. This provides assurance that
the programmed manipulations delivered the appropriate event streams to participants. Response rates (normalized by taking square root) were not significantly influenced by range, \( F(2,118) = 0.456, \, MSE = 1.918, \, p = .635 \); however there was a significant effect on response rate of delay, \( F(1,59) = 5.197, \, MSE = 1.609, \, p < .05, \, \eta^2_p = 0.088 \). An inspection of Table 3.3 suggests that response rate was slightly lower in the long-delay conditions; this is in line with previous reports (e.g. Shanks et al., 1989).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>delay</th>
<th>2s</th>
<th>3s</th>
<th>6s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean response rate (limin)</td>
<td>21.83</td>
<td>19.06</td>
<td>19.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean outcome rate (limin)</td>
<td>16.31</td>
<td>14.04</td>
<td>14.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actual ( P(e</td>
<td>c) )</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean actual delay (ms)</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>2968</td>
<td>2993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean causal rating</td>
<td>60.92</td>
<td>54.63</td>
<td>51.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Behavioural Data for Experiment 2B. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

### 3.3.3 Discussion

Experiment 2B has therefore provided a clear illustration that temporally predictable cause-effect relations are perceived as more causal compared to variable and unpredictable relations. Furthermore, increasing temporal variability within unpredictable relations results in a corresponding linear decrease in causal judgments. This is the first time, as far as I am aware, that this finding has been obtained in a free-operant response-outcome learning task. It would appear, therefore, that these results are more in line with a structural or model-based account of causal judgment, and problematic for associative perspectives on causal learning and a reductionist account.
However, these results need not altogether be incompatible with comparable findings from reinforcement learning; there remains an alternative explanation that must be explored. Drawing on the wider literature on learning and memory, it has been widely reported that the progression of learning is highly dependent on the type of training or practice undergone. In particular with regard to motor learning and skill acquisition, researchers have compared constant practice, where participants practice using a consistent set of materials and skills, with variable practice, where performance takes place in a variety of different conditions. Constant practice generally produces better performance in the short term, whereas variable practice leads to better retention in the long run (Gluck, Mercado, & Myers, 2008). Thus although learning under consistent conditions may initially result in more rapid acquisition, over time, variable conditions result in the formation of stronger associations. According to Schmidt (1975), variations in practice of a motor skill result in superior learning which is demonstrated by better ability to transfer the skill to different contexts. Wulf and Schmidt (1997) for example found that performance on a continuous pursuit tracking task in transfer tests with novel scaling was generally enhanced by variable compared to constant practice. Until fairly recently though, there has been little interest in whether this finding generalizes to higher level cognitive tasks. However, Goode, Geraci and Roediger (2008) investigated the effects of constant versus variable practice on performance with the verbal priming task of anagram solution. The results from this study showed that although initially a greater proportion of anagrams were correctly solved following constant rather than variable practice, by the third practice session this trend had reversed.

Thus, there is converging evidence from a range of learning paradigms and contexts for a facilitatory effect of variability, provided enough learning time is provided. Of course, causal or contingency learning is very different from motor skill acquisition. Nonetheless, inspiration may be taken from this literature to explore the possibility of an analogous role of temporal variability with respect to causal learning. Specifically, I shall acknowledge the possibility that learning may reach asymptote faster with consistent temporal intervals compared to variable ones, and hence the apparent advantage conferred by temporal predictability may simply be due to learning having failed to reach asymptote for the variable conditions in the time provided. If this is indeed the case, this short-term advantage
for predictability may then disappear over enough learning trials, and even be reversed in the long run.

In contrast, a computational perspective might instead suggest that, if anything, temporal predictability may have more of an impact as learning progresses: Increasing learning time is likely to enhance any potential temporal contribution to a mental computation of causality, since more temporal information becomes available over extended learning periods. Moreover, temporal predictability is only capable of exerting an influence when an observer experiences multiple intervals. The more cause-effect intervals a reasoner experiences during a learning period, the greater the total amount of variation that may be experienced, and the more apparent a distinction between a predictable, fixed relation and a variable, unpredictable relation may become. I endeavoured to examine these two opposing hypotheses in the following experiment.

3.4 Experiment 3

Experiments 1 and 2B have clearly demonstrated a facilitatory effect of temporal predictability in causal learning. However, a possible consideration in the interpretation of these results is that the rate of acquisition may differ with temporally predictable conditions compared to temporally variable conditions. Variable-interval causal relations may take longer to discover but may then lead to formation of a stronger associative bond, and thus prove more resilient to extinction. If enough learning time is provided, then it might be expected that judgments of causal strength for temporally variable causal relations should match or even exceed those for temporally predictable conditions.

To address this possibility, the following study set out to investigate the potential influence of the learning time provided in each experimental condition on the effect of temporal predictability in a free-operant causal learning experiment. If, as might be suggested by associative accounts, the effect of predictability observed thus far is merely a failure of learning to reach asymptote, then increasing condition time should bring causal ratings for variable conditions in line with predictable conditions. Accordingly in the following experiment, condition duration was introduced as a factor by adding conditions lasting double the length of time as those in previous experiments (that is, four rather than two minutes) and contrasting conditions with different durations. If the ‘failure to reach
asymptote' argument holds, some reduction of the difference between predictable and variable temporal relations should be obtained for the four-minute conditions with respect to the two-minute conditions. The variable conditions may even be judged as more causal if in fact variability leads to the formation of stronger associations (provided enough learning time is allowed), as might be suggested from the literature on variability of practice. The experiment will thus serve as a sterner test of the influence of temporal predictability.

3.4.1 Method

3.4.1.1 Participants

33 undergraduate psychology students based at Cardiff University, with a median and modal age of 19 years, were recruited via an online participation panel, and received partial course credit for completing the experiment.

3.4.1.2 Design

This experiment introduced exposure time (to each condition) as an additional factor. Two levels of this factor were applied; 2 minutes, to be consistent with experiments thus far and attempt to replicate the findings; and 4 minutes, which by doubling the sampling opportunity should provide ample time for participants to fully investigate, discover and make a judgment on any causal relationship that might exist. Delay and range were retained as factors, although to simplify and condense the experiment, I removed the 'intermediate' level of temporal interval range (3s). This gave two levels of range, 0s (fixed and maximally predictable) and 6s (variable and maximally unpredictable), while the two levels of mean delay remained at 3s and 6s. Combination of all three factors produced 8 different conditions, all of which were experienced by each participant, thus providing a 2×2×2 fully within-subjects design. The condition that was experienced first by each participant was pre-determined by counterbalancing across participants; all remaining conditions occurred in random order. Participants provided causal ratings from 0-100 at the end of each condition as the dependent measure.

In order to add a degree of difficulty to the task and avoid making the contingency too apparent, a steady rate of non-contingent background effects was applied to each condition. This was equivalent to one every ten seconds, and each effect could occur at any point within a given ten second segment (i.e. the first background effect could occur somewhere between 0-10s, the next between 10-20s and so on). Of course, yoked
conditions could instead have been again implemented, as for Experiment 2B, but given that this experiment had eight master conditions, it seemed that matching each of these with a non-contingent condition would be somewhat uneconomical, and a more streamlined experiment would be less tedious for participants.

3.4.1.3 Apparatus, materials & procedure

The experiment was conducted in a small computer lab, using identical apparatus as for Experiment 2, and was once again developed and run using the Python programming language. Participants were tested in small groups, seated at individual workstations which were screened off from each other. The paradigm and procedure were identical to those of the previous experiments, using the same visual stimuli and layout, with only the key differences described above, and corresponding modifications to the instructions informing participants that they would experience conditions of different durations.

3.4.2 Results

3.4.2.1 Causal Ratings

Figure 3.7 summarizes the results from Experiment 3. As can be clearly seen, there is once again a noticeable influence of interval range, with a decline in ratings evident with all bar one of the temporally-variable conditions compared to the corresponding temporally-predictable conditions with the same combination of delay and condition time, and an overall significant main effect of range, \( F(1,32) = 6.134, \text{MSE} = 571.4, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .161 \). Delay also again has an immediately apparent influence, with the 3s conditions receiving significantly higher ratings than 6s conditions, \( F(1,32) = 5.152, \text{MSE} = 823, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .139 \). Of central interest in this experiment, it can be seen that there is no significant influence of the duration of the experimental conditions, \( F(1,32) = 0.796, \text{MSE} = 694.5, p = .379 \), and crucially no significant Range × Duration interaction, \( F(1,32) = 2.26, \text{MSE} = 587.6, p = .143 \), confirming that the advantage for predictability over variability is maintained for the longer (4-minute) conditions. None of the other possible interactions were significant.
Figure 3.7: Mean Causal Ratings from Experiment 3 as a function of interval range. Filled and unfilled symbols refer to 2 and 4 minutes training respectively. Mean delays are noted by different symbol and line styles.

3.4.2.2 Instrumental Behaviour and Outcome Patterns

Table 3.4 shows the behavioural data from Experiment 3. As can be seen, response rates were fairly consistent across levels of range and delay, though naturally there were more responses in total in the 4-minute conditions than the 2-minute. Within-subjects ANOVAs found that response rate (square-rooted), mean experienced delay, and actual $P(e|c)$, were not significantly affected by interval range (all $ps > .1$); mean delay and $P(e|c)$ were unaffected by condition duration (all $ps > .2$); and response rate and $P(e|c)$ were unaffected by delay (all $ps > .2$); therefore the effects of my manipulations are not mediated through these potential confounds.
Table 3.4: Behavioural Data for Experiment 3. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>condition time</th>
<th>range of temporal intervals</th>
<th>delay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 minutes</td>
<td>4 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0s</td>
<td>0.5s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean response rate (min)</td>
<td>22.65</td>
<td>24.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean outcome rate (min)</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>18.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actual P(e</td>
<td>c)</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean actual delay (ms)</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean causal rating</td>
<td>(28.44)</td>
<td>(28.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.3 Discussion

This experiment has once again found temporally predictable causal relations to receive significantly higher causal ratings than temporally variable, and indeed obtained the strongest effect of predictability thus far. Here I provided maximal contrast between predictable and unpredictable conditions by allowing intervals to vary up to the maximum of 100% of the nominal interval (0-6s with a mean delay of 3s and 0-12s with a mean delay of 6s) and dispensing with any intermediate levels of predictability.

This effect of temporal predictability remained undiminished as condition time increased, with condition time itself appearing to have little influence. The extent of information sampling apparently then does not moderate or mediate any effects associated with predictability. We can therefore be confident that the effect of predictability observed thus far (and demonstrated once again in this experiment), cannot be attributed to a mere failure of learning to reach asymptote. Temporal regularity remains as a cue to causality regardless of duration of learning.
3.5 Experiment 4

From the outset, the goal of this chapter was firstly to ascertain whether temporal predictability might have an influence on causal judgments, and what this might be. In the experiments thus far, a definite pattern has begun to emerge such that conditions with fixed temporal intervals are consistently judged to be more causally effective than those with variable temporal intervals. The lattermost findings addressed the possibility of an alternative explanation for this effect, but found no evidence to support this alternative. The initial question therefore appears to have been satisfactorily answered. The secondary aim of this chapter, if predictability could indeed be identified as a potential cue to causality, was then to determine what its relationship might be to the other most prominent cues, contingency and contiguity.

En route to the current point, each experiment has included at least two levels of mean delay, enabling us to evaluate the predictability effect at both short and long intervals. Since contiguity and predictability may be both be regarded as parameters of a set of temporal intervals, respectively analogous to the mean and the standard deviation of a distribution, it seemed a natural approach to investigate the two in tandem, and hence shed light on the relationship between predictability and contiguity. The facilitatory effect of predictability on judgments has now been demonstrated across a number of different delays, with delay extent not appearing to moderate the influence of predictability. While Experiment 2A suggested that predictability might be more important when contiguity is low, the general effect of predictability has tended to be comparable at both longer and shorter delays. This same pattern also persists under both shorter and longer observation times. Predictability and contiguity thus appear to independently influence causal judgment.

Thus far however, this thesis has only barely touched on the potential relationship between predictability and contingency. In Experiment 1, contingency was manipulated in a sense by the use of different levels of background effects. Increasing the frequency of noncontingent outcomes inflates the value of $P(e|\neg c)$ (cell C in the $2\times2$ contingency matrix), so contingency is decreased as level of background effects is increased. While the simple main effect of background effects on judgments was robust, there was no interaction between predictability and background effects. This suggests that, as with contiguity,
contingency does not mediate the impact of predictability, and the two act separately to influence causal judgments.

There are of course other ways through which contingency may vary; the values of all three remaining cells of the 2×2 matrix may be adjusted. However in the FOP, without using an underlying trial structure, precise values of \( P(\neg e|c) \) and \( P(\neg e|\neg c) \) cannot be defined, since defining the absence of an effect must be in reference to a specified unit or period of time. The value of \( P(e|c) \) however can be controlled directly. Throughout all the experiments presented so far, a constant value of \( P(e|c) \) has been used. This value was inherited from Shanks et al.'s (1989) paradigm, and since this has proved useful as a template for investigating the role of time in a number of subsequent studies (Reed, 1992), it was adopted as the standard for the experiments in this chapter. There was, however, an additional consideration underlying the selection of this default level. Research suggests that in order for a temporal interval to be learned, the interval in question must be experienced with sufficient regularity (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000b). Hence it was assumed that for temporal predictability (in the form of interval regularity) to be detected and used as a cue to causality, the cause must then generate the effect reliably enough to provide such experience. The fairly high probability of 0.75 used by Shanks et al. fitted this requirement. The question then arises as to whether this assumption was indeed valid. Does a high probability of a response generating an outcome constitute a prerequisite for a predictability effect? The final experiment of this chapter sought to answer this question.

3.5.1 Overview of experiment

The familiar FOP paradigm was once again utilised, with varying levels of \( P(e|c) \) applied across different conditions. Probabilities of 80%, 50% and 20% were used in conjunction with both fixed and variable delays. A single mean delay of 2 seconds was selected, with interval then either fixed at this value or varying freely on a given pairing between 0 and 4 seconds.

Since the focus here is on \( P(e|c) \) rather than \( P(e|\neg c) \), no background effects were applied. Earlier in this chapter, the concern was raised that without the uncertainty provided by background effects or noncontingent conditions, the task may become trivial as participants may recognize a constant contingency across conditions. However since a
constant value of $P(e|c)$ is not being used across condition, this concern does not apply to the current experiment.

Owing to external time constraints, the experiment needed to be as short and streamlined as possible. Accordingly, and since the preceding experiment revealed no significant effect of observation time, the duration of each condition was reduced to one minute. The reduced duration should also further minimize any problems arising from the absence of background effects, since long periods of abstaining from responding (which would reveal this absence) are likely to be reduced commensurately.

3.5.2 Predictions

There is a large body of existing evidence (e.g. Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Chatlosh, Neunaber, & Wasserman, 1985; Wasserman et al., 1983) demonstrating that human causal judgments tend to be strongly influenced by contingency, of which $P(e|c)$ is a major component. This experiment should be no exception and therefore it is anticipated that causal judgments will decline as $P(e|c)$ is decreased. Based on the results of the thesis thus far, higher ratings for conditions with fixed intervals compared to those with variable intervals is also anticipated. If the predictability effect depends on repeated experience of the fixed interval, as intuition suggests, then one should also expect an interaction between probability and predictability, such that superiority of predictability over variability is amplified at higher probabilities. If instead predictability and contingency are independent, as the lack of an interaction in Experiment 1 implies, then one would anticipate that fixed intervals should create stronger impressions of causality than variable intervals regardless of the probability of an outcome following a response.

3.5.3 Method

3.5.3.1 Participants

23 psychology undergraduates volunteered via an online participation panel hosted at Cardiff University and completed the experiment to receive partial course credit.

3.5.3.2 Design

The factors delay (with levels fixed and variable) and probability (with levels 0.8, 0.5, and 0.2) combined in a $2 \times 3$ within-subjects design giving six conditions each of one minute in duration. Each response made had the specified probability of generating an
outcome. If scheduled, the outcome occurred either after a delay of 2s (fixed interval conditions), or after a delay of between 0 and 4s (variable interval conditions) with the delay on any given cause-effect pairing randomly selected from within this range. To alleviate order effects, counterbalancing across participants was applied with respect to which of the six conditions was the first presented.

3.5.3.3 Apparatus & Materials

The experiment was conducted on a Dell Inspiron laptop with a 19” display running Microsoft Windows Vista and Python 2.6. Participants were tested one-at-a-time in an individual testing booth.

3.5.3.4 Procedure

The standard instrumental FOP used in the previous experiments was once again applied here. Visual stimuli, layout, requirements and basic procedure were thus identical to the preceding experiments. The only difference between this and the previous experiments, from the perspective of participants, was the shorter condition duration and the absence of background effects.

3.5.4 Results

3.5.4.1 Causal Judgments

Figure 3.8 presents mean causal ratings for the six conditions in Experiment 4. Most evident from inspection of this figure is the ascension of causal ratings in an apparently linear trend as $P(e|c)$ is increased. It is also immediately apparent that conditions with fixed delays received uniformly higher mean causal ratings than the corresponding variable-delay conditions, although this difference is only substantial at the highest level of $P(e|c)$.

A 2×3 within-subjects ANOVA found significant main effects of predictability, $F(1,22) = 7.355, MSE = 636.9, \eta^2_p = .251, p < .05$, and probability, $F(2,44) = 40.59, MSE = 675.6, \eta^2_p = .649, p < .0005$. Planned comparisons collapsing across predictability found that ratings where $P(e|c)$ was 0.8 ($M = 70.61, SE = 4.564$) were significantly higher than those at 0.5 ($M = 42.26, SE = 4.159$), $t(45) = 5.849, p < .001$, which in turn were significantly higher than those at 0.2 ($M = 22.00, SE = 4.309$), $t(45) = 3.825, p < .001$, emphasizing the strong linear effect of $P(e|c)$. The overall interaction between the two failed to reach significance, $F(2,44) = 2.363, MSE = 515, p = .16$; however the linear
component of the interaction was marginally significant, \( F(1,22) = 4.209, MSE = 384.8, p = .052, \eta^2_p = .161 \). Further analysis of the interaction using Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons found that ratings at \( P(e|c) \) of 0.8 were significantly higher for fixed than variable conditions, \( t(22) = 3.564, p < .005 \), but no such differences were found at \( P(e|c) \) of 0.5 or 0.2.

![Figure 3.8](image.png)

**Figure 3.8**: Mean causal ratings from Experiment 4 as a function of \( P(e|c) \). Filled and unfilled symbols refer to fixed and variable delays respectively.

### 3.5.4.2 Instrumental Behaviour and Outcome Patterns

The behavioural data for Experiment 4 is reported in Table 3.5. As with the preceding experiments, analyses of this data were again performed to examine potential confounds. Normalized response rate was not significantly affected by probability, \( F(2,44) = 0.052, MSE = 1.916, p = .950 \), variability, \( F(1,22) = 1.740, MSE = 3.409, p = .201 \), or the interaction between the two, \( F(2,44) = 1.137, MSE = 1.017, p = .330 \). Different levels of \( P(e|c) \) naturally resulted in significant differences between conditions for rate of outcomes, \( F(2,44) = 12.29, MSE = 325.2, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .358 \), and actual contingency, \( F(2,44) = 425.63, MSE = 0.011, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .951 \), but these measures were not significantly
affected by variability, both $ps > 0.25$. Mean delays experienced were not significantly affected by probability, variability, or their interaction, all $ps > 0.4$. The effect of predictability in this experiment therefore cannot be attributed to these potential confounds.

![Image]

Table 3.5: Behavioural Data for Experiment 4. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

|               | delay $P(e|c)$ | fixed | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.2 |
|---------------|---------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| mean response rate (/min) |               |       | 32.87 | 34.00 | 31.00 | 28.57 | 23.13 | 29.48 |
| mean outcome rate (/min)  |               |       | 26.87 | 17.30 | 6.70 | 22.74 | 11.70 | 5.70 |
| actual $P(e|c)$           |               |       | 0.763 | 0.751 | 0.743 | 0.764 | 0.772 | 0.746 |
| mean actual delay (ms)    |               |       | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 1938 | 2151 | 2120 |
| mean causal rating        |               |       | (0) | (0) | (0) | (355) | (441) | (842) |
|                           |               |       | (21.60) | (27.79) | (25.16) | (29.48) | (25.88) | (22.53) |

3.5.5 Discussion

Experiment 4 continued the pattern shown throughout this chapter that holding the cause effect interval constant elicited higher causal ratings. The facilitatory role of temporal predictability in causal learning has been demonstrated yet again and the support for the predictability hypothesis is now compelling. The manipulation of outcome probability meanwhile also produced the expected findings, with judgments corresponding to a close linear function of $P(e|c)$.

Evaluating the interplay between probability and predictability is a less straightforward task. On the one hand, an inspection of Figure 3.8 indicates that predictable conditions received uniformly higher ratings than variable conditions across levels of probability, and while a main effect of predictability was confirmed, the interaction failed to reached significance. At the same time, the linear component of the interaction was
marginally significant, and perhaps most tellingly, follow-up comparisons revealed that fixed and variable conditions differed significantly only at $P(e|c) = 0.8$. The influence of predictability is thus amplified when the effect follows the cause with a high probability.

This is consistent with causal learning being viewed as a retroactive reasoning process. For predictability to be detected and thus exert an influence, the cause-effect interval must be experienced with sufficient regularity in order that a temporally predictable causal relation may be distinguished from an unpredictable one. Strictly speaking, it might be more accurate to say that the effect of increasing statistical regularity was harmed by temporal unpredictability, since when $P(e|c)$ was highest, judgments fell well below $\Delta P$ with variable intervals, but were more normative at lower levels of $P(e|c)$. However, since there was a cause-effect delay in all conditions, it is not necessarily expected that judgments should in fact conform to $\Delta P$ but to fall somewhat short of this measure (Shanks et al., 1989). Regardless, it is clear from this experiment that temporal predictability elicits stronger judgments of causality than variability, and this difference is amplified when $P(e|c)$ is high. The notion that sufficient experience of the interval in question is necessary for predictability to be identified is thus supported by these results.

Interestingly then, it seems that a straightforward relationship between predictability and contingency in a broad sense cannot be defined. Instead, comparing the results of Experiments 1 and 4 suggests that predictability is differentially sensitive to the cells of the contingency matrix. While reducing contingency through increasing the value of $P(e|\neg c)$ (cell C) surprisingly did not adversely impact the effect of predictability, reducing contingency by reducing $P(e|c)$ (cell A) attenuated the predictability effect. Temporal regularity thus depends on statistical regularity only to a certain degree. This dependency should however not harm the case for temporal predictability to be recognized as a cue to causality in its own right. Greville and Buehner (2007), for instance, have demonstrated that contingency and contiguity act in concert to influence causal judgment. Since the experience of temporal intervals, which convey both contiguity and predictability information, necessarily depends on there being a certain contingency with which the effect follows the cause, then it should come as no surprise that there is a considerable degree of interplay between these cues to causality.
Chapter Summary

This chapter has attempted to broaden understanding of the role of time in causal inference, and to address a gap in the empirical study of causal learning. Specifically, it has been highlighted that temporal predictability can act as an empirical cue in the induction of causal relations from a real-time response-outcome schedule. More precisely, the results demonstrate that fixed, predictable temporal intervals attract higher causal ratings than variable ones, and that causal ratings decrease as a function of temporal uncertainty.

Before postulating that temporal predictability should join temporal order, contingency and contiguity as a recognized cue to causality, it seems necessary to ascertain whether the findings obtained thus far can generalize to other learning situations. One obvious feature of the studies presented thus far is that they are all based on the same essential paradigm, the instrumental FOP. As Waldman and Hagmayer (2005) observe, there are two primary modes of accessing information; by “doing” (intervening) and by “seeing” (observing). A number of studies have demonstrated that differential results may be obtained depending on which mode of learning is instigated (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005). Likewise in behaviour analysis, the distinction between learning through intervention or observation is manifested through the two separate conditioning protocols, instrumental and classical conditioning. Despite the obvious parallels between the two, each process is known to have its own individual characteristics. The most obvious question to next pursue would thus seem to be, can the same facilitatory effects of predictability obtained here with an instrumental procedure likewise be obtained with causal inference from observation?
Chapter 4 – The Role of Temporal Predictability in Observational Causal Learning

The experiments in Chapter 3 repeatedly demonstrated the facilitatory role of temporal predictability in instrumental causal learning. Conditions with fixed temporal intervals consistently received higher ratings than their variable counterparts, with such differences reaching statistical significance in four of the five studies presented. Increasing interval variability appeared to elicit a corresponding decline in causal evaluations, and variability was never preferred to predictability.

An obvious common thread of the tasks in Chapter 3, and the studies on which they were based such as those of Shanks et al. (1989), Reed (1992), and Wasserman et al. (1983), is that they all concern instrumental learning. Such tasks are characterized by requiring a participant to actively investigate a putative causal relation by making instrumental responses such as pressing a button, and observing the effect this has on the delivery of a particular stimulus, such as a light illuminating. Such tasks trace their heritage to operant conditioning studies with animals such as those of Skinner. Here then, a putative causal link in the environment is actively investigated through the performance of a response and its apparent consequences. Causal relations may, of course, also be uncovered by passive observation, through simply observing the occurrence of different stimuli (but see Lagnado & Sloman, 2002). The immediately apparent allegory is with operant and classical conditioning.

The next logical consideration, then, for evaluating the role of temporal predictability, would seem to be whether the same effects of predictability hold for causal induction from observed rather than generated events, and thus whether the effects obtained thus far may generalize to other forms of causal decision making. However, before delving headlong into the empirical investigation of predictability in observational settings, it is worth pausing briefly to examine existing theories and research to clarify whether an influence of predictability parallel to that observed in the instrumental studies is indeed expected.
4.1 Parallels and Disparities between Classical and Instrumental Conditioning

The most obvious basis for the separate consideration of learning through acting and learning through observing is the dissociation between classical and instrumental conditioning. Chapter 1 introduced these basic protocols, both of which are used to study the acquisition of associations. Classical conditioning concerns associations between cues or signals in the environment. Instrumental conditioning meanwhile refers to the association between an executed behaviour and an evaluative outcome. In the former paradigm, the experimenter typically arranges the delivery of both the CS and the US, whereas in the latter, while the contingency between response and reinforcer is determined by the experimenter, the subject chooses the rate at which it performs the instrumental response (although it may be prompted to respond by another stimulus such as the illumination of the response key, e.g., Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Lander, 1965).

The obvious operational distinction aside, classical and instrumental conditioning share many common elements. As discussed earlier, both are similarly affected by stimulus intensity and the statistical and temporal relations between stimuli. As with causal learning, contingency and contiguity are crucial constituents of both classical and instrumental conditioning processes. If it is to be proposed that temporal predictability also constitutes a fundamental component of learning, then it seems reasonable to expect consistent effects of predictability across both instrumental and observational modes.

However, despite their inherent similarities, the associative learning literature tends to treat classical and instrumental conditioning as distinct processes. Skinner (1938) was one of the first researchers to highlight the operational distinction between the two processes, and to postulate separate mechanisms for the two. Evidence from neurological studies suggests that while certain neurological structures and pathways are vital to both processes, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Delamater, 2007), the role of other structures such as the amygdala is dissociable between classical and instrumental conditioning. For instance, Vazdarjanova and McGaugh (1998) demonstrated that rats with amygdala lesions fail to exhibit conditioned freezing to cues paired with a shock, despite still successfully performing the instrumental response of avoiding a compartment in which they received the shock.
4.2 Distinguishing Intervention and Observation

In studies of human causal judgment, the distinction between observational and instrumental learning has traditionally been less pronounced than in conditioning. Whereas fundamentally different mechanisms have been postulated to underlie the formation of CS-US and response-outcome associations, statistical models of learning based on cause-effect contingencies (such as $\Delta P$ or PowerPC) apply the same algorithm regardless of whether such events are passively observed or actively generated.

As discussed earlier, the dominant approach to the study of causal induction has focused on how statistical information is used to infer causality. As such, observational studies where specifically defined event contingencies can be presented to participants have been widely utilised to assess how well human causal judgment corresponds to the available statistical information. Typically, unambiguous data indicating presence and absence of causes and effects is presented either in a summary format such as tabulated results (Greville & Buehner, 2007; Liljeholm & Cheng, 2007), or through sequential presentation of cases (Matute, Arcediano, & Miller, 1996; Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008). Such studies have shown that passively observed contingency information affects judgments of causality in much the same way as response-outcome contingencies in instrumental learning, with higher contingencies eliciting stronger judgments of causality. Studies of observational learning involving direct experience of cause-effect delays in real time are rather more thin on the ground, but Siegler and Liebert (1974) and Buehner and McGregor (2006, 2009) have demonstrated effects of contiguity mirroring those found in response-outcome learning tasks (that is, judgments tend to decline with delays). It has further been demonstrated that moderating influences of the effects of contiguity such as prior knowledge are also exhibited in observational as well as instrumental studies (Allan et al., 2003).

Yet in recent years, causal model theory in particular has emphasized the special status of actions in causal reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Lagrado & Sloman, 2004, 2006; Leising, Wong, Waldmann, & Blaisdell, 2008; Sloman & Lagrando, 2005; Waldmann, 1996, 2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992, 1997). Intervention – performing an instrumental response on a system to modify the value of a variable – creates different predictions compared to where the value of a variable is merely observed.
In an oft-cited example, observing a reading on a barometer may lead one to have expectations regarding the weather, while if one was to make an intervention to deliberately set the barometer to a specific setting, one would not expect the weather to change correspondingly. Such causal asymmetry reflects not only causal directionality (causes produce their effects but not vice versa) but also causal structure in the sense that intervening on a variable renders it independent of its parent causes.

Of course, such distinctions with respect to learning causal structure do not constitute a direct parallel with distinguishing between intervention and observation in elementary causal induction from a real-time cue-outcome schedule. Nevertheless, this does highlight the special status of interventions in causal reasoning. This recognition of the privileged role bestowed to instrumental responding may well therefore create different expectations between learning through observation rather than intervention. It is generally accepted in scientific literature that experimentation is a more effective tool for learning and discovery than observation (Hinkelmann & Kempthorne, 1994; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004) and one can easily see how instrumental learning may be a more powerful process through which to explore one's environment. By deliberately intervening on the environment, an organism can control the frequency or rate of responding, the pattern or temporal distribution of responses, the intensity or strength of response, and so on and so forth. Simply put, patterns of intervention are self-governed, and choices can modulate the data that is received (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006). Learning from observation meanwhile may intuitively seem more difficult, since the occurrence of stimuli is beyond the control of the organism.

Temporal regularity in particular might be easier to detect under instrumental rather than observational conditions. Under the former, since one can control one's own rate and pattern of responding, one can produce meaningful or memorable patterns of responses, that perhaps might be dubbed response rhythms. After generating such rhythms, one can then monitor the stream of outcomes to see if a similarly matching pattern occurs. This could be on as simple a level as comparing ratios of rates or frequencies (that is, comparing number of outcomes to number of responses) but could also involve more complex comparisons such as whether the specific timing of outcomes mirrors the pattern of responses (or to what degree the patterns have a similar temporal distribution). Meanwhile
when learning through observation alone, one would have to wait for such meaningful patterns to be generated by the environment or an alternative agent. Interventional learning then may promote more directed hypothesis testing, as someone who repeatedly intervenes on a system is in a better position to test their own hypotheses than someone who merely observes the system. Indeed, Sobel and Kushnir (2006) demonstrated that “learners were better at learning causal models when they observed intervention data that they had generated, as opposed to observing data generated by another learner” (p. 411).

In summary, it is clear that there are many commonalities between instrumental and observational learning, in the domains of both animal conditioning and human causal learning. Such commonalities, particularly with regard to the general effects of cues such as contingency and contiguity, suggests that an effect of predictability observed in instrumental paradigms might well extend to observational scenarios. At the same time, there is much evidence to suggest that intervention and observation differ in the insight that they may provide regarding causal structures. Suffice it to say, it is certainly not a given that the same facilitatory effects of predictability on causal learning in instrumental tasks will also be found in observational tasks.

4.3 Existing Evidence – Young & Nguyen, 2009

As an illustration of this point, recent work by Young and Nguyen (2009) obtained results which directly contradict the findings presented in Chapter 2. Their task could, to some extent, be conceived as a classical conditioning analogue of these temporal predictability studies, with participants observing events rather than taking instrumental action. Participants in Young and Nguyen’s experiments engaged in a first-person-shooter game, exploring a 3D virtual world consisting of four game levels, each containing seven separate regions. In each region, participants encountered groups of three ‘orcs’ (humanoid monster-like characters) firing projectiles from their crossbows onto a distal target (such as a building). Participants were informed that in each case, one orc was an enemy and was firing explosive projectiles (the true cause, or target) while the other two were ‘friendlies’ and firing duds (the foils). For each orc, the firing of the crossbow was noticeable by the recoil of the weapon and an audible click; the projectile itself could not be seen travelling from the weapon to the target since this makes the causal link all too evident. The firing of
the enemy (target) orc produced explosions in the target region. The participants' task was to protect the building at each region by destroying the orc that was causing the explosions, shooting it with their own crossbow. Essentially then, the task can be summarized as deciding which of three candidate causes (orcs) was producing an effect (explosions).

The key manipulation of interest was the extent and variability of the delay between the cause (target orc firing its weapon) and the effect (explosions). This was varied across game regions (along with presence or absence of auditory fillers during the delay). At each region, the firing of the orcs' weapons was governed by an underlying trial structure, with each orc firing its weapon once during each trial. The trials were of 4s duration, with each orc firing at a random point during the first 3s of the 4s trial. The timing of the effect meanwhile was not linked to the trial structure; rather, the effect followed the true cause according to the programmed cause-effect delay. Game level 1 contained no delays and was used to orient the participants to the game environment. In subsequent levels, Young and Nguyen employed delays of 0.5s, 1s and 2s, which at a given region could be fixed or could vary from trial to trial by up to either 25% or 50% of the nominal delay. In experiment 1, delay varied within levels while variability was constant within a given level but varied across levels; the reverse arrangement was made for experiment 2.

Contrary to the findings presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis, in Young and Nguyen's experiments constancy of delay did not appear to provide an advantage, and in fact high variability sometimes led to an increased percentage of correct target selection. This suggests that participants' ability to connect the effect with its true cause increased when the intervals separating them were variable. As well as being somewhat counterintuitive, this result is in direct conflict with those obtained thus far in this thesis, and therefore this warrants closer examination.

It should be noted that the advantage for variability was considerably less robust and pervasive than the concurrent influence of delay extent, and curiously seemed to be restricted to male participants; variability had no significant influence on either accuracy or latency for females. It is also worth pointing out that Young and Nguyen's task utilized a dependent measure unlike that in the instrumental studies in Chapter 3. Rather than providing a judgment of causal strength, participants instead were faced with a forced-choice discrimination task, having to select the correct target from multiple causal
candidates. This is quite obviously different from the evaluation of a single cause-effect relation on the basis of repeated observations, and may well involve different cognitive mechanisms or reasoning processes. Nevertheless, if temporal predictability reinforces the idea of a genuine stable causal mechanism linking cause and effect, then if participants can recognize this, it should be a useful cue to choosing the correct target. Indeed, one might be particularly inclined to make such an assumption when considering the game context provided by Young and Nguyen, set in a realistic 3D environment comparable to a real-world scenario. If participants assume that the same laws of physics present in our world applied to the game environment, then they should assume that a projectile being fired at a target should take the same time to reach that target when being fired repeatedly by the same weapon (assuming that wind speed and direction were constant). Much research exists that suggests such prior knowledge or experience can generalize to experimental tasks (Buehner & May, 2002, 2003, 2004; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Waldmann, 1996). Such mechanism considerations would seem to predispose Young and Nguyen’s participants to expect temporal predictability. The failure to find such an advantage for fixed intervals in either of Young and Nguyen’s experiment thus poses difficulty for the predictability hypothesis. The discrepancy between these results and those presented in Chapter 3 clearly warrants further exploration.

4.3.1 An alternative to the predictability hypothesis – The temporal proximity account

One of the difficulties involving causal learning with delays is that competing agents can come between the cause and the outcome. This is particularly true in a task such as this, involving choice between multiple identical causal candidates, since the foils can be more contiguous with the effect than the true cause. The corollary of this is that incorrect selection of a foil as the target may arise from an coincidental instance of the foil being contiguous with the effect. The longer the delay, the more likely this is to occur, and this is particularly true for a constant, high-delay causal candidate: Whilst for a variable-long-delay, there is the possibility on any given trial that there may be a contiguous pairing of the cause and effect, this cannot occur with fixed-long-delays. Young and Nguyen (2009) were aware of these complication; in running Monte Carlo simulations prior to the experiment, they discovered that “highly variable long delays produced a larger number of experiences of the true cause being more contiguous to the effect whereas consistent long
delays produced more experiences of one of the foils being more contiguous” (p.300). If participants tend to select as the target the candidate that is most often proximal to the effect, then this will result in a greater number of errors in a fixed-long-delay condition. Their results suggest this may well have been the case, with correct identification of the target for fixed-high-delay causal candidates falling as low as under 20%. According to such an interpretation, it is not variability per se that is facilitatory, but rather the occasional contiguous pairing that variability permits.

Yet, despite identifying this potential issue prior to conducting their experiments and predicting this effect of variability, Young and Nguyen (2009) still describe this finding as paradoxical. This is understandable since Young and colleagues were in fact the initial proponents of the temporal predictability hypothesis (Young et al., 2005), according to which consistent delays are indicative of a genuine mechanism connecting cause and effect. Young and Nguyen’s participants however failed to make use of such information, in violation of this hypothesis, and instead apparently selected as the target the candidate that was most often contiguous with the effect. Here then, there is apparently a shift in emphasis between temporal cues, from predictability to contiguity.

The simple associative model describing the decline of associative strength with delay as a negatively accelerated function (Figure 2.1) is consistent with and would predict this behaviour since according to this model, associative strength (and thus impression of causality) would be most boosted by experience of a contiguous cause-effect pairing. And it is indeed the case, as the simulations revealed, that variability produces more instances of the cause being contiguous with the effect, with a greater degree of variability creating a greater likelihood of contiguous cause-effect pairings. But given that the same is true in elemental causal induction, why was predictability consistently favoured over variability in the experiments in the preceding chapter? Evidently, valid accounts can be constructed to explain facilitatory effects of both predictability and variability; what is unclear is why there appears to be a shift from on to the other depending on the task. It is not the case that predictability is simply more important than contiguity in elemental causal induction, since effect sizes obtained for contiguity in the previous chapter were consistently larger than those for predictability. There must then be other reasons why interval regularity failed to produce the same effects in Young and Nguyen’s study.
4.3.2 The video game context

Perhaps the most prominent difference between my studies and the paradigm employed by Young and Nguyen (2009) is the context. The video game presents participants with a virtual world, a highly detailed and involving environment. Young and Nguyen argued, justifiably, that such scenarios are more representative of real-world causal learning tasks where information will have to be filtered from the rich sensory input available, placing high demands upon organisms’ cognitive resources. However as a consequence, much of the empirical evidence may have been less salient and more difficult to detect, with many other stimuli to divert attention. In the experiments presented in the previous chapter, the visual stimuli were simple and there were no alternative behavioural opportunities besides actively investigating the causal link. In contrast, Young and Nguyen’s study ceded a great deal of control to the participant, allowing them to freely explore the virtual world, and choosing from what distance and what angle to view the relevant events. As a consequence, participants may have been engrossed in simply navigating the environment and had their attention drawn by other visual features. In addition, another layer of complexity was added through of auditory stimuli filling the delay interval. Young and Nguyen acknowledge that “the consistency of the delays was likely less evident within our complex dynamic environment” (p.309). The question thus arises as to whether the rich detail of the video game captured attention to the extent that participants were simply unable to recognize interval constancy. Young and Nguyen’s aim in providing this complex context was to more closely mirror the richness of the world within which we make our everyday causal inferences, and thus improve ecological validity. While such a goal is laudable, it may well be that a more traditional, tightly-controlled experimental approach is more useful in eliciting the precise role of a more subtle causal cue such as temporal predictability, before moving forward to see how complex dynamic environments may alter the influences of such temporal factors.

4.4 Experiment 4A

Accordingly, the goal of the next experiment was to construct an analogue of Young and Nguyen’s experiment, using a straightforward preparation with simple stimuli. By doing so, the potential diversion of exploring the 3D virtual world would be eliminated,
which would then hopefully allow participants to focus specifically on the relevant events. By devoting greater attention to the candidate causes and effects, the temporal relations between these events should become more apparent to participants. At the same time, any effects of prior knowledge or experience that participants may have brought to bear in the realistic scenario provided by the first-person-shooter game would be eliminated. To this end, the essential features of Young and Nguyen's task in terms of the timing of stimulus delivery were retained and recast in a simple experimental protocol using abstract stimuli, more closely resembling standard contingency judgement problems such as those of Reed (1992), Shanks et al. (1989) and Wasserman et al. (1983). Participants were presented with a triangle in the upper portion of the screen, as per the experiments in Chapter 2, and below this were situated three buttons, in similar arrangement to the 'orcs' in Young and Nguyen's task. Alongside each button was a pointing hand, which periodically moved and depressed the button, which constituted an instance of a candidate cause. Thus, as in Young and Nguyen's task, participants took no instrumental action themselves in generating the button-presses. Instead, the administration of the candidate causes was governed by the same underlying trial structure with each candidate cause occurring at a random point within the first 3s of each 4s trial. The triangle illuminated contingent upon one of the buttons being pressed, with the other two buttons being foils. The interval separating cause and effect was determined using the same programmed delays and delay variability as for Young and Nguyen's task. Buttons were labelled 1, 2 and 3 from left to right, and the position of the true cause on each condition was randomized on each condition.

Participants thus had only to focus on the timing of the candidate causes and the effect, and were free from the potential distractions of the complex environment. Consequently it was hoped that where constancy of delay between cause and effect existed, that this would become evident to the participants. Results should then reveal whether such information was beneficial to participants in terms of the accuracy and rapidity of their choice of causal candidate, or whether they instead tended to prefer the occasional contiguous pairing of cause and effect licensed by interval variability.
4.4.1 Predictions

Detrimental effects of delay are a well-established finding in the learning literature and delays should thus make the identification of the correct causal candidate more difficult; hence it was expected that increasing delays would increase error rate and latency. The impact of whether delays are predictable or variable was rather more difficult to forecast, since viable accounts for facilitatory effects of both predictability and variability have been mooted. While the simplistic adaptation of Young and Nguyen’s (2009) causal decision making task should mean that the temporal distribution of events is more salient, whether such information will in fact aid the decision process in a task such as this is, as yet, uncertain. However based on the results of the previous chapter, coupled with the simplification of the task, a facilitatory effect of predictability was anticipated.

4.4.2 Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff

There remains, in a task of this nature, a further potential relationship that surprisingly was overlooked by Young and Nguyen (2009); that between the two dependent measures, sampling time and accuracy. It is a widely-known and longstanding finding in the psychological domain that a relationship often exists between the speed and the accuracy with which a task is performed or a decision is reached (Garrett, 1922; Schouten & Bekker, 1967). From an adaptive perspective, it is advantageous for such behaviours to be executed as rapidly and accurately as possible (Chittka, Skorupski, & Raine, 2009). Typically however, speed and accuracy tend to be inversely related such that the faster a response is made, the less accurate that response tends to be. In a decision-making task, accumulating more information can increase the likelihood of an correct decision, though at the cost of the additional time required to do so. A balance must therefore be struck between competing demands; speed may be sacrificed for accuracy, or accuracy for speed, depending on what the circumstances call for. This compromise is commonly referred to as the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) (Wickelgren, 1977).

Much effort has been devoted to the development of both normative theories of optimal decision making (e.g. Bogacz, 2007) and models that reflect the actual behavioural preferences of organisms (e.g. Zacksenhouse, Bogacz, & Holmes, 2010). The precise function linking speed and accuracy may differ between behaviours (Wood & Jennings, 1976) and the SAT does not always manifest in all types of learning situations (Busemeyer,
Nevertheless the SAT is a pervasive phenomenon found in a diverse range of behaviours in humans and other organisms, including motor performance and aiming movements (Hancock & Newell, 1985; Keele, 1968); olfactory discrimination (Uchida & Mainen, 2003); recognition memory (Reed, 1973); and foraging (Burns, 2005). One paradigm in which the SAT is particularly well-established is the two-alternative forced-choice decision task (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Herrnstein, 1961). In such a task, where in terms of accuracy one can only be correct or incorrect on a single given choice, one must then ask oneself, “how much time is an error worth?” (Pew, 1969, p.16). Since the current task can be certainly be characterised as a forced choice discrimination task (although obviously with three alternatives), it seems highly plausible that an SAT may be exhibited here. Therefore in addition to the potential effects of manipulating delay and variability on accuracy, accuracy may also be influenced by sampling time. While of course sampling time is itself a dependent measure, and may therefore be affected by the controlled factors, an independent influence of sampling time on accuracy may also be exerted. Analysis of the current experiment therefore needs to take this into account.

4.4.3 Method

4.4.3.1 Participants and Apparatus

40 psychology students (24 females, 16 males) based at Cardiff University completed the experiment either voluntarily or to receive partial course credit. Due to experimenter error, one participant received incorrect materials, and one further participant self-reported as completely misunderstanding the experiment. Data was disregarded in both cases, thus a total of 38 participants contributed data to the analysis.

The experiment was conducted in either a single person testing booth, or in a small computer lab, where individual workstations were screened off from one another using partitions. The Python programming language was used to create and deliver the experiment, using PCs running Microsoft Windows XP. Size, shape and speed of stimulus delivery was consistent across computers.
4.4.3.3 Design and Materials

The independent factors delay extent and delay variability were combined in a fully within-subjects design. Each factor had three levels; 500ms, 1000 ms and 2000ms for delay extent (programmed mean values), and none (0%), low (25%) and high (50%) for delay variability, combining to give nine experimental conditions all of which were experienced by each participant. I also included one additional condition involving no delays as an initial practice trial, however this condition did not contribute to the results. Conditions were not blocked by delay or by variability; instead, the order of which condition was presented first was counterbalanced across participants, with the remaining conditions presented in random order. The dependent measures were accuracy, coded as either 1 or 0 depending on whether or not the participant selected the correct target, and the sampling time taken to reach this decision.

The paradigm was a straightforward adaptation of Young and Nguyen’s video game, taking the essential principles of stimulus delivery from this task, and re-situating it in a simple context more closely resembling traditional contingency judgment paradigms (Reed, 1992; Shanks et al. 1989; Wasserman et al., 1983). The basic layout on screen consisted of an outline of a triangle, and beneath this, three red buttons, arranged equidistant from each other along the horizontal and labelled as 1, 2 and 3 from left to right. Each button initially appeared in the ‘unpressed’ state, with a raised appearance and coloured in a dark and desaturated shade of red. Alongside each button was an image of a pointing finger. When a cause was scheduled, the finger moved directly on top of the button, which then simultaneously ‘depressed’ (took on a sunken appearance) and ‘illuminated’ (turned a brighter, more saturated shade of red) thus effectively creating the impression that the finger had pressed the button. The effect consisted of the triangle flashing for 250ms as in previous experiments.

The true cause was deterministic (always produced the effect) and the position of the true cause was randomized across conditions. The delay between the true cause and the effect on any given trial was a function of the two independent variables delay extent and delay variability. For example, while the delay on the 500ms/0% condition was always 500ms, the interval on a 2000ms/50% condition could vary anywhere between 1000ms and
3000ms. Intervals were sampled from within the specified range according to a uniform probability distribution; in other words all delays were equally probable.

In governing stimulus delivery, an underlying trial structure was used in the same manner as for Young and Nguyen’s experiments, with the timeline divided into 4s segments. Trials ran seamlessly from one into the next; as one trial ended the next trial began immediately with no inter-trial interval. Trial structure was therefore not explicitly signalled to participants. All the candidate causes (button presses) occurred during the first 3s of each 4s segment, randomly distributed within this 3s. The effect then followed its true cause with the specified delay. The timing of the effect was thus not anchored to the trial structure, as in other trial-based experiments such as Wasserman et al. (1983); only the timing of the causes was dictated by this structure. This meant that on occasion, the effect would not actually occur before a new trial began, and that it could ‘spill over’ into the next trial. For instance, the latest that a cause could occur would be 3s into the 4s trial, while delays could range up to 3s (which is the maximum possible in the 50%-variability long-delay condition). Thus, the effect could occur as late as 6s after the start of one trial, which would in fact be 2s into the following trial, and therefore possibly follow instances of the cause from that next trial. This of course destroys the deterministic nature of the cause; objectively, there will be no effects on some trials and more than one on others. While this might be a potential source of confusion for participants, stimulus delivery was intended to be as faithful as possible to Young and Nguyen’s original paradigm, so this trial structure was retained.

4.4.3.4 Procedure

Participants were instructed that their task was to identify, in each condition, the button which they felt was the most likely to be causing the triangle to illuminate. It was made clear to participants that the buttons themselves would automatically be pressed by the pointing hands as the condition progressed and that no direct responses (besides selecting their choice) were required. Rather, they simply had to observe the sequences of events taking place on the computer screen, which would continue until they were ready to make their choice. Thus, they were in control of how much information to sample, and were free to take as much or as little time as they wanted in each condition, though still trying to make the correct choice in each case.
In similar fashion to Young and Nguyen (2009), who used the first game level as an orienting phase with no delays, I gave participants a practice condition likewise involving no delays so that they could familiarize themselves with the stimulus arrangement and task demands. As discussed earlier, prior experience can bias participant expectation and dramatically modulate the influence of factors such as delay (Buehner & May, 2003). It was therefore anticipated that this practice trial might well bias participants to expect contiguity and thereby reduce tolerance to delays. However since Young and Nguyen did not raise this as a methodological concern, it was decided that the benefit of providing a practice trial outweighed the potential costs, given that the task is that much more complex than the traditional contingency judgment paradigm. On completing this practice phase, participants were informed that the next few tasks might be more difficult and then proceeded to the first experimental condition. Participants were instructed that once they were ready to make their decision, they could press the corresponding key on the keyboard (1, 2 or 3) to select the respective button. The trial sequence terminated immediately when a target was selected with the appropriate keyboard press. Participants were given explicit feedback informing them whether their choice was correct or incorrect immediately following their response, and could then proceed directly to the next condition.
The program recorded which of the buttons was selected, whether this choice was correct, and the time taken to make this choice from the beginning of the condition, thus providing the dependent measures. Young and Nguyen also took into account the gender of their participants and their previous experience with video games, since these were identified as factors that could influence task performance. However since the adapted paradigm used here is less like a game and more closely resembles standard causal judgement paradigms, amount of prior gaming experience was not solicited from participants in the current experiment, nor were gender differences analysed. The relationship between the two dependent measures was however examined to determine the presence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff.

4.4.4 Results

It is worth taking a moment here to provide a brief overview of the results section, since the novel paradigm posed a considerable challenge in terms of deciding on appropriate methods for analysis. Young and Nguyen (2009) originally used repeated-measures ANOVAs to examine the effects of delay and variability on both accuracy and latency. Since latency is a continuous variable, an ANOVA is an appropriate choice of analysis in this case. However, given that the dependent variable accuracy is dichotomous, the assumptions of an ANOVA here are violated, and a binary logistic regression instead seems more apt. However, this method assumes that each individual case (or participant) contributes only one score, an assumption violated by the repeated measures design of the current experiment. Subsequent studies by Young and colleagues using the same paradigm went on to use linear mixed effects models in place of the ANOVA, while the methods for performing repeated measures logistic regression suggested by Lorch and Myers (1990) were also considered as an option. However the most appropriate analysis instead seemed to be the use of a generalized linear model, specifying subject as a repeated measures variable, while using binomial error distribution and a logit link function to address the binary dependent variable accuracy. This permitted not only the modelling of the independent variables delay and variability as predictors, but also the dependent variable latency as a covariate of accuracy. Young and colleagues ignored this potential relationship, and while the speed-accuracy relationship is only of tangential interest to the topic of predictability that is the focus of this thesis, I considered that to adequately and fully
describe the relationship between the variables that this needed to be taken into account. Hence, although the accuracy of participant choices might be the most interesting result in this experiment, in order to determine which predictors should enter into the model, it was first necessary to interpret the relationship between variables. Thus, an analysis of the speed-accuracy relationship shall be presented first, followed by an analysis of the effects of delay and variability on latency, before proceeding to examine the potential predictive influence of delay, variability and latency on accuracy.

4.4.4.1 Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff

Each participant contributed a score for accuracy and latency in each of the nine experimental conditions. In terms of overall performance, the total percentage of correct responses across all participants and conditions was 62.6%, with a mean sampling time of 15.9s. Sampling times were, as is typical of such experiments, positively skewed, so were log-transformed to normalize the distribution for subsequent analyses.

For each participant, mean accuracy (percentage of correct choices) and mean log sampling time across all nine conditions were calculated. A positive correlation was found between sampling time and accuracy, $r = 0.426$, $n = 38$, $p < .01$, such that participants who spent a longer time on average sampling information made fewer erroneous choices. Figure 4.1 summarizes this relationship showing mean accuracy as a function of mean sampling time. This is indicative of a speed-accuracy tradeoff, at least in terms of individual performance. To avoid any confusion, it is as well to note that latency and speed are antonyms; therefore here, since accuracy is positively correlated with latency, there is a negative correlation between accuracy and speed.

To confirm the presence of the speed-accuracy tradeoff on a more general level, a repeated-measures binomial logistic regression was performed (since accuracy was coded as a dichotomous variable) for all scores across participants and conditions. Overall, sampling time was not a significant predictor of accuracy $\beta = 0.288$, $SE = 0.164$, Wald $\chi^2 = 3.075$, $p = .08$. However, decision difficulty can modulate the speed-accuracy tradeoff (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) and therefore separate analyses were performed at each level of delay. While for delays of 0.5s, accuracy was not significantly predicted by sampling time, $\beta = 0.121$, $SE = 0.466$, Wald $\chi^2 = 0.067$, $p = 0.795$, sampling time was a positive predictor of accuracy with delays of both 1s, $\beta = 0.791$.
, $SE = 0.325$, Wald $\chi^2 = 5.936$, $p < .05$, and 2s, $\beta = 0.749$, $SE = 0.237$, Wald $\chi^2 = 9.975$, $p < .005$. Sampling time should therefore be considered as a predictor in the regression model for accuracy.

Figure 4.1: Scatter plot showing participants’ mean percentage accuracy as a function of their mean log sampling time across all nine conditions in Experiment 5A.

4.4.4.2 Sampling Time

Since the presence of the SAT indicates that sampling time may exert an influence on accuracy independent of the controlled variables, it seems sensible to first analyse the effect of the controlled factors on sampling time ahead of accuracy. Mean log sampling times for each of the nine experimental conditions are shown as a function of delay and variability in Figure 4.2. The distribution of scores suggests that longer delays resulted in longer latencies, while the effect of variability is more difficult to discern. A 3×3 repeated measures ANOVA confirmed the main effect of delay as significant, $F(2,74) = 24.52$, $MSE = 0.191$, $\eta_p^2 = .399$, $p < .0005$. Planned orthogonal Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons found that sampling times with delays of 2s ($M = 2.773$, $SD = 0.737$) were significantly longer than those at both 1s ($M = 2.440$, $SD = 0.665$), $t(113) = 5.576$, $p < .001$, and at 0.5s ($M = 2.406$, $SD = 0.586$), $t(113) = 6.039$, $p < .001$, which in turn did not differ significantly from one another, $t(113) = 0.592$, $p = .555$. No significant effect of variability
was found on sampling time, $F(2,74) = 1.947$, $MSE = 0.171$, $p = .150$; nor was there a significant interaction between delay extent and variability, $F(2,74) = 1.179$, $MSE = 0.204$, $p = .322$.

Figure 4.2: Mean log sampling time as a function of interval variability for all nine conditions in Experiment 5A. Different symbol and line styles denote different mean delays. Error bars show standard errors.

### 4.4.4.3 Accuracy

To analyse the effects of the independent factors on accuracy, SPSS™ was used to fit a range of generalized linear models to the data, specifying a binomial error distribution with a logit link function. As mentioned earlier in the prologue to the current experiment, in order to correctly interpret these effects, it is crucial to identify the best-fitting model, including any potential interaction between the dependent measures themselves. The presence of the speed-accuracy tradeoff suggests that latency may indeed be a predictor of accuracy independently of the influence of the controlled variables. Latency was thus included as a covariate in the regression model. Figure 4.3 depicts a potential model for the relationships between the variables in the experiment. The best fitting model was assessed
according to the quasi likelihood under independence model criterion (QIC; Pan, 2001). Each of the fixed-effects factors, covariates and their interactions were systematically included or excluded until the best model was identified.

![Figure 4.3: Hypothetical causal model of the independent and dependent variables in Experiment 5A. Nodes represent variable and arrows represent causal influence.](image)

Each of the fixed-effects factors, covariates and their interactions were systematically included or excluded until the best model was identified. The best model included the intercept with delay and sampling time as fixed effects and no factorial interaction: \( \text{Accuracy} \sim \text{delay} + \log\text{RT} \). Variability was not included as a factor in the best fitting model. In the best model including variability, its influence was not significant, Wald \( \chi^2 = 0.139, p = .933 \). Variability therefore did not contribute to predicting differences in accuracy. Delay had a strongly negative predictive effect on accuracy, Wald \( \chi^2 = 47.64, p < .001 \), while sampling time was a positive predictor, Wald \( \chi^2 = 10.18, p < .005 \).

It is also perhaps worth noting here that an ANOVA performed on the data, although an inappropriate choice of analysis, likewise reveals precisely the same results with respect to the independent variables, that is, a significant main effect of delay and no significant effect of variability.
4.4.5 Discussion

The results confirm that introducing a delay between the cause and effect made the task of identifying the true cause more difficult. Delay extent was a potent predictor of both sampling time and choice accuracy, with longer delays resulting in longer latencies and lower accuracies. This finding replicates that of Young and Nguyen (2009) and is consistent with the effects of temporal delays throughout the learning literature. In addition, evidence for a speed-accuracy tradeoff was obtained, with longer decision times tending to reduce error frequency, consistent with the bulk of existing research on decision making. This was particularly notable in light of the fact that longer sampling times and lower accuracy were both common effects of increasing delays, meaning accuracy and latency were predisposed to be negatively rather than positively correlated with one another. The effect of interval variability meanwhile was negligible on either accuracy or latency. The key determinant of difficulty therefore appeared to be overall contiguity; whether this was imperfect or constant across trials was of little consequence. I did not, therefore, replicate
the facilitatory effect of variability from Young and Nguyen’s study. At the same time, I also failed to replicate the facilitatory effects of predictability from the preceding chapter. This does not readily lend support to the predictability hypothesis.

An explanation for Young and Nguyen’s (2009) results has already been outlined in terms of participants selecting their target based on sporadic instances of cause-effect contiguity licensed by variability. Meanwhile in Chapter 3 where opposing results were obtained, a potential explanation for a top-down facilitatory effect of predictability was forwarded in terms of providing an impression of a consistent causal mechanism. Why then in the current task are participants apparently failing to make use of either potential cue?

In the original experiment of Young and Nguyen (2009), it was considered that temporal regularities might be overshadowed by the complex dynamic environment that the video game setting provided. The goal of the current experiment was to remove the distraction provided by extraneous stimuli in such an environment and thus allow participants to make full use of the available cues in terms of temporal distributions of events. On the one hand it seems at first glance that this aim was unsuccessful, since no facilitatory effect of predictability manifested. On the other hand, the advantage for variability that Young and Nguyen reported was no longer present. If two potential strategies by which learners reach a decision may be postulated – either selecting based on occasional contiguous cause-effect pairings and thus preferring variability, or instead recognizing a consistent temporal interval as evidence for a causal mechanism and thus preferring predictability – then use of these strategies equally between participants, will have the overall effect of cancelling each other out. The results of the current experiment could therefore be interpreted as a shift in the number of participants adopting the latter strategy over the former (compared to Young and Nguyen’s paradigm), though with neither strategy being dominant. Such a suggestion must be treated with caution however. While Young and Nguyen’s results provide some evidence that participants might be adopting the former strategy, there is not yet evidence that other participants might be adopting the latter strategy, at least not on this particular task; hence this account cannot yet be validated.

Moving beyond such speculation then, there remain more solid explanations for the lack of a facilitatory effect of predictability that can be addressed experimentally, and which shall now be discussed.
In order for temporal predictability to facilitate causal induction in the top-down manner suggested by cognitive accounts, then constancy of temporal interval must first be detected. A participant will need to experience a number of cause-effect pairings before it can be recognized that delays are consistent. This is particularly true where there are more than one causal candidates involved, as each must be focused on separately. If only small samples are taken then interval constancy might not even be recognized and therefore cannot act as a cue to causality. While in Experiment 3 no overall effect of increasing the duration of conditions was found, participants still had a minimum of two minutes exploration time, with a mean response rate of 20 per minute across conditions and participants. This would presumably give the participants enough evidence to recognize the constancy of the temporal interval if such constancy was present. Furthermore, while there is no direct motivation for participants to respond, the fixed sampling time and lack of alternative behavioural opportunities may have prompted participants to occupy themselves by actively investigating the causal link rather than just sitting there doing nothing.

In contrast, in Young and Nguyen’s (2009) task, participants were free to navigate the environment with apparently no restriction on the minimum amount of observation time and information sampling they had to undergo prior to selecting a target. Decision making may therefore have been on the basis of fairly sparse data. Young and Nguyen acknowledged that players “were not motivated to obtain large observation samples” (p.309). Sampling times in the current study were likewise self-truncated. No instruction was given regarding recommended minimum observation time; control of this parameter was ceded completely to participants. There was also no incentive (besides getting the answer correct) for participants to increase the amount of information sampled, and no penalty was applied for incorrect responses (besides the feedback that the choice was incorrect), so there was no deterrent from making hasty decisions. It should come as little surprise then that the overall mean decision time was just 15.9s which is less than four trials sampled per condition. It seems very unlikely that participants could have identified a consistent temporal interval from such limited data; perhaps therefore it is to be expected that predictability should make such little difference in a task such as this.

The difficulty in perceiving predictability is further compounded by the presence of multiple alternative causes. While one might feasibly notice over the course of four trials
that a single cause produces its effect following a constant delay, this would be next to impossible with three causal candidates all competing for attention over such a short space of time. Participants would need to be able to isolate individual causal candidates (focusing on one at a time while ignoring the others) in order to recognize interval constancy, which in itself is a challenging task that would likely require extended observation. Furthermore, with the potential for foils to come between the cause and the effect, some intervals might contain intervening stimuli while others might be unfilled. This may disrupt subjective perception of the interval (Grondin, 1993; Rammsayer & Lima, 1991) making the task of identifying predictably doubly difficult.

As well as the self-truncated sampling times providing an obstacle for the detection of predictability, this may also predispose participants to making a greater number of errors with fixed delays. A small number of participants made very rapid decisions after observing just a solitary effect. Presumably, under such limited evidence, they selected that causal candidate that was most temporally proximal to the effect on that particular trial. It is unlikely, particularly in the case of long fixed delays, that the correct target will be selected via such a strategy. As already stated, there is a greater likelihood, on a given trial, that a foil will be more contiguous with the effect than the true cause under fixed compared to variable delays. If an observer experiences a contiguous foil early on and is particularly “trigger-happy” they may incorrectly select this as the target. The frequency with which such errors are made will be exacerbated with long fixed delays since the true cause would always be temporally separated from its effect (while this is not necessarily guaranteed with variability). Thus, quicker responses will tend to result in more errors for fixed delays. Research suggests that such impulsive choice is often more likely in males than in females (Claes, Vertommen, & Braspenninck, 2000; D'Zurilla, Maydeu-Olivares, & Kant, 1998) which would account for the pattern of results obtained by Young and Nguyen where males made considerably more errors than females under fixed 2s delays. The opposite was however true in the current experiment, where males outperformed females under fixed 2s delays with 44% correct choices compared to 27%, which might to some extent account for the failure to replicate Young and Nguyen’s (2009) advantage for variability.
Clearly, the small samples that arose from self-truncation of observation times can potentially have a significant bearing on the results with regard to the effect of predictability. Different findings may well have been obtained had learners been given sampling opportunities of a pre-determined duration (as they were in the experiments in Chapter 2) and experienced more pairings of cause and effect. Thus, the following experiment aimed to increase the amount of information sampled by participants. The most obvious means of doing so would be to introduce a fixed number of trials or a minimum observation time, forcing participants to experience a given amount of information. Additionally, a disincentive for making impulsive decisions could be provided by introducing a penalty for incorrect choices.

4.5 Experiment 5B

Having failed to discern conclusive evidence from this experiment regarding the influence of predictability in observational causal decision-making, the data and paradigm were examined more closely in an attempt to ascertain why this might be the case. The apparent difficulty is that participants are generally not allowing themselves enough sampling time, and thus experience with the cause-effect relation, in order to actually detect interval constancy. As a consequence, predictability cannot act as a cue. In order for the paradigm to be a useful tool for probing the effects of predictability, suitable modifications are called for that can prompt participants to observe larger samples and increase sensitivity to temporal information.

One element of the experimental design overlooked in the first replication was that Young and Nguyen's (2009) task required participants to make eight successive shots to successfully destroy the target in each case. Such an increase in response requirement in turn increases the time cost of making an incorrect target selection, and should accordingly prompt participants to extend sampling time and improve the likelihood of a correct choice. However, because my adaptation of the paradigm took participants away from the first-person-shooter environment, it did not really make any sense to ask them to select the target eight consecutive times before their decision registered. Instead, a ten-second time penalty for an incorrect target selection was added to the experiment. This should provide an incentive for participants to exercise more restraint and make sufficient observations to give
them a reasonable chance of making the correct response, since presumably participants will not want their time to be occupied by the experiment any longer than necessary.

In order for the paradigm to be receptive to the effects of predictability, participants also need to be prevented from making a decision based on the first trial they experience. The feature of temporal predictability based on constancy of interval requires experience of more than one cause-effect pairing, in order that intervals may be compared. Predictability therefore cannot possibly be perceived on the basis of a single trial. To address this, a minimum observation period was introduced. Participants were prevented from making their selection until five trials had elapsed. After this point they were free to make their response whenever they wished; they could continue to observe the stream of evidence if so desired, or make their response immediately the opportunity became available. Both the time penalty and the minimum observation period were clearly and explicitly described to participants in the instructions. Through these alterations, it was anticipated that participants would observe more cause-effect instances and thus have more of an opportunity to recognize the consistency of the temporal interval between the true cause and the effect.

4.5.1 Method

4.5.1.1 Participants

40 undergraduate psychology students from Cardiff University completed the experiment to receive course credit. Due to a program malfunction, two participants failed to experience all the experimental conditions and their data was thus disregarded, leaving a total of 38 participants contributing data to the analysis.

4.5.1.2 Design

The basic design was identical to the previous experiment, using the same independent and on-screen stimuli, with a few minor modifications to the procedure. Firstly, a ten-second time penalty for incorrect choices was applied. If a participant failed to select the correct target, explicit feedback was provided informing the participant that their choice was incorrect and that a time penalty of ten seconds would follow. The ‘continue’ button that allowed progression to the next condition did not appear until this time had elapsed. Secondly, a minimum observation period of five trials was introduced. Participants were informed that any response made before this point would be ineffective. The end of
this minimum period was signified by the appearance of three boxes labelled 1, 2 and 3, beneath the respective buttons, immediately following the fifth trial. These boxes could then be clicked on with the mouse to select the desired target. This represents one further small alteration from the first experiment in that participants now clicked an on-screen selection box to indicate their choice rather than pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard. Qualitative feedback provided in the previous experiment such as “I meant to press 3 but slipped and pressed 2 instead” suggested that accidental key presses may have contributed to erroneous selections. This modification made it less likely that participants would inadvertently press a different key than intended, since the button were situated fairly widely apart. It was emphasized in the instructions given that the appearance of the on-screen buttons was not a signal to respond and participants need not make their decision as soon as the opportunity became available, but could continue to observe for as long as they felt necessary to arrive at the correct decision.

4.5.1.3 Apparatus & Materials

All participants completed the experiment in the same small computer lab that was used in Experiment 5A, with the same apparatus and software. The program was a minor modification of the previous experiment as described above.

4.5.1.4 Procedure

The instructions given to participants were identical to those in the previous experiment with the addition of information pertaining to the changes made. Instructions thus informed participants that an incorrect selection would result in a ten-second time penalty before they could proceed to the next condition; that each condition had a minimum observation time during which they would be prevented from selecting the target; and that after this minimum time, numbered boxes would appear beneath the respective buttons, on which they could click to select their target. It was emphasized that the appearance of the boxes did not signal the end of the condition, and participants need not make their decision as soon as the opportunity became available; instead the event sequences would persist beyond this point and they could continue to observe for as long as they felt necessary to make an informed decision.
4.5.2 Results

As for the previous study, each participant provided an accuracy and latency score in each of the nine conditions. Accuracy improved overall (81.3% correct target selection compared to 62.6% in Experiment 5A), \( t(653) = 5.560, p < .0005 \). Latencies were also significantly longer, increasing from 15.9s to 27.1s, \( t(682) = 14.821, p < .0005 \).

Mean percentage accuracy and mean log sampling time across all nine conditions were again calculated for individual participants. In a remarkable reversal from the previous experiment, a strong negative correlation was found between sampling time and accuracy, \( r = -0.557, n = 38, p < 0.001 \). In other words, participants who sampled more information also made more incorrect choices. This is the inverse of the classic speed-accuracy tradeoff that is typical of forced-choice discrimination tasks. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.5.

![Figure 4.5: Scatter plot showing participants’ mean percentage accuracy as a function of their mean log sampling time across all nine conditions in Experiment 5B.](image)

Repeated-measures binomial logistic regressions confirmed the violation of the speed-accuracy tradeoff across participants. Latency was overall a negative predictor of accuracy, \( \beta = -8.935, SE = 1.360, \text{Wald } \chi^2 = 43.17, p < .001 \), such that longer sampling time actually diminished the likelihood of a correct response. This pattern was consistent at
each level of delay; at 0.5s, $\beta = -27.53$, $SE = 9.606$, Wald $\chi^2 = 8.106$, $p < .005$, $\beta = -12.43$, $SE = 2.614$, Wald $\chi^2 = 22.62$, $p < .001$, and 2s, $\beta = -7.315$, $SE = 1.803$, Wald $\chi^2 = 16.46$, $p < .001$.

### 4.5.2.1 Sampling Time

Figure 4.6 shows mean log sampling times for each of the nine conditions. Longer latencies with increasing cause-effect delays is an immediately noticeable pattern, with little discernible effect of variability. These impressions were confirmed by a $3 \times 3$ repeated measures ANOVA, finding firstly a significant main effect of delay, $F(2,74) = 66.89$, $MSE = 0.041$, $\eta^2_p = .644$, $p < .001$, but no significant effect of variability, $F(2,74) = 1.632$, $MSE = 0.040$, $p = .203$, nor a significant interaction, $F(2,74) = 1.451$, $MSE = 0.049$, $p = .220$. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons between levels of delay found that sampling times with delays of 2s ($M = 3.435$, $SD = 0.288$) were significantly longer than those at both 1s ($M = 3.215$, $SD = 0.207$), $t(113) = 3.160$, $p < .005$, which in turn were longer than those at 0.5s ($M = 3.141$, $SD = 0.161$), $t(113) = 7.649$, $p < .001$, verifying that latencies increased with delay.

![Figure 4.6](image_url)

*Figure 4.6:* Mean log sampling time as a function of interval variability for all nine conditions in Experiment 5B. Different symbol and line styles denote different mean delays.
4.5.2.2 Accuracy

For the analysis of accuracy, the generalized linear model was again used to assess the best fitting model, systematically adding or eliminating factors until the lowest QIC was obtained. The best model included the intercept with delay, sampling and factorial combination of delay and sampling time as fixed effects: Accuracy ~ delay + logRT + delay * logRT. As for the previous experiment, variability was not a significant predictor of accuracy and was excluded from model. Delay entered into the expected negative predictive relationship with accuracy, Wald $\chi^2 = 9.660, p < .01$. In contrast to the previous experiment however, sampling time was a strongly negative predictor of accuracy, Wald $\chi^2 = 36.85, p < .001$. Accuracy was also significantly predicted by the interaction of delay and sampling time, Wald $\chi^2 = 9.006, p < .05$. The nature of the interaction was such that at longer sampling times, accuracy was lower for longer delays than shorter delays.

Figure 4.7: Mean percentage accuracy as a function of interval variability for all nine conditions in Experiment 5B. Different symbol and line styles denote different mean delays.
4.5.3 Discussion

The key difference between this experiment and its predecessor were the manipulations to increase sampling time via an enforced observation period of 20s minimum and penalizing incorrect answers. The aim in doing so was to provide enough experience with the temporal interval in order that any facilitatory effect that interval regularity might contribute can actually be exerted.

4.5.3.1 A Speed-Accuracy Violation

A side-effect of these alterations that is immediately apparent on inspection of Figure 4.6 is that overall accuracy increased significantly from the previous experiment. This suggests that the additional sampling obtained from the extended observations enabled participants to make better, more informed choices. Paradoxically though, in terms of individual participant performance, longer latencies were actually accompanied by more errors. This is a complete reversal of the speed-accuracy tradeoff typically seen in decision-making tasks relationship and that was in fact obtained in the previous experiment. Such a finding, while counterintuitive, is not unknown in the literature. Errors are sometimes slower than correct responses, mainly when the task is difficult and an emphasis is placed on accuracy (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Swensson, 1972). However, the high level of overall accuracy attained in this experiment suggests that task difficulty is unlikely to be responsible for this violation of the SAT. An alternative candidate that immediately suggests itself is the effect of delays, which tended to both increase latency and reduce accuracy, thus naturally predisposing a negative relationship between the two. Yet, regression analysis revealed an independent influence of sampling time above and beyond that partialled out onto delay. To explain this finding then, it is worth briefly mentioning a number of contrasting accounts of decision-making that can encapsulate violations of the normal speed-accuracy relationship.

In a controversial example, Fiedler and Kareev (2006) argued that small samples can result in more accurate choices since the high dispersion of a small sample distribution tends to amplify an existing population contingency. They also suggest that the relative advantage of small samples is most apparent when sampling is self-truncated, as was indeed the case here. Evans and Buehner (2011) meanwhile provide evidence favouring a reflection of the causal structure proposed by Fiedler and Kareev – that is, clear data can
create small samples, rather than small samples creating clear data. According to this view, sampling is ended when the correct choice becomes evident. At the same time, larger samples may incur mental fatigue, resulting in more errors. In addition, Busemeyer (1993) also suggests that the normal relation between speed and accuracy may be violated when discriminability between alternatives is low, which was also true of the current experiment.

Applying such perspectives to these results, it would seem that decisions which were relatively easy were made quickly (once a response was permitted by the experiment). Meanwhile difficult decisions prompted longer deliberation, but the additional sampling was not sufficient to increase frequency of correct target selection, and these slower responses were still more likely to be incorrect. What then seems something of a mystery is how the manipulations, which extended sampling time, improved overall accuracy if sampling time and accuracy are negatively correlated? To address this, the data from the previous experiment was examined more closely. Across participants and conditions, nearly 25% of all choices made occurred before two trials had completed, with accuracy for this subset below 50%, compared to over 66% for decisions made after two or more trials. This suggests that the lack of accuracy in the first experiment was largely attributable to impulsive or careless choices. Here, the introduction of a minimum sampling time eliminated the possibility of making such quick decisions. The change in the nature of the relationship between accuracy and latency from Experiment 5A to 5B, coupled with the overall increase in accuracy, thus demonstrates that this manipulation was effective in reducing the frequency of errors due to insufficient data.

4.5.3.2 Failure to find support for predictability

Although the modifications to the paradigm had a significant influence in terms of increasing overall accuracy, the additional sampling by participants did not appreciably change the influence of delay extent or variability. With regard to delay extent, the results largely echo those of the previous experiment. Longer delays tended to increase both error frequency and sampling time, with the longest delays of two seconds being most problematic. Differences between the two shorter delays were relatively minor. Effects of delay variability on both accuracy and latency were once again minimal. Though Figures 4.6 and 4.7 suggest that low variability produced both greater accuracy and lower sampling times (suggesting that ease of decision was facilitated) than either no variability or high
variability, this was not a statistically significant finding. Once again then, I failed to obtain a facilitatory effect of either predictability or variability (although accuracy was slightly but not significantly higher for low-variability compared to no-variability). These results therefore provide support neither for the predictability hypothesis, nor the alternative argument that sporadic contiguity would make variability preferable. What does this mean in terms of the overall assessment of the predictability hypothesis?

The collective failure to find an advantage for predictability, both in the two experiments presented thus far in this chapter and in those of Young and Nguyen, certainly present a difficult challenge for the temporal predictability hypothesis. The pessimist may be tempted to reject this theory outright. However before undue consternation at the extent to which these results undermine the predictability hypothesis, a number of important points should be taken into consideration. It is worth reminding ourselves that these experiments are all based on a novel paradigm that is markedly different from reliable standards such as the free operant procedure. As such, the suitability of this paradigm for assessing causal learning has not been established. The numerous ways in which this task differs from standard contingency judgments has already been pointed out earlier in the chapter in terms of the arrangement and delivery of stimuli, the required responses, and the dependent measures solicited. Further considerations shall now be addressed that raise additional queries over viability of this paradigm to assess the impact of temporal cues such as predictability.

Firstly, it should be noted that although a minimum observation period was introduced, few participants extended their sampling for much longer than this required amount. Indeed, the overall mean sampling time across all participants and conditions was 27.1s, which is less than two additional trials beyond the mandatory five. This remains in sharp contrast to the two minutes and twenty-or-so response-outcome pairings that were typical of the instrumental experiments in the previous chapter. While it is possible that predictability may have been recognized from seven cause-effect pairings, it is still a difficult task given that participants lacked the power to isolate individual causes or exercise any control over the timing of their occurrences. It is still therefore not necessarily a given that participants were in fact able to notice the constancy of temporal interval in the fixed delay conditions.
Yet despite this, the overall percentage of correct target selection rose sharply to over 80%. The additional 12s taken (on average) per condition was thus sufficient for an improvement of nearly 20% in accuracy. The implication is that had the minimum observation time been increased much further then accuracy may well have approached ceiling; differences between conditions would thus be negligible and the experiment would provide no meaningful data regarding the manipulated variables. Efforts to make predictability more apparent by further increasing sampling time beyond the restrictions imposed for this experiment would therefore likely be an exercise in futility.

4.5.3.3 Temporal order violations may reveal the true cause

Moreover, the longer that one observes these sequences of events in this particular arrangement, the more opportunities will become available for the causal relation to be “given away” by a single trial. To explain: One reason that this paradigm was selected as a probe for temporal predictability was because the influence of temporal cues was expected to be amplified. Given the deterministic nature of the experiment – the true cause always produces the effect, and every trial always includes all three candidate causes – contingency between cause and effect ceases to be a useful cue. Temporal information is thus the only source of information that can be used to successfully rule out the foils and identify the true cause. However, the available temporal information may provide a more potent and fundamental indicator of causality than either contiguity or predictability – temporal order. Recall that the candidate causes may occur at any point within the first three seconds of the trial, and the occurrence of the effect is not tied to the end of the trial but can occur at any point. Consequently there is the possibility that on any given trial, the true cause may occur relatively early, and be followed by its effect, before either of the two foils have occurred. On a trial such as this, the true cause is immediately revealed as such, since the principle of temporal priority (that causes must precede their effects) rules out the other two candidates. The use of a trial structure, forcing all candidate causes to occur fairly closely together in time, may to some extent alleviate this problem, as it prevents individual candidates from being isolated, but it does not eliminate it completely.

Participants may well be capable of realizing that depending on the points at which the causes occur, some trials may be more useful and informative than others. As an obvious example, a trial when all causes coincidentally occur at the same time (at least on a
perceptual level) is of no use in distinguishing between them. Meanwhile a trial that rules out a foil as a potential cause through temporal order violations as described above represents the most useful configuration of events in terms of facilitating correct target identification. Participants may simply wait for a trial (or combination of trials) that reveals the true cause or makes the decision obvious (for instance one foil may be ruled out during one trial while the second is ruled out in another). In other words, the decision may be based neither on contiguity nor predictability.

Contiguity does, however, greatly increase the likelihood of such an occurrence. For instance, consider a fixed delay of 0.5s. With trials of 3s length, if the true cause occurred during the first 1s (i.e. the first third) of the trial, the following two candidates would both need to occur after 1.5s or later (i.e. during the second half) to guarantee that the effect from the true cause preceded both of the foils. A probability estimate of this configuration is thus $1/3 \times 1/2 \times 1/2 = 1/12$. If instead the delay was of 1s, the two candidates would need to occur after 2s or later (i.e. during the final third of the trial) if the true cause occurred during the first 1s, and the probability is then $1/3^3 = 1/27$. Predictability meanwhile does not improve the likelihood of this configuration. In fact, the likelihood decreases exponentially with longer delays and so the overall likelihood is somewhat greater with variable delays (distributed evenly about a central point) than delays fixed at the same central point. This may be likened to the way in which variable delays may result in a greater net associative associated strength than fixed delays of equivalent mean duration (see Figure 2.1).

Since such a potent indicator of causality may present itself in this kind of decision making task, it is small wonder that the variability of delay seemingly matters so little. It has already been noted that attempts to improve sensitivity of the paradigm to predictability by increasing number of observed pairings led to a sharp escalation of overall accuracy, leading to concerns that further such efforts may lead to performance becoming indistinguishable between conditions. Such concerns are now heightened, since as the time spent observing the event sequences progresses, so the occurrence of a temporal order violation by a foil becomes increasingly likely, presumably making it evident which is the true cause. It would thus seem that this paradigm is poorly suited to the investigation of how predictability shapes the inductive process.
4.5.3.4 Alternative Applications

These concerns should not however detract from the considerable potential of this paradigm, which may have numerous other promising applications. In recent years there has been considerable interest in developing video games as learning and educational tools. Games are engaging and can motivate students to learn through entertainment (Kim, Park, & Baek, 2009). Research has suggested that games such as first-person shooters may confer genuine benefits in terms of general cognitive or behavioural performance, such as increasing reaction times and speed of action processing (Dye, Green, & Bavelier, 2009), and may even be applied as a tool in psychotherapy (Ceranoglu, 2010). Even aside from the obvious attraction of the video game, the task itself also represents a new variety of a causal decision-making problem with which various aspects of learning may be explored. Indeed, Young and colleagues have already adapted their paradigm to investigate how decision time and accuracy are affected by time pressure (Young, Sutherland, & Cole, 2011), number of options or causal candidates (Nguyen, Young, & Cole, 2010), and probabilistic rather than deterministic causes (Young, Sutherland, Cole, & Nguyen, 2011). Future work might wish to consider how performance on a task such as this might relate to individual traits such as need-for-cognition, ruminative style, or with scores on an impulsivity questionnaire such as Barratt’s Impulsivity Scale (Barratt & Patton, 1983; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995).

4.5.3.5 “Back to Basics”

A number of valid explanations have been advanced as to why predictability has failed to demonstrate an influence in this particular strand of learning tasks. The fact remains, however, that a lack of constant contiguity apparently does not preclude the correct identification of a cause from a series of prospective candidates. In a causal decision-making task of this nature, predictability is apparently not a feature that ‘makes or breaks’ the detection of a causal relationship. Indeed, although not evident in the experiments presented here, an advantage for variability has been found by Young and Nguyen (2009), and a feasible explanatory framework has been constructed to account for these effects that would seem to be in direct competition with the temporal predictability hypothesis.
Recall however that the predictability hypothesis specifically referred to the process of elemental causal induction. Young et al (2005) purported that the extent to which a single candidate cause was a good predictor of whether and when an effect occurred determined the extent of the causal impression between the two, providing examples such as poison ivy causing allergies or a bat striking a ball. However the two experiments presented in this chapter thus far, although concerning causal attribution, are not in the strictest sense elemental causal induction. From a Bayesian perspective, elemental causal induction is the task of choosing between the two models $h_1$ and $h_0$, with temporal predictability considered to be more likely under the former than the latter. Here instead the hypothesis space includes three possible causal models (constrained by the experimental instructions), $h_1$, $h_2$ and $h_3$. In each of these, background causes are ruled out (by virtue of the instructions). Unlike the comparison in elemental causal induction between $h_0$ (where variability is likely) and $h_1$ (where predictability is likely), predictability in this task is a priori equally likely across all models and therefore less useful as a diagnostic cue.

Furthermore, besides the obvious differences in the structure and demands of the task that have already been emphasized, there is one clear alternative explanation for these conflicting results that has not yet been considered. The elephant in the room, so to speak, is the distinction outlined in the opening of this chapter; that between observation and intervention. Perhaps the reason for the lack of influence of predictability in Young and Nguyen’s study, and the two analogues presented here, is simply because these are observational studies. It may be the case that observational learning is not susceptible to the influences of predictability and this instead remains an epiphenomenon of instrumental learning. As discussed earlier, there are a number of plausible reasons why this might be the case, not least the special status held by active intervention in causal reasoning (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Leising et al., 2008). One might therefore be tempted to infer that intentional action or deliberate intervention is necessary for predictability to exert an influence, and to attribute the disparity between these sets of results to differences between operant and observational learning. There are however far too many disparities between the paradigm used here and typical contingency judgment protocols, above and beyond the distinction between observational and instrumental learning, to permit any such conclusion with confidence from these results alone. Instead to address this proposition, an
observational learning task is required that is a closer analogue of the instrumental studies of the previous chapter. The remainder of the current chapter takes up this challenge.

4.6 Experiment 6A

There is thus far a dearth of support for the predictability hypothesis from the observational learning studies presented in this chapter. The facilitatory effect of predictability that was evident in the preceding instrumental studies has not been replicated in a task requiring the identification of a cause from multiple candidates. It should however be acknowledged that this task was an adaptation of a novel paradigm that is quite unlike those traditionally used to study contingency estimation and judgments of causal efficacy. Experiments such as those of, for instance, Alloy and Abramson (1979), Wasserman et al. (1983), Dickinson et al. (1984), Shanks et al. (1989), Shanks and Dickinson (1991), Reed (1992), Buehner and May (2003), Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2005), and White (2009), all concerned the assessment of the causal relation between a single candidate cause and effect over successive learning trials – in other words, elemental causal induction.

Young et al. (2005), when outlining the predictability hypothesis, provide specific example referring to elemental causal induction, such as bat hitting a ball or poison ivy causing allergies). The predictability hypothesis was specifically developed as an account of this particular process, arguing that the predictive power of a candidate cause provides evidence for the existence of a causal relation compared to no such relation existing. The task used for the first two experiments in this chapter, although requiring a causal decision, is quite clearly distinct from elemental causal induction, and may in fact tap fundamentally distinct learning mechanisms that are required for ‘target selection’ (Heekeren, Marrett, & Ungerleider, 2008).

This now leaves two major competing explanations for the lack of a predictability effect in the latter two studies. Is it because these studies involved observation rather than intervention, or is it because these tasks did not involve elemental causal induction? To definitively address whether temporal predictability can facilitate causal induction through observation alone, an observational variant of the elemental causal induction paradigm is required.
4.6.1 An Observational Analogue of the Elemental Causal Judgment Task

Accordingly, the following experiment adopted a paradigm that retained most of the same basic features as the instrumental free operant procedure, with the primary difference being that participants passively observe a sequence of candidate causes and effects instead of actively generating them through instrumental responses. Rather than choosing the correct cause from a number of candidates, participants were once again required to evaluate the causal efficacy of a single candidate causal relation, namely, the effect of a button being pressed on the illumination of a triangle on the computer screen. Obviously, the participant could not be permitted to press this button directly, so the question then was how to govern the occurrence of the candidate causes and subsequent effects. In order to provide the closest replica of an instrumental study, it was decided to use one of the experiments in the previous chapter to form a direct template for the current study, using the same factors, conditions and patterns of event occurrence. Since the timing of every response and outcome made during each experiment was recorded, this data can be used to generate a stream of events and play this back to an observer. This previously generated sequence of causes and effects can then simply be observed as cues and outcomes. The key decision then was which of the previous studies to select as the template. It was decided that the ideal candidate should include more than two levels of predictability, in order that any trend in judgments with predictability can be more accurately described. Secondly, in order to successfully compare predictability effects between instrumental and observational learning, the instrumental study used for comparison needs to have obtained reliable main effects. In addition, since pre-recorded data was presented, it was also advantageous for the selected study to have a large sample size, thus providing a wide range of possible event sequences to choose from. Experiment 2B appeared to fit all these criteria well, and was therefore chosen as the basis for the following study.

One small dilemma arose from this choice. The original study included six non-contingent control conditions. These effectively provided no real insight as to the effects of predictability, since any outcomes were not contingent on responses and intervals were thus uncontrolled. Instead, these conditions were added to provide contrast with the master conditions. Recall that the removal of background effects in Experiment 2A led to speculation that the task became trivial and therefore minimized the influence of
predictability. The subsequent manipulation of adding control conditions in Experiment 2B meanwhile appeared to be successful in improving sensitivity to temporal information. However, it seems rather uneconomical to double the length of this experiment solely for this purpose. At the same time, the alternative method of including background effects might obscure the objective perception of interval regularity. The question thus arose to which, if either, of these methods of increasing uncertainty should be included.

The key concern in the earlier instrumental experiments was that if a participant wished to test the hypothesis that the base rate was zero, they simply had to withhold responding for a certain period of time. Removing the option of direct responding eliminates this opportunity. Even if the event sequence includes a long period with no cues, the inability to test the hypothesis directly through intervention may well prevent any firm conclusions being drawn (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006). Concerns over the task becoming trivial therefore seem to be less pertinent to observational learning. Furthermore, whereas in an instrumental learning task an awareness of one's own responses is assumed, in the observational experiment one must pay close attention throughout in order to notice when cues are presented. The experiment is thus more demanding in terms of attentional resources. It may well therefore be rather difficult for participants to maintain concentration for twelve conditions, each of two minutes duration, all identical in appearance, while at the same time being prevented from active investigation. It was therefore considered that the task would be challenging enough even without control conditions and learners would be reliant on all available cues, including temporal predictability if indeed such information can aid the process, in order to evaluate the causal relation. Moreover, since the analogue of the rather complex task of Young and Nguyen (2009) failed to find any effect of varying the temporal intervals, here there was a compulsion to provide as simple and straightforward a paradigm as possible to investigate temporal variability in an observational task. Accordingly, the master conditions alone from Experiment 2B were utilized for a more streamlined study.
4.6.2 Method

4.6.2.1 Participants

33 undergraduate psychology students at Cardiff University completed the experiment to receive course credit.

4.6.2.2 Design

The task marked a return to the standard causal judgement paradigm, replaying event sequences from an earlier experiment, from which the design is hence largely inherited. Experiment 2B was chosen as the template, since this study provided robust findings and included three levels of interval range, providing a better insight as to the trend of judgments as a function of predictability. For the sake of simplicity and economy, only the master conditions (where the cause actually generated the effect according to the specified intervals) were selected, ignoring the non-contingent yoked conditions. Condition (master/yoked) as a factor was therefore eliminated, leaving six experimental conditions arising from the factorial combination of mean Delay (3s/6s) and interval Range (0s/3s/6s) in a 2×3 within-subjects design.

Let us briefly recap the implementation of the factors delay extent and variability in determining temporal intervals in the preparation. For conditions with zero variability, intervals were fixed at the specified delay. Where the delay was variable, the nominal delay instead represented the midpoint of a range defining the limits from which the interval could be taken of the possible interval values on any given instance. Over successive occurrences, the mean interval should approximate to the nominal value. With a wider interval range, the variability of the intervals is increased, and the less predictable the condition becomes. In contrast, conditions with a fixed delay entail maximal temporal predictability. See Figure 3.4 for a schematic representation of the temporal ranges of the conditions.

4.6.2.3 Apparatus, Materials and Procedure

Participants were tested in groups in the same small computer lab using the same equipment as for the previous two experiments. The arrangement of stimuli and task procedure was on a parallel with the parent experiment on which it was based. Participants saw a triangle in the centre of the screen and a button beneath this triangle. In addition, an image of a pointing finger, like that used in the two previous experiments, was presented
alongside the button. In the original instrumental paradigm, participants used the mouse
cursor to move over and click on the button to perform a response. Here instead, the
pointing hand was used to signify a button-press. Ordinarily, the hand was situated adjacent
to the button, which was itself in the ‘unpressed’ state (raised in appearance and not
illuminated). At the point where an instance of the cause was scheduled according to the
recorded data (i.e. when a response was made by the previous participant), the hand moved
over the button, which then depressed and illuminated for 250ms, before both hand and
button returned to their original state. If an effect was scheduled, the triangle illuminated in
the usual way, also for 250ms.

The occurrence of causes and effects was simply a carbon copy of the exact same
response and outcome schedule that was generated and experienced by the selected
participant from Experiment 2B. Occurrence of effects was therefore not determined anew
using a probability schedule following occurrence of causes but instead matched the pattern
in the recorded data. No additional background events were inserted into the event
sequence. Since it is yet to be definitively addressed whether predictability may serve as a
cue to the inductive process, the intention was to keep the study fairly short and
straightforward. Accordingly only the six master conditions were retained. By so doing it
was hoped that participants would be more receptive to temporal information and noisy
data from participant inattention would be avoided.

In order that participants may report an informed judgment, they must obtain
adequate experience of the causal relation in question. For the event sequence to provide
useful evidence, it must comprise sufficient pairings of cause and effect so that the
statistical and temporal relationship between them is tangible. As discussed with respect to
the previous two experiments, temporal features such as interval constancy may not
become apparent with small samples, and therefore the influence of such information on
causal judgment cannot be evaluated. In addition, deviation from programmed values has
greater weight with smaller samples which may mean that the encountered data is not truly
representative of the causal relation under investigation. At the same time, if event density
is too high then the true causal relationship may be obscured. It is necessary for the
encountered data stream to also contain periods where no causes are administered, in order
that the baseline occurrence of the effect can be determined. Accordingly, the median
response rate across conditions was calculated for each participant in the original experiment, and a median split was performed. Data from participants whose overall response rates were in the upper and lower quartiles was discarded, thus excluding event streams containing too few or too many responses to provide meaningful data. This still left a total of 30 different data sets from the middle two quartiles that were available for selection. For each new participant in the current experiment, one data set was chosen at random (with replacement) from this sample, with a separate selection for each participant. The event sequences experienced by the previous participant for all six conditions were then replayed to the current participant in the corresponding condition, with the order in which the conditions were experienced also retained. The pattern of events experienced by each participant in the current experiment thus exactly mirrored the pattern generated and experienced by a previous participant. The dependent measure was once again a causal rating provided by participants between 0 and 100. Since each condition lasted for two minutes, when combined with reading time for instructions, this gave a total experiment time of approximately 15 minutes.

4.6.3 Results

4.6.3.1 Causal Ratings

Figure 4.8 shows the mean of the causal ratings provided by participants for the six different conditions. It can clearly be seen that the maximally predictable conditions, where the temporal interval was invariant, received the highest ratings. It seems that judgments decline as interval variability increases and temporal predictability is lost. With longer delays, ratings appear to decline as a linear function of increasing variability, whereas with shorter delays, a negatively accelerated function would appear to better to describe the decline in ratings with variability, as the decline levels off. The effect of delay is less apparent; while ratings are noticeably higher for 3s than 6s where variability is high, the different delays received close to identical mean ratings where variability was intermediate or zero.
Figure 4.8: Mean causal ratings as a function of temporal interval range for all six conditions in Experiment 6A. Different symbol and line styles denote different mean delays.

A 3×2 repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of interval range, with only the linear component reaching significance, $F(1,32) = 11.11, \text{MSE} = 504.5, p < .005, \eta^2_p = .258$. Planned comparisons found a significantly higher ratings for the fixed ($M = 54.55, SE = 3.754$) compared to both the high-variability ($M = 41.52, SE = 3.072$) conditions, $t(65) = 3.401, p < .005$, and the intermediate-variability ($M = 45.97, SE = 3.690$) conditions, $t(65) = 2.408, p < .05$; the difference between intermediate and high variability was non-significant, $t(65) = 1.298, p = .199$. No significant effect of mean delay was obtained, $F(1,32) = 0.546, \text{MSE} = 715.2, p = .465$, nor was there a significant interaction between predictability and delay, $F(2,64) = 0.656, \text{MSE} = 474.1, p = .522$.

4.6.3.2 Cue and outcome patterns

Since all the events in the experiment are simply being played back from pre-recorded data, it is not entirely accurate to suggest that they may be directly influenced by the independent variables. However, these factors could have influenced the behaviour of the participants undergoing the instrumental learning task from which this data was
obtained. For this reason and also for the sake of completeness and consistency with previous experiments, the data for the rates of event occurrence, objective contingency between cause and effect, and actual delays experienced, are reported in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Behavioural data for Experiment 6A. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>delay</th>
<th>range of temporal intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3s</td>
<td>6s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0s</td>
<td>3s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean cause rate (min)</td>
<td>17.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean effect rate (min)</td>
<td>12.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actual P(e</td>
<td>c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean actual delay (ms)</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean causal rating</td>
<td>54.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(32.38)</td>
<td>(26.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to analyse the effect of delay and variability on cue and outcome patterns. Rate of cue occurrence did not vary significantly with delay, $F(1,32) = 0.083, MSE = 157.438, p = .775$. However, there was significant variation with temporal interval range, $F(2,64) = 4.015, MSE = 226.580, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .111$, and a significant delay $\times$ range interaction, $F(2,64) = 3.612, MSE = 175.889, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .101$. Obviously since cues and outcomes were probabilistically linked, outcome rates followed a similar pattern, with no significant effect of delay, $F(1,32) = .467, MSE = 110.239, p = .499$, but significant variation with temporal interval range, $F(2,64) = 4.777, MSE = 139.483, p < 0.012, \eta_p^2 = 0.130$, and a significant interaction between delay and range, $F(2,64) = 4.155, MSE = 100.212, p < 0.02, \eta_p^2 = 0.115$. However, these effects of predictability on cue and outcome rates were unsystematic, and not consistent with the direction of the effect of predictability on ratings, so are not confounded with this finding.
For analysis of the experienced mean delays, seven data points that were more than two standard deviations from the mean were removed. Experienced delay naturally varied significantly with different nominal delays, $F(1,32) = 3252$, $MSE = 13900$, $p < .0005$, $\eta_p^2 = .990$. There was no significant variation with temporal interval range, $F(2,64) = 0.262$, $MSE = 69530$, $p = .771$, and no significant delay × range interaction, $F(2,64) = .077$, $MSE = 110400$, $p = .926$. Mean actual $P(e|c)$ did not vary significantly with delay, $F(1,32) = 0.610$, $MSE = 0.004$, $p = .440$, or range, $F(2,64) = 2.898$, $MSE = 0.011$, $p = .062$, nor was there a significant delay × range interaction, $F(2,64) = 2.023$, $MSE = .005$, $p = .141$. The effects of the independent variables on ratings are therefore not driven by systematic variations in experienced contingency or contiguity between experimental conditions.

Of rather more pressing concern however are the standard deviations reported in Table 4.1. It can clearly be seen that, at the longer mean delay of 6s, there was considerably greater variation for the 6s-range condition than for the 3s-range condition, as would of course be expected. However, this difference is markedly reduced for the shorter 3s delays. In other words, the difference between intermediate and high variability was greater for longer delays compared to shorter delays, which was not intended. Does this pose problems for the interpretation of the causal ratings?

The differences in the causal ratings between these conditions in fact mirrors the pattern of differences in variability. At longer delays, interval variability appreciably increases in accordance with the programmed variability, and ratings decline apparently as a function of this increasing variability. Meanwhile at shorter delays, the objective interval variability increases by a far smaller margin from one level to the next, and ratings similarly show a smaller decline. The higher ratings for short delays compared to long delays (with high variability) may well be attributable to the differences in actual interval variability rather than the differences in delay extent. If this indeed is the case, then one may speculate that had the difference in variability between intermediate and high conditions for the lower delays matched that of the longer delays, then ratings might also have declined in the same linear fashion. In other words, this unexpected findings actually works against the hypothesized effect of predictability, since there is smaller difference in objective variability than expected between different programmed levels of variability. We can therefore be more confident still in the reliability of the main effect of predictability.
However, the absence of the delay effect remains problematic, and shall be further explored in the next experiment.

4.6.4 Discussion

For the first time in this chapter, a significant effect of predictability in an observational learning task has been obtained. Causal judgments were highest with fixed delays, and declined as delay variability increased, in much the same fashion as for the earlier instrumental tasks. This finding demonstrates the capacity of temporal predictability to facilitate causal learning in an observational or classical conditioning analogue of the elemental causal induction task. The implication is that the facilitatory effects of predictability seen in instrumental learning can indeed generalize to observational learning, at least when requirements of the task are similar. Specifically, when the learning preparation calls for causal inference in the sense of providing an evaluative judgement of a single candidate causal relation, such judgments are enhanced by temporal predictability.

The judgments that appear to be primarily driving the main effect of interval range are those given for the fixed conditions. These were the highest judgments provided at both long and short delays and were significantly higher when collapsed across delays than their variable counterparts. It can therefore be declared with some confidence that judgments of causality were enhanced by predictability. The effect of increasing variability was less definitive. While it is evident that increasing interval variability elicited weaker judgments, this deterioration was more pronounced with longer delays, appearing to follow a linear function. At shorter delays however, the decline levelled off as variability increased, suggesting a negatively accelerated function. The analyses report that only the linear component of the main effect was significant. Regardless of its precise functional form, the decline in ratings with loss of predictability is clear.

These effects of temporal predictability are consistent with the instrumental studies reported earlier. Meanwhile, rather surprisingly, no effect of delay extent was found. This marks the first occasion in this body of work where the effect of predictability superseded that of delay. This is in contrast to a plethora of studies in the literature that have previously demonstrated detrimental effects of delays in learning, both in human judgments of causality (Shanks et al., 1989) and conditioning in animals (Grice, 1948; Williams, 1976), which has become a familiar and well-established phenomenon. Indeed, robust and
consistent effects of delay were found in all the instrumental studies presented earlier. The failure to find an effect of delay extent here is therefore a cause for some concern. Buehner and May (2002, 2003, 2004) have demonstrated that delays need not always impair judgments of causality. However, their studies required the presence of additional information, such as prior knowledge of mechanism, to bridge the temporal gap in such circumstances. External cues can also mitigate the effect of delays, such as auditory fillers bridging the temporal gap (Young et al., 2005) or markers delineating trial structure (Greville et al., 2010). Yet no such cues were provided in the current study. What then could have attenuated the impact of delays?

Although Buehner and May (2004) showed that expectation of a delay could mitigate its detrimental impact, according to the strong version of the knowledge mediation hypothesis, an expectation of a delayed mechanism should also result in a weaker perception of causality when events are contiguous, since the data is then inconsistent with mechanism beliefs. However this finding was not obtained; when response and outcome were maximally contiguous, ratings were high regardless of whether contiguity was made plausible or implausible by the cover story. Thus the incompatibility of the expected mechanism was insufficient to negate the facilitatory effect of contiguity. Yet, in a Pavlovian analogue of Buehner and May’s (2002) grenade-launching task, Allan, Tangen, Wood and Shah (2003) managed to achieve the full crossover interaction such that ratings were higher when delay and prior knowledge were congruent both in contiguous and in delayed conditions. If there is a greater bias to expect contiguity in an instrumental rather than an observational learning task, it is possible that experienced contiguity overrode instruction in Buehner and May’s experiments but was subordinate to mechanism belief in Allan et al.’s Pavlovian analogue. It is therefore plausible that contiguity was similarly de-prioritised in the observational experiment reported here and the prominence of predictability as a cue was thus heightened. In Experiment 2A, the decision to remove background effects apparently resulted in the failure of predictability to offer any further facilitation beyond that already provided by contiguity. Here, if the reverse is true and the importance of contiguity as a cue is degraded, then the absence of background effects or control conditions may have exacerbated this overshadowing effect (although their exclusion was, as discussed earlier, a carefully considered decision).
An additional possibility is that the motivational significance of a contiguous outcome may be reduced in an observational learning task. Many normative theories analyse decision-making in terms of utility (Manski, 2000; Mongin, 1997), which is often characterized by a cost-benefit relation. The cost of making a response or an intervention is typically considered in terms of the effort expended by the animal in comparison to the animal’s energy budget (Caraco & Lima, 1987). Meanwhile, the benefit or subjective value conferred by a reward is strongly influenced by the delay until the receipt of that reward, as a vast body of literature on temporal discounting has made clear (e.g. Myerson & Green, 1995). In instrumental performance, contiguity is thus central in determining the utility of a particular response-outcome relation. In contrast, merely observing a cue incurs a negligible energy cost in comparison to performing an instrumental response. As such, contiguity may well have a diminished role in learning from observation.

These concerns over the lack of an effect of delay should not however detract from the principle novel finding from the current study, that causal learning through observation alone can be facilitated by temporal predictability. Participants observing sequences of cues and outcomes obtained from performance of previous participants showed the same improvement in ratings with predictability as that shown by the participants who originally generated the data through instrumental responding. Caution must however be exercised before drawing any firm conclusions from the results of this single study, and four specific arguments may be advanced to suggest that a further experiment is warranted. Firstly, in light of the failure to find any such effects in first two experiments of the this chapter, a replication of the effect obtained using the current paradigm would be desirable in order to improve confidence in this finding. Secondly, despite considerable effort to ensure that cue and outcome rates and timings were comparable with typical human instrumental performance, there remained unplanned differences in event distributions between the experimental conditions that it would be preferable to eliminate. Thirdly, the surprising absence of a delay effect raises some minor methodological concerns with regard to the presence of background effects or control conditions.

The fourth and final concern is perhaps the most crucial to conclusively determining whether temporal predictability can indeed serve as a cue to causality in both instrumental and observational learning. Organisms, particularly humans, may be seen as intentional
agents who perform naïve experiments and engage in hypothesis testing in order to uncover causal mechanisms. As such, they can intervene on the world in a structured manner in an attempt to elucidate meaningful patterns of events. Organisms can also learn vicariously; that is, by observing the behaviour of others. However, many causal mechanisms are inaccessible to or independent of the behaviour of organisms. One of the key benefits afforded by observational learning is that it allows organisms to learn about causal systems on which they cannot directly intervene. At the same time, an important challenge for observational learning is that lack of control over stimulus delivery means there is no guarantee that events will be segregated into meaningful patterns. Causal inference in naturalistic systems, such as learning that the presence of clouds may cause rain or that forest fires may arise from an extended period of hot and dry weather, tends to be made from more haphazard distributions of events quite unlike the structured responding typical of the behaviour of organisms. Such events may be characterized as stochastic processes. A distinction can thus be made between patterns of events that might be emblematic of learning from one’s own behaviour, learning from the behaviour of another, or learning by simply observing events unfold.

The experiments in the previous chapter constitute learning by “doing”; the current study meanwhile falls into the category of “watching it done” (Sobel, 2003). Though the participant observing the events sequences did not directly observe the previous participant performing the action, the event sequences were obtained from human performance. As such, these sequences included patterns of cue occurrence that was characteristic of exploratory behaviour, including rapid successive response bursts, rhythmic responding, and abstinence from responding. If learning through observation can truly be facilitated by temporal predictability, it needs to be demonstrated that predictability can facilitate induction from event sequences that more closely resemble those in naturalistic settings, where such characteristic patterns that might serve as useful diagnostic tools are absent. The goal of the following experiment therefore was to reduce the incidence of these structured patterns of cue presentation and see if the facilitatory effect of predictability obtained in the current experiment can be replicated with a more challenging causal induction task.
4.7 Experiment 6B

Temporal predictability has thus far been demonstrated to facilitate causal induction when evaluating a causal relation, both through one’s own instrumental responding, and also through observation. The third and final step required is to determine whether predictability can facilitate induction when observing events that occur according to a stochastic process rather than in patterns characteristic of the intentional action of an agent.

Accordingly, this experiment utilized a similar observational variant of the elemental causal induction task closely based on the previous paradigm. The essential modification was that this time the distribution of cues and outcomes were not extracted from performance of previous human participants. Instead, the causal candidate occurred according to a probabilistic rate process. The likelihood of obtaining patterns of cues resembling exploratory behaviour, such as successive burst or a long period of abstinence, is therefore reduced, and should thus appear more “natural” (or random) to observers. Furthermore, since the same rate was applied to all conditions in the experiment, this should help ensure equal rates of cue presentation across conditions, whereas the previously recorded instrumental data used in the previous study is more prone to include greater fluctuations in response rates.

In addition, non-contingent background effects were reintroduced to the experiment. This manipulation was made for two reasons. Firstly, this makes the task more challenging and provides a more strenuous test of the reliability of the predictability effect, as objective perception of predictability may be impaired by a non-contingent effect occurring between the cue and its programmed outcome. Secondly, the absence of a main effect of delay in the previous study was unexpected and drew comparisons with Experiment 2A where a similar procedure similarly saw the influence of one factor overshadow the other. By making the task more challenging it may prompt participant to make full use of the available cues and thus restore the effect of delay extent.

4.7.1 Method

4.7.1.1 Participants

33 participants completed the experiment either voluntarily or to receive partial course credit. One participant self-reported as completely failing to understand the task, hence their data was discarded.
4.7.1.2 Design

The same 2×3 within-subjects design as for the previous experiment was again applied here. The factors delay (3s/6s) combined with interval range (0s/3s/6s) provided six conditions, each lasting for two minutes, with participants providing a causal rating from 0-100 as the dependent measure.

4.7.1.3 Apparatus, Materials & Procedure

The experiment was carried out in the same location using the same equipment as for the previous experiment. The changes made from the previous experiment did not affect the outward appearance or requirements of the task, thus the arrangement of stimuli, instructions, and basic perceptual experience for participants was also essentially identical.

The first modification from the previous experiment was that the occurrence of cues or candidate causes was no longer obtained from pre-recorded data. Instead, the timeline was divided into a series of small segments during which there was a fixed probability of a cue being presented. Specifically, after every 500ms, there was a 1/6 chance of cue presentation. This created, on average, a rate of one cue every three seconds, which is in line with the approximate 20 responses per minute observed in the preceding instrumental studies. Following cue presentation, the outcome was delivered according to the appropriate probability schedule with the appropriate temporal interval. Once again, the probability of the outcome following the cue was set to 0.75. The temporal intervals were likewise determined by the nominal delay and range of variation about this central point for a given condition. The delays and ranges used were identical to the previous experiment.

The second modification was the application of background effects at a pseudo-random rate of one every ten seconds on average. In other words, the first background effect occurred at a randomly determined point between 0-10s into the condition, the second between 10-20s, and so on.

4.7.2 Results

4.7.2.1 Causal Ratings

Figure 4.9 shows the mean of the causal ratings provided by participants for the eight different conditions. As has become a fairly prevalent feature of the experiments presented in this thesis, the condition with fixed short delays attracted noticeably higher ratings than all other conditions. The familiar effect of delay also appears to have
resurfaced, with short-delay conditions receiving uniformly higher ratings than long-delay conditions. Ratings also appear to generally decline with increasing temporal interval range, though this is more pronounced with short than long delays.

A 2×3 repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of delay, \( F(1,31) = 12.73, \quad MSE = 406.0, \quad p = .001, \quad \eta^2_p = .291 \). The effect of interval range was also significant, \( F(2,62) = 5.352, \quad MSE = 314.0, \quad p < .01, \quad \eta^2_p = .147 \), but there was no significant delay × range interaction, \( F(2,62) = 0.169, \quad MSE = 370.5, \quad p = .845 \). Only the linear component of the main effect of range was significant, \( F(1,31) = 7.805, \quad MSE = 422.9, \quad p < .01, \quad \eta^2_p = .201 \). Planned comparisons found that ratings for the fixed conditions (\( M = 46.48, \quad SE = 3.090 \)) were significantly higher than both the maximally-variable conditions (\( M = 36.33, \quad SE = 2.895 \), \( t(63) = 2.902, \quad p < .01 \), and the intermediate-variability conditions (\( M = 40.22, \quad SE = 3.110 \), \( t(63) = 2.086, \quad p < .05 \); the difference between intermediate and high variability was not significant at the 0.05 level, \( t(63) = 1.206, \quad p = .232 \).

4.7.2.2 Cue and outcome patterns

Table 4.2 reports the mean cue and outcome rates, experienced contingency and contiguity, and ratings provided by participants, for each condition. Rate of cause occurrence did not vary significantly with delay, \( F(1,31) = 0.950, \quad MSE = 31.66, \quad p = .337 \), or temporal interval range, \( F(2,62) = 0.334, \quad MSE = 42.25, \quad p = .559 \), nor was there a significant delay × range interaction, \( F(2,62) = 0.448, \quad MSE = 26.34, \quad p = .641 \). Obviously since effect rate is directly determined by cause rate, a similar pattern emerged, with no effect of delay, \( F(1,31) = 1.748, \quad MSE = 21.03, \quad p = .196 \), or temporal interval range, \( F(2,62) = 0.032, \quad MSE = 31.13, \quad p = .968 \), and no interaction between the two, \( F(2,62) = 0.730, \quad MSE = 22.93, \quad p = .486 \). Mean actual \( P(e|c) \) did not vary significantly with delay, \( F(1,31) = 0.685, \quad MSE = 0.005, \quad p = .414 \), or range, \( F(2,62) = 1.777, \quad MSE = 0.004, \quad p = .178 \), nor was there a significant delay × range interaction, \( F(2,62) = 0.491, \quad MSE = 0.004, \quad p = .614 \). The mean action-outcome interval experienced within a given condition naturally varied significantly with delay, \( F(1,31) = 13100, \quad MSE = 33620, \quad p < .0005, \quad \eta^2_p = .998 \), but there was no significant variation with temporal interval range, \( F(2,62) = 1.072, \quad MSE = 54910, \quad p = .348 \), and no significant delay × range interaction, \( F(2,62) = 0.270, \quad MSE = 43070, \quad p = .764 \). In summary, no unplanned differences in event rates or experienced contingency or contiguity were confounded with differences in ratings between conditions.
4.7.3 Discussion

The most apparent differences between these results and those of the previous study is the return of the familiar detrimental effect of delays on ratings. Indeed the effect is strong and robust, with shorter delays preferred to longer delays at each level of predictability. This restores faith in the reliability of the observational paradigm being utilized here. Ratings overall were lower than in the previous study, which is to be expected since the task was deliberately made more challenging. The most notable result in the wider context however is that a significant effect of temporal predictability has once again been obtained. Although a comparison of effect sizes reveals that the influence of predictability was weaker here than in the previous experiment, and was once again subordinate to the influence of delay, a reduction in the influence of predictability was anticipated as a consequence of the manipulations. Yet despite the potential obstacles this effect was nonetheless statistically significant.

Figure 4.9: Mean causal ratings for Experiment 6B as a function of temporal interval range. Different symbol and line styles denote different mean delays. Error bars show standard errors.
Table 4.2: Behavioural data for Experiment 6B. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>range of temporal intervals</th>
<th>3s</th>
<th>6s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0s</td>
<td>19.53</td>
<td>19.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3s</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>19.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6s</td>
<td>19.86</td>
<td>20.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>delay (min)</th>
<th>0.763</th>
<th>0.751</th>
<th>0.743</th>
<th>0.764</th>
<th>0.772</th>
<th>0.746</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean cause rate</td>
<td>14.91</td>
<td>14.34</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>14.91</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>14.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean effect rate</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>2913</td>
<td>2957</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>5966</td>
<td>5994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean actual delay (ms)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(193)</td>
<td>(375)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean causal rating</td>
<td>52.81</td>
<td>44.78</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>40.16</td>
<td>35.66</td>
<td>31.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This provides additional confirmation that predictability can facilitate causal induction in observational as well as instrumental learning. Furthermore, the predictability effect is maintained when observing patterns of events whose occurrence is governed by a probabilistic rate schedule as well as when observing those derived from exploratory behaviour. This finding thus completes a ‘hat-trick’ of obtaining facilitatory effects of predictability in elemental causal induction tasks, having now been demonstrated in learning from one’s own responses, learning by observing another’s responses, and learning from identifying patterns in a stochastic process.

There are of course some idiosyncrasies of the current set of results that warrant further comment. It is certainly interesting that what may seem like fairly minor modifications from the previous to the current paradigm were capable of producing such significant changes with regard to delay. Given the consistent effects of delay in all the other experiments contained herein, one might be tempted to dismiss the lack of such an effect in the previous experiment as something of an anomaly. Yet, the effect of delay was not just marginal but well short of significance, and there is reason to suspect the delay effect have been almost completely absent had endogenous variability been greater in the
low-delay high-variability condition. The combined results of the two studies then strongly imply that resurfacing of the delay effect in the current experiment is attributable to the reintroduction of background effects, and without their competing influence, contiguity ceases to be important for observational learning. Given robust influences of delay throughout the literature however this seems unlikely. Possibly then, there is some threshold above which delays will indeed impair learning but the delays in this experiment coupled with the absence of noncontingent effects meant the delay was beneath this threshold. Couple with the notion that considerations of utility may be less important in observational learning, one can begin to postulate reasonable explanations for this surprising finding. It should however be kept in mind that the primary novel finding of these latter two experiments was the predictability effect.

A further nuance of the current experiment may be identified. Although there was no significant interaction between delay and predictability, an inspection of Figure 4.9 suggests the trend that the decline in ratings with predictability for longer delays was less steep compared to that for shorter delays, and also compared to the same decline with longer delays in the previous experiment. This is however readily explicable in view of the modifications made. As I suggested earlier, introducing background effects might interfere with the detection of predictability, since a non-contingent effect might occur during the interval between a cause and its scheduled effect. Thus the effect will follow the cause after a shorter interval than normal and destroy the impression of fixed intervals (unless this effect is correctly disregarded as spurious). Obviously then, with longer fixed intervals, the greater the potential for this to occur, and the more damaging (potentially) background effects will be to a facilitatory influence of predictability.

Future research may wish to delve deeper into the precise relationship between delay, background effects, and whether the task is instrumental or observational. For the present moment though, the main objective of this study – to determine whether predictability can facilitate causal learning in from stochastic rates – has largely been fulfilled, with the answer in the affirmative.
4.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter aimed to take the investigation of temporal predictability a step further by uncovering whether the facilitatory effects of predictability in instrumental causal induction found in the previous chapter could be extended to observational learning. Overall, the evidence at first glance paints a mixed picture, with the latter half of the experiments finding a similar facilitatory effect while the former pair were unreceptive to predictability. These first two experiments were however based on a novel paradigm which, as has been discussed at length, differs considerably from the traditional causal judgment task, and numerous justifications have been presented as to why this paradigm may not be amenable to the influence of predictability. Meanwhile when reverting to a more traditional causal induction paradigm as the basis for the observational learning task, facilitatory effects of predictability complementing those found with instrumental learning were obtained, both when the patterns of cue occurrence were based on prior exploratory behaviour and also when based on a more random rate-based process.

The results from the latter two studies nicely harmonize with the results from Chapter 3. Causal relations with fixed temporal intervals consistently received higher judgments from observing participants than conditions with variable intervals, as was also the pattern during the instrumental studies, and increasing interval variability resulted in a concomitant decline in ratings, in line with the results of Experiment 2B. It has thus been demonstrated that elemental causal induction is aided by temporal predictability both in instrumental and observational learning.

The results of the last two experiments add considerable weight to the argument that predictability facilitates learning, at least with respect to elemental causal induction. Temporal predictability does not, on the basis of the first two experiments in this chapter, assist in the identification of a causal candidate from a number of alternatives. One can of course then immediately question the validity of such a blanket statement as “temporal predictability facilitates causal learning” when in fact a facilitatory effect of predictability has only been demonstrated in a very specific learning preparation. It however would seem fairly reasonable to conclude from the accumulation of results herein that temporal predictability facilitates elemental causal induction in both instrumental and observational learning.
Chapter 5 – General Discussion and Conclusions

This final chapter will summarize and broadly discuss the empirical work presented in this thesis. Firstly, I shall provide a very brief synopsis of each experiment, before expanding more generally on their underlying motivation, specific findings and overall impact. I shall then review the three main theoretical positions on causal learning as presented in Chapter 2, and consider how well the empirical work in this thesis resonates with each perspective. A critique of the methodology and an outline of further research that may be undertaken in this domain shall then follow, before a final summary of the most important conclusions that may be drawn from this work.

5.1 Brief Synopsis of Experiments

Experiment 1, rather ambitiously perhaps, attempted to determine at a stroke whether a) temporal predictability influences causal judgments; in other words will causal relations with fixed intervals be judged differently from those with variable intervals; b) the nature of that influence (i.e. will predictability or variability be preferred); c) whether temporal predictability, if such an effect is obtained, interacts with other influences such as contingency and contiguity. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that fixed-interval causal relations were indeed judged as more causal than those with variable intervals, and that this apparent facilitatory effect of predictability did not interact with either contingency or contiguity.

However Experiment 1, far from being a definitive answer, was merely the first indication of a role for predictability. The data was somewhat noisy and the experiment perhaps attempted to accomplish too much too quickly. The subsequent two experiments then set about to replicate the predictability effect, and to determine whether ratings decline as the causal relation becomes increasingly unpredictable (in other words, determine the function according to which ratings follow predictability).

Experiment 2A showed that fixed intervals elicited higher causal ratings than variable intervals, and that causal ratings declined with increasing unpredictability, however only at longer overall delays. With shorter delays, the overall effect of predictability was minimal. Consideration of methodological considerations suggested that
predictability may have been redundant as a cue at shorter delays. Increasing task difficulty in Experiment 2B demonstrated convincingly that at both long and short delays, fixed causal relations were preferred and judgments declined as a function of temporal uncertainty.

Experiment 3 demonstrated that temporally predictable causal relations received more favourable evaluations than unpredictable relations, regardless of allocated learning time, and thus ruled out an alternative explanation for the predictability effect.

Experiment 4 once again demonstrated that fixed temporal intervals enhanced judgments of causality, and that this effect was most marked when the effect followed the cause with a high probability. This result, in tandem with Experiment 1, suggested that predictability may be differentially affected by statistical relation between cause and effect; specifically that the influence of predictability depends on the effect following the cause with a high probability, but is largely insensitive to the base rate of the effect.

Experiments 5A and 5B failed to find a significant effect of temporal predictability in the identification of the true cause from a number of candidates. However this paradigm was markedly different from that of the previous studies and possibly insensitive to case-by-case fluctuations in cause-effect delay.

Experiments 6A and 6B replicated the predictability effect in observational learning tasks that were similar in nature to the earlier instrumental studies. The combined implication of Experiments 5 and 6 is that temporal predictability can enhance judgments of causality in observational learning, but that the predictability effect may be limited to the special case of elemental causal induction. Whether temporal predictability may serve as a cue to causality when a different hypothesis space is involved remains a question for future research.

5.2 Temporal Predictability Facilitates Elemental Causal Induction

The empirical studies presented in the preceding three chapters attempted to broaden the perception of the role of time in causal learning, and resolve some unanswered questions concerning this role. Temporal contiguity has long been recognized as a potential cue to causality. However the fact that contiguity may vary from one cause-effect pairing to another has largely been overlooked in the literature. Acknowledgement of this problem
allows a distinction to be drawn between temporal predictability, where contiguity is constant, and temporal uncertainty, where contiguity is variable. The primary question that this thesis attempted to resolve was, are human judgments of causality affected by this distinction, and if so, how?

Overall the experiments have demonstrated fairly consistently that temporal predictability can act as an empirical cue in causal induction. More precisely, the results demonstrate that fixed, predictable temporal intervals attract higher causal ratings than variable ones, and that causal ratings decrease as a function of temporal uncertainty. This facilitatory effect of temporal predictability was demonstrated in both instrumental and observational learning from a real-time response-outcome (or cue-outcome) schedule. Effects of predictability persist regardless of extent of information sampling, and appear largely independent of delay extent or the frequency of non-contingent background effects.

Two experiments however demonstrated that there are limitations on the ability of predictability to aid a causal judgment. When choosing between multiple alternative candidates, a consistent temporal interval between the cause and its effect did not help to differentiate the true cause from noncausal foils. The facilitatory effects of predictability were instead limited to enhancing the impression of causality between a single candidate cause and its effect. The most accurate conclusion that one can draw from the empirical work presented in these two chapters is therefore “temporal predictability facilitates elemental causal induction.”

This specificity should not in any way detract from the significance of these findings. Many theories and extensive empirical research have focused almost exclusively on this process of elemental causal induction (Cheng, 1997; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Shanks, 1993; Wasserman, 1990; White, 2003), and considerations such as how contingency data may be used to infer causality has been an important and heated topic of debate. The results of the work herein will hopefully contribute to understanding and stimulate debate, while at the same offering insight into an under-researched aspect of causal judgment.

Having now reached a conclusion regarding the facilitatory effect of predictability founded on a significant body of empirical research, the next step is to consider the broader theoretical implications of this finding. Chapter 2 reviewed three major strands of learning
theory aiming to provide an account of human causal judgment. I shall now review each of these perspectives, their respective predictions regarding an effect of predictability and the resulting support or conflict that the results of this thesis provide.

5.3 An Associative Analysis of Temporal Predictability

The importance of contiguity has been debated among associative theorists. While contiguity has previously been identified as both necessary and sufficient for an association to be acquired (Damianopoulos, 1982; Guthrie, 1933; Miller & Barret, 1993; Savastano & Miller, 1998), other work casts doubt on such assertions (Rescorla, 1988; Schafe, Sollars, & Bernstein, 1995). The prevailing view however is that within a standard conditioning or reinforcement learning preparation, degradations in contiguity between cue and outcome or response and reinforcer leads to progressively weaker associations. While supplemental explanations are required to account for learning over longer intervals, such as in conditioned taste aversion, this simple principle rather neatly explains a well-established feature of animal behaviour, the preference for variable-interval reinforcement. Applying basic associative theory to causal learning therefore assumes a monotonic effect of contiguity.

An associative perspective on causal learning is partly motivated by the multitude of apparent similarities between conditioning in animals and causal learning in humans (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987). Endorsements of an associative perspective have considered phenomena such as the outcome-density bias, sensitivity to cue competition, and super-learning to reflect deep structural similarities between human causal learning and animal conditioning (Shanks, Holyoak, & Medin, 1996). The experiments in this thesis addressed the question as to whether a similar commonality arises between human judgment and animal behaviour in response to variations in intervals between cause and effect; that is, the degree of temporal predictability. The results from my experiments, however, have shown that human judgments were directly opposed to animal preference for variable reinforcement, and participants instead drew the conclusion that causes which produced their effects over a stable and reliable timeframe were more effective than those where the effect occurred with variable latencies. What is the reason for this distinction?
One important conceptual difference between studies of animal conditioning and human causal learning which might account for the divergent results is that the emphasis in the former tends to be in terms of rewards and punishments – stimuli that respectively increase or decrease the likelihood of a specific behaviour – rather than causes and effects. Studies of conditioning nearly always employ real appetitive or aversive stimuli (e.g. food or shocks), whereas studies of causal hardly ever do (e.g. triangles flashing) – and if they do, it tends to be only in described examples (e.g. food allergy scenarios, stock market “games”) where any specific outcome has no direct relevance or value to the participants themselves. Consequently, conditioning studies involve the concept of utility: a food reward is pleasant, and a foot shock is painful. Human causal learning studies, in contrast, seldom call upon utility: It is of no consequence to the participant whether the triangle flashes, or whether an imaginary Mister X experiences an allergic reaction. This disparity is significant because when utility is relevant, then behavioural economics come into play, and phenomena such as delay discounting may manifest, as shall now be further explained.

5.3.1 Delay Discounting

The use of tangible rewards (and punishments) with adaptive value in studies of animal conditioning means that such stimuli are subject to discounting. To explain, rewards can in many cases be quantified (for instance, the amount of food or money received) and in this regard have an objective value. Naturally, animals favour large rewards over smaller rewards (Denny & King, 1955; Festinger, 1943). However, depending on the current situation (such as the animal’s level of deprivation) the reward may also have a subjective value that differs from its objective magnitude. A factor of crucial importance in determining subjective value is the time taken for the reward to be received. It is well-established that animals exhibit preference for immediate rewards over delayed rewards of the same magnitude (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967). However, numerous studies have demonstrated that in certain cases, animals will choose a smaller immediate reward over a larger delayed reward (Rachlin & Green, 1972). If we assume that, in choosing between concurrently available alternatives, the animal always selects the reward which it perceives has the greater value, then we may conclude that the subjective value of a reward declines with delay. Delays of reinforcement thus result in the objective value of the reward being discounted, hence the term delay discounting is used to describe this process. The greater
the delay until the reward is delivered, the lower its subjective value – that is, the more likely it becomes that the animal will prefer the smaller sooner reward over the larger later reward. This is of course reflected in the effects of reinforcement delays on response rates and choice behaviour as already discussed in Chapter 2, where I identified a number of studies which have demonstrated that rates of responding decline with delays according to a negatively accelerated function (Chung, 1965; Herrnstein, 1970; Mazur, 1984; Williams, 1976). The process of delay (or temporal) discounting has been extensively studied from both psychological and economic perspectives (e.g. Ainslie, 1991), and similar effects of reinforcement delay on choice behaviour have been obtained for both human and non-human subjects (Green & Myerson, 2004; Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, & Estle, 2004; Woolverton, Myerson, & Green, 2007).

Theories of delay discounting however seem less likely to apply to human causal learning, because they address how (positive and negative) subjective utility decreases as a function of time-to-event. If the event has no intrinsic utility (as is arguably the case in human causal learning studies), then there is nothing to discount. In contrast, rewards and punishments are very clearly liable to discounting, both in human and non-human animals. The advantage of variable over fixed intervals in studies of animal learning thus may well be grounded in the shape of the discounting function and commensurate differences in subjective utility of the obtained outcomes. But because studies of human causal learning do not involve utility, discounting does not apply. Indeed, in other work I have carried out as part of my research but that is not presented in this thesis, I found a lack of correlation between the rate at which participants devalued delayed rewards in a discounting task and their judgment of delayed causal relations, which further supports the idea that the two processes are distinct. There is therefore both a theoretical and an empirical basis to suggest that delays have different effects in causal and reinforcement learning, and so by extension, that a common learning algorithm is unlikely to underlie both processes. The implication may then be drawn that if an associative account is used to explain animal preference for variable reinforcement (which it does rather neatly as described in Chapter 2), then the same account cannot be used to explain the facilitatory effect of temporal predictability in human causal judgment. A key assumption underlying this argument is that preference for variable reinforcement is indeed a reflection of the degree of association between response
and reinforcer. However as outlined in the previous chapter, such preferences may also be explained in terms of subjective value. Ascribing choice behaviour to associative learning assumes that subjective value of the reward is derived from or equivalent to associative strength. However, it may be that exhibition of preferences is due not to the association between response and reinforcer per se, but due to perceived net gain. If the two can be dissociated, this suggests that animals have the capacity to learn associations, or causal connections, without this necessarily resulting in an observable change expressed in behaviour. It is therefore implied that elements that traditionally were perceived as only adjunctive to the formation of associations and determinants of associative strength, such as reward magnitude, timing, and reliability, may also be represented in the association, and that such parameters determine the expression of behaviour. Indeed, a recent variant of associative learning theory, the temporal coding hypothesis (Miller & Barnet, 1993) posits exactly that, as shall be discussed in more detail further below.

One might then be tempted to suggest that the function linking associative strength to delay does not follow a negatively accelerated function when applied to causal learning. If the shape of the function is different, then different predictions regarding interval variability may be generated. For instance, a linear function would predict no difference between variable and predictable delays, while a positively accelerated function would indeed predict an advantage for fixed delays. However such functions would be implausible since they would cross the x-axis and thus predict negative associative strength for outcomes delayed beyond a certain point, when obviously the occurrence of an outcome, however delayed, should never contribute less associative strength than no outcome at all. Moreover, there is no empirical basis for the suggestion of a different function, whereas the negatively accelerated function describing the effect of increasing delays is well established. Even in studies directly soliciting human judgments of causality (Shanks & Dickinson, 1991; Shanks et al., 1989), mean causal ratings at specific delays were found to broadly adhere to such a function. In studies comparing fixed and variable delays then, a simple summation or average of perceived causality across the combined delays experienced should thus have conferred a higher overall rating for variable rather than fixed delays. Yet somehow, this was not the case in the studies presented here and in the majority of cases the opposite was in fact true. The implication is that the perceived causal strength
goes beyond a simple arithmetic combination of the delays or perceived causality on each trial or cause-effect pairing, and that the process of causal induction is more than just the “sum of its parts” and some other information or representational knowledge must form an integrative part of causal inference.

5.3.2 The Temporal Coding Hypothesis

Recent formulations of associative theories have begun to challenge the simplistic conception of timing effects that limited earlier models. According to the traditional associative view (Pearce, 1987; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), contiguity may, in the appropriate circumstances, be a contributory factor to the associative strength that is acquired, with decrements in contiguity resulting in weaker associations. However, this view did not subscribe to the idea that organisms acquire representational knowledge of temporal intervals, and instead saw contiguity as merely adjunctive to the learning process. The temporal coding hypothesis (TCH) however, as alluded to above, represents a radical departure from this traditional view, and instead argues that the temporal relationship between events is encoded as part of the association. During training, exposure to contiguous or delayed event contingencies will not only result in respectively stronger or weaker acquisition, but also will create expectancies regarding the timeframe of action. Following training then, exposure to the CS will lead to anticipation not only of the occurrence but also of the timing of the US. Another way of saying this is that the animal learns not only that the effect will occur, but also when it will occur. This information is then assumed to play a critical role in determining if a response is made, and the magnitude and timing of that response. In other words, whether or not an acquired association will be expressed as observable behaviour depends on the encoded temporal knowledge (Arcediano & Miller, 2002; Savastano & Miller, 1998). According to such a perspective, the factors determining the ease with which a particular relation is learned may not necessarily result in a concomitant preference in choice behaviour associated with that relation. An extension of such an argument would be that an organism may be perfectly capable of recognizing a particular relation, and indeed identifying that relation as stable, but still exercise preference for another schedule that it perceives as perhaps less stable but offering greater potential for reward.
This idea has steadily accumulated support, since it has proved capable of addressing findings concerning variations in timing that previous associative models (e.g. Rescorla-Wagner, 1972; Pearce-Hall, 1980) could not account for, including differential effects of various CS-US intervals in Hall-Pearce negative transfer (Savastano & Miller, 1998) and in overshadowing (Blaisdell, Denniston, & Miller, 1998). By acknowledging that animals encode temporal information as part of the association, this view could potentially address findings where the role of time appears to go beyond mere contiguity. For instance, Allan, Tangen, Wood and Shah (2003) argue that the temporal coding hypothesis can be adapted to accommodate the results of Buehner and May (2004), and their own findings, that delayed causal relations receive higher causal evaluations than contiguous relations under certain circumstances. The basis of this argument is that knowledge mediation serves as an initial training phase where the observer “learns” the delay. A similar extrapolation of this theory might apply here; if an organism learns the temporal interval between events and carries this forward, subsequent variation of the intervals might negatively impact CS-US association (as does a disruption of continuity between training phases, e.g. in latent inhibition or negative transfer). Indeed, Denniston, Blaisdell and Miller (1998) have already demonstrated an adverse effect of temporal incongruence in inhibitory conditioning.

The temporal coding hypothesis can not only account for the superiority of temporal regularity, but it paradoxically also appears capable of addressing the preference for variability observed in studies using reinforcement schedules. The notion that contiguity is a key determinant of associative strength remains a fundamental tenet of the temporal coding hypothesis, as outlined by Blaisdell et al. (1998, p. 72): “Contiguity is sufficient for the formation of an association. The degree of spatial and temporal proximity between two events (stimuli or responses) determines the extent to which they are associated.” Thus, the association will depend on how associative strength changes as a function of delay, and the shape of this function may be highly dependent on the context. As mentioned previously, since utility is crucial for animal reinforcement learning, it may well be that the associative strength of delayed events does in such cases decline in a manner consistent with delay discounting.

The difficulty then seems to lie in determining the specific predictions of the temporal coding hypothesis; what are the circumstances that govern whether a facilitatory
or inhibitory effect of variability on learning is anticipated from this perspective? The temporal coding hypothesis does not explicitly put differential weights on the extent versus the constancy of the reinforcement delay. Consequently, it could potentially be adapted to fit any set of results via a post-hoc re-conceptualization of the learning task (for example, see Allan et al., 2003). What is therefore needed is some extension or restriction of this theory that would enable it to specify, a priori, the expected progression of learning given a particular input or data set.

Clearly, the temporal coding hypothesis represents an important step in the development of associative learning theory; the fundamental principle that temporal information is encoded in an association enabling the multi-faceted influences of time in learning to be accommodated. However, such a radical departure from traditional associationism raises queries over whether the temporal coding hypothesis can truly be regarded as an associative theory in the strictest sense. The idea that an animal acquires representational knowledge of the intervals in a conditioning preparation, and that this knowledge affects subsequent behaviour, seems to echo similar arguments regarding knowledge mediation proposed by cognitive theories of learning. Moreover, it remains as yet unclear whether the anticipation of a definitive influence of temporal predictability in a given situation can be derived from the TCH. I shall therefore now turn to consider other theoretical approaches that make more concrete predictions regarding predictability.

5.4. A contingency-based perspective on predictability

Having struggled thus far to reconcile the finding of this thesis with associative learning theory, it seems appropriate to now consider this evidence in light of the covariation or contingency-based perspective. It was described in the introduction how the attribution shift hypothesis could extend a covariation perspective to account for the effect of predictability by reducing erroneous attribution of delayed effects to random background processes. With a temporally predictable cause, repeated experience of a constant interval may lead the reasoner to adjust their temporal window such that delayed events are attributed to the candidate cause rather than disregarded. However there remains the compelling question of whether time merely serves to facilitate or inhibit the detection and interpretation of events, or if temporal information itself is actually computed to form an
integral part of the mental representation of causality. According to this account, temporal information is not considered to form part of a mental representation of causality, but merely determines the attribution of events to the cells of a contingency table. However, if this were the case, and predictability improves causal judgments simply by enabling the reasoner to correctly detect cause-effect pairings, then the degree of separation between cause and effect should not matter. If repeated experience of the same interval enables detection of delayed events, there should not be a simultaneous effect of delay. Under these assumptions then, while an effect of predictability could be accounted for, effects of predictability and delay are mutually exclusive and could not occur in tandem as demonstrated by my results. Besides, Greville and Buehner (2007) have already demonstrated that contiguity and covariation act in concert to influence causal judgment, even in situations where the extent of contingency is unambiguous.

Additionally, the covariation account and attribution shift hypothesis encounter difficulty with the results from Experiment 3. If participants are given more time to explore the causal relation in question, they most likely will (and in this case indeed did) experience more action-outcome pairings. The more exposure participants have to a particular contingency, the more likely it is that they will be able to recognize it correctly. While it is clear that temporal cues such as contiguity or predictability may assist in the recognition of cause-effect pairings in the short term at least, (and conversely, temporal delay or unpredictability may impede the attribution of effect to the cause), given enough exposure, participants should be able to detect contingencies independently of temporal information. If participants do in fact come to notice the contingency, and this is the determinant of their causal representation, then temporal information should cease to be important. However as Experiment 3 revealed, judgments of causality did not move significantly closer to $\Delta P$ as learning time was increased, and the effects of predictability and delay persisted. The implication is that cues such as contiguity and predictability are in-and-of-themselves components of a computation of causal strength, rather than just an aide to event parsing for the calculation of covariance, as a purely statistical or contingency-based approach to learning would suggest.
5.4.1 Attribution Aide or Cognitive Component?

Thus, the evidence from this study is incompatible with a covariation perspective even when its assumptions are relaxed as per the attribution shift hypothesis. However, it may still possible that the process of attribution shift does in fact take place during event parsing, but that the constraints of the covariation account on this process are invalid. According to a strict covariation account, having determined whether or not event pairings are causal or spurious, temporal information then plays no further role in the learning process. However if instead temporal information is still represented in the mental computation, then the causal decision may essentially be a trade-off between contingency and contiguity. For instance, suppose that predictability does indeed result in a shift of the temporal window. In a delayed but predictable relation, it is likely that attribution shift will not occur; since all the effects happen after the same interval, they should be attributed to the cause. However since they are all delayed, the overall impression of contiguity will be weak. For a delayed but variable relation however, while later events may be disregarded as spurious, there will also be earlier events, that occur with closer contiguity than events in the fixed interval relation, which should be attributed to the cause. Subjective contingency therefore is decreased relative to the fixed-condition; however because the remaining \( c \rightarrow e \) pairings that are counted will all have equal or shorter intervals than the fixed-delay, then the overall impression of contiguity is stronger for the variable condition. Thus whether variable or predictable causal relations are perceived as stronger would crucially depend on the trade-off between contingency and contiguity (see Buehner & McGregor, 2009).

5.5 A Bayesian account of predictability

As discussed previously, Bayesian models of causal learning assess the likelihood of the obtained data under two opposing hypotheses; one where there is a genuine mechanistic link between candidate cause and effect, and one where no such links exists and the effect is the result of alternative unseen causes. Regularity is more likely under the former hypothesis than the latter so is taken as evidence for the existence of a causal relation. Though Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2005) causal support model was originally developed as a computational account of assessing causal structure from contingency information, a logical extension of this perspective could easily be applied to temporal
information. Under this assumption, the prediction of the structure account with regard to the phenomenon addressed in this paper is clear: temporal regularity should facilitate learning. Indeed, in a more recent framework, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2009) extend the structure account and highlight the importance of patterns of spatial or temporal coincidences, with a set of regularly-spaced events being much more probable under an identified potential mechanism than a spontaneous activation of an unseen alternative cause.

From such a perspective, predictability may further facilitate causal learning through the process of Bayesian updating (for instance see Lagnado & Sloman, 2002; Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). For instance a reasoner may, in the first few instances of experiencing a delayed causal relation, decide that the effect was not actually generated by the cause. However if the temporal interval is fixed, then after several exposures the reasoner may revise and update their causal beliefs about the relation in question, and adopt a new expectation of the timeframe. If they then continue to experience effects that occur at the time they now expect, then this will reinforce the impression of a causal relation. Additionally, events that had previously been classed as non-causal may also be re-evaluated as causal, further contributing to the overall impression of causal strength. However, one problem with a simple formulation of the Bayesian account is that it too, like the Attribution Shift Hypothesis, would seem incapable of simultaneously accounting for a joint influence of delay and temporal predictability. Presumably, if a temporal interval is highly predictable, and therefore provides good support for a causal structure model, the extent of delay should not matter. One way to address this would be for future models to include priors of delay assumptions that reflect the consistent bias to prefer contiguous over delayed relations.

5.6 A Novel Approach – Temporal Expectancy Theory

A theory of conditioning that takes a step further in acknowledging the role of temporal information is Gibbon’s (1977) scalar expectancy theory (SET), a precursor of Gallistel and Gibbon’s rate estimation theory (RET), which postulates that temporal intervals are in fact the sole determinant of conditioning (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000a). SET was developed as a model to account for the timing of the conditioned response (CR) in
animals, when there is some temporal separation between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US). At the heart of this theory is the idea of a temporal accumulator that continually monitors the time until the delivery of a reinforcer. When reinforcement is received, the latency is written to memory. At the onset of the CS, the currently elapsing interval ($t_e$) is compared to the remembered latency ($t^*$). When this ratio exceeds a threshold ($\beta$), the animal responds, hence this ratio $t_e/t^*$ is known as the decision variable. Since the CR is an anticipatory response, the when-to-respond threshold $\beta$ is somewhat less than 1. To summarize in the simplest of terms, the timing of the CR depends on when the animal expects the US to be delivered.

If it is accepted that animals can remember intervals and develop an expectancy of when an outcome is likely to occur, then this model could then feasibly be extended to account for the effects of predictability reported in this thesis. Through repeated experience of a temporally consistent causal relation, it may become apparent that causes and effects are separated by the same temporal interval. If this interval is detected, it can then be recorded in memory, analogously to the $t^*$ signal as specified by SET. There thus develops a clear expectancy of points in time at which an outcome can occur. Attention can then be more closely directed to the point at which the outcome is anticipated; in terms of SET, when the currently elapsing interval $t_e$ approaches the remembered interval $t^*$. As the ratio of $t_e$ to $t^*$ grows, expectancy of an outcome peaks. Meanwhile, the outcome is not expected at other times. Depending then on the time at which an outcome occurs, the effect will either be attributed to the cause (if the decision ratio is close enough a given threshold) or to random background processes (if it is not). Following a response (or observed cue), it then becomes a simple case of waiting to see if an effect occurs at the anticipated point or not, thus making causal attribution easier. From such a perspective, the process of causal induction depends not solely on the temporal proximity of the effect to its cause, but on the temporal proximity of an effect to its expected time of occurrence. In other words, the temporal predictability of the outcome will facilitate the attribution process.

To outline a rudimentary computational account of this process, recall from Chapter 1 the brief discussion of the ideas proposed by Krynski (2006), specifically that the likelihood of experiencing a given delay, where delay variability is assumed to be proportional to delay duration, could be modelled as a probability distribution, thus creating
a bias favouring short delays. Borrowing from this idea, consider that the expectancy of experiencing an outcome at any given point following the cause may likewise be modelled as a distribution of likelihood over time. In other words, the shape of this distribution will then correspond to expectancy; the expectancy of outcome occurrence will vary over time, with the distribution peaking at those points when outcomes are expected. In terms of SET, the distribution peak would be at $t^*$. If the outcome occurs at or close to this point, then this provides evidence in favour of the assumed timeframe and hypothesized causal mechanism, while outcomes occurring at other times will offer no such support or may constitute disconfirmatory evidence. While this expectancy distribution may of course favour short delays a priori, a key assumption is that the shape of the distribution may be moulded through experience, such that repeated experience of a given temporal interval will cause an elevation of the expectancy distribution at that point in time. This provides the flexibility to permit any fixed interval to be detected and written to memory as the $t^*$ signal.

The question is then raised as to why there should be any effect of delay if there is sufficient temporal regularity. From a rational perspective, if sufficient cognitive resources are assumed to be available, then a consistent 10s delay should offer just as much evidence in favour of a causal relation as a consistent 1s delay. This question may be addressed by appealing to the idea of Bayesian evidence integration and the consideration of dual expectancy distributions. Suppose that more than one expectancy distribution may exist, and that a first distribution maps the expectancy of an outcome following the cause, where that outcome is in fact due to that cause. Based on experience, the peak of this outcome may be over any particular delay, and the less variation in previously experienced delays, the narrower and higher this peak will be. However consider then a second expectancy distribution that maps the expectancy of an outcome occurring due to random background processes. As Krynski (2006) suggests, the spontaneous occurrence of outcomes may be modelled as a Poisson process, in which the probability density function of the waiting time until the next occurrence is an exponential distribution. Thus, as the interval following a candidate cause increases, so does the likelihood of the spontaneous occurrence of an outcome. In contrast, the likelihood of an outcome having occurred spontaneously becomes increasingly less likely as temporal proximity to the cause increases. Any given outcome may therefore be assigned two values; the likelihood of that outcome being due to the
cause, and the likelihood of that outcome being due to background processes. The evidence in favour of a causal relation, that is, in favour of $h_1$ over $h_0$, may be assessed by a ratio of these two values. Thus, if one was to directly compare a fixed short delay and a fixed long delay, while there may be a peak of the same shape over each delay on the first distribution, the height of the second distribution will be greater at the longer delay, and thus the ratio of expectancies will always be lower for longer delays relative to shorter delays that are both a priori equally likely. In summary, while a predictable delay may indeed result in facilitation of causal attribution through an increase in the likelihood of an outcome occurring at that particular delay being due to the cause, the corresponding likelihood of that outcome being due to random background processes is minimized with contiguity, further enhancing perception of causality.

It would thus seem that this approach appealing to temporal expectancy is capable of embracing joint effects of both predictability and contiguity. While this approach is not novel in the sense that it adopts the idea of evidence integration, and thus is still essentially a Bayesian decision, this is the first account, as far as I am aware, that would a priori predict a contribution of both delay extent and variability to causal inference.

### 5.7 Methodological Concerns

One important methodological aspect of the experiments presented in this thesis that might be brought to attention is the assumption that the psychological mean of the temporal intervals is equivalent to the arithmetic mean. To adequately compare variable and fixed delays, it was necessary to ensure that the mean of the intervals in the variable condition was (approximately) equal to that of the predictable condition, since a discrepancy would imply that the differences in predictability were confounded with different actual experienced delays. Indeed in all such types of experiment, there is bound to be some fluctuation of the mean experienced delay from the nominal programmed delay set by the experimenters (though an analysis of this data for my experiments showed a good degree of isomorphism between the two). However, it is not necessarily a given that the mean of these experienced intervals is functionally equivalent to the psychological mean. If subjective perceived duration of a temporal interval differs from the veridical duration, then the perceived mean duration will likewise differ from the recorded mean. This need only be
cause for concern for my studies if subjective duration is some non-linear function of actual duration. Wearden (1991) has shown that subjective time increases linearly as a function of real time in interval reproduction experiments. Perception of time is not always so accurate however; using a similar paradigm, Humphreys and Buehner (2010) found evidence to suggest that as intervals increase, our ability to accurately judge their duration diminishes and intervals may be perceived as shorter than they actually are. In psychophysics, the Weber-Fechner Law regarding the relationship between the physical magnitudes of stimuli and their perceived intensity suggests that time perception may in fact be logarithmic, endorsing Humphreys and Buehner’s results. This however would still not cause problems for the interpretation of the results presented in this thesis. According to this view, longer intervals would be increasingly underestimated, relative to shorter intervals, and the (subjective) net delay would thus be *smaller* when considering a short and long delay compared to two instances of a constant delay formed by the arithmetic mean of the short and long interval. Therefore this discrepancy would only work against the predictability hypothesis and make it *less* likely for predictable relations to draw higher ratings than variable ones. Since in fact predictable conditions were favoured, this is not really a concern; indeed in light of this consideration, the obtained findings are all the more noteworthy.

5.7.1 Interactions of Predictability with Delay Extent and Background Effects

One interesting feature of a number of the experiments presented here is that the occurrence of non-contingent outcomes independently of a response or cue does not seemingly render temporal predictability impotent as a guide to causality. It has been discussed previously that the occurrence of a background effect between a response or cue and its associated outcome can disrupt objective predictability, since the interval between the response or cue and the background effect will differ from the regular interval that would separated the response or cue and its generated outcome. Yet, significant effects of predictability were found in all the experiments including background effects, namely Experiments 1, 3, and 6B. Moreover, an interaction between predictability and background effects in Experiment 1 was not found, suggesting that even increasing the rate of background effects to a high level does not completely obscure temporal regularity. Yet at the same time, these experiments all showed weaker effects of predictability compared to
others where background effects were absent, with the most obvious comparison being between 6A and 6B. A full understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between temporal predictability and background effects could thus certainly benefit from further study.

Throughout all experiments, no interaction between delay and predictability was found. Yet at the same time, trends in experiment 2A and 6A indicate that predictability might be more beneficial at longer delays than shorter delays, with the reverse being true for Experiment 6B. Perhaps it is unwise to make any speculation on the basis of non-significant trends, but it is possible that a three-way interactive relationship may exist between predictability, delay and the presence or absence of background effects, such that in the presence of background effects, predictability exerts a greater influence at shorter delays, and a greater influence at longer delays in the absence of background effects. The underlying basis for this supposition is that the absence of background effects might make judging contingency trivial with shorter (but not longer) delays, rendering predictability information surplus to requirements (as was seemingly the case in Experiment 2A), while the presence of background effects might obscure predictability at longer (but not shorter) delays (as was seemingly the case in Experiment 6B).

It should be remembered that all the studies presented here were very much exploratory in nature, and some trial and error was necessary in determining the best paradigm to probe for an effect of temporal predictability. Further research would be desirable, particularly investigating this thorny issue of background effects.

5.8 Future Directions

Far from being the final word on temporal predictability in causal learning, this thesis may be regarded as a starting point that hopefully will act as a springboard for future work investigating this interesting property. It is of course not a given that the results obtained here will necessarily generalize to other types of learning situations, and further research may consider alternative preparations. Indeed, the paradigm devised by Young and Nguyen (2009) has already suggested that interval variability may have different effects in multiple-cue causal decision making compared to elemental contingency judgment, and this potential avenue warrants further exploration.
As additional possibilities, one could, for instance, examine the effect of predictability in scenarios where the operational relationship between cause and effect is already clearly defined, with no ambiguity regarding which response generates which outcome. Such a scenario would provide further clarity as to whether temporal variability weakens impressions of causality by degrading the subjective perception of contingency or purely due to the uncertainty regarding effect timing. There is also work currently being conducted within the causal learning sphere concerning the effects of ‘hasteners’ versus ‘postponers’. For example, Greville and Buehner (2007) demonstrated that in causal learning from tabular data, when contingency was identical in two scenarios, participants evaluated scenarios where the timing of the outcomes was brought forward as more causally effective than those where outcomes were more delayed. Lagnado and Speekenbrink (2010) meanwhile have investigated the effect of adding a hastener on causal learning in real time, but in fact found that hasteners actually exerted a detrimental effect on causal ratings. Lagnado and Speekenbrink interpreted this effect in terms of the greater variability in experienced delays that the hastener provided; their finding is thus in accordance with those of this thesis and lends further support to the predictability hypothesis. It would be interesting to see if comparable effects to those of hasteners and postponers could be achieved by applying ‘stabilizers’ and ‘destabilizers’ where by the timing of the effect is respectively made more or less predictable.

One obvious feature of the experiments in this thesis is that they all deal with generative causes. A further future research question may then be: How might predictability affect preventive causes? This is perhaps difficult to anticipate, since without the occurrence of an outcome, there is no ‘marker’ to clearly delineate the interval between cause and a preventative effect. One cannot easily measure the interval between a response and an absence of an outcome. Only if the outcome was anticipated at a precisely defined moment, and then subsequently failed to occur, could a realistic attempt be made at such a measurement. Instead, when considering preventative causes, it would be easier to assess the impact of predictability in terms of rates. If a candidate cause was temporally extended beyond a point event to have a substantial duration, then occurrence of outcomes during the presence and absence of the cause may be either temporally predictable (that is, regularly spaced) or temporally variable. Current work by our lab is underway in contrasting fixed
and outcome rates when moving from one context to another, considering changes both in overall increases or decreases in outcome rate, as well as whether such rates are temporally predictable or unpredictable. Early results indicate firstly that, as would be expected, humans are sensitive to both the direction and extent of changes in overall outcome rate, and of novel significance, that a moderating effect of predictability is exerted such that judgments are less positive for generative and less negative for preventative causes.

5.9 Conclusions

Perhaps the most concise encapsulation of the findings of this thesis is the following sentence: Temporal predictability can play a role in causal learning and in elemental causal induction, this role has been characterized as facilitatory. Temporal predictability thus must be acknowledged and accommodated within causal theories. No existing causal model currently represents such information adequately, and this highlights the difficulty of constructing a model of causal learning in real time. Extensive and excellent work has been carried out by, for example, Cheng (1997), Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005), and others, in providing models that have been enormously successfully in modelling human judgments from unambiguously available contingency data. However as the findings of this thesis and other works (e.g. Buehner, 2005) have demonstrated, to assume that configurations of events experienced in continuous time neatly and consistently assign themselves to cells in the contingency table is a fallacy.

The initial goal of this thesis was to address a gap in the empirical study of causal learning, rather than to advance any particular theoretical account. However, the evidence from the experiments herein contained make a strong case for the rejection of a simple associative account for the effect of delay in causal learning. The findings do not rule out an associative account altogether, but the proposition that the detrimental effect of delays in causal learning are the result of a decline in associative strength in the same manner as response rates in animals decline with delayed reinforcement is seriously challenged by the collective results here. The findings of Experiment 7 underscore this dissociation and illustrate the difficulty in attempting to provide a unifying account of learning processes. Considering the results of this thesis as a whole, the evidence has steadily mounted in favour of the temporal predictability hypothesis, that humans infer a stronger impression of
causality when the interval separating cause and effect is fixed rather than variable. While constant delays may not universally promote causal learning, temporal predictability clearly facilitates elemental causal induction.

Looking forward, the effects of temporal predictability demonstrated throughout this thesis, combined with the pervasive (and already established) effects of delay, suggest that an alternative conception of the contribution of time in causal induction may help to provide a better model for the learning process. I propose that, in line with the structural account, temporal information should be regarded in a similar manner to statistical information, which is to say that regularities in this input are used by reasoners to infer causal relations. Therefore, just as statistical regularity facilitates causal discovery, so does temporal regularity. The rationale behind this argument is that reasoners evaluate the likelihood of obtaining the observed data that is available to them within two hypothetical universes in a Bayesian decision. In one universe, there is a genuine mechanistic link between candidate cause and effect, and in the other there is not (and the effect happens solely due to random background conditions). Under the latter hypothesis, any form of cause-effect regularity is unlikely. If there is consistently a reliable timeframe of event occurrence such that cause and effect are routinely separated by the same temporal interval, then this provides growing evidence of a causal relation.

The effects of time in causal learning may then be seen as fourfold. Firstly, as has been pointed out many times previously in the literature, causal relations with short delays are much easier to learn than those with long delays. If there is a temporal separation between cause and effect then establishing a causal link between them requires far greater cognitive effort; the events must be held in memory for longer and other events that occur in the intervening period must be ignored. Secondly, there is also the cognitive or pragmatic component of delay. In the case of a generative cause, if two different events produce an outcome but one does so more rapidly than the other, then that event may be judged as the stronger cause, particularly if considerations of utility figure in the evaluation of the relation. For instance, if a person has a splitting headache, then the sooner a medication can provide relief, the better. Thirdly, any temporal interval between cause and effect may be compared to an existing hypothesis about the causal mechanism and the expected timeframe of event occurrence. Evidence which conforms to this will strengthen the causal
relation, while that which deviates from expectation will weaken the impression. Fourthly, and which is the key novel insight provided by this thesis, evidence of a regular temporal interval between cause and effect might either facilitate the discovery of the statistical regularity between cause and effect, or may result in the reasoner modifying prior assumptions about the timeframe of the hypothesized relation (or both). Since such regularity is highly unlikely to occur by random chance, temporal predictability conveys representational evidence in favour of a consistent causal mechanism.

The ultimate implication that I hope to impart from this thesis, beyond the empirical findings, is that causal induction involving directly experienced events occurs within real time, and time therefore must be an integral component of the learning process. Models of causal learning therefore crucially need to represent temporal information as well as frequencies or rates of causes and effects. Among popular perspectives on learning, two divergent approaches provide some key insights to this issue. Recent advances in associative learning theory, such as the temporal coding hypothesis, offer the flexibility to incorporate differential effects of time dependent on the learning situation, by positing that organisms learn temporal relationships along with associations, and that the nature of behaviour depends on this representational knowledge. Meanwhile, a cognitive perspective, distilling elements from causal model theory and the Bayesian structure approach, presents the threefold argument that causality is the product of a mechanistic connection between cause and effect, that such mechanisms reveal themselves through environmental regularities, and the integration of the available evidence both for and against the existence of a causal relation allows one to form mental representations of causal relations in the world around us. The willingness of researchers to remain open to exciting new findings in causal learning, under whatever theoretical tradition such work may have been carried out, together with the synthesis of ideas developed across different disciplines, from machine learning and artificial intelligence to conditioning and behavioural economics, may continue to offer new insights to the scientific community and further deepen our understanding of causality and causal learning.
References


