Sometime between his return to the Dresden court chapel after his second trip to Italy (1657) and his departure for Hamburg (1663), the singer and composer Christoph Bernhard (1628-1692) penned a treatise in the august tradition of musica poetica. The Tractatus compositionis augmentatus has become a classic example of the rhetorical outlook on composition in 16th and 17th-century Northern Germany. Drawing on their extensive educations in classical Latin rhetoric, musicians conceived their art as one of effective communication (rather than of organic works), which could be learned through codifiable rules and techniques. The rhetorical slant of the Tractatus is best known in its classifications of figures.

1 The exact date of the work is not known. Known today only through 18th-century copies, the treatise circulated widely in manuscript in the last decades of the 17th century. For a summary on current knowledge of its provenance, see Paul WALKER, Theories of Fugue from the Age of Josquin to the Age of Bach, Eastman Studies in Music, no. 13 (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000), 152-53.
(e.g. ellipsis and heterolepsis), in its stylistic categories (grave and luxuriant), and in its catalogue of models for imitation (including Palestrina, Monteverdi, Carissimi, and Schütz among many others), all typical elements in the rhetorical treatises of the time. But even aside from compositional prescriptions, it exhibits a rhetorical mode of thought about the basic concept of composition. As was typical of verbal and musical treatises of the time, Bernhard began the treatise with a portrayal of his subject matter, defining both counterpoint and musical composition by reference to classical rhetoric. As a discipline grounded in persuasion and the communicative interaction between orator and audience, rhetoric would seem to mark music as functional, as involved in a practice in which music serves clear purposes. Music would serve its religious or political uses by moving the listener, and it would oppose the principle of aesthetic autonomy—the idea that music can be experienced as an end rather than simply a means. This basic opposition, while not wholly incorrect, is too simple to do justice to 17th-century practice. Because of the very centrality of rhetoric to the treatise, the first chapter of Bernhard’s *Tractatus* offers an excellent starting point to refine the relationship between functionality and aesthetic autonomy within the rhetorical tradition.

The task of this paper is to illuminate the complex of artistic practices that underpins Christoph Bernhard’s music theory and late 17th-century German musical culture in general. The thesis: The fragmentary practices of autonomy in the *Tractatus* were proper to the world of professional North-German composer-musicians in the late 17th century. It was a relatively closed world whose professional structures hovered between those of secretive, localized guilds and the communicative, cosmopolitan, but still specialized Republic of Letters. In this world, to use a distinction made by Stephen Hinton, musicians undoubtedly could think about the theoretical autonomy of their music, the features that gave it excellence beyond its function and durability after the event. Without an explicit theory of aesthetic autonomy—the principle that music can be considered as an end, rather than as a means to some further end—musicians and connoisseurs developed its principles in their practices and modes of thought. Finally they developed their practices within set traditions and institutions so as to maximize


their social autonomy, the independence of action that would allow them control over their creative conditions. While impossible to separate these three types of autonomy neatly, this article will examine each in turn. To close, it will examine some of the reasons that French and German intellectuals treated art or artworks as autonomous in the late 17th century and early 18th century. While only professional musicians may have treated music as either theoretically or aesthetically autonomous, there were other people at the time who thought about the political and moral autonomy of individuals (both aspects of social autonomy, but ones that went beyond issues of creative freedom). For many intellectuals, the arts were a way to resist political and economic forces that seemed to constrain human agency. While these different types of autonomy all were put into practice in the 17th century, they merged together at the beginning of the 19th century.

It is important to revisit and to refine the concepts of functionality and autonomy in 17th-century rhetorical practice for several reasons. Despite much scholarship on the issue, the historical origins of the autonomy aesthetics can still be clarified. While some scholars insist that aesthetic autonomy and its correlate, the musical work, are thoroughly modern, others note that there is a long tradition of treating music as works. To take only some recent examples, Lydia Goehr has insisted that the »separability principle« was only truly »regulative« after 1800, while Rob Wegman, Leeman Perkins, and Anthony Newcomb have noted that Renaissance musicians did treat music as works, fixing them into notated scores and taking pride in their internal consistency. John Butt has similarly noted tendencies towards work-practices in the seventeenth century. Taking up the approach suggested by Wegman, Newcomb, and Butt, this article studies the regulative practices as they existed within relatively distinct practices and traditions, namely those of specialized musicians in late 17th-century Northern Germany.

1. Theoretical Autonomy: Musical Processes and Musical Works

For the rudiments of a notion of theoretical autonomy, it is helpful to turn to a single document, and even to a single passage. The first chapter of Bernard’s treatise, a definition of music in terms common to many treatises of the time, is as follows. (I have provided a new English translation, as Walter Hilse’s widely used one in *The Music Forum* mistranslates certain terms essential to the intellectual background of the treatise.)

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| Tractatus compositionis augmentatus | The 1st Chapter  
| Q. D. B. V. [Quod Deus bene vertat.]  
| Das 1ste Capitel  
| Vom Contrapuncte insgemein  
| 1) Die Composition ist eine Wissenschaft aus wohl gegen einander gesetzten Con- und Dissonantiis einen harmonischen Contrapunct zu setzen.  
| 2) Ist also der Zweck der Composition die Harmonia oder Wohl-Laut mehrerer und unterschiedener Stimmen, welches die Musici einen Contrapunct heißen, weilen vor Alters und vor Erfindung derer itzt üblichen Noten anstatt derselben nur Puncte gebräucht worden; daher also durch solche Puncta angedeutete zwey oder mehrere Stimmen Contrapunct genannt worden. Könnte nach etlicher Meynungh besser ein Contrasonus genannt werden.  
| 3) Die Materia solches Contrapuncts sind Con- und Dissonantien, doch unter denen letztern nur Diejenigen, welche aus Eintheilung der Octave in ihre Tonom und Semitonia herrühren, nicht aber die übrigen, so unnatürlich, und also der Harmonie zuwider sind.  
| 1) Composition is a science of setting a harmonic counterpoint from consonances and dissonances well counterposed.  
| 2) It is thus the goal of composition [to make] a harmony or concord of several and diverse voices, which musicians called a counterpoint, for long ago, before the invention of the now common notes, points were used; and thus the two or more voices indicated through such points were named counterpoint. According to the opinion of many, it could better be called a contrasonus.  
| 3) The materials of such counterpoint are consonances and dissonances, though among the latter only those that derive from the division of the octave in its tones and semitones, not however the others, so unnatural, and thus contrary to harmony.  

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Fitting out the 17th-century text with 20th-century Anglo-American Schenkerian terminology, Hilse translates the first sentence of the *Tractatus* as »Composition is a science which erects a harmonious contrapuntal structure out of well-disposed consonances and dissonances.« Subsequently, Bernhard’s Aristotelian terms *materia* and *forma* are translated as »building blocks« and »beauty« respectively. Walter HILSE, *The Treatises of Christoph Bernhard*, in *The Music Forum* 3, ed. William J. Mitchell and Felix Salzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 31. All translations from Bernhard are my own.
4) **Die Forma** besteht in der künstlichen Abwechslung und Vermengung solcher **Con- und Dissonantzen**, also in **Observation der General und Special Regeln des Contrapuncts**, als aus deren unterschiedlichen Brauch und natürlichen **Influentz** es herrühret, daß eine **Composition** gut, die andere aber besser ist, die minder oder mehr vergnüget und den **Authoren** berühmt macht.

4) The **form** lies in the artistic alternation and combination of such **consonances** and **dissonances**, thus in the observation of the **general and special rules of counterpoint**, for from their diverse use and **natural influence** it results that one **composition** is good, another however even better, pleasing either less or more and making the **author** famous.

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In this brief chapter, Bernhard touched on two aspects of the theoretical autonomy of music. While, at the most basic level, the mere definition of musical terms and rules set aside musical processes as belonging to a common order, and thus implied a general theoretical autonomy, the reference to the »composition« as a self-sufficient whole implied a specific type of theoretical autonomy, the structural autonomy and coherence of the work. »Coherence« here is used in a broad sense. It does not necessary imply a harmonious unity of parts and whole, but rather merely states that there is some definable relationship between them.

With terms such as »consonance« and »dissonance,« as self-evident as they may seem, Bernhard laid out the first elements for a concept of theoretical autonomy. To regulate and control the movement between dissonances and consonances, he could rely on the »**general and special rules of counterpoint**« as a type of rule which applies only to music. Through them, he could conceptualize and manipulate sound *as if* it followed its own laws. By defining a »**science**« (a body of practical knowledge) that dealt with such laws, a theorist defined a world of specifically musical operations. For Bernhard, the rules of composition included not only consonance and dissonance treatment, but also principles such as mode, canonic artifice, and cadence. Since at least the *Musica enchiriadis*,² musicians have relied on this body of specifically musical terms as they seek to mold their music, and this definition of a vocabulary provides the foundation for the theoretical autonomy of music, the sense that tones can be arranged such that they seem to have a life of their own.

However, it is vitally important to recognize this level of the specifically musical as formed by human intentions. »Consonance« and »dissonance,« for instance, may seem to represent purely musical categories, but they register, as all musical terms must do, the meeting of mind and world. As David Cohen has noted, Carolingian theorists of organum invoked metaphysical ideals to ground

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the priority of consonance over dissonance in such texts as the Musica enchiriadis. Bernhard did not explicitly distinguish between consonance and dissonance in such terms, but did dismiss all non-standard intervals (those outside the diatonic scale) as «unnatural.» At times, the terminology only shows its aesthetic dimensions in context. Bernhard began the nuts and bolts of his discussion with a list of intervals, always treated as simultaneities. However, as Werner Braun has noted, musicians use the term «interval» to designate varying musical phenomena. A simultaneous dyad is different from the distance between melodically displaced tones, and the interval of a third, say, within the course of a single phrase has a different quality from the third that separates the cadential note of one phrase from the upbeat of the next. The term «interval» always brings assumptions about the temporal nature of music into play. Such cultural values always attend the production or reception of music processes. But in order to manipulate or to understand such processes, it is necessary to describe musical relations as if they were theoretically autonomous. At the same time, the socially determined thought of any single person should not be treated as the meaning of the musical processes, for they are «underdetermined,» as the saying goes. The music articulates time and moves through affective spheres in ways that no single description, theoretical or poetic, can exhaust. While composers cannot avoid drawing upon their culturally defined experiences as they manipulate musical processes, just as recipients cannot avoid experiencing the music in culturally defined ways, the music will invariably carry different meanings for different people. The theoretical autonomy of musical process lies not in any absence of meaning, but rather in the indeterminacy of meaning.

To describe the theoretical autonomy of musical processes is not, however, to define the autonomy of the musical work, or «composition» as Bernhard wrote. The theoretical autonomy of musical terms and processes became important early in Western musical traditions. The structural autonomy of musical works is a second...
and more narrow type of theoretical autonomy, one that came historically later and that depended even more upon social practices and aesthetic ideas than the theoretical autonomy of musical processes. Although the structural autonomy of works was not the essential concern that it became in the 19th and 20th centuries, Bernhard still was sensitive to it. Rhetoric provided him the means to discuss works.

Like other German theorists before him, Bernhard borrowed the word »composition« from rhetoric, using it in two senses: as the activity of combining tones together, and as the result of the activity. In the opening definition of the topic of his treatise, he used the term in its first sense, as an activity. The activity of composition is a craft or science (Wissenschaft) that proceeds according to rules. »Composition« is a science of setting a harmonic counterpoint from consonances and dissonances well counterpoised. It is thus the goal of composition to make a harmony or concord of several and diverse voices, which musicians called a counterpoint. As he shifted his focus from the activity to the result in the last paragraph. »It results that one composition is good, another however even better.« To a large extent, the two faces of the word »composition« crystallize an essential issue in scholarship on the work concept. How do musicians think about the activity of composition (the performance of a task) as separate from the result (the work or artifact)?

As a good student of Aristotle, Bernhard emphasized the productive activity of composition above all, an activity that required the broad principle of theoretical autonomy but not necessarily the narrower one of structural autonomy. Science (Wissenschaft) was not abstract knowledge, but rather pragmatic knowledge necessary to accomplish a goal. At the same time, Bernhard also thought about the result (the work or artifact). As many scholars have noted, musicians from the Renaissance onward did think about repeatable works, often drawing on the treatises on rhetoric by Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle. In 1537 Listenius famously distinguished the result-oriented poetic music from both activity-oriented theoretical...
and practical music, directed toward knowing and doing respectively. Poetic music
«consists of making or putting together more in this work which afterwards leaves
the work perfect and absolute, which otherwise is artificially like the dead. Hence,
the poetic musician is one who is trained in leaving something more in his achieve-
ment.»

Despite this famous definition, the existence of a work concept in the Renais-
sance has been challenged. Heinz von Loesch has argued that Listenius primarily
used the rhetorical terminology simply to invoke a mode of thought [Denkform],
not to describe their musical practice. As Loesch puts it,

The use of the Aristotelian and Quintilianian terminology is not a means to an end,
but rather an end in itself. In other words, the substance of the concept of »musica
poetica« consists not in the formulation of a modern concept of composition or work,
but rather in the transfer (transformation) of an Aristotelian-Quintilianian figure of
thought into the realm of music. In the process something emerges, to a certain extent
accidentally, that corresponds to our work concept.

To exemplify this foreign mode of thought, he argues that the »musical work«
in Listenius's original formulation (in the Rudimenta musicae of 1533) applied
primarily to works of music theory. While he notes that composition (rather than
theory) increasingly dominated the discussion of musical »making« over the course
of the 16th and 17th centuries, Bernhard would still have found the blurred line
between music theory and composition familiar. The Tractatus itself is as much a
»work« as Bernhard’s own music. In its neat division into chapters and parts, it had
internal integrity. And it had temporal durability—Johann Mattheson still referred
to it in the Vollkommene Capellmeister (1739). By rationalizing compositional practice,
Bernhard gave the Tractatus the closed quality of an independent whole.

15 Nicolas LISTENIUS, Music (Musica), trans. Albert Seay (Colorado Springs: Colorado College

16 »Die Anwendung der aristotelischen und quintilianschen Begrifflichkeit ist nicht Mittel zum
Zweck, sie ist Selbstzweck. Mit anderen Worten: Das substantielle Moment am Begriff der ’Musica
poetica’ besteht nicht in der Formulierung eines neuzeitlichen Kompositions- und Werkbegriffs, es
besteht in der Übertragung (Transformation) einer aristotelisch-quintilianschen Denkfigur in den
Bereich der Musik, bei der sich, gewissermaßen akzidentell, etwas ergibt, das unserem Werkbegriff
entspricht.« Heinz von LOESCH, Der Werkbegriff in der protestantischen Musiktheorie des 16. und 17.
Jahrhunderts: Ein Missverständnis, ed. Thomas Ertelt, Studien zur Geschichte der Musiktheorie, no. 1
(Hildesheim: Olms, 2001), 95-96.

17 ——, Musik–Musica practica–Musica poetica, in Deutsche Musiktheorie des 15. bis 17. Jahr-
hunderts: Erster Teil. Von Paulmann bis Calvisius, Geschichte der Musiktheorie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftli-
che Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 122-23. See also P. CAHN, »Zur Vorgeschichte des ’Opus perfectum et
absolutum’«, Heinz von LOESCH, ’Musica’ und ’opus musicum’: Zur Frühgeschichte des musikali-
schen Werkbegriffs, in Musikwissenschaft zwischen Kunst, Ästhetik und Experiment. Festschrift Helga de la

18 Ibid., 105-06. Glarean’s list of composers represents a historical turning point for Loesch.
But if Bernhard did think about the Tractatus as a theoretical »work,« he also offered the same category to practicing composers and musicians. In this respect, the »composition« was the result, a whole that could be judged and could transcend the immediate occasion of the setting. To see the shift in emphasis from the activity of composition to the composed result, it is necessary to read carefully his statements on the purpose of composition, again borrowed from rhetoric. In other words, by referring to aesthetic and social issues, Bernhard integrated the notion of the composed work into the foundations of his theoretical remarks.

For Bernhard, a composed work could be separated from its performance. As he wrote in the last sentence of the first chapter, the skillful and differentiated use of counterpoint meant [quote] »that one composition is good, another however even better, pleasing either less or more and making the author famous.« The claim to fame might seem smug in a learned work on counterpoint, were it not a fixed topos of rhetoric and poetry, ancient and modern.19 To take only one example, Horace, in the Ars Poetica, wrote that the expert piece of writing will »cross the sea and extend to a distant day the author’s fame.«20 But the statement was more than a rhetorical formula, as it described aesthetic and social practices in order to denote the structural autonomy of the work. Of course, Bernhard did not specify the public with which the author would win his fame—it could have been the immediate audience of a Capellmeister’s court no less than transmaritime publics, and thus the fame resulting from performances rather than works. Nonetheless, the rhetorical trope suggests an ideal of wide distribution. And for a composition to be distributed, it needed to be treated as a result of compositional activity, not simply the activity itself. The rhetorical terms evoke a musical practice in which musicians separated between work and performance. Bernhard did this again in the later parts of his treatise when he named works by Italian and German contemporaries and predecessors.21 The pieces were models of style. They exemplified imitable principles of part writing, not the inimitable qualities that Romantics looked for in their canons of works. That said, even if Bernhard cited works as exempla, rather than aesthetic entities, works such as Palestrina’s motet Ad te levavi animam meam had the rudimentary structural autonomy that allowed them to cross mountains, if not seas.22

Today, the structural autonomy of a work has become more a matter of aesthetics than of theory. It has become a question of reception, related to how a piece of music is treated rather than how it is constructed. As Peter Bürger has

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21 J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed., Kompositionslehre, 90.
22 Bernhard cites Palestrina’s motet as an example of modal extension. Ibid., 106.
noted, the institution of art is so strong that even avant-garde anti-art has its place in the museum. Yet in order for the principles of aesthetic autonomy to arise, musicians needed to develop their expertise in the manipulation of sound, the province of theory. While one can treat any piece as aesthetically autonomous, as 19th-century musicians did when they performed age-old liturgical works in their concert halls and theaters, musicians would not have done so in the first place if they had not been able to rely upon musical processes to create structural coherence. They had to step from the general theoretical autonomy of musical processes to a more specific structural autonomy of a musical work. Here, musicians needed to borrow the rhetorical terminology and its aesthetic values to develop certain types of musical processes—in particular harmony (or counterpoint) and cadence—among the range of those treated as theoretically autonomous. They could, in other words, enlarge the realm of the general theoretical autonomy of music by drawing upon the principle of structural autonomy established in rhetoric.

There is a central term in Bernhard’s first chapter that fills out his concept of the composition: harmony. This term offered, among other things, a normative criterion to judge the success of the work, and it thereby gave substance to the fame Bernhard prized. As musicians in distant cities or across seas would not necessarily hear a performance of a work, and thus not be able to judge the effect on an audience, »harmony« provided those in the profession a standard by which they might judge its quality. The term was especially useful, as it denoted empirical, religious, and theoretical aspects of the music, as the situation demanded. It also could complement more specific conceptions of a musical work as a type of musical discourse. At the empirical level, harmony described the pleasurable sensations that a listener felt. »It is thus the goal of composition [to make] a harmony or concord of several and diverse voices. . . . [The composition is] pleasing either less or more. « »Harmony« is here the sound of pleasant concord. On a theological plane, some of Bernhard’s compatriots, both earlier and later, considered music as a divine science. Johann Gottfried Walther, for instance, wrote around 1708 that »Music is a heavenly-philosophical science, grounded in particular in mathematics, that deals with sound insofar as a good and artistic harmony or concord can be brought forth from it.«

But »harmony« could describe something else beside empirical sensation and theological ideal. At the theoretical level, it was a term that could designate

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24 See, for example, Daniel HARRISON, Rhetoric and Fugue: An Analytical Application, Music Theory Spectrum 12, no. 1 (1990).

the concordance of parts as a whole, and in particular the rules by which two or more voices could combine into a counterpoint.

»It is thus the goal of composition [to make] a harmony or concord of several and diverse voices, which musicians called a counterpoint. . . . The form lies in the artistic alternation and combination of such consonances and dissonances, thus in the observation of the general and special rules of counterpoint, for from their diverse use and natural influence it results that one composition is good, another however even better.«

Thus, Bernhard furnished his readers with a normative category that, at a minimal level, marked off musical works as discrete entities. Harmony could designate the confluence of musical processes that, at least in the late 17th century, was necessary to distinguish «compositions» from their performances. »Harmony« could point to structural autonomy.

The centerpiece of Bernhard’s notion of structural autonomy is counterpoint. Invoking Aristotelian terminology, he defined the »materials« as consonances and dissonances, the »form« as »the artistic [künstlich] alternation and combination of such consonances and dissonances.« He emphasized both the interrelationship between musical materials, and the idea that there were certain principles that governed their behavior: the composer attended to the rules of art and craft to put the consonances together. Together, these materials and principles bind the music together into the first foundations of a coherent entity. Later, in his discussion of the rhetorical figures, the integrity of the contrapuntal texture, the »concord of several and diverse voices,« provided the point of departure for the expressive use of dissonance. Thus, the »whole« provided by the harmony lay in the local interactions between of intervals and melodies. Polyphonic texture (rather than form, as in the 19th century) was the foundation for Bernhard’s concept of structural autonomy.

But, in the course of the treatise, he did often refer to parameters that might give a work some large-scale coherence. The first, and most important, was the text. As Bernhard noted, in order to compose a melodic line easy to sing, it was important »that text and notes rhyme well with each other.« Although he spoke in this context primarily of the correct setting of prosody, by implication the poetic structure of the text would have primacy in determining the structure of the work.
Musical processes, after all, are not the only means to establish structural autonomy, and it is all too easy to overlook the properties of texts and narratives. Words and ideas can contribute to the structural coherence of a composition no less than musical processes, providing both the coherence of a narrative or lyrical theme as well as a formal coherence through rhyme schemes and other verbal structures. Finally, the interaction between text and music, as through the sensitive application of figures, can define the structural autonomy of a work as well as musical processes.

Second, mode could function as a control. Bernhard differentiated, for example, between «common» [gewöhnlich] and «rare» [seltsam] transpositions of mode (between those by fifth or fourth, and those by other intervals)—a distinction that would later turn into the system of close and distant key relations. That said, he did not presuppose mode as a means of harmonic unity, as key would become. Among the five manipulations of mode (transpositio, consociatio, aequatio, extensio, and alteratio), Bernhard allowed pieces to begin and end in different modes (alteratio), a musical procedure inimical to later conceptions of tonal unity. While he was certainly conscious of other strategies, as his own works suggest (e.g., sectional divisions and the alternations between vocal and instrumental passages, as well as those between soloist and ensemble), he saw no need to discuss them.

2. Aesthetic Autonomy: Judgment

If rhetoric allowed Bernhard to conceptualize the theoretical autonomy of music (both the autonomy of musical processes and the structural autonomy of the work), it also allowed him to think about music not just as a means to an end (as functional), but also as an end itself (as aesthetically autonomous). Like all others of his time, if pressed he probably would have been quite happy to point out the usefulness of his art. In the church, music enhanced religious devotion; in the court and city, it honored authority; in the collegium musicum and other intimate settings, it provided an excuse for conviviality and furthered moral formation; and in private festivities, it adorned the proceedings and acted as a mark of distinction. He armed his readers with the theoretical precepts necessary to achieve these ends through the rhetorical concept of style, elaborated in chapter forty-three of the Tractatus. Although he did not mention it explicitly, genre would have been no less important to his compatriots, and was also a fixed part of rhetoric. Yet when Bernhard noted in the first chapter that the goal of the composer was to «please,» he saw no need to bind it to any one of these purposes. The central position assigned to pleasure—at the very head of the treatise—is a sign that Bernhard had some notion of aesthetic autonomy.

29 Ibid., 97.
30 Ibid., 40.
Aesthetic autonomy involves the postulate that music can be judged according to qualitative criteria that abstract from stated purposes. A work or a performance can be considered as an end rather than a means. To be an end, the work or performance elicits some powerful experience from the recipient that gives it self-sufficiency (described by «aesthetic» terms such as pleasing, beautiful, sublime, grotesque, and so forth), but also takes place within some social practice in which participants are likely to value such experiences as of a class of their own. Two caveats are necessary. First, as people always conceive of their actions in terms of a hierarchy of personal and collective goals, the traditional language of aesthetic autonomy is slightly misleading. To practice music «for its own sake» is not so much to put oneself in the service of a musical work, as the literal meaning of the phrase suggests, but rather to treat music as contributing in a direct way to the final goals of life, whatever they may be for a particular person or society. As one distinguishes between practices in which music is treated as an end (as autonomous) and those in which it is treated as a means to some further end (as functional), it would be more accurate to speak of a hierarchy of ends, some of which are more directly linked to ideals of the good life than others. To treat music «as an end» is to say that it brings human beings close to their ideals of «the good life.» The terminology of ends and means is still useful, and will be used in this article, as it allows one to differentiate clearly between the different types of functions these two practices have. Second, aesthetic autonomy does not imply that a work cannot also serve as a means to some further end, but only that it can be judged as if it were independent. Thus, as a particular practice of judgment is essential to the principle of aesthetic autonomy, it is impossible to separate social issues from aesthetic ones. For the sake of clarity, the third and fourth sections will treat both of these caveats as it turns to the practices and institutions essential to aesthetic autonomy. This section will focus on types of judgments and its link with the rhetorical concepts of music.

With words of exemplary precision, if often misunderstood, Immanuel Kant isolated the centrality of judgment when he described the pure judgment of taste as based on a sense of purposiveness without a goal. Although he wrote a century later than Bernhard, Kant articulated distinctions that were not foreign to the 17th century, and his distinction between judgments based on intrinsic and extrinsic properties is thus worthy of treatment. Other more controversial elements of Kant’s theory of judgment can be passed over, notably the universal claim of the subjective judgment of taste, and the strict distinction between, on the one hand, agreeable pleasure derived from the senses, and, on the other, the aesthetic pleasure produced by the free play between the understanding and the imagination.

There are features of Kant’s theory that make it eminently applicable to 17th- and 18th-century practice. For instance, he offered a theory of aesthetic autonomy that acknowledged the importance of function and purpose for art. Any work of
human making would primarily have »adherent beauty« derived from its suitability to a particular end. This was in essence a theory of decorum, a rhetorical principle of ancient provenance. Kant insisted that art needed a moral purpose, for it should serve humanity as served as a means of acculturation. By contrast, nature provided examples of »free beauty,« of »purposiveness without an end,« for it was impossible for the finite consciousness of human beings to ascertain any divine plan. He did not maintain this distinction between works of art and works of nature strictly, for he also noted that certain works of human art and artifice, especially arabesques and »music fantasies (without a theme),« indeed all instrumental music,« offered correlates of human making.31 It was precisely their free beauty and lack of clear moral purpose that made them questionable in his eyes and ears.

But Kant’s was a theory of judgment, not of art and certainly not of l’art pour l’art. If an artwork served moral ends, it could nonetheless be judged according to the criteria of free beauty. Kant argued that the »judgment of taste« could be differentiated from the judgment of the propriety of an object with respect to its end.

A judgment of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would thus be pure only if the person making the judgment either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgment. But in that case, although this person would have made a correct judgment of taste, in that he would have judged the object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be criticized and accused of a false taste by someone else, who considered beauty in the object only as an adherent property (who looked to the end of the object), even though both judge correctly in their way: the one on the basis of what he has before his sense, the other on the basis of what he has in his thoughts. By means of this distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty between judges of taste, by showing them that the one is concerned with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty, the first making a pure, the second an applied judgment of taste.32

As the basis for the judgment of taste lies in the »inner perfection« of the work (something intuited rather than conceptually articulated), rather than in the »external perfection« (its suitability to its end), Kant isolated the aesthetic quality of a work from its purpose. This was a theoretical separation, as Kant was well aware. Art could be judged aesthetically, even though the mere fact of aesthetic value did not in any way keep it from being useful as well. There were simply two different criteria of judgment.

In the late 17th century, it would have been difficult for musicians (amateur or professional) or listeners to articulate such distinctions. Nonetheless, there are

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32 Ibid., 115-16.
numerous signs that musicians and connoisseurs did isolate the intrinsic quality from the extrinsic purpose of works. As noted, in the *Tractatus*, Bernhard isolated the pleasure provided by a composition (chapter one) from the issue of purpose (transmitted indirectly through the concept of style in chapter forty-three). Much later, in his prefatory recommendation of Johann Theile’s *Pars Prima Missarum 4. & 5. Vocum* (1673), Bernhard punned that he had recently viewed »a part« [einen Theil] of Thiele’s masses, and that it »had especially delighted« him [sonderlich ergetzet habe].33 While his remark spun with publicistic vim, there is no reason to doubt that the music did give Bernhard pleasure. The extreme attitudes of composers are also in part a sign of their dedication to intrinsic qualities of works. As evidence of a Baroque interest in »aesthetic experience,« Harry White has rightly called attention to J. S. Bach’s pride in and engagement with counterpoint, out of proportion to the liturgical functions of the music.34

When Bernhard noted his pleasure in Theile’s works, he referred to a quite specific type of pleasure, one that derived in part from his ability to judge the works. In order to be judged an end in itself, musicians or listeners must be able to focus their pleasure and attention on a specific work or event, and have the habit of doing so. For instance, 17th-century composers such as Bernhard could focus on musical processes, while amateurs could focus on the skill with which moral ideas were made musically manifest. In each case, the recipient would have had material for a pure judgment— they could have judged the skill of the composer or performer—even if they also judged a work in terms of its adherent beauty—its appropriateness to its purpose, professional or ethical. In each case, the recipients could classify certain types of works or events as belonging together, and develop rules of art that both instructed practitioners and guided judges. These objective conditions required a practice and contexts in which people would actually link certain types of works or events as governed by its own principles. The meetings of composers and humanists provided such contexts.

To negotiate the twin demands of pleasure and purpose, musicians could again draw on rhetoric. Style and genre offered easy points of mediation on two interrelated issues that faced musicians: between autonomy and functionality, on the one hand, and between the rules of art and the contexts within which music was created and received, on the other. While style and genre are linked to purposes, they also offered musicians material upon which they could exercise their judgments. In its origin, the rhetorical principle of style was based on a principle of decorum, that is, of fitness of a particular literary or compositional type to a particular situation. As music in Bernhard’s time was composed primarily for particular purposes, a creative musician could reckon with a number of clearly

33 Bernhard’s »Sendschreiben« is reprinted as an appendix in Wolfgang HORN, Die Kompositionslehre Christoph Bernhards in ihrer Bedeutung für einen Schüler, Schütz-Jahrbuch 17 (1995): 118.
prescribed situations with set constraints. Church music required a solemn style, while weddings and birthdays demanded an extroverted one. Such distinctions in character grounded Bernhard’s distinction between *stylus gravis* and *stylus luxurians*, and helped to define the function of particular works. In a similar way, genres were also linked to particular uses and principles of decorum.

Despite the firm links between music and stated uses, the reduction of various types of festivity and social gatherings to ritualized types allowed composers to stylize the techniques they used in their occasional works. The luxuriant style of figural counterpoint, for instance, not only gave works an exuberance that helped them achieve their end, but the style also could be treated as an end in its own right. Musicians could take pleasure in an artful display of craft and knowledge, as Bernhard expressed with respect to Theile’s masses. Thus, on the one hand, stylistic and generic norms allowed composers to communicate more effectively with an audience. They were rhetorical. On the other, they represented a self-conscious artistry that could be manipulated and refined. Means (the skillful cultivation of the luxuriant style of counterpoint) could vie with ends (for instance, the bestowal of distinction upon a wedding or birthday), and thereby become an end in themselves. If occasional works were functional, they also allowed musicians to show their talents in a particular genre, to compete with past masters, and, if their compositions were felicitous, to offer new *exempla* to later generations.

Style and genre, then, aided both the functionality and the aesthetic autonomy of music. On the one hand, they codified standard uses of music through the conventions of style and genre. On the other, they tended toward a potential autonomy from these purposes by allowing composers to manipulate these conventions. These two tendencies are not mutually exclusive, and can even comfortably coexist if the composer stays within certain boundaries.

It is a general tendency in practices of rhetoric for style and genre to become valued for their own sake, rather than simply as means to an end. From antiquity onward, rhetoricians were concerned not just with functional speech (political or judicial persuasion), but also with narration and the rules of art themselves. In his survey of rhetoric, George Kennedy has distinguished between primary and secondary rhetoric. While primary rhetoric found its application in speech acts (or, applied to music, in particular performances), secondary rhetoric was manifested in discourse and art forms without an explicitly persuasive function. Kennedy notes that the shift from primary to secondary rhetoric is a persistent tendency in the history of the discipline. It has been called *letturaturizzazione*, »the tendency of rhetoric to shift focus from persuasion to narration, from civic to personal contexts, and from speech to literature, including poetry.«35 Although the artistry of secondary rhetoric thrives in a written tradition, as Kennedy notes,36

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36 Ibid., McCRELESS, Music and Rhetoric, 849.
primary and secondary rhetoric differ more in manner than in medium. A speech or a musical improvisation can poetically or musically overshoot its purpose, just as written poetry and music can be bound by purpose. The North-German tradition of *musica poetica* hewed closely to the pole of secondary rhetoric, more so than the performative Italian traditions of opera and cantata.37

In the 17th century, it was in musicians’ interests to develop style and genre both rhetorically (as a means to an end) and with a view to its potential aesthetic autonomy (as an end in itself). With conventions of genre and style, composers could be sure that their music suited its purpose properly, and that the audience understood it in an appropriate manner. Linked to the skillful use of technical norms (such as mode, fugue, and imitation), genre and style become potential objects of critical judgment abstracted from the use of the music. While a piece of liturgical music could encourage a devotional attitude when it was performed in a church, it could also recommend itself through its sophistication. In Kantian terms, its value as liturgical music is the object of an applied judgment, its value as a work of art and artifice that of a pure judgment. For example, Palestrina’s *Ad te levare animam meam* served Bernhard less as a piece with a liturgical purpose than as a model of excellence in modal extension.38 While good modal extension could further the affective and illustrative power of the work (and thus its ability to achieve its function), it also showed the composer’s craft and skill. In general, compositional conventions of all types lend themselves to free judgments, first by making musical processes available to composers for sophisticated treatment, and second by giving recipients a means by which to judge them.

It is true that the particular pleasures afforded by music were linked to moral and religious ends, even outside the church. As Johann Kuhnau noted, the virtuoso »can please God quite well if he is willing to let his virtu and the grace God bestowed on him be seen and heard in honest company.«39 As will be discussed below, the moral and religious purposes helped to constitute special types of function linked to humanist and professional institutions. For the moment, it is only necessary to note that musicians emphasized the pleasure that their music could give, and that it was not necessarily immediately bound to particular purposes. Indeed, as Rob Wegman has noted, both religious asceticism and moralistic injunctions against the pleasures of music signal a long-standing, widespread, and popular tendency to judge experiences of beauty as without specific purpose.40

40 R.C. WEGMAN, From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450-1500, 454.
3. Social Autonomy: Institutions and Traditions

If late 17th-century musicians and recipients could draw upon rhetoric to manipulate musical processes and to judge skill with the rules of art, they always did so as part of distinct practices and traditions. In general, in a ritualized world of occasional music, it was not obvious for a person to separate the experience of a work per se from the experience of the work as a celebratory or memorial event. There were two traditions that encouraged practices of separation, though with approaches that cultivated two different forms of aesthetic autonomy. The first was broadly humanist, directed toward the practice of the autonomy of music from the necessary demands of daily life, the second narrowly professional and focused on the theoretical autonomy of musical processes and works. In each case, practitioners linked their musical activities to an ideal of the good life, which in 17th-century Northern Germany was Lutheran through and through.

First, nobles and educated burghers (especially civil servants, professionals, and teachers, but also merchants) cultivated the liberal arts in humanist forms. As they separated the arts from utilitarian crafts and sciences, practitioners of the arts assigned them a purpose (ethical formation of character) that was deemed essential to inner cultivation and social harmony. To draw this distinction, humanistically minded practitioners characterized the arts as ancillary to everyday concerns, as Neben-Werck. It was primarily literature and poetry that grounded the humanist, ethical education as well as the practice of distinguishing between primary and secondary activities. In the preface to his Blumen (1680), Daniel Caspar von Lohenstein, for example, wrote that poetry presented to him »an ennobling way to while away the time, but only as a mere ancillary thing, not, by contrast, as a ponderous pursuit.« In the literary societies that sprang up in the 17th century, such as the Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft, founded in 1617 on the model of the Florentine Accademia della Crusca, cultivators of the arts also had a patriotic mission: to create a German literature that might compete with that of Italy. The arts had several explicitly stated uses, but the distinction in types of utility underpinned a type of aesthetic autonomy. The arts formed character, provided amusement, enhanced religious devotion, and fostered a sense of national culture, but these

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41 In his definition of aesthetic autonomy as »not merely the expressivity of Fux’s compositions as this is recovered by contemporary scholars but the existential force of the music which obtained when it was originally performed,« White does not distinguish sufficiently between these two types of judgment. H. WHITE, ‘If It’s Baroque, Don’t Fix It’, 102n27.

42 This distinction between the autonomy of art and the autonomy of the artwork has been suggested by Peter BÜRGER, Critique of Autonomy, in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 174.

were ends directed inward, not toward the direct accomplishment of everyday ends. While the primary tasks of everyday life were seen as necessary parts of life, the secondary and ancillary practices devoted to inner cultivation were considered ways to cultivate the soul, and thereby to receive grace. For humanists in the Lutheran tradition, it was the inner life that was essential to the pursuit of the good.

If it could provide no competition to literature, music partook in the ancillary character of the linguistic arts. The musical institutions that resulted from such humanist practices were both courtly and civil in form. In the court, the seigneur and courtiers might set aside a certain part of the day and certain chambers in their residences (not to mention court theaters) for the enjoyment of music and other arts and sciences. As a singer and later as a music director at the Saxon court in Dresden, Christoph Bernhard participated in such activities, and with his Italian training and experiences, brought modernity and worldliness to the court through his practice of the arts. In the literary societies (which could include musical performances) and the collegia musica, nobles and burghers could engage in artistic pursuits, often using the sense of conviviality developed there to moderate social hierarchies. While cantor at St. Johannis in Hamburg from 1664 to 1674, Christoph Bernhard participated in the collegium musicum founded by Matthias Weckmann in 1660.

This is not to deny the many functions of the arts that were directed outward or toward less august ends. The arts served to connote status and distinction in the modern world. Nobles used the arts to distance themselves from feudal, knightly traditions based on the virtues of bravery and the crafts of war. By cultivating arts whose importance lay in their ancillary character (Neben-Werck), nobles could show their sovereign free spirits along lines set out by Italian humanists such as Baldassare Castiglione in Il Cortegiano (1528), and thereby their modernity. For the bourgeois professionals and educated men, the cultivation of


46 The memory of feudalism was by no means dead in 17th-century Germany, and many nobles viewed the humanist ideals with some suspicion. The Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft permitted the
the liberal arts similarly provided both internally and externally directed goods. The arts edified and softened the spirit, but also enhanced their social standing within a highly stratified society. Some poets were even ennobled for their artistic efforts, among them Martin Opitz (1627), Johann Rist (1646), Philipp von Zesen (1653), and Sigmund von Birken (1655). But if the music had many functions, the ones primarily pursued were those ethical and religious goals. Johann Kuhnau noted that »from their pleasant harmony« the musicians as a collegium musicum »should learn an even, harmonious agreement among their personalities which from time to time must prevail among such people.«

However, the humanist cultivation of the fine arts did not require specialized musical knowledge, though many nobles and burghers were practiced as performers, improvisers, or composers. The humanist practice of music as a fine art could cover all forms of musical experience, from passive listening to active participation to theoretical speculation. While specialized knowledge was not essential to humanist distinctions between necessary and ancillary activities, all of which had some purpose that justified their practice, it was important to the strong form of aesthetic autonomy in which a recipient makes a judgment that abstracts from stated purposes. Specialized knowledge allowed the play of art, whether of poetic structures or of musical forms, to attract interest in its own right. It also provided a bridge between the theoretical autonomy of musical processes and poetic conventions, on the one hand, and the aesthetic autonomy accorded to music as an art, on the other.

It was primarily the professional musician—the »industrious lover of the score« [fleißiger Partitur Liebhaber], as Bernhard put it—that had the experience and the theoretical language that allowed them to think consciously of music’s theoretical autonomy. He would have been particularly sensitive to this circle of connoisseurs, for he belonged to a coterie of professional organists, cantors, and Kapellmeister that met in Hamburg and Lübeck in the early 1670s to discuss learned counterpoint. Among its participants were Dieterich Buxtehude, Johann Adam Reincken, Johann Theile, and probably Matthias Weckmann. He was also well aware that the »profession« included a canon of »exceptional authors« from membership of learned bourgeois. Some aristocrats took offense at the social mixture and tried to turn the society into a knightly order. The protector of the society, Prince Ludwig of Anhalt-Köthen (1579-1650), responded that the goal of the order was to cultivate virtue and the German language, and though knightly deeds were not excluded, they were not the sole purpose. Volker MEID, Literatur des Barock, in Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2001), 107-08.

K. Chapin: »A Harmony or Concord of Several and Diverse Voices«: Autonomy in 17th-Century German Music Theory and Practice

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47 W. BARNER, Barockrhetorik, 228-29.
many countries and of long tradition. If the tradition of the liberal arts allowed humanistically minded amateur musicians and listeners to separate artistic from everyday pursuits, the tradition of professionalized composition allowed composers to formulate the internal goals that separated their activities from other crafts and practices. For professional musicians, the quality of a work was an issue separable from, though of course not unimportant to the purpose of a work. Radically stated, the quality of a work was useless, even if a work itself had specific uses, for works of inferior quality could fulfill stated purposes. The musicians aimed at a specifically musical excellence, to speak anachronistically. Of course, there were without doubt other functions that the quest for musical quality performed, such as the establishment of norms that both constituted the profession and excluded others from its ranks; the personal advancement in the profession through the recognition by other experts; and so forth.

While Bernhard identified the quality of the work as a primary goal of the *musicus poeticus*, many of his contemporaries assigned their contrapuntal manipulations a mystical function, but in terms that suggest quality and skill as primary if hidden goals. The most emphatic statements about the internal goals of North-German musicians of Bernhard’s acquaintance or tenor come from those who perceived music in alchemic terms. As David Yearsley has noted, the esoteric interest in learned counterpoint and canonic artifice was linked, for some at least, to a belief in magic. Yet while Heinrich Bokemeyer, Heinrich Buttstett, Johann Theile, and Johann Walther were surely convinced that contrapuntal artifices were alchemic, it is difficult to imagine that they had much success in their magic. The real motivation for their activities must rather have lay in the existential pleasure they derived from their own practical and theoretical skill and knowledge, and in the marvels of the harmonious interplay of musical lines. In other words, while they thought that they were engaging in a magical activity, they would have found little interest in the activity unless they derived a pleasure that would later be considered aesthetic from the play with musical processes, so that a *de facto* principle of aesthetic autonomy informed their actions. On the one hand, the alchemic language conferred validity upon the play with the laws of music, that

54 The efficacy of musical magic has been a matter of debate. While Gary Tomlinson has argued that one must not trespass on the beliefs of historical actors—that Ficino’s musical magic »worked«—Karol Berger has rightly responded that the historian, in a true dialogue with historical actors, must be ready to acknowledge the mistakes made by others, as the historical actors are not around to enter the dialogue themselves. Gary TOMLINSON, *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 247; Karol BERGER, *Contemplating Music Archeology*, *Journal of Musicology* 13, no. 3 (1995): 408-10.
is, a play within the world circumscribed by the theoretical autonomy of music. On the other, the pleasurable workings of »the music itself« gave rhyme and reason to the high-flung metaphysics of counterpoint. The metaphysics are important as a sign of these musicians' hierarchies of goals. Through its power, music could trump other types of activities. It was essential to their identities and to their life. In this, at least, even composers of a less speculative bent would surely have concurred.

To pursue music as an end in itself, musicians in the 17th century needed institutions that would allow them a certain degree of social autonomy. Bernhard worked in both of the primary institutions open to German musicians in the 17th century, in a church (as cantor of St. Johannis in Hamburg) and in a court (as singer, Vice-Capellmeister, and later Capellmeister for the Kurfürst of Saxony in Dresden). For these institutions, he performed, directed, and wrote music that served particular uses. But court and church also supported a further institution in which the music could be its own goal. Trained, professional musicians with both practical and theoretical knowledge made up a »Musical Republic,« as Johann David Heinichen termed it in 1728, which, especially by that time, had all the internal quarrels characteristic of the Republic of Letters. This Republic was in part based on local meetings of the collegium musicum. It was also based on communications between musicians through letters, manuscripts, and theoretical works, including Bernhard’s own Tractatus and Heinichen’s Der General-bass in der Composition. Whether local or scattered, the Republic served as a professional network. Before becoming the organist at St. Johannis, Weckmann had been a student of Heinrich Schütz in Dresden and it is probable that he facilitated his friend Bernhard’s move. It was also a means of professional refinement. As Johann Kuhnau noted, such gatherings allowed musicians »to continue to improve themselves in their splendid profession.« Composers communicated with each other in order to train each other and to develop their craft. Through such links, they could develop specialized knowledge and skills. While their compositional techniques may have been directed ultimately at some further purpose, composers could posit goals that they and a few talented amateurs alone would have recognized. Their professionalization allowed them to posit goals internal to their practices and to take pleasure in the skillful realization of these goals.

The professional and humanist traditions were not completely isolated from each other. Not only did many members of the nobility engage in composition as one of their ancillary activities, as mentioned above, but certain uses of music permitted more room for composers to engage in artistic play. Musicians had greater liberties in courts than churches, at least in musical matters if not in their

everyday lives. While patronage systems may not have allowed composers full social autonomy, patrons often realized the representational value of sophisticated music. The Kurfürst Johann Georg I of Saxony allocated Bernhard a stipend for a trip to Venice to study and scout talent. It was in his interest to allow the arts in his realm to flower with the most marvelous, most modern, and therefore most Italian of musical styles. Thus, a composer could aim for the sophisticated play of style and genre that made it possible for music to have some aesthetic autonomy, at the same time that patrons could bask in the prestige that this sophistication reflected back onto their own courts. In a courtly context, music could represent authority simply through the artistry of the work. If they were employed by a ruler with a taste for the latest music, musicians could unfold their powers with much freedom. By contrast church authorities sometimes complained that the complexity of the newest musical styles hindered the devotional purposes of the music, either because untrained clerics could not perform the works or because the congregation was distracted from the meaning of the text or rite. Moreover, as they trained themselves to perform sophisticated music, schoolmen could spend less time on their other devotional and pedagogical activities.

Thus, to define differences between tasks of necessity and pursuits of pleasure, as would a humanist, and to define differences between the goals of skill and craft intrinsic to a profession and the goals of a court or church job exterior to the Musical Republic, as might a composer, were to engage in types of aesthetic autonomy. In each case, people used music to achieve a goal that they separated from other types of goals. In the first case, humanist nobles, courtiers, and burghers defined the experience of music as one directed inward, toward the moral necessities of character and not toward the practical necessities of everyday life. In the second case, specialized musicians used standards of quality that were opaque to the non-specialist to define their own professional goals. Such musicians found ways to align their inner professional goals with the external goals demanded by the dictates of courtly and religious institutions. Broadly speaking, while the humanists grounded their practice of autonomy on an idea of the fine arts in which music was clearly linked to moral formation, the composers grounded theirs on an idea of the theoretical autonomy of music. Only later, when musicians began to teach the amateurs more about the processes of music, did the two approaches merge to generate Romantic practices of autonomy.

4. The Functions of Autonomy: Individual and Society

The ideals and practices of musical autonomy—theoretical, aesthetic, and social—invariably have social and political benefits and dangers. While artists only developed an explicit theory of aesthetic autonomy in the 19th century, in part to maintain the quasi-religious functions of the arts within secular genres and contexts, in part to redefine their relationship to the new forms of state authority that developed after the French Revolution, at least some artists in the 17th were aware of the political and social potential of artistic autonomy. During the 17th century, there were two central arenas in which discussions about the social functions of autonomy developed, discussions that later fed directly into the Romantic theories of aesthetic autonomy. First, in France the literary Querelle des anciens et des modernes broached questions about the relationship between the artist and the state. Second, in Germany scholars tried to parse the demands of religion and commerce in a satisfactory manner. In such debates, the champions of artistic autonomy sought to define a conception of the good life that they believed in danger.

Within the Republic of Letters and the French Academy, the champions of the Ancients developed a concept of artistic autonomy in order to resist the political pressures of absolutist states.59 The Republic of Letters had its roots in the humanism of the Italian Renaissance, in the groups of intellectuals devoted to the restitution of antique learning, including the practice of rhetoric. While groups of humanists and nobles often formed official or semi-official academies, associated with courts, the intellectuals also corresponded with each other as private individuals. Moreover, they often specifically constituted their activities in opposition to the rise of political absolutism and imperialism, first against the Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburg Charles V, and later against the collusion of state and church advanced by Richelieu and Colbert, councilors to Louis XIV. As Habsburg and French imperialists often donned the robes of religious authority to further their political ambitions, the defense of pagan authors implied both a commitment to standards of free discourse and debate, and the recognition of values other than those mandated by church and state.

Thus, ancient authors provided not only formal models, but also standards of righteous behavior that the absolutist state could or should not touch. For example, Nicolas Boileau, maligned as a pedant first by his adversaries in the Querelle and then by later historians of literature from Voltaire to the present, used the literary tradition of the ancients to oppose the political machinations of the moderns. As Marc Fumaroli has written, for Boileau, »the honor and the conscience

of the man of letters have their true and autonomous foundation in a literary
tradition independent of current events and derived from Antiquity.«60 Although
both ancients and moderns did curry royal favor, they had different goals. Ancients
such as Boileau appealed to the personal power of Louis XIV and thereby pre-
served the relative political autonomy of individuals vis-à-vis the state and the
church, if not the king. The moderns, on the other hand, appealed to the king as
an abstract embodiment of both state and religious power.61 For the moderns, all
people were marionettes controlled by hands both royal and divine. Thus, by
arguing for the artistic nature of certain genres of writing, the party of the ancients
gave literary works a political function, albeit a weak one from a modern perspec-
tive. There were standards of behavior, as well as a realm of the soul, over which
world and state had no power. This political autonomy was enshrined in the Re-
public of Letters.62

The champions of the ancients appealed less to the autonomy of the artwork
than to the institutional autonomy of art. For example, Molière insisted on his
right to criticize dogmatic theologians in his plays. It was, in other words, a plea
for the social autonomy of the artist above all, that is, for his freedom from censor-
ship. However, the fight for the autonomy of art implicitly raised the central issue
of the aesthetic autonomy of the artwork. Boileau separated to some degree
between form and content, between the mode of presentation and the subject mat-
ter presented. Even though he appealed to the ethical values presented in ancient
texts—independence of thought, bravery, courage—he also depended on the
eloquent, artistic character of the literary tradition, and thus on the formal and
stylistic qualities of artworks, to single out literary texts. »The verse best achieved
and the most noble thought / Cannot please the spirit if the ear is wounded.«63 In
other words, the formal qualities of verse did not have a particular political use,
but certainly a political function. Of course, it was also possible to criticize the
cultivation of aesthetic criteria as a step back from immediate civic concerns. In a
beautifully phrased critique that portended his break with the Republic of Letters,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau criticized incipient aesthetic autonomy in his Discours sur
les Sciences et les Arts of 1750. »One no longer demands of a man if he has probity,
but rather if he has talents; nor of a book if it is useful, but rather if it is well
written. Recompense is given to those with fine spirit, while virtue rests without
honors. There are a thousand prizes for beautiful discourses, and none for beautiful

60 »Pour Boileau, à l’inverse, l’honneur et la conscience de l’homme de lettres ont leur fondement
propre et autonome dans une tradition littéraire indépendante de l’actualité et remontant à l’Antiquité.«
Ibid., 136.
61 Ibid., 132.
62 On the history of the Republic of Letters in the 17th century, see Dena GOODMAN, The Republic
63 »Le vers le mieux rempli, la plus noble pensée / Ne peut plaire à l’esprit, quand l’oreille est
actions."\(^{64}\) Rousseau criticized the tendency of writers to develop rhetorical eloquence into an end in itself. No means to an end, eloquence had in his eyes wrongly become an aesthetic value in its own right.

There are several reasons that the Querelle, with its various political subtexts, did not affect German discussions of the arts during the 17th and early 18th century. As Peter Kapitza has noted, German intellectuals knew of the Querelle, but did not feel the need to engage in the partisan polemics of the French debate.\(^{65}\) First, in a checkered land of diverse political authorities, there was no omnipotent ruler comparable to Louis XIV to whom intellectuals could appeal or by whom they might be threatened. The lack of centralized authority thus lowered the stakes of the debate. In addition, if authors felt too restricted, they could presumably move to a new city or state where greater tolerance in intellectual matters reigned. Second, the educated class in Germany tended to work in schools, universities, and court administrative posts. Because they lacked the inducements to free exchange offered by the Parisian culture of the aristocratic salon, and because they had a vested interest in the existing state and religious institutions, they had less need and reason to challenge existing authority and thus to formulate any demand for the autonomy of the arts. The salon allowed Parisian intellectuals to draw upon the themes of ancient wisdom in order to move their discussions away from the closed discussions of the Republic of Letters characteristic of earlier humanist debates. Third, and most importantly, Lutheran doctrine, itself based on humanist principles, mediated between ancients and moderns. Lutherans were interested in the philological recovery of the wisdom of the ancients, and of the Bible in particular, at the same time that they understood themselves as moderns. In general, Germans prided themselves for taking a middle road, for avoiding the extreme positions advanced in France. The situation would change toward the end of the 18th century, as German Aufklärer began to draw upon English and French thought more fully and to challenge existing social institutions more emphatically, and as Prussia began to develop its politics of expansion and absolutism under Frederick the Great. Until then, German intellectuals lacked the political provocations and inducements that led their French neighbors to formulate a principle of the autonomy of the arts.

Thus, if French intellectuals put the humanist distinction between useless and useful pursuits to work to open a political space for individual autonomy,

\(^{64}\) "On ne demande plus d’un homme s’il a de la probité, mais s’il a des talents; ni d’un livre s’il est utile, mais s’il est bien écrit. Les récompenses sont prodiguées au bel esprit, et la vertu reste sans honneurs. Il y a mille prix pour les beaux discours, aucun pour les belles actions." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts. Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), 50.

even as they flattered their monarch, German intellectuals did not yet feel the need to strive for this autonomy. While the Germans followed the verbal battles assiduously, it was not until the 1750s and 1760s that Lessing, Klopstock, and later Schiller begin to reap the fruit of the *Querelle*, and to insist on their social autonomy from courts and the aesthetic autonomy of their works.

But even if German intellectuals did not draw political consequences from the autonomy of the arts, they still made use of the humanist distinction between primary, useful activities (such as commerce) and ancillary activities (such as the arts). Indeed, this distinction was particularly important in regions of economic prosperity. In *Das Neu-eröffnete Orchestre* (1713), Johann Mattheson blamed three groups for a perceived decline of music: speculative theorists and pedants; composers and performers who pretended knowledge that they lacked; and finally *Musikanten* who worked for mercenary reasons. To answer Heinrich Buttstedt's reply, Mattheson later whetted his appetite for polemics on theorists and pedants, but in this early salvo he was at least as concerned with the morality of church musicians. And to protest money-grubbing, he argued a line that had long separated the liberal arts from practical pursuits.

Through the compulsion [produced by the desire for money] the *ingenia* are struck down, one loses one's natural freedom of disposition—one becomes sullen, slothful, lazy, and indolent, and one can never achieve anything of value. When, however, the time is up, then so a youth is glad as if he had escaped from prison. He dons his dagger at his side and walks away. And this should be a musician that one uses at a wedding.

The compulsion [Zwang] linked to base desires led to both artistic and moral degeneration. Not just the quality of the performance suffered from the pursuit of money, but more seriously the performer lost his sovereign free spirit. Like Aristotle and most later advocates of the liberal and fine arts, Mattheson advocated a certain inner distance from desires, and believed that the arts depended on such circumspection.

Mattheson, the champion of that most worldly and expensive of genres, opera, probably did not oppose the entrepreneurial spirit of Hamburg in all its facets. For many of his contemporaries, piety and commerce could exist in perfect harmony within the Protestant work ethic. Beekman Cannon noted that...
The noble Hamburg Senators must have been inspired to profound contemplation of the state of their souls when, between prayers, they turned to the notations of the Stock exchange, printed conveniently on the last pages of Melchior Christoph Wöttgen’s prayerbook, which showed on its title page a woodcut not of the church and its congregation but of Hamburg’s exchange and the stockbrokers.67

While a good Protestant could not achieve salvation through work, financial success could nonetheless be a sign of a divine calling, and so long as linked to asceticism in worldly concerns, no impiety.68 Moreover, amidst forays against the mercenary spirit of some musicians, Mattheson also complained bitterly in Das Neu-eröffnete Orchestre about the low pay given to German musicians. While Mattheson conceived the pleasures of music and the profits of the musician as good, so long as linked to a moral attitude, he nonetheless presented the arts as a possible line of defense against capitalist utilitarianism. Again, the arts were autonomous from commercial pursuits, though they had a clear moral purpose.

Within the Lutheran tradition, music had greater autonomy from the everyday than other arts, as it was a special gift of God. Luther wrote that »next to the Word of God, music deserves the highest praise. She is a mistress and governess of those human emotions—to pass over the animals—which as masters govern men or more often overwhelm them.« Although Luther built upon a Classical and Renaissance fascination for the marvelous effects of music on the emotions, his specifically theological concerns began to separate the emotions brought forth by music from the emotions that arose in the course of daily life. While music was a religious and not an aesthetic experience, he nonetheless introduced the foundations of a separability principle. Mattheson, for one, was attentive to the special qualities of music. If the current conditions of music making were in a sad state, he argued, music itself had lost none of its nobility. It was a gift of God and could not suffer from human mistreatment. Thus, while the arts in general opposed the abacus mentality of commerce, music singled itself out through its divinity, at least among right-minded musicians. Not only did Mattheson note the link between music and theology, but he also argued that the materiality of the other arts sullied them with worldliness. »Other plaisirs do not hold a candle to this one [music]. They are all moreover subject to greater danger and to materie, while [music] on the other hand is almost wholly spiritual and occupies the soul.«69 The power of music to elicit rare experiences, opposed quotidian approaches to life,

69 »Andere Plaisirs reichen diesem nicht das Wasser / sind auch mit einander grötzerer Gefahr und Materie unterworfen dahingegen diese fast gantz spirituel ist und die Seele occupiret.« J. MATTHESON, Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre, 33.
later informed the Romantic aesthetics of absolute music. It existed in nuce in the Lutheran approach to the fine arts, as Mattheson makes abundantly clear. Although Mattheson followed a Pietist path that diverged from the highways traveled either by the cosmopolitan Christoph Bernhard or by the Orthodox Lutheran cantors and organists that followed him, they all believed in the fundamental divinity of the musical arts. The »divine science« apostrophized so often in treatises on musical poetics differed in name and in details from the »divine art« beloved by Mattheson, but they shared their opposition to the quotidian.

In both the French Academy and in the German church, then, artists used some concept of artistic autonomy to isolate or cultivate their individuality. In France, Boileau sought to resist the collusion of state and church under royal authority, though he did not by any means resist royal authority. In Germany, Mattheson conceived of music as an affair of the individual soul, and opposed it to normal activities of everyday life. In each case, individuals used the practices and aesthetics of autonomy to define themselves as individuals and to protect some private value, whether the literary freedom or private morality. This link between artistic autonomy and individual autonomy would only strengthen in the late 18th century, when critics granted the inspired and individual genius the right to overturn the canons of decorum so central to the rhetorical approach to composition.

5. Concluding Remarks

To conclude this overview of 17th-century trends toward autonomy principles, it is possible to make some general remarks about the complex of theoretical phenomena, aesthetic ideals, and social practices that together form musical traditions predicated on artistic autonomy.

By building practices that produce works that do not evanesc in the explicit uses assigned to them in society, Christoph Bernhard and other North-German skilled musicians (improvisers and composers alike) reserved a sphere of activity to themselves. As productive musicians cultivating musical processes according to inner-professional criteria, they worked with and progressively extended a world of theoretical autonomy. Within the boundaries set by institutional principles of decorum, they could act with relatively little fear of interference to create music that could delight both producer and recipient, as well as achieve other religious and social ends. For such musicians, the professional skills and standards were in part a tribute to the real delight they took in a well-done performance or composition, and in part a protective shield against those outside of the profession.70 To extrapolate a general point, all artists, craftspeople, and profes-

70 Their skills and standards, along with their stability within church and court institutions, also sentenced them to a certain distance from their educated contemporaries. Laurenz LÜTTEKEN, Das
sionals develop canons of skills and criteria that constitute intrinsic goods to their particular art. As people outside the art, craft, or profession may not know or have sufficient expertise to judge these skills, artists or craftsmen enjoy the potential advantages and run the risks of a relative freedom from outside regulation. If their skills offer members of a group both a sense of cohesion and potential isolation, it can also give them a means to relativize the demands of state and society. A claim for artistic autonomy can be a claim for personal freedom and autonomy—a claim for religious or secular self-realization—and at times one fraught with political significance.

A claim for aesthetic autonomy can equally well be a sentence to insignificance and impotence. By raising the importance of specialist concerns that are distant from everyday political and social issues, artists may cede their political voices to those willing to act in the world of the mundane. If they strive to create a realm of mental or spiritual autonomy, artists can leave the political authorities greater freedom of movement in practical matters. At the extreme, they can even further the worldly designs of ruler or state as they take or offer a mental refuge in a purely artistic realm of free action. Indeed, artistic autonomy may only retain its positive political force when it is a fragile concept, when artists struggle to maintain their freedom from political, religious, or other institutions of power. As soon as the rights of artistic autonomy are taken for granted, art can offer mental or spiritual solace and strength—goals by no means to be sneezed at—but may lose its immediate relevance with respect to political issues.

At a social level, the cultivation of sophisticated artistic techniques can become esoteric, though not necessarily less legitimate to those engaged in them, if the theoretical autonomy of works and musical processes is accepted too easily. Not only can specialists forget that they practice their arts every day and in the everyday, but they can forget to link their own inner-professional interests with the issues and concerns of a larger public. Taken to an extreme, artistic pursuits can estrange amateurs, without of course losing their vitality among the connoisseurs. Such was the situation of learned contrapuntists at the beginning of the 18th century.

But the practice of autonomy is not limited to professional practitioners of the arts. Humanists developed another concept of autonomy, and one with social functions of its own. In the tradition of the liberal and then the fine arts, critics distinguished between inner and outer-directed practices, between self-formation and well-being, on the one hand, and biologically and economically necessary tasks, on the other. While critics usually assigned inner-directed activities a social use—by forming better individuals one formed also a better society—they still

...
separated it from the types of direct commercial and practical interactions that governed everyday social intercourse. Neither side of the equation is unimportant, and both continue to play important functions in modern society. Inner-directed practices form the individual; outer-directed, quotidian practices further the concrete integration of the individual into society.

The history of music in 18th-century Germany can be told, among other ways, as a fusion of these two cultures of music, professional and humanist. As professional musicians learned to talk about their inner-professional interests in journals and pamphlets, they reached out to the tastes of people who valued music for its ancillary character. And as humanistically minded intellectuals lost faith in the intrinsic moral qualities of art, they sought to understand the play of emotions and tones and thereby legitimize their intrinsic pleasure in music. Around 1800, the proverbial year of reckoning, writers with educations in both traditions like Christian Friedrich Michaelis and E. T. A. Hoffmann fused the professionals’ interest in the theoretical autonomy of music (musical process and structure) with the humanists’ development of the aesthetic autonomy (its »useless« character and its divine nature) to ground the Romantic tradition. They could not have done it without the work of musicians like Christoph Bernhard.

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Sažetak

»Harmonija ili složnost više različitih glasova«: Autonomija u njemačkoj glazbenoj teoriji i praksi 17. stoljeća

Dobro je poznato da Tractatus compositionis augmentatus Christopha Bernharda – kao klasični primjer za kompozicijsku teoriju u tradiciji musicae poeticae – izlaže retorički način mišljenja. Retorika, donoseći estetiku u kojoj je glazba upravljena prema slušateljima i vezana uz određene svrhe, također pruža temelje za teorijske, estetičke i društvene principe glazbene autonomije. Autonomija i funkcionalnost međusobno se ne isključuju, iako to znanstvenici smatraju implicitnim. U ovom se članku, s jedne strane, u sjevernoj Njemačkoj u kasnom 17. stoljeću pronalaze tragovi razvitka pojmova i praksa češće vezanih uz rano 19. stoljeće, ali, s druge strane, i redefinira estetička autonomija kao povezanost s posebnim tipom funkcije: uporabom glazbe u težnji prema nekoj viziji »dobra života«, kao što je Aristotel imenovao krajnji cilj ljudskoga postojanja.

Da bismo izbjegli laka odbacivanja principa glazbene autonomije nužno je napraviti neke razlike. U prvom poglavlju Tractatusa Bernhard je upotrijebio retoričku terminologiju kako bi definirao teorijsku autonomiju glazbenih procesa (prividnu neovisnost i zakonitost zvuka u pokretu) i glazbenog djela (krajnjeg rezultata skladateljske djelatnosti). Osim ove teorijske autonomije Bernhard je postavio razliku između posebnog »zadovoljstva« u glazbi i konkretnih etičkih, vjerskih i političkih ciljeva, te tako ponudio načelo estetičke autonomije (razlika između glazbe koja se smatra ciljem po sebi, a ne sredstvom). Napokon, Bernhard je bio dijelom i ‘glazbene republike’, koja se sastojala od profesionalnih glazbenika, i collegiuma musicum, koji je objedinjavao humanistički nastrojeno građanstvo s vještim glazbenicima. U svakoj od ovih skupina ljudi su pravili razliku između djelatnosti i ciljeva vezanih uz glazbu i djelatnosti i ciljeva vezanih uz neprofesionalne ili svakodnevne poslove. Ovakve institucije dopuštale su glazbenicima relativnu društvenu autonomiju u razvijanju vještina i ciljeva unutar njihove profesije. Sudjelujući u ovim oblicima autonomije sudionici su pripisivali umjetnosti glazbe relevantnost i važnost. S pomoću toga nadali su se postići svoju viziju – priopćenu u luteranskim vrijednostima – o »dobre životu«.