The Production of Space Through Practices of Self-Reliance

The Spatiality of Refugee Integration in Berlin after the 2015 Refugee Crisis

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Working Paper
Refugee Self-Reliance and Humanitarian Action in the City

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The dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe since 2012 has generated a humanitarian challenge for both national and local governments, as their displacement is slowly becoming protracted. This has generated a transition from an emergency response, to new policies, programmes and projects that aim for the integration of refugees in cities. Within this context, Berlin is celebrated as a case of innovation in strategies for hosting refugees; an innovation that comes in contrast to refugee protests and contestation in different sites in the city.

This paper will explore processes of refugee integration in Berlin, arguing that refugee self-reliance (whether practiced or enacted) is producing spaces of integration in the city. To do so, it will bring theories on space developed by Henri Lefebvre and Jacques Rancière to discussions on self-reliance and integration drawn from literature on sociology, cultural studies, humanitarian action and political science. A theoretical framework built from this will guide the analysis of two specific sites in the city where spaces of integration are being produced: the Tempelhof and Oranienplatz. As a conclusion, policy implications will be outlined to suggest that self-reliance should be understood as a spatial practice that produces different types of spaces of integration in the city. It is hoped that bringing space to the discussion on refugee integration and self-reliance might contribute to on-going debates on these topics. Furthermore, in a broader context, this aims to build on the argument that space is both a product and a precondition of society.

**Key words:** Production of Space, Refugee Integration, Self-Reliance, Berlin, European Policies, Refugee Crisis.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASBB</td>
<td>Amt für Statistik Berlin Brandenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMF</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENN</td>
<td>Berlin Entwickelt Neue Nachbarschaften</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMAS</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMJV</td>
<td>Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz</td>
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<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Deutsche Welle</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXCOM UNHCR</td>
<td>Executive Committee United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSBTB</td>
<td>Give Something Back to Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRT</td>
<td>Labour Recruitment Treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBB</td>
<td>Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVSEW</td>
<td>Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Introduction

Since 2012, the European Union has had a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants seeking asylum; mostly due to rising violence in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Katz, et al., 2016). This has generated different responses from European governments, ranging from the construction of walls in borders, to the provision of refuge through a quota system. As it is not yet clear when the situation in the Middle East will allow people to return, one of the biggest challenges for European countries is to deal with a displacement that is becoming protracted.

Within this context, Berlin is celebrated in policy reports for its innovative strategies to host refugees (Katz, et al., 2016). They aim to generate an environment that facilitates processes of integration through fostering practices of self-reliance in refugee communities. However, parallel to this, refugee activism has also gained strength and the city has been witness to different protests in which injustices are denounced through the enactment of self-reliance.

This paper will argue that refugee self-reliance (whether practiced or enacted) is producing spaces in the city where processes of integration are taking place. By doing so, it aims to contribute to the on-going debates on refugee integration and self-reliance by bringing to them the notion of space. As it will be shown in Berlin, space is central to the discussions about integration and the way in which it is produced should be carefully examined.

The focus on an urban context, as opposed to a national context, follows the fact that urban communities and local governments are the ones who deal with the most immediate challenges of receiving such an increased number of refugees (Katz, et al., 2016). Furthermore, local governments in Europe are more flexible than other levels of government, dealing with challenges “[...] quickly and efficiently by introducing pilot projects and practices for refugee reception and integration” (Eurocities, 2016, p.6). The city is a fundamental unit of analysis as it allows both general and specific issues on integration to emerge, as well as its spatial dynamics to be evidenced.

The exploration will start with a theoretical framework in which literature from sociology, cultural studies, humanitarian action and political science (among others) will be brought together to build an understanding of the concepts of integration and self-reliance. Section 2 will introduce the notions of space developed by Jacques Rancière and Henri Lefebvre to argue how different conceptualisations of self-reliance imply a production of different types of spaces of integration.

After this, section 3 will give context to the case of Berlin and highlight the strategies deployed by the government and other actors to foster self-reliance to achieve integration. Furthermore, section 4 will unpack this in an analysis of two specific and contrasting sites where spaces of integration are being produced in the city. Finally, these cases will be compared to draw conclusions suggesting what are the potentials and limitations of the approach here explored.

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1 The number of asylum seekers in the European Union was around 1.3 million both in 2015 and 2016. From them, 54% came from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Eurostat, 2017).
Section I

Integration and Self-Reliance

1.1. Conceptualising Integration

Integration is a recurrent term used in European policies regarding refugees in cities, which aim to develop long-lasting solutions for people in protracted displacement. However, as a concept in sociological theory, it tends to be argued from two different points of view: assimilation and multiculturalism (Chau, 2013).

Integration, as assimilation, is a term first used by Emile Durkheim in his writings on Sociology. He argued that in a society, when there is an increased interaction between people (moral density), there is necessarily a competition for resources that results on social differentiation (Turner, 1981). This implies the emergence of subgroups inside the society and in this process, “normal” and “abnormal” conditions arise. Integration for him is a state of “normality” of a social system, where broad cultural and social norms regulate individual action (Turner 1981). As such, it entails a sense of collectiveness embedded in norms and practices, in which the social and cultural differences between subgroups in a society are blurred; a state that a society can reach through negotiation between individuals and the collective.

This definition of integration, although conceived in the 19th century, still permeates current policies and most of the research on the topic, especially in a context of migration (Favell, 2001). In it, integration is a process of becoming one unitary state and society. The assumption here is that “[…] there is an integrated and bounded host society to which immigrants can or must adapt” (Ireland, 2007, p.4). It also highlights a sense of social cohesion (Favell, 2001) and a movement of convergence among the components of a society (Ireland, 2007).

On the other side of the spectrum, there is a lot of recent scholarship developed around integration as multiculturalism (Barry, 2002; Emerson, 2013; Modood, 2014; Parekh, 2000). As a starting point, multiculturalism understands integration as something that is needed when “an established society is faced by some people who are perceived and treated unfavourably by standard members” (Modood, 2014, p.145). Its essence relies in an equality of opportunities in a society where difference stops being a problem; a society in which distinctiveness is recognised and encouraged (Emerson, 2013; Modood, 2014). It is unity in difference and as such it entails an expression of this difference at both the individual and collective level.

However, multiculturality doesn’t necessarily translate into a society free of exclusion dynamics and segregation, as such emphasis on differentiation might lead to hostility towards minority groups (Modood, 2014). Furthermore, in Karin Ling-Fung Chau’s words, “[t]he objectively existing multiculturality of the city does not automatically imply a smooth process of integration” (Chau, 2013, p.290). Multiculturalism, then, is one end of a spectrum that describes different modes of integration.

Moving forward, in this paper integration will be understood as something dynamic that occurs in the threshold between assimilation and multiculturalism (figure 1) or in other words, what Emerson (2013) calls interculturalism or Klopp (2002) calls reciprocal integration. This follows the argument that the binary between assimilationism and multiculturalism becomes problematic in the context of migration as it generalises complex processes of interaction between migrants and host societies,
Interculturalism is a new term giving a name to attempts to find a compromise between the polar opposites of multiculturalism and assimilation. (Emerson, 2013, p.5)

Theoretically, reciprocal integration should be understood as a process located between pure assimilation to a predetermined membership standard and an extreme, relativist multiculturalism in the form of separate ethnic communities or enclaves that exist side by side […] (Klopp, 2002, p.27).

In cross-cultural psychology, this process is called acculturation, defined as something that “[…] comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups”. (Redfield, Linton & Herskovits, 1936, p.149, quoted by Berry, 1997, p.7)

In a process of integration, both migrants and hosts mutually influence each other in such a way that the original cultural patterns of each group fundamentally change (Berry, 1997). This comprehends a dialogue and constant negotiation between one’s culture and the other’s, mediated by daily interaction (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015). Integration, thus, happens when there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained through that interaction in larger social networks (Berry, 1997): when integration occurs, some cultural elements change while others are preserved.

Recognising integration as something dynamic implies understanding it as a process rather than an end state (Emerson, 2011). However, because of the complexity of the different groups that interact in a society, integration is everything but a smooth process. It takes place in a context of inequalities and conflict and it “[…] spans various aspects of social life leading to the juxtaposition of overlapping layers of juncture and disjuncture in society.” (Chau, 2013, pp.291-292).

Integration, as argued by Favell (2001), needs to be reconciled with the recognition of de facto inequalities in society which, he claims, are always present. One of such inequalities lies on the fact that a migrant group will always enter the host society as a spectator and subject of current political, economic and social dynamics. These dynamics shape the way in which migrants and host societies interact and by doing so, they may accentuate existing inequalities or create new ones.

An analysis of processes of integration, then, must embrace conflict and differences, but also possibilities of change. Special attention must be paid to the way in which different populations interact, and the way in which this interaction is framed by a political, economic and social context. Following this, it is necessary to bring the discussion to the issue of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, exploring the concept of self-reliance as the objective of current integration policies.

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3 “Interculturalism is a new term giving a name to attempts to find a compromise between the polar opposites of multiculturalism and assimilation.” (Emerson, 2013, p.5)
4 “Theoretically, reciprocal integration should be understood as a process located between pure assimilation to a predetermined membership standard and an extreme, relativist multiculturalism in the form of separate ethnic communities or enclaves that exist side by side […]” (Klopp, 2002, p.27).
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1.2. Self-Reliance as the Objective of Integration Policies

Integration policies, as argued by Favell (2001), usually aim for the inclusion of a new social group (i.e. refugees) in a host society. As such, they foster a sense of membership to that society; for refugees to be integrated, they should be included already-existing structures of the context. According to UNHCR (2006), integration occurs in a dynamic process outlined as follows:

“[…] local integration is the end product of a dynamic and multifaceted two-way process with three interrelated dimensions. First, it has a legal dimension. As part of this, the host State grants refugees a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements that are broadly commensurate with those enjoyed by its citizens […] Local integration also has an economic dimension whereby individuals, households and communities are enabled to become less dependent on humanitarian aid and increasingly become self-reliant contributors to the local economy […] Third, integration has a social and cultural dimension. Refugees have a responsibility to make conscientious efforts to “acclimatize” themselves to the local environment and respect and understand new cultures and lifestyles, taking into consideration the values of the local population. For its part, the host community has a responsibility to “accommodate” refugees into its socio-cultural fabric.”

(EXCOM UNHCR, 2006, p.138, emphasis by author)

UNHCR’s conceptualisation of refugee integration highlights three dimensions of the process: a legal, an economic and a socio-cultural one. Within these, self-reliance is regarded as one of the components that contribute to the economic layer of integration. However, unpacking the meaning of this term reveals that it inevitably permeates and is manifest in all three dimensions.

Defined by UNHCR, self-reliance is “[…] the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity” (UNHCR, 2005, p.1). Humanitarian action has the mission to provide the means for refugees to be self-reliant, which is the rationale behind the drafting and publishing of UNHCR’s Handbook for Self-Reliance (2005): a document that outlines how humanitarian actors can work with refugees to achieve this goal. This builds on the argument that “[t]he integration process has been recognised as dependent upon the migrant and the opportunities open to them in the localities where they live” (Spencer, 2011, quoted by Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015, p.477).

Refugee integration, then, occurs through their interaction with the host society in the legal, economic and social layers of the context. In the literature, more than just being the objective of humanitarian action (Ensor, 2010; EXCOM UNHCR, 2006), self-reliance builds up the basis for a long-term durable solution for the problems faced by refugees in cities (UNHCR, 2005).

In the economic dimension, this means being able to acquire resources to fulfil basic needs without relying on humanitarian aid (EXCOM UNHCR, 2006). By working and participating in urban economic networks, refugees not only find means of interaction with the host society, but also become actors that contribute to urban markets. Furthermore, refugees arrive to their new context already possessing experience and knowledge in different sectors of the economy. This means that their potential participation in local economies also depends on the work-specific abilities they have acquired.

This participation is also defined by the legal framework of the context: how policies grant refugees with rights and access to services (EXCOM UNHCR, 2006). Every host country has specific procedures for applying for asylum and through them, asylum-seekers and refugees acquire specific rights. In some cases, for example, there is no right to work or to even access education until a refugee status is recognised (Ensor, 2010). This is also dependent on what happens at a local scale, as every city has different capacities to provide refugees with the opportunities they
need. According to UNHCR, this is reinforced by the specific socioeconomic conditions of the host society (UNHCR, 2006).

Participation in the legal dimension, then, becomes a fundamental aspect of self-reliance. It is related to Scorza’s definition of political self-reliance, which he argues is “[…] primarily the practice of independently estimating the nature and level of one’s own political responsibility, rather than depending on others for a view of one’s obligations” (Scorza, 2003, p.189). Because integration is a two-way process, the way in which refugees interact with the legal framework they are embedded in, becomes a political dimension of self-reliance. This may open room for refugee action or create barriers of access to different services.

Another type of barrier faced by refugees is in the socio-cultural dimension and it involves the cultural differences between them and the host society. One of such differences may be language proficiency, as it usually is a requisite to access the job market. Navigating through the legal, social and economic conditions of the new context, then, implies a need for assistance in refugee populations. Literature on self-reliance tends to associate this with “[…] education and vocational training initiatives designed to support the acquisition of the essential life skills that can enable urban refugees to become autonomous members of their host societies” (Ensor, 2010, p.25).

This is also translated into more interaction with different social groups and actors in the city. There is a need in refugee populations to establish sustainable livelihoods and the capacity-building to achieve this requires the joint effort of a variety of stakeholders in governments and civil society (EXCOM UNHCR, 2006; Clements, Shoffner & Zamore, 2016). Such interaction triggers and reinforces the integration dynamics discussed previously.

This also brings benefits for all the actors involved, as practices of self-reliance allow refugees to contribute to the general development of the country and reduce the need for relief assistance. In addition, it allows them to “[…] regain better control of their lives, provides greater stability and dignity, and may help them become “agents of development.” (EXCOM UNHCR, 2006, p.136)

To summarise, refugee self-reliance entails an intertwining of the political, economic and social dimensions of local integration (figure 2). Furthermore, if integration is understood as a process rather than an end state, then self-reliance must be understood as a series of practices that are continuously building the political, economic and social abilities of an individual or group to meet their essential needs. This builds on the fact that the context is never static and “[…] the needs of refugees change over time” (Tandon, 1984, p.270).

Figure 2. Integration through practices of self-reliance. Source: author.
Section 2

The Production of Spaces of Integration

To bring space into the discussion on refugee self-reliance and integration, a bridge must be built with theories on space and politics developed by Jacques Rancière and Henri Lefebvre in the second half of the 20th century.

2.1. The Practices VS the Enactment of Self-Reliance

Self-reliance, as the objective of integration policies, can be understood as a series of practices in which refugees gain political, economic and social abilities to meet their essential needs. However, this conceptualisation has two assumptions. First, that host societies are already more self-reliant and that for refugees to be integrated, they must ‘catch up’ with them to be able to actively contribute. Second, that when refugees arrive to the new context, they lack abilities to become self-reliant, which is the reason behind capacity building projects by governments and humanitarian actors.

These assumptions are problematic as they undermine the fact that both refugee and host populations are heterogeneous; within them are groups and individuals that are more self-reliant than others. Self-reliance, therefore, needs to be understood in relation to context; a relation that ultimately produces two different types of space in which integration occurs. To build on this argument, a parallel will be made with Jacques Rancière’s ideas on “The Emancipated Spectator” (Rancière, 2009) and the demonstration of equality (Boano & Kelling, 2013; Dikeç, 2005; Rancière, 2001).

In “The Emancipated Spectator” (2009), Rancière explores critiques on theatre to analyse the implications of being a spectator and bring this from the aesthetic to the political realm. For him, “[t]o be a spectator is to be separated from both the capacity to know and the power to act” (Rancière, 2009, p.2). It is having a passive role and a distance from action: the manifestation of a distribution of roles and positions in space. This distribution, reflects a general structure of a society in which different members are assigned specific roles (Boano & Kelling, 2013).

In a context of refugee integration, this is seen in the conditions faced by refugees in their new context. They are assigned a place within the political, economic and social structures, which creates a distance between them and their host society. Efforts of integration aim to reduce this distance by fostering practices of self-reliance.

But this distance is mirrored by the one between the spectator and the spectacle or, following another of Rancière’s texts, between the schoolmaster and his student (Rancière, 2009; Rancière, 1991). The distance is defined by the roles assigned by the system (schoolmaster and ignoramus), and to reduce it, the schoolmaster must inevitably redefine it, as it is “[...] enforced by the interminable practice of the ‘step ahead’ separating the schoolmaster from the one whom he is supposed to train to join him” (Rancière, 2009, p.9). In other words, the activity will always confirm a presupposition of an inequality of intelligence, something Rancière critiques when he calls for intellectual emancipation. He affirms that “[t]here are not two sorts of intelligence separated by a gulf” (Rancière, 2009, p.10); there is an equality of intelligence that needs to be constantly verified.

Taking this to a broader argument in his literature, for him “[...] equality is not an end-state but a starting point that requires constant verification [...]” (Boano & Kelling, 2013, p.45). The presupposition, then, should be that of equality and through its verification (or demonstration), the

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6 He calls this the partition of the sensible: “[…] that system of sensible evidences that discloses at once the existence of a common [that is, the whole] and the partitions that define the respective places and parts in it.” (Rancière, 2000a, p.12, quoted by Dikeç, 2005, p.174).
order and structure of society, what he calls the police, is contested and politics occur. The police, for Rancière, becomes the representation of the entirety of societal structures (Rancière, 2001; Dikeç, 2005; Boano & Kelling, 2013).

The same happens with the distance between refugees and the host society in terms of self-reliance. By attempting to reduce it, governments and humanitarian actors constantly confirm a presupposition of inequality of capacities to meet essential needs. However, if this is changed to a presupposition of equality in abilities, then it is through the demonstration of self-reliance that the distance between these populations in the police can be subverted. Self-reliance here becomes something that can be enacted, rather than a series of practices specific to a certain group. Examples of this can be found in some of the literature on refugee self-reliance in which the participation of refugees in the structuring and development of their own aid programmes is deemed essential for integration to take place (Easton-Calabria, 2016; Tandon, 1984). By building their own aid programmes or organisations, they demonstrate their equality in abilities to contest the role assigned to them by the police.7

Following this argument, then, the way in which self-reliance is conceptualised (either as a series of practices or as something that is enacted) implies a different nature of the spaces of integration it produces.

2.2. The Production of Spaces of Integration

Space, according to Henri Lefebvre, is “[…] fundamentally bound up with social reality. […] Space does not exist ‘in itself’; it is produced” (Schmid, 2008, p.28). Rather than a void in which social interaction happens, for him space is a product of those interactions. As such, it is both a precondition and a result of the production of society; space as a product is specific to a context (Schmid, 2008; Lefebvre, 1991).

A city, then, can be thought as a space created and re-created by the interaction between the people and social groups that inhabit it and are subject to its general structures (the police). In the context of refugee integration, spaces (or places) “[…] are remade through the social practices of refugee settlement and integration” (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015, p.489). In other words, space is created through the interaction between refugees and the host society; an interaction mediated by practices (or the enactment) of self-reliance.

In this sense, refugee self-reliance produces space as it implies an interaction between refugees and the host-society that is immersed in the social reality of the context. Nevertheless, the way in which self-reliance is conceptualised determines how the created space of integration is characterised. When it is conceived as a series of practices deployed by refugees in a context of inequalities, the space produced lies within the already established structure of society (the police). Meanwhile, when there is a presupposition of equality in capacities and self-reliance is conceived as something that is enacted, then the space produced exceeds this structure of society and becomes a space of politics.8

The space of the police is defined by Rancière as “[…] a fixed and inert ‘container’ geometrically divisible into discrete and mutually exclusive parts, the sum of which gives the count that is equal to the ‘whole’ to be governed” (Dikeç, 2005, p.181). It is a space ruled by the norms established by the structures of the police; a space where interaction may occur but where the roles of refugee and host society are not challenged. In it, integration can occur as space may allow “[…] deeper and more enduring interactions between people engaging in shared activities with common goals [to] take place” (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 2015, p.488). In other words, changes in both refugees and host society can occur without it implying a change in the division of such roles.

7 See Easton-Calabria (2016) and Tandon (1984), where refugee-run organisations have proven useful for addressing wider integration issues in the city.

8 This distinction can be equated to the one between “invited” and “invented” (or claimed) spaces in literature on participation in development. The first is provided by the state for the public engagement of marginalised communities, while the second is conquered by the civil society to address social injustice (Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall & Coelho, 2006; Miraftab, 2004).
Opposed to this is Rancière’s conceptualisation of space of politics, which emerges “[…] for the verification and enactment of equality” (Dikeç, 2012, p.674). It is a space for contestation, for disruption and re-configuration. In that sense, it becomes a space of negotiation and conflict represented by politics. “Politics, for Rancière, inaugurates space” (Dikeç, 2012, p.674). What is contested here is the structure of society that assigns a place and a role to refugees. Politics for Rancière “[…] implies a disruption of the order of the police, and its guiding principle is equality” (Dikeç, 2005, p.174); it is a questioning of the order imposed by the police and the verification of equality, in this case, is through the enactment of self-reliance.

However, the above cannot be understood as a binary of spaces, but rather as a spectrum. The context in which integration occurs is always changing as the police is never fixed: there are constant transformations in the legal, economic and social contexts in which integration takes place. This builds on the idea that “[s]pace is neither naturally given nor immutable, but rather is a product of interrelations always in the making, and never ‘a totally coherent and interrelated system of interconnections’ […]” (Massey, 1999, p.280, quoted by Dikeç, 2005, p.181). Space is constantly being created and recreated through social interaction between refugees and their host societies. Furthermore, there is an intrinsic relationship between the two sides of this spatial spectrum, as “[…] what happens in one impinges on what happens in others, as relations of power within and across them are constantly reconfigured” (Cornwall, 2002, p.7). This blurs the boundary of the police, as it is constantly being reconfigured by what occurs both inside and outside of it.

To recapitulate, then, a space of integration is produced in a double threshold between the space of the police and the space of politics, and between integration as assimilation and integration as multiculturalism (figure 3). Moving forward, this two-dimensional conceptualisation will be explored through the case of Berlin, more specifically in two sites that illustrate how different characterisations of self-reliance produce different spaces of integration within this double threshold.
Section 3

Berlin: The City of Migration

3.1. General Context

Berlin is the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, a country which is home to around 82'200,000 people as of 2015 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017); the largest in the EU in population size and the fourth in area with a total of 348,900 km² (World Bank, 2017b). It is also the largest economy in the EU by nominal GDP (World Bank, 2017a). The country is divided in 16 different states (Länder), three of which are metropolitan areas around individual cities. As it is a federal republic, each state has a degree of autonomy and sovereignty, under the general legal framework of the German Constitution.

Migration trends are responsible for Germany’s population growth during the past years, as its natural growth rate has been negative since 1970 (UNDESA, 2017). Waves of migration have been related to both internal political and economic changes, such as the reunification of Germany in the 1990’s, as well as to international crises such as the Yugoslav Wars and the current conflicts in the Middle East (figure 4). Because of this, 10,58% of Germany’s population is foreign, while 20,80% has a migrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).

Berlin is the third largest metropolitan area in the country with a population of 6’500,000 (ASBB, 2015) and has a dual nature of city and state. This means it has a local government that handles internal affairs, as well as representatives in the federal government. It has been the capital of the country since the German reunification and since then it has been subject to numerous urban transformations.

Its contested history has caused Berlin to have social and economic dynamics that do not generally follow the trends of other German cities (Chau, 2013; Möbert, 2017). Despite being the capital of the biggest economy in the EU, the cost of living in it is relatively low. However, due to the urban population growth, property prices are increasing and the city is currently facing a shortage of affordable housing (Möbert, 2017). Furthermore, the urban landscape in terms of population density, settlement of migrants and inequalities contribute to the city’s complexity. A more detailed description of this complexity can be found in Appendix 1.

3.2. The 2015 Refugee Crisis

The 2015 Refugee Crisis is Europe is the name with which media refers to the dramatic influx of refugees in Europe since 2012. This crisis is caused by an increase of conflict and human rights violations in their countries of origin, especially in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (Katz, et al., 2016). In Germany alone, there were 614,745 first-time asylum applications between 2014 and 2015, making it the preferred destination for refugees in Europe. This put a lot of pressure on the EU and bordering countries, which resulted in the building of physical and legal barriers of access to Europe, deals that limited the number of refugees entering the region (Katz, et al., 2016) and the establishment of a quota system to redistribute the high number of refugees received by Greece and Italy (Council of the European Union, 2015).

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9 Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen.
10 Percentages over total population in 2015.
11 After the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region and the Frankfurt Rhine-Main metropolitan region (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).
12 For a detailed summary of these statistics, please refer to Möbert (2017).
The Production of Space Through Practices of Self-Reliance

Figure 4. Net migration with timeline of relevant national/international events. Source: author.
At the national level, however, every country established its own quota system to accommodate asylum seekers. In the case of Germany, it used the Königsteiner Schlüssel distribution system, originally created to distribute federal funding for research institutions and universities among the different states (Katz, et al., 2016). The number of refugees that each state must accommodate is directly proportional on its population and its fiscal capacity (Katz, et al., 2016; BAMF, 2017). Furthermore, each state had its own system to distribute its quota within its territory.

In the case of Berlin, because it is a city-state, the distribution system allocated to it an extremely high number of refugees in relation to its area: more than 60 refugees per square kilometre (Katz, et al., 2016). This, compared to other states in the country, meant that “[t]he burden of addressing both pre-existing affordability challenges and the new challenges created by accommodating large numbers of refugees also present complex budget, programmatic, and political issues” (Katz et al., 2016, p.13).

In terms of the distribution of responsibilities in the accommodation of refugees, there is an imbalance between what is required from the national and the local governments (figure 5). Again, this system implied bigger costs for city-states compared to the rest of the states, even though the national government has been retroactively reimbursing them for the additional economic burden (Katz, et al., 2016).

### 3.3. The Process of Becoming a Refugee in Germany

According to current policies, there are four types of protection for asylum seekers in Germany: protection from political persecution, protection as refugee, subsidiary protection and ban on deportation (BAMF, 2017). Although each one is regulated by a different legal framework, when a person applies for asylum, he/she is considered under all categories. In general terms, the process of becoming a refugee in Germany is highly regulated and has a timeline illustrated in figure 6 (Katz et al., 2016; BAMF, 2017; BMAS, 2016a).
Although there is no timeframe for a decision to be made on the asylum application, the German government has created a legal framework that aims to start the integration process as soon as possible. This is done through language education programmes, permission to leave the reception centres, the provision of an asylum welfare and the possibility of an early access to the job market. However, the large volume of asylum applications received by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) since 2015 have caused the process to be relatively slow and the national government has had to develop special programmes to further facilitate integration (Katz et al., 2016; BAMF, 2017). One of such programmes is the Flüchtlingsintegrationsmaßnahmen, which has made 100.000 jobs available for asylum seekers to “[…] be nudged towards the German labour market and get an impression of working and social life in Germany even before their asylum procedure is terminated” (BMAS, 2016b).
3.4. Integration Policies, Programmes and Projects in Berlin

Moving forward, it is necessary to unpack how existing policies, programmes and projects are understanding processes of integration, as “[…] during 2016, the political, social and administrative focus shifted gradually from organising the newcomers’ reception and registration and accelerating asylum procedures towards the allocation of asylum seekers to individual municipalities, towards integration […]” (BAMF, 2017, p.5).

As a starting point, the general conceptualisation of integration from the EU depicts it as a process involving seven tasks for national and local governments: provision of long-term affordable housing; inclusion in the public education system; provision of language courses; job training and access to the labour market; provision of mental and health care services; provision of financial services; and maintenance of safe and secure environments (Katz, et al., 2016). Even though it is not explicitly stated as such\(^\text{18}\), these provisions highlight the role of governments as facilitators of processes of refugee self-reliance: they must provide capacity building and services for them to be able to fulfil their basic needs.

However, there is a clear emphasis only on the economic and social dimensions of self-reliance. Some of the tasks aim to eliminate the barriers of access to economic networks in the new context through access to the labour market and provision of financial services. On the other hand, language training and security efforts aim to reduce cultural barriers that prevent refugees from interacting with members of the host society.

German policies tend to follow this, as the 2016 Integration Act (\textit{Integrationsgesetz}) was drafted to promote a quicker integration into the labour market specifically. This act proposed four measures to achieve this: a labour market programme with 100,000 jobs that asylum seekers can access before a decision has been made on their application; easier access to employment; more support for vocational training; and more legal certainty during the training so it is not suddenly halted (BMAS, 2016a). Again, there is an emphasis on the economic and social dimensions of self-reliance as two things that must be developed for refugees to be integrated.

Furthermore, looking at how the policy is written and the language it uses to address the process of integration, there is a clear conceptualisation of it that is closer to assimilation than multiculturalism. As an example, the policy states that “[i]ntegration requires effort from all arriving individuals, the state and the society as a whole. It requires pro-activeness, initiative and willingness to integrate on the part of the displaced persons, as well as certain governmental incentive structures” (\textit{Integrationsgesetz}, 2016, p.1).\(^\text{19}\) The government sees integration as a process dependent on the refugee’s willingness to adapt, while outlining its own role as the provider of the structures for them to do so.

Nevertheless, there is one aspect of the \textit{Integrationsgesetz} that conceptually differentiates it from EU policies. It describes integration as a two-way process in which refugees are given support (\textit{fordern}) in exchange for the compliance with two obligations (\textit{fordernd}): cooperating with integration measures and agreeing to take up a residence wherever the government assigns them (BMAS, 2016a). This introduces a political dimension to self-reliance as it encourages refugees to become politically responsible by measuring their own level of involvement and obligations with the system (compliance with the police, to put it in Rancière’s terms).

In terms of the specific programmes and projects that Berlin has proposed for refugee integration, it is important to distinguish between two phases of the response: the emergency accommodation and a more durable solution. The first phase required to accommodate the more than 69,000 asylum

\(^{18}\) Self-reliance is not mentioned in OECD & EU’s working paper on refugee integration in the European labour market (OECD & European Union, 2016).

seekers and refugees that have arrived in the city during the last 3 years (Eurocities, 2016), while the second phase requires a more strategic plan for a permanent solution. Because of this, the city decided to allocate the hangars of the Tempelhof airport (among other buildings), to quickly build a refugee camp to be used as a reception centre and temporary accommodation until new housing projects are built.

For a more durable solution, housing projects are being built by the government to host refugees in neighbourhoods around the periphery of the city, where they can forge social networks with current residents of the area. These projects are called Berlin Entwickelt Neue Nachbarschaften (BENN) and they aim to start functioning in 20 locations by the beginning of 2018 (SVSEW, 2017a).

Parallel to the above, there are many refugee-run organisations that have been providing other types of services to refugees and asylum seekers in the city. They have actively reclaimed spaces to protest and demand better policies for asylum seekers and refugee integrations. So far, their operations have been concentrated around Oranienplatz, a square in the district of Kreuzberg, gaining momentum during the past years through social networks and social media (Bhimji, 2016).

Figure 7 shows the location of sites where both government and refugee efforts are concentrated and spaces of integration are being produced. In the next section, two of them will be taken to exemplify how spaces of integration are being produced through refugee self-reliance.
Section 4

The Production of Spaces of Integration in Berlin

The Tempelhof and Oranienplatz exemplify sites where different spaces of integration are produced within the double threshold described in section 2; a production that can be understood through different conceptualisations of refugee self-reliance. Although this exploration does not cover all the spaces of integration produced in the city, it allows to illustrate the different natures they might have.

4.1. Integration within the Police: Tempelhof

The Tempelhof today is the remnant of Berlin’s former airport which ceased operations in 2008. The Tempelhof today is the remnant of Berlin’s former airport which ceased operations in 2008. It was designed and built in 1936 by Ernst Sagebiel to replace an older building on the site and became a monument and symbol of power for the Nazi regime as one of the largest built structures in Europe (Shead, 2017). Since then, it has been used for many purposes throughout the years, being a shelter for Berliners during the Second World War, a military base for the US during the onset of the Cold War and a commercial airport during the 90’s and 00’s (Shead, 2017). Since 1995, it has been listed as heritage, so it cannot be demolished. This generated a lot of debate around the potential of the space.

In 2014, 64.3% of Berlin’s voting population decided in a referendum to keep the site as it is, which means it must remain unchanged at least until 2024 (Shead, 2017). The Tempelhof Feld, then, became a metropolitan park that has been widely used for different purposes ranging from small exhibitions to large-scale international events like a Formula E race (Shead, 2017).

Due to the arrival of more than 69 000 refugees and the lack of facilities to host them, in 2015 the local government decided to adapt the empty hangars of the building to accommodate up to 7000 people; making it the largest refugee camp in Germany (Shead, 2017). Furthermore, in November 2015, a law was issued by the city senate to modify the protection regulations and allow the construction of temporary shelter units next to it (Senatsverwaltung, 2015). This was regarded as a temporal solution until more space was made available to accommodate refugees in the city. As a deadline for this, the city senate extended the building permit on the Tempelhof only until December 31st, 2019 (Senatsverwaltung, 2015).

At the moment, the Tempelhof is highly regulated, controlled and compartmentalised. It has been devised as a site where refugees are given the tools to become more self-reliant and be able to integrate more easily with the rest of the German society. As a space, it perfectly embodies the spatiality of Rancière’s police: “[…] a fixed and inert ‘container’ geometrically divisible into discrete and mutually exclusive parts, the sum of which gives the count that is equal to the ‘whole’ to be governed. […]” (Dikeç, 2005, p.181). The building has been divided into sections, represented by the hangar number, where refugees are accommodated in groups according to the date they arrived in the city. In some hangars, tents were built to host two families each (up to 12 people), while in others, cubicle-type structures were built instead. No family can alter the space provided for them.

Although it has had different uses along the years, the Tempelhof does not have the necessary infrastructure to adequately support the amount of families it hosts. Refugees share bathroom facilities as well as plugs for electricity and there are no individual lights inside the cubicles/tents; the lighting system works per hangar. The toilets are modular cabins located outside the main building. In interviews conducted by the Deutsche Welle, some refugees have reported these conditions...
as being problematic for their wellbeing, while others simply do not mind them and see them as a sacrifice in exchange for a much greater sense of personal security (Deutsche Welle, 2016).

The fact that the site is heavily guarded and protected from the public with fences has limited processes of integration as it has isolated refugees from the rest of the society. However, one café in Hangar 1 is open to the public and it has become a place for Berliners to provide language lessons (Shead, 2017). Despite this, there are Civil Society Organisations, such as Give Something Back to Berlin (GSBTB) that have been actively opening spaces to foster practices of social self-reliance through interaction between volunteers and refugees inside the Tempelhof. GSBTB is a project platform that nurtures community integration through activities and spaces to promote cultural exchange and build confidence on both refugees and other Berliners, for them to interact with each other (GSBTB, 2016a; 2016b; 2017b; 2017c; 2017d).

These efforts complement the ongoing programmes from the local government that provide language courses and vocational training for refugees and asylum seekers. Local authorities built a school outside of one of the hangars to give especial lessons to children, while adults may attend various courses offered under the Integrationsgesetz. This gives refugees the tools to navigate through the German society and its job market more easily.

Ultimately, these are spaces of integration within the Tempelhof, created and recreated through practices of self-reliance. In one hand, through the training provided, refugees gain language tools to be able to independently interact with other Berliners and navigate the cultural differences between them and their host society; they are encouraged to practice their social self-reliance in spaces like the café in Hangar 1, thus shaping it through their participation. On the other hand, the vocational training and the job opportunities provided allow refugees to acquire more tools to engage with broader economic networks, practicing their economic self-reliance to open new spaces to interact with the host society, further encouraging their integration.

Finally, in terms of political self-reliance, there is an implicit need to comply with norms and regulations even if some are seen as inhumane by some refugees. They acknowledge the need to follow procedures to be on the government’s track to a more durable solution (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Through that acceptance of their rights and duties, they are showing their understanding of their political responsibilities. Nevertheless, in some cases those norms have been broken as refugees have resorted to different materials to ‘personalise’ their cubicles. Others used graffiti to produce drawings and write messages on the pristine white walls (Parsloe, 2017). These practices are ways of expressing the need for a less rigid space for them to live, which is also evidence of a growing political awareness and need for participation.

Other attempts to express this have occurred in the Open Art Shelter sessions by GSBTB, in which they have written letters to local and national authorities requesting improvements on their life quality at the Tempelhof (GSBTB, 2016a; 2017c). They ask for measures to make their stay easier and allow them to interact more with other Berliners. One of the letters, for example, explicitly asks “[t]hat there be a gate allowing direct access to the [Tempelhof Feld] park” (GSBTB, 2017c).

In summary, different interactions between refugees, local authorities and other Berliners have promoted practices of self-reliance in its three dimensions. These are effectively producing spaces within the structure of the police where refugees feel safe and can engage with other Berliners (and authorities), although in a heavily regulated manner. Some of these spaces, at the same time, are being appropriated by refugees to negotiate their well-being.

These can be read as spaces of integration as they allow for interaction between refugees and other Berliners to happen in such a way that there is a reciprocal influence between them. In one hand, there is a sense of adaptation to the German norms from the side of refugees, while on the other

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20 See appendix 5.
21 See appendix 6.
hand, there is an increased awareness in the host society that moves Berliners to interact even more and learn from refugees. However, because the structure of the police is not challenged but only reconfigured to be more inclusive, the spaces produced remain largely apolitical. At the same time, this pushes the processes of integration more towards assimilation, in accordance to German policies (figure 9).

At the same time, this pushes the processes of integration more towards assimilation, in accordance to German policies (figure 9).

4.2. Integration in Spaces of Politics: Oranienplatz

Oranienplatz is a central square in the neighbourhood of Kreuzberg in Berlin. Its borders consist of mixed-used buildings, usually with commerce on the ground floor and it is an important centre of activity for the area. It has also been the scenario for many protests during the past decades (Landry, 2015; RBB, 2016). In 1953, 50,000 people protested in solidarity for workers in East Berlin; in 1984, it hosted more protests and the construction of barricades; and in 1992 a car was burned in the middle of protests against Kreuzberg being a right-wing neighbourhood (RBB, 2016). Thus, Oranienplatz has historically been a site of political engagement.

In 2012, the square became again a scenario for contestation when the Refugee Movement occupied it to build a camp. They are a group of refugee activists (as they call themselves) from all over Germany, formed in 2012 after the suicide of an Iranian refugee in Würzburg (Landry, 2015; Refugee Movement, 2017). It is made up of people from different backgrounds, ethnic groups and nationalities who got tired of the living conditions they faced since arriving in the country. Specifically, they protest for the abolition of Lagers (emergency accommodation sites like the Tempelhof) and the Residenzpflicht, the prohibition of getting out of the geographical areas they are assigned to live in (Bhimji, 2016; Refugee Movement, 2017).

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22 On his reading of Ranciere’s politics, Dikeç claims that “[t]he inclusion of the excluded is about alterations in the police order, and it is not a political issue precisely because there already exists a partitioning” (Dikeç, 2005, p. 177).

23 See appendix 7.
Moving to and settling on Oranienplatz, then, meant a clear defiance to the regulations refugee activists were subject to. They escaped their Lagers and violated Residenzpflicht to arrive in Berlin to protest. The built camp became the epicentre of a series of protests and mobilisations that emerged during the following years (Bhimji, 2016). Even after they were evicted from the square in 2014, they continued their activities at the Gehart-Hauptmann Schule, Gürtelstrasse and the TV tower at Alexanderplatz, among others.

During their occupation of Oranienplatz, refugees changed the spatial organisation of the place, turning it from a public, open space, to a refugee camp with tent shelters and a central space for meetings and negotiations (Bhimji, 2016). It was a space built through the enactment of self-reliance as it explicitly challenged the structure of the police in their context. Refugees emerged to demonstrate their equality in capacities and demanded a change in the structures of society to match this equality with an equality in rights. By challenging Lager and Residenzpflicht, they challenged their assigned place and role in the structure of the police.

Refugees actively engaged with policies, denouncing the injustices embedded in them and therefore demonstrating political self-reliance and willingness to participate in political arenas. They provided arguments for the abolition of Lager and Residenzpflicht, based on their nature as human beings that deserved the same treatment as fellow residents in Germany. By engaging in such political struggle, they sought to gain visibility through disruption and be recognised as legitimate actors in the city; through their emergence in defiance to the police, they created a political space.

In addition to this, the contested nature of the political space they inaugurated was reflected also in the way the movement functioned internally. They had a clear division of tasks, delegating some to manage the settlement, while others focused on dissemination of their actions through social media (Bhimji, 2016). They also established information points in the camp to engage with people passing by to acquire more support (Landry, 2015). However, within the protesters were various refugee activist groups, like Lampedusa in Berlin, which demanded different things than the Refugee Movement (Bhimji, 2016). This required them to pursue instances of negotiation both inside the settlement as well as outside with local authorities, which further demonstrated their capacities to provide a political organisation for themselves.

On the other hand, they enacted economic self-reliance by being able to acquire resources to travel around the country, as well as to build and maintain the camp. During their time at Oranienplatz, refugees shared facilities and food among themselves and got connected with informal economic networks that provided them with the services and goods they needed (Bhimji, 2016). Nevertheless, most of their income came from donations which meant that at the long run the camp (as a physical space) was economically unsustainable and quickly deteriorated (Landry, 2015).

Regarding the social dimension of self-reliance, refugee activists could create social networks among refugees both inside Berlin, as well as around Germany and different countries in Europe (Refugee Movement, 2017). They also did not wait for spaces to open for them to interact with other Berliners; they created them through political action and contestation. This attracted media coverage, which amplified their capacity to reach more people to support them, showing how social media and technology played a vital role to strengthen the movement. On the other hand, as a diverse community, they organised themselves to do activities to promote their wellbeing, such as collective meals, game nights and even German lessons with the help of volunteers (Landry, 2015).

Although much of its support came from other refugee groups, the movement also created alliances with other community-based organisations and civil-society groups, such as the Cuvry Squat in Kreuzberg or neighbourhood associations that helped them resist police eviction from the Gehart-Hauptmann Schule (Bhimji, 2016). These alliances were useful to make visible the inequalities of the wider context in Berlin and the space created by the refugee movement served as a platform to address them. This shows how space, according to Rancière, is crucial since “it becomes the creative and dramatic stage for visibility […] and [the process] involves not only the manifestation of
a new subject but also the construction of common space or scenes of relationality, which did not previously exist” (Boano & Kelling, 2013, p.46).

The enactment of self-reliance in its three dimensions in Oranienplatz, then, allowed refugees to create spaces of integration, as they entered in continuous contact and interaction with Berliners, local government authorities and other organisations. These political spaces were born in Oranienplatz, but were transformed and kept even long after they were evicted from it.24 Space here, quoting Dikeç, “[…] becomes political in that it becomes the polemical place where a wrong can be addressed and equality can be demonstrated. It becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order” (Dikeç, 2005, p.172). Oranienplatz became a site that exploded in multiple spaces of integration that brought a wide range of communities and members of the society in Berlin into dialogue and attention over issues that affected them all.

Because of this, the integration processes in Oranienplatz are different from that in other parts of the city and lean more towards Multiculturalism. The way refugee activists have interacted with the host society implies a respect for differences, rather than efforts of assimilation. This has brought along even more inequalities from the context and within the refugee groups themselves. Moreover, paraphrasing Dikeç (2005), it was in the recognition of such inequalities and differences that the possibility of bringing different logics together rose to find a way to disrupt the police.

Figure 9. Characterisation of spaces of integration in Oranienplatz. Source: author.

24 The Refugee Movement website is still active and it even has a calendar showing upcoming meetings and events where everyone is welcome to join (Refugee Movement, 2017).
Conclusions

The analysis demonstrated how differently spaces of integration are being produced in various sites in Berlin after the 2015 Refugee Crisis. Places like the Tempelhof, in one hand, provide refugees with the conditions necessary to become self-reliant and thus be able to integrate with the German society. By complying with the structure of the police and the role assigned to them by it, refugees deploy practices of political, economic and social self-reliance; practices that create and recreate spaces of integration such as the Café at Hangar 1 or the Open Art Shelter.

Radically different is the nature of spaces created in Oranienplatz. In this site, refugees defy the role given to them by the police through a demonstration of equality in capacities, thus enacting self-reliance. This action inaugurates spaces of politics in which refugees interact with other actors in the government and the civil society. These are spaces of integration as they entail a sense of negotiation and adaptation from both refugee communities and the various sectors of the host society.

Nevertheless, integration is qualified differently in each of the sites explored. While in the Tempelhof it is expected that refugees adapt to the host society, following the principles underlying German policies, in Oranienplatz there is an exaltation of unity in difference. Integration in spaces at the Tempelhof is closer to assimilation, while integration in spaces at Oranienplatz is closer to multiculturalism. Despite this, both types of spaces allow negotiation at different scales, through which refugees seek collaboration to improve their quality of life.

This leads to the question of effectiveness of the spaces created in negotiating the boundaries of the police for positive change; what Cornwall (2002) would call the room for manoeuvre. On one side, the negotiation that occurs in spaces at the Tempelhof do not challenge the roles assigned to refugees by the police and therefore the changes brought might be perceived small in scale and relatively slow. Meanwhile in Oranienplatz, negotiation is disruptive as there is an explicit challenge to the roles assigned by the police and the change caused might be perceived as structural and larger in scale.

However, this does not mean that one approach is more effective than the other one in achieving positive outcomes. As Cornwall states, “[n]ew ways in old spaces can transform their possibilities, just as old ways in new spaces can perpetuate the status quo” (Cornwall, 2002, p.7). This means that in the long run, negotiating within the space of the police might result in better living conditions, while contestation in spaces of politics might bring along new injustices that make positive change more difficult. To some degree, this has been the case of Berlin. Refugee action in the Tempelhof has made the government reevaluate its approach in terms of the quality of the temporal shelter provided (Deutsche Welle, 2016), thus being more effective in negotiating collective benefits; while in Oranienplatz, only some of the refugee groups reached agreements to improve their lives. They succeeded in negotiating individual benefits, which were not directly translated into a wider transformation at the policy level (Bhimji, 2016; Landry, 2015).
It is necessary to note here that Rancière’s theories, especially those regarding the police and spaces of politics, are born in a reflection on aesthetics and are oriented more towards emancipatory practices rather than processes of integration. Although aligning both bodies of theory was helpful for understanding the spatiality of integration, this relationship might be problematic. The objective of refugee self-reliance, and even refugee activism, is that of improving quality of life and finding the means to live in dignity without aid. This does not necessarily translate into a need to change the status quo and disrupt the structure of the police.

Bringing the discussion back to the theoretical framework built in the first two sections allows for policy implications or even new possible areas of inquiry to be outlined. Firstly, there is the challenge of working across different scales. Integration, normally measured and theorised in sociology across large scales, needs to be reconciled with refugee self-reliance, which literature on humanitarian action observes more at the scale of the community. At this point, the city becomes a fundamental scale of action where both self-reliance and integration can be observed together. In Berlin, the city became the scenario for interaction between refugees and the host society; an interaction that took various forms ranging from the contestation of national policies in public spaces around the city (Oranienplatz), to the compliance to norms and regulations in specific sites to achieve more specific changes in the quality of life of refugees (Tempelhof). In terms of policies, then, this implies the need of an approach that focuses on the city as a fundamental scale of action.

Furthermore, it is the local actors working on cities the ones that have been ultimately responsible for the development of strategies and projects to host refugees. They have more room of manoeuvre to adapt their own response to specific needs (Eurocities, 2016). However, at the policy level, flexibility is also needed to accommodate the diverse circumstances faced by refugees and host societies and give cities more power to adapt national strategies. Flexibility here also relates to the engagement with the unexpectedness of refugee activism and the possibility of contestation. Flexible policies may allow for smoother processes of negotiation that reduce the barriers of interaction between refugees and host societies, therefore allowing for processes of integration to occur more easily.

Refugee participation, then, is fundamental for processes of integration to take place. As it was shown in the case of Berlin, refugees can be active contributors in society, as opposed to passive spectators. Through their practices of self-reliance, they can bring attention to specific issues they face (i.e. isolation at the Tempelhof), while through the enactment of self-reliance, they can point out to wider societal inequalities (i.e. denounce of implications of asylum policies at Oranienplatz). A policy approach that encourages refugee activism and participation, then, introduces a political dimension to self-reliance that so far has been absent in general EU regulations. This, at the same time fosters the production of a variety of spaces of integration, each qualified differently in the double spectrum proposed in section 2 of this paper.

Finally, this paper brings space as a key element in the discussion of integration policies, starting to suggest an understanding of self-reliance as a spatial practice. As it was shown in Berlin, the political, economic and social layers of self-reliance are deeply interconnected. Self-reliance is both practiced and enacted in space, effectively producing and reconfiguring space through contestation and negotiation with the police. An understanding of self-reliance as a spatial practice, then, may provide policies with new insight on how integration processes take place at specific sites in the city and at the same contribute to its ongoing transformation.
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References


References


Statistisches Bundesamt (2017). Germany’s population expected to have increased to 82.8 million. Retrieved from: https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/01/PE17_033_12411.html [Accessed on 24/07/2017]


Appendices

Appendix 1: Berlin’s Urban Landscape

Berlin is a complex city, due to its particular history as a contested space and the fact that it has been home to various diasporas and migrant communities for the past 50 years, reflecting the immigration dynamics of the country. The following maps are a testimony for this, and provide useful information on the urban socio-spatial patterns that today constitute the context for refugee integration programmes and projects.

As a starting point, it is a city with a heterogeneous landscape in terms of inequalities, as shown in figure A1. The Gesamtindex Soziale Ungleichheit shows how deprived (status) a specific neighbourhood is in terms of unemployment, transfer of welfare benefits and child poverty, as well as how the situation is currently changing (dynamic). In general, the periphery tends to have less pronounced inequalities between neighbourhoods, when compared to the area around the centre. However, there are specific neighbourhoods or areas in which there are pockets of deprived areas with negative change. This is mostly towards the north and concentrated in the inner periphery.

In terms of where the foreign population is settled, there is a tendency for them to be concentrated more towards the centre of the city, representing more than 40% of the population living in certain neighbourhoods. In contrast, towards the eastern periphery, there is a little concentration of migrant population (less than 10%). In some of these areas, the government will build BENN projects aiming to both provide a long-term solution for refugee accommodation and trigger wider processes of integration.
However, this spatial distribution changes drastically when considering only non-EU foreigners. The landscape here tends to be more heterogeneous, as there are pockets with high concentration of foreigners scattered both throughout the city centre and the peripheries. Furthermore, some of these pockets in the north and north-eastern part of the city coincide with socially deprived areas as well.
Spatial trends of unemployment in young populations also depict a heterogeneous landscape, as there are neighbourhoods with high unemployment rates adjacent to others with very low rates. Some of these areas coincide as well with areas of marked inequalities, especially towards the western and north-eastern peripheries.

Finally, a smaller group of these neighbourhoods also coincide with areas marked for redevelopment, as shown by figure A5. This suggests that the government is looking for alternatives to revitalise the areas. Furthermore, the fact that most of the BENN projects are located on these sites also suggests the government is seeing them as a way to help revitalise them. However, it is yet unclear how being relocated to these neighbourhoods might impact the lives of refugees in the city.
Appendix 2: The Challenges of Accommodating Refugees in Numbers

Between 2014 and 2015, Berlin has been the preferred destination for asylum seekers in Europe. As it is shown by figure A6, the number of refugees it has hosted in this period is almost double the number of refugees hosted in Vienna, and more than ten times the number hosted in cities like Barcelona, Stockholm or Birmingham. However, it is to be noted that some cities, like Athens, have become cities of transit. Because of this, they have had to temporarily accommodate large numbers of refugees, while they move on to other destinations (Eurocities, 2016).

In Germany in particular, the Königsteiner Schlüssel, has allocated a very high number of refugees to Berlin in relation to its area (figure A7). This is due to the fact that the quota system only takes into account tax revenues and the share of total population of each state, and not the fact that three of these states are also cities. In all three of them, the refugee density is much higher than in other territories.
Similar is the case of other cities, which also receive a large number of refugees because of their population density (figure A8). However, it is to be noted that some cities also host initial reception centres for the state (like Nuremberg), while others are also cities of transit (like Munich) (Katz et al., 2016). This explains some of the high numbers in figure A8. Nevertheless, Berlin is by far the city with the largest density of hosted refugees in the country.

![Figure A8: Refugees accepted per square kilometre in major German cities (2015). Source: (Katz et al., 2016)](image)

Figure A9 illustrates an example of the costs that a city in Germany faces when hosting a high number of refugees. Although the national government is responsible for asylum welfare, there are major discrepancies between the costs that the national government bears compared to those from local governments. As described by Katz et al. in the case of Hamburg:

“Hamburg, for instance, spent 586.2 million euros on accommodating refugees in 2015; only 50 million euros was refunded by the federal government during that year. However, the federal government has retroactively reimbursed the states […], which alleviates the financial strain in state budgets.” (Katz et al., 2016, p.16).
# Figure A9. Breakdown of costs of refugee services in Hamburg (2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cost (million Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation and Maintenance of Initial and Emergency Reception Centres</td>
<td>147.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare for Refugees in Initial Reception Centres</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare for Refugees in Consecutive Reception Centres</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation of Refugees</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Staff</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of Consecutive Reception Centres</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Reception Centres</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Affairs</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses according to asylum welfare bill</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial and consecutive care of unaccompanied minors</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>586.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, based on (Katz et al., 2016)
Appendix 3: Types of Protection for Asylum Seekers in Germany

The four types of protection available for asylum seekers in Germany are as follows. It is to be noted that in an application for asylum, each case is considered under every type of protection.

Type 1: Asylum

This protection is usually given to those who are persecuted by the state, as opposed to those fleeing from war, natural disasters or poverty. In the words of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge:

“Asylum for those suffering from political persecution is enshrined in the German constitution (Art. 16a of the Basic Law) and is granted to anyone who, upon return to his or her country of origin, would be subject to grave human rights violations due to his or her ‘race’, political convictions, religious affiliation or membership of a certain social group” (BAMF, 2017, p.35).

Type 2: Refugee Status

Refugee status is given following the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Unlike type 1, this type of protection covers all those feeling from persecution, without it being necessarily from the state. According to the Geneva Convention:

“A refugee […] is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” (UN General Assembly, 1951).

Type 3: Subsidiary Protection

Subsidiary Protection is considered when the applicant is not eligible for asylum protection or refugee status, but going back to his/her country of origin poses a serious threat of harm by state or non-state agents. According to the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge:

“Subsidiary protection is granted if a person ‘has shown substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin’ (Section 4 subs. 1 of the Asylum Act). Serious harm consists of death penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. A threat of serious harm within the meaning of Section 4 subs. 1 of the Asylum Act may emanate from the state, from quasi-state agents or from non-state agents (Section 3c of the Asylum Act in conjunction with Section 4 subs. 3 first sentence of the Asylum Act)” (BMI/BAMF 2016: 86)." (BAMF, 2017, p.35).
Type 4: Ban on Deportation

When the applicant is not eligible for the three types described before, he/she can still remain in Germany if there is a concrete threat to life, limb or liberty in the country of origin. This includes cases in which there is a serious or life-threatening health condition that could be worsened on the return. According to the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge:

“She should none of the three forms of protection – entitlement to asylum, refugee protection and subsidiary protection – be applicable, a ban on deportation can be issued if specific grounds apply.

A person who is seeking protection may not be returned if:

> Return to the destination country constitutes a breach of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), or

> A considerable concrete danger to life, limb or liberty exists in that country.

A considerable concrete danger can be considered to exist for health reasons if a return would cause life-threatening or serious diseases to become much worse. This is not contingent on the healthcare provided in the destination state being equivalent to that available in the Federal Republic of Germany. Adequate medical treatment is also deemed to be provided as a rule if this is only guaranteed in a part of the destination country.

If a national ban on deportation is issued, a person may not be returned to the country to which this ban on deportation applies. Those concerned are issued with a residence permit by the immigration authority.

A ban on deportation can however not be considered if the person concerned could depart for another country, and it is reasonable for them to be called on to do so, or if they have not complied with their obligations to cooperate.” (BAMF, 2016)
Appendix 4: Process of becoming a Refugee in Germany

In general, the process of becoming a refugee in Germany has a timeframe which is straightforward and involves the following steps:

1. An asylum seeker arrives to Germany.

2. He/she contacts the authorities to inform them that he/she wants to apply for asylum.

3. He/she is sent to an initial reception centre (the closest) in which he/she is registered, undergoes a medical assessment and the application for asylum is formally submitted.

4. The asylum seeker is sent to a reception centre within an assigned state following the Königsteiner Schlüssel distribution system.

5. He/she is sent to a specific municipality following the state’s quota system.

6. The asylum seeker may not work for a period of at least three months after their first contact with the authorities. The BAMF is the only entity able to grant permission to work after this time. The asylum seeker can, however, do vocational training or internships meanwhile.

7. For 15 months, he/she is entitled to asylum welfare.

8. After 6 months, the asylum seeker is free to move out of the reception centre and access integration services.

9. When he/she receives refugee status (the application for asylum is successful), he/she can register with a job centre.

10. The refugee will be issued a residence permit from 1 to 3 years, depending on the type of protection granted. This permit can be extended.

11. The permit can be exchanged for a permanent settlement permit after 3 or 5 years, depending on the refugee’s proficiency in German and economic sufficiency.\textsuperscript{25}

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\textsuperscript{25} If the refugee has a level C1 CEFR in German and can provide for him/herself, he/she may be granted a permanent settlement permit after 3 years. If he/she has a level A2 CEFR and cannot entirely provide for him/herself, the permit may be granted after 5 years (BAMF, 2017).
Appendix 5: The Tempelhof in Images

Figure A12. Axonometric view of the Tempelhof Refugee Camp. Source: (Czienskowski, 2016)

Figure A13. A view of one of the hangars. Source: (DW, 2016)
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Figure A14. Toilet and Bathroom Facilities. Source: (DW, 2016)

Figure A15. Tents inside the Tempelhof. Source: (DW, 2016)
The Production of Space Through Practices of Self-Reliance

Figure A16. Volunteer and child painting. Source: (GSBTB, 2016b)
Appendix 6: Letter from the Refugees at the Tempelhof

Petition from residents of NUK Flughafen Tempelhof to the relevant authorities, to guarantee a respectful transition to the Container Village and to ensure the intermediate and long-term wellbeing of all residents

6 April 2017

To the Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten, Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen, Senatsverwaltungen für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, LAG bezirkliche Flüchtlingskoordination Tempelhof-Schöneberg, Tamaja Soziale Dienstleistungen GmbH, and Berliner Immobiliengesellschaft,

We, the residents of Hangar 2, Tempelhof NUK, who are soon to be relocated to the Container Village on Tempelhofer Feld, over which we believe you have some power and influence, kindly ask you to note the following concerns and recommendations, and to act on them as soon as possible as these are the implementations of basic human rights rather than luxuries.

Respecting the integrity of family & community:

1. That our families living across Berlin and Germany can be reunited in the Container Village; for example, parents and adult or teenage children who are currently living in separate camps could live together at Tempelhof. In the case of not having many close relatives here, we kindly ask for this opportunity to extend to cousins as it can greatly help with loneliness and detachment from family, heritage and culture.

2. That there will be just one family in each Tempohome. When a family consists of two people (e.g. husband and wife or mother and daughter), we ask that they be guaranteed the privacy of their own bathroom and kitchen and have the right to use freely the additional space.

3. That there be no more than two people in one room and therefore no more than 4 people in one tempohome. When a family has more than 4 members be guaranteed more tempohomes located next to each other.

4. That we be able to receive visitors and guests (also overnight), which could be family members or friends without any limitations imposed.

5. That close family members (children and parents) who are visiting would be able to stay with us for longer periods of time, even if that means over a period of a few weeks. Separation from each other is nowadays one of the main sources of suffering and psychological disturbance for many of us.

6. That we have a say in who lives next to whom, based on the strong friendships and sense of community we have developed with other residents over the past months. We wish not to become isolated but to feel safe among our immediate neighbours. For example, there is an intention from the single women, including single mothers and their children, to live together. This is because the presence of the men causes discomfort and insecurity for them, plus the women have developed ways of supporting each other.

Respecting basic human dignity, including the rights and needs of different groups:

7. That the move from the Hangars to the Container Village be announced well in advance.

8. That the move occurs before Ramadan, as this would allow us to cook our own food and celebrate in a more comfortable communal setting for the first time in two years. Alternatively, if it is not possible to move before Ramadan, we would prefer to hold off until after Ramadan, as during this period we are
fasting during the day and therefore lacking energy (i.e. the move should occur before 26.05.17 or after 26.06.17).

9. That elderly and infirm people be accommodated as close to the gate as possible.

10. That containers include a cooling system (at least a fan), and if that is not possible, that elderly or infirm people (such as those with heart conditions, or who have undergone brain surgery etc.) be accommodated in a different type of housing, a housing that can/would serve their specific needs.

11. That the Container Village includes a safe space exclusively for women and girls.

12. That there be a gate allowing direct access to the park.

13. That washing machines will be spread equally across the premises, so that people need not carry heavy loads across long distances.

14. That residents be offered employment or work experience in the Container Village when possible, e.g. cleaning, maintenance, security, childcare, building and construction.

15. That there be no stickers, signs etc. instructing on how to use toilets or any other signs which humiliate us by suggesting inferiority and a lack of basic education, manners and/or understanding of culture.

16. That there be high-speed wireless internet connection available to ensure our access to information, platforms fostering learning and the search for jobs, apartments, entertainment and, above all, contact with our relatives.

Respecting our right to information and to participate in decisions affecting our everyday lives and near and long-term future:

17. That we be provided (and kept up-to-date) with information on long-term plans to solve the housing problem, such as relocation to the countryside or urban social housing.

18. That we be provided (and kept up-to-date) with information on plans for the integration of newcomers into the wider community (specifically, addressing the issue of ghettoisation).

19. That no further investments be made that would turn the temporary homes into a long-term housing solution.

20. That the Container Village will be closed no later than the end of 2019 as has been promised, and that every effort will be made to help us find proper accommodation by that time.

In the event that a particular request from this list cannot be accommodated, that we be given an explanation and invited to discuss possible alternatives.

We kindly expect written response addressed to us as a group living at Hangar 2, Notunterkunft Flughafen Tempelhof, Columbiadamm 10, 12101 Berlin and as a copy to the organisation that supports us, Give Something Back to Berlin, Lenaustrasse 4, 12047 Berlin.

Sincerely,

The undersigned residents of Hangar 2, Notunterkunft Flughafen Tempelhof

Source:
Appendix 7: Oranienplatz in Images

Figure A17. Oranienplatz before occupation. Source: (RBB, 2016)

Figure A18. Refugee occupation of Oranienplatz. Source: (Refugee Movement, 2017)
Figure A19. Remains of Infopoint after eviction of refugees in Oranienplatz. Source: (RBB, 2016)

Figure A20. Occupation of Gehart-Hauptmann Schule. Source: (Refugee Movement, 2017)
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Figure A21. Demands of Refugee Protest in 2012. Source: (Refugee Movement, 2017)

Figure A22. Protest to support occupation of Gehart-Hauptmann Schule. Source: (Refugee Movement, 2017)