Administrative Justice and the Legacy of Executive Devolution: Establishing a Tribunals System for Wales

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Uniquely, Wales has a primary legislature, but remains part of a single legal jurisdiction with England. It does not have responsibility for administering civil and criminal justice but has long had a range of devolved tribunals. Given this jurisdictional and constitutional context, a distinctively Welsh approach to administrative law and administrative justice, tribunal reform, and “integrity” institutions has developed. Welsh tribunals have become a test bed for further devolution of justice powers and the eventual establishment of a separate Welsh courts and tribunals service. In this article we examine reforms to Welsh tribunals, alongside the potential for building a broader justice system from the foundations of administrative justice.

The Welsh model of tribunals is distinctive in light of Wales’ political, constitutional and legal development. In particular its journey from a historically sophisticated legal code, to being England’s first colony, becoming the often-junior partner in a single England and Wales legal jurisdiction. Despite continuation of the combined legal jurisdiction, Wales has responsibilities for administrative justice, and an increasingly systematised approach to its set of devolved tribunals. This has been reinforced by recent legislation, including the statutory establishment of a President of Welsh Tribunals. The tribunals within the President’s remit are managed by the devolved Welsh Government, an administrative set up seen by some as the nucleus containing the DNA, not only for a fully devolved Welsh tribunals system, but potentially for a Welsh courts and tribunals service.1

During replication DNA unwinds so that its instructions can be read and copied. This article reads the main strands of DNA within the Welsh tribunal system, and examines how complete they might be and what gaps remain to be filled. These strands include: administrative justice principles; structure and administration; independence; procedures and practices; leadership; confidence and standards; political will; coherent policy; and longer-term arrangements for oversight. Before examining each strand, the article first draws attention to the constitutional context of Wales and how this has informed its unique administrative justice characteristics. Finally, it compares the Welsh model of administrative justice and tribunals to some other jurisdictions, focusing on possible strengths, weaknesses and future directions.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The codified native Welsh laws of the 10th century maintained a clear distinction between Welsh and English laws that remained even after the Norman conquest in 1066. This was gradually challenged by the growing power of English Kings and in 1282, following the death of the “last Prince of Wales”, Edward I imposed aspects of English common law in Wales. In 1536 Henry VIII extended the English legal system over the whole of Wales. Although Wales retained a different structure of courts and circuits

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until the Judicature Act 1830 (UK), it was the English legal jurisdiction that operated in Wales, a legacy underpinning the protracted devolution of legislative powers to Wales. The Government of Wales Act 1998 (UK) introduced a model of “executive devolution” that established a National Assembly for Wales (the “Assembly”) as a body corporate with subordinate law-making powers. This was structured on a conferred powers model where specific executive powers were transferred from the United Kingdom (UK) government to the Assembly.

The body corporate, or so-called “double yolker” egg model, however, did not reflect a traditional Westminster conception of separation of powers between executive and legislative branches. After an informal separation, the Government of Wales Act 2006 (UK) (GoWA) officially divided the Assembly and the Welsh Assembly Government (later renamed the Welsh Government). The GoWA gave the reformed Assembly powers to enact laws, known as Measures, in specific fields. Measures had the same status as primary legislation but were limited by the conferred powers model. Full primary legislative powers were transferred in areas of devolved Welsh competence following a 2011 referendum, but the settlement remained one of conferred powers and Westminster continued to be Wales’ other Parliament. The legal problems of two legislatures within a single legal jurisdiction have since been dodged by “constitutional sleight of hand”. The GoWA principle of “apply and extend” provides that Assembly laws apply only in Wales but extend over England and Wales. This allows courts in England to interpret Welsh law and for the unified legal system to operate largely unaltered.

The conferred powers model has, however, proved unsustainable, with the 2014 Commission on Devolution in Wales (the “Silk Commission”) recommending that Welsh devolution be brought into line with the reserved powers approach operating in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Silk Commission concluded some aspects of justice could be devolved immediately, but that devolution of traditional justice institutions, such as courts and the judiciary, would take at least a decade. However, as concerns administrative justice it recommended that immediate progress could be made by reforming administration of the devolved Welsh tribunals.

Following a Supreme Court case, which interpreted conferred powers as wider than the UK government had anticipated, a St David’s Day White Paper set out plans for a reserved powers model. However, the UK government’s politicised approach to reservations allowed the devolution of some subject matters to be vetoed without full justification. Consequently, “justice” was not seen as a matter for devolution, except, that is, for statutory recognition of Welsh tribunals. The subsequent Wales Act 2017 (UK) has been criticised for its complex framework of general reservations, specific reservations and exceptions to reservations. Commentators have described it as “carrying the seeds of its own destruction”. Nevertheless, administrative justice is an area where the UK government has admitted that there are, and could legitimately continue to be, differences between justice in England and justice in Wales.

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4 Wales Act 2014 (UK) s 4.


8 Silk Commission, n 7, 124.


example, the history of tribunals in Wales operating under some degree of devolved structure goes back more than 50 years. The oldest Welsh tribunal is the Agricultural Land Tribunal Wales created by the *Agriculture Act 1947* (UK). Various other tribunals have since been established at different stages of devolution, meaning that their statutory basis and regulation is governed by multiple sources of United Kingdom, England and Wales, and Wales only primary and secondary legislation.

The *Wales Act* gives statutory recognition to seven specific tribunals: Agricultural Land; Mental Health; Rent Assessment Committees; the Special Educational Needs Tribunal for Wales (SENTW); appeals about the registration of school inspectors; the Adjudication Panel for Wales; and the Welsh Language Tribunal (WLT). Further tribunals can be designated as Welsh tribunals by a UK Order in Council.

The *Wales Act* also creates the role of President of Welsh Tribunals. The President is tasked to ensure that Welsh tribunals are accessible, fair and efficient, that their members have sufficient expertise, and to have regard to “the need to develop innovative methods of resolving disputes”. The Act additionally provides for “cross-deployment” of judges between the different Welsh tribunals (with consent of the President). This article discusses some practical implications of these reforms, but politically speaking the current Welsh Government takes the view that they do not go far enough in terms of an evolving Welsh justice system.

The Welsh Government has argued that the reservation of large aspects of responsibility for the administration of justice, and the single legal jurisdiction of England and Wales, no longer serves the needs of the people of Wales, with the Counsel General for Wales stating:

> A process has begun to create a distinct legal infrastructure for Wales. This is a process that won’t stop. The process of making laws for Wales won’t stop, the divergence in laws between Wales and England won’t stop. The creation of a Welsh legal jurisdiction and the devolution of the justice system is inevitable.

Whether or not separation is indeed inevitable, the process of moving to a reserved powers model has exposed both the constitutional complexity caused by a growing body of divergent laws, but also the practical challenges of operating different systems of public administration within a single legal structure. Research has begun to expose “jagged edges” in the devolution settlement, caused by the disconnect between devolved policy areas and a largely reserved justice system in the traditional sense of courts and legal services. New statutory Welsh public law duties are more often than not enforced through the reserved England and Wales courts. Here Wales has limited sway over time set aside to create Wales-specific Civil Procedure Rules, a matter that has delayed the bringing into force of key legislation. Wales also has no real say over legal aid policies to support litigants.

That said, it would be wrong to conclude that apparent weaknesses in Welsh administrative justice stem entirely from external factors. Partially due to inexperience (the comparative youth of the Assembly and Welsh Government) and partially due to ideology, Welsh political institutions have tended to conflate administrative justice with public administration. The examples below show that this has led to challenges in complying with core constitutional principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.

Cognisant of growing concerns around “jagged edges”, the Welsh Government established a Commission on Justice in Wales under the chairmanship of Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. It had a wide remit to review the operation of the justice system in Wales, setting a long-term vision. The Commission reported on 24 October 2019, with its headline recommendation being a call for the full legislative and executive devolution of responsibility for justice accompanied by a transfer of financial resources. It also recommended that the law applicable in Wales should be formally identified as the law of Wales,

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13 *Wales Act 2017* (UK) s 60(4)(d).

14 *Wales Act 2017* (UK) s 62.


distinct from the law of England. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the UK Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ) immediate response was to stress its belief that a single legal jurisdiction remains the most effective way to deliver justice across England and Wales. Regardless of the MoJ’s reaction, the Commission report is full of “ground-up” recommendations that address more immediate challenges of delivering justice in Wales, particularly administrative justice, for the people of Wales.

**PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE**

Principles are the foundation of any system of justice. The work of various bodies reporting on devolving legislative powers to Wales, and on jurisdictional arrangements, has been underpinned by a principled approach to good administration. 19 Emphasis has been placed on devolving competences for the benefit of public administration and social justice, not on the incremental increase in power for its own sake. In 2007, Mark Drakeford (Wales’ First Minister since late 2018) proposed a Welsh commitment to social justice anchored in principles including the value of good governance, an ethic of participation and improving equality of outcome. 20 This connection to substantive equality has remained evident since former First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s 2002 “clear red water” speech where he argued that Wales should take a different approach to the politics of Westminster, noting: “Our commitment to equality leads directly to a model of the relationship between the government and the individual which regards the individual as a citizen rather than as a consumer.” 21 The political majority in Wales continues to back state provision of public services and “progressive universalism” supporting those most in need. 22 In essence a Welsh approach to administrative justice is rooted in the view that good governance is “good for you”. 23 However, the concept of administrative justice is still a relatively unfamiliar one in Wales, and as one Assembly Member put it, “is not on the lips of my constituents”. 24 So, while there is significant evidence from which to construct a principled Welsh approach, those responsible for the system may take more convincing that this is indeed their construct, and that it matters.

The importance of underlying principles was recognised by the Committee for Administrative Justice and Tribunals in Wales (CAJTW), which considered one of its primary tasks to be creating a set of Administrative Justice Principles for Wales (the “Principles”). The Principles designate administrative justice as a fundamental right and a cornerstone to social justice. 25 They cover decision-making, systems and procedures, and values and behaviours. They are outward looking, being based in part on a synthesis of developing European and global standards.

When comparing the Welsh conception of administrative justice to a possible Australian account, a likely difference is that the Welsh approach is focused more on administrative justice as a collective social good, than as a means of providing individualised substantive justice. Groves has noted that during the 1999 *Australian Institute of Administrative Law Annual Conference* on the theme of administrative justice, no speaker offered a detailed or even working definition of the concept. 26 The Australian Administrative Review Council, unlike the Welsh CAJTW, did not develop specific administrative justice principles, but

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19 IS Richard, “The Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales” (2004); Silk Commission, n 7; Thomas Commission, n 18.
23 Drakeford, n 20.
24 Oral Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales, 23 March 2019 (Sir Adrian Webb, Ray Burningham and Sarah Nason).
it has espoused a collection of public law values including fairness, lawfulness, rationality, openness (or transparency) and efficiency.\(^{27}\)

It is likely that the basis of administrative justice in Australia remains as expressed by the Kerr Committee – that federal institutions at least are intended to reconcile the requirements of efficiency in administration and justice to the citizen. Australian literature highlights the role of individuals, emphasising they are recipients of justice and therefore central to administrative justice.\(^{28}\) However, the individual’s interests should be balanced against the distributive justice focus of public administration. The Australian concept stresses that individuals who access the administrative justice system are looking for a particular substantive outcome.

The Welsh conception mirrors this commitment to individuals as rights bearers in the administrative justice system. However, a difference may be the Welsh focus on protecting individuals through engagement and involvement, giving them a voice or co-operative role in developing and delivering public services, but less emphasis on securing individual substantive rights through tribunal (and court) procedures and remedies. What is uncertain is whether this “egalitarian”\(^{29}\) Welsh approach to administrative justice is the product of principled design, or the default implications of limited power and responsibility over the full purview of justice functions (courts, judges, legal aid, the legal profession and so on).

The Welsh Government’s response to the CAJTWT Principles was relatively lukewarm, noting: “[T]he proposed principles closely reflect existing values and legislative provisions that inform working practices. The CAJTWT formulation will provide a helpful source of guidance for the Welsh Government.”\(^{30}\) It is difficult to determine how much the Principles have been used as there are few references to them in published documents, whereas there have been occasions where explicitly testing proposed statutory redress measures against the Principles could have avoided problems further down the line.

Ongoing research has recommended that the President of Welsh Tribunals incorporates the Principles (or a suitably amended version of them) into the developing rules and procedures of Welsh tribunals.\(^{31}\) The research also recommend that the Law Commission examine how best to incorporate the Principles into any proposed reforms to the Welsh tribunals system as part of its forthcoming project. The background to this project is that while some of the gaps in Welsh tribunal structural and procedural DNA have been filled by administrative arrangements and statutory reform, inconsistency and complexity remains in processes and legislative frameworks that developed prior to devolution, and are now inconsistent with the Wales Act. In this context, the Law Commission has a broad remit to consider the following:

- the roles of the President of Welsh Tribunals and the Welsh Tribunals Unit;
- appointment and discipline of tribunal judges and other members;
- appointment of Presidents/Deputies;
- power to make and standardise procedural rules;
- appeals processes;
- complaints process; and
- protecting judicial independence.\(^{32}\)


The project is anticipated to result in a draft Welsh Tribunals Bill designed to establish an appropriate degree of coherence and consistency in procedures.

**STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION**

Matters the Law Commission will have to grapple with include the strands of DNA concerning structure and administration. Unlike the reserved tribunals of England and Wales, and many Australian tribunals (at Commonwealth, and State and Territory level), the Welsh tribunals have not been amalgamated into a single structure. In England and Wales reserved bodies, amalgamation has been through the creation of a single tribunal edifice incorporating a range of existing disparate bodies into a tier and chamber structure. These reforms were recommended by the 2001 Leggatt Report and enacted in the *Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK)* (*TCEA*).

When Leggatt reported, powers over a range of tribunals had already been transferred to the Assembly. Although England and Wales (and UK) tribunals have been increasingly judicialised, at the time of devolution tribunal jurisdictions nevertheless attached to the administrative policy fields that transferred from the UK Government Wales Office to the Assembly (and subsequently to the Welsh Government).\(^{33}\) Despite Leggatt’s remit not extending directly to devolved tribunals, he highlighted the need for cross-border operation:\(^{34}\)

> The process is complex because devolution has been achieved in different ways in each country as regards jurisdiction, powers, policy responsibilities, legislation and operational matters. There are tensions between general (devolved) administrative justice matters and the reservation of UK tribunals.\(^{35}\)

That devolved tribunals in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland remained outside the *TCEA* structure has sometimes compounded the ad hoc development that Leggatt hoped to resolve.\(^{36}\) He proposed closer inter-governmental relations as a means to ensure that devolved issues were considered during tribunal reform.\(^{37}\) However, the UK’s inter-governmental mechanisms have come under consistent strain, and justice is no exception.\(^{38}\)

An innovation of the *TCEA* was the introduction of a statutory definition of an administrative justice system. This would have been of limited value in itself without the creation of an Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) to oversee that system. This included a Welsh Committee with a statutory duty to oversee administrative justice as it applies to Wales, extending to tribunals administered by the Welsh Government. This provided an opportunity to define devolved tribunals operating in Wales in a converging, but loose and non-comprehensive structure based on the statutory remit of the Welsh Committee.\(^{39}\) In 2010 the Welsh Committee undertook a “Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales”,\(^{40}\) identifying relevant bodies, some administered by Welsh Government departments, others by local authorities, some longstanding, others ad hoc. This review highlighted matters to be rectified, including independence and impartiality, accessibility for users, efficiency and effectiveness, and coherence.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{34}\) Sir Andrew Leggatt, “Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service” (2001) [11.4].

\(^{35}\) Leggatt, n 34, [11.3].

\(^{36}\) Leggatt, n 34, [1.3].

\(^{37}\) Leggatt, n 34, [11.4].

\(^{38}\) Jones and Jones, n 16, 43; Nicola McEwen et al, “Reforming Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom” (2018); Brian Thompson, “Opportunities and Constraints: Reflections on Reforming Administrative Justice Within and Across the United Kingdom” in Nason, n 1.

\(^{39}\) *Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK)* Sch 7, Pt 4, para 27 defined them as tribunals whose functions are only exercisable in Wales and where Welsh ministers have powers to either appoint or make regulations; see also *Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (Listed Tribunals) (Wales) Order 2007 (UK)*, SI 2007/2876, W 250.


The report emphasised contextual differences between England and Wales, and also between Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Differences relating to devolution settlements, the absence of a separate Welsh legal jurisdiction (Scotland and Northern Ireland both being separate from the England and Wales jurisdiction), and the comparative size and scale of tribunal decision-making.\textsuperscript{42}

The Welsh Government has subsequently followed an incremental approach, especially in relation to reforming tribunal administration, beginning with the establishment of an Administrative Justice and Tribunals Unit (now known as the Welsh Tribunals Unit (WTU)). The WTU provides a unified management structure, and some independence from policy departments.\textsuperscript{43} This form of “shared services” model also operates for some smaller federal tribunals in Canada\textsuperscript{44} and allows access to pooled resources, technology and expertise, including linguistic expertise valuable for a bilingual system.\textsuperscript{45}

Amalgamation is not off the table and has been proposed for tribunals in the smaller jurisdiction of Northern Ireland (a population just over half that of Wales). However, this process has been paused due to the current suspension of devolution to Northern Ireland (at the time of writing). On the other hand, reform in Scotland is ongoing with a six-chamber First-tier Tribunal and a single-chamber Upper Tribunal having been established.\textsuperscript{46} Following the \textit{Scotland Act 2016} (UK), there are also further provisions to transfer responsibility for management and operation of some reserved tribunals to Scotland. The President of Scottish Tribunals has expressed frustration with the lack of development in transferring employment, tax and social security jurisdictions, while recognising that much of this delay is caused by inevitable financial constraints as well as ensuring that transferred judges retain the same terms and conditions of service, particularly as regards security of tenure.\textsuperscript{47}

Australian commentators note that tribunal reforms, and in particular the amalgamation of tribunals, have often been undertaken for political and pragmatic reasons, with little if any independent empirical evidence or inquiry to support them. Groves argues that while the Australian Administrative Tribunal was originally set up as an interface between citizens and government as a means of increasing access to justice, this has been supplanted by aspirations of efficiency and informality directly linked to costs savings. Similar concerns have been expressed in the United Kingdom, perhaps less so in relation to the amalgamation of England and Wales and UK tribunals (though there has been no evidence-based review of the success of the Leggatt reforms), but increasingly in relation to the introduction of compulsory internal administrative review prior to a tribunal appeal, and the digitalisation program.\textsuperscript{48}

Creyke has proposed an approach to tribunal reforms, and particularly to tribunal amalgamation, that takes into account organisational theory.\textsuperscript{49} She argues that Wales should take a less hasty approach than has occurred in other jurisdictions and should consider four key factors: political commitment; organisational structure; process and procedure; and organisational culture. Each of these factors requires discussion and some are equivalent to the broader strands of DNA, which are contained in the nucleus of the Welsh tribunals system.

\textsuperscript{42} Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, [69].
\textsuperscript{43} Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [25].
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act}, SC 2014, c 20.
\textsuperscript{47} Judicial Office for Scotland, n 46, 19.
\textsuperscript{49} Robin Creyke, “Amalgamation of Tribunals in Australia: Whether’tis Better...?” in Nason, n 1, 325.
INDEPENDENCE

An important aspect of organisational structure and particular processes (especially those relating to tribunal judges) is independence. In the Welsh structure, WTU staff are Welsh Government employees. Though not providing complete independence, this is consistent with AJTC Welsh Committee recommendations about a suitable structure for Wales for the time being. This structure is also, to some degree, consistent with developments in other parts of the United Kingdom and the common law world. For example, Scottish devolved tribunals were initially administered by an executive unit of the Scottish Government before being incorporated into the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service. This approach provides what Sossin has referred to as “quasi-independence” – such quasi-independent bodies are often tied to legislation designed to meet quite specific policy objectives, and they have limited control over their budgets and staff appointments. Sossin suggests that with strong political leadership it is possible to uphold this quasi-independent structure.

At least some Welsh tribunal leaders are satisfied with the current “quasi-independent” administrative arrangements. The Chairperson of the Agricultural Land Tribunal for Wales has noted that it “is already a well-understood separation of roles, reflecting the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive”. A research interviewee from the WTU explained that the WTU is perceived differently to other Welsh Government departments and workstreams, and that there is a growing element of respect and understanding particularly for judicial independence and expertise, though this has taken some time to establish. It was also suggested that having a judicial lead (the President of Welsh Tribunals) creates space between the individual tribunal presidents and ministers. Nevertheless, outward perceptions of the relationship between the WTU and the Welsh Government are also important.

The President of Welsh Tribunals has proposed that the WTU structure should be reformed as an executive agency. One reason for this is the importance of ensuring not only that judicial independence is maintained, but that it is “seen to be maintained” as “the cornerstone of the democratic system”. There is still some room for flexibility in the precise model that would enhance independence and clarify the relationship between the Welsh Government and the WTU. For example, the Welsh Revenue Authority, the first non-ministerial government department established by the Welsh Government, could provide a template for developing the WTU. The Commission on Justice in Wales has now recommended that: “The Welsh Tribunals Unit should have structural independence.” If the WTU is reformed as an executive agency this may well then be short-lived, with the Justice Commission (and the President of Welsh Tribunals who was also a Commissioner) now openly favouring an independent tribunals service chaired by the President (based on the Scottish model). This would be desirable not only for the immediate benefits, but also in anticipation of a longer-term transfer of additional justice functions to Wales.

50 Research Interview with Head of WTU, Cardiff, 6 June 2019.
51 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, [68], [70].
54 Sossin, n 53, 220–221.
56 Research Interview with Head of WTU, n 50.
58 President of Welsh Tribunals, n 57, 10.
60 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 27.
The current Welsh “quasi-independence” model is quite different to the constitutional position of many Australian tribunals, which are, in effect, part of the executive branch and defined specifically as “not courts”. When considering the case for England and Wales, and UK-wide reforms the Leggatt Committee recognised tribunals as judicial bodies (and superior courts of record in the case of the Upper Tribunal), insisting that they should have the same independent status as courts.\textsuperscript{61} Although Leggatt welcomed some comparisons with Australian tribunals as having an “admirable and distinctive role” within the executive branch, he concluded that the 1957 Franks Committee had set UK tribunals on a judicial path.\textsuperscript{62} The more recent \textit{Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014} (UK) follows this judicial trajectory. Nevertheless, there has been discussion of the potential value of a “merits review” approach particularly in high-volume UK tribunal jurisdictions (especially immigration and social security);\textsuperscript{63} the case for UK tribunals considering cases on their substantive merits is not entirely closed.

**PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE**

Leggatt’s equation of courts and tribunals is said to have led to the “judicialisation” of tribunals – that is, increased formalism in rules, practices and procedures, and an increase in adversarialism in at least some jurisdictions. This form of judicialisation or juridiication is not so evident in the Welsh tribunals. Their flexibility and adaptability have been recognised, including where lack of amalgamation within a courts and tribunals structure has led to making better use of less formal venues that can be more sensitive to user perspectives. Cuts to HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) England and Wales estate will have less impact on Welsh tribunals, which have only made limited use of court buildings. It is fair to say that the Welsh tribunals have to an extent developed ad hoc practices suited to the needs of particular jurisdictions; however, this adaptability does not entirely ameliorate concerns caused by inconsistencies across rule and regulation-making processes.

Despite the Welsh Government having most administrative responsibility for Welsh tribunals, procedural rules stem from a range of legal sources. For example, rules and regulations of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for Wales are formally laid down by the Lord Chancellor, despite funding and administration of the tribunal being the responsibility of the WTU. There are also legacy issues, where certain English subject matter jurisdictions (eg Residential Property Tribunals) have been transferred to the First-tier Tribunal under the \textit{TCEA}, whereas the sister Welsh jurisdiction (the Residential Property Tribunal for Wales (RPTW)) remains governed largely by sections of England and Wales legislation (the \textit{Housing Act 2004} (UK)) that no longer apply to England.\textsuperscript{64} This leaves old rules and regulations designed for England and Wales tribunals operating in a different, Wales only, constitutional and public administration context.

Wales’ first attempt at devising a wholly devolved administrative justice regime was the \textit{Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011} (UK), creating a system of Welsh Language Standards, a Welsh Language Commissioner and a WLT.\textsuperscript{65} Although this is the primary means for protecting a national language, the main emphasis of the legislation is on administrative procedures, detailing the role and functions of the language regulator (the Commissioner) and the regulator’s regulator (the WLT). Some argue that this has come at the expense of outlining the content of legally enforceable substantive language rights.\textsuperscript{66} Individuals cannot directly challenge the content of Welsh Language Standards developed by the Welsh Language Commissioner. If a complainant considers there has been a flaw in the Commissioner’s investigation into compliance with its own Standards, they can appeal to the WLT.

The WLT is a unique case study as it was the Welsh Government and Assembly’s first attempt at establishing a body with judicial functions. The WLT appointment regulations require Welsh ministers to

\textsuperscript{61} Leggatt, n 34, [2.5]; Sossin, n 53, 218.

\textsuperscript{62} Leggatt, n 34, [2.5].


\textsuperscript{64} Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2013 (UK) SI 2013/1036, Sch 2, Pt 1, para 1.


\textsuperscript{66} Huws, n 65.
“have regard” to upholding the principles of rule of law and independence of the Tribunal.\textsuperscript{67} Arrangements were also made for a member of the Law Commission to sit on the panel appointing the tribunal President and members.\textsuperscript{68} The 2011 Measure copies Pt 2 of the \textit{TCEA} in determining whether a person satisfies judicial-appointments eligibility conditions. In terms of drawing up the tribunal regulations themselves, the WLT President was primarily responsible for the process with support from the CAJTW, thus ensuring expertise and impartiality from government.

In relation to procedures and practices, the President of Welsh Tribunals is also required to have regard to innovative methods of dispute resolution. Such methods are anticipated to include mediation processes and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, inquisitorial methods and digitalisation. A previous report of the Justice in Wales Stakeholder Group, recommended that the Welsh Government should consider the benefits of adopting inquisitorial approaches in any of the devolved tribunals it administers.\textsuperscript{69} However, the report did not examine any research and commentary around different types of approaches, and that adversarial/inquisitorial and active/passive methods are a continuum of different styles rather than absolutes. It did, however, note that changing judicial and administrative styles could involve costs and new training requirements and should only be adopted in order to improve outcomes for individuals.

In the context of any move to systematise or rationalise Welsh tribunal procedures and processes, whether combined with amalgamation of jurisdictions or not, there must be an appropriate degree of balancing specialisation and generalisation within tribunal rules and balancing the interests of a range of stakeholders. There is a particular concern to ensure that the needs of smaller jurisdictions are not swamped by those with larger caseloads – for example, the caseload of the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales is over 2,000 per annum, whereas that of the WLT is circa 5–10 per annum.

Another matter for clarification and reform will be the disjointed appeal routes from Welsh tribunals.\textsuperscript{70} For example, some appeals go to the Administrative Court and others to various Chambers of the England and Wales Upper Tribunal. The only real consistency is that there are no devolved judicial bodies in Wales with the authority to set binding legal precedents.

Another issue of procedure is the extent to which Welsh tribunals should be digitalised. Electronic working is already evident within Welsh tribunals, and it is notably easier for some tribunals to adapt their processes quickly depending on the nature of their caseloads. Reforms at England and Wales, and UK levels are progressing rapidly under HMCTS digitalisation project.\textsuperscript{71} Through the “Tribunals Judicial Ways of Working” program, tribunals will see radical changes to how they operate,\textsuperscript{72} including for example, full video hearings and continuous online resolution.

Digitalisation could have particular benefits for Wales, which has significant rural populations. However, advantages in terms of geography will need to be balanced against challenges of demography, digital exclusion and broadband access.\textsuperscript{73} Digitalisation reforms are ongoing for a substantial number of cases from Wales that are determined in reserved tribunals (the biggest by far being the Social Security and Child Support Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal) and for appeals from Welsh tribunals to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal. There are concerns around two-speed or multiple-speed processes diverging between England and Wales, where Welsh tribunals risk being left behind in part due to not being able

\textsuperscript{67} Welsh Language Tribunal (Appointment) Regulations 2013 (UK) SI 2013/3139.
\textsuperscript{68} Welsh Government, “Appointment of the President and Other Members of the Welsh Language Tribunal: Statement of Appointment Policy and Procedure” (Version 1, 10 December 2013) [4.3.1].
\textsuperscript{70} Research Interview President of Welsh Tribunals, Cardiff, 6 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{72} Senior President of Tribunals, n 71.
\textsuperscript{73} Nason, n 31, [103]–[105].
to take advantage of economies of scale in technological developments. The WTU is likely to bide its time until sufficient information is available to evaluate the success of HMCTS digitalisation program with respect to jurisdictions where Wales has comparable devolved competence, such as in mental health and special educational needs. This is a wise move as the speed of the reforms and limited opportunities for independent research evaluation have alarmed commentators.\textsuperscript{74} That the reforms are taking place during a time of austerity cannot be ignored; if a particular degree of digitalisation prioritises efficiency over fairness and equal access to justice, this would not fit with the Welsh political approach to good administration.

The Commission on Justice in Wales has now recommended that a strategy should be drawn up to ensure proper access to justice based on the needs of the people of Wales. This should include a “workable court IT network” with video and digital facilities, assistance for users, improved information on accessing dispute resolution remotely, a “digital network” and a court centre in Cardiff “fit for a capital city”\textsuperscript{75}

**CONFIDENCE AND STANDARDS**

The perceived fairness of tribunal procedures and practices is a factor going to public confidence, with 2015 research highlighting a lack of confidence in the capacity of the justice system as devolved to Wales to deliver quality outcomes and experiences comparable to combined England and Wales institutions.\textsuperscript{76} The CAJTW has stressed that individual users and legal professionals must be able to have confidence in the system and that it should deliver “at least as good a quality of justice as in England”. One way of achieving this is through ensuring quality within the judicial branch, with consistent judicial appraisal and discipline across the Welsh tribunals, capable of passing “parity test” with England.\textsuperscript{77} Efforts to achieve this have highlighted the “jagged edges” of devolution, especially regarding parity of judicial conditions and of judicial opportunity. The judicial appointments process remains inconsistent across the Welsh tribunals. For example, the Lord Chancellor appoints the president and legal chairs of the SENTW, whereas the appointment of lay members has been transferred to the Welsh Government (though Secretary of State consent is required).\textsuperscript{78}

The Welsh Government has adopted several administrative measures aimed to “achieve standards that are comparable with non-devolved tribunals”.\textsuperscript{79} There is a Framework Agreement between the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) and the Welsh Government for recruitment and appointment processes. In practice the process for appointing tribunal judges is the same regardless of whether the Lord Chancellor or Welsh ministers are the appointing body; however, this is not reflected in statutory frameworks, which are still disjointed.\textsuperscript{80}

In addition to the JAC, the Judicial Office has also provided support including providing access to judicial office guidance and training materials. The Welsh tribunal judiciary use the same e-judiciary communication network as England and Wales judges. This shows that the WTU can “tap into” non-devolved arrangements in order to provide a consistent level of service to the judiciary. Similar arrangements have previously been in place with the Judicial College (in respect of training) and the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) regarding complaints.


\textsuperscript{75} Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 39.


\textsuperscript{77} Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [25], Recommendation 11.

\textsuperscript{78} This will remain the case when the provisions for the Education Tribunal for Wales come into force under the *Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunals (Wales) Act 2018* (UK) s 91.

\textsuperscript{79} “Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW Legacy Report”, n 30.

\textsuperscript{80} “Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW Legacy Report”, n 30.
The CAJTW noted in 2016 that “although [the] Welsh judiciary [were] in effect ‘tied in’ to England and Wales institutions (the Judicial Office, Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial College and Judicial Conduct Investigations Office)” the relationship between them has not been clear.\(^8^1\) In particular, the small size of Welsh tribunals and complexity of their constitutional position hampered progression of more formal arrangements.\(^8^2\) There were also notable gaps. For example, the JCIO do not extend over all devolved tribunals and the Wales Training Committee of the Judicial College has no responsibility for devolved Welsh tribunals (only Welsh interests in the TCEA edifice).\(^8^3\)

The CAJTW recommended a comprehensive set of formal agreements with judicial offices like the JAC, Judicial College and JCIO,\(^8^4\) but it also emphasised that Welsh training should not be solely delivered by England and Wales bodies. Currently, training is arranged by the individual Welsh tribunal presidents, with oversight from the President of Welsh Tribunals, and can be adapted to deal with emerging legislation. Joint “judge craft” training days have also been discussed across the Welsh tribunals. It has been suggested that the minimum amount of training is being met by these arrangements.\(^8^5\)

The WTU, in conjunction with the President of Welsh Tribunals and tribunal leads, is beginning to develop internal expertise and establishing equivalent roles to those within HMCTS, the JCIO and Judicial Office. A natural consequence of administering tribunals is the need to increase expertise in areas not previously the concern of the Welsh Government such as judicial salaries, pensions and complaints.\(^8^6\) This provides some insights into what will eventually be required to administer a potentially much larger set of judicial bodies in the case of further devolution.

The Welsh tribunal judiciary have in the past been concerned about parity of opportunity with the “English” judiciary. Research in 2015 noted that there was little incentive for junior practitioners to undertake a judicial career in Wales due to lack of opportunities to sit. It was suggested that good candidates were being lost to England where there were more opportunities to gain experience. Participants worried about the risk of a “second-rate” judiciary in Wales and “cross-ticketing” of judges was identified as a way to tackle some concerns.\(^8^7\) The Wales Act now provides for Welsh tribunal judges to be cross-deployed across the Welsh tribunals or to the First-tier Tribunal. Early indications are that this has been successful in terms of level of judicial interest and quality of candidates, it can also reduce recruitment costs.\(^8^8\) Cross-deployment into the First-tier Tribunal has also occurred in the case of the Property Chamber. A member of the tribunal judiciary in Wales has recently been appointed as a circuit judge, and there is a perceived sense of greater opportunities for career progression than back in 2015.

**Political Will and Jagged Edges**

Although the Welsh Government has made little ostensible use of the Administrative Justice Principles for Wales developed by the CAJTW, the Counsel General has reinforced the importance of principle-based administrative decision-making in the context of modern devolved government. Such proposed principles were said to include honesty, fairness, candidness, legality, rationality, proportionality and sustainability, with decisions subject to testing by review processes that are objectively fair and proportionate. Following up this account in an Assembly Plenary discussion he proposed that:

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\(^8^1\) Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [26].

\(^8^2\) Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [26].

\(^8^3\) Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [28]; Commission on Justice in Wales, n 55.

\(^8^4\) Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, Recommendation 10.

\(^8^5\) Research Interview with Head of WTU, n 50.

\(^8^6\) Research Interview with Head of WTU, n 50.

\(^8^7\) Nason, n 76, [7.6]–[7.9].

\(^8^8\) President of Welsh Tribunals, n 57, 7; Research Interviews with Head of WTU, n 50.
We can expect that administrative decisions lead us to a more equal Wales … so that decisions taken by tribunals and by commissioners and by ombudsmen within the administrative justice system lead us to that outcome.

The current Welsh Government’s commitment to further devolution of responsibility for the administration of justice is encapsulated, again in the words of the Counsel General, that devolution of justice and the creation of a Welsh legal jurisdiction is inevitable.

The Welsh Government’s commitment to improving judicial independence through administrative and governance arrangements has more recently been matched by public statements. Such as the Counsel General’s Cabinet Statement on the Welsh tribunal judiciary’s independence, coinciding with pressure on the UK Lord Chancellor for not defending the judiciary following press criticism of the main “Brexit” judicial review case.

However, when it comes to specific reforms that could increase the workload of Welsh tribunals, political attitudes appear more reticent. Three specific examples are provided below, and other strands of DNA in tribunal development (such as appropriate procedures and coherent structures) are also highlighted. These examples are education, residential property and returning again to the Welsh language. The first two examples also highlight the “jagged edges” of devolution where policy responsibility and tribunal administration is devolved, while traditional justice functions such as courts and legal aid are not.

**Education**

The *Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunal (Wales) Act 2018* (UK) creates a new framework for supporting children of compulsory school age (or below) and young people in school or further education with additional learning needs. It introduces a single statutory Individual Development Plan (IDP) that applies to all learners up to age 25, aimed at ensuring equity in terms of support and rights for those in post-16 education. Further core aims of the Act are: more participation and collaboration in the development and implementation of IDPs; avoiding disagreements and early dispute resolution; and providing clear and consistent rights of appeal.

The Act renames the SENTW as the Education Tribunal. It is predicted to lead to an increase in Education Tribunal claims, as the right to appeal is extended from under 16s (through their parents/carers or in their own right where relevant) to young people up to the age of 25 pursuing further education. Other changes in the legislation will have a consequent impact on the types of cases issued and determined in the Education Tribunal, but not necessarily their frequency.

While some increase in caseload is accepted in consequence of substantive Welsh law reforms, there are also matters currently determined in non-devolved courts that could feasibly have been transferred to the Education Tribunal, but which will not be. These are disability discrimination cases under the *Equality Act 2010* (UK) currently within the jurisdiction of the county courts. These cases are within the specialist expertise of Education Tribunal members and transferring them to the Tribunal could lead to a more integrated and less confusing system for users. It may be that the reason for not transferring this class of cases to the Tribunal is more to do with concerns about Wales taking a different approach to England (where such cases are determined in county courts) than it is to do with further increases in the Welsh tribunal caseload.

In the education context the AJTC Welsh Committee, and later the CAJTW, recommended that thought be given to transferring school admissions and school exclusions appeals into an Education Tribunal for Wales. These appeals are currently determined by panels convened by Local Authorities (of which there are 22, potentially resulting in 22 different processes with concerns over consistency, fairness and transparency).

However, following feasibility studies, the Welsh Government’s current view is that

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89 Counsel General Questions, National Assembly for Wales, Plenary (26 September 2018) <http://record.assembly.wales/Plenary/5352#A45564>.


91 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, [76]; Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [53].
the Education Tribunal is not an “appropriate vehicle” for these types of appeals. The Commission on Justice in Wales has, however, stated:

We are concerned that school admissions and exclusions appeals panels operate without any kind of judicial scrutiny save in those very rare cases in which an exclusion leads to an application for judicial review. The role of judges in determining disputes relating to the education of pupils has steadily increased over time as functions of public bodies have increased. We consider that a thorough appraisal of the operation of local authority appeal panels and oversight by the President of Welsh Tribunals of their decision making processes is required.

It is ultimately hard to escape the conclusion that rebranding the SENTW as the Education Tribunal for Wales has been done in anticipation of longer-term expansion in the Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Residential Property

The Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 (UK) will replace existing leases and licences in Wales with two types of “occupation contract”, designed to make renting a home simpler and easier. At present the majority of housing disputes are determined in the non-devolved county courts, with a smaller number of matters handled by the RPTW. The legislative process provided an opportunity to reform how the majority of housing disputes are determined in Wales. In evidence during the Bill’s passage respondents expressed enthusiasm for increased use of ADR processes (especially mediation) and greater use of the RPTW to resolve housing disputes. In the view of specialist NGO Shelter Cymru:

The county court is not always the most effective route for resolving disputes. As well as the escalating court costs themselves, we also find that a lack of expertise in housing law among District Judges can sometimes result in delays and poor decision-making that ultimately prejudice both parties. Many other countries have specialist housing tribunals … We suggest that the most cost-effective solution for Wales may be to expand the role of the Residential Property Tribunal, which is currently quite under-used. Creating a specialist tribunal for Wales would considerably increase landlords’ and tenants’ confidence that they can resolve disputes quickly and fairly when they need to.

However, in response to further information requested by the Assembly Equality, Communities and Local Government Committee, the Residential Landlords Association (RLA) argued that the majority of cases should remain in the county courts as HMCTS already has “the necessary infrastructure” in place. The RLA proposed that as the RPTW is not assimilated into a courts and tribunals service it lacks sufficient resources (eg designated hearing venues). It also noted that RPTW members are fee paid part-time judges, not permanent salaried appointees and that “with the current climate affecting public expenditure, it is unrealistic to think that this [expanding the jurisdiction of the RPTW to include possession claims] is a priority to which resources could be devoted”. Expanding the jurisdiction of the RPTW to include possession claims would, for example, increase its caseload from approx 150 per annum to over 4,000 cases per annum.

Other issues raised included the processes and procedures of each institution. Some respondents suggested that their experience of county court claims had been of highly adversarial procedures (especially in anti-social behaviour cases) and they were concerned about whether a tribunal is the appropriate venue for more “heated” disputes.

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93 Thomas Commission, n 18, [6.47].
94 A secure contract modelled on the current secure tenancy used by local authorities, and a standard contract modelled on current assured shorthold tenancies used by the private sector.
97 Oral Evidence to the Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, 30 April 2015 (Chair of Housing Law Committee, Law Society) [174].
The crux is that possession and anti-social behaviour claims are said to be more adversarial than say rent assessment or disrepair cases, as such it is argued that they should take place in a court and the parties should be legally represented. Such claims should not be determined in tribunals where more inquisitorial procedures are used, where parties “need” not be legally represented, and specifically where legal aid funding for representation is not available. A representative from the Housing Law Practitioners Association (HLPA) put this starkly: “The downside of the residential property tribunal is, one, there will never be legal aid for it. Just conceptually, there isn’t legal aid for tribunals. It’s just the divide that we strike as a matter of legal policy in this country.” Presumably he was referring here to “England and Wales”, as Wales has not yet had any opportunity to develop a legal aid policy, this being a reserved matter. The Commission on Justice in Wales has now recommended that “[t]he funding for legal aid and for the third sector providing advice and assistance should be brought together in Wales to form a single fund under the strategic direction of an independent body”. England and Wales-wide reforms have greatly reduced the availability of legal aid funding for representation in housing claims in the county courts; in practice many types of claim (eg social housing possession cases) are rarely at the extreme end of an adversarial-inquisitorial continuum (compare mortgage company possession claims); and more often than not defendants in tribunal proceedings will be legally represented whereas claimants will not be. Arguments about adversarial and inquisitorial procedures, and represented and unrepresented parties, may no longer stack up. These are just some reasons why the UK government is currently considering the case for a specialist housing court combining the housing dispute resolution jurisdictions of the county courts (in England and Wales) and the First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (in England), but not (it would appear) the jurisdiction of the RPTW. Devolution of responsibility for the administration of particular tribunals is not necessarily permanent, though politically it is very hard to reverse. It would not be impossible for the RPTW to be absorbed into an England and Wales housing court, and such “reverse devolution” was actually proposed by the Law Commission in a 2007 consultation on proportionate dispute resolution in housing. It is extremely unlikely this would take place now given the political context and increasing divergence between English and Welsh housing law.

Institutional hierarchies are just part of the “jagged edge” that will continue to cause issues for Wales, as many appeals on a point of law from Welsh tribunals are to England and Wales Upper Tribunal Chambers or to the non-devolved Administrative Court. As it stands, appeals from the RPTW go to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), which already has a backlog of cases and would struggle to deal with additional appeals from Wales should the RPTW jurisdiction be expanded. Further to this, decisions made by the Upper Tribunal are not binding on the county court as there is no legal hierarchy between them, so in cases where there is significant interplay between aspects of county court jurisdiction and aspects of actual (or proposed future) jurisdiction of the RPTW, any appeal decisions taken by the Upper Tribunal would not be binding on the county courts causing what the HLPA describes as “legal chaos”.

The Law Society for England and Wales has been particularly critical of proposals to establish a single housing court, noting that central issues delaying resolution of disputes are insufficient resourcing of the county courts, and the (necessary) procedural requirements that must be complied with before a person can be evicted from their home. The establishment of a more specialist court will invite further reductions in the availability of legal aid funding for advice and representation, leading to even higher numbers of unrepresented litigants.

98 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 1.
99 Oral Evidence to the Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, 20 May 2015 (Housing Law Practitioners Association (HLPA)) [136].
101 HLPA, n 99, [137]–[138].
In relation to unrepresented claimants, the RPTW President has stressed that tribunal members have considerable experience and “are very good at teasing out what the issues are … making sure that both sides of the argument are heard and the issues are aired”. Despite criticism from the Upper Tribunal about tribunals taking issues that parties have not raised, he felt that “it is our obligation as an expert tribunal to get to the crux of the matter”. This reflection may disclose future concerns. The President of Welsh Tribunals is required to have regard to innovative methods of dispute resolution, but exercising this function may cause some “jagged edge” tension if it involves developing active inquisitorial methods in Welsh tribunals with appeal routes to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal, especially if the latter is sceptical about these approaches.

Ultimately with respect to the Renting Homes (Wales) Act, the Assembly Committee recommended a modest transfer of some existing types of county court claims to the RPTW, and that some new claims (arising specifically in the context of the Act’s obligations) also be determined by the Tribunal. These included: disputes in relation to rent increases; fitness for human habitation issues; succession rights; and failure to supply a contract. The President of the RPTW indicated that the Tribunal would be an appropriately specialised forum to determine these cases, but that it would require additional resources.

However, the Welsh Minister responded to the Committee stating: “Whilst such an amendment may initially have some attraction, the Residential Property Tribunal for Wales does not have the necessary capacity to deal with such disputes. Building in such capacity would be costly and would need to be fully considered and consulted upon.”

Overall when enacting new legislation imposing duties on public bodies in Wales, the Assembly has generally tended not to interfere with administrative justice redress processes, deciding instead to roll over existing mechanisms from England and Wales legislation. Sometimes this is done without any real consideration of why these redress processes were initially chosen and whether such original justifications remain; there has also tended to be little consideration of data showing how many people are actually using these processes and their outcomes. For example, although the Housing (Wales) Act 2014 (UK) makes some additional use of the RPTW, the overwhelming majority of claims under the Act adopt the internal review followed by county court appeal route followed in previous England and Wales legislation. Shelter Cymru has expressed concerns about the lack of county court appeals under the Act (approximately two to four per annum) and the subsequently limited independent judicial interpretation of new substantive Welsh law. It is an open question whether a tribunal appeal route might have proven more accessible. The Commission on Justice in Wales has argued:

In relation to housing disputes, for example, a single court or tribunal is needed to more efficiently deal with such matters. Even though the UK Government has not yet reached a decision on a single housing court, the reasons for providing all decisions to be made by a single judicial body are compelling. A single judicial body would be able to develop expertise and an overview of all the different issues that will arise on housing. The creation of the single court would also facilitate access to justice to those with housing disputes. Our analysis is that the current structure for resolving disputes demonstrates that there is a need to unify courts and tribunals, both for civil justice and administrative justice.

The Commission has therefore recommended that: “Courts and tribunals which determine disputes in both civil and administrative law should be under one unified system in Wales.” This could ultimately lead to Wales developing its own version of civil and administrative tribunals common in Australia.

103 Oral Evidence to the Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, 30 April 2015 (Andrew Morris, President RPTW) [309]–[311].

104 Morris, n 103, [309]–[311].


106 Another example is with the introduction of a new Welsh Land Transaction Tax to replace Stamp Duty Tax in Wales, where redress is to the England and Wales First-tier (Tax) Tribunal rather than through an existing or new Welsh tribunal.

107 Thomas Commission, n 18, [5.56].

108 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 22.
Welsh Language

Returning to the WLT, the context is quite different. The Welsh language protection regime was the Welsh Government and Assembly’s first attempt at establishing a full administrative justice process including an appellate tribunal. However, this only lasted six years before a 2017 White Paper proposed further reforms suggesting that the existing regime is too bureaucratic, does not ensure value for money, and does not strike a proportionate balance between promoting the Welsh language and regulating compliance with Welsh Language Standards.\(^{109}\)

New proposals emphasised internal processes, with individuals being required to complain first to the public body before taking their complaint to a new Welsh Language Commission (to replace the existing Commissioner). However, as a package the reforms were described as regressive by language campaigners and Plaid Cymru.\(^{110}\) They had the potential to diminish individual rights to use Welsh: first, by the provision that the Welsh Language Commission should only investigate complaints in “serious” cases; and secondly, by watering down the content of the Standards. A third issue was the proposal to introduce a permission requirement into some appeals to the WLT.

The proposals had a policy objective of avoiding disputes and resolving issues as early and informally as possible but appeared to gloss over some more specific legal technicalities. In particular, the nuances involved in determining what might be a “serious breach” of Standards before the Commission. Another nuance is the distinction between appeals and reviews in the WLT, as this impacts on whether introducing a permission requirement would be principled and consistent. There was also no evidence that the WLT was inundated by an unmanageable caseload at the time; however, in response to consultation, the WLT President agreed that a permission filter could be imposed on some types of case (akin to judicial review) given an anticipated rise in the Tribunal’s caseload and the impact that this would also have on the Commissioner.\(^{111}\)

He further concluded that there is no evidence of the need to add a permission filter into cases where an individual complainant has a right to appeal to the WLT, as this could give rise to “unintended and unexpected complications”.

The proposals are not in fact being taken forward, with the Minister for International Relations and the Welsh Language instead looking to reconsider the balance between the Welsh Language Commissioner’s language promotion and regulation functions. Within this broader picture the role of the WLT is quite limited, and the Welsh Government has specifically rejected a proposal for enacting a right to use Welsh in primary legislation, to be enforced by a direct appeal route to the WLT.\(^{112}\)

A Welsh Model of Administrative Justice: Implications for Tribunal Reform?

In comparing different nations’ approaches to administrative justice, Asimow has proposed “models of administrative adjudication”.\(^{113}\) He argues that there are three phases to administrative justice: (1) the initial decision; (2) administrative reconsideration; and (3) judicial review (in effect any reviews or appeals on a point of law). For Asimow, the initial decision does not actually refer to the frontline decision, it refers to the first opportunity a person has to query that decision. A key relevant insight is that:

Each country tends to rely primarily on one of the three phases (that is, initial decision, reconsideration, or judicial review) to achieve a fair and accurate result. Efficiency concerns require countries to make this choice. Countries cannot afford to invest resources equally in two, much less all three, of the phases. The

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phase that each country chooses as the recipient of most resources is likely to be the phase that private parties regard as providing their best chance to win the case.\textsuperscript{114}

Asimow concludes that the United Kingdom and Australia follow the same model of administrative adjudication because the phase of adjudication receiving the largest state resource is tribunal reconsideration. Asimow’s models are admittedly over-simplifications, as growing differences between Wales, England and UK tribunals demonstrate. For example, in high-volume areas of administrative decision-making still largely reserved to the United Kingdom (social security and immigration) there has been a policy of de-tribunalisation, with government emphasising compulsory administrative review (reconsideration) by the initial decision-making agency and seeking to limit access to tribunals.\textsuperscript{115}

Where Wales is increasingly differing to England (and to reserved UK-wide matters) is through its investment in initial decision-making and the avoidance of disputes. This tracks to a Welsh fascination with what some consider to be an Australian invention – the “integrity” branch.\textsuperscript{116} However, this has been coupled perhaps with a distinctively non-Australian approach to social and economic rights. While the common law of England and Wales remains the central repository of administrative law standards, Welsh political institutions have expressed their commitment to human rights by legislating to develop new procedural duties requiring public bodies to show they have taken social, economic and inter-generational rights into account in their decision-making. This has combined to form a nascent rights-based administrative procedure law.\textsuperscript{117}

Relevant legislation begins with policy goals evidencing a strong declaration of political intent to promote and protect rights. However, good intentions have sometimes been weakened in legislative drafting, with the end result being a hybrid, or compromise between government and civil society, that some have referred to as “bestial” in its complexity.\textsuperscript{118} These legislative developments have occurred against an understandable backdrop of government wishing to carve out its own constitutional identity and to promote its record on rights and social justice issues, while simultaneously insulating itself from potentially repetitive and costly individual legal challenges. As such, the new duties are rarely coupled with specific correlative rights for individuals to enforce them through legal action in a tribunal or court. More often the duties are to be “enforced” either by ad hoc arrangements or through a regime of “soft law” power consisting of institutions that have various functions to review public body activities, make recommendations and promote “right first time” decision-making. The rejection of specific legally enforceable rights in Wales sometimes appears to have occurred more for pragmatic reasons than any concerns over the limits of legislative competence. For example, the Secretary of State for Wales can still intervene to prevent Bills going for Royal Assent if they have reasonable grounds to believe that legal divergence would have an adverse effect on the operation of the law as it applies in England.\textsuperscript{119} In other cases it is explicitly a matter of resources; such being the main argument against legal rights to use Welsh to be protected by a specific tribunal appeal route.

The most ambitious example of Welsh rights and social justice-based administrative procedure legislation is the \textit{Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015} (WFGA). This places public bodies under a duty to practice sustainable development by complying with “Well-being Goals”.\textsuperscript{120} Public bodies \textit{must} carry out sustainable development and \textit{must} “take all reasonable steps” to meet their set Well-being Objectives.

\textsuperscript{114} Asimow, n 113.

\textsuperscript{115} Thomas, n 48.


\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Government of Wales Act 2006} (UK) s 101(1)(c).

\textsuperscript{120} A more prosperous Wales, a resilient Wales, a healthier Wales, a more equal Wales, a Wales of cohesive communities, a Wales of vibrant culture and thriving Welsh language, and a globally responsible Wales.
as a means to achieving Well-being Goals. The word “must” implies a legal duty enforceable through judicial review. However, the broad, general and aspirational nature of the legislative objectives appears at odds with this form of enforcement. The Administrative Court has concluded that the WFGA prescribes a high-level target duty that is deliberately vague, general and aspirational and applies to a class rather than to individuals, as such judicial review will not lie. Judicial review is also not available to enforce the “Five Ways of Working” laid out in the WFGA. The legislation states that public bodies must act in these “ways” when carrying out sustainable development – they are: (1) thinking long-term; (2) integrating various objectives; (3) involving people; (4) collaboration; and (5) prevention (deploying resources to prevent problems occurring or getting worse). Together these “Ways of Working” could express some overarching requirements of administrative procedure, but their vagueness hampers expressly legal enforcement.

Some would consider it significant that the judge who has so far rejected judicial review claims seeking to rely on the WFGA is a so-called “judge on wheels”121 having never practiced law in Wales. However, a further reason for excluding judicial review is that the WFGA provides for other public bodies and mechanisms to police compliance with sustainability and wellbeing duties – namely, integrity branch institutions, a Future Generations Commissioner and the Auditor General for Wales.

The Welsh integrity landscape also includes an Older People’s Commissioner, the Welsh Language Commissioner and a Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (PSOW). The PSOW is the most long-established and wide-ranging Welsh integrity institution, appointed by and accountable to the Assembly. The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2019 (UK) gave the PSOW “own initiative” powers of investigation, powers to accept oral complaints, powers over some private medical treatment, and a more extensive role in relation to complaints handling standards and procedures. This makes the PSOW one of the most influential and progressive of the UK Ombudsmen. Though perhaps it is a further sign of the jagged-edges of devolution that an argument in favour of reforming “statutory bars” regulating the relationship between the PSOW and courts and tribunals, aiming to make redress more flexible,122 was rejected by an Assembly Committee on the basis that altering the relationship between Ombuds and the courts should only be approached on a UK-wide basis.123 The PSOW called for this issue to be revisited by the Commission on Justice in Wales.124 The Commission has recommended that:

The Administrative Court should have the power to stay court proceedings whilst the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales investigates a complaint. The Ombudsman should have the power to refer a point of law to the Court.

The Senior President of UK and England and Wales Tribunals also endorses a more fluid approach to institutional relationships between Ombuds and the tribunal judiciary.

Ultimately Welsh administrative procedure legislation attempts to harness the quasi-political power of integrity branch institutions to incentivise systematic change, subsequently perhaps reducing the need for individual legal challenges. On the contrary it could be said that federal Australian administrative procedure law, such as the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), is primarily about outlining specific circumstances where an individual can seek legal redress. This more legalised model is not without its problems, particularly in terms of potentially increasing the incidence of litigation focused on fine-grained interpretations of statutory terminology that may have little impact on improving decision-making outcomes and administrative practices.

121 Rawlings uses this phrase to describe London-based judges travelling out to hear cases in the Regional Administrative Court Centres in Cardiff, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester, or where judges move between the Administrative Court and the Upper Tribunal: Richard Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review” (2008) 61 Current Legal Problems 95, 108.

122 Law Commission, Public Services Ombudsmen, Law Com No 329 (2011) [3.23]–[3.49].


125 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 26.
In terms of how well the Welsh model of prioritising rights-based “right first time” decision-making is working in comparison to other models, there is evidence that public satisfaction with government and with public services provision tends to be higher than the UK average. Legal claims per head of population are also lower when comparing Wales to other UK devolved nations, and to regions within England. For example, the number of judicial review applications is lower per head of population in Wales than it is across various English regions. The number of tribunal appeals per head of population is also lower in Wales, in almost all the Welsh tribunals for which comparative data is available. However, low rates of judicial review and tribunal appeals could be as much due to lack of awareness and limited accessibility of affordable legal advice as to the quality of Welsh administrative decision-making. Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales shows that cuts to legal aid funding (a non-devolved matter) have had a disproportionately negative impact in Wales and that the number of specialist public administrative lawyers based in Wales has been decreasing. It is revealing that the only Welsh tribunal that has a higher rate of applications per head of population than its English counterpart is the Mental Health Review Tribunal. This is the one tribunal where legal aid funding for advice and representation remains available in principle for all applicants.

**Policy and Oversight: Drawing the DNA Strands Together**

While it is possible to construct a Welsh model of administrative justice, this is based on interpretation of the evidence as there is no administrative justice and tribunals policy for Wales. Previous research has recommended developing an administrative justice policy specifically drawing explicit connections between administrative justice, and issues of human rights, equality, good administration, nascent rights-based Welsh administrative procedure law and social justice more broadly. This policy could also contain a presumption, as recommended by the Commission on Justice, that when legislating to create new public law duties applicable to devolved Welsh authorities, any new legal redress measures created should be by recourse to Welsh tribunals. This would also stem the creation of ad hoc redress schemes, where a consistent and principled approach is lacking and there are no overarching standards for operation. Such schemes do not always give citizens a fair and independent system of redress and they have tended to be considered as administrative processes rather than mechanisms for serving justice.

While the underpinning conceptions of administrative justice in Australia and Wales have their differences, it is telling that both the Australian Administrative Review Council and the CAJTW have been disbanded and that neither Australia nor Wales currently has a specific body charged with oversight of its administrative justice system as a whole. The authors recommend greater political engagement with, and ownership of, administrative justice in Wales and the establishment of an

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129 Nason, n 31, 3.

130 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 27.

131 The Discretionary Assistance Fund provides some means-tested benefits. A private company administers the Fund on behalf of the Welsh Government, initial redress is to the company itself, with a possible further appeal to a charity, and the FSOW has jurisdiction over maladministration and service complaints.

132 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [72].

133 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [72].

134 There is an Administrative Justice Council, but this has no practical statutory oversight function and aims to cover the whole of the United Kingdom: see <https://ajc-justice.co.uk>.
oversight function either within an existing Assembly Committee (for starters the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee) or in a new committee established for the next Assembly (from 2021) (such as a Justice Committee). Oversight must be by way of a statutory political committee to ensure the bipartisan political support essential to progressing administrative justice reforms, especially those involving adequate funding for the establishment and continued operation of new, or reformed, tribunal structures.

The Commission on Justice has now recommended that the Assembly should take a more proactive role in appropriate scrutiny of the operation of the justice system, and that further legislative devolution should be accompanied by the creation of a Justice Department within the Welsh Government and a Justice Committee within the Assembly. In the more immediate term, the Commission recommends that:

All public bodies, ombudsmen and other tribunals which have been established under Welsh law or by the Welsh Government, which make judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, and are not currently subject to the supervision of the President of Welsh Tribunals, should be brought under the supervision of the President.

More detailed thought will likely need to be given about the precise nature of this supervisory role, particularly for bodies that are already accountable to the Assembly or Welsh Government, and those that are independent such as the PSOW.

Returning to whether the Welsh tribunals are the nucleus containing the DNA of a fully devolved justice system, this conclusion seems quite a stretch. Wales is already a long way from having a single comprehensive system of tribunals reflecting the full extent of devolution. A more comprehensive system could be arranged around broad areas, including planning and environment, land and tax, education, public administration (including local government), housing, health and social welfare, and Welsh language rights.

Having some (administrative) justice functions has likely led to more Welsh Government insight and awareness into the operation of a justice system, including matters of constitutional principle as well as more pragmatic resource implications. The requirements to make provision for more impartial relationships between policy departments and tribunals, and the WTU and the Welsh Government itself, are significant for an administration where justice is mostly not a devolved responsibility. The Welsh Government and the Assembly have often had to undertake these reforms within the constitutional confines of various unsatisfactory devolution settlements that continue to struggle with positioning the administration of justice. It is then less surprising that workable mechanisms have had to be fashioned through administrative arrangements, and by deploying administrative justice in its broadest sense to include a range of integrity branch institutions.

A new buzzword in UK administrative justice, recently coined by Sir Ernest Ryder, Senior President of Tribunals, is “interoperability”. This has a range of dimensions, one of which is cross-deployment of tribunal judges across at least three of the four UK nations. Cross-deployment between tribunals both within and across territorial and subject matter boundaries is built into the Wales Act. For example, with Welsh tribunal judges deployed to English Property Tribunals. The Tribunals (Scotland) Act contains similar foundations that could see the territorial cross-deployment of Scottish tribunal judges. Another dimension of “interoperability” is in co-operation and shared services between devolved and reserved tribunals, with the opening of a new joint tribunal centre in Glasgow being seen as a positive example. In these dimensions interoperability advances Leggatt’s earlier reflections on the need for improved cross-border co-operation. This encapsulates an evolving relationship between administrative justice

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135 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 62.
136 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 68.
137 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 70.
138 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 25.
139 Judicial Office for Scotland, n 46, 5.
140 Leggatt, n 34, [11.3]–[11.4].

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systems where there is a more fluid relationship across UK jurisdictions. This development should be followed closely, particularly in terms of how efficiency and effectiveness for users can be improved through shared services, and consistency of judicial and administrative standards. Interoperability will have to respect the asymmetrical constitutional context and allow room for the autonomy of each government. For example, there are already some concerns the cross-deployment is being used to deploy “English” judges into Welsh tribunal cases, seemingly contrary to the initial impetus for the practice as designed to increase opportunities for Welsh judges to sit, making a career in the Welsh tribunal judiciary a more feasible and attractive prospect.

A further dimension of interoperability is the relationship between bodies in the administrative justice system, with the Senior President of Tribunals specifically encouraging joint working between Ombuds and tribunals, including developing joint training and liaison. Such engagement should be sought as a means to share skills, learning and good practice across administrative justice systems, and could be more swiftly and effectively progressed in Wales given its comparatively smaller size.

Whether or not the Welsh tribunals contain the DNA for a broader justice system, the context of their development helps demonstrate that traditional court and court-equivalent structures, and largely paper-based and adversarial models, are not optimum means for delivering administrative justice in the 21st century. A more successful approach is likely to involve flexible interactions (interoperability) between a range of institutions, both within and across jurisdictional boundaries, whether these be territorial boundaries or boundaries of traditionally perceived procedures and expertise.