ABSTRACT
The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan’s decision to ‘stand aside’ during UN ‘Operation Grandslam’, especially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive effects on Anglo-American relations. This article recasts this decision as a shrewd manoeuvre in extremely tight circumstances, balancing multiple interests and preventing an open breach with Kennedy’s Congo policy. Moreover, ‘stand aside’ facilitated subsequent Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo, which this article demonstrates by examining events beyond December 1962, where much of the current analysis peters out.

Scholarship on Anglo-American relations during the Kennedy-Macmillan era paints a generally positive picture. The personal relationship between President and Prime Minister was unexpectedly warm and ably assisted by key officials, notably British Ambassador to Washington David Ormsby-Gore. Both sides were determined to continue the rebuilding process begun by Eisenhower and Macmillan following the disastrous Suez crisis and their cooperation was marked by important initiatives, including the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. The traditional irritant of the British Empire was seemingly eased by Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech and commitment to rapid but responsible decolonisation. And renewed Anglo-American intimacy was evident in the privileged position accorded to Britain during the Cuban missile crisis and by Kennedy’s decision, following an emotional appeal by Macmillan in the wake of the cancellation of Skybolt, to override opposition from within his administration and provide Britain with Polaris.

Yet, in more recent years a revisionist tone has emerged suggesting limits to the extent that Kennedy and Macmillan’s personal diplomacy could deliver positive outcomes, reconcile underlying Anglo-American differences and mask consequences flowing from the growing asymmetry of the special relationship. Revealing of internal American reconsideration of British relative capabilities and importance was the Multilateral Force Concept (MLF). Designed to help resolve tension with NATO over nuclear control, the MLF potentially positioned Britain as a primarily European power and questioned the continuation of its independent nuclear deterrent. There were sharp differences too over handling of the Cold War. Bitter American disappointment
at British trade with Cuba was reciprocated in Macmillan’s sense of betrayal at American sales of Hawk missiles to Israel and resentment that US pressure within NATO led to the organisation’s adoption of the American Sergeant surface-to-surface missile rather than the British-designed Blue Water system. At their first hastily arranged meeting in March 1961, Macmillan fought a rearguard action against Kennedy’s pressure for a British military commitment should the US intervene in Laos. And when civil war broke out in the Yemen in 1962, the British refused to support American plans to extend diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary republican regime, which was known to be backed by Egyptian President Nasser. More generally, it has been argued that Macmillan was disillusioned both with American unwillingness to ‘parley at the summit’ with the Soviets, especially in the aftermath of the disastrous Four Power meeting in Paris in May 1960, and with US interpretation of the concept of Anglo-American interdependence.  

The focus of this article, the Congo crisis, has traditionally been interpreted in the sense of a crisis in Anglo-American relations. Scholars viewing the Macmillan–Kennedy years positively tend either to gloss over the crisis or treat it as a friction without significant lasting effect. For others, the crisis was symptomatic of diverging Anglo-American interests and of a wider malaise afflicting the relationship as both sides adjusted to Britain’s ever-more evident relative decline and its movement towards the European Economic Community. Some authors have gone as far as to suggest that the Congo was for Britain ‘little short of a diplomatic disaster’ and that the rift with America had corrosive long-term effects on the wider special relationship.

This article acknowledges that the 1960s were a period of adjustment in the special relationship but uses newly declassified materials to challenge conventional wisdom regarding British policy towards the Congo and its significance for Anglo-American relations. First, it argues that the British decision to stand aside during Operation Grandslam should be seen not as a policy failure but as a reasonably successful effort to establish a middle ground when confronted by both substantial policy constraints and a possible open disagreement with Kennedy’s Congo policy. Second, by looking beyond December 1962, where most studies finish, the article demonstrates continuing close Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo, which in turn suggests that the long-term effects of the crisis on the special relationship were less harmful than sometimes suggested.

### An Anglo-American consensus

The speed with which the Belgian government pulled out of the Congo, coupled with a long history of ‘paternalistic’ governance, left the Congolese politically and socially unprepared for the challenges of developing a modern independent nation-state. The region had been awarded to King Leopold II of Belgium as ‘Congo Free State’ at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference. The Belgian government subsequently acquired it in 1908 for approximately 220 million Belgian francs and renamed it Belgium Congo. Thereafter it was administered by a ‘colonial trinity’ comprising the colonial administration, foreign business and the Roman Catholic Church. The latter provided one of few unifying institutions in the country and brought some education to its citizens. Nevertheless, although the Congo had the best literacy rate in the sub-Saharan Africa it was not until
the second quarter of the twentieth century that Catholic missions began to offer secondary education and by 1960 there were just two Universities in the Congo: the University of Lovanium in Leopoldville and the University of Elisabethville. Thus, when independence was granted, few native political elite and military officers existed in the Congo and there was no experience of self-governance or democracy.

Prior to independence, the first elections exacerbated pre-existing rifts between the Congo’s over 200 tribal groups. The agreed Federal model of government, with a legislature composed of a Chamber of Representatives and a Senate, forced the already small and inexperienced political elite to divide itself among several different echelons of government and augured ill for independent government. Furthermore, the way in which the central government was created served to initiate long-term tension within the political elite. Although the King of Belgium was accorded power to select a formateur, who would then appoint a cabinet under legislative approval, he relinquished this responsibility to the Belgian minister without portfolio in charge of African affairs, Hans Ganshof van der Meersch. Van der Meersch subsequently selected Joseph Kasavubu, founder of the Alliance des Bakongo (Aboko) party, as formateur, despite the leader of the Mouvement National Congolaise (MNC) party, Patrice Lumumba, being democratically elected as the Congo’s leader. Once Kasavubu proved unable to form a Cabinet, however, Lumumba appointed himself as Prime Minister and Kasavubu as the President. Relations between the two leaders were unsurprisingly ‘strained’ and ‘hostile’ even during the independence celebrations on 30 June 1960.

For some, the manner of Belgium’s withdrawal suggests a neo-colonial policy designed to preserve Belgian government and commercial interests following the Congo’s formal award of independence. It is unlikely, however, that these actors foresaw the speed and severity of the crisis that swiftly ensued. Continuity of colonial issues after independence, captured in the infamous comment scribbled on a blackboard by army chief General Émile Janssens, that ‘before independence = after independence’, provoked indignation within the Congolese population and resentment amongst Congolese soldiers towards their Belgian officers. On 5 July, Congolese soldiers at the Thysville barracks, just 90 miles from the capital, mutinied and in a show of support, workers began to strike, threatening civil and military disorder throughout the country. Rivalries between different ethnic groups in the cities of Leopoldville and Luluabourg compounded difficulties in maintaining order and on 9 July, the Belgian military intervened. However, it did so without acquiring full support from either Lumumba or Kasavubu, prompting the Congolese leadership to request that the United Nations (UN) secure the removal of Belgian troops and help restore order and stability to the country.

On 12 July, the crisis deepened when the country’s most prosperous province, Katanga, declared secession under the leadership of Moïse Tshombé. Although Tshombé opposed Lumumba’s leadership and used this as the excuse to initiate Katanga’s secession, the move was driven also by indigenous Katangese elites and by Belgian neo-colonial interests. Katanga was a mineral rich region and dominated economically by a Belgian mining company called Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), which supplied 80 per cent of Katanga’s revenues. Belgian colonists, most of who were tied to the UMHK, were wary of the consequences that the Congo’s independence might bring. As the Congo was a shareholder with voting powers
within the UMHK, European companies in the Congo had to operate without the full rights that were usually accorded to boards of management.\textsuperscript{23} This arrangement had worked well during Belgium’s colonial rule but Lumumba’s left-wing nationalist leadership posed a significant threat to their continued prosperity.\textsuperscript{24} Although the Belgium government officially rejected Tshombé’s request for financial, technical and military support,\textsuperscript{25} the UMHK helped to underwrite Katanga’s bid for independence. The company not only provided Tshombé with financial support but also organised the breakaway state, institutionally representing it in Brussels and recruiting a Belgian scholar to draft Katanga’s new constitution.\textsuperscript{26} From the perspective of the Central Congolese Government—and many other African states—Katanga’s secession marked an effort by Western commercial interests to retain their neo-colonial position and thereby both impede the Congo’s full independence and deny the state a major source of revenue.

Initial British and American policy positions in the Congo were broadly aligned. Both countries, in what had been designated the ‘Year of Africa’, feared the consequences that might flow from either the Congo’s disintegration or its falling under unsympathetic African nationalist leadership. The Congo’s size, mineral riches and central African location would surely attract unwanted Soviet attention, and potential for communist or non-aligned countries to cause problems within the UN was ever greater as decolonisation denied the US and UK automatic majorities in the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{27} Also, Congolese nationalism threatened not only Belgian interests but also the pro-western influence of the Catholic Church on account of its close association with the Belgian state.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, there were early indications of Congolese willingness to seek Soviet support in order to remove Belgian forces from the region.\textsuperscript{29} On 13 July, after Belgian troops occupied the Leopoldville airport, Lumumba and Kasavubu appealed to Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, to monitor the situation closely lest Soviet intervention was necessary to stop western aggression against the Congo.\textsuperscript{30} These considerations together produced Anglo-American agreement on two key objectives. First, they needed to establish in the Congo a stable, united and independent government that was reasonably friendly with the West. Second, they wanted to prevent the Congo from becoming an ‘arena of Cold War competition.’\textsuperscript{31} The UN was therefore seen as the best means to ensure these objectives and the \textit{Operations des Nations Unies au Congo} (ONUC) was duly established on 14 July 1960.\textsuperscript{32}

Broad Anglo-American alignment did not mean an absence of influential policy nuances. Perhaps the most important of these flowed from Britain’s status as a colonial power with considerable African responsibilities being in juxtaposition with traditional US anti-colonialism and a newfound American interest in harnessing African independence leaderships. These differences were immediately highlighted in negotiation of the first UN mandate in the Congo. This mandate called on Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorised the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to take the necessary steps in consultation with the Congolese government to provide it with UN military and technical assistance until ‘the national security forces may be able …to meet fully their tasks.’\textsuperscript{33} The Eisenhower administration’s default position was to avoid American identification with European metropolitan policies during the process of African decolonisation.\textsuperscript{34} This meant that the administration favoured reliance on the UN to achieve political stability in the Congo and that it consequently voted in favour of the
first mandate. Prime Minister Macmillan’s position was much more difficult. His Cabinet was disposed to see the Congo crisis as a private matter of Belgian decolonisation. There were concerns too, for British economic interests in the Congo and about the implications of any UN action for British responsibilities elsewhere. In Britain’s view, therefore, the UN mandate was too critical of Belgium and threatened to set unwanted precedents for British African colonies that were also preparing for independence. Although Macmillan publicly supported the ONUC operation, in the UN Britain abstained from voting for the mandate, alongside China and France.

Nevertheless, at this point, Britain’s abstention at the UN was a portent of differences to come rather than an upset to Anglo-American relations. In fact, Lumumba unwittingly served to draw UK and US positions closer together than hitherto. On 17 July, he and Kasavubu delivered an ultimatum to the UN Undersecretary General for Special Political Affairs, Ralph Bunche, stating that if the UN did not discharge the Belgian military mission within 72 hours they would be ‘obliged to call upon the Soviet Union to intervene’. The ultimatum was dropped with the passing of the first UN mandate, but the damage had been done. The American Embassy in Leopoldville concluded that Kasavubu was ‘under [Lumumba’s] thumb’ and was not himself a threat to US interests. Lumumba, though, was perceived differently. US Chief of Station in the Congo, Larry Devlin, recalls that although there was no reason to believe Lumumba was a Soviet agent or even a communist, he was still ‘too close to the Soviet Union and its allies for comfort’. On 21 July, the US National Security Council (NSC) went further, characterising Lumumba as a ‘Castro or worse’. Fear of another revolutionary leader, this time in the Congo, now inclined the Eisenhower administration to hedge its bets rather than to simply ride traditional US anti-colonialism.

The ideal solution remained a united Congo under pro-western leadership, which was still the publicly maintained line, but privately this was not considered possible under Lumumba. Lumumba, therefore, became the focal point of Eisenhower’s Congolese policy based on the premise that ‘there was no Katanga problem between Tshombé and Kasavubu…only with Lumumba’. Meantime, it was essential that Katanga remain a viable independent unit within the western orbit. This did not necessarily equate, as has been suggested, to the Eisenhower administration still having ‘an eye on following its European allies’. US records make clear the administration’s determination to prevent a militant Katanga leadership as well as to combat Lumumba, the underlying rationale being twofold. First, Katanga might provide a solution to the Congo crisis. Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Maurice Stans and Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon speculated in August 1960 whether Tshombé’s efforts to pick up other areas of the Congo might be quietly supported as a step towards reorganising the country in a loose confederation. Moreover, to do so at this stage was less politically dangerous to the US given that Belgian troop withdrawals were diminishing the impression of Tshombé as a puppet of colonial interests. Second, Katanga might provide a bulwark in the event that an independent Congo disintegrated or fell under Soviet influence. As Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Allen Dulles, advised the NSC in August 1960, if the assets of Katanga could be retained, then the economy of the Congo could be throttled and the Soviets left with a very expensive and difficult task in maintaining the rest of the Congo as a viable asset.
Evolving Anglo-American discord

President John F Kennedy assumed office in January 1961 with the Congo crisis threatening both America’s political reputation and the credibility of the UN in Africa. His predecessor’s policy had disappointed Afro-Asian nationalists, resulting both in accusations that the US was supporting Western colonial interests and in threats by countries including Guinea, UAR, Morocco and Indonesia to withdraw their military contributions from the UN mission. This was not an inconsequential risk for the US given that 82.4% of ONUC military forces came from Afro-Asian states and that collectively the most important contributing states—India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia and Ghana—provided 61.2% of total ONUC forces. In addition, the constitutional crisis that had developed in the Congo following a failed attempt in September 1960 by Kasavubu to remove Lumumba, continued. Of particular concern was Antoine Gizenga, President of the Parti Solidaire Africain, a left-wing political party that enjoyed strong support among the rural regions in Kwango and Kwilu and which had formed part of the inaugural post-independence coalition. On 15 December 1960, US intelligence reported that Gizenga had proclaimed himself to represent the lawful government of the Congo and that this statement was probably designed to encourage diplomatic recognition and material aid from the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian bloc. On 7 January, pro-Lumumba Afro-Asian states gathered at the Casablanca conference and duly called for the transfer of Casablanca troops from the ONUC to Gizenga. Gizenga also sent requests to Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, leader of the German Democratic Republic, for military aid with which he initiated attacks on Northern Katanga, forcing Tshombé to rely increasingly on open Belgian assistance to maintain the secession. Thus, when in January 1961 Lumumba was assassinated by Belgian and Congolese military police, his death did not offer the automatic solution to the Katangese secession for which Eisenhower had hoped.

In response, the Kennedy administration evolved a ‘New’ policy centred upon three objectives. The first called for a strengthened UN mandate which would give the authority to bring under control all principal military elements in the Congo and thereby neutralise the role of Congolese forces in the politics of the country. Under the new mandate, the UN would be expected to increase its efforts to prevent all outside military assistance from entering the Congo. Second, with the Afro-Asians at the forefront, the UN should have a greater administrative role in the Congo. The overarching goal was to reorient the US position such that it would have the support of ‘principal segments of opinion in Africa and Asia.’ Third, there needed to be a broadly based Congolese government, which meant pressing Kasavubu to increase his efforts in establishing a middle of the road cabinet government and strengthened US efforts to sponsor the appointment of a suitable Prime Minister. Following a flirtation with Joseph Iléo, a senator who had been strongly opposed to Lumumba but who proved to be a weak leader, this meant supporting Cyrille Adoula, who was aligned with a pro-Western Binza group and whom US Chief of Station in the Congo, Larry Devlin, recalls as having assisted US attempts in early September 1960 to remove Lumumba via a no-confidence vote.

Kennedy’s gradual adherence to Afro-Asian hard-lined policies and progressively militarised UN actions after Lumumba’s assassination began to drive a wedge into US-
UK relations in the Congo. Lumumba’s assassination had angered the Afro-Asian states and, led by Egyptian President Nasser, they proposed a resolution to the UN Security Council whereby the ONUC ought to have the right to use force ‘if necessary, in last resort’ to prevent civil war. The passage of this resolution allowed Hammarskjöld to approve two ONUC operations in Katanga. The first was Operation Rumpunch, initiated on 28 August to expel Belgian officers and mercenaries from Katanga. When that failed the second mission was Operation Morthor. Launched on 13 September without consultation with Washington or other Western powers, this too proved to be problematic. Rhodesian political support for Tshombé meant that the Katangese forces were provided with military equipment sufficient to surround the UN troops in Jadotville and bring the UN campaign precariously close to defeat. Moreover, Hammarskjöld was killed on 17 September when his plane crashed en route to ceasefire negotiations with Tshombé in Ndola.

Macmillan’s government was deeply concerned about increased ONUC military capability, faced substantial domestic and international pressure to prevent the use of UN military force in Katanga, and was so angered by the ONUC’s impetuous actions that it considered terminating support for the UN if fighting were not immediately suspended. Evolving US-UK policy differences were evident at the December 1961 Bermuda Summit. Foreign Secretary, Lord Home reiterated the British opinion that the UN had exceeded its mandate and had ‘gotten itself in a bad way in [the] Congo.’ He also expressed concern at the possible prolongation of UN military involvement and urged the US towards favouring the use of diplomatic negotiations. The Kennedy administration publicly reiterated American support for a peaceful solution to the Katanga secession but privately officials favoured a swift solution and were increasingly frustrated with perceived British apathy in exerting ‘real pressure on Tshombé. Moreover, American concern deepened as a result of two developments. First, Adoula, whose appointment as Prime Minister in August 1961 Secretary of State Dean Rusk had called a defeat for the Soviets, was losing support. Second, Tshombé continued to equivocate. On 21 December 1961, he and Adoula signed the Kitona Accords, which recognised the political unity of the Congo. Subsequently, however, Tshombé reneged upon his commitment, accusing the US Ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, of imposing the agreement upon him.

With the Americans increasingly convinced that diplomatic negotiations alone would not be enough to resolve the crisis, Under Secretary of State George Ball epitomised how Anglo-American thinking began consequently to diverge. In his view, Tshombé would continue to refuse agreements unless he was ‘deprived of his means to maintain [his] independent operation’. Ball also believed that the new UN acting Secretary General, U Thant, should recognise that the Congo was now at a stage where the ‘upgrading of effort’ was both ‘necessary and desirable. On 24 July 1962, Ball’s thinking was transposed by the African Bureau of the State Department into a National Reconciliation Plan. This plan had four incremental phases intended to guarantee its timely implementation. If progress were not made in the drafting and approval of the Congolese constitution (phase one) or in Katanga’s acceptance of it (phase two) then economic sanctions (phase three) would be invoked against Katanga. Finally, if economic sanctions did not work, there would be a threat of military coercion (phase four) to ensure the plan’s implementation. Stages one and two of the plan were given
White House general approval on 6 August and, after discussions with U Thant and the French, British and Belgian Embassies in Washington, the Plan was revised on 11 August, the final version becoming the UN reconciliation plan. The most significant change was the deletion of specific measures in phase four with an understanding that if that stage were reached the participating governments would consult with each other and the UN when necessary. This was to prove problematic later in that this inbuilt ambiguity allowed U Thant to progress military measures against Katanga faster than the Kennedy administration wished. Meantime, though, Adoula and Tshombé accepted the plan under heavy American pressure.

It was the incremental progression of the reconciliation plan that finally pushed the Macmillan government and Kennedy administration into opposing camps. By September 1962, Tshombé and Adoula had not reached any substantial agreement concerning reconciliation and the Katangese secession remained. On 25 September, in an attempt to ensure continued UK cooperation with the plan the US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee, asked the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, to uphold the third phase of the reconciliation plan, namely to apply economic sanctions upon Tshombé alongside Belgium and the US. They argued that the Congo had reached the pinnacle of crisis and that failure of the reconciliation plan would lead to both a bankruptcy of the ONUC and civil war in the Congo. Home demurred, reiterating British objections to sanctions on the grounds that their failure was likely to be followed by the use of military force.

These differences were subsequently replayed at the highest diplomatic level at the Nassau summit in December 1962. Kennedy outlined American concerns that the ONUC would collapse; the UN was running out of money and India, the largest military contributor to the ONUC, would be withdrawing its forces in March 1963. The best course of action was thus to prove to Tshombé that the UN stood behind the reconciliation plan, even if that risked military action. Kennedy’s presentation succeeded only in raising British hackles. At one stage, Lord Home lost his temper and asked if the ‘United States Government would tell Adoula to dismiss the Congolese Parliament and rule by decree. Was the United States going to tell the world this?.. "Best idea I have heard in years."’ Macmillan also suggested sarcastically that ‘the US should take over the Congo and make Tshombé into some kind of a Maharajah, with US support.’ Although the two delegations returned to consider the Congo crisis in an improved atmosphere on 21 December, no further progress was made. Britain subsequently stood aside as the ONUC military operation ‘Grandslam’ began on 28 December 1962 and eventually forced Tshombé to announce formally the end of the Katangese secession on 14 January 1963.

Stand aside re-evaluated

There was no meeting of Anglo-American minds at Nassau about the Congo crisis but this was not wholly unexpected and the US ultimately got what it wanted. As the State Department noted before the summit, all they really needed from the UK was their ‘grudging acquiescence accompanied by silence.’ For the British, though, the decision to stand aside and the subsequent forcible reintegration of Katanga into the Congo by ONUC forces have encouraged scholars such as Ashton, James and
O’Malley to conclude that the Congo crisis represented a ‘decisive defeat for the British government’ and an evident failure to coordinate British and American policies. Yet while differences between Macmillan and Kennedy’s Congo policies undoubtedly strained Anglo-American relations, it is an overstatement to see stand aside as a policy failure. It should be viewed instead as a reasonably successful attempt at damage limitation when confronted by substantial policy constraints and disagreement with Kennedy’s Congo policy.

The Macmillan government’s policy was geared throughout the crisis to securing Katanga’s reintegration without unduly weakening Tshombé’s government. The reasoning behind this was made clear during a September 1961 Cabinet meeting. If Tshombé were defeated, it would encourage the collapse of Katanga’s administration and, with Gizenga retaining a seat of legitimate power in the central government, risk surrendering the central government to Soviet influence. Thus, Macmillan believed that the best policy objective was to convince Tshombé to cooperate with the central government, and to achieve this, the UN had to ‘devote themselves to mediation rather than to the exercise of force’.

However, while British concern about possible Soviet gains in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa was genuine, their strongest representations thereof were tactical, being aimed at presumed American over-sensitivity to the communist threat. Behind British anti-communism lay three interconnected considerations that determined policy and which became increasingly pressing as events unfolded in the Congo. The first constraint was economic. Some 45% of British investment in the Congo was concentrated in the mineral rich region of Katanga and the single most important concern was Tanganyika Concessions—a London-based holding company that had a 14.5% percent shareholding in the UMHK. According to Captain Charles Waterhouse, Chairman of the Tanganyika Concessions and a member of the UMHK’s board of directors, Britain’s financial interest in the area was ‘of the order of £180 million’. Through letters and meetings with Foreign Office officials Waterhouse repeatedly emphasised the importance of ensuring the UMHK’s continued stability and that forced entry into Katanga by ONUC forces could jeopardise the investments of many British stakeholders.

The second consideration was geopolitical and stemmed from Britain’s role as a colonial power and the Congo’s geographical position. Immediately to the east of the Congo were Uganda and Tanganyika, and beyond them, Kenya. To the Congo’s southeastern border lay the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the outset of the crisis, Britain bore responsibility for all of these territories, which meant that political instability within Katanga threatened to complicate British governance in neighbouring states. Meantime, South Africa favoured Katanga with cautious diplomatic, economic and limited military support in order to bolster white minority power, prevent anti-colonial counter-violence and guard against the Congo becoming a UN precedent for intervention in South West Africa. Northern Rhodesia, though, was of particular concern to the British given their ongoing attempts to maintain the Central African Federation (CAF), which linked the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the white-settler-dominated colony of Southern Rhodesia. As Northern Rhodesia and Katanga shared ‘the copper belt’ border, the security of the UMHK and Tshombé’s continued leadership were of great importance to the white-settler leadership of the CAF. The Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, sent regular letters to Macmillan and Lord Home
specifically arguing this point. In one such letter he informed Home that Tshombé was ‘an implacable enemy of communism’ and could be a ‘very good friend to the West if only they showed him the slightest support and encouragement.’ Furthermore, there was a danger that UN military intervention might force Welensky and Tshombé into a military alliance, thereby creating a powerful autonomous copper belt region and serious complications for Britain’s African responsibilities.

The final consideration was the political influence of pro-Katanga forces within domestic British politics, with which Welensky maintained good relations. Prominent members of the British Katanga Lobby included former MP Captain Charles Waterhouse; Lords Alexander, Selbourne and Clitheroe—three Conservative Privy Councillors and each a member of the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd Board; and the Lord of Salisbury, founder of the Conservative Monday Club—a group established in 1961 partly in reaction to Conservative Party decolonisation policy and from which the Katanga Lobby also drew support. Influential members of this club included Major Patrick Wall, John Biggs-Davidson, Paul Williams, Neil McLean and Anthony Fell—the latter founding the Anglo-Katanga Association in July 1960. Furthermore, there were close personal relations between some members of the Katanga Lobby and members of the government. Murphy, for instance, has placed particular emphasis on the importance of Waterhouse’s relationship with Foreign Secretary Home in drawing sympathy for Katanga and in presenting its stability as being a bulwark against communism.

These policy constraints cumulatively placed the Macmillan government in an awkward position. Though it appeared to have the ability to apply significant pressure on Tshombé via the use of economic and political contacts in Northern Rhodesia and in the UMHK, in reality the government was exceedingly limited in supporting policies that went beyond securing a peaceful reintegration of Katanga. Anything more risked the wrath of Conservative backbenchers and possibly the fall of the government. The seriousness of Macmillan’s problems was demonstrated in late 1961. During Operation Mortor the ONUC was materially disadvantaged by its inability to call upon aircraft capable of responding to air attacks from Katanga. Six British-built Canberra bombers were consequently acquired from India. Then, in the latter part of October, Macmillan’s government received a UN request to supply 24,000 pound bombs to fit the planes.

The British government was immediately trapped between the UN and likely strong resistance to the request from the Conservative backbenchers in Parliament and from within the Cabinet itself. To supply the bombs opened Macmillan’s government up to attack from the Katanga Lobby but to withhold the bombs would incite allegations of succumbing to British business interests and incur political blowback in the UN. On 7 December, Foreign Office officials agreed to supply the bombs under the condition that they were only to be used in ‘self defensive action confined to attacking private aircraft on the ground or destroying runways.’ However, this careful compromise was ruined by UN statements and actions. Sture Linner, the UN Officer in charge of the Congo, proclaimed in an interview with a Swedish newspaper his intent to smash Tshombé and his military forces. Rumours of ONUC attacks on mines, hospitals and private houses became reality when Ethiopian ONUC soldiers killed three Red Cross workers. With an impending foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 14 December, Macmillan feared that opposition on the Canberra bombs issue would be enough to topple his government through a vote of no confidence. The only
option was to persuade President Kennedy to arrange an immediate ceasefire in the area. Fortunately the British Ambassador to the US, David Ormsby-Gore, was successful in this appeal. In the Ambassador’s presence, Kennedy telephoned George Ball and instructed him accordingly: ‘I have got David Gore sitting beside me here, he will explain what it is the British Government wants done, and I want it done.’ The ceasefire was announced by U Thant the following day.

Kennedy’s action, however, afforded Macmillan only temporary relief. A similar scenario presented itself once U Thant made the decision on 7 December 1962 to proceed to the next phase of the UN reconciliation plan. With the Canberra bombs issue as an ominous backdrop, Macmillan baulked at the American request at the Nassau summit to place economic sanctions on Tshombé. The power of the Katanga Lobby and backbench opposition threatened the stability of his government. Concomitantly, though, to oppose the ONUC mission was also unacceptable. It would provide Tshombé with additional political leverage before the UN Operation began and make public Anglo-American disagreement, both of which risked damage to the special relationship.

The British government was reduced to two options. The first of these was to do nothing. When asked by Secretary of State Dean Rusk what the British proposed to do in regards to the UN request to impose economic sanctions, Home ‘wondered whether we should not have to live with the present situation for some time.’ This did not imply recognition of Katanga as a sovereign state but did entail leaving the province alone. Home proposed that the ONUC troops could leave, enabling the UN to convert its operation into a civilian mission ‘for salving the rest of the Congo.’ In reality, of course, this was a non-option as the Kennedy administration had grown tired of what Ormsby-Gore termed the ‘ostrich position’ in reference to the ‘usual’ British pragmatism, a ‘resolution to let sleeping dogs lie, not to engage in hypothetical or advance planning, to procrastinate.’ With Kennedy under increasing domestic and international pressure to end the secession, the ‘only possible’ course of action for Macmillan’s government was to offer to ‘stand aside.’

It is thus easy to see why analyses of Britain’s immediate position following Operation Grandslam have led scholars to claim British policy failure. The manner in which the ONUC eventually brought about the end of Katanga’s secession—by the use of military force with only limited damage to the UMHK in the aftermath—made British policy concerns appear rather unfounded. Also, Macmillan’s decision to refuse to support economic sanctions on Tshombé meant that members of Adoula’s government perceived Britain to have largely prioritised Tshombé’s security over achieving Katanga’s successful reintegration into the Congo.

However, stand aside was actually a shrewd move in tight circumstances that helped ease Anglo-American tension and provided for future cooperation in the Congo. In September 1962, having realised it was unlikely that Macmillan’s government would be able to support the UN reconciliation plan, the State Department made a direct request that the British silence their public opposition to the matter. Critical public statements emanating from Britain strengthened Tshombé’s political campaign and placed increasing pressures on a Kennedy administration that was already contending with substantial domestic opposition to its hard-lined policies. Although Home initially refused the request for British silence, by December he had softened his position and promised that the UK ‘could keep quiet.’ The extent of this undertaking should not be
underestimated; Macmillan’s government was under renewed pressure from within the Conservative Party to prevent Operation Grandslam entirely. On 12 December, the pro-Katanga Sir Tufton Beamish passed a motion in the House of Commons urging his government to block the use of ONUC military force or economic coercion in ‘any part of the Congo.’ The Parliamentary Office feared that the strength of support for the motion amongst Conservative backbenchers would mean it would have to be debated. However, Macmillan’s decision to stand aside circumvented this and helped maintain the British silence that had become important to the Americans. Parliamentary members were informed that the Government could not find time to debate the matter before the Recess and by the time Parliament returned the decisive moves against Katanga’s secession had already taken place.

During Operation Morthor, the Foreign Office had contemplated withdrawing from the Congo crisis entirely and in December 1962 this idea was contemplated again. Patrick Dean, British Representative to the UN admitted to Macmillan that he was becoming increasingly attracted to the idea of removing Britain from the crisis ‘so far as we possibly can’. The rationale was clear. Were the British to become involved in negotiations and then have to either make reservations or to hold back, they would be blamed in the event that the UN reconciliation plan failed. Yet such suggestions of voluntary withdrawal of British officials from the Congo were largely expressions of frustration and wishful thinking. British colonial responsibilities in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya needed tending, too, and although British officials could not play as active a role as before the Operation Grandslam, Macmillan’s decision to stand aside ultimately enabled the Foreign Office to continue gathering information from within the Congo and to provide important assistance and advice from the sidelines. This, in turn, preserved residual British influence and offered opportunities for continued Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo.

Continuing Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo

Common wisdom maintains that with heated exchanges at the Nassau summit and British stand aside at the UN over Operation Grandslam, Anglo-American relations in the Congo reached a nadir. This would suggest reciprocal resentment and a breakdown in Anglo-American coordination and cooperation. Yet detailed analysis of events beyond 1962 does not support such dire conclusions.

For a start, it is evident that the US continued to value British residual influence in the Congo. A good example of this is how the US worked to ensure that the British were able to maintain diplomatic representation within Katanga. Prime Minister Adoula and other leading Congolese parliamentarians were frustrated by British dealings with Tshombé and resented what they perceived to be Britain’s interference in the Congo’s internal affairs. These sentiments were sufficiently strong that the American Embassy in Leopoldville feared a breach of Anglo-Congolese relations at the beginning of January 1963. The American ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, interjected on behalf of the British in an attempt to head off this possibility. In a conversation with Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboke on 2 January, the Ambassador set out Britain’s continued importance in Katanga. First, the UK’s wider responsibilities in Africa meant it would be important in helping the Congolese government negotiate with countries...
such as Rhodesia. Second, the Congolese had ‘good friends’ among the British people, press and parliament. To break relations with Britain would alienate these important sources of support for the new country, including within the Labour Party that might at some point come into power. Gullion also emphasised the risks to the Congolese government’s relations with the wider western world of breaking diplomatic relations with the British, especially were this done whilst maintaining relations with the USSR and an impression thereby be created that the Congo was moving towards the Soviet orbit. In particular, this eventuality would play badly in influential US political circles and likely have negative consequences for future US–Congolese relations. 117

The Congolese leadership listened but its frustration with Britain was such that at this point it was convinced neither by the US Ambassador nor by British attempts to ameliorate Anglo-Congolese relations—including an offer of two million pounds in economic aid. 118 Caught between American pressure and a majority in the Congolese Cabinet favouring a break of diplomatic relations with Britain, Foreign Minister Bomboko elected to expel at 24 hours’ notice Derek Dodson of the British Consulate—the individual most associated with Tshombé’s return—rather than the entire British Consulate in Elisabethville. Dodson was to leave on 10 January, the same day that news of Tshombé’s return to Elisabethville reached Adoula’s government. 119 The Americans now faced a telling choice. They could accept this decision and potentially thereby consolidate relations with Adoula or they could risk their political standing with the Congolese government to press for a reconsideration of Dodson’s expulsion. The Kennedy administration immediately pursued the latter option, with the State Department and the American Embassy in Leopoldville flying into mediation mode. A member of the American Consul in Elisabethville, Jonathan Dean, sent a telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk explaining that the Congolese government was ignorant of the fact that Dodson had given full support to the Congo’s integration and that he ‘had personally seen him repeatedly argue sincerely and forcefully with Tshombé... for common GOC, US and UK policy.’ He also informed Rusk that it would be damaging to US interests to lose Dodson ‘both as [an] UK representative and as [an] individual.’ 120 These sentiments clearly resonated with those held in Washington for the State Department sent an immediate response instructing the US Embassy to ‘assert all possible influence, short of endangering your own position’ to achieve a reversal in the Congolese government’s decision. 121

Ambassador Edmund Gullion duly met with Adoula and Robert Gardiner, Sture Linner’s replacement as the UN Officer responsible for the Congo, to urge moderation. This meeting risked angering Adoula and damaging US–Congo relations were the Congolese Prime Minister to perceive the interjection as American valuing of British interests in the region above securing the country’s political stability. Nevertheless, Gullion argued that Dodson could ‘save the destruction of lives and property’ in Katanga and that Congolese public opinion might be assuaged were the government to announce that it had received British explanations for their policy in Katanga. 122 During the meeting, Adoula was non-committal but Gullion was evidently hopeful of a positive outcome, describing the Congolese Prime Minister as having appeared ‘interested’ in his argument. 123 Adoula subsequently proposed to defer Dodson’s expulsion on condition that ‘certain things had to be done.’ 124 What he meant by this is unclear but in any case events took over. By 14 January, Tshombé had allowed the UN freedom...
of movement in Katanga and legally ended the secession, thereby releasing much of the parliamentary pressure upon Adoula. Dodson’s expulsion was forgotten but the British remained appreciative of the American role. As was noted in a Foreign Office memorandum, ‘it appears that...Mr. Gullion was instructed to weigh in on Mr. Dodson’s behalf and this may have been an element in persuading the Congolese Government to relax [their] pressure.’

American investment in helping preserve British representation in the Congo paid dividends as the UK and US cooperated in the ending of the secession of Katanga. Operation Grandslam had caused Tshombé to abscond to Northern Rhodesia and to incite a ‘scorched earth’ policy, which called upon the Katangese to resist ONUC forces by ‘all means including spears and poisoned arrows.’ He publicly blamed a fear for his personal safety as the predominant motive for fleeing but as Tshombé’s gendarmerie was facing military defeat in Katanga it is reasonable to suspect the decision was at least partially tactical; an attempt to complicate the culmination of the ONUC operation by refusing to accept legally the end of Katanga’s secession. The forecasted consequences of Tshombé’s continued absence were troubling for the US and UK. First, Tshombé was considered to be the only leader capable of preventing clashes between tribal groups within Katanga that were united only in their steadfast opposition against the UN, European states and institutions such as the UMKH. Second, a breakdown in political stability within Katanga threatened to initiate a general exodus of Europeans from the Congo, which would have serious economic and political repercussions for both the British and Belgian governments. Such an exodus would undermine, too, UMKH operations, with negative consequences for the Congolese Treasury, regional economic stability and diplomatic relations with Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Third, Tshombé’s absence would force the UN to assume an administrative role in order to ensure Katanga’s continued stability, a role for which it was ill-equipped. Foreign Office and State Department officials were therefore agreed that once the ONUC operation was finished Tshombé must be encouraged to return to Katanga to help manage and legitimise the end of the Katangese secession.

The Americans however were in a difficult position vis-a-vis Tshombé and Katanga. The Katangese generally perceived the US to have supported Operation Grandslam and the consequent threat to Tshombé’s safety. The Kennedy administration thus had limited capacity to exert pressure on Tshombé. At the same time, American desire to court African nationalist groups, coupled with rising sensitivity to race relations within the US and mounting public resentment in the Congo at what was perceived to be continued European meddling in their internal affairs, meant that US policymakers preferred not to be identified with Tshombé’s return. The Kennedy administration consequently turned to the British and the Belgians to take the lead in achieving a mutually desired end. Macmillan’s government was well placed to assist. Tshombé had sought safety within a British protectorate, meaning the UK had diplomatic leverage over him through the British Consulate in Elisabethville and through the use of both individuals such as Welensky and through shareholders of Tanganyika Concessions. The trick, though, given the political pressures facing the Conservative government over the Congo, was to assist the Americans without being seen to take a lead position. The solution developed by the Foreign Office was to exercise influence but place the
‘Belgians in the front line’ so that Macmillan’s government avoided actions which ‘would be unacceptable to public opinion’ in the UK. Joint US-UK messages were sent to Tshombé through British government officials in Rhodesia, the Belgian consulate and through the UMHK. One such message, drafted by Home and Rusk, warned Tshombé that failure to return to Elisabethville would provide the Russians with an opportunity to enter into the Congo. The Katangese leader was urged ‘most earnestly to return without delay.’ Once he did so, the covert messages continued. On 4 January, a Foreign Office message assured Dean Rusk that there had been constant communication with Tshombé. The UK High Commissioner in Salisbury ‘in some “mysterious” way’ relayed messages by radio to the Katangese leader. Another route was explained on 5 January by Jonathan Dean. American messages to Tshombé could be passed through the UMHK Director Urbain. Responses would then pass through Joachim Frenkiel, the Rector of Elisabethville University, to the British Consulate in Elisabethville who in turn would pass the messages to the Americans.

Diplomatic messages alone however would not guarantee the end of Katanga’s secession. When on 30 December Tshombé acceded to persistent British pressure and agreed to return to Elisabethville, he did so on the condition that the UN would guarantee his personal safety and that of his ministers. This assurance was not easily secured given that U Thant resolutely refused to negotiate with Tshombé unless he surrendered his ‘scorched earth’ policy. The UK and US again coordinated their responses, dividing tasks according to where their influence was the greatest. While the British continued to press Tshombé to end the secession, the Americans focused their attention on the UN, urging members to support assurance of Tshombé’s safe return. This was achieved on 31 December, when U Thant relented. He pledged that Tshombé’s safety could be assured if he returned to Elisabethville and took the necessary steps towards integration within a two week timeframe. On 3 January, after ONOC forces seized Jadotville, the Foreign Office informed Rusk that Tshombé, with ‘few bargaining points left’, appeared more amenable to cooperation. Although there were ‘no categorical assurances’ that Tshombé was prepared to cooperate with UN demands, the Foreign Office believed he was ‘more thoroughly scared than he has ever been and can be pressured to do so.’ With UN permission, Belgian plans were consequently made to transport Tshombé to Elisabethville via a sanctuary in Kolwezi. Though continued UN military movement into Jadotville and Kolwezi-integral mining regions in Katanga prolonged the reconciliation process and meant that Tshombé did not formally renounce the end of Katanga’s secession until 14 January, by then the US and UK had already achieved their primary objective: Tshombé had returned to Katanga under UN guarantees for his safety and negotiations were enabled.

The end of Katanga’s secession did not resolve all of the Congo’s problems and as such there were further opportunities for Anglo-American cooperation. By 1964 the political situation in the country was again turbulent. The Conseil National de Liberation (CNL), an increasingly powerful opposition party that had strong Chinese Communist affiliations, gained control of a large portion of the Province of Kwilu. The ONUC, scheduled to withdraw in June that year, had established a Belgian training programme to strengthen the Armée National Congolaise (ANC) before their departure. The programme had proven inadequate and the ANC was consequently unprepared to fill
important leadership roles once the ONUC departed. Closely following the UN’s with-
drawal in June, Adoula’s weak leadership also ended when Tshombé returned to the
Congo from his exile in Spain.\textsuperscript{146} On 9 July 1964, he was granted power by Kasavubu to
form a new provisional government with himself as Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{147} A weak central
government and the absence of the UN military presence provided the CNL with the
opportunity it needed to fill prevailing power vacuums. On 5 August, CNL soldiers seized
control of Stanleyville, capital of the Orientale Province, and refused to allow approxi-
mately 1000 non-Congolese citizens—the majority of whom were of American and
European origin—to leave the city.\textsuperscript{148}

British Prime Minister Wilson’s facilitation of the US President Johnson administra-
tion’s policies during this hostage crisis speaks to the intimacy of the Anglo-American
special relationship. Prior to the crisis, Johnson’s administration had developed strong
reservations about America’s continued presence in the Congo. His predecessor had
incurred substantial domestic and international criticism for the American role in
Operation Grandslam and for support of Adoula’s government.\textsuperscript{149} In August 1964, the
State Department concluded that it was time the US ‘pulled their horns’ from the
Congo.\textsuperscript{150} Within this context and upon hearing news of the hostage crisis, the new
American Ambassador to the Congo, George Mc Murtie Godley, outlined three possible
US options. The first was to convince the Belgians to intervene militarily. Second, if the
Belgians refused, the State Department might urge Tshombé to recruit a mercenary
brigade. Finally, and only in the ‘most extreme conditions’, the US should be prepared to
intervene militarily.\textsuperscript{151}

The British were helpful initially in enabling American material support of Tshombé. In
August 1964 the Americans used Ascension Island as a base to stage United States Air
Force (USAF) aircraft tasked with delivering material to the Congo in support of
Tshombé. Though this was not the first time they had used the British island, in
September the Americans realised they had been using it on this occasion without a
formal agreement; the existing Anglo-American arrangement provided for the use of
Ascension only for rocket tracking.\textsuperscript{152} The Foreign Office, previously unaware that
American assistance flights to the Congo had been taking place from the island, was
thus surprised to receive an apology for the American oversight. The reaction that
Johnson’s administration received, however, differed significantly from what might be
expected between two sovereign states in these circumstances. Wilson’s government
was supportive. It advised that it ‘did not consider any formal exchange of letters was
required’\textsuperscript{153} and the Americans were subsequently allowed continued access to the
island through until November.

The second stage of Anglo-American cooperation came as the hostage crisis
intensified. By November 1964, a Belgian refusal to intervene militarily coupled
with an insubstantial Congolese mercenary force meant that the hostages faced an
‘imminent danger’.\textsuperscript{154} Wilson’s government was invited by the Belgians and the
Americans to participate in contingency planning of Operation Dragon Rouge, a
joint American-Belgian paratrooper mission to rescue the hostages. The Belgians
and Americans also asked Britain in November 1964 to provide two battalions of
paratroopers which were to be supported by 27 medium-range and nine long-range
aircrafts. The British declined participation in the planning\textsuperscript{155} but agreed to stage the
operation and Belgian troops through Ascension, this despite acknowledging that
were their role to be exposed the government would likely incur strong African and domestic criticism. Previous limitations in the use of Ascension to the provision of ‘material assistance’ were avoided by categorising the action as being ‘purely humanitarian’ and ‘in no way intended as interference in Congolese politics.’\textsuperscript{156} The British also met a request by US Under Secretary of State, George Ball, to safeguard the Operation from leaks by initiating a complete blackout of communication to and from Ascension whilst the paratroopers were moved to a new location.\textsuperscript{157} This was no easy task for the Wilson government. It had no legal power to impose the information censorship that the US and Belgians desperately required.\textsuperscript{158} Nevertheless, it successfully delayed outgoing messages from Ascension and stalled media speculation until the Operation was successfully completed.\textsuperscript{159}

**Conclusion**

The Congo crisis demonstrates the complex process for Western countries of removing colonial control in favour of indigenous government whilst also seeking to protect vested interests, safeguard Cold War considerations and uphold as best possible the rights and obligations of democratic governance in successor Developing Countries. It also shows that whilst broad conclusions can be drawn about the history and practice of decolonisation, the potential variables are of such magnitude that individual cases can only be understood fully through detailed archival reconstruction. In terms of the Congo crisis and Anglo-American relations, it was an undoubtedly complicated issue but claims of a breakdown in UK–US coordination and of long-term damage to the special relationship overstate the case. They also preference narratives of decline in British power and of the special relationship by underplaying the importance accorded by London and Washington to UK–US cooperation before Macmillan’s ‘stand aside’ and by neglecting their continuing collaboration afterwards in the Congo.

A better way to appreciate the Congo crisis in terms of Anglo-American relations, therefore, is to view it through a lens of overlapping but not identical frames. For the US in the Congo, as often happened elsewhere as the developing world was decolonised, there was an uncomfortable juxtaposition of traditional anti-colonialism, the colonial interests of one or more American allies at stake, and a tendency in the higher reaches of American administrations especially to superimpose upon complex indigenous events a Cold War dynamic. The ideal ‘solution’ from the perspective of the White House was for the peaceful emergence of an independent Congo headed by a government broadly sympathetic to Western interests and respectful of established overseas economic interests. Whitehall could gladly accept the same solution but in arriving at that point primary British considerations and options were different. The Macmillan government had vested British economic interests to protect, domestic political constraints to manage, and a raft of wider considerations to balance, including Britain’s responsibilities in Africa and its own de-colonisation process, Anglo-American relations and anti-communism—however exaggerated British officials sometimes felt such threats to be by the Americans.

Establishing these overlapping but non-identical frames reveals how constrained the British government’s freedom of manoeuvre was in meeting US concerns and why Macmillan’s ‘stand aside’ during the December 1962 ONUC Operation Grandslam was...
actually a shrewd decision. It protected his Conservative Party leadership and government by distancing Britain from the UN mission and removed both an important irritant in UK-US relations and an obstacle to the ONUC’s entry into Katanga. It also preserved a measure of British influence within Katanga and with Tshombé, which was important in the eventual reintegration of Katanga, and avoided Britain withdrawing from the crisis entirely. The latter would have neglected its African colonial responsibilities, undermined British economic interests in Katanga and prevented the Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo that subsequently continued.

Finally it is evident that throughout the Congo crisis London and Washington valued, and made concessions to preserve, their collaboration. In December 1961 Kennedy helped arrange a ceasefire in the Congo to ease Macmillan’s concerns that his government might fall as a result of a vote of no confidence in Parliament. Similarly, the Kennedy administration’s scramble in January 1963 to prevent the expulsion of Derek Dodson of the British consul from Elisabethville demonstrates that the Americans were willing to take calculated political risks with the Congolese government to ensure the British remained. Conversely Prime Minister Wilson’s assistance in the Johnson administration’s handling of the Stanleyville hostage crisis in 1964 confirms that Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo owed more than the close personal relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan. In fact, the informality with which American use of Ascension Island was agreed in August 1964 was in many respects reminiscent of the remarkable nature of American use of military bases in Britain itself.

Notes

1. Cf Dumbrell, A Special Relationship; Dobson, Anglo-American Relations and Reynolds and Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart.
2. For a collection of perspectives on this speech see Butler and Stockwell, eds. The Wind of Change.
4. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War.
5. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 195.
7. James, "Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis," 152.
13. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 17; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 46.
15. James, "Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis," 154.
17. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 64; and De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, 6.


22. For an introduction to indigenous Katangese leaders see Larmer and Kennes, "Rethinking the Katangese Secession," 741–761.


25. UKNA, FO 371/146659, JB 1019/8, 'Recognition of Katanga as independent' comment by Belgian PM, memo by African Department, 13 July 1960.


27. In the early 1960s, seventeen African countries were preparing for independence and subsequently, both Washington and Moscow were reviewing their African policies. Namikas explains that in the rawest form, both superpowers, wanting as many allies as possible were prepared to secure the allegiances of any newly independent African state. Namikas, 47; DDE, White House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa, South, Central and East, 'US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa' 19 January 1960.


30. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 38; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 68.


37. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 43.


39. Ibid.

40. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 25.


44. DDE, US National Security Council Records Presidential Records, Intelligence Files 1953-61, Box 1, Minutes of Special Group Meetings, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 10 November 1960.


46. John F Kennedy Presidential Library (JFK), National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General 1/61-4/61, Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961.


48. DDE, White House Office Files, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol II (7), Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President, 15 December 1960.

49. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 123.

50. Ibid., 121.

51. JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General 1/61-4/61, Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961.

52. De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, 118; Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 200–205; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 125.

53. Currently, there is no consensus as to when Kennedy was informed of Lumumba’s death. Lumumba’s return to power continued to be debated within Kennedy’s administration into mid-January 1961. First reports indicating suspicions of Lumumba’s death emerged on 17 January 1961 but the official announcement of Lumumba’s death was made on 13 February. FRUS Special National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d2> (accessed November 27, 2016); Ibid., Editorial Note, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d6> (accessed November 27, 2016); JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General, 1/61-4/61, Statement by US Representative in Security Council, 13 February 1961.

54. See note 51 above.


56. At the July 1961 Lovanium gathering, where the Congolese leaders gathered to elect a new government, the CIA reportedly spent $23 000 in order to strengthen Adoula’s position during the closed meetings. FRUS, Editorial Note, Volume XX, Congo crisis, Document 71 [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d71> (accessed October 20, 2016); Ibid., Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 28 April 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d62> (accessed March 9, 2017). For an indication of Adoula’s political opposition to Lumumba see Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 70.


60. In Operation Rumpunch, ONUC forces seized the headquarters of the gendarmerie, the radio station and other communications buildings in Elisabethville. On the same day Tshombé agreed to cooperate with the ONUC’s withdrawal request and the operation was halted. Hammarskjöld approved Operation Morthor after the arrival of new mercenary forces in


63. United States National Archives (USNA), RG 59, Conference Files, Box 273, CF 203- Bermuda Meeting with Macmillan, folder 2 of 2, Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 28 December 1961.


65. JFK, Personal Papers of Harlan Cleveland, Box 68, Congo General, 2/61-10/61, United States Policy in the Congo Report, 21 September 1961, 5.


69. Recognising that Adoula and Tshombé were unlikely to come to an agreement through negotiations alone, Director of the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman sent a report suggesting policy alternatives to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk in March 1961. The report recommended ‘strong external pressures on both parties.’ JFK, National Security Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo-General 3/10/62-4/30/62, Policy Alternatives in the Congo, report by Roger Hilsman, 29 March 1962.

70. U Thant was appointed Acting Secretary General on 3 November 1961. See for instance, footnote two in FRUS, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 11 November 1961, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d140 (accessed November 29, 2017). For George Ball’s thoughts on the Congo, see JFK, National Security Files, Box 31, Countries, Congo Cables 7/16/62-7/23/62, Telegram from the Department of State, 21 July 1962.


72. FRUS, Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (Fredericks), 6 August 1962, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d269> (accessed February 20, 2017).

73. The National Reconciliation Plan was also referred to informally as the ‘U Thant Plan’, the ‘conciliation plan’ and the ‘plan’. FRUS, Memorandum for the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 11 August 1962, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d274 (accessed February 20, 2017).

74. Although the plan was generally supported by the French, Belgian and British governments, political participation varied significantly. The French refused to participate, the British refused to participate after phase two and the Belgians refused to participate after stage three. JFK, National Security Files, Box 28 A Countries, Congo General 8/11/61-8/27/62, Current Status of Proposed Action on the Congo, Department of State Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 11 August 1962.

77. USNA, RG59, Conference Files, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan Nassau Meeting, Memcons, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Congo, 19 December 1962.  
78. For information on the British decision to stand aside, see Ibid., 21 December 1962. For information on Operation Glandslam see, FRUS, Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen), 28 December 1962,[online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d387> (accessed February 20, 2017).  
80. JFK, National Security Files, Box 28 A, Countries, Congo General 14/12/62-17/12/62, Congo Scenario, n.d.  
81. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 109; James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 195; and O’Malley, “Anglo-American-UN relations during the Congo Crisis,” 40.  
83. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 124.  
84. James, “Britain, the Cold War and the Congo Crisis,” 154.  
87. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 112.  
90. Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, 113; and Williams, Who Killed Hammarskold? 1000 135–139.  
91. For correspondence between Welensky and Home, see Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 209–240; and Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, 114–115.  
92. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 140.  
93. UKNA, FO 371/155007, Bombs for the UN in the Congo, FO Minute by K.M Wilford, 9 November 1961; PREM 11/3168, Telegram from UK Delegation to the UN, 12 December 1961.  
94. Ibid., Meeting of Ministers to consider further the supply of bombs to the United Nations, Foreign Office note to Mr. Stevens, 7 December 1961.  
96. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 116; and O’Malley, “What an awful body the UN have become!!!,” 37.  
100. UKNA, FO 371/161491, Brief for the Cabinet Meeting on 11 December, F.O Minute by G.E. Millard, 10 December 1962.  
101. UKNA, FO 371/161485, Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Dean Rusk at the American Embassy in Paris, 11 December 1962.  
102. JFK, President’s Weekend Reading, Box 5, Weekend Reading, 26 May 1962.
103. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 30 A, Congo Cables 5/14/62-5/19/62, Telegram from London to Secretary of State, 16 May 1962.

104. Ibid., Box 28 A, Congo General 12/14/62-12/17/62, Report of Conversation with Secretary General U Thant on the Congo, memorandum from Harlan Cleveland, 16 December 1962.


110. UKNA, FO 371/161491, Resolution urging HMG to refrain from the forcible solution of Congo crisis, motion by Mr. Tufton Beamish, 12 December 1962.


112. USNA, RG 59, Box 1967 B, 770g.00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram London to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.

113. UKNA, CAB 130/178, Minutes of a meeting, Subject: The Congo, 12 September 1961.

114. UKNA, FO 371/161478, Letter to Macmillan from Patrick Dean, 4 December 1962.


116. UKNA, FO 371/167244, UK Aid to the Congo, FO Minute by P. M. Foster, 9 January 1963.

117. JFK, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo cables 1/1/63-1/5/63, Message from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January, 1962.

118. British Foreign Office officials were informed that the Congo refused to be compared with a ‘small child to whom one gives a piece of sugar to keep it quiet’. UKNA, FO 371/167244, Telegram from Leopoldville to Foreign Office by Mr. Riches, 9 January 1963.

119. The Belgian Ambassador in Elisabethville was also requested to leave. JFK, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/1963-1/10/1963, Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 10 January, 1963.

120. Ibid., Telegram Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963.

121. Ibid., Telegram Department of State to American Embassy in Leopoldville, 10 January 1963.


123. Ibid.

124. Ibid., Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 12 January, 1963.

125. UKNA, PREM 11/4084, Secret memorandum to Philip de Zulueta from Tom Bridges, 14 January 1963.

126. USNA, RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/12-2962–/1-163, Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 30 December 1962.

127. UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Congo’ brief for Cabinet Meeting by West and Central African Department, 2 January 1963.

128. Ibid., ‘Congo’ Brief for the Nassau Conference by G.E. Millard, 14 December 1963’ USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram from the Department of State, 3 January 1963.

129. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28 A, Congo General 11 63/1/15/63.

130. Ibid, Box 33 A, Congo Cables XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 30 December 1962.

131. For Gullion’s reservations for instance, see USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January 1963, for reservations concerning American public opinion, see Ibid., 770g 00/1-563–/1-863, Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 8 January 1963.

132. The policy was first put forward by G.E Millard, head of the Western and Central African Department in December 1963. He explained that the idea was ‘inglorious’ but ‘good

133. The message was meant to be sent to Tshombé through the British High Commissioner in Rhodesia, Lord Alport but on 4 January the communication route was queried with the Foreign Office ultimately deciding they preferred ‘to use the Union Minière Channel.’ For details see, UKNA, FO 371/167244, Message from HMG to Tshombé, 1 January 1963; Message from Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 4 January 1963; Message from Foreign Office to Elisabethville, 4 January 1963.

134. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables, 1/1/63-1/5/63, Telegram from London to Secretary of State, January 4 1963.

135. Ibid., Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 5 January 1963.


137. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Telegram from the Department of State, 8 January 1963.

138. Ibid.


140. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Incoming telegram from London to Secretary of State, 3 January 1963.

141. Ibid., Incoming telegram from London to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.

142. Sobelair, a Belgian company had a commercial airplane in Elisabethville under UN protection. The UN subsequently permitted the plane to fly to Kolwezi, pick up Tshombé and fly to Kipushi where Tshombé would then make his way to Elisabethville by road. Ibid, Telegram from New York (Plimpton) to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.

143. On 9 January, the UN also moved into Kolwezi- home of two of the province’s key dams and power generators. Tshombé again issued his scorched earth policy and demanded that all administrative workers refuse to cooperate with the UN. He was consequently placed under house arrest, from which on 11 January he escaped. On 14 January, Tshombé wrote to Adoula stating that the Katangese gendarmerie were ‘ready to proclaim immediately before the whole world that the secession of Katanga is over.’ Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174; JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/63-1/10/63, Telegram Leopoldville (Gullion) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963; Ibid., Telegram Salisbury (Geren) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963; Ibid., Congo Cables 1/11/63-1/20/63, Telegram from Salisbury to Secretary of State, 14 January 1963.


145. Ibid.

146. On 31 May 1963 Tshombé escaped to Spain to avoid house arrest as UN troops brought the final holdouts in Katanga under control. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174. For Tshombé’s return to the Congo, see Ibid., 191.

147. UKNA, FO 371/176653, Telegram from Leopoldville (Mr. Rose) to Foreign Office, 10 July 1964.


149. UKNA, FO 371/176660, Comments on the American Attitude to the OAU’s Discussing Military Assistance to the Congo, memo by R.J. R. Owen, 9 July 1964.

150. Ibid., Interview with Mr. Looram of the State Department, report by R.J.R Jones, 4 August 1964.


153. For information on the American letter see, UKNA, CO 968/809, Memo from C.M. Rose to John Higham in the Colonial Office, 30 September 1964. For British reaction see, Ibid., Letter to C. M. Rose from J. D. Higham, 7 October 1964; Ibid., Letter to J. D. Higham from C. M. Rose, 13 November 1964.


155. LBJ, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 83, Congo, Volume 6 10/64-11/64 [3 of 4], Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 13 November 1964.

156. UKNA, CO 968/809, Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 November.

157. The request was initially sent on 21 November but it was extended until the Operation had been completed on 24 November. See Ibid., Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Ascension Island (Administrator) 21 November 1964; Ibid., 22 November 1964; Ibid., 23 November 1964; Ibid., 24 November 1964.

158. Ibid, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Ascension Island (Administrator), 23 November 1964.

159. The telegram notes that the ‘U.S Government are most grateful for the imposition of the black-out.’ Ibid., Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Ascension.

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