Fixed vs. Flexible Pricing in a Competitive Market

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Abstract: We study the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing policies—fixed price and flexible price—in competitive markets. Our paper extends previous work in marketing, e.g. Desai and Purohit (2004) by focusing on decentralized markets with a dynamic and fully competitive framework while also considering possible non-economic aspects of bargaining. We construct and analyze a competitive search model which allows us to endogenize the expected demand depending on pricing rules and posted prices. Our analysis reveals that fixed and flexible pricing policies generally coexist in the same marketplace, and each policy comes with its own list price and customer demographics. More specifically, if customers dislike haggling, then fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium, but if customers get some additional satisfaction from the bargaining process, then both policies are offered, and the unique equilibrium exhibits full segmentation: Haggler customers avoid fixed-price firms and exclusively shop at flexible firms whereas non-haggler customers do the opposite. We also find that prices increase in customer satisfaction, implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Finally, considering the presence of seasonal cycles in most markets, we analyze a scenario where market demand goes through periodic ups and downs and find that equilibrium prices remain mostly stable despite significant fluctuations in demand. This finding suggests a plausible competition-based explanation for the stability of prices.

Keywords: pricing policy, negotiation, competition, competitive search

1 Introduction

In a variety of markets, including houses, used cars, boats or jewelry, fixed and flexible pricing policies often coexist. While some sellers clearly indicate that they are flexible and open to bargaining (e.g., a homeowner putting “OBO” (or best offer) next to the asking price), other sellers point out fixed-prices by using words such as “sharp price” or “no-negotiations”. Some popular used car supermarkets in the UK, such as Cargiant, offer only fixed prices and leave no room for negotiation, whereas it is still a common practice to negotiate in most other used-car dealerships. Similarly, many sellers who are well-known for fixed-price selling are reported to allow haggling in
recent years (Richtel, 2008; Agins and Collins, 2001). Some even go one step further and train their employees in the art of bargaining with customers (Stout, 2013). In addition, consumers vary in their bargaining ability and practice in purchasing such items. According to Consumer Report’s recent national survey of American adults on their haggling habits, while a notable portion of individuals report negotiating when they purchased appliances (39%), jewelry (32%), furniture (43%), and collectibles and antiques (48%), with 89% of those who haggled obtained discounts at least once, others simply have not tried bargaining at all (Marks, 2013).

Although the practice of both fixed price and flexible price policies are widespread, there are surprisingly few studies in the marketing literature that investigate strategic drivers and implications of these seemingly contrasting pricing policies (see Desai and Purohit (2004) for an exception). Our goal in this paper is to understand the dynamics and consequences of fixed and flexible pricing policies in fully competitive settings. We particularly focus on decentralized markets such as housing, used cars, boats, or high-end jewelry which exhibit the following characteristics. First, the majority of these markets operate via search and matching: it takes time and effort to locate an item or to attract a buyer and depending on the market, a player may have to wait days or even weeks before he buys or sells. Second, sellers typically have limited inventories (which is the case in markets for houses, apartments, used cars or boats, where sellers usually possess a single item, and to a certain extent it is the case in markets for home furniture, jewelry, or antiques); consequently, there may be significant trade frictions in that a product available today may not be available tomorrow. Third, a large number of independent sellers compete with each other in order to attract customers, and in doing so, they use a range of pricing tools and tactics in an effort to appeal to customers.

As hinted above, these characteristics are present in a notable proportion of markets for big ticket items. In addition, markets for other products that may not necessarily be considered as big-ticket e.g. used product markets for electronics, playstations or bicycles, also broadly exhibit the aforementioned characteristics, and therefore are relevant to our study context. In contrast, not all big ticket items demonstrate all the aforementioned traits. For example, markets for some new large appliances such as high-end big screen TV’s often exhibit ample product availability, which renders our model less suitable for those settings.

A key feature of the markets we study is that bargaining is arguably as prevalent as fixed pricing, especially if conceivable savings from bargaining are not negligible for customers. Customers, however, are not homogenous in their ability and willingness to negotiate in that some customers
are willing to exert effort to obtain a discount (hagglers), whereas others are not (non-hagglers). As such, sellers’ pricing policies (fixed or flexible) may have significant consequences in terms of the kind of customers they attract or dispel. Also, the process of bargaining may involve additional psychological dynamics for customers. Specifically, haggling may be discomforting and costly due to additional effort or opportunity cost of time, or due to concerns of being perceived as cheap or unclassy (Evans and Beltramini, 1987; Pruitt, 2013). On the other hand, in addition to tangible benefits of obtaining a lower price, customers may also get secondary non-economic benefits from the bargaining process such as feelings of enjoyment or excitement.

Our modeling approach is based on a competitive search (directed search) framework which takes into account the aforementioned characteristics—that is, we consider a decentralized market with search frictions where sellers have limited product availability and customers may enjoy or dislike bargaining. Extending existing work in marketing on fixed and flexible pricing policies (i.e., Desai and Purohit, 2004), our directed search approach allows us to explicitly incorporate full market competition in a decentralized and dynamic setup, which we believe is the first study doing so in the marketing literature.

The model provides several important insights. First, in our benchmark case where customers are neutral to the bargaining process (i.e. they receive no displeasure or enjoyment from the process itself), we show that a continuum of search equilibria exist, and in any realized equilibrium, partial segmentation of customers takes place. Specifically, non-haggler customers self-select themselves into fixed-price firms, whereas haggler customers are indifferent and may shop anywhere. This is because flexible firms foresee an eventual surplus loss during negotiations, so they strategically inflate the list price. Such inflated prices, however, put off non-haggler customers as they cannot negotiate better deals. Thus, the flexible firms end up attracting haggler customers only. Fixed price firms, on the other hand, announce moderate prices and attract both types of customers.

Second, if customers dislike haggling, then fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. This is because buyers incur some disutility due to haggling, which, in a competitive setting bleeds into flexible sellers’ profit functions, and causes them to earn less. As a result, sellers are better off with fixed pricing.

Third, we find that if customers get some additional pleasure (proxied by a positive $\varepsilon$) from the haggling process, then a unique equilibrium emerges with full segmentation of customers where hagglers avoid fixed-price firms and non-hagglers avoid flexible firms. In addition, we show that the equilibrium list prices increase in $\varepsilon$, implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility
enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Surprisingly, we observe a spillover effect in that fixed price sellers, who do not cater to haggler customers also raise their prices if \( \varepsilon \) goes up.

Finally, taking into account the fact that most markets follow seasonal trends (Radas and Shugan, 1998), we consider the price dynamics in a long selling period where demand goes through seasonal ups and downs. An interesting finding is that prices do not fluctuate as much as the demand. This observation provides an interesting insight. In explaining the stability of prices, a significant portion of existing literature in marketing highlights price fairness concerns (Xia et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2003; Anderson and Simester, 2008) which has its origins in the principle of dual entitlement put forward by Kahneman et al. (1986). Our model, on the other hand, provides an additional explanation for price stability that is based on forward looking customers in a competitive and dynamic market.

2 Model

2.1 Description of the Model

Consider a dynamic market that runs for \( t = 1, 2, ..., T \) periods and is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous buyers and homogeneous sellers. Each seller has one unit of a product that he is willing to sell above his reservation price, zero, and each buyer wants to purchase one unit and is willing to pay up to his reservation price, one. Buyers are divided into two groups according to their bargaining abilities. Low types (non-hagglers) are not skilled in bargaining and never attempt to negotiate the list price. High types (hagglers) on the other hand are skilled in bargaining and negotiate the price whenever it is worthwhile to do so. (In the Online Appendix 2 we extend the model by considering \( N \) types.)

The market is decentralized and operates via competitive search. At the beginning of each period sellers simultaneously and independently announce a list price \( r_{m,t} \in [0, 1] \) and a declaration \( m \in \{\text{firm} (f), \text{best offer} (b)\} \) indicating whether they are firm with the price or whether they are flexible to accept a counter offer. If the seller is firm then the transaction takes place at the list price. If he is flexible then the transaction may involve bargaining, but if the buyer does not wish to bargain or if two or more buyers are present at the firm then no bargaining takes place and the item is sold at the initially posted price (more on this below). Before proceeding further, we should acknowledge that our model implicitly assumes that sellers can commit to a pricing rule and implement it without incurring any costs. However, in reality sellers may find it difficult to commit
to a fixed price policy, for instance, in markets where bargaining is prevalent and customers insist upon receiving a deal.

Buyers observe sellers’ announcements and then choose to visit a seller. It is possible that multiple customers show up at the same location, so we let $n = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ denote the realized demand. If $n \geq 2$ then each buyer has an equal chance $1/n$ of being selected. If transaction occurs at price $p_t$ then the seller obtains $\beta^t p_t$ and the buyer obtains $\beta^t (1 - p_t)$, where $\beta$ is the common discount factor.

The decentralized nature of the market, coupled with sellers’ limited inventories, creates trade frictions in that no one is guaranteed of an immediate trade and players may have to try for several periods before they can actually buy or sell. Indeed, if multiple customers show up at the same firm, then some of them walk out empty-handed because of the limited inventory. Similarly, due to the decentralized matching process a seller may well end up with no customer at all. In either case players need to wait for the subsequent period to try again. Waiting, of course, is costly as future payoffs are discounted at rate $\beta$.

The market starts with a measure of $s_1$ sellers and $b_1$ buyers, of which a fraction $\eta_1 \in (0, 1)$ are low types. At the end of each period, players who transact exit the market while the remaining ones move to the next period to play the same game. Outgoing players may be fully or partially replaced. Specifically, we assume that at the beginning of each period $t = 2, 3, \ldots$ a new cohort of $b_t^{\text{new}}$ buyers and $s_t^{\text{new}}$ sellers enter the market joining the existing players. The measures of buyers and sellers present in the market at time $t$, denoted by $b_t$ and $s_t$, depend on the entering cohorts as well as the existing players who are yet to trade. (In Section 6 we discuss how $b_t$ and $s_t$ evolve over time.)

Finally, our model considers possible additional psychological utility (or disutility) associated with the bargaining experience. In order to examine such non-economic considerations, we introduce a parameter, $\varepsilon$, which can be positive, negative or zero depending on how customers perceive the bargaining experience and we explore how this parameter affects the selection of equilibrium pricing rules. The parameter $\varepsilon$ enters into a buyer’s utility function as an additive separable term, which captures the idea that in addition to and independent of the utility derived from the consumption of the good (proxied by the price of the item), customers derive some additional utility or disutility from bargaining. This is also consistent with the previous literature in which consumers’ bargaining

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1In the Online Appendix 2 we explore a variation where unmatched buyers and sellers get to meet for a second time during the same trading period and show that the results remain robust, up to a modification in outside options.
cost is incorporated in additive separable form (Rubinstein, 1982; Desai and Purohit, 2004). Finally, the parameter \( \varepsilon \) is relevant for haggler customers only. It is inapplicable for non-hagglers, as they always pay the list price due to their lack of bargaining skills.

### 2.2 Discussion of the Modeling Approach

A number of models in marketing and pricing literatures examine strategic implications of different pricing policies, however, most of these studies do not consider competition, and instead focus on a monopolist seller who receives customers exogenously (Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983; Wang, 1995; Kuo et al., 2011, 2013).\(^2\) Other studies incorporate competition using Hotelling or Cournot frameworks.\(^3\) In a closer work to ours, Desai and Purohit (2004) consider a duopoly setting and use a Hotelling framework to examine the implications of haggling and fixed price policy decisions by two retailers. They show that depending on the parameters, there may exist equilibria in which both firms choose fixed prices, both firms offer haggling, or where one firm offers haggling and the other charges fixed prices. An important finding of theirs is that the benefits of price discrimination in a monopoly setting do not necessarily transfer over to a competitive environment. The Hotelling framework captures competition between (typically two) major retailers without inventory constraints in an effective way, however our study, which focuses on competition between a large number of sellers, who have limited inventories and who operate in a market with trade frictions calls for a different modeling approach. To that end, our directed search approach is a natural fit in capturing the aforementioned market characteristics and modelling them in an analytically tractable way.

Our model also differs from the existing directed search models (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010; Virag, 2011) with several new features. First, we explicitly incorporate customer heterogeneity in terms of bargaining skills (hagglers vs. non-hagglers). Second, we introduce a dynamic setup which enables us to examine strategic implications of fixed and flexible pricing policies over multiple

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\(^2\) Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) examine a monopolist seller facing risk neutral customers, and suggest that fixed pricing is optimal in comparison to negotiations. This is because while haggling may be advantageous in terms of price discrimination, the gains from haggling are more than offset when buyers refuse purchasing at higher prices. Wang (1995) creates a dynamic model with a monopolist seller, and concludes that bargaining is preferable if it costs the same as fixed pricing, or if the common costs are high enough. Focusing on operations-related questions in a monopoly setting, Kuo et al. (2011) characterize the optimal posted price and the resulting negotiation outcome as a function of inventory and time, and Kuo et al. (2013) focus on pricing policy in a supply chain.

\(^3\) For instance, Wernerfelt (1994) finds that in a duopoly bargaining may be profit maximizing for sellers as it helps them avoid the costly Bertrand competition. Using a Hotelling framework, Gill and Thanassouls (2016) study strategically chosen stochastic discounts in markets with prior list-price-setting competition. Kuksov (2004) considers a duopoly model of competition with search costs, and demonstrates that lower search costs may actually result in higher prices since product differentiation can also increase with decreased search costs.
periods and in seasonal markets.

As mentioned earlier, our model considers possible non-economic utility (or disutility) associated with the bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter $\varepsilon$. A negative value for $\varepsilon$ indicates disutility associated with haggling, which has been highlighted in a number of studies as buyers’ bargaining disutility (Morton et al., 2011) or haggling costs (Desai and Purohit, 2004). A negative $\varepsilon$ suggests that customers may have the ability to bargain down the list price, but nevertheless, they may dislike the bargaining process, say, for the fear of being seen as cheap or unclassy, or due to opportunity cost of time.

A positive $\varepsilon$ on the other hand, refers to possible non-economic factors such as additional excitement, enjoyment or thrill from the bargaining experience. We must admit, however, that a positive $\varepsilon$ does not have a very clear justification, which is a major limitation for the following reasons. First, the benefit or enjoyment of bargaining could be first and foremost due to the tangible benefit of getting a lower price. While there may exist additional psychological benefits of bargaining beyond obtaining a lower price, these are likely to be of secondary order for customers. Second, in our model we treat the positive $\varepsilon$ as an exogenous parameter, without explicitly accounting for factors, psychological or otherwise, that may give rise to it. If such factors are explicitly included in the model, then they may have important interactions with other components of the model, which we do not consider here. In sum, while our findings with the positive $\varepsilon$ are intriguing, one should take note of these caveats in interpreting the corresponding results.

2.3 Bargaining and the Sale Price

We move backwards in the analysis, starting with the determination of the bargained price in a meeting. We, then, turn to buyers’ search decisions and explain how the expected demand at each firm is pinned down. Finally, we turn to the sellers’ problem and explore how they select prices and pricing rules.

The list price at a flexible firm may be negotiated if the firm has a single customer. If two or more customers are present then no bargaining takes place and the item is sold at the posted price.\(^5\) Let $\theta$ denote the bargaining power of high type buyers relative to the seller. The bargaining

\(^4\)Bargaining process may possibly provide additional excitement and sensory involvement (Babin et al., 1994), as well as an additional satisfaction by feeling victorious, proud and smart from obtaining a deal (Holbrook et al., 1984; Schindler, 1998; Jones et al., 1997). These feelings for bargaining may "transcend the satisfaction of mere economic gain" (Sherry, 1990)

\(^5\)The assumption that haggling is possible only if there is a single customer in store ($n = 1$) is without loss in generality. One can recast the model where haggling may be possible for $n > 1$; however this modification does not add any additional insight.
power of low types is normalized to zero. Similarly, let $u_{h,t+1}$ and $\pi_{t+1}$ denote, respectively, a high type buyer’s and a seller’s expected payoff ("value of search") in period $t+1$. These payoffs serve as outside options during negotiations, i.e. in case of disagreement the buyer walks out with payoff $\beta u_{h,t+1}$ and the seller with $\beta \pi_{t+1}$. The negotiated price, $y_t$, can be found as the solution to the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{y_t \in [0,1]} (1 - y_t + \varepsilon - \beta u_{h,t+1})^\theta (y_t - \beta \pi_{t+1})^{1-\theta}. $$

The solution yields

$$y_t = 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \theta (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + \varepsilon (1 - \theta).$$

The bargained price $y_t$ falls with $\theta$, i.e. the higher the buyer’s negotiation skills, the lower the price. To see why, note that $u_{h,t+1} + \pi_{t+1} \leq 1$ because the total payoff in a transaction cannot exceed the maximum surplus, one. Therefore the expression $1 - \beta (u_{h,t+1} + \pi_{t+1})$ is positive; hence $y_t$ falls in $\theta$. In addition $y_t$ rises with $\pi_{t+1}$ and falls with $u_{h,t+1}$ i.e. the stronger the seller’s outside option the higher the price and the stronger the buyer’s outside option the lower the price. As it turns out, outside options depend on how competitive the market is expected to be in the next period, in the period after, and so on. Even though bargaining is bilateral and takes place between two players in private, it is still driven by market competition, which filters into the negotiation process via outside options.

Whether or not buyers attempt to renegotiate depends on how $y_t$ compares with the list price $r_{b,t}$ as well as the parameter $\varepsilon$. The case $\varepsilon = 0$ is straightforward: buyers opt for bargaining if they can negotiate a better deal than the list price, i.e. if $y_t \leq r_{b,t}$. If, however, $\varepsilon < 0$ then buyers attempt to renegotiate only if the deal they end up getting warrants incurring the negative $\varepsilon$, i.e. if $y_t \leq r_{b,t} + \varepsilon$. We assume that buyers’ bargaining power is sufficiently large to ensure that, even after accounting for the negative $\varepsilon$, they would still prefer bargaining over purchasing at the posted price. (The other scenario where they would not even attempt negotiating trivially yields a fixed price equilibrium.) Finally, if $\varepsilon > 0$ then buyers opt for bargaining if $y_t \leq r_{b,t}$. The parameter $\varepsilon$ is absent from this condition because the psychological satisfaction from bargaining (proxied by a positive $\varepsilon$) kicks in only if the item is purchased below the list price.

These conditions require the bargaining power $\theta$ to be sufficiently high, which we assume to be the case for now. (Subsequently we will provide the necessary thresholds.) The opposite case
where even high types are unable to negotiate a better deal is trivial as the availability of bargaining
becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a fixed price setting.

2.4 Buyer’s Problem

Demand Distribution. In the tradition of the competitive search literature we focus on visit-
ing strategies that are symmetric and anonymous (Burdett et al., 2001; Shimer, 2005; Eeckhout
and Kircher, 2010). Symmetry requires buyers of the same type use the same visiting strategies.
Anonymity, on the other hand, means that visiting strategies ought to depend on what sellers post
but not on sellers’ identities i.e. sellers posting the same list price $r_{m,t}$ and trading with the same
pricing rule $m$ ought to be visited with the same probability.$^6$

Given symmetry and anonymity, the number of applications at a firm follows a Poisson dis-
tribution. To see why, and to get some intuition on how the matching process works, consider a
finite setting with $B$ buyers and $S$ sellers, where the buyer seller ratio equals to $\lambda = B/S$. For a
moment ignore the haggler-price taker distinction and suppose that all buyers are price takers. Also
suppose that all sellers use fixed pricing and post the same list price, say, $r = 0.5$. Since all sellers
compete with the same rule and post the same price, symmetry and anonymity in buyers’ visiting
strategies imply that the probability that a buyer visits a particular seller is $1/S$. Consequently,
the probability that the seller gets $n$ customers equals to

$$\Pr [n] = \binom{B}{n} (1/S)^n (1 - 1/S)^{B-n},$$

i.e. the seller receives customers according to a binomial distribution with parameters $B$ and $1/S$.
The expected number of customers, therefore, equals to $B \times 1/S = \lambda$. Now fix $\lambda$ and let $B$ and $S$
tend to infinity (recall that we have a continuum of buyers and sellers). As the market gets large,
the binomial distribution converges to the Poisson distribution with arrival rate $\lambda$, that is

$$\Pr [n] = \frac{e^{-\lambda} \lambda^n}{n!}.$$ 

$^6$Imposing symmetry and anonymity on visiting strategies is a restriction; however these assumptions facilitate the
characterization of the equilibrium and lead to outcomes which are analytically tractable. As such, with few exceptions
the vast majority of the directed search literature restricts attention to such strategies. A notable exception is an
extension in Burdett et al. (2001) where they consider a simple 2 by 2 setup with only two buyers and two sellers
and construct equilibria supported by non symmetric strategies; however such equilibria require coordination among
buyers on who goes where. In a small market with few buyers such coordination may be possible, but in a large
market with multiple buyers and sellers such coordination is not feasible. The symmetric equilibrium requires no
coordination.
Along this example every firm competes with fixed pricing and posts the same list price, and therefore, the expected demand at each firm equals to \( \lambda \). (Even though the ex-ante expected demand at each firm is \( \lambda \), the ex-post realized demand is uncertain. A firm may well end up getting no customer at all, or it may get more customers than it can serve.) If sellers were to post different prices, or pick different pricing rules, then, again because of symmetry and anonymity, the demand distribution at each firm would be still Poisson, but each with a different arrival rate that depends on what the seller posts and how it compares with the rest of the market (Galenianos and Kircher, 2012). For instance, if a seller posts a lower price, say 0.4, while everyone else still posts 0.5, then his expected demand \( q \) would be higher than \( \lambda \) (more on this below).

In the full-fledged model the expected demand \( q \) depends not only on the list price \( r \), but also on the pricing rule \( m \), the date \( t \) and buyers’ type \( i \). Specifically, the probability that a firm with the terms \( (r_{m,t}, m) \) meets \( n = 0, 1, 2... \) customers of type \( i = h, l \) is given by

\[
\Pr [n] = \frac{e^{-q_{i,m,t}(r_{m,t})}q_{i,m,t}^n (r_{m,t})}{n!} \equiv z_n (q_{i,m,t}).
\]

The fact that \( q \) is indexed by \( i \) indicates that, when thinking about the total demand at a firm, one has to consider arrivals from high types \( q_{h,m,t} \) as well as low types \( q_{l,m,t} \).

Firms post their prices and pricing rules, and buyers direct their search depending on how attractive these terms are. All else equal, cheaper firms attract more customers and expensive firms attract fewer customers; however price is not the only concern for a buyer when deciding where to shop. Each seller has a limited inventory, so buyers must also take into account the likelihood of not being able to purchase today and having to try again in the next period. In that respect it is easier to purchase at expensive firms as they tend to be less crowded; thus, customers do not necessarily head straight to the cheapest firm. In equilibrium, the expected demands adjust to ensure that buyers are indifferent across all firms posting different prices or pricing rules.\(^7\)

**Expected Utilities.** Let \( U_{i,m,t} \) denote a type \( i = h, l \) buyer’s expected utility at a firm trading with rule \( m \in \{f, b\} \). Consider a fixed price firm with price \( r_{f,t} \). We have

\[
U_{i,f,t} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})}{n+1} (1 - r_{f,t}) + \left[ 1 - \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})}{n+1} \right] \beta u_{i,t+1}.
\]

High types and low types arrive at Poisson rates \( q_{h,f,t} \) and \( q_{l,f,t} \). The distribution of the total

\(^7\)Throughout the text we use "expected demand", "arrival rate" and "queue length" interchangeably.
demand, therefore, is also Poisson with arrival rate \( q_{h,f,t} + q_{f,f,t} \). So, a buyer who finds himself at the firm finds \( n = 0, 1, \ldots \) other buyers with probability \( z_n (q_{h,f,t} + q_{f,f,t}) \). He purchases with probability \( 1/(n + 1) \) and his payoff is \( 1 - r_{f,t} \). With the complementary probability, given by the expression in square brackets, the buyer fails to transact so he moves to the next period, where he expects to earn \( \beta u_{i,t+1} \).

Now consider a flexible firm with list price \( r_{b,t} \). A low type buyer always pays the list price \( r_{b,t} \); so, his expected utility \( U_{l,b,t} \) is similar to above:

\[
U_{l,b,t} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t})}{n+1} (1 - r_{b,t}) + \left[ 1 - \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t})}{n+1} \right] \beta u_{l,t+1}.
\]

A high type’s expected utility \( U_{h,b,t} \), on the other hand, is given by

\[
U_{h,b,t} = z_0 (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t}) (1 + \varepsilon - y_t) + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{z_n (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t})}{n+1} (1 - r_{b,t}) + \left[ 1 - \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t})}{n+1} \right] \beta u_{h,t+1}.
\]

With probability \( z_0 (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t}) \) the high type buyer is alone at the firm, in which case he bargains and obtains the item paying \( y_t \). Since the transaction involves bargaining, the buyer obtains the additional \( \varepsilon \). The second part of the expression is similar to above: with probability \( z_n (q_{h,b,t} + q_{l,b,t}) \) he finds \( n = 1, 2, \ldots \) competitors; so he purchases with probability \( 1/(n + 1) \) paying the list price \( r_{b,t} \) (recall that if multiple customers are present then no bargaining takes place). Finally with the complementary probability he fails to transact and moves to period \( t + 1 \), where he expects to earn \( \beta u_{h,t+1} \).

**Lemma 1** We have \( \partial U_{i,m,t} / \partial r_{m,t} < 0 \) and \( \partial U_{i,m,t} / \partial q_{i,m,t} < 0 \), where \( i = h, l \) and \( m = f, b \).

The proof is skipped as it is based on straightforward algebra. Put simply, the Lemma says buyers dislike expensive or crowded firms (the ones with a high price \( r \) or high demand \( q \)). The first claim is self-explanatory; the second claim follows from the fact that customers are less likely to purchase at crowded firms.

Let \( \bar{U}_{i,t} \) denote the maximum expected utility ("market utility") a type \( i \) customer can obtain in the market at time \( t \). For now we treat \( \bar{U}_{i,t} \) as given, subsequently it will be determined endogenously.\(^8\) So, consider an individual seller who advertises the price package \( (r_{m,t}, m) \) and suppose

\(^8\)The market utility approach is standard in the directed search literature as it greatly facilitates the characteriza-
high and low type buyers respond to this advertisement with arrival rates \( q_{h,m,t} \geq 0 \) and \( q_{l,m,t} \geq 0 \). The rates satisfy

\[ q_{i,m,t} > 0 \text{ if } U_{i,m,t}(r_{m,t}, q_{h,m,t}, q_{l,m,t}) = \bar{U}_{i,t} \text{ else } q_{i,m,t} = 0. \]  

(6)

The indifference condition (6) says that the price package and the arrival rates must generate an expected utility of at least \( \bar{U}_{h,t} \) for high type customers, else they will stay away \((q_{h,m,t} = 0)\) and at least \( \bar{U}_{l,t} \) for low type customers, else they will stay away \((q_{l,m,t} = 0)\).

The indifference condition also reveals a law of demand in that the expected demand \( q_{i,m,t} \) decreases as the list price \( r_{m,t} \) increases. In words, cheaper firms attract more customers and expensive firms attract fewer customers. To see why, apply the Implicit Function Theorem to (6) to obtain

\[ \frac{dq_{i,m,t}}{dr_{m,t}} = -\frac{\partial U_{i,m,t}/\partial r_{m,t}}{\partial U_{i,m,t}/\partial q_{i,m,t}}. \]

The numerator and the denominator are both negative (Lemma 1); hence \( dq_{i,m,t}/dr_{m,t} \) is negative, indicating that if the seller raises \( r \) then buyers respond by decreasing \( q \). From a seller’s point of view, raising the price brings in more revenue; however it lowers the expected demand. The seller’s problem involves finding a balance between these two opposing effects, which we study next.

### 2.5 Seller’s Problem and Definition of Equilibrium

The expected profit of a fixed price seller is given by

\[ \Pi_{f,t} = [1 - z_0 (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t})] r_{f,t} + z_0 (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t}) \beta \pi_{t+1}. \]  

(7)

The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting at least a customer, in which case the item is sold at list price \( r_{f,t} \). With the complementary probability the seller fails to get a customer and moves to the next period where he expects to earn \( \beta \pi_{t+1} \), which represents his discounted value of search in period \( t + 1 \). The expected profit of a flexible seller is similar:

\[ \Pi_{b,t} = z_0 (q_{l,b,t}) z_1 (q_{h,b,t}) y_t + [z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) z_1 (q_{l,b,t}) + \sum_{n=2}^{\infty} z_n (q_{l,b,t} + q_{h,b,t})] r_{b,t} + z_0 (q_{l,b,t} + q_{h,b,t}) \beta \pi_{t+1}. \]  

(8)

tion of equilibrium, e.g. see Burdett et al. (2001). Galenianos and Kircher (2012) provide game theoretic foundations for the use of the market utility paradigm in a variety of directed search setups.
With probability $z_0(q_{h,t}, q_{l,t}) z_1(q_{h,t})$ the seller gets a single high type customer, who haggles and obtains the item at price $y_t$. The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting either a single low type customer or getting multiple customers. In either case list price $r_{b,t}$ is charged. The last bit, as above, deals with the possibility of not getting any customer at all. A seller’s objective is to maximize the profit subject to the fact that he must provide buyers with their market utilities. Specifically each seller solves

$$\max_{m \in \{f,b\}, r_{m,t} \in [0,1], (q_{h,m,t}, q_{l,m,t}) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2} \Pi_{m,t} \quad \text{subject to (6)}. \quad (9)$$

Indifference constraints in (6) determine expected demands $q_{h,m,t}$ and $q_{l,m,t}$ as functions of the pricing rule $m$ and the list price $r_{m,t}$. Note that the seller faces two indifference constraints, one for high type customers and one for low type customers. If both constraints bind, then the seller is able to attract both types of customers. If a single constraint binds then he attracts one type only. (The case where neither constraint binds, of course, can be ruled out as it implies that the seller gets no customer at all.)

Sellers are free to post any price and they are also free to be fixed or flexible with what they post. Letting $\alpha_{m,t}(r_{m,t})$ denote the fraction of sellers posting $r_{m,t}$ we have

$$\alpha_{m,t}(r_{m,t}) > 0 \text{ only if } \Pi_{m,t}(r_{m,t}, q_{h,m,t}, q_{l,m,t}) = \bar{\Pi}_{m,t} \text{ else } \alpha_{m,t}(r_{m,t}) = 0, \quad (10)$$

where

$$\bar{\Pi}_{m,t} \equiv \max_{r_{m',t} \in [0,1], (q_{h,m',t}, q_{l,m',t}) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2} \Pi_{m',t}(r_{m',t}, q_{h,m',t}, q_{l,m',t}).$$

Similarly letting $\varphi_{m,t}$ denote the fraction of sellers opting for rule $m$, we have

$$\varphi_{m,t} > 0 \text{ only if } \bar{\Pi}_{m,t} = \max_{\tilde{m} \in \{f,b\}} \bar{\Pi}_{\tilde{m},t}, \text{ else } \varphi_{m,t} = 0, \quad (11)$$

i.e. rule $m$ is selected only if it delivers the highest expected profit. This does not mean that a unique pricing rule will prevail in equilibrium. It is possible that, and indeed it is the case that, both rules emerge in equilibrium delivering equal profits.

Finally, to close down the model, we need two feasibility conditions to ensure that the weighted sum of expected demands (per seller) consisting of type $i$ buyers equals to the market wide buyer-seller ratio for that particular type. Recall that $\lambda_t$ is the total buyer-seller ratio in period $t$ and
that \( \eta_t \) is the fraction of low type buyers. Letting \( \lambda_{l,t} \equiv \eta_t \lambda_t \) and \( \lambda_{h,t} \equiv (1 - \eta_t) \lambda_t \) we have

\[
\varphi_{b,t} \int_0^1 \alpha_{b,t}(r_{b,t}) q_{i,b,t}(r_{b,t}) dr_{b,t} + \varphi_{f,t} \int_0^1 \alpha_{f,t}(r_{f,t}) q_{i,f,t}(r_{f,t}) dr_{f,t} = \lambda_{i,t} \text{ for } i = h, l. \tag{12}
\]

There are two equations in (12), one for high types and one for low types, and the equations are designed to take into account the possibility of each seller posting a different price. In Lemma 2, however, we prove that sellers competing with the same rule end up posting the same list price \( r_{m,t} \); so, borrowing that result, and noting that \( \varphi_{f,t} + \varphi_{b,t} = 1 \), the equations in (12) become

\[
\varphi_{f,t} q_{i,f,t} + (1 - \varphi_{f,t}) q_{i,b,t} = \lambda_{i,t} \text{ for } i = h, l. \tag{13}
\]

We can now define the equilibrium.

**Definition 1** A competitive search equilibrium ("equilibrium") consists of prices \( r^*_{m,t} \), expected demands \( q^*_{h,m,t}, q^*_{l,m,t} \) and fractions \( \alpha_{m,t}^*, \varphi_{m,t}^* \) satisfying the demand distribution (2), buyer’s indifference (6), profit maximization (9), equal profits (10)-(11) and feasibility (12).

The evolution of the buyer seller ratio \( \lambda_t \) and the fraction of non-hagglers \( \eta_t \), also part of the equilibrium, is discussed in Section 6.

### 3 Characterization of Equilibria: The Benchmark Case

The parameter \( \varepsilon \) plays an important role in determining the nature of the equilibria. We start with the case where \( \varepsilon = 0 \), i.e. where customers are neutral to the bargaining process, i.e. they have no displeasure or enjoyment from the bargaining process itself.

**Proposition 1** Suppose \( \varepsilon = 0 \). Depending on how large \( \theta \) is, the model exhibits two types of equilibria:

- **Partial Segmentation Equilibrium (Eq-PS):** If \( \theta \geq \tilde{\theta}_t \equiv z_1(\lambda_t) / [1 - z_0(\lambda_t)] \) then there exists a continuum of payoff-equivalent equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction \( \varphi_{f,t}^* \geq \eta_t \) of firms trade via fixed pricing and remaining firms trade via flexible pricing. Fixed and flexible
firms post

\[ r_{f,t}^* = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \frac{z_1(\lambda_t)}{1 - z_0(\lambda_t)} (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) \quad \text{and} \quad (14) \]

\[ r_{b,t}^* = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \frac{z_1(\lambda_t)(1 - \theta)}{1 - z_0(\lambda_t) - z_1(\lambda_t)} (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}), \quad (15) \]

and if negotiations ensue the transaction occurs at price

\[ y_{t}^* = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \theta (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}). \quad (16) \]

Prices satisfy \( r_{b,t}^* > r_{f,t}^* > y_t \), i.e. flexible firms post a higher price than what fixed price firms post, which in turn, is greater than the bargained price. The inequality in prices leads to a partial segmentation in customer demographics: non-hagglers shop exclusively at fixed price firms whereas hagglers shop anywhere. In any equilibrium sellers and buyers earn

\[ \pi_t = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - [z_0(\lambda_t) + z_1(\lambda_t)] (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}), \quad (17) \]

\[ u_t = z_0(\lambda_t) [1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] + \beta u_{t+1} \quad (18) \]

**Fixed Price Equilibrium (Eq-FP):** If \( \theta < \bar{\theta}_t \), i.e. if high type buyers are not skilled enough in negotiations, then the availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium, i.e. all sellers adopt fixed pricing and post \( r_{f,t}^* \) given by (14). Equilibrium payoffs are the same as above, i.e. sellers and buyers earn \( \pi_t \) and \( u_t \).

The main message of the Proposition is that fixed and flexible pricing rules can coexist in the same marketplace; however each rule comes with its own list price and customer demographics. Flexible firms announce higher prices and attract high types only. Fixed price firms, on the other hand, announce lower prices and attract both types of customers.

To see why prices are unequal, note that flexible stores factor in the fact that they may end up selling at a discount, so they raise their prices to cover themselves against this contingency. In other words, they strategically inflate the sticker price anticipating the eventual surplus loss during negotiations. Fixed price firms, on the other hand, are committed to charge what they post, so they post moderate prices. While the relationship between flexible pricing and inflated sticker prices may sound intuitive, to our knowledge, this is the first study providing a competition based explanation to such phenomenon with a decentralized market equilibrium approach.
The inequality of prices raises the question of whether buyers or sellers may want to pass a potential trading opportunity in the hope of getting a better deal in subsequent periods, and the answer is no. In the proof of the Proposition we show that players in a match are better off transacting immediately instead of walking away. There are two reasons for this. First, waiting is costly (the discount factor is less than one), so players have a strong incentive to settle a deal as early as possible. And more importantly, second, the market operates via search and matching, so no-one is guaranteed to find a suitable match in subsequent periods. A seller may not get a customer at all, whereas a buyer may well end up in a crowded firm and walk out empty handed as a result. Therefore, a sure transaction today, even under the worst case scenario—buying at the highest price $r^*_b,t$ for a buyer, selling at the lowest price $y^*_t$ for a seller—is still better than walking away and facing the prospect of not being able to buy or sell tomorrow.

4 Characterization of Equilibria when Customers Dislike Bargaining

The discussion so far revolved around the case $\varepsilon = 0$. If, on the other hand, customers dislike the bargaining experience then the result is remarkably simple.

**Proposition 2** If $\varepsilon < 0$ then fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. For characterization see item Eq-FP in Proposition 1.

Recall that if $\varepsilon = 0$ then fixed and flexible pricing are payoff equivalent in equilibrium and sellers are indifferent to select either pricing rule. If $\varepsilon$ falls below zero then this indifference no longer holds because the negative $\varepsilon$ filters into flexible sellers’ profits causing them to earn less than their fixed price competitors. Sellers can avoid the negative impact of $\varepsilon$ by switching to fixed pricing, which explains why the fixed price outcome emerges as the unique equilibrium.

It is worth pointing out that the fixed price equilibrium arises not because buyers would not bargain anyway (because of the negative $\varepsilon$), but because offering flexible pricing causes sellers to lose on profits, and therefore, in equilibrium no venue offers this option in the first place. Indeed in the proof of the Proposition we consider the out of equilibrium scenario where a firm offers flexible pricing and we assume that high types’ bargaining power is sufficiently large to ensure that, even after accounting for the negative $\varepsilon$, they would still prefer bargaining over purchasing at the posted price. (The other scenario where they would not even attempt negotiating trivially yields a fixed
price outcome.) We show that along this scenario the negative $\varepsilon$ filters into the flexible firm’s profit, and the firm is better off by unilaterally switching to fixed pricing.

This finding suggests that from a seller’s point of view the flexible pricing strategy is not a viable option if potential customers indeed dislike the haggling process. More specifically, if sellers realize that even potential hagglers might dislike bargaining for their products (e.g. due to the fear of being seen unclassy) and they can not effectively reduce or eliminate such displeasure, perhaps due to product characteristics, then they have an incentive to practice fixed pricing.

Finally, we turn the case where customers get a psychological satisfaction if they manage to purchase the item below the posted price.

5 Characterization of Equilibria when Customers Enjoy Bargaining

Proposition 3 Suppose $\varepsilon$ is positive but sufficiently small.

- **Full Segmentation Equilibrium (Eq-FS):** If $\theta \geq \tilde{\theta}_t$, where
  \[
  \tilde{\theta}_t \equiv \frac{z_1(q_{h,t}^*)}{1 - z_0(q_{h,t}^*)} - \frac{\varepsilon z_1(q_{h,t}^*)q_{h,t}^*}{[1 - z_0(q_{h,t}^*)][(1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + \varepsilon]}
  \]  

  then there exists a unique equilibrium where a fraction $\varphi_{t,t}^* = \eta_t$ of firms choose fixed pricing while the rest opt for flexible pricing. Equilibrium prices are given by

  \[
  r_{f,t}^* = 1 - \beta u_{t,t+1} - \frac{z_1(q_{f,t}^*)}{1 - z_0(q_{f,t}^*)} (1 - \beta u_{t,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1})
  \]  

  \[
  r_{h,t}^* = 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \frac{z_1(q_{h,t}^*)}{1 - z_0(q_{h,t}^*)} \left[ 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} + \varepsilon \frac{q_{h,t+1}^* - \varepsilon}{1 - \theta} \right]
  \]  

  \[
  y_t^* = 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \theta (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + \varepsilon (1 - \theta).
  \]  

  The equilibrium is characterized by full segmentation of customers: low types avoid flexible firms and high types avoid fixed price firms. Expected demands satisfy $q_{h,b,t}^* < \lambda < q_{h,f,t}^*$, i.e. flexible firms attract fewer customers than fixed price firms. Equilibrium payoffs are as follows

  \[
  \pi_t = 1 - \beta u_{t,t+1} - [z_0(q_{f,t}^*) + z_1(q_{f,t}^*)] (1 - \beta u_{t,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1})
  \]  

  \[
  u_{h,t} = z_0(q_{h,t}^*) (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + [z_0(q_{h,t}^*) - z_1(q_{h,t}^*)] \varepsilon + \beta u_{h,t+1}
  \]  

  \[
  u_{l,t} = z_0(q_{l,t}^*) (1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + \beta u_{l,t+1}
  \]
Fixed Price Equilibrium (Eq-FP): If $\theta < \tilde{\theta}$, then fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. For characterization see item Eq-FP in Proposition 1.

When compared to the benchmark case $\varepsilon = 0$, the introduction of a positive $\varepsilon$ leads to two important results: uniqueness of the equilibrium, instead of a continuum of equilibria, and full segmentation of customers, instead of partial segmentation. The multiplicity of equilibria in the benchmark case is disturbing for two reasons. First, the model loses predictive power as one cannot know how many firms are firm with the price and how many are flexible. Second, and perhaps more worrisome, is the presence of an equilibrium where the fraction of fixed price sellers $\varphi^*_f,t$ may, in fact, be equal to 1, i.e. a fixed price outcome where no seller offers flexible pricing, despite the availability of bargaining and despite the fact that high types are sufficiently skilled in negotiations. The introduction of a positive $\varepsilon$ eliminates the continuum of equilibria, and instead, yields a unique equilibrium. To understand why, notice that in the benchmark if sufficiently many sellers pick fixed pricing, then the marginal seller is indifferent between picking either pricing rule, which is why there is a continuum of equilibria where $\varphi^*_f,t$ can be anywhere between $\eta_t$ and 1. But if $\varepsilon > 0$ then the marginal seller is strictly better off picking flexible pricing, because, compared to the benchmark, buyers have a larger appetite for flexible deals, yet there are not sufficiently many sellers offering such deals. The marginal seller can earn more if he deviates to flexible pricing, which explains why the introduction of a positive $\varepsilon$ unsettles the aforementioned indifference and leads to a unique equilibrium.

The equilibrium is characterized by full segmentation of customers: low types avoid flexible firms whereas high types avoid fixed price firms. The reason behind the first relationship is the same as in the benchmark: flexible firms post negotiable but high prices, but non-hagglers cannot negotiate; hence they avoid these firms. The second relationship is due to the positive $\varepsilon$. In the benchmark model high types were indifferent between fixed and flexible firms, so they would shop anywhere. The introduction of $\varepsilon$ unsettles this indifference in favor of flexible venues because in this setting high types not only are able to bargain down the list price but also get some additional satisfaction from doing so.\(^9\)

\(^9\)Proposition 3 requires $\varepsilon$ to be positive but small. If $\varepsilon$ is large, then there exists a corner equilibrium, where all sellers choose flexible pricing and low type buyers have no choice but to shop at these stores and pay inflated list prices. We do not focus on this outcome, because $\varepsilon$ is assumed to be a small psychological factor, whereas this outcome requires $\varepsilon$ to be so large to convince all sellers to ignore low types in order to lure the more lucrative high types.
In our model we a-priori classify buyers as hagglers and non-hagglers, and then, obtain the segmentation result along those lines (hagglers to flexible stores vs. non-hagglers to fixed price stores). Thus, it may seem that the exogenous classification of buyers in terms of their bargaining abilities is necessary for the segmentation result; but this is not the case. Consider a scenario where buyers are identical in terms of their bargaining skills but differ in terms of their enjoyment for the bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter $\varepsilon$. Imagine that $\varepsilon$ varies in an interval $[\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_N]$, where $\varepsilon_1 < 0$ and $\varepsilon_N > 0$, and that buyers are divided into $N$ separate groups, where group 1 has the lowest $\varepsilon$ and group $N$ has the highest, that is $\varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2 < \ldots < \varepsilon_N$. We show that if the gap between $\varepsilon_N$ and $\varepsilon_{N-1}$ is sufficiently large, then there exists an equilibrium, where bargaining deals are designated for the most enthusiastic type only—that is, in equilibrium type $N$ customers hunt for bargaining deals and shop at flexible stores, while everyone else shops at fixed price stores. This outcome is similar to Eq-FS in that it generates segmentation among customers. In addition, along this variation the division of hagglers vs. non-hagglers emerges as an endogenous phenomenon, in that type $N$ customers turn into hagglers whereas remaining customers do not haggle at all. (The proof of this result can be found in the Online Appendix 2.)

The result on self selection and segmentation is indeed important as it shows that the type of demand a firm gets strategically depends on the pricing rule it selects at the first place. As indicated in the Introduction, most of the existing literature in pricing strategies assume a non-competitive environment, typically a monopolist seller, where heterogenous customers (myopic, strategic etc.) are assumed to arrive at an exogenous rate and irrespective of the pricing rule in place. Our result, however, suggests that if the exogenous demand assumption is relaxed then due to self-selection some customers may not visit certain firms in the first place.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that customers indeed love the feeling of purchasing the item below the posted price and that they inevitably gravitate towards outlets offering such deals. Retail giant JC Penney made a bold move in January 2012 by ridding their stores of all discounts, sales and bargains in an effort to establish "fair and square" pricing. Unfortunately, for JC Penney, this strategy did not work as its core consumers, who were accustomed to sales and bargains, began leaving the retailer in droves. At the end, the now ousted CEO Ron Johnson had to confess this (Tuttle, 2013):

"I thought people were just tired of coupons and all this stuff. The reality is all of the couponing we did, there were a certain part of the customers that loved that. They gravitated to stores that competed that way. So our core customer, I think was much
more dependent, and enjoyed coupons more than I understood."

While this example illustrates how customers’ enjoyment of the selling institution itself may have significant implications, we note that enjoyment of coupons is not the same as enjoyment of bargaining. There are apparent differences between the two cases including the rules, deadlines, contexts and specific processes associated with coupons. However despite these differences, one can identify broad similarities between coupons and bargaining. First, in both cases, customers who are willing to exert effort (either by engaging in haggling or by being diligent enough to monitor deals from Hi/Lo retailers) may get rewarded with lower prices. Second, in both cases, even with additional effort, obtaining a deal is not guaranteed with limited availability items (as demand may rise endogenously depending on the appeal of the pricing/promotion policy). Third, customers may possibly gain additional non-economic pleasure with feelings of excitement, mastery and competence from getting discounts via coupons or bargaining.

To understand how equilibrium objects change with respect to $\varepsilon$ we simulate prices and the fraction of firms adopting flexible pricing against $\varepsilon$ and calendar time $t$. The simulations are based on a stationary environment where outgoing agents are assumed to be replaced with clones; thus $\eta_t$, $b_t$ and $s_t$ remain constant throughout all market activity. The stationarity of the environment ensures that the observed dynamics do not stem from fluctuations in the number or composition of buyers and sellers.\textsuperscript{10}

Price trajectories in 1a and 1b reveal that for any given $t$, the equilibrium fixed price and the flexible list price both increase in $\varepsilon$, implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Remarkably fixed price sellers, who do not even cater to hagglers, also raise their prices if $\varepsilon$ goes up. The mechanism behind this spillover effect is this. As $\varepsilon$ goes up, more firms offer flexible pricing (see panel 1c) and fewer firms offer fixed pricing. Since fixed price firms are the only outlets where non-hagglers can shop, the expected demand at fixed price firms goes up. The rising demand, naturally, leads to higher prices. The fact that fixed price firms get more crowded and charge higher prices points to another interesting spillover effect in that non-bargaining customers, who shop only at fixed price firms, end up receiving less utility.

\textsuperscript{10}The simulations are based on the following parametrization: $b_1 = s_1 = 1$, $\eta_1 = 0.5$, $\theta = 0.6$, $T = 25$ and $\beta = 0.9$. The terminal payoffs, $u_{T+1}$ and $\pi_{T+1}$, are both assumed to be zero. The parameter $\varepsilon$ ranges from 0 to 0.05.
when haggling customers enjoy bargaining.\footnote{We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the second relationship between $\varepsilon$ and its impact on the non-bargaining customers’ utility.}

A variety of markets operate on implicit or explicit deadlines, and those deadlines inevitably have a bearing on price dynamics. In our model, the simulations are based on a setting with a finite $T$, which allows us to study such deadline effects on prices and the percentage of sellers adopting each pricing rule. Price trajectories with respect to the calendar time $t$ reveal that if the deadline is sufficiently far away (i.e. when $t$ is small) then sellers list higher prices. As the deadline nears, however, prices start to fall. The pattern is more visible for larger values of $\varepsilon$. Indeed, if $\varepsilon \approx 0$ then prices remain rather flat over time, however if $\varepsilon \approx 0.05$ then they clearly exhibit a falling pattern. The reason is this. When $t$ is small, sellers are not worried about not being able to trade as they know the market will remain active for a long while. So, they list higher prices in order to take advantage of the presence of high type buyers and benefit from the positive $\varepsilon$ they bring with. Towards the end of the market however, the fear of not being able to sell and walking out empty handed kicks in, as such, prices start to fall.\footnote{In Figure 1a, taking $\varepsilon = 0$ as a benchmark, we observe that flexible sellers add a premium to their prices as $\varepsilon$ goes up and during the initial periods this premium can exceed $\varepsilon$. To see why, recall that customers pay this full price only with some positive probability. With the remainder probability, they negotiate and pay a lower price plus they enjoy $\varepsilon$ on top. Thus, on expected terms they are still better off compared to the benchmark even though the premium may exceed $\varepsilon$. The premium is highest during the initial periods, because, early on, many stores offer flexible pricing, and the higher the number of such stores, the less crowded they are. This, in turn, means that their customers are very likely to negotiate a discount. To cover themselves against such likely discounts, the stores raise the aforementioned premium. As the deadline approaches the number of flexible stores decreases; thus, the premium starts to shrink.} Notice that, the drop in prices is only gradual and it does not warrant buyers to delay their purchase. As discussed earlier, in equilibrium, players

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{subfigure}{0.33\textwidth}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1a.png}
\caption{Flexible List Price}
\end{subfigure}\hspace{0.05\textwidth}
\begin{subfigure}{0.33\textwidth}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1b.png}
\caption{Fixed Price}
\end{subfigure}\hspace{0.05\textwidth}
\begin{subfigure}{0.33\textwidth}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1c.png}
\caption{Fraction of Flexible Stores}
\end{subfigure}
\caption{Equilibrium Market Dynamics against $t$ and $\varepsilon$}
\end{figure}
are better off trading immediately rather than waiting. The deadline effect can be augmented by considering imbalances in terminal payoffs of buyers and sellers. Suppose, for instance, that sellers have the option to liquidate unsold items in a secondary market that starts at the end of the first market, i.e. suppose that \( \pi_{T+1} > 0 \) (buyers’ terminal payoff is still \( u_{T+1} = 0 \)). Along this scenario, the payoff \( \pi_{T+1} \) filters into the prices and prevents them from falling too much even when the deadline is near.

Another observation is that the equilibrium percentage of sellers adopting flexible pricing falls in \( t \) (panel 1c). To see why, notice that along Eq-FS flexible stores attract, on average, fewer customers than fixed price stores; thus, they are less likely to make a sale. Initially sellers are not too worried about not being able to trade, so a large number of them remain flexible in an effort to trade with high type customers. But as \( t \) grows large, sellers start to switch to fixed pricing to maximize their likelihood of making a sale.

Panel 1c further reveals that the percentage of sellers adopting flexible pricing rises in \( \varepsilon \). The intuition is that flexible sellers are able to convert a larger \( \varepsilon \) into higher prices, and thereby, into higher profits. The market is competitive; so, if \( \varepsilon \) rises then more sellers become flexible in an effort to take advantage of this opportunity. The next proposition summarizes the discussion above analytically. (The proof is in the Online Appendix 1.)

**Proposition 4** The equilibrium profit \( \pi_t \) rises in \( \varepsilon \).

In order to prove the proposition, we start by establishing that the expected utility of low types, \( u_{l,t} \), falls in \( \varepsilon \). In words, low type (non-bargaining) customers, who shop only at fixed price firms, end up receiving less utility when haggling customers’ \( \varepsilon \) increases. Recall that we have seen this spillover effect in the simulations above. In the proof of the proposition, we establish this result analytically. Next, we show that sellers’ profit increases as \( u_{l,t} \) decreases, thus the result in the proposition follows.

The proposition suggests that sellers may convert a positive \( \varepsilon \) into higher prices and profits. This, then, indicates that firms’ attempt to raise customers’ enjoyment of the bargaining process (e.g. through such actions as better training of the salesforce to be highly courteous during bargaining, providing a relaxing environment for price negotiation, among others) may be a profitable strategy.
6 Price Dynamics

In this section we explore how equilibrium prices respond to fluctuations in expected demand. We proxy the expected demand by the buyer-seller ratio $\lambda_t = b_t/s_t$ since along Eq-PS and Eq-FP the expected demand at each store is equal to $\lambda_t$, whereas along Eq-FS expected demands $q_{h,b,t}^*$ and $q_{l,f,t}^*$ are proportional to it (they increase if $\lambda_t$ increases and they fall if it falls).

To determine the trajectory of $\lambda_t$ one needs to focus on how the measures of buyers and sellers evolve over time. Recall that the market starts with a measure of $s_1$ sellers and $b_1$ buyers, of which a fraction $\eta_1$ are low types. At the end of each period, trading players leave the market and the ones who could not trade move to the next period to play the same game. In addition, at the beginning of each period $t = 2, 3, \ldots$ a new cohort of $s_t^{\text{new}}$ sellers and $b_t^{\text{new}}$ buyers, of which a fraction $\eta_t^{\text{new}}$ are low types, enter the market joining the existing players. The proposition below pins down how these measures evolve over time.

**Proposition 5** Along Eq-PS and Eq-FP the measures of buyers and sellers evolve according to

$$b_t = b_t^{\text{new}} + b_t - s_t(1 - \eta_t(\lambda_t)) \quad \text{and} \quad s_t = s_t^{\text{new}} + s_t - \eta_t(1 - \eta_t)$$

for $t \geq 2$. (26)

The fraction of non-hagglers, on the other hand, evolves according to

$$\eta_t = \left[b_t^{\text{new}} \eta_t^{\text{new}} + b_t - s_t(1 - \eta_t)\right]/b_t.$$  

(27)

Specifically if $\eta_t^{\text{new}} = \eta_1$ then $\eta_t = \eta_1$ for all $t \geq 2$. Along Eq-FS we have

$$b_t = b_t^{\text{new}} + b_t - (l_t - h_t)$$

and

$$s_t = s_t^{\text{new}} + s_t - (l_t - h_t)$$

where $l_t - 1 \equiv s_t(1 - \varphi_{f,t-1}^*)[1 - \eta_t(\lambda_t)]$ and $h_t - 1 \equiv s_t(1 - \varphi_{h,t-1}^*)[1 - \eta_t(\lambda_t)]$. The fraction of non-hagglers evolves according to $\eta_t = \left[b_t^{\text{new}} \eta_t^{\text{new}} + b_t - s_t(1 - \eta_t)\right]/b_t$. (28)

Given the equations governing $b_t$ and $s_t$, one can pin down how $\lambda_t$ evolves over time and then, via reverse engineering, one can impose specific trajectories on $\lambda_t$. To see how, note that along Eq-PS or Eq-FP we have

$$\lambda_t = \frac{b_t^{\text{new}} + b_t - s_t(1 - e^{-\lambda_t})}{s_t^{\text{new}} + s_t(1 - e^{-\lambda_t})}$$

for $t \geq 2$. (28)
The trajectory is endogenous but it is partly driven by the measures of incoming cohorts \( b_{t}^{new} \) and \( s_{t}^{new} \), which are exogenous. This means that one can reverse engineer and pick the exogenous numbers in such a way that the trajectory follows a particular pattern one may have in mind. Specifically, we consider seasonal cycles where \( \lambda_t \) starts low in the beginning of the cycle, peaks in the middle of the cycle and subsides towards the end of the cycle and each such cycle lasts, say, \( k \) periods, that is \( \lambda_t = \lambda_{t+k} \), for some integer \( k \). For instance consider a case with \( k = 2 \), where the market alternates between episodes of high and low demand. Suppose in odd periods we want to have \( \lambda_{odd} = 0.5 \) and in even periods \( \lambda_{even} = 1 \). One can produce such cycles by picking starting values, say, \( b_1 = 1 \) and \( s_1 = 2 \) and the new entrants as \( b_{1}^{new} = 1.7, s_{1}^{new} = 0.7, b_{1}^{new} = 0.3 \) and \( s_{1}^{new} = 1.3 \).\(^{13}\)

![Figure 2: Price Dynamics in a Market with Seasonal Cycles](image_url)

In the simulation we pick \( k = 12 \) and select the entering cohorts in such a way that the expected

\(^{13}\)In period 1 the buyer seller ratio equals to \( \lambda_1 = b_1/s_1 = 0.5 \). At the end of the period \( s_1 (1 - e^{-\lambda_1}) = 0.8 \) buyers and sellers trade and exit, which means that a measure of 1.2 sellers and 0.2 buyers are unable to trade so they move to the next period. At the beginning of period 2, \( b_{2}^{new} = 1.7, s_{2}^{new} = 0.7 \) enter the market; thus \( b_2 = s_2 = 1.9 \) and therefore \( \lambda_2 = 1 \). At the end of period 2, \( s_2 (1 - e^{-\lambda_2}) = 1.2 \) buyers and sellers trade and exit; hence a measure of 0.7 sellers and 0.7 buyers move to period 3. At the beginning of period 3, \( b_{3}^{new} = 0.3, s_{3}^{new} = 1.3 \) join them; thus \( b_3 = 1 \) and \( s_3 = 2 \) and therefore \( \lambda_3 = 0.5 \). And so on.
demand follows a zigzag trajectory: the cycle starts when lambda is at its lowest value 0.6, then it peaks at 2 in the middle of the season, then it declines back to 0.6 and then it starts again (see Figure 2). In addition, for the sake of simplicity we assume that $\eta_t^{new} = \eta_1 = 0.5$ so that $\eta_t$ remains constant at 0.5 at all times.\footnote{Note that in Eq-PS if $\eta_t^{new} = \eta_1$ then $\eta_t = \eta_1$ for all $t$. In words, the fraction of low types remains constant at $\eta_1$ throughout all market activity, provided that the fraction in the entrant cohorts is also $\eta_1$. (This relationship holds in Eq-FP as well, but this is rather immaterial because no one negotiates in Eq-FP.) To see why note that along Eq-PS the expected demand at all firms is equal to $\lambda_t$; thus all buyers trade and exit at the same rate. This means that the ratio of hagglers to non hagglers is not disturbed by how fast different types of buyers exit the market. If this ratio is not disturbed externally either, then $\eta_t$ remains constant at $\eta_1$ for all $t \geq 2$. This relationship does not hold along Eq-FS because in that equilibrium hagglers are more likely to trade than non hagglers, and they exit the market at a faster rate. Simulations suggest that if we fix $\eta_t^{new} = \eta_1$ then $\eta_t$ converges to a level slightly above $\eta_1$.}

There are a few observations that stand out. First, prices seem to follow the same trajectory as the expected demand $\lambda_t$: they rise as $\lambda_t$ rises and they fall as it falls. The intuition is simple. If $\lambda_t$ goes up then sellers face less competition to attract customers, so they post higher prices. If $\lambda_t$ falls then they face stiffer competition and cut their prices.

Second, the simulation confirms that the flexible list price is indeed higher than the fixed price. As discussed earlier, flexible sellers understand that they may well end up selling at a lower price than what they initially post, so they inflate the list price up-front to cover themselves against this contingency.

Third, there is a time lag between prices and the expected demand—prices seem to front-run the expected demand by about two periods. Indeed, prices peak around $t = 5$, whereas the expected demand peaks at $t = 7$. Similarly, prices dip at around $t = 11$, which, again, is well before $\lambda_t$ reaches its own minimum at $t = 13$. To understand why, note that prices depend not only on the current demand, but on the entire sequence $\{\lambda_{t+j}\}_{j=0}^T$, as such, if the general outlook of future demand turns negative, then prices start to fall even if demand keeps rising for a short while. For instance at $t = 6$ sellers understand that demand will rise only for one more period, after which it will fall for six consecutive periods until $t = 13$; so, they start cutting prices. By the time $\lambda_t$ peaks at $t = 7$ prices have already started falling. The opposite happens at the end of the cycle. By the time the demand dips at $t = 13$, prices have already started rising. (We remind the reader that players, due to trade frictions, are always willing to transact immediately rather than waiting.)

The final observation is that prices do not fluctuate as much as the expected demand. Even though the demand goes through sharp zigzags, prices follow much smoother trajectories with little fluctuation\footnote{In the simulation, the maximum value of $\lambda_t$ is more than three times its minimum value, but for prices this ratio is less than 1.5. Similarly, the coefficient of variation for $\lambda_t$ is 0.32, whereas for prices it is less than 0.1.}. The reason is this. Prices depend on the entire demand sequence $\{\lambda_{t+j}\}_{j=0}^T$ and if
the terminal period $T$ is sufficiently far away then sellers effectively face a market with cyclical demand that goes through periodic ups and downs. (In the simulation we have $T = 360$, which means that the market goes through thirty cycles of twelve periods before it comes to an end.) With cyclical demand, if $\beta$ is sufficiently large then future total demand is more or less constant because the variation in demand is mostly accounted for; hence prices do not fluctuate as much. Indeed as $\beta \to 1$ price trajectories converge to each other and they start to look like flat lines. On the other hand, as $\beta \to 0$ the impact of any lambda beyond, say, the current period becomes ignorable, which leaves the current demand $\lambda_t$ as the dominant factor driving the prices. Consequently, price trajectories start to follow the trajectory of the current demand $\lambda_t$ closely, exhibiting a similar zigzag pattern.\footnote{16}{We thank the AE for pointing out the interplay between the cyclicality of demand and stable prices.}

The parameter $\beta$ (inversely) proxies the severity of trade frictions. A small value of $\beta$ indicates that players who are unable to buy or sell today incur significant waiting costs before trying again in the subsequent period. The discussion above suggests that fluctuations in prices depend on the degree of trade frictions. If trade frictions are severe (i.e. if waiting is costly) then prices move significantly; else, they remain stable even though the demand goes through sharp ups and downs. In the simulation we have $\beta = 0.8$, which is a moderately high value; hence the stable prices. The following proposition summarizes the discussion so far (the proof is in the Online Appendix 1).\footnote{17}{We restrict the Proposition within Eq-PS and Eq-FP because in the other equilibrium (Eq-FS) expected demands $q_{h,b,t}^*$ and $q_{l,f,t}^*$ have non-trivial closed form solutions rendering an analytic proof elusive. Numerical simulations, however, suggest that along Eq-FS, too, prices tend to remain stable if $\beta$ and $T$ are large.}

**Proposition 6** Both in Eq-PS an in Eq-FP if $T$ is sufficiently large then for all $1 < t \ll T$ we have

$$
\lim_{\beta \to 1} \Delta y_t^* = \lim_{\beta \to 1} \Delta r_{b,t}^* = \lim_{\beta \to 1} \Delta r_{f,t}^* = 0,
$$

where $\Delta y_t^* \equiv y_t^* - y_{t-1}^*$ denotes the difference in prices ($\Delta r_{b,t}^*$ and $\Delta r_{f,t}^*$ are likewise).

In marketing, the phenomenon of stable prices in the presence of fluctuating demand and supply is predominantly explained with fairness concerns, which originates from the principle of dual entitlement put forward by Kahneman et al. (1986). This principle suggests, among others, that customers have perceived fairness levels for both firm profits and retail prices, and it is ‘not fair’ for retailers to change the price arbitrarily, or just to increase the firm’s existing profit, for example, by taking advantage of excess demand (Xia et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2003; Anderson and Simester, 2008). In addition, the fact that prices are not that responsive to changes in costs or demand has
also been analyzed in the economics literature by highlighting, inter alia, the role of consumers’ loss aversion (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2008), the risk of antagonizing customers (Anderson and Simester, 2010), or menu costs. While fairness concerns, or the fear of antagonizing customers could be drivers of price stability in many markets, our results suggest that the phenomenon of stable prices can be obtained as a result of market competition with forward looking rational players.

A second distinction of our paper is that, unlike the cited literature, which by default assume fixed pricing, price stability in our model obtains even when the selection of the pricing rule is endogenous, and where the sale price may involve a non-trivial bargaining process. While forward looking agents may facilitate smooth prices, it is not obvious whether (and under what pricing rules) the smooth price phenomenon would emerge if sellers were allowed to trade via alternative pricing rules. Our paper demonstrates that all prices—the fixed price, the flexible list prices and the bargained price—remain stable despite the fluctuating demand.

Admittedly, the phenomenon of stable prices may emerge in alternative settings with forward looking customers and market competition, e.g., the aforementioned literature studying pricing mechanism selection (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010; Virag, 2011). One can potentially obtain stable prices if one constructs dynamic versions of these models, however, their static (one-shot) setups do not allow them to investigate the issue of price stability. In contrast, our paper considers a dynamic framework, which enables us to explore the issue of price stability in detail.

Many real world markets exhibit cyclical or seasonal demand patterns (Radas and Shugan, 1998; Gijsenberg, 2017), where periods of higher demand follow periods of lower demand. Recent empirical research in marketing has documented such demand patterns and also examined the evolution of observed prices along such cycles (Gijsenberg, 2017). A notable finding therein is the relative stability of prices over time and the limited influence of the demand cycles on the observed prices. While their study context (consumer packaged goods) is clearly different than ours, the observation appears to be quite similar to the price stability phenomenon we observe in our study. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that markets that are known for significant seasonal/cyclical demand fluctuations, such as the housing market, exhibit surprisingly stable prices, which fall quite slowly during low-demand periods (so the average time of a house on the market substantially increases) and do not increase as swiftly and significantly as one would expect during high-demand periods. Our results may provide a compelling reason for these observations in that the variation in future demand gets to be largely accounted for in current prices, so, prices do not fluctuate much.
7 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we develop economic intuition on the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing rules—fixed price and flexible price—using the competitive search paradigm. Fixed pricing is plain enough; flexible pricing involves bargaining between the buyer and seller. Despite bargaining being a common practice in many buying-selling situations, previous analytical models of bargaining in marketing have mostly focused on business-to-business and channel relationships (Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003; Dukes et al., 2006; Guo and Iyer, 2013), leaving room for models investigating the practice of bargaining by customers. In addition, non-economic dynamics such as pleasure or displeasure associated with bargaining could play a role during such transactions. As such, our modeling approach attempts to incorporate this additional non-economic element into the model.

As fixed and flexible pricing coexist in many modern day markets, it is important to gain a better conceptual understanding of these pricing strategies. In this paper, we provide a theoretical rationale for firms’ selection and strategic implications of fixed and flexible pricing in a fully competitive setting by focusing on decentralized markets such as housing or used cars. Fixed and flexible pricing formats, of course, are not exclusive to these markets, and they coexist in a variety of marketplaces. For example in many classified advertisement websites such as Craigslist, one observes indicators for both flexible price selling (“OBO”–or best offer) and fixed price selling (e.g., "sharp price") for seemingly similar items. Similarly, on eBay, in addition to the auction setup, individuals typically have two other options to sell the product: (i) using a fixed price (“Buy It Now”) or (ii) using a flexible price option, under which the seller can either accept the offer, decline it, or respond with a counter offer.

Our study has also connections to research on everyday low pricing (EDLP) and promotional (Hi/Lo) pricing strategies employed by retailers (Lal and Rao, 1997; Ho et al., 1998; Ellickson and Misra, 2008). Fixed pricing resembles EDLP, and flexible pricing resembles Hi/Lo pricing in some ways. As such, our setting has some distinctions and similarities with EDLP and promotional pricing. The differences include the focus on buyers shopping for a single item in our case, whereas customers shopping for a set of items or product categories in EDLP and Hi/Lo research. Also, while search and trade frictions play an essential role in our model, these are typically small or negligible for EDLP and Hi/Lo settings.

Despite these differences, there are some noteworthy similarities. First, both in Hi/Lo settings and in our model, there is uncertainty pertaining the price. More specifically, we have ex-ante
price uncertainty in our model in that customers do not know whether they will get an opportunity to negotiate with the seller before visiting the stores. (We do not have ex-post price uncertainty, i.e., once customers arrive at stores, there is no uncertainty regarding the sale price). Such ex-ante price uncertainty is somewhat similar to promotions at local Hi/Lo sellers where customers may not be aware of those promotions before actually visiting the stores. A similar ex-ante price uncertainty in Hi/Lo stores is that demand can endogenously rise as a result of the appeal of the coupons/promotions, therefore, as in our model, there is no guarantee for a prospective customer to obtain a deal if the item has limited availability.

Furthermore, there seems to be a broad correspondence between our model of fixed vs. flexible pricing and EDLP vs. Hi/Lo pricing in terms of the role of consumer dynamics. In both cases, consumers’ heterogeneity (e.g., some customers put additional effort by engaging in bargaining or by closely monitoring promotions, whereas others do no exert effort) as well as their non-economic aspects (e.g., enjoyment from bargaining) may have significant implications for sellers’ choice of pricing policies.

Finally, our article provides an important methodological contribution to the pricing literature in marketing in that, in addition to Bertrand, Cournot, or Hotelling frameworks, our study underlines the competitive search approach as an alternative way of capturing competition. The competitive search approach is particularly suitable to model the pricing problem in decentralized markets where search and trade frictions matter. Overall, we think that incorporating competitive search models into marketing problems could open up a new avenue of research for scholars in this area.

Our paper has several limitations. First, we implicitly assume that sellers can commit to a pricing rule and implement it without any costs. However, sellers may find it difficult to commit to a fixed price policy in markets where bargaining is widespread. A second issue pertains to the enjoyment of bargaining, proxied by a positive $\varepsilon$, which may be difficult to justify. This is because even if there is a non-economic benefit of bargaining beyond the tangible benefit of obtaining a lower price, it is not clear if it is a first order effect. Furthermore, we take the positive $\varepsilon$ as given—while remaining agnostic about the factors, psychological or otherwise, generating it—and explore sellers’ pricing and buyers’ visiting decisions in the presence of such a parameter. If such factors are explicitly accounted for, then they may interact with other components of the model and lead to non-trivial results. Therefore, the results regarding the positive $\varepsilon$ should be taken with caution. Overall, while we recognize that our model is stylized and some of our modeling assumptions may not apply to broader markets or product categories, we believe our paper is an important step.
towards a better understanding of fixed and flexible selling strategies.

References


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Online Appendix

for
"Fixed vs. Flexible Pricing in a Competitive Market"

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8 Online Appendix 1

8.1 Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3

The proof is by induction. In what follows we show that the claims in the propositions hold in the terminal period $T$. Then we establish the inductive step. To start, substitute the terminal payoffs $\pi_{T+1} = u_{h,T+1} = u_{l,T+1} = 0$ into (3), (4) and (5) to obtain

$$U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} = \frac{1-z_0(q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T})}{q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T}} (1 - r_{f,T})$$

$$U_{l,b,T} = \frac{1-z_0(q_{l,b,T} + q_{l,b,T})}{q_{l,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}} (1 - r_{b,T})$$

$$U_{h,b,T} = U_{l,b,T} + z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) (r_{h,T} - y_T + \varepsilon).$$

A high type buyer requests negotiations if $y_T < r_{h,T} + \varepsilon$. This requires $\theta$ to be large enough, which we assume to be the case for now. The fact that $y_T < r_{h,T} + \varepsilon$ implies that $U_{h,b,T} > U_{l,b,T}$. At fixed price firms, on the other hand, we have $U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T}$. It follows that $\hat{U}_{h,T} \geq \hat{U}_{l,T}$. Similarly, substituting $\pi_{T+1} = 0$ into profit functions (7) and (8) and re-arranging yields

$$\Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T}) - q_{h,f,T}U_{h,f,T} - q_{l,f,T}U_{l,f,T},$$

$$\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T} U_{h,b,T} - q_{l,b,T} U_{l,b,T} + q_{h,b,T} z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) \varepsilon. \quad (8.1)$$

**Lemma 2** In a competitive search equilibrium all flexible firms post the same list price $r_{b,T}$ and cater to high type buyers only. Similarly, fixed price firms post the same list price $r_{f,T}$, but their customer base depends on $\varepsilon$. If $\varepsilon \leq 0$ then they cater to both types of customers but if $\varepsilon > 0$ then they cater to low types only.
The Lemma establishes how customer demographics would look like if a competitive search equilibrium were to exist (it does not prove existence). These results greatly facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium, which we accomplish subsequently.

**Proof of Lemma 2.** The proof consists of the following steps.

- **Step 1.** Flexible firms cannot attract both types of customers; they attract either the high types (haggler) or the low types (non-haggler).
- **Step 2.** Flexible firms attract high types only.
- **Step 3.** Fixed price firms cannot attract high types only; they attract either both types or just the low types.
- **Step 4a.** If \( \varepsilon \leq 0 \) then fixed price firms attract both types of customers.
- **Step 4b.** If \( \varepsilon > 0 \) then fixed price firms attract low types only.
- **Step 5.** All flexible firms post the same list price \( r_{b,T} \) and all fixed price firms post the same list price \( r_{f,T} \).

**Step 1.** We prove that flexible firms cannot attract both types of customers. By contradiction, suppose they do, i.e. consider a flexible firm where expected demands \( q_{h,b,T} \) and \( q_{l,b,T} \) are both positive. This means that \( U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and \( U_{l,b,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,b,T} > U_{l,b,T} \). It follows that \( \bar{U}_{h,T} > \bar{U}_{l,T} \). The seller’s profit equals to

\[
\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T} \bar{U}_{h,b,T} - q_{l,b,T} \bar{U}_{l,b,T} + q_{h,b,T} z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) \varepsilon \\
= 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) - (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) \bar{U}_{l,b,T} - \Delta,
\]

where \( \Delta := q_{h,b,T} z_0 (q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T}) (r_{h,T} - y_T + \varepsilon) \). Note that \( \Delta \) is positive as \( r_{h,T} - y_T + \varepsilon > 0 \).

Now suppose that this seller keeps his price intact at \( r = r_{h,T} \) but changes the rule from ‘flexible’ to ‘fixed’. We claim that the seller loses all high type customers \( (q_{h,f,T} = 0) \) but gains new low type customers one-for-one, so that his new expected demand \( q_{l,f,T} \) equals to his previous expected demand \( q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} \). Since \( \bar{U}_{h,T} > \bar{U}_{l,T} \) there are two possibilities:

- **U**.  
  \( U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and therefore \( U_{l,f,T} > \bar{U}_{l,T} \). This case is impossible since, \( U_{l,f,T} \), by definition, cannot exceed the market utility \( \bar{U}_{l,T} \).
\[ U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \] and therefore \( U_{h,f,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T} \). This means that \( q_{l,f,T} \) is positive and satisfies \( U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \) while \( q_{h,f,T} = 0 \) since \( U_{h,f,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T} \). This scenario is possible.

Since \( U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \) and \( U_{l,h,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \) (from above) we have \( U_{l,h,T} = U_{l,f,T} \). This implies that

\[
\frac{1-z_0 (q_{h,b,T}+q_{l,b,T})}{q_{h,b,T}+q_{l,b,T}} (1 - r) = \frac{1-z_0 (q_{l,f,T})}{q_{l,f,T}} (1 - r)
\]

and therefore \( q_{l,f,T} = q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T} \). So, by switching to fixed pricing, the seller indeed keeps his total demand intact. The seller now earns

\[
\Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) - q_{l,f,T} \bar{U}_{l,f,T}.
\]

Using the equality \( q_{l,f,T} = q_{h,b,T} + q_{l,b,T} \) it is easy to show that \( \Pi_{f,T} - \Pi_{h,T} = \Delta > 0 \), i.e. the seller earns more than he did before; hence the initial outcome could not be an equilibrium.

**Step 2.** We now show that flexible firms attract high types only. Suppose the opposite is true i.e. they attract low types only (the third scenario where they attract both types is ruled out in Step 1). This means that \( U_{l,h,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \) and \( U_{h,h,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T} \) therefore \( q_{l,h,T} > 0 \) and \( q_{h,h,T} = 0 \). Recall that \( U_{h,h,T} > U_{l,h,T} \). It follows that \( \bar{U}_{h,T} > \bar{U}_{l,T} \). According to our conjecture high types stay away from flexible firms, so they must be shopping at fixed price firms. This means that \( U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \). Recall, however, that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} \), which implies \( U_{l,f,T} > \bar{U}_{l,T} \); a contradiction since \( U_{l,f,T} \leq \bar{U}_{l,T} \) by definition.

**Step 3.** Suppose there is a fixed price firm that caters just to high types. This implies \( U_{l,f,T} < \bar{U}_{l,T} \) and \( U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} \). It follows that \( \bar{U}_{h,T} < \bar{U}_{l,T} \); a contradiction since \( \bar{U}_{h,T} \geq \bar{U}_{l,T} \).

**Step 4a.** We will show that if \( \varepsilon \leq 0 \) then fixed price firms attract both types of customers. The previous step established that fixed price firms serve either both types of customers or low types only. Below we rule out the second alternative.

By contradiction suppose fixed price firms indeed attract low types only, i.e. suppose that \( q_{l,f,T} > 0 \) and \( q_{h,f,T} = 0 \). This implies that \( U_{h,f,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and \( U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} \); hence \( \bar{U}_{l,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T} \). From Step 2 we know that flexible firms attract high types only, i.e.
$q_{h,b,T} > 0$ and $q_{l,b,T} = 0$. This implies that $U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}$ and $U_{l,b,T} < \bar{U}_{l,T}$. A fixed price firm solves

$$\max_{q_{l,f,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) - q_{l,f,T} U_{l,f,T} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T}. $$

The first order condition (FOC) implies that

$$z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) = \bar{U}_{l,T} \Rightarrow \Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) - z_1 (q_{l,f,T}).$$

Similarly a flexible firm solves

$$\max_{q_{h,b,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T} U_{h,b,T} + z_1 (q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}. $$

The FOC is given by

$$z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) + [z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) - z_1 (q_{h,b,T})] \varepsilon = \bar{U}_{h,T}. $$

Thus

$$\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) - z_1 (q_{h,b,T}) + q_{h,b} z_1 (q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon.$$ 

Suppose $\varepsilon = 0$. Then the equal profit condition $\Pi_{b,T} = \Pi_{f,T}$ implies that $q_{l,f,T} = q_{h,b,T}$. Substituting this into the FOCs above we have $\bar{U}_{h,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T}$; a contradiction since $\bar{U}_{l,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T}$. Now Suppose $\varepsilon < 0$. The equal profit condition implies that $q_{l,f,T} < q_{h,b,T}$. To see why fix some $q_{h,b,T}$ and note that $\Pi_{f,T} > \Pi_{b,T}$ even when $q_{l,f,T} = q_{h,b,T}$ because $\varepsilon < 0$. The function $\Pi_{f,T}$ falls if $q_{l,f,T}$ decreases, so if $q_{l,f,T}$ exceeds $q_{h,b,T}$ then $\Pi_{f,T}$ further exceeds $\Pi_{b,T}$. It follows that for equal profits we must have $q_{l,f,T} < q_{h,b,T}$. Recall that $U_{h,T} > U_{l,T}$. This requires

$$\varepsilon \leq \frac{z_0 (q_{f,T}) - z_0 (q_{h,b,T})}{z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) (1 - q_{h,b,T})} \text{ if } 1 \leq q_{h,b,T}. $$

Hence, there are two scenarios:

- $1 > q_{h,b,T}$ and $\varepsilon > \frac{z_0 (q_{f,T}) - z_0 (q_{h,b,T})}{z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) (1 - q_{h,b,T})}$: Recall that $q_{l,f,T} < q_{h,b,T}$. It follows that $z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) > z_0 (q_{h,b,T})$ which in turn implies that $\varepsilon > 0$; a contradiction since $\varepsilon < 0$.

- $1 < q_{h,b,T}$ and $\varepsilon < \frac{z_0 (q_{f,T}) - z_0 (q_{h,b,T})}{z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) (1 - q_{h,b,T})}$: This case, too, produces a contradiction. To see why note that the equal profit condition $\Pi_{b,T} = \Pi_{f,T}$ implies that

$$\varepsilon = \left[ (1 + q_{h,b,T}) z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) - (1 + q_{l,f,T}) z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) \right] / q_{h,b,T}^2.$$
Substituting this into the inequality above we need

\[ z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_0(q_{l,f,T}) > (q_{h,b,T} - q_{l,f,T}) z_0(q_{l,f,T})(q_{h,b,T} - 1) . \]

Since \( q_{l,f,T} < q_{h,b,T} \) and \( 1 - q_{h,b,T} < 0 \) the left hand side of the inequality is negative whereas the right hand side is positive; a contradiction.

**Step 4b.** We show that if \( \varepsilon > 0 \) then fixed price firms cater to low types only. Step 3 establishes that fixed price firms cannot be catering to high types only. This leaves two possibilities: either they serve both types or they serve low types only. Below we rule out the first alternative, which means that if an equilibrium exists where some sellers compete with fixed pricing, then those sellers must be catering to low types only.

To start, suppose, by contradiction, that there is a fixed price seller who attracts both types of customers, i.e. suppose that \( q_{h,f,T} \) and \( q_{l,f,T} \) are both positive and satisfy \( U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and \( U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} \). It follows that \( \bar{U}_{l,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \). Letting \( q_{f,T} := q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T} \), a fixed price seller solves

\[
\max_{q_{f,T} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi_{f,T} = \max_{q_{f,T} \in \mathbb{R}^+} 1 - z_0(q_{f,T}) - q_{f,T}U_{h,f,T} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
\]

After substituting the constraint into the objective function, the FOC is given by

\[
z_0(q_{f,T}) = \bar{U}_{h,T} \Rightarrow \Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{f,T}) - z_1(q_{f,T}). \tag{8.3}
\]

We argue that this seller would earn more if he were to switch to flexible pricing. Note that after such a switch he would attract high types only (Steps 1 and 2), i.e. \( q_{h,b,T} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,b,T} = 0 \). He solves

\[
\max_{q_{h,b,T} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi_{b,T} = \max_{q_{h,b,T} \in \mathbb{R}^+} 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T}U_{h,b,T} + z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
\]

The FOC is given by

\[
z_0(q_{h,b,T}) + z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon = \bar{U}_{h,T} \tag{8.4}
\]

and therefore

\[
\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}) + q_{h,b,T}z_1(q_{h,b}) \varepsilon.
\]
We can now compare expected profits and show that the deviation is profitable, i.e. \( \Pi_{\text{h},T} > \Pi_{\text{f},T} \).

To start note that expressions (8.3) and (8.4) together imply that

\[
\varepsilon = \frac{z_0(q_{\text{f},T}) - z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T})}{z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T})(1 - q_{\text{h},b,T})}.
\]

Recall that \( \varepsilon \) is positive; thus \( q_{\text{h},b,T} \neq q_{\text{f},T} \), so we have either \( q_{\text{f},T} < q_{\text{h},b,T} \) or \( q_{\text{f},T} > q_{\text{h},b,T} \).

- Suppose \( q_{\text{f},T} < q_{\text{h},b,T} \). Under this specification we have \( \Pi_{\text{f},T} < \Pi_{\text{h},T} \). To see why, fix some \( q_{\text{h},b,T} \) and note that \( \Pi_{\text{f},T} < \Pi_{\text{h},T} \) even when \( q_{\text{f},T} = q_{\text{h},b,T} \). The function \( \Pi_{\text{f},T} \) decreases as \( q_{\text{f},T} \) decreases, so if \( q_{\text{f},T} \) falls below \( q_{\text{h},b,T} \) then \( \Pi_{\text{f},T} \) falls further below \( \Pi_{\text{h},T} \).

- Suppose \( q_{\text{f},T} > q_{\text{h},b,T} \). Let \( \Delta := \Pi_{\text{h},T} - \Pi_{\text{f},T} \). We will show that \( \Delta \) is positive. Substitute \( \varepsilon \) into \( \Pi_{\text{h},T} \), and use the fact that \( z_1(q) = qz_0(q) \) to obtain

\[
\Delta = (q_{\text{f},T} - q_{\text{h},b,T})z_0(q_{\text{f},T}) + \frac{z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T}) - z_0(q_{\text{f},T})}{q_{\text{h},b,T} - 1}.
\]

Since \( q_{\text{f},T} > q_{\text{h},b,T} \) the first expression on the right hand side is positive. The inequality \( q_{\text{f},T} > q_{\text{h},b,T} \) implies that \( z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T}) > z_0(q_{\text{f},T}) \). For \( \varepsilon \) to be positive the denominator must be negative, hence we have \( q_{\text{h},b,T} > 1 \). It follows that the second expression, too, is positive. Hence \( \Delta \) is positive, which means that the deviation is profitable, i.e. \( \Pi_{\text{h},T} > \Pi_{\text{f},T} \).

**Step 5.** Recall from Step 3 that flexible firms cater to high types only; so, consider such a firm with price \( r_{\text{h},T} \) and expected demand \( q_{\text{h},b,T} \). From Step 4b we know that its FOC is given by

\[
z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T})[1 + \varepsilon - \varepsilon q_{\text{h},b,T}] = \hat{U}_{\text{h},T}
\]

Solving \( U_{\text{h},b,T} = z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T})[1 + \varepsilon - \varepsilon q_{\text{h},b,T}] \) for the list price \( r_{\text{h},T} \) we have

\[
\hat{r}_{\text{b},T} = 1 - \frac{z_1(q_{\text{h},b,T})(r_{\text{f},T} - \varepsilon q_{\text{h},b,T})}{1 - z_0(q_{\text{h},b,T}) - z_1(q_{\text{h},b,T})}.
\]

Now consider another flexible firm with price \( r'_{\text{h},T} \) and expected demand \( q'_{\text{h},b,T} \). His FOC is given by

\[
z_0(q'_{\text{h},b,T})[1 + \varepsilon - \varepsilon q'_{\text{h},b,T}] = \hat{U}_{\text{h},T}.
\]

Combining both FOCs we have \( q'_{\text{h},b,T} = q_{\text{h},b,T} \). This, in turn, implies that \( \hat{r}'_{\text{b},T} = \hat{r}_{\text{b},T} \) as the price function above is one-to-one. Going through similar steps one can show that fixed price firms, too,
post identical prices. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. ■

Now we can start characterizing the equilibria. There are three cases.

8.1.1 Case 1: $\varepsilon = 0$.

Per Lemma 2 if $\varepsilon = 0$ then flexible firms attract high types, i.e. we have $U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}$ and $U_{l,b,T} < \bar{U}_{l,T}$ and therefore $q_{h,b,T} > 0$ and $q_{l,b,T} = 0$. Substituting $\varepsilon = 0$ and $q_{l,b,T} = 0$ into (8.2) yields

$$
\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T}U_{h,b,T}.
$$

The seller’s problem is $\max_{q_{h,b,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T}U_{h,b,T}$ subject to $U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}$. After substituting the constraint into the objective function, the first order condition (FOC) is given by $z_0(q_{h,b,T}) = \bar{U}_{h,T}$. The second order condition is trivial, hence the solution corresponds to a maximum. Substituting the FOC into $\Pi_{b,T}$ yields

$$
\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}). \quad (8.5)
$$

Now consider a fixed price seller. If $\varepsilon = 0$ then fixed price sellers attract both types of customers, i.e. $q_{h,f,T}$ and $q_{l,f,T}$ are both positive and satisfy $U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}$ and $U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T}$. Since $U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T}$ we have $\bar{U}_{l,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}$. Letting $q_{f,T} := q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T}$ denote the total demand, the fixed price seller solves

$$
\max_{q_{f,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} \Pi_{f,T} = \max_{q_{f,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0(q_{f,T}) - q_{f,T}\bar{U}_{h,f,T} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
$$

The FOC is given by $z_0(q_{f,T}) = \bar{U}_{h,T}$. The seller’s profit, therefore, is equal to

$$
\Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{f,T}) - z_1(q_{f,T}). \quad (8.6)
$$

Both FOCs together imply that $q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T} = q_{h,b,T}$, i.e. expected demands at a fixed and flexible firm must be identical. Substituting this equality into the feasibility conditions in (13) and using the fact that $q_{l,b,T} = 0$ one obtains

$$
q_{h,b,T} = \lambda_T, \quad q_{h,f,T} = \lambda_T(\varphi_{f,T}^* - \eta_T)/\varphi_{f,T}^* \quad \text{and} \quad q_{l,f,T} = \lambda_T \eta_T/\varphi_{f,T}^*.
$$
where \( \varphi_{f,T}^* \) denotes the fraction of fixed price firms. Note that for any \( \varphi_{f,T}^* \in [\eta_T, 1] \) expected demands \( q_{h,f,T} \) and \( q_{l,f,T} \) are both positive and satisfy the relationship above. This means that \( \varphi_{f,T}^* \) is indeterminate, so we have a continuum of equilibria where \( \varphi_{f,T}^* \) can be anywhere in between \( \eta_T \) and 1. Furthermore, in any given equilibrium flexible sellers and fixed price sellers have the same expected demand \( \lambda_T \).

Now we can obtain equilibrium payoffs and list prices. Recall that \( \bar{U}_{1,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} = z_0 (q_{h,b,T}) \). Since \( q_{h,b,T} = \lambda_T \) we have \( u_T = z_0 (\lambda_T) \). Similarly substituting \( q_{h,b,T} = q_{f,T} = \lambda_T \) into (8.5) and (8.6) yields sellers’ equilibrium profit \( \Pi_{f,T} = \Pi_{b,T} \equiv \pi_T = 1 - z_0 (\lambda_T) - z_1 (\lambda_T) \). Given that \( u_T = z_0 (\lambda_T) \) one can obtain the equilibrium fixed price by solving \( \bar{U}_{h,f,T} = z_0 (\lambda_T) \) for \( r_{f,T} \) and the equilibrium flexible price by solving \( \bar{U}_{h,b,T} = z_0 (\lambda_T) \) for \( r_{b,T} \). We have

\[
\begin{align*}
  r_{f,T}^* (\lambda_T) &= 1 - \frac{z_1 (\lambda_T)}{1 - z_0 (\lambda_T)} \\
  r_{b,T}^* (\lambda_T) &= 1 - \frac{z_1 (\lambda_T) (1 - \theta)}{1 - z_0 (\lambda_T) - z_1 (\lambda_T)}.
\end{align*}
\]

Finally substituting \( \varepsilon = 0 \) and \( u_{h,T+1} = 0 \) into (1) yields the equilibrium bargained price \( y_T^* = 1 - \theta \). Observe that expressions for \( r_{f,T}^*, r_{b,T}^*, y_T^*, \pi_T \) and \( u_T \) can be obtained by substituting \( u_{T+1} = \pi_{T+1} = 0 \) into expressions (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18) on display in Proposition 1, confirming the validity of the Proposition for the terminal period \( T \).

So far we assumed that high type buyers are sufficiently skilled in bargaining. Now we can put some structure behind this assumption. A buyer negotiates if \( y_T \leq r_{b,T}^*, \) which, after substituting for \( r_{b,T}^* \) and re-arranging, is equivalent to \( \theta \geq \bar{\theta} (\lambda_T) \), where \( \bar{\theta} (\lambda_T) := z_1 (\lambda_T) / [1 - z_0 (\lambda_T)] \). So, high types negotiate if their bargaining power exceeds threshold \( \bar{\theta} \) and purchase at the list price otherwise. Straightforward algebra reveals that if \( \theta > \bar{\theta} (\lambda_T) \) then \( r_{b,T}^* (\lambda_T) > r_{f,T}^* (\lambda_T) > y_T^*, \) i.e. flexible firms advertise higher prices than fixed price firms.

The case \( \theta < \bar{\theta} (\lambda_T) \) is trivial. Since even haggler do not find it worthwhile to negotiate the list price, the availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a fixed price setting. Technically this is equivalent to the outcome where \( \varphi_{f,T}^* = 1, \) i.e. where all firms trade via fixed pricing, post \( r_{f,T}^* \) and serve both types of customers. The total demand at each firm equals to \( \lambda_T \), whereas the equilibrium payoffs are still given by \( u_T = z_0 (\lambda_T) \) and \( \pi_T = 1 - z_0 (\lambda_T) - z_1 (\lambda_T) \).

### 8.1.2 Case 2: \( \varepsilon < 0 \)

In what follows we will show that if \( \varepsilon < 0 \) then no firm adopts flexible pricing. The proof is by contradiction, i.e. suppose that an equilibrium exists where at least one firm adopts flexible pricing.
We will show that this firm earns less than its fixed price competitors. To start recall that if \( \varepsilon < 0 \) then a flexible firm attracts high types only while low types stay away (Lemma 2) i.e. \( U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and \( U_{l,b,T} < \bar{U}_{l,T} \) hence \( q_{h,b,T} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,b,T} = 0 \). The flexible firm solves

\[
\max_{q_{h,b,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T}U_{h,b,T} + z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
\]

The first order condition is given by

\[
z_0(q_{h,b,T}) + [z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T})] \varepsilon = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
\]

It follows that

\[
\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}) + q_{h,b,T}z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon.
\]

Now consider fixed price firms. Per Lemma 2 they attract both types of customers i.e. \( q_{h,f,T} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,f,T} > 0 \) and satisfy \( U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and \( U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{l,f,T} \). It follows that \( \bar{U}_{l,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T} \). Letting \( q_{f,T} := q_{h,f,T} + q_{l,f,T} \), a fixed price seller solves

\[
\max_{q_{f,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0(q_{f,T}) - q_{f,T}U_{h,f,T} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
\]

The FOC is given by \( z_0(q_{f,T}) = \bar{U}_{h,T} \); therefore

\[
\Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{f,T}) - z_1(q_{f,T}).
\]

We will show \( \Pi_{f,T} > \Pi_{b,T} \). First note that the FOCs together imply that

\[
z_0(q_{h,b,T}) + [z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T})] \varepsilon = z_0(q_{f,T}) \Rightarrow \varepsilon = \frac{z_0(q_{f,T}) - z_0(q_{h,b,T})}{z_0(q_{h,b,T})(1-q_{h,b,T})}.
\]

The fact that \( \varepsilon < 0 \) implies that either we have (i) \( q_{f,T} < q_{h,b,T} \) and \( q_{h,b,T} > 1 \) or we have (ii) \( q_{f,T} > q_{h,b,T} \) and \( q_{h,b,T} < 1 \). Now we can compare profits. Let \( \Delta \equiv \Pi_{f,T} - \Pi_{b,T} \). We will show that \( \Delta > 0 \). Note that

\[
\Delta = z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_0(q_{f,T}) + z_1(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{f,T}) - q_{h,b,T}z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon
\]

\[
= \frac{z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_0(q_{f,T})}{1-q_{h,b,T}} - z_0(q_{f,T})(q_{f,T} - q_{h,b,T})
\]
The first step follows after substituting for $\Pi_{f,T}$ and $\Pi_{b,T}$ whereas the second step is obtained after substituting for $\varepsilon$ and noting that $z_1(q) = qz_0(q)$. Observe that under condition (i) both terms of $\Delta$ are positive; hence $\Delta > 0$. Under condition (ii) the first term is positive but the second one is negative so we need a closer inspection. Fix $q_{h,b,T} < 1$ and note that $\Delta$ falls in $q_{f,T}$ under the restrictions of (ii). It follows that $\Delta$ reaches a minimum when $q_{f,T} \backslash q_{h,b,T}$ (recall that under (ii) we have $q_{f,T} > q_{h,b,T}$). Note that $\lim_{q_{f,T} \backslash q_{h,b,T}} \Delta = 0$; thus $\Delta > 0$ when (ii) holds.

The inequality $\Delta > 0$ implies that if fixed and flexible sellers compete in the same market then fixed price sellers earn more than flexible sellers; so there cannot be an equilibrium where flexible pricing is adopted by any firm. The implication is that if $\varepsilon < 0$ then the only possible outcome is where all sellers trade via fixed pricing, which we have already characterized in Case 1.

8.1.3 Case 3: $\varepsilon > 0$.

Per Lemma 2 if $\varepsilon > 0$ then flexible stores attract high types only i.e. $q_{h,b,T} > 0$ and $q_{l,b,T} = 0$ satisfying $U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}$ and $U_{l,b,T} < \bar{U}_{l,T}$. Substitute $q_{l,b,T} = 0$ into the expression of $\Pi_{b,T}$ to obtain

$$\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T}U_{h,b,T} + z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon.$$  

The seller’s problem is

$$\max_{q_{h,b,T} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - q_{h,b,T}U_{h,b,T} + z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{h,b,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.$$  

The FOC is given by

$$z_0(q_{h,b,T}) + [z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T})] \varepsilon = \bar{U}_{h,T}. \quad (8.7)$$

The second order condition is satisfied if

$$-z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) [2 - q_{h,b,T}] \varepsilon < 0. \quad (8.8)$$

If $q_{h,b,T} \leq 2$ then the inequality is satisfied irrespective of $\varepsilon$. If $q_{h,b,T} > 2$ then we need $\varepsilon < 1/(q_{h,b,T} - 2)$. The right hand side is positive. Since $\varepsilon$ is assumed to be positive but small, the inequality is satisfied; hence the the solution of the FOC yields a maximum.

Substituting (8.7) into $\Pi_{b,T}$ yields

$$\Pi_{b,T} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}) + q_{h,b,T}z_1(q_{h,b,T}) \varepsilon. \quad (8.9)$$
Now consider fixed price sellers. They attract low types only (Lemma 2), i.e. \( q_{h,f,T} = 0 \) and \( q_{l,f,T} > 0 \) satisfying \( U_{h,f,T} < \bar{U}_{h,T} \) and \( U_{i,f,T} = \bar{U}_{l,T} \). Recall that \( U_{h,f,T} = U_{i,f,T} \). It follows that \( \bar{U}_{h,T} > \bar{U}_{l,T} \). Substituting \( q_{h,f,T} = 0 \) into the expression of \( \Pi_{f,T} \) yields

\[
\Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) - q_{l,f,T} U_{l,f,T}.
\] (8.10)

The seller solves

\[
1 - z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) - q_{l,f,T} U_{l,f,T} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{l,f,T} = \bar{U}_{h,T}.
\]

The FOC implies

\[
z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) = \bar{U}_{l,T} \quad \text{and therefore} \quad \Pi_{f,T} = 1 - z_0 (q_{l,f,T}) - z_1 (q_{l,f,T}).
\] (8.11)

Recall that \( \varphi_{f,T} \) denotes the fraction of sellers who compete with fixed pricing. Substituting \( q_{h,f,T} = q_{l,b,T} = 0 \) into the feasibility conditions in (13) yields

\[
q_{l,f,T} = \eta T \lambda_T / \varphi_{f,T} \quad \text{and} \quad q_{h,b,T} = (1 - \eta_T) \lambda_T / (1 - \varphi_{f,T}).
\]

We will show that there exists a unique \( \varphi_{f,T}^* \in (0, \eta_T) \) satisfying the equal profit condition \( \Pi_{f,T} = \Pi_{b,T} \), proving the equilibrium exists and it is unique. Let \( \Delta(\varphi_{f,T}) \equiv \Pi_{b,T} - \Pi_{f,T} \). Combining (8.9) and (8.11) it is easy to show that

\[
\Delta(\varphi_{f,T}) = z_0 (q_{l,f,T}^*) + z_1 (q_{l,f,T}^*) - z_0 (q_{h,b,T}^*) - z_1 (q_{h,b,T}^*) + q_{h,b,T}^* z_1 (q_{h,b,T}^*) \varepsilon.
\]

Note that \( \Delta \) rises in \( q_{l,b,T} \), which in turn rises in \( \varphi_{f,T} \), and that \( \Delta \) falls in \( q_{l,f,T} \), which in turn falls in \( \varphi_{f,T} \). It follows that \( d\Delta/d\varphi_{f,T} > 0 \). Furthermore note that \( \Delta (\eta_T) > 0 \), whereas \( \Delta (0) < 0 \) if \( \varepsilon \) is small. To see why, note that \( \Delta (0) = -z_0 (q) - z_1 (q) + q z_1 (q) \varepsilon \), thus \( \Delta (0) < 0 \) if

\[
\varepsilon < (1 + q)/q^2, \quad \text{where} \quad q \equiv (1 - \eta_T) \lambda_T.
\] (8.12)

The expression on the right hand side is positive. Since \( \varepsilon \) is assumed to be positive but sufficiently small, the inequality is satisfied. The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a unique \( \varphi_{f,T}^* \in (0, \eta_T) \) satisfying \( \Delta(\varphi_{f,T}^*) = 0 \). Since \( \varphi_{f,T}^* < \eta_T \) we have \( q_{h,b,T}^* < \lambda_T < q_{l,f,T}^* \) i.e. fixed price firms are more crowded than flexible firms.
The equilibrium payoffs are immediate from the first order conditions (8.7) and (8.11). We have

\[ u_{h,T} = z_0(q_{h,b,T}^*) + [z_0(q_{h,b,T}^*) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}^*)] \varepsilon, \quad u_{l,T} = z_0(q_{l,f,T}^*), \quad \pi_T = 1 - z_0(q_{l,f,T}^*) - z_1(q_{l,f,T}^*). \]

Given that high and low type buyers earn, respectively, \( u_{h,T} \) and \( u_{l,T} \) one can obtain the equilibrium flexible price by solving \( U_{h,b,T} = u_{h,T} \) for \( r_{b,T} \) and the equilibrium fixed price by solving \( U_{l,f,T} = u_{l,T} \) for \( r_{f,T} \). We have

\[ r_{b,T}^* = 1 - \frac{z_1(q_{h,b,T}^*)}{1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}^*) - z_1(q_{h,b,T}^*)} \left[ 1 + \varepsilon - \frac{q_{h,b,f}^*}{1 - \theta} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad r_{f,T}^* = 1 - \frac{z_1(q_{l,f,T}^*)}{1 - z_0(q_{l,f,T}^*)}. \]

Finally substituting \( \pi_{T+1} = u_{h,T+1} = 0 \) into (1) yields the bargained price \( y_T^* = (1 - \theta)(1 + \varepsilon) \).

Observe that expressions for \( r_{b,T}^*, r_{f,T}^*, y_T^*, \pi_T, u_{h,T} \) and \( u_{l,T} \) can be obtained by substituting \( u_{h,T+1} = u_{l,T+1} = \pi_{T+1} = 0 \) into (20), (21), (22), (23), (24) and (25) in Proposition 3, confirming the validity of the Proposition for the terminal period \( T \).

A high type buyer negotiates if \( y_T^* \leq r_{b,T}^* + \varepsilon \). After substituting for \( r_{b,T}^* \) and \( y_T^* \) and re-arranging this condition is equivalent to

\[ \theta \geq \tilde{\theta}_T \equiv \frac{z_1(q_{h,b,T}^*)}{1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}^*)} - \frac{\varepsilon z_1(q_{h,b,T}^*) q_{h,b,T}^*}{(1 + \varepsilon) [1 - z_0(q_{h,b,T}^*)]}. \]

If \( \theta < \tilde{\theta}_T \) then even hagglers do not find it worthwhile to negotiate the list price. The availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a fixed price setting which was characterized earlier in Case 1.

This completes the proof of the terminal period \( T \). Going through a similar analytical process one can establish the inductive step as well. As the analysis is largely the same the inductive step is relegated to the Online Appendix 2.

8.2 Other Proofs

Proof of Proposition 4. In what follows we prove that \( d\pi_t/d\varepsilon > 0 \) and \( du_{l,t}/d\varepsilon < 0 \), where \( \pi_t \) is given by (23) and \( u_{l,t} \) is given by (25). The proof is by induction, where we start with the terminal period \( T \). Substituting the terminal payoffs \( u_{l,T+1} = \pi_{T+1} = 0 \) into (23) and (25) yields

\[ \pi_T = 1 - z_0(q_{l,f,T}^*) - z_1(q_{l,f,T}^*) \quad \text{and} \quad u_{l,T} = z_0(q_{l,f,T}^*), \]

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and therefore
\[
\frac{d\pi_t}{de} = z_1(q^*_{t,r,T})\frac{dq^*_{t,r,T}}{de} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{du_{l,t}}{de} = -z_0(q^*_{t,r,T})\frac{dq^*_{t,r,T}}{de}.
\]

Our goal is to show that the first derivative is positive and the second one is negative. Notice that both relationships hold if \(dq^*_{t,r,T}/de > 0\), so below we establish that this is indeed the case. Let \(\Delta_T \equiv \Pi_{b,T} - \Pi_{r,T}\), where \(\Pi_{b,T}\) is given by (8.9) and \(\Pi_{r,T}\) is given by (8.10), and note that the expected demand \(q^*_{t,r,T}\) satisfies \(\Delta_T = 0\). By the implicit function theorem we have
\[
\frac{dq^*_{t,r,T}}{de} = -\frac{\partial \Delta_T / \partial e}{\partial \Delta_T / \partial q^*_{t,r,T}}.
\]

Note that \(\Delta_T\) rises in \(e\) and falls in \(q^*_{t,r,T}\). It follows that \(dq^*_{t,r,T}/de > 0\). This proves the claim for period \(T\). Now for the inductive step suppose that \(d\pi_{t+1}/de > 0\) and \(du_{l,t+1}/de < 0\). We will show that \(d\pi_t/de > 0\) and \(du_{l,t}/de < 0\). Notice that
\[
\frac{d\pi_t}{de} = -\frac{du_{l,t+1}}{de} \beta \left[1 - z_0(q^*_{t,f,t}) - z_1(q^*_{t,f,t})\right] + \frac{d\pi_{t+1}}{de} \beta [z_0(q^*_{t,f,t}) + z_1(q^*_{t,f,t})] \\
+ (1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) z_1(q^*_{t,f,t}) \frac{dq^*_{t,f,t}}{de}
\]

The first line is positive due to the inductive step. Hence, in order to establish \(d\pi_t/de > 0\) it suffices to show that \(dq^*_{t,f,t}/de > 0\). Let \(\Delta_t \equiv \Pi_{b,t} - \Pi_{f,t}\), where \(\Pi_{b,t}\) is given by (9.9) and \(\Pi_{f,t}\) is given by (9.11), and note that \(q^*_{t,f,t}\) satisfies \(\Delta_t = 0\). By the implicit function theorem we have
\[
\frac{dq^*_{t,f,t}}{de} = -\frac{\partial \Delta_t / \partial e}{\partial \Delta_t / \partial q^*_{t,f,t}}.
\]

Note that \(\Delta_t\) rises in \(e\) and falls in \(q^*_{t,f,t}\); thus \(dq^*_{t,f,t}/de > 0\). This proves the claim \(d\pi_t/de > 0\). The other claim can be proved by going through similar steps. \(\blacksquare\)

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Consider Eq-PS first. Along this equilibrium path the expected demand at any store at time \(t-1\) is equal to \(\lambda_{t-1}\), so each seller trades with probability \(1 - z_0(\lambda_{t-1})\). The law of large numbers implies that \(s_{t-1}(1 - z_0(\lambda_{t-1}))\) sellers trade and exit the market. Each transaction involves one seller and one buyer, so the total number of buyers who trade and exit is also \(s_{t-1}(1 - z_0(\lambda_{t-1}))\). The number of sellers present in period \(t\) is, then, \(s_t = s_t^{\text{new}} + s_{t-1}z_0(\lambda_{t-1})\), whereas the number of buyers is \(b_t = b_t^{\text{new}} + b_{t-1} - s_{t-1}(1 - z_0(\lambda_{t-1}))\).

Now turn to the proportions of hagglers and non hagglers. In period \(t-1\) the total demand at any fixed price firm equals to \(\lambda_{t-1}\) of which \(\lambda_{t-1} \eta_{t-1}/\varphi^*_{t,f,t-1}\) are non-hagglers and \(\lambda_{t-1}(\varphi^*_{t,f,t-1} - \)

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\( \frac{\eta_{t-1}}{\varphi_{f,t-1}} \) are hagglers (Proposition 1). Since buyers are equally likely to be selected at the point of transaction, the probability that the purchasing customer is going to be a low type equals to \( \frac{\eta_{t-1}}{\varphi_{f,t-1}} \). There are \( \varphi_{f,t-1}^{*} s_{t-1} \) fixed price firms present in the market, each seller trades with probability \( 1 - z_{0} (\lambda_{t-1}) \) and each transaction involves one buyer and one seller; so, the number of non-haggler customers who trade and exit equals to

\[
\varphi_{f,t-1}^{*} s_{t-1} \times (1 - z_{0} (\lambda_{t-1})) \times \frac{\eta_{t-1}}{\varphi_{f,t-1}} = \eta_{t-1} s_{t-1} (1 - z_{0} (\lambda_{t-1})).
\]

Remaining buyers move to period \( t \). The number of non-hagglers present in period \( t \), given by \( \eta_{t} b_{t} \), equals to

\[
\eta_{t} b_{t} = b_{t}^{\text{new}} \eta_{t}^{\text{new}} + b_{t-1} \eta_{t-1} - \eta_{t-1} s_{t-1} (1 - z_{0} (\lambda_{t})).
\]

It follows that \( \eta_{t} \) is given by expression (27), on display in Proposition 5. This completes the discussion on Eq-PS. Along Eq-FP, as in Eq-PS, the expected demand at any store at time \( t - 1 \) is equal to \( \lambda_{t-1} \) so \( b_{t} \) and \( s_{t} \) evolve as in (26). The proportion of hagglers, too, evolves as in (27), but this is rather irrelevant because along Eq-FP buyers do not negotiate anyway.

Now consider the final scenario, Eq-FS, where non hagglers shop at fixed price stores and haggler shop at flexible stores. The number of fixed price sellers trading and exiting the market at time \( t - 1 \) is equal to \( s_{t-1} \varphi_{f,t-1}^{*} (1 - z_{0} (q_{f,t-1}^{*})) \equiv l_{t-1} \) whereas the number flexible sellers trading and exiting the market is equal to \( s_{t-1} (1 - \varphi_{f,t-1}^{*}) (1 - z_{0} (q_{h,t-1}^{*})) \equiv h_{t-1} \). Each transaction involves one buyer and one seller; thus \( s_{t} = s_{t-1} - (l_{t-1} + h_{t-1}) + s_{t}^{\text{new}} \) and \( b_{t} = b_{t-1} - (l_{t-1} + h_{t-1}) + b_{t}^{\text{new}} \). Finally note that there are \( b_{t-1} \eta_{t-1} \) non-hagglers in the market at \( t - 1 \), of which \( l_{t-1} \) exit the market while the rest move to period \( t \). Therefore \( \eta_{t} = [b_{t-1} \eta_{t-1} - l_{t-1} + \eta_{t}^{\text{new}} b_{t}^{\text{new}}] / b_{t} \). This completes the proof.

**Proof of Remark 6.** If \( \varepsilon \leq 0 \) then \( r_{f,t}^{*} \), \( \pi_{t} \) and \( u_{t} \) are given by (14), (17) and (18). Letting \( x_{t} \equiv 1 - \beta u_{t} - \beta \pi_{t} \) these expressions can be re-written as follows:

\[
\pi_{t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - [z_{0} (\lambda_{t}) + z_{1} (\lambda_{t})] x_{t+1}
\]

\[
u_{t} = \beta u_{t+1} + z_{0} (\lambda_{t}) x_{t+1}
\]

\[
r_{f,t}^{*} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - x_{t+1} \frac{z_{1} (\lambda_{t})}{1 - z_{0} (\lambda_{t})}
\]
Letting $\Delta r_{f,t}^* = r_{f,t}^* - r_{f,t-1}^*$ and noting that $x_t = 1 - \beta + z_1(\lambda_t)\beta x_{t+1}$ we have

$$\Delta r_{f,t}^* = (1 - \beta) \left[ \frac{z_1(\lambda_{t-1})}{1-z_0(\lambda_{t-1})} - \beta x_{t+1} \right] + x_{t+1} \left[ \frac{\beta z_1(\lambda_t)z_1(\lambda_{t-1})}{1-z_0(\lambda_{t-1})} + \beta z_0(\lambda_t) - \frac{z_1(\lambda_t)}{1-z_0(\lambda_{t-1})} \right].$$

Our goal is to show that $\lim_{\beta \to 1} \Delta r_{f,t}^* = 0$. It is clear that if $\beta \to 1$ then the first term, which is a multiplicative of $1 - \beta$, will vanish; however the second term, which is a multiplicative of $x_{t+1}$ needs some inspection. The equation $x_t = 1 - \beta + z_1(\lambda_t)\beta x_{t+1}$ pins down the relationship between $x_t$ and $x_{t+1}$. Iteration on $t$ yields

$$x_{t+1} = (1 - \beta) \times \left[ 1 + \sum_{i=1}^{s-1} \beta^i \prod_{j=1}^{i} z_1(\lambda_{t+j}) \right] + \beta^s \prod_{j=1}^{s} z_1(\lambda_{t+j}) \times x_{t+1+s},$$

where $s \in \mathbb{N}_+$ is an arbitrary integer. The terms $z_1(\lambda_{t+j})$ are all strictly less than 1. Since $T$ is large, one can pick $s$ large enough to ensure that $O(s) \approx 0$; hence

$$x_{t+1} \approx (1 - \beta) \times \left[ 1 + \sum_{i=1}^{s-1} \beta^i \prod_{j=1}^{i} z_1(\lambda_{t+j}) \right].$$

Consequently we have $\lim_{\beta \to 1} x_{t+1} = 0$; and therefore $\lim_{\beta \to 1} \Delta r_{f,t}^* = 0$. This completes the proof for $\Delta r_{f,t}^*$. The remaining cases pertaining $\Delta y_{t}^*$ and $\Delta r_{b,t}^*$ can be proved similarly. 

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9 Online Appendix 2

9.1 Inductive Step

Our goal in this section is to establish that the claims in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 hold true in period \( t \), assuming they are true in period \( t+1 \). We start by re-arranging the expected payoffs for buyers and sellers. Noting that \( \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n(q)}{n+1} = \frac{1-z_0(q)}{q} \), the expression for \( U_{i,f,t} \), given by (3), can be re-written as

\[
U_{i,f,t} = \frac{1-z_0(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})}{q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t}} (1 - r_{f,t} - \beta u_{i,t+1}) + \beta u_{i,t+1}. \tag{9.1}
\]

Similarly we have

\[
U_{l,b,t} = \frac{1-z_0(q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t})}{q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t}} (1 - r_{b,t} - \beta u_{l,t+1}) + \beta u_{l,t+1} \tag{9.2}
\]

Note that

\[
U_{h,b,t} = U_{l,b,t} + z_0(q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t})(r_{b,t} - y + \varepsilon) + \left[ 1 - \frac{1-z_0(q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t})}{q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t}} \right] \beta (u_{h,t+1} - u_{l,t+1}). \tag{9.3}
\]

Using these expressions we can now rewrite \( \Pi_{f,t} \) and \( \Pi_{b,t} \). Equation (9.1) implies that

\[
[1-z_0(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})] r_{f,t} = [1-z_0(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})] (1 - \beta u_{i,t+1}) + \beta u_{i,t+1} - (q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t}) U_{i,f,t}
\]

Substituting this relationship into (7) yields

\[
\Pi_{f,t} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})(1 - \beta \pi_{t+1}) - (q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})(U_{i,f,t} - \beta u_{i,t+1})
\]

\[
- [1-z_0(q_{h,f,t}+q_{l,f,t})] \beta u_{i,t+1}. \tag{9.4}
\]

Similarly combining (9.2), (9.3) with (8) yields

\[
\Pi_{b,t} = 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - z_0(q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t})(1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{h,t+1}) - q_{h,b,t}(U_{h,b,t} - \beta u_{h,t+1})
\]

\[
-q_{l,b,t}(U_{l,b,t} - \beta u_{l,t+1}) + q_{h,b,t}z_0(q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t})\varepsilon + \frac{1-z_0(q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t})}{q_{h,b,t}+q_{l,b,t}}q_{l,b,t}\beta (u_{h,t+1} - u_{l,t+1}) \tag{9.5}
\]

We can now start characterizing the equilibria. There are three cases: \( \varepsilon = 0, \varepsilon < 0 \) and \( \varepsilon > 0 \).
9.1.1 Case 1: \( \varepsilon = 0 \).

Per the inductive assumption we have \( u_{h,t+1} = u_{l,t+1} = u_{t+1} \). Substituting \( u_{h,t+1} = u_{t+1} \) into (1) yields the expression for the bargained price \( y_t^* \), which is on display in Proposition 1 (equation (16)). For now we assume that \( y_t^* \leq r_{b,t} \), which requires \( \theta \) to be sufficiently large. Furthermore we conjecture that players prefer to transact immediately rather than waiting (verified below).

One can show that flexible firms post the same list price \( r_{b,t} \) and cater to high types while fixed price firms post the same list price \( r_{f,t} \) and cater to both types if \( \varepsilon \leq 0 \) and cater to low types if \( \varepsilon > 0 \). In other words, Lemma 2, which was valid in the terminal period \( T \), is also valid in period \( t \). The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 2; hence it is skipped here.

Since \( u_{h,t+1} = u_{l,t+1} \) we have \( U_{h,f,t} = U_{l,f,t} \). In addition \( U_{h,b,t} > U_{l,b,t} \) since \( r_{b,t} > y_t \). Now consider a flexible firm. Since flexible firms attract high types only we have \( U_{h,b,t} (r_{b,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) and \( U_{l,b,t} (r_{b,t}) < \bar{U}_{l,t} \), and thus \( q_{h,b,t} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,b,t} = 0 \). Substituting these into (9.5) we have

\[
\Pi_{h,t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1}) - q_{h,b,t} (U_{h,b,t} - \beta u_{h,t+1}) \]

A flexible firm solves \( \max_{q_{h,b,t} \in \mathbb{R}_+} \Pi_{h,t} \) s.t. \( U_{h,b,t} (r_{b,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \). The FOC is given by

\[
z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) [1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] = \bar{U}_{h,t} - \beta u_{t+1}.
\] (9.6)

The SOC is trivial, hence the solution to the FOC yields a maximum.

Fixed price firms attract both types of customers, i.e. \( U_{h,f,t} (r_{f,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) and \( U_{l,f,t} (r_{f,t}) = \bar{U}_{l,t} \) thus \( q_{h,f,t} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,f,t} > 0 \). Note that \( u_{h,t+1} = u_{l,t+1} = u_{t+1} \) and that \( U_{h,f,t} = U_{l,f,t} \). Thus \( \Pi_{f,t} \), given by the expression in (9.4), becomes

\[
\Pi_{f,t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - z_0 (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t}) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1}) - (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t}) (U_{h,f,t} - \beta u_{t+1})
\]

A fixed price firm solves \( \max_{q_{h,f,t}, q_{l,f,t} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2} \Pi_{f,t} \) s.t. \( U_{h,f,t} (r_{f,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) and \( U_{l,f,t} (r_{f,t}) = \bar{U}_{l,t} \). (It appears that the seller faces two separate constraints, one for high types and one for low types. Recall, however, that \( U_{h,f,t} = U_{l,f,t} \), which, in turn, implies that \( \bar{U}_{l,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \); thus both constraints are identical.) The FOC implies that

\[
z_0 (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t}) [1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] = \bar{U}_{h,t} - \beta u_{t+1}.
\] (9.7)
FOCs (9.6) and (9.7) together imply that \( q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t} = q_{h,b,t} \), i.e. expected demands at all firms, fixed or flexible, should be identical. Substitute \( q_{l,b,t} = 0 \) into the feasibility constraint (13) and use the fact that \( q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t} = q_{h,b,t} \) to obtain

\[
q_{h,b,t} = \lambda_t, \quad q_{h,f,t} = \lambda_t (\varphi^*_{f,t} - \eta_t)/\varphi^*_{f,t} \quad \text{and} \quad q_{l,f,t} = \lambda_t \eta_t / \varphi^*_{f,t}.
\]

Note that, \( \varphi^*_{f,t} \) is indeterminate and can take any value within \([\eta_t, 1]\); hence, there is a continuum of equilibria where any fraction \( \varphi^*_{f,t} \geq \eta_t \) of sellers compete via fixed pricing while the rest compete via flexible pricing. In addition, note that in any equilibrium the total expected demand at each firm equals to \( \lambda_t \).

Now we can characterize prices. Combining the FOC (9.6) with indifference constraint \( U_{h,b,t} (z_{b,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) yields

\[
z_0 (\lambda_t) [1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] = U_{h,b,t} (r_{b,t}) - \beta u_{t+1},
\]

where \( U_{h,b,t} \) is given by (9.2). Solving this equality for \( r_{b,t} \) yields expression (15), on display in Proposition 1. Similarly the FOC (9.7) along with \( U_{h,f,t} (z_{f,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) implies

\[
z_0 (\lambda_t) [1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] = U_{h,f,t} (r_{f,t}) - \beta u_{t+1},
\]

where \( U_{h,f,t} \) is given by (9.1). Solving this equality for \( r_{f,t} \) yields expression (14), on display in Proposition 1. High type buyers negotiate if \( r_{b,t} \geq y_{t}^* \), which, after substituting for \( r_{b,t}^* \) and \( y_{t}^* \), is equivalent to \( \theta \geq \bar{\theta}_t \equiv z_1 (\lambda_t) / [1 - z_0 (\lambda_t)] \). Given the expressions for \( r_{f,t}^* \) and \( r_{b,t}^* \) one can verify that the equilibrium payoffs \( \pi_t \) and \( u_t \) are indeed as in Proposition 1 (equations (17) and (18)). In addition note that if \( \theta > \bar{\theta}_t \) then \( r_{b,t}^* > r_{f,t}^* > y_t \).

If \( \theta < \bar{\theta}_t \) then \( r_{b,t}^* < y_t \); thus no bargaining takes place as the list price \( r_{b,t}^* \) falls below the bargained price \( y_t^* \). In this parameter region the model collapses to a fixed-price setting where \( \varphi_t^* = 1 \), i.e. where all sellers trade via fixed pricing and post \( r_{f,t}^* \) serving both types of customers. The equilibrium demand at each firm is \( \lambda_t \) and the expected payoffs for buyers and sellers remain the same as in (17) and (18).

**Transact Now or Wait?** The inequality in prices raises the issue of whether players should keep searching for better deals. Below we prove that they are better off trading immediately instead of waiting. There are two cases: (i) \( \theta \geq \bar{\theta}_t \) and (ii) \( \theta < \bar{\theta}_t \).

**Eq-PS:** If \( \theta \geq \bar{\theta}_t \) then fixed and flexible stores coexist in the same market and prices satisfy
The worst case scenario for a buyer is buying at the highest price \( r_{b,t}^* \) whereas the worst case scenario for a seller is selling at the lowest price \( y_t^* \). If players transact at these prices then they clearly would transact at more favorable prices.

Consider a buyer who contemplates trading at \( r_{b,t}^* \). He purchases if
\[
1 - r_{b,t}^* > u_t + 1,
\]
i.e. if the immediate surplus is greater than the present value of search in the next period. After substituting for \( r_{b,t}^* \) the inequality is satisfied if
\[
1 - u_t + 1 > 0.
\]
One can verify that the expression on the left hand side is positive:
\[
to see why use the expressions for \( u_t \) and \( \pi_t \) to obtain
\[
x_t = 1 - \beta + \beta z_1 (\lambda_t) x_{t+1}, \quad x_t \equiv 1 - \beta (u_t + \pi_t). \]
We want to show that \( x_t \) is positive for all \( t = 1, 2, \ldots T \).

Note that if \( x_{t+1} > 0 \) then \( x_t > 0 \). Substituting the terminal conditions \( u_{T+1} = \pi_{T+1} = 0 \) yields \( x_T = 1 \), which, of course, is positive. Hence \( x_t \) is positive for all \( t < T \). Since the expression is positive, the buyer is better off purchasing at \( r_{b,t}^* \) rather than waiting. Since the buyer is willing to transact in this worst case scenario, it is clear that he is ready to transact at lower prices \( r_{f,t}^* \) and \( y_t^* \) as well.

Now consider a seller. The worst case scenario for him is to sell at \( y_t^* \). He agrees to transact if
\[
y_t^* > \beta \pi_{t+1}, \quad \text{which, after substituting for } y_t^*, \text{ is equivalent to } 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} > 0. \]
We know this inequality holds, so the seller, too, wishes to sell instead of walking away. Since he is willing to sell at \( y_t^* \), it is clear that he is ready to sell at higher prices \( r_{f,t}^* \) and \( r_{b,t}^* \) as well.

**Eq-FP:** If \( \theta \geq \overline{\theta}_t \) then all sellers compete via fixed pricing and post \( r_{f,t}^* \). A buyer transacts if
\[
1 - r_{f,t}^* > u_{t+1}, \quad \text{which after substituting for } r_{f,t}^* \text{ is equivalent to}
\]
\[
(1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) \times z_1 (\lambda_t) /[1 - z_0 (\lambda_t)] > 0.
\]
Since the term \( 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} \) is positive the inequality holds. Similarly the seller transacts if \( r_{f,t}^* > \beta \pi_{t+1}, \) which is equivalent to
\[
(1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) \times [1 - z_1 (\lambda_t) /[1 - z_0 (\lambda_t)]] > 0
\]
Both expressions inside the parentheses are positive hence the inequality holds.

**9.1.2 Case 2:** \( \varepsilon < 0 \).

As in the terminal period, we will show that if \( \varepsilon < 0 \) then there cannot be an equilibrium where firms adopt flexible pricing. The proof is by contradiction, i.e. suppose that there is an equilibrium where a firm adopts flexible pricing. We will show that this firm earns less than its fixed price
competitors. Recall that if \( \varepsilon < 0 \) then a flexible firm attracts high types only while low types stay away i.e. \( U_{h,b,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) and \( U_{l,b,t} < \bar{U}_{l,t} \) hence \( q_{h,b,t} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,b,t} = 0 \). Substituting \( q_{l,b,t} = 0 \) along with the fact that \( u_{h,t+1} = u_{l,t+1} = u_{t+1} \) (inductive step) into expression (9.5) we have

\[
\Pi_{b,t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1}) - q_{h,b,t} (U_{h,b,t} - \beta u_{t+1}) + z_1 (q_{h,b,t}) \varepsilon
\]

A flexible firm solves \( \max_{q_{h,b,t} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi_{b,t} \) s.t. \( U_{h,b,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \). The FOC is given by

\[
z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1}) + [z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) - z_1 (q_{h,b,t})] \varepsilon = \bar{U}_{h,t} - \beta u_{t+1}.
\]

The second order condition is trivial since \( \varepsilon < 0 \). It follows that

\[
\Pi_{b,t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - (z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) + z_1 (q_{h,b,t})) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1}) + q_{h,b,t} z_1 (q_{h,b,t}) \varepsilon
\]

Now consider fixed price firms. They attract both types of customers i.e. \( q_{h,f,t} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,f,t} > 0 \) and satisfy \( U_{h,f,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) and \( U_{l,f,t} = \bar{U}_{l,t} \). Since \( u_{h,t+1} = u_{l,t+1} = u_{t+1} \) we have \( U_{h,f,t} = U_{l,f,t} \) and therefore \( \bar{U}_{l,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \). It follows that \( \Pi_{f,t} \), given by (9.4), becomes

\[
\Pi_{f,t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - z_0 (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t}) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1}) - (q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t}) (U_{h,f,t} - \beta u_{t+1}),
\]

Letting \( q_{f,t} \equiv q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t} \), a fixed price firm solves \( \max_{q_{f,t} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi_{f,t} \) s.t. \( U_{h,f,t} (r_{f,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \). The FOC implies that

\[
z_0 (q_{f,t}) (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} - \beta u_{t+1}.
\]

Hence

\[
\Pi_{f,t} = 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - (z_0 (q_{f,t}) + z_1 (q_{f,t})) (1 - \beta \pi_{t+1} - \beta u_{t+1})
\]

We will show \( \Pi_{f,t} > \Pi_{b,t} \). First note that the FOCs together imply that

\[
\varepsilon = \frac{z_0 (q_{f,t}) - z_0 (q_{h,b,t})}{z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) (1 - q_{h,b,t})} (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}).
\]

Observe that \( 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} \) is positive; thus the inequality \( \varepsilon < 0 \) implies that either we have (i) \( q_{f,t} < q_{h,b,t} \) and \( q_{h,b,t} > 1 \) or we have (ii) \( q_{f,t} > q_{h,b,t} \) and \( q_{h,b,t} < 1 \).
Now, let \( \Delta \equiv \Pi_{f,t} - \Pi_{b,t} \). We will show that \( \Delta > 0 \). Note that

\[
\Delta = \left[ z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - z_0(q_{f,t}) + z_1(q_{h,b,t}) - z_1(q_{f,t}) \right] (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) - q_{h,b,t} z_1(q_{h,b,t}) \varepsilon
\]

\[
= \left\{ \frac{z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - z_0(q_{f,t})}{1-q_{h,b,t}} - z_0(q_{f,t}) (q_{f,t} - q_{h,b,t}) \right\} (1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1})
\]

The first step follows after substituting for \( \Pi_{f,t} \) and \( \Pi_{b,t} \) whereas the second step is obtained after substituting for \( \varepsilon \) and noting that \( z_1(q) = q z_0(q) \). The term \( 1 - \beta u_{t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} \) is positive; thus focus on the expression inside the curly brackets (call it \( \Omega \)). Under condition (i) both terms of \( \Omega \) are positive; hence \( \Delta > 0 \). Under condition (ii) the first term of \( \Omega \) is positive but the second one is negative so it needs a closer inspection. Fix \( q_{h,b,t} < 1 \) and note that \( \Omega \) falls in \( q_{f,t} \) under the restrictions of (ii). It follows that \( \Omega \) reaches a minimum when \( q_{f,t} < q_{h,b,t} \) (recall that under (ii) we have \( q_{f,t} > q_{h,b,t} \)). Note that \( \lim_{q_{f,t} \searrow q_{h,b,t}} \Omega = 0 \). Hence \( \Omega > 0 \) and therefore \( \Delta > 0 \) in the region \( q_{f,t} > q_{h,b,t} \).

The fact that \( \Delta > 0 \) implies that fixed price sellers earn more than flexible sellers; hence there cannot be an equilibrium where flexible pricing is adopted. The implication is that if \( \varepsilon < 0 \) then the only possible outcome is the one where all sellers adopt fixed pricing (Eq-FP), which we have already characterized in Case 1.

### 9.1.3 Case 3: \( \varepsilon > 0 \).

If \( \varepsilon > 0 \) then flexible firms cater to high types only i.e. \( U_{h,b,t}(r_{b,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) and \( U_{l,b,t}(r_{b,t}) < \bar{U}_{l,t} \) thus \( q_{h,b,t} > 0 \) and \( q_{l,b,t} = 0 \). Substitute \( q_{l,b,t} = 0 \) into \( \Pi_{b,t} \), given by (9.5), and use the fact that \( z_1(q) = q z_0(q) \) to obtain

\[
\Pi_{b,t} = 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - z_0(q_{h,b,t}) (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) - q_{h,b,t} (U_{h,b,t} - \beta u_{h,t+1}) + z_1(q_{h,b,t}) \varepsilon
\]

A flexible firm’s problem is \( \max_{q_{h,b,t} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi_{b,t} \) s.t. \( U_{h,b,t}(r_{h,t}) = \bar{U}_{h,t} \). The FOC is given by

\[
z_0(q_{h,b,t}) (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + [z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - z_1(q_{h,b,t})] \varepsilon = \bar{U}_{h,b,t} - \beta u_{h,t+1}
\]

The second order condition is satisfied if

\[
-z_0(q_{h,b,t}) [1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] - \varepsilon [2 z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - z_1(q_{h,b,t})] < 0.
\]

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If $2z_0(q_{h,t}) > z_1(q_{h,t})$, i.e. if $2 > q_{h,t}$ then the inequality is satisfied irrespective of $\varepsilon$. If $2 < q_{h,t}$ then we need $\varepsilon < (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) / (q_{h,t} - 2)$. The expression on the right hand side is positive. Since $\varepsilon$ is assumed to be positive but sufficiently small the inequality is satisfied; hence the SOC holds.

It follows that

$$
\Pi_{b,t} = 1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - [z_0(q_{h,t}) + z_1(q_{h,t})] (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) + q_{h,t} z_1(q_{h,t}) \varepsilon
$$

(9.9)

Now consider fixed price sellers. Recall that they attract low types only, i.e. $U_{h,f,t} < U_{h,t}$ and $U_{l,f,t} = U_{l,t}$; hence $q_{h,f,t} = 0$ and $q_{l,f,t} > 0$. Substituting $q_{h,f,t} = 0$ into $\Pi_{f,t}$, given by (9.4), yields

$$
\Pi_{f,t} = 1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - z_0(q_{l,f,t}) [1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] - q_{l,f,t} (U_{l,f,t} - \beta u_{l,t+1})
$$

The seller solves $\max_{q_{l,f,t} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi_{f,t}$ s.t. $U_{l,f,t}(r_{b,t}) = U_{l,t}$. The FOC is given by

$$
z_0(q_{l,f,t}) [1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}] = U_{l,f,t} - \beta u_{l,t+1}.
$$

(9.10)

The SOC is trivial; hence the solution corresponds to a maximum. It follows that

$$
\Pi_{f,t} = 1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - [z_0(q_{l,f,t}) + z_1(q_{l,f,t})] (1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1})
$$

(9.11)

Recall that $\varphi_{f,t}$ denotes the fraction of sellers who compete with fixed pricing. Substituting $q_{h,f,t} = q_{l,b,t} = 0$ into the feasibility conditions in (13) yields

$$
q_{l,f,t} = \eta_t \lambda_t / \varphi_{f,t} \quad \text{and} \quad q_{h,b,t} = (1 - \eta_t) \lambda_t / (1 - \varphi_{f,t}).
$$

We will show that there exists a unique $\varphi_{f,t}^* \in (0, \eta_t)$ satisfying the equal profit condition $\Pi_{f,t} = \Pi_{b,t}$, proving the equilibrium exists and it is unique. Let $\Delta(\varphi_{f,t}) \equiv \Pi_{b,t} - \Pi_{f,t}$ and note that $\Delta$ rises in $q_{h,b,t}$, which in turn rises in $\varphi_{f,t}$, and that $\Delta$ falls in $q_{l,f,t}$, which in turn falls in $\varphi_{f,t}$. It follows that $d\Delta / d\varphi_{f,t} > 0$. Furthermore note that $\Delta(\eta_t) > 0$ as $u_{h,t+1} > u_{l,t+1}$ (from the inductive step) whereas $\Delta(0) < 0$ if $\varepsilon$ is small. To see why, note that $\Delta(0) < 0$ if $\varepsilon < \bar{\varepsilon}$, where

$$
\bar{\varepsilon} \equiv \frac{\beta u_{h,t+1} - u_{l,t+1}}{q z_1(q)} + \frac{1 + q}{q} [1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}], \quad \text{and} \quad q \equiv (1 - \eta_t) \lambda_t.
$$

(9.12)
The expression for \( \bar{\varepsilon} \) is positive. Since \( \varepsilon \) is positive but sufficiently small the inequality \( \varepsilon < \bar{\varepsilon} \) holds.

Since \( \Delta (0) < 0 \), \( \Delta (\eta_t) > 0 \) and \( \Delta \) is rising in \( \varphi_{f,t} \), by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exits a unique \( \varphi_{f,t}^* \in (0, \eta_t) \) satisfying \( \Delta (\varphi_{f,t}^*) = 0 \). Since \( \varphi_{f,t}^* < \eta_t \) we have \( q_{h,b,t}^* < \lambda_t < q_{l,f,t}^* \) i.e. fixed price firms are more crowded than flexible firms.

Now we can obtain equilibrium prices and payoffs. Substituting \( q_{h,b,t}^* = 0 \) into the expression for \( U_{h,b,t} \), given by (9.2), yields

\[
U_{h,b,t} = \frac{1-z_0(q_{h,b,t}^*)}{q_{h,b,t}^*} (1 - r_{b,t} - \beta u_{h,t+1}) + z_0(q_{h,b,t}^*) (r_{b,t} + \varepsilon - y_t) + \beta u_{h,t+1}.
\]

Solving \( U_{h,b,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \), where \( \bar{U}_{h,t} \) is given by (9.8), for \( r_{b,t} \) yields the expression for \( r_{b,t}^* \), which is on display in Proposition 3 (equation ((21))). Similarly substituting \( q_{h,f,t}^* = 0 \) into \( U_{l,f,t} \), given by (9.2), and solving the equation \( U_{l,f,t} = \bar{U}_{l,t} \), where \( \bar{U}_{l,t} \) is given by (9.10), for \( r_{f,t} \) yields the expression for \( r_{f,t}^* \) (equation (20)).

Equilibrium payoffs \( \pi_t, u_{h,t} \) and \( u_{l,t} \) are immediate from the first order conditions (9.8) and (9.10). Finally the equilibrium bargained price \( y_{f,t}^* \) is obtained by substituting \( u_{h,t+1} \) into (1).

High type buyers bargain if \( y_{f,t}^* \leq r_{b,t}^* + \varepsilon \). After substituting for \( r_{b,t}^* \) and \( y_{f,t}^* \) and re-arranging this condition is equivalent to

\[
\theta \geq \bar{\theta}_t = \frac{z_1(q_{h,b,t}^*)}{1-z_0(q_{h,b,t}^*)} - \frac{\varepsilon z_1(q_{h,b,t}^*) q_{h,b,t}^*}{[1-z_0(q_{h,b,t}^*)][1-\beta u_{h,t+1} + \beta \pi_{t+1} + \varepsilon]}.
\]

If \( \theta < \bar{\theta}_t \) then even high types would not opt for bargaining; thus the availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a fixed price setting, characterized earlier (Eq-FP).

**Transact Now or Wait?** We have already established that players are better off trading immediately along Eq-FP (see Case 1 above). What remains to be done is to establish this claim for the other outcome, i.e. Eq-FS. Along this equilibrium high types shop at flexible stores and low types shop at fixed price stores. Start with flexible stores. The worst case scenario for a high type buyer is to purchase at \( r_{b,t}^* \) (the alternative is buying at the bargained price \( y_{f,t}^* \), which is less than \( r_{b,t}^* \)).

The buyer purchases if \( 1 - r_{b,t} > \beta u_{h,t+1} \). After substituting for \( r_{b,t}^* \) the condition is equivalent to \( \varepsilon < Q \), where

\[
Q = (1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) \frac{1-\theta}{q_{h,b,t}^* - 1 + \theta}.
\]

Notice that \( Q \) is positive. To see why, note that the numerator is positive, but the sign of the denominator, \( q_{h,b,t}^* - 1 + \theta \), needs inspection. Recall that along Eq-FS we have \( \theta \geq \bar{\theta}_t \) and note
that $\bar{\theta}_t \geq z_1(q_{h,b,t}^*/[1 - z_0(q_{h,b,t}^*)])$. The expression $q_{h,b,t}^* - 1 + \theta$ is increasing in $\theta$; thus in order to show that it is positive it suffices to show that $q_{h,b,t}^*/[1 - z_0(q_{h,b,t}^*)] > 0$. It is easy to verify that this inequality holds true for all values of $q_{h,b,t}^*$, which means that $q_{h,b,t}^* - 1 + \theta$ is also positive; thus $Q$ is positive. Since $\varepsilon$ is positive but small the inequality $\varepsilon < Q$ holds; hence the buyer is better off purchasing instead of waiting. (One can show that $Q > \bar{\varepsilon}$, where $\bar{\varepsilon}$ is given by (9.12); thus $\varepsilon < Q$ as long as $\varepsilon < \bar{\varepsilon}$.)

Now consider the seller, whose worst case scenario is selling at $y_t^*$. The seller agrees to trade if $y_t^* > \beta\pi_{t+1}$. Substituting for $y_t^*$ the condition is equivalent to $(1 - \theta) [1 - \beta u_{h,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} + \varepsilon] > 0$. Both expressions are positive; thus the inequality holds.

Now consider a fixed price firms, where low types shop. A low type buyer purchases if $1 - r_{f,t}^* > \beta u_{l,t+1}$. After substituting for $r_{f,t}^*$ the condition is equivalent to

$$(1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) \times z_1(q_{l,f,t}^*/[1 - z_0(q_{l,f,t}^*)]) > 0.$$

Since $1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1} > 0$ the inequality holds. Similarly the seller trades if $r_{f,t}^* > \beta \pi_{t+1}$, i.e. if

$$(1 - \beta u_{l,t+1} - \beta \pi_{t+1}) \times [1 - z_1(q_{l,f,t}^*/[1 - z_0(q_{l,f,t}^*)])] > 0$$

Expressions inside the brackets are positive; hence the inequality holds. This completes the proof. 

$\blacksquare$
9.2 Model with $N \geq 2$ Types of Buyers

In the main text buyers are divided into two types according to their bargaining abilities. Here we consider a setting with $N$ types, where type 1 buyers are the least skilled in bargaining ("non-hagglers") and type $N$ buyers are the most skilled. Our goal is to check if the results in the main text remain robust to this variation. As this exercise is a robustness check, rather than a full blown analysis, we focus on the one shot game with $\epsilon = 0$ and then elaborate on what would happen if $\epsilon < 0$ or $\epsilon > 0$.

**The Outcome of Bargaining.** Letting $\theta_i \in [0, 1)$ denote the bargaining power of type $i = 1, 2, \ldots, N$ buyers, we fix $\theta_1 = 0$ and assume that negotiation skills increase in $i$, that is $\theta_{i+1} > \theta_i$. As in the benchmark, bargaining may ensue only if there is a single customer at the store. If two or more customers are present then the item is necessarily sold at the list price. Furthermore we assume that a buyer’s negotiation skill manifests itself at the bargaining table, i.e. once negotiations start the seller can tell how skilled his customer is and correctly identify the parameter $\theta_i$. Notice that identifying who is the most/least skilled among multiple customers is not an issue as the item is sold at the posted price under that contingency. Consider the negotiation process between a seller and a type $i$ buyer. The bargained price $y_i$ can be found as the solution to the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{y_i \in [0, 1]} (1 - y_i)^{\theta_i} y_i^{1-\theta_i}$$

The solution yields $y_i = 1 - \theta_i$. Since $\theta_{i+1} > \theta_i$ we have $y_{i+1} < y_i$, i.e. higher types bargain lower prices. Since $\theta_1 = 0$, type 1 never bargains. We assume that $\theta_2$ is sufficiently large to ensure that $r_b \geq y_2$, i.e. type 2 buyers are skilled enough to obtain a lower price than the posted price. (Otherwise the model collapses to a setting with $N - 1$ types, where type 1 and type 2 buyers are the non-hagglers.) Clearly, if type 2 is skilled enough to ask for bargaining then the higher types $(3, 4, \ldots, N)$ are more than capable of doing so.

**Expected Payoffs.** Let $q_{i,m}$ denote the expected demand consisting of type $i$ buyers at a store trading via rule $m$ and let

$$q_m \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,m}, \quad \text{where } m = f, b \text{ and } i = 1, 2, \ldots, N$$

denote the total demand at that store. It follows that the expected utility of a type $i$ buyer at a
fixed price store is given by

\[ U_{i,f} = \frac{1 - z_0(q_f)}{q_f} (1 - r_f), \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \ldots, N. \]

At a flexible store, on the other hand, we have

\[
U_{1,b} = \frac{1 - z_0(q_b)}{q_b} (1 - r_b) \quad \text{and} \\
U_{i,b} = z_0(q_b) (1 - y_i) + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{z_n(q_b)}{n+1} (1 - r_b), \quad i = 2, 3, \ldots N.
\]

The first line is the expected utility of a type 1 buyer (they never negotiate), whereas the second line is the expected utility of a type \( i \) buyer, who would negotiate if he is the sole customer at the store. These expressions are similar to their counterparts in the baseline model and can be interpreted similarly. Basic algebra reveals that

\[
U_{i,b} = U_{1,b} + z_0(q_b) (r_b - y_i) \quad \text{and} \quad U_{i+1,b} = U_{i,b} + z_0(q_b) (y_i - y_{i+1}) \text{ for } i = 2, 3, \ldots N \quad (9.13)
\]

Since \( r_b > y_2 \) and \( y_i > y_{i+1} \) we have \( U_{i+1,b} > U_{i,b} \). Now turn to sellers. A fixed price seller expects to earn

\[ \Pi_f = [1 - z_0(q_f)] r_f. \]

The expression for \( \Pi_f \) is the same as its counterpart in the benchmark model; however flexible sellers’ expected profit is slightly more cumbersome, because they face the prospect of meeting all types of customers and each type negotiates a different price. We have

\[
\Pi_b = \sum_{i=2}^{N} \prod_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N} z_0(q_{j,b}) z_1(q_{i,b}) y_i + \left[ \prod_{j=2}^{N} z_0(q_{j,b}) z_1(q_{1,b}) + \sum_{n=2}^{\infty} z_n(q_b) \right] r_b
\]

To understand the first term note that with probability \( \prod_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N} z_0(q_{j,b}) z_1(q_{i,b}) \) the seller gets exactly one type \( i \) customer, in which case he charges the bargained price \( y_i \) (recall that the seller can identify the type of the customer during the negotiation process). To account for all types, the expression needs to be summed over all \( i \), but the summation starts from \( i = 2 \) because type 1 customers never negotiate. The second expression inside the brackets represent the probability of getting exactly one type 1 customer or getting more than one customer, regardless of the type.
In either case the seller charges the posted price $r_b$. Noting that $\prod_{j=1}^{N} z_0(q_{j,b}) = z_0(q_b)$ and that $x z_0(x) = z_1(x)$ one can show that

$$\Pi_m = 1 - z_0(q_m) - \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,m} U_{i,m}, \text{ where } m = f, b.$$ 

Now we can state the main result of this section.

**Proposition 7** If $\theta_N \geq \theta \equiv z_1(\lambda) / [1 - z_0(\lambda)]$ then there exists a continuum of equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction $\varphi^* \geq \max \{\eta_1, \eta_2, ..., \eta_N\}$ of sellers trade via fixed pricing and remaining sellers trade via flexible pricing. The equilibria are characterized by partial segmentation: Everyone but type $N$ customers shop exclusively at fixed price firms whereas type $N$ customers shop anywhere. The expected demand at each store equals to $\lambda$. Fixed and flexible price sellers post, respectively

$$r_f^*(\lambda) = 1 - \frac{z_1(\lambda)}{1 - z_0(\lambda)} \quad \text{and} \quad r_b^*(\lambda) = 1 - \frac{z_1(\lambda)(1 - \theta_N)}{1 - z_0(\lambda) - z_1(\lambda)}$$

The equilibria are payoff-equivalent: in any realized equilibrium sellers and buyers earn $\pi = 1 - z_0(\lambda) - z_1(\lambda)$ and $u = z_0(\lambda)$ no matter which rule sellers compete with and no matter which seller’s rule buyers join in. If $\theta_N < \theta$, i.e. if type $N$ customers are not skilled enough in negotiations then the availability of flexible pricing becomes immaterial and fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium.

The proposition largely resembles its counterpart in the main text (Proposition 1), which indicates that the results remain rather robust. The key insight in here is that competition among sellers dictates bargaining deals to be designated for the most skilled type, which is why in equilibrium only the most skilled negotiators hunt for bargaining deals and everyone else shops at fixed price venues. An outcome where a firm attracts two different types of customers fails to exist, because along that scenario the lower type ends up with a lower market utility, which is incompatible with profit maximization under competition. An outcome where a firm caters exclusively to a lesser type fails to exist for similar reasons.

In what follows we prove the proposition. Steps 1, 2 and 3, reminiscent of Lemma 2 in the main text, establish how customer demographics pan out along a competitive search equilibrium. We, then, characterize the equilibrium.

- Step 1. A flexible store cannot attract two (or more) different types of customers at the same
time. It must be attracting a single type only.

We will show that the store cannot attract two different types at the same time. The fact that it cannot attract more than two types is a corollary. To start, suppose, by contradiction, a flexible store attracts types \(k\) and \(k+1\), i.e. suppose that \(q_{k,b}\) and \(q_{k+1,b}\) are both positive whereas \(q_{i,b} = 0\) for all \(i \neq k, k+1\). The fact that \(q_{k,b}\) and \(q_{k+1,b}\) are both positive implies that \(U_{k,b} = \bar{U}_k\) and \(U_{k+1,b} = \bar{U}_{k+1}\). Recall that \(U_{k+1,b} > U_{k,b}\). It follows that \(\bar{U}_{k+1} > \bar{U}_k\). In addition the fact that \(q_{k+j} = 0\), where \(j \geq 2\), implies that \(U_{k+j,b} < \bar{U}_{k+j}\). Since \(U_{k+j,b} > U_{k,b} = \bar{U}_k\) we have \(\bar{U}_{k+j} > \bar{U}_k\). In words all types who are better negotiators than type \(k\) must have a higher market utility than type \(k\). The seller’s profit equals to

\[
\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{k,b} + q_{k+1,b}) - q_{k,b} U_{k,b} - q_{k+1,b} U_{k+1,b}
= 1 - z_0 (q_{k,b} + q_{k+1,b}) - (q_{k,b} + q_{k+1,b}) U_{k,b} - \Delta,
\]

where \(\Delta := q_{k+1,b} z_0 (q_{k,b} + q_{k+1,b}) (y_k - y_{k+1}) > 0\). The second line follows from (9.13) and note that \(\Delta\) is positive because \(y_k > y_{k+1}\).

Below we show that if this seller switches from flexible pricing to fixed pricing and provides his customers with market utility \(\bar{U}_k\) then he could keep his expected demand intact yet he would earn higher profits, rendering the above outcome a non-equilibrium. To start, note that if the seller switches to fixed pricing then all buyers, regardless of their bargaining ability, earn the same expected payoff

\[
U_f = \frac{1 - z_0 (q_f)}{q_f} (1 - r_f)
\]
at his firm. If the seller provides customers with market utility \(\bar{U}_k\) then types \(k+1\) and above will not visit that store because \(\bar{U}_{k+j} > \bar{U}_k\) for all \(j \geq 1\) (see above). It follows that the seller will be visited by types \(k\) or below. The fact that the seller provides his customers with market utility \(\bar{U}_k\) implies that \(U_f = \bar{U}_k\). Recall that \(U_{k,b} = \bar{U}_k\). It follows \(U_f = U_{k,b}\), i.e

\[
\Delta = \frac{1 - z_0 (q_f)}{q_f} (1 - r_f) - \frac{1 - z_0 (q_b)}{q_b} (1 - r_b) - z_0 (q_b) (r_b - y_k) = 0.
\]

Fix \(r_b\) and \(q_b\) and note that, per the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exits a unique \(\hat{r}_f \in (0, r_b)\) ensuring that \(q_f = q_b\) while satisfying \(\Delta = 0\). In words if the seller posts \(\hat{r}_f\) then he can provide his customers with market utility \(\bar{U}_k\) while keeping his expected demand intact. Recall that his prior expected demand was \(q_b\); by posting \(\hat{r}_f\) the seller ensures that his new expected demand \(q_f\) is the
same as $q_b$.

The seller’s expected profit under fixed pricing is equal to $\Pi_f = 1 - z_0(q_f) - q_f U_f$. Since $q_b = q_f$ it is easy to show that $\Pi_f - \Pi_b = \Delta > 0$, i.e. the seller earns higher profits than he did before; hence the initial outcome could not be an equilibrium. This completes the proof. ■

Step 1 establishes that a flexible store can only attract a single type. This raises the question of whether a flexible store attracts, say, type $k$ while another flexible store attracts type $k + 1$. I.e. whether a separating equilibrium where different flexible stores attract different types could exist. Below we rule out this possibility.

• Step 2. There cannot be an outcome where different flexible stores attract different types of customers. All flexible stores must attract the same type.

Consider two flexible stores, say store $A$ and $B$. Suppose store $A$ attracts type $k$ only store $B$ attracts type $k + 1$ only (Step 1 ruled out the possibility of a store attracting more than one type). So for store $A$ we have $q^A_k > 0$ and $q^A_i = 0$ for all $i \neq k$ and for store $B$ we have $q^B_{k+1} > 0$ and $q^B_i = 0$ for all $i \neq k + 1$.

Note that type $k + 1$ could shop at store $A$ and obtain a better deal than type $k$ as they are more skilled, but the fact that they stay away from store $A$ indicates that their market utility is higher, i.e. $\hat{U}_{k+1} > \hat{U}_k$. Technically at store $A$ we have $U^A_{k,b} = \hat{U}_k$. The fact that $q^A_{k+1} = 0$ indicates that $U^A_{k+1,b} < \hat{U}_{k+1}$. Recall that $U^A_{k+1,b} > U^A_{k,b}$. It follows that $\hat{U}_{k+1} > \hat{U}_k$.

Store $A$ solves

$$\max_{q^A_{k,b} \in \mathbb{R}^+} \Pi^A_b = \max_{q^A_{k,b} \in \mathbb{R}^+} 1 - z_0(q^A_{k,b}) - q^A_{k,b} U^A_{k,b} \text{ s.t. } U^A_{k,b} = \hat{U}_k$$

The FOC implies $z_0(q^A_{k,b}) = \hat{U}_k$; hence

$$\Pi^A_b = 1 - z_0(q^A_{k,b}) - z_1(q^A_{k,b}) .$$

Store $B$’s problem is similar, thus

$$\Pi^B_b = 1 - z_0(q^B_{k+1,b}) - z_1(q^B_{k+1,b}) .$$

Stores must earn equal profits; thus $\Pi^A_b = \Pi^B_b$. This implies that $q^A_{k,b} = q^B_{k+1,b}$, which in turn implies that $\hat{U}_k = \hat{U}_{k+1}$; a contradiction. ■
• Step 3. Flexible stores must be attracting type $N$ only.

Suppose they attract some other type, say type $k < N$. The fact that type $k$ buyers visit flexible stores while type $N$ buyers stay away indicates that $U_{N,b} < \bar{U}_N$ and $U_{k,b} = \bar{U}_k$. Recall that $U_{N,b} > U_{k,b}$, thus $\bar{U}_N > \bar{U}_k$. Since type $N$ buyers stay away from flexible firms, they must be shopping at fixed price firms. This means that $U_{N,f} = \bar{U}_N$. Recall however that $U_i,f$ is the same for all $i$, thus $U_{k,f} = U_{N,f}$. It follows that $U_{k,f} > \bar{U}_k$; a contradiction since by definition $U_{k,f}$ cannot exceed the market utility $\bar{U}_k$. ■

**Characterization of Equilibrium.** Flexible stores attract no one but type $N$, i.e. $q_{N,b} > 0$ and $q_{i,b} = 0$ for all $i \neq N$. It follows that

$$\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - q_{N,b} \bar{U}_N,$$

A flexible seller solves

$$\max_{q_{N,b} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - q_{N,b} \bar{U}_N \text{ s.t. } U_{N,b} = \bar{U}_N$$

The FOC implies $z_0 (q_{N,b}) = \bar{U}_N$; hence

$$\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b}).$$

The fact that flexible stores attract no one but type $N$ indicates that types $1, 2, ..., N - 1$ must be shopping at fixed price stores. So, let $q_f = \sum_{i=1}^N q_{i,f}$ denote the total demand of a fixed price store consisting of type $1, 2, ..., N - 1$, and possibly of type $N$, customers. The fixed price seller solves

$$\max_{q_f \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0 (q_f) - q_f \bar{U}_f \text{ s.t. } U_f = \bar{U},$$

where $\bar{U}$ is a generic level or market utility (as it turns out this will be equal to $\bar{U}_N$). The FOC is given by $z_0 (q_f) = \bar{U}$. The seller’s profit, therefore, is equal to

$$\Pi_f = 1 - z_0 (q_f) - z_1 (q_f).$$

Both sellers must earn equal profits; i.e. $\Pi_b = \Pi_f$. This indicates that $q_{N,b} = q_f$, i.e. expected demands at fixed and flexible stores must be identical. This means that $\bar{U} = \bar{U}_N$, indicating that
all buyers must earn the same market utility and that type \(N\), too, may shop at fixed price stores i.e. \(q_{N,f}\) may indeed be positive. Letting \(\varphi_f\) denote the fraction of fixed price sellers and \(\eta_i\) the fraction of type \(i\) buyers in the market, with \(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \eta_i = 1\), we have

\[
\varphi_f q_{i,f} + (1 - \varphi_f) q_{i,b} = \lambda \eta_i \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, ..., N.
\]

The feasibility condition is similar to its counterpart in the main text (compare with (13)). Noting that \(q_{i,b} = 0\) for \(i < N\) we have

\[
\varphi_f \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,f} + (1 - \varphi_f) q_{N,b} = \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{N} \eta_i = \lambda.
\]

Recall that \(q_f = q_{N,b}\); hence

\[
q_{N,b}^* = \lambda, \quad q_{N,f}^* = \frac{\lambda(\eta_N - 1 + \varphi_f^*)}{{\varphi_f}^*}, \quad q_{i,f}^* = \frac{\lambda \eta_i}{{\varphi_f}^*} \quad \text{for } i < N.
\]

Note that for any \(\varphi_f^* \geq \max \{\eta_1, \eta_2, ..., \eta_N\} \equiv \bar{\eta}\) expected demands \(q_{i,f}^*\) are positive and satisfy the relationship above. This means that \(\varphi_f^*\) is indeterminate and we have a continuum of equilibria where \(\varphi_f^* \in [\bar{\eta}, 1]\). Note that if \(\varphi_f^* \geq \bar{\eta}\) then \(\sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,f}^* = q_{N,b}^* = \lambda\), i.e. in any given equilibrium flexible sellers and fixed price sellers have the same expected demand \(\lambda\). To complete the proof we need to pin down the equilibrium payoffs and prices; but this is a rather mechanic task and it can be accomplished by going through the steps outlined in the proof of Proposition 1; hence it is skipped here. \(\blacksquare\)

What if \(\varepsilon \neq 0\)? First, if \(\varepsilon < 0\) then, as in the benchmark, no seller would offer flexible pricing. To see why, notice that if \(\varepsilon = 0\) then sellers are indifferent between fixed and flexible pricing. If, however, \(\varepsilon\) falls below zero then this indifference would no longer hold because the negative \(\varepsilon\) would filter into flexible sellers’ profits causing them to earn less than fixed price stores. Sellers can avoid this negative effect by switching to fixed pricing. This claim can be proved by repeating the steps in the proof of Proposition 2 because the key in that proof is the fact that a negative \(\varepsilon\) hurts flexible sellers’ profits, which would remain true irrespective of whether there are two or \(N\) types of customers.

If \(\varepsilon > 0\) then we expect Proposition 3 to go through with the above caveat—that flexible stores attract type \(N\) customers and that everyone else shops at fixed price stores. To establish this claim
one needs to prove Steps that are analogous to Step 1, 2 and 3 above. A close look at their proofs reveals that the key factor driving the results is the inequality $U_{i+1,b} > U_{i,b}$—the fact that higher types earn more at a bargaining store than lower types. With $\varepsilon > 0$ expected utilities $U_{i,b}$ would have different closed form expressions, but, nevertheless the inequality $U_{i+1,b} > U_{i,b}$ would remain as the parameter $\varepsilon$ is orthogonal to the bargaining ability $\theta_i$. As such, the claims in Steps 1, 2 and 3 would go through even if $\varepsilon > 0$. Once customer demographics are settled (that flexible stores attract type $N$ customers and fixed price stores attract everyone else), the characterization of the equilibrium can, then, be accomplished by virtually repeating the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.
9.3 Second Round Matching

In the main text buyers who are unable to get an offer from, a firm or firms who are unable to receive a customer need to wait until the next trading period before they can try again. Here we study a variation where unmatched players may be costlessly re-matched with trading counterparts before moving to the next period—a process to which we refer as second round matching. In what follows we reconstruct the equilibria under this modification and show that the results of the benchmark model remain unchanged, subject to a modification in outside options. Since this exercise is a robustness check rather than a full blown analysis, we analyze the case $\varepsilon = 0$ in detail and then elaborate on what would happen if $\varepsilon < 0$ or $\varepsilon > 0$.

We assume that in each trading period two rounds of meetings take place. The first one is the matching process in the benchmark model. At the end of this round, inevitably, some buyers and sellers remain unmatched, so these players costlessly enter into a second round, where they are randomly matched with one another. One can specify a number of ways on how this may work, but to keep things simple and tractable we remain agnostic about the matching process, and simply assume that each buyer, regardless of his type, gets to trade with probability $\omega_{B,t}$ whereas each seller, regardless of whether he was fixed or flexible with the list price, gets to trade with probability $\omega_{S,t}$. The key observation is that, even in the second round players are not guaranteed to trade, i.e. the matching function may assign multiple buyers to a seller, in which case some buyers will be unable to buy, or it may assign no buyers to a seller, in which case the seller will have no choice but to wait for the next period. For now we take $\omega_{B,t}$ and $\omega_{S,t}$ as given, but at the end of this section we show how they might be tied to the fundamentals of the model, for example, via a standard urn-ball matching function.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is how the transaction in the second round is settled. This can be done in a number of ways, e.g. a fifty-fifty split, trading at the initially posted price and so on. Again, we remain agnostic about this mechanism, and instead assume that after a transaction in the second round the seller obtains payoff $p_t \in [\underline{p}_t, \overline{p}_t]$ and the buyer obtains $1 - p_t$. For now we take the boundaries of $p_t$ as given but subsequently they will be pinned down endogenously.

**Proposition 8** Fix some $p_t \in [\beta \pi_{t+1}, 1 - \beta u_{t+1}]$. If $\theta > \bar{\theta}_t$ then there exists a continuum of equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction $\varphi_{f,t}^* \geq \eta_t$ of sellers trade via fixed pricing and remaining
sellers trade via flexible pricing. Sellers post

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{r}_{f,t}^* &= 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \frac{z_1(\lambda_t)}{1 - z_0(\lambda_t)} \left(1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t}\right) \\
\hat{r}_{b,t}^* &= 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \frac{z_1(\lambda_t)(1 - \theta)}{1 - z_0(\lambda_t) - z_1(\lambda_t)} \left(1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t}\right)
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[
\mu_{B,t} = \omega_{B,t}(1 - p_t) + (1 - \omega_{B,t}) \beta u_{t+1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mu_{S,t} = \omega_{S,t} p_t + (1 - \omega_{S,t}) \beta \pi_{t+1}
\]

In case negotiations ensue transaction occurs at price

\[
y_t^* = 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \theta \left(1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t}\right)
\]

The expected demand at each store equals to \(\lambda_t\), however the equilibria are characterized by partial segmentation of customers: non-hagglers shop exclusively at fixed price firms whereas hagglers shop anywhere. In any equilibrium sellers and buyers earn

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_t &= 1 - \mu_{B,t} - [z_0(\lambda_t) + z_1(\lambda_t)] \left(1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t}\right) \\
u_t &= z_0(\lambda_t) \left[1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t}\right] + \mu_{B,t}.
\end{align*}
\]

If \(\theta < \bar{\theta}_t\) then fixed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium: all sellers post \(\hat{r}_{f,t}^*\) and serve both types of customers. The total demand at each firm equals to \(\lambda_t\) and the equilibrium payoffs remain the same as above.

In the main text a buyer’s outside option is \(\beta u_{t+1}\), which is the present value of his expected payoff in the next period. With the prospect of second round meetings, his outside option is \(\mu_{B,t} = \omega_{B,t}(1 - p_t) + (1 - \omega_{B,t}) \beta u_{t+1}\), which is a weighted average: with probability \(\omega_{B,t}\) the buyer gets to trade in the second round and obtains \(1 - p_t\) and with the complementary probability \(1 - \omega_{B,t}\) he is unable to trade even in the second round, so he walks away with \(\beta u_{t+1}\). Sellers’ outside option \(\mu_{S,t}\) can be interpreted similarly. A comparison between this proposition and its counterpart in the main text, Proposition 1, reveals that they are virtually identical if one updates the outside options with their current form in here, which indicates that the results remain robust.

The second round meeting gives customers and firms another chance to transact without incurring additional costs, as such, it diminishes trade frictions and improves everyone’s outside options (one can show that \(\mu_{B,t} > \beta u_{t+1}\) and \(\mu_{S,t} > \beta \pi_{t+1}\)). This effect is similar to raising the discount
factor in the benchmark model. Indeed in the benchmark model $\beta u_{t+1}$ and $\beta \pi_{t+1}$ can be improved simultaneously by raising $\beta$, which lowers waiting costs for everyone and renders trade frictions less biting.

An important question is whether players would like to trade immediately rather than waiting. Although we address this issue more technically in the proof of the proposition, the answer is yes—both in the first round as well as in the second round players are better off transacting whenever they have an opportunity to do so. Recall that in the second round buyers get payoff $1 - p_t$ and sellers get $p_t$. The fact that $p_t \in [\beta \pi_{t+1}, 1 - \beta u_{t+1}]$ ensures that both the firms and their customers are willing to trade during the second round meetings instead of waiting for the next period. If $p_t$ falls outside these boundaries then either the firm or the customer will walk away, rendering second round meetings immaterial and causing the model to collapses to its version in the main text. The crucial question is, then, whether players would want to transact in the first round instead of waiting for the second round. The answer is, still yes. Trade frictions may be lessened by the prospect of second round meetings, but they are not completely wiped out as no one is guaranteed to a sure trade, and therefore players are better off trading immediately instead of waiting. It is worth pointing out that the prospect of second round meetings filters into the equilibrium objects, i.e. the prices and payoffs are determined taking into consideration the the new version of outside options, which convinces buyers and sellers to trade at those prices instead of waiting.

As mentioned above, the analysis is based on the case $\epsilon = 0$; however given the results so far we can speculate on what would happen if $\epsilon > 0$ or $\epsilon < 0$. A detailed comparison between the proof of Proposition 8 and the proof of its counterpart in the main text, Proposition 1, reveals that both proofs follow virtually identical steps if one replaces the outside options in the benchmark with their current form. The parameter $\epsilon$ is orthogonal to the determination of outside options, as such we expect Propositions 2 and 3, which correspond to cases $\epsilon < 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$, to go through in similar fashion.

**Proof of Proposition 8.** The proof is by induction; however the analysis of the terminal period is quite similar to the analysis of the inductive step; hence skipping it we directly analyze the inductive step pertaining period $t$.

*Bargaining.* The Nash product in this version of the model is given by

$$\max_{y_t \in [0,1]} (1 - y_t - \mu_{B,t})^\theta (y_t - \mu_{S,t})^{1-\theta}.$$
The solution yields
\[ y_t = 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \theta \left( 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t} \right). \]
We assume that \( y_t < r_{b,t} \), which requires \( \theta \) to be sufficiently large, i.e. hagglers have sufficient bargaining power to negotiate the list price.

**Expected payoff.** We construct an equilibrium under the conjecture that non hagglers shop at fixed price stores whereas hagglers shop at both types of stores. Furthermore we conjecture that players transact immediately instead of waiting. We will verify both of these conjectures once we pin down equilibrium prices and payoffs. Along our conjecture, the expected utility of a high type buyer, who shops at a best offer store, is given by

\[
U_{h,b,t} = z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) \left( 1 - y_t \right) + \frac{1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) - z_1 (q_{h,b,t})}{q_{h,b,t}} \left( 1 - r_{h,t} \right) + \frac{q_{h,b,t} - 1 + z_0 (q_{h,b,t})}{q_{h,b,t}} \mu_{B,t}. \tag{9.14}
\]
With probability \( z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) \) the buyer is alone at the store and purchases the item through negotiations at price \( y_t \). With probability \( z_n (q_{h,b,t}) \) he encounters \( n = 1, 2, \ldots \) other buyers, and his probability of being able to buy is

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{z_n (q_{h,b,t})}{n + 1} = \frac{1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) - z_1 (q_{h,b,t})}{q_{h,b,t}}.
\]
If he manages to purchase, then he pays the list price \( r_{b,t} \). Finally with the complementary probability he is unable to buy in the first round, so he obtains \( \mu_{B,t} \). A flexible seller’s profit is given by

\[
\Pi_{b,t} = z_1 (q_{h,b,t}) y_t + \left[ 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) - z_1 (q_{h,b,t}) \right] r_{b,t} + z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) \mu_{S,t}
\]
If there is a single customer then the transaction occurs at price \( y_t \), if there are more than one customer then the transaction occurs at \( r_{b,t} \) and if the seller does not get a customer then he obtains \( \mu_{S,t} \). Given the expression for \( U_{h,b,t} \) we can rewrite the profit function as follows

\[
\Pi_{b,t} = 1 - z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) - q_{h,b,t} U_{h,b,t} + \left[ q_{h,b,t} - 1 + z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) \right] \mu_{B,t} + z_0 (q_{h,b,t}) \mu_{S,t}.
\]
Now consider a fixed price store. Letting \( q_{f,t} \equiv q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t} \) denote the total expected demand,
both types of buyers obtain the same expected utility at the fixed price store, where

\[ U_{h,f,t} = U_{l,f,t} = U_{f,t} = \frac{1 - z_0(q_{f,t})}{q_{f,t}}(1 - r_{f,t}) + \frac{q_{f,t} - 1 + z_0(q_{f,t})}{q_{f,t}}\mu_{B,t}. \] (9.15)

The expression is similar to \( U_{h,b,t} \) except for the fact that the transaction occurs at the fixed price even if there is a single customer at the store. A fixed price seller’s profit is equal to

\[ \Pi_{f,t} = [1 - z_0(q_{f,t})]r_{f,t} + z_0(q_{f,t})\mu_{S,t}, \]

which can be rewritten as

\[ \Pi_{f,t} = 1 - z_0(q_{f,t}) - q_{f,t}U_{f,t} + \left[q_{f,t} - 1 + z_0(q_{f,t})\right]\mu_{B,t} + z_0(q_{f,t})\mu_{S,t}. \]

**Characterization of the Equilibrium.** Recall that non hagglers shop at fixed price stores whereas hagglers shop at both types of stores. This means that \( U_{l,f,t} = U_{l,t} \) and \( U_{h,f,t} = U_{h,b,t} = U_{h,t} \). Since \( U_{h,f,t} = U_{l,f,t} \) we have \( \hat{U}_{h,t} = \hat{U}_{l,t} \equiv \hat{U}_{t} \). A flexible seller maximizes \( \Pi_{b,t} \) subject to \( U_{h,b,t} = \hat{U}_{t} \). Substituting the constraint into the objective function, the first order condition is given by

\[ z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - \hat{U}_{t} + \left[1 - z_0(q_{h,b,t})\right]\mu_{B,t} - z_0(q_{h,b,t})\mu_{S,t} = 0. \]

It follows that

\[ \Pi_{b,t} = 1 - z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - z_1(q_{h,b,t}) - \left[1 - z_0(q_{h,b,t}) - z_1(q_{h,b,t})\right]\mu_{B,t} + \left[z_0(q_{h,b,t}) + z_1(q_{h,b,t})\right]\mu_{S,t}. \]

Similarly a fixed price seller maximizes \( \Pi_{f,t} \) subject to \( U_{f,t} = \hat{U}_{t} \). The first order condition is given by

\[ z_0(q_{f,t}) - \hat{U}_{t} + \left[1 - z_0(q_{f,t})\right]\mu_{B,t} - z_0(q_{f,t})\mu_{S,t} = 0, \]

which implies that

\[ \Pi_{f,t} = 1 - z_0(q_{f,t}) - z_1(q_{f,t}) - \left[1 - z_0(q_{f,t}) - z_1(q_{f,t})\right]\mu_{B,t} + \left[z_0(q_{f,t}) + z_1(q_{f,t})\right]\mu_{S,t}. \]

In equilibrium sellers must earn equal profits, i.e. \( \Pi_{f,t} = \Pi_{b,t} \); thus \( q_{h,b,t} = q_{f,t} = q_{h,f,t} + q_{l,f,t} \). It
follows that
\[ q_{h,b,t} = \lambda_t, \quad q_{h,f,t} = \lambda_t (\varphi^*_{f,t} - \eta_t) / \varphi^*_{f,t} \quad \text{and} \quad q_{f,f,t} = \lambda_t \eta_t / \varphi^*_{f,t}, \]

where \( \varphi^*_{f,t} \) denotes the equilibrium fraction of fixed price sellers. Note that, \( \varphi^*_{f,t} \) is indeterminate in that any value within \([\eta_t, 1]\) satisfies the equalities above; hence, there is a continuum of equilibria where any fraction \( \varphi^*_{f,t} \geq \eta_t \) of sellers compete via fixed pricing while the rest compete via flexible pricing. Notice, however, in any equilibrium, the total expected demand at each firm equals to \( \lambda_t \).

Now we can obtain expressions for equilibrium prices. Combining the first order condition of flexible sellers with indifference constraint \( U_{h,b,t} = \tilde{U}_{h,t} \) yields
\[ z_0 (\lambda_t) + [1 - z_0 (\lambda_t)] \mu_{B,t} - z_0 (\lambda_t) \mu_{S,t} = U_{h,b,t}, \]

where \( U_{h,b,t} \) is given by (9.14). Solving this equality for \( r_{b,t} \) yields the expression for \( r^*_{b,t} \) in the body of the proposition. The equilibrium fixed price \( r^*_{f,t} \) is obtained likewise. The first order condition of fixed price sellers along with the indifference constraint \( U_{f,t} = \bar{U}_{h,t} \) implies
\[ z_0 (\lambda_t) + [1 - z_0 (\lambda_t)] \mu_{B,t} - z_0 (\lambda_t) \mu_{S,t} = U_{f,t}, \]

where \( U_{f,t} \) is given by (9.15). Solving this equality for \( r_{f,t} \) yields the expression for \( r^*_{f,t} \) in the body of the proposition. High type buyers negotiate if \( r^*_{b,t} \geq y^*_t \), which, after substituting for \( r^*_{b,t} \) and \( y^*_t \), is equivalent to \( \theta \geq \beta_t = z_1 (\lambda_t) / [1 - z_0 (\lambda_t)] \). Given the expressions for \( r^*_{f,t} \) and \( r^*_{b,t} \) one can verify that the equilibrium payoffs are as follows \( \Pi_{h,t} = \Pi_{f,t} = \pi_t \) and \( U_{h,b,t} = U_{f,t} = u_t \), where \( \pi_t \) and \( u_t \) are given in the body of the proposition.

If \( \theta < \beta_t \) then \( r^*_{b,t} < y_t \); thus no bargaining takes place as the list price \( r^*_{b,t} \) is already below the bargained price \( y^*_t \). As in the benchmark model, in this parameter region, the model collapses to a fixed-price setting.

Proof of Conjecture 1: Players transact immediately rather than waiting.

If \( p_t \in [\beta(t+1) \pi_{t+1} \ , \ \beta u_{t+1}] \) then sellers and buyers would be willing to trade in the second round instead of waiting for the next period. Indeed if \( p_t \geq \beta(t+1) \pi_{t+1} \) then the seller is better off transacting at \( p_t \) instead of waiting for period \( t+1 \) and obtaining \( \beta(t+1) \pi_{t+1} \). Similarly if \( p_t \leq 1 - \beta u_{t+1} \) then the buyer is better off purchasing instead of waiting for the next period and getting \( \beta u_{t+1} \).

Now consider the first round. It is straightforward to show that if \( \theta \geq \beta_t \) then \( r^*_{b,t} > r^*_{f,t} > y^*_t \). From a sellers’ perspective the worst case scenario is transacting at \( y^*_t \), which is the lowest price.
Similarly for a buyer the worst case scenario is purchasing at \( r_{b,t}^* \). If they agree to transact under these worst case scenarios then they would agree to transact under more favorable prices.

Consider a buyer who contemplates buying at \( r_{b,t}^* \). He would transact if \( 1 - r_{b,t}^* \geq \mu_{B,t} \), i.e. if his immediate surplus \( 1 - r_{b,t}^* \) exceeds his outside option \( \mu_{B,t} \) associated with walking away at the end of round 1. Basic algebra reveals that this inequality is satisfied if

\[
\frac{z_1(\lambda_t)(1-\theta)}{1-z_0(\lambda_t)z_1(\lambda_t)} \left( 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t} \right) > 0.
\]

The left hand side is positive; hence the inequality holds.

Now consider a seller, whose worst case scenario is selling at \( y_t^* \). The seller transacts if \( y_t^* \geq \mu_{S,t} \), i.e. if his immediate surplus \( y_t^* \) exceeds his outside option \( \mu_{S,t} \) associated with walking away at the end of round 1. Basic algebra reveals that this inequality is satisfied if

\[
(1 - \theta) \left( 1 - \mu_{B,t} - \mu_{S,t} \right) > 0.
\]

Again, both expressions are positive; hence the seller, too, is willing to transact immediately.

**Proof of Conjecture 2. Low types strictly prefer fixed price stores and high types are indifferent.**

A low type’s expected utility at a best offer store is given by

\[
U_{l,b,t} = \frac{1-z_0(\lambda_t)}{\lambda_t} \left( 1 - r_{b,t}^* \right) + \frac{\lambda_t - 1+z_0(\lambda_t)}{\lambda_t} \mu_{B,t}
\]

Substituting for \( r_{b,t}^* \), it is easy to show if \( \theta > \theta_t \) then \( U_{l,b,t} < u_t \); confirming indeed that low types are better off staying away from best offer stores. To show that high types are indifferent between fixed and flexible stores we need to show that along the equilibrium path we have \( U_{h,b,t} = U_{f,t} \).

Substituting \( r_{b,t}^* \) and \( r_{f,t}^* \) it is a matter of basic algebra to verify that indeed this equality holds, confirming the validity of the conjecture. This completes the proof of the proposition. ■

**Matching Function.** Here we show how \( \omega_{S,t} \) and \( \omega_{B,t} \) may derived from the fundamentals of the model if one assumes that second round meetings are governed by "urn-ball matching", where all unmatched buyers (balls) and all unmatched sellers (urns) enter into a random matching process (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). Matching frictions are due to the random nature of the process—some urns receive several balls and others none. Given the process one can pin down the probabilities \( \omega_{B,t} \) and \( \omega_{S,t} \) as follows. Along the equilibrium outlined in the Proposition,
at the end of the first round $s_t (1 - z_0 (\lambda_t))$ sellers are matched. Players transact immediately and each transaction takes one buyer and one seller. This implies that $b_t - s_t (1 - z_0 (\lambda_t))$ buyers and $s_t z_0 (\lambda_t)$ sellers are not matched.\footnote{The payoff in the second round is the same for all buyers, thus we do not need to keep track of high and low types during this process. As an aside, note that along the equilibrium in Proposition 8 high and low types trade at the same rate; thus, the ratio of high types to low types remains intact among unmatched buyers. (See the analysis in the main text for a formal proof for this argument.)} The buyer-seller ratio in the second round is equal to

$$\chi_t' = \frac{b_t - s_t (1 - z_0 (\lambda_t))}{s_t z_0 (\lambda_t)} = \frac{\lambda_t - 1 + z_0 (\lambda_t)}{z_0 (\lambda_t)}.$$  

The second equation follows from the fact that $s_t = b_t \lambda_t$. An unmatched seller’s chance of being able to transact, $\omega_{S,t}$, is equal to the probability of meeting at least a buyer, i.e.

$$\omega_{S,t} = 1 - z_0 (\chi_t').$$

Similarly, an unmatched buyer’s chance of transacting in the second round is equal to

$$\omega_{B,t} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{z_n (\chi_t')}{n+1} = \frac{1 - z_0 (\chi_t')}{\chi_t'}.$$  

With probability $z_n (\chi_t')$ he encounters $n = 0, 1, 2, ...$ other buyers there (recall that due to randomness of the process a seller may get more than one buyer), in which case he has a probability of $\frac{1}{n+1}$ obtaining the item (each buyer has an equal chance). The second equality follows from the facts that $z_{n+1} (x) = \frac{z_n (x)}{n+1}$ and that $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} z_n (x) = 1$. Notice that if $\chi_t' > 1$ then $\omega_{S,t} > \omega_{B,t}$, i.e. if there are more buyers in the pool than sellers, then a seller is more likely to meet a trading partner than a buyer. The opposite is true if $\chi_t' < 1$.

### 9.4 Sellers’ Implementation Cost of Bargaining

In our model firms do not incur any implementation costs to sell via bargaining. However given the results on how the nature of equilibria respond to $\varepsilon$ we can predict what would happen if sellers were to incur such a cost. Recall that if $\varepsilon = 0$ then both pricing rules are payoff equivalent and sellers are indifferent to pick either fixed pricing or flexible pricing. If, however, $\varepsilon$ turns negative then the payoff equivalence breaks down and fixed pricing emerges as the unique outcome. From sellers’ point of view the negative $\varepsilon$ is an indirect cost. It is incurred by buyers, but nevertheless it bleeds into the sellers’ profit functions and thereby induces them to switch to fixed pricing. The
implication is that if an indirect cost can disturb the payoff equivalence between fixed and flexible pricing then a direct cost will result in the same outcome, i.e. introducing a cost of implementing bargaining into the setting $\varepsilon = 0$ would cause flexible sellers to earn less, and thereby, lead to a fixed price equilibrium. Needless to say, introducing such a cost into a setting with $\varepsilon < 0$ will only reinforce the fixed price outcome.

If, however, $\varepsilon > 0$ then the outcome is less clear because along Eq-FS sellers are able to convert the positive $\varepsilon$ into higher prices and, thereby, earn higher profits compared to a fixed price equilibrium. So, if one inserts an implementation cost into the framework with $\varepsilon > 0$ then whether or not sellers would revert back to fixed pricing depends on how this cost compares with the difference in profits. If the cost is prohibitively large then we would expect a fixed price equilibrium to emerge and if the cost is sufficiently small then Eq-FS should survive, albeit with fewer flexible stores (compared to the benchmark model with no cost).

9.5 Game with Infinite Horizon

In our model the market runs for a finite number of periods, i.e. $T < \infty$. Under this specification one can solve the model recursively by substituting the terminal payoffs $u_{T+1} = \pi_{T+1} = 0$ into the equilibrium conditions to obtain payoffs for period $T$, which then can be substituted to obtain payoffs for period $T - 1$, and so on. The method is straightforward, but more importantly, one does not need to worry about how market demand fluctuates over time, driven by the tuple $\{i_{t}^{\text{new}}, s_{t}^{\text{new}}, n_{t}^{\text{new}}\}_{t=2}^{T}$.

If $T = \infty$ then one can prove existence of equilibrium and analytically characterize a solution if the market exhibits some cyclicality, i.e. if agents face the same outlook, say, every $k$ periods. The cyclical nature of the model would allow us to prove analogous versions of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 using induction and then, again, exploiting cyclicality we can pin down equilibrium payoffs and prices. As an example focus on the setting with $\varepsilon = 0$ and consider the simplest possible scenario where the environment is fully stationary in that outgoing agents are replaced by incoming agents one for one. With perfect replacement the number of buyers and sellers, and therefore the expected demand $\lambda_t$, remains constant at all times. Since players face the same market outlook irrespective of the calendar time, equilibrium payoffs $\pi_t$ and $u_t$, and thereby, equilibrium prices are also time independent, which allows us to solve the model analytically. (To prove existence of the equilibrium one needs to virtually repeat the steps outlined in the proof of Proposition 1). Dropping the time
subscripts from equations (17) and (18), we have
\[
\pi = 1 - \beta u - [z_0 (\lambda) + z_1 (\lambda)] (1 - \beta u - \beta \pi) \quad \text{and} \quad u = z_0 (\lambda) [1 - \beta u - \beta \pi] + \beta u.
\]

This is a simple system with two equations and two unknowns (\(\pi\) and \(u\)), which can be solved easily. Once \(\pi\) and \(u\) are pinned down, the equilibrium prices and probabilities readily follow. This solution concept is rather straightforward, but as \(\lambda_t\) starts to fluctuate the system of equations grows rapidly. For instance if \(\lambda_t\) is high in even periods and low in odd periods then we would have a system of four equations and four unknowns \((\pi_{\text{odd}}, \pi_{\text{even}}, u_{\text{odd}}, u_{\text{even}})\) to deal with. In general if the cycles lasts \(k\) periods then one needs to solve a system of \(2k\) equations and unknowns. Needless to say, as \(k\) grows large an analytic solution becomes elusive.

If the model cannot be solved analytically, then one can fix \(T\) at some large value and pick some arbitrary values for terminal payoffs \(u_{T+1}\) and \(\pi_{T+1}\) and solve the model via the aforementioned recursive method. The solution will be accurate for \(t << T\) because, due to discounting, the impact of terminal payoffs vanishes if \(t\) is sufficiently far away from \(T\). Our simulations seemed to confirm this insight. We fixed \(T = 360\), \(\beta = 0.95\) and ran simulations for a number of arbitrary values of \(u_{T+1} \in [0, 1]\) and \(\pi_{T+1} \in [0, 1]\) and saw no impact of the terminal payoffs on equilibrium objects (prices and payoffs) for \(t < 350\) or so. Needless to say, the accuracy can be extended by picking a larger \(T\) or a smaller \(\beta\).
9.6 Endogenous separation of hagglers and non-hagglers

Suppose that buyers are identical in terms of their bargaining skills but they differ in terms of their enjoyment for the bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter $\varepsilon$. Imagine that $\varepsilon$ varies in an interval $[\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon}]$, where $\underline{\varepsilon} < 0$ and $\bar{\varepsilon} \geq 0$, and that buyers are divided into $N$ separate groups, where the fraction of group $i$ is given by $\eta_i$, with $\sum_{i=1}^{N} \eta_i = 1$. Furthermore, suppose that group 1 has the lowest $\varepsilon$ and group $N$ has the highest, that is

$$\underline{\varepsilon} \equiv \varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2 < \ldots < \varepsilon_N \equiv \bar{\varepsilon}.$$ 

The following proposition presents the main result along this variation.

**Proposition 9** The nature of the equilibria depends on the upper bound $\varepsilon_N$. There are two cases:

1. If $\varepsilon_N = 0$ then there exists a continuum of payoff-equivalent equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction $\varphi^* \geq 1 - \eta_N$ of firms trade via fixed pricing and remaining firms trade via flexible pricing. The equilibria exhibit partial segmentation in customer demographics: types $1, 2, \ldots, N - 1$ shop exclusively at fixed price firms whereas type $N$ customers shop anywhere.

2. If $\varepsilon_N > 0$ and if the gap $\varepsilon_N - \varepsilon_{N-1}$ is sufficiently large then there exists an equilibrium where a fraction $\varphi^* < 1 - \eta_N$ of firms trade via fixed pricing and remaining firms trade via flexible pricing. The equilibrium exhibits full segmentation of customers: types $1, 2, \ldots, N - 1$ shop exclusively at fixed price firms whereas type $N$ customers shop at flexible firms.

The equilibrium in item 1 is largely identical to Eq-PS in the main text, which emerges when $\varepsilon = 0$. Similarly, the equilibrium in item 2 is similar to Eq-FS, which exists when $\varepsilon > 0$. The similarities indicate that the results of the main text remain robust under this variation; however there are some subtleties that we need to point out.

First, sellers designate the bargaining deals only for the most enthusiastic type (type $N$), which is why in equilibrium only type $N$ customers hunt for such deals while everyone else shops at fixed price venues. To see why, note that unlike the main text, lower types in here can negotiate a deal if they are alone at a flexible store. But, if they are not alone, then they must pay the inflated list price. As hinted above, the list price is designated for the most enthusiastic type, so it is too high for everyone else. For lower types, the enjoyment they might get from negotiating a deal (proxied by their $\varepsilon$) is simply not enough to counter-balance the prospect of paying such a high price. Thus, lower types are better off shopping at fixed price venues.
Second, if \( \varepsilon_N > 0 \) then the existence of the equilibrium hinges on the condition of there being a large enough gap between \( \varepsilon_N \) and \( \varepsilon_{N-1} \). This is to ensure that type \( N-1 \) stays away from flexible stores (if type \( N-1 \) stays away, then all other types will stay away). In the main text we did not need such a condition—Eq. m FS would go through as long as \( \varepsilon \) was positive. The reason is that in the main text low types were not able to bargain anyway (due to the lack of their bargaining skills), so we did not need a separate condition on their \( \varepsilon \) to keep them away from flexible stores.

Third, unlike the main text, customers in this setting are identical in their bargaining skills, yet the division of hagglers vs. non-hagglers still emerges as an endogenous phenomenon. Indeed, in equilibrium customers who enjoy bargaining the most, shop at flexible stores and haggle over the sale price whereas remaining customers shop at fixed price stores and do not haggle at all. This observation suggests that one can potentially do away with the exogenous haggler vs. non-haggler distinction in the main text, and instead start from a primitive of heterogenous \( \varepsilon \) and still obtain qualitatively similar results.

The endogenous separation of hagglers vs. non-hagglers is indeed appealing. However, from an analytical point of view, the setup in the main text with the exogenous distinction of hagglers vs. non-hagglers, has its advantages. First, the setup in the main text allows us to prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. In here, unfortunately, the proof of uniqueness remains elusive. (The proposition above claims existence but it does not rule out other scenarios.)

Second, the existence of equilibrium along the current variation hinges on the condition of there being a large gap between \( \varepsilon_N \) and \( \varepsilon_{N-1} \). If we solve this model in a dynamic setting, then there will be \( T \) similar and recursively related conditions. Analytically characterizing that many conditions would be impractical and, therefore, it will be down to numerical simulations to confirm whether an equilibrium exists for a given parameter set.

The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the proposition. (We focus on a one shot game, where the search market operates only once, i.e. \( T = 1 \).)

**Proof of Proposition 9.** The proof consists of three steps.

**Step 1. Preliminaries.** Let \( q_{i,m} \) denote the expected demand consisting of type \( i \) buyers at a store trading via rule \( m \) and let

\[
q_m \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,m}, \quad \text{where } m = f,b \text{ and } i = 1,2,\ldots,N
\]
denote the total demand. The expected utility of a type \(i\) buyer at a flexible store is given by

\[
U_{i,b} = z_0(q_b)(1 - y + \varepsilon_i) + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{z_n(q_b)}{n+1} (1 - r_b),
\]

where \(y\) is the bargained price and \(r_b\) is the flexible list price. Notice that since buyers are equally skilled in bargaining, they negotiate the same price \(y\) when dealing with a flexible seller. For the purpose of the proposition we do not need a closed form solution for \(y\)—we simply assume that buyers’ bargaining power, which pins down the bargained price, is high enough for them to take advantage of flexible deals (else, the model collapses to a fixed price setting.)

Basic algebra reveals that

\[
U_{i,b} = U_{N,b} - z_0(q_b)(\varepsilon_N - \varepsilon_i) \quad \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, N
\]

Since \(\varepsilon_{i+1} > \varepsilon_{i+1}\) we have \(U_{i+1,b} > U_{i,b}\). Now turn to sellers. Flexible sellers expect to earn

\[
\Pi_b = [1 - z_0(q_b) - z_1(q_b)] r_b + z_1(q_b) y.
\]

Basic algebra reveals that

\[
\Pi_b = 1 - z_0(q_b) - \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,b} U_{i,b} + z_0(q_b) \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,b} \varepsilon_i.
\]

At fixed price stores, things are the same as in the main text, i.e.

\[
U_f = \frac{1 - z_0(q_f)}{q_f} (1 - r_f) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_f = 1 - z_0(q_f) - q_f U_f.
\]

**Step 2. Case: \(\varepsilon_N = 0\) (item 1 in the Proposition)**

Consider fixed price firms. Along our conjecture (to be verified later) types 1 through \(N\) shop at fixed price firms, i.e. \(q_{i,f} > 0\) for all \(i = 1,\ldots,N\). Recall that all buyers earn the same expected payoff at fixed price firms, that is \(U_{i,f} = U_f\) for all \(i\). The fixed price firm solves

\[
\max_{q_f \in \mathbb{R}^+} 1 - z_0(q_f) - q_f U_f \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_f = \bar{U}.
\]
where $\bar{U}$ is the market utility offered by the fixed price firm. The FOC is given by $\bar{U} = z_0 (q_f)$; thus the firm earns

$$\Pi_f = 1 - z_0 (q_f) - z_1 (q_f).$$

Per our conjecture, flexible firms attract type $N$ only, i.e. $q_{N,b} > 0$ and $q_{i,b} = 0$ for $i = 1, \ldots, N - 1$. Substituting these into the expression for $\Pi_b$ yields

$$\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - q_{N,b} U_{N,b}.$$ 

The problem of a flexible seller is given by

$$\max_{q_{N,b} \in \mathbb{R}^+} 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - q_{N,b} U_{N,b} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{N,b} = \bar{U}_N,$$

where $\bar{U}_N$ is the market utility promised to type $N$ customers. The FOC is given by $\bar{U}_N = z_0 (q_{N,b})$; thus, the firm earns

$$\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b}).$$

In equilibrium, sellers must earn equal profits. The equality $\Pi_f = \Pi_b$ yields $q_{N,b} = q_f$. Let $\varphi$ denote the fraction of fixed price firms and recall that $\eta_i$ denotes the fraction of type $i$ buyers. The feasibility condition, analogous to the one in the main text requires

$$\varphi q_{i,f} + (1 - \varphi) q_{i,b} = \eta_i \lambda \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, N$$

Noting that $q_{i,b} = 0$ for $i = 1, \ldots, N - 1$, we have

$$q_{i,f} = \frac{\eta_i}{\varphi} \lambda, \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, N - 1.$$ 

We know $q_f = q_{N,b}$. In addition, recall that $q_f = \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_{i,f}$. Thus

$$\lambda \frac{N-1}{\varphi} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \eta_i + q_{N,f} = q_{N,b} \Rightarrow \lambda \frac{N}{\varphi} (1 - \eta_N) + q_{N,f} = q_{N,b}.$$

For type $N$, we have

$$\varphi q_{N,f} + (1 - \varphi) q_{N,b} = \eta_N \lambda.$$
Substituting for \(q_{N,b}\) from above

\[
q_{N,f} = \frac{\lambda}{\varphi} \left[ \varphi - (1 - \eta_N) \right].
\]

It follows that \(q_{N,b} = q_f = \lambda\). Note that, the equilibrium value of \(\varphi\), denoted by \(\varphi^*\), is indeterminate and can take any value within \([1 - \eta_N, 1]\), hence, there is a continuum of equilibria where an indeterminate fraction \(\varphi^* \geq 1 - \eta_N\) of sellers compete via fixed pricing while the rest compete via flexible pricing. Notice, however, in any equilibrium, the total expected demand at each firm equals to \(\lambda\). Along this equilibria buyers and sellers earn

\[
U_f = U_{N,b} = z_0(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_f = 
\]

\[
\Pi_b = 1 - z_0(\lambda) - z_1(\lambda).
\]

The final task is to verify the conjectures made above. First, the fact that \(U_f = U_{N,b} = z_0(\lambda)\) implies that type \(N\) customers are indifferent between fixed and flexible stores; thus, as we conjectured, they can shop at both types of stores. The second conjecture pertains types \(1, \ldots, N - 1\) staying away from flexible stores. At fixed price stores they earn \(U_f = z_0(\lambda)\). If they were to visit flexible stores, they would earn

\[
U_{i,b} = U_{N,b} - z_0(\lambda) (\varepsilon_N - \varepsilon_i),
\]

which is less than \(U_f\) because \(\varepsilon_N > \varepsilon_i\) and \(U_{N,b} = U_f\); hence they are justified to stay way. This completes the proof of item 1 in the proposition.

**Step 3. Case: \(\varepsilon_N > 0\) (item 2 in the Proposition)**

Consider fixed price firms. Along our conjecture (to be verified later) types 1 through \(N - 1\) shop at fixed price firms, i.e. \(q_{i,f} > 0\) for all \(i = 1, \ldots, N - 1\). Type \(N\), on the other hand, stays away, i.e. \(q_{N,f} = 0\); thus \(q_f = \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} q_{i,f}\). Recall that all buyers earn the same expected payoff at fixed price firms, that is \(U_{i,f} = U_f\) for all \(i = 1, \ldots, N - 1\). A fixed price firm solves

\[
\max_{q_f \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0(q_f) - q_f U_f \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_f = \bar{U},
\]

where \(\bar{U}\) is the market utility of all types but type \(N\). The FOC is given by \(\bar{U} = z_0(q_f)\); thus the firm earns

\[
\Pi_f = 1 - z_0(q_f) - z_1(q_f).
\]

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Per our conjecture, flexible firms attract type \( N \) only, i.e. \( q_{N,b} > 0 \) whereas \( q_{i,b} = 0 \) for \( i = 1, ..., N-1 \).

Substituting these equalities into the expression for \( \Pi_b \) (and noting that \( \varepsilon_N > 0 \)), a flexible firm’s expected profit becomes

\[
\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - q_{N,b} U_{N,b} + z_0 (q_{N,b}) q_{N,b} \varepsilon_N.
\]

The flexible seller solves

\[
\max_{q_{N,b} \in \mathbb{R}_+} 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - q_{N,b} U_{N,b} + z_0 (q_{N,b}) q_{N,b} \varepsilon_N \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_{N,b} = \tilde{U}_N,
\]

where \( \tilde{U}_N \) is the market utility of type \( N \) customers. The FOC is given by

\[
\tilde{U}_N = z_0 (q_{N,b}) + [z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b})] \varepsilon_N
\]

thus, the firm earns

\[
\Pi_b = 1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b}) + q_{N,b} z_1 (q_{N,b}) \varepsilon_N.
\]

Let \( \varphi \) denote the fraction of fixed price firms and recall that \( \eta_i \) denotes the fraction of type \( i \) buyers. Feasibility requires

\[
\varphi q_{i,f} + (1 - \varphi) q_{i,b} = \eta_i \lambda \quad \text{for} \quad i = 1, ..., N.
\]

Noting that \( q_{i,b} = 0 \) for \( i = 1, ..., N-1 \), we have

\[
q_{i,f} = \frac{\eta_i}{\varphi} \lambda, \quad \text{for} \quad i = 1, ..., N-1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad q_f = \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} q_{i,f} = \frac{1 - \eta_N}{\varphi} \lambda
\]

In addition, since \( q_{N,f} = 0 \) we have

\[
q_{N,b} = \frac{\eta_N}{1 - \varphi} \lambda.
\]

In equilibrium sellers must earn equal profits, i.e. \( \Delta (\varphi) \equiv \Pi_b - \Pi_f = 0 \). Note that \( \Pi_b \) rises in \( q_{N,b} \), which itself rises in \( \varphi \) and that \( \Pi_f \) rises in \( q_f \), which in turn falls in \( \varphi \). It follows that \( \Delta \) rises in \( \varphi \).

In addition, note that \( \Delta (1 - \eta_N) > 0 \) since \( \varepsilon_N > 0 \) and that \( \Delta (0) < 0 \). The Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees existence of a unique \( \varphi^* < 1 - \eta_N \) such that \( \Delta (\varphi^*) = 0 \).
Since \( \varphi^* < 1 - \eta_N \) we have \( q_{N,b} < \lambda < q_f \). Solving \( U_{N,b} = z_0 (q_{N,b}) + [z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b})] \varepsilon_N \) and \( U_f = z_0 (q_f) \) for \( r_f \) and \( r_b \) yields equilibrium list prices:

\[
    r_f^* = 1 - \frac{z_1 (q_f)}{1 - z_0 (q_f)} \quad \text{and} \quad r_b^* = 1 - \frac{z_1 (q_{N,b}) q - q_{N,b} z_1 (q_{N,b}) \varepsilon_N}{1 - z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b})}
\]

Observe that, as in the main text, the flexible list price \( r_b^* \) increases in \( \varepsilon_N \), which indicates that flexible sellers pass type \( N \)'s enthusiasm about getting a deal on to their prices (which explains why lower types may want to stay away from a flexible store).

To complete the proof, we need to verify the conjectures made earlier. First, we need to show that, at the margin, type \( N \) buyers stay away from fixed price stores. At flexible firms they earn

\[
    U_{N,b} = z_0 (q_{N,b}) + [z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b})] \varepsilon_N.
\]

At fixed price firms they earn \( U_f = z_0 (q_f) \). The equal profit condition gives us

\[
    \varepsilon_N = \frac{z_0 (q_{N,b}) + z_1 (q_{N,b}) - z_0 (q_f) - z_1 (q_f)}{q_{N,b} z_1 (q_{N,b})}.
\]

Our conjecture would hold if \( U_{N,b} > U_f \), i.e. if

\[
    (1 - q_{N,b}) \varepsilon_N > \frac{z_0 (q_f) - z_0 (q_{N,b})}{z_0 (q_{N,b})}.
\]

Recall that \( q_f > q_{N,b} \). Thus \( z_0 (q_f) < z_0 (q_{N,b}) \), implying that the right hand side is negative. If \( 1 - q_{N,b} > 0 \) then we are done; so suppose that \( 1 - q_{N,b} < 0 \). The inequality holds if

\[
    \varepsilon_N < \frac{z_0 (q_f) - z_0 (q_{N,b})}{z_0 (q_{N,b}) (1 - q_{N,b})}.
\]

Substituting for \( \varepsilon \) from above, we need

\[
    \frac{z_0 (q_{N,b})}{z_0 (q_f)} > q_{N,b}^2 + 1 - q_{N,b} + q_f q_{N,b}
\]

We know \( q_{N,b} < q_f \); thus a sufficient condition is

\[
    \frac{z_0 (q_{N,b})}{z_0 (q_f)} > 1 - q_{N,b} + q_f \quad \iff \quad \varepsilon_{q_f - q_{N,b}} > 1 - (q_f - q_{N,b}).
\]
Let \( x = q_f - q_{N,b} > 0 \). The question is whether \( e^x + x - 1 > 0 \). The expression on the left is positive for all \( x > 0 \); hence the inequality holds. This verifies the conjecture that type \( N \) buyers strictly prefer to shop at flexible stores.

The second conjecture pertains remaining types, i.e. we need to show that types \( 1, .., N-1 \), would not want to shop at flexible stores. For that we need \( U_f > U_{i,b} \). Recall that

\[
U_{i,b} = U_{N,b} - z_0 (q_{N,b}) (\varepsilon_N - \varepsilon_i) .
\]

Thus, we need

\[
U_f > U_{N,b} - z_0 (q_{N,b}) (\varepsilon_N - \varepsilon_i) .
\]

We already know that \( U_{N,b} > U_f \). Thus, for the above inequality to go through, the gap \( \varepsilon_N - \varepsilon_i \) must be sufficiently large. Since \( \varepsilon_i \) rises in \( i \), the gap is the smallest for type \( N-1 \) customers, so pick \( i = N-1 \). In what follows we will show that if \( \varepsilon_{N-1} \) is smaller than a threshold, which itself is smaller than \( \varepsilon_N \), then the inequality holds. To start, recall that

\[
U_{N,b} = z_0 (q_{N,b}) + [z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_1 (q_{N,b})] \varepsilon_N \quad \text{and} \quad U_f = z_0 (q_f)
\]

and keep in mind that \( q_f > q_{N,b} \), so \( z_0 (q_f) < z_0 (q_{N,b}) \). The inequality holds if

\[
z_1 (q_{N,b}) \varepsilon_N - z_0 (q_{N,b}) \varepsilon_{N-1} > z_0 (q_{N,b}) - z_0 (q_f)
\]

Note that: (i) if \( \varepsilon_{N-1} = \varepsilon_N \) then the inequality is the other way around (from above) and (ii) if \( \varepsilon_{N-1} = 0 \) then the inequality holds (this step can be proved by substituting for \( \varepsilon_N \) and going through the same steps as above). Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists some \( \bar{\varepsilon}_{N-1} \in (0, \varepsilon_N) \), such that if \( \varepsilon_{N-1} < \bar{\varepsilon}_{N-1} \) then the inequality holds. This verifies the second conjecture and completes the proof. ■

References