CHAPTER 3

THE SLOW NORMALIZATION OF NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY

Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism
Then and Now

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This chapter focuses on attempts to link the normative criticisms and prescriptions of International Political Theory (IPT) with the critical, empirical, and sociological ambitions of International Relations (IR). Revisiting the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate might seem an unlikely vehicle for such an enterprise. The description of IPT that divided normative scholarship into cosmopolitan and communitarian camps drew much criticism and, arguably, reinforced the divide between IR and political theory. The debate put political theorists into conversation with political theorists on the theme of global or international justice, rather than putting political theory in conversation with other aspects of IR. Yet reflection upon the twenty-five years since the cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction provided initial focus to the (re)emergence of IPT shows that two things stand out. First, despite the many well-founded criticisms of the way the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate conceived of the theoretical debates in IPT, and of the ways political theorists conducted those debates, it has proven remarkably difficult to escape or transcend the core features of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in IPT. Attempts to qualify or hyphenate core terms, and to abandon them altogether to find new ones, have not really recast the core concerns of IPT. Second, notwithstanding this first claim, the critical work done in response to the challenges of the early debates has left a more mature and refined IPT, one less insistent on drawing sharp lines between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (or their various progeny) or between IPT and IR. There is still real critical merit in conversations between cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans on matters of meta-ethics and global justice, but some
of the most interesting and important work is now happening at the interface between IPT and empirical, sociological, and legal studies in IR. It is here, this chapter contends, that the contemporary debates between cosmopolitans engaging with the socio-legal fabric of international society and new-communitarians engaging with the normative implications of evolving transnational and global communities are effecting the normalization of IPT.

Chris Brown’s critique of his own presentation of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate captures the peculiar relationship many political theorists have with the distinction.

Although these terms will turn up quite frequently in what follows, this distinction is not, in fact, a suitable basis for classification. It obscures more than it clarifies; too many writers who seem to be in one camp cross over to the other at crucial points. There is a real distinction to be made between cosmopolitan and communitarian thought, but it cannot be made to bear too much weight—and there is no other classification that does much better in this respect. (Brown 2002: 17)

While we have learned much from attempts to amend and transcend the terms of the debate, there is something fundamental about these broadly drawn categories that means they still structure moral reflection on international affairs. Nevertheless, all the critical work in response to the limitations of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate has not been in vain. The second claim this chapter defends is that the cutting edge of contemporary cosmopolitan theory and new-communitarian theory (the phrase comes from Emmanuel Adler’s 2005 collection) is working to transcend the divisions between empirical and sociological (including critical) IR and normative IPT, and in doing so, is bringing IPT to bear on the core questions of international law, diplomacy, and public policy. Not all IPT has this focus; some forms of cosmopolitan thought in particular value the critical distance that abstraction or ideal theory afford the normative theorist. But the real potential lies in the emergent debates between cosmopolitans and communitarians engaged with normative challenges thrown up by the international legal order. In general terms the debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians has lessened. This is partly because some communitarians have rebranded as weak cosmopolitans, but also because the distance between the traditions has widened, with analytic political theorists pursuing moral philosophical arguments between themselves and constructivists and historicists pursuing social-theoretic arguments in the pages of a distinct literature. But the big ideas that provide the basis for a critical understanding of the normative still matter, even if the fact that the core division between contemporary cosmopolitans and communitarians is not really about the moral equality of humans has drawn some of the sting from the early debates. As Risse notes, “we have learned the basic cosmopolitan lesson: moral equality is an essential part of any credible theory of global justice” (2012: 10; see also Brock and Brighouse 2005: 3). What is key, however, is the distinctive ways in which these scholars reason about the normative and particularly about the relationship between the moral and political.
This chapter draws attention to the ways that some cosmopolitan theory and some varieties of non-cosmopolitanism, having learned from the critique of the cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction and having matured as a sub-discipline, are re-engaging with the fundamental institutions of global politics and asking the critical and praxeological questions that make ethical enquiry relevant to the world (Linklater 1998). There is a symmetry here in that IPT, once so keen to push past what Wight once pointed to as IR theory—the historical interpretation of law and diplomacy—in a bid to assert the centrality of normative enquiry is now returning to these fundamental sites of international political practice in order to realize the potential of the field. In order to explore these claims, this chapter examines the institutional or practical turn in the work of key cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz and Allen Buchanan. Their work shows the development of cosmopolitanism from the early critique of the work of scholars such as John Rawls and Michael Walzer to the institutionally and legally focused work that enables them to address, in moral and political terms, vital socio-normative questions from secession to environmental or humanitarian protection. Thereafter the chapter explores the work of scholars who, despite acknowledging the normative force of universal and global moral claims, do not identify with cosmopolitanism as a theoretical tradition. This group, which includes scholars such as Christian Reus-Smit and Andrew Hurrell, is influenced by English School and constructivist scholarship, and stresses the need to consider the normative and sociological context in which norms operate in a highly legalized world order.

There is no strong binary division between the political positions of cosmopolitans and communitarians here. It could be argued that there never really was, and that focus on the opposition between cosmopolitans and communitarians was a distraction. Nevertheless, at moments of great political crisis the theoretical approaches that underlie normative claims really matter. Even if, as Buchanan has recently argued, “ideal theory’s principles can be satisfied or at least seriously approximated through a process that begins with the institutions and culture that we now have” (Buchanan and Keohane 2004: 28), we still need to understand the implications and structure of communitarian and cosmopolitan moral arguments in order to make clear and well-reasoned ethical judgements.

**PART 1**

The first claim is not simply an attempt to resurrect the terminology of the cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction, but an argument that different terminology still references the same broadly drawn but central features of normative debate in IPT. Cosmopolitanism certainly has a clearly defined place in the literature. The critical response of liberal cosmopolitans to Rawls’s *Law of Peoples*, and the establishment of the then quite radical proposition that moral concern for individuals ought to transcend geopolitical space (particularly the bonds of citizenship) and generational time
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(see e.g. Pogge 1994; Beitz 2000; Buchanan 2000), established the tradition at the heart of contemporary IPT. It is easy, from the vantage point of 2016, to underestimate the resistance to the ways in which cosmopolitanism insisted on the existence of universal moral principles and the ways in which such principles ought to feed into global politics. The Rawlsian assumption that IPT should focus on a society of peoples founded on a shared history of international law, as developed after the Second World War (Rawls 1993; 1999), may have put the question of international justice back on the agenda for Anglo-American analytic political thought, but it reinforced the statism of the realist and pluralist traditions in IR. The trajectory of the work of the early critics of Rawls’s work to their current contributions to the debates tells its own story about the rise and rise of cosmopolitanism. This is true in two ways. First, the initial work criticized Rawls for not seeing the international implications of the moral egalitarianism that was at the heart of liberal political theory (e.g. Pogge 1994; Buchanan 2000). The successes of these arguments were such that Michael Blake’s claim, “We are all cosmopolitans now,” is entirely credible (Blake 2013). Few who fail to identify with cosmopolitan political theory would deny the central tenets of cosmopolitan thought. The commitment to a moral conception of the equal worth of human beings and new understandings of the multiple ways in which human beings are connected with each other and with future generations mean that Pogge’s famous description of the basic elements of cosmopolitanism is now applicable to almost all normative IPT (Pogge 2002: 169). Blake argues that this makes the term overdue for retirement—it is a frame that did important work when moral egalitarianism was disputed but cannot help when the arguments have moved on (Blake 2013: 52; see also Risse 2012: 17). This point is important but, while bearing in mind the earlier injunction to be aware that the categories we employ to simplify our field cannot bear too much weight, there are at least two reasons to continue to employ the term as part of an attempt to survey the field. First, the term is a key part of the self-description of a significant section of the field. Cosmopolitanism is, without doubt, the major tradition to emerge from the early debate, and the centrality of cosmopolitanism can blind us to its radical and critical nature, which still needs to be defended and elaborated. Secondly, it is still important to distinguish between the ways that cosmopolitan IPT thinks about moral egalitarianism and the very different ways that non-cosmopolitan traditions do so. The cosmopolitan tradition has become much more able to engage with the inherent statism of international law and institutions, and more tolerant of the nuances of ethical theories that have a place for the state and the international more broadly. This moral confidence has led key scholars including Pogge and, more recently and more completely, Buchanan, Beitz, and Risse to focus on the institutional and practical implications of cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan “grounds of justice” (Risse 2012: 16–17) that exist side by side in the global order. The headline here is that the cosmopolitan voice can now be heard as a key interlocutor in legal and policy debate. Rather than attacking the foundations of an international order that failed to take distributive justice, environmental justice, and human rights seriously as a basis for political action, the implications of cosmopolitan ethics on immigration, trade law, secession, environmental governance, and humanitarian action are now the everyday subjects of cosmopolitan
IPT (see Chapters 39 and 40). Such confidence is best expressed, I will argue below, in the practical turn in the recent work of Buchanan and Beitz. Here, the question of how moral theory can engage with the fragmented and often institutionally compromised global legal order is at the centre of debate, and it is an engagement born of confidence rather than compromise.

Communitarianism, on the other hand, has had rather different fortunes. The term was often used pejoratively to imply a denial of universal or global moral norms, and to link non-cosmopolitan scholarship with parochialism and realism. In part, the dynamics noted above led early cosmopolitan theorists to overstate the flaws in non-cosmopolitan work. Michael Walzer’s work was the clearest example of this phenomenon. Walzer’s communitarian position was portrayed as both conservative and statist. His critique of the amorality of realism and his elucidation of universal moral and legal rules notwithstanding, Walzer’s argument for limited humanitarian warfare, respect (born of solidarity and awareness of the dangers of domination) for cultural difference, and respect for the ways in which the state protected the ways of life created by humans (Walzer 2006; 1994: 16; 1990: 23) came in for strident criticism. Walzer’s self-description of his project as the desire “to take my place among the universalists […] to explain the appeal of moral particularism” (1990: 509) was barely heard in the early debates. It is telling that a symposium in Ethics & International Affairs (Beitz 2009; Doyle 2009; Kymlicka 2009) that revisits the debates in Philosophy & Public Affairs between Walzer and his critics (Beitz 1980; Doppelt 1980; Luban 1980; Walzer 1980) puts much more emphasis on the implicit internationalism of Walzer’s work (Beitz 2009: 325). In part this is due to the new confidence in cosmopolitan theory in engaging with the centrality of states in law and politics. It also has to do with the broader acceptance by those outside the cosmopolitan tradition of the range of global injustices, and the moral resources at hand to help critically approach those injustices. Nevertheless, the early debates effectively neutered the viability of the term as it became associated with a conservative agenda in IPT.

The reason this chapter argues for the preservation of the term draws on work in another subfield of IR theory. In 2005 Adler published a collection of essays entitled Communitarian International Relations in which he develops a constructivist account of the “communities of practise” that transform ideas into social practices. In the introductory essay he makes two moves that point us to a body of scholarship that has the potential to be a vital interlocutor with cosmopolitanism in the more practice-oriented debates that characterise some of the most interesting developments in IPT. First, Adler contrasts normative and constructivist communitarianism. For Adler, the flaws of normative IPT include foundational accounts of the priority of community interests over individual interests and the priority of the good over the right. Constructivist communitarianism, or “new communitarianism” as he terms it, is more explicit about the role of power in international politics and concerned with constitutive mechanisms of community such as “narrative, discourse and practise” that can link theory with practice (Adler 2005: 13–14). He is also clear that the new communitarian account of communities of practice “cuts across state boundaries and mediate between states, individuals and human agency, one on one hand, and social structures and systems on the other”
(p. 15). His approach has helped link theorists of international society/community with other debates in empirical and sociological IR. While Adler is clear that new communitarianism has not provided a real engagement with the core normative question that has held the attention of IPT—“whether the construction of governance institutions and practices should aim, as Hedley Bull argued, at maintaining international order or, as Beitz held, at achieving global justice” (p. 13)—more recent work by scholars including constructivists such as Richard Price and political theorists such as Reus-Smit has addressed this lacuna, bringing communitarianism back into dialogue with IPT on key questions of the justice of international practices.

If it were the case that all cosmopolitans were universalist and all communitarians statist, the distinction would have been less problematic; but most communitarians argue in favour of at least some global moral obligations, and most cosmopolitans recognize at least some special obligations among fellow-citizens and/or between members of religious, ethnic, or cultural groups. Yet even taking this into account the debate remains focused on “the moral value to be credited to particularistic collectivities as against humanity as a whole or the claims of individual human beings” (Brown 1992: 12). The main “flaw” that Brown saw in the distinction, that “too many writers who seem to be in one camp cross over to the other at crucial points” (p. 17) is not a flaw in the distinction itself but a flaw in the way scholars viewed cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as mutually exclusive. Moral reasons for valuing human beings as human beings and moral reasons for valuing social and political communities are not always theoretically incompatible, but there is something important about the ways in which we assign moral priority to the global or the local when making policy recommendations. At issue between cosmopolitans and communitarians were the ways in which universal moral principles arise and become normative for actors in the world. Communitarians tended to draw on more historicist and phenomenological traditions of moral philosophy, and it is this that is represented in contemporary or new communitarian thought. As with the contemporary cosmopolitans, much of the focus is now on how global moral principles manifest on the international plane. It is here, in the theoretical and empirical work in the social constructivist and English School traditions, that the distinction is and remains useful. Replacing the terms with “pluralist” or “solidarist” or with “internationalist” or “globalist” does not really change this, and to ignore this central challenge is to ignore a core dynamic of IPT.

Even if the terms themselves are at least minimally plausible, much of the criticism of the distinction focused on deeper concerns. The cosmopolitan communitarian debate was critiqued as being too limited a basis for normative reflection on IR. The purpose of the initial presentation of the distinction was to provide an intellectual starting point for thinking about questions of international and global justice. In the postwar struggle to banish utopianism from the science of IR, moral theory, and the classical canon of political theory that was the historical core of normative social and political thought, was excised from the discipline either because it was hopelessly idealistic or because it was thought to be a fitting subject for (domestic) political rather than international reflection. The project outlined in International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches
(Brown 1992) and in other works such as Janna Thompson’s *Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry* (1992) or Andrew Linklater’s earlier *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (1982), which came out in second edition in 1990 as the debate took form, was to re-establish the relevance of political theory (particularly in the Western Anglo-American and European traditions) to IR as field of study. The initial claim that the history of political thought was also, *contra* Wight (Wight 1966; see Brown 1992: 4–8; Linklater 1990: 4–5; Boucher 1998: 8), the classical resource for IPT had rather divergent receptions. On the one hand it opened up the field to “a powerful and neglected literature” (Smith 1992). On the other, in appealing to the classic Western canon it was accused of reinforcing the distinction between empirical and normative IR. This latter critique has several relevant variants, all of which focus on the relation between politics and ethics. Communitarians, critical theorists, feminists, postcolonial theorists and post-structuralists challenged the ways in which IPT treated “ethics as a potential ‘doctor’ for IR, a body of principles that can imported from outside, *once they are finally agreed*” (Walker 1993: 50, cited in Brasset and Bulley 2007: 1, emphasis original; see Chapter 42). For these scholars, the problematic philosophical foundations of ethics as presented in the classical canon obscured the deeply political nature of moral claims in global affairs. There are more or less radical versions of this critique. For the post-structuralists, reliance on moral foundations that are “always-already political,” and the intellectual certainty that such principles are free of the taint of politics, inevitably “enacts a violence towards alternative possible futures” (Brasset and Bulley 2007: 2), and the project becomes a sustained critique of the ways these violences manifest. Without embracing the full extent of the critique offered by post-structuralist theorists such as Kim Hutchings and Chris Reus-Smit, both express concerns at the ways that the cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction tends to isolate IPT from IR, and thus the normative from the empirical.

When IR scholars place normative enquiry in a separate scholarly universe—in the realm of political theory or philosophy—they are working with this narrow conception of what constitutes ethical reasoning. And because students of international ethics have themselves internalized this understanding, they too contribute to the ongoing bifurcation of studies of international relations. Profound differences separate students of international ethics, fuelling debates between cosmopolitans and communitarians, deontologists and consequentialists, and Kantians, Grotians, and Hobbesians. But underneath these differences lies an unstated consensus as to the narrowly defined nature of ethical reasoning; and this unstated yet powerful consensus reinforces the divide between scientists and ethicists, but this time from the other direction (Reus-Smit 2008: 65–6; Hutchings 1999: 30).

The way IPT often conceives of the normative, its moral foundationalism, its reliance on the classical Western canon, pushes all IPT away from the critical and praxeological projects of IR. Yet, fuelled by the positive reception of the core idea that morality matters and that individual moral wellbeing matters whether we are thinking about life in a state, a shared transnational context (such as the economy or the environment), or just as human moral agents, several pioneering scholars have taken the plunge and sought
to open up normative thinking to the political. The watchword of this development is “moral accessibility,” the attempt to gain some critical purchase for ethical reasoning by consciously situating ethical reasoning in the political and institutional context of global affairs. In this enterprise, scholars in the neo-Kantian liberal tradition often associated with cosmopolitanism and scholars in more historicist traditions are moving from different directions towards a similar goal—morally accessible, institutionalized moral reasoning.

**Part 2**

Cosmopolitans and communitarians have different reasons for seeking moral accessibility. For the latter, doubts about the fact/value distinction and a critical or interpretive concern for the ways that politics informs ethics pushes theorists to consider the ways that moral reasons manifest in social and political contexts (Hurrell 2002: 139–42). For the former, a recognition that global institutions embody at least some universal principles designed to promote the equal moral worth of all humans has prompted an engagement with the institutional and brought with it a sense that such an engagement changes the nature of the theoretical enterprise. These intellectual patterns once again bring cosmopolitans and communitarians into debate—this time over what institutional moral reasoning is and what moral prescriptions flow from it. The key claim here is that once again we are finding fruitful ground for a renewed debate between the two camps, and one that is of significance to an intellectual constituency beyond political theory.

It is unsurprising that communitarianism might find an ally in constructivist IR theory. A focus on the creation and evolution of communities that create meaning, and on the co-constitutive ways in which ideas, norms, and institutions develop, is the natural extension of the tradition. Indeed, the broad historical claims about the evolution of international society and the ways that communities mediate morality found in the work of communitarians, the English School, and in that of constitutive theorists such as Mervyn Frost gains much from the empirical and sociological research programmes of the constructivist approach. Richard Price notes that “much constructivist work was itself a response to scepticism that moral norms matter in world politics” (Price 2008: 3). But an understanding of the relationship between the empirical revelation that moral norms do matter and the question that critical and normative political theorists want to ask is a vital project still under development. The new communitarians (and here the description casts off the imprimatur of Adler) pursue moral accessibility through locating stable, public and shared vocabularies of justice that can serve as a medium for argumentative exchange across the world as a whole and not simply within the confines of the Western world, or the still more limited confines of liberal political theory […] the core focus, then, should be on the idea of a moral community, not as posited, or imagined, or argued for by human reason alone, but as reflected in the
shared practises, shared understandings and broader moral consciousness of international and global society. (Hurrell 2007: 303)

We need to bear in mind that what we are seeking access to is a site of moral debate. It is not possible to read off the answer to the question “What ought we to do in context x?” by simply describing context x. Nor can communitarians avail themselves of the empirical findings of the constructivists and then simply apply existing moral theories found in IPT. As Price argues, “normative theory and ethical prescriptions cannot completely eschew their own empirical assumptions even as they rarely develop them as thoroughly as has constructivism” (Price 2008: 7). At the same time, empirical accounts of the normative cannot and ought not to eschew normative theorizing. The praxeological question that animates this work is simply “How should we act?” and, as Reus-Smit argues, this question necessarily brings empirical inquiry into dialogue with normative theory.

Pure empirical analysis or positive theory can never, in and of itself, tell us how we should act, as it can never tell us our purposes. And purely normative, philosophical enquiry can tell us nothing about the parameters of action, about the constraints and opportunities provided by the context—material and non-material—in which we seek to act. The purely empirical is as mythological and naive as the purely philosophical. (Reus-Smit 2008: 57)

The key challenge of this new communitarianism is to elaborate the relationship between the empirical and the normative, and to show how that helps us answer the praxeological question. One example of how this might be done can be seen in Reus-Smit’s argument about the “interstitial” structure or “holistic” nature of ethical reasoning, and how practices discipline normative arguments (Reus-Smit 2004: 24–38; 2008: 74–9).

Cosmopolitans, by contrast, appear to have less natural affinity with practice-based approaches to normative reasoning. Yet much early work recognized the important ways in which the development of (for example) human rights institutions provides the basis for individualized moral claim rights that serve to restrict the rights of states in their dealings with those in their jurisdiction and, more tentatively, generate obligations to those whose state cannot provide appropriate fulfilment of those rights. This enabled some scholars to pursue a cosmopolitan agenda on the basis of an apparent consensus already reached in practise. Thomas Pogge’s unpacking of the moral and practical consequences of taking article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) seriously provides a powerful case (Pogge 2002; 2007). In this case the institutional implications of the UDHR stood in as little more than a proxy for the moral argument that underpinned Pogge’s cosmopolitanism. More recently, however, Buchanan and Beitz have gone much further, seeking to engage more completely with practices. In doing so they recognize both the advantages and compromises entailed in such an enterprise (Buchanan 2004; 2010; Beitz 2010). The practical turn in liberal IPT (if indeed it is developed enough to be so called) recognizes that if we are to take practices seriously we
have to permit the practice some authority in the argument we present. Institutions matter. Norms require institutionalization in order to be effective and so, at the very least, we need to be cognizant of the effects institutionalization will have. Equally importantly, we must realize that it is the practices themselves, rather than philosophical arguments about practices, that are normative for actors.

Buchanan’s recent work develops arguments about the vital role of institutional moral reasoning in IPT. Studying the practices of international human rights law (or, in the earlier work, of international law more generally) is to study the “universally accessible authoritative version of the global lingua franca” (Buchanan 2013: 7). Studying these institutionalized practices and ideas also enables us to focus on the question of the feasibility (in practical and moral terms) of getting from where we are to where we want to go (Buchanan 2004: 18–22). Buchanan makes clear that “international legal human rights are not the legal embodiment of a subset of moral human rights. Rather, they are what they are: legal rights; and legal rights need not be the embodiment of corresponding moral rights. Nor need legal rights be justified by appealing to moral rights. Legal rights, as instrumental human creations, can serve a number of different purposes and can be justified by appeal to a number of different kinds of moral considerations” (Buchanan 2013: 11, emphasis original). In the earlier work he describes his project as developing a moral theory of international law. The practice has rules that make the lingua franca intelligible to and legitimate in the eyes of actors. Buchanan, drawing on Samantha Besson, argues that the law

is an institutionalized form of practical reasoning that serves moral values while at the same time managing moral disagreement by constraining the types of reasons and evidence it admits as relevant. (Buchanan 2013: 8)

Buchanan is not renouncing his moral philosophy (which he describes a natural “duty of justice” argument) but, in turning to practices, he is limiting its role in the recognition that “institutionalized public normative reasoning plays an ineliminable role” (Buchanan and Keohane 2004: 5–6). Beitz pushes in the same direction. His practical approach “aims to exploit the observation that the human rights enterprise is a global practise” (Beitz 2010: 8). In doing so, he argues that as political theorists we are obliged to allow the practice some authority in our thinking.

the practise exists: it is elaborate both doctrinally and politically, it consumes a considerable amount of human and other resources, and people tend to regard its norms with great seriousness. If the focus of critical interest is the idea of human rights as it exists in public reflection and argument about global political life, then it seems self-evident that we should take instruction from public practise in conceptualizing its central terms. (Beitz 2010: 11)

Both scholars are intent on exploring the justice of the existing normative order. They clearly have some normative commitments that we would describe as cosmopolitan, but
they are subjecting them to the authority of the practice in order to gain access to the global lingua franca. It is here that we can see the re-emergence of a more mature, institutionally nuanced debate.

**Conclusion**

The potential to bring moral debate to the centre of debates about institutions, legal reform, and power by opening IPT to conversation with other scholarly traditions in IR and beyond is immense. Here the strengths of critical and sociological IR theory, of legal scholarship, and of IPT re-engage in a conversation that situates ethical reflection as a part of politics rather than as something outside it. The cosmopolitan communitarian debate on the relationship between ethics and politics, the normative, and the empirical is a significant part of this development, but the whole thrust of the practical turn is the recognition that moral theory alone does not have the answers to our real-world dilemmas. It is worth remembering that the cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction was intended as a textbook introduction to ethical issues in IR, and it is a distinction that most textbooks have struggled to transcend. Good textbooks capture the essence of disciplinary evolution, speaking both to what is happening in the best scholarship and to what the next stage of scholarly debate should be. The volumes that established and developed the cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction did just that, and provoked important work by scholars in IPT. Whether IPT sustains or abandons the terminology, it is clear that the core ideas are still relevant, and that opening out that conversation to learn from other traditions of scholarship is vital. It is significant then that Anthony Lang’s recent introduction to IPT finds four stands of IPT in political theory—IR theory, international legal theory, and moral and ethical philosophy—noting that while most scholars in these strands do not see themselves as contributing to IPT, we should ignore sub-disciplinary boundaries and work with all who engage with issues of normativity at the international level (Lang 2015: 8). This thought will influence the scholarship of students who read the book, and who are taught that IPT is a vital part of IR more broadly, and of scholars in empirical, legal, and philosophical disciplines for whom the subject matter of IR—the question what ought we to do in the face of global challenges—is more important than intellectual boundaries.

**References**


