Partition equilibria in a Japanese-English auction with discrete bid levels for the wallet game

Goncalves, Ricardo and Ray, Indrajit 2017. Partition equilibria in a Japanese-English auction with discrete bid levels for the wallet game. [Discussion Paper]. Discussion Paper Series, CRETA, Department of Economics, vol. 34. Coventry: University of Warwick.

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Abstract

We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously Öxed discrete bid levels for the wallet game with two bidders, following GonÁalves and Ray (2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate some separating and pooling equilibria with two and three discrete bid levels. We also compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria and thereby Önd the optimal choices of bid levels for these cases.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Unpublished
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	University of Warwick
Last Modified:	11 Aug 2017 14:16
URI:	http://orca-mwe.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/103347

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