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In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Cardiff School of Law and Politics
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Abstract

In 2012, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were elected in 41 police forces across England and Wales. This reform significantly changed the structure for police governance for the first time since the formalisation of the tripartite system in the Police Act 1964. Elected by the local public, with powers to set the police budget, hold the Chief Constable to account, create local policing strategies through public consultation, and allocate funding for community safety activities, PCCs were criticised as likely to have omnipotent power and potentially politicising the police. This theoretically driven thesis uses urban political analysis to identify the impact of these new actors on local community safety policy, specifically how the agenda is set in negotiation with other relevant actors, and the type of agenda that this negotiation produces. The multiple-embedded comparative case study design enables insight into the significance of the English and Welsh Context for PCCs, through the examination of two case study sites: Bristol, in Avon and Somerset, and Cardiff, in South Wales. Through the use of interviews, document analysis, observations and social media analysis, the impact of PCCs on local community safety agendas is evidenced to be limited due to their necessary operation within a policy network, in which other actors have community safety agenda-setting responsibilities, and resources to pursue these. The creation of PCCs’ agenda is reliant on local contingencies within the policy network, including PCCs’ claims to expertise and how they view their role, how other agencies engage with the new actor, and the local context of the case study site. This dependence on established agencies within the policy network, results in convergence of PCCs’ agendas, focused on risk management and situational crime prevention, favoured by local authorities in the era of austerity.
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1. Introduction

In 2012 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were elected in 41 police forces across England and Wales. This reform significantly changed the structure of police governance for the first time since the formalisation of the tripartite structure in the Police Act 1964, which consisted of the Chief Constable, the Home Office and Police Authorities in each force area. As part of the Coalition government’s Big Society Agenda in 2010, and specifically through the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs were introduced with the aim of improving the democratic accountability of the police, and removing bureaucracy. Elected every four years, PCCs have a range of responsibilities to govern a local police force, including the power to hire and fire the Chief Constable, set the annual force budget, set local policing priorities in a Police and Crime Plan, and allocate funding for policing and community safety activities.¹ The statutory arrangements around PCCs express elements of both representative and participatory democracy: not only are they elected to represent the will of the public, and are therefore democratically accountable at the ballot box; but the public also have the opportunity to participate in decision-making throughout the PCC’s term in office, by being consulted on local policing priorities.² In addition to engaging with the local public, the 2011 Act states that PCCs must ‘have regard’ for the priorities of relevant local authorities, and vice versa.³

The reform abolishes the tripartite structure, in part due to a perception of failing Police Authorities, in which members lacked the expertise and resources to truly hold a Chief Constable to account, often deferring to decisions of either the Home Office, or the Office of the Chief Constable itself, as well as being invisible to the public.⁴ Instead, the reform implements the ‘quadripartite structure’, consisting of the Home Secretary, the PCC, the Police and Crime Panel, which scrutinises the actions of the PCC, and the Chief Constable.⁵ Such a model has been criticised for reducing the constabulary independence of the Chief Constable, which insulates the police and policing from political bias.⁶

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¹ See Section 2.5
² See Section 2.4
³ Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.10
Despite PCCs’ responsibilities being strategic, rather than operational, their ‘unfettered’ power has criticised, particularly their power to hire and fire a Chief Constable.  

The 2011 Act was criticised for being rushed through Parliament, resulting in a vague list of responsibilities for actors in the new quadripartite structure, rather than ‘tight boundaries’. In addition, this major reform led to ‘incoming PCCs [having] no blueprint to work from as there is no equivalent post elsewhere in the world or in any other public services in the UK’. This legislative ambiguity has the potential to lead to uncertainty on the ground, although advocates of the reform argue this is intentional, as PCCs should be responding to local need, which may differ between forces, rather than adhering to centrally defined priorities. The lack of ‘tight boundaries’ implies a need to consider both necessary relations (those processes, defined by the legislation, that are required to occur), and contingent relations (how such processes are dependent on the agency of actors in particular contexts).

Community safety as a policy issue, has the potential to demonstrate such necessary and contingent relations within this police governance reform. Often suggested to be a contested and capacious concept, community safety can be characterised as an outcome of a response to crime and disorder, or as a policy construct. For example, for Hope, community safety denotes the condition of a community, while for Hughes, community safety is a ‘strategy which seeks to move beyond a police-driven crime prevention agenda, to involve other agencies and generate greater participation from all sections of the “community”’. Community safety has emerged as a significant policy strategy in recent decades, and it is this conceptualisation which underpins this thesis. Speaking to the Home Affairs Committee, Lord Wasserman said that the key role of PCCs was not to save money, but rather

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11 See Section 2.6


to develop community safety strategies for the Chief Constable to operationalise. PCCs have the responsibility to allocate financial resources for community safety projects, which were previously passed from the Home Office directly to local authorities and, in the particular context of Wales, the Welsh Government, in accordance with the priorities outlined in their Police and Crime Plan. In addition to being within the remit of the police, community safety is a significant focus of local authorities, who work in partnership to address particular issues. Community safety is also an area where members of the public can involve themselves in decision making processes through established public meetings such as Partnerships and Communities Together (PACT) meetings, and other public/partnership forums. However, the inclusion of the public in the setting of priorities for crime and disorder, has the potential for producing populist agendas, reflecting the loudest voices, rather than the legitimate interests of the wider public, potentially exacerbated by the introduction of an elected governor of policing. The setting of the community safety agenda is therefore an area where many key individuals and institutions can be involved, and it is an area where the impact of the PCC on engaging the public in agenda setting can be identified.

The Welsh Government opposed the creation of PCCs, and is no longer in receipt of the community safety grant. However, many aspects of community safety work, including local authority partnerships, are devolved matters, despite policing not being devolved. It is therefore proposed that the Welsh Government may continue to be a key actor in the community safety agenda setting arena. To enable this consideration of particular contexts, the thesis uses a multiple embedded comparative case study design of two sites with different relevant actors: Cardiff, South Wales, and Bristol, Avon and Somerset. The discussion thus far indicates a theory-driven thesis, due to the propositions for PCCs in setting the community safety agenda: the PCC has the potential to impact on local community safety agendas. However, this impact may be dependent on contingent relations, therefore varying between force areas, due to the lack of specific guidance within the 2011 Act regarding public consultation and agenda setting with other actors. The key theoretical influences driving the research have been taken from Rhodes’ work on governance and Stone’s work on urban political regimes. Rhodes’ concepts of

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14 Home Affairs Committee, Police and Crime Commissioners: Progress to date. Sixteenth report of session 2013-14 Q403 EV 58 Tuesday 21st January 2014
16 See Chapter 5
17 See Chapter 4
resources of power-dependence and policy networks, and the related literature on governance, is useful for identifying the relationships that exist within a policy network, and whether PCCs have the power to construct and pursue their own agenda (given the criticism of their unfettered, or omnipotent, power), or whether they are dependent on others for resources to accomplish their agenda. Stone’s work provides a means of explaining PCCs’ capacity to govern, and conceptualising the principal orientations of the community safety responses in the agendas which exist in the two case study sites. Used together, these theoretical influences clarify the power-dependencies encountered by PCCs in governing policing, the discretion they have in negotiating these dependencies, whether such discretion leads to divergence in types of PCCs’ local community safety agendas, and if so, how this divergence is characterised.

This thesis therefore enables a consideration of broader implications of the exercise of power in policing: while critics of the introduction of PCCs argued that a democratically elected representative would create ‘top-down’ policies for other agencies to execute, and therefore PCCs would politicise policing, the community safety policy context involves a wide range of political and executive institutions. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate how PCCs impact the already crowded and negotiated field of community safety agenda setting in Cardiff and Bristol, and whether they have the capacity to position themselves as an obligatory passage point for this agenda setting.¹⁹

The theories driving this thesis, discussed above, inform the following research questions:

1. How does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, impact city-level community safety policy?
   I. To what extent does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners to the community safety agenda setting process, impact public participation in that process?
   II. To what extent does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners impact the process of funding community safety?
   III. To what extent does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners impact the types of responses to issues of crime and disorder within a community safety agenda?

2. How is agenda setting shaped by power-dependence relationships and to what extent are resources of power negotiated and used to influence decisions?

¹⁹ See Section 2.1
3. How does Welsh Government seek to influence community safety agenda setting in Wales? To what extent does it succeed? What factors enable and limit that influence?

Through a comparative case study, this thesis therefore investigates the impact of PCCs, relative to other policy actors, in setting city-level community safety agendas, including the claim that PCCs democratise policy-making in this area. The broader analytical significance of this comparison for ‘understanding governance’, is elucidation of the impact that an elected representative can have on the democratic scrutiny of governing arrangements ‘beyond Westminster and Whitehall’, particularly in a policy area historically renowned for its insulation of such scrutiny due to the doctrine of constabulary independence.20

The structure of the thesis encapsulates the theoretically driven nature of the study. The next chapter provides a chronological account of the governance of the police and community safety over recent decades, thus detailing the background to the police governance reform that is the central focus of this thesis. This chapter considers the 2011 Act which introduced PCCs, using recent literature to identify the prospects implied by this new policy. The following chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks provided by urban political analysis and studies of governance, including policy networks, resources of power-dependence relationships, regime theory, and dimensions of power, and considers their value as frameworks for analysis in the context of this thesis.

The following chapter discusses the research strategy, design and methodology of the thesis. The adaptive nature of the thesis is detailed, including the limitations of the fieldwork period.21 Justification for the selection of the case study sites of Cardiff and Bristol is provided and the research methods of interviews, non-participant observations, documentary sources, and social media sources are critically discussed. This chapter also considers the ethics of this study, in particular acknowledging the difficulty in escaping ‘politics’.

The next two chapters provide the individual findings of the case studies of Bristol, in Avon and Somerset, and Cardiff, in South Wales. These are structured according to Yin,22 providing the ‘case’ of the PCC, their agenda and the resources they have to pursue that agenda, followed by the ‘context’ of community safety in that case study site: the other agencies with responsibilities to set community safety agendas, and resource them. The theoretical framework of regime analysis, adds a further layer of interpretation to the findings, and is used to conceptualise the principal orientations of community

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21 See Chapter 4
safety responses contained in multiple agendas in each case study site. The ‘units of analysis’, which are the relationships between these key actors and institutions which develop based on a particular policy interest, are then considered, using Rhodes’ resources of power-dependence to understand how the agenda is set through negotiation between actors. These chapters demonstrate that PCCs rely on contingent relations within the policy network, including informational power from local authorities, to set their agenda, rather than the 2011 Act introducing a structure necessitating these relationships.

The discussion chapter compares the findings of the individual case studies demonstrating that despite the divergence in approaches that the two PCCs take in performing their role and responsibilities, there is a convergence in the types of agendas that are produced, and convergence in the ways in which the power of the PCCs are limited due to other actors’ agendas and their vast resources to pursue those agendas. The final chapter considers the wider implications for this thesis, particularly contemplating the questions that this thesis raises for future research.
2. Literature and Policy Review

The formation of the Coalition Government in 2010 brought about the most significant reform to police governance since 1964 and statutorily altered the key actors with responsibility for community safety, as well as wider policing and issues of crime and disorder. This thesis seeks to understand the impact of this police governance reform on the process of setting and funding community safety agendas, as well as the type of responses to crime and disorder including within a community safety agenda. It is therefore necessary to consider context in which this reform occurs. This chapter provides a chronological account of the policy developments relating to community safety agenda setting and police governance, and thus provides the background to the current policing landscape.

Firstly, the police governance structure for the time period 1964-2012 is detailed, including the issues which led to the abolition of this tripartite structure. Following this, two distinct eras of community safety policy are addressed: 1982-1997 and 1997-2010. In the first era community safety emerges as a ‘reaction discourse’ but remains a non-statutory responsibility. The second time period considers the context of the Labour Government’s establishment of statutory multi-agency partnerships, from the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, including the tension between central and local government in the control of community safety. Community safety is then considered within the time period 2010-2012, related to the creation of the Coalition government and the ideological rationale for the creation of PCCs as new, directly elected, local governors for policing and community safety.

This chapter ends with a detailed account of the roles and responsibilities of the new quadripartite structure, established by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, considered alongside recent academic literature on the ‘prospects’ for PCCs, focusing particularly on the responsibility of PCCs to set priorities for the police force and fund community safety activities. This last section therefore begins to consider what may be ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ relations for PCCs: what necessary, statutory powers do PCCs have, and how might these provide capacity for contingencies to emerge in particular contexts?

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2. See Sections 2.5 and 2.6
2.1 1964-2012 Tripartite Structure of Police Governance

Prior to the Police Act 1964 there was no fundamental statutory distinction between the police and other local services: ‘no one thought to treat the police separately from other local institutions’. The Act provided for the tripartite structure, marking three lines of governance. Firstly, the Home Secretary was responsible for the strategic direction, performance scrutiny and financial control of all police forces; secondly, the police were accountable to the local public through Police Authorities comprising elected local councillors, magistrates and business representatives, nominated by a central panel; thirdly, each police force was under the direction and control of its Chief Constable, and Chief Constables held their police force to account on an operational basis. Although Police Authorities were attached to the local government, their powers derived directly from the 1964 Act. Their key role was to ‘secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for their area’, which included the power to set the force budget, hire and fire Chief Constables, provide and maintain premises, vehicles, clothing and other equipment, and hold the police to account for their actions on behalf of the public. Police Authorities consisted of two-thirds elected members, and one third magistrates, therefore aiming to provide the public with a line of accountability to the police, via local election.

However, democratic control of the police cannot functionally be separated from democratic control of local government: Police Authority members could not separate this position from their position as an elected Councillor, therefore combining their membership with more general duties, rather than specialising in their Police Authority role. This led to Police Authority members having an inability to gain access to necessary information and a vast amount of delegation of decision making to the Chief Constable – the very subject of their scrutiny. Therefore, the police were able to ‘lead inexpert part-time Councillors by the nose’. While most Chief Constables made efforts to establish close working relationships with their local authorities, when matters of real significance arose, it was the Chief Constable’s view that would inevitably prevail. For example, in 1988, Northumbria Police Authority struggled to challenge the Chief Constable’s policy decision, due to the Chief Constable having Home Office support.

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4 1964 Police Act (s.4(1))
6 L. Lustgarten, (1986) n.3 page 86
Further criticisms have been levied at the 1964 Act, including that it is ‘vague’ in prescribing relationships. Instead, these relationships were gradually defined by case law, particularly by the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the case *Ex parte Blackburn*. This case questioned whether the courts could control the exercise of police discretion in prosecuting, and whether the police owed a duty to the public to enforce the law: ‘a policy instruction by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner not to enforce the provisions of the Betting and Gaming legislation could, had it not been withdrawn, have been controlled by the issue of mandamus’. Therefore, there did not exist a breach in the duty to enforce the law in an instance of non-prosecution, the political controls normally governing public officials should not apply to the police during operational functions, and it was deemed that the police should not be under the political control of any agency. Instead, the police are ‘answerable to the law, and the law alone’. This operational independence of the police became enshrined in law as a fundamental principle of British Policing. Case law demonstrates that despite the police being ‘answerable to the law and the law alone’, courts will bestow significant discretion to Chief Constables if a legal challenge is brought regarding their operational decisions. This was exemplified during the political and industrial conflict of the mid 1980s, when a number of Police Authorities challenged their forces’ participation in the mutual aid agreements set up to facilitate the anti-picket operation, in court: in all of these disputes the courts ruled in favour of the chief constable. Therefore:

‘…the police are independent operationally and in policy formulation (the myth of constabulary independence is sacrosanct).’

The tripartite structure of police governance enshrined the distinction between operational control over policing, held by the Chief Constable of a force, and strategic decision-making, arranged by the Home Secretary through policies: the Home Office maintained ‘a prerogative power to maintain law and order’. The Act provided the Home Secretary with a range of strategic and tactical

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11 R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 1 All ER 763, 769 per Lord Denning.
responsibilities, aiming to ‘promote the efficiency of the police’, including requiring a compulsory report from the Chief Constable about the policing of particular matters. Police Authorities were also required to seek approval from the Secretary of State for both the appointment of Chief Constable, and the determination of the number of persons of each rank. The Home Office could also withhold the government grant to a Police Authority if it was deemed that a police force was operating inefficiently, although this was used as the basis of central government ‘advice’ to local authorities on a range of issues, rather than a direct threat. Therefore, while the tripartite structure claimed to devolve police governance to the local through the Police Authorities, central government retained much of the control.

It is useful to consider Marshall’s conceptualisation of accountability at this point. He asserts that there are two fundamentally distinctive forms of accountability: ‘subordinate and obedient’ and ‘explanatory and co-operative’. In the former, ‘the supervisor’s responsibility is typically accompanied by administrative control and the ability to direct and veto’. This model has been argued to be a ‘euphemism for control’. The latter relates to the ‘capacity to require information, answers and reasons that can then be analysed and debated’ by elected officials, in the press, and any other relevant forum. The tripartite structure therefore exemplifies Marshall’s ‘explanatory and co-operative’ model of accountability, although this has been criticised by radical commentators as unacceptable and unintended. Indeed, the ‘central and local machinery that was set up in 1964 [is not] ideally adapted to the exercise of explanatory accountability. In some degree this is perhaps more the fault of elected members than of the legislative machinery.’ Therefore, the lack of Police Authority powers, or awareness and use of their powers, leads to a potentially more desirable model of police governance and accountability, which does not encroach on the doctrine of constabulary independence.

The early 1990s saw a perception arise within the Conservative government that increased funding for the police service was not succeeding in reducing levels of crime and disorder. Consequently, a new regime of public management was instigated, described as ‘a way of reorganising public sector

16 1964 Act part 2 section 29(1)
17 Local Government Act 1974 section 5; L. Lustgarten (1986) n.3
18 G. Marshall (1978) n.10 pages 61-63
19 Ibid page 61
21 G. Marshall (1978) n.10 page 62
22 R. Reiner (2016) n.20
23 G. Marshall (1978) n.10 page 62
bodies to bring their management and reporting closer to...business methods’. While the government had attempted to implement such management through policing by objectives in the 1980s, these had relatively little impact on working practice, and therefore more rigorous efforts were pursued. New public management of the police was consolidated in the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, and included empowering the Home Office to set national policing objectives, the establishment of performance targets to assess the attainment of such objectives, and the introduction of ‘cash-limited budgets’ thereby enhancing the government’s control over total expenditure. In addition to this, Police Authorities were now free-standing bodies, separated from the local government structure, and to which the Home Office directly paid the financial allocation for local police work. The composition of Police Authorities also changed under the 1994 Act, with most now consisting of 17 members: nine councillors chosen by local authorities, three magistrates, and five ‘independent’ members. The original proposal was that the independent candidates should be directly appointed by the Home Office. Instead, a selection procedure was introduced, involving a selection board comprising one person nominated by the local Police Authority, who nominated another, and one by the Home Office. A maximum of 20 candidates were shortlisted, which was then halved by the Home Office, before the local selection panel chose successful candidates, thus distributing responsibility between central and local government.

The 1994 Act offered enhanced autonomy for Chief Constables by replacing existing Home Office controls over personnel and financial matters. For example, rather than being defined by the Home Office, the Chief Constable was able to determine the number of police officers employed in their force. The Chief Constable also held management responsibility for directing local policing in accordance with a business plan drawn up within the context of local policing plan and cash-limited budget. However the Police Authority had ‘ownership’ over the local policing plan: it was the Authority’s role to determine objectives for policing for that year, and to consult with the Chief Constable and the local public on the plan. Essentially the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994 attempted to separate the purchaser and provider of policing. However, the financial management code of practice for Police Forces in England and Wales stipulated that:

‘Unless there are good reasons to the contrary, police authorities should delegate financial management to the chief constable so that, as far as possible, the financial management of a force takes place within that force’

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25 P. Joyce (2011) n.15
This provided the Chief Constable with discretion in their purchasing, but the Police Authority retains a monitoring role. Despite the financial contribution by local government, Police Authorities exercised limited influence over the priorities of police forces. Therefore, ‘the Police Authorities pay the piper but do not call any tunes’.

In this way, national and local authorities governed the police but ‘at a distance’ through target setting and performance monitoring, supported by economic sanctions. The need for the Chief Constable to work with both central and local policing priority objectives in mind has potential to cause conflict, and a Chief Constable could be subject to judicial review if they were to ignore the priorities set by one or the other.

An evaluation of the 1994 Act emphasised the enhanced central control exerted by the Home Office through ‘setting detailed targets, prescribing policing strategies, inspecting performance and requiring the implementation of detailed action plans’. Under these new terms of management the police service could be directed to pursue Home Office national objectives, and policing ‘relegated to providing services determined by Police Authorities in their local policing plan’. However, it is alleged that the Police Authorities themselves were subject to increased central direction, effectively becoming an intermediary of central government. The situation was aggravated by further targets imposed by central government, which became the key tool of performance management, meaning that forces had to devote the bulk of their attention to delivering on centrally determined activities. These targets placed central concerns above local needs, and had perverse outcomes: priorities were distorted, ‘tempting officers into using their time in unproductive ways or into directly fiddling performance figures’, and creating a ‘counting culture’ in which ‘only what got measured got done’. As such, it was concluded that ‘the public lacks the power to get the policing they want’.

In 2006, the Police and Justice Act amended the composition of Police Authorities and their powers. Magistrates ceased to be a specific category of Police Authority membership, although later legislation stipulated that a Police Authority should contain at least one magistrate. The 2006 Act reduced the extent of central government involvement in selecting independent members. Police Authority remit

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30 P. Joyce, (2011) n.15 page 128
32 P. Joyce, (2011) n.15 page 7
35 Police Authority Regulations (2008)
was extended from the 1964 Act’s minimalist ‘securing the maintenance of an efficient and effective force’, to requiring the Police Authority to hold the Chief Constable to account for the exercise of their functions, and those of the officers and staff under their control.

During this time period, policing became an increasingly politicised topic, with local and national Labour politicians calling for a new model of accountability that was more suitable for a democracy: ‘subordinate and obedient’. The Police, at all levels including the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Police Federation, and the Conservative party resisted this, citing the doctrine of independence. Following the Miner’s strike, the election of ‘new’ Labour and the introduction of New Public Management, Marshall’s models were supplanted with a ‘calculative and contractual’ version of accountability.36 The focus on accountability of the police became replaced with a focus on accountancy of all public services.37

The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 can be regarded as a ‘central development’ in the formulation of PCCs, as politician and external body input on police strategy awakened the notion that setting policing and crime related policy was not necessarily purely a matter for Chief Constables.38 This theme is further discussed in the following sections, regarding the governance of community safety, and the ‘decentring of the public police’.39

Throughout the following sections, the association between the governance of the police and community safety community is ascertained, recognising that, while community safety is a role for the police, it is also a role for a multitude of other agencies, which becomes more formalised during recent decades.

2.2 1982-1997 Voluntary Community Safety

Defined as the ‘voluntary phase’, this time period saw the introduction of several significant policy developments related to community safety through neighbourhood policing.40 Prior to the 1980s, crime prevention had emerged as a policy discourse, with publicity campaigns targeting businesses to

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36 R. Reiner (2016) n.22 page 137
37 Ibid
encourage responsibility for mitigating the risk of victimisation, thus raising questions of the ability of the police and other criminal justice agencies to respond to the multi-faceted problems of crime and disorder.\textsuperscript{41} This section confirms the recognition that the police cannot manage criminal justice issues ‘alone’, through a discussion of the Police and Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, the Morgan Report and the increased use of Home Office Circulars.\textsuperscript{42}

Arising out of Scarman’s influential report into the Brixton riots was the recognition that the absence of direct accountability between communities and law enforcement agencies was the underpinning of policing problems in the area.\textsuperscript{43} Following Scarman’s report, a Home Office Circular (54/1982) was quickly dispatched, supporting local consultation between police and the public. Statutory provision came through the PACE Act 1984:

‘Arrangements shall be made in each police area for obtaining the views of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in the area’\textsuperscript{44}

This Act acknowledged that core police and criminal justice agencies are unable to comprehend and prevent crime and disorder issues alone, and thus emphasised the need for agencies to work in partnership and the importance of community members as stakeholders in policing.

The PACE Act 1984 sparked an increase in police statutory discretionary powers with regards to their engagement with the public and other agencies, through Police Community Consultative Groups (PCCG). However, the ‘arrangements’ stipulated under the Act were largely seen by local agencies as voluntary rather than mandatory, therefore demonstrating the tensions between centralised and localised power. Central government provided no additional resources for the ‘requirement’ of obtaining information from the public, which may have contributed to there being little ‘action’ outside of pilot funded areas, limited interest from the public, and a lack of resources to run the initiative.\textsuperscript{45} However, PCCGs did play a vital role in improving relationships between the local police

\textsuperscript{42} These Acts have been identified as having the most impact on the governance of policing and the setting of community safety agendas. There are, of course, other Acts or policies which may have had indirect influence, but for the purpose of this thesis, these are not viewed as essential to the ‘story’.
\textsuperscript{44} Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 s.106
and local politicians, lessening the conflict between Chief Constables and local council representatives.  

The ‘relatively patchy’ implementation of such initiatives has been attributed to the lack of a coherent direction from central government. This lack of steering was subsequently acknowledged by the Morgan Report, which claimed that ‘at present crime prevention is a peripheral concern for all of the agencies involved and a truly core activity for none of them’. It championed multi-agency crime prevention, developed and coordinated through local authorities, and promoted the concept of ‘community safety’ over that of ‘crime prevention’, to encourage the involvement of other sections of the community beyond the police. However, the recommendations of the report were largely ignored by the incumbent Conservative Government. Instead, the voluntary community safety agendas and projects were ‘beyond the control of the centre’, resulting in local divergence.

2.3 1997-2010 Mandatory Community Safety

The election of the New Labour Government in 1997 commenced the era of national mandatory community safety policy. As discussed above, prior to this community safety was characterised by divergence in local practices and a lack of central government input, while this time period sees community safety as dominating the policy agenda. The rationale for this was New Labour’s efforts to compete with the Conservatives on law and order, who were traditionally seen as tougher on such issues. Termed as the ‘Third Way’, New Labour introduced several ‘flagship’ pieces of legislation, including the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which is discussed below.

The creation of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999 is also significant to this time period and the context of this thesis, due to the comparison of the impact of governance structure on neighbourhood policing between England and Wales. For the first time, Welsh Ministers, based in Wales, could make policies and regulations, tailor-made for Wales and often distinct from those implemented elsewhere.

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49 G. Hughes (1998) n.47 page 102
50 Gilling et al. (2013) n.1
in the UK. Since devolution, the Welsh Assembly Government has seen increases in its powers through legislation such as the Government of Wales Act 2006, which allows Welsh Ministers to make Welsh Laws (Assembly Measures). While the devolved powers do not currently include matters of crime and justice, which remain controlled and centrally funded by the Secretary of State, they do include the delivery of local services, and are thus relevant to the context of community safety local agenda setting. They include areas such as social welfare, local government, housing, fire and rescue, health and health services, and public administration. Since the creation of the National Assembly for Wales, there have been assertions of Wales ‘doing things differently’ to England, including Rhodri Morgan’s claim of ‘clear red water’ between England and Wales.\(^{53}\) These declarations are supported with rhetoric emphasising social justice, fairness and equality, such as ‘children first, offenders second’, thus espousing ‘positive youth justice’.\(^{54}\) As will be discussed in later chapters, the Welsh Government provided funding for the Welsh community safety partnerships, for priorities aligned with such topics.\(^{55}\) This variation between England and Wales, suggests a need for research which investigates the impact of PCCs on each of these countries, which are so often considered to have similar agendas.

Community Safety Partnerships (Wales) and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (England) were set up as statutory bodies under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, building upon many of the recommendations of the Morgan Report. With representatives from the police and Police Authority, the local council, and other responsible authorities, such as the fire, health, and probation services, the partnerships aimed to collaboratively develop and implement strategies to protect local communities from crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour, and to reduce fear of crime. As such, the statutory partnerships demonstrate clear support for the earlier claims that issues of crime and disorder are multifaceted, and cannot be dealt with by the police alone. They also provided a mechanism of forums in the public arena, through which the public could hold the relevant authorities to account for their decisions by putting questions to them regarding certain issues. In addition to this, the public were given the opportunity to influence local priority-setting through consultation. The partnerships would then formulate priorities from these, while also taking into account national objectives and budgetary constraints, and publish a three-year strategy for tackling crime and disorder.\(^{56}\) Local authorities therefore had responsibility, not just for social disorder, but also for crime


\(^{55}\) See Chapter 5.

\(^{56}\) P. Joyce, (2011) n.15
reduction: ‘within this framework and under statute the public police were one part of the crime reduction machinery – decentering almost by law.’\(^5^7\)

Despite this attempt to engage the public in consultation and put across the image of a ‘bottom-up approach’, this was very much a top-down policy. If the public were dissatisfied with the level of service received from the partnerships, the only recourse remained the ballot box. The responsible authorities involved in statutory partnerships were required to submit a report on the implementation of strategies: in England to the Secretary of State and in Wales to both the Secretary of State and the National Assembly for Wales. In addition to this, the Secretary of State and National Assembly for Wales were able to order the responsible authorities to implement a centrally-derived strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder at the local level, thus leading to potential conflict in central-local relations and competing priorities. Indeed, criticisms were levied that public participation in such policy making was limited, and that disguised elitist initiatives repressed the marginalised.\(^5^8\)

Therefore, centralised power can restrict local empowerment in the context of a partnership, despite the rhetoric of a partnership suggesting that empowerment of the local, leads to the empowerment of all.\(^5^9\) Evidence for this comes from research into the Safety Merseyside Partnership:

> ‘In practice, the partnership programme has not only consolidated the formal and informal power of local elites, but has been successful in generating a new local crime control industry.... which mirrors and reinforces the ideological perspective of this local elite and the perspective of central government who lay down the rules and sanctions within which this industry operates.’\(^6^0\)

In the context of Wales, such conflict is exacerbated when the matter of funding enters the equation, as partnership funding between England and Wales differs. In England, the Home Office funded partnership initiatives; in Wales, partnership initiatives were funded by both Welsh Government (post-devolution) and the Home Office (through the Safer Community Fund).\(^6^1\) For example, Welsh Government funded initiatives related to substance misuse as one of its priority areas, while the Home Office promoted the priority of partnership working on knife crime. Therefore, despite England and Wales both having Labour governments for the majority of this time period, community safety

\(^{57}\) S. Savage, (2007) n.39 page 212 emphasis in original
\(^{59}\) Ibid
\(^{60}\) Ibid page 103
\(^{61}\) The Welsh Government are the majority funder for community safety partnerships in Wales, rather than the Home Office. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.2
priorities differed between the two countries, which had consequences for funding: a central government priority of knife crime may have little relevance in parts of Wales, but it was for this priority that specific funding is provided.\textsuperscript{62}

Central government also controlled partnerships through Home Office Crime Reduction Teams. These regional teams liaised with partnerships to provide guidance, support and training. The teams also monitor ‘the performance of projects that have been funded by the Home Office’, and ensure ‘that an appreciation of crime reduction issues is reflected in the work performed by all government offices who operate in the region’\textsuperscript{63} In Wales, the Home Office Reduction Team sits within the Welsh Assembly, and is tasked with ensuring the meeting of targets set by both the Home Office and the Welsh Assembly. The Home Office Crime Reduction Teams arguably extend the control of central government, improving their knowledge of and information on partnerships and crime and disorder at the local level.

Following the introduction of statutory partnerships, there was a gradual movement towards ‘joined-up government’, and the post-1997 Labour government sought to ensure greater coordination of public sector organisations that could contribute towards crime reduction.\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, it has been noted that partnerships arose from a need for integration in an increasingly fragmented organisational landscape, and partnerships provided a means of developing strategic direction and co-ordination in this ‘polycentric’ terrain.\textsuperscript{65} A key mechanism for this was through Local Area Agreements (LAAs), which were introduced in England and Wales in 2004. These three yearly agreements between central government and local authorities, set out the priorities for a local area and contained improvement targets for each partner involved. Each local area was represented by a non-statutory, multi-agency, non-executive Local Strategic Partnership (LSP), and it was these bodies that negotiated and delivered the LAAs.

LAAs were structured around four policy areas or ‘indicative themes’: (1) children and young people, (2) safer and stronger communities, (3) healthier communities and older people, and (4) economic development and environment. Structuring responses by theme, rather than ‘traditional segmented and compartmentalised social responses...provides a holistic approach to crime and disorder which is

\textsuperscript{63} P. Joyce, (2011) n.15 Page 104
\textsuperscript{64} A. Crawford, (2001) n.52
problem-focused rather than bureaucracy-premised'. In addition, LSPs were accountable to both local and central government, in part due to their dual funding: the four policy areas of focus were funded from a single ‘pot’ from the Home Office in both England and Wales, which was then distributed by the local authorities. Such a funding system allowed greater flexibility in the allocation of resources to meet local demand than the previous system, which attracted separate funding for each policy area. However, the creation of the new community safety partnerships, LSPs, and LAAs has been argued to further fragment service delivery at the local level due to the encouragement of ‘pluralisation of local service providers….opening up new policy arenas, encouraging partnerships across and between the public, voluntary and private sectors [and emphasising] locally-grounded, problem solving methodology [which] encourages new players to enter the field’. Therefore, effective coordination is paramount, but there is an undermining of effective steering mechanisms.

Local government became increasingly involved in issues of crime and disorder, following the Police and Justice Act 2006, which legislated for each local authority to organise crime and disorder committees (known as Oversight and Scrutiny Committees from the Local Government Act 2000). Comprising local members, the committees reviewed decisions made, or action taken, by those authorities in relation to crime and disorder functions. These committees were then able to make recommendations to the local authority with regards to these functions, but were not themselves able to make policy decisions. The organisation of crime and disorder review committees differed between England and Wales: In England, the Secretary of State issued guidance, including the frequency of reviews, and made provision to co-opt additional members to the committee. In Wales, the same was true, although Secretary of State was required to ‘consult’ with National Assembly for Wales, therefore maintaining the role of central government in decision making. Oversight and Scrutiny Committees are currently tasked with ensuring accountability by being a critical friend who challenges policy-makers and decision-makers, and enables the voice and concerns of the public to be heard, in order to drive improvement in public services. However, it must be noted that in some instances, these Committees are ‘examining’ themselves, resulting in stead in support rather than scrutiny.

A review of the statutory partnerships that had emerged from the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act was published in 2006. The review was well-timed considering that the partnership landscape had changed considerably since their introduction, and new challenges were presented with the introduction of

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66 A. Crawford, (2001) n.52  
67 Ibid. page 61  
68 Ibid. page 61  
Local Area Agreements, and the changing role of the government outlined above: the political and policy discourses on community safety were unstable and there was contestation as to their ‘terrain’. The review aimed to strengthen the visibility, responsiveness, membership and role of local partnerships, and to make them as effective as possible in the current landscape to tackle crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour. To meet these objectives, ‘multi-functional Neighbourhood and Policing Teams’ were to be introduced, comprising police officers, PCSOs, special constables, police support volunteers and neighbourhood wardens. These teams would involve themselves in partnership working with the responsible authorities for particular areas. The Home Office initiative, the ‘Policing Pledge’, assisted with these aims, by establishing national standards as to what the public could expect from the police service, which were supplemented by a local element. This included photographs and contact details of neighbourhood policing teams, and the top three locally-identified priorities to be tackled in the area. However, this promotion of police visibility, led to the police being viewed in isolation from the other agencies working in partnership, who had less visibility.

In 2008, the Casey Report ‘Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime’ noted this issue of reliance on the police, and made several proposals, including:

‘The Government should ensure on behalf of the public that standardised approaches to Neighbourhood Policing are adapted by all forces by the beginning of 2009 to improve public awareness, familiarity and confidence. From our discussions with the public during the review we suggest that they should focus on:

- Agreeing a single name and identity for Neighbourhood Policing Teams where several currently exist;
- Using a single name for local public engagement meetings on crime – PACT – in partnership with local government and other criminal justice agencies, and applying approaches that are based on key good practice principles for public engagement;

G. Hughes and M. Rowe, ‘Neighbourhood policing and community safety: Researching the instabilities of the local governance of crime, disorder and security in contemporary UK’ Criminology and Criminal Justice (2007) Vol. 7(4)


Providing monthly common and comparable local information via Neighbourhood Policing and PACT meetings, including feedback on action taken on crime and neighbourhood problems and what has happened to any criminals convicted for local crimes.\textsuperscript{73}

PACT – Partnerships and Communities Together – was rolled out across England and Wales in 2008. This initiative aimed to make decision-making a partnership exercise, through which the police and relevant agencies were held accountable by the public through public meetings. Local areas were given more organisational discretion with the introduction of PACT: the public meetings were organised primarily by PCSOs and the local police involved in partnerships, but involved a panel in attendance comprising local authority councillors relevant to the area, the local PC and one or more PCSOs. The public attending each meeting could make suggestions for ‘priorities to be tackled’.

The panel of councillor and police representatives retained the decision-making power to choose priorities proposed by the public, and this enhanced discretion in exerting control over the allocation of their organisation’s resources to meet local demands. The local councillors elected on a democratic mandate are well placed to influence local agenda setting and the allocation of local resources. However, at the same time as the introduction of PACT, the Home Secretary announced a move to a single top-down numerical target for police forces, which focused on the confidence of the public in the force identifying and addressing local crime and anti-social behaviour issues. PACT priorities were therefore required to take into account national objectives, and PACT meetings and the setting of priorities was a Neighbourhood Policing performance measure.\textsuperscript{74} Due to these requirements, research suggests that PACT involves ‘cynical consultation’, where the public feel that they are participating, but the priorities are determined elsewhere.\textsuperscript{75}

The introduction of top-down performance targets therefore increased the quantity and quality of information held about each force by central government, used for scrutiny and national objective setting, which would in turn reduce police discretion. However, there is also potential for the police to have better access to, and hold more information about, the public domain than other responsible authorities, due to the increased visibility of the police leading to more confidence in them, and therefore the public confide in them.

\textsuperscript{73} L. Casey, Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime, Summary, Cabinet Office (2008) page 10 Proposal seven
\textsuperscript{74} These measures are designed to enable performance comparison between police forces, detailed enough to compare within force delivery of most day to day policing operations, including neighbourhood policing activities. R. Gasper and A. Davies, ‘Identity (Re)constructions in Public Meetings: An Ethnography of the Governance of Crime and Disorder’. Symposium: Work, organisation and ethnography. (2010)
The 2008/09 recession inevitably required the police service to operate in a tight fiscal environment. This was problematic given that 87 per cent of police funding is spent on the workforce, and there had been an increase in police numbers (by almost 10 per cent during 2000-2007), resulting in the largest police service ever recruited in post-war history. While central government assured the public that front line policing was being protected overall, in reality neighbourhood policing officers were required to spend increasing amounts of time on administration, as office staff had been stripped back. Community safety also suffered under austerity, resulting in the ‘abolition of many community safety roles, and the ‘downsizing’ of community safety teams, alongside the collapse of multi-agency partnership working and the retreat of agencies back to their departmental silos’. Due to the lack of personnel, public consultations declined, as those still employed privileged tasks associated with central performance management targets instead.

This exposition of the time period 1997-2010 has charted the development of multi-agency working in the context of crime disorder and community safety, through the introduction of statutory partnerships, LAAs and overview and scrutiny committees, and the formation of an era of ‘mandatory’ community safety working in partnerships. Despite this prioritisation of community safety work, this time period demonstrates increased centralised control and management of resources, in accordance with New Labours’ ‘enthusiasm for the rationalities and technologies of new public management’. The pluralisation of community safety, through the decentring of tasks to local authorities and PCSOs, and a growing industry of regulatory governance, diminishes the discretion and decision-making power previously enjoyed by chief officers. In part due to the financial crisis towards the end of this time period, this ideological development progresses with the election of the Coalition Government in 2010.

2.4 2010-2012 Period of Transition

This third time period is identified as one of transition, rather than settlement, in terms of community safety agenda setting responsibilities, although some have categorised it as ‘the still unfolding localised and devolved’ phase. In May 2010, the Coalition government of Conservative and Liberal
Democrat parties was formed. An early task was establishing the ‘Big Society Agenda’ which aimed to give local councils and neighbourhoods more power to make the decisions that shape their area, to ‘open up public services... to enable charities, social enterprises, private companies... to compete to offer people high quality services’, and encourage social action and engagement within communities.\(^{81}\) In addition, an early action of the new Home Secretary was to abandon several central targets that had been put forward by the former Home Secretary, including the confidence target, and the policing pledge, and central and local planning structures were dismantled, including LAAs. Therefore, the Coalition government enhanced the theme of localism through neighbourhood management that emerged in the previous time period, and a focus on managing neighbourhoods, rather than tackling specific types of crime (as seen with LAAs) began to materialise ‘on the ground’.

The diminishing responsibilities of the state, through the Big Society Agenda, are notably associated with austerity, and the Coalition government’s radical ‘fast and deep’ cuts to public services.\(^{82}\) Therefore, while the Localism Act 2011 additionally created powers for the centre as well as local authorities, these tended to be related to control of local spending, including extending central government’s power on issues such as deciding whether a local authority’s expenditure is excessive.\(^{83}\) As discussed above, the growth of community safety as a strategic policy construct under New Labour, occurred alongside an expansion of state control on public funding, through ‘new public management’.\(^{84}\) Thus, the decentralisation of some governance to the local, while adding further central control of expenditure under the Coalition government, has potential ramifications for community safety work. This is of particular interest given the traditional Conservative view of police governance: Loader suggests that the introduction of PCCs contradicts the Conservative party’s thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, which contested the insistence of greater local democratic scrutiny and control of the police, made by left-wing politicians, while also increasing government influence over the police.\(^{85}\)

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\(^{84}\) See Section 2.3

The police governance reform of implementing PCCs was a key part of the Big Society Agenda, aiming to promote accountability of the police to the public, reduce bureaucracy and focus on the ‘local’. This policy development is a fundamental shift from the long-standing tripartite structure of police governance, in which the Police Authorities were seen as the weak link: it was claimed that they were failing at their responsibilities of scrutinising the Chief Constable and setting the strategic direction of the force because they had insufficient knowledge about their roles, and they lacked the formal powers needed to exert real influence. In addition to this, public awareness of Police Authorities was almost non-existent, which was deemed to be an acute failure given that policing should enforce the law on behalf of and with the support of the community it serves. The Home Affairs Committee surmised that Police Authorities were ‘under-resourced and relatively unknown local people’.

Architects of the reform hoped that the act of direct election would excite interest and involvement in local policing and crime issues through localised campaigning, and that a single recognisable figurehead of local policing governance would make the police and policing more visible to local communities, further enabling greater engagement between the public and the police. A Conservative policy, brought in by the Coalition, it followed a growing consensus within the party that policing had become complicated by performance targets and bureaucracy, and that policing should get back to crime fighting. Electing PCCs enabled the police to do that, but the power was placed ‘directly in the hands of the public’. This provided a situation whereby “somebody, somewhere has to answer to the public and victims very directly about what is happening to tackle crime in the neighbourhood, what the priorities are and how things are done”. Writing in the 1980s, theorists on the topic of democratic accountability of the police to the public had suggested a reform to the tripartite structure of policing, advocating a democratic body of ‘police commissions’. These would be:

“...charged with the duty of upholding the law and concerned with interpreting the general legal duty of the police. As publicly elected representatives, they would issue instructions to local police chiefs on matters of policy, and take decisions based on collaboration with

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86 F. Millen, and M. Stephens, ‘Police authorities, accountability and citizenship’ Policing (2012) Vol. 6(3)
87 A. Myhill et. al. ‘The role of Police Authorities in public engagement’ (Home Office report 37/03 (2003); L. Scarman, (1986) n.43 Section 4.60
89 M. Davies (2014) n.38
communities, thus stressing an uncompromising equity within communities: at the heart of the democratic state is the idea of equality of citizens; a democratic state is obliged to respect all citizens equally”

These hypothesised ‘Police Commissions’ would improve the democracy of policing by filling the gap left by the law: specifically, the lack of guidance on matters of general policing policy. ‘Police Commissions’ would be locally elected and their responsibilities would include issuing policy instructions to police chiefs. They would improve the mechanisms for the local public to articulate their interests, as it was argued that the occasional casting of national and local election votes is not sufficient and continuous participation is required, therefore creating a participatory democratic arena. This utopian, left of centre view appears to have been adopted by the political right, through the Big Society Agenda and the introduction of PCCs. This is particularly exemplified by the rooting of the role in notions of both representative democracy and participatory democracy. Democracy is both a political method, and an environment: the U.K. is a democracy because we elect a political actor to represent us, and this method of election is representative democracy. The ideal of democracy is that electors, with definitive beliefs about policy, periodically vote freely for parties who will attempt to implement these policies. This has been adapted to a narrower focus by Schumpeter who, based on his empirical research, defined democracy as an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by a means of a competitive struggle for the peoples’ vote’. Therefore, what makes a system democratic is competition for votes at periodical elections. It is clear that the introduction of PCCs can be defined as such a system, given the four yearly elections at the ballot box. In addition, participatory democracy, which also involves the electorate, is significant to the role of PCCs. Originating primarily from considerations of the workplace, where workers’ motivation and commitment increased when they were provided the opportunity to participate in making decisions, due to shared goals, personal development and moral involvement, participatory democracy is defined in terms of engaging the populous in decision-making in between the periodic elections. PCCs have the constitutional-legal power to consult the local public on policing priorities, which is defined in this thesis as an example of participatory democracy. It has been suggested that there are key elements that should occur for a democracy to exist. The element of ‘participation’ is argued to be one of the least important due to the recognition of difficulties in

95 See Section 2.5.3
engaging the general public in politics, and ‘redress’, that is the ability to remove an ineffective political actor, is the ‘strongest’.97

2.5 Responsibilities, Prospects and Problems for PCCs

The following sections considers the role of the PCC in detail, focusing particularly on the prospects for PCCs outlined in the literature, including the responsibility for setting and funding a community safety agenda, mechanisms for consultation and accountability, and how this new actor may ‘politicise’ the police.

2.5.1 The Police and Crime Plan

In accordance with the aim of decentralising policing and responses to crime and disorder, PCCs must publish an annual Police and Crime Plan. This sets out the priorities for the policing of that area, the required financial, and other, resources, the means by which the police performance in that area will be measured, and the allocation of grants from the community safety fund.98 This plan is issued by the PCC as soon as practical after they take office, but after this a Police and Crime Plan may be issued ‘at any time’ and there are no restrictions on how often it may be issued or varied, although it must have regard to the strategic policing requirement issued by the Secretary of State.99 The inaugural Police and Crime Plans were issued 2 months after the PCCs took office. Due to this, allocations of community safety funding were omitted due to the quick turnaround, and instead included later. Analysis of Police and Crime Plans demonstrates a relation between the priorities for policing included in the plans, and allocation of funding for community safety activities, which is discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.

The election of a single figurehead for local policing caused concern that local service delivery could be subject to radical changes ‘depending on the priorities and judgements of each individual PCC’.100 This was argued to potentially be exacerbated by political affiliation of PCCs, with a commitment to punitively tackling a particular crime, or targeting a particular group, to appeal to the general public

97 Ibid. Page 192
98 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.7(1)(a)
99 The Strategic Policing Requirement sets out the appropriate national policing capabilities to address national threats.
and attempt to guarantee their re-election. Related to this it is important to note that PCCs are not only ‘Police Commissioners’. The recognition from previous decades that crime is a multi-faceted problem is carried through into this new era and the inclusion of the allocation of funding to community safety partnerships results in PCCs having governance responsibilities for community safety as well as the police. However, this has resulted in concerns that the capacious role of PCCs will ‘reduce and subsume community safety and crime prevention to police-related policy concerns, rather than seeing policing as an element or sub-set of community safety’. This situation could result in PCCs sacrificing the expertise of local actors in favour of “deploying resources first and foremost for reactive, old-fashioned police led “crime fighting””. In doing so, the ‘hegemonic consensus’ about the problem of crime, and community safety, may be maintained, given the deep-rooted views of what is considered a problem, and how to respond to it.

2.5.2 Responsible Authorities

To carry out their role, PCCs are expected to forge relationships with the plethora of local authorities, councillors and directly elected mayors in the wide geographic range they cover. The PCC must liaise with responsible authorities and, in exercising its functions, have regard to the relevant priorities of each responsible authority, while such agencies must also act in cooperation with the functions of the PCC. Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, responsible authorities are defined as ‘the council for the area…and every chief officer of police any part of whose police area lies within the area’. This relatively narrow definition of responsible authorities does not many agencies who are currently involved in community safety, and do not fit directly into this definition. Furthermore, even this narrow definition of responsible authorities encompasses a significant number of potential actors to ‘have regard’ to, due to PCCs having responsibility for police force areas which can cover several counties, and even more councils and wards, where these actors are located. Therefore the extent to which PCCs are ‘local’ actors, and how they should ‘have regard’ to multiple agencies, who are potentially competing for resources from the PCC in exercising their functions, must be questioned.

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105 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 Section
106 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 5.5(1)
Critics of the police governance reform have argued that this statutory responsibility to ‘have regard’ could cause ‘democratic confusion’ due to the multi-faceted nature of community safety, and potential for contrasting mandates of elected officials.\(^{107}\) This is compounded by the absence of PCCs having a statutory role in connection with the work performed by community safety partnerships, therefore argued to potentially have a detrimental impact on the delivery of the community safety agenda.\(^{108}\) The Police Foundation disagrees, claiming that PCC’s are well situated to effectively coordinate such actors, to work together more efficiently.\(^{109}\) However, content analysis of the campaign manifestos of the 2012 PCC candidates, demonstrated that half of the successful candidates referred to the importance of the police working with local partnerships on community safety issues, potentially demonstrating either progressive or regressive tendencies:

> ‘Whilst these data might be seen, therefore, as suggestive of a progressive debate, which served to undermine the dominant myth of a police monopoly over crime, they might equally be interpreted as evidence of a more regressive debate that underplayed the important statutory role of PCCs in governing crime and community safety, more broadly’.\(^{110}\)

Therefore, the reform may feed into the narrow conception of policing as ‘a function largely of something that the police alone do and focused on crime fighting’.\(^{111}\) Significantly for this thesis, how PCCs conduct their statutory responsibility to ‘have regard’ to other responsible authorities may be contingent on the local context and the individual PCC.\(^{112}\)

### 2.5.3 The Public

Given that PCCs are locally elected individuals, introduced with the aim of making policing more visible and accountable to the public, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 also makes reference to the importance of disseminating information to the public about their local area,

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\(^{108}\) Cheshire Police Authority, (2011) in P. Joyce, (2011) n.91  
\(^{112}\) Discussed in more detail at the end of this Chapter.
maintaining existing arrangements for obtaining views of people about matters concerning policing in that area, and co-operating with the police in preventing crime, originally enacted in the 1996 Police Act. The 2011 Act supplements this with the requirement to obtain ‘the views of victims of crime in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area’ and, as mentioned above, with obtaining the views of the public on the Police and Crime Plan before it is issued. The Act states that PCCs must ‘provide’ for the holding of regular meetings in each neighbourhood between residents and neighbourhood police officers. Both these methods of attempting to engage the local public in policing decisions are hints at participatory forms of democracy. However, it is not statutorily necessary for the PCC to attend these meetings and engage with the public; rather, it is the Chief Constable who is held to account for the effectiveness and efficiency of their arrangements for engagement with local people. Akin to this, the PCC must provide the public with information about policing in their area, including how policing in their neighbourhood aims to deal with local crime and disorder, and therefore providing material for accountability. However, again there is no stipulation as to how the PCC might undertake this. There is therefore enormous discretion afforded to the PCC in accountability and consultation, and how these responsibilities are achieved may be based on local contingent relations. These aspects of the role may be particularly difficult, given their positioning at the regional, force level, rather than the local level.

The extent to which PCCs conduct this participatory democratic part of their role, of consultation and accountability, can be evaluated using the theoretical abstraction of the ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’. Originating from United States’ urban policy developments in the 1960s, this relatively simple abstraction identifies rungs on a ladder, marking different levels of participation. At the lowest level, substitutes for genuine participation are conducted, allowing the powerful to educate the powerless. In the middle of the ladder, ‘cynical consultation’ defines the provision of the opportunity for the public to ‘hear and be heard’ but lacks the power to ensure that their views will be heeded. The highest rungs of the ladder provide participants with the ability to make decisions and achieve equal power with institutions of authority. However, while Arnstein’s abstraction was constructed to promote genuine participation as the ideal, there are dangers of participatory democracy within the context of policing: the involvement of the public in issues of policing, crime,

113 Police Act 1996 s.96
114 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.14(2)
115 Ibid s.34(1)
116 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act s.7(e)
117 Ibid s.34(2)
118 S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2015) n.110
119 S Arnstein, (1969) n.75
and disorder has the potential for producing ‘populist’ and ‘majoritarian’ agendas, which enhance the prospects of electoral success, but ignore the interests of minorities.\textsuperscript{120} Mechanisms for involving the public in decision-making also privilege those who are confident and articulate in public contexts, and the middle-classes, due to the timing of such meetings.\textsuperscript{121} Therefore, despite the reform aiming to provide more socially democratic police governance, through both representative and participatory mechanisms, the extent to which this is truly desirable has been questioned.\textsuperscript{122}

2.5.4 The Police and Crime Panel

A key part of the new quadripartite structure of police governance are Police and Crime Panels. Consisting of a combination of both elected and independent members, such as local councillors and co-opted individuals, the function of a Police and Crime Panel is to ‘support the effective exercise of the functions of PCC in that area’.\textsuperscript{123} Its duties include reviewing and making recommendations on the draft Police and Crime Plan, arranging a public meetings in which it can ask ‘the commissioners such questions about the annual report that the panel deem appropriate’, and reviewing and making recommendations on the annual report to the PCC.\textsuperscript{124} The Panel may require the PCC or the Chief Constable to attend before them to answer any question which appears to the Panel to be necessary in order for it to carry out its functions.

Scandals during PCCs’ first term of office have shown the Panels to be relatively toothless in holding PCCs to account for their actions, or being able to take suitable action, deemed to be due to a lack of explicit legislation regarding the powers of the Panel.\textsuperscript{125} For example, a PCC can appoint a Deputy PCC, a role which is not subject to a democratic vote and does not have to be advertised. The Panel can scrutinise the PCC’s decision to appoint to this position, but has no power to veto. Within a year, 16 PCCs in the 2012 cycle had appointed friends, former colleagues, and contacts, as deputies on salaries of up to £65,000, leading to accusations of ‘cronyism’.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{120} S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2015) n.110  \\
\textsuperscript{122} S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2015) n.110  \\
\textsuperscript{123} Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.28(2)  \\
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid s.28(4)(b)  \\
\textsuperscript{125} S Chambers, ‘Who is policing the police and crime commissioners? Safer Communities (2014) Vol. 13(1)  \\
http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/Researchcentresandgroups/mannheim/pdf/policingforabetterbritain.pdf  \\
Accessed on 18th July 2017
\end{flushright}
Due to the lack of legislative power of the Panels, their effectiveness has been argued to be contingent, to a large extent, on its powers of persuasion and argument, and interpretive latitude of the rules. Consequently, Panel scrutiny is largely subjective, and this is potentially exacerbated by local politics, where a Panel may be dominated by members of the same political party as the PCC, and the ‘pendulum of the Panel may swing more towards ‘support’ than ‘scrutiny’’. In contrast, in areas of partisan political differences, or where an independent PCC has been elected, there is the possibility for an ‘adversarial culture’ in which ‘blame and liability are the end game to be tussled over’. Further issues in specific areas have also been noted since the first election of PCCs and establishment of Panels in 2012. Firstly, the Chair of Surrey Police and Crime Panel was stated to be ‘defensive’ and controlling of research interview questions, indicating a lack of transparency and openness of this supposedly democratic mechanism for scrutiny. Secondly, despite the Home Secretary declaring a ‘hands off approach’, shortly after the 2012 PCC elections, scandals in several force areas led to the need for central government involvement. For example, in Lincolnshire, the Chair of the Panel found the powers of members so unclear that he wrote to the Home Secretary for clarification, while in Gwent the PCC appeared before the Home Affairs Select Committee due to actions that bypassed the Panel in his attempt to fire the Chief Constable. These examples suggest that the ambiguities in the 2011 Act lead to central government having more involvement than was envisaged.

2.5.6 The Chief Constable

The 2011 Act stipulates that the key aim for PCCs is to ‘secure the maintenance of the police force for that area, and ensure the police force is efficient and effective’. In doing so, the PCC must hold the relevant Chief Constable to account for the exercise of their functions and the functions of persons under their direction and control, but the police force, its human operational resources, and its operational independence remain under the direction and control of the Chief Constable. Therefore, the 2011 Act appears to seek to maintain the doctrine of constabulary independence.

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127 S. Lister, ‘Scrutinising the role of the Police and Crime Panel in the new era of police governance in England and Wales’ Safer Communities (2014) Vol.13(1) page 27
128 Ibid page 28
129 Ibid page 28
131 S. Chambers (2014) n.125 page 35
132 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, s.1(6). This key aim is a slight variation on the constitutional key aim of the now defunct Police Authorities, which was to ‘secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for their area’ (Police Act 1964 s.4(1)).
133 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.1(7)(b),
Despite this, the responsibility of PCCs to hold Chief Constables to account has been widely debated, particularly due to the majority of PCC candidates and elected individuals representing a political party, and the risk of ‘politicising’ the police. For Reiner, politicised policing has implications for policing decisions becoming reliant on populism, ‘inherent with mainstream party politics’. PCCs have both governance and executive functions: not only do they set the force budget and priorities but they also assess its performance against their own Police and Crime Plan, for which the Chief Constable is held to account. Therefore the line between operational and strategic control could be too easily overstepped by a PCC, either purposefully or by accident, leading to a loss of constabulary independence. It has been suggested that the legislation creates ‘too powerful an office-holder’, and offers little protection for Chief Constables and PCCs when conflict does occur.

The framework of accountability implemented by the 2011 Act is therefore complex. There is the lack of a straightforward figure of accountability: the PCC holds the Chief Constable to account, but the PCC is also held to account by the public, the Police and Crime Panel, their political party, and the Home Secretary. Some have argued that as a model of democratic governance, it is a worse structure than that it replaces, as there is a lack, at least in principle, of balanced powers of ‘the local and the national, of elected politicians and of professional experts’. Indeed, the quadripartite structure demonstrates both Marshall’s ‘explanatory and cooperative’ and ‘subordinate and obedient’ models of accountability: the PCC can be argued to fit with the former, given the lack of Panel’s powers to veto, while the Chief Constable fits with the latter, as they are held to account by the PCC for carrying out the PCC’s strategic priorities.

137 S. Lister, (2013) n.101 page 243; M. Davies, and J. Johnson ‘Navigating the One-on-One Model of Accountability: Lessons for Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables through the Lens of Principal–Agent Theory’ Policing, (2016) Vol.10(3)
139 R. Reiner, (2016) n.20 page 144
2.6 Conclusion

The discussion above appears to indicate a distancing of police governance from the hands of central government, demonstrating a break away from the established routine of the past few decades. Centralised targets are scrapped, and local democracy is fostered with election of PCCs. However, supporting extant literature, this thesis considers the legislation which provides the new quadripartite structure with power, to be vague, providing little specific direction for PCCs or other relevant actors. Proponents of the policy reform have argued that this is purposeful, as doing so allows arrangements to be determined locally, thus encapsulating the point of this policy – to enable localism – and allows for a wide range of responses. However, the extent to which PCCs are able to respond to local problems may be constrained by the positioning of the PCC at the regional level of police force area and size of their jurisdictions.

The ambiguity of the legislation therefore enables considerable capacity for the impact of PCCs on the community safety agenda – that is, the type of community safety agenda that emerges, the mechanisms for setting it, and the process of funding it - to be dependent on contingent, rather than necessary, relations. Derived initially from philosophy, but adopted in many academic traditions, including legal research, the concepts of necessary and contingent relations enable an explanation of actions or decisions that are required to occur, and those that are dependent on specific actors or contexts that are not universal. Necessary relations are those that are required to occur, and their identification enables nomothetic explanations to be made that can be transferred to different contexts, because they are associated with processes that have to occur. In the context of this thesis they are the structural relations established by the 2011 Act: for example, the PCC must hold the Chief Constable to account, publish a Police and Crime Plan, and be held to account by the Police and Crime Panel. However, the conducting of these necessary tasks, is dependent on contingent relations because, as discussed above, the 2011 Act is vague in its prescription of how statutory responsibilities should be fulfilled. The identification of these can generate insight into particular processes and

140 B. Caless and J. Owens, Police and Crime Commissioners. The transformation of police accountability. Policy Press (2016) Page 162. Although, this is the nature of British legislation, exemplified by recent law on emergency surveillance, anti-terror, and human rights, and it should be noted that the same criticism has levied by at the Police Act 1964, which formalised the tripartite structure by R. Reiner, (2010) n.9
142 S. Lister and M. Rowe (2015) n.110
contexts, and allow for an explanation of the scope of agency involved in local community safety agenda setting. In the context of this thesis, these are reliant on the specific case study area, and the specific actors involved, including the expertise and connections of a PCC, and how they interact with different actors, and the local context of community safety work.\textsuperscript{144} The existence of multiple actors necessitates community safety being viewed through a lens of plural governance and policy networks, which is discussed in the next chapter. The potential for contingencies to emerge depending on local contexts informs the approach taken to conducting this research: one cannot study the practice of this legislation through a 'black letter law' approach, focusing solely on the primary sources of statute or case law alone.\textsuperscript{145} Instead a socio-legal approach is justified, and is detailed in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{144} A discussion of such relations in a comparative approach to studying 'public safety' is available at: G. Hughes and A. Edwards, 'Comparing the governance of safety in Europe: a geo-historical approach' (2005) 9(3) Theoretical Criminology 345-363

\textsuperscript{145} S. Qureshi, 'Research methodology in law and its application to women's human rights law' (2015) 22(2) J of Pol Studies 41-55
3. Theoretical Frameworks

It has been discussed in Chapter 2, that community safety agenda setting involves multiple actors, located at various positions within governmental infrastructure. It is therefore necessary to consider theoretical frameworks which explain how power is exercised within a differentiated polity. For Emerson ‘power is a property of the social relation; it is not an attribute of the actor’, but mutual dependency between social actors impacts on their goals, and thus ‘power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency’. Building on this work, Rhodes focuses on central-local relations of government. Previous literature on this subject has centred on what is termed as the agent and partnership models. In the agent model, local authorities implement national policies supervised by central departments. In the partnership model, local authorities and central departments are co-equals under parliament, and local authorities have considerable discretion in the design and execution of policies. Rhodes critiques both models as inaccurate because local government is neither dependent on nor independent of the centre; they are interdependent, embedded in various relationships with fluctuating local discretion. Modern British government therefore exists within a differentiated polity, consisting of various interdependent departments and agencies, characterised by ‘functional and institutional specialisation and fragmentation of policies and politics’. This recognition of a differentiated polity, has implications for the setting of agendas, discussed below in relation to power-dependence relationships and the framework of regime analysis.

3.1 Resources of Power-Dependence Relationships

In a differentiated polity, organisations are dependent on one another for resources, and consequently enter into exchange relationships. Rhodes describes this process as a game in which each organisation deploys resources (described in detail below), to maximise influence over outcomes, while trying to avoid becoming dependent on the other players. In modern states this game has become one of maintaining ultimate control, yet sharing the exercise of public authority. These interrelationships are termed ‘policy networks’ by Rhodes, in which formal and informal institutional

links between both governmental and non-governmental actors are structured around shared interests in public policy making and implementation. In other words, policy networks refer to dependency relationships that emerge between organisations and individuals who are frequently in contact in relation to particular policy areas. The recognition of such relationships represents inter-level and intra-level interaction between social actors and institutions positioned at the local, regional and national level. Therefore, Rhodes’ theory is situated in what Rhodes identifies as the ‘micro-level of analysis’, focusing on the behaviour of particular individuals or organisations. However, it must be recognised that the micro level is constrained by both the meso-level and macro-level. At the meso-level the focus is on links between the centre and sub-central political and governmental organisations, while the macro-level is interested in the changing characteristics of British government as a whole.  

Rhodes distinguishes five types of policy networks ranging from tightly integrated policy communities, through professional networks, intergovernmental networks and producer networks, to loosely integrated issue networks. This categorisation acknowledges the vast array of policy interests within government and the need for actors to work and liaise together to be effective, and the recognition that this process is a fact of everyday life in government. However, despite this necessity for joint liaison, failure may be frequent, as interests cannot always be reconciled and unified action is not possible. Consequently, policy networks influence, but do not determine, policy outcomes.  

Instead they reflect the relative status or power of the particular interests within a broad policy area. For the purposes of this study, policy networks are a tool for exploring how power is exercised and who benefits from its exercise, and Rhodes’ definition of policy networks is used as a set of interdependent relationships linking a variety of actors who share a common interest in a particular policy, and who exchange resources to pursue such shared interests.

Focussing specifically on governmental relations, Rhodes suggests that networks are rooted in resource exchange and how these are distributed in a specific network is central to an explanation of distribution of power. Rhodes categorises these resources as follows:

- Constitutional-legal: the mandatory and discretionary powers allocated between local authorities and central departments by statute and constitutional convention. In the context

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5 R. Rhodes (1997) n.3
of this thesis, key examples related to the PCC are the legal power to set the policing priorities within a Police and Crime Plan, set the budget for the force, allocate funding for community safety and the legal responsibility for hiring and firing the Chief Constable.\(^8\)

- **Hierarchical**: the authority to issue commands and to require compliance conferred by the position of an actor in an organisational hierarchy. This is separate from constitutional-legal power as it is not derived directly from the law, but from organisational structure. This can become routinised and elaborated to such an extent that the legal basis becomes a poor guide to real practice. Rhodes uses the example of circulars issued by central departments which may have no specific statutory basis but they may also be seen as legitimate interventions and as a means of central supervision.\(^9\) Other forms relevant to the context of policing structure might include training, appraisals and promotions. It is important to note that when individuals from different institutions work within a partnership, their hierarchical duty remains to their original institutional hierarchy.

- **Financial**: the money raised by a public sector organisation from services provided, from taxes levied or precepted and from borrowing. Finance is both centrally and locally determined, much of the time with strings attached which provides the creditor with power. Significant in the context of this thesis is the financial power of PCCs to commission specific community safety projects, delivered by others in the policy network such as community safety partnerships.

- **Political**: the access to decision-makers in other government units bestowed on elected representatives by political office, the legitimacy deriving from election and the right to build public support. Therefore, in the context of this thesis, political power is possessed by those elected into office including, central government, Police Authorities (when they existed), local Councils, and PCCs. By Rhodes’ definition, Chief Constables would be required to respond to the political influence wielded by elected officials as a result of their democratic mandate, but, as discussed in Chapter 2, this is limited due to constabulary independence. It is also important to acknowledge that Rhodes’ definition of political power includes both representative and participatory democracy, which are both key roles of the PCC.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) See Section 2.5.6

\(^9\) R. Rhodes (1981) n.2 pages 100-101

\(^10\) See Section 2.5
- **Informational**: the information and expertise possessed by actors. This can be organised in many ways, but Rhodes argues that in the context of central-local relations, the most notable example is the knowledge held by professional groups in local government and the civil servants of central departments. This could include the conducting of research and having access to data, and defining such data, for example key performance indicator information and beat operations information. It could also include the willingness, or obligation, to share this data with others in the policy network, and the terms on which this is shared.

It is acknowledged by Rhodes, that these five categories of resources, which provide the basis of power-dependence relationships between and within organisations, do not exist in isolation from each other. Indeed, early definitions of the network concept by political scientists used expressions such as ‘whirlpools of activity’ and ‘web of relationships in the subsystem’ to convey the image of fluid relationships that involved participants from a variety of institutional sites in decentralised systems of mutual dependence’. Others have additionally noted that interdependencies are developed at uneven rates and do not progress or recede in a linear direction. Therefore, not all may be identified at any point in time, and some may be deemed more significant than others in determining how the agenda is set. The concept of power-dependence relations has the advantage of admitting that local authorities and central departments may be dependent upon each other to different degrees in different circumstances.

These five resources can therefore be used as tools to investigate changes in the extent and location of power and discretion in policy making. Rhodes defines discretion as ‘room for decisional manoeuvre possessed by a decision-maker’ in the context of public sector interactions. Discretion is a matter of degree, and even local authorities who are subjected to close supervision by a central department will have some degree of discretion. This discretion is potentially both constrained and enhanced by access to the five categories of resources set out above (and potentially others, as inevitably no policy area will conform exactly to each type of agenda). It is claimed by Rhodes that the local authority degree of discretion in routine decision making, associated with the implementation of policy, can be explored. Indeed, the concept of policy networks attracts interest due to its evident relevance for two key questions of policy analysis, specifically ‘who participates and who wields power?’.

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11 M. Atkinson, and W. Coleman, (1992) n.4 page 159
14 M. Atkinson, and W. Coleman, (1992) n.4 page 158
of resources and policy networks can therefore be used in this thesis to explore the power-dependence relationships between and within central, regional, and local government, in the context of police governance and community safety. Furthermore, the potential change to these relationships due to the introduction of PCCs, and the extent to which this varies due to local contingencies, can be investigated.  

This pluralist view of power, advocated by Rhodes, enables actors to position themselves not only to avoid becoming dependent on others for resources, but also as ‘indispensable’ actors. To do so an actor positions himself, using resources of power, to ensure involvement in all relevant decisions. This position is a ‘obligatory passage point’ and, should the other actors within the policy network accept this identity and the actor’s interests, the shape and scope of the network can be altered due to this actor’s decisions and actions. Significantly for empirical research, Akrick and Latour consider it useful to focus on a single actor, or case, to identify a valid obligatory passage point in the policy network. In the context of this thesis, the 2011 Act suggests that PCCs are expected to be an obligatory passage point for policing and community safety.

Previous literature focusing on the influence of policy networks tends to conclude that policy networks do exist, and can have an effect on policy outcomes. Policy networks theory has therefore contributed to an understanding of British government through revealing and developing an explanation of its differentiated nature. The theory has been used to challenge the Westminster model of British government by indicating the ‘complex system of interdependent relations among policy actors through which any specific policy must be steered for the actual implementation of its objectives’.

However, undesirable normative implications of policy networks exist, including the destruction of political responsibility by shutting out the public, and the creation of privileged oligarchies, in addition to a failure to be as influential as claimed, due to the favouring of established interests. Indeed, Rhodes and Marsh state that if policy networks can have an influence on outcomes, this is because

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15 See Section 2.6
17 S. Restivo, (2010) n.16
19 See section 2.5
21 J. Benyon, and A. Edwards, (2001) n.20 page 152
the existence of a policy network constrains the policy agenda and therefore shapes the results.\textsuperscript{23} These are therefore ‘close, closed...relationships...which negotiate policy between them to their mutual advantage...’, clearly implying an elitist power structure, and in these terms, ‘interest group liberalism corrupts democratic government; it confounds public expectations about democratic government; it renders government impotent; and it erodes the formal mechanisms of representative democracy’.\textsuperscript{24}

Rhodes’ framework also raises issues that are specific to the context of this study of local community safety agenda. Firstly, the classification of resources of power does not recognise that in a liberal democratic state, all lawful exercise of power is dependent upon the execution of constitutional-legal power: without constitutional-legal power none of the other four resources of power identified by Rhodes can exist. However the isolation of constitutional-legal power, and defining its key characteristic in terms of law, suggests the need to examine how claims to legal authority are deployed in negotiations. This is significant given the ‘vague’ legislation providing PCCs and the quadripartite structure with powers.\textsuperscript{25}

Secondly, there is a danger of overemphasising the causal weight of the resource of information in driving change in policy, as the deployment of information as a resource is ‘limited by material interests of criminal justice policy networks’.\textsuperscript{26} Rather, policy elites must manage such intelligence at the same time as cuts to public expenditure, and the subsequent consequences of this, such as loss of staff. This issue demonstrates the interdependent nature of the resources of power, and the recognition of their lack of isolation, which is acknowledged within this thesis.

Despite these flaws, Rhodes’ theory is fit for purpose, given this study’s empirical investigation of policy in action: it is possible to use the framework to identify and describe the interplay of interests in an inter-governmental context by using the resources as abstractions. The policy process in recent years has been characterised by the proliferation of levels and agencies within local government, public interest groups and voluntary associations, and therefore this research has the opportunity of assessing the validity of the criticism that policy networks shut out the public and create elitist agenda-setting, within the particular policy context of neighbourhood management (arguably implemented

\textsuperscript{23} D. Marsh, and R. Rhodes, (1992) n.20 page 262
\textsuperscript{25} B. Caless, and J. Owens, Police and Crime Commissioners. The transformation of police accountability Policy Press (2016) age 162
\textsuperscript{26} J. Benyon, and A. Edwards (2001) n.12 page 162
by local government, public interest groups and voluntary associations), under a new governance structure. It has been argued elsewhere that crime control, and more specifically community safety, provides a critical test of networking as a governing technique.\textsuperscript{27}

### 3.2 Dimensions of Power

The work of Rhodes, and the negotiation of power through deployment of particular resources, leads to the consideration of theoretical ‘dimensions of power’. Lukes asserts that there are three views of power in decision-making structures: one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-dimensional. The one-dimensional view is the most simple and easily observable in empirical means: A has power over B, to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.\textsuperscript{28} In the context of agenda-setting, A can therefore promote its items or priorities on the agenda, over B’s.

However, it is also important to consider ways in which items can more subtly be kept off the agenda, which can be interpreted using Lukes’ second and third dimensions of power. The two-dimensional view recognises that power is exercised when A devotes energies to ‘creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices’ in a way that limits the scope of issues brought forward for public consideration to those which are ‘comparatively innocuous to A’.\textsuperscript{29} To the extent that this is successful, B is prevented from bringing forward any issues that might be detrimental to A’s purpose. In this view, the game that Rhodes describes can be seen, where A controls its resources to ensure processes work in its own favour, and allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are made, and ‘non-decisions’ occur: those that induce conflict are prevented from coming to the fore by the power holder.\textsuperscript{30} In the three-dimensional view the behavioural focus of the two-dimensional view is critiqued, and the focus shifts to how agencies have control over political agenda. Lukes asks rhetorically ‘is it not the...most insidious exercise of power to prevent people... from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their roles in the existing order of things?’\textsuperscript{31} In the context of agenda-setting, the second and third dimensions of power can therefore lead to policies which favour the most powerful, and which restrict public participation. In doing so the hegemonic consensus of the problem of crime may be able to continue.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{27} Ibid. Page 176
\bibitem{28} S. Lukes \textit{Power: A Radical View} Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (2005) page 16
\bibitem{29} P. Bachrach, and M. Baratz. \textit{Power and Poverty, Theory and Practice} OUP, New York (1970) page 7
\bibitem{30} S. Lukes (2005) n.28
\bibitem{31} P. Bachrach, and M. Baratz, (1970) n.29 page 27
\end{thebibliography}
so entrenched are the issues of anti-social behaviour, substance misuse and violence, on the community safety agenda, and the responses deemed appropriate to tackle them.\textsuperscript{32}

3.3 Regime Analysis

As discussed above, Rhodes’ framework can provide an explanation of the interactions between individual actors within a policy network. This is essential for understanding the impact of the PCC on the setting of community safety agenda, as it has been argued that this process occurs within such a policy network. However, it is also necessary to consider the focus of the agenda that is set, and the capacity of PCCs to set an agenda. Regime analysis is a mechanism for conceptualising principal orientations of policy agendas, or ‘regimes’. A dominant paradigm in the field of urban politics and policy, it originated as a tool to explain relationships between government, non-government actors, and institutions in US cities.\textsuperscript{33} Power is viewed as fragmented, and capacity to govern requires assembly, rather than being bestowed by sovereignty. There is therefore a focus on the ‘power to’ take action, rather than the ‘power over’ another actor. Regime analysis details core ‘particulars of governance’, which are used to identify the capacity to govern. These are:

- an agenda to address a distinct set of problems;
- a governing coalition of state and non-state actors formed around that agenda;
- resources for the pursuit of the agenda, provided by the governing coalition;
- schemes of cooperation used to motivate participation within the coalition.\textsuperscript{34}

The governing coalition is the key driving force for the regime, as this achieves the capacity to govern, which is required for the agenda to be successfully imposed. Therefore, a shared sense of purpose and direction, influenced by knowledge of what is feasible and what is not, is vital. Such policy agendas are associated with ‘resource-rich actors’, to ‘make one an attractive coalition partner’, and favouring some goals other others.\textsuperscript{35} There is therefore an association with ‘obligatory passage points’, as an actor needs to set himself as this in order to create a governing coalition around his agenda. Achieving this cooperation is assumed to be problematic, hence the need for schemes that induce it. These can

\textsuperscript{32} P. Hillyard et al. Leaving a ‘stain upon the silence’: contemporary criminology and the politics of dissent. British Journal of Criminology (2004) Vol. 44(3)


take many forms, including the buying of cooperation, the exertion of moral pressures, or threatening reputational damage for non-compliance.  

Table 1 illustrates the types of policy agenda defined by regime analysis. The description offers examples for each type from Stone’s work, based on political-economy of urban cities and urban regeneration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Types</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Focusing on routine service delivery; maintains the status quo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Works with established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas, but seeks to augment these; traditionally concerned with promoting growth by changing land use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformative</td>
<td>Seeks to reform policy agendas and advance alternative core objectives; traditionally concerned with ‘middle-class’ interests including environmental protection and historic preservation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative</td>
<td>Alter context of major public policy problems and advance alternative objectives; traditionally concerned with ‘lower-class’ opportunity expansion regimes such as widening access to employment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Regime Agenda Types

A regime, therefore, is a particular type of long term stable relationship between government and non-government actors at city-level, and the socially produced agenda can be conceptualised in the ways described in the table. It is important to note that despite sharing some common ground, this relationship, defined as a governing coalition, and a policy network, defined within Rhodes’ framework, are not interchangeable terms for the same concept, though they do share some common features. Their differences lie in the agendas of actors and agencies involved: in a governing coalition, all members are motivated to undertake a single, shared agenda; in a policy network, multiple agendas exist and pursued by individual actors. However, resources of power-dependence relations can exist in both policy networks and governing coalitions.

Regimes are not constant (a long term stable relationship is generally defined in the literature as one that lasts more than one electoral cycle) and regimes can fail or, put more simply, not exist. To reiterate, a successful regime would have a clear agenda, a governing coalition based around that agenda, resources to sustain the pursuit of that agenda, and schemes of cooperation to motivate the governing coalition. Regime analysis states that without even one of these factors, there is regime failure, as no policy regime will exist. Such a state may be the default position, particularly for more radical policy agendas that seek to reform or transform. However, even a maintenance or developmental agenda can be difficult to pursue when there are multiple agendas in that particular

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36 A. Edwards, and G. Hughes, (2012) n.34
arena. Empirically, when this happens, the identification of regime stability or failure can be ascertained by considering the most dominant agenda, and the dominant actor: who has the most capacity to bring together a governing coalition? Who is least dependent on others for resources (as defined by Rhodes)? If there is this dominance by a particular actor, then this may be considered a limited regime. If this is lacking, and instead there is a cacophony of agendas that can be conceptualised as having different aims, this could be defined as regime failure.

Regime analysis is a relatively established conceptual framework in urban politics, and its philosophy has started to migrate to other areas of academic interest. For example, regional coalition building rather than only at city-level, urban education policy, and lesbian and gay politics.38 It is of course the travel of regime analysis to criminology and agendas around policies of crime and disorder that is of most interest to this thesis. Its rise in interest to criminologists, most notably Edwards and Hughes, is related to the growing interest in divergence (and convergence) of local crime and disorder policy agendas. Such divergence in crime and disorder, and community safety, is associated with the inability of core state police and criminal justice agencies to comprehend and prevent such problems ‘alone’.39 This acknowledgement of the need for negotiation/cooperation with both non-state actors and the wider public to provide responses to these problems, relates to the need for a regime to include state and non-state actors.

The application of regime analysis to criminology requires the re-conceptualisation of regime types from urban political-economy examples to examples of crime and disorder. Table 2 demonstrates Edwards and Hughes’ re-conceptualisation of regime categories applied to community safety.40

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39 As discussed in Chapter 2.
40 A. Edwards, and G. Hughes, (2012) n.34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Criminological Conceptualisation and Implications for Community Safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance: maintains previous status quo of established regime</td>
<td>Criminal justice: public safety policies which augment criminal law enforcement and public order; retrenchment of community safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental: works with established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas, but seeks to augment these</td>
<td>Risk management: maintaining criminal justice tendencies, with the addition of risk management priorities; contracting out of community safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformist: Seek to reform policy agendas and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Restorative justice: diversion from custody and non-state conflict resolution; continuation and diversification of community safety activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative: alter the context of major public policy problems, and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Social justice: socially inclusive priorities, based on social justice model; integration of partnership structures and mainstreaming of community safety.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Criminology Regime Agenda Types

A maintenance regime, in criminological terms, is one that privileges a criminal justice oriented agenda, which advocates that crime needs to be managed by the existing criminal justice system. It is argued that, in Europe, this regime remains most prominent, demonstrated by punitive responses to issues of crime and disorder, in part as a result of crises of legitimacy of the police and criminal justice agencies, and the associated rising fear of crime.\(^{41}\) Austerity is also significant here, as such measures have potential to create ‘a centripetal force that encourages a focus on ‘core business’ and therefore a climate that is less supportive of partnership working in peripheral areas’.\(^{42}\) Given the emotional and symbolic value of criminal justice polices, the cutting of ‘fluffy’ responses of stereotypical community safety work, are unlikely to result in public disapproval.\(^{43}\) Potential therefore exists for PCCs to sacrifice invisible community safety activities, in favour of ‘deploying resources first and foremost for reactive, old-fashioned police led “crime fighting”’.\(^{44}\)

Developmental tendencies are also apparent in Europe. Municipal authorities, which lack powers to formulate their own agendas for criminal justice, but that are involved in issues of crime and disorder,

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\(^{44}\) D. Giling et al (2013) n.42 page: 5. Also discussed in Section 2.5.1
respond to problems through the use of their administrative powers in ways that benefit them.\textsuperscript{45} Specifically, developmental regimes are conceptualised in criminology as those that maintain the core policy agenda, but ‘complement it through innovations in the anticipation and management of groups at risk of offending and victimisation’.\textsuperscript{46} Examples of such agendas would prioritise situational crime prevention and early interventions with those believed to be ‘criminogenic’, and a greater emphasis placed on private citizens to take responsibility for their own safety. Community safety may therefore lend itself to a developmental regime, due to the focus on multiple agency involvement. Such programmes for reducing crime and disorder are common in England and Wales, particularly with the rise of pluralistic crime prevention initiatives of the 1997 New Labour government. As discussed in Section 2.3, also characteristic of this era was an expansion of state control on public funding, which is arguably evident in the Coalition government’s focus on austerity and the Big Society Agenda, and therefore developmental tendencies may be expected.

A progressive/reformist regime is characterised through associations with restorative justice, argued to be ‘the most influential development in crime control in the past decade’.\textsuperscript{47} This movement prioritises the diversion of offenders from custody, rehabilitation, non-state conflict resolution and direct negotiation of reparations between victims and offenders. As such, it progresses beyond the criminal justice agenda, rather than simply developing it.\textsuperscript{48} For community safety, this increases and diversifies the agencies that are involved in such activities because progressive agendas and restorative justice attracts ‘significant interest from voluntary or ‘third sector’ organisations’.\textsuperscript{49}

Lastly, a transformative regime alters the embedded criminal justice focussed priorities to adopt social justice objectives. In such a regime, crime and disorder is related to socially inclusive priorities, and those that extend citizen’s entitlements to ‘improved education, training employment, housing, health, leisure and family support’.\textsuperscript{50} The scope of what is defined as crime is also extended to target corporate and environmental crimes, through improved health and safety at work. In such a regime, community safety partnership working is more firmly integrated in, and facilitates a more holistic approach to, mainstream local governance capabilities.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46} A. Edwards, and R. Prins, (2014) n.41
\textsuperscript{49} A. Edwards, and G. Hughes (2012) n.34 page 449
\textsuperscript{50} A. Edwards, and R. Prins, (2014) n41
\textsuperscript{51} A. Edwards, and G. Hughes (2012) n.34
The reconceptualization of Stone’s regime types in terms suitable to criminology and ‘public safety’ produces a framework of abstractions that can be used to diagnose the principal orientation of policy responses to crime and disorder within cities. It is important to note that, in practice, regimes are likely to be an admixture of some or all of these categories. This is due to the persistent political competition within cities, characterised by bureaucratic interests and ideological motivation, and a definitive regime is dependent on the ability to build and sustain a governing coalition around that agenda.

There are limitations to the transference of a conceptual framework conceived for a specific context, to another: ‘uncertainty arises in trying to generalise from prototypical cases about what in fact is the essence of urban regimes and what should hold across all cases’. According to most critiques of transfer to enable comparative research, there are four pitfalls: parochialism, misclassification, degreeism and concept stretching. More specifically to the context of this thesis, it has been argued that regime theory cannot be applied to the context of local governance in the UK due to the ‘strong central government control [creating an unlikely context in which] regime-coalitions might grow’. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the shift towards localism through the Big Society Agenda implemented by the Coalition government, creates a context in which the application of regime theory is more suitable. The empirical study of the conditions generated by the localism agenda, and the introduction of PCCs, necessitate a theoretical framework that recognises power existing at the local level, and the legislative structure that can both enable and constrain this power, in addition to acknowledging the agency of actors. Regime theory allows an examination of ‘the legitimacy and governing capacities of public authorities embedded in particular political-economies’, which is of particular interest in the context of this thesis, experiencing the age of austerity. However, it lacks the ability to explain why regimes occur or fail: this can be explained through the use of Rhodes’ resources of power-dependence relations.

3.4 Conclusion

The theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter can be used empirically to identify, analyse and conceptualise the impact of PCCs in community safety policy networks. Rhodes’

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55 A. Edwards, and G. Hughes (2012) n.34
56 A. Edwards, and G. Hughes (2012) n.34 page 444
power-dependence relationships, Latour’s obligatory passage points, and Lukes’ three faces of power fit the ‘pluralist’ method of looking at power, that is through its exercise rather than through the structural stance taken by ‘elitists’. As this thesis is focussed on how city-level community safety agenda is set, it is necessary to identify how power is used to negotiate between actors in the policy network, and how this negotiation affects decisions and non-decisions, which is possible with these frameworks. Regime theory provides an additional layer of interpretation to the agenda that is produced by PCCs, by considering the principal orientations of the responses to crime and disorder that are included in that agenda.
4. Methodology

The previous chapters have outlined the theoretical propositions of this thesis: the introduction of a new actor into local community safety policy networks has the potential to impact how the community safety agenda is set, and with whom, the principal orientations to responding to issues of crime, disorder and community safety that are included in that agenda, and the resources to pursue the agenda. Significantly, a consideration of the legislation, which structures power in a quadripartite form, but is vague, suggests that the impact of PCCs is dependent on contingent relations, such as the scope of agency and discretion of actors, rather than the necessary relations of power established by the legal structure.

These propositions have driven the choice of research strategy, design and methodology for the thesis, which will be discussed in this chapter. The research is adaptive, rather than inductive or deductive, due to the need to use different theoretical frameworks at different points of the research process, to understand the changing environment of the first financial year of the PCC’s terms in office.¹ This chapter is therefore written reflexively to convey this adaptive research process.

4.1 Research Strategy

The research problem of the impact of PCCs on community safety agenda setting implies a research strategy that tests, as well as builds on, the theoretical frameworks of power-dependence relations, and associated negotiation, and regime analysis. As discussed in the previous chapter, these frameworks are situated at the local level, and are related to the notion of ‘power to’ govern, rather than ‘power over’ others.² Power is a social construction, subjectively viewed by those involved in its negotiation. Therefore, the study necessitates a research strategy that is suitable for investigating the construction of experience, how it is given meaning, and what contexts sustain it. However, the focus of the local context of governance within the theoretical frameworks risks ‘hermetic localism’, in which ‘the local’ is viewed as separate from seemingly external influences.³ This was not a goal of the research and I also did not seek to make grandiose generalisations, nor only enable explanations of social phenomenon that only apply to a particular context, such is the case with the interpretivist tradition. Instead, this research acknowledges the role of theory in empirical research, and adopts a

¹ See Section 4.2 for further explanation of the adaptive theory used for this thesis
realist perspective, accepting the existence of an objective truth, while recognising that this can only be understood through a ‘culturally mediated’ nature of reality. By viewing this research through the theoretical lens of power-dependence relations and regime analysis, I can only understand the impact of PCCs on local community safety agendas, by the application of these particular descriptions, because social phenomena and their meanings are constantly being accomplished by social actors, and in turn, interpreted by the researcher. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge that the research will always be a social construction, and ‘evidence’ will always represent a specific version of social reality, rather than being definitive: to find meaning in an action and to achieve Verstehen is differentially represented. The findings of this research can achieve ‘analytic generalisation’, and contribute to wider theoretical understandings regarding the impact of the police governance reform on community safety agendas in specific localities. The design and methods used in this research are just one way of conducting this study: other research on PCCs and community safety may generate alternative findings due to use of a different theoretical framework, or a different ‘geo historical context’.

4.2 Research Design

A case study research design is suitable when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. A multiple embedded case study design is therefore appropriate for this thesis, due to the necessity for two localities to ascertain the impact of PCCs on local community safety agenda in England and Wales, which is of interest due to the devolved powers of the Welsh Government, providing responsibilities of community safety. In a multiple embedded case study, the same case is not replicated merely to encourage validity, but rather for theoretical replication, in which different results are expected for predictable reasons. The development of the theoretical framework is therefore crucial: it needs to state the conditions in which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found, and the conditions when it is not likely to be found. This opposes an inductive, or truly grounded theoretical, study. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two primary theoretical frameworks which guide this study: Rhodes’ resources of power-dependence relationships, and

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9 R. Yin, (2003) n.7 page 1
10 Ibid. Pages 46-53
Stone’s regime theory. Rhodes’ work was used throughout the majority of the research process, to explain the relations between actors within the policy network, and assisted in the creation of tools for data collection and analysis, such as the interview schedule and the coding scheme. However, while attempting to compare the case study findings, this framework failed to enable analysis which could consider the broader impact of PCCs, due to its micro-level position of analysis. Regime theory was considered only after data collection, providing a framework for identifying how the resources of power-dependence impact the type of agenda that is set, thus situating the research at the meso-level. This theory adds further interpretation to the findings, in a similar academic tradition, viewing policy-making as a group pursuit, requiring negotiation, or schemes of cooperation. It is this additional layer of analysis that results in the adaptive nature of this thesis: I acknowledge the need for relevant theory prior to data collection (Rhodes’ resources of power-dependence relations within policy networks), in addition to recognising that, as data is analysed, theory remains a key focus, potentially broadening the theoretical approach of the research. Therefore, ‘adaptive theory’ emphasises the development of theory through combining different frameworks, particularly those of ‘sensitising concepts and explanatory networks’, but recognises that this process necessitates initial orientation to such concepts.

In an embedded case study design, data collection occurs at each case study site, but is not pooled across the sites. In doing so, this research makes no attempt to generalise findings in an empirical sense to wider policing populations; instead it tests the theoretical considerations related to the negotiation of power and power-dependence relations. However, researching the context of power-dependencies is challenging, given that interdependencies are configured differently over time and across space, and develop at uneven rates: ‘they do not progress or recede uniformly in a linear direction’. In acknowledging this challenge, this study provides a snapshot of power-dependence relationships in the specific context of this study. The justification for the time period of when data collection occurred will be discussed in Section 4.6 of this chapter.

Case study research has been criticised for providing little basis for scientific generalisation, but this is not the purpose of a case study. Case studies are generalisable to theory, rather than to populations: theory can be tested, built or adapted, and therefore case study designs should be critiqued on the basis of how well analytical, rather than empirical, generalisation is achieved. This adaptive thesis

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13 Ibid. Page 26
14 R. Yin, (2003) n.7 page 53
can therefore contribute to the theoretical frameworks of power-dependence relationships and regime analysis, and the emerging body of work that uses these frameworks in a criminological context.

4.3 The Case and Case Study Sites

In case study research, clear elucidation of what the ‘case’ is required. Given the analytical focus of the study on local governance of community safety activities, the case of this comparative study is the PCCs who were elected into office in Avon and Somerset and South Wales in 2012. As discussed in previous chapters, the most important responsibility of the PCC was stated to be the development of community safety strategies for the Chief Constable to operationalise. PCCs have the responsibility to allocate financial resources for community safety projects, which were previously passed from the Home Office directly to local authorities and, in the particular context of Wales, the Wales Government, in accordance with the priorities outlined in the PCC’s Police and Crime Plan. Chapter 2 detailed particular concerns regarding PCCs, including their potential to politicise the police and overstep the doctrine of constabulary independence, respond to populist demands, returning community safety to a police-only concern, and disrupt localised funding processes due to their regional positioning. Due to the responsibilities of this new role, and these significant concerns, it is imperative that the PCCs are the case of this research, rather than another agency with community safety responsibilities.

The police force areas of South Wales and Avon and Somerset were purposefully selected for the research as, under the former Labour administration, these force areas were placed in the same ‘British Crime Survey Family’ for the purpose of managing the performance of all Community Safety Partnerships in England and Wales. Both sites previously demonstrated a commitment to partnership working and community safety through the operation of community involvement groups such as PACT (South Wales), and Neighbourhood Forums (Avon and Somerset).

Despite PCCs having responsibilities for the entire force area, this research is situated at the city-levels of Cardiff and Bristol. This is due to several factors: firstly, community safety partnerships tend to be situated at the city, or ward level, rather than regional force areas, and both case study sites have city-level partnerships with city-level strategies. Secondly, the city-level is the level of focus for regime analysis. These case study sites can therefore be meaningfully compared as they are of similar

17 Lord Wasserman Oral Evidence to Home Affairs Committee, Police and crime Commissioners: Progress to date. Sixteenth report of session 2013-14 Q403 EV 58 Tuesday 21st January 2014
18 The Home Office organised Partnerships into comparator groups as a way of monitoring their performance.
19 See Section 4.4.1
geographical size, with similar problems of policing, crime and disorder, and are suitable for the level of analysis.

4.4 Units of Analysis

Units of analysis position the level of the case for data collection and analysis, relative to the initial research questions and theoretical propositions: in some case studies it could be an individual, an organisation or a policy development. In the changing context of current police governance reform, and given that this study began before PCCs were even elected, embryonic research questions and propositions changed significantly since the start of the study. Prior to the election, it was not possible to fully develop research questions and theoretical propositions regarding how PCCs would operate, with whom, and their available financial resources. Again, this demonstrates the adaptive nature of this research.

Given the focus of community safety in this thesis, the units of analysis are the relationships between networks of actors, and the PCC, which develop around community safety as a policy issue. This thesis therefore recognises that:

‘We will never understand on the basis of generic constructs . . . how and in what circumstances collective action arises. We must turn, as movement organizers do, to the values embedded in and the points of conflict between social actors revealed in actual social situations’

The locations of these relationships are discussed below but first it is important to note the hurdles that must be overcome to study power relations in urban politics. Urban politics research must confront a problem which rarely occurs in other fields, which is to identify ‘who the powerful are’ before one can begin to analyse what they do. This is a ‘central paradox of such research that its aim has often been to demonstrate who has power in a particular community, yet the decision as to where to look has been determined by an initial judgement of where power lies’.  

This therefore justifies the adaptive approach to the research: existing knowledge of literature and theory is needed to identify the most likely power-holders but this can change throughout the process of conducting the research. This thesis uses the prior identification method for ascertaining the location of power, using empirical and theoretical considerations to narrow down the focus of attention before data

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collection. If the assumption of where the power lies is misled or too restrictive, this can be rectified during data collection and snowball sampling can be used to correct one’s path. This is not a limitation of the method, as any initial positioning will reflect theoretical considerations: a theoretical position needs to be identified, as well as the tentative case study questions, before the units of analysis can be distinguished. In the context of this thesis, the term community safety encompasses a wide range of activities, and is inevitably tasked by a wide range of agencies and individuals. There are therefore multiple locations for the units of analysis to be identified. Due to careful consideration of extant literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, the locations of the units of analysis were straightforwardly identified. The following sections provide details of urban political arenas in which local community safety agenda setting may occur. These are the settings in which the operation of the relationships between institutions can be observed. It is only through data collection that the relationships of these actors can be interpreted.

4.4.1 Community Safety Partnerships and Partnership Boards

As discussed in Section 2.5.2, the PCC must ‘have regard’ to the relevant authorities, many of which are involved in community safety partnerships and partnership boards in Cardiff and Bristol, while also commissioning community safety activities through these agencies. It is therefore necessary for these actors to have a relationship, but the nature of this is dependent on contextual contingencies.

Both case study sites have Partnership Boards which produce strategies for neighbourhood management in each city. These strategies are known as Cardiff 2010: 2020 and Bristol 20:20 and, as the titles suggest, these aim to work on a series of particular priorities, securing successful outcomes by the year 2020. The Cardiff 10 year strategy is initiated and implemented by local agencies including the council, police, housing associations, Universities, faith organisations, health service, probation service, and retail outlets. The aim of this strategy is to make Cardiff a ‘World class, quality of life capital city’, by meeting seven key objectives, termed as ‘outcomes’. For this case study the outcome of focus is ‘People in Cardiff are safe and feel safe’ which has clear links with aspects of community safety. Operationally this is undertaken through neighbourhood management programmes, which consist of council officers and the police, who work together on specific priorities.

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23 See Chapters 5 and 6
24 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.10
Accessed on: 30th December 2016
The Bristol Partnership consists of responsible authorities including the police, probation services, city council, and the government office for the South West, businesses, the voluntary sector and higher education institutions. The aim of this strategy is to make Bristol ‘one of Europe’s top 20 cities’ by 2020, by meeting four key objectives, similarly to Cardiff, termed by the strategy as ‘outcomes’. The outcome of focus for this study is ‘a city of strong and safe communities’ and this is delivered by ‘Safer Bristol’, the local crime and disorder partnership.

The community safety partnerships, partnership boards, and PCCs all have the statutory responsibility to create agenda related to community safety. These actors are also inextricably connected through funding processes for community safety work. This thesis will therefore investigate how the necessary stipulation to ‘have regard’ to each other is organised within relationships between actors, how the funding process for the work of these partnerships is changed with the arrival of the PCC, and the principal orientations to responses to crime, disorder, and community safety within co-existing agendas.

4.4.2 Oversight and Scrutiny Committees

As discussed in Chapter 2 the 2006 Police Act legislated for each local authority to organise crime and disorder committees, now known as Oversight and Scrutiny Committees, to hold to account those working in this policy area. Consisting of local councillors, the committees review decisions made, or action taken by, authorities in relation to crime and disorder functions, and make recommendations to the local authority with regards to these functions. However, they are not themselves able to make policy decisions.

In Cardiff the Community and Adult Services Committee scrutinises the processes and actively promotes improvement in the council’s performance for the provision of services for community and adult service. In the year prior to the election of PCCs, the work programme for the Committee included scrutiny of the new arrangements for community safety and community cohesion in Cardiff. Specifically this included how the arrangements are structured, the anticipated benefits and proposed outcomes, the funding regimes, the reporting and monitoring processes, and the role of the Council and partners.

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27 Oversight and Scrutiny Committees devise annual work programmes identifying particular aspects of crime and disorder functions they wish to scrutinise.
28 Agenda Item, Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee, 23rd October 2012.
In Bristol, the Community Cohesion and Safety Scrutiny Commission scrutinises the council's community cohesion activities and the work of Safer Bristol. Prior to the election of PCCs, the Committee’s work programme for 2012/13 focused on the changing structure of arrangements for community safety, the role of partners and the funding structures.29

Given the focus of these Committees for 2012/13, it was anticipated that the work programmes for 2013/14 would entail a heavy focus on how the Partnership Boards and the PCCs were working together to set agenda in a community safety context. These committees were therefore a vital public arena to engage with, to identify the relationship between local authorities and the PCC, and how this impacts the community safety agenda that is set.

4.4.3 Mechanisms for Public Consultation and Accountability

PCCs are statutorily required to make arrangements for obtaining the views of the people in the relevant area regarding a Police and Crime Plan before it is issued.30 These consultations therefore have the potential to inform an agenda, and result in modifications. Following the 2012 PCC elections, it was identified that PCCs in both case study sites undertook consultation on their first plan, to varying degrees, and produced reports on the consultation, which included who they reached, the feedback received, and how they have taken certain aspects into account in their agenda setting.

In addition to the legal obligation to consult with the public prior to the issuing of a Police and Crime Plan, there is an element of continuing participatory democracy during a PCC’s term in office, aiming to engage the public in policing and to enable accountability. The mechanisms for this were provided in two ways across the case study sites: one is a public forum for any member of the public in a specific local area to express their views. In this format, there is the opportunity for the public to put forward questions in advance online, but questions ‘on the night’ are also taken. The other form is reaching out purposefully to specific community groups, and consulting them about their policing needs. Both of these types of consultation are identified as a unit of analysis, as they enable the identification of the relationship between the PCC and the public: it is suggested that as a statutory part of their role, public consultation should be a key arena for agenda setting for PCCs.

4.4.4 Police and Crime Panel

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30 Discussed in detail in Section 2.5
The Police and Crime Panel is a statutory body that aims to ‘support the effective exercise of the functions of the police and crime commissioner in that area’. Their duties include reviewing and making recommendations on the draft Police and Crime Plan, arranging public meetings that involve ‘asking the commissioners such questions about the annual report that the panel deem appropriate’, reviewing the annual report and making recommendations on the annual report to the commissioner. The Panel may require the PCC or the Chief Constable to attend before them to answer any question that the Panel deems necessary in order for it to carry out its functions. Due to these statutory functions, public meetings of the Police and Crime Panel are a key arena for identifying relationships that impact agenda setting, as the Panel is able to make specific recommendations on the PCC’s agenda.

4.4.5 The Chief Constable

The responsibilities of a Chief Constable of a County Police Force are defined in the Police Act 1996, and include operational leadership and performance management of the force. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 amended this to include the creation and maintenance of positive, effective relationships with the PCC, and to deliver the PCC’s Police and Crime Plan.

As discussed in Section 2.5.6, critics of the police governance reform argued that the elected PCC would blur the line of operational independence of the police, in the holding of the Chief Constable to account for the delivery of the Police and Crime Plan. Therefore, the relationship between the two actors requires investigation not only to ascertain whether PCCs do overstep the line, but also to establish the Chief Constables’ input in the city-level community safety agenda.

4.4.6 The Welsh Government

In Wales, while policing is not devolved, community safety is, within the remit of the Minister for Communities and Tackling Poverty. The aims of the Welsh Government within this context include improving safety in communities, reducing the level of crime, and fear of crime and harm associated

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31 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011) s.28 (2)
32 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011) s. 28(4)(b)
with substance misuse, therefore significantly overlapping with the aims of the introduction of PCCs.\textsuperscript{35} Prior to the introduction of PCCs, the Welsh Government received funding for community safety activities from the Home Office. Since the election, this funding passes from the Home Office to the PCC, for community safety related activities, bypassing the Welsh Government. Despite this loss of funding, the Welsh Government continue to produce community safety related priorities within its ‘programme for change’ agenda, and have financial resources to pursue that agenda. They therefore continue to be a key actor within the community safety agenda setting arena, and therefore their potential relationship with the South Wales PCC is investigated in this thesis. The absence of this institutional element in Bristol provides an interesting component of analysis.

4.4.7 Bristol City Mayor

On the same day as the elections for PCCs, the electorate of the City of Bristol could elect a Mayor for the first time. Independent candidate, George Ferguson was elected. The role of the Mayor is to lead the City Council in achieving their aims, as well as focusing on his own priorities and principles, which were set out in in ‘A vision for Bristol’.\textsuperscript{36} These include improving public transport, building respectful and caring neighbourhoods that have a sense of belonging, and enhancing skills for work. While these priorities may not be directly related to community safety, there is a clear link with these priorities and those of the Bristol Partnership Board, discussed above. The PCC must ‘have regard’ to the priorities of the Mayor, as well as the Partnership Board, and therefore their necessary relationship is a unit of analysis for this thesis.

4.4.8 Home Office

As discussed in previous chapters, PCCs were introduced as part of the 2010-15 Coalition Government’s Big Society Agenda, which focussed on saving money by giving more responsibility for public services to local authorities and the public. In accordance with this, following the introduction of PCCs, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, declared a ‘hands off approach’ to local policing, intervening only when national security is threatened.\textsuperscript{37} In accordance with this, the strategic policing requirement was put into place: a strategic document that sets out collective capabilities for

\textsuperscript{35} Welsh Government 2011-16 Programme for Change, page 26
addressing national threats such as terrorism and organised crime. However, central government can influence the local community safety agenda, through the funding of particular projects, in particular the Police Innovation fund for "innovative approaches with the potential to improve policing and deliver further efficiencies in the future." It is therefore possible for a PCC to have a contingent relationship with central government, if they apply for this fund, and consequently, this relationship is a unit of analysis.

This section has sought to explain and justify the identification of the units of analysis. By doing so it demonstrates that Cardiff and Bristol are localities with sufficient similarities for effective comparison which nevertheless show elements of variation which can be a focus of analysis. The discussion of the locations of units of analysis demonstrates the prior identification method: certain details about the political arenas for agenda setting, and actors involved, need to be known, for a relationship to become a unit of analysis. However, to reiterate, it is the relationships between these political actors and institutions which have some involvement or responsibility in setting the local community safety agenda, located within particular urban political arenas, which are the units of analysis, and these are discussed in the findings chapters.

4.5 Research Methods

To understand the impact that PCCs had on local community safety agenda in their first financial year, it was necessary to understand how they set and funded their agenda, as well as the type of agenda that was set. However, it was also necessary to understand other related actors’ narratives on how the PCCs’ agenda differed from the previous financial year, and their perceived roles within local community safety policy. Therefore, the use of multiple qualitative methods, enabled comparison of data, as well as identification of convergence and divergence in those narratives.

The identification of the urban political arenas for the units of analysis prompted consideration for how data collection should be conducted, due to the presence of three common factors: the holding of meetings in the public arena; the production of documents; and key individuals involved in each arena. This lead to the selection of three methods of data collection for all units of analysis: non-participant observation; official document analysis; and semi-structured interviews. In addition to

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these, social media analysis of PCCs’ Facebook and Twitter accounts assists with identifying how consultation with the public takes place. These four methods are used together in ‘sociological triangulation’, and are discussed below.

This methodological approach has been used in previous research on similar topics. For example, Stone’s research on the governing regime in Atlanta, advocated the use of existing secondary data, including the examining of local media publications and public records, supplemented with primary interview data. While for Stone, interview data ‘were a source of background and context’, in this thesis I seek to ensure that participants are given a voice in the findings, while taking into account limitations of interview elites, discussed in more detail below. More recently, and more locally, Edwards and Prins’ research on the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), used documentary sources, such as published Police and Crime Plans and transcripts of public meetings, to examine the ‘the conditions for urban governance in ways that are both enabling for certain policy agendas whilst constraining of others’. In Wales, Edwards and Hughes undertook textual analysis of all 22-community safety partnerships’ community safety strategy and audit reports for 2005-8, and in depth semi-structured interviews with community safety managers in each local authority area. Through the analysis of documents and the narratives of community safety managers’ reflections on their own practices and experiences of working in partnerships, variations were identified in how legislation on youth justice was implemented, in local contexts. Finally, Cartwright’s case study of community safety governance in Cardiff used the same four methods as I will be using. However, Cartwright states that his research is an ethnography, which this thesis does not aspire to be.

Data collection began before the election of PCCs, demonstrating the prior identification method of recognising the potential power holders in community safety agenda setting. Members of Neighbourhood Policing Teams were interviewed prior to the elections as it was considered that they could be key to setting the agenda in public arenas as they undertake public forums such as ‘PACT’ (Policing And Communities Together) and ‘Neighbourhood Forums’. In fact, it was realised that there was not much to be gleaned from this area once the PCCs were elected and conducting their own public forums.

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42 See Section 4.5.1
The main timing of data collection was a fifteen-month period from October 2012 to April 2014. This encompassed the first financial year of the PCC’s terms in office, as well as the elections, as it was thought that as soon as PCCs were elected they would be engaging with the pre-identified policy network, to set priorities in their Police and Crime Plans. This definitive fieldwork period had implications for the adaptive nature of this thesis, discussed in Section 4.6.

4.5.1 Non-Participation Observations

Non-participant observation and the composition of field notes occurred during PCC public forums and consultations; public meetings of the Police and Crime Panel and the Oversight and Scrutiny Committees; and any meeting of the Partnership Boards that occurred in the public arena. This method of data collection allowed for an understanding of how the relevant agencies and individuals interacted with each other and the public, and made public decisions, as well as assisting with access for interviews.43 I observed fifteen public meetings across both case study sites, totalling approximately 50 hours of non-participant observations.44 I selected these fifteen meetings based on my reckoning that they would be relevant to the topic of PCC impact on community safety. This judgement was made based on the prior identification method: having identified my units of analysis, I could be confident that meetings of the Police and Crime Panel, and public forums, where the PCC would be in attendance, would be relevant. For other public meetings, such as those of the Scrutiny Committees, I sourced documents such as agendas and work programmes online, which stated whether community safety or work of the PCC would be discussed during that meeting, and I ensured I attended those meetings. It is possible that issues relevant to this thesis were discussed at meetings where it was not stipulated on a pre-published agenda.

Field notes are a common method of recording observations used to document events, behaviour and the researcher’s initial reflections on them.45 Field notes can be made in both overt and covert observations, but problems can occur with participants feeling self-conscious when they are aware of note taking.46 I considered making field notes with a Dictaphone, but dismissed this as being more intrusive, and radically increasing the amount of transcription that would be needed. Instead, field notes were made by hand and overtly. Prior to the observations, agendas and any other relevant pre-published items, such as reports from the community safety partnership, were read, printed and taken

43 See Section 4.5.3
44 A full list of observations conducted is available in Appendix 2
45 A. Bryman (2004) n.5
to the meeting. This enabled me to be more situated in the room, as I could follow the order of the meeting more easily, and could concentrate on listening and taking notes.

No issues of participant self-consciousness were identified, potentially due to the actors, arguably elites, being accustomed to observations and note-taking during discussions. Due to the public nature of the meetings, it was deemed unnecessary to introduce myself as a researcher. However I did this when the opportunity arose, to assist with recruiting participants for interviews. As the fieldwork progressed, I became known to some actors through the interviews and was therefore recognised at the public meetings, particularly Police and Crime Panel meetings which I attended the most regularly.

As soon as possible after the observation of meetings, the rough field notes were converted into more detailed records. Often I made notes on the documents that I had printed, alongside the agenda item headings, as this gave context to my field notes for this conversion. This method of data collection and recording is commonly used in ethnographic research. However, I did not aspire for this thesis to be an ethnographic study, although I see the value of such a study. Previous research has used non-participant observation and eschewed the label of ‘ethnographer’. For example, Waddington states that his two year-long non-participant observation of formal meetings and public order policing of events with the Metropolitan police, is not ethnographic as he recognises the limitations of the method in terms of reliability. Ethnomethodology describes the accounts people give, and how they make sense of their own lives; it does not share the ‘theoretical or methodological toolkits, scientific and causal perspectives on, and assumptions about social life, characteristic of sociology as a scientific enterprise’. In doing so, ethnomethodology places considerable emphasis on agency, over structure. The context of this thesis, which recognises the constitutional-legal power of actors and the necessary relations produced by the 2011 Act, is therefore not suited to being studied via this method. Therefore, while field notes were constructed more fully after the observation, I did not use ‘thick description’, which is commonly associated with ethnography. However, this reflexive process stimulated second thoughts about what remarks meant, allowed for quick cross-referencing of certain points (at the observation just occurred, at previous observations, and with data gathered from other methodologies), and enabled a clear identification of what data had been generated at that meeting.

### 4.5.2 Documentary Sources

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It is not possible through written records alone to learn how an organisation actually operates day by day. However, documentary sources can be helpful in tracking trends or shifts in policy. In a policy area such as community safety, where changes have occurred frequently and with speed, empirical research on each stage of transition is rare, and so documentary analysis is useful. It can provide an effective starting point from which to ascertain key issues and priorities to address in interviews, and to assist with the prior identification method of sampling, but should not be seen purely as a supplement to other kinds of data. Rather, documentary sources can also be used as a comparative point of reference to corroborate (or otherwise) interview and observation data. They can also be useful when observations cannot be made. For example, Partnership Board meetings are still relatively insulated, rarely happening in public, so documentary analysis is vital for that unit of analysis, although Oversight and Scrutiny committee meetings can shed some light on Partnership Board operations. However, documents must be analysed with caution as, rather than presenting windows on reality, they can be evidence of how the author wishes to present reality. Documents sourced for this research included:

- PCCs’ Police and Crime Plans, consultation reports and financial statements;
- Partnership, Mayoral, and Welsh Government strategy and financial documents;
- Official agendas and the subsequent minutes of public meetings of the Police and Crime Panels and Oversight and Scrutiny Committees;
- Relevant ‘official documents deriving from the state’, for example Home Affairs Select Committee documents, including transcripts of meetings.

In addition to the plethora of documentary sources that existed at the start of the research, new documents were published throughout the fieldwork period. Therefore, the data generated from this methodology was the largest out of the four methods, and contributed greatly to the findings. Due to the evolving nature of policy-related documents, it was possible to trace the impact of PCCs on the processes of setting local community safety policy.

For ease, and due to availability, the majority of these documents were sourced online. When a relevant document was found, it was downloaded and saved for coding at a later date. This was not always possible with webpages, for example information on the PCCs’ websites. This was occasionally

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52 A. Bryman, (2004) n.5 page 386
an issue, when needing to return to the original document to check meaning or context, and it was no longer available. The South Wales PCC website was extensively modified, and much material was removed and archives could not be found. This is a finding in itself, suggesting that the PCC did not view information on the website as necessary, for example, for accountability.\(^{53}\)

Official state documents can be quality assessed by applying Scott’s four criteria of authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.\(^{54}\) The documents discussed above can provide authenticity, are representative and give meaning to phenomena. In terms of credibility, official minutes of public meetings may be distorted if the documentary source is biased: for example, a PCC’s consultation report is likely to be more positive about the extent and quality of consultation than an independent source might be. While such documents can provide interesting evidence because of the biases they reveal, it is important to exercise caution in attempting to treat state documents such as official minutes as true depictions of reality. Highlighting this issue, and demonstrating the benefits of using multiple methods when investigating decision-making arenas, variation between observations of an Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel meeting, and the subsequent official minutes of that meeting were found, the latter of which portrayed the Panel in a more positive light than the observation.\(^{55}\) It is also possible for particular items to go unrecorded, for example if they are ‘difficult or controversial’, and therefore such documents may not reflect the whole truth.\(^{56}\) Analysis of documents belonging to those within the policy network was also an issue when investigating financial resources, due to differences stated between documents. Due to this it was not possible to guarantee the authenticity of every document. Where discrepancies occurred, these have been recorded in the footnotes of the findings chapters.

### 4.5.3 Interviews

Conducting interviews with actors involved in city-level community safety agenda setting strengthens the methodology thus far, providing the opportunity to ask direct questions to relevant actors on a specific topic of interest, rather than being constrained by other actors’ agendas. Individuals for interview were identified using the prior identification method, and recruitment was attempted via email, or in some instances, social media. Interview participants included the PCCs, Chief Constables, and Partnership Chief Officers, as well as members of the PCCs’ teams, and other partnership

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\(^{53}\) See Section 5.3.6  
\(^{55}\) This is discussed further Section 6.3.4  
officers.\textsuperscript{57} Two recruitment attempts failed: the Chief Constable of South Wales declined to be interviewed, instead referring me to the South Wales Police Justice and Partnership Team, who agreed to interview; the Cardiff Partnership Board chief officers also declined interview, instead referring me to documents containing information that could assist. Existing literature has demonstrated difficulties in accessing elites within the Criminal Justice System and therefore, in some ways I am in good company. For example, Reiner details a tough negotiation process, including the approval of ACPO, to access Chief Constables in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{58} I felt no need, and potential participants did not advise me, to go through such channels. Both PCCs readily agreed to take part, which I suggest is due to them fulfilling the transparent and visible aim of their role in Avon and Somerset, and a recognition of the importance of research in South Wales.\textsuperscript{59}

Interviews with both PCCs were conducted twice over their first year in office, as it was perceived that, due to the freshness of their role, their views and ways of working may change over this year. Interviews with other participants were conducted once. Eight interviews were conducted across the two case study sites during the fieldwork period.\textsuperscript{60} While I acknowledge that this seems a small number, the quality of the data generated from these interviews, as well as the quality, and abundance, of the data from the other methods, cannot be underestimated. The data collected from these interviews provides a deeper insight into the impact that PCCs have on the local community safety agenda, and how it is set relative to relationships within the policy network. I had considered interviewing members of the Police and Crime Panels and the Oversight and Scrutiny Committees, so that I had interviews from the majority of the sites of the units of analysis, but given the quality and volume of data from other methods and participants, this did not seem necessary. In addition, I was more interested in how these groups engaged in the public arena with the PCC. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the offers of PCCs to involve panel members in the setting of their agenda outside of the public meetings was sufficient to demonstrate that the relationship between Panels and PCCs was a contingent, rather than a necessary relation, and that this contingency was initiated by a PCC, rather than a Panel member. It also did not seem necessary to interview members of the public for this thesis, focussing on PCC impact on community safety agendas: interviewing members of the public may have informed me of public perceptions of their own impact on the agenda, or operationalisation of the agenda, but neither of these seemed relevant to the context of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{57} See Appendix 2 for full list of interviews and observations conducted in both case study sites
\textsuperscript{59} See Chapters 5 and 6
\textsuperscript{60} Additional interviews were conducted prior to this period, used to provide background and context.
The interviews were largely semi-structured, for the provision of flexibility while retaining the opportunity to capture complexity. An interview schedule was constructed with a range of themes and general questions to be asked, providing the interviewee with a great deal of leeway in how to reply. However, conducting interviews with PCCs and Chief Constables can arguably be defined as elite interviews, in which a slightly different approach is required. These are a key tool of qualitative analysis for political scientists, and others, which provide an account by a major player of an event or issue of importance, allowing the researcher to understand the perceptions of that player and what led to their behaviour.\footnote{D. Richards, ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls’ Politics (1996) Vol.16(3) page 204} Interviewing elites requires much preparation prior to the interview. The researcher must know as much as possible about the context, stance and past behaviour of the participant before the interview. This prevents time being wasted and demonstrates researcher credibility. Consequently, elite interviewing is probably most productive at the latter stages of the research, when the interviewer knows their topic well.\footnote{D. Richards, (1996) n.61 page 201} Therefore, the observations and documentary analysis conducted before interviewing were a valuable resource in preparing the interview schedules. This was particularly useful when an interview was arranged at the last minute due to an opening in an elite participant’s diary. These resources were also valuable during the interviews: if I was keen to discuss a diagram in a Police and Crime Plan, or a specific phrase used in an overview and scrutiny meeting document, I took a copy to ensure that the participant knew what I was referring to in my question. For example, in an interview with the Bristol Partnership Service Director, a diagram and a table were referred to, in order to avoid confusion over what I was discussing.

Elite interviews tend to be constrained by time, and this was experienced during fieldwork for this thesis. It was therefore important to use the time wisely. However, this was made difficult by encountering a common problem with elite interviewing: deference, in which a notorious participant can lead to a deferential interviewer.\footnote{D. Richards, (1996) n.61 page 201} Consequently, the interviewee may control the interview, and the researcher may let this occur. In some interviews, particularly with both PCCs, I found this to be the case, with participants discussing something they wanted to talk about, rather than referring to the question I had posed. I recognised that an imbalance in power existed between me as a researcher, and the PCC as an elite, elected official, and often felt that the interviewee was doing me a favour by giving me to the time for the interview. With practice I felt more able to interrupt and steer the discussion back in my preferred direction, and the second interviews with the PCCs were far more ‘on track’ than the first. Using the visual aids mentioned above, assisted with keeping the participant on
topic. In addition, I was now a familiar face to the PCCs, due to my non-participant observations throughout the year, and I feel this led to the PCCs viewing me as a credible researcher.

Due to the lack of anonymity given to participants, all interview transcripts were sent to the participants for approval of use in the study prior to coding and analysis. While the benefits of granting participants anonymity cannot be ignored, including the possibility for generating more valid data, it was not appropriate for this study. Given the focus of this thesis on the impact of contingent relations on community safety policy, it was important to include information regarding the PCCs’ claims to expertise and how they view their roles. Therefore, while I could have given the PCCs pseudonyms, they would not have been fully anonymised as it was necessary to include identifiable information. Most previous research on PCCs has granted anonymity, but these tend to be large cross-sectional studies, in which it is arguably easier to anonymise participants, while still generating relevant findings, due to the ability to make generalisations. The use of multiple methods in this thesis counteracts the possibility of dishonest interviews: data was analysed in triangulation, and therefore discrepancies could be noted and rectified at future interviews, or information could be corroborated.

4.5.4 Social Media Sources

Previous research has used social media analysis to identify public opinion during a general election, sentiment during public disorder, and healthcare experiences. Twitter is the most popular platform for social media research, for both academics and industry, seemingly due to the high number of users, and the ease with which relevant data is generated. As discussed in Section 2.5.3, PCCs have the

64 See Section 4.7
66 See Section 4.6
legal responsibility to engage with the public on local issues of policing, crime and disorder, and provide opportunities for themselves to be held to account for their actions, although the mechanisms for doing so are not stipulated by the 2011 Act. Both PCCs created social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter, and these accounts were used to identify whether the PCCs were using these mechanisms to assist with undertaking the participatory democracy element to their role.

While a key benefit of this method is the availability of real time data, rather than needing to wait for access to be approved, or for surveys to be returned, the collection of data from social media for this thesis was undertaken after the PCCs’ first financial year in office, but looked at that time period. This may mean that posts had been deleted or removed, and were therefore not included in the analysis. There are other limitations to using social media, which can affect the validity and representativeness of the research method. For example, people behave differently online and offline, often purporting exaggerated views due to the anonymity afforded by the internet, and containing impulsive comments, made by the loudest voices. Despite these issues, analysing social media is useful in two key ways. First, it can provide indications of information seeking behaviour; and second, it can provide indications of public opinion of specific policies or events. Therefore, in relation to PCCs’ consultation and accountability mechanisms, it is arguably a useful way of finding out public sentiment about certain issues, in addition to providing the opportunity to investigate how the public are engaging with the PCCs, and vice versa.

There are a number of different methods for analysing social media data, including sentiment analysis to categorise large amounts of data as positive, negative or neutral, and social network analysis, which identifies online communities and explores the relationships between them. The analysis technique for this method was determined by the data itself. On Twitter, searching for all tweets that mention the PCC’s username provided the tweets made by the account as well as those directed at the account. On Facebook, posts to the PCC’s page from the public, as well as any replies or posts from the PCC, were visible. Despite examining two social media platforms, a small amount of data was generated: for example, South Wales’ Facebook page had two posts to it from the public over the whole year. Therefore, sentiment analysis was not necessary, and due to the interest in PCC interactions with the

71 W. Ahmed (2017) n.68
72 This in itself was a finding, and is discussed in Section 5.3.6
general public, social network analysis was not suitable. Instead, all social media data was subject to qualitative content analysis, primarily identifying the purpose of the post and whether it was related to consultation or accountability. This analysis was conducted ‘by hand’ without the need for NVivo, or specialist exporting tools, due to the small volume of content available.

4.6 Data Analysis Process and Sociological Triangulation

The process of data analysis began with familiarisation of the data, a process that was embedded in practices such as ensuring accuracy of interview transcripts before sending to participants for confirmation, creating fuller field notes of the observations, and reading public meeting agendas and previous minutes before observing the next meeting. These procedures assisted with identifying emerging themes, which were later subject to more formal, theoretically driven, analysis. In doing so, subsequent observations, selection of documents for analysis, and construction interview questions reflected these emerging themes, and thus the data was steered by theory, enabling a narrowing of focus on issues relevant to this thesis. For example, my field notes consisted of explicit references to a category of power, either to persuade another actor to do something, or to justify a decision, and enhanced my understanding of particular priorities, which helped conceptualise the agenda by regime type.73

This familiarisation with the data was enhanced by not using computer-aided software for analysis. Instead, all data was analysed ‘by hand’ using theoretically-driven thematic analysis, structured around the frameworks offered by power-dependence relations and regime analysis. While this method of analysis can diminish a wide rich description of the data, it instead provides a detailed analysis of particular aspects of it, and was therefore considered suitable for answering the research questions that are so pertinent to theory.74 The analysis of the field notes of observations, the official documents, and the interview data, was undertaken using open and axial codes. In grounded theory research, data is first analysed using open codes. This is the process of selecting and naming broad categories in the data, or themes emerging from the data. Following this, axial coding takes place, which would seek to identify relationships within and between these open coded categories.75 However, as discussed throughout this chapter, this is a theory-driven thesis, rather than grounded theory or hypo-deductive research: I sought to test and build upon the theoretical framework provided by Rhodes’ work on power-dependence relationships within policy networks, and it was after

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73 See Chapters 5 and 6
74 V. Braun, and V. Clarke ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ Qualitative Research in Psychology (2006) Vol. 3(2) page 12
the field work period was over, that Stone’s work on regime theory was drawn upon.\textsuperscript{76} Therefore, the open and axial coding process occurred inversely. First, I conducted axial coding. Using Rhodes’ framework, the data was analysed for examples of resources of power-dependence, which would describe the relationships between the key actors in the policy network for community safety agenda setting. Once the data had been analysed using this framework, and while undertaking comparison of the case study findings, I conducted open coding of the data, drawing upon regime theory. This entailed broadly categorising the data, by examining key points viewed as significant to a PCC’s role in setting the local community safety agenda, which enabled the identification of the success or failure of a regime. These broad categories were defined as strategic politics, public consultation and accountability, and budgetary politics, and are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

When regime theory became significant to the thesis, I had been out of the field for over a year. In ‘true’ adaptive research it may have been desirable to return to the field, to ensure that these open codes were an accurate interpretation of the reality of the case studies. However, I recognised that conducting interviews with individuals about a specific financial year was unlikely to be reliable due to issues of memory, or actors placing new interpretations on events during that period, and of course it was impossible to conduct further non-participation observations of that financial year. However, I did source additional documents from the first financial year that may have been initially overlooked, which could assist with identifying the ‘core particulars of governance’, particularly the type of community safety agendas that exist within the case study sites. In doing so, the defining of the open codes was validated. Despite this lack of using regime theory to its full potential, this does therefore have implications for future research, which is discussed in Chapter 8.

Data collected with each method was used to advise and corroborate data collected via other methods. Comparison content analysis was conducted between the field notes from non-participation observation, the interview transcripts, and the official documents. Comparative analysis between interview data and official documents enabled identification of power-dependence relations on particular policy issues. In addition to this, comparisons were made between PCCs’ manifestos and their first published Police and Crime Plan, as differences between the two were suggested to demonstrate a negotiation of power in the setting of agenda. The assorted methods used in this thesis generate different forms of knowledge and therefore different types of data for analysis as they come from different epistemological positions, thus providing different ‘lenses’ on the world. The interview lens is verbal, but its temporal range is biographical, and is therefore dependent on participants’

\textsuperscript{76} See Section 4.2
recolleciton and understanding of past events. In contrast, the use of documents as a method is predominantly textual.

Defined as ‘sociological triangulation’, this use of multiple sources of data and research methodologies, allows for data to be cross-checked, thus enhancing the legitimacy of the findings, and giving a nuanced and detailed understanding of how community safety agenda setting at a city-level works and the impact of PCCs on this.77 For example, the use of interviews as well as non-participant observation provides the opportunity to explore issues that are not amenable to observation alone. Indeed, some have claimed that elite interviews should only be regarded as one of a number of research methods in a study: ‘only in very rare case(s), can they be relied upon as the sole tool for research’.78 This is due to the reliability of a person’s memory of events, and the potential that any interview, but particularly those with elites, can be deceitful.79 Despite the triangulation of methods assisting in moderating the limitations of individual methods, this methodology cannot uncover everything: I am mindful of conversations that I am not privy to, that interviewees may choose not to discuss, and which may not be included in documents for analysis. As evidenced in Chapters 5 and 6, there is consensus around the PCCs’ agendas, rather than the expected tension, and I recognise that alternative methods, or localities for observations, or documents, may have resulted in alternative findings. For example, Cartwright’s observations of private meetings between the Cardiff Partnership Board and the PCC, demonstrated a tension surrounding the PCC’s regional positioning.80 Therefore it is important to reiterate that the findings presented in this thesis are a version of reality, which has necessarily been culturally mediated through my theoretical and methodological choices.

4.7 Political and Ethical Considerations

As asserted by Guba and Lincoln, ‘politics suffuses all social scientific research’.81 That is, politics cannot be extracted from research, as it runs too deep into the very existence of the research and encompasses a vast range of forms. Punch claims that:

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78 D. Richards, (1996) n.61 page 204
79 Ibid
80 See Section 5.3.5
‘politics can mean everything from the micropolitics of personal relations to the cultures and resources of research units and universities, the powers and policies of government research departments, and ultimately even the hand of the central state itself’.  

It is vital to recognise the importance of this in the researching of power relationships in how agenda is set: without the ‘micro-politics of... relations’ as identified by Punch, this research would not take place. However, these relations also need to be offset in order for the research to maintain credibility and validity. For example, an elite with a particular agenda to push, can influence the direction of the interview towards their own political bias. This justifies the use of the three methods, and sociological triangulation, as data can be corroborated for validity.

On ethical matters, prior to conducting the study, a compulsory research proposal was put before Cardiff University Ethical Committee. The research adheres to the British Sociological Association guidelines on ethics and the data is analysed in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Interviewees were recruited via email, with a short summary of the details of the research, On the day of the interview, interviewees read and signed an ethical consent form prior to the interview commencing, agreeing to being recorded, that their identity would not be anonymised and that any data could be used in the thesis, following their viewing of the transcript. A copy of this form was given to the interviewee for their records.

Allowing interviewees to view the transcript had dual purpose. Firstly, for the benefit of the research, the interviewee could clarify any points that the researcher was unsure on, and it gave the opportunity to ask further questions by email. Secondly, for the benefit of the interviewee, due to their elite status, sensitive topics may have been discussed that, in hindsight, the interviewee thinks should remain confidential. These can then be removed. This activity aligns the research with the constructivist paradigm in which participants are seen as stakeholders in the research process, and the research seeks to avoid harm, obtain fully informed consent, and recognise the need for privacy and confidentiality. This research endeavoured to adhere to Guba and Lincoln’s criteria of authenticity which asserts that the research needs to fairly represent members’ viewpoints and help members arrive at a better understanding of their circumstance. Research conducted in accordance with these

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83 See Appendix 1
84 This occurred following two interviews: with the South Wales Police Justice and Partnership team, and with the financial officer from the Office of the South Wales PCC
principles enhances the data generated, as participants are more likely to provide a truthful account of phenomena, thus increasing the validity of the findings.86

Due to the public nature of urban political arenas, such as Police and Crime Panel meetings and Overview and Scrutiny Committee meetings, permission was not sought for observation or document analysis. However, incidences arose where confidentiality became an issue: for example, at a Police and Crime Panel meeting in Avon and Somerset, prior to conducting an interview with the Chief Constable, I was mistaken by him for a news reporter and told to not report on a certain subject as it was not yet in the public domain. It is concerning that this occurred during a public part of the Panel meeting, and where such sensitive topics do not seem to be the correct forum for discussion. In relation to this, the researcher, and any other members of the public, were asked to leave the room when complaints against the Police and Crime Commissioner were discussed at Panel meetings. There was also confusion over what part of the meetings were public, due to Panels sometimes holding briefing sessions prior to the PCC’s arrival. It was resolved that these briefing sessions were also open to the public.

When conducting social media analysis, the Government for Social Research guidelines for using social media for social research guidelines were followed.87 This meant that informed consent of participants was not sought, but the research was identified as being acceptable within the terms and conditions of the social media platforms. No social media data used within this thesis has the potential to cause harm to any participants, and posts from members of the general public, to the PCCs, have been anonymised.88

This research never intended to identify a ‘good’ PCC, or actor, or a ‘bad’ way of working. Rather, the research sought to contribute to theory that can understand and explain the impact of the role of the new actors in community safety agenda-setting policy network.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has provided justification for the research strategy, design and methodology for a study of the impact of police governance reform through PCCs on the setting of community safety agenda. In doing so, the case study localities have been outlined, chosen for their comparable similarities, such as demo-geography, crime and disorder issues, and the local arrangements for managing these, and

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86 M. Punch, (1998) n.82 page 170
87 n.70
88 A Twitter exchange between the ex-chairman of the Bristol Labour Party and the PCC has not been anonymised as including the identifiable information provides context to the exchange. See Section 6.3.6
their elements of difference, including the influence of Welsh Government and the Bristol Mayor. The units of analysis have been identified and justified: they are the relationships that develop between the key actors and the institutions which have community safety agenda setting responsibilities. The methods for data collection have been discussed, in particular how they interact with one another to both initially identify the institutional settings for the units of analysis and then to collect data.

This chapter has therefore strengthened the relationship between theory (resources of power-dependence relationships and regime theory) and research strategy, design and methodologies. Theoretical frameworks that focus on the social construction of power, within and between groups of actors and institutions, necessitate methodological approaches that qualitatively investigate the interactions between those within policy network.
5. Finding and Analysis: Cardiff, South Wales

This chapter provides the findings of the case study site of Cardiff, South Wales. As discussed in previous chapters, the theoretical propositions driving this case study relate to the ambiguity of the legislation, indicating a reliance on the agency of actors within the new quadripartite structure, and related contingencies in the local context, rather than the necessary relations of the structure itself. Therefore, approaches to issues of crime and community safety may be based on the local demands of the area, the priorities and resources at the disposal of established policy networks, and the individual Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC). This has potential to lead to divergence between forces, hence the cross-case comparison research design of this thesis.

Following Yin’s model for case study design, the case of the South Wales Office of the PCC is discussed below, detailing how the agency of the elected PCC, Alun Michael, enables the creation of an agenda which is rhetorically formed from an evidence-base. The context in which the PCC must operate follows, with consideration of the community safety agenda landscape in Cardiff. This section considers the other agencies with community safety agenda setting responsibilities, including Welsh Government, and sets out a conceptualisation of the agendas produced by such agencies, using regime analysis, as well as a discussion of the political economy of the area. In doing so, these first two sections identify the impact that the PCC has had on the community safety agenda in relation to the priorities and their funding.

The final section of this chapter discusses each of the units of analysis - the relationships between actors in the policy network for community safety agenda setting and the PCC in Cardiff, South Wales. These relationships are conceptualised in terms of Rhodes resources of power-dependence within the urban political arenas in which community safety agenda setting takes place. This chapter therefore provides a detailed account of the impact that the South Wales PCC has on the local community safety agenda, the characterisation of relevant agendas (using regime analysis), and how the agenda is set during the first financial year of the PCC’s term in office.

The findings presented in this chapter have been derived from the four methods of data collection - elite interviews, document analysis, non-participant observations and social media analysis - and the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that Alun Michael takes an evidence-based approach to setting his agenda, and consulting with established groups and political organisations on his priorities. An attempt to form a governing coalition that assists the pursuit of his agenda, facilitated by his background and expertise as a community safety policy-maker, is identified. Despite this claim
to expertise, characterised through political and informational power, the PCC creates a community safety agenda which is largely similar to that prior to his election, due to dependence on the informational power of other actors within the policy network. Therefore, the PCC has limited impact on what community safety issues are prioritised in Cardiff, South Wales. In addition to this, the funding provided by the PCC is dwarfed in comparison to that of Welsh Government for community safety issues, and therefore the PCC lacks financial power outside of ‘criminal justice’ responses to crime, disorder and community safety.

5.1 The Case: The South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner

This section of the chapter discusses the elected PCC, his Office, and the community safety agenda contained within his 2013-17 ‘Police and Crime Reduction Plan’.

The PCC for South Wales, Alun Michael, was elected on November 15\textsuperscript{th} 2012, with a turnout of 14.7%, having competed against 3 other candidates: a Conservative and two Independents. Prior to his election into post, Alun Michael was the Labour MP for Cardiff South and Penarth for 15 years, also serving as the First Secretary for Wales, and Leader of Welsh Labour from 1999-2000. While in political office, Michael was a Shadow Home Affairs Minister in opposition, then becoming Minister of State following the 1997 general election. As part of this role, he steered the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 through the House of Commons, which introduced Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, as well as statutory Crime Reduction Partnerships in England and Community Safety Partnerships in Wales. Prior to his career in politics, he was a youth and community worker in Wales. Alun Michael resigned as an MP in October 2012; a necessary move as PCCs are unable to simultaneously hold political offices. Alun Michael therefore has vast experience of crime and disorder reduction policy making, resulting in him already being involved in the policy network of community safety agenda setting in South Wales, and has, at the minimum, an acquaintance with other actors involved in community safety agenda setting.

The South Wales PCC oversees a small internal organisational hierarchy: sixteen individuals are employed by the Office of the PCC. Included in these employees are the Deputy and Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners. PCCs are able to hire a Deputy and Assistant Commissioner, to help them with their role, but there is no legal requirement to do so. For the majority of the fieldwork period, the South Wales Deputy Commissioner was Sophie Howe, and Assistant Commissioner was Dave Francis. Howe, previously a Labour Councillor and Deputy Leader of the opposition Labour group to the Council, Member of Children and Young People Scrutiny Committee, and Government special advisor on community safety, was well known to Alun Michael prior to starting the job, and her
background would imply a sharing of broad political ideologies. Former Deputy Chief Constable for South Wales, Francis, was also known to the PCC prior to starting the role, and stated that the ‘vision and values’ held by Alun Michael were important to him.\(^1\) Following Dave Francis’ retirement in early 2014, John Rose was employed as an Assistant Commissioner. Trained as a Youth Worker, Rose worked in Ely, as well as leading the Wales Youth Agency and working within Welsh Government, advising on young people. By filling these posts, with individuals who all share the broad political ideologies of the PCC, Alun Michael creates a hierarchy, in which is can be easier to exert power both within, and external to, his own small office.

Responsibilities delegated to the Deputy Commissioner, Sophie Howe, include maintaining the ‘working relationship with the leadership of the local authorities’, with the PCC recognising that ‘managing some relationships of that sort is quite a challenge’ (Sophie Howe, Interview). The Deputy and Assistant are also tasked with conducting specific pieces of work with partners, for example on domestic violence. Therefore, the PCC is able to maintain close working contact with other regional agencies within the policy network through his Deputy and Assistant, which ensures that his priorities are made prominent to the other agencies. For example, Sophie is a ‘core member’ of the Cardiff Partnership Leadership Group, and Mark Brace, the Planning and Performance Manager for the Office of the PCC, is vice chair of the Cardiff Partnership Board Scrutiny Panel. The significance of these relationships between the PCC’s Office and other agencies in the policy network, is discussed later in this chapter.\(^2\)

The PCC, his Deputy, and Assistant therefore have clear policy interests, including young people, community safety issues, and an emphasis on partnership working. Alun Michael’s inaugural Police and Crime Reduction Plan showcases these policy interests with the following priorities: \(^3\)

- Strong, swift response to anti-social behaviour
- Youth offending and youth justice
- Working with the criminal justice system
- Crime reduction and prevention
- Putting victims at the heart of our work

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2 See Section 5.3.5
Alongside these eleven priorities in the 2013-17 Police and Crime Reduction Plan, the PCC included ‘the strategic policing requirement’ and ‘equality and diversity’, as overarching themes to be taken into account in delivering the other priorities. The plan states that it will be refined in an ‘analytical, evidence-based approach... turning into an outcome-orientated, partnership-based plan for the reduction of crime and disorder in South Wales’. Alun Michael’s political ideology is transparent in his statement of ‘principles for action’, including:

‘to be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime; to put co-operative values into practice [through partnership approaches]; to pursue social justice as well as justice’

The framework provided by regime analysis enables this agenda to be conceptualised as maintenance, developmental, progressive, or transformative. In order to do so, the entire plan required coding, as priorities themselves do not provide details on the strategies for addressing them. Table 3 presents the conceptualising of all priorities using regime analysis. To demonstrate the conceptualising of these priorities, some examples are further discussed here. The promotion of the use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) in the 2013-17 Police and Crime Reduction Plan, means that the priority of a ‘strong, swift approach to anti-social behaviour’ has maintenance tendencies: the use of ASBOs has been identified in previous literature as an example of a criminal justice, and therefore maintenance, priority, because of their punitiveness. The recording of offences is a key area for the PCC, within the

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4 In 2012 the Home Office developed the strategic policing requirement: a national document outlining collective capabilities for addressing national threats such as terrorism and organised crime, which all forces must act in accordance with.

5 n.3 page 5.

6 Ibid page 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Criminological Conceptualisation</th>
<th>South Wales PCC priority areas 2013-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance: maintains previous status quo of established regime</td>
<td>Criminal justice: public safety policies which augment criminal law enforcement and public order</td>
<td>Strong swift approach to anti-social behaviour, using Anti-Social Behaviour Orders; Enforcement of road safety; Crime reduction and prevention, through increased recording; Working with the criminal justice system to speed up processes; Putting victims at the heart of our work, to better understand crime; Working with partners on violence and the causes of crime, with elements of robust enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental: work with and augment established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas</td>
<td>Risk management: maintaining criminal justice tendencies, with the addition of risk management priorities</td>
<td>Reduce youth offending and youth justice through early intervention; Improving the prospects for the 18-25 age group through early intervention; Tackling violence against women and girls, including the identification of repeat offenders; Understanding needs of old people to reduce risk of victimisation; Tackling online crime and online child abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformist: Reform policy agenda and advance core objectives</td>
<td>Restorative justice: diversion from custody and non-state conflict resolution</td>
<td>Improving prospects for the 18-25 age group, by diverting from the criminal justice system; Restorative justice (with youth offenders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative: alter the context of major public policy problems, and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Social justice: socially inclusive priorities, based on social justice model</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again, this focus on criminal justice enforcement also suggests a maintenance tendency. ‘Improving prospects for the 18-25 age group’ is characterised as developmental, due to the acknowledgement of this group as at risk of offending or re-offending, and the aim within this priority of ‘working with local authorities, prisons, the probation service and the Children’s Commissioner for Wales to try to break the cycle of crime and reoffending’.9

The inclusion of these ‘usual’ agencies for dealing with crime and offending of young people, suggests working with known offenders, or known potential offenders, cementing the characterisation of this priority as developmental. Alun Michael’s agenda also demonstrates progressive tendencies, through ‘the promotion of restorative justice techniques’.10 However, this suggests the ‘promotion’ of existing restorative responses, rather than reforming the policy agenda or advancing alternative core objectives in this vein. The priority of ‘fairness, equality, diversity and poverty’ is difficult to conceptualise using regime analysis due to the lack of specific aims and objectives within the priority. However, due to the desire to ‘complement Welsh Government’s Anti-Poverty Strategy and work with partners to identify way to lessen the impact of poverty in communities’, it can be suggested that this has transformative tendencies, due to the PCC seeming to broaden his statutory remit to social policy issues.11

The responsibilities of the PCC go beyond setting strategic priorities: they also have the obligation to provide financial resources for these priorities, as well as having control of the budget for the wider force. The introduction of PCCs has changed the structure of funding for policing and community safety activities in all forces. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the structure 2012-13, before PCCs were elected, and 2013-14, following the election, in South Wales, with a focus on the case study site of Cardiff.

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9 Ibid. page 23
10 Ibid. page 30
11 Ibid. page 32
The finite details of these diagrams are discussed throughout the chapter. It is important to note here, as demonstrated by the second diagram, the PCC allocates £148,985 to the Cardiff Community Safety partnership, which maintains the same level of funding that the partnership received in the financial year prior to the election of the PCC. This is of particular interest given that prior to the PCC elections, the Welsh Government received funding from the Home Office for commissioning projects undertaken by the community safety partnerships in Wales. This funding is now passed directly from...
the Home Office to the PCC, for the funding of community safety projects. Despite this, the PCC is not an obligatory passage point for the funding of community safety activities in South Wales: the Welsh Government continue to provide community safety related funding, through the Youth Crime Prevention Fund, although this has been reduced since the introduction of the PCC.\textsuperscript{12}

As discussed in previous chapters, England and Wales have experienced public austerity since the Coalition government formation in 2010, with public services required to reduce spending by up to 20%. Figure 3 illustrates the revenue and expenditure of the South Wales PCC in 2013-14:

Figure 3 South Wales PCC Revenue and Expenditure, 2013-14

The South Wales Constabulary experienced a reduction of £25 million during 2010-2013, and a £2.8 million reduction in 2013-14.\textsuperscript{13} South Wales Police are also negatively affected by the Area Cost Adjustment, which entails some forces providing financial resources to others, based on a Home Office determined formula. For 2013-14, South Wales contribute £8.8million to this adjustment, making them the 4th highest floor funding contributor.\textsuperscript{14} However, it should be noted that the 1.6% reduction in funding from 2012/13 to 2013/14, is faced by every police force area for 2013/14, and therefore

\textsuperscript{12} Discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.2
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. page 40
\textsuperscript{14} Avon and Somerset Constabulary is the second highest according to the 2013-17 South Wales Police and Crime Reduction Plan. Ibid. page 39
South Wales is at no greater disadvantage than any other force in terms of reduction in funding from the Coalition government.\textsuperscript{15}

PCCs are able to alter the council tax precept for policing, increasing it by a maximum of 7\% per financial year. In his first financial year in office, Alun Michael increased the council tax precept by the maximum amount, enabling him to ring fence £1million for a ‘specific communities and partnership fund to be allocated in consultation with local authorities and other public sector/ voluntary bodies to reduce pressure on services resulting from anti-social behaviour, domestic violence and protecting the vulnerable’.\textsuperscript{16} This demonstrates Alun Michael’s focus on partnership working and consultation with agencies within the policy network, in order to both implement and, as will be discussed in later in this chapter, consult on his agenda.

Figure 4 illustrates the PCC’s funding allocations for community safety working in South Wales, by local authority area, in comparison to the funding they received from the Home Office prior to his election. It demonstrates that Cardiff receives the largest amount for community safety partnerships and youth offending teams. Funding defined as ‘community safety partnership funding’ includes ‘work to tackle issues including anti-social behaviour, offender management and domestic abuse’, while funding defined as ‘youth offending team funding’ is for ‘early intervention and prevention work with young people at risk of offending; to provide substance misuse services to young offenders and those at risk of offending’.\textsuperscript{17} However, other local authority areas receive additional funding for distinct projects. Bridgend receives funding for Positive Futures, a sports based social inclusion programme for young people at risk of, or already engaged in, offending or known to social services, as well as funding for a Youth Response Team to engage with young people involved in underage drinking or substance misuse, who are causing anti-social behaviour; Neath Port Talbot received funding for school based intervention work with young people at risk of offending; and Merthyr Tydfil receives funding for Home Security measures for vulnerable victims of domestic abuse, burglary hate crime.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} Annotated document received from South Wales office of Police and Crime Commissioner Finance Officer
\end{flushleft}
All youth offending team funding has been reduced since the election of the PCC, with Cardiff having the greatest reduction at nearly £20,000, and the Bridgend and Neath and Port Talbot specific project funding has been hugely reduced, with both Positive Futures and the Youth Response Team reduced by half, and New Sandfields and Aberavon reduced by more than two thirds. Homesafe in Merthyr Tydfil is the only new specific project to have received funding from the PCC, which meets his priority area of working with victims of (domestic) violence. Many of these local authorities include the poorest places in Wales, and these examples of funding can meet Alun Michael’s priority of complementing the Welsh Government’s Anti-Poverty Strategy, as discussed in his Police and Crime Reduction Plan 2013-17.18

The PCC based his funding allocations for community safety on the previous year’s allocations:

‘Pretty much a carry forward previous allocations with some pro rata reductions’

(Geoff Petty, South Wales PCC Financial Officer, Interview)

Therefore, despite the creation of an additional £1million ‘communities and partnership fund’ through the raising of the council tax policing precept, the funding for community safety partnerships

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remained the same: this funding seems to be making up for a shortfall in funding from the Home Office.

This section has considered the case of the South Wales PCC, the content of his community safety agenda and the resources that he has to pursue that agenda. It has been demonstrated that Alun Michael’s priorities are primarily developmental, but also with maintenance and progressive tendencies. The priorities are influenced by the PCC’s political ideology, and background as a community safety policy-maker, and therefore his agency, stressing the importance of an evidence-base. He creates a hierarchy of employees who are in agreement with his priorities and ideology, and makes no change to the specific community safety funding for partnerships, but pro rata reductions to other related funding, as demonstrated in Figure 4.

5.2 The Context: Community Safety in South Wales (Cardiff)

This section of the chapter provides the context of community safety agendas in South Wales, with a specific focus on Cardiff. First, the community safety agendas and priorities of Welsh Government and the Cardiff Partnership Board are discussed and conceptualised using regime analysis, to identify ‘an agenda to address a distinct set of problems’. Following this, the political economy of the area is considered, to identify how the PCC’s funding of community safety activities, as discussed above, relates to the wider context for funding of community safety activities.

5.2.1 Community Safety Agendas and Priorities

As identified in Chapter 2, a key criticism of the implementation of PCCs was that they would have omnipotent power to create and provide resources for priorities that were potentially punitive. The PCC’s community safety agenda and priorities have been discussed above, and conceptualised using regime analysis as being a predominantly maintenance/developmental agenda, due to the criminal justice and risk management related priorities within it, although also with some progressive tendencies due to the promotion of restorative justice. Details of how the PCC funds these community safety related priorities has also been considered above. However, the PCC is not the only actor with the responsibility to set and financially resource community safety activities.

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Chapter 2 detailed the responsibilities of Welsh Government, situated at the regional level, which includes community safety activities delivered by local authorities, although policing powers are not devolved. The priorities for community safety are included in the ‘Programme for Change’ agenda. The priorities for 2011-2016 are:

- Reducing the level of crime and the fear of crime;
- Improving safety in communities;
- Reducing rates of domestic abuse and violence against women;
- Reducing harm associated with substance misuse;
- Reduction and prevention of young offending.  

Using regime analysis, these priorities can be conceptualised as having maintenance, developmental and transformative tendencies. For example, reducing the level of crime has a criminal justice focus (despite Welsh Government not having powers in Criminal Justice), while reducing rates of domestic abuse and violence against women suggests risk management with known offenders and victims. For the reduction and prevention of young offending, it is only through reading the Programme for Change closely, that this has transformative tendencies:

‘Schemes aimed at diverting young people away from crime and anti-social behaviour. These include projects relating to education, training, leisure, arts, sports, restorative justice and initiatives to combat substance misuse.’  

The mechanisms for preventing young offending detailed in this policy document clearly demonstrate a socially inclusive focus.

At the local level, Cardiff’s ‘What matters strategy 2010:2020’ sets outcomes for meeting the target related to this thesis for ‘people in Cardiff to be safe and feel safe’. Their four key priorities for this target are:

- People are safe from harm, abuse and exploitation
- Communities and neighbourhoods in Cardiff are cohesive
- People are free from crime and the effects of crime

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22 Ibid
23 The organisation of this strategy, and other strategic targets, not directly related to this thesis are discussed in Section 4.4.1
• People are safe in their environment

These priorities are carried out through work streams, led by the Cardiff Partnership Board, who also must deliver projects funded by the PCC and Welsh Government. For 2013-14, Cardiff Partnership Board had the following ‘priority work streams’:

• Improve offender management;
• Deliver CONTEST strategy;
• Reduce domestic and sexual violence;
• Reduce first time entrants to youth justice system;
• Develop a safe night time economy;
• Address exploitation (human trafficking and street sex work);
• Promote community cohesion.

These priorities are conceptualised as being primarily maintenance and developmental. For example, offender management is a criminal justice oriented response to problems of crime and disorder. Reducing first time entrants to the youth justice system is conceptualised as developmental due to it focussing on at risk offenders through the use of ‘Neighbourhood Policing Teams and Schools Police Liaison Officers… successfully diverting youths from progressing into more serious criminal activity’. The priority of ‘promote community cohesion’ is conceptualised as developmental due to the objectives within it including ‘managing and monitoring tensions’, and the lead officer being a Chief Inspector, implying that it is viewed through a criminal justice, rather than social justice, lens. The significance of these agendas, with differing priorities is discussed at the end of this chapter, and in more detail in Chapter 7.

5.2.2 Community Safety Funding

According to regime theory, resources are required for the successful pursuit of agendas such as those discussed thus far. It has been demonstrated above that the PCC sets his own community safety agenda, and provides financial resourcing for it, but other agencies within the policy network also have

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24 What Matters 2010:2020 Page 54. Retrieved from https://www.cardiffpartnership.co.uk/what-matters-2010-2020/ Accessed on: 30th December 2016. These outcomes have not been analysed using regime theory because there is no specific priority to be addressed to meet these outcomes. Rather, it is the Cardiff Partnership Board’s priority work streams which aim to achieve these outcomes, and it is these that are analysed.


26 Safer and Cohesive Communities Worksteam Highlight report April-June 2013
a community safety agenda. It is therefore important to consider the financial resources that these other agencies have to pursue their agendas. Identifying the volume and direction of these resources demonstrates the limited influence exercised by PCC funding, as opposed to the Welsh Government.

Prior to imposed austerity in 2010, and the introduction of PCCs in 2012, Community Safety Partnerships in Wales received 40-50% of their funding from the Home Office; around 30% from the Welsh Government through the Safer Communities Fund; and around 30% from local authorities. The funding provided by the Home Office, is now allocated to the force PCC, who can commission partnership projects in line with his own priorities. For 2013/14, the South Wales PCC allocated £3,476,000 of his budget for community safety across South Wales, which is the same amount allocated by the Home Office in 2012/13.

The Safer Communities Fund is a Welsh Government devised fund for Community Safety related work, with a specific focus on young people. The funding allocated to the community safety partnerships within each local authority, is determined using a formula reflecting the extent of the youth population and overall recorded crime, demonstrating a commitment to young people and using an evidence-based approach. Further demonstrating the Welsh Government’s commitment to young people and social justice, discussed in Chapter 2, the Safer Communities Fund was renamed the Youth Crime Prevention Fund in 2013, continuing to provide funding to support Community Safety Partnership initiatives aimed at diverting young people from crime and anti-social behaviour. Table 4 shows the Welsh Government funding for community safety related activities across Wales, both before and after the election of PCCs. The table shows an increase in the Welsh Government funding for community safety related activities, despite the reductions in funding from the Home Office.

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Specific to Cardiff, for 2012-13, the city received £3,273,000 from the Welsh Government for ‘management of community safety’, which rose to £4,419,000 in 2013-14. The Safer Communities/Youth Crime Prevention Fund has also increased: in 2011-12 Cardiff received £496,937, while in 2013 the city received £740,353. Despite policing not being devolved, Welsh Government provide the PCC with funding for policing, as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>2012/13 £M</th>
<th>2013/14 £M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Grant (Home Office)</td>
<td>£92.690</td>
<td>£97.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Support Grant (Welsh Government)</td>
<td>£39.342</td>
<td>£42.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Domestic Rates (Welsh Government)</td>
<td>£38.241</td>
<td>£34.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Formula Based Grant</strong></td>
<td><strong>£170.273</strong></td>
<td><strong>£174.190</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Grants (Neighbourhood Policing Fund)</td>
<td>£6.730</td>
<td>Consolidated into Police Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from Home Office</strong></td>
<td><strong>£177.003</strong></td>
<td><strong>£174.190</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage reduction</strong></td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Funding for South Wales police from the Home Office and Welsh Government

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32 See Section 5.3.3
33 n.16 page 52
35 Not included in this table is the ‘amount to be met by local taxation’ which is £79,062 for 2012/13. G. Petty Chief Financial Officer for South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner, Financial Report and Statement of Accounts for year ended 31st March 2013 Retrieved from:
The volume of funding provided to South Wales Police from the Home Office, is only slightly more than the amount provided by the Welsh Government, despite policing not being formally devolved. This reflects the Welsh Government’s keen involvement in issues of policing and community safety, which is discussed in Section 5.3.3

Cardiff Council’s financial statement for 2013/14 states that £31,000 was provided for ‘Integrated Partnership Strategy’. Such a small figure suggests that the priority work streams of the Cardiff What Matters Strategy are integrated into daily working practices, rather than receiving funding for specific projects to meet their priorities.

These figures demonstrate that the PCC is not the majority funder for community safety in Cardiff: the Welsh Government provide £740,353 from the Youth Crime Prevention fund, compared to the PCC’s £148,985 community safety funding to the Cardiff Partnership. Even including £78,662 for the PCC’s funding of youth offending teams does not bring him close to Welsh Government’s contribution. Therefore the PCC is not an obligatory passage point for community safety funding in Cardiff: he is restricted by the necessary structure that includes the large regional actor of Welsh Government, which has more resources at its disposal. The Welsh Government are able to reinforce their priority of early interventions with young people with the renaming of the Safer Communities Fund to the Youth Crime Prevention Fund in 2013, and further specification of the fund’s remit aimed at projects that divert young people away from crime and anti-social behaviour and resolve issues that have led to them being arrested.

5.3 Setting the Community Safety Agenda: relationships and negotiation in the policy network

The preceding two sections of this chapter have discussed the case of the PCC, Alun Michael, and the community safety agenda context in which he must operate. It has been evidenced that he creates a hierarchy, which shares his policy interests, and in his allocation of community safety funding, he makes little change to what was funded in the previous financial year. The PCC is not an obligatory passage point for the funding of community safety activities in Cardiff: the Welsh Government surpass

the PCC’s funding. Regime analysis has identified that the agendas of the PCC and the Welsh Government, as well as the priorities supported by the What Matters Strategy 2010:2020, have an admixture of priorities, predominantly characterised as maintenance and developmental.

This section of the chapter demonstrates how the setting and funding of this agenda is negotiated between the agencies and individuals within the policy network, in relation to the theoretical framework of Rhodes’ resources of power-dependence relationships. This section therefore addresses the theoretical proposition that the introduction of the PCC to the community safety policy network alters the power-dependence relations in agenda-setting in Cardiff. The units of analysis, identified as the relationships of key actors and agencies within the policy network, to the case of the PCC, are discussed in turn and, in doing so, the PCC’s impact on how the community safety agenda is set within each urban political arena for community safety agenda setting is presented. Within his role, the PCC has the political power derived from election, access to other decision makers and the right to build public support; the constitutional-legal power bestowed on him by the legislation outlining his role; the financial power to commission crime reduction and community safety initiatives; the informational power of his background in policy-making; and hierarchical power within his own office, as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, he is not the only actor within the policy network with resources of power, and therefore the application of Rhodes’ framework suggests that due to this differentiated polity, negotiation is required for agenda to be set. This negotiation can be based on both necessary relations, those which are stipulated by the legislation outlining the new structure for police governance, and contingent relations, those which are dependent on the specific context that the individual PCC is in, and their agency. Figure 7 presents the directions of those resources of power between the regional, local, sub-national and national level. These relationships have been identified through the four methods of data collection - elite interviews, document analysis, non-participant observations and social media analysis – and will be discussed in detail in this final section of the chapter. In doing so, the following research question is considered: How is agenda setting shaped by power-dependence relationships and to what extent are resources of power negotiated and used to influence decisions?
5.3.1 Home Office

As discussed in previous chapters, PCCs were introduced as part of the 2010-15 Coalition Government’s Big Society Agenda, which focussed on saving money by giving more responsibility for public services to local authorities and the public. Following the introduction of PCCs, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, declared a ‘hands off approach’ to local policing, intervening only when national security is threatened. In accordance with this, the strategic policing requirement was put into place: a strategic document that sets out collective capabilities for addressing national threats such as terrorism and organised crime. Despite this, central government can influence the local community safety agenda, through the funding of particular projects. The South Wales PCC applied to the Home Office Innovation Fund in late 2013, for the financial year 2014/15. This funding was stated by the Home Office to be a way of encouraging more collaboration between forces:

‘Notwithstanding the statutory requirements placed on commissioners and chief constables, they also face a financial incentive to collaborate as police forces have been required to make large budgetary savings in recent years, and will continue to need to do so. Although police

forces have still needed to reduce staff levels in response to financial constraints, most commissioners recognise the value of collaboration, both as a means of promoting efficiency, but also helping to deliver a better service to the communities they serve. To encourage their efforts, the Home Office has established the Police Innovation Fund, which will allocate £50 million in 2014-15 for investment in "innovative approaches with the potential to improve policing and deliver further efficiencies in the future." 39

The South Wales PCC stated in his 2014-18 financial strategy that a decision on his application was yet to be made but it was ‘assumed that the Bids will be successful’. 40 Details of the specific bids made by the PCC are unavailable, but analysis of the 2014-18 financial strategy does state the priorities related to the bids: reducing offending and re-offending in 18-25 year olds, tackling violence against women and girls and tackling violent crime including domestic abuse and sexual violence, all have bids related to them, as well as a focus on working with ‘other partners’. 41

Through the Police Innovation Fund, the Home Office retain some level of financial power, used to enhance collaboration at the local level, although are less influential in setting local policing priorities. However, it is not necessary for PCCs to apply for funding, thus demonstrating a contingency that is dependent on the agency of the PCC.

5.3.2 Chief Constable of South Wales Police

The responsibilities of a Chief Constable of a County Police Force are defined in the Police Act 1996, and include operational leadership and performance management of the force. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 amends these responsibilities to also include the creation and maintenance of positive, effective relationships with the PCC, and deliver the Police and Crime Plan. 42

Peter Vaughan has been Chief Constable of South Wales Police since 2010, having previously been the Assistant and then Deputy Chief Constable. During his time as Deputy Chief Constable for South Wales, he was a member of the All Wales Community Safety Forum: a forum for information exchange on a variety of strategic crime and disorder issues. The Chief Constable declined to be interviewed for this

41 Ibid
42 As discussed in Section 2.5
research, but through data collection with other key agencies involved in the policy network, it is possible to make inferences regarding his relationship with the PCC.

As discussed in previous chapters, the election of PCC was criticised for having the potential to politicise the police and damage constabulary independence. The 2011 Act, which defined the role and responsibilities of the PCC and associated Chief Constable, clearly states that while the PCC has the constitutional-legal power to set the strategic direction of the force, the Chief Constable retains the constitutional-legal power to manage operational policing. However, in his arguably seminal text on the democratic governance of the police, Lustgarten argues that where the line between strategic and operational policing can be drawn remains a key question, invoking the ‘slippery slope’ argument. The relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable in South Wales provides an interesting standpoint on this ‘line’. In part due to the contingency of an existing acquaintance between the two actors prior to the election of the PCC – enabled by Alun Michael’s previous roles as First Minister for Wales, a local MP, and a youth and community worker – there is a conceptualisation of their relationship as a ‘critical friendship’:

‘I think I’m fortunate because I think there’s a high degree of mutual respect between me and the Chief Constable, we both worked at making it happen, I think we’ve both felt on occasions when we’ve been at meetings with other Chief Constables and other commissioners, we’ve ended up saying to each other we’re lucky’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

However, Alun Michael also stated that the relationship, and need for co-operation and challenge, is facilitated by the 2011 Act:

‘The extent to which there is accountability having an individual as the police and crime commissioner as a corporation sole, which is what the legislation requires, does give the capacity for a direct relationship between the commissioner and the Chief Constable which is one of challenge and co-operation, you actually need both of those…. I said from the beginning it would be very unfortunate if that were to be regarding as the Berlin Wall, rather than a permeable membrane, it would be ridiculous if I wasn’t commenting on stuff that I know is for the Chief Constable to decide and vice versa’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

This relationship, aided by an established acquaintance, may afford the PCC the opportunity to ‘cross the line’ between operational and strategic policing. Observations of the Chief Constable and PCC during public meetings, also demonstrated an ‘agreeable relationship’. At the Police and Crime Panel meeting in January 2014, the Panel questioned the PCC on the strategic issue of increasing the council tax precept. Following his own response, the PCC invited the Chief Constable to comment, and he concurred with the proposal to increase the precept. In doing so, the PCC used the operational expertise of the Chief Constable to legitimise his strategic decisions: by asking the Chief Constable to comment on how the increase in the precept would impact local policing, he drew on the Chief’s resource of informational power of operational matters. This example could be viewed as evidence of a potential politicisation of the police: the Chief Constable is requested to comment on a strategic issue, regarding the arguably political decision of raising the council tax precept. In doing so, the Chief Constable overly exhibits a political view, in agreement with the actor who has the power to dismiss him.

At an administrative level, a working relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable is evidenced through the involvement of the Chief Constable on the interview panel for officers employed by the PCC. This Chief Constable reciprocates, inviting the PCC to be involved in the interview panel for the Assistant and Deputy Chief Constable of the force:

‘I invited the Chief Constable to be part of the appointment panel [...] and he played a significant role in those appointments, but at the end of the day he knew it was for me to appoint, similarly he has invited me to be on the panel for the appointment of the Deputy Chief Constable and the Assistant Chief Constable, and I know that that doesn’t always happen in other forces, [...] it’s going to be his decision to take but it’s with my involvement and my advice, and of course that’s seen by the people we’re interviewing so an Assistant Chief Constable sees the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Commissioner because the Commissioner is in the room when he’s appointing him in the first instance, and I think we’re seeing the benefits of that now, it’s a sort of interdependency, it’s a mutual arrangement, and although that’s the pinnacle of it, it then plays down to, in a lot of other arrangements’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

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44 Problems between Chief Constables and PCCs in other forces seem to arise when there is not an affable pre-established acquaintance. For example, in Gwent, despite the PCC having experience of working as chief superintendent in the force prior to his election, no positive working relationship was evident. See, for example, BBC News ‘Carmel Napier ‘bullied’ into retiring as Gwent Police chief’ 2nd July 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-23136222 Accessed on 18th July 2017
There is no legal requirement for either the Chief Constable to sit on the PCC’s interview panel, or vice versa. The interview extract above implies that the task is undertaken to assist with maintaining a cooperative working relationship between the two actors. Such actions shape the relationships between actors within South Wales Police and the PCC’s office, and is noted by the PCC as consequentially being beneficial to the operation of the force throughout all ranks:

‘The biggest achievement is having been successful and obviously this is again dependent on the relationship with the Chief Constable, on the trickle down from the good relationship between him and me, to good relationships with the Assistant Chief Constables and members of my team and then increasingly at the BCU level as well... I am quite often in a meeting where the Chief Constable will say well it’s a priority in the Police and Crime Plan, now that’s him acknowledging that it’s there and saying to other people that because it’s in the police and crime plan it’s important and that that’s quite reassuring... there’s then the trickle down so the Force Delivery Plan has to reflect the Plan and that is the thing that goes on the notice board in the offices of right across the force and of course it’s quite important because people can point to it and say this is what you said you’d do so the Police and Crime Plan in that sense sets the tone for the coming year for the police, and that’s one reason why it’s so important that the ownership is joint, that Peter Vaughan [Chief Constable] feels that it’s as much his Plan as mine, that his Chief Officers think well the Chief’s signed up to this right so they’re on the one hand the audience but need to feel that they’ve got some ownership of it’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

These extracts demonstrate the importance that the PCC places on ‘joint ownership’ of the strategic direction of the force, and the recognition that this is dependent on his relationship with, and influence on, the Chief Constable. This relationship indicates a blurring of the boundaries of hierarchical power, and the PCC stated in an earlier interview that the South Wales Police Force were initially reluctant to accept the addition of the PCC to the established hierarchy:

‘The way in which the police are organised is the gold silver bronze idea so the things will be prepared and you expect people to be beaver away at bronze level, pass it up to silver and then it’ll go up the gold level and eventually to the Chief Constable whereas I think my approach had to be completely different... I’m concerned with what happens at the community level and its feeding into the whole way in which the force as a whole approaches it based on the experience at that sort of local community level’

(Alun Michael, Interview 1)
This problem of institutional hierarchy was again mentioned in a later interview as one of the difficulties that had since been overcome:

‘Things like information that I was looking for or a report that was being prepared going up and down the hierarchy in the police before it could be shared instead of sharing it as work in progress, again I think that’s changed with the piece of work that was done on domestic violence was a joint initiative so it was shared in draft and we agreed the direction needs to go in order to produce the final version’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

This further demonstrates an acknowledgement of the need to work in co-operation, not only between the Chief Constable and PCC, at the top of the hierarchies, but also from those within the force, lower down the organisational hierarchy: it is necessary for the lower ranks of the force to be guided by the strategic plan devised by the PCC, but this seems easier to push if the Chief Constable is involved in its creation.

The ‘Justice and Partnerships Department’ of South Wales Police provides a link between the police and the public and local authorities, including community safety partnerships. The department is a member of the South Wales Partnership Board and South Wales Criminal Justice Boards, and it is the contact for public who wish to partake in the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme. It is therefore a strategic department, based within South Wales Police Force, the position of which enables cooperation and collaboration between the police and other agencies, through the sharing of information. Interview evidence with the Head of the Justice and Partnerships Department, highlighted the positive impact of the PCC and Chief Constable’s co-operative working relationship.

‘[there is a] broader base there on strategic and operational policing focus, and partnership focus [and there is a] positive relationship between Chief Constable and Commissioner, to link with Wales [sic] government’

(Barbara Ranger, Head of Justice and Partnerships Department, South Wales Police, Interview)

This extract demonstrates the perceived necessity of co-operation between the actors, and ‘linking’ with other actors in the policy network, on both strategic and operational issues. Co-operation is facilitated by the pre-existing acquaintance between the Chief Constable and Alun Michael, prior to his election to the PCC post, and by these actors operating at the regional, force-wide level.
This section demonstrates that the relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable is shaped by constitutional-legal power, specifically through both the statutory division between operational and strategy decision making power, and the PCC's power to hire and fire the Chief Constable. However, it is difficult to both assess the influence of constitutional-legal power when it is not formally invoked, and to disentangle such power from other aspects of the relationship, including the pre-existing acquaintance in this context. The necessary formal powers enable capacity for contingent relations, in which the PCC for South Wales is able to breach the constabulary independence of the Chief Constable, and the Chief Constable becomes involved in strategic decision-making. However, this breach is not viewed problematically by those interviewed for this thesis, due to it facilitating cooperation. The South Wales PCC and Chief Constable therefore exhibit tendencies towards an 'explanatory and cooperative' model of accountability, in which the Chief Constable is not subordinate to the PCC.

5.3.3 Welsh Government and Local Government

In 1999 the National Assembly for Wales was created. For the first time, Welsh Ministers, based in Wales, could make policies and regulations in certain domains, tailor-made for Wales and often distinct from those implemented elsewhere in the UK. The Welsh Government has always had a Labour First Minister, including Alun Michael (1999-2000), and therefore, for the fieldwork period, the South Wales PCC and Welsh Government were from the same political party.

Since devolution, the Welsh Assembly Government has seen increases in its powers through legislation such as the Government of Wales Act 2006, which allows Welsh Ministers to make Welsh Laws (Assembly Measures) in particular domains. While the devolved powers do not currently include matters of crime and justice, which remain controlled and centrally funded by the Home Office, they do include the delivery of local services. This includes areas such as social welfare, local government, housing, fire and rescue, health services, and public administration, many of which are related to community safety responsibilities. The National Assembly, rather than Westminster, therefore has the power to place such duties on local authorities in Wales.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, prior to the election of PCCs, the Welsh Government received funding from the Home Office for commissioning projects undertaken by the community safety partnerships in Wales. Since the PCC election in November 2012, funding now goes directly from the Home Office to the PCCs, for them to fund community safety projects. This loss of financial power may explain the Welsh Government’s opposition to PCCs, leading to the refusal of consent for the UK Parliament to place duties on local authorities in Wales, which would have included the establishment
of Police and Crime Panels. This vote prevents the local authorities in Wales establishing their own Panels, as happens in England, and instead the Panels are established by the Home Secretary. Such a move demonstrates a clear distancing of the Welsh Government from the PCC and associated Panels: the Welsh Government are isolated from formal policy decisions regarding the new quadripartite structure.

Despite their apparent isolation from the policy prior to the elections of PCC, Alun Michael places importance on the involvement of the Welsh Government in setting both his agenda, and pursuing it through collaboration with the Welsh Government:

“With the cabinet member for community safety [we talk] largely about how community safety is integrated into neighbourhood planning and things like that and sort of specific concerns and issues, we talk about how we increase responsiveness to people trafficking which you know has gradually been going up the agenda and awareness of the need to do something has been increasing’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

The PCC therefore uses his political power as an elected representative to access decision-makers in other government departments. In the context of South Wales, the Commissioner can also use his background as a well-known political operator, to gain access to these other actors and agencies:

‘it doesn’t hurt to go into that meeting with the endorsement of the minister ... Mark Drakeford actually who’s the new Health Minister is somebody I worked with young offenders in Ely 30 odd years ago so he has that background of the systems and he will absolutely get the reason that we’re doing this.... I meet the chief executive and the leader of each local authority on a quarterly basis with the leader... that’s for political discussion and we talk about whatever we want to, we may talk about how to jointly influence a Welsh Minister on an issue or what the politics are in the local area....’

(Alun Michael, Interview 1)

The above interview extract demonstrates the PCC using his political power, as an elected representative at the regional level, to create or maintain joint priorities at the local authority level. Doing so enhances the public legitimacy of the PCC’s proposal, which can then be used to influence the Welsh Minister in the direction of the PCC’s priorities, or mobilise additional resources for his priorities. These interview extracts also highlight the promotion of a coordinated approach, since the

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45 See Section 5.3.4
introduction of the PCC which may be unexpected given the Welsh Government’s ‘vehement opposition’ to the elections.\textsuperscript{46}

Due to the dialogue between the PCC and the Welsh Government, evidenced by the interview data with the PCC, there is an alignment of community safety priorities of the two:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welsh Government 2011-2016 ‘Programme for Change’ priorities\textsuperscript{47}</th>
<th>South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner Priorities 2013-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear of crime</td>
<td>Making the public feel safer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership working</td>
<td>Partnership working on the causes of crime/working with the Criminal Justice System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic abuse</td>
<td>Violence against women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early intervention and prevention</td>
<td>Crime reduction and prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth justice</td>
<td>Youth offending and youth justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance misuse</td>
<td>Substance misuse featured in various priorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 6 Comparison of priorities between South Wales PCC and the Welsh Government}

The PCC’s 2013-17 Police and Crime Reduction Plan cites the Welsh Government priorities in Appendix D, specifically highlighting the similarities. These similarities are viewed as beneficial by the Office of the PCC:

\textit{‘The other thing about the plan is that it does reflect a number of Welsh Government priorities, in the agenda around violence against women and girls, priority areas certainly for Carl [Sergeant, Welsh Minister for Social Justice and Local Government] the swift action in terms of anti-social behaviour and the perceptions of crime... that’s what the manifesto was all about, 18-25 (year age group as a priority) very much fits in with assembly policy around and they regard children up to the age of 25 so it does, it ticks a lot of boxes’}

\textit{(Sophie Howe, Deputy PCC, Interview)}

\textit{‘You look at it and think we’re just imitating or following and no I don’t take that approach, what I say is that the public debates that there is around Welsh Government legislation going forward, following the white paper, is going to create an environment in which it will be easier}

\textsuperscript{46} This opposition is communicated through the Welsh Local Government Association, who provide a link between local government in Wales, and the Welsh Government. Memorandum submitted by the Welsh Local Government Association to the Home Affairs Committee, Policing: Police and Crime Commissioners, 23\textsuperscript{rd} November 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/511/511uw21.htm Accessed on: 30\textsuperscript{th} December 2016

\textsuperscript{47} Welsh Government n.35
to push, at a local level, strategies to tackle violence against women and girls, so actually it’s much better to say ‘that’s our priority and oh it fits with the Welsh Government priority – great, there’s resonance’”

(Alun Michael, Interview 1)

It is implied that the resonance in priorities is helpful to the PCC in promoting his own priorities, due to the recognition that the Welsh Government can have a greater impact on local policy-making. Therefore, interaction between the PCC and other decision makers, including the Welsh Government, is a useful exercise, in order for the PCC’s priorities to come to fruition. This function of co-operation may be viewed as an alternative example to Rhodes’ ‘game’, where individuals and institutions must cooperate but attempt to avoid being dependent on one another. In this instance, the PCC desires and welcomes the interdependence provided by co-operating with the Welsh Government: given the low turnout at the PCC elections, he can pool his political power with other elected representatives, which enhances his own political legitimacy. The ideological affinity of the PCC and the Welsh Government, leads to shared values and priority areas, which enhances the capacity for this interdependence to occur, benefitting both actors. In this way, the PCC is attempting to create a governing coalition around his own agenda which, regime analysis argues, is necessary for establishing a successful regime.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Welsh Government devised a Safer Communities Fund for allocating funding to community safety partnerships in Wales. Since 2012, at the same time as the introduction of PCCs, this funding has reduced substantially, been given a narrower focus, and been renamed as the Youth Crime Prevention Fund. This specific funding demonstrates the Welsh Government’s commitment to issues of community safety, partnership working, and, in particular, young people, and it is therefore unsurprising that they are continuing to be involved in community safety activities. In 2013 the Welsh Government provided for additional PCSOs across Wales, the majority of which are based in South Wales. This achieved one of the top five priorities that the current Welsh Government pledged during their election campaign. The Minister, Carl Sargeant, ‘made clear his reasonable expectation that these numbers will be genuinely additional and not to be

48 See Section 2.3
49 The previous Police Authority committed to increasing the number of PCSOs across South Wales to 506, through additional Welsh Government funding, on the condition that Police Authorities did not allow for a reduction in PCSOs. However, the consolidation of the ring-fenced Neighbourhood Policing Fund has resulted in a net loss of £1 million for 2013/14 in South Wales, resulting in a shortfall in required funds to maintain the Home Office funded PCSO numbers, standing at 300. The Police and Crime Commissioner therefore decided to maintain the commitment to the Welsh Government, and raise the required amount for PCSOs, through increasing the policing council tax precept by 7%.
used to make up a shortfall in Central Government Funding’. This had an impact on how the PCC made decisions:

‘if Peter had said ‘I can’t go below the 2900 police officers’ I would have had to say ‘I can’t afford to do that’, if he’d said I need to lose 200 PCSOs’ I think I would have to say ‘well Welsh Government won’t be able to continue to support of us with the additional 206, I don’t think that would be the right decision’”

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

This extract demonstrates that the PCC takes into consideration both the Chief Constable’s and the Welsh Minister’s demands when making decisions. Due to the explicit statement from the Welsh Minister that the PCSOs were to be additional, and not to enable the PCC to remove PCSOs from his own budget, the PCC could not make the hypothetical cuts suggested by the Chief Constable.

The Welsh Government funding of explicitly additional PCSOs, demonstrates an attempt to maintain a level of involvement in community safety operations, given that PCSOs are within this remit. This is evidenced by a member of the PCC’s team:

‘Through the funding of the additional PCSOs in Wales, they might argue, with some justification, that that would signal the devolved administrations intent towards community safety... certainly when you look at PCSO numbers in Welsh forces compared to England we’ve got considerably higher PCSO numbers’

(Geoff Petty, South Wales PCC Financial Officer, Interview)

In June 2015, the Welsh Government continued the funding of the 500 additional PCSOs, at a cost of £16.8million, with Leighton Andrews AM stating that ‘this funding represents a significant investment in community safety... our aim is to make communities safer through reduction in anti-social behaviour and crime, including fear of crime’.

The purposeful link between the PCC’s priorities, the Welsh Government’s priorities, and a shared commitment to community safety policy, highlights the importance placed on co-operation within the context of South Wales. This was evidenced by the Justice and Partnerships department of South

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Wales Police, discussed earlier in relation to the cooperation between the PCC and the Chief Constable, reproduced here:

‘[there is a] broader base there on strategic and operational policing focus, and partnership focus [and there is a] positive relationship between Chief Constable and Commissioner, to link with Wales [sic] government’

(Barbara Ranger, Head of Justice and Partnerships Department, South Wales Police, Interview)

Therefore, in the South Wales context, the good working relationship between the Chief Constable and the PCC, discussed earlier in this chapter, provides a better link with the Welsh Government, which is viewed as a positive outcome to others in the policy network.

This section has evidenced tension between institutions and actors within the differentiated polity, particularly between the Coalition Central Government 2010-2015, and the Labour Welsh Government, with the latter removing themselves from the PCC implementation, prior to the election. However, the election of a Labour PCC, with a policy focus on matters that are also of interest to the Welsh Government, and shared values and priorities, appears to have brought them back into the agenda setting process. Alun Michael’s discussions with the Welsh Government enable him to pool collective political legitimacy, and advance his priorities in his Police and Crime Plan. In addition to this, his knowledge of the political environment means that he is aware that resonance with the Welsh Government priorities, will make it easy to ‘push’ certain priorities at the local level. The significance, therefore, of the Welsh Government is that they add a sub-national level to the policy network, which is not present in England, and not formally within the necessary relations of the quadripartite structure of police governance, with which the PCC finds it helpful to collaborate and discuss his own agenda.

5.3.4 South Wales Police and Crime Panel

The Police and Crime Panel are a key institution at the regional level within the policy network for community safety agenda setting in South Wales. The legislative duties of a Panel, which have been detailed, in previous chapters, are reiterated here: In brief, their role is to review and make recommendations on draft versions of the Police and Crime Plan, submitted to them by the PCC. This scrutiny includes focussing on whether the PCC has: achieved the objectives set out in the previous plan, considered the relevant priorities of community safety partners, and consulted appropriately
with the public. This scrutiny is to take place in a public meeting, and the Chief Constable for the force area can be instructed to attend. As discussed above, Police and Crime Panels in Wales are established by the Home Secretary, following the National Assembly vote to refuse consent for the UK Parliament to place duties on local authorities in Wales, which is a devolved responsibility.

During the fieldwork period, the South Wales Police and Crime Panel was composed of ten local Councillors from various councils around South Wales, and two independent co-opted members. Seven of the ten councillor Panel members were Labour Party members, therefore sharing the PCC’s broad political ideology. The other councillor members belonged to Plaid Cymru, the Liberal Democrat Party, and the Independent Party, and there were two independent members of the Panel. Membership of a Police and Crime Panel in Wales is determined by the Secretary of State, who asks local authorities to make nominations of a specific number. These are then accepted, or another nomination must be made.

During the fieldwork period of the first financial year of the PCC’s term in office, the Police and Crime Panel met in public five times, and all these meetings were observed for data collection. No other ‘observers’ were present at these meetings, despite the meetings being held in public, suggesting that the public are either unwilling or unable to attend. Part of the role of Police and Crime Panels is to conduct public scrutiny of the PCC. Conducting a review of the first year of Police and Crime Panels, the Centre for Public Scrutiny found that many had low visibility to the public, and it was necessary for them to consider how to better engage the public. Of the Panel meetings observed during the fieldwork period, all but one of the meetings took place in a Business Centre in Merthyr Tydfil, on the same site as the Welsh Government offices. The Panel Annual General Meeting in June 2013 entailed a discussion regarding the location of the meetings. For keeping the location the same, points included the ease of parking and finding the venue, and it being equidistant for members. Despite a member stating that the location of meetings ‘should be about accessibility for the public’ the motion for future meetings to be held in the same venue were carried. The Centre for Public Scrutiny Review acknowledged the problems of Panels covering large geographical areas which makes it costly for

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53 Ibid.


members to move venues each meeting. Instead, the review suggested webcasting meetings to improve Panel visibility.\textsuperscript{57} For the fieldwork period, no meetings of the South Wales Police and Crime Panel were webcasted.

The ambiguous nature of the legislation outlining the roles and responsibilities of Police and Crime Panels, and PCCs, which has been discussed in previous chapters, was evidenced during observations of Panel meetings. Five months on from the election of PCCs, and since the Panel had first met to scrutinise, the duties of the Panel required clarification by members: in March 2013, a Panel member was observed requesting clarification from the legal representative who was present, on whether or not the panel had the power to veto the plans of the PCC. It was confirmed at the Panel meeting that a recommendation can be made which the PCC can ignore. However, legislation does state that the Panel can veto a policing precept proposal, once, with a two-thirds majority vote, which the PCC must respond to.\textsuperscript{58}

During the fieldwork time period, it was observed that the South Wales Police and Crime Panel devoted significant attention to the proposed raising of the policing precept, as opposed to focussing on areas such as priorities and strategy. For example, while setting dates for forthcoming meetings, the Panel demanded an earlier meeting on the development of the budget, so that the PCC had more time to take into account their views.\textsuperscript{59} Following this, in December 2013, the PCC organised a seminar on finance for the Panel, to inform members of ‘important considerations’, in advance of the meeting in which the precept would be discussed. No similar meetings were arranged for focussing on the priorities of the PCC. On 20\textsuperscript{th} January 2014, the Police and Crime Panel met in advance of the precept meeting for a briefing session to ‘clarify direction’ of their agenda for scrutiny. Observation of this meeting, and the full meeting that followed, evidenced a determined focus on the approval, or otherwise, of the precept raise, with one member in particular voicing concern over the amount proposed. At the full meeting, the PCC discussed the medium term financial strategy 2014-18 and stated his intention to raise the precept by 5%, citing this as the ‘balance place’. The Chief Constable, in attendance, agreed with this percentage raise, indicating that ‘lower would be a struggle’, and the raise was agreed unanimously by the panel.\textsuperscript{60} There was very little discussion of the priorities, despite the revised iteration of the Police and Crime Reduction Plan needing to be published by the end of

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\textsuperscript{57} Centre for Public Scrutiny (2014) n.55 page 29
\textsuperscript{59} Field notes of observation of South Wales Police and Crime Panel meeting 24\textsuperscript{th} June 2013
\textsuperscript{60} Field notes of observation of South Wales Police and Crime Panel meeting 20\textsuperscript{th} January 2014. Also discussed in Section 5.3.2
\end{flushright}
March. However, the Panel member who raised concerns during the briefing meeting left the room during the item presentation, unaware that doing so invalidated any vote that he made on that item, and thus demonstrating further unfamiliarity with the rules and regulations regarding the duties of the Panel. It is therefore unknown whether this member would have voted against the raise, but his opposing vote would not have made a difference as a two-thirds majority would have been needed to veto.

Several explanations are proposed here for the lack of Panel scrutiny on the PCC’s priorities and strategies, and therefore input on the agenda, and instead a focus on the financial aspects of the PCC’s work within the public meetings. Firstly, the similarities between the PCC’s priorities and those which were in place prior to his election, may explain the Panel’s focus on scrutinising the financial aspects of the PCC’s work, as opposed to priorities or strategy. The lack of radical change to previous priorities, and the sharing of broad political ideologies, with seven of the ten Councillor Panel members being Labour Party members, results in ‘support’ over ‘scrutiny’, supporting extant literature. In addition to this, observations of the Panel meetings demonstrated the PCC inviting Panel members to be involved in priorities outside of the Panel environment. For example, at a Police and Crime Panel meeting in 2013, the PCC invited members of the Panel to round table discussion to share their ‘expert knowledge’ on ‘particular priorities, and the principles and practice of partnership working’. This is significant in two ways: firstly it evidences Alun Michael’s recognition of the knowledge of the Panel, but defines the contribution that he requests. Secondly, Panel members could use this opportunity to have influence on priorities, rather than through the formal Panel meetings, which may explain the lack of robust scrutiny on priorities observed in the Panel meetings.

A further explanation for the lack of Panel focus on scrutiny, and prioritising financial matters instead, relates to the primary roles of Panel members: local Councillors and organisational stakeholders. Therefore, due to the raising of the council tax police precept, which impacts the local public, members recognised their role of representing the public: ‘Let’s be proactive on behalf of the public’

Their position as local councillors, means it may be they who receive complaints when the council tax precept is increased, rather than the PCC. Therefore they feel the need to question him thoroughly on the topic, so that they can provide answers to the public.

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61 S. Lister, ‘Scrutinising the role of the Police and Crime Panel in the new era of police governance in England and Wales’ Safer Communities. (2014) Vol. 13(1)
63 Field notes of observation of Panel Member speaking at Police and Crime Panel meeting 13th March 2014
A final explanation of the Panel’s lack of scrutiny on priorities and strategy is related to the PCC’s discourse on the matter of legal responsibilities, and his use of informational power. In documents, and when called before the Panel, the PCC frequently refers to the legislation that outlines his powers, interpreted here as a way of justifying his authority or legitimacy for action. For example, when asked for a report by the Police and Crime Panel on how he made decisions, the PCC referred to the legal structure that enables him to make ‘necessary’ decisions:

‘the decisions that I am able to make primarily relate to the discharge of my statutory functions’.\(^{64}\)

References to the legislation are made, before the report details the reasons why not all decisions made have been included:

‘The register contains all the key decisions that have been made as a result of the arrangements described above. This is not the totality of the decisions I have made but only those which are of significance or would be of public interest. I have not included every single decision for several reasons namely, I am not required to do so, it would become overly bureaucratic to maintain, there would be too much detail to make it user friendly for public inspection, the level of detail would not be at a sufficiently strategic level and key decisions could become lost among all the others’.\(^{65}\)

By emphasizing what he is not required to do, the PCC justifies his approach to the decisions register using his constitutional-legal power – ‘I am not required to do so’ - with which the Police and Crime Panel would find it difficult to argue. He also refers to the 2011 Act in several of his reports to the Police and Crime Panel:

‘I am required under s.12 (1) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to produce a report on - (a) the exercise of my functions in each financial year, and (b) the progress that has been made in the financial year in meeting the police and crime plan objectives in my police and crime plan. The Panel will be aware that I had to issue my first plan by the 31 March 2013 and strictly speaking that means that I cannot yet report on points (a) & (b) above because they relate to the current 2013/14 financial year.’\(^{66}\)

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\(^{65}\) Ibid

'In accordance with s5 (6) (a)-(f) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011 the following report seeks to finalise the process for varying my Police and Crime Plan by way of formal sign off by the Panel before 31 March 2014.'

As stated above, Alun Michael must create these reports, but the form of that report, or the level of detail within it, is not specified by the Act. The PCC therefore has the opportunity to decide this form, and he uses it to refer to his legislative duties, reminding the Panel of his and their role, and of the constitutional-legal limits of his duties towards them.

In addition to this, the PCC draws upon his informational power, related to his relationships with other experts, to respond to scrutiny: for example, empirical observations of Police and Crime Panel meetings demonstrates that, when questioned about a specific local funding decision, Alun Michael may refer to the work of Cardiff University, Universities Police Science Institute, or the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in his answer. Such answers are not always directly related to the question he is being asked, but by forming an answer in this way, he is able to divert scrutiny as the Police and Crime Panel lack the knowledge to critique his expertise.

The panel proposed writing to the Home Office and Welsh Secretary of State regarding lobbying for ‘Capital Grant’, stating that it shows ‘panels and local councillors doing their bit’ in the ethos of partnership. The PCC agreed with this proposal. This further demonstrates the Panel’s focus on financial aspects of the PCC’s work. During the fieldwork period the Panel’s lobbying was unsuccessful.

This section has demonstrated, using evidence gathered from non-participant observations of Panel meetings, and analysis of official documents from the Panel and the PCC, that the Panel focuses on the scrutiny of the financial decisions of the PCC, as opposed to his specific agenda. Several explanations for this have been provided, including the broadly shared political ideologies of the Panel members and the PCC, the PCC’s expertise on the topic of community safety, crime and policing, as well as the PCC providing Panel members with the opportunity to be involved in priority discussions in other fora outside of Panel meetings. The contingent relations, and the necessary relations

Accessed on: 30th December 2016


68 Field notes of Alun Michael speaking at Police and Crime Panel meetings 2013-14. Discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.6

69 A force area can apply to the Home Office for a Capital Grant, to assist with policing a capital city within the force area.
contained in the 2011 Act, in which the Panel do not have the power to veto, lead to an ‘explanatory and co-operative’ model of accountability between the PCC and the Police and Crime Panel.

5.3.5 Cardiff Integrated Partnership Board and the Cardiff Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee

In 2010, local authority partners in Cardiff brought together four separate strategy documents (the Proud Capital Community Strategy; the Health, Social Care and Well Being Strategy; the Children and Young People’s Plan; and the Community Safety Strategic Assessment), into a single integrated strategy, delivered by an integrated partnership board, comprising relevant local partners. Recognising that resolving issues such as ‘reducing crime and improving public health, does not sit with one organisation alone’, the integrated partnership board aims to collaboratively address the ‘big issues’ and make service more effective. This is achieved through the 10 year strategy ‘What Matters 2010: 2020’ which is initiated and implemented by the members of the board, including the council, police, housing associations, Universities, faith organisations, health service, probation service, and retail outlets. The primary aim of this strategy is to make Cardiff a ‘World class, quality of life capital city’, by meeting seven key objectives, termed as ‘outcomes’. The focus for this case study is the outcome ‘People in Cardiff are safe and feel safe’, which has clear links with aspects of community safety. Operationally, the work towards this strategy is undertaken through neighbourhood management programmes, which consist of council officers and the police, who work together on specific priorities. Prior to 2010, the specific partnership that worked towards this outcome in Cardiff was the community safety partnership ‘Safer Capital’. However, since the emergence of the integrated partnership board, this separate partnership has disintegrated, instead existing as a ‘work stream’ of the integrated board. The Cardiff Partnership Board now fulfils the statutory requirement of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, as well as a broader remit of statutory duties that go beyond community safety.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the 2006 Police Act legislated for each local authority to organise crime and disorder committees. Now known as Scrutiny Committees, these have a broader remit than originally enacted. Consisting of local councillors, the Committees review decisions made, or action taken by, authorities in relation to crime and disorder functions, and make recommendations to the local

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authority with regards to these functions. However, Committees are not able to make policy decisions. In Cardiff, the Community and Adult Services Committee scrutinises the processes and actively promotes improvement in the council’s performance in the provision of services for community and adult service. As part of the work programme for 2012-13 the Committee agreed to scrutinise the new arrangements for community safety and community cohesion in Cardiff.\(^72\) Specifically, this included how the arrangements are structured, the anticipated benefits and proposed outcomes, the funding regimes, the reporting and monitoring processes, the role of the Council and partners, and the emerging factors that have an impact on the above.\(^73\)

During the fieldwork period, the Committee met fourteen times. Two of these meetings involved the scrutiny of the Cardiff Integrated Partnership Board and Safer Capital in direct relation to community safety issues, and both these meetings were observed for data collection. Prior to the election of PCCs, the Committee voiced a concern that a PCC could disregard local community safety strategies.\(^74\) This was based on the vague legislation outlining the powers of a PCC, and was said to be exacerbated by the fact that PCC would receive the funding from which to commission community safety projects, which was previously managed by the partnerships.\(^75\) The Committee expressed apprehension that this structure would potentially result in partnerships no longer being involved in community safety agenda setting due to the moving of funding allocations occurring at the district level, to the regional level through PCCs. Similarly, the architectural context of community safety governance, specifically the PCC’s regional positioning, has been evidenced to lead a contest of wills in other research. For example, Cartwright’s study demonstrated tension between the South Wales PCC and the Cardiff community safety partnership in ‘how local governance is best achieved’, and strain placed on governing capacity at the city level.\(^76\)

Acknowledging that the introduction of PCCs would cause significant changes to the local policing and community safety landscape, the Home Office undertook intensive consultation programmes, known as ‘Deep Dives’, to identify challenges, issues and responses that were being prepared by particular local partners.\(^77\) The volunteer police forces for these events, in late 2011, were West Midlands, West

Yorkshire, Leicestershire, and South Wales, and involved chief executives and leaders from local authorities, chairs and executives from Police Authorities, chief police officers, chairs of community safety partnerships, chairs of scrutiny committees, community safety managers and voluntary and community sector partnership representatives. Findings of the South Wales events supported the observational data discussed above: concerns that the commitment to the principle of collaboration and shared ownership underlined the programmes in South Wales, and this could be diluted by the ability of the PCC to award grants directly to organisations.\textsuperscript{78}

Despite these concerns, while the funding awarded to the ‘Safer Capital’ has decreased steeply since 2010, Table 7 illustrates a maintenance of the volume of funding provided by the South Wales PCC, compared to previous years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding Awarded to ‘Safer Capital’</th>
<th>Funder\textsuperscript{79}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>£369,172</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>£294,493</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>£148,985</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>£148,985</td>
<td>South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 7 Funding awarded to Cardiff Community Partnership}

The reasons behind this funding decision were discussed by the Finance Officer for the South Wales PCC:

\begin{quote}
\textit{‘The partnerships are long standing and are all delivering to a greater or lesser extent so it wasn’t as if it was a failing environment. So we ensured a degree of continuity and stability through the transition phase of the PCCs’}
\end{quote}

(Geoff Petty, South Wales PCC Financial Officer, Interview)

As stated in the interview extract, this decision to maintain funding volume was largely due to the deemed successes of the partnerships, and the desire to ensure continuity in the first year of Alun Michael’s term in office. Given the anxieties expressed during the ‘Deep Dive’ consultations the maintenance of funding also provides reassurance to other actors.

Interviews with other agencies involved in this policy network, evidenced alternative reasons behind this continuity in community safety funding. For example, the Head of South Wales Police Justice and

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
Partnerships Department emphasised the preparation that was undertaken prior to the election of PCCs:

‘We thought what would be the things that, whoever came in, whether it was Mr Michael or someone else, [would want to know about] we’ve always had proper plans so there would have been something about ASB in there, there would have been X and Y and to be fair when the commissioner’s office came in they in a way really said ‘yes we’re on the right track’, but obviously in that 6-7 weeks they put his stamp on that and they came up with the 15 priorities’

(Barbara Ranger, Head of Justice and Partnerships Department, South Wales Police, Interview)

This interview extract demonstrates not only the preparation involved prior to the election, but also the informational power of the Justice and Partnerships Department, derived from its strategic level expertise, and using this to influence the South Wales Police and Crime Reduction Plan.

This feeding of information, and consequently, priorities, from the Partnership Board and local authority agencies to the PCC, is not limited to the setting of the inaugural Police and Crime Reduction Plan. For example, within Cardiff Council, a ‘Partnership Analyst’ is employed to collate and analyse intelligence that enables the development, management and implementation of the ‘What Matters’ Strategy, and this information is shared with the Cardiff Partnership Board. Particularly relevant for this study, quarterly reports are shared which identify the most prevalent offence by neighbourhood, which the Partnership Board can then prioritise to tackle. Significantly, since the election of the PCC, the Partnership Analyst has been invited for discussions with the Office of the PCC, specifically for the Analyst to share information on violent crime and domestic violence. It is understood that these subjects for discussion were set by Alun Michael. This again demonstrates the PCC’s tendency to boost the legitimacy for his agenda, as well as his informational power, using an evidence base of data collected by other agencies, while still setting the parameters of other agency involvement.

This section evidences that the concern of the Community and Adult Services Committee of Cardiff Council, that the PCC could disregard community safety strategies, has not been realised, due to the informational power of the Justice and Partnerships Department, and co-operation between agencies within the policy network. In addition to this, the fact that the PCC has maintained the same level of funding for the community safety partnerships throughout South Wales in the first financial year of his term in office, as existed prior to his election, means it is difficult for these agencies to be dissatisfied with the decisions made. However, due to the temporal constraint of this research, it is
possible that reductions were made in the following years of the PCC’s term in office, which may have produced more competition and, in Rhodes’ terms, the need for overt negotiation, over resources. It is also acknowledged that other research in South Wales has evidenced tensions between the PCC and the council based community safety partnership, attained through access to private meetings, which this thesis was not privy to.  

5.3.6 Police and Crime Commissioner’s consultations with the public

This section of the chapter addresses the relationship of the South Wales PCC and the public, and its impact on the setting of the community safety agenda. In doing so the following research question is specifically addressed: To what extent does the introduction of PCCs to the community safety agenda setting process, impact the public participation in that process?

The significance of this question lies in the dual democratic functions that a PCC must fulfil. Firstly, PCCs have a function of representative democracy, in that they are elected at the ballot box to represent the public. Secondly, crucially to this section of the chapter, it is a PCC’s duty to consult with the public about policing and safety issues within their local area, and then implement the policy derived from such consultation, thus demonstrating participatory democracy. Specifically, the legislation sets out that a PCC must obtain ‘the views of victims of crime in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area’. For the period of fieldwork, the South Wales PCC consulted on two ‘Police and Crime Reduction’ Plans: the 2013-17 plan, and the 2014-17 plan. For the 2013-17 plan, consultation primarily involved making the draft plan available for comments from a range of groups and organisations, as well as the general public. The consultation efforts were reported to the Police and Crime Panel:

‘My team has conducted a two week public consultation to obtain comments on the content of the plan. The consultation exercise included circulating the plan to an extensive list of partner agencies and the replies I have received, along with comments from the public, have provided some excellent feedback for consideration in developing the plan. In addition, I have

80 T. Cartwright, (2016) n.76
81 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, s.14(2)
continued to meet partner agencies to further understand the partnership landscape within South Wales and identify joint working opportunities\textsuperscript{63}

Despite Alun Michael stating that the Police and Crime Reduction Plan, and its priorities, were set in accordance with ‘the public’s priorities’, only 240 members of the general public responded to a survey available online for consultation on the priorities in 2013, and a single consultation event in March 2013 was held with young people in South Wales, to receive their comments on the priorities in the draft plan.\textsuperscript{84} The majority of consultation took place with organisations, including the seven local authorities in South Wales, Community Safety Partnerships and local service boards, as well as transport agencies, victim support services and the Welsh Government. This demonstrates that Alun Michael prioritises the arguably evidence-based views of ready-formed groups to provide feedback on his plan and priorities, over the individualistic subjective views of the public. Indeed, the primary function of his consultation seems to be obtaining partner agency feedback and to scope joint working, with public opinion as an additional factor. This is corroborated by early interview data:

‘it’s not just a question of asking for opinions – you can get opinions, they’re very cheap’

(Alun Michael, Interview 1)

In support of this, data demonstrates that the PCC pays little attention to being known to the local public:

‘ideally I want to be invisible, I want them to be saying, which actually a lot of the councillors were saying to me, ‘oh the you know the local Neighbourhood policing team, the local PCSO is brilliant, you know it’s Fred, its Jenny its whoever it may be’, the fact that they know who their local cop, local PCSO is, to me is success for me, I don’t need to be visible in order for that to be counted as success’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

‘It would be ludicrous to attempt to duplicate local engagement through the small team that I have at my direct disposal. For that reason I am seeking to work and listen through the


\textsuperscript{84} n.3
channels of the police service itself, whose neighbourhood teams and community support officers reach every village and street of our area, to understand local needs.\(^{85}\)

The PCC chooses not to engage directly with the general public, and instead highlights the importance of utilising existing networks of information gathering, to co-produce an evidence based agenda. He places little focus on encouraging individual members of the public to participate in local policing strategy, instead preferring institutional expertise. This is corroborated by who Alun Michael views as the audience for the Police and Crime Reduction Plan:

> ‘I think number 1 the police... I’d say the second thing is partners, local government in particular, health service, voluntary sector’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

Within the 2013-17 plan, under the subheading ‘the public’, is the following:

> ‘It is absolutely crucial for the police to be excellent at responding to events and offences, to investigate and detect, to intervene and arrest, but that’s not the whole story. When he established the first police service in London, Sir Robert Peel set down nine key principles, of which two were absolutely crucial and central then as now: The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. [and] The police are the public and the public are the police. Given the nature of the police service there is an expectation from the public that the police will be there when things go wrong at any time of the day or night, and that police officers will handle everything that is thrown at them with calm, restraint, firmness and dignity. When the challenges are properly understood, it is clear that the police and the public need each other and are at their best when they share clear objectives and have a shared identity. We cannot be successful without each other or without mutual confidence. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.’\(^{86}\)

This extract refers to the police as public servants, rather than himself as a representative political figure, again evidencing the lack of focus he places on engaging with individual members of the public.

The PCC justifies this approach to consultation as being more efficient, in comparison to consultation with the general public:

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\(^{86}\) n.3 page 18
‘It’s difficult to know how you would listen to 1.3 million people ... it’s bound to be partial, it’s bound to be the people who turn up to one meeting ... [instead] councillors speaking as individuals within their own political group so they’re comfortable within that situation, they’re talking about their relationship with their local electorate so that by only one step gets me to every ward right across the South Wales area’

(Alun Michael, Interview 2)

The interview extract above discusses a project of the PCC, which involved meeting every political group of the seven local authorities across South Wales. This is another example of the PCC prioritising the meeting of ready-formed groups over the general public, which can be viewed as him boosting his political power, through partnership with others. In addition to this, it evidences how the PCC uses his political expertise to influence the agenda. Given his substantive knowledge and experience of the political circumstances of South Wales, Alun Michael is able to use his awareness of, and prior relationships with, the key players in community safety decision making and operations, to his advantage. Political power is not merely the fact of election or the potential to access decision makers, but previous ‘political’ experience can also be used to maximise influence. Therefore, political power is not a static characteristic of an agency in a policy network, as would be suggested by Rhodes: rather it can be developed by certain actors, through relationships with others that have political legitimacy. In the case of South Wales, this is made all the more effective by the South Wales PCC knowing the Chief Constable, and his associations with the Welsh Government, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

In addition to this, Alun Michael’s comment that consulting with these groups has been ‘very very reassuring’, relates to the existence of similarities in the PCC’s priorities, and the views of these actors. The PCC views corroboration between the two as beneficial, although this may cause neglect of other priorities, which would be detrimental to his agenda.

Despite this focus on consulting with established groups on priorities, over the general public, the South Wales PCC does utilise media outlets to provide information to the general public. In July 2013, Alun Michael released statistics via local newspapers, demonstrating a 38% decrease in Anti-Social Behaviour, from 71,616 in 2011-12 to 44,426 in 2012-13.87 Despite the PCC’s arguably brief consultation phase (as discussed above, 240 members of the general public were consulted on the draft plan), when discussing these figures, Alun Michael stated that:

87 South Wales Echo July 29th 2013.
‘Members of the public have told us that this area is a priority and should be tackled, which is why it is a key focus of my Police and Crime Reduction Plan’.  

This statement indicates that the PCC wants the public to think they are participating, yet the lack of consultation with individual members of the public discussed so far in this section, does not demonstrate that to be the case.

The PCC has a Facebook page, which provides contact information for his Office, as well as a brief overview of duties. The page is ‘liked’ by 50 Facebook users, and two public posts were visible on the page during the fieldwork period. Both posts asked questions, but neither have had visible responses on the Facebook page.

‘Why is it that South Wales police do not take reports of systematic online abuse seriously? Would love an answer!

‘I am from your force area and was bereaved by homicide. Could you tell me if you are supporting the Homicide Action Groups call for government to continue to fund support for victims like me centrally? If not could you tell me how much you have allocated for this type of support in our force area, to enable me to continue to receive the support I need as and when I need it. Thank you’

The latter post was commented on by the original poster the following day, stating that:

‘Also sent an email because nobody here is responding.’

These extracts demonstrate the interest of the general public in engaging with the PCC, particularly to request information, and a failure by the Office of the PCC to visibly engage with the public in this way.

The South Wales PCC does have a more active presence on the Social Media platform Twitter, using the account @commissionersw, which is managed by his Office. Searching for all tweets mentioning @commissionersw during the fieldwork period provides information on the tweets made by this account, as well as those directed at this account. Tweets made by the account included encouraging public views on the PCC’s priorities, for example:

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88 South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner ‘Big Anti-Social Behaviour Drop for South Wales’ 18th July 2013
89 www.facebook.com/southwalespcc/
90 Data accurate as of 25th June 2015
91 www.facebook.com/southwalespcc/ posted on 3rd September 2014
92 Ibid. posted on 24th March 2014

‘Want to have your say on policing and community safety issues in South Wales? Join our Voices Panel: http://www.southwalescommissioner.org.uk/en/Take-Part/Voices-Panel/Introduction.aspx’

The Voices Panel mentioned in the above extract is a group of people in South Wales who complete three questionnaires a year, and are invited to attend discussions, on particular issues. The information from the Voices Panel is stated to be used ‘to have your say, be heard, and influence policing and community safety’. Some tweets made by @commissionersw seek the public’s views on particular priorities, for example:

‘The national strategic policing requirement is important to us. Is it yours? Have your say here: http://bit.ly/YdWxeu’

‘Making the public feel safer is important to us. What do you think? http://bit.ly/YdWxeu’


When the links embedded in these tweets were live, they led to a questionnaire asking respondents to rate how important they viewed particular priorities. Consultation was therefore narrowed to those topics that the PCC had already decided were priorities, with little opportunity for the public to put forward alternative priorities. This demonstrates the second face of power, as the PCC is able to prevent other issues coming to the fore, which may take focus away from, or be detrimental to, his own priorities. The success of these tweets at encouraging the public to provide their views is unknown.

The PCC’s Twitter account was also used for disseminating information to the public. For example, on the 20th January 2014, the PCC’s account ‘livetweeted’ during a Police and Crime Panel meeting:

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93 Tweet from @commissionersw 3rd February 2014
94 Ibid. 4th July 2013
96 Tweet from @commissionersw 3rd March 2013
97 Tweet from @commissionersw 2nd March 2013
98 Tweet from @commissionersw 1st March 2013
‘This morning the commissioner is meeting with the police and crime panel to discuss the precept and the plan’. 100

‘Commissioner tells police & crime panel strategic priorities continue to be tough on crime tough on causes of crime’. 101

‘Commissioner sets out how his priorities cover working with the police, partners, criminal justice system, and work in progress’. 102

‘Livetweeting’ the Panel meeting ensures that the most up to date information on the PCC’s Twitter account is that which he and his team want to be disseminated, and tweets appear to be carefully crafted. For example the tweet below outlines an increase in Council Tax, due to an increase in the policing precept:

‘Increase in South Wales precept supported by police and crime panel. Will now be £190.34 for band d household’. 103

In the tweet, the PCC justifies his decision by demonstrating collective support from the Panel for the raise. While some tweets proffer detailed information, others are vague and provide little useful information for the public. For example:

‘Excellent attendance at tonight’s you engagement event. Looking forward to hearing views of young people on online abuse & bullying’. 104

‘Giving a speech tonight to cardiff neighbourhood watch’. 105

Tweets such as these provide diary information about the PCC’s activities, but little detail on how such activities inform his agenda, or how he views their purpose.

During the fieldwork time period of the first financial year of the South Wales PCC’s term in office, four tweets were sent to the PCC using @commissionersw, requesting a response:

‘@commissionersw Hi there, do you hold local public elections for top cop jobs or is the responsibility of hiring and firing solely on you?’ 106

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100 Tweet from @commissionersw 20th January 2014
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Tweet from @commissionersw 27th January 2013
105 Tweet from @commissionersw 28th May 2013
106 Tweet to @commissionersw 26th July 2013
‘Awful. Time for a major review by @commissionersw of how @swpolice deal with violence against women? http://bbc.in/14nUBZh.\(^{107}\)

‘Why don’t South Wales Police keep records of historic use of Taser and why don’t they record where subject was hit? @commissionersw.\(^{108}\)

‘Why is the use of Taser in South Wales Police much higher than most other parts of the country? Working class area? @commissionersw.\(^{109}\)

The public view of the PCC’s Twitter account shows no evidence of responding to these tweets, although it is possible that they were responded to privately or via a different medium. However, by refusing to publicly engage with these tweets, and the previous Facebook posts, the PCC is sending a message to the public that there is no point in contacting him via this medium to put forward issues for the agenda. In doing so, certain issues may be concealed from the PCC’s agenda. In addition to this, the PCC sends a message to the public that he will not engage with them nor be held accountable for his actions through social media.

This section of the chapter has highlighted the importance that the South Wales PCC places on consultation with those which share his evidence-based approach and with which he can boost his own political legitimacy for the Police and Crime Plan. It is clear from social media analysis, which could arguably be the easiest way for him to engage with the general public on both the agenda and issues of accountability, that he does not place high emphasis on direct democratic methods in founding community safety strategies. Consultation with established groups and experts rather than members of the public is not, in itself, cynical consultation as defined by Arnstein.\(^{110}\) However, such a limited initial consultation sample, and the statement that the plan is constructed based on public demand, does suggest cynical consultation.

5.4 Summary and Conclusion: South Wales Case Study

This chapter has discussed the impact that the South Wales PCC has on setting the agenda for community safety, by identifying what is prioritised, what is funded, and how the agenda is set through negotiation. The four methods of data collection have provided evidence of a community safety agenda that is produced in co-operation with the agencies within the policy network in Cardiff. As

\(^{107}\) Tweet to @commissionersw 2\(^{nd}\) August 2013

\(^{108}\) Tweet to @commissionersw 9\(^{th}\) August 2013

\(^{109}\) Tweet to @commissionersw 9th August 2013

discussed in previous chapters, the legislation outlining the roles and responsibilities of PCCs, is facilitative rather than prescriptive, and this is particularly true of the manner in which it addresses co-operation between actors:

‘The elected local policing body for a police area must, in exercising its functions, have regard to the relevant priorities of each responsible authority’\textsuperscript{111}

‘The elected local policing body for a police area, in exercising its functions, and a responsible authority, in exercising its functions conferred by or under section 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in relation to that police area, must act in co-operation with each other’\textsuperscript{112}

In defining the legal powers of relevant actors, the 2011 Act establishes that responsible authorities and the PCC must act in cooperation with each other, but no actor or agency has the power to impose co-operation upon another. This was highlighted by the South Wales Office of PCC:

‘[The] reality of human politics, human relationships is, if you get to the point where you need to force or coerce a partner to do something you’ve pretty much all failed anyway so I mean certainly the approach that Alun Michael has adopted here is he puts a huge amount of personal effort and the Deputy and Assistant Commissioner, do in terms of building those relationships with the councils, third sector, they’re making a lot of effort to develop relationships with health as well... violent incidents in Cardiff impact on health as well as police services’

(Geoff Petty, South Wales PCC Financial Officer, Interview)

This extract evidences the efforts made to enhance relationships with other actors, and recognises that this is preferable to attempts at coercing other actors into co-operation. It has been made clear in this chapter that the PCC benefits greatly from this voluntary co-operation, particularly with other democratically elected representatives, such as Welsh Ministers or Local Authority Councilors. The low turnout at the 2012 elections implies weak political legitimacy of PCCs. Therefore by creating a community safety agenda that is set from an evidence-base, Alun Michael can use the political legitimacy of other elected representatives to boost the legitimacy of his plan.

However, due to the constitutional-legal power of a PCC to, for example, provide funding to community safety projects, there may exist an element of bargaining in the shadow of the law. For example, partner agencies may recognise the need to co-operate and align their agendas with the

\textsuperscript{111} Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s. 10(1)
\textsuperscript{112} Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s. 10(2)
PCC’s, or provide the PCC with data and information as has been seen above, in order to receive funding. In South Wales, no explicit evidence for this occurring was found during fieldwork, and instead there was an explicit commitment to cooperate on matters related to the agenda. This cooperation explains the lack of divergence from priorities that existed prior to the election of the PCC.113

Regime analysis details core ‘particulars of governance’, which are used to identify the capacity to govern. These are: an agenda to address a distinct set of problems; a governing coalition of state and non-state actors formed around that agenda; resources for the pursuit of the agenda, provided by the governing coalition; and schemes of cooperation used to motivate participation within the coalition.114

The cooperation on Alun Michael’s community safety agenda, involving Labour dominated Welsh Government and local authorities, with whom he has ideological affinity, as well as actors with whom he has a pre-existing acquaintance, and who provide him with political and informational power to boost his legitimacy, does suggest a capacity to govern and an attempt to create a governing coalition.115

This chapter has also discussed the relevant agencies who have the responsibility, and financial resources, for setting a community safety agenda in Cardiff, and their priorities have been presented. Table 8 illustrates in more detail how the priorities within such agendas have been conceptualised using regime analysis.

The table demonstrates a predominantly developmental focus of community safety agendas within Cardiff, focusing on risk management with known or potential offenders and victims through crime prevention. However there are also maintenance and progressive priorities on all agendas, and Welsh Government’s priority of ‘reduction and prevention of young offending’, could be conceptualized as transformative given that, as discussed above, the mechanisms for doing so are socially inclusive. Conceptualising the agendas in this way indicates regime failure due to the lack of an agreed agenda between these agencies, as defined by regime analysis. Resources to pursue these agendas is a significant element of regime theory. It has been evidenced that Cardiff Partnership Board are reliant on both the Welsh Government and the PCC for financial resources, and the PCC’s funding to the Partnership Board is dwarfed by Welsh Government. Therefore, despite Welsh Government losing funding to the PCC through the re-structuring of governance, they remain the dominant financial actor for community safety activities in the case study site and the PCC is not an obligatory passage point for such activities. Alun Michael’s attempts at creating a governing coalition around his agenda, do not enable his agenda to be dominant. He does not have sufficient ‘control of resources that make

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113 See Table 3
115 Although it is important to note a lack of non-state actors which Stone’s regime theory state is needed for a regime to succeed.
The criticism of PCCs of having omnipotent power to make decisions is therefore unfounded regarding community safety in South Wales: the PCC is reliant on the informational power of other agencies, and other agencies retain financial power to meet their own agendas. The wider significance of this key finding is considered in detail in Chapter 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8 Regime Conceptualisations of South Wales Community Safety Agenda</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agenda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance: maintains previous status quo of established regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental: work with and augment established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformist: Reform policy agendas and advance alternative core objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative: alter the context of major public policy problems, and advance alternative core objectives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Findings and Analysis: Bristol, Avon and Somerset

This chapter provides the findings from the case study site of Avon and Somerset. As discussed in previous chapters, the theoretical propositions driving this case study relate to the ambiguity of the legislation, indicating a reliance on the agency of actors within the new quadripartite structure, rather than the structure itself. Therefore, approaches to issues of crime and community safety may be based on the local demands of the area, the priorities, and resources at the disposal, of established policy networks, and the expertise of the individual Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC). Such an approach is therefore argued to differ between forces due to these contingencies.

The case of the Avon and Somerset Office of the PCC is discussed below, detailing how the agency of the PCC, Sue Mountstevens, specifically her independence from a political party, impacts her community safety priorities. The context in which the PCC must operate follows, with consideration of the community safety agenda landscape in Bristol. This provides details of the other agencies with community safety agenda setting responsibilities, including the Bristol Mayor, a conceptualisation of the agendas produced using regime analysis, and a discussion of the political economy of the area.

The final section of this chapter discusses each of the units of analysis, identified as the relationships between actors in the policy network for community safety for Bristol, and the PCC. These relationships are conceptualised in terms of Rhodes’ resources of power within the urban political arenas of community safety agenda setting. This chapter therefore provides a detailed account of the impact that the Avon and Somerset PCC has on the local community safety agenda, the characterisation of relevant agendas (using regime analysis), and how the agenda is set during the first financial year of the PCC’s term in office.

Derived from the four methods of data collection - elite interviews, document analysis, non-participant observations and social media analysis - the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that Sue Mountstevens focuses on being a representative of the public, ensuring that the local public are consulted on issues of policing, crime and disorder, and have opportunities to hold her to account. Recognising that being a regional actor attempting to implement local policy is problematic, the PCC creates district-level Police and Crime Plans. In doing so, it is demonstrated that the PCC uses her political power through the legitimacy derived from election, and the right to build public support, to set her community safety agenda.\(^{117}\) However, despite this concentration on political power, the evidence also demonstrates the informational power of the other agencies in the

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policy network, specifically the community safety partnership ‘Safer Bristol’, resulting in the PCC creating an agenda with priorities of a similar nature to those prior to her election. In addition to this, it is demonstrated that the structure of community safety agenda setting in Bristol results in the PCC not being a majority funder of community safety related activities, and thus she has a lack of financial impact on the local community safety agenda. Through this discussion, the value of Rhodes’ theoretical framework for analysing the use of resources of power in interdependent relations can be seen.

6.1 The Case: The Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner

This section of the chapter discusses the elected PCC, her Office, and her community safety agenda contained within the 2013-17 Police and Crime Plan.

The PCC for Avon and Somerset, independent candidate Sue Mountstevens, was elected on November 15th 2012, with a turnout of 18.8%. This was one of the highest turnouts at the PCC elections held across England and Wales, potentially due to the election of the Bristol City Mayor on the same day. The PCC beat off competition from a Conservative, a Liberal Democrat and a Labour candidate. Prior to her election into post, Sue Mountstevens was an independent member of the Avon and Somerset Police Authority, serving 2010-2012, a Magistrate for 15 years, and the Vice-Chair of the Independent Monitoring Board of Bristol Prison. These previous roles provide the PCC with a broad expertise in criminal justice in the local area of Avon and Somerset. Outside of these positions directly related to crime and policing, Sue Mountstevens has been the director and owner of two businesses, and therefore has knowledge and experience of handling budgets.

The Office of the Avon and Somerset PCC is a small organisation, employing 19 staff. The PCC employed a Chief Executive, but chose not to appoint a non-elected, not-legally required Assistant or Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner. When asked in interview whether she had ever wavered on this decision, she stated:

‘No I’m absolutely determined I made the right decision… I think that if you are going to take on a Deputy there’s only 2 ways – that is you stand on a double ticket so everyone knows or you do an open, completely open recruitment plan and you get some of the panel to be part of the assessment, because there have been accusations of cronyism and I think it’s as a public role we have to be absolutely clean as a whistle and those are the only ways but generally speaking I think that it has, no definitely been the right decision, and it’s been the right decision

118 Correct July 2015
basically because a Deputy would cost money and when I am cutting police officers PCSOs if you said to the local people what would you rather have, a Deputy PCC or 2 PCSOs – it’s a no brainer.’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 2)

The reasons provided for not appointing a Deputy or Assistant Commissioner demonstrate a commitment to transparency, the meeting of public demand and a desire for a more personal relationship with the electorate rather than one mediated through a hierarchy of Deputies and Assistants. These qualities may stem from her independence from a political party. The PCC referred to this frequently, both prior to the elections, and after being elected:

‘Obviously, being an independent, I do not have a political allegiance. I have always been very clear that I am there representing Avon and Somerset and the local people that make up that area.’

The regional positioning and size of jurisdiction of a PCC has been criticised, given the aims of being accountable to the local public for local policing strategy. The PCC’s formation of the Police and Crime Plan 2013-17, demonstrates an attempt to diminish this issue, as well as meet local demands: she creates not just a force-wide plan for Avon and Somerset, but also six ‘local’ Police and Crime Plans, ‘to reflect and respond to local needs’. These local plans are divided by geographical areas: Bristol, Bath and North East Somerset, West Somerset, North Somerset, East Somerset and South Gloucestershire. Four of six of these are Unitary Councils, with the district council of Somerset being divided into West Somerset and East Somerset local areas for the plan.

All the Police and Crime Plans for Avon and Somerset detail the priorities for the force area. There are four main priorities, to meet the central aim of ensuring the ‘right to be safe and feel safe in your community’. These priorities are:

- Reduce the impact that anti-social behaviour has in our communities;

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• Prevent and reduce the risk of burglary, and decrease the fear of burglary in your area;
• Tackle domestic and sexual violence, particularly violence towards women and children;
• Ensure victims are at the heart of the criminal justice system.

Alongside these priorities, the plan details a ‘commitment to: early intervention and prevention; better coordinating and integrating of local services; building strong relationships between communities and crime, community safety and criminal justice agencies’. The force-wide plan states that these priorities have been set ‘based on the issues you have raised. You have told me that your concerns are anti-social behaviour, burglary and domestic and sexual violence. I will ensure that wherever you live – rural, suburban, town or city – your police will work with you and have the flexibility to deliver these priorities’. The local plans detail the PCC’s force-wide priorities, and state how they will be tackled within that specific area through locally based partnerships and agencies. Some plans also have additional priorities such as road safety and rural crime. The arrangement of the seven Police and Crime Plans for Avon and Somerset, and the claims that priorities are based on public demands and tackled locally, demonstrates the PCC’s commitment to being representative of the public at the local level.

The PCC’s Bristol Police and Crime Plan for 2013-17 included all priorities listed in the force-wide plan, with the addition of ‘improving road safety and providing a visible and accessible service’. Using the framework provided by regime analysis for the conceptualisation of this agenda, there are maintenance, developmental and progressive priorities. To enable this, the entire plan required coding, as the priorities themselves do not provide details on the strategies for addressing them. Table 9 provides the conceptualisation of all the priorities contained within the Bristol area 2013-17 Police and Crime Plan.

122 Ibid.
124 Ibid. page (i)
126 A full table of the regime analysis conceptualisation of these priorities is provided at the end of this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Criminological Conceptualisation</th>
<th>Avon and Somerset PCC priority areas for Bristol, 2013-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance: maintains previous status quo of established regime</td>
<td>Criminal justice: public safety policies which augment criminal law enforcement and public order</td>
<td>Improve (increase) criminal justice outcomes for burglary; Focussed offender management for burglary and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental: work with and augment established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas</td>
<td>Risk management: maintaining criminal justice tendencies, with the addition of risk management priorities</td>
<td>Reduce opportunities for burglary and reduce risk to vulnerable properties; Improve citizen reporting of Anti-Social Behaviour; Tackling domestic and sexual violence, particular towards women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformist: Reform policy agenda and advance core objectives</td>
<td>Restorative justice: diversion from custody and non-state conflict resolution</td>
<td>Community resolutions to Anti-Social Behaviour; Seeking restorative justice for victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative: alter the context of major public policy problems, and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Social justice: socially inclusive priorities, based on social justice model</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 9 Regime Conceptualisations of Avon and Somerset PCC’s priorities in the Bristol Police and Crime Plan, 2013-17*

To further understand the conceptualising of the agenda, some examples are discussed in more detail here. Focussing on anti-social behaviour is a priority for the PCC, but it is the discussion within the Plan that details the aspirations to improve citizen reporting of it, which could characterised as part of a developmental regime, due to it resulting in the management of known risky populations or spaces. The Plan also discusses anti-social behaviour in terms of using community resolutions for such offenders, which could be characterised as part of a progressive regime, due to it being a restorative justice approach promoting diversion from custody. For the priority area of burglary, the Plan states a targeted offender management approach for burglary, therefore resulting in a maintenance priority due to its criminal justice focus. Reducing opportunities for the crime and risk to vulnerable properties is also a burglary related priority, conceptualised as a developmental priority due to the crime prevention tendencies. Conceptualising the PCC’s agenda in this way is a way of meaningfully comparing it with the community safety agendas of others within the policy network, which can result in identifying a dominant ‘refrain’ of the local community safety agenda in Bristol. This is discussed further at the end of this chapter.
Not only does Sue Mountstevens have the statutory obligation to set community safety priorities within a Police and Crime Plan, but she also has financial resources to fund activities to work on these priorities, as well as control of the budget for the wider police force. The introduction of PCCs has changed the structure of funding for policing and community safety activities in all forces. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the structure in 2012-13, before PCCs were elected, and in 2013-14, following the election, in Avon and Somerset, with a focus on the case study site of Bristol.

![Figure 6](image6.png)

**Figure 6 Major funding streams for Policing and Community Safety in Bristol, Avon and Somerset, 2012-13**

![Figure 7](image7.png)

**Figure 7 Major funding streams for Policing and Community Safety in Bristol, Avon and Somerset, 2013-14**
The details of these diagrams are discussed later in the section on the context of community safety agendas in Avon and Somerset. However, it is important to note here that while the PCC has an impact on the structure of community safety funding in the case study site, she is not an obligatory passage point for community safety activities: funding for community safety does not have to pass through her, as Bristol Council and the Mayor continue to provide funding to the partnership Safer Bristol for such activities.

As discussed in previous chapters, since the Coalition government formation in 2010, England and Wales has experienced public austerity, with public services being required to make cuts of up to 20%. The Avon and Somerset constabulary has experienced a £15m shortfall in funding 2013-15 from its annual budget, and between 2006-2014, the total grant provided by the Home Office for constabulary expenditure, has been reduced by £110m, particularly due to central-government imposed ‘damping’.127

Avon and Somerset Constabulary receive an increase in funding from the government, due to a large increase in the Council Tax Freeze Grant.128 For 2013/14, it was the Commissioner’s decision to freeze the Council Tax policing precept for Avon and Somerset, and thus receive a grant from the Treasury, despite the Police and Crime Panel’s attempt to veto.129 This freezing may be due to a recognition of the funding being local public money, and wanting to ensure the public support her role and her agenda. Indeed, interview data suggests an acknowledgement of who is paying for the constabulary:

‘I’m not prepared to just throw out public money....there’s a lot of scrutiny and I think some organisations have not had that scrutiny before and some find it very difficult but I’m afraid that’s part of the terms and conditions that I’m prepared to spend taxpayers’ money’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 2)

The Avon and Somerset PCC ‘Budget Book’ for 2014-15, discusses the previous financial year. Of interest is the statement of Financial Summary, the table of which is replicated here:

128 A one-off grant from government due to the freezing of council tax in the force area, to make up for the otherwise shortfall in funding.
129 See Section 6.3.4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012/13 £M</th>
<th>2013/14 £M</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£1.4</td>
<td>£1.45</td>
<td>Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>£2.4</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner commissioning budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£281.2</td>
<td>£275.8</td>
<td>Constabulary operating budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£282.6</td>
<td>£279.6</td>
<td>Total cost of services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 10 Avon and Somerset Financial Summary, 2013-14 Budget Book*

The budget book names the £2.4m non ring-fenced funding, from Central Government for ‘community safety related activities’, as the PCC’s commissioning budget, suggesting that this is the only pot from which community safety projects can be commissioned. However, the constabulary operating budget, and Office of the PCC costs are also non ring-fenced, and therefore could be used for community safety.

£240,000 of this £2.4m is allocated by the PCC to the Safer Bristol Partnership, which is a reduction of over £60,000. The budget book names the £2.4m non ring-fenced funding, from Central Government for ‘community safety related activities’, as the PCC’s commissioning budget, suggesting that this is the only pot from which community safety projects can be commissioned. However, the constabulary operating budget, and Office of the PCC costs are also non ring-fenced, and therefore could be used for community safety.

Figure 8 illustrates how Sue Mountstevens allocates the Avon and Somerset budget for policing, focusing specifically on community safety funding. The PCC receives a large grant from the Home Office, which she allocates to particular functions including the running of the constabulary, the operating of her Office, and Community Safety commissioning. This Community Safety Fund replaces the majority of community safety funding streams that previously were directly funded from the Home Office, including the Drug Testing Grant, and Youth Justice Grant. The Community Safety Fund therefore amalgamates the streams of funding received by the local authorities. The new, amalgamated Community Safety Fund is no longer ring-fenced, and the PCC can use it to commission a range of services that come under the remit of ‘community safety’, in line with her own priorities outlined in her Police and Crime Plan. As can be seen in the diagram, the Community Safety Fund allocation is divided into two parts: in Avon and Somerset, the PCC allocates money to Community Safety Partnerships, when projects meet her priorities. The PCC also allocates funding to centrally determined projects, and for the first financial year of the PCC’s term in office, these are continuations of projects from previous years.

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130 In the previous year, this funding was allocated by the Home Office, to the local authority. See Section 6.2.2
131 This is true for all PCCs in England
132 See Section 6.3.5
For community safety commissioning, the PCC creates a funding formula for the allocation of funding to each district partnership based on the recorded crime, levels of deprivation, and population of a particular area. This was due to the PCC being aware of criticisms surrounding the allocation of the Community Safety Fund, and she stressed the importance on transparency and equity in decisions on Community Safety Partnership funding allocations during interview:

‘one of the issues is that Somerset feel that they do not get a fair deal because a larger amount of money has to go into Bristol... so I wanted to make sure that we had an as fair and as equitable system of allocating funds as we could and we use a formula... I wanted to prove that there was a formula behind it rather than the accusation that was thrown at the Police Authority and police beforehand that you just put a finger in the air and you make the decision... It was a very conscious decision to try to have a formula that people could see and I was being transparent and open about where and how the money was being allocated’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 2)

The formula provides Bristol with 37% of the PCC’s total grant for community safety for Avon and Somerset, funding projects that meet her priorities. All districts in Avon and Somerset experienced a
decrease in funding after the election of the PCC, the introduction of the funding formula, and after the introduction of austerity in public services in 2010. Despite this overall reduction, the funding formula was viewed positively by the Director of Safer Bristol:135

‘it was tricky because it was so new to everyone, [there] was a real worry and insecurity around what chunk of the cake would Bristol get, because Sue’s remit is Avon and Somerset and we were always worried about that because as far as we’re concerned Bristol is the place where most crime happens where disadvantaged communities are concentrated ... where most of the victims are in neighbourhoods like South Bristol, Hartcliffe, so we were working on what if the formula comes up with something where we don’t feel we’re getting our due proportion of the funding but I think it came out at 37% or whatever which we were happy with’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

The PCC’s funding formula was also a subject of interest for the Home Affairs Select Committee, who received oral evidence from the Avon and Somerset PCC and Chief Constable in January 2014:

‘Q428 Mark Reckless: Commissioner Mountstevens, let me ask you about the urban/rural spread. You have the large city of Bristol with its significant policing needs but also a very substantial area of countryside with, I am sure, people pressing for greater policing visibility. I just wonder how you have managed that conflict to the extent that you see a conflict and whether you have made any changes in the amount of relevant resources going to areas.

Sue Mountstevens: You are absolutely right. There is always a tension and whenever I am in Somerset I am being asked by local people almost all the time, "Does the money always go to Bristol", and vice versa, I have to say. Bristol has 41% of the crime, so there has to be appropriate resources put into that, but it is also making sure that we work within the rural communities. I have set up a rural crime forum to make sure that, for farmers and people who work in less urban areas, their voices can get heard.’ 136

135 It should be noted that the reduction for Safer Bristol was less than 1% from the previous year.
The Home Affairs Select Committee evidence demonstrates the need for PCCs to be deliberative with local communities in the using of finite police resources.\textsuperscript{137} Sue Mountstevens recognises that Bristol requires more financial resources because that is where the majority of crime occurs, but mollifies rural areas, such as Somerset, by providing additional opportunities to be consulted on policing, crime and disorder. The use of the mathematical formula also obviates the need for external ‘expert’ judgement about policing needs, instead enabling the PCC to maintain a focus on the public, while legitimising her decisions. Table 11 shows the projects funded in Bristol for 2013-14, and how they fit with the PCC’s priorities:\textsuperscript{138}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCC Priority Area</th>
<th>Safer Bristol Project</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim / Domestic and Sexual Violence</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation Prevalence Report</td>
<td>£35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and Sexual Violence</td>
<td>Domestic and Sexual Violence and Abuse Prevention Campaign</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Hate crime - Victim / Service user support</td>
<td>£35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Delivery Team Burglary Fund</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>Young Person’s substance misuse service</td>
<td>£65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Reducing Burglary / Anti-social behaviour by targeted technical solutions</td>
<td>£15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Justice Project</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>Alleygating</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Victims)</td>
<td>Reducing racially motivated perpetrating and offending in children and young people</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unallocated</td>
<td>£5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 11 Avon and Somerset PCC Community Safety Grant Allocation, 2013-14*

The success of the Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Plan for 2013-17, in meeting its aims is difficult to assess, particularly as, at the end of the fieldwork period, the PCC had three years remaining in office. However, the Police and Crime Plan for 2014-17, provides some update on the meeting of objectives to date. The 2014-17 Plan states that ‘satisfaction levels amongst victims of crime have increased to the highest level ever recorded in Avon and Somerset, and the risk of domestic burglary

\textsuperscript{137} S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2014) n.4 page 365

in the area is now one of the lowest in the country’. The arrangement of the Plan changed for 2014-17, producing nine local plans, and one force-wide plan. This provides a plan for every Unitary and District Council area in Avon and Somerset, which would arguably make arrangements for directing resources easier to manage. For example, funding can be provided to an entire Unitary or District Council, rather than it needing to be shared across these boundaries in the 2013-17 Plan. In addition to this, the defined areas may be more easily held to account for delivering on the PCC’s priorities. However, in doing so, this may further fragment local service delivery, rather than attempting to coordinate it at the regional level.

This section has considered the PCC’s role in community safety priorities in Avon and Somerset, and more specifically Bristol. It has been demonstrated that, as an independent PCC, Sue Mountstevens sets a community safety agenda that can be conceptualised using regime analysis as having maintenance, developmental and progressive priorities. The PCC states that she focusses on the demands of the local public, creating force-wide and district-level plans to meet those demands, and implementing a funding formula to enhance transparency of community safety funding allocations. In doing so, the PCC is using her political agency to anticipate and negotiate claims for finance from competing authorities within Avon and Somerset, as exemplified by the formation of a rural crime forum.

6.2 The Context: Community Safety in Avon and Somerset (Bristol)

This section of the chapter provides the context of community safety agendas for Avon and Somerset, and more specifically Bristol. The community safety agendas and priorities of other relevant agencies are discussed, specifically Bristol Council, Bristol Partnership, and the Safer Bristol Partnership, and conceptualised using regime analysis, to identify whether there is ‘an agenda to address a distinct set of problems’. In addition to this, the political economy of the area is considered, to identify how the PCC’s funding of community safety activities, as discussed above, relates to the wider context.

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6.2.1 Community Safety Agendas and Priorities

A key criticism of the introduction of PCCs was that they would have omnipotent power to set priorities and provide funding for them. The PCC’s community safety agenda and priorities have been discussed above, and conceptualised using regime analysis as being a predominantly maintenance/developmental agenda, due to the criminal justice and risk management related priorities within it, although also with some progressive tendencies due to the promotion of restorative justice. Details of how the PCC funds these community safety related priorities has also been considered. However, the PCC is not the only actor with the responsibility to set and financially resource community safety activities.

In Bristol, as discussed in the methodology chapter, the Bristol Partnership have a strategy named ‘Bristol 20:20’ which includes the outcome of ‘a city of strong and safe communities’. This is delivered by Safer Bristol, the local crime and disorder partnership. Within this outcome are 4 key priorities:

- Reduce Crime (targeting hot spots and situational crime prevention projects)
- Reduce impact of substance misuse (through treatment)
- Tackle violent crime (promoting reporting, emphasising reduction of reoffending)
- Reduction of domestic violence.

There is a clear similarity between these priorities and those of the PCC, presented in the first section of this chapter. Using regime analysis categories of agendas, these priorities can be conceptualised as developmental: there is a focus on risk management, while maintaining the core ‘criminal justice’ related policy agenda. In addition, the inclusion of substance misuse treatment suggests the involvement of non-criminal justice agencies, which is characteristic of a developmental agenda.

142 S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2014) n.4
143 The Bristol 20:20 Plan, The Bristol Partnership. Retrieved from: http://www.persona.uk.com/ashton/Core_docs/C12.pdf Accessed on: 30th December 2016 The ‘Bristol partnership’ is the integrated partnership, which includes safer Bristol, and 4 other partnerships (with the priorities of children and young people, health and wellbeing, thriving neighbourhoods and prosperous and ambitious)
144 The potential reasons for this similarity are discussed in Section 6.3.5
145 See Section 3.3
While Safer Bristol deliver projects funded by the PCC and Bristol Council (through the 20:20 strategy), which meet those priorities, they also have their own priorities, outlined in their 2012-15 plan.\(^\text{146}\)

These priorities are:

- Reduce offending and improve offender management
- Reduce acquisitive crime
- Reduce violent crime (including sexual violence and street violence)
- Reduce the harm caused by drugs
- Youth Offending (reduce the use of custody).

Again, this is predominantly a developmental agenda, as these priorities largely have risk management tendencies, as reducing acquisitive crime, street violence and harm suggest situational and social crime prevention approaches. However, improving offender management can be conceptualised as a maintenance priority due to the focus on known offenders, while reducing the use of custody for young offenders is a progressive priority, due to the focus on diversion from custody. The significance of these agendas, with differing priorities is discussed at the end of this chapter, and in more detail in the discussion chapter.

6.2.2 Community Safety Funding

The reductions in funding provided by central government to public services have been discussed above and in previous chapters. This of course includes reductions in funding to local authorities, including Bristol Council, which is a key actor in the provision of community safety services in this case study site. Table 12 shows the allocation of community safety funding in the three years prior to the introduction of the PCC, in comparison with Sue Mountstevens’ first financial year of her term in office. For 2010-2013, this funding was provided directly to a local authority, by the Home Office, for the commissioning of community safety projects within that area. It is clear from Table 12 that there has been a huge reduction in the total funding spent on community safety related activities in Avon and Somerset since 2010:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home office allocation to Council Area</th>
<th>PCC allocation to Area Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010-11</strong></td>
<td><strong>2011-12</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath and NE Somerset</td>
<td>£214,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>£747,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Somerset</td>
<td>£240,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>£618,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Gloucester</td>
<td>£270,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>£2,091,407</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 Allocation of Community Safety Funding to Council Areas in Avon and Somerset

Regarding how the funding is spent in the financial year prior to the election of PCCs, Bristol Council’s expenditure on Community Safety issues, including the allocation of the Community Safety grant, follows in the next table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Funder’ and Stream/priority</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Office – Community Safety Grant</strong></td>
<td>Street Sex Work Intervention Project</td>
<td>£211,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighbourhood Delivery Teams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Domestic Violence Advisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target hardening and response to acquisitive crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street Conflict Intervention (mentoring)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hate Crime Community Based Support Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – Supporting People Funding</strong></td>
<td>Drug and alcohol – resettlement, floating support</td>
<td>£2,120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hate Crime - floating support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Violence and Abuse – floating support and refuge provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Office, National Treatment Agency – Drug Intervention Funding</strong></td>
<td>Treatment, testing and intervention in custody</td>
<td>£2,136,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pooled funding from Police, Primary Care Trust, Bristol City Council – Domestic Violence and Abuse</strong></td>
<td>Voluntary male perpetrator programme</td>
<td>£427,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Based Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Domestic Violence Advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training and support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survivor Groupwork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MARAC Co-ordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – Hate crime support</strong></td>
<td>Community based support service for victims of hate crime</td>
<td>£215,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – PCSOs</strong></td>
<td>Contribution to PCSOs in Bristol</td>
<td>£943,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council - CCTV</strong></td>
<td>Expansion of wireless coverage for Bristol</td>
<td>£100,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-deployable provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – Rape Crisis</strong></td>
<td>Telephone and face to face support for victims</td>
<td>£75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – Home hardening</strong></td>
<td>Securing vulnerable properties</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – Family Intervention Project</strong></td>
<td>Working with troubled families with multiple and complex needs</td>
<td>£307,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol City Council – Independent Sexual Violence Advisors (ISVAs)</strong></td>
<td>Employment of ISVAs to provide support and advice</td>
<td>£51,407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 Bristol Council funding for Community Safety Projects, 2012-13


148 For much of these projects, funding has been pooled from various agencies, all of which are listed where known. Data available from ‘Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner: Briefing for Candidates’, prepared by all those involved in community safety in Bristol, March 2012 Accessed online 2015

149 Pooled with Primary Care Trust, Home Office, Bristol City Council & other local = £108,168
The first line of the table above shows the volume of funding received by Bristol Partnership from the Home Office for 2012/13 - £211,341. Relative to the total volume shown in the table, it is clear that this is a small addition to funding for community safety activities in Bristol: 0.04%. In fact, it is Bristol City Council who fund the majority of community safety related projects in Bristol prior to the election of PCCs. This arrangement continues following the election of Sue Mountstevens: she allocates £240,000 to Safer Bristol for community safety activities that meet her priorities, while Bristol Council remain the majority funder, providing £9.4m to Safer Bristol:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safer Bristol Activity funded by Bristol Council</th>
<th>2012-13 Base Budget (000s)</th>
<th>2013-14 Proposed Budget (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Confidence</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime reduction</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance Misuse Strategy</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>1,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Control Centre</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Enforcement</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>1,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory compliance</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and substance misuse general</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Offending Team</td>
<td>1,694</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Coordination Team</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection Unit</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,507m</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,401m</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 Bristol Council funding to Safer Bristol for specific priority areas, 2012-13 and 2013-14

However, Bristol Council reduced its funding to Safer Bristol by over £2million, and for priority activities that are not a priority of the PCC, funding has been significantly reduced. For example, for the priority of ‘substance misuse’ funding has reduced by half, from over £9million, including Bristol and across Avon and Somerset funding, to approximately £5million.150

In contrast, the PCC’s priority of ‘reducing the impact that anti-social behaviour has on communities’ could arguably be related to Youth Offending Teams, which have experienced an increase in their funding since the introduction of the PCC, rising by over £1million. However, the shortfall in Bristol Council’s funding has not been met.151 The reasons for this convergence in the funding of priority

150 Calculated using data presented in previous tables, Bristol Council provided £4.9m to Bristol specifically, and would have had a share of £4.3m from pooled funding across Avon and Somerset totalling £9.2m for 2012/13. This is in comparison to the Police and Crime Commissioner allocations of £1.2m centrally allocated, £65,000 to a substance misuse related Safer Bristol Project, and Bristol Council funding to Bristol of £3.8m, totalling £5m for 2013/14.

151 Calculated using data presented in previous tables. Bristol Council provided £1.7m for Youth Offending Teams to Safer Bristol in 2012/13. In 2013/14 it provided £1.5m, and the Police and Crime Commissioner allocated £245,000 across Avon and Somerset. Data for these calculations retrieved from: [https://www.bristol.gov.uk/committee/2013/ta/ta000/0226_7i.pdf](https://www.bristol.gov.uk/committee/2013/ta/ta000/0226_7i.pdf) Accessed 2015
areas by the PCC and Bristol Council is not clear. However, it is unmistakable that Bristol Council remain the majority funding provider for Safer Bristol projects. The PCC is therefore constrained by the structure in which she is operating: while she is able to fund projects that are not the priorities of other agencies, this impact is limited due to the enormous difference in the volumes of funding the PCC and Bristol Council allocate to Safer Bristol.

This section has discussed the wider community safety context in Bristol. It is clear that while the PCC has the responsibility for setting a community safety related agenda, and funding projects to meet her priority areas, other agencies have far more financial power to meet their own agendas. The evidence demonstrates that Bristol Council remain the majority funding providers for community safety related issues in Bristol, despite the new un-ring-fenced community safety fund being the PCCs responsibility to allocate. Due to this, the PCC does not exist as an obligatory passage point for the funding of community safety in Bristol: Bristol Council and Safer Bristol can continue funding their own priorities, which do not appear on the PCC’s agenda. Therefore, the impact of the PCC on the funding of community safety related issues is limited. However, this may alter between district authority areas, and it should be noted that while this case study focusses on the PCC of Avon and Somerset, the case study area exists as the unitary district of Bristol City.

6.3 Setting the Community Safety Agenda: relationships and negotiation in the policy network

The preceding two sections of this chapter have discussed the case of the PCC, Sue Mountstevens, and the context in which she must operate. It has been evidenced, through interview data, documentary analysis, and observations of public meetings during the PCC’s first financial year in office, that she sets an agenda, claimed to be based on public demand, and provides funding for her objectives to be met, based on her creation of a new funding formula for community safety issues. However, the PCC is not an obligatory passage point for the funding of community safety activities in Bristol: Bristol Council provide the vast majority of funding for community safety, and have priorities which are divergent from the PCC’s.\(^{152}\)

This section of the chapter evidences how the PCC’s agenda is set, in relation to the other actors within the policy network, discussed using the theoretical framework of Rhodes’ resources of power-dependence relationships. Within her role, the PCC has the political power derived from election, access to other decision makers and the right to build public support; the constitutional-legal power

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\(^{152}\) Although, as noted above, there is also convergence of particular priorities, and the amount they are funded since the election of the PCC. As discussed, a reason for this is unclear.
bestowed on her by the legislation outlining his role; and the financial power to commission crime reduction and community safety initiatives. She also has informational power, as a consequence of her background as a Magistrate, and some hierarchical power over employees within her own office.

However, she is not the only actor within the policy network with resources of power, and therefore the application of Rhodes’ framework suggests that, due to this differentiated polity, negotiation is required for an agenda to be set. This negotiation can be based on both necessary relations, those which are stipulated by the legislation outlining the new structure for police governance, and contingent relations, those which are dependent on the specific context that the individual PCC is in, and their agency.

Figure 9 summarises the directions of these resources of power, at the district, regional and national level, with the focus on the case of the impact of the Avon and Somerset Office of the PCC. The remainder of the chapter discusses the necessary relations, produced by the structure of community safety agenda setting in Avon and Somerset, and the contingent relations, or agency, of individual actors within the structure.

*Figure 9 Power-dependence relationships in Avon and Somerset policy network for Community Safety Agenda Setting*
These relationships have been identified through the four methods of data collection - elite interviews, document analysis, non-participant observations and social media analysis – and will be discussed in detail in this final section. In doing so, the following research question is considered: How is agenda setting shaped by power-dependence relationships and to what extent are resources of power negotiated and used to influence decisions?

6.3.1 Home Office

As discussed in previous chapters, the Home Office is a background figure in the context of community safety agenda setting due to the declared ‘hands off approach’ to local policing, stated by the Home Secretary shortly after the election of PCCs. However, the financial power of the Home Office is significant, given their provision of the revenue budget for forces, and their ability to reduce this substantially, as discussed in Chapter 2. Related to this, the Avon and Somerset PCC applied to the Home Office Innovation Fund in late 2013, for the 2013/14 financial year. Bids for funding were subject to demanding criteria, including the ability to transform policing through innovation, enhance collaboration, deliver efficiencies and be locally owned and monitored. Three projects were successfully funded in Avon and Somerset in January 2014. These were a citizen portal for the public to have simplified access to local authority and police services; body cameras and digital evidence capture to improve professional standards and gather a wider intelligence data, to enable crime demand to be managed lower through early interventions; and STORM, a platform to deliver regional shared specialist operational resources across Avon and Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire. These projects clearly link to the PCC’s focus on better coordination and integration of local services, building strong relationships between communities and crime-related agencies, and early intervention and prevention. However, by providing funding for such projects, central government is able to have an influence on the tackling of issues at the local level. The Home Office also sets the strategic policing requirement, which sets out collective capabilities for addressing national threats such as terrorism and organised crime, to which the PCC must adhere.


6.3.2 Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police

Shortly after being elected, the Avon and Somerset PCC opened recruitment for a new Chief Constable. It was reported that the rationale for this was the PCC wanting a Chief who would serve for the entirety of her first term in office, and the incumbent Chief Constable, Colin Port, not wishing to extend his contract beyond one year. The new Chief Constable, Nick Gargan, had worked with Interpol and the British Embassy on the investigation into the death of the Princess of Wales, before working for the National Criminal intelligence Service. In 2010 he was Chief Executive and Chief Constable of the National Police Improvement Agency. Nick Gargan was already in situ during the first research interview with the PCC, and it was apparent that the PCC ensured that the new Chief would agree with her priorities:

‘they had the sight of the Police and Crime Plan [in the interview] because I was asking them- whoever we took on- that they would have to sign up to these priorities and Nick was very- I mean they all were obviously- but Nick was very supportive and they were quite broad enough that he didn’t feel that they constrained the constabulary’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 1)

The recruitment of a Chief Constable following the PCC elections, may have meant that Avon and Somerset managed to avoid what other forces, outside of the cross-case comparison in this thesis, suffered: the difficulties experienced by an established Chief Constable, and incoming PCC, due to conflict over roles and responsibilities, have been well documented. For example, Gwent gained notoriety for disagreement between versions of events which led to the Chief Constable’s retirement, with the PCC claiming that the Chief Constable had warned her staff to have no interaction with himself, that she had lost the confidence of staff, and that her managerial style was dismissive and abrupt. The Chief Constable stated that the PCC had provided the ultimatum of ‘retire or resign’.

A key criticism prior to the election of PCC was that the new actor would breach the doctrine of constabulary independence in operational matters, thus politicising the police. However, the Chief

156 S Chambers, ‘Who is policing the police and crime commissioners? Safer Communities (2014) Vol. 13(1)
Constable of Avon and Somerset stated a clear recognition of both his roles and responsibilities, and those of the PCC, highlighting the constitutional-legal power relationship:

‘Sue and I have an understanding that I run the police force, I am the operational leader of this police force but she is entitled to set me priorities so she is absolutely within her rights to say ‘no your priority will be to achieve this’ so she has a huge influence over me’

(Nick Gargan, Interview)

This constitutional-legal relationship between the PCC and the Chief Constable, in particular the acknowledgement of his operational position and support of the Commissioner’s priorities, impacts on his hierarchical power and organisational decision-making:

‘Of course we’re talking about large organisations... as Chief here, I’m looking after 6000 people and a budget of £2.75 million so actually what happens personally is... I have a very light and distant touch from it... Nevertheless through documents and the way we organise and the selecting of people and all those kind of things you can exert a huge influence... So for example the key individual who will support me in delivering the change agenda and the safety agenda in Bristol, is the Bristol area commander and that post is at chief superintendent level in policing and it is one cop who polices Bristol and I have the right to hire fire and remove and so we have interviews tomorrow for the new Bristol area commander post...so you know it’s a big influencing opportunity’

(Nick Gargan, Interview)

The Chief Constable’s recognition of his operational position, and in turn the PCC’s strategic position, as well as his support of the PCCs priorities, has an impact on how the Chief Constable approaches his role: while the PCC has the constitutional-legal power to compel the Chief Constable to take a particular approach to priorities, it is the Chief Constable who has the hierarchical power to affect change in accordance with the PCC’s agenda.

Given the PCC’s recruitment of Nick Gargan, a positive working relationship would be expected between the two individuals. Indeed, Sue Mountstevens and Nick Gargan were called before the Home Affairs Select Committee in January 2014, as a ‘model’ of ‘a commissioner and a Chief Constable who work together and the relationship is very harmonious’, during which the PCC stated.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{159} Home Affairs Select Committee Keith Vaz 21 January 2014 Q425 HC757 Retrieved from: \url{http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/757/140121.htm} Accessed on: 30\textsuperscript{th} December 2016
‘We have mutual understanding of each other’s roles and that is absolutely key to a good relationship between a chief constable and a police and crime commissioner. We work very closely together. We are obviously going to agree on many things because we have the same vision. We are trying to create very safe and strong communities and by making sure that I hold him to account and ask him questions that the local people are constantly feeding into me about making sure that that attention to detail is paramount. I have a very good professional working relationship with Mr Gargan and making sure that it does not become too cosy a relationship, because I hold him to account.’

Data collection for this case study evidenced a publicly supportive working relationship, with a focus on visible accountability, the benefits of which were noted by the Director of Safer Bristol:

‘Sue’s not being stuck in her office in Portishead [Avon and Somerset Police Headquarters], they [the PCC and Chief Constable] spend a lot of their time out there, hearing directly from communities and the voices of the people out there so that’s a huge strength and that sort of gives a message to officers about how they want things to work’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

Together, the Chief Constable and PCC attended public meetings, where both could be held to account by, or provide information to, members of the general public. This was observed at several meetings of the Police and Crime Panel, and during Public Forums (discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.6), where the two individuals arrived together, sat next to each other, and supported each other through the questioning that occurred. Events such as the Public Forums were livestweeted by the Office for the Avon and Somerset PCC, and included reference to the Chief Constable, tweeting his statements alongside the PCC’s. For example:

‘@AandSPCC @ngargan_police V interesting to watch the South Glos. PCC Public Forum from K’wood tonight - impressive openness and transparency’

‘I said to her, ‘if you give me this job I will throw open the doors of this constabulary’ and I went to the press office and said ‘if the BBC needs someone to talk about a particular issue, or we are being challenged, the answer is always yes, the same with ITV, the same Bristol post, the answer is always yes repeat after me’… similarly when critical press comment comes our way the answer is always ‘maybe these people have got a point’, rather than ‘how dare they,

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161 Tweet to Sue Mountstevens and Nick Gargan, on 3rd September 2013
how do we prove them wrong’ and that has been very very personally led by me but that is what Sue appointed me to do’

(Nick Gargan, Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset, Interview)

It is clear from the above interview extract that the Chief Constable was committed to a visible and accountable constabulary, and his focus on this is likely to have led to his successful employment. The PCC still has the power to dismiss the Chief Constable, and despite this seemingly positive working relationship at the start of his employment, in May 2014 the Chief Constable was suspended by the PCC for allegations of misconduct. Mountstevens stated that ‘whistle-blowers had spoken with her [...] and she had referred the matter to the IPCC”. Gargan was suspended on full pay for 14 months, before a hearing found him guilty of eight charges of misconduct and he began a phased return to work, awaiting sanctioning. In August 2015, an online petition calling for his resignation, or removal by the PCC, had received 1000 signatures. Shortly after this petition was presented to the PCC, Sue Mountstevens announced that she was to begin proceedings to invoke Section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, which enables the removal of Chief Constable: the first PCC to do so. In her announcement, the PCC stated:

‘He abused his position by forwarding confidential emails, interfering with a proper recruitment process and sending, receiving and storing intimate images on his police issue phone...[he should have] led by example [but instead had ]shown flawed judgement...from what I have seen and heard, he has lost the confidence of local people, police officers and staff’

This quote highlights importance the PCC placed on the views of the local public, potentially coming from the signed petition. Her decision to remove the Chief Constable was referred to Tom Winsor,

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162 During Gargan’s suspension, Deputy Chief Constable John Long, acted as the Chief Constable for Avon and Somerset. Given that May 2014 is outside of the formal fieldwork period, no data collection was undertaken while John Long was in office.


164 If he had been found guilty of any charges of gross misconduct, he would have been removed from post. S. Morris ‘Suspended chief constable found guilty of eight misconduct charges’ The Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/09/nick-gargan-avon-somerset-police-chief-constable-guilty-misconduct Accessed on: 30th December 2016

HMCIC, who said she was ‘entitled and justified’ to call upon him to resign, and in October 2015, Sue Mountstevens accepted Gargan’s resignation.\textsuperscript{166}

The action of members of police staff making a complaint to the PCC about the Chief Constable has implications for the new structures of constitutional-legal power and mechanisms for accountability. Firstly, it evidences the PCC’s position, her constitutional-legal power to remove the PCC, and that it is she that should be sought out in such circumstances, to hold the Chief Constable to account. More broadly, this issue is important in considering the accountability of the Chief Constable to the PCC, and the existence of the PCC as a method for holding the Chief Constable to account for his actions, existing far more widely than merely in the remit of his operational decisions.

It is noteworthy that the PCC also came under fire during this scandal, for revealing the identity of the whistle-blower to Gargan, prior to his suspension. An investigation by the Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel found her to have demonstrated ‘serious error of judgement’, given the sensitive and personal information provided by the complainant to the PCC, and the privacy expected in doing so.\textsuperscript{167}

The Panel recommended that the PCC and all staff in her office were trained in appropriate key policies and procedures, including the Whistleblowing Policy and Staff Code of Conduct. This incident made local and national news, with members of the public calling for the PCC to step down from her post. For example:

> ‘She should be sacked, the fact that she didn’t know the full facts is neither here nor there’.\textsuperscript{168}

> ‘it seems to me she has to go. this action must have surely jeopardised the whistleblower’s position and that of the investigation into the allegations. is there are any other assessment that can be made of this 'mistake'?\textsuperscript{169}


Such public pressure may explain her readiness to attempt to remove Gargan, particularly given her persistent rhetoric about meeting public demand. However, the PCC did not stand down, and was successfully re-elected into post in 2016. 170

This section of the chapter has demonstrated that the Chief Constable in this case study area did not have input PCC’s inaugural Police and Crime Plan, and therefore her community safety agenda, as he was recruited following its publication. Indeed, the PCC ensured that she hired a Chief Constable who was ‘signed up’ to her priorities, and her participatory democratic approach to the role. Doing so, enabled an initial ‘explanatory and co-operative’ model of accountability between the two actors.

The turbulent times in Avon and Somerset, with the suspension and subsequent attempted removal of the Chief Constable, demonstrate a potential bowing to public pressure by the PCC, as well as an exertion of constitutional-legal power: her invoking of Section 38 to remove the Chief Constable was the first across England and Wales since the introduction of PCCs. The significant power of the PCC to be able to dismiss, or threaten dismissal of, the Chief Constable was a major criticism of the introduction of PCCs, as it blurs the already vague boundaries between ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ control of local policing. However, it must be noted that Nick Gargan’s dismissal was not directly related to operational policing, or failing to conduct an aspect of the Police and Crime Plan: rather it was due to misconduct in the work place. Interestingly, this scandal highlights the PCC’s position as an obligatory passage point for holding the Chief Constable to account, which is arguably an improvement on the failures of Police Authorities, who were renowned for deferring to the Chief Constable’s professional expertise, even if the Chief was the subject of scrutiny. 171

6.3.3 Bristol City Mayor

Section 6.2.2 discussed the community safety funding of the PCC and Bristol Council, demonstrating that the Council, run by the Mayor, have financial resources for community safety that vastly exceed that of the PCC. This section will illustrate how the PCC and the Mayor negotiate financial resources for particular community safety related activities.

On the same day as the elections for PCCs, the electorate of the City of Bristol were able to elect a Mayor for the first time. An independent candidate, George Ferguson was elected. The role of the Mayor is to lead the City Council in achieving its aims, as well as focusing on his own priorities and

170 See Epilogue
‘principles’, set out in in ‘A vision for Bristol’. These include improving public transport, building respectful and caring neighbourhoods that have a sense of belonging, and enhancing skills for work. While these priorities may not be directly related to community safety, there is a clear link with these priorities and those of the Bristol Partnership board, which will be discussed in Section 6.3.5.

The Mayor of Bristol was not interviewed for this thesis, but his participation in the policy network for community safety in Bristol, was discussed by other members of the policy network. For example, the working relationship between the Mayor and the PCC was discussed by the Partnership Director, highlighting the benefit of having an independent Mayor and PCC:

‘I think the good thing for us as well is because both our elected Mayor and the PCC are both independent and they seem they have a very positive working relationship, that’s a good thing and they’ve both got a style that is very committed and delivers a huge amount of community engagement and visibility so they very much complement each other in that respect’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

It is implied that a Mayor and PCC with different political ideologies may not have complemented each other’s vision in a similar way.

In May 2013 the Bristol Mayor demonstrated a keen interest in community safety issues, evidenced by his agreement to fund PCSOs in Bristol, so as to maintain their current level. Prior to the election of the Mayor and PCC, Bristol Council had funded 32 PCSOs, while 80 were funded by Avon and Somerset Constabulary. However, due to the Council needing to make substantial savings, a new arrangement was agreed, with the Council, under the Mayor’s instruction, funding 20, the PCC funding 10, and the Constabulary maintaining their funding of 80. Therefore, due to the agreement made between the Mayor and the PCC, this was only two less PCSOs in Bristol than the previous year, as opposed to the potential 12 less. The financial commitment for PCSOs from the Mayor demonstrates a focus on community safety issues, as evidenced by the document extract below:

‘While we recognise the value of PCSOs we had to look at every way that we can make savings but, working with Sue Mountstevens, we have ensured that there were [sic] still be a similar level of PCSO support this year and the PCSOs will be a central part of working to common aims to ensure a safer community’


173 ‘Bristol mayor & police and crime commissioner sign contracts to retain PCSOs’ Retrieved from: http://www.avonandsomerset-pcc.gov.uk/ARCHIVE-2012-April-2016/News-and-Events-2012-Apr-2016/News-
The above extract also highlights the ‘common aims’ of the Mayor and PCC, demonstrating how the Mayor’s priorities are linked to the PCC’s. The agreement of financial support for PCSOs also evidences mutual benefits for the funders: while on one side of the coin, the PCC is assisting the Mayor, who otherwise would have ten less PCSOs in Bristol, on the other side, the PCC is associated with an aspect of policing which is seen as positive by the public:

‘I think community feedback is that PCSOs are really valued and they are seen as the frontline, the community facing part of policing ...so they provide a really valuable role that people out there don’t want to see reduced...’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

Therefore, while there is no legal obligation to cooperate, it is beneficial to both the PCC and the Mayor to be involved in the funding of Bristol PCSOs: as elected representatives, there is a political incentive to meet public demand for PCSOs. The agreement in funding demonstrates an interdependency on financial matters, which was noted by the Safer Bristol Director:

‘A deal was struck ... there’s an interplay there it’s not all about we have to keep the PCC happy, there’s a sort of collective dependency....’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

It is noteworthy to add that the Mayor only committed to funding PCSOs for one year. This fixed-term funding of PCSOs was mentioned at the Bristol Police Public Forum (see Section 6.3.5), where Councillor Levy, then a member of the Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel, offered to lobby the Mayor on the matter of continued funding for PCSOs, collectively with the PCC.174 This highlights an attempt by another actor in the policy network to build collective political power, of elected individuals, to negotiate with a single elected individual. The outcome of Councillor Levy’s plea is unknown.

This section of the chapter has demonstrated the negotiation and interdependence of financial resources between the Bristol City Mayor and the PCC. These independent, political representatives, elected on the same day in November 2012, both have a commitment to keeping the public safe. Despite the financial resources of Bristol Council to fund community safety activities, directed by the Mayor, vastly exceeding that of the PCC, they negotiate using financial resources to fund PCSOs, which are beneficial to both of them. This example demonstrates that despite the PCC having the legislative

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174 Field notes of observation of Bristol Police Public Forum 25th June 2013.
duty to make priorities and provide funding to meet them, she does not have the sole financial power within the policy network: agreements are made between those with common aims, and are jointly funded.

6.3.4 Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel

The legislative duties of a Police and Crime Panel have been detailed in previous chapters: their role is to review and make recommendations on draft versions of the Police and Crime Plan, submitted to them by the PCC. This scrutiny includes focussing on whether the PCC has achieved the objectives set out in the previous plan, has considered the relevant priorities of community safety partners, and has consulted appropriately with the public. For each meeting, the Panel follow a work programme, created once a year for scrutiny of specific issues, in addition to addressing issues that may have recently arisen. The scrutiny is to take place in a public meeting, and the Chief Constable for the force area can be instructed to attend. Police and Crime Panels in England are established via one ‘host authority’ within the force, which nominates and appoints members, before notifying the Home Office that arrangements have been made.\footnote{Police and Crime Panel Regulations’. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117477/police-and-crime-panel.pdf Accessed on: 30\textsuperscript{th} December 2016. Although the guidance states that the host authority nominates members, in practice, potential members make themselves known to the host authority, who then selects from this pool.}

The Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel comprised 15 Councillor Members, representing the major political parties in the area, and three independent co-opted members.\footnote{9 Conservative, 2 Labour, 4 Liberal Democrat/Lib Dem. Correct on 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2015. Changes in panel membership were made at various points from the Police and Crime Commissioner election to present.} All meetings of the Police and Crime Panel take place at the North Somerset Council offices, in Clevedon. At meetings observed during the fieldwork period, there were other ‘observers’, but rather than being the general public, these tended to be representatives from the local news media, or those with a professional interest in specific issues, such as the British Transport Police. This suggests that, while these meetings must be held in public, the public are unwilling or unable to attend.

As noted in the South Wales findings chapter, the Centre for Public Scrutiny suggested webcasting public Panel meetings, to meet the requirement of conducting public scrutiny. The importance of holding open and public meetings was observed in several meetings, and at the meeting of 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2014, the possibility of webcasting the meetings was proposed by the PCC. Given the expense of buying equipment for the public webcasting of the meetings, the PCC was observed requesting that
the Panel might contribute to the costs from their budget, but this was refused. However, the official minutes for this meeting state that:

‘The Chairman reported that mobile webcasting equipment to be purchased by North Somerset Council would be available for use at PCP meetings if the Panel decided to webcast future meetings. This being the case, the Panel would make a small contribution towards the initial outlay and the on-going operating costs’.

Aside from highlighting the significance of multi-method research in evidencing different versions of the same meeting, as noted in Chapter 4, this demonstrates a commitment from the Panel and the particular Council, in ensuring that meetings are held publicly. Given this context that the PCC finds herself in, it could be expected that she would follow suit, and ensure that she too makes herself available to the public.

The Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel use their scrutiny function to focus on the PCC’s priorities in the Police and Crime Plan. For example, in one of the first meetings observed as part of fieldwork, in March 2013, the Police and Crime Plan had been distributed to the Panel ahead of the meeting, for the Panel to make comments and recommendations. The list below provides the particularly detailed nature of these comments, found in the Official Minutes of this meeting:

- Panel would have liked to have seen the actual data arising from the consultation phase of the draft plan. Commissioner ‘would be happy to share more specific consultation data with the Panel as the year progressed’.

- The plan lacks detail in relation to basic policing, assurance, and the ability to deal with emergency situations.

- The panel would welcome the Chief Constable’s comments on the objectives contained in the plan.

- On the priority of anti-social behaviour, the plan aims to improve public satisfaction with how it is dealt with, but the plan did not say how it will be reduced. Contact numbers for reporting incidents of anti-social behaviour should be included.

- Reoffending had been given a ‘light touch’ in the plan. More emphasis on reducing the reoffending rate.

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• **Hate crime requires a specific category.**¹⁷⁸  

This extract is a selection of the comments made, including a request to hear the Chief Constable’s thoughts on the plan, and specific data needed on a specific priority such as anti-social behaviour. The Panel is therefore scrutinising on a wide range of issues. The impact of the Panel’s comments and recommendations on the Police and Crime Plan were discussed by the PCC:

> ‘I did get some pushback from the Police and Crime Panel about what I didn’t have in it and one of the things raised was they felt there should be more mention of hate crime. I did include it as one of the areas we were looking at, but I did not make it a priority... I think there is a lot more that can be done with hate crime... but there comes a point where if you increase the number of priorities they no longer stay priorities’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 2)

Therefore, the PCC did take into account the comments and recommendations of the Panel on the Police and Crime Plan, but on her own terms: she did not agree with making hate crime a specific priority, but due to the Panel highlighting its importance, she noted that ‘there is a lot more that can be done with hate crime’, and it therefore comes to the fore: in 2013 the PCC attended three public events as part of National Hate Crime Awareness Week, and promoted methods for reporting hate crime on her website.²⁷⁹

The scrutiny of the Police and Crime Panel is not confined to during the scheduled public meetings. Social media analysis evidences a Panel member, Liberal Democrat party member Pete Levy, who also stood in the PCC elections, using Twitter to publicly ask the PCC questions. For example, when the PCC tweeted about a meeting between the South-West PCCs and Chief Constables, ‘to discuss regional collaboration’, the Panel member responded:

> ‘@AandSPCC That’s great but what regional collaborations are you discussing? Isn’t [sic] about time to hear the detail’²⁸⁰

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¹⁸⁰ Panel member Tweet to PCC, 7th March 2013
The Police and Crime Panel also share their expertise on particular topics that align with the PCC’s priorities of reduction in burglary, violence against women and children, tackling anti-social behaviour and victims the in criminal justice system. At the observation of the Panel meeting on the 5\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Panel members discussed the potential to draw up their work programme for scrutiny, in line with these priorities, named ‘Champion Areas’. It was suggested that this could involve hearing ‘evidence from someone [a panel member] who could provide steer on something that was not happening locally’.\textsuperscript{181} Panel members therefore sought to create the opportunity to share their expertise on a particular local issue and to become involved in setting the community safety agenda, evidenced with the word ‘steer’. However, these ‘Champion Areas’ remain set by the PCC: the Panel’s expertise is utilised by the PCC, but on priorities that are defined by the PCC.

The use of this expertise, or informational power, has the potential to result in more effective scrutiny of the PCC by Panel members. A draft work programme for scrutiny was developed by the Panel, including items suggested by the PCC, and items suggested by the Panel members that were closely related to the PCC’s priorities. An example of this in subsequent Panel meetings was observed on the 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2014, when Councillor Brett, the then titled ‘panel link member for victims commissioning’, provided an update report on this Champion Area, involving detailed scrutiny of this particular topic, with Councillor Brett drawing on her own expertise in the area, as a previous employee of the national Victim Support charity.\textsuperscript{182}

This example demonstrates the Police and Crime Panel having an impact on what is prioritised: their work programme defines what is scrutinised at each meeting, and the PCC would want to ensure that a particular topic is prioritised leading up to that scrutiny. This highlights the Panel drawing on their constitutional-legal power to scrutinise the PCC, their political power as elected representatives of the public, and their informational power, defined as their expertise on particular topics and in particular areas.

In contrast to this apparent exercise of political and informational power by the Panel on the scrutiny of Champion Areas, in a more general scrutiny of recent actions of the PCC at the same meeting on 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2014, the Panel were observed as having little impact on the PCC’s actions or decisions. At this meeting the Panel expressed their concerns over the closure of several small police stations, with members referring to their roles as local Councillors in their questioning of the PCC, and therefore drawing on their political power as elected representatives of the public at the local authority level. In

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{181} Field notes from observation of Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel meeting, 5\textsuperscript{th} June 2013
\textsuperscript{182} Field notes from observation of Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel Meeting, 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2014. It is interesting to note that Councillor Brett stood for PCC nomination from her party, the Liberal Democrats, but lost out to Peter Levy.
\end{flushright}
doing so, it seemed the members attempted to use their collective political power, at the force level as actors within the Panel rather than individual Councillors, to influence the PCC’s decision. The PCC used her knowledge of the individual areas mentioned and defended the closures, stating that these particular stations were rarely used, already had reduced opening hours, or that there was another police station nearby that would remain open, and the questioning from the Panel ceased.  

Significantly, this example evidences the tensions between the regional and district level: the PCC, at the regional level and in control of the force budget, refuses the Panel members, and those they represent as Councillors at the district level, the maintenance of police station opening hours. This is due to the requirement of her role in delivering policing services force wide, and therefore it is necessary for her to consider the resources at her disposal more widely, rather than the district level issues that the Councillors manage. The PCC uses her informational power of knowledge of the particular issue, her political power as being a regional elected representative, and her financial power of setting the force budget and commissioning services at the regional level, to negotiate the tension and enforce her own agenda. This example also demonstrates a potential blurring of the lines of operational and strategic independence: the distribution of police across the force area is an operational task, but the managing of Estates and financial resources is strategic. The Chief Constable was not present for this Panel meeting and therefore his opinion on the matter is unknown.

This section has considered the input of the Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel on the PCC’s agenda and priorities, identified through the observations of all Police and Crime Panel meetings occurring in 2013/14 financial year, and extensive document analysis. It has been evidenced that the Panel created the opportunity to influence the PCC’s agenda, by sharing their expertise on her pre-defined priorities, demonstrating an explanatory and cooperative model of accountability. However, when scrutinised on financial decisions, the PCC resists their input, using her informational, financial and political power in one instance, to ensure her own agenda, of saving money across the region, is maintained.

6.3.5 The Bristol Partnership Board, Safer Bristol, and the Community Cohesion and Safety Scrutiny Commission

This section outlines the relationship between Safer Bristol and the PCC, as well as the Bristol Council Scrutiny Commission for Community Cohesion and Safety, drawing on evidence collected during interviews with the Safer Bristol Partnership Director, non-participant observations of Scrutiny Commission meetings, and analysis of relevant documents including Partnership Plans, Police and

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183 Field notes of observation of Police and Crime Panel Meeting. 21st March 2014
Crime Plans, and official minutes of meetings. In doing so, similarities between the priorities of the PCC, and those of the Partnership pre-election are highlighted. This is evidenced to be due to the interplay of information and expertise provided by the Partnership to the PCC, demonstrating their impact on the setting of the local community safety agenda. In turn, the Partnership experiences increased scrutiny on the progress of the community safety projects funded by the PCC, by both the PCC and the Scrutiny Commission, demonstrating the PCC's impact on the local community safety agenda, through her financial power of funding the projects.

The Bristol Partnership Board consists of responsible authorities including Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Probation Services, City Council, Health Services, and the Government Office for the South West, businesses, the voluntary sector and higher education institutions. The aim of the Board is to make Bristol ‘one of Europe’s top 20 cities’ by 2020, by meeting four key objectives termed as ‘outcomes’: Reduce health and wealth inequality, Raising the aspiration and achievement of our children, young people and families, Making our prosperity sustainable, and A city of strong and safe communities. It is this final outcome that provides the focus for this study, which is primarily delivered by the local crime and disorder partnership, ‘Safer Bristol’. For 2013-14, the PCC allocated a total of £650,000 across five community safety project areas in Avon and Somerset, of which Bristol received the largest amount: £240,000. Safer Bristol were then required to source local projects, which would meet particular priorities of the PCC:

‘The PCC said you’re getting £240,000, what projects are you going to deliver for that?’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

The particular projects are delivered by other agencies, but it is the Safer Bristol who are held to account by the PCC for their operation. Nine projects were submitted to the PCC in application for community safety funding, and all were successful. Table 15 shows the projects funded in Bristol for this period, and which priority of the PCC’s that they are most closely linked to, replicated from Section 6.1:  

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185 n.22
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Area</th>
<th>Safer Bristol Project</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim / Domestic and Sexual Violence</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation Prevalence Report</td>
<td>£35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and Sexual Violence</td>
<td>Domestic and Sexual Violence and Abuse Prevention Campaign</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Hate crime - Victim / Service user support</td>
<td>£35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Delivery Team Burglary Fund</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>Young Person’s substance misuse service</td>
<td>£65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Reducing Burglary / Anti-social behaviour by targeted technical solutions</td>
<td>£15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Justice Project</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>Alleygating</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Victims)</td>
<td>Reducing racially motivated perpetrating and offending in children and young people</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unallocated</td>
<td>£5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 15** PCC allocation of Community Safety Grant to Safer Bristol, 2013-14

It was noted by the Director of Safer Bristol, although the projects sourced needed to link to the PCC’s priority areas, there was little restriction on the particularities of the projects:

> ‘There was a lot of autonomy given to us to work up those projects, some of them were continuations of things that had been going on before’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

As shown in Table 15, Safer Bristol were allocated £65,000 for a project named ‘young person’s substance misuse service’, which links to their priority of reducing the harm caused by drugs, as well as the PCC’s priority of reducing the harm caused by anti-social behaviour. This is an example of the autonomy given to Safer Bristol to source the projects: it is not necessary for the funding to only meet the PCC’s priorities. Rather Safer Bristol can source a project for PCC funding which meets both the PCC’s priorities, and their own. The similarities between Safer Bristol’s areas of work and the priorities of the PCC within the 2013-17 Plan, are more explicitly shown in Table 16. For the purposes of comparison, only those priorities of the PCC that are aligned with Safer Bristol’s areas of work, are included in Table 16. As discussed in Section 6.1, the Avon and Somerset PCC has several priorities that tackle crime problems in particular contexts. Therefore, the priorities of ‘a victim centred criminal justice system, coordinating and integrating services’, and priorities that are included in other local Police and Crime Plans, but not in the Bristol Plan, such as rural crime, are not included in this table of comparison.
Safer Bristol Plan 2012-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reduce Acquisitive Crime</th>
<th>Prevent and reduce burglary and fear of Burglary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Community Confidence (Anti-Social Behaviour &amp; Hate Crime)</td>
<td>Build strong relationships between communities and the crime, community safety and criminal justice agencies that serve them / Key aim of 'be safe and feel safe in your community'/Reduce impact that anti-social behaviour has in communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Violent Crime</td>
<td>Tackle domestic and sexual violence, particularly violence towards women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Offending</td>
<td>Early intervention and prevention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16 Comparison of Safer Bristol and Avon and Somerset PCC priorities

One reason proposed for the similarities between priorities is due to the provision of information from the partnership to the PCC. The work of Safer Bristol is steered by a three-yearly Partnership Plan, which is refreshed annually and informed by the Safer Bristol Crime and Disorder Strategic Assessment, which is conducted every 6 months. This assessment provides direction for Safer Bristol with an overview of current and future crime, disorder and community safety issues affecting Bristol, to facilitate informed decision making by senior managers. This document was updated more frequently than usual in 2012, to ensure it contained the most up-to-date information for PCC Candidates. In doing so, Safer Bristol was able to steer the incoming PCC towards their priorities, by demonstrating what was working well and the current funding allocations. This would have made it easier for the incoming PCC to make quick decisions regarding budget allocation. Following the election of PCCs, Safer Bristol used the Crime and Disorder Strategic Assessment to provide information to the PCC, aiming to assist understanding of the wider environment in which funded projects are operated. There is therefore a filtering process undertaken by Safer Bristol, using their established expertise on community safety issues, which leads to convergence between the PCC’s and partnerships priorities.

However, there is also evidence that Safer Bristol prioritised the projects that fitted in with the PCC’s priorities, to ensure funding was granted. Between November 2012 and February 2013, Safer Bristol and the Office of the PCC were ‘in negotiation’ for the continuing investment in community safety.

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186 n.30
187 n.9
projects across Bristol. Following this negotiation, nine projects were funded, ensuring they met the priorities of the partnership and the PCC:

‘Because the PCC passports money to the city council, to the partnership, which used to come as grants directly from government, we are listening to that, and responding to that, so when Sue Mountstevens says that her priorities are victims centred approach, violence against women and girls, restorative approaches … we’ve got to respond to that and reflect that in the type of projects that we resource to deliver outcomes’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

This is identified as the third face of power: the PCC is able to limit the scope of issues brought forward by the community safety partnership, as she will not fund projects that do not align with her priorities. This leads to Safer Bristol self-censoring those they put forward:

‘I think what we’d done is prioritised the ones that have come through from the PCC’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

It was observed at a meeting of the Community Cohesion and Safety Scrutiny Commission, that scrutiny was directed towards projects funded by the PCC rather than those funded by Bristol Council. This may account for the importance placed on the PCC funded projects: they are given priority because they are subject to more scrutiny. In addition to this, Safer Bristol have a long standing relationship with Bristol Council, but are trying to build one with the PCC, and so prioritising projects funded by the PCC may aid this

A final explanation for the similarities in the PCC’s priorities and those of Safer Bristol prior to her election, is the PCC’s attendance at Safer Bristol meetings. The Partnership Director noted that the PCC’s Office frequently attends the meetings, which was corroborated by document analysis showing that the Office of the PCC was represented at all four meetings of the Safer Bristol Partnership Executive Board in financial year 2013/14. Information is shared at such meetings, on specific incidences in Bristol. For example, in the interview with Gillian Douglas, a recent incident was used to

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189 Bristol City Council Overview and Scrutiny Management Board, minutes of meeting 12th September 2013
190 16th May 2013, 5th September 2013, 21st November 2013, 20th February 2014

demonstrate how Safer Bristol undertook research into the failure of agencies to protect an individual, and the interest that the PCC took in the outcomes.\textsuperscript{191}

\begin{quote}
\textit{[a major incident] stimulated a piece of research that we commissioned and got the final report and we invited the mayor and the PCC this week to come and hear the results and that was really good because they both gave the time to do that and they both took the key messages from that and want to see action on the back of it’}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)
\end{flushright}

Through the PCC’s involvement in such meetings, the partnership are able to use their expertise to persuade the PCC of a suitable direction. The PCC can then use this information to adjust or justify her funding decisions. In addition to this, the PCC situates herself firmly, and visibly, within the policy network and she is able to push her own priorities on community safety at such meetings, ensuring they remain on the agenda of other actors.

Safer Bristol noted increased scrutiny over their projects since the arrival of the PCC. In November 2013, the Office of the PCC wrote to Safer Bristol, questioning the progress of some of the projects funded to date, with ‘genuine concerns about the rate of progress in about half of the projects’.\textsuperscript{192}

This was also discussed in the interview with the Director of Safer Bristol:

\begin{quote}
\textit{the scrutiny has been around have they delivered and were they delivering at the 6 month point, and we’ve got some quite hard hitting feedback that said ‘progress of project x is not fast enough, we’d like to see this’ and sort of steer about ‘we wouldn’t fund that a second year because we think it’s done what it needed to do or we don’t think enough has been achieved’”}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)
\end{flushright}

Therefore, the financial power of the PCC is demonstrated through scrutiny and monitoring of the projects. This management of performance at the force-wide level, from the PCC, counteracts the rhetoric of devolved action at the district level, through the establishment of locally based Police and

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\textsuperscript{191} This was the case of Bijan Ebrahimi who was killed in Bristol in 2013 by a neighbour who wrongly believed him to be a paedophile, and sparked an inquiry into the failure of police officers and a PCSO to respond to the victim’s calls for help. ‘Police face misconduct charge over Bijan Ebrahimi death’ BBC News Online Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-30347231 Accessed on: 30\textsuperscript{th} December 2016

\textsuperscript{192} Overview and Scrutiny Management Board meeting, Agenda Item No.9, 19\textsuperscript{th} December 2013 Retrieved from: https://democracy.bristol.gov.uk/Data/Overview%20&%20Scrutiny%20Management%20Board/201312191800/Agenda/1219_9.pdf Accessed: 30\textsuperscript{th} December 2016
Crime Plans. This scrutiny of delivery is to be expected given the PCC’s elected status, and need to demonstrate successful results should she stand for re-election, as well as her commitment to ensure that taxpayers money is well spent. Through the management of Safer Bristol’s performance the PCC is able to keep her priorities on the agenda of other actors:

‘it’s about how much focus and emphasis you give...violence against women and girls or domestic or sexual abuse partnership ... has always been one of our priorities so... it’s more about Sue’s confirming ‘that’s great I want you to keep the momentum up on that work I want you to get some breakthrough around FGM or particular elements of the VAWG agenda and also responding to things that happen in Bristol’193

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

In Bristol, the Community Cohesion and Safety Scrutiny Commission scrutinises the council’s community safety activities, including the work of Safer Bristol. Prior to the election of PCCs, the Scrutiny Commission agreed to focus on the changing structure of arrangements for community safety, the role of partners, and the funding regimes.194 It is evident that these issues are within the context of the subject of community safety, and the remit of the PCC’s role. However, during the fieldwork period, due to restructuring within Bristol Council, the Community Cohesion and Safety Scrutiny Commission’s work programme was undertaken by the Overview and Scrutiny Management Board of Bristol Council. Significantly, the community safety project ‘Female Genital Mutilation Prevalence Project’ funded by the PCC for 2013/14, was stated as being recommended by the Scrutiny Commission in the previous year, demonstrating the impact that the Commission had on issues put on the agenda.195

One meeting was observed on the 19th December 2013, due to the agenda including a progress report on the community safety projects funded through the PCC’s Community Safety Grant. This agenda

193 FGM = Female Genital Mutilation; VAWG = Violence Against Women and Girls
item was presented by the Director of Safer Bristol, Gillian Douglas, who circulated a report prior to the meeting on progress to date, and responded to questions provided by the Board. Given the PCC’s role in the community safety projects as funding provider, it is somewhat surprising that no representative of the PCC’s office was in attendance at the meeting. The scrutiny of Safer Bristol at this meeting was discussed by the Director during interview a month later:

‘it was really really useful because members who were out there dealing with people in their constituencies have really strong views [...] I found that really valuable because I could sit and think ‘oh alley gating well we’ve done that’ but ... what we heard was that [it] was really making a difference to some people, some residents’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

This extract demonstrates the importance of recognising the Scrutiny Commission as an agency within the policy network for community safety agenda setting in Bristol: they have an input through scrutiny, likened to consultation. This information is passed from Safer Bristol to the PCC, which may explain the lack of PCC representation at the meeting itself:

‘I [provide] feedback [...] ‘this is the flavour from the members, this is what the members want to see, we need to be listening to them, they’re our employers, they reflect what they hear from their communities so it’s not to be taken with a pinch of salt, it’s to be listened to’ [...] so when the PCC says ‘well why do you want to continue with alley gating’ we say ‘well neighbourhood delivery teams are saying this about it, the difference it’s made, our scrutiny members said this’, so that was good’

(Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

The extract above illustrates how information discussed at the Scrutiny Commission meeting is used by Safer Bristol and the PCC, to identify both gaps in service and areas of best practice. Safer Bristol uses their political and informational power, gained from scrutiny by the Council, to inform the PCC, potentially having a significant impact on what the PCC might prioritise. The scrutiny of the community safety projects funded by the PCC was discussed at a Police and Crime Panel meeting, where it was highlighted that the monitoring and oversight of the grant, would be used to ‘inform decision making for next year’. This ‘partnership’ approach to scrutiny, with both the Bristol Council Scrutiny

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196 Ibid.
197 Field notes from observation of Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel meeting, 5th June 2013
Commission and the PCC monitoring the progress of community safety projects, could cause problems of competing views and priorities.

The evidence presented in this section suggests that the Safer Bristol Partnership and Scrutiny Commission play a significant role in the setting of the community safety agenda, with the PCC, through the sharing of information. However, the PCC has financial power, as the funder of community safety projects, which is played out through the more intensive scrutiny experienced by Safer Bristol, than prior to the election of the PCC. The PCC positions herself as the obligatory passage point in the circuit of power in relation to her specific community safety grant allocations, despite the majority of funding for community safety related issues in Bristol remaining funded by Bristol Council.

6.3.6 Police and Crime Commissioner’s consultations with the public

As stated earlier in this chapter, the Sue Mountstevens views herself as ‘representing Avon and Somerset and the local people that make up that area.’ Due to this, she undertakes consultation with members of the general public, in various ways, to get their views on priorities for the Police and Crime Plan:

‘I aim to ensure that people have real and practical opportunities to shape their policing and community safety services’

‘If I am to be the voice of the public, which is what I think my role as PCC is, then my job is to go out and listen and you can never do enough listening because you go out and listen to groups of people and they know what the issues are and they just need to tell me...I am very accountable to the public .... that was the whole point of having a Police and Crime Commissioner, to be the bridge between the police and the residents and... we’ve had so many people being in touch with our office, I’ve had 1300 in the last couple of months you know I had 2500 in the first 10 weeks.. if you compare that with the Police Authority who only had 260 contacts in one year you can see that there was a real hunger out there for people to want to have their voices heard and that’s my job’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 1)

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198 Home Affairs Committee, 21st January 2013, Q426 Retrieved from:
199 n.9 page 8
The PCC associates her visibility to the public with the fact that there has been a vast increase in the volume of public contacting her, in comparison to the previous Police Authority. This increase in contact with the public was also highlighted in the PCC’s first Annual Report:

‘The Commissioner received 2,725 individual contacts from members of the public between November 2012 and May 2013, which compares to 174 received by the Police Authority during the same period in 2011/12. This has been due, in part, to an increased profile of the role, a single point of focus for the public and an increased level of community engagement.’

In addition to these individual contacts to the Office of the PCC, public consultation was undertaken on the Police and Crime Plan from mid-December 2012, via a questionnaire which could be completed online, over the phone or on a hard copy, gaining 1179 responses. Consultation events were held in each police district and local authority area, in venues such as community centres, supermarkets, museums, council premises and libraries. These events were ‘set up so that views could be captured from those who proactively planned to attend and also enabled engagement with passers-by’. The PCC, or a representative from her office, would be in attendance at these events, as well as local police officers, PCSOs and local authority staff ‘ensuring that any immediate issues that arose could be addressed’.

Consultation responses were also encouraged via social media, while radio interviews, press releases, information on websites, posters and direct targeting of local news agencies, parish councils and community groups were also utilised to promote awareness of the consultation opportunities. In addition to engaging the general public in the ways listed above, specific groups and individuals were also consulted, including refuges, homeless shelters, substance misuse services and youth clubs. The consultation report states that 519 people were engaged in the various ‘public facing sessions’ held by the PCC. The consultation report also states that, where other groups and individuals have led consultations and fed information back to the PCC, feedback has been ‘taken into consideration in developing the plan’ for 2013-17. Particular mention is given to the Force Forward projects, which provided 500 young people with the opportunity to ‘influence PCC priorities’ in the lead up to the PCC elections.

Such consultation demonstrates the distinctive emphasis on public

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202 Ibid.

engagement prior to the PCC election, which Sue Mountstevens may feel the need to maintain throughout her term in office. The PCC states that aim of consultation events was to encourage responses from those hard to reach:

‘I went to various groups, I spend one day a week out in the community ... we went to supermarkets and various other places to engage the public ... we had quite a lot of consultation days where we went out to meet what I would call the ‘quiet voices’ to listen to what they had to say and we also obviously had email responses and letters’

(Sue Mountstevens, Interview 1)

The consultation report noted that the majority of those consulted had been ‘victims of crime and/or were from minority groups’. Indeed, questionnaire participant levels were monitored repeatedly throughout the consultation period, and those groups that were found to be underrepresented (including children and young people, black and minority ethnic groups and disabled people) were then targeted in order to increase participation levels.

The consultation questionnaires largely consisted of closed questions asking respondents to rate predefined priority areas in order of importance. Table 17 shows the results of these consultation questionnaires:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Important or Very Important to them</th>
<th>Important or Very Important to residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti Social Behaviour</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against Women and Girls</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 17 Results of Avon and Somerset PCC consultation question on importance of priorities)

Respondents were also able to provide ‘free text’ regarding their views on the priorities, and three emerging areas were subsequently included in the first Police and Crime Plan: visibility of the police, road safety, and relationships between communities and the police, community safety and criminal

Note: a specific page on the PCC’s website named ‘consultation’ was available during the field work period, but is no longer available to view.


Accessed on: 30th December 2016

205 Ibid.
justice agencies. In addition to this, violence against women and girls was widened to ‘domestic and sexual violence, particularly violence towards women and children’. Any feedback that related to other agencies, primarily local authorities, was shared with them and partner agencies.

Consultation with the public was not confined to the pre-publication of the Police and Crime Plan: instead the PCC continued to engage with the public throughout the first financial year of her term in office. For example: the PCC gathered the views and opinions of the general public that she represents through the holding of bi-monthly local public meetings attended by her, the public and the local police; she encouraged questions from the public at the start of Police and Crime Panel meetings’; and she provided the opportunity to talk to the PCC and Chief Constable on the radio, at local festivals, at supermarkets, libraries and other public places. Activities such as these were argued to ‘open up the police force’ and ‘improve accessibility’.

The first ‘Police and Crime Commissioner, and Police Public Forum’ was held in April 2013, five months after the election, and after the first Police and Crime Plan had been published. In a written update to the Police and Crime Panel in March 2013, the PCC stated that the purpose of the meetings is ‘to allow for public access and demonstrate accountability’, rather than a consultation on priorities. Two of the public forums were observed as part of fieldwork: Frome in April 2013, and Bristol in June 2013, in which the PCC and District Commander discussed local and wider issues, and provided presentations on matters likely to be of public interest. For example, the Frome Forum included a presentation from the Chief Superintendent of the area on the local policing team, local crime statistics, and local crime type priorities (burglary and anti-social behaviour). The majority of the meeting was used to respond to questions from the public. Data collected from observing the Frome Forum, corroborated by document analysis of the transcript of the meeting shows that 13 questions from the members of the public were asked. A dominant subject matter at the Frome Forum was how the PCC would take action in relation to reductions in funding. The PCC responded, stating a commitment to delivering frontline services, and resilience in collaboration with other forces, and local partners. Some questions raised personal issues, such as experience of anti-social behaviour, to which the District Commander in attendance promised a follow up of the individual case; other questions related to the organisation that the member of the public was representing, such as the

206 Field notes of observation Sue Mountstevens, speaking at the Frome Police and Crime Commissioner, and Police Public Forum, April 2013
207 Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner’s written update to Panel, 15th March 2013 Page 1
Accessed on: 30th December 2016
208 A full transcript of questions and answers, and the presentations made at the Frome Public forum is available at: http://www.avonandsomerset-pcc.gov.uk/Openness/Frome-Public-Forum.aspx
Hope Charity, or Community Speedwatch, recruiting for volunteers. Particularly noteworthy was the question from an ex-parish councillor, who was critical of the allocation of PCSOs to rural villages, and felt that there had been an unfair reduction of 50%. The response from the transcript follows:

‘There has been a 17% reduction in PCSOs overall across the organisation. The savings the organisation is having to make are huge and Chief Officers cannot micro-manage and individuals have to be moved in response to the need e.g. if colleagues were in danger or the burglary issue in Frome. The District Commander confirmed that the number of PCSOs in the area has not reduced from 9 in three years but that they have to move around according to demand and are a mobile workforce. Some Local Authorities have elected to support community safety and contribute towards some PCSO posts.’

Despite the PCC’s attempt at fairness in funding using the funding formula outlined in earlier in this chapter, there are public concerns regarding the spread of resources such as PCSOs. Additionally, this public question and response shows the subjectivity of public views, demonstrating the historical problem with participatory democracy.

The Bristol Forum, in June 2013, followed a similar format to the inaugural Frome Forum: attended by the PCC, Chief Constable and District Commander, a presentation from the District Commander on policing the area, and questions from the public. Non-participant observations of the Forum, corroborated with the published transcript of the Forum, show that 16 questions were asked. Similarly to the Frome Forum, questions were asked regarding personal cases, such as anti-social behaviour victimisation, which, as a live case, was not discussed publicly. It became clear that these meetings were not to be used as a way of reporting issues to the police. For example, a resident raised the issue of a road being used as a ‘drag strip’, and received the response that it needed to be reported through the proper channels: ‘let the police know the details please’.

In addition to the general public forums, less frequent forums that tackle specific themes were organised. For example, in December 2013 a forum on road safety took place, with 150 people attending in person and 700 people watching it streamed online. In response to a Home Affairs Committee question on media engagement, the PCC drew on the road safety forum, stating that:

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210 See Section 6.1
211 See Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.3
212 Field notes of observation of Bristol Police Public Forum, 25th June 2013
’It is making sure that we are talking about areas that local people want to hear about and making sure that we are very accessible. I have made it very clear that you do not have to submit a question in advance. You can ask us any question that you want and the Chief and I, whoever is most appropriate, will make sure that we answer it’.213

In addition to meeting members of the public face to face, the PCC used technology to reach out the public. For example, a webchat was organised in March 2013, to mark 100 days in office. Writing in her regular column, in the Bristol Post, the PCC noted that the webchat highlighted the fact that ‘people are still unclear about this new role’ and clarified the strategic and accountability function of the role.214 Therefore, despite the PCC’s attempts to actively engage with the public in person, through the forums discussed above, even those members of the public who engage with a webchat with the PCC, were still uncertain about her roles and responsibilities.

The Avon and Somerset PCC was also an active presence on Social Media sites. On Facebook, the Commissioner’s page was liked by 422 people, and included information on how the public can contact her.215 The Page was regularly updated by the Office of the PCC with text and photos, often of engagement and consultation events, and also included a timetable for upcoming events. Posts by members of the public were made frequently to the page, and the majority of which were responded to by the Office of the PCC within 24 hours. However, during the fieldwork time period there were no posts to the Facebook page that related to community safety priorities or agenda. Rather, the majority of posts related to holding the PCC to account for organisational issues, and complaints against her conduct, rather than issues relating to community safety priorities.216

The Avon and Somerset PCC also had an active presence on social media site Twitter.217 This account is used in a similar manner to the Facebook page, providing information about engagement and consultation events being held by the PCC. Analysis of tweets directed to the account during the first financial year of the PCC demonstrates a variety of themes. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Office of the Avon and Somerset PCC livetweeted events such as the Public Forums, to share information for those that are not in attendance. This was commented on by a Twitter user:

216 This was particularly true following the suspension of the Chief Constable, Nick Gargan, when the Police and Crime Commissioner was also found to have revealed confidential information.
217 @AandSPCC
'@AandSPCC @ngargan_police Great to see that communication is a priority for local policing. Good Twitter feed tonight is a great example'.

Twitter also offered an opportunity for members of the public to provide their views on what they think needs to be a priority. For example, in response to the PCC’s tweet ‘I want to be as open and honest with you as possible. The service is changing and we do have to respond to #policecuts’ on the 27th May 2014, a twitter user stated ‘@AandSPCC Please keep looking at everything that needs awaking [sic] up and improving. Thank you for taking the job on. Don’t let the tribe lead’. However, despite tweets made by the PCC’s account, urging the public to provide their views on the Police and Crime Plan, no direct tweets to the PCC’s account were available under the search terms used. It is possible that the public responded to these tweets using a different medium.

Similarly to the Facebook use discussed above, Twitter was used by the public to scrutinise the PCC. For example, on the topic of police station closures, the following exchange occurred between the Commissioner and the ex-Chairman of the Bristol Labour Party, Darren Lewis:

From @BristolRed: ‘@AandSPCC @SuMountstevens & for avoidance of doubt is there a plan/draft consultation where closure of any Bristol station is an option?’

From @AandSPCC: ‘@BristolRed @SuMountstevens appreciate it could confuse although they were careful to say 'under threat' rather than closing.’

From @BristolRed: ‘@AandSPCC I think it's your language that is misleading. In the public's perception what you've described is a planned closure’

These extracts demonstrate that for Avon and Somerset, social media platforms are utilised as a method for disseminating information to the public, and for the public to scrutinise the PCC, rather than the expected use of encouraging consultation on priorities. It is possible that due to the PCC’s commitment to consulting face-to-face, as discussed above, the public do not feel that it is necessary to respond to requests for consultation via social media.

The problems with the PCC’s aim of consulting with the general public, and using their opinion to form the Police and Crime Plan priorities, were discussed by the Safer Bristol Director:

Something [...] I struggle with is making sense of what are agency priorities and what is truly a priority of the community because, as we know whenever we do consultation or we want to

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218 Tweet to @AndSPCC 28 Jan 2014 commenting on North Somerset public forum
219 Tweet to @AandSPCC 27 May 2014
220 Twitter, 20th December 2013
know community views, certain voices come to the fore … there are certain people who will participate, they’re confident, they’re maybe pushy, they’re sure of themselves, whereas the so called hard to reach […] the people who don’t come forward people, say with mental health issues or whatever, what about their issues? so we’ll go to a core cities meeting and people will say ‘oh the two crimes that are going up now are shoplifting and mobile phone theft’ and the debate is [about] but how important is [that?] … are we actually really going to divert resources away from domestic violence or hate crime when we know the personal harm…?’

(Gillian Douglas, Director for Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

This extract raises several significant, and related, points. Firstly, the problem of forms of participatory democracy have been well documented. As indicated in the literature, public meetings tend to capture the views of those who can shout the loudest, or have the social mobility to attend such meetings.221 Such mechanisms for consultation have been proposed to create a majoritarian, or populist, agenda, which limits the engagement of minorities.222 While the PCC is committed to representing the public, her mechanisms for consultation demonstrates an approach that lacks an attempt at achieving a representative sample, aside from boosting particular social groups during the initial survey on the 2013-17 Police and Crime Plan.

Secondly, the extract sheds light on the problem of the PCC attempting to respond to local level problems, from the regional level. Problems such as shoplifting and mobile phone theft are clearly important crime priorities to local residents of Bristol, but the PCC, operating at the force-wide level is required to take these into consideration alongside, arguably, more harmful issues such as domestic violence. This tension between local, district level resources for ‘quality of life issues’, and regional, force-wide resources for more serious crimes, is clearly a concern for the Partnership Director. Of course the PCC also needs to acknowledge the other local areas that may have different issues, thus producing more tension in resources. In addition, it is these quality of life disorders that the public are far more likely to experience, and would still have a significant impact on the individual. It is therefore these issues that the PCC might address, if she wishes to be re-elected for the next term.

The concerns of the Director of Safer Bristol over the focus on public demand was partly negated by the acknowledgment that the PCC views the demands from the public in relation to other factors:

222 S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2014) n.4
‘It’s triangulated with ‘what’s the evidence base, what are the budget pressures, how much difference do we think we can make?’”

(Gillian Douglas, Director for Safer Bristol Partnership, Interview)

This interview extract therefore demonstrates that the agenda is also set in relation to the ‘evidence base’, and budget pressures. For example, document analysis shows that the PCC consults with local University departments, taking account of their evidence on matters of crime and disorder. This is in addition to the information sharing between agencies such as the local statutory partnerships that has been discussed in Section 6.3.5. This highlights the importance of the multi-method approach to this case study: if only interviews with the PCC had been conducted, it would have been assumed that the agenda was only set based on the consultations with the general public.

6.4 Summary and Conclusion: Avon and Somerset Case Study

This chapter has provided the case of the impact that the Avon and Somerset PCC has on the agenda for community safety, through identifying the impact on what is prioritised, what is funded, and how the agenda is set through negotiation. A significant finding is the democratic approach to the role that Sue Mountstevens takes, demonstrated by her focus on political power through the legitimacy derived from election (representative democracy) and right to build public support (participatory democracy). She provides the public with opportunities to consult on her Police and Crime Plan, not only prior to the annual publication, but also throughout the year at various engagement events. Such events also provide an opportunity for the public to hold her to account for her decisions. Her visible working relationship with the now ex-Chief Constable of the force, also has an impact on her perceived constitutional-legal power by ranks within the force. Such findings exemplify her position as an obligatory passage for wider organisational matters, which is both a necessary and contingent relation: the 2011 Act necessitates that she is involved in the removal of a Chief Constable, yet it is a contingency that she was the initial contact for a whistle-blower in this instance, as the individual may have approached another actor instead.

Despite this focus on what may often be subjective views of the public, there are similarities between her priorities in the 2013-17 Plan, and the priorities of the community safety partnerships prior to her election. As has been stated, this is arguably due to the partnership using its informational power,

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224 R. Rhodes (1997) n.1 page 37
built from expertise in the field, to push certain priorities. However, on the other side of the same coin, the PCC has the financial power to fund community safety projects that meet her priorities, and therefore Safer Bristol must align with these to receive funding from her Office. Due to these issues, the two agencies work closely together: the PCC benefits by receiving information, and the Partnership by receiving financial assistance.

One of the most significant findings from this chapter, is provided in Section 6.2 regarding the context of Avon and Somerset, and specifically Bristol: despite the restructuring of funding provision, necessitating the PCC now allocating the Community Safety grant to Partnerships whose projects align with her priorities, it is Bristol City Council who retain financial power, as majority funders for community safety related issues in Bristol. The PCC is not the obligatory passage point for all community safety related activities in Bristol. This therefore provides evidence for the existence of a policy network, and justification for the research design of the thesis, in addition to providing a counterargument to a key criticism of PCCs – that they have omnipotent power to make decisions – by demonstrating that other local agencies retain financial power. Safer Bristol can still receive funding for priorities not outlined in the PCC’s agenda, through Bristol Council, at a pro rata reduction, similarly to all public services during imposed austerity.

Regime analysis details core ‘particulars of governance’, which are used to identify the capacity to govern. These are: an agenda to address a distinct set of problems; a governing coalition of state and non-state actors formed around that agenda; resources for the pursuit of the agenda, provided by the governing coalition; and schemes of cooperation used to motivate participation within the coalition.225

This chapter has discussed the relevant agencies who have the responsibility for setting a community safety agenda in Bristol, and their priorities have been presented. Table 18 illustrates in more detail how the priorities within such agendas have been conceptualised using regime analysis. The table demonstrates that there are predominantly developmental tendencies, with a focus on risk management priorities which prioritise situational and social crime prevention, and the identification and management of those at risk of criminal or disorderly behaviour. However, there are also maintenance and progressive priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Criminological Conceptualisation</th>
<th>Avon and Somerset PCC priority areas for Bristol</th>
<th>Bristol Council 20:20 plan</th>
<th>Safer Bristol Partnership priority areas, 2012-15 plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance: maintains previous status quo of established regime</td>
<td>Criminal justice: public safety policies which augment criminal law enforcement and public order</td>
<td>Improve (increase) criminal justice outcomes for burglary; Focussed offender management for burglary and violence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Reduce offending and improve offender management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental: works with established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas, but seeks to augment these</td>
<td>Risk management: maintaining criminal justice tendencies, with the addition of risk management priorities</td>
<td>Reduce opportunities for burglary and reduce risk to vulnerable properties; Improve citizen reporting of Anti-Social Behaviour; Tackling domestic and sexual violence, particularly violence towards women and children</td>
<td>Reduce Crime (targeting hot spots and situational crime prevention projects) Reduce impact of substance misuse (through treatment) Tackle violent crime (promoting reporting, emphasising reduction of reoffending) Reduction of domestic violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformist: Seek to reform policy agendas and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Restorative justice: diversion from custody and non-state conflict resolution</td>
<td>Community resolutions to Anti-Social Behaviour; Seeking restorative justice for victims</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Reduce acquisitive crime Reduce violent crime (including sexual violence and street violence) Reduce the harm caused by drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative: alter the context of major public policy problems, and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Social justice: socially inclusive priorities, based on social justice model</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Regime Conceptualisation of Avon and Somerset Community Safety Agenda
Viewing the priorities alone indicates regime failure due to the lack of an agreed agenda, as defined by regime analysis. Considering the other ‘core particulars of governance’, it is also clear that the PCC struggles to create a capacity to govern, as the PCC is not an attractive enough coalition partner, due to two related contingent factors. Firstly, to form a successful governing coalition, the PCC would need compromise some aspirations to account for other agencies’ demands. As she views her role as being a representative of the public, she is unwilling to do so. Secondly, the discussions earlier in the chapter demonstrate that Bristol Council have vast financial resources to pursue their agenda, in comparison to the PCC who has far less, or Bristol Partnership who is reliant on the resources of the other two actors. Bristol Council uses this financial power to motivate the participation of the PCC and the partnership in their own agenda, as exemplified above in relation to the PCSO agreement. However, an overlap of priorities and a funding agreement does not constitute a governing coalition, due to the lack of coordinated agenda. Therefore the dominant actor in setting the local community safety agenda in Bristol, remains Bristol Council, despite the introduction of a new actor, who has community safety agenda setting responsibilities. The wider significance of this key finding is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

\[226\] Which also benefits the PCC
7. Discussion: Comparing the Cases

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the broader context of the detailed findings of the thesis, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and address the research questions, by comparing the two case studies. The findings demonstrate that despite being introduced with the aim of developing a more personal relationship with the electorate, leading to the creation of a more locally based community safety agenda, PCCs are restricted by the necessary power-dependence relationships of the quadripartite structure, and local policy network. It has been evidenced that multiple actors with their own agendas exist within a tangled web of power-dependence relationships. For city-level community safety policy, regime failure exists in both case study sites as not all the core ‘particulars of governance’ (an agenda to address a distinct set of problems; a governing coalition of state and non-state actors formed around that agenda; resources for the pursuit of the agenda, provided by the governing coalition; and schemes of cooperation used to motivate participation within the coalition) are met. In South Wales, despite similarities between the PCC’s and Welsh Government’s agenda, and the emergence of a governing coalition around Alun Michael’s agenda, he lacks the ability to be the dominant actor in community safety policy in South Wales, particularly due to his limited financial resources relative to other actors. Similarities between community safety agendas of actors in Avon and Somerset also exist, but the PCC has limited financial resources relative to other actors, as well as the lack of a governing coalition.

The comparative discussion of these core findings is structured around three ‘open codes’, which have been identified as being significant to a PCC’s role in setting the local policy agenda for community safety. These are associated with the core ‘particulars of governance’ that are used by regime theorists to identify the capacity to govern, and have been used by other authors as a conceptual and methodological framework which can test and build criminological accounts of the role of political power in negotiating social order. These are as follows:

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1 See Section 4.6
Particulars of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open code</th>
<th>Relation to role of PCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A clear agenda to address a distinct set of problems</td>
<td>The creation of a Police and Crime Plan, with priorities for policing and responses to crime and disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A governing coalition formed around the agenda</td>
<td>Community safety policy network agencies’ involvement in the agenda; Arrangements for democratic oversight of local governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A scheme of cooperation</td>
<td>Budgetary Politics Resourcing of community safety initiatives by the PCCs, and the other agencies in the policy network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(financial) Resources for the pursuit of the agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19 Relating Regime Analysis and Police and Crime Commissioners

The aims of the role of PCCs, and hopes and fears surrounding this new actor in police governance, were discussed in policy and academic fields, as well as mass media, prior to the first election in 2012. This literature has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but is reiterated briefly here, specifically related to these open codes.

Firstly, related to strategic politics, advocates of the reform, the Police Foundation, claimed that the introduction of PCCs offered ‘an opportunity for strengthening neighbourhood policing, [and] developing holistic local crime reduction’, while incorporating evidence-based policing.5 The Foundation also argued that due to their elected position, PCCs would possess ‘soft power’ which could be used to persuade different agencies to work together more effectively. However, PCCs also had the potential to further fragment service delivery at the local level, and disrupt successful local political regimes.6 Lobbying groups also criticised the reform for the potential politicisation of the police and the related loss of constabulary independence: by electing a PCC who could stand on a

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4 Regime analysis focusses on a governing coalition that is typically formed between governmental and non-governmental members, but gives little attention to the role of the general public, (as they are not established and organised groups of the public). In the context of this thesis, the democratic oversight and scrutiny that the public have the potential to perform, as well as involvement in consultation means that this is necessary to be included.


political party ticket, the police would no longer enjoy their insulation from political forces. Exacerbating this was the risk that PCCs would create punitive strategies, appeasing populist demands, to boost their chances of re-election. Doing so would drastically change the landscape of policing and community safety strategies within the forces, returning to crime fighting over the ‘fluffy’ responses of community safety. However, others countered such criticisms by noting that organised political parties would be the most likely to have a vision of a holistic, democratic partnership approach to local policing, and they would be realistic about what policing could achieve.

The independence of the constabulary has been argued to only apply to the Chief in making broad operational decisions, as the Home Office can exercise ‘enormous influence’ over the police, due to the realities of police organisation and management, through Home Office Circulars.

The second open code discussed in this chapter is public consultation and accountability. Due to the perceived failure of Police Authorities in performing this role, and the Coalition Government’s Big Society Agenda, PCCs were introduced with the aim of reducing the ‘democratic deficit’ within police governance through direct elections of a single local figurehead for policing with individual political mandates. The Police Foundation, in support of the introduction of PCCs, deemed them a ‘vehicle through which people can have some direct say over how local areas are policed’. This statutory public consultation part of their role echoes Jefferson and Grimshaw’s claim that occasional casting of national and local election votes is not sufficient for democratic governance: rather, continuing participation is required. Such a police governance model presages a shift from a ‘managerialist organisational regime’, to one which enables more local discretion due to the local democratic input. However, PCCs were argued to be constrained by the geographical area of representation, due to their force wide responsibilities being incompatible with their obligation to address citizens’ local policing needs.

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11 I. Loader and R. Muir (2016) n.5


concerns. In addition, a traditionally ill-informed public contributing to crime and policing priorities raises concerns over the focus on PCC consultation. In contrast, there is the potential for cynical consultation, in which the public can feel that they are participating in creating policing strategies, but their suggestions for priorities are overlooked by policy-makers. The very rationale of PCCs as enhancing democratic accountability within police governance has also been critiqued for its limited focus on only state actors, rather than acknowledging the diverse reality of policing which includes private actors.

Lastly, budgetary politics is identified as an open code due to the significance of PCCs’ responsibility for setting the force budget and commissioning community safety responses. The removal of commissioning powers from a local to a regional position, has been criticised for creating tensions between local councils and partnerships, due to competition for resources from the PCC. This may be exacerbated by the central government programme of austerity and associated severe reductions in funding available for policing and community safety responses.

In this chapter, these three open codes, related to the particulars of governance, are discussed in relation to the ‘axial codes’ of Rhodes’ relationships of power dependence, which structure processes of governance (informational, political, financial, hierarchical and constitutional-legal). This enables an explanation of the negotiation that occurs within the policy networks, as well as the content of an agenda. It is therefore possible to ascertain the capacity of PCCs to build a stable policy regime within the post-2011 police governance structure, and provide an account of how such power is exercised through negotiations with other policy actors. Such a regime would include an agenda that is financially and politically sustainable, the formation of a governing coalition, a scheme of cooperation which enables that agenda, and resources in pursuit of that agenda. Conversely, it is also possible to identify whether such capacity is limited by factors raised in previous chapters and the literature outlined above, including, for example, their relative insignificance in terms of funding their agenda, and their position at the regional level, rather than local. Such factors might lead to an assessment of PCCs that can be conceptualised as regime failure, where there are a lack of resources to sustain a clear agenda, and/or the inability to create an effective governing coalition around that agenda.

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14 F. Sampson, ‘Hail to the chief? How far does the introduction of elected police commissioners herald a US-style politicisation of policing for the UK?’ Policing, (2012) Vol.6(1)
17 S. Lister, and M. Rowe, (2015) n.6
18 Observation of Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee meeting, 23rd October 2012
19 See Section 4.6
By comparing Avon and Somerset and South Wales in this way, the necessary and contingent relations of power dependence discovered in the case study areas and presented in the previous findings chapters can be explained, not just described. Consideration of necessary relations entails the identification of processes that are required to occur. In the context of this thesis, they are the necessary conditions of the post-2011 structure for local policing and community safety governance. For example, a necessary relation is the legislative responsibilities of a PCC to set the force budget, allocate specific grants, propose priorities in a Police and Crime Plan, and hold the Chief Constable to account. How these relations are understood and actioned is dependent on contingent relations, and it is these relations which can generate insight into particular processes and contexts, because it is possible, but not necessary, for a process to occur. Such processes are contingent on a particular actor or a particular local context. Therefore the scope of agency and discretion involved in local community safety policy making can be explained. In the context of this thesis, a contingent relation is reliant on the specific case study area: specifically the expertise and connections of a particular PCC, their political ideology, and the particular local context of a site. Such contingencies are consequently related to the particular informational and political power of the PCC and associated policy network. Therefore, strategy setting and budgetary politics, the way in which public accountability is enabled, and the resources of power that are used by agencies within the policy network to pursue their own agendas, are contingent upon variations between case study areas. It is the interaction with different political actors within the area, for example Welsh Government, or the Bristol City Mayor, which enable the identification of these contingent relations.

The distinctions between necessary and contingent relations, discussed within this chapter, enable an identification and explanation of the impact of PCCs on community safety agenda setting, by considering both the structure of the governance of policing in England and Wales, post-2011, as well as the agency that individual PCCs, and others within the policy network, possess and the use of discretion.

7.2 Strategic Politics

As has been discussed throughout this thesis, the significant element of the role of the PCC is that they have the constitutional-legal power to set the strategic direction for a police force, which is a new arrangement in police governance in England and Wales, but they are one of multiple actors with community safety agenda setting responsibilities. This section reiterates the agendas of these actors,

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each one conceptualised in terms of regime analysis as maintenance, developmental, progressive or transformative. Conceptualising agendas in this manner is a way of diagnosing principal orientations, or dispositions, of policy responses to crime, and community safety, in specific localities. It would be foolish to disregard the fact that in practice regimes are likely to be an assortment of different typologies due to the multiple actors with the responsibility for setting agendas, which could be a successful regime if adequate governing coalitions and resources were obtained, or could lead to regime failure. This is considered alongside the axial codes of power-dependence relationships, reflecting how the PCCs utilise these resources of power in relation to others within the policy network for community safety. Therefore, the core particulars of governance of a clear agenda, a governing coalition, and a scheme of cooperation, are examined.

There are necessary and contingent relations that enable, and limit, the formation of a cooperating coalition around the local community safety agenda. Firstly, in terms of necessary relations, the 2011 Act stipulates that PCCs and relevant local authorities must ‘have regard’ to each other’s priorities. This is arguably vague guidance which has the potential to result in variable levels of cooperation in practice. Thus, significance is placed on the contingencies which exist in each force area, particularly the expertise and background of the individual PCC, the existence of other actors within the policy network, and the interaction that occurs between these actors.

In South Wales, the PCC, the Welsh Government, and Cardiff Partnership Board all have the constitutional-legal power to set local community safety agendas. The community safety response to young people and crime has been used as an ‘acid test’ for the conceptualisation of their agendas, and previous chapters have highlighted the differing aims of each agenda: the PCC and the Cardiff Partnership board have a predominantly developmental agenda, while the Welsh Government have an agenda that could be characterised as having both reformatory and transformative tendencies.

The constitutional-legal remit of the PCC states that he must ‘have regard’ to relevant authorities, with no specification of who that might be. This provides the PCC, and other agencies, with discretion in who they engage with and on what matters, arguably creating opportunity for a range of responses to crime and disorder, including progressive or transformative. However, despite his experience in the policy-making arena, Alun Michael does not use this opportunity. Instead, for the first financial year of office, he is dependent on the expertise of others to set priorities, for example the South Wales Police Justice and Partnership Team, which results in the continuation of pre-existing priorities.

21 Full tables depicting the conceptualisation of each actor’s agenda by regime analysis have been included and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 22 The table at the end of Chapter 5 provides a table showing all the priorities for all these actors. For ease of interpreting this ‘acid test’, Appendix 3 contains an amended table, showing only responses to young people and crime.
causing a predominantly developmental agenda. In addition to this, the constitutional-legal remit of the PCC is limited: he must ‘have regard’ to relevant agencies, but there is a presumption that these are the usual agencies. In contrast, the Welsh Government has a wider constitutional-legal remit, is far more established, and is therefore able to use its capacity to create social justice related priorities. Therefore, the progressive or transformative potential of a PCC is limited relevant to the other agencies in the policy network for community safety.

The priority of responding to young people’s anti-social behaviour highlights this divergence in agendas. Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) have been used in previous literature as an example of a criminal justice, and therefore maintenance, agenda, because of their punitiveness.\(^{23}\) Therefore, Alun Michael’s statement in his Police and Crime Reduction Plan 2013-17, that ASBOs have been ‘successful and efficient’ and should be continued to meet his ‘outcomes’ of reducing the level of anti-social behaviour, reducing the number of repeat victims and improving public confidence in the police, indicates maintenance tendencies.\(^{24}\) This is despite South Wales having a low rate of issuing ASBOs in England and Wales, seemingly due to a ‘rejection’ of the use of ASBOs within Wales.\(^{25}\) The Welsh Government 2011-2016 Programme for Change priorities include reducing and preventing young offending by continuing ‘funding to community safety partnerships for projects related to education, training, leisure, arts, sports, restorative justice and initiatives to combat substance misuse’.\(^{26}\) Therefore, Alun Michael’s promotion of the use of the ASBO indicates a punitive shift in the rhetorical response to young people in South Wales, and potentially signifies a narrowing of the community safety agenda.\(^{27}\)

Alun Michael uses his policy-making experience in other ways, and attempts to build a governing coalition. He is well acquainted with many other politicians, policy-makers, and practitioners in South Wales, and he uses these contacts, exploiting his resource of political power, to attempt to create a governing coalition around his agenda. For example, he meets with Local Authority Leaders, Local Councillors and Welsh Assembly members, to discuss both his own agenda, as well as mutually

\(^{26}\) Welsh Government 2011-2016 Programme for Change page 26
\(^{27}\) A. Crawford (2013) n.6
beneficial objectives.\textsuperscript{28} On the basis of the empirical evidence, and due to the adaptive nature of this thesis, it is difficult to assess the success of this attempt at creating a governing coalition. To do so, empirical evidence would be needed from individuals within the attempted governing coalition, regarding the schemes of co-operation and their interpretation of their relationship with the PCC and his agenda. As discussed in the methodology chapter, regime analysis came to the fore late in the research process, and it therefore was not possible to return to the field to measure the success of the governing coalition.\textsuperscript{29}

Interview data with Alun Michael evidences that the audience for the Plan is other relevant agencies, and his strategic priorities and objectives are focussed on saving resources, and encouraging partnership working - issues that are important to the police and criminal justice agencies. In addition to this, the PCC creates a hierarchical structure by employing Assistant and Deputy PCCs, and ensures they are involved in the policy network across the region at the local level. This action, as well as creating priorities that are important to other agencies, encourages adherence to the PCC’s priorities at meetings such as the Cardiff Partnership Leadership Group. This is characterised as ‘soft power’, which enables better coordination between agencies, as well as enabling the PCC’s power to be exercised at the local level, reducing the impact of his role being positioned at the regional level.\textsuperscript{30}

In Avon and Somerset, the PCC, Bristol Council (through the integrated Bristol Partnership) and the community safety partnership Safer Bristol, have the constitutional-legal power to set community safety agendas. These agendas have been discussed in Chapter 6, and have been conceptualised using regime analysis as predominantly developmental, although both the PCC and Safer Bristol also have maintenance tendencies, through the inclusion of criminal justice focussed priorities. The similarities between these agendas is argued to firstly be due to Safer Bristol being part of the Bristol partnership, and secondly, Safer Bristol sharing information with the PCC: Safer Bristol updated their typical planning documents more frequently than usual, prior to the election of the PCC, to demonstrate what was working well, aiming to influence the PCCs priority decisions. The PCC therefore relies on the informational power of the other agencies to help set her agenda. Therefore, similarly to South Wales, the capacity of the PCC to create a radically different agenda is limited due to this contingent dependence on other agencies.

Despite the sharing of information from partnership to PCC, this does not result in formation of a governing coalition around the PCC’s agenda. This is because once community safety projects are

\textsuperscript{28} As discussed in Chapter 5, and Section 7.3
\textsuperscript{29} See Chapter 4
commissioned, information fed from the partnership to the PCC serves a different purpose: it is used by the PCC to scrutinise the work of the partnership. This is therefore a hierarchical relationship, rather than an equal coalition. She also struggles to form a governing coalition because she does not employ an Assistant or Deputy Commissioner, who would be able to promote her priorities in strategic arenas, as in South Wales, preferring instead to attempt to establish a personal relationship with the public. She concentrates her strategy on the local, viewing the public as the audience for her plan, and producing local plans, as well as a regional plan, which assists with negating the criticism of the regional position of the role of PCCs.

These findings demonstrate a contingent difference between the two case study areas, arguably due to the background and expertise of the two PCCs, which impacts their ability or desire to form a governing coalition around their agenda: as an established policy-maker, involved in the creation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, that introduced statutory partnerships, it is unsurprising that Alun Michael welcomes the input of ‘experts’, including the partnership, seeking to include them in his governing coalition. In contrast, Sue Mountstevens’ focus on having a personal direct relationship with the electorate, is incompatible with forming a governing coalition with other policy actors around her agenda, as that would result in compromising her claim to be operationalising the priorities of the public. Therefore, in Avon and Somerset, policy actors instead tacitly accept power differences, for example by self-censoring particular issues as a way of negotiating funding for projects that do align with the PCCs priorities. Again, this self-censoring limits any progressive or transformative potential of the new structure, as the ‘usual problems’ appear on the agenda. It is important to note that PCCs had less than three months to prepare their inaugural plan, and therefore it would have been difficult to design programmes or interventions from scratch, due to time: a PCC could do little more than finance a selection that were already being prioritised by existing agencies. This again demonstrates the constraint of the necessary relations of the post-2011 structure.

This section of the chapter has considered whether there is a dominant, common agenda - as defined by regime analysis - a governing coalition formed around that agenda, and a scheme of cooperation to pursue the agenda. The discussion thus far indicates a tendency towards regime failure: despite the attempt to create a governing coalition around the PCC’s agenda in South Wales, there is not a common agenda between the agencies that have community safety agenda setting responsibilities, while in Avon and Somerset a governing coalition is lacking. It is also evidenced that, due to the sharing

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31 Self-censorship of priorities for an agenda does result in a common agenda, but formed in a different way in South Wales compared to Avon and Somerset. See Section 6.3.5
of information and shared ideological tendencies of relevant agencies, fears that PCCs would respond to populist majority sentiment to ensure re-election, have largely been overdrawn. 32

7.3 Public Consultation and Accountability

As stated in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, and discussed in earlier chapters, PCCs must make arrangements ‘for obtaining the views of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area’. 33 A key aim of the introduction of PCCs was to enable democratic accountability and participation in local policing policy, which had previously been argued to be in deficit. 34 As discussed above in relation to strategy, the PCCs in Avon and Somerset and South Wales conduct their role in different ways. Alun Michael uses his political and hierarchical power to attempt to create a governing coalition around his agenda which aims to make more efficient use of resources. In contrast, Sue Mountstevens focusses on delivering the best services for the public, and holding the service delivery agencies to account on behalf of the public, through the use of her political power. These contingencies are related to how the PCCs perform a necessary part of their role: consulting with the public and providing opportunities to be held to account for their decisions. As such, the adequacy of the new governance of local policing structure for enabling public consultation and accountability to the public is discussed in this section, with reference to the political power of the PCC.

Due to a lack of public awareness of the role of PCCs prior to their election, consultation with the public is a way in which the PCCs could improve their visibility. 35 In Avon and Somerset, Sue Mountstevens consulted with the general public throughout her first financial year in office, through public forums, inviting public questioning at Police and Crime Panel meetings, and requesting public views via social media. These mechanisms served a dual purpose. Not only did they enable the public to provide their views on what should be prioritised, they also provided the opportunity for public oversight and scrutiny of the PCC and local policing strategy. While this could be viewed as the PCC offering ‘power to the people’, 36 previous chapters have highlighted that there is a lack of a social

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32 S. Lister and M. Rowe, (2015) n.6
33 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s.14, as amended from the Police Act 1996 s.96
35 The low turnout at the 2012 election was in part blamed on the lack of public awareness about the elections and the role of the PCC.
scientific approach, which would prioritise representativeness of the sample: instead, such mechanisms are likely to attract the ‘usual suspects’.37

Alun Michael prioritises the views of ‘platonic guardians’ on his agenda: he consults with ‘liberal elites’ and experts in policy making, including Local Authority leaders, local Councillors and Welsh Assembly Members in private meetings.38 Interview data, discussed in pervious chapters, has demonstrated that the PCC does not view consultation with the general public as a part of his role, as that would be duplicating the role of others, such as Neighbourhood Policing Teams. Therefore, in contrast to public consultation mechanisms in Avon and Somerset, Alun Michael’s mechanisms for consultation do not appear to provide the opportunity for direct consultation with the general public, nor enable public scrutiny of local policing strategy.

Related to these differences is the contrast in how information is presented to the public, which would also allow the public to scrutinise the work of the PCC, and hold them accountable for their actions. The Police and Crime Plans for each case study area are written very differently, and serve different purposes: Alun Michael stated in interview that his Plan was for the police and related agencies to view. In contrast, it is clear that Sue Mountstevens’ Plan is aimed at the general public, due to the language used, in addition to the creation of local plans as well as regional, thus evidencing a shift from a managerialist organisational regime, to one which enables more local discretion.39 The websites for each of the PCCs contain information for the public, but Sue Mountstevens’ is updated more regularly, and still provides access to previous iterations of the Police and Crime Plans, while Alun Michael’s previous plans have been removed from his website.40 The presentation of performance targets within the PCCs’ Police and Crime Plans also demonstrates the intended audience of the plan: Sue Mountstevens provides tables of quantifiable outcomes to achieve by 2017: for example, being in the top 10 of England and Wales forces for detection rates for serious sexual offences, police detected burglary, and for victim satisfaction with the police, as well as increasing victim satisfaction of anti-social behaviour by 86.7%. Such specific targets provide the public with clear information, with which the Commissioner can be held to account.41 In contrast, Alun Michael’s Police and Crime Reduction plan does not provide specific desired outcomes. Instead, including graphical data of recorded crime rates, sanction detection rates and victim satisfaction rates, and

37 This criticism of supposed ‘bottom-up’ participation has been acknowledged by many authors, writing on public participation on democracy. For examples, see John Clayton Thomas; Tina Nabatchi and Matt Leighninger.
38 I. Loader, Fall of the ‘platonic guardians’, British Journal of Criminology 46(4) 2006
40 Correct as of October 2016
41 Although indicators such as victim satisfaction is a highly complex concept, perhaps better measured qualitatively
states that ‘we must maintain, and where possible build on this performance’. Defining outcomes loosely with a lack of specific targets, for example aiming for a ‘reduction’ or ‘improvement’, but neglecting to state by how much, may indicate informed scepticism about the reality of quantifiable performance targets. However, it also enables the PCC to claim achievement of an outcome. The presentation of such information in this vague and haphazard manner, restricts the opportunity for meaningful public scrutiny, again demonstrating the lack of importance Alun Michael places on this. By shutting out the public in this way, there is potential for the South Wales PCC to create an oligarchy, favouring established interests.

Aside from potentially enhancing the visibility of the PCCs, the opportunities presented by the Avon and Somerset PCC for consultation with the general public and public scrutiny, provide a prospect for agenda setting that is in line with public demands. Interview data with the PCC highlighted her conviction that she set her priorities according to what the public had demanded. However, the frequent updating of the Safer Bristol Crime and Disorder Strategic Assessment in 2012, and the subsequent similarities between the pre-PCC priorities of the partnership and the PCCs inaugural Police and Crime Plan, suggest that the PCC is more dependent on the expertise of other agencies in the policy network, than her interview data implies. Rather, consultation with the public involves providing limited priorities for the public to choose from, narrowed by the information provided by the Partnership.

Both PCCs therefore perform ‘cynical consultation’, in which the public have the opportunity to be consulted, but lack the power to ensure action is taken on their views. In South Wales, Alun Michael engages with established groups who are associated with his pre-defined priority areas, and there is a lack of general public engagement, as well as a lack of engagement with those groups outside of his immediate priority areas. In Avon and Somerset, the public have the opportunity to ‘hear and be heard’, and may believe that they are fully participating, but their options for participation are limited to pre-defined priority areas, and they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded. However, given the ‘ill-informed, punitive’ tendencies of the general public, it would be difficult to

42 n.24 pages 13-14
44 This is a common criticism of policy networks. See Section 3.1
45 S. Arnstein (1969) n.16
perform genuine citizen engagement as a PCC, which is of course problematic for a structure that is supposed to enable participatory democracy.46

These findings demonstrate a contingent difference in how the PCCs utilise their political power. For Alun Michael, his political power is constructed through relationships with professionals within the policy network, which assists with his ability to create a governing coalition around his agenda, thus legitimising his role. For Sue Mountstevens, her political power is constructed through representing the public, demonstrated by her rhetoric of being visible and providing opportunities for public scrutiny of her policy strategy.47 Therefore the post-2011 quadripartite structure of ‘local’ police governance is not adequate to produce relations that necessitate genuine methods of consultation and accountability. The legislation states that PCCs must seek the views of local public on the policing of that area, but the regional positioning of PCCs limits the opportunities to accomplish this. It is therefore the contingencies of PCC’s backgrounds, who they view as the audience for their strategy, and therefore who they view as holding them to account, that impacts public involvement in priority setting, rather than the necessary legislative responsibilities of a PCC.

Despite the divergence of focus that PCCs place on public consultation and provision of mechanisms for accountability, there is convergence of the PCCs’ strategic priorities, with both producing a primarily developmental agenda. As discussed in the previous section, this is argued to be due to both PCCs being dependent on the informational power of other agencies in the policy network. Therefore, expertise of other agencies is prioritised over public opinion, even in Avon and Somerset where there is rhetoric of creating priorities based on public demand. This again limits the extent that the PCCs in this thesis can produce an agenda that is transformative or reformatory. However, it is possible that this finding is an artefact of the fieldwork time period, of the first financial year of PCCs’ term in office: PCCs may develop expertise over time that will reduce their dependence on the informational power of other agencies.

7.4 Budgetary Politics

Budgetary politics refers to the PCCs’ responsibility to set the force budget, including the police precept, and commission community safety projects.48 This final open code is discussed in relation to

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47 It is important to reiterate that Mountstevens does engage with, and consult, expert groups, but this is not what she draws upon when under scrutiny by the Police and Crime Panel, for example.
financial power and the core particular of governance from regime theory of resources to pursue and sustain an agenda. This part of the PCC role was highly criticised prior to the elections, for seemingly allowing an individual with no police or business experience to have responsibility for overseeing multi-million pound budgets of taxpayer money. Therefore, criticisms were levelled at the vague guidance provided within the Act, which provided very little restrictions what these budgets could be used for.\textsuperscript{49} It has been demonstrated in previous chapters that community safety responses in particular have experienced a large reduction in funding in both case study areas, and PCCs must manage this necessary part of their role. However, the way in which they do this is based on contingent relations, leading to divergence between the case study areas.

Alun Michael manages reductions in public expenditure and his financial allocation in several ways. Firstly, his creation of an organisational hierarchy, and thus maintaining a local presence at decision-making boards, enables him to justify decisions directly to those who may have missed out on funding, and potentially involve them in other ways instead, such as within his governing coalition. In addition to this, due to his maintenance of community safety project funding from the pre-PCC era, in part due to his vocal opposition to the introduction of PCCs, there is little disagreement on his allocations from those who have missed out.\textsuperscript{50} Alun Michael also uses his own claims to expertise, pooled with informational power of others, to respond to scrutiny: for example, by referring to the work Cardiff University, Universities Police Science Institute, or the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 when under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{51}

In Avon and Somerset, Sue Mountstevens manages cuts to public expenditure and related potential competition for resources, by implementing a funding formula for the allocation of resources to partnerships, based on recorded crime, levels of deprivation and the population of a particular area. Interview data with both the PCC and the Partnership director demonstrates that this was viewed as a fairer and more transparent way of managing the commissioning of resources, as previously it was assumed that Bristol would always receive most of the funding.\textsuperscript{52} When scrutinised by the Police and Crime Panel, Sue used both the funding formula and the demands of the public to defend her decisions to allocate specific funding.

\textsuperscript{49} ‘What are police and crime commissioners – and have they made a difference?’ This Week. 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2016 Retrieved from \url{http://www.theweek.co.uk/71445/what-are-pccs-and-have-they-made-a-difference} Accessed on: 30\textsuperscript{th} December 2016

\textsuperscript{50} Interview data with Alun Michael, and document analysis of his Police and Crime Reduction plan 2013-17 evidence a dissatisfaction with the way in which PCCs were introduced, particularly the timing of the elections, the lack of national awareness campaigns, and the short period of time PCCs had to produce their inaugural plan.

\textsuperscript{51} See Chapter 5

\textsuperscript{52} The use of a funding formula increased Bristol Partnerships’ receipt of funding by 1\%.
These examples of managing cuts to, and competition over, resources demonstrate the contingent difference between the PCCs. Sue Mountstevens’ funding formula enhances the transparency of resource allocation and allows for public scrutiny. Alun Michael, with a disregard for enabling scrutiny by the general public and an overt opposition to the very role of PCCs as regional governors of policing, maintains previous expenditure, justified by his claims to expertise in this policy field.

Significantly, and in counter-argument to criticisms of PCCs having omnipotent power to finance what they wish, PCCs are not the provider for the majority of funding for community safety specific responses in either case study area. Therefore, they do not alone have the financial resources to pursue and sustain their own agenda, and as such they are dependent on other agencies within the policy network, or their governing coalition, to assist such a pursuit. In South Wales, funding which previously passed from central government to Welsh Government for community safety, now bypasses Welsh Government, and is received by the PCC. Despite this, Welsh Government remains committed to community safety issues, which is a devolved matter, providing £740,353 to Cardiff through the Youth Crime Prevention fund in 2013. This results in the Welsh Government being the majority commissioner of community safety related services in South Wales, as the PCC commissions to Cardiff approximately £148,985 in his first financial year in office, on projects of a similar nature to pre-PCC and allocation of a similar volume. Alun Michael’s sees no point in trying to duplicate the Welsh Government in their role as funders of community safety projects.

In Avon and Somerset, community safety agenda-setting necessitates the involvement of Bristol Council. Bristol Council allocate £9.4m to Safer Bristol, far exceeding the PCC’s £650,000 allocation. Despite Bristol Council being the majority funder of community safety responses, Safer Bristol Partnership align their projects with the PCC’s priorities. This is suggested to be due to both the political power of the new actor, and the substantial reductions to community safety funding in recent years, indicating a dependence on her financial power.

The findings from both case studies demonstrate the limited financial impact of the new governance of policing structure on funding community safety responses: the PCCs are not the majority providers of community safety funding, due to necessary relations in both case study areas. Due to this, related to regime analysis, the PCCs lack the resources to pursue or sustain their agenda, or to make it the dominant agenda.

7.5 Summary of Discussion

Rhodes argues that resources of power are used for negotiation between agencies, and such agencies deploy specific resources to avoid dependence on others within the policy network. However, this
thesis has identified limited overt negotiation and evidence of Rhodes’ ‘game’. Rather, agencies within the policy network recognise the benefits of coordinating strategy, consultation and budgets, to reduce overlap of priorities, and therefore dependence on one another is necessary to facilitate this: a path to action is negotiated around the power of agencies, rather than under the power of agencies. Such coordination is primarily possible due to ideological similarities between all those within the policy network: there is little need of negotiation to push own priorities, as they are largely similar to the other agencies, and to the pre-PCC era. Rather than PCCs using their political, informational, constitutional-legal, hierarchical and financial resources of power to negotiate their own agenda, they are instead used to justify their decisions to others when under scrutiny, and provide legitimacy for those decisions. This thesis has built and adapted Rhodes’ framework to specifically include participatory democratic political power, rather than only representative democratic political power. It has been demonstrated that PCCs have political power which is constructed from engaging with participatory democratic process: specifically the consultation with the general public and offering opportunities to be held to account outside of representative democratic process. This has been evidenced in Avon and Somerset, where the PCC uses this political power to legitimise the her responsibility to make decisions, which is significant given the low turnout for the 2012 PCC elections, as well as to justify her decisions and actions while under scrutiny from, for example, the Police and Crime Panel.

The application of Rhodes’ theories of power-dependence resources allows for the identification of how decisions are made, while the consideration of regime theory provides a conceptualisation of the type of agenda that is produced through such interactions, and whether it is sustainable through a governing coalition and/or financial resources. This chapter has demonstrated that both PCCs employ a largely developmental agenda, which continues the priorities of the community safety partnerships prior to their election to post. This is unsurprising, given the PCCs’ dependence on the expertise of others, and provides an explanation for the lack of transformative policies within their agendas. The agency of the individual PCC, in other words their background and expertise, has been demonstrated to impact the ability to form a governing coalition. However, as discussed above, the success of the governing coalition around Alun Michael’s agenda, is unknown due to the adaptive nature of this thesis and the time period of fieldwork.

Importantly, it has been demonstrated that PCCs themselves lack the resources to pursue and sustain their own agenda. Coupled with difficulties in creating governing coalitions (particularly in Avon and

53 See Section 3.1
54 See Section 6.3.4
55 See Section 4.6
Somerset), this results in PCCs being constrained by the necessary financial structure of community safety agenda-setting, where they are not majority funders of community safety, and are therefore unable to compete with other actors community safety responsibilities. Their agenda is one of many, and the least resourced. In terms of local community safety policy setting, PCCs do not represent a ‘monocratic’ form of governance.\(^\text{56}\)

The asymmetry of the wider architecture of community safety also limits the ability of PCCs to create a governing coalition. Given the existence of multiple actors, at local, regional and sub-national levels, with differing constitutional-legal powers, geographical reach and electoral mandates, and vague stipulations of the 2011 Act to ‘have regard’ to other relevant authorities, it is therefore unsurprising that the arrival of the PCC did not lead to a unifying policy presence, and introduce a figure with the capacity for leading an explicitly defined coalition. Rather, the pre-existing ad-hoc relationships continue, albeit one that in South Wales – due to common ideological background – can be demonstrated as constructive rather than conflictual.

Returning then to the initial premise of the role of PCCs – introduced to improve the democratic accountability of local police governance – the findings of this thesis suggest that the policy reform has failed to achieve its aim. While it can be argued that PCCs are more visible than the previous Police Authorities, and in some force areas provide more opportunities to be held to account, they are not being held to account for their own agendas, nor for the funding of community safety responses, because the post-2011 structure restricts their agency to set their own agenda, and resource it. In the case study sites investigated for this thesis, the introduction of PCCs, alters but does ‘not fundamentally transform’ city-level community safety agenda.\(^\text{57}\)


\(^{57}\) D. Gilling et al (2013) n.8 page 10
8. Implications and Future Research

This chapter summarises the key findings of this thesis in relation to the research questions, before considering the implications of these findings, and potential issues for future research. In particular, this chapter discusses these conclusions in relation to contemporary research on police governance and community safety, which goes beyond the empirical data in this thesis, both geographically (beyond the case study sites) and temporally (after the fieldwork period had ended).

This thesis has investigated the impact of the police governance reform of PCCs on the setting of the community safety agenda in two case study sites. The following research questions have been answered in the three previous findings chapters:

1. How does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, impact city-level community safety policy?
   I. To what extent does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners to the community safety agenda setting process impact the public participation in that process?
   II. To what extent does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners alter the process of funding community safety?
   III. To what extent does the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners impact the types of responses to issues of crime and disorder within a community safety agenda?

2. How is agenda setting shaped by power-dependence relationships and to what extent are resources of power negotiated and used to influence decisions?

3. How does Welsh Government seek to influence community safety agenda setting in Wales? To what extent does it succeed? What factors enable and limit that influence?

To briefly reiterate the key findings, which provide answers to these questions, the impact of PCCs on city-level community safety agenda setting during their first financial year in office, is limited due to the necessary relations produced by the post-2011 structure. The PCCs do not convincingly involve the public in agenda setting, despite the attempts made in Avon and Somerset. The introduction of PCCs does alter the funding process for community safety activities, particularly in South Wales, but the PCCs lack financial resources to pursue their own agenda, relative to other agencies within the policy network.
Resources of power-dependence relationships have been identified as being used for justification, or assistance with creation of, community safety priorities. However, even when using their agency to create a transparent funding formula, or set the agenda with platonic guardians, PCCs are fundamentally constrained by the constitutional-legal power of all the other relevant agencies to create and fund a community safety agenda. Therefore the necessary post-2011 structure results in PCCs accommodating established interests in setting the agenda. As Stone argues, ‘under the constraints of bounded rationality, human beings are focused on what is immediate’. Thus, it is logical that PCCs would focus on the established, commonplace issues.

Consequently, PCCs find themselves in a context where the scope for priorities is already narrowed, so entrenched are issues of anti-social behaviour, substance misuse and violence, on the community safety agenda, and the responses deemed appropriate to tackle them. There is a continuity, despite the significant reform, which reflects a ‘hegemonic consensus’ about the problem of crime. The findings of this thesis therefore suggest that if a PCC had radical or transformative tendencies, to use the term of regime analysis, these would be constrained by the necessary relations of the post-2011 structure of community safety agenda setting. To take a classic example, a PCC wishing to respond to substance misuse through a social justice approach rather than a criminal justice approach, is either unlikely to be able to do so because they are reliant on the expertise of others, or unlikely to make much impact due to their minimal funding for such a project. Therefore, the acknowledgement of the temporal constraint of this thesis – the first financial year in which PCCs had little time to create an inaugural Police and Crime Plan, or develop expertise on specific topics – may not have limited the findings of the thesis, due to this recognition of a ‘hegemonic consensus’ about crime.

Comparable actors at the regional level in other localities with the responsibility for setting the strategic direction of policing, seem to have had greater impact on the agenda, than the PCCs in this thesis. For example, in London, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) has been identified as the dominant actor, with the ability to have greater influence over the regional policing strategy. The resources (financial, political, hierarchical and constitutional-legal) of MOPAC, in comparison to other relevant agencies, are suggested here to be the reasons for this. The London Mayor has far more financial resources at its disposal than a PCC; the office of the Mayor has more political power due to

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2 P. Hillyard et al. ‘Leaving a ‘stain upon the silence’: contemporary criminology and the politics of dissent’ British Journal of Criminology (2004) Vol 44(3)
a higher public turnout at the ballot box, and is a more publicly identifiable actor; the Mayor delegates responsibilities to a specific Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime; and, perhaps most importantly, the Mayor has statutory obligations outside of policing and crime, that can lead to an agenda with transformative tendencies.\textsuperscript{4} The context of London, that necessitates the responding to, and policing of, major events such as the 7/7 bombings, the Olympics and the 2011 riots, suggests a divergence from the types of problems of crime and disorder experienced by Cardiff and Bristol. MOPAC is better able to produce a transformative agenda due to both the context of London, and the resources at its disposal. Therefore the structure for MOPAC enables this transformative potential, unlike the structure for PCCs.

However, MOPAC has been criticised for imposing a centralised agenda, which ignores the diverse range of issues that specific boroughs in London experience.\textsuperscript{5} In contrast, the PCCs in this thesis demonstrate divergence in the prioritising of contextual issues, particularly Sue Mountstevens through her formation of the district levels plans. This contrast raises questions about the processes of convergence and divergence of priorities associated with the local governance of policing: given that PCCs and MOPAC are comparably located actors, at the regional level, what leads one to create a centralised agenda, and the other to respond to diverse local need?

This question has further implications when considering the imminent introduction of other comparable actors to regional police governance: for example, in the large metropolitan force of Greater Manchester, a Mayor will be elected in 2017 who will assume the responsibilities held by the PCC, thus following a similar structure to London. The implications of this dual role outside of the Capital and in a core city of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ necessitates future research: will the success of MOPAC in setting and pursuing a radical, centralised, regime be echoed in Manchester, and is this desirable? A similar actor is planned for the city-region of Birmingham, which creates potential for other ‘core-cities’ and their regions, such as Newcastle, Glasgow, Manchester, as well as Cardiff and Bristol, to follow suit.\textsuperscript{6} The diverse nature of these regions, marked by cities that are economically the largest outside of London, and are generally surrounded by rural and suburban areas, has the potential to result in divergent priorities for tackling crime and disorder. However, an actor for police governance in this context will suffer competing pressures to prioritise issues that preoccupy the electorate, such as anti-social behaviour, in addition to inter-regional problems, such as the

\textsuperscript{4} A. Edwards et al (2017) p.223 Edwards et al identify a significant shift in London from a developmental to a transformative policing agenda following the election of the Khan/Linden administration.

\textsuperscript{5} The Johnson/Greenhalgh administration of MOPAC prompted criticisms over the decision to set city-wide priorities, neglecting the potential for specific problems arising in different boroughs of London. A. Edwards and R. Prins (2014) Pages 81-82

\textsuperscript{6} www.corecities.com
displacement of drug-crime from one area to another, as well as national issues including the threat of terrorism, which has a disproportionate impact on large urban metropolises. The processes of governance involved in the management of this range of issues requires questioning empirically.

The type of agenda that is set by such new actors also requires clarification. The PCCs in this thesis set primarily developmental agendas, which is unsurprising given the reliance on information from others within the policy network. Developmental regimes emerged from the ‘increasing recognition amongst municipal authorities of their ability to formulate their own policing agendas through the use of the administrative laws and sanctions under their control.’ Therefore, while agencies such as Councils and Community Safety Partnerships cannot set agendas for policing, which tend to be criminal justice focused, they can develop those agendas through the use of administrative sanctions. In doing so, these agencies can respond to problems in ways that are effective and efficient for them (particularly important in the era of austerity), and concentrate on ‘those cohorts of the population who are most dependent on public services and least able to ‘immunise’ themselves through access to private security.’

Given this imminent ‘perfect storm’ it might be expected that the new actor of police governance in Manchester, and the potential actors in the other core city regions, will also create developmental agendas. This raises another question of how MOPAC was able to move on from a developmental to a transformative regime tendency. Both these issues require empirical clarification.

Lastly, this thesis has focused on convergence and divergence in policy talk and decision-making in a context renowned for its insulation from political influences, that of police governance. This is a key analytical concern in studies of governance and policy networks. Future research is needed within this context on policy in action - that is the outcomes of policy, and the prevalence of convergence and divergence in the execution of such policy, and the identification of potential implementation gaps. This is the next stage in research conducted by the Policing European Metropolises Project, which has so far concentrated on identifying convergence and divergence in policing policy in European city-regions, the second stage to which, data from this thesis has contributed.

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7 A. Edwards et al (2017) n.3 page 317
8 Ibid
**Epilogue**

In the run up to the 2015 general election, the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties all included PCCs in their manifestos. While the Conservatives stated that they wanted to ‘develop the role’, the other two major parties proposed their abolition, with the Liberal Democrats replacing them with ‘Police Boards’ composed of local councillors – arguably a return to the structure of Police Authorities.\(^{10}\) Labour’s call for abolition was supported by the Stevens Report, which proposed several new structures for police governance.\(^{11}\) To the surprise of pollsters, the 2015 general election was won by the Conservative Party, who made no haste to alter the quadripartite structure.

In 2016, a busy year for elections, the public went to the ballot box to vote in the second election of Police and Crime Commissioners in May. Turnout was higher than in 2012, with an average of 26% rather than 15%.\(^{12}\) However, rather than suggesting public approval or awareness of the role, the rise in turnout is more likely to be due to local elections for councils and the Welsh Assembly occurring on the same day, with Wales having the highest force area turnout in Dyfed Powys of nearly 50%. Other elections happening on the same day may have led to party conflation, explaining the few independent candidates that were elected in 2012, in comparison to 2016: 12 to 3.

Both Alun Michael and Sue Mountstevens stood for re-election, and were successfully re-elected into office. Their manifestos held little surprises, with Sue Mountstevens declaring herself the voice of the public, and ‘protecting the police from political interference’, and Alun Michael advocating the partnership approach in South Wales.\(^{13}\) Their re-election may suggest public support for their actions over the previous 4 years. The Home Affairs Select Committee have inquired into the ‘Progress of Police and Crime Commissioners’ since 2010. Their most recent publication on PCCs was largely positive about the police governance reform, confirming that the Government is committed to continuing to develop the role and that PCCs ‘have clear local accountability and a strong incentive to pursue ambitious reform to improve local services and deliver value for money in the interests of local

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\(^{13}\) www.choosemypcc.org.uk
Despite the findings of this thesis, I cannot argue otherwise: the Home Affairs Select Committee has based such a finding on generalisable evidence. However, the findings of this thesis do support the 2016 Wales Audit Office Report into Community Safety in Wales, findings that if local accountability does exist, PCCs are not being held to account for their own agendas.\textsuperscript{15}

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Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form

The research is being conducted by Sophie Chambers (a PhD student at Cardiff University). The project is a case study of two areas in England and Wales, following the election of Police and Crime Commissioners. The aim of the project is to identify how Police and Crime Commissioners set local community safety agenda, and how this differs from previous processes.

The project adheres to the Data Protection Act 1998. However, participants in the study will not be given anonymity. Following an interview, a transcript of the interview will be sent to the participant for approval for use in the thesis, or corrections to be made.

Consent:

I confirm that I have read and understood the information for the study
I agree to take part in the study
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from the study at any time
I agree to an interview being recorded by electronic device
I understand that the data will not be given anonymity
Upon approval, I agree to the data being used in the thesis and any subsequent publications within a reasonable period of time

I have read the conditions of consent and upon the basis of assurances presented to me, I agree to all of the above:

Print Name (Participant)                  Signature                  Date

Print Name (Researcher)                  Signature                  Date
Appendix 2: List of Observations and Interviews undertaken in both Case Study Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting Observed and Interviews Conducted in Avon and Somerset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th April 2013</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner Public forum, Frome (consultation with the public)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st May 2013</td>
<td>Interview 1, Sue Mountstevens, Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th June 2013</td>
<td>Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th June 2013</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner Public Forum, Bristol (consultation with the public)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th October 2013</td>
<td>Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th December 2013</td>
<td>Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th December 2013</td>
<td>Interview, Nick Gargan, Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th December 2013</td>
<td>Bristol Council Community Cohesion and Safety Scrutiny Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th January 2014</td>
<td>Interview, Gillian Douglas, Director of Safer Bristol Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th February 2014</td>
<td>Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st March 2014</td>
<td>Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd May 2014</td>
<td>Interview 2, Sue Mountstevens, Avon and Somerset Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the fieldwork period (financial year 2013-14) all Police and Crime Panel meetings in Avon and Somerset were observed. One Bristol Council Scrutiny Board meeting was observed, due to community safety issues being on the agenda for that meeting. Two Public Forums were observed: the first in Frome was observed due to it being the first forum and wanting to gauge how it operated; the second in Bristol was observed due to it being the comparative case study area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meetings Observed and Interviews Conducted in South Wales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th March 2013</td>
<td>Interview 1, Alun Michael, South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner, and Sophie Howe, Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th April 2013</td>
<td>Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st May 2013</td>
<td>Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th June 2013</td>
<td>Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd October 2013</td>
<td>Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st October 2013</td>
<td>Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th November 2013</td>
<td>Interview, Geoff Petty, Finance Office, South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th January 2014</td>
<td>Interview, Barbara Ranger, Head of Justice and Partnerships, and Superintendent Liane Bartlett, Deputy Head of Justice and Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th January 2014</td>
<td>Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th March 2014</td>
<td>Police and Crime Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th April 2014</td>
<td>Interview 2, Alun Michael, Police and Crime Commissioner for South Wales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the fieldwork period (financial year 2013-14) all Police and Crime Panel meetings in South Wales were observed. Two Community and Adult Service Scrutiny Committees were observed, due to community safety issues being on the agenda for that meeting.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Criminological Conceptualisation</th>
<th>South Wales PCC priority areas 2013-17</th>
<th>Welsh Government 2011-2016 ‘Programme for Change’ priorities</th>
<th>Cardiff Partnership Board workstreams 2013-14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance: maintains previous status quo of established regime</td>
<td>Criminal justice: public safety policies which augment criminal law enforcement and public order</td>
<td>Strong swift approach to anti-social behaviour, using Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (punitive approach to known offenders)</td>
<td>Reduce youth offending/early interventions with 18-25 age group (risk management approach with known offenders, or those at risk of offending)</td>
<td>Reduce 1st time entrants to youth justice system (divert youths from progressing to more serious crime – known offenders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental: work with and augment established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas</td>
<td>Risk management: maintaining criminal justice tendencies, with the addition of risk management priorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive/Reformist: Reform policy agendas and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Restorative justice: diversion from custody and non-state conflict resolution</td>
<td>Diver t18-25 age group from criminal justice system (Work with local authorities, prisons, probation and children’s commissioner for Wales to break cycle of crime and reoffending)</td>
<td>Reduction and prevention of young offending (continue funding to CSP’s for projects related to education, training, leisure, arts, sports, restorative justice and initiatives to combat substance misuse)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative: alter the context of major public policy problems, and advance alternative core objectives</td>
<td>Social justice: socially inclusive priorities, based on social justice model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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